QUESTION IX
THE DIVINE PERSONS

  1. Et primo quaeritur utrum quomodo se habeat persona ad essentiam, subsistentiam et hypostasim.
  2. Secundo quid sit persona.
  3. Tertio utrum in Deo possit esse persona.
  4. Quarto utrum hoc nomen persona in divinis significet aliquid relativum vel absolutum.
  5. Quinto utrum numerus personarum sit in divinis.
  6. Sexto utrum nomen personae convenienter possit pluraliter praedicari in divinis.
  7. Septimo quomodo termini numerales praedicentur in divinis, utrum scilicet positive, vel remotive tantum.
  8. Octavo utrum in Deo sit aliqua diversitas.
  9. Nono utrum in divinis sint tres personae tantum, an plures vel pauciores.
  1. The Persons as Compared to the Essence, Subsistence and Hypostasis
  2. What Is Meant by a Person?
  3. Can There Be a Person in God?
  4. In God Does the Term ‘Person’ Signify Something Relative or Something Absolute?
  5. Are There Several Persons in God?
  6. In Speaking of God Can the Word ‘Person’ Be Rightly Predicated in the Plural?
  7. Are Numeral Terms Predicated of the Divine Persons?
  8. Is There Any Diversity in God?
  9. Are There Only Three Persons in God: or Are There More or Fewer than Three?

Q. IX:
ARTICLE I
The Persons As Compared to the Essence, Subsistence and Hypostasis


[Sum. Th. I, Q. xxix, A. 2]
Et primo quaeritur quomodo se habeat persona ad essentiam, subsistentiam et hypostasim. Et videtur quod omnino sint idem. WE are inquiring about the divine Persons, and the first point of inquiry is about the Persons in comparison with the essence, subsistence and hypostasis: and it would seem that they are absolutely the same.
Dicit enim Augustinus in VII de Trin., quod idem intelligunt Graeci cum confitentur in Deo tres hypostases, et Latini cum confitentur tres personas. Ergo hypostasis et persona significant idem. 1. Augustine (De Trin. vii, 3) says that the Greeks mean the same when they acknowledge three hypostases in God, as the Latins when they acknowledge three Persons. Wherefore hypostasis and Person signify the same.
Sed dicendum, quod persona differt ab hypostasi in hoc quod hypostasis significat individuum cuiuscumque naturae in genere substantiae, persona vero solum individuum rationalis naturae. —Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, quod Graeci utuntur hoc nomine hypostasis solum pro individuo rationalis naturae. Si ergo persona significat individuum rationalis naturae, omnino sunt idem hypostasis et persona. 2. But it will be replied that the person differs from the hypostasis in that the latter signifies an individual of any nature in the genus of substance, whereas a person denotes an individual of none but a rational nature. —On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that the Greeks employ the term hypostasis to denote only an individual of rational nature. If, then, person signifies an individual of rational nature, hypostasis and person are absolutely the same.
Praeterea, nomina imponuntur a rationibus rerum quas significant. Sed eadem ratio individuationis est in his quae sunt rationalis naturae, et in aliis substantiis. Ergo individuum rationalis naturae non debet habere speciale nomen prae aliis individuis in genere substantiae, ut per hoc sit differentia inter hypostasim et personam. 3. Names are taken from our idea of the things they signify. Now individuality conveys the same idea in things of a rational nature as in other substances. Therefore an individual of rational nature should not have a special name rather than other individuals in the genus of substance, as though there were a difference between hypostasis and person.
Praeterea, nomen subsistentiae a subsistendo sumitur. Nihil autem subsistit nisi individua in genere substantiae, in quibus sunt et accidentia et secundae substantiae, quae sunt genera et species, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Sola ergo individua in genere substantiae sunt subsistentiae. Individuum autem in genere substantiae est hypostasis vel persona. Ergo idem est subsistentia quod hypostasis et persona. 4. Subsistence is taken from subsisting. Now nothing subsists besides individuals in the genus of substance, in which are accidents and second substances, namely genus and species (Praedic.). Therefore only individuals in the genus of substance are subsistences. But an individual in the genus of substance is a hypostasis or person. Therefore subsistence is the same as hypostasis and person.
Sed dicendum, quod genera et species in genere substantiae subsistunt, eo quod eorum est subsistere, ut Boetius dicit, in Lib. de duabus naturis. —Sed contra, subsistere nihil aliud est quam per se existere. Quod ergo existit solum in alio, non subsistit. Sed genera et species sunt solum in alio: sunt enim solum in primis substantiis, quibus interemptis, impossibile est aliquid aliorum remanere, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Non est ergo subsistere, generum et specierum, sed solum individuorum in genere substantiae; et sic remanet quod subsistentia sit idem quod hypostasis. 5. It will be replied that genera and species in the genus of substance subsist, since to subsist belongs to them according to Boethius (loc. cit.). —On the contrary, to subsist is to exist by oneself. Hence what exists only in another does not subsist. Now genera and species are only in something else: for they are only in ‘first substances,’ and if these latter be removed, nothing of the former can possibly remain (Praedic. Substantia). Hence to subsist does not belong to genera and species, but only to individuals in the genus of substance: so that we must still conclude that subsistence is the same as hypostasis.
Praeterea, Boetius dicit, quod ousia id est essentia, significat compositum ex materia et forma. Hoc autem oportet esse individuum: nam materia est individuationis principium. Ergo essentia significat individuum; et sic idem est persona, hypostasis, essentia, et subsistentia. 6. Boethius, (Comment. Praedic.) says that ουσια, i.e. essence, signifies that which is composed of matter and form. Now this must be an individual, since matter is the principle of individuation. Therefore the essence signifies the individual, and thus person, hypostasis, essence and subsistence are the same.
Praeterea, essentia est quam significat definitio, cum per definitionem sciatur quid est res. Definitio autem rei naturalis, quae est ex materia et forma composita, non solum continet formam, sed etiam materiam, ut patet per philosophum. Ergo essentia est aliquid compositum ex materia et forma. 7. The essence is signified by the definition, since a definition tells us what a thing is. Now the definition of a natural thing that is composed of matter and form, includes not only the form but also the matter, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi). Therefore the essence is something composed of matter and form.
Sed dicendum, quod essentia significat naturam communem, alia vero tria, scilicet subsistentia, hypostasis et persona, significant individuum in genere substantiae.- Sed contra universale et particulare inveniuntur in quolibet genere. In aliis autem generibus non distinguitur nomen particularis et universalis: eodem enim nomine nominatur qualitas aut quantitas, sive sit universalis sive sit particularis. Ergo nec in genere substantiae debent esse distincta nomina ad significandum substantiam universalem et particularem: et sic videtur quod praedicta nomina non differant. 8. It will be replied that the essence denotes the common nature, while the other three, namely subsistence, hypostasis and person, signify an individual in the genus of substance. On the contrary, universal and particular are to be found in every genus. Now in other genera there are not different names for the particular and the universal; thus quality and quantity are denominated in the same way whether ‘in general or in particular. Neither therefore in the genus of substance should there be different names to denote a universal and a particular substance: wherefore one would think that these terms have the same signification.
Sed contra. Est quod Boetius dicit in commento praedicamentorum quod ousia id est essentia, significat compositum ex materia et forma; ousiosis id est subsistentia, significat formam; hypostasis vero materiam. Ergo praedicta differunt. On the contrary, Boethius says (Comment. Praed.) that ουσια, i.e. essence, signifies that which is composed of matter and form; that ουσιωσις, i.e. subsistence, signifies the form, and hypostasis the matter. Therefore they differ.
Praeterea, idem videtur ex hoc quod idem auctor assignat praedictorum nominum differentiam in Lib. de duobus naturis. Moreover the same conclusion would seem to follow from the fact that the same author (De Duab. Nat.) explains the difference between these terms.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod philosophus ponit substantiam dupliciter dici: dicitur enim uno modo substantia ipsum subiectum ultimum, quod non praedicatur de alio: et hoc est particulare in genere substantiae; alio modo dicitur substantia forma vel natura subiecti. Huius autem distinctionis ratio est, quia inveniuntur plura subiecta in una natura convenire, sicut plures homines in una natura hominis. Unde oportuit distingui quod est unum, ab eo quod multiplicatur: natura enim communis est quam significat definitio indicans quid est res; unde ipsa natura communis, essentia vel quidditas dicitur. Quidquid ergo est in re ad naturam communem pertinens, sub significatione essentiae continetur, non autem quidquid est in substantia particulari, est huiusmodi. Si enim quidquid est in substantia particulari ad naturam communem pertineret, non posset esse distinctio inter substantias particulares eiusdem naturae. Hoc autem quod est in substantia particulari praeter naturam communem, est materia individualis quae est singularitatis principium, et per consequens accidentia individualia quae materiam praedictam determinant. Comparatur ergo essentia ad substantiam particularem ut pars formalis ipsius, ut humanitas ad Socratem. Et ideo in rebus, ex materia et forma compositis, essentia non est omnino idem quod subiectum; unde non praedicatur de subiecto: non enim dicitur quod Socrates sit una humanitas. In substantiis vero simplicibus, nulla est differentia essentiae et subiecti, cum non sit in eis materia individualis naturam communem individuans, sed ipsa essentia in eis est subsistentia. Et hoc patet per philosophum et per Avicennam, qui dicit, in sua metaphysica, quod quidditas simplicis est ipsum simplex. Substantia vero quae est subiectum, duo habet propria: quorum primum est quod non indiget extrinseco fundamento in quo sustentetur, sed sustentatur in seipso; et ideo dicitur subsistere, quasi per se et non in alio existens. Aliud vero est quod est fundamentum accidentibus substentans ipsa; et pro tanto dicitur substare. Sic ergo substantia quae est subiectum, in quantum subsistit, dicitur ousiosis vel subsistentia; in quantum vero substat, dicitur hypostasis secundum Graecos, vel substantia prima secundum Latinos. Patet ergo quod hypostasis et substantia differunt ratione, sed sunt idem re. Essentia vero in substantiis quidem materialibus non est idem cum eis secundum rem, neque penitus diversum, cum se habeat ut pars formalis; in substantiis vero immaterialibus est omnino idem secundum rem, sed differens ratione. Persona vero addit supra hypostasim determinatam naturam: nihil enim est aliud quam hypostasis rationalis naturae. I answer that the Philosopher (Metaph. v) says that substance may be taken in two ways. In one sense it is the ultimate subject which is not predicated of another: and this is the individual in the genus of substance: while in another sense it is the form or nature of a subject. The reason for this distinction is that several subjects may have a common nature; thus several men have in common the nature of man. Hence the need of distinguishing that which is one from that which is multiple: for the common nature is signified by the definition which indicates what a thing is: so that this common nature is called the essence or quiddity. Wherefore whatsoever a thing contains pertaining to the common nature is included in the signification of the essence, whereas this cannot be said of all that is contained in the individual substance. For if whatsoever is in the individual substance were to belong to the common nature, there would be no possible distinction between individual substances of the same nature. Now that which is in the individual substance besides the common nature is individual matter (which is the principle of individuation) and consequently individual accidents which determine this same matter. Accordingly the essence is compared to the individual substance as a formal part thereof, for instance, human nature in Socrates. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the essence is not quite the same as the subject, and consequently it is not predicated of the subject: for we do not say that Socrates is his human nature. On the other hand in simple substances there is no difference between essence and subject, seeing that in them there is no individual matter to individualise the common nature, but their very essence is a subsistence. This is clear from what the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii), and from Avicenna, who says (Metaph.) that a simple thing is its own quiddity. Now two things are proper to the substance which is a subject. The first is that it needs no external support but is supported by itself: wherefore it is said to subsist, as existing not in another but in itself. The second is that it is the foundation to accidents by sustaining them, and for this reason it is said to substand. Accordingly substance which is a subject, inasmuch as it subsists, is called ουσιωσις or subsistence, but inasmuch as it substands it is called hypostasis by the Greeks, and ‘first substance’ by the Latins. It is clear then that hypostasis and substance differ logically but are one in reality. Essence, however, in material substances is not the same as they really, nor yet is it altogether diverse since it is by way of a formal part: but in immaterial substances it is altogether the same in reality while differing logically. Person adds a definite nature to the hypostasis, since it is nothing more than a hypostasis of rational nature.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, ex quo persona non addit supra hypostasim nisi rationalem naturam, oportet quod hypostasis et persona in rationali natura sint penitus idem; sicut cum homo addat supra animal, rationale, oportet quod animal rationale sit homo; et ideo verum est quod Augustinus dicit, quod idem significant Graeci cum confitentur in Deo tres hypostases, et Latini cum confitentur tres personas. Reply to the First Objection. Inasmuch as person adds nothing but the rational nature to the hypostasis, it follows that hypostasis and person are absolutely the same in rational nature; thus seeing that man adds rational to animal, it follows that a rational animal is a man. Hence Augustine’s statement is true when he says (De Trin. vii, 4) that Greeks mean the same when they acknowledge three hypostases in God, as the Latins when they acknowledge three Persons.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc nomen hypostasis, in Graeco ex proprietate significationis habet quod significet individuam substantiam cuiuscumque naturae; sed ex usu loquentium habet quod significet individuum rationalis naturae tantum. Reply to the. Second Objection. The word hypostasis in Greek in its proper signification denotes an individual substance of any nature, but through use it has come to, mean only an individual of rational nature.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut substantia individua proprium habet quod per se existat, ita proprium habet quod per se agat: nihil enim agit nisi ens actu; et propter hoc calor sicut non per se est, ita non per se agit; sed calidum per calorem calefacit. Hoc autem quod est per se agere, excellentiori modo convenit substantiis rationalis naturae quam aliis. Nam solae substantiae rationales habent dominium sui actus, ita quod in eis est agere et non agere; aliae vero substantiae magis aguntur quam agant. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut substantia individua rationalis naturae, speciale nomen haberet. Reply to the Third Objection. just as it is proper to an individual substance to exist by itself, so is it proper to it to act by itself. For nothing acts but an actual being: for which reason as heat exists not by itself so neither does it act by itself, but the hot thing heats by its heat. Now to act by themselves is becoming in a higher degree to substances of a rational nature than to others: since rational substances alone have dominion over their actions, so that it is in them to act or not to act, while other substances are acted on rather than act themselves. Hence it was fitting that the individual substance of rational nature should have a special name.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis nihil subsistat nisi individua substantia, quae hypostasis dicitur, tamen non eadem ratione dicitur subsistere et substare: sed subsistere in quantum non est in alio; substare vero in quantum alia insunt ei. Unde si aliqua substantia esset quae per se existeret, non tamen esset alicuius accidentis subiectum, posset proprie dici subsistentia, sed non substantia. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Although nothing subsists but the individual substance which is called a hypostasis, it is not said to subsist for the same reason as it is said to substand: it is said to subsist as not existing in another, and to substand inasmuch as other things are in it. Hence if there were a substance that exists by itself without being the subject of an accident, it could be called a subsistence but not a substance.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod Boetius loquitur secundum opinionem Platonis, qui posuit genera et species esse quasdam formas separatas subsistentes, ab accidentibus denudatas; et secundum hoc poterant dici subsistentiae, sed non hypostases. Vel dicendum, quod subsistere attribuitur generibus et speciebus, non quia subsistant, sed quia individua in eorum naturis subsistunt, etiam omnibus accidentibus remotis. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Boethius expresses himself according to the opinion of Plato, who held genera and species to be separate subsistent forms devoid of accidents; and in this view they could be called subsistences but not hypostases. Or we may reply that genera and species are said to subsist, not because they themselves subsist, but because in their natures individuals subsist, apart from all accidents.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod essentia in substantiis materialibus significat compositum ex materia et forma, non tamen ex materia individuali, sed ex materia communi: definitio enim hominis quae significat eius essentiam, continet quidem carnes et ossa, sed non has carnes vel haec ossa. Sed materia individualis comprehenditur in significatione hypostasis et subsistentiae in rebus materialibus. Reply to the Sixth Objection. In material substances essence denotes something composed of matter and form; not indeed of individual but of common matter: thus the definition of man which signifies his essence, includes flesh and bones but not this flesh and these bones. On the other hand individual matter is included in the meaning of hypostasis and subsistence in material things.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad septimum. This suffices for the Reply to the Seventh Objection.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod accidentia non individuantur nisi ex suis subiectis. Sola autem substantia per seipsam individuatur, et per propria principia; et ideo convenienter in solo genere substantiae particulare habet proprium nomen. Reply to the Eighth Objection. Accidents are not individualised save by their subjects. Substance alone is individualised by itself and its proper principles; hence it is fitting that only in the genus of substance should the particular have a special name.
Rationes quae sunt in oppositum, concedimus; tamen sciendum, quod Boetius aliter accipit ista nomina in commento praedicamentorum, quam sit communis usus eorum, prout exponit ea in Lib. de duabus naturis. Attribuit enim nomen hypostasis materiae quasi primo principio substandi, ex qua habet substantia prima quod substet accidenti: nam forma simplex subiectum esse non potest, ut dicit idem Boetius in Lib. de Trinit. Nomen autem ousiosis vel subsistentiae attribuit formae quasi essendi principio, per ipsam enim est res in actu; nomen autem ousia vel essentiae attribuit composito. Unde ostendit quod in substantiis materialibus tam forma quam materia sunt essentialia principia. The arguments advanced in a contrary sense may be granted. But it must be noted that Boethius in his commentary on the Categories takes these terms in a different sense from that in which they are usually employed and as he uses them in his work De Duabus Naturis. Thus he applies% the term hypostasis to matter as the first substanding principle, whereby the ‘ first substance ‘ is enabled to underlie accidents: since a simple form cannot be a subject, as he also says (De Trin.). Again he applies the term ουσιωσις to the form as the principle of being: because by it is a thing actual: while he employs ουσια or essence as indicating the composite. Whence he shows that in material substances both form and matter are essential principles.

Q. IX:
ARTICLE II
What is Meant by A Person?


[Sum. Th. I, Q. xxix, AA. 1, 3]
Secundo quaeritur quid sit persona. Videtur quod inconvenienter definiat eam Boetius in Lib. de duabus naturis dicens quod persona est: rationalis naturae individua substantia. THE second point of inquiry is the meaning of the word person. Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) defines it as “an individual substance o rational nature”: and it would seem that this definition is incorrect.
Nullum enim singulare definitur, ut patet per philosophum. Sed persona significat singulare in genere substantiae, ut dictum est. Ergo non potest definiri. 1. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii) no singular thing can be defined. Now a person is an individual in the genus of substance as already stated. Therefore it cannot be defined.
Sed dicendum, quod licet id quod est persona sit quoddam singulare, tamen ratio personae communis est, et pro tanto persona in communi definiri potest. &8212;Sed contra, id quod est commune omnibus substantiis individuis rationalis naturae, est intentio singularitatis, quae quidem non est in genere substantiae. Ergo non debet in definitione personae poni substantia quasi genus. 2. To this it will be replied that although that which is a person is singular, the idea of a person is something common, and this suffices to make it possible to define it. &8212;On the contrary, that which is common to all individual substances of rational nature, is the ‘intention’ of singularity, which is not in the genus of substance. Therefore in the definition of person we should not give substance the place of the genus.
Sed dicendum, quod hoc nomen persona non significat tantum intentionem, sed intentionem simul cum subiecto intentionis. &8212;Sed contra est quod philosophus probat, quod compositum ex subiecto et ex accidente, non potest definiri, &8212;sequeretur enim nugatio in definitione&8212; cum enim in definitione accidentis ponatur subiectum, sicut nasus in definitione simi, oportebit quod in definitione compositi ex subiecto et accidente, ponatur bis subiectum: semel pro se, et semel pro accidente. Si ergo persona significat intentionem et subiectum, inconveniens est quod definiatur. 3. But it will be replied that this word person does not denote a mere intention, but an intention together with its subject. &8212;On the contrary, the Philosopher (Metaph. vii) proves that a compound of subject and accident cannot be defined: because such a definition would be nugatory. For seeing that the definition of an accident includes the subject, e.g. nose in the definition of simous, it will be necessary in defining a compound of subject and accident to express the subject twice; once for itself and once for the accident. If, then, person signifies the intention together with the subject it will be futile to define it.
Praeterea, subiectum huius intentionis communis est aliquod singulare. Si ergo persona significat simul intentionem et subiectum intentionis, adhuc sequeretur quod, definita persona, definiatur singulare; quod est inconveniens. 4. The subject of this common intention is an individual. If then person denotes the intention together with its subject, it will still follow that in defining person the individual will be defined, which cannot be done.
Praeterea, intentio non ponitur in definitione rei, nec accidens in definitione substantiae. Persona autem est nomen rei et substantiae. Inconvenienter igitur in definitione personae ponitur individuum, quod est nomen intentionis et accidentis. 5. An intention is not included in the definition of a thing, nor accident in the definition of a substance. Now person denominates a thing and a substance. Therefore it is unfitting to include individual in the definition of person, since it denotes both an intention and an accident.
Praeterea, illud in cuius definitione ponitur substantia pro genere, oportet quod sit species substantiae. Sed persona non est species substantiae, quia condivideretur contra alias substantiae species. Ergo inconvenienter ponitur substantia in definitione personae quasi genus. 6. A thing in whose definition substance is expressed as the genus must be itself a species of substance. Now person is not a species of substance, for then it would be condivided with other species of substance. Therefore it is unfitting in defining person to express substance as the genus.
Praeterea, substantia dividitur per primam et secundam. Sed substantia secunda non potest poni in definitione personae: esset enim oppositio in adiecto, —cum dicitur substantia individua— nam substantia secunda est substantia universalis. Similiter autem neque substantia prima, nam substantia prima est substantia individua; et sic esset nugatio cum additur individuum supra substantiam in definitione personae. Inconvenienter ergo substantia ponitur in definitione personae. 7. Substance is divided into first and second. Now second substance cannot have a place in the definition of person: since a contradiction of terms would be involved in saying individual substance, inasmuch as ‘second substance’ is a universal substance. Likewise it cannot denote a ‘first substance,’ for a ‘first substance’ is an individual substance, so that it would be futile to add individual to substance in defining person. Therefore it is unfitting to include substance In the definition of person.
Praeterea, nomen subsistentiae propinquius esse videtur personae quam substantia: dicimus enim in Deo tres subsistentias, sicut et tres personas; non autem dicimus tres substantias, sed unam. Magis ergo debuit persona per subsistentiam quam per substantiam definiri. 8. The term subsistence is seemingly more akin than substance to person: thus we say that there are three subsistences in God, as likewise three Persons: whereas we do not say there are three substances, but one. Therefore it were better to define person as a subsistence than as a substance.
Praeterea, quod ponitur in definitione tamquam genus, multiplicato definito multiplicatur, plures enim homines sunt plura animalia. Sed in Deo sunt tres personae, non autem tres substantiae. Ergo substantia non debet poni in definitione personae quasi genus. 9. If you multiply the thing defined you multiply the genus included in the definition: thus many men are many animals. Now there are three persons and not three substances in God. Therefore substance should not be expressed as the genus in the definition of person.
Praeterea, rationale est differentia animalis. Sed persona invenitur in his quae non sunt animalia, scilicet in Angelis et in Deo. Ergo rationale non debuit poni in definitione personae. 10. Rational is a difference of animal. Now person is to be found in things that are not animals, viz. in the angels and in God. Therefore rational should not be expressed as the difference in defining person.
Praeterea, natura est tantum in rebus mobilibus: est enim principium motus, ut dicitur in II Phys. Sed essentia est tam in rebus mobilibus quam in immobilibus. Ergo convenientius fuit in definitione personae ponere essentiam quam naturam, cum etiam persona inveniatur tam in rebus mobilibus quam in immobilibus: est enim in hominibus, in Angelis et in Deo. 11. Nature is only in movable things, since it is the principle of movement (Phys. ii, 1). Now essence is in things both movable and immovable. Therefore it were better in defining person to include essence rather than nature, seeing that person is found to be both in movable and immovable things, since there are persons in men, angels and God.
Praeterea, definitio debet converti cum definito. Non autem omne quod est rationalis naturae individua substantia, est persona. Essentia enim divina, secundum quod est essentia, non est persona, alioquin esset in Deo una persona, sicut est una essentia. Ergo inconvenienter definitur persona definitione praedicta. 12. The definition should be convertible with the thing defined. Now not every individual substance of rational nature is a person. For the divine essence qua essence is not a person, else in God there would be one Person even as there is one essence. Therefore the aforesaid definition of person is unsuitable.
Praeterea, humana natura in Christo est rationalis naturae individua substantia: neque enim est accidens, neque universalis substantia, neque irrationalis naturae; non tamen humana natura in Christo est persona: sequeretur enim quod persona divina quae assumpsit humanam naturam, assumpsisset humanam personam; et sic essent in Christo duae personae, scilicet divina assumens, et humana assumpta; quod est haeresis Nestorianae. Non ergo omnis individua substantia rationalis naturae est persona. 13. Human nature in Christ is an individual substance of rational nature: for it is neither an accident nor a universal substance, nor is it of irrational nature: and yet in Christ it is not a person, since it would follow that the divine Person in assuming human nature assumed a human person. Thus there would be two persons in Christ, the divine Person assuming and the human person assumed, which is the heresy of Nestorius. Therefore not every individual substance of rational nature is a person.
Praeterea, anima separata a corpore per mortem, non dicitur esse persona; et tamen est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Non ergo haec est conveniens definitio personae. 14. The soul separated by death from the body is not said to be a person; yet it is an individual substance of rational nature. Therefore this is not a suitable definition of person.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod rationabiliter, individuum in genere substantiae speciale nomen sortitur: quia substantia ex propriis principiis individuatur,- et non ex alio extraneo,- sicut accidens ex subiecto. Inter individua etiam substantiarum rationabiliter individuum in rationali natura, speciali nomine nominatur, quia ipsius est proprie et vere per se agere, sicut supra dictum est. Sicut ergo hoc nomen hypostasis, secundum Graecos, vel substantia prima secundum Latinos, est speciale nomen individui in genere substantiae; ita hoc nomen persona, est speciale nomen individui rationalis naturae. Utraque ergo specialitas sub nomine personae continetur. Et ideo ad ostendendum quod est specialiter individuum in genere substantiae, dicitur quod est substantia individua; ad ostendendum vero quod est specialiter in rationali natura, additur rationalis naturae. Per hoc ergo quod dicitur substantia, excluduntur a ratione personae accidentia quorum nullum potest dici persona. Per hoc vero quod dicitur individua, excluduntur genera et species in genere substantiae quae etiam personae dici non possunt; per hoc vero quod additur rationalis naturae, excluduntur inanimata corpora, plantae et bruta quae personae non sunt. I answer that as explained above it is reasonable that the individual in the genus of substance should have a special name: because a substance is individualized by its proper principles, and not by something extraneous as an accident is by its subject. Again it is reasonable that among individual substances the individual of rational nature should have a special name, because as stated above it belongs to it properly and truly to act by itself. Wherefore just as the word hypostasis according to the Greeks, or ‘first substance’ according to the Latins is the special name of an individual in the genus of substance, even so the word person is the special name of an individual of rational nature: so that person is a special name under both these heads. Hence to indicate that it is in a special manner an individual in the genus of substance, it is stated that it is an individual substance; and to indicate that it is in a special manner (an individual) of rational nature it is added of rational nature. Accordingly by describing it as a substance we exclude accidents from the notion of person, for no accident can be a person, and by adding individual we exclude genera and species in the genus of substance, since they cannot be called persons: and by adding of rational nature we exclude inanimate bodies, plants and dumb animals which are not persons.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in substantia particulari, est tria considerare: quorum unum est natura generis et speciei in singularibus existens; secundum est modus existendi talis naturae, quia in singulari substantia existit natura generis et speciei, ut propria huic individuo, et non ut multis communis; tertium est principium ex quo causatur talis modus existendi. Sicut autem natura in se considerata communis est, ita et modus existendi naturae; non enim invenitur natura hominis existens in rebus nisi aliquo singulari individuata: non enim est homo qui non sit aliquis homo, nisi secundum opinionem Platonis, qui ponebat universalia separata. Sed principium talis modi existendi quod est principium individuationis, non est commune; sed aliud est in isto, et aliud in illo; hoc enim singulare individuatur per hanc materiam, et illud per illam. Sicut ergo nomen quod significat naturam, est commune et definibile,- ut homo vel animal,- ita nomen quod significat naturam cum tali modo existendi, ut hypostasis vel persona. Illud vero nomen quod in sua significatione includit determinatum individuationis principium, non est commune nec definibile, ut Socrates et Plato. Reply to the First Objection. Three points are to be noted in an individual substance: first, the generic and specific nature existing in the individual: second, such a nature’s mode of existence, inasmuch as the generic and specific nature in the individual substance exists as proper to that individual and not as common to many: third, the principle whence arises this mode of existence. Now just as a nature considered in itself is common, so also is that nature’s mode of existence: for we do not find human nature existing in things except as individualized in this or that man: since there is not a man that is not a particular man, except in the opinion of Plato who posited separate universals. But the principle of that mode of existence, namely the principle of individuation, is not common, but differs in each individual: for this particular thing is individualized by this matter, and that one by that matter. Accordingly just as the term denoting the nature is common and definable, e.g. man or animal, so too is the term denoting the nature together with such a mode of existence, e.g. hypostasis or person. On the other hand the term that includes in its signification a determinate principle of individuality, is neither common nor definable, e.g. Socrates or Plato.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod non solum intentio singularitatis est communis omnibus individuis substantiis, sed etiam natura generis cum tali modo existendi; et hoc modo significat hoc nomen hypostasis naturam generis substantiae ut individuatam; hoc autem nomen persona solum naturam rationalem sub tali modo existendi. Et propter hoc neque hypostasis neque persona est nomen intentionis, sicut singulare vel individuum, sed nomen rei tantum; non autem rei et intentionis simul. Reply to the Second Objection. Not only is the intention of singularity common to all individual substances, but also the generic nature together with that particular mode of existence. In this way the term hypostasis denotes a nature of the genus substance as individualized; while the term Person denotes only a rational nature with that particular mode of existence. For this reason neither hypostasis nor person is a term of intention, like singular and individual, but denotes a thing only, and not a thing together with an intention.
Unde patet solutio ad tertium et quartum. This suffices for the Replies to the Third and Fourth Objections.
Ad quintum dicendum quod, quia essentiales rerum differentiae sunt ignotae frequenter et innominatae, oportet interdum uti accidentalibus differentiis ad substantiales differentias designandas, sicut docet philosophus, et hoc modo individuum ponitur in definitione personae, ad designandum individualem modum essendi. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Whereas the essential differences of things are often unknown and unnamed, we are sometimes under the necessity of employing accidental differences to denote substantial distinctions, as the Philosopher teaches (Metaph. viii). Thus it is that individual is included in the definition of person, in order to indicate an individual mode of existence.
Ad sextum dicendum quod, cum dividitur substantia in primam et secundam, non est divisio generis in species,- cum nihil contineatur sub secunda substantia quod non sit in prima,- sed est divisio generis secundum diversos modos essendi. Nam secunda substantia significat naturam generis secundum se absolutam; prima vero substantia significat eam ut individualiter subsistentem. Unde magis est divisio analogi quam generis. Sic ergo persona continetur quidem in genere substantiae, licet non ut species, sed ut specialem modum existendi determinans. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The division of substance into ‘first’ and ‘second’ is not a division into genus and species, since ‘second’ substance covers nothing that is not covered by ‘first’ substance: but it is a division of a genus according to different modes of existence. Thus ‘second’ substance denotes the generic nature in itself absolutely, while ‘first’ substance signifies that nature as individually subsistent: wherefore the division is analogous rather than specific. Accordingly person is contained in the genus substance, although not as a species, but as defining a specific mode of existence.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod quidam dicunt, quod substantia ponitur in definitione personae prout significat hypostasim, sed cum de ratione hypostasis sit individuum, secundum quod opponitur communitati universalis vel parti,- quia nullum universale, nec aliqua pars, ut manus vel pes, potest dici hypostasis,- ulterius de ratione personae est individuum, secundum quod opponitur communitati assumptibilis. Dicunt enim, quod humana natura in Christo est hypostasis, sed non persona. Et ideo ad excludendum assumptibilitatem additur individuum in definitione personae. Sed hoc videtur esse contra intentionem Boetii, qui in Lib. de duabus naturis, per hoc quod dicitur individuum, excludit universalia a ratione personae. Et ideo melius est ut dicatur, quod substantia non ponitur in definitione personae pro hypostasi, sed pro eo quod est commune ad substantiam primam, quae est hypostasis, et substantiam secundam, et dividitur in utraque. Et sic illud commune, per hoc quod additur individuum, contrahitur ad hypostasim, ut idem sit dicere: substantia individua rationalis naturae, ac si diceretur hypostasis rationalis naturae. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Some hold that substance is included in the definition of person, inasmuch as it signifies a hypostasis; but since the definition of hypostasis includes individual as opposed to community of universality and to part (for no universal or part of a thing, e.g. a hand or a foot, can be called a hypostasis) they say that individual is added in the definition of person, inasmuch as individual excludes the community of assumability: for they hold that human nature in Christ is a hypostasis but not a person. Wherefore, say they, to exclude assumability, individual is added in the definition of person. This, however, would seem contrary to the intention of Boethius who (De Duab. Nat.) by the term individual excludes universals from the definition of Person. Hence it is better to say that in the definition of person substance does not stand for hypostasis but for that which is common to ‘first’ substance, i.e. hypostasis and ‘second’ substance, and is divided into both: so that this common (substance) by the addition of individual is narrowed down to the hypostasis, and thus to say: An individual substance of rational nature, is the same as to say a hypostasis of rational nature.
Ad octavum dicendum quod, secundum praedicta, ratio non procedit: quia substantia accipitur non pro hypostasi, sed pro eo quod est commune ad omnem substantiae acceptionem. Si tamen acciperetur substantia pro hypostasi, adhuc ratio non sequeretur: substantia enim quae est hypostasis, propinquius se habet ad personam quam subsistentia; cum tamen persona dicat aliquid subiectum, sicut substantia prima, et non solum sicut subsistens ut subsistentia. Sed quia nomen substantiae refertur etiam apud Latinos ad significationem essentiae, ideo ad vitandum errorem non dicimus tres substantias, sicut tres subsistentias. Graeci vero apud quos est distinctum nomen hypostasis a nomine ousias indubitanter in Deo tres hypostases confitentur. Reply to the Eighth Objection. In view of what we have just said, this argument does not prove. Substance does not stand for hypostasis, but for that which is common to all substance in whatever sense it be taken. If, however, substance were to stand for hypostasis the objection would, remain inconclusive: because the substance that is a hypostasis, is more akin to person than is subsistence, since person conveys the idea of subject like a ‘first’ substance, and not merely the idea of subsistence, as subsistence does. But seeing that the term substance is employed even by the Latins to denote the essence, therefore in order to avoid error we do not speak of three substances, as we do of three subsistences. The Greeks, however, who have the word hypostasis as distinct from ουσια do not hesitate to acknowledge three hypostases in God.
Ad nonum dicendum quod, sicut dicimus in Deo tres personas, ita possumus dicere tres substantias individuas; unam tamen substantiam quae est essentia. Reply to the Ninth Objection. just as we speak of three Persons in God so may we speak of three individual substances: but of only one substance that is the essence.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod rationale est differentia animalis, secundum quod ratio, a qua sumitur, significat cognitionem discursivam, qualis est in hominibus, non autem in Angelis nec in Deo. Boetius autem sumit rationale communiter pro intellectuali, quod dicimus convenire Deo et Angelis et hominibus. Reply to the Tenth Objection. Rational is the difference of animal, inasmuch as reason whence it is taken denotes discursive knowledge, such as is in angels but not in man nor in God. But Boethius takes rational in a broad sense for intellectual, and this is common to man, angels and God.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod natura in definitione personae non accipitur prout est principium motus, sicut definitur a philosopho, sed sicut definitur a Boetio: quod natura est unumquodque informans specifica differentia. Et quia differentia complet definitionem et determinat definitum ad speciem, ideo nomen naturae magis competit in definitione personae —quae specialiter in quibusdam substantiis invenitur— quam nomen essentiae, quod est communissimum. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In the definition of person nature is not to be taken according as it is the principle of movement, in which sense it is defined by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, i) but as defined by Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) according as it is the specific difference giving each thing its form. And since the difference completes the definition and confines the thing defined to its species, it follows that the term nature is more suitable in the definition of person which is special to certain substances, than the term essence which is most common.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod individuum, in definitione personae, sumitur pro eo quod non praedicatur de pluribus; et secundum hoc essentia divina non est individua substantia secundum praedicationem &8212;cum praedicetur de pluribus personis&8212; licet sit individua secundum rem. Richardus tamen de sancto Victore, corrigens definitionem Boetii, secundum quod persona in divinis accipitur, dixit: quod persona est divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia, ut per hoc quod dicitur incommunicabilis, essentia divina, persona non esse, ostenderetur. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. In the definition of person individual signifies that which is not predicated of several; and in this sense the divine essence is not an individual substance by predication, inasmuch as it is predicated of several persons, although it is individual in itself. However, Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. iv, 18, 23) amends the definition of Boethius as applied to the divine Persons; and says that a person is the incommunicable existence of the divine nature, so as to indicate by the term incommunicable that the divine essence is not a Person.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod cum substantia individua sit quoddam completum per se existens, humana natura in Christo, cum sit assumpta in personam divinam, non potest dici substantia individua &8212;quae est hypostasis&8212; sicut nec manus nec pes nec aliquid eorum quae non subsistunt per se ab aliis separata; et propter hoc non sequitur quod sit persona. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Seeing that an individual substance is something complete existing by itself, human nature in Christ, inasmuch as it was assumed into the divine Person, cannot be called an individual substance such as is a hypostasis, any more than a hand, a foot or anything that does not subsist by itself apart from anything else: and for this reason it does not follow that it is a person.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod anima separata est pars rationalis naturae, scilicet humanae, et non tota natura rationalis humana, et ideo non est persona. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The separated soul is a part of rational nature and not a whole rational human nature: wherefore it is not a person.

Q. IX:
ARTICLE III
Can There Be A Person in God?


[Sum. Th. I, Q. xxix, A. 3]
Tertio quaeritur utrum in Deo possit esse persona. Et videtur quod non. THE third point of inquiry is whether there can be a person in God: and seemingly the reply should be in the negative.
Sicut enim dicit Boetius nomen personae sumitur a personando, quia homines larvati personae dicebantur, quia in comoediis vel tragoediis aliquid personabant. Sed esse larvatum non competit Deo, nisi forte metaphorice. Ergo nomen personae non potest dici de Deo, nisi forte metaphorice. 1. According to Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) the word person is taken from personating, for masked men were called persons, because they personated something in comedies and tragedies. But it is unbecoming for God to be masked except perhaps metaphorically speaking. Therefore the term person should not be applied to God except perhaps metaphorically.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Damascenus, de nullo eorum quae dicuntur de Deo, possumus scire quid est, prout ei conveniunt. Sed de persona scimus quid est, per definitionem praemissam. Ergo persona non competit Deo, ad minus secundum definitionem praedictam. 2. As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1, 2, 4), it is impossible for us to know what any of the things are which we ascribe to God, as regards the sense in which they apply to him. Yet what a person is we know by the above-given definition (A. 2). Therefore person is not applicable to God, at least in the sense of the aforesaid definition.
Praeterea, Deus non est in aliquo genere; cum enim sit infinitus, sub nullius generis terminis comprehendi potest. Persona autem significat aliquid quod est in genere substantiae. Ergo persona Deo non convenit. 3. God is not in a genus: because since he is infinite he cannot be confined within the limits of any genus. Now person signifies something in the genus of substance. Therefore person is not to be applied to God.
Praeterea, in Deo nulla est compositio. Sed persona significat aliquid compositum; singulare enim humanae naturae, quod est persona, est maximae compositionis; partes etiam definitionis personae demonstrant personam esse compositam. Non est ergo in Deo persona. 4. There is no composition in God. But person signifies something composite: for an individual of human nature, which is a person, is extremely composite: besides, the parts of the definition of person show that person is a composite thing. Therefore there is no person in God.
Praeterea, in Deo nulla est materia. Principium autem individuationis materia est. Cum ergo persona sit substantia individua, non potest Deo convenire. 5. There is no matter in God. But matter is the principle of individuation. Since then a person is an individual substance, the term cannot be applied to God.
Praeterea, omnis persona est subsistentia. Sed Deus non potest dici subsistentia, quia non existit sub aliquo. Ergo non est persona. 6. Every person is a subsistence. But God cannot be called a subsistence, for he is not subject to anything. Therefore he is not a person.
Praeterea, persona sub hypostasi continetur. Sed in Deo non potest esse hypostasis, quia non est in eo aliquod accidens, cum hypostasis dicat subiectum accidentis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo in Deo non est persona. 7. Person is comprised under hypostasis. Now there cannot be a hypostasis in God, since there are no accidents in him, and hypostasis denotes the subject of an accident as stated above (A. i). Therefore there is no person in God.
Sed contrarium, apparet per Athanasium in symbolo quicumque vult, etc., et per Augustinum in VII de Trinit., et per communem Ecclesiae usum, quae a spiritu sancto edocta non potest errare. The contrary is plain from the authority of Athanasius in the Creed, Quicumque vult, etc., and of Augustine (De Trin. vii, 6), and from the general usage of the Church who being taught of the Holy Spirit cannot err.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod persona, sicut dictum est, significat quamdam naturam cum quodam modo existendi. Natura autem, quam persona in sua significatione includit, est omnium naturarum dignissima, scilicet natura intellectualis secundum genus suum. Similiter etiam modus existendi quem importat persona est dignissimus, ut scilicet aliquid sit per se existens. Cum ergo omne quod est dignissimum in creaturis, Deo sit attribuendum, convenienter nomen personae Deo attribui potest, sicut et alia nomina quae proprie dicuntur de Deo. I answer that, as stated above, person denotes a certain nature with a certain mode of existence. Now the nature which person includes in its definition is of all natures the most exalted, to wit that nature which is intellectual in regard to its genus. Likewise the mode of existence signified by the word person is most exalted, namely that a thing exists by itself. Since then whatsoever is most excellent in creatures should be attributed to God, it is becoming that the word person should be attributed to God, even as other terms which are said of God properly.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in nomine aliquo est duo considerare: scilicet, illud ad quod significandum nomen imponitur, et illud a quo imponitur ad significandum. Frequenter enim imponitur nomen aliquod ad significandum rem aliquam, ab aliquo accidente aut actu aut effectu illius rei; quae tamen non sunt principaliter significata per illud nomen, sed potius ipsa rei substantia, vel natura sicut hoc nomen lapis sumitur a laesione pedis, quam tamen non significat, sed potius corpus quoddam in quo tale accidens frequenter invenitur. Unde laesio pedis magis pertinet ad etymologiam huius nominis lapis, quam ad eius significationem. Quando ergo illud ad quod significandum nomen imponitur, Deo non competit &8212;sed aliqua proprietas eius secundum similitudinem quamdam&8212; tunc illud nomen de Deo metaphorice dicitur: sicut Deus nominatur leo, non quia natura illius animalis Deo conveniat, sed propter fortitudinem quae in leone invenitur. Quando vero res significata per nomen Deo convenit, tunc illud nomen proprie de Deo dicitur, sicut bonum, sapiens et huiusmodi; licet etiam quandoque illud a quo tale nomen imponitur, non conveniat Deo. Sic ergo licet personare ad modum larvati hominis a quo impositum fuit nomen personae, Deo non conveniat, tamen illud quod significatur per nomen, scilicet subsistens in natura intellectuali, competit Deo; et propter hoc nomen personae proprie sumitur in divinis. Reply to the First Objection. Two things must be considered in a name: that which it is intended to signify, and that from which it is taken for the purpose of signification. For a name is often given to signify a certain thing, but is taken from an accident or an action or an effect of that thing, and yet these are not the chief signification of the name which denotes rather the very substance or nature of the thing. Thus the word lapis (stone) is taken from laesio pedis (hurting the foot), yet it does not signify this, but rather a body wherein such an accident is frequently found: so that laesio pedis belongs to the etymology of the word lapis rather than to its meaning. Accordingly when it is not the intended signification of a term that is appropriate to God, but some property by way of likeness, then such a term is applied to God metaphorically. Thus God is called a lion, not that the lion’s nature is to be attributed to God, but on account of the lion’s strength. When, however, that which the term signifies is appropriate to God, it is applied to God in its proper sense, for instance, good, wise and the like, although sometimes the source from which such terms are taken is not applicable to God. Thus although to personate as a masked man, whence comes the term person, is not to be attributed to God, yet that which the word signifies, namely that which subsists in an intellectual nature is appropriate to God: and for this reason the term person is ascribed to God in its proper sense.
Ad secundum dicendum quod tam nomen personae quam definitio de persona data, si recte intelligatur, convenit Deo: non tamen ita quod sit definitio eius, quia plus est in Deo quam significetur per nomen. Unde id quod Dei est, per rationem nominis non definitur. Reply to the Second Objection. Both the word person and the definition of person given above are applicable to God: not however, so as to be a definition of God, since there is more in God than is signified by the term. Hence the definition of the term does not define what God is.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet Deus non sit in genere substantiae tamquam species, pertinet tamen ad genus substantiae sicut generis principium. Reply to the Third Objection. Although God is not in the genus of substance as a species, he belongs to the genus of substance as the principle of the genus.
Ad quartum dicendum quod accidit personae, in quantum huiusmodi, quod sit composita, ex hoc quod complementum vel perfectio, quae requiritur ad rationem personae, non invenitur statim in uno simplici, sed requirit adunationem multorum, sicut in hominibus patet. In Deo autem, cum summa simplicitate est summa perfectio; et ideo est ibi persona absque compositione. Partes vero positae in definitione personae non ostendunt aliquam compositionem personae, nisi in substantiis materialibus: individuum autem cum sit negatio, per hoc quod substantiae additur, nulla compositio importatur. Unde remanet ibi sola compositio individuae substantiae, id est hypostasis ad naturam: quae duo, in substantiis immaterialibus, secundum rem, sunt idem omnino. Reply to the Fourth Objection. It is accidental to person as such that it is composite, because the complement or perfection required for personality is not to be found at once in one simple thing, but requires a combination of several, as is to be observed in men. But in God together with supreme simplicity there is supreme perfection: wherefore in him there is person without composition. As to the parts which combine to make. the definition of person they do not argue composition in person except in material substances: and individual, being a negation, does not imply composition through being added to substance. Hence the only composition that remains is that of individual substance, i.e. hypostasis with the nature: which two in immaterial substances are absolutely one and the same thing.
Ad quintum dicendum quod rebus materialibus, in quibus formae non sunt per se subsistentes, sed materiae inhaerentes, oportet quod principium individuationis sit ex materia: formae vero immateriales, cum sint per se subsistentes, ex seipsis individuantur; ex hoc enim quod aliquid est subsistens, habet quod de pluribus praedicari non potest: et ideo nihil prohibet in rebus immaterialibus substantiam individuam et personam inveniri. Reply to the Fifth Objection. In material things whose forms are not self-subsistent but adherent to matter the principle of individuation must needs come from matter: whereas immaterial forms, being self-subsistent, are individualized by themselves, because from the very fact that a thing is self-subsistent, it cannot be predicated of several. Consequently there is no reason why there should not be an individual substance and a person in immaterial things.
Ad sextum dicendum quod, licet in Deo non sit compositio, ut in eo aliquid sub alio intelligi possit, tamen secundum intellectum nostrum, seorsum accipimus esse eius et substantiam ipsius sub esse eius existentem, ut huic subsistens dicatur. Vel dicendum, quod licet subesse &8212;a quo imponitur vocabulum subsistendi&8212; Deo non conveniat, tamen per se esse &8212;ad quod significandum imponitur&8212; competit ei. Reply to the Sixth Objection. Although there is no composition in God by reason whereof we might be able to understand subjection of one thing to another in him, nevertheless by an act of the mind we consider his being apart from his substance as subject to his being, and from this point of view call it subsistence.
Ad septimum dicendum quod, licet in Deo non sint accidentia, sunt tamen in eo proprietates personales, quibus hypostases substant. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Though there are no accidents in God, there are personal properties of which the hypostases are the subjects.

Q. IX:
ARTICLE IV
In God Does the Term ‘Person’ Signify Something Relative Or Something Absolute?


[Sum. Th. I, Q. xxix, A. 4]
Quarto quaeritur utrum hoc nomen persona in divinis significet relativum, vel aliquid absolutum. Et videtur quod significet aliquid absolutum. THE fourth point of inquiry is whether this term person signifies something relative or something absolute in God: and seemingly it signifies something absolute.
Dicit enim Augustinus, quod cum Ioannes dicit: tres sunt qui testimonium dant in caelo, pater, verbum et spiritus sanctus; et quaereretur quid tres essent, responsum est quod sunt tres personae. Sed quid quaerit de essentia. Ergo hoc nomen persona in divinis significat essentiam. 1. Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that “when John states that there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word and the Holy Spirit, if it be asked, Three what? the answer is, Three Persons.” Now the query What? refers to the essence. Therefore in God person signifies the essence.
Praeterea, in eodem Lib. Augustinus dicit, quod idem est Deo esse quod personam esse. Sed esse in divinis significat essentiam, et non relationem. Ergo et persona. 2. Augustine (ibid. 6) says that in God to be and to be a person are the same. Now in God to be denotes the essence and not a relation. Therefore person does so also.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit ibidem: ad se proprie dicitur persona, non ad filium vel spiritum sanctum, sicut ad se dicitur Deus, et magnus et bonus et iustus. Sed haec omnia essentiam significant, et non relationem. Ergo et persona. 3. Augustine (loc. cit.) says: “Person is predicated (of the Father) absolutely not with respect to the Son or the Holy Spirit: just as he is called God, great, good or just absolutely.” Now all these denote the essence and not a relation. Therefore person does so also.
Praeterea, Augustinus ibidem dicit quod, quamvis commune est illis, scilicet patri et filio et spiritui sancto, nomen essentiae, ita ut singulus quisque dicatur essentia, tamen illis commune est personae vocabulum. Sed relatio in divinis non est commune, sed distinctivum. Ergo persona in divinis non significat relationem. 4. Augustine (ibid. 4) says that although “the term essence is common to them,” namely the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, so that each one is called the essence, yet the term person is common to them. But relation in God is not common but distinctive. Therefore person does not signify relation in God.
Sed dicendum, quod persona est commune ratione et non re in divinis.- Sed contra, in divinis non est universale; unde Augustinus in eodem libro improbat opinionem illorum qui dicebant quod essentia in divinis est sicut genus vel sicut species; persona vero sicut species vel individua. Quod autem est commune ratione et non re, est commune per modum universalis. Ergo persona non est commune in divinis ratione tantum, sed etiam re; et ita non potest significare relationem. 5. It will be replied that in God Person is common logically and not really. On the contrary, there are no universals in God: hence Augustine (ibid. 6) rejects the opinion of those who said that the essence in God is like a genus or species, and Person like a species or individual. Now that which is common logically and not really is common after the manner of a universal. Hence in God Person is common not merely logically but really, so that it cannot denote a relation.
Praeterea, nullum nomen significat res diversorum generum, nisi aequivoce: acutum enim aequivoce dicitur in saporibus et magnitudinibus. Manifestum est autem quod persona in Angelis et hominibus non significat relationem, sed aliquid absolutum. Si ergo in Deo significet relationem, erit aequivoce dictum. 6. A term does not denote things of different genera except equivocally: thus acute is applied equivocally to the sense of taste and to a mathematical figure. Now it is evident that person does not signify a relation in angels and man, but something absolute. Therefore if it signifies a relation in God, it will be employed equivocally.
Praeterea, quod accidit rei significatae per nomen, est extra significationem nominis; sicut extra significationem hominis est album, quod accidit homini. Res autem significata per hoc nomen persona est substantia individua rationalis naturae; quia ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, secundum philosophum, in IV Metaph.: substantiae autem tali accidit ad aliud referri. Relatio ergo est extra significationem huius nominis persona. 7. That which is accidental to the thing signified by a term is beside the term’s signification; thus white which is accidental to man is beside the signification of man. Now the thing signified by the word person is an individual substance of rational nature, since according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv) the description of what a word means is its definition: and it is accidental to such a substance that it be related to something else. Therefore relation is beside the signification of the word person.
Praeterea, nullum nomen potest intelligi de aliquo vere praedicari, cui non intelligitur convenire res significata per nomen; sicut non potest intelligi esse homo quod intelligitur non esse animal rationale mortale. Iudaei autem et Pagani confitentur Deum esse personam; non tamen confitentur in eo relationes, quas nos ponimus secundum fidem. Ergo hoc nomen persona in divinis non significat huiusmodi relationes. 8. It is inconceivable that any term be predicated of a thing to which the meaning of that term is seen to be inappropriate: thus if we understand that a certain thing is not a rational animal it is inconceivable that such a thing be a man. Now Jews and pagans acknowledge God to be a person; yet they do not acknowledge relations in him, whereas we ascribe them to him according to faith. Therefore person does not signify these relations in God.
Sed dicendum, quod Iudaei et Pagani erroneam habent opinionem de Deo; unde ex eorum opinione non potest accipi argumentum.- Sed contra, error opinionis non variat nominis significationem, nec etiam veritas. Si ergo apud errantes de Deo nomen persona non significat relationem, nec etiam significabit apud recte sentientes de Deo. 9. But to this it will be replied that Jews and pagans err in their views about God: and thus we cannot argue from their opinion.—On the contrary neither an erroneous opinion nor truth itself can change the meaning of a word: so that if the word person does not signify relation in the opinion of those who err about God, neither will it do so with those who think aright about him.
Praeterea, voces, secundum philosophum, sunt signa intellectuum: intellectus enim qui concipitur ex hoc nomine persona est in intellectu substantiae primae. Ergo hoc nomen persona significat substantiam primam, qua nihil est magis absolutum, cum sit per se existens; ergo hoc nomen persona non significat relationem, sed aliquid absolutum. 10. According to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) words are signs of ideas. Now the idea conceived of the word person is the idea of a ‘first’ substance. Therefore this word person signifies a ‘first’ substance, than which nothing is more absolute, since it is self-existent. Therefore the word person does not signify a relation, but something absolute.
Sed dicendum, quod hoc nomen persona significat relationem per modum substantiae.- Sed contra, haec propositio est immediata: nulla relatio est substantia, sicut et haec: nulla quantitas est substantia, sicut patet per philosophum. Si ergo hoc nomen persona significat substantiam, ut probatum est, impossibile est quod significatum eius sit relatio. 11. But to this it may be replied that the word person signifies a relation after the manner of a substance.—On the contrary, this is a self-evident proposition: No relation is a substance, just as this: No quantity is a substance, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i). If then the word person signifies the substance as we have already proved, it cannot possibly signify a relation.
Praeterea, opposita non possunt verificari de eodem. Sed esse per se et esse ad aliud, sunt opposita. Si ergo quod significatur nomine personae est substantia, quae est ens per se, impossibile est quod sit ad aliquid. 12. Opposite terms cannot be true of the same thing. Now self-existence and existence by another are opposite terms. If then person signifies substance which is a self-existent being, it cannot signify a relation.
Praeterea, omne nomen significans relationem, refertur ad aliquid quod consignificat, sicut dominus et servus. Sed patet quod hoc nomen persona non refertur ad aliud. Ergo non significat relationem, sed aliquid absolutum. 13. A term that signifies a relation, is referred to some. thing that it co-signifies, for instance, master and servant. Now it is clear that person has no reference to something else. Therefore it does not signify a relation, but something absolute.
Praeterea, persona dicitur quasi per se una. Unitas autem in divinis pertinet ad essentiam. Ergo hoc nomen persona significat essentiam, et non relationem. 14. Person is as it were one by itself (per se una). Now unity in God regards the essence. Therefore person signifies essence and not relation.
Sed dicendum, quod hoc nomen significat unum distinctum, et quia distinctio in divinis est per relationem, ideo significat relationem. —Sed contra, filius et spiritus sanctus dicuntur distingui in divinis secundum modum originis: nam filius procedit per modum intellectus, ut verbum, sed spiritus sanctus per modum voluntatis, ut amor. Non ergo per solas relationes est distinctio in divinis; et sic non oportet quod persona relationem significet. 15. To this it will be replied that this word signifies one distinct thing, and since distinction in God arises from relation, person must signify relation. —On the contrary, the Son and Holy Spirit are said to be distinguished by the mode of their origin; because the Son proceeds by way of the intellect as Word, and the Holy Spirit by way of the will, as Love. Therefore distinction in God is not through the relations alone: and consequently it does not follow that person signifies relation.
Praeterea, si relatio in divinis est distinguens; persona autem est quid distinctum, non distinguens; non significabit relationem nomen personae. 16. If relation causes distinction in God, while person is something distinct without causing distinction, relation cannot be signified by the word person.
Praeterea, relationes in divinis dicuntur esse proprietates. Persona autem significat aliquid substans proprietati. Non ergo significat relationem. 17. The relations in God are called properties: whereas the person is something underlying the properties. Therefore it does not signify relation.
Praeterea, quatuor sunt relationes in divinis: scilicet paternitas, filiatio, processio, communis spiratio: innascibilitas enim, quae est quinta notio, non est relatio. Sed hoc nomen persona nullam harum significat. Si enim significaret paternitatem, non diceretur de filio; si filiationem, non diceretur de patre; si autem processione spiritus sancti, non diceretur neque de patre neque de filio; si vero communem spirationem, non diceretur de spiritu sancto. Non ergo significat relationem hoc nomen persona. 18. There are four relations in God, paternity, filiation, procession, common spiration: for innascibility which is the fifth notion is not a relation. But the word person signifies none of these: because if it signified paternity, it would not be said of the Son; if it signified filiation, it would not be said of the Father; if it signified the procession of the Holy Spirit, it would be said neither of the Father nor of the Son; and if it signified the common spiration, it would not be said of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the word person does not signify relation.
Sed contra. Boetius dicit, quod omne nomen, ad personas pertinens, relationem significat. Sed nullum nomen magis pertinet ad personas quam hoc nomen persona. Ergo hoc nomen persona relationem significat. On the contrary Boethius says (De Trin.) that “every term that refers to the Persons signifies relation.” Now no term refers to the persons more than person itself. Therefore the word person signifies relation.
Praeterea, sub persona in divinis continentur pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Sed haec nomina relationem significant. Ergo et nomen personae. Again, in God under Person are included the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. But these names signify relation. Therefore person does also.
Praeterea, nullum absolutum distinguitur in divinis. Sed persona distinguitur. Ergo non est absolutum, sed relativum. Again, nothing absolute is divided in God. But person is divided. Therefore it is not absolute but relative.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod hoc nomen persona habet commune cum nominibus absolutis in divinis quod de qualibet persona praedicatur, nec secundum nomen ad aliud defertur; cum nominibus vero relationem significantibus, quod distinguitur, et pluraliter praedicatur. Et ideo videtur quod utraque significatio et relativi et absoluti pertineat ad personam. Qualiter autem utraque significatio ad nomen personae pertineat est diversimode a diversis assignatum. I answer that the term person in common with the absolute names of God is predicated of each Person, and does not in itself refer to anything else, and in common with the names signifying relation it is divided and predicated of several: wherefore it would seem that person admits of both significations absolute and relative. How the name person can a it of both significations has been explained in various ways.
Dicunt enim quidam quod persona significat utrumque, sed per modum aequivocationis. Dicunt enim quod hoc nomen persona, quantum est de se, absolute significat essentiam, tam in singulari quam in plurali, sicut hoc nomen Deus, aut bonus, aut magnus: sed propter insufficientiam nominum ad loquendum de Deo, accommodatum est hoc nomen persona a sanctis patribus in Nicaeno Concilio, ut quandoque possit sumi pro relativo, et praecipue in plurali, cum dicimus quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt tres personae, vel cum termino partitivo adiuncto, ut cum dicitur: alia est persona patris, alia filii; vel cum dicitur: filius est alius a patre in persona. In singulari autem cum absolute praedicatur, potest indifferenter significare essentiam vel personam, ut cum dicitur: pater est persona, vel filius est persona.- Et haec videtur esse opinio Magistri in I sententiarum. Sed non videtur sufficienter dici: non enim absque ratione ex propria significatione nominis sumpta, sancti patres divinitus inspirati, hoc nomen invenerunt ad confessionem verae fidei exprimendam; et praecipue quia dedissent occasionem erroris dicendo tres personas, si hoc nomen persona significat essentiam absolute. Some say that person signifies both, but equivocally. They assert that in itself it expresses the essence absolutely both in the singular and in the plural, like the name God, or good or great: but that owing to the insufficiency of names employed in speaking of God, the holy fathers in the Council of Nicea accommodated the term person so that it could be employed sometimes in a relative sense, especially in the plural, as when we say that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three Persons, or with the addition of a disjunctive term, as when we say: “One is the Person of the Father, another of the Son,” or: “The Son is distinct from the Father in person.” And that when it is predicated in the singular absolutely, it may equally signify the essence or the relation, as when we say: “The Father is a person,” or: “The Son is a person.” Apparently this is the opinion of the Master (I., D. xxv): but this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation. For it was not without reason taken from the very signification of the word, that the holy fathers inspired by God chose this term to express a profession of the true faith; and all the more seeing that they would have provided an occasion for error in affirming three Persons, if the word person signified the essence absolutely.
Et ideo alii dixerunt quod simul significat essentiam, et relationem, sed non aequaliter; sed unum in recto, et aliud in obliquo. Quorum quidam dixerunt, quod significat essentiam in recto, et relationem in obliquo; quidam e converso. Sed neutri dubitationem solvunt: quia si essentiam in recto significant, non deberet pluraliter praedicari; si vero relationem, non deberet ad se dici, nec de singulis praedicari. Et ideo alii dixerunt quod significat utrumque in recto. Quorum quidam dixerunt, quod significat essentiam et relationem ex aequo, et neutrum circa aliud ponitur. Wherefore others said that it expresses at the same time essence and relation but not equally; the one directly and the other indirectly. Some of them maintained that it expresses the essence directly and the relation indirectly: while others took the contrary view. Yet neither opinion solves the difficulty: for if it signifies the essence directly it should not be predicated in the plural, and if it signifies the relation directly, it should not be predicated absolutely or of each Person. Hence others said that it signifies both directly: and some of them said that it, expresses equally both essence and relation, and neither more than the other.
Sed hoc non est intelligibile: quia quod non significat unum nihil significat. Unde omne nomen significat unum in una acceptione, ut dicit philosophus in IV Metaph. Et ideo alii dixerunt quod relatio ponitur circa absolutum. Quod quidem difficile est videre, cum relationes non determinent essentiam in divinis. Et ideo alii dixerunt quod non significat absolutum, sive substantiam quae est essentia, sed quae est hypostasis: hoc enim relatione determinatur. Quod quidem verum est, sed per hoc dictum nihil nobis manifestatur. Minus enim est nobis manifestum nomen hypostasis vel subsistentiae, quam nomen personae. But this is unintelligible: since that which does not signify one thing signifies nothing: wherefore according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv) every term signifies one thing in one sense. Hence others said that it signifies relation as affecting the essence: but it is difficult to see how this is possible inasmuch as relations do not determine the essence in God. And so others said that the relation does not express the absolute, i.e. the substance which is essence, but the substance which is hypostasis, since this is determined by a relation. This is indeed true, but does not make us any wiser, seeing that the meaning of hypostasis or subsistence is less clear than that of person.
Et ideo ad evidentiam huius quaestionis sciendum, quod propria ratio nominis est quam significat nomen, secundum philosophum. Id autem cui attribuitur nomen, si sit recte sumptum sub re significata per nomen, sicut determinatum sub indeterminato, dicitur supponi per nomen; si autem non sit recte sumptum sub re nominis, dicitur copulari per nomen; sicut hoc nomen animal significat substantiam animatam sensibilem, et album significat colorem disgregativum visus: homo vero recte sumitur sub ratione animalis, sicut determinatum sub indeterminato. Est enim homo substantia animata sensibilis tali anima, scilicet rationali; sub albo vero, quod est extra essentiam eius, non directe sumitur. Unde homo supponitur nomine animalis, copulatur vero nomine albi. Et quia inferius quod supponitur per nomen commune, se habet ad commune sicut determinatum ad indeterminatum: id quod erat suppositum, fit significatum, determinatione apposita ad commune: animal enim rationale significat hominem. Sed sciendum, quod aliquid significat dupliciter: uno modo formaliter, et alio modo materialiter. Formaliter quidem significatur per nomen ad id quod significandum nomen est principaliter impositum, quod est ratio nominis; sicut hoc nomen homo significat aliquid compositum ex corpore et anima rationali. Materialiter vero significatur per nomen, illud in quo talis ratio salvatur; sicut hoc nomen homo significat aliquid habens cor et cerebrum et huiusmodi partes, sine quibus non potest esse corpus animatum anima rationali. Accordingly to elucidate the matter it must be noted that, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the proper definition of a term is its signification. Now when a term is predicated of a thing which is directly included in the signification of that term as the determinate in the indeterminate, that thing is said to be classed under that term: but if it is not directly included in the term’s signification it is said to be coupled with it. Thus animal signifies a sensible animate substance, and white signifies a colour that dilates the sight: while man is included directly in the idea of animal as the determinate in the indeterminate; for man is a sensible animate substance, having a rational soul: and is included under white, not directly, however, since white is outside his essence. Hence man is classed under the term animal, but is coupled with the term white. And since that which comes under a common denomination is related to the common name as the determinate to the indeterminate, that which was included becomes the thing signified by the addition of a determining word to the common term: thus a rational animal is a man. But we must observe that a thing is signified in two ways, formally and materially. Formally a term signifies that which it was chiefly intended to signify and this is the definition of the term: thus man signifies something composed of a body and a rational soul. Materially a term signifies that which is requisite for that definition: thus man signifies something that has a heart, brain and such parts as are required in order that the body be animated with a rational soul.
Secundum hoc ergo dicendum est, quod hoc nomen persona communiter sumpta nihil aliud significat quam substantiam individuam rationalis naturae. Et quia sub substantia individua rationalis naturae continetur substantia individua &8212;id est incommunicabilis et ab aliis distincta, tam Dei quam hominis quam etiam Angeli&8212; oportet quod persona divina significet subsistens distinctum in natura divina, sicut persona humana significat subsistens distinctum in natura humana; et haec est formalis significatio tam personae divinae quam personae humanae. Sed quia distinctum subsistens in natura humana non est nisi aliquid per individualem materiam individuatum et ab aliis diversum, ideo oportet quod hoc sit materialiter significatum, cum dicitur persona humana. Distinctum vero incommunicabile in natura divina non potest esse nisi relatio, quia omne absolutum est commune et indistinctum in divinis. Relatio autem in Deo est idem secundum rem quod eius essentia. Et sicut essentia in Deo idem est et habens esse essentiam, ut deitas et Deus: ita idem est relatio et quod per relationem refertur. Unde sequitur quod idem sit relatio et distinctum in natura divina subsistens. Patet ergo quod persona, communiter sumpta, significat substantiam individuam rationalis naturae; persona vero divina, formali significatione, significat distinctum subsistens in natura divina. Et quia hoc non potest esse nisi relatio vel relativum, ideo materiali significatione significat relationem vel relativum. Et propter hoc potest dici, quod significat relationem per modum substantiae, non quae est essentia, sed quae est hypostasis; sicut et relationem significat non ut relationem, sed ut relativum, idest ut significatur hoc nomine pater, non ut significatur hoc nomine paternitas. Sic enim relatio significata includitur oblique in significatione personae divinae, quae nihil aliud est quam distinctum relatione subsistens in essentia divina. Accordingly we reply that the term person signifies nothing else but an individual substance of rational nature. And since under an individual substance of rational nature is contained the substance, individual, i.e. incommunicable and distinct from others, whether of God, of man or of angels, it follows that a divine Person must signify something subsistent and distinct in the divine nature, just as a human person signifies something subsistent and distinct in human nature: and this is the formal signification of a person whether divine or human. Since, however, that which is distinct and subsistent in human ‘nature is nothing else than something individualized and differentiated from others by individual matter, it follows that this is the material signification when we speak of a human person. But the only thing that is distinct and incommunicable in the divine nature is relation, since all that is absolute is common and undivided. Now in God relation is really the same as the essence. And as in God essence is identical with the one who has the essence (e.g. the Godhead is identical with God), so also is relation the same as the one who is related. Consequently relation is the same as that which is distinct and subsists in the divine nature. It is evident then that person commonly speaking signifies an individual substance of rational nature; while a divine person in its formal signification denotes a distinct being subsistent in the divine nature. And seeing that this can be nothing else but a relation or a relative being, it follows that in its material signification it denotes a relation or a relative being. Hence it may be said that it signifies a relation by way of substance not qua essence but qua hypostasis, even as it signifies a relation not qua relation but qua relative: e.g. as signifying Father not as signifying paternity. For in this way the signified relation is included indirectly in the signification of the divine Person, which is nothing but something distinct by a relation and subsistent in the divine essence.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quid non solum quaerit de essentia sed quandoque etiam de supposito, ut: quid natat in mari? Piscis. Et sic, ad quid respondendum est per nomen persona. Reply to the First Objection. What? queries not only the essence but also sometimes the supposit, for instance: What swims in the sea? Fish. And so the answer to what? is the person.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, propter modum significandi huius nominis persona, dicit Augustinus: idem est Deo esse quod persona esse. Non enim significat per modum relationis, sicut pater et filius. Reply to the Second Objection. It is on account of the mode of signification of this word person, that Augustine says: “In God to be and to be a person are the same.” For it does not signify by way of relation as Father and Son do.
Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc provenit ex formali significatione personae quod ad se dicitur et ad aliud non refertur. Reply to the Third Objection. It is due to the formal signification of person that it is predicated absolutely without reference to another.
Ad quartum dicendum quod essentia est communis re in divinis, sed persona secundum rationem tantum, sicut et hoc nomen relatio. Reply to the Fourth Objection. In God essence is common in reality, but person only logically, like the word relation.
Ad quintum dicendum quod in divinis nihil est diversificatum secundum esse, cum ibi sit tantum unum esse. Hoc autem est contra rationem universalis; et ideo non est ibi universale, licet sit ibi unum secundum rationem, et non secundum rem. Reply to the Fifth Objection. In God there are no differences of being since there is but one being in him. Now this is incompatible with the idea of universal, wherefore there is no universal in him, although there is in him one thing logically and not really.
Ad sextum dicendum quod, hoc quod persona aliud significat in Deo et homine, pertinet ad diversitatem suppositionis magis quam ad diversam significationem huius communis, quod est persona. Diversa autem suppositio non facit aequivocationem, sed diversa significatio. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The fact that person designates one thing in God and another in man must be referred to a difference in suppositality rather than in the signification of the word person: and equivocation arises from a difference in signification but not in suppositality.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod licet relatio accidat ei quod significatur communiter per hoc nomen persona, non tamen accidit personae divinae, sicut ostensum est. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although relation is accidental to the common signification of Person, it is not accidental to the divine Person, as we have proved above.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod obiectio illa procedit de formali significatione nominis, et non de materiali. Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument considers the formal and not the material signification of the term: and the same answer applies to the Ninth Objection.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod substantia prima dicitur absoluta, quasi ab alio non dependens. Relativum autem in divinis non excludit absolutum quod est ab alio dependens; sed excludit absolutum quod ad aliud non refertur. Reply to the Tenth Objection. A ‘first’ substance is said to be absolute as being independent of another. In God, however, the relative term does not exclude the absolute that depends on another, but the absolute that is not related to another.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod ista propositio, nulla relatio est substantia, est immediata, si accipiatur relatio et substantia quae sunt in genere. Sed Deus non limitatur terminis alicuius generis, sed habet in se perfectiones omnium generum. Unde non distinguitur in eo secundum rem relatio et substantia. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. This proposition, No relation is a substance is self-evident if it refer to relation and substance that are in a genus. God, however, is not confined within the limits of a genus, but contains in himself the perfections of all genera. Wherefore relation and substance are not really distinct in him.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod per se existens opponitur ad non per se existens, non autem ei quod est ad aliquid. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Self-existent is opposed to non-self-existent and not to that which is related to another.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod persona secundum nomen ad aliud non refertur, propter modum quem significat. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The word person does not itself refer to a relation, but by its mode of signification.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod unum in divinis se habet communiter ad essentiam et relationem; dicimus enim quod essentia est una, et quod pater est unus. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. In God one is common to essence and relation: thus we say that the essence is one, and that the Father is one.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod forte modus ille processionis diversus &8212;quo dicitur filius procedere per modum intellectus, spiritus sanctus vero per modum voluntatis&8212; non sufficit ad distinguendum personaliter spiritum sanctum a filio, cum voluntas et intellectus non distinguantur personaliter in divinis. Si tamen concedatur quod hoc ad eorum distinctionem sufficiat, manifestum est quod uterque a patre per relationem distinguitur, prout unus eorum procedit a patre ut genitus, alius ut spiratus; et hae relationes constituunt eorum personas. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. It may be that this different mode of procession whereby the Son is said to proceed by way of intellect, and the Holy Spirit by way of will, does not suffice for a personal distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son, since in God will and intellect are not really distinct. If, however, it be granted that this suffices to make a distinction between them, it is clear that each is distinct from the Father by a relation, in that one of them proceeds from the Father by generation, the other by spiration, and these relations constitute their Persons.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod sicut relatio significat ut distinguens in divinis, ita relatum significatur ut distinctum. In Deo autem non est aliud relatio et relatum, sicut nec essentia et quod est; et ideo nec distinguens et distinctum in Deo differunt. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. just as relation signifies as causing distinction in God, so is that which is related signified as being distinct. Now in God relation and the thing related are not distinct, as neither are essence and that which is: hence in God that which distinguishes and that which is distinct are one and the same.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod proprietas in divinis non est accidentalis, sed est idem secundum rem ei cuius est proprietas; sed differt secundum modum intelligendi. Persona ergo non significat relationem prout est proprietas, sed prout est proprietati et essentiae subsistens. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. In God property is not an accident, but is really the same as the thing whose property it is: although it differs therefrom logically. Accordingly person does not signify relation as a property, but as the essence underlying the property.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod licet universale non possit esse praeter singularia, potest tamen intelligi, et per consequens significari. Et propter hoc sequitur, si non est aliquod singularium, quod non sit universale. Non tamen sequitur, si non intelligitur aut significatur aliquod singularium, quod non intelligatur vel significetur universale: hoc enim nomen homo non significat aliquem singularium hominum, sed solum hominem in communi; et similiter hoc nomen persona, etsi non significet paternitatem neque filiationem neque communem spirationem aut processionem, tamen significat relationem in communi, per modum iam dictum, sicut et hoc nomen relatio suo modo. Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. Although there cannot be a universal without singulars, it can be understood apart from them and consequently signified. Hence it follows that if there axe no singulars there is no universal: but it does not follow that unless some one singular be misunderstood or signified amiss, the universal is not understood or signified. Thus the word man does not signify any one individual man but only man in general: and in like manner the word person, although it does not signify paternity or filiation or common spiration or procession, it nevertheless signifies relation in general in the way already explained, even as the word relation does in its own particular way.

Q. IX:
ARTICLE V
Are There Several Persons in God?


[Sum. Th. I, Q. xxx, A. i]
Quinto quaeritur utrum numerus personarum sit in divinis. Et videtur quod non. THE fifth point of inquiry is whether there are several persons in God: and seemingly there are not.
Dicit enim Boetius: hoc vere unum est in quo nullus est numerus. Sed Deus est verissime unus. Ergo in eo nullus est numerus. 1. Boethius says (De Trin.): That is truly one in which there is no number. But God is most truly one. Therefore number is not in him.
Sed dicendum, quod in Deo non est numerus simpliciter, sed numerus personarum. —Sed contra, semper ad secundum quid sequitur simpliciter, quando determinatio non est diminuens; sequitur enim: est homo albus; ergo est homo; sed non sequitur: est homo mortuus; ergo est homo. Sed hoc quod dicitur numerus personarum, non est determinatio diminuens, cum persona sit quoddam completissimum. Ergo sequitur, si est in divinis numerus personarum, quod sit ibi numerus simpliciter. 2. It will be replied that in God there is not number simply but a number of persons. —On the contrary, from a qualified statement we may always infer a simple statement provided the qualification has not the effect of diminishing: thus from the proposition, There is a white man, it follows that there is a man, but from the proposition, There is a dead man, it does not follow that there is a man. Now when we say a number of persons the qualification does not diminish since person is something most complete. Therefore if in God there is a number of persons, it follows that there is number simply.
Praeterea, uni opponitur multitudo, secundum philosophum. Sed opposita non insunt eidem. Cum ergo in Deo sit summa unitas, non potest in eo esse aliquis numerus vel aliqua pluralitas. 3. Unity is opposed to number according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 20). But opposite things are not in the same subject. Since then in God there is supreme unity there cannot be number or plurality in him.
Praeterea, ubicumque est numerus, ibi est pluralitas unitatum. Ubi autem sunt plures unitates, ibi est multiplex esse: aliud enim est esse huius unitatis, et aliud illius. Si ergo in Deo est numerus, oportet quod sit in eo multiplex essentia; quod patet esse falsum. 4. Wherever there is number there is plurality of units and where there are several units there is manifold being, because the being of one unit is distinct from the being of another unit. If then there be number in God there must be manifold being and manifold essence; which is clearly false.
Sicut unum est indivisum, ita multitudo non est sine divisione. Sed in Deo non potest esse aliqua divisio, cum non sit ibi aliqua compositio. Ergo non potest esse in divinis aliquis numerus. 5. just as unity is undivided so is there division in number. But there cannot be division in God since there is no composition in him. Therefore there cannot be number in God.
Praeterea, omnis numerus habet partes: componitur enim ex unitatibus. Sed in Deo non sunt aliquae partes, cum non sit ibi compositio. Ergo in Deo non est numerus. 6. Every number has parts, for it is composed of units. But there are no parts in God, since there is no composition in him. Therefore number is not in God.
Praeterea, illud per quod creatura differt a Deo, non debet Deo attribui. Creatura autem differt a Deo per hoc quod in numero quodam constituta est, secundum illud Sap. cap. XI, 21: omnia in numero, pondere et mensura constituisti. Numerus ergo non debet poni in divinis. 7. We should not attribute to God anything wherein the creature differs from him. Now the creature differs from God in that it is produced in, a certain number, according to Wisdom xi, 21: Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight. Therefore we should not ascribe number to God.
Praeterea, numerus est species quantitatis. In Deo autem non est aliqua quantitas; propter quod si aliquid quantitatem significans in divinam praedicationem venerit, mutatur in substantiam, ut dicit Boetius. Aut ergo numerus nullo modo est in divinis, aut ad substantiam pertinet, quod est contra fidem. 8. Number is a species of quantity. But there is no quantity in God, inasmuch as if any quantitative expression were predicated of God he would be substantially changed, as says Boethius (De Trin.). Therefore either there is no number in God, or it belongs to his substance; which is contrary to the faith.
60597] De potentia, q. 9 a. 5 arg. 9 Praeterea, ubicumque est numerus, ibi sunt numeri passiones, ut perfectum et diminutum, multiplicatio et divisio, et alia huiusmodi quae consequuntur numerum. Haec autem in Deo esse non possunt. Ergo in Deo non potest esse numerus. 9. Wheresoever is number there are those things to which number is liable, such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and division, and the like which result from number. But these cannot be in God. Therefore number cannot be in God.
Praeterea, omnis numerus finitus est. Quod ergo infinitum, non est numerabile. Ergo cum Deus sit infinitus, in eo non potest esse numerus. 10. Every number is finite. Therefore the infinite cannot be numbered. Since then God is infinite there cannot be number in him.
Sed dicendum, quod Deus etsi est infinitus nobis, est tamen finitus sibi. —Sed contra, verius competit Deo quod competit ei secundum seipsum quam quod competit ei secundum nos. Si ergo Deus est finitus sibi, infinitus autem nobis, verius est finitus, quam infinitus; quod patet esse falsum. 11. To this it might be replied that God though infinite to us is finite to himself. —On the contrary, that which belongs to God in himself is truer than that which belongs to him as compared to us. If then God is finite to himself and infinite to us he is more truly finite than infinite: and this is clearly false.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum, numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum. Deus est mensura non mensurata. Ergo in Deo non est numerus. 12. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x) number is multitude measured by unity. But God is a measure, himself unmeasured. Therefore no number is in God.
Praeterea, in omni natura quae non differt a suo supposito, impossibile est multiplicari supposita illius naturae: propter hoc enim possibile est esse plures homines in una natura humana, quia hic homo non est sua humanitas; et ideo multiplicatio individuorum in una natura humana, consequitur diversitatem principiorum individualium, quae non sunt de ratione naturae communis. In substantiis autem immaterialibus in quibus ipsa natura speciei est suppositum subsistens, non est possibile esse plura individua unius speciei. Sed in Deo est idem natura et suppositum, quia ipsum esse divinum &8212;quod est natura divina&8212; est subsistens. Impossibile est ergo quod in natura divina sint plura supposita vel plures personae. 13. In a nature that differs not from its supposit, it is impossible to have several supposits of that nature: since for this reason is it possible to have several men in the one human nature, that the individual man is not his own humanity: wherefore the multiplication of individuals in the one human nature is consequent to the diversity of individual principles, which are not part of the common nature. Whereas in immaterial substances wherein the very nature of the species is the subsisting supposit, there cannot be several individuals of one species. Now in God there is the most complete identity of nature and supposit, because the divine being itself which is the divine nature, is subsistent. Therefore there cannot be in God several supposits or persons.
Praeterea, persona est nomen rei. Ergo ubi non est numerus rerum, non est numerus personarum. Sed in Deo non est numerus rerum; dicit enim Damascenus, quod in divinis pater et filius et spiritus sanctus re quidem sunt unum, ratione autem et cogitatione differunt. Ergo in Deo non est numerus personarum. 14. Person is the name of a thing: hence where there is not a number of things there is not a number of persons. Now there is not a number of things in God: for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, xi) that in God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are really one thing, though logically and in our way of thinking they are distinct. Therefore in God there is not a number of persons.
Praeterea, impossibile est in aliquo uno esse rerum pluralitatem absque rerum compositione: Deus autem unus est. Si ergo in Deo sunt plures personae, quod est esse plures res, sequitur quod in eo sit compositio; quod simplicitati divinae repugnat. 15. There cannot be a number of things in one without composition. Now God is one: wherefore if in God there are several persons which is the same as several things, it follows. that there is composition in him, and this is incompatible with his simplicity.
Praeterea, absolutum perfectius est quam relatum. Sed proprietates absolutae, idest attributa essentialia, ut sapientia, iustitia et huiusmodi, non constituunt in Deo plures personas. Ergo nec proprietates relativae, ut paternitas et filiatio. 16. The absolute is more perfect than the relative. Now the absolute properties, namely the essential attributes such as wisdom, justice and so on, do not constitute so many persons in God. Neither therefore do the relative properties such as paternity and filiation.
Praeterea, ea quibus aliqua ab invicem distinguuntur, comparantur ad ipsa sicut differentiae constitutivae ipsorum. Si ergo personae in divinis relationibus distinguuntur, oportet quod relationes sint quasi differentiae constitutivae personarum; et ita in personis divinis erit aliqua compositio, cum differentia adveniens generi constituat speciem. 17. That which differentiates things from one another stands in relation to them as their constituent difference. If then the divine persons are distinguished by their relations, these latter must be the constituent differences of the persons; and consequently there will be composition in the divine persons, inasmuch as the difference constitutes the species by being added to the genus.
Praeterea, ea quae distinguuntur per formas specie differentes, necesse est specie differre; sicut homo et equus differunt specie sicut rationale et irrationale. Paternitas autem et filiatio sunt relationes specie differentes. Ergo si personae divinae solis relationibus distinguuntur, necesse est quod specie differant; et ita non erunt unius naturae, quod est contra fidem. 18. Things that are distinguished by specifically different, forms must themselves differ specifically: thus man and horse differ specifically as being rational and irrational. Now paternity and filiation are specifically different relations. If then the divine persons are distinguished by the relations only, they must differ specifically, and consequently will not be of one nature; which is against the faith.
Praeterea, non est intelligibile quod aliqua sint supposita diversa, quorum est unum esse. Sed in divinis non est nisi unum esse. Ergo impossibile est quod sint ibi plura supposita vel plures personae. 19. It is inconceivable that several supposits have one being. Now in God there is but one being. Therefore there cannot be several supposits or persons in him.
Praeterea, cum creatio sit proprie actio Dei, oportet quod procedat a quolibet supposito divinae naturae. Impossibile est autem quod haec actio, cum sit una, proveniat a pluribus suppositis, quia una actio non est nisi ab uno agente. Ergo impossibile est quod divinae naturae sint plura supposita sive plures personae. 20. Since creation is the proper act of God alone, it must proceed from each supposit of the divine nature. Now it is impossible that this action, inasmuch as it is one, proceed from several supposits, because one action is from but one agent. Therefore there cannot be several supposits or persons in the divine nature.
Praeterea, diversitas proprietatum non facit diversa supposita in istis inferioribus: non enim per hoc quod hic est albus et ille niger, est hoc suppositum humanae naturae aliud ab illo. Sed per diversitatem materiae individualis, quae est substantia individuorum, hoc suppositum est aliud ab illo. Si ergo in divinis non est distinctio nisi per proprietates relativas, impossibile est quod sit ibi pluralitas suppositorum vel personarum. 21. Here below, difference in properties does not make a difference in supposits: thus one supposit of human nature is not distinct from another through the one being white and the other black; but through the diversity of individual matter which is the substance of each individual. If then in God there is no distinction save that which arises from relative properties, there cannot be in him a number of supposits or persons.
Praeterea, supremae creaturae sunt Deo similiores quam infimae. In infimis autem creaturis sunt plura supposita in una natura, non autem in supremis sicut in corporibus caelestibus. Ergo nec in Deo sunt plures personae in una natura. 22. The highest creatures are more like God than the lowest. Now in the lowest creatures there are several supposits in one nature, whereas in the highest creatures, which are the heavenly bodies, there are not. Therefore in God there are not several persons in one nature.
Praeterea, quando tota perfectio speciei invenitur in uno supposito, non sunt plura supposita illius naturae, sicut philosophus probat, quod est unus tantum mundus, quia constat ex tota sua materia. Tota autem perfectio divinae naturae invenitur in uno supposito. Non ergo sunt plura supposita vel personae in una natura. 23. The Philosopher (De Coelo et Mun. i) says that when the whole perfection of a species is in one supposit there are not several supposits of that nature, and that for this reason there is but one world because it consists of its whole matter. Now the whole perfection of the divine nature is in one supposit. Therefore in the one nature there are not several supposits or persons.
Sed dicendum, quod ad plenitudinem gaudii requiritur quod sit consortium plurium in divina natura, quia nullius rei sine consortio potest esse iucunda possessio, ut dicit Boetius. Oportet etiam ad perfectionem amoris ut unus diligat alterum quantum seipsum.- Sed contra, plenitudinem gaudii et amoris habere in alio, est eius qui non habet bonitatis sufficientiam in seipso. Unde philosophus dicit, quod mali, qui non habent delectabile in seipsis, quaerunt cum aliis conversari; boni autem quaerunt conversari secum, quasi in seipsis causam iucunditatis habentes. Divina autem natura non potest esse absque omni sufficientia bonitatis. Ergo cum unum suppositum divinae naturae habeat in se omnem plenitudinem gaudii et amoris, non propter hoc oportet ponere in divinis plura supposita vel plures personas. 24. To this it may be replied that the fullness of joy requires the companionship of several in the divine nature, because there is no pleasure in possessing a thing unless we share it with a companion, according to Boethius. Moreover perfect love is to love another as oneself.—On the contrary, to depend on another for the fullness of one’s joy and love is an indication of insufficient goodness in oneself. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that the wicked through finding no pleasure in their own company seek the companionship of others: whereas the good seek to commune with themselves through finding pleasure in so doing. Now the divine nature cannot lack a sufficiency of goodness. Wherefore since one supposit of the divine nature has in himself all fullness of joy and love, there is no need to put several supposits, or persons in God.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur I Ioan. cap. V, 7: tres sunt qui testimonium dant in caelo: pater, verbum et spiritus sanctus. On the contrary it is written (1 Jo. v, 7): There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word and the Holy Spirit.
Praeterea, Athanasius dicit in symbolo: totae tres personae aeternae sibi sunt et coaequales. Ergo est in divinis numerus personarum. Again Athanasius says in the Creed: “All the three Persons are co-eternal and co-equal with one another.” Therefore in God there is a number of persons.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod pluralitas personarum in divinis est de his quae fidei subiacent, et naturali ratione humana nec investigari nec sufficienter intelligi potest; sed in patria intelligendum expectatur, cum Deus per essentiam videbitur visione fidei succedente. Sed tamen sancti patres propter instantiam eorum qui fidei contradicunt, coacti sunt et de hoc disserere, et de aliis quae spectant ad fidem, modeste tamen et reverenter absque comprehendendi praesumptione. Nec talis inquisitio est inutilis, cum per eam elevetur animus ad aliquid veritatis capiendum quod sufficiat ad excludendos errores. Unde Hilarius dicit: hoc credendo, scilicet pluralitatem personarum in divinis, incipe, percurre, persiste; et si non perventurum me sciam, tamen gratulabor profecturum. Qui enim pie infinita prosequitur, etsi non contingat aliquando, tamen proficiet prodeundo. I answer that the plurality of persons in God is an article of faith, and natural reason is unable to discuss and adequately understand it though we hope to understand it in heaven when we shall see God in his essence, and faith will be succeeded by vision. The holy fathers, however, being pressed by those who gainsaid the faith, were compelled to discuss this and other matters of belief, yet humbly and reverently withal, and avoiding any pretence to comprehension. Nor is such a discussion without its use since it enables the mind to perceive some glimpse of the truth sufficient to steer clear of error. Wherefore Hilary (De Trin. ii) says: “Believing this,” namely the plurality of persons in God, “set forth, run, persevere, and though I may know that you will not reach, I shall acclaim your progress. He who religiously pursues the infinite, although he will never catch up with it, will progress so long as he continues.”
Ad manifestationem ergo aliqualem huius quaestionis, et praecipue secundum quod Augustinus eam manifestat, considerandum est quod omne quod est perfectum in creaturis oportet Deo attribui, secundum id quod est de ratione illius perfectionis absolute; non secundum modum quo est in hoc vel in illo. Non enim bonitas est in Deo vel sapientia secundum aliquod accidens sicut in nobis, quamvis in eo sit summa bonitas et sapientia perfecta. Nihil autem nobilius et perfectius in creaturis invenitur quam intelligere; cuius signum est quod inter ceteras creaturas, intellectuales substantiae sunt nobiliores, et secundum intellectum ad Dei imaginem factae dicuntur. Oportet ergo quod intelligere Deo conveniat et omnia quae sunt de ratione eius, licet alio modo conveniat sibi quam creaturis. De ratione autem eius quod est intelligere, est quod sit intelligens et intellectum. Id autem quod est per se intellectum non est res illa cuius notitia per intellectum habetur, cum illa quandoque sit intellecta in potentia tantum, et sit extra intelligentem, sicut cum homo intelligit res materiales, ut lapidem vel animal aut aliud huiusmodi: cum tamen oporteat quod intellectum sit in intelligente, et unum cum ipso. Neque etiam intellectum per se est similitudo rei intellectae, per quam informatur intellectus ad intelligendum: intellectus enim non potest intelligere nisi secundum quod fit in actu per hanc similitudinem, sicut nihil aliud potest operari secundum quod est in potentia, sed secundum quod fit actu per aliquam formam. Haec ergo similitudo se habet in intelligendo sicut intelligendi principium, ut calor est principium calefactionis, non sicut intelligendi terminus. Hoc ergo est primo et per se intellectum, quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta, sive illud sit definitio, sive enuntiatio, secundum quod ponuntur duae operationes intellectus, in III de anima. Hoc autem sic ab intellectu conceptum dicitur verbum interius, hoc enim est quod significatur per vocem; non enim vox exterior significat ipsum intellectum, aut formam ipsius intelligibilem, aut ipsum intelligere, sed conceptum intellectus quo mediante significat rem: ut cum dico, homo vel homo est animal. Et quantum ad hoc non differt utrum intellectus intelligat se, vel intelligat aliud a se. Sicut enim cum intelligit aliud a se, format conceptum illius rei quae voce significatur, ita cum intelligit se ipsum, format conceptum sui, quod voce etiam potest exprimere. Cum ergo in Deo sit intelligere, et intelligendo seipsum intelligat omnia alia, oportet quod ponatur in ipso esse conceptio intellectus, quae est absolute de ratione eius quod est intelligere. Si autem possemus comprehendere intelligere divinum quid et quomodo est sicut comprehendimus intelligere nostrum, non esset supra rationem conceptio verbi divini, sicut neque conceptio verbi humani. Possumus tamen scire quid non sit et quomodo non sit illud intelligere; per quod possumus scire differentiam verbi concepti a Deo, et verbi concepti ab intellectu nostro. Scimus enim primo quod in Deo est tantum unum intelligere, non multiplex sicut in nobis: aliud enim est intelligere nostrum quo intelligimus lapidem et quo intelligimus plantam; sed unum est Dei intelligere, quo Deus intelligit et se et omnia alia. Et ideo intellectus noster concipit multa verba, sed verbum conceptum a Deo est unum tantum. Iterum intellectus noster imperfecte plerumque intelligit et seipsum et alia; intelligere autem divinum non potest esse imperfectum. Unde verbum divinum est perfectum, perfecte omnia repraesentans: verbum autem nostrum frequenter est imperfectum. Iterum in intellectu nostro aliud est intelligere et aliud est esse; et ideo verbum conceptum in intellectu nostro, cum procedat ab intellectu in quantum est intellectus, non unitur ei in natura, sed solum in intelligere. Intelligere autem Dei est esse eius; unde verbum quod procedit a Deo in quantum est intelligens, procedit ab eo in quantum est existens; et propter hoc verbum conceptum habet eamdem essentiam et naturam quam intellectus concipiens. Et quia quod recipit naturam in rebus viventibus dicitur genitum et filius, verbum divinum dicitur genitus et filius. Verbum autem nostrum non potest dici genitum ab intellectu nostro nec filius eius, nisi metaphorice. In order then to throw some light on this question and especially in accordance with the elucidations of Augustine, we must observe that we must attribute to God every perfection that is in creatures, as regards the essence of the perfection absolutely but not as regards the way in which it is in this or that one. Thus goodness or wisdom is not in God as an accident as it is in us, although in him is supreme goodness and perfect wisdom. Now in creatures nothing is more excellent or more perfect than to understand: a sign of which is that of all creatures intellectual substances are the highest and are said to be made to God’s image in respect of their intelligence. It follows then that understanding is in God as well as whatsoever is essential thereto, although it belongs to God in one way and to creatures in another. Now for the act of understanding it is essential that there be one who understands and something understood. And that which is understood in itself is not the thing that is known by the intellect, since this thing is at one time only potentially understood and is outside the person who understands, as when a man understands a material thing, for instance a stone, an animal or something of the kind: whereas the thing understood must be in the person who understands and must be one with him. Now the intelligible species is the likeness of the thing understood, which likeness informs the intellect for the purpose of understanding. For the intellect cannot understand except in so far as it is actuated by this likeness, just as nothing else can act as being in potentiality but only as actuated by a form. Accordingly this likeness is as the principle in the act of understanding, just as heat is the principle of calefaction, and not as the term of understanding, Consequently that which is the first and direct object in the act of understanding is something that the intellect conceives within itself about the thing understood, whether it be a definition or proposition according to the two operations of the intellect mentioned in De Anima, III. Now this concept of the intellect is called the interior word and is signified by means of speech: for the spoken word does not signify merely the thing understood, or the intelligible form thereof or the act of understanding, but the concept of the intellect through which it signifies the thing: as when I say, man, or, Man is an animal. And in this respect it matters not whether the intellect understands itself, or something else: since just as when it understands another thing from itself it forms a concept of that thing which is expressed orally, so also when it understands itself it forms a concept of itself which also can be expressed by word of mouth. Since then in God there is the act of understanding, and since in understanding himself he understands all other things, it follows that there must be in him an intellectual concept which is absolutely essential to the act of understanding. And if we were able to comprehend the divine act of understanding so as to grasp what it is and how it takes place, just as we grasp our own act of understanding, the conception of the divine Word would not surpass reason as neither does the conception of the human word. We can, however, know what it is not and understand how it is not: and thus we are able to know the difference between the Word conceived by God and the word conceived by us. Thus first of all we know that in God there is but one act of understanding and not many as in us: for our act of understanding a stone is distinct from our act of understanding a plant: whereas God by one act understands himself and all else. Hence our intellect conceives many words, but the Word conceived by God is but one. Again our intellect frequently understands both itself and other things imperfectly; whereas God’s act of understanding cannot be imperfect. Hence God’s Word is perfect, representing all things perfectly, while our word is often imperfect. Again, in our intellect, understanding and being are distinct, wherefore the word conceived in our intellect, since it proceeds from our intellect as such, is not united to it in nature but in the act of understanding. Whereas God’s act of understanding is his being, so that the Word which proceeds from God as understanding proceeds from him as existing: and for this reason the conceived Word has the same essence and nature as the conceiving intellect. And because that which in living things is the recipient of nature, is said to be begotten and is called a son, the Word of God is ‘ said to be begotten and is called the Son. Whereas our word cannot be described as begotten of our intellect or as its son, except metaphorically.
Sic ergo relinquitur quod cum verbum intellectus nostri ab intellectu differat in duobus, in hoc scilicet et quod est ab eo, et est alterius naturae, subtracta a divino verbo naturae differentia, ut ostensum est, relinquitur quod sit differentia secundum hoc solum quod est ab alio. Cum ergo differentia causet numerum, relinquitur quod in Deo sit solum numerus relationum. Relationes autem in divinis non sunt accidentia, sed unaquaeque earum est realiter divina essentia. Unde et unaquaeque earum est subsistens, sicut divina essentia; et sicut divinitas est idem quod Deus, ita paternitas est idem quod pater, et per hoc pater idem quod Deus. Numerus ergo relationum est numerus rerum subsistentium in divina natura. Res autem subsistentes in divina natura sunt divinae personae, ut ex praecedenti articulo patet. Et propter hoc ponimus personarum numerum in divinis. Accordingly since the word of our intellect is distinct from our intellect in two respects, namely in that it proceeds from it, and is of a different nature, and seeing that difference of nature must be removed from the divine Word (Q. viii, A. i), the only remaining distinction is that it proceeds from another. And whereas difference causes number it follows that the only number in God is that of relations. Now in God relations are not accidents, but each one is the divine essence in reality. Wherefore each of them like the divine essence is subsistent: and just as the Godhead is the same thing as God, so is Paternity the same thing as the Father, and therefore the Father is the same thing as God. Accordingly the number of relations is the number of things subsistent in the divine nature, and these are the three persons as appears from the preceding Article. For this reason then we place a number of persons in God.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Boetius per verba illa intendit excludere numerum a divina essentia; de hoc enim agit. Reply to the, First Objection. By these words Boethius means to exclude number from the divine essence: for this is the point of his discussion.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet personae, in quantum sunt subsistentes, non habeant quod diminuant de ratione numeri, habent hoc tamen in quantum sunt relationes; nam distinctio secundum relationes est minima, sicut et relatio minimum habent de ente inter omnia genera. Reply to the Second Objection. Although the persons considered as subsistent do not detract from the idea of number, they do so considered as relations: because relative distinction is the least of all distinctions just as relation itself of all the genera has the least being.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod unitas et pluralitas attribuuntur Deo non secundum idem, sed unitas secundum essentiam, pluralitas secundum personas; vel unitas secundum absoluta, pluralitas secundum relationes. Reply to the Third Objection. Unity and number are both attributed to God but not in the same respect: unity in respect of the essence, number in respect of the persons: or unity in respect of absolutes, number in respect of relations.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum pluralitas unitatum ex aliqua distinctione causetur, ubi est distinctio secundum esse, oportet quod unitates secundum esse differant; ubi autem est distinctio secundum relationes, oportet quod unitates ex quibus consistit pluralitas, solum relationibus ab invicem distinguantur. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Since plurality of units is caused by a distinction, if this distinction be one of being the units must differ in being: but where the distinction is one of relation, the units that compose the number must differ only relatively from one another.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod quaelibet distinctio sufficit ad pluralitatem similem constituendam. Unde, sicut in Deo non est divisio secundum absoluta &8212;quae sine compositione esse non potest&8212; sed solum distinctio relationum; ita non est in Deo pluralitas quantum ad absoluta, sed solum quantum ad relationes, ut iam dictum est. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Any kind of distinction suffices to cause a plurality of like kind. Wherefore as in God there is no distinction in that which is absolute (which distinction is inseparable from composition) but only a distinction of relations, even so in God there is not plurality in respect of what is absolute, but only in respect of relations, as already stated.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod unitates semper sunt partes numeri, si loquamur de numero absoluto quo numeramus; si autem loquamur de numero qui est in rebus, tunc non est ratio totius et partis in numero, nisi sicut invenitur totum et pars in rebus numeratis. Diversae autem relationes in divinis non sunt partes, sicut paternitas et filiatio non sunt partes Socratis, quamvis sit pater et filius diversorum. Unde nec unitates relationum comparantur ad numerum relationum ut partes. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The parts of a number are always units if we speak of absolute number whereby we count. But if we take number as it is in things, then the idea of whole and part does not apply to number itself but to the things numbered. Now the different relations in God are not parts: thus fatherhood and sonship are not parts of Socrates, although he is father of one and son of another. Wherefore neither are the units of the relations compared as parts to the number of relations.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod creatura differt a Deo in hoc quod producitur in numero essentialium principiorum. Talis autem non est numerus personarum. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The creature differs from God in that it is produced in a number of essential principles. But this kind of number is not that of the persons.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod numerus qui est species quantitatis, causatur ex divisione continui; unde sicut quantitas continua est quid mathematicum &8212;quia est separata a materia sensibili secundum rationem, et non secundum esse&8212; ita et numerus qui est species quantitatis, qui est etiam subiectum arithmeticae, cuius principium est unum quod est prima mensura quantitatis. Unde patet quod hic numerus non potest esse in rebus immaterialibus, sed est in eis multitudo, quae opponitur uni quod convertitur cum ente; quae quidem causatur ex divisione formali, quae est per quasdam formas oppositas, vel absolutas vel relativas. Et talis numerus est in divinis. Reply to the Eighth Objection. The number which is a species of quantity is caused by a division of a continuous quantity: wherefore just as continuous quantity relates to mathematics, because it is separated from sensible matter logically and not in reality, so also number which is a species of quantity is the subject-matter of arithmetic the principle whereof is unity that is the first measure of quantity. Hence it is plain that number of this kind cannot be in immaterial things; but in them is multitude that is opposed to the unity that is convertible with being: and this is caused by formal division which is into opposite forms whether absolute or relative: and such is number in God.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod illae passiones consequuntur numerum qui est species quantitatis, qui non competit in divinis, ut dictum est. Reply to the Ninth Objection. Number that is a species of quantity is liable to such things: but this kind of number is not in God, as stated above.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod Deus est infinitus secundum perfectionem magnitudinis et sapientiae et huiusmodi: unde in Ps. CXLVI, 5, dicitur, quod sapientiae eius non est numerus; sed processio in divinis, secundum quam multiplicantur personae divinae, non est in infinitum; non enim est immoderata divina generatio, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Trinit.; et ideo nec personarum numerus est infinitus. Reply to the Tenth Objection. God is infinite in the perfection of greatness, wisdom and the like, wherefore it is written (Ps. cxlvi, 5) that of his wisdom there is no number: but procession in God, by reason of which there are several divine persons, does not tend to the indefinite, for as Augustine says (De Trin.) the divine generation is not immoderate: therefore neither is the number of persons infinite.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod Deus dicitur esse finitus sibi, non quia cognoscat se esse finitum, sed quia ita comparatur ad se sicut ad nos comparantur finita, in quantum comprehendit seipsum. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. God is said to be finite to himself, not that he knows himself to be finite, but because he is compared to himself as we to finite things, in that he comprehends himself.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod illa definitio datur de numero secundum quod est in genere quantitatis, ad quod pertinet ratio mensurae. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. This is the definition of number as a kind of quantity to which the idea of measure is applicable.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod in rebus creatis principia individuantia duo habent: quorum unum est quod sunt principium subsistendi (natura enim communis de se non subsistit nisi in singularibus); aliud est quod per principia individuantia supposita naturae communis ab invicem distinguuntur. In divinis autem proprietates personales hoc solum habent quod supposita divinae naturae ab invicem distinguuntur, non autem sunt principium subsistendi divinae essentiae: ipsa enim divina essentia est secundum se subsistens; sed e converso proprietates personales habent quod subsistant ab essentia: ex eo enim paternitas habet quod sit res subsistens, quia essentia divina, cui est idem secundum rem, est res subsistens; ut inde sequatur quod sicut essentia divina est Deus, ita paternitas est pater. Et ex hoc est etiam quod essentia divina non multiplicatur secundum numerum ex pluralitate suorum suppositorum, sicut accidit in istis inferioribus. Nam ex eo aliquid secundum numerum multiplicatur, ex quo subsistentiam habet. Licet autem divina essentia secundum seipsam, ut ita dicam, individuetur, quantum ad hoc quod est per se subsistere, tamen, ipsa una existente secundum numerum, sunt in divinis plura supposita ab invicem distincta per relationes subsistentes. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. In created things the principles of individuality exercise two functions. The one is that they are the principle of subsistence (since the common nature does not subsist by itself except in the individual): and the other is that they distinguish the supposits; of the common nature from one another. But in God the personal properties only distinguish the supposits of the divine nature from one another, while they are not the principles of subsistence of the divine essence (since the divine essence is subsistent in itself) but on the contrary subsist by the essence; thus Paternity is a subsistent thing because. the divine essence with which it is identical is a subsistent thing: so that it follows that as the divine essence is God, so is Paternity the Father. And hence it follows likewise that the divine essence is not numerically multiplied by reason of the multiplicity of its supposits, as happens here below. Because a thing is multiplied on account of that which gives it subsistence: and although the divine essence is so to speak individualized by itself as regards its self-subsistence, yet though it is itself one in number there are several supposits in God mutually distinct by subsistent relations.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod si pater et filius et spiritus sanctus non re, sed solum ratione differunt, nihil prohibet unum de altero praedicari: sicut vestis et tunica de se invicem praedicantur; et similiter pater esset filius, et e converso; quod est haeresis Sabellianae. Unde dicendum est, quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt tres res, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. I de Doctr. Christ., si tamen res pro re relativa accipiatur; si enim sumatur pro absoluto, sic sunt una res, ut idem Augustinus dicit. Et hoc modo sumendum est quod Damascenus dicit, quod sunt unum re. Quod autem dicit, quod ratione tantum distinguuntur, communiter exponitur, id est relatione. Nam relatio etsi per comparationem ad relationem oppositam, distinctionem realem faciat in divinis, tamen ab essentia divina non differt nisi ratione; cum hoc etiam relatio inter omnia genera debiliori modo res est. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. If the Father, Son and Holy Spirit differed from one another logically and not really, there would be no reason why one should not be predicated of the other: even so a shirt and an undergarment may be predicated of each other; and in like manner the Father would be the Son and vice versa: which is the heresy of Sabellius. Hence we must reply that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three things, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5), provided thing be taken for a relative thing: for if it be taken as absolute, then they are but one thing, as again Augustine says. In this sense we must take the words of Damascene where he says that they are really one. And when he says that they differ only logically, this is generally understood to mean relatively. For although a relation as compared with the opposite relation makes a real distinction in God, it does not differ save logically from the divine essence. Moreover relation of all the genera is the least stable in point of reality.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod pluralitas rerum in divinis est pluralitas relationum subsistentium oppositarum, ex quo non sequitur compositio in divinis. Nam relatio, comparata ad essentiam divinam, non differt re, sed ratione solum; unde non facit compositionem cum ipsa, sicut nec bonitas nec aliud essentialium attributorum; sed per comparationem ad oppositam relationem est pluralitas rerum, non tamen compositio; quia relationes oppositae, in quantum huiusmodi, ab invicem distinguuntur. Compositio vero non est ex aliquibus distinctis in quantum distincta sunt. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. In God plurality of things is plurality of subsistent opposite relations, and this does not cause composition in God: because relation as compared to the divine essence differs not really but only logically. Hence it does not enter into composition with it, as neither does goodness nor any other of the essential attributes: whereas if we compare it with the opposite relation there are several things, but not composition; because opposite relations as such are distinct from each other: and composition is not of distinct things as such.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod attributa essentialia nullam ad invicem habent oppositionem sicut relationes; et ideo licet subsistant sicut relationes, non tamen constituunt pluralitatem suppositorum ab invicem distinctorum, cum pluralitas distinctionem sequatur; distinctio vero formalis fit ex aliqua oppositione. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The essential attributes are in no way opposed to one another as the relations are: wherefore although like the relations they subsist, they do not constitute a plurality of mutually distinct supposits, since plurality follows distinction: and formal distinction arises from opposition.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod in divinis non differt quod significatur per modum formae et quod significatur per modum suppositi: ut divinitas et Deus, paternitas et pater; et ideo non oportet quod, licet proprietates relativae sint quasi differentiae constituentes personas, faciant compositionem aliquam cum personis constitutis. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. In God there is no difference between what is signified as a form and what is signified as a supposit: for instance, Godhead and God, Paternity and Father. Hence although the relative properties are by way of constituent differences of the persons, it does not follow that they enter into composition with the persons thus constituted.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod licet pater et filius non distinguantur ab invicem nisi paternitate et filiatione, non tamen oportet quod pater et filius quasi specie differant in divinis: quia paternitas et filiatio sunt relationes secundum speciem diversae. Non enim istae relationes se habent ad divinas personas ut speciem dantes, sed magis ut supposita distinguentes et constituentes. Illud autem quod se habet ad personas divinas ut speciem dans, est natura divina, in qua filius est similis patri: nam generans generat sibi similem secundum speciem, non secundum individuales proprietates. Sicut ergo Socrates et Plato licet non distinguerentur ad invicem individualiter nisi albedine et nigredine, quae sunt diversae qualitates secundum speciem, non tamen specie differrent: quia id quod est species albo et nigro, non est species Socrati et Platoni; ita nec sequitur quod pater et filius specie differant propter differentiam paternitatis et filiationis secundum speciem: licet in divinis non possit proprie dici aliquid differre secundum speciem, cum non sit ibi species et genus. Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. Although the Father and the Son are not distinct from each other except by paternity and filiation, it does not follow that because paternity and filiation are specifically different relations in God there is therefore a kind of specific difference between Father and Son: for these relations do not specify the divine persons, but rather distinguish and constitute the supposits. That which specifies the divine persons is the divine nature wherein the Son is like the Father. Because the begetter begets his like in species and not in individual properties. Accordingly just as Socrates and Plato, even if the only difference between them as individuals were that one is black and the other white (which are specifically different qualities) would not differ themselves specifically; since that which is a species to white and black is not a species to Socrates and Plato: even so the specific difference between paternity and filiation does not cause a specific difference between Father and Son. And yet in God it cannot be said properly that anything differs specifically, inasmuch as species and genus are not in him.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod omnino concedendum est quod in divinis non sit nisi unum esse: cum esse semper ad essentiam pertineat, et praecipue in Deo, cuius esse est sua essentia. Relationes autem quae distinguunt supposita in divinis, non addunt aliud esse super esse essentiae, quia non faciunt compositionem cum essentia, ut dictum est. Omnis autem forma addens aliquod esse super esse substantiale, facit compositionem cum substantia, et ipsum esse est accidentale, sicut esse albi et nigri. Diversitas ergo secundum esse sequitur pluralitatem suppositorum, sicut et diversitas essentiae, in rebus creatis. Neutrum autem in divinis. Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. It must by no means be granted that there is more than one being in God: seeing that being always refers to essence and especially in God whose being is his essence. But the relations which distinguish the supposits in God do not add another being to the being of the essence, because they do not enter into composition with the essence, as already stated. And every form that adds being to the substantial being enters into composition with the substance, and its being is accidental, for instance, the being of white and black. Accordingly difference in respect of being follows plurality of supposits, just as difference of essence in creatures: but neither of these obtains in God.
Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod operatio egreditur ab agente ratione formae vel virtutis, quae est principium operationis; et ideo nihil prohibet a tribus personis, quae sunt unius naturae et virtutis, unam creationem procedere: sicut si trium calidorum esset unus numero calor, una numero ab eis calefactio proveniret. Reply to the Twentieth Objection. Operation issues from the agent in ratio to the form or power that is the principle of the operation: wherefore there is no reason why the one creation should not proceed from the three Persons since they are of one nature and power: thus if three hot things had the same identical heat, one identical heating would issue from them.
Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod formae individuantes in rebus creatis non sunt subsistentes sicut in divinis; et ideo non est simile. Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. The individualizing forms in creatures are not subsistent as in God: hence the comparison fails.
Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod in rebus creatis ad multitudinem suppositorum sequitur multiplicatio essentiae, quod non accidit in divinis; unde ratio non sequitur. Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. In creatures multiplication of essence entails multiplication of supposits,: but this is not the case in God; wherefore the conclusion does not follow.
Ad vicesimumtertium dicendum quod, licet tota et perfecta divinitas sit in qualibet trium personarum secundum proprium modum existendi, tamen ad perfectionem divinitatis pertinet ut sint plures modi existendi in divinis ut scilicet sit ibi a quo alius et ipse a nullo, et aliquis qui est ab alio. Non enim esset omnimoda perfectio in divinis, nisi esset ibi processio verbi et amoris. Reply to the Twenty-third Objection. Although the Godhead is wholly and perfectly in each of the three Persons according to its proper mode of existence, yet it belongs to the perfection of the Godhead that there be several modes of existence in God, namely that there be one from whom another proceeds yet proceeds from no other, and one proceeding from another. For there would not be absolute perfection in God unless there were in him procession of word and love.
Ad vicesimumquartum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit ac si divinae personae per essentiam distinguerentur. Sic enim plenitudo gaudii quam habet pater in filio, esset in aliquo extrinseco, et non haberet pater hoc in seipso; sed quia filius est in patre ut verbum ipsius, non posset esse patri plenum gaudium de seipso nisi in filio; sicut nec homo de seipso gaudet nisi per conceptionem quam de seipso habet. Reply to the Twenty-fourth Objection. This argument takes it for granted that the divine persons differ in essence. For thus the fullness of delight that the Father has in the Son would be in something extrinsic and the Father would not have it in himself; but because the Son is in the Father as his Word, the Father could not have perfect joy in himself except in the Son; even so a, man does not delight in himself except through the concept he has of himself.

Q. IX:
ARTICLE VI
In Speaking of God Can the Word ‘Person’ Be Rightly Predicated in the Plural?


[Sum. Th. I, Q. xxx, A. 4]
Sexto quaeritur utrum nomen personae convenienter possit praedicari pluraliter in divinis. Et videtur quod non. THE sixth point of inquiry is whether when we speak of God we may rightly use the word person in the plural: and seemingly not.
Persona enim est substantia, ut ex definitione Boetii patet. Sed substantia non praedicatur pluraliter in divinis. Ergo nec persona. 1. A person is a substance, as appears from the definition of Boethius. But substance in God is not predicated in the plural. Neither therefore is person.
Praeterea, alia nomina absoluta praedicantur tantum singulariter in divinis, ut sapiens, bonus et huiusmodi. Sed hoc nomen persona est nomen absolutum. Ergo non debet praedicari pluraliter in divinis. 2. Other absolute names in God are only predicated in the singular, for instance wise, good and so forth. Now the word person is an absolute term. Therefore in God it should not be predicated in the plural.
Item, nomen personae a subsistendo sumi videtur, cum significet individuum in genere substantiae, et persona dicatur quasi per se una. Subsistere autem ad essentiam pertinere videtur, quae non multiplicatur in divinis. Ergo nec nomen personae pluraliter potest praedicari. 3. The word person apparently is taken from subsistence, inasmuch as it denotes an individual in the genus substance, and is so to speak one by itself (per se una). Now subsistence would seem to pertain to the essence, and this is not multiplied in God. Therefore the word person should not be predicated in the plural.
Sed dicendum, quod licet subsistere sumatur ab essentia, tamen dicere possumus quod in divinis sunt tres subsistentes, et similiter quod tres personae. —Sed contra, ea quae significant essentiam in divinis, non possunt praedicari pluraliter, nisi sint adiectiva, quae non trahunt numerum a forma significata, sed a suppositis, cum e converso sit in substantivis. Unde dicimus, quod in Deo sunt tres aeterni, si ly aeterni adiective sumatur; si vero substantive, tunc verum est quod Athanasius dicit in Symb. quod non sunt tres aeterni, sed unus aeternus. Hoc autem nomen persona est substantivum, non adiectivum. Ergo non debet praedicari in plurali. 4. To this it will be replied that even if subsistence be derived from essence, we can still say that there are three subsistents in God, and likewise three persons. —On the contrary terms that signify the divine essence cannot be predicated in the plural unless they be adjectives which do not take their number from the form signified but from the supposits, whereas the contrary obtains in substantives. Hence we may say that in God there are three eternal, if eternal be an adjective, whereas if it be a substantive then the words of Athanasius are true: “Not three eternals but one eternal.” Now person is a substantive and not an adjective. Therefore it should not be predicated in the plural.
Praeterea, licet adiectiva essentialia praedicentur pluraliter in divinis, tamen formae significatae non praedicantur pluraliter, sed singulariter tantum. Etsi enim aliquo modo dicamus pluraliter tres aeternos in divinis, nullo tamen modo dicimus tres aeternitates. Etsi ergo aliquo modo possit dici quod sint tres personae in divinis, nullo tamen modo poterit dici quod sint tres personalitates. 5. Although essential adjectives are predicated of God in the plural, the forms signified by them are not predicated in the plural but only in the singular. Thus although in a certain sense we may use the plural in predicating eternal of God, in no way do we speak of three eternities. Therefore although in a sense we may speak of three persons in God, by no means may we say that there are three personalities.
Praeterea, sicut Deus significat divinitatem habentem, ita persona divina significat subsistentem in divinitate. Sed sicut dicimus in divinis tres subsistentes in divinitate, ita tres habentes divinitatem. Si ergo hac ratione potest dici quod in divinis sint tres personae, similiter poterit dici quod sint ibi tres dii, quod est haereticum. 6. just as God signifies one who has Godhead, so a divine person denotes one who subsists in the Godhead. Now just as we speak of three subsisting in the Godhead so do we speak of three having the Godhead. If then this suffices for us to say that there are three persons in God, we may also say that there are three Gods, which is heretical.
Praeterea, Boetius dicit, quod ideo non sunt tres dii, quia Deus non differt a Deo in divinitate. Sed similiter persona divina non differt a persona divina aliqua personalitatis differentia, ut videtur, cum commune sit eis hoc quod est esse personam. Ergo persona non potest pluraliter praedicari in divinis. 7. Boethius (De Trin.) says that there are not three Gods because God does not differ from God in the Godhead. But in like manner seemingly one divine person does not differ from another by a personal difference, since it is common to them to be a person. Therefore person cannot be predicated of God in the plural.
Sed contra. Est quod Augustinus dicit, quod quaerentibus quid tres essent pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, responsum est, quod sunt tres personae. Ergo persona pluraliter in divinis praedicatur. On the contrary Augustine says (De Trin. vii. 4) that when we ask, “what are these three, Father, Son and Holy Spirit?” the reply is: “Three persons.” Therefore person is predicated of God in the plural.
Praeterea, Athanasius dicit, ubi Sup., quod alia est persona patris, alia filii, alia spiritus sancti. Distinctio autem est causa numeri. Ergo persona pluraliter debet praedicari in divinis. Again Athanasius says (loc. cit.) that “one is the person of the Father, another that of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit.” Now otherness is the cause of number, therefore person must be predicated of God in the plural.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod nomina substantiva, sicut iam supra dictum est, trahunt numerum a forma significata, adiectiva vero a suppositis. Cuius ratio est, quia nomina substantiva significant per modum substantiae, adiectiva vero per modum accidentis quod individuatur et multiplicatur per subiectum, substantia vero per seipsam. Cum ergo hoc nomen persona sit substantivum, oportet ex forma significata ipsius considerare, utrum possit pluraliter praedicari. Forma autem significata nomine personae non est natura absolute: quia sic idem significaretur nomine hominis et nomine personae humanae, quod patet esse falsum; sed nomine personae significatur formaliter incommunicabilitas, sive individualitas subsistentis in natura, sicut ex praemissis patet. Cum ergo proprietates facientes esse distinctum et incommunicabile in divinis sint plures, oportet quod nomen personae pluraliter praedicetur in divinis; sicut etiam in humanis pluraliter praedicatur nomen personae propter pluralitatem principiorum individuantium. I answer that substantives, as stated above, take their number from the form signified, and adjectives from the supposits: and the reason of this is that substantives signify after the manner of a substance, while adjectives signify after the manner of an accident which is individualized and multiplied by its subject, but a substance by itself. Accordingly seeing that person is a substantive the possibility of its being predicated in the plural depends on the form signified thereby. Now the form signified by the word person is not the nature absolutely, for in that case man and human person would mean the same thing which is clearly false: but person formally signifies incommunicability or individuality of one subsisting in a nature, as we have clearly explained. Since then there are several properties which cause a distinct and incommunicable being in God, it follows that person is predicated of God in the plural, even as it is predicated of man on account of the manifold individualizing principles.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod persona est substantia individua, quae est hypostasis; et hoc pluraliter praedicatur, sicut patet ex usu Graecorum. Reply to the First Objection. A person is an individual substance which is a hypostasis: and this is predicated in the plural as is evident from its use in Greek.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod nomen personae est absolutum ex modo significandi; significat tamen relationem, sicut ex praemissis patet. Reply to the Second Objection. person is an absolute term from its mode of signification: and yet it signifies a relation, as stated above.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod nomen personae non designat hoc solum quod est subsistere, quod videtur ad essentiam pertinere, sed etiam hoc quod est distinctum esse et incommunicabile, quod est propter proprietates relativas in divinis. Reply to the Third Objection. The word person indicates not only subsistence which apparently belongs to the essence, but also distinction and incommunicability, which are due to the relative properties in God.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod forma significata per nomen personae non est essentia absolute, sed illud quod est principium incommunicabilitatis sive individuationis; et ideo pluraliter praedicatur, licet sit nomen substantivum: et propter hoc etiam, quia sunt plures proprietates distinguentes in divinis, dicuntur esse plures personalitates. Reply to the Fourth Objection. The form signified by the word person is not the essence taken absolutely, but is that which is the principle of incommunicability or individuation. For this reason is it predicated in the plural, although it is a substantive. And for this reason also, since there are several distinctive properties in God there are said to be several personalities.
Unde patet solutio ad quintum. Wherefore the Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod hoc nomen persona significat subsistentem in natura divina, cum distinctione et incommunicabilitate; hoc autem nomen Deus significat habentem divinam naturam nihil importans de distinctione vel incommunicabilitate; ideo non est simile. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The word person signifies one that subsists in the divine nature distinctly and incommunicably: whereas the word God signifies one who has the divine nature without reference to distinction or incommunicability: hence the comparison fails.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod licet Deus a Deo non differat aliqua differentia divinitatis &8212;quia non est nisi una divinitas numero&8212; persona tamen divina differt a persona divina differentia personalitatis, quia ad personalitatem pertinet in divinis etiam proprietas distinguens personas. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although God differs not from God by a difference in the Godhead, for there is only one Godhead: yet divine person differs from divine person by a difference of personality, since in God personality includes also the property that distinguishes the persons.

Q. IX:
ARTICLE VII
Are Numeral Terms Predicated of the Divine Persons?


[Sum. Th. I, Q. xxx, A. 3]
Septimo quaeritur quomodo termini numerales praedicentur de divinis personis, utrum scilicet positive vel remotive tantum. Et videtur quod positive. THE seventh point of inquiry is as to how numeral terms are predicated of the divine persons, whether positively or only negatively: and it would seem that they are predicated positively.
Si enim nihil ponunt in divinis, tunc qui dicit tres personas, nihil dicit quod sit in Deo. Ergo et qui negat tres personas, nihil negat de Deo quod sit in ipso. Non ergo contra veritatem loquitur, et ita non est haereticus. 1. If they signify nothing positive in God, then by affirming three persons we do not speak of something that is in God. Therefore by denying three persons one would not deny anything that is in God: and consequently one would not say that which is untrue nor would one be a heretic.
Praeterea, secundum Dionysium in Lib. de Divin. Nom., tribus modis dicitur aliquid de Deo: scilicet per negationem, per eminentiam et per causam. Quocumque autem istorum modorum termini numerales praedicentur in divinis, oportet quod aliquid ponant. Quod quidem manifestum est, si quidem praedicentur per eminentiam vel per causam similiter autem et si praedicentur negative. Non enim sic aliqua negantur de Deo, ut idem Dionysius dicit, quasi omnino ei desint, sed quia non eodem modo ei conveniunt sicut et nobis. Oportet ergo omnibus modis quod termini numerales aliquid ponant. 2. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom.) things are predicated of God in three ways: negatively, eminently and causally. Now in whichever of these three senses numeral terms are predicated of God they must needs have’ a positive signification. This is evident if they be predicated eminently or causally: and likewise if they be predicated negatively. For as the same Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii; Div. Nom. iv, xi) we do not deny things of God as though he lacked them altogether, but because they are not appropriate to him in the same way as they are to us. Therefore in any way numeral terms must have a positive meaning as applied to God.
Praeterea, quidquid praedicatur de Deo et creaturis, nobiliori modo de Deo quam de creaturis praedicatur. Termini autem numerales de creaturis praedicantur positive. Ergo multo magis de Deo. 3. Whatsoever is predicated of God and creatures is affirmed in a more eminent sense of God than of creatures. Now numeral terms are predicated of creatures positively. Therefore with much more reason are they thus predicated of God.
Praeterea, multitudo et unitas importata per terminos numerales, secundum quod praedicatur de Deo, non sunt in intellectu tantum: quia sic non essent tres personae in Deo nisi secundum intellectum; quod pertinet ad haeresim Sabellianam. Ergo oportet quod sint aliquid in ipso Deo secundum rem; et ita positive de Deo dicuntur. 4. Plurality and unity as implied by the numeral terms when predicated of God are not mere mental concepts, for thus there would not be three persons in God save logically, which belongs to the heresy of Sabellius. Therefore they must be something really in God, and consequently predicated of him positively.
Praeterea, sicut unum est in genere quantitatis, ita bonum est in genere qualitatis; in Deo autem nec est quantitas nec qualitas nec aliquod accidens; et tamen bonum non praedicatur de Deo remotive sed positive. Ergo similiter unum, et per consequens multitudo, quam constituit unum. 5. As unity is in the genus of quantity, so is good in the genus of quality. Now in God there is neither quantity nor quality nor any accident, and yet goodness is predicated of God not negatively but positively. Therefore unity is predicated of him in the same way, and consequently plurality which is based on unity.
Praeterea, quatuor prima entia dicuntur, scilicet ens, unum, verum et bonum. Sed tria eorum, scilicet ens, verum et bonum, dicuntur de Deo positive. Ergo et unum, et per consequens multitudo. 6. There are four transcendentals, namely being, unity, truth and goodness. Now three of these, to wit being, truth and goodness, are predicated of God positively. Therefore unity is also and consequently plurality.
Praeterea, multitudo et magnitudo pertinent ad duas species quantitatis, quae sunt discreta quantitas et continua. Sed magnitudo praedicatur de Deo positive, cum dicitur Ps. CXLVI, 5: magnus dominus et magna virtus eius. Ergo et multitudo et unum. 7. Number and magnitude are two species of quantity, namely discrete and continuous quantity. Now magnitude is predicated of God positively (Ps. cxlvi, 5): Great is our Lord and great is his Power. Therefore multitude and unity are also.
Praeterea, creaturae Dei similitudinem praeferunt, secundum quod in eis vestigium divinitatis apparet. Sed secundum Augustinum, quaelibet creatura vestigium quoddam divinae Trinitatis in se habet, in quantum est aliquid unum et specie formatur et ordinem aliquem habet. Ergo creatura est una ad similitudinem Dei. Sed unum praedicatur de creatura positive: ergo et de Deo. 8. Creatures are like God inasmuch as they bear a trace of the Godhead. Now according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 10) every creature bears a trace of the divine Trinity, inasmuch as it is “one particular thing, informed by a species,” and “has a certain order.” Therefore the creature is one in its likeness to God. Now one is predicated of a creature positively: and therefore of God also.
Praeterea, si unum praedicatur de Deo privative, oportet quod aliquid removeat, et non nisi multitudinem. Multitudinem autem non removet; non enim sequitur, si est una persona, quod non sint plures. Unum ergo non dicitur remotive de Deo, et per consequens nec multitudo. 9. If one be predicated of God in a privative sense, it follows that it removes something, and this can only be plurality. Now it does not remove plurality, since if there be one person it does not follow that there are not more. Therefore one is not said of God by way of remotion: and consequently neither is number.
Praeterea, privatio nihil constituit. Unum autem constituit multitudinem. Non ergo dicitur privative. 10. Privation constitutes nothing: whereas unity constitutes number. Therefore the latter is not predicated in a privative sense.
Praeterea, nulla privatio est in Deo, quia privatio omnis pertinet ad defectum. Unum autem praedicatur de Deo. Ergo non significat privationem. 11. There is no privation in God, since all privation is a defect. Now one is predicated of God. Therefore it does not denote a privation.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod quidquid praedicatur de Deo, praedicatur secundum substantiam, vel secundum relationem. Et Boetius etiam dicit, quod omnia quae veniunt in divinam praedicationem, mutantur in substantiam praeter ad aliquid. Si ergo termini numerales praedicantur de Deo, oportet quod significent substantiam vel relationem; et ita oportet quod positive de Deo praedicentur. 12. Augustine says (De Trin. v, 5) that whatsoever is predicated of God indicates either substance or relation. And Boethius (De Trin. iv) says that whatsoever is predicated of God refers to the substance except relative terms. If then numeral terms are predicated of God they must denote either the substance or a relation, and consequently must be predicated positively.
Praeterea, unum et ens convertuntur et videntur esse synonyma. Sed ens praedicatur de Deo positive. Ergo et unum, et per consequens multitudo. 13. One and being are convertible terms and are apparently synonymous. Now being is predicated of God positively. Therefore one is also and consequently number.
Praeterea, si unum praedicatur de Deo remotive, oportet quod removeat multitudinem tamquam sibi oppositam. Hoc autem non potest esse, cum multitudo constituatur ex unitatibus; unum autem oppositorum non constituitur ex alio. Ergo unum non praedicatur de Deo remotive. 14. If one be predicated of God by way of remotion, it must remove number as being contrary thereto. But this cannot be the case, since number is constituted by units: and one contrary is not made up of the other. Therefore one is not predicated of God by way of remotion.
Praeterea, si unum dicitur per remotionem multitudinis, oportet quod unum opponatur multitudini, sicut privatio habitui. Habitus autem est naturaliter prior privatione, et etiam secundum rationem, quia privatio non potest definiri nisi per habitum. Ergo multitudo erit prior uno secundum naturam et secundum rationem; quod videtur inconveniens. 15. If one indicate the removal of number, it follows that one is opposed to number as privation to habit. Now habit is naturally prior to privation: as well as logically, since privation cannot be defined except in reference to habit. Therefore number will precede unity both naturally and logically: which is apparently absurd.
Praeterea, si unum et multa in divinis praedicantur remotive, oportet quod unum removeat multitudinem et multitudo removeat unitatem. Hoc autem est inconveniens, quia sequeretur circulus unius et multi, ut dicatur, quod unum est quod non est multa, et multa sunt quae non sunt unum; et sic per ista nihil fieret notum. Non est ergo dicendum, quod unum et multa in Deo dicantur privative. 16. If one and number are predicated of God by way of remotion, then one removes number and number removes unity. But this cannot be admitted, since it would lead to a vicious circle, namely that unity is where there is not number, and number where there is not unity, and we should be none the wiser. Therefore we must not say that one and number are said of God privatively.
Praeterea, unum et multa cum se habeant ut mensura et mensuratum, videntur opponi ad invicem relative. In relative autem oppositis utrumque dicitur positive. Ergo tam unum quam multa positive praedicantur de Deo. 17. Since one and many are as measure and measured it would seem that they are opposed to each other relatively. Now when terms are relatively opposite both are predicated positively. Therefore both unity and number are predicated of God positively.
Sed contra. Dionysius dicit, IV de Divin. nominibus: unitas laudata et Trinitas, quae est super omnia divinitas, non est neque unitas neque Trinitas quae a nobis aut alio quodam existentium sit cognita. Videtur ergo quod termini numerales per remotionem dicantur de Deo. 1. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 13) “That Unity with Trinity in which we worship the supreme Godhead is not the same unity or trinity with which we or any other living being are acquainted.” Therefore seemingly numeral terms are predicated of God by way of remotion.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit: quaesivit humana inopia quid tria diceret, et dixit substantias sive personas. Quibus nominibus non diversitatem intelligi voluit sed singularitatem noluit. Sunt ergo huiusmodi termini numerales introducti in divinis magis ad removendum quam ad ponendum. 2. Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 4): The poor human tongue sought how to express the Three, and it called them substances or persons: not intending to imply that they are different, yet desirous to avoid saying that there is only one. Hence in speaking of God these numeral terms are employed negatively rather than positively.
Praeterea, unum et multitudo, sive numerus, sunt in genere quantitatis. In Deo autem non potest esse aliqua quantitas, cum quantitas sit accidens et dispositio materiae. Termini ergo numerales in Deo nihil ponunt. 3. One and many, i.e. number are in the genus of quantity. Now there is no quantity in God, seeing that quantity is an accident and a disposition, of matter. Therefore numeral terms indicate nothing positive in God.
Sed dicendum, quod licet quantitas secundum rationem sui generis, vel secundum rationem accidentis, non possit esse in Deo, tamen secundum rationem speciei aliqua quantitas potest praedicari de Deo, sicut aliqua qualitas, ut scientia vel iustitia. &8212;Sed contra, illae solae species qualitatis in divinam praedicationem assumuntur quae secundum rationem suae speciei nullam imperfectionem important, sicut scientia, iustitia et aequitas; non autem ignorantia nec albedo. Omnis autem quantitas secundum rationem suae speciei imperfectionem importat: cum enim quantum sit quod est indivisibile, species quantitatis distinguuntur secundum diversos modos divisionis; sicut pluralitas est quae divisibilis est in non continua, linea autem quae est divisibilis secundum unam dimensionem, superficies autem secundum duas, corpus vero secundum tres. Divisio autem perfectioni divinae simplicitatis repugnat. Nulla ergo quantitas secundum rationem suae speciei potest praedicari de Deo. 4. To this it will be replied that although quantity as to its generic nature or considered as an accident cannot be in God, yet in its specific nature a certain kind of quantity may be predicated of God, even as a certain kind of quality such as knowledge or justice. &8212;On the contrary only those species of quality can be predicated of God which in their specific nature contain no imperfection, such as knowledge, justice, equity, but not ignorance or whiteness. But all quantity by its specific nature implies imperfection: because since a thing that has quantity is divisible, the various species of quantity are distinguished according to various kinds of division: thus plurality is quantity divisible into non-continuous parts: a line is quantity divisible as to one dimension: while a surface is divisible as to two, and a body as to three. Now division is incompatible with the perfection of divine simplicity. Therefore no quantity as to its specific nature can be predicated of God.
Sed dicendum, quod distinctio per relationes quae facit numerum personarum in divinis, non importat imperfectionem in Deo. &8212;Sed contra, omnis divisio vel distinctio aliquam multitudinem causat. Non autem omnis multitudo est numerus qui est species quantitatis: cum multitudo et unum circumeant omnia genera. Non ergo omnis divisio vel distinctio sufficit ad constituendum numerum qui est species quantitatis, sed sola illa divisio quae est secundum quantitatem, qualis non est distinctio relationum. 5. But it will be argued that distinction according to the relations which causes the number of persons in God, does not imply perfection in him. &8212;On the contrary every division or distinction causes plurality of some kind. Now not every kind of plurality is that number which is a species of quantity, inasmuch as many and one pervade all the genera. Hence not any division or distinction suffices to set up number which is a species of quantity, but only quantitative division, and such is not relative division.
Sed dicendum, quod omnis multitudo est species quantitatis, et omnis divisio sufficit ad constituendam speciem quantitatis. &8212;Sed contra, ad positionem substantiae non sequitur positio quantitatis, cum substantia possit esse sine accidente. Sed positis solis formis substantialibus, sequitur distinctio in substantiis. Ergo non quaelibet distinctio constituit multitudinem quae est accidens et species quantitatis. 6. But it will be objected that every plurality is a species of quantity, and every division suffices to cause a species of quantity. &8212;On the contrary given substance, quantity does not necessarily follow, inasmuch as substance can be without accident. Now given substantial forms only, there follows distinction in substances. Therefore not every distinction causes number, which is an accident and a species of quantity.
Praeterea, discretio quae constituit numerum, quae est species quantitatis, opponitur continuo. Discretio autem continuo opposita est, quae consistit in divisione continui. Ergo sola divisio continui, quae non competit Deo, causat numerum qui est species quantitatis; et ita non potest praedicari de Deo numerus qui est species quantitatis. 7. Discreteness that causes number which is a species of quantity is opposed to continuity. Now discreteness is opposed to continuity because it consists in division of the continuous. Therefore only division of the continuous, which division is impossible in God, causes number that is a species of quantity: so that such a number cannot be predicated of God.
Praeterea, quaelibet substantia dicitur una. Aut ergo est una per essentiam suam, aut per aliquid aliud. Si per aliquid aliud, cum et illud oporteat esse unum, necesse est quod et illud per se sit unum, vel per aliquid aliud, et illud iterum per aliud. Impossibile est autem quod hoc procedat in infinitum. Ergo statur alicubi. Melius est ergo quod stetur in primo, ut scilicet substantia per seipsam sit una. Non ergo unum est aliquid additum substantiae; et ita non videtur significare aliquid positive. 8. Every substance is one. Either then it is one by its essence, or by something else. If by something else, since this again must be one, it must be one either of itself or by something else, and this again by something else. But this cannot go on indefinitely: and hence we must stop somewhere. And it were better to stop at the beginning, so that substance be one of itself. Therefore unity is not something added to substance: and thus seemingly it does not signify anything positively.
Sed dicendum, quod substantia non est una per seipsam, sed per unitatem ei accidentem; unitas autem est per se una; prima enim denominant seipsa, sicut bonitas est bona, veritas est vera, et similiter unitas est una. &8212;Sed contra, huiusmodi seipsa denominant propter hoc quod sunt primae formae, nam secundae formae non denominant seipsas, sicut albedo non est alba. Quae autem se habent ex additione ad aliud, non sunt prima. Ergo unitas et bonitas non se habent ex additione ad substantiam. 9. But it will be argued that a substance is one not by itself but by accidental unity: and unity is one essentially, since the primary notions are named after themselves: thus goodness is good, truth is true and likewise unity is one. —On the contrary these are named after themselves because they are primary forms; whereas second forms are not named after themselves: thus whiteness is not white. Now things which result from addition to others are not primary. Therefore unity and goodness are not additional to substance.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum, omnia dicuntur unum in quantum non dividuntur. Hoc autem quod est non dividi, non ponit aliquid, sed solum removet. Ergo unum non praedicatur positive sed remotive in divinis; et per consequens multitudo, quae constituitur ex unis. 10. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v) a thing is one in so far as it is undivided. Now to be undivided is nothing positive but only removes something. Therefore unity is predicated of God not positively but negatively: and the same applies to number which is composed of units.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod de uno et multo diversa inveniuntur, quae etiam apud philosophos fuerunt occasio diversa sentiendi. Invenitur enim de uno, quod est principium numeri, et quod convertitur cum ente; similiter invenitur de multo, quod pertinet ad quamdam speciem quantitatis, quae dicitur numerus, et iterum quod circuit omne genus, sicut et unum, cui videtur multitudo opponi. I answer that about unity and number there are various points which have given rise to various opinions among philosophers. As regards unity it is to be observed that it is the principle of number and that it is convertible with being: and as regards plurality it belongs to a species of quantity called number; moreover, it pervades all the genera like unity, which apparently is opposed to number.
Fuerunt ergo aliqui inter philosophos qui non distinxerunt inter unum quod convertitur cum ente, et unum quod est principium numeri, aestimantes quod neutro modo dictum unum aliquid super substantiam adderet; sed unum quolibet modo dictum significaret substantiam rei. Ex quo sequebatur quod numerus, qui ex unis componitur, sit substantia omnium rerum secundum opinionem Pythagorae et Platonis. Accordingly some philosophers failed to distinguish between unity which is convertible with being,’and unity which is the principle of number, and thought that in neither sense does unity add anything to substance, and that in either sense it denotes the substance of a thing. From this it followed that number which is composed of unities is the substance of all things: and this was the opinion of Pythagoras and Plato.
Quidam vero non distinguentes inter unum quod convertitur cum ente, et unum quod est principium numeri, crediderunt e contrario, quod utrolibet modo dictum unum, adderet aliquod esse accidentale supra substantiam; et per consequens omnis multitudo oportet quod sit aliquod accidens pertinens ad genus quantitatis. Et haec fuit positio Avicennae, quam quidem videntur secuti fuisse omnes antiqui doctores. Non enim intellexerunt per unum et multa nisi aliquod pertinens ad genus quantitatis discretae. On the other hand others who failed to distinguish between unity that is convertible with being and unity that is the principle of number held the contrary opinion that in any sense unity adds a certain accidental being to substance: and that in consequence all number is an accident pertaining to the genus of quantity. This was the opinion of Avicenna: and apparently all the teachers of old followed him: for they did not understand by one and many anything else but something pertaining to discrete quantity.
Quidam vero fuerunt qui attendentes quod in Deo nulla quantitas esse potest, posuerunt quod termini significantes unum vel multa de Deo non ponunt aliquid, sed removeant tantum. Non enim possunt ponere nisi quod significant, scilicet quantitatem discretam, quae nullo modo potest esse in Deo. Sic ergo secundum eos unum dicitur de Deo ad removendum multitudinem quantitatis discretae; termini vero significantes pluralitatem, dicuntur de Deo ad removendum unitatem, quae est principium quantitatis discretae. Et haec videtur fuisse opinio Magistri, quae ponitur in 24 dist. I sententiarum. Quae quidem, supposita suae opinionis radice, scilicet quod omnis multitudo significaret quantitatem discretam, et omne unum esset eiusdem quantitatis principium, inter omnes rationabilior invenitur. Nam et Dionysius dicit, quod negationes sunt maxime verae in Deo; affirmationes vero sunt incompactae. Non enim scimus de Deo quid est, sed magis quid non est, ut Damascenus dicit. Unde et Rabbi Moyses omnia quae affirmative videntur dici de Deo, dicit magis esse introducta ad removendum quam ad aliquid ponendum. Dicimus enim Deum esse vivum ad removendum ab eo illum modum essendi quem habent res quae apud nos non vivunt, non ad ponendum vitam in ipso, cum vita et omnia huiusmodi nomina sint imposita ad significandum quasdam formas et perfectiones creaturarum quae longe absunt a Deo; quamvis hoc non sit usquequaque verum, nam, sicut dicit Dionysius, sapientia et vita et alia huiusmodi non removentur a Deo quasi ei desint, sed quia excellentius habet ea quam intellectus humanus capere, vel sermo significare possit; et ex illa perfectione divina descendunt perfectiones creatae, secundum quamdam similitudinem imperfectam. Et ideo de Deo, secundum Dionysium, non solum dicitur aliquid per modum negationis et per modum causae, sed etiam per modum eminentiae. Sed quidquid sit de spiritualibus perfectionibus, certum est quod materiales dispositiones removentur omnino a Deo. Unde cum quantitas sit dispositio materiae, si termini numerales non significant nisi quod est in genere quantitatis, necesse est quod de Deo non dicatur nisi ad removendum quae significant, sicut Magister posuit, loc. cit. Nec sequitur ex eius positione circulus &8212;dum unitas removet multitudinem, multitudo unitatem&8212; quia removentur a Deo unitas et multitudo, quae sunt in genere quantitatis, quorum neutrum de Deo dicitur. Et sic unitas dicta de Deo, quae removet multitudinem, non removetur, sed alia unitas, quae de Deo dici non potest. There were others who, considering that there cannot be quantity of any kind in God, maintained that words signifying one or many have no positive signification when attributed to God, but only remove something from him. For they cannot ascribe to him save what they signify, to wit discrete quantity, and this can nowise be in God. Hence according to these one is predicated of God in order to remove the. plurality of discrete quantity; and terms signifying plurality are said of God in order to remove that unity which is the principle of discrete quantity. Apparently this was the view of the Master (I., D. xxiv): and granted the principle on which his opinion is based, namely that all multitude signifies discrete quantity, and all unity is the principle of such quantity, this opinion would seem of all the most reasonable. For Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ii) says that we are nearer the truth when we speak of God in the negative, and that all our affirmations about him are figurative. For we know not what God is, but rather what he is not, as Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. i, 4). Hence Rabbi Moses says that whatever we affirm about God is to be taken as removing something from him rather than as placing something in him. Thus we say that God is a living being in order to remove from him that mode of being which inanimate beings have, and not in order to ascribe life to him; since life and all such terms are employed to denote certain forms and perfections of creatures which are far distant from God. And yet this is not altogether true, for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) wisdom and life and the like are not removed from God as though they were not in him; but because he has them in a higher degree than mind can conceive or words express: and from that divine perfection created perfections come down in an imperfect likeness to it. Wherefore things are said of God according to Dionysius (Myst. Theol. i: Coel. Hier. ii: Div. Nom. ii) not only negatively and causally but also eminently. Still whatever the truth may be with regard to spiritual perfections it is certain that material dispositions are altogether to be removed from God. Wherefore since quantity is a disposition of matter, if numeral terms signify nothing outside the genus of quantity it follows that they are not to be said of God except as removing what they signify, according to the Master’s opinion (loc. cit.), and although in his opinion unity removes plurality and plurality unity, this does not involve a vicious circle, because the unity and plurality removed from God are in the genus of quantity, neither of which can be ascribed to God. So that the unity ascribed to God which removes plurality is not removed, but that other unity which cannot be said of God.
Quidam vero, non intelligentes quod nomina affirmativa ad removendum possint in praedicationem divinam induci, nec iterum ponentes unum et multa &8212;nisi quod est in genere quantitatis discretae, quam in Deo ponere non audebant&8212; dixerunt quod termini numerales non praedicantur de Deo quasi dictiones significantes aliquam rem conceptam sed quasi dictiones officiales, exercentes aliquid in divinis, scilicet distinctionem ad modum syncategorematicae distinctionis. Quod quidem fatuum apparet, cum nihil tale ex horum terminorum significatione possit haberi. Some, however, through not understanding how affirmative expressions can be predicated of God for the purpose of negation, and not conceiving unity and plurality except as included in the genus of discrete quantity, which they dared not ascribe to God, said that numeral terms are not predicated of God as though they expressed’ an idea with an objective reality, but as official expressions positing something in God, namely a kind of syncategorematic distinction, all of which is clearly absurd, since nothing of the kind can be had from the meaning of these terms.
Et ideo alii dixerunt, quod praedicti termini aliquid positive ponunt in Deo, licet supponant quod unum et multa sunt solum in genere quantitatis; dicunt enim quod non est inconveniens aliquam speciem quantitatis Deo attribui, licet genus removeatur a Deo; sicut et aliquae species qualitatis, ut sapientia et iustitia, dicuntur de Deo positive, licet in Deo qualitas esse non possit. Sed illud non est simile, ut in obiiciendo est tactum, nam omnes species quantitatis ex ratione suae speciei habent imperfectionem, non autem omnes species qualitatis. Et praeterea quantitas proprie est dispositio materiae; unde omnes species quantitatis sunt mathematica quaedam, quae secundum esse non possunt a materia sensibili separari, nisi tempus et locus quae sunt naturalia, et magis materiae sensibili annexa. Unde patet quod nulla species quantitatis potest in rebus spiritualibus convenire, nisi secundum metaphoram. Qualitas autem sequitur formam, unde quaedam qualitates sunt omnino immateriales, quae attribui possunt rebus spiritualibus. Hae igitur opiniones processerunt, supposito quod idem sit unum quod convertitur cum ente et quod est principium numeri, et quod non sit aliqua multitudo nisi numerus qui est species quantitatis. Quod quidem patet esse falsum: nam cum divisio multitudinem causet, indivisio vero unitatem, oportet secundum rationem divisionis de uno et multo iudicium sumi. Est autem quaedam divisio quae omnino genus quantitatis excedit, quae scilicet est per aliquam oppositionem formalem, quae nullam quantitatem concernit. Unde oportet quod multitudo hanc divisionem consequens, et unum quod hanc divisionem privat, sint maioris communitatis et ambitus quam genus quantitatis. Est autem et alia divisio secundum quantitatem quae genus quantitatis non transcendit. Unde et multitudo consequens hanc divisionem, et unitas eam privans, sunt in genere quantitatis. Quod quidem unum, aliquid accidentale addit supra id de quo dicitur, quod habet rationem mensurae; alias numerus ex unitate constitutus, non esset aliquod accidens, nec alicuius generis species. Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, non addit supra ens nisi negationem divisionis, non quod significet ipsam indivisionem tantum, sed substantiam eius cum ipsa: est enim unum idem quod ens indivisum. Et similiter multitudo correspondens uni nihil addit supra res multas nisi distinctionem, quae in hoc attenditur quod una earum non est alia; quod quidem non habent ex aliquo superaddito, sed ex propriis formis. Patet ergo quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, ponit quidem ipsum ens, sed nihil superaddit nisi negationem divisionis. Multitudo autem ei correspondens addit supra res, quae dicuntur multae, quod unaquaeque earum sit una, et quod una earum non sit altera, in quo consistit ratio distinctionis. Et sic, cum unum addat supra ens unam negationem &8212;secundum quod aliquid est indivisum in se&8212; multitudo addit duas negationes, prout scilicet aliquid est in se indivisum, et prout est ab alio divisum. Quod quidem dividi est unum eorum non esse alterum. Wherefore others, though holding that unity and multitude are only in the genus of quantity, said that these terms denote something positive in God. They say in effect that it is not unreasonable to ascribe some kind of quantity to God, although the genus is not to be attributed to him: even as certain species of quality, as wisdom and justice are predicated of God, although there cannot be quality in God. But as indicated in an objection (5) there is no comparison: because all the species of quantity from their specific nature are imperfect, but not all the species of quality. Moreover quantity properly speaking is a disposition of matter: so that all the species of quantity are mathematical entities which cannot exist apart from sensible matter, except time and place which are natural entities and which are better described as adjuncts of sensible matter. It is evident then that no species of quantity can be attributed. to spiritual things otherwise than metaphorically. Whereas quality follows the form, wherefore certain qualities are altogether immaterial and can be ascribed to spiritual things. Accordingly the above opinions were based on the supposition that the one which is convertible with being is the same with that which is the principle of number, and that there is no plurality but number that is a species of quantity. Now this is clearly false. For since division causes plurality and indivision unity, we must judge of one and many according to the various kinds of division. Now there is a kind of division which altogether transcends the genus of quantity, and this is division according to formal opposition which has nothing to do with quantity. Hence the plurality resulting from such a division, and the unity which excludes such a division, must needs be more universal and comprehensive than the genus of quantity. Again there is a division of quantity which does not transcend the genus of quantity. Wherefore the plurality consequent to this division and the unity which excludes it are in the genus of quantity. This latter unity is an accidental addition to the thing of which it is predicated, in that it measures it: otherwise the number arising from this unity would not be an accident nor the species of a genus. Whereas the unity that is convertible with being, adds nothing to being except the negation of division, not that it signifies indivision only, but substance with indivision: for one is the same as individual being. In like manner the plurality that corresponds to this unity adds nothing to the many things except distinction, which consists in each one not being the other: and this they have not from anything added to them but from their proper forms. It is clear then that one which is convertible with being, posits being but adds nothing except the negation of division. And the number corresponding to it adds this to the things described as many, that each of them is one, and that each of them is not the other, wherein is the essence of distinction. Accordingly then, while one adds to being one negation inasmuch as a thing is undivided in itself; plurality adds two negations, inasmuch as a certain thing is undivided in itself, and distinct from another; i.e. one of them is not the other.
Dico ergo, quod in divinis non praedicantur unum et multa quae pertinent ad genus quantitatis, sed unum quod convertitur cum ente, et multitudo ei correspondens. Unde unum et multa ponunt quidem in divinis ea de quibus dicuntur; sed non superaddunt nisi distinctionem et indistinctionem, quod est superaddere negationes, ut supra expositum est. Unde concedimus, quod quantum ad id quod superaddunt eis de quibus praedicantur, remotive in Deo accipiuntur; in quantum autem includunt in sua significatione ea de quibus dicuntur, positive accipiuntur. Unde ad utrasque rationes respondendum est. I say then that in speaking of God we do not predicate the unity and plurality which belong to the genus of quantity, but one that is convertible with being and the corresponding plurality. Wherefore one and many predicate in God that which they signify: but they add nothing besides distinction and indistinction, which is the same as to add negations as explained above. Hence we grant that as regards what they add to the things of which they are predicated, they are attributed to God by way of removal; but in so far as in their signification they include the things of which they are said they are predicated of God positively. We must now reply to the objections on both sides.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod qui dicit tres personas, aliquid in Deo dicit, scilicet distinctionem personarum; quam qui negat, haereticus est. Ista autem distinctio non addit aliquid supra personas distinctas. Reply to the First Objection. To speak of three persons in God is to indicate a distinction of persons: and to deny this is heresy. But this distinction adds nothing to the distinct persons.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet in remotione quorumdam a Deo, sit cointelligenda praedicatio eorumdem de Deo per eminentiam et per causam, tamen quaedam solummodo negantur de Deo et nullo modo praedicantur; sicut cum dicitur: Deus non est corpus. Et hoc modo posset dici secundum opinionem Magistri, quod omnino negatur a Deo quantitas numeralis; et similiter secundum id quod ponimus, omnino negatur ab eo essentiae divisio, cum dicitur: essentia divina est una. Reply to the Second Objection. It is true that while we remove certain things from God we understand at the same time that these things are predicated of God eminently and causally: but some things are denied of God absolutely and in no way predicated of him; as for instance, God is not a body. In this way according to the Master’s opinion it might be said that numeral quantity is altogether denied of God: and in like manner according to our own opinion when we say: The divine essence is one, we altogether deny that God’s essence is divided.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod in rebus creatis termini numerales non ponunt aliquid superadditum rebus de quibus dicuntur, nisi prout significant id quod est in genere quantitatis discretae, secundum quem modum non praedicantur de Deo; et hoc pertinet ad perfectionem ipsius. Reply to the Third Objection. In created things numeral terms posit nothing in addition to the things to which they are affixed, except in so far as they signify something in the, genus of discrete quantity: in this way they are not predicated of God, and this pertains to his perfection.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod unitas et multitudo quae significantur per terminos numerales dictos de Deo, non sunt solum in intellectu nostro, sed sunt in Deo secundum rem; non tamen propter hoc significatur aliquid positive praeter intellectum eorum quibus ista attribuuntur. Reply to the Fourth Objection. It is true that the unity and plurality signified by numeral terms predicated of God are not purely subjective but are really in God: and yet it does not follow that they signify something positive besides the things to which they are attributed.
Ad quintum dicendum quod bonum quod est in genere qualitatis, non est bonum quod convertitur cum ente, quod nullam rem supra ens addit; bonum autem quod est in genere qualitatis, addit aliquam qualitatem qua homo dicitur bonus; et simile est de uno, sicut ex dictis patet. Sed in hoc differt quod bonum utroque modo acceptum potest venire in divinam praedicationem, non autem unum: non enim est eadem ratio de quantitate et qualitate, sicut ex dictis patet. Reply to the Fifth Objection. The good that is a kind of quality is not the good that is convertible with being. The latter adds nothing real to being, whereas the former adds a quality in respect of which a man is said to be good. The same applies to unity, as already explained; yet there is this difference that good in either sense can be predicated of God, whereas unity cannot: because as already explained the comparison between quantity and quality fails.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod inter ista quatuor prima, maxime primum est ens: et ideo oportet quod positive praedicetur; negatio enim vel privatio non potest esse primum quod intellectu concipitur, cum semper quod negatur vel privatur sit de intellectu negationis vel privationis. Oportet autem quod alia tria super ens addant aliquid quod ens non contrahat; si enim contraherent ens, iam non essent prima. Hoc autem esse non potest nisi addant aliquid secundum rationem tantum; hoc autem est vel negatio, quam addit unum (ut dictum est), vel relatio ad aliquid quod natum sit referri universaliter ad ens; et hoc est vel intellectus, ad quem importat relationem verum, aut appetitus, ad quem importat relationem bonum; nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Reply to the Sixth Objection. Of these primary notions being is the first, wherefore it must be predicated positively: because negation or privation cannot be the first thing conceived by the intellect, since we cannot understand a negation or privation unless we first understand what is denied or lacking. But the other three must add something that is not a contraction of being: for if they contracted being they would no longer be primary notions. Now this is impossible unless that which they add were purely logical, and this is either a negation which is added by unity as already stated, or relation or something which by its very nature is universally referable to being: and this is either the intellect to which the true bears a relation, or the appetite to which the good bears a relation, for the good is what all things seek (Ethic. i, i).
Ad septimum dicendum, quod secundum philosophum, multum dicitur dupliciter: uno modo absolute, et sic dicitur per oppositum ad unum; alio modo dicitur comparative, prout importat excessum quemdam respectu minoris numeri, et sic multum opponitur pauco. Similiter autem et magnum potest dupliciter dici: uno modo absolute, prout importat quantitatem continuam quae dicitur magnitudo; alio modo comparative, prout importat excessum respectu minoris quantitatis. Primo ergo modo magnum non praedicatur de Deo; sed secundo, ut importetur eius eminentia super omnem creaturam. Reply to the Seventh Objection. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x) we speak of a number of things in two senses: first absolutely, and then number is the opposite of one: secondly comparatively, as denoting excess in relation to a smaller number, and then number is opposed to a few. In like manner magnitude may be taken in two ways: first absolutely, in the sense of a continuous quantity which is called a magnitude: secondly comparatively, as denoting excess in relation to a smaller quantity. In the first sense magnitude is not predicated of God but in the second, and denotes his eminence over all creatures.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod unum quod pertinet ad vestigium Dei in creaturis, est unum quod convertitur cum ente, quod quidem ponit aliquid, in quantum ponit ipsum ens, cui solam negationem superaddit, ut dictum est. Reply to the Eighth Objection. The unity that pertains to the trace of God in his creatures is the one that is convertible with being. As we have already stated this posits something, namely being, to which it adds nothing but a negation.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod unum oppositorum non excludit aliud, nisi ab eo de quo praedicatur. Non enim sequitur, si Socrates est albus, quod nihil sit nigrum: sed quod ipse non est niger. Sic ergo sequitur quod si patris persona est una, patris personae non sunt plures; non autem sequitur quod non sint plures personae in divinis. Reply to the Ninth Objection. One opposite does not exclude the other except from the subject of which it is predicated. For supposing that Socrates is white it does not follow that nothing is black, but that he is, not black. Wherefore if the person of the Father is one it follows that there are not several persons of the Father, but not that there are not more than one person in God.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod unum non constituit multitudinem ex parte privationis, sed ex parte illa qua ponit ens. Reply to the Tenth Objection. One is not a constituent of a number, on the side of privation, but inasmuch as it posits being.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod sicut dicitur in V Metaph., privatio tribus modis dicitur: uno modo proprie, quando removetur ab aliquo quod natum est habere, et in quo tempore natum est habere; sicut carere visu est privatio visus in homine. Alio modo communiter, quando removetur ab aliquo quod ipsum quidem non est natum habere, sed genus eius; sicut si non habere visum dicatur esse privatio visus in talpa. Tertio modo communissime, quando removetur ab aliquo id quod a quocumque alio natum est haberi, non tamen ab ipso, nec ab alio sui generis: sicut si non habere visum, dicatur esse privatio visus in planta. Et haec privatio medium est inter privationem veram et simplicem negationem, habens commune aliquid cum utroque; cum privatione quidem vera, in hoc quod est negatio in aliquo subiecto, unde non competit simpliciter non enti; cum negatione vero simplici, in hoc quod non requirit aptitudinem in subiecto. Per hunc autem modum unum privative dicitur, et potest simili modo praedicari in divinis, sicut et alia quae simili modo praedicantur in divinis, ut invisibilis et immensus et huiusmodi. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Privation may be taken in three ways (Metaph. v, text. 27). First strictly, when a thing lacks that which by nature it should have, and when by nature it should have it: thus to lack sight is in a man privation of sight. Secondly in an extended sense, when a thing lacks that which is due not to its specific but to its generic nature: thus lack of sight may be called a privation of sight in a mole. Thirdly in a very broad sense, when a thing lacks that which may be naturally due to anything else but not to it, nor to any other member of its genus: thus lack of sight may be called a privation in a plant. This last kind of privation is a mean between real privation and simple negation, and has something in common with both. With real privation in that it is the negation of something in a subject, so that it cannot be predicated simply of nonbeing: and with simple negation, in that it does not require aptitude in the subject. It is in this way that one denotes privation, and in this sense it can be predicated of God, like other things that can be predicated of God in the same way, as, for instance, invisible, immense and so forth.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod termini numerales non addunt aliquid in divinis supra id de quo praedicantur; et ideo quando praedicantur de essentialibus, significant essentiam; quando vero de personalibus, significant relationem. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Numerical terms add nothing to God besides the subject of which they are predicated. Hence when they are predicated of essentials they signify the essence, and when they are predicated of personal properties they signify the relations.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod unum et ens convertuntur secundum supposita; sed tamen unum addit secundum rationem, privationem divisionis; et propter hoc non sunt synonyma, quia synonyma sunt quae significant idem secundum rationem eamdem. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. One and being are convertible as to their supposits: yet one adds logically the privation of division and thus they are not synonymous, because synonyms are words which signify the same thing from the same point of view.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod unum potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo quantum ad illud quod ponit, et sic constituit multitudinem; alio modo quantum ad negationem quam superaddit, et sic opponitur unum multitudini privative. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. One may be considered in two ways. First as to what it posits, and thus it is a constituent of number: secondly as to the negation which it adds, and thus it is opposed to number privatively.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod secundum philosophum, multitudo est prior uno secundum sensum, sicut totum partibus et compositum simplici; sed unum est prius multitudine naturaliter et secundum rationem. Hoc autem non videtur sufficere ad hoc quod unum opponatur multitudini privative. Nam privatio est posterior secundum rationem, cum in intellectu privationis sit eius oppositum, per quod definitur: nisi forte hoc referatur solum ad nominis rationem, prout hoc nomen unum significat privative, nomen vero multitudinis positive; nomina enim imponuntur a nobis secundum quod cognoscimus res. Unde ad hoc quod aliquid significetur per nomen ut privatio, sufficit qualitercumque sit posterius in nostra cognitione; quamvis hoc non sufficiat ad hoc quod res ipsa sit privativa, nisi sit posterius secundum rationem. Et ideo potest melius dici, quod divisio est causa multitudinis, et est prior secundum intellectum quam multitudo; unum autem dicitur privative respectu divisionis, cum sit ens indivisum, non autem respectu multitudinis. Unde divisio est prior, secundum rationem, quam unum; sed multitudo posterius. Quod sic patet: primum enim quod in intellectum cadit, est ens; secundum vero est negatio entis; ex his autem duobus sequitur tertio intellectus divisionis (ex hoc enim quod aliquid intelligitur ens, et intelligitur non esse hoc ens, sequitur in intellectu quod sit divisum ab eo); quarto autem sequitur in intellectu ratio unius, prout scilicet intelligitur hoc ens non esse in se divisum; quinto autem sequitur intellectus multitudinis, prout scilicet hoc ens intelligitur divisum ab alio, et utrumque ipsorum esse in se unum. Quantumcumque enim aliqua intelligantur divisa, non intelligetur multitudo, nisi quodlibet divisorum intelligatur esse unum. Et sic etiam patet quod non erit circulus in definitione unius et multitudinis. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x), number precedes unity objectively, as the whole precedes its parts and the composite precedes the simple: but unity precedes number naturally and logically. But this seemingly is not sufficient in order that unity be opposed to number privatively. For privation logically is an afterthought, since in order to understand a privation we must first understand its opposite whence its definition is taken: unless perhaps this refer, merely to the definition of the term, in so far as one has a privative signification, while number has a positive meaning: since we name things according as we know them. Wherefore in order that a term have a privative signification it suffices that the thing signified come in any way whatsoever to our knowledge as an afterthought: although this is not enough to make the thing itself privative, unless it come afterwards logically. It would be better then to say that division is the cause of number and precedes it logically; and that one since it is undivided being is predicated privatively in relation to division, but not in relation to multitude. Hence division logically precedes being but number follows it: and this is proved as follows. The first object of the intellect is being; the second is the negation of being. From these two there follows thirdly the understanding of distinction (since from the fact that we understand that this thing is and that it is not that thing we realize that these two are distinct): and it follows fourthly that the intellect apprehends the idea of unity, in that it understands that this thing is not divided in itself; and fifthly the intellect apprehends number, in that it understands this as distinct from that and each as one in itself. For however much things are conceived as distinct from one another, there is no idea of number unless each be conceived as one. Wherefore there is not a vicious circle in the definitions of unity and number.
Unde patet responsio ad decimumsextum. And this suffices for the Reply to the Sixteenth Objection.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod unum quod est principium numeri, comparatur ad multitudinem ut mensura ad mensuratum; quod quidem unum positive aliquid supra substantiam addit, ut dictum est. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. The one which is a principle of number is compared to many as measure to the thing measured: and unity in this sense adds something positive to substance, as stated in the Article.
Ad ea quae in oppositum obiiciuntur, secundum praemissa, facile est respondere considerantibus secundum quid veritatem concludant. Unum tamen quod in illis obiectionibus tangebatur considerandum est, quod huiusmodi prima, scilicet essentia, unitas, veritas et bonitas, denominant seipsa ea ratione, quia unum, verum et bonum consequuntur ad ens. Cum autem ens sit primum quod in intellectu concipitur oportet quod quidquid in intellectum cadit, intelligatur ut ens, et per consequens ut unum, verum et bonum. Unde cum intellectus apprehendat essentiam, unitatem, veritatem et bonitatem in abstracto, oportet quod de quolibet eorum praedicetur, ens, et alia tria concreta. Et inde est quod ista denominant seipsa, non autem alia quae non convertuntur cum ente. After what we have said the arguments on the other side present no difficulty to those who realize that they contain a certain amount of truth. We must, however, take notice of one point advanced in these objections, namely that these primary notions, essence, unity, truth and goodness denominate themselves inasmuch as one, true and good are consequent to being. Now seeing that being is the first object of the intellect, it follows that every other object of the intellect is conceived as a being, and therefore as one, true and good. Wherefore since the intellect apprehends essence, unity, truth and goodness in the abstract, it follows that being and the other three concretes must be predicated of them. Thus it is that they denominate themselves, whereas things that are not convertible with being, do not.

Q. IX:
ARTICLE VIII
Is There Any Diversity in God?


[Sum. Th. I, Q. xxxi, A. 2]
Octavo quaeritur utrum in Deo sit aliqua diversitas. Et videtur quod sic. THE eighth point of inquiry is whether there is diversity in God: and seemingly there is.
Quia, secundum philosophum, unum in substantia facit idem, multitudo autem in substantia facit diversum. In divinis autem est multitudo secundum substantiam, dicit enim Hilarius, quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt per substantiam tria, per consonantiam vero unum. Ergo in divinis est diversitas. 1. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v) unity of substance makes things the same, multitude in substance makes things diverse. Now in God there is multitude of substance: thus Hilary says (De Synod.) that Father, Son and Holy Spirit “are three in substance, one in harmony.” Therefore there is diversity in God.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum, diversum dicitur absolute, differens vero relative; unde omne differens est diversum, non autem omne diversum est differens. Sed in divinis conceditur esse differentia; dicit enim Damascenus: differentiam personarum in tribus proprietatibus, id est paternali et filiali et processibili recognoscimus. Ergo in divinis est diversitas. 2. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x) diversity is absolute, but difference is relative: wherefore all that differs is diverse, but not everything that is diverse is different. Now it is granted that there is difference in God, since Damascene (De Fid. Orth. iii) says: We acknowledge a difference between the persons arising from the three properties, namely Paternity, filiation and Procession. Therefore there is diversity in God.
Praeterea, differentia accidentalis facit alterum solum; differentia vero substantialis facit aliud, idest diversum. Cum ergo in divinis sit differentia, et non possit ibi esse accidentalis differentia &8212;et per consequens oportet quod sit differentia substantialis&8212; oportet quod sit ibi diversitas. 3. Accidental difference only makes a thing other, but substantial difference makes another, i.e. a diverse, thing. Since then in God there is a difference, which must be substantial, seeing that it cannot be accidental, there must be diversity in him.
Praeterea, multitudo causatur ex divisione, sicut iam dictum est. Ubi autem est divisio sequitur diversitas. Ergo in divinis cum sit multitudo, erit ibi diversitas. 4. Number results from division, as stated above (A. 7, ad 15). Now where there is division there must be diversity. Therefore in God, since there is number, there must be diversity.
Praeterea, idem et diversum sufficienter dividunt ens. Sed pater non est idem filio: non enim conceditur quod pater generando filium, generet se Deum. Ergo filius est diversus a patre. 5. Identical and diverse are an adequate division of being. Now the Father is not the same as the Son, for it is not granted that in begetting the Son he begets God who is himself. Therefore the Son is diverse from the Father.
Sed contra. Est quod Hilarius dicit: nihil in divinis novum, nihil diversum, nihil alienum, nihil separabile. On the contrary Hilary says (De Trin. vii): In God nothing is new, nothing diverse, nothing foreign, nothing separable.
Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit: pater et filius divinitate unum sunt, nec est ibi substantiae differentia, nec ulla diversitas. Again Ambrose says (De Trin.): Father and Son are one in Godhead, nor is there any substantial difference in them, nor any diversity whatsoever.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod, sicut dicit Hieronymus, ex verbis inordinate prolatis, incurritur haeresis. Et ideo sic loquendum est de divinis ut nulla errori occasio praebeatur. Fuerunt autem circa divina duo errores, praecipue cavendi ab illis qui de unitate et Trinitate in divinis loquuntur: scilicet error Arii, qui unitatem essentiae negavit, ponens aliam essentiam esse patris et aliam filii. Alius error est Sabelli, qui negavit pluralitatem personarum dicens, eumdem esse patrem qui est filius. Ad evitandum ergo errorem Arii sunt nobis quatuor cavenda in fidei confessione: primo diversitas per quam tollitur unitas essentiae, quam confitemur dicendo esse unum Deum; secundo divisio, quae obviat divinae simplicitati; tertio disparitas, quae repugnat aequalitati divinarum personarum; quarto ut non confiteamur filium esse alienum a patre, per quod tollitur similitudo. Similiter contra errorem Sabelli sunt quatuor cavenda. Primo singularitas, per quam tollitur naturae divinae communicabilitas; secundo nomen unici, per quod tollitur realis distinctio personarum; tertio confusio, per quam tollitur ordo qui est in divinis personis; quarto solitudo, per quam tollitur consociatio divinarum personarum. Confitemur autem contra diversitatem, unitatem essentiae; contra divisionem, simplicitatem; contra disparitatem, aequalitatem; contra alienum, similitudinem; contra singularitatem personarum, pluralitatem; contra unicum, distinctionem; contra confusionem, discretionem; contra solitarium, consonantiam et connexionem amoris. I answer that, as Jerome says, the careless use of terms leads to heresy: wherefore in speaking of God we must choose our words so as to avoid any occasion of error. Now about the divine nature there are two errors especially to be avoided by those who would discuss the unity and trinity of the Godhead: namely the error of Arius who denied the unity of the essence, and asserted a difference between the essence of the Father and that of the Son: and the error of Sabellius; who denied the distinction of the persons and asserted that the Father is the same as the Son. Accordingly to guard against the error of Arius there are four points on which we must be wary in confessing our belief. First, diversity which is incompatible with that unity of essence which we acknowledge when we profess our belief in one God; secondly, division which is incompatible with the divine simplicity; thirdly, inequality which is incompatible with the equality of the divine persons; fourthly, that we do not believe the Son to be alien to the Father, whereby we would deny their likeness. Again against the error of Sabellius four points call for caution. First, singularity which excludes communicability of the divine nature; secondly, the word only which excludes the real distinction of the persons; thirdly, confusion which excludes the order existing between the divine persons; fourthly, dissociation (solitudo) which excludes the fellowship of the divine persons. Accordingly against diversity we acknowledge unity of essence; against division simplicity; against inequality equality; against difference likeness; not one only but several persons; distinction against identity; order against confusion; and against dissociation the harmony and bond of love.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod substantia accipitur ibi pro hypostasi, non pro essentia, cuius multitudo faceret diversitatem. Reply to the First Objection. In the words quoted substance stands for hypostasis, not for essence, multiplication of which causes diversity.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet a quibusdam doctoribus Ecclesiae inveniatur nomen differentiae circa divina, non tamen est communiter utendum, nec ampliandum, quia differentia importat distinctionem aliquam secundum formam, quae non potest esse in divinis, cum forma Dei sit divina natura, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed exponenda est differentia, ut ponatur pro distinctione, quae minimum distinctionis importat; cum etiam secundum relationes vel secundum solam rationem aliqua distingui dicantur. Sic etiam exponendum est, si inveniatur diversitas in divinis; utpote si dicatur quod diversa est persona patris a persona filii, accipiendum est diversum pro distincto. Magis tamen cavendum est nomen diversitatis in divinis quam differentiae; quia diversitas magis pertinet ad essentialem divisionem, nam qualiscumque formarum multitudo facit differentiam; diversitas autem fit solum per formas substantiales. Reply to the Second Objection. Although some doctors of the Church use the term difference in reference to God, it should not be employed as a general rule, or enlarged upon: because difference denotes a distinction of form, and this is impossible in God since God’s form is his nature according to Augustine. But we must explain the term difference as standing for a distinction of the slightest kind: since some things are described as distinct in respect of a mere relation or even only logically. Again if we meet with the term diversity in connexion with God, we must explain it in the same way: for instance, if we find it stated that the person of the Father is diverse from that of the Son, we must take diverse to denote distinct. Yet in speaking of God we must be more wary of using the word diverse than the word different, because diversity refers more to an essential division: inasmuch as any multiplication whatsoever of forms causes a difference, whereas diversity arises only from substantial forms.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet in divinis non sit accidens, est tamen ibi relatio, cuius oppositio distinctionem facit in divinis, non autem diversitatem. Reply to the Third Objection. Though there is no accident in God there is relation; and relative opposition causes distinction but not diversity in God.
Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet in divinis non sit proprie loquendo divisio, est tamen ibi distinctio per relationes, quae sufficit ad numerum personarum. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Though properly speaking there is not division in God, there is relative distinction, and this suffices to make a number of persons.
Ad quintum dicendum quod filius est idem Deus cum patre; non tamen potest dici quod pater se Deum genuerit, filium generando: quia ly se, cum sit reciprocum, refert idem suppositum: pater autem et filius sunt duo supposita in divinis. Reply to the Fifth Objection. The Son is the same God as the Father, yet it cannot be said that the Father in begetting the Son begot God who was himself; because himself being reciprocal indicates identity in the supposit: whereas in God Father and Son are two supposits.

Q. IX:
ARTICLE IX
Are There Only Three Persons in God: Or Are There More Or Fewer Than Three?


[Sum. Th. I, Q. xxxi, A, i]
Nono quaeritur utrum in divinis sint tres personae tantum, an plures vel pauciores. Et videtur quod plures. THE ninth point of inquiry is whether in God there are only three persons, or more or fewer than three. It would seem that there are more than three.
Dicit enim Augustinus in libro contra Maximinum: filius non genuit creatorem; neque enim non potuit, sed non oportuit. In divinis autem non differt esse et posse, quia nec in aliquibus sempiternis. Ergo filius genuit alium filium; et sic sunt duo filii in divinis, et per consequens plures personae quam tres. 1. Augustine says (Con. Maxim. iii, 12): “The Son did not beget a creator, not that he could not but because it was unfitting.” Now in God, just as in all perpetual things, there is no difference between the actual and the possible (Phys. iii, text. 32). Therefore the Son begot another Son: and thus there are two Sons in God, and consequently more than three persons.
Sed diceretur, quod hoc quod dicit: neque enim non potuit, exponendum est: idest, non ex impotentia fuit. —Sed contra, unicuique supposito alicuius naturae convenit actus naturae illius, nisi propter eius impotentiam. Generatio autem est actus ad perfectionem naturae divinae pertinens; alioquin non conveniret patri, in quo non est nisi quod perfectionis est. Si ergo filius non generat alium filium, hoc erit ex impotentia eius. 2. To this it may be replied that the words he could not mean that it was not due to his inability. —On the contrary the acts belonging to a particular nature are appropriate to every supposit of that nature, except through inability to execute them. Now generation is an act pertaining to the perfection of the divine nature, otherwise it would not be appropriate to the Father, in whom there is nothing that is not perfect. If then the Son begets not another Son, this will be because he is unable to do so.
Praeterea, si filius non potest generare, potest autem generari; habet ergo potentiam ut generetur, non potentiam ut generet. Aliud autem est generare, et aliud generari. Cum ergo potentiae distinguantur penes obiecta, non erit eadem potentia patris et filii, quod est haereticum. 3. If the Son cannot beget he can be begotten — and therefore he has the power to be begotten but not the power to beget. Since then to beget differs from being begotten and since powers are distinguished in reference to their objects, the Father’s power will not be the same as the Son’s: and this is heretical.
Praeterea, actio et passio in his quae agunt et patiuntur, reducuntur ad diversa principia; nam agit aliquid per rationem formae in rebus creatis, patitur vero ratione materiae. Generare autem et generari significantur per modum actionis et passionis. Ergo oportet quod ad diversa principia referantur; et sic non potest esse una potentia qua pater generat, et qua filius generatur. 4. In things active and passive action and passion are reduced to different principles, since in creatures a thing acts by reason of its form and is patient by reason of its matter. Now to beget and to be begotten express action and passion. Therefore they must be referred to different principles: so that it cannot be the same power whereby the Father begets and the Son is begotten.
60728]Sed diceretur, quod est eadem potentia, in quantum utraque radicatur in essentia divina, quae una est patris et filii. —Sed contra, potentia calefaciendi et desiccandi radicantur in uno subiecto, scilicet igne; nec tamen est una et eadem potentia: alia enim qualitas est calor, qui est principium calefaciendi, et alia siccitas, quae est principium desiccandi. Ergo unitas divinae essentiae non sufficit ad hoc quod sit eadem potentia qua pater generat et filius generatur. 5. But to this it might be replied that it is the same power inasmuch as on either hand it is rooted in the divine essence which is one in Father and Son. —On the contrary the power to heat and the power to dry are rooted in one subject, namely fire: and yet they are not one and the same power, since heat which is the principle of calefaction is a distinct quality from dryness which is the principle of desiccation. Wherefore the unity of the divine essence does not suffice to make one the Father’s power to beget and the Son’s power to be begotten.
Praeterea, omnis sapiens et intelligens ex sua sapientia aliquam conceptionem habet. Sed filius est sapiens et intelligens, sicut et pater. Ergo habet aliquam conceptionem. Conceptio autem patris est verbum: quod est filius. Ergo filius etiam habet alium filium. 6. Every wise and intelligent subject forms a concept by his wisdom. Now the Son is wise and intelligent even as the Father. Therefore he has a concept. But the Father’s concept is the Word which is the Son. Therefore the Son also has a Son.
Sed diceretur, quod verbum dicitur in divinis non solum personaliter, sed essentialiter; et sic verbum essentialiter dictum potest esse conceptio filii. —Sed contra, verbum dicit speciem conceptam ordinatam ad manifestationem, et ita importat originem. Quae autem important originem in divinis, dicuntur personaliter, et non essentialiter. Ergo verbum essentialiter dici non potest. 7. To this it may be replied that word is predicated of God not only personally but also essentially, and thus the Word predicated essentially may be the concept of the Son. —On the contrary word denotes the species conceived and ordered for the purpose of manifestation, and thus it implies origin. Now those terms which indicate origin in God are predicated personally and not essentially. Therefore word cannot be predicated essentially,.
Praeterea, Anselmus dicit in Monologio, quod sicut pater dicit se, ita et filius et spiritus sanctus. Idem autem est patrem dicere se, quod generare filium, ut ipse ibidem dicit. Ergo filius generat alium filium; et sic idem quod prius. 8. Anselm (Monolog.) says that “as the Father utters (dicit) himself, so do the Son and the Holy Spirit.” Now, as he says (ibid.), for the Father to utter himself is the same as to beget a Son. Therefore the Son begets another Son: and thus the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, ex hoc probatur quod Deus generat, quia generationem aliis tribuit, secundum illud Isai. LXVI, 9: si ego qui generationem caeteris tribuo, sterilis ero? Dicit dominus. Sicut autem pater dat generationem, ita et filius, quia indivisa sunt opera Trinitatis, et filius generat filium. 9. God is proved to beget from the fact that he bestows on others the faculty of begetting (Isa. lxvi, 9): Shall I that give generation to others be barren? says the Lord. Now as the Father gives generation, even so does the Son: because the works of the Trinity are undivided. Therefore the Son begets a Son.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. ad Orosium, quod pater generat filium natura. Damascenus etiam dicit, quod generatio est opus naturae. Eadem autem est natura patris et filii. Ergo sicut pater generat, ita et filius; sunt ergo plures filii in divinis, et ita plures personae quam tres. 10. Augustine (Dial. ad Oros. lxv, 7) says that the Father begets the Son naturally: and Damascene (De Fide Orth. xxvii, 2) says that generation is a work of nature. Now the Father and the Son have the same nature. Therefore as the Father begets, so also does the Son: and consequently in God there are several Sons and more than three persons.
Sed dicendum, quod ea ratione non possunt esse plures filii in divinis, quia non potest ibi esse nisi una filiatio; forma enim unius speciei non multiplicatur nisi per divisionem materiae, quae nulla est in divinis. —Sed contra, omnis differentia nata est facere pluralitatem. Potest autem esse differentia inter duas filiationes, non solum ex materia, sed etiam ex hoc quod haec filiatio est talis, illa vero talis. Ergo nihil prohibet plures filiationes ponere in divinis, licet ibi non sit materia. 11. But someone will reply that there cannot be more than one Son in God since there can be but one filiation: because the form of one species is not multiplied otherwise than by division of matter, and there is no such thing in God. —On the contrary any difference whatsoever must naturally connote number. Now there can be more than one filiation, not only by reason of the matter but also because this filiation is this wise and that filiation is that wise. Therefore nothing prevents several filiations being in God, although there is no matter in him.
Praeterea, filius procedit a patre sicut splendor a sole, secundum illud Hebr., I, 3: cum sit splendor gloriae. Sed splendor etiam potest alium splendorem producere. Ergo et filius potest alium filium generare; et sic sequitur quod in divinis sint plures filii, et personae plures tribus. 12. The Son proceeds from the Father as brightness from the sun, according to Hebrews i, 3, being the brightness of his glory. Now one brightness can produce another brightness. Therefore the Son can beget another Son: and thus there would be several Sons in God and more than three persons.
Praeterea, spiritus sanctus est amor quo pater diligit filium. Sed etiam spiritum sanctum amat pater. Ergo oportet quod sit alius spiritus quo pater amat spiritum sanctum; et sic quatuor sunt personae in divinis. 13. The Holy Spirit is the Father’s love of the Son. Now the Father also loves the Holy Spirit. Therefore there must be another Spirit whereby the Father loves the Holy Spirit and thus there will be four persons in God.
Praeterea, secundum Dionysium bonum est communicativum sui. Bonitas autem spiritui sancto appropriatur, sicut potentia patri et sapientia filio. Ergo propriissime ad spiritum sanctum pertinere videtur quod naturam divinam alii personae communicet; et sic sunt plures tribus personis in divinis. 14. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) the good is self-communicative. Now goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, as power to the Father and wisdom to the Son. Therefore one would think it most appropriate to the Holy Spirit that he should communicate the divine nature to another person: and thus there will be more than three persons in God.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in IV Meteororum, perfectum unumquodque est, quando potest sibi simile ex se producere. Spiritus autem sanctus est perfectus Deus. Ergo potest aliam divinam personam producere; ergo, et cetera. 15. According to the Philosopher (Meteor. iv) a thing is perfect when it can of itself produce its like. Now the Holy Spirit is perfect God. Therefore he can produce another person: and consequently... etc.
Praeterea, filius a patre divinam naturam non recipit perfectius quam spiritus sanctus. Recipit autem filius a patre divinam naturam non solum passive (ut ita dixerim) quasi ab eo genitus, sed etiam active, quia potest eamdem naturam alii communicare. Ergo et spiritus sanctus divinam naturam potest alii personae communicare. 16. The Son does not receive the divine nature from the Father more perfectly than the Holy Spirit. Now the Son receives from the Father the divine nature not only passively (so to speak) as being begotten of him, but also actively, because he can communicate the same nature to another. Therefore the Holy Spirit also can communicate the divine nature to another person.
Praeterea, quod est perfectionis in rebus creatis, oportet Deo attribui. Communicare autem naturam ad perfectionem in rebus creatis pertinet, licet modus communicandi aliquam imperfectionem habeat, in quantum talem communicationem consequitur aliqua divisio, vel aliqua transmutatio generantis. Ergo communicare divinam naturam est perfectionis in Deo; et ita spiritui sancto est attribuendum. Procedit ergo a spiritu sancto aliqua divina persona; et sic sequitur quod in divinis sint personae plures tribus. 17. Whatsoever belongs to perfection in creatures must be attributed to God. Now it belongs to perfection in creatures to communicate nature, although the mode of communication has a certain imperfection in that it involves division or change in the generator. Therefore to communicate the divine nature belongs to perfection in God, and consequently it must be attributed to the Holy Spirit. Therefore a person proceeds from the Holy Spirit, and thus it follows that there are more than three persons in God.
Praeterea, sicut divinitas est quoddam bonum in patre, ita et paternitas. Ex eo autem quod nullius boni sine consortio potest esse iucunda possessio, probatur a quibusdam quod sunt plures habentes divinam naturam. Ergo pari ratione sunt plures patres in divinis; et similiter plures filii, et plures spiritus sancti; et ita personae plures tribus. 18. Just as the Godhead is a good in the Father, so also is paternity. Now from the fact that no good is possessed with pleasure without others sharing in it, some prove that in God there are several persons having the divine nature. Therefore for the same reason there are several Fathers, and several Sons and several Holy Spirits in God: and consequently more than three persons.
Praeterea, filius et spiritus videntur distingui ab invicem in hoc quod filius procedit a patre per modum intellectus ut verbum: spiritus sanctus per modum voluntatis ut amor. Sunt autem plura attributa essentialia quam voluntas et intellectus, ut bonitas, potentia et huiusmodi. Ergo plures personae procedunt a patre quam filius et spiritus sanctus. 19. The Son and the Holy Spirit are seemingly distinguished from each other in that the Son proceeds from the Father by way of the intellect as his word, while the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of the will as his love. But there are other essential attributes besides the intellect and will, such as goodness, power and so forth. Therefore other persons proceed from the Father besides the Son and Holy Spirit.
Praeterea, processio naturae plus videtur differre a processione intellectus quam processio voluntatis. In rebus autem creatis processionem intellectus semper concomitatur processio voluntatis, quia quaecumque aliquid intelligunt, etiam aliquid volunt; processionem autem naturae non semper concomitatur processio intellectus quia non in omnibus quae naturaliter generant, intellectus invenitur. Si ergo persona quae procedit per modum voluntatis ut amor, est alia in divinis a persona quae procedit per modum intellectus ut verbum, etiam erit persona quae procedit per modum intellectus ut verbum, alia a persona quae procedit per modum naturae ut filius. Sunt ergo tres personae procedentes in divinis, et una non procedens; et sic sunt quatuor personae. 20. Apparently the process of nature differs from the process of the intellect more than does the process of the will, inasmuch as in creatures the process of the intellect is always accompanied by that of the will, since whatever understands something also wills something: whereas the process of nature is not always accompanied by the process of intellect, thus not everything that can generate can understand. If then in God the person who proceeds by way of the will as love is distinct from the person who proceeds by way of the intellect as word, there will also be a person who proceeds by way of the intellect distinct from the person who proceeds by way of nature as Son. Hence there will be three persons proceeding in God and one who does not proceed: and thus there are four persons.
Praeterea, personae multiplicantur in divinis propter relationes, quae subsistunt. Ponuntur autem in divinis quinque relativae notiones, scilicet paternitas, filiatio, processio, innascibilitas, et communis spiratio. Sunt ergo quinque personae in divinis. 21. In God the persons are multiplied on account of the subsistent relations. Now in God there are five relative notions, viz. paternity, filiation, procession, innascibility and common spiration. Therefore there are five persons in God.
Praeterea, relationes quae ab aeterno de Deo dicuntur, non sunt in creaturis, sed in Deo. Quidquid autem est in Deo, est subsistens, cum in Deo non sit aliquod accidens. Omnes ergo relationes quae ab aeterno Deo conveniunt, sunt subsistentes, et per consequens sunt personae. Tales autem sunt infinitae; nam ideae rerum creatarum ab aeterno sunt in Deo, quae non distinguuntur ab invicem nisi per respectus ad creaturas. Sunt ergo infinitae personae in divinis. 22. The relations which are attributed to God from eternity are not in creatures but in God. Now whatsoever is in God is subsistent, since in him there is no accident. Therefore any relation that belongs to God from eternity is subsistent and consequently is a person. Now such relations are infinite in number: thus the ideas of creatures are in God from eternity, and they are not mutually distinct except by their relation to creatures. Therefore the persons in God are infinite in number.
Sed contra, videtur quod sint pauciores tribus. On the other hand it would seem that there are fewer than three.
In una enim natura non est nisi unus modus communicationis illius naturae; unde, secundum Commentatorem, animalia quae generantur ex semine, non sunt unius speciei cum animalibus ex putrefactione generatis. Divina autem natura est maxime una. Ergo non potest communicare nisi uno modo. Sic ergo non possunt esse nisi duae personae, una divinitatem communicans per aliquem modum, et persona per illum modum divinitatem recipiens. 1. In one nature there is but one mode of communication of that nature: wherefore, according to the Commentator (Phys. viii), animals generated from seed are not of the same species as those engendered from corrupt matter. Now the divine nature is supremely one: wherefore it can be communicated in one way only. Therefore there, cannot be more than two persons, one that communicates the Godhead in some particular way, and another that receives the Godhead in that same way.
Praeterea, Hilarius, ostendit filium naturaliter a patre procedere, quia talis existit qualis Deus est; creaturas vero a Deo procedere voluntarie, quia tales sunt quales eas voluit Deus esse, non qualis est Deus. Sed spiritus sanctus, sicut et filius, talis est qualis est Deus pater. Ergo spiritus sanctus procedit naturaliter a patre, sicut et filius. Non ergo est distinctio inter spiritum sanctum et filium ex eo quod filius procedit per modum naturae non autem spiritus sanctus. 2. Hilary (De Synod.) shows that the Son proceeds from the Father naturally because he is such as God is, but that creatures proceed from God according to his win, because they are such as he wishes them to be, not such as he is. Now the Holy Spirit, like the Son, is such as God the Father is. Therefore the Holy Spirit, like the Son, proceeds from the Father naturally; and consequently there is no distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son through the Son proceeding naturally and the Holy Spirit not.
Praeterea, natura voluntatis et intellectus non differunt in Deo nisi secundum rationem tantum. Ergo processio per modum naturae et intellectus et voluntatis non differunt in Deo nisi ratione tantum. Si ergo per hoc distinguuntur filius et spiritus sanctus, quod unus procedit per modum naturae vel intellectus, et alius per modum voluntatis, non erunt distincti nisi secundum rationem. Ergo non erunt duae personae, cum pluralitas personarum, rerum pluralitatem importet. 3. In God will and intellect differ not in nature but only logically: and consequently procession by nature, by intellect and by will differ but logically in God. Therefore if the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished through the one proceeding naturally and the other by the will, they will be but logically distinct: and they will not be two persons, since plurality of persons implies a real distinction.
Praeterea, personae in divinis distinguuntur solum secundum relationes originis. Ad designandam autem originem sufficiunt duae relationes, scilicet a quo alius, et qui ab alio. Ergo in divinis non sunt nisi duae personae. 4. The persons in God are distinct by relations of origin only. Now two relations suffice to indicate origin, namely one from whom is another, and one who is from another. Therefore there are but two persons in God.
Praeterea, omnis relatio exigit duo extrema. Sicut ergo in divinis personae non distinguuntur nisi secundum relationem: ita oportet quod sint in divinis vel duae relationes, et sic erunt quatuor personae; vel una relatio tantum, et sic erunt solum duae personae. 5. Every relation requires two extremes. Since then in God the persons are not distinct save by the relations; it follows that in God there are either two relations, and consequently four persons; or one relation, and therefore only two persons.
Sed contra, videtur quod sint tantum tres personae in divinis, per hoc quod dicitur I Ioan. V, 7: tres sunt qui testimonium dant in caelo. Interrogantibus autem quid tres, respondit Ecclesia, quod tres personae, ut dicit Augustinus. Ergo in divinis sunt tres personae. On the contrary it is manifest that there are but three persons in God from 1 Jo. v, 7, There are three who bear witness in heaven: and if we ask “three what?” the Church replies: “Three persons,” as Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4). Therefore there are three persons in God.
Praeterea, ad perfectionem divinae bonitatis, felicitatis et gloriae requiritur, quod sit in Deo vera et perfecta caritas; nihil enim est caritate melius, nihil caritate perfectius, ut dicit Richardus in III de Trinitate. Felicitas autem absque iucunditate non est, quae maxime per caritatem habetur. Ut enim in eodem libro dicitur, nihil caritate dulcius, nihil caritate iucundius, caritatis deliciis rationalis vita nihil dulcius experitur, nulla delectatione delectabilius fruitur. Perfectio etiam gloriae in quadam magnificentia perfectae communicationis consistit, quam caritas facit. Vera autem et perfecta caritas requirit in divinis ternarium numerum personarum. Amor enim quo aliquis se tantum diligit, est amor privatus, et non caritas vera. Alium autem summe Deus diligere non potest qui non sit summe diligibilis; nec summe diligibilis est, nisi sit summe bonus. Unde patet quod vera caritas in Deo summa esse non potest si sit ibi tantum una persona; nec etiam perfecta, si sint duae tantum: quia ad perfectionem caritatis requiritur quod amans velit id quod ab eo amatur, etiam aeque ab alio diligi. Indicium namque magnae infirmitatis est non posse pati consortium amoris; posse vero pati, signum magnae perfectionis. Magis gratanter suscipere, maximo est desiderio requirere, ut dicit Richardus in eodem Lib. Oportet ergo, si sit in Deo perfectio bonitatis, felicitatis et gloriae, quod sit in divinis ternarius personarum numerus. Moreover for the perfection of divine goodness, happiness and glory there must be true and perfect charity in God: for nothing is better or more perfect than charity, as Richard says (De Trin. iii, 2). Now there is no happiness without enjoyment, and this arises chiefly from charity: for as we read (ibid. 5), “Nothing is sweeter than charity, nothing more enjoyable, the intellectual life affords no sweeter experience, or delight more exquisite.” And the perfection of glory consists in the splendour of perfect communication, which is effected by charity. And true and perfect charity requires the trinity of persons in God. For the love whereby a person loves himself is selfish love and is not true charity. But God cannot love supremely another who is not supremely lovable; and none is supremely lovable that is not supremely good. Hence it is evident that true charity cannot be supreme in God if there be but one person in him. Nor can it be perfect if there be but two persons: since perfect charity demands that the lover wish that what he loves himself be equally loved by another. For it is a sign of great imperfection to be unwilling to share one’s love, whereas to be willing to share it is a sign of great perfection: “The more one is pleased to receive a thing the greater our longing in seeking for it,” as Richard says (ibid.). In God therefore, since there is perfection of goodness, happiness and glory, there must be a trinity of persons.
Praeterea, cum bonum sit communicativum sui, perfectio divinae bonitatis requirit quod Deus summe sua communicet. Si autem esset tantum una persona in divinis, non summe communicaret suam bonitatem: creaturis enim non summe se communicat; si vero essent solum duae personae, non communicarentur perfecte deliciae mutuae caritatis. Oportet ergo esse secundam personam, cui perfecte communicetur divina bonitas, et tertiam cui perfecte communicentur divinae caritatis deliciae. Again, as goodness is self-communicative, the perfection of divine goodness requires that he communicate his perfections supremely. But if there were only one person in God he would not communicate his goodness supremely: for he does not communicate himself supremely to creatures: and if there were but two persons, the delights of mutual charity would not be communicated perfectly. Hence there must be a second person to whom the divine goodness is perfectly communicated, and a third to whom the delights of divine charity are perfectly communicated.
Praeterea, ad amorem tria requiruntur, scilicet amans, id quod amatur, et ipse amor, ut Augustinus dicit in VIII de Trinitate. Duo autem mutuo se amantes, sunt pater et filius; amor autem qui est eorum nexus est spiritus sanctus. Sunt ergo tres personae in divinis. Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 1, 2), three things are required for love, the lover, the beloved and love itself. Now the two who love each other are the Father and the Son: and the love that is their mutual bond is the Holy Spirit. Therefore there are three persons in God.
Praeterea, sicut Richardus dicit, in V de Trinitate, in rebus humanis videbis quod persona de personis procedit tribus modis: quandoque immediate tantum, sicut Eva de Adam; quandoque mediate tantum, sicut Enoch de Adam; quandoque immediate et mediate simul, sicut Seth de Adam; immediate in quantum eius filius fuit, mediate vero in quantum fuit filius Evae quae ab Adam processit. In divinis autem non potest procedere persona de persona mediate tantum, quia non esset ibi summa germanitas. Relinquitur ergo quod in divinis sit una persona quae non procedit ab alia, scilicet persona patris, a qua procedunt aliae personae; una immediate tantum, scilicet filius; alia mediate simul et immediate, scilicet spiritus sanctus, qui ex patre filioque procedit. Ergo est personarum ternarius in divinis. Again, as Richard remarks (De Trin. v, 6), in mankind it is to be observed that a person proceeds from persons in three ways: first, immediately only, as Eve from Adam: secondly, mediately only, as Enoch from Adam: thirdly, both immediately and mediately, as Seth from Adam, immediately as his son, mediately as the son of Eve who proceeded from Adam. Now in God one person cannot proceed from another mediately only, since there would not be perfect equality. Hence we must conclude that in God there is one person that does not proceed from another, i.e. the Father from whom two other persons proceed; one immediately only, i.e. the Son; and the other both mediately and immediately, i.e. the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the Son. Therefore there are three persons in God.
Praeterea, inter dare plenitudinem divinitatis et non accipere, et accipere et non dare, medium est dare et accipere. Dare autem plenitudinem divinitatis et non accipere, pertinet ad personam patris; accipere vero et non dare, pertinet ad personam spiritus sancti. Oportet ergo esse tertiam personam, quae plenitudinem divinitatis et det et accipiat; et haec est persona filii. Sunt ergo tres personae in divinis. Again, to both give and receive the fulness of the Godhead comes between giving and not receiving it, and receiving without giving it. Now it belongs to the person of the Father to give the fulness of the Godhead without receiving it: and to receive the fulness of the Godhead without giving it belongs to the person of the Holy Spirit. Therefore there must be a third person who both gives and receives the fulness of the Godhead: and this is the person of the Son: and thus there are three persons in God.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod, secundum positionem haereticorum, nullo modo potest poni certus personarum numerus in divinis. Intellexit enim Arius personarum Trinitatem hoc modo, quod filius et spiritus sanctus essent quaedam creaturae; quod etiam Macedonius de spiritu sancto sensit. Processio autem creaturarum a Deo non de necessitate certo numero terminatur, cum divina virtus ex sua infinitate hoc habeat quod omnem creaturae modum, speciem et numerum excedat. Unde si Deus pater omnipotens creavit duas excellentissimas creaturas, quas Arius dicit filium et spiritum sanctum, non est remotum quin alias aequales vel etiam maiores creare poterit. Sabellius autem posuit quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus non distinguuntur nisi nomine et ratione; quae etiam patet in infinitum posse multiplicari, secundum quod ratio nostra infinitis modis de Deo cogitare potest ex variis effectibus, et eum diversimode nominare. Sola autem Catholica fides, quae ponit unitatem divinae naturae in personis realiter distinctis, ternarii numeri potest rationem in divinis assignare. Impossibile enim est quod una natura simplex sit nisi in uno sicut in principio. Unde Hilarius dicit, quod qui confitetur in divinis duos innascibiles, confitetur duos deos; unum enim Deum praedicari natura unius innascibilis Dei exigit. Unde et quidam philosophi dixerunt, quod in rebus quae sunt sine materia non potest esse pluralitas nisi secundum originem. Una enim natura potest in pluribus esse ex aequo propter materiae divisionem, quae in Deo locum non habet. Unde impossibile est ponere in divinis nisi unam personam innascibilem quae ab alio non procedat. Si autem ab eo aliae personae procedant, oportet quod hoc sit per aliquam actionem. Non autem per actionem transeuntem in id quod est extra agentem, sicut calefacere vel secare sunt actiones ignis et serrae, et creatio ipsius Dei; quia sic personae procedentes essent extra naturam divinam. Relinquitur ergo quod processio personarum in unam naturam divinam non sit nisi secundum operationes quae non transeunt extra, sed manent in operante. Hae autem in natura intellectuali sunt solum duae, scilicet intelligere et velle. Secundum autem utramque earum invenitur aliquid procedens cum hae operationes perficiuntur. Ipsum enim intelligere non perficitur nisi aliquid in mente intelligentis concipiatur, quod dicitur verbum; non enim dicimur intelligere, sed cogitare ad intelligendum, antequam conceptio aliqua in mente nostra stabiliatur. Similiter etiam ipsum velle perficitur amore ab amante per voluntatem procedente, cum amor nihil sit aliud quam stabilimentum voluntatis in bono volito. Verbum autem et amor in creatura quidem non sunt personae subsistentes in natura intelligente et volente. Intelligere enim et velle creaturae non est esse eius. Unde verbum et amor sunt quaedam supervenientia creaturae intelligenti et volenti, sicut accidentia quaedam. Cum autem in Deo idem sit esse, intelligere et velle, necessarium est quod verbum et amor in Deo non accidant, sed subsistant in natura divina. Non autem est in Deo nisi unum simplex intelligere et unum simplex velle, quia intelligendo essentiam suam, intelligit omnia; et volendo bonitatem suam, vult omnia quae vult. Non est ergo nisi unum verbum et unus amor in divinis. Ordo autem intelligendi et volendi aliter se habet in Deo et nobis. Nos enim cognitionem intellectivam a rebus exterioribus accipimus; per voluntatem vero nostram in aliquid exterius tendimus tamquam in finem. Et ideo intelligere nostrum est secundum motum a rebus in animam; velle vero secundum motum ab anima ad res. Deus autem non accipit scientiam a rebus, sed per scientiam suam causat res; nec per voluntatem suam tendit in aliquid exterius sicut in finem, sed omnia exteriora ordinat in se sicut in finem. Est ergo tam in nobis quam in Deo circulatio quaedam in operibus intellectus et voluntatis; nam voluntas redit in id a quo fuit principium intelligendi: sed in nobis concluditur circulus ad id quod est extra, dum bonum exterius movet intellectum nostrum, et intellectus movet voluntatem, et voluntas tendit per appetitum et amorem in exterius bonum; sed in Deo iste circulus clauditur in se ipso. Nam Deus intelligendo se, concipit verbum suum, quod est etiam ratio omnium intellectorum per ipsum, propter hoc quod omnia intelligit intelligendo seipsum: et ex hoc verbo procedit in amorem omnium et sui ipsius. Unde dixit quidam, quod monas monadem genuit, et in se suum reflectit ardorem. Postquam vero circulus conclusus est, nihil ultra addi potest; et ideo non potest sequi tertia processio in natura divina, sed sequitur ulterius processio in exteriorem naturam. Sic ergo oportet quod in divinis sit una tantum persona non procedens, et duae solae personae procedentes; quarum una persona procedit ut amor, et alia ut verbum; et sic est personarum ternarius numerus in divinis. I answer that according to the opinions of heretics it is impossible to assign a definite number of persons in God. Arius took the trinity of persons to mean that the Son and Holy Spirit are creatures: and Macedonius was of the same opinion in regard to the Holy Spirit. Now the procession of creatures from God is not necessarily limited to a certain number, seeing that the divine power being infinite surpasses all mode, species and number of the creature. Wherefore if God the Father almighty created two super-excellent creatures, whom Arius stated to be the Son and Holy Spirit, there is no reason why he should not create others equal to them or even greater than they. Sabellius contended that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are only nominally and logically distinct: and here again it is evident that there would be an indefinite multiplication, inasmuch as our reason can consider God in an infinite number of ways in respect of his various effects, and give him various names. The Catholic faith alone which acknowledges unity of the divine nature in persons really distinct, can assign a reason for the trinity in God. For it is impossible that one simple nature be in more than one as principle: wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.) that whosoever acknowledges two innascibles in God must acknowledge two gods. Now the nature of one innascible God demands that we should acknowledge but one God. Hence certain philosophers asserted that in immaterial things there cannot be plurality except in respect of origin. For one nature can be equally in several subjects on account of the division of matter, which does not apply to God. Wherefore there cannot be in God more than one innascible person that does not proceed from another. Now if other persons proceed from him this must be by some action. Not, however, by an action passing into a subject outside the agent, as heating and cutting are the actions of fire and saw, and as creation is the act of God himself: since then the proceeding persons would be outside the divine nature. It follows then that the procession of persons into the one divine nature is by reason of an action that does not pass into an extraneous subject but remains in the agent: and in the intellectual nature such actions are but two, to understand and to will. In each of these actions something is found to proceed when the action is performed. The action of understanding is not exercised without something being conceived in the mind of the one who understands, and this is called the word: since before a concept of some kind is fixed in the mind we are not said to understand but to think about a thing in order to understand it. In like manner the act of willing is exercised by love proceeding from the lover through his will, for love is simply the fixation of the will in the good that is willed. In creatures word and love are not subsistent persons in the nature that is endowed with intelligence and will: for a creature’s acts of understanding and will are not its very being. Hence its word and love are accessories of and accidental to the understanding and willing creature. But seeing that in God, being, intelligence and will are one and the same, it follows of necessity that word and love in God are not accidents but subsist in the divine nature For in God there is but one simple act of intelligence and one simple act of will, since by understanding his essence he understands all things, and by willing his goodness, he wills whatsoever he wills. Hence there is but one Word and one Love in God. Now the order of understanding and willing is not the same in God as in us. We receive our intellective knowledge from external things: and by our will we tend to something external as an end. Wherefore our act of intelligence is according to a movement from things to the soul: but our act of will is according to a movement from the soul to things. On the other hand God does not acquire knowledge from things, but by his knowledge is the cause of things: nor by his will does he tend to anything external as his end, but he directs all external things to himself as their end. Accordingly both in us and in God there is a certain rotation in the acts of the intellect and will: for the will returns to that whence came the beginning of understanding: but whereas in us the circle ends in that which is external, the external good moving the intellect and the intellect moving the will, and the will by appetite and love tending to the external good; in God, on the other hand, the circle ends in him. For God, by understanding himself, conceives his word which is the type of all things understood by him, inasmuch as he understands all things by understanding himself, and from this word he proceeds to love of all things and of himself. Thus someone has said that a “monad engendered an atom and reflected its own beat upon itself.” And the circle being closed nothing more can be added, so that a third procession within the divine nature is impossible, although there follows a procession towards external nature. Hence in God there must be but one person that does not proceed, and only two persons that proceed, one of whom proceeds as love, the other as word: and thus the persons in God are three in number.
Cuius quidem ternarii similitudo in creaturis apparet tripliciter: primo quidem sicut effectus repraesentat causam; et hoc modo principium totius divinitatis, scilicet pater, repraesentatur per id quod est primum in creatura, scilicet per hoc quod est in se una subsistens; verbum vero per formam cuiuslibet creaturae: nam in his quae ab intelligente aguntur, forma effectus a conceptione intelligentis derivatur; amor vero in ordine creaturae. Nam ex eo quod Deus amat seipsum, omnia ordine quodam in se convertit; et ideo haec similitudo dicitur vestigii, quod repraesentat pedem sicut effectus causam. Alio modo secundum eamdem rationem operationis; et sic repraesentatur in creatura rationali tantum, quae potest se intelligere et amare, sicut et Deus, et sic verbum et amorem sui producere, et haec dicitur similitudo naturalis imaginis; ea enim imaginem aliorum gerunt quae similem speciem praeferunt. Tertio modo per unitatem obiecti, in quantum creatura rationalis intelligit et amat Deum; et haec est quaedam unionis conformitas, quae in solis sanctis invenitur qui idem intelligunt et amant quod Deus. In creatures a likeness to this trinity appears in three ways. First as an effect reflects its cause; and in this way the principle of the whole Godhead, i.e. the Father, is represented by that which holds the first place in the creature, namely by being in itself one subsistent thing. The Word is represented by the form of each creature; because in those things which are done by an intellectual agent the form of the effect derives from the concept of his intelligence. Love is represented it the order of creatures: because from the fact that God loves himself, he directs all things to himself in a certain order. Wherefore this likeness is called a vestigiary likeness in that this bears the trace of the foot as an effect bears a trace of its cause. Secondly, by reason of a similar kind of operation: and thus it is represented in the rational creature alone who like God can understand and love himself, and consequently produces his own word and love: and this is called the likeness of the natural image; because in order that one thing be the image of another it must present a like species. I Thirdly, on account of the unity of object, inasmuch as the rational creature understands and loves God: this is a kind of conformity of union that is found in the saints alone who understand and love the same thing as God understands and loves.
De prima quidem similitudine dicitur Iob XI, 7: forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes? De secunda Genes. I, 26: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; et dicitur imago creationis. De tertia II Cor. III, 18: nos enim omnes revelata facie gloriam domini speculantes, in eamdem imaginem transformamur; et haec dicitur imago recreationis. Of the first kind of likeness it is written (Job xi, 7) Peradventure thou wilt understand the steps of God? Of the second (Gen. i, 26): Let us make man to our own image and likeness: and this is called the image of creation. Of the third it is written (2 Cor. iii, 18): But we beholding the glory of the Lord with open face are transformed into the same image: and this is called the image of re-creation.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ideo dicit Augustinus quod non est dicendum quod filius non potuit generare, sed non oportuit: quia non ex impotentia filii est quod non generat, ut hoc quod dicit non potuit sumatur privative, et non simpliciter negative; per hoc autem quod dicit quod non oportuit, significat quod sequeretur inconveniens, si in divinis filius alium filium generaret. Quod quidem inconveniens ex quatuor potest considerari: primo quidem quia cum filius in divinis procedat ut verbum, si filius filium generaret, sequeretur quod in Deo verbum ex verbo procederet, quod quidem esse non potest nisi in intellectu inquisitivo et discursivo in quo verbum ex verbo procedit, dum ex consideratione unius veritatis in alterius veritatis considerationem procedit; quod nullo modo convenit perfectioni et simplicitati intellectus divini, qui uno intuitu omnia simul videt. Secundo, quia illud per quod aliquid individuatur et incommunicabile efficitur, impossibile est pluribus esse commune. Id enim per quod Socrates est hoc aliquid, nec intelligi potest pluribus inesse. Unde si filiatio in divinis pluribus conveniret, non esset filiatio constituens incommunicabilem filii personam; et ita oporteret quod filius individua persona constitueretur per aliquid absolutum, quod essentiae divinae unitati non convenit. Tertio, quia nihil unum secundum speciem existens, potest secundum numerum multiplicari nisi ratione materiae; et hac ratione in divinis non potest esse nisi una essentia, quia divina essentia est immaterialis omnino. Si autem essent plures filii in divinis, oporteret etiam esse filiationes plures; et ita oporteret eas secundum materiam subiectam multiplicari; quod divinae immaterialitati non convenit. Quarto, quia filius dicitur aliquis ex hoc quod naturaliter procedit; natura autem ad unum se habet determinate, nisi per accidens ex aliquo naturaliter plura proveniant propter materiae divisionem; et ideo ubi est omnino immaterialis natura, oportet solum filium unum esse. Reply to the First Objection. The reason why Augustine says that it is not true that the Son was unable to beget, but that it was not fitting for him to beget, is that it was not through inability that the Son does not beget: so that the words was unable must be taken privatively and not simply negatively, and the words it was not fitting indicate that the consequence would be unfitting if in God the Son were to beget another Son. How true this is may be considered in four ways. First, seeing that in God the Son proceeds as word, if the Son begot a Son it would follow that in God word proceeds from word: and this is impossible except in an inquiring and discursive intellect, wherein word proceeds from word when the mind proceeds from the consideration of one truth to the consideration of another: whereas this is nowise consistent with the perfection and simplicity of the divine intellect which at one glance sees all things at the same time. Secondly, because that which renders a thing individual and incommunicable cannot possibly be common to several: thus that which makes Socrates to be this particular thing cannot even be conceived as being in others besides. Hence if in God filiation were common to several (persons) it would not make the personality of the Son incommunicable, and thus the Son would have to be made an individual person by something absolute, and this is incompatible with the unity of the divine essence. Thirdly, because nothing that is one in species can be more than one except by reason of matter: for which reason there can be but one essence in God, because the divine essence is utterly immaterial. Now if there were several Sons in God there would also be several filiations, and consequently they would have to be multiplied according to matter subjected to them: and this is incompatible with the divine immateriality. Fourthly, because a man is a son as resulting from a process of nature. Now nature is confined definitely to one effect: except when by accident several effects are produced on account of the matter being divided: and consequently where nature is utterly devoid of matter, there can be but one son.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod dupliciter aliquid potest esse naturae alicuius: uno modo secundum quod absolute consideratur; et sic oportet ut quae ad aliquam naturam pertinent, conveniant omnibus suppositis in natura illius; et sic convenit naturae divinae esse omnipotentem, creatorem, et alia huiusmodi, quae sunt communia tribus personis. Alio modo pertinet aliquod ad naturam secundum quod consideratur in aliquo uno supposito; et sic non oportet quod id quod convenit naturae, conveniat cuilibet supposito illius naturae: sicut enim natura generis habet aliquid in una specie quod alteri speciei non convenit —quemadmodum ad naturam sensitivam consequuntur quaedam in homine, non autem in animalibus brutis, ut habere excellentissimum tactum et reminisci, et alia huiusmodi —ita etiam aliquid pertinet ad naturam speciei prout est in uno individuo, quod non convenit alii individuo eiusdem speciei; sicut patet quod naturae humanae prout fuit in Adam convenit quod non sit per generationem naturalem accepta, quod tamen in aliis individuis humanae naturae non invenitur; et per hunc modum posse generare, consequitur naturam divinam, prout est in persona patris; quod patet ex hoc quod pater non constituitur persona incommunicabilis nisi ex ipsa paternitate, quae competit ei secundum quod est generans; et ideo non sequitur quod filius, licet sit perfectum suppositum divinae naturae possit generare. Reply to the Second Objection. A thing may be of this or that nature in two ways. First, as considered absolutely: and thus whatsoever belongs to a particular nature must be appropriate to every supposit of that nature: in this sense it is competent to the divine nature to be almighty, creator and other similar attributes that are common to the three persons. Secondly, a thing belongs to a particular nature as considered in one particular supposit: and then whatsoever belongs to the nature does not necessarily belong to every supposit of that nature. Thus just as the generic nature includes something in one species which does not belong to another species (for instance, the sensible nature endows man with certain qualities with which it does not endow dumb, animals, such as a delicate sense of touch and memory and so forth); even so certain things belong to the specific nature in one individual, and not to another individual of the same species. For instance, it was peculiar to human nature considered as in Adam that it was not received by him through the natural process of generation, which does not apply to other individuals of human nature. In this way then the ability to beget belongs to the divine nature as in the person of the Father, precisely because the Father is not constituted an incommunicable person otherwise than by paternity which belongs to him as begetting: hence though the Son is a perfect supposit of the divine nature it does not follow that he can beget.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet pater possit generare, non autem filius, non tamen sequitur quod potentiam aliquam habeat pater quam non habet filius. Eadem enim potentia est patris et filii, per quam et pater generat et filius generatur. Nam potentia absolutum quiddam est; et ideo non distinguitur in divinis, sicut nec bonitas, nec aliquid sic dictum. Generare vero et generari in divinis non significant aliquid absolutum, sed solam relationem in divinis. Relationes autem oppositae, in uno et eodem absoluto communicant in divinis, et ipsum non dividunt; sicut patet quod in patre et filio est una essentia, unde nec potentia distinguitur in divinis per hoc quod est ad generare et generari. Non enim etiam in creaturis oportet quod per quamcumque obiectorum distinctionem potentia distinguatur sed per differentiam formalem obiectorum, et quae in eodem genere accipiatur; sicut potentia visiva non distinguitur per hoc quod est videre hominem et videre asinum, quia ista differentia non est sensibilis in quantum est sensibile; et similiter in divinis absolutum per relationem non distinguitur. Reply to the Third Objection. Although the Father can beget whereas the Son cannot, it does not follow that the Father has a power which the Son has not: because in the Father and the Son it is the same power whereby the Father begets and the Son is begotten. For power is something absolute, wherefore it is not distinguished in God as neither is goodness nor anything else of the kind. On the other hand in God to beget and to be begotten do not denote something absolute, but merely a relation. Now opposite relations in God meet together in the one same absolute and do not divide it; thus it is clear that the one essence is in Father and Son; wherefore neither is power divided in God through being referred to begetting and being begotten. In fact not even in creatures does every difference of objects necessarily differentiate powers, but only when the objects differ formally within the same genus: thus the power of sight is not differentiated by seeing a man and seeing a horse, because these sensible objects do riot differ qua sensible: and in like manner the absolute is not divided by the relative in God.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod in omni operatione quae transit ab agente in rem exteriorem, requiritur aliud principium in agente, per quod est agens, et aliud principium in patiente, per quod est patiens. In operatione autem quae non transit in rem exteriorem, sed manet in operante, non requiritur nisi unum operationis principium; sicut ad volendum requiritur principium ex parte volentis, per quod possit velle. In creaturis autem est generatio secundum operationem transeuntem in rem exteriorem: unde oportet quod sit alia potentia activa in generante, et alia passiva in generato. Sed generatio divina attenditur secundum operationem non quidem in aliquid exterius transeuntem, sed interius manentem, idest secundum conceptionem verbi. Unde non oportet quod alia sit potentia activa in patre, et alia passiva in filio. Reply to the Fourth Objection. In every action that passes from the agent into an extraneous thing there must be a principle in the agent whereby it is agent, and another principle in the patient whereby it is patient. But in the operation which does not pass into anything extraneous, but remains in the agent, only one principle is required: thus in order to will a principle is necessary on the part of the willer that enables him to will. Now in creatures generation is an operation passing into something extraneous, wherefore the active power in the generator must be distinct from the passive power in the generated. Whereas the divine generation is an operation that does not pass into anything extraneous but remains within; consisting as it does in the conception of the Word. Wherefore there is no need for distinct powers, active in the Father and passive in the Son.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod calor et sapor prout in se considerantur, sunt qualitates quaedam, possunt tamen dici potentiae secundum quod sunt actuum quorumdam principia; unde patet quod licet radix prima et remota, quae est subiectum, sit una radix, tamen propinqua, quae est qualitas, non est una. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Heat and dryness considered in themselves are qualities; however, we may Call them powers, inasmuch as they are principles of certain actions. Hence it is clear that although the primary and remote root, i.e. the subject, is but one, the proximate root which is the quality is not one.
Ad sextum dicendum quod, sicut pater est Deus generans, filius autem est Deus genitus: ita dicendum est quod pater est sapiens ut concipiens, filius vero sapiens ut verbum conceptum. Filius enim in eo quod est verbum, est quaedam conceptio sapientis. Sed quia quidquid est in Deo, est Deus, oportet quod ipsa conceptio sapientis Dei sit Deus, et sapiens, et potens, et quidquid aliud competit Deo. Reply to the Sixth Objection. As the Father is God begetting and the Son God begotten, so must we say that the Father is wise and conceiving, while the Son is wise and conceived. Because the Son in that he is the Word is a conception of a wise being. But since whatsoever is in God Js God it follows that the very conception of a wise God is God, is wise, is powerful and whatsoever is appropriate to God.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod verbum in divinis non potest dici nisi personaliter, si proprie accipiatur. Nulla enim alia origo in divinis esse potest nisi immaterialis, et quae sit conveniens intellectuali naturae, qualis est origo verbi et amoris; unde si processio verbi et amoris non sufficit ad distinctionem personalem insinuandam, nulla poterit esse personalis distinctio in divinis. Unde et Ioannes tam in principio sui Evangelii quam in prima canonica sua, nomine verbi pro filio utitur, nec est aliter loquendum de divinis quam sacra Scriptura loquatur. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Taken in its proper sense word cannot be attributed to God otherwise than personally: because in God there cannot be any origination but what is immaterial and consistent with an intellectual nature, such as the origination of word and love: wherefore if the procession of word and love is not enough to indicate a personal distinction, no distinction of persons will be possible in God. Thus John both in the beginning of his gospel and in his first epistle employs the term Word instead of Son, nor may we in speaking of God express ourselves in terms other than those of Holy Writ.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod dicere potest dupliciter sumi: uno modo proprie secundum quod dicere idem est quod verbum concipere; et sic dicit Augustinus, quod non singulus quisque in divinis, sed solus pater est dicens. Alio modo communiter, prout dicere nihil est aliud quam intelligere; et sic dicit Anselmus, quod non solum pater est dicens, sed etiam filius et spiritus sanctus; et tamen licet sint tres dicentes, est unum solum verbum —quod est filius— quia solus filius est conceptio patris intelligentis et concipientis verbum. Reply to the Eighth Objection. Dicere may be taken in two senses. First strictly and then it means to utter a word: and in this sense Augustine (De Trin. vii) says that in God each person does not speak, but the Father alone. Secondly, in a broad sense in which to speak denotes intelligence: and thus Anselm (loc. cit.) says that not only the Father speaks but also the Son and the Holy Spirit: and though there are three who speak there is but one Word which is the Son: because the Son alone is the concept who understands and conceives the Word.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod non sequitur quod sit generatio in divinis ex hoc solum quod tribuit generationem aliis sicut causa effectiva, quia pari ratione sequeretur quod in Deo sit motus, quia tribuit aliis motum. Sequitur autem quod sit in Deo generatio ex hoc quod tribuit aliis generationem ut causa effectiva et exemplaris: pater autem est exemplar generationis ut generans, sed filius ut genitus; unde non oportet quod generet. Reply to the Ninth Objection. That there is generation in God is not proved from the mere fact that God gives generation to others as efficient cause, since it would follow in like manner that there is motion in God because he gives motion to others. Generation is proved to be in God from the fact that he gives generation to others as both efficient and exemplary cause: and the Father is the exemplar of generation as begetting, while the Son is the exemplar as begotten: wherefore it does not follow that he begets.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod generatio est opus divinae naturae, prout est in persona patris, ut supra dictum est, unde non oportet quod conveniat filio. Reply to the Tenth Objection. Generation is an operation of the divine nature as residing in the person of the Father, as we have already stated, hence it does not follow that it is appropriate to the Son.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod, cum filiatio sit relatio consequens determinatum modum originis —scilicet quae est per modum naturae— impossibile est quod filiatio a filiatione differat differentia formali; nisi forte secundum differentiam naturarum, quae per generationem communicantur, sicut potest dici quod alia species filiationis est qua hic homo est filius, et qua hic equus est filius. In divinis autem non est nisi una natura; unde non possunt ibi esse plures filiationes formaliter differentes; et patet etiam quod nec materialiter. Et sic sequitur quod ibi sit tantum una filiatio et unus filius. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Since filiation is a relation arising from a determinate mode of origin, i.e. according. to nature, it is impossible that filiation differ from filiation formally; unless perhaps by reason of a difference of natures communicated by generation: thus we might say that the species of filiation whereby a particular man is a son differs from the species of filiation whereby a particular horse is a son. But in God there is but one nature, wherefore there cannot be several formally different filiations: and it is evident that there cannot be several filiations differing in matter. Consequently in God there is but one filiation and one Son.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod unus splendor ab alio splendore procedit, ex eo quod lux diffunditur ad aliud subiectum: et sic patet quod hoc fit per divisionem materialem, quae non potest esse in divinis. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. One brightness proceeds from another by the diffusion of light on to another subject: wherefore this is clearly due to a division of matter, which is impossible in God.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod unumquodque amatur in quantum est bonum; unde cum una et eadem sit bonitas patris et filii et spiritus sancti, eodem amore, qui est spiritus sanctus, pater diligit et filium et spiritum sanctum, et totam creaturam; sicut eodem verbo, quod est filius, dicit se et filium et spiritum sanctum, et totam creaturam. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. A thing is loved in so far as it is good: hence since one and the same goodness is that of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the Father with the same love, which is the Holy Spirit, loves himself, the Son, the Holy Spirit and all creatures. Even so by the same Word, which is the Son, he utters himself, the Son, the Holy Spirit and all creatures.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod bonitas est id ad quod terminatur operatio viventis, quae manet in operante. Primo enim intelligitur aliquid ut verum, et sic deinceps desideratur ut bonum; et ibi sistit et quiescit operatio intranea, sicut in fine. Sed ex hinc incipit processus operationis ad exteriora, quia ex hoc quod intellectus desiderat et amat aliquid praeconsideratum ut bonum, incipit exterius operari ad illud. Unde ex hoc ipso quod bonitas spiritui sancto appropriatur, convenienter accipi potest quod processio divinarum personarum ultra non porrigitur. Sed quod sequitur, est processio creaturae, quae est extra naturam divinam. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Goodness is something in which terminates the living being’s operation that abides in the operator. First a thing is understood as true, and then is desired as good: and there the internal operation stops and rests as in its end. But from this point begins the process of external operation: because through the intellect’s desire and love for that which it has already considered as good there follows an external operation towards that good. Wherefore from the very fact that goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit it is reasonable for us to conclude that the procession of the divine persons goes no further. What does follow, however, is the procession of creatures which is outside the divine nature.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod inter omnes lineas linea circularis est perfectior, quia non recipit additionem. Unde hoc ipsum ad perfectionem spiritus sancti pertinet quod sua processione quasi quemdam circulum divinae originis concludit, ut ultra iam addi non possit, sicut supra, iam ostensum est. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Of all lines the circle is the most perfect, because it admits of no addition. Hence this belongs to the perfection of the Holy Spirit that as it were he closes the circle of the divine origin, so that no addition is possible, as we have shown above.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod in hoc quod est accipere vel communicare naturam divinam, non attenditur differentia nisi solum secundum relationes; quae quidem differentia inaequalitatem perfectionis constituere non potest, quia, ut dicit Augustinus contra Maximinum, cum quaeritur quis de quo sit, est quaestio originis, non aequalitatis vel inaequalitatis. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. In the reception or communication of the divine nature there is no other difference but that arising from the relations and this difference cannot cause inequality of perfection because as Augustine says (Cont. Maxim. iii, 18), when we ask who Proceeds from whom, it is a question of origin, not of equality of inequality.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod sicut communicare divinam naturam, est perfectionis de patre in filio, ita perfecte accipere communicatam est perfectionis in spiritu sancto; et utraque perfectio non differt secundum quantitatem, sed secundum relationem, quae inaequalitatem non constituit, ut dictum est. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. Just as the communication of the divine nature by the Father to the Son belongs to their perfection, so the perfect reception of the communicated nature belongs to the perfection of the Holy Spirit: and both perfections differ not in quantity but only in respect of relation which does not constitute imperfection,
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod illud per quod aliqua persona est incommunicabilis, non potest esse multis commune, ut supra dictum est. Unde habere consortium in illo non faceret iucunditatem, sed destructionem distinctionis personarum. Unde si pater in paternitate haberet consortem in divinis, sequeretur confusio personarum; et eadem ratio est de filiatione et processione. Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. As we have already observed, that which makes a person incommunicable cannot be common to many. Hence the result of sharing therein would be not enjoyment but the destruction of the distinction of the persons. Thus were the Father to have a companion in the Godhead to share his paternity there would be a confusion of persons: and the same applies to filiation and procession.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum est quod alia attributa non habent operationem intrinsecam, secundum quam possit attendi processus divinae personae, sicut intellectus et voluntas. Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. The other attributes have no intrinsic operation as the intellect and will have, whence could arise the procession of a divine person.
Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod processio naturae et intellectus conveniunt in hoc quod in utraque processione procedit unum ab uno ut similitudo eius a quo procedit. Amor autem qui procedit secundum voluntatem, procedit a duobus mutuo se amantibus. Nec ex hoc quod est amor, habet quod id sit similitudo amantis; et ideo in divinis idem procedit per modum naturae et intellectus, scilicet ut filius et verbum; sed alia persona est quae procedit per modum voluntatis ut amor. Reply to the Twentieth Objection. The process of nature and the process of the intellect have this in common that in either case one thing proceeds from one thing in likeness to that whence it proceeds. But love which proceeds from the will proceeds from two who love each other mutually: nor can we infer that because there is love there is a likeness of the lover. Wherefore in God the same (person) proceeds by way of nature and by way of the intellect, i.e. as Son and as Word: whereas it is another person that proceeds by way of the will as love.
Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod licet sint quinque notiones in divinis, tamen solum sunt tres proprietates personales constituentes personas; et propter hoc solum sunt tres personae. Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. Although there are five notions in God there are but three personal properties constituting the persons: and therefore there are but three persons.
Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod relationes ideales sunt Dei ad id quod est extra, scilicet ad creaturas; et ideo per eas non distinguuntur personae in divinis. Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. The ideal relations in God refer to things outside, i.e. to creatures: and consequently they do not cause a distinction of persons in him.
Oportet etiam respondere ad rationes alias, quibus concludebatur quod personae divinae sunt tribus pauciores. We must also reply to the other arguments which would prove that there are fewer than three persons in God.
Ad quorum primum dicendum, quod in qualibet natura creata inveniuntur multi modi processionum, non tamen secundum quemlibet eorum natura speciei communicatur; et hoc est propter imperfectionem naturae creatae, in qua non subsistit quidquid in ea est; sicut verbum hominis, quod procedit ab intellectu eius, non est aliquid subsistens, nec etiam amor qui procedit a voluntate humana. Sed filius, qui generatur per operationem naturae, est subsistens in natura humana; et propter hoc hic est solus modus quo natura communicatur, licet in eo sint plures modi processionum. Sed in Deo est subsistens quidquid in ipso est; et ideo secundum quemlibet modum processionis communicatur natura in divinis. 1. In every created nature there are many modes of procession, yet the specific nature is not communicated in each of them: and the reason of this is to be found in the imperfection of created nature, inasmuch as not everything of a created nature subsists in itself: thus the word that proceeds from a man’s intellect is not subsistent, nor is the love that proceeds from his will: whereas the son who is begotten by an operation of nature subsists in human nature: wherefore this is the only way in which human nature is communicated, although there are several modes of procession. On the other hand whatsoever is in God is subsistent, wherefore in God the divine nature is communicated in every mode of procession.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod nihil prohibet etiam a voluntate aliquid naturaliter procedere: nam et voluntas aliquid naturaliter vult et amat, scilicet felicitatem et veritatis cognitionem, et ideo nihil prohibet quin spiritus sanctus naturaliter procedat a patre et filio, quamvis procedat per modum voluntatis. 2. There is no reason why something should proceed even naturally from the will: for the will naturally wills and loves something, viz. happiness and the knowledge of the truth. Hence there is no reason why the Holy Spirit should not proceed from the Father and the Son, although he proceeds by way of the will.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet voluntas et intellectus non differant in Deo nisi secundum rationem, tamen oportet illum qui procedit per modum intellectus, realiter distingui ab eo qui procedit per modum voluntatis. Nam verbum, quod procedit per modum intellectus, procedit ab uno tantum, sicut a dicente; spiritus vero sanctus, qui procedit per modum voluntatis ut amor, oportet quod procedat a duobus mutuo se amantibus, vel etiam ex dicente et verbo: nihil enim potest amari cuius verbum in intellectu non praeconcipitur. Et sic oportet quod ille qui procedit per modum voluntatis, sit ab eo qui procedit per modum intellectus, et per consequens quod distinguatur ab eo. 3. Although will and intellect do not differ in God except logically, he that proceeds by way of the intellect must be really distinct from him who proceeds by way of the will: because the Word which proceeds by way of the intellect proceeds from one only as from the speaker: while the Holy Spirit who proceeds by way of the will as love, must needs proceed from two who love each other mutually, or from one who speaks and. his word. For nothing can be loved unless the intellect has first conceived it by its word. Hence he who proceeds by way of the will must proceed from him who proceeds by way of the intellect, and consequently must be distinct from him.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod qui est ab alio in divinis, potest esse dupliciter: scilicet vel per modum verbi, vel per modum amoris; et ideo qui est ab alio secundum quod communiter dicitur, non sufficit ad constituendum personam incommunicabilem, sed solum secundum quod ad propria determinatur. 4. He that proceeds from another in God may do so in two ways, namely by way of word and by way of love. Hence to be from another in a general way is not enough to constitute an incommunicable person, and must be defined in reference to that which is proper.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod in divinis sunt quatuor relationes, nedum duae; sed solum tres ex eis sunt personales, nam una earum —scilicet communis spiratio— non est proprietas personalis, cum sit communis duabus personis: et ideo non sunt in divinis nisi tres personae. 5. In God there are four relations and not only two: yet only three of them are personal, for one, namely common spiration, is not a personal property, seeing that it is common to two persons: and for this reason there are only three persons in God.
Alias rationes concedimus. We grant the remaining arguments.