Caput 1
| Chapter 1
FOREWORD
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| Ecce, haec ex parte dicta sunt viarum eius, et cum vix parvam stillam sermonum eius audiverimus, quis poterit tonitruum magnitudinis eius intueri. Iob, 26-14.
| [Douay, altered:] Lo, these things are said in part of His ways: and seeing we have heard scarce a little drop of His word, who shall be able to behold the thunder of His greatness? (Job 26:14).
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| Intellectus humanus, a rebus sensibilibus connaturaliter sibi scientiam capiens, ad intuendam divinam substantiam in seipsa, quae super omnia sensibilia, immo super omnia alia entia improportionaliter elevatur, pertingere per seipsum non valet.
| [1] The human intellect, to which it is connatural to derive its knowledge from sensible things, is not able through itself to reach the vision of the divine substance in itself, which is above all sensible things and, indeed, improportionately above all other things.
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| Sed quia perfectum hominis bonum est ut quoquo modo Deum cognoscat, ne tam nobilis creatura omnino in vanum esse videretur, velut finem proprium attingere non valens, datur homini quaedam via per quam in Dei cognitionem ascendere possit: ut scilicet, quia omnes rerum perfectiones quodam ordine a summo rerum vertice Deo descendunt, ipse, ab inferioribus incipiens et gradatim ascendens, in Dei cognitionem proficiat; nam et in corporalibus motibus eadem est via qua descenditur et ascenditur, ratione principii et finis distincta.
| Yet, because man’s perfect good is that he somehow know God, lest such a noble creature might seem to be created to no purpose, as being unable to reach its own end, there is given to man a certain way through which he can rise to the knowledge of God: so that, since the perfections of things descend in a certain order from the highest summit of things—God—man may progress in the knowledge of God by beginning with lower things and gradually ascending. Now, even in bodily movements, the way of descending is the same as the way of ascending, distinguished by beginning and end.
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| Praedicti autem descensus perfectionum a Deo duplex est ratio. Una quidem ex parte primae rerum originis: nam divina sapientia, ut perfectio esset in rebus, res produxit in ordine, ut creaturarum universitas ex summis rerum et infimis compleretur. Alia vero ratio ex ipsis rebus procedit. Nam cum causae sint nobiliores effectibus, prima quidem causata deficiunt a prima causa, quae Deus est, quae tamen suis effectibus praeminent; et sic deinceps quousque ad ultima rerum perveniatur.
| [2] There is a twofold account of the descent of perfections from God just mentioned. One account looks to the first origin of things: for divine Wisdom, to put perfection in things, produced them in such order that the universe of creatures should embrace the highest of things and the lowest. The other account comes from the things themselves. For, since causes are more noble than their effects, the very first caused things are lower than the First Cause, which is God, and still stand out above their effects. And so it goes until one arrives at the lowest of things.
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| Et quia in summo rerum vertice Deo perfectissima unitas invenitur; et unumquodque, quanto est magis unum, tanto est magis virtuosum et dignius: consequens est ut quantum a primo principio receditur, tanto maior diversitas et variatio inveniatur in rebus. Oportet igitur processum emanationis a Deo uniri quidem in ipso principio, multiplicari autem secundum res infimas, ad quas terminatur. Et ita, secundum diversitatem rerum, apparet viarum diversitas, quasi ab uno principio inchoatarum, et terminatarum ad diversa.
| And because in the highest summit of things, God, one finds the most perfect unity—and because everything, the more it is one, is the more powerful and more worthy—it follows that the farther one gets from the first principle, the greater is the diversity and variation one finds in things. The process of emanation from God must, then, be unified in the principle itself, but multiplied in the lower things which are its terms. In this way, according to the diversity of things, there appears the diversity of the ways, as though these ways began in one principle and terminated in various ends.
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| Per has igitur vias intellectus noster in Dei cognitionem ascendere potest, sed propter debilitatem intellectus nostri, nec ipsas vias perfecte cognoscere possumus. Nam cum sensus unde nostra cognitio incipit, circa exteriora accidentia versetur, quae sunt secundum se sensibilia, ut color et odor et huiusmodi; intellectus vix per huiusmodi exteriora potest ad perfectam notitiam inferioris naturae pervenire, etiam illarum rerum quarum accidentia sensu perfecte comprehendit. Multo igitur minus pertingere poterit ad comprehendendum naturas illarum rerum quarum pauca accidentia capimus sensu; et adhuc minus illorum quorum accidentia sensu capi non possunt, etsi per quosdam deficientes effectus percipiantur. Sed etsi ipsae naturae rerum essent nobis cognitae, ordo tamen earum, secundum quod a divina providentia et ad invicem disponuntur et diriguntur in finem, tenuiter nobis notus esse potest: cum ad cognoscendam rationem divinae providentiae non pertingamus. Si igitur ipsae viae imperfecte cognoscuntur a nobis, quomodo per eas ad perfecte cognoscendum ipsarum viarum principium poterimus pervenire? Quod quia sine proportione excedit vias praedictas, etiam si vias ipsas cognosceremus perfecte, nondum tamen perfecta principii cognitio nobis adesset.
| [3] Through these ways our intellect can rise to the knowledge of God. But because of the weakness of the intellect we are not able to know perfectly even the ways themselves. For the sense, from which our knowledge begins, is occupied with external accidents, which are the proper sensibles—for example, color, odor, and the like. As a result, through such external accidents the intellect can scarcely reach the perfect knowledge of a lower nature, even in the case of those natures whose accidents it comprehends perfectly through the sense. Much less will the intellect arrive at comprehending the natures of those things of which we grasp few accidents by sense; and it will do so even less in the case of those things whose accidents cannot be grasped by the senses, though they may be perceived through certain deficient effects. But, even though the natures of things themselves were known to us, we can have only a little knowledge of their order, according as divine Providence disposes them in relation to one another and directs them to the end, since we do not come to know the plan of divine Providence. If, then, we imperfectly know the ways themselves, how shall we be able to arrive at a perfect knowledge of the source of these ways? And because that source transcends the above-mentioned ways beyond proportion, even if we knew the ways themselves perfectly we would yet not have within our grasp a perfect knowledge of the source.
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| Quia igitur debilis erat Dei cognitio ad quam homo per vias praedictas intellectuali quodam quasi intuitu pertingere poterat, ex superabundanti bonitate, ut firmior esset hominis de Deo cognitio, quaedam de seipso hominibus revelavit quae intellectum humanum excedunt.
| [4] Therefore, since it was a feeble knowledge of God that man could reach in the ways mentioned—by a kind of intellectual glimpse, so to say—out of a superabundant goodness, therefore, so that man might have a firmer knowledge of Him, God revealed certain things about Himself that transcend the human intellect.
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| In qua quidem revelatione, secundum congruentiam hominis, quidam ordo servatur, ut paulatim de imperfecto veniat ad perfectum: sicut in ceteris rebus mobilibus accidit. Primo igitur sic homini revelantur ut tamen non intelligantur, sed solum quasi audita credantur: quia intellectus hominis secundum hunc statum, quo sensibilibus est connexus, ad ea intuenda quae omnes proportiones sensus excedunt, omnino elevari non potest. Sed cum a sensibilium connexione fuerit liberatus, tunc elevabitur ad ea quae revelantur intuenda.
| In this revelation, in harmony with man, a certain order is preserved, so that little by little he comes from the imperfect to the perfect—just as happens in the rest of changeable things. First, therefore, these things are so revealed to man as, for all that, not to be understood, but only to be believed as heard, for the human intellect in this state in which it is connected with things sensible cannot be elevated entirely to gaze upon things which exceed every proportion of sense. But, when it shall have been freed from the connection with sensibles, then it will be elevated to gaze upon the things which are revealed.
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| Est igitur triplex cognitio hominis de divinis. Quarum prima est secundum quod homo naturali lumine rationis, per creaturas in Dei cognitionem ascendit. Secunda est prout divina veritas, intellectum humanum excedens, per modum revelationis in nos descendit, non tamen quasi demonstrata ad videndum, sed quasi sermone prolata ad credendum. Tertia est secundum quod mens humana elevabitur ad ea quae sunt revelata perfecte intuenda.
| [5] There is, then, in man a threefold knowledge of things divine. Of these, the first is that in which man, by the natural light of reason, ascends to a knowledge of God through creatures. The second is that by which the divine truth—exceeding the human intellect—descends on us in the manner of revelation, not, however, as something made clear to be seen, but as something spoken in words to be believed. The third is that by which the human mind will be elevated to gaze perfectly upon the things revealed.
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| Hanc igitur triplicem cognitionem Iob in verbis propositis insinuat. Quod enim dicit, ecce, haec ex parte dicta sunt viarum eius, ad illam cognitionem pertinet qua per vias creaturarum in Dei cognitionem noster intellectus ascendit. Et quia has vias imperfecte cognoscimus, recte adiunxit, ex parte. Ex parte enim cognoscimus: sicut apostolus dicit, 1 Cor. 13-9.
| [6] It is this threefold cognition which Job suggests in the words set down. The words, “Lo, these things are said in part of His ways,” refer to that knowledge by which our intellect ascends to a knowledge of God by the ways of creatures. And because we know these ways imperfectly, he rightly added: “in part.” “For we know in part,” as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 23:9).
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| Quod vero subdit, et cum vix parvam stillam sermonum eius audiverimus, ad secundam cognitionem pertinet, prout divina nobis credenda per modum locutionis revelantur: fides enim, ut dicitur Rom. 10-17, est ex auditu, auditus autem per verbum Dei; de quo etiam dicitur Ioan. 17-17, sanctifica eos in veritate: sermo tuus veritas est. Sic igitur, quia revelata veritas de divinis non videnda, sed credenda proponitur, recte dicit, audiverimus. Quia vero haec imperfecta cognitio effluit ab illa perfecta cognitione qua divina veritas in seipsa videtur, dum a Deo nobis mediantibus Angelis revelatur, qui vident faciem patris, recte nominat stillam. Unde et Ioel 3-18 dicitur: in die illa stillabunt montes dulcedinem. Sed quia non omnia mysteria quae in prima veritate visa Angeli et alii beati cognoscunt, sed quaedam pauca nobis revelantur, signanter addit, parvam. Dicitur enim Eccli. 43-35 quis magnificat eum sicut est ab initio? Multa abscondita sunt maiora his: pauca enim vidimus operum eius. Et dominus discipulis dicit, Ioan. 16-12: multa habeo vobis dicere, sed non potestis portare modo. Haec etiam pauca quae nobis revelantur, sub quibusdam similitudinibus et obscuritatibus verborum nobis proponuntur: ut ad ea quomodocumque capienda soli studiosi perveniant, alii vero quasi occulta venerentur, et increduli lacerare non possint: unde dicit apostolus, I ad Cor. 13-12: videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate. Signanter igitur addit, vix ut difficultas ostenderetur.
| [7] What is added, however, “and seeing we have heard scarce a little drop of His word,” refers to the second knowledge, in that the divine things we are to believe are revealed to us in, speech; “faith then,” as Romans (10:17) says, “comes by hearing; and hearing by the word of God.” Of this John (17:17) also says: “sanctify them in truth. Thy word is truth.” Thus, then, since the revealed truth is proposed not about divine things to he seen, but to be believed, Job rightly says: “we have heard.” But, since this imperfect knowledge flows down from that perfect knowledge wherein the divine Truth is seen in itself, while God reveals it to us through the ministry of angels who “see the face of the Father” (Mat. 18:10), Job rightly names it “a drop.” Hence, Joel (3:18) also says: “In that day the mountains shall drop down sweetness.” Since not all the mysteries known in the vision of the First Truth by the angels and the other blessed, but a certain few are revealed to us, Job adds significantly: “a little.” For Sirach (43:35-36) says: “Who shall magnify Him as He is from the beginning? There are many things hidden from us that are greater than these: for we have seen but a few of His words” And our Lord says to the disciples in John (11:12): “I have yet many things to say to you: but you cannot hear them now.” The few things also which are revealed to us are set forth in similitudes and the obscurities of words—as a result, only the studious arrive at any sort of grasp of them at all. Others, however, venerate them as things hidden, and unbelievers cannot attack them; hence, the Apostle says: “We see now through a glass in a dark manner” (1 Cor. 13:12). Significantly, then, does Job add “scarce” to bring out the difficulty.
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| Quod vero subdit, quis poterit tonitruum magnitudinis eius intueri? Ad tertiam cognitionem pertinet, qua prima veritas cognoscetur, non sicut credita, sed sicut visa: videbimus enim eum sicuti est, ut dicitur I Ioan. 3-2. Unde dicit, intueri. Nec aliquid modicum de divinis mysteriis percipietur, sed ipsa maiestas divina videbitur, et omnis bonorum perfectio: unde dominus ad Moysen dixit, Exodi 33-19: ego ostendam tibi omne bonum. Recte ergo dicit, magnitudinis. Non autem proponetur veritas homini aliquibus velaminibus occultata, sed omnino manifesta: unde dominus discipulis suis dicit, Ioan. 16-25: venit hora cum iam non in proverbiis loquar vobis, sed palam de patre annuntiabo vobis. Signanter ergo dicit, tonitruum, ad manifestationem insinuandam.
| [8] But this addition, “Who shall be able to behold the thunder of His greatness,” refers to the third kind of knowledge, in which the First Truth will be known, not as believed, but as seen; “We shall see Him as He is,” we read (1 John 3:2). So Job adds: “to behold.” Nor will one perceive some measure of the divine mysteries: the divine majesty itself will be seen and all the perfection of goods; hence, the Lord said to Moses: “I will show you all good” (Ex. 33:19). Rightly, then, does Job say “greatness.” Nor will the truth be set before man hidden under any veils, but will be entirely manifest; hence, our Lord says to His disciples: “The hour cometh when I will no more speak to you in proverbs; but will show you plainly of the Father” (John 16:25). Significantly, therefore, does Job speak of “the thunder” to suggest the manifestation.
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| Competunt autem verba praemissa nostro proposito. Nam in praecedentibus de divinis sermo est habitus secundum quod ad cognitionem divinorum naturalis ratio per creaturas pervenire potest: imperfecte tamen, et secundum proprii possibilitatem ingenii, ut sic possimus dicere cum Iob, ecce, haec ex parte dicta sunt viarum eius. Restat autem sermo habendus de his quae nobis revelata sunt divinitus ut credenda, excedentia intellectum humanum.
| [9] Now, the words set down fit our purpose. In what has preceded we have dealt with divine things according as the natural reason can arrive at the knowledge of divine things through creatures. This way is imperfect, nevertheless, and in keeping with the reason’s native capacity. That is why we can say with Job (26:14): “These things are said in part of His ways.” We must now deal with those divine things that have been divinely revealed to us to be believed, since they transcend the human intellect.
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| Circa quae qualiter procedendum sit, praemissa verba nos docent. Cum enim huiusmodi veritatem vix audiverimus in sermonibus sacrae Scripturae quasi stillam parvam ad nos descendentem; nec possit aliquis in huius vitae statu tonitruum magnitudinis intueri; erit hic modus servandus, ut ea quae in sermonibus sacrae Scripturae sunt tradita, quasi principia sumantur; et sic ea quae in sermonibus praedictis occulte nobis traduntur, studeamus utcumque mente capere, a laceratione infidelium defendendo; ut tamen praesumptio perfecte cognoscendi non adsit; probanda enim sunt huiusmodi auctoritate sacrae Scripturae, non autem ratione naturali. Sed tamen ostendendum est quod rationi naturali non sunt opposita, ut ab impugnatione infidelium defendantur. Qui etiam modus in principio huius operis praedeterminatus est.
| [10] And the manner of proceeding in such matters the words set down do teach us. For, since we have hardly heard the truth of this kind in sacred Scripture as a little drop descending upon us, and since one cannot in the state of this life behold the thunder of the greatness, this will be the method to follow: What has been passed on to us in the words of sacred Scripture may be taken as principles, so to say; thus, the things in those writings passed on to us in a hidden fashion we may endeavor to grasp mentally in some way or other, defending them from the attacks of the infidels. Nonetheless, that no presumption of knowing perfectly may be present, points of this kind must be proved from sacred Scripture, but not from natural reason. For all that, one must show that such things are not opposed to natural reason, in order to defend them from infidel attack. This was also the method fixed upon in the beginning of this work.
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| Quia vero naturalis ratio per creaturas in Dei cognitionem ascendit, fidei vero cognitio a Deo in nos e converso divina revelatione descendit; est autem eadem via ascensus et descensus: oportet eadem via procedere in his quae supra rationem creduntur, qua in superioribus processum est circa ea quae ratione investigantur de Deo: ut primo scilicet ea tractentur quae de ipso Deo supra rationem credenda proponuntur, sicut est confessio Trinitatis. Secundo autem, de his quae supra rationem a Deo sunt facta, sicut opus incarnationis, et quae consequuntur ad ipsam. Tertio vero, ea quae supra rationem in ultimo hominum fine expectantur, sicut resurrectio et glorificatio corporum, perpetua beatitudo animarum, et quae his connectuntur.
| [11] But, since natural reason ascends to a knowledge of God through creatures and, conversely, the knowledge of faith descends from God to us by a divine revelation—since the way of ascent and descent is still the same—we must proceed in the same way in the things above reason which are believed as we proceeded in the foregoing with the investigation of God by reason. First, to be specific, we must treat of the things about God Himself which surpass reason and are proposed for belief: such is the confession of the Trinity; second, of course, the things which surpass reason that have been done by God, such as the work of the Incarnation and what follows thereon; third, however, the things surpassing reason which are looked for in the ultimate end of man, such as the resurrection and glorification of bodies, the everlasting beatitude of souls, and matters related to these.
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Caput 4
Quid opinatus sit Photinus de filio Dei, et eius improbatio
| Chapter 4
THE OPINION OF PROTINUS ON THE SON OF GOD, AND ITS REFUTATION
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| Huius autem doctrinae veritatem quidam perversi homines suo sensu metiri praesumentes, de praemissis vanas et varias opiniones conceperunt.
| [1] Now, certain men, who perversely presumed to measure the truth of this doctrine by their own comprehension of it, conceived on the points just mentioned opinions both vain and various.
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| Quorum quidem consideraverunt hanc esse Scripturae consuetudinem, eos qui divina gratia iustificantur, filios Dei dici: secundum illud Ioan. 1-12, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, his qui credunt in nomine eius. Et Rom. 8-16, dicitur: ipse enim spiritus testimonium reddit spiritui nostro quod sumus filii Dei. Et 1 Ioan. 3-1: videte qualem caritatem dedit nobis pater, ut filii Dei nominemur et simus. Quos etiam a Deo genitos esse Scriptura non tacet. Dicitur enim Iac. 1-18: voluntarie genuit nos verbo veritatis. Et 1 Ioan. 3-9, dicitur: omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit, quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet. Et, quod est mirabilius, eiusdem nomen divinitatis adscribitur. Dominus enim dixit ad Moysen: ego constitui te Deum Pharaonis. Et in Psalmo: ego dixi, dii estis, et filii excelsi omnes; et, sicut dominus dicit, Ioan. 10-35: illos dixit deos ad quos sermo Dei factus est.
| [2] Some among these took into consideration Scripture’s custom of calling those who are justified by divine grace “sons of God,”, as in John (1:12): “He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in His name.” And Romans (8:16) says: “The Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God.” And 1 John (3: 1) : “Behold what manner of charity the Father has bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God.” And Scripture does not hesitate to call these “begotten of God,” for it says in James (1:18): “For of His own will bath He begotten us by the word of truth”; and 1 John (3:9) says: “Whosoever is born of God commits not sin: for His seed abides in him.” Also, to the same men, which is more marvelous, the name of “divinity” is applied. For the Lord said to Moses: “I have appointed you the God of Pharaoh” (Ex. 7:1); and the Psalmist says: “I have said: You are gods and all of you the sons of the most High” (Ps. 81:6); and, as our Lord said: “He called them gods, to whom the word of God was spoken” (John 10:35).
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| Per hunc ergo modum, opinantes Iesum Christum purum hominem esse, et ex Maria virgine initium sumpsisse, et per beatae vitae meritum divinitatis honorem prae ceteris fuisse adeptum, aestimaverunt eum, similiter aliis hominibus, per adoptionis spiritum Dei filium; et per gratiam ab eo genitum; et per quandam assimilationem ad Deum in Scripturis dici Deum, non per naturam, sed per consortium quoddam divinae bonitatis, sicut et de sanctis dicitur II Petr. 1-4: ut efficiamini divinae consortes naturae, fugientes eius quae in mundo est concupiscentiae corruptionem.
| [3] After this fashion, therefore, they formed the opinion that Jesus Christ was pure man, that He had had a beginning from the Virgin Mary, that by the merit of His blessed life He had received the honor of divinity above all others; and they thought that He was, like other men, a son of God by the spirit of adoption, begotten of God by grace, and by a kind of likens to God called God in Scripture not by nature, but by partaking in the divine goodness, just as it says of the saints in 2 Peter (1:4): “That by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature: flying the corruption of that concupiscence which is in the world.”
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| Hanc autem positionem sacrae Scripturae auctoritate confirmare nitebantur.
| [4] Such was the position they were trying to establish by the authority of sacred Scripture.
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| Dicit enim dominus, Matth. ult.: data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra. Quod si ante tempora Deus esset, potestatem ex tempore non accepisset.
| [5] For our Lord says in Matthew (28:18): “All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth.” But, if He were God before all times, He would not have received power in time.
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| Item, Rom. 1, dicitur de filio quod factus est ei, scilicet Deo, ex semine David secundum carnem; et quod praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute. Quod autem praedestinatur et factum est, videtur non esse aeternum.
| [6] Again, Romans (1:34) says of the Son: “Who was made to Him,” to God, namely, “of the seed of David according to the flesh”; and says that He was “predestinated the Son of God in power.” But what was predestinated and was made seems not to be eternal.
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| Item. Apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. 2-8: factus est obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis: propter quod Deus exaltavit illum, et dedit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen. Ex quo videtur ostendi quod propter obedientiae et passionis meritum divino sit honore donatus, et super omnia exaltatus.
| [7] The Apostle also says (Phil. 2:8): “He humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross. For which cause God also bath exalted Him, and bath given Him a name which is above all names.” From this it appears clear that by the merit of His obedience and passion He was given divine honor and was exalted above all things.
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| Petrus etiam dicit, Act. 2-36: certissime ergo sciat omnis domus Israel quia dominum eum et Christum Deus fecit hunc Iesum, quem vos crucifixistis. Videtur igitur ex tempore Deus esse factus, non ante tempora natus.
| [8] Peter also says: “Therefore let all the house of Israel know most certainly, that God bath made both Lord and Christ, this same Jesus, whom you crucified” (Acts 2:36). Therefore, it seems that He was made God in time, not born before time.
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| Adducunt etiam in fulcimentum suae opinionis ea quae in Scripturis de Christo ad defectum pertinere videntur: sicut quod femineo portatur utero, et profectum aetatis accepit, esuriem passus est, et lassitudine fatigatus, et morti subiectus; quod sapientia profecit, iudicii se nescire diem confessus est, et mortis terrore concussus est; et alia huiusmodi, quae Deo per naturam existenti convenire non possent. Unde concludunt quod per meritum honorem divinum adeptus est per gratiam, non quod esset naturae divinae.
| [9] They also bring in to shore up their opinion whatever Scripture says which seems to imply a defect in Christ: that He was carried in a woman’s womb, that He progressed in age, that He suffered hunger, was wearied with fatigue, and was subject to death; that He advanced in wisdom, confessed He did not know the day of judgment; that He was stricken with the fear of death; and other things of this sort which could not be in agreement with a God existing by His nature. Hence their conclusion: that by merit Christ acquired divine honor through grace and that He was not by nature divine.
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| Hanc autem positionem primo adinvenerunt quidam antiqui haeretici, Cerinthus et Ebion; quam postea Paulus Samosatenus instauravit; et postea a Photino est confirmata, ut qui hoc dogmatizant, Photiniani nuncupentur.
| [10] Now, this position was first invented by certain ancient heretics, Cerinthus and Ebion. Later, Paul of Samosata renewed it; and later it was strengthened by Photinus, so that those who dogmatize thus are called Photinian.
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| Diligenter autem verba sacrae Scripturae considerantibus apparet non hunc sensum in ea contineri quem praedicti homines sua opinione conceperunt. Nam cum Salomon dicat, nondum erant abyssi et ego iam concepta eram, satis ostendit hanc generationem ante omnia corporalia extitisse. Unde relinquitur quod filius a Deo genitus initium essendi a Maria non sumpsit. Et licet haec, et alia similia testimonia depravare conati fuerint perversa expositione, dicentes haec secundum praedestinationem debere intelligi, quia scilicet ante mundi conditionem dispositum fuit ut ex Maria virgine Dei filius nasceretur, non quod Dei filius fuerit ante mundum; convincantur quod non solum in praedestinatione, sed etiam realiter fuerit ante Mariam. Nam post praemissa verba Salomonis subiungitur: quando appendebat fundamenta terrae, cum eo eram cuncta componens: si autem in sola praedestinatione fuisset, nihil agere potuisset. Hoc etiam ex verbis Ioannis Evangelistae habetur: nam cum praemisisset, in principio erat verbum, quo nomine filius intelligitur, ut ostensum est; ne quis hoc secundum praedestinationem accipere possit, subdit: omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil, quod verum esse non posset nisi realiter ante mundum extitisset. Item, filius Dei dicit, Ioan., 3-13: nemo ascendit in caelum nisi qui descendit de caelo, filius hominis, qui est in caelo; et iterum, Ioan. 6-38: descendi de caelo, non ut faciam voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem eius qui misit me. Apparet ergo eum fuisse antequam de caelo descenderet.
| [11] However, those who diligently examine the words of sacred Scripture do not find in them the meaning which these men have by their own opinion constructed. For, when Solomon says: “The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived,” (Prov. 8:24), he makes it clear enough that this generation existed before all bodily things. Hence, it follows that the Son begotten by God received no beginning of being from Mary. To be sure, they endeavored to debase these and other like testimonies by their perverse exposition. These, they said, should be understood after the manner of predestination: that before the foundation of the world it was arranged that a Son of God should be born of the Virgin Mary, not that the Son of God had been before the world. But they are refuted by this: Not only in predestination, but in reality as well, He had been before Mary. For after the words of Solomon just quoted this is added: “When He balanced the foundations of the earth: I was with Him forming all things” (Prov. 8:29-30); but if He had been present in predestination only, He would have been able to do nothing. One gets this also from the words of John the Evangelist, for, when he had first set down: “In the beginning was the Word” (by which name the Son is understood as was shown) to keep anyone from taking this as predestination, he adds: “All things were made by Him: and without Him was made nothing” (1:1, 3); and this could not be true if He had not really existed before the world. Again, the Son of God says in John (3:13): “No man has ascended to heave except He who descended from heaven, the Son of man who is in heaven”; again in John (6:38): “I came down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of Him who sent me.” Clearly, therefore, he was before He descended from heaven.
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| Praeterea. Secundum praedictam positionem, homo per vitae meritum profecit in Deum. Apostolus autem e converso ostendit quod, cum Deus esset, factus est homo. Dicit enim, ad Philipp. 2-6 cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo: sed semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens, in similitudinem hominum factus, et habitu inventus ut homo. Repugnat igitur praedicta positio apostolicae sententiae.
| [12] There is more. According to the position described above, a man by the merit of his life advanced to being God. The Apostle shows, on the contrary, that when He was God He became man. For he says: ‘Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man” (Phil. 2:6). Therefore, the position described is in conflict with apostolic teaching.
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| Adhuc. Inter ceteros qui Dei gratiam habuerunt, Moyses eam habuit copiose, de quo dicitur Exod. 33-11, quod loquebatur ei dominus facie ad faciem, sicut loqui solet homo ad amicum suum. Si igitur Iesus Christus non diceretur Dei filius nisi propter gratiam adoptionis, sicut alii sancti, eadem ratione Moyses filius diceretur et Christus, licet etiam abundantiori gratia Christus fuerit dotatus: nam et inter alios sanctos, unus alio maiori gratia repletur, et tamen omnes eadem ratione filii Dei dicuntur. Moyses autem non eadem ratione dicitur filius qua Christus. Distinguit enim apostolus Christum a Moyse sicut filium a servo: dicitur enim ad Hebr. 3-5: Moyses quidem fidelis erat in tota domo eius tanquam famulus, in testimonium eorum quae dicenda erant: Christus autem tanquam filius in domo sua. Manifestum est ergo quod Christus non dicitur Dei filius per adoptionis gratiam, sicut alii sancti.
| [13] Furthermore, among all the rest of those who had the grace of God, Moses had it in abundance; it says of him in Exodus (33:11) : “The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend.” If, therefore, Jesus Christ is not said to be a son of God except by the grace of adoption, like other saints, on the same grounds Moses should be called son and Christ, even though Christ was endowed with more abundant grace: among the other saints, also, one is endowed with greater grace than another, but all are called sons of God on the same ground. But Moses is not called son on the same ground that Christ is so called, for the Apostle distinguishes Christ from Moses as the Son from the servant. He says in Hebrews (3:5-6): “Moses indeed was faithful in all His house as a servant, for a testimony of those things which were to be said: But Christ as the Son in His own house.” Manifestly, then, Christ is not called the Son of God by the grace of adoption, as other saints are.
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| Similis etiam ratio ex pluribus aliis Scripturae locis colligi potest, quae quodam singulari modo Christum prae aliis Dei filium nominat, quandoque quidem, absque aliis, singulariter eum filium nominat: sicut vox patris intonuit in Baptismo, hic est filius meus dilectus, in quo mihi complacui. Quandoque eum unigenitum nominat: sicut Ioan. 1-14, vidimus eum quasi unigenitum a patre; et iterum, unigenitus, qui est in sinu patris, ipse enarravit. Si autem communi modo, sicut et alii, filius diceretur, unigenitus dici non posset. Quandoque etiam et primogenitus nominatur, ut quaedam derivatio filiationis ab eo in alios ostendatur: secundum illud Rom. 8-29: quos praescivit et praedestinavit fieri conformes imagini filii eius, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus; et Gal. 4-4 dicitur: misit Deus filium suum ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus. Alia ergo ratione ipse est filius, per cuius filiationis similitudinem alii filii dicuntur.
| [14] One can gather a similar understanding from several other places in Scripture, in which Christ is named in some singular way and prior to others as the Son of God. Sometimes singularly and without others He is named “Son”: as the voice of the Father thundered at the baptism: “This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased” (Mat. 3:17). Sometimes He is named “Only-begotten” as in John: “We saw His glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father”; and again: “The only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared Him” (1:14, 18). If He were to be called son in some common fashion like others, He could not be called the Only-begotten. Sometimes, also, He is named “First-begotten” to show an overflowing of sonship from Him to others: as in Romans (8:29): ‘Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be the first-born amongst many brethren; and Galatians (4:4-5) says: “God sent His Son that we might receive the adoption of sons. On another ground, therefore, is He a Son, through likeness to whose sonship others are called sons.
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| Amplius. Quaedam opera in Scripturis sacris ita Deo proprie attribuuntur quod alteri convenire non possunt, sicut sanctificatio animarum, et remissio peccatorum: dicitur enim Levit. 20-8: ego dominus, qui sanctifico vos; et Isaiae 43-25: ego sum qui deleo iniquitates vestras propter me. Utrumque autem horum Christo Scriptura attribuit. Dicitur enim ad Hebr. 2-11: qui sanctificat et qui sanctificantur, ex uno omnes; et ad Hebr. ult.: Iesus, ut sanctificaret per suum sanguinem populum, extra portam passus est. Ipse etiam dominus de se protestatus est quod haberet potestatem remittendi peccata, et miraculo confirmavit, ut habetur Matth. 9-6. Hoc etiam Angelus de ipso praenuntiavit, ipse, inquiens, salvum faciet populum suum a peccatis eorum. Non igitur Christus, et sanctificans et peccata remittens, sic dicitur Deus sicut dicuntur dii hi qui sanctificantur, et quorum peccata remittuntur: sed sicut virtutem et naturam divinitatis habens.
| [15] In sacred Scripture, moreover, certain works are properly attributed to God, and in such wise that they cannot be assigned to another: such are the sanctification of souls and the remission of sins; for it is said in Leviticus (20:8): “I am the Lord that sanctify you”; and in Isaiah (45:25): “I am He that blot out your iniquities for My own sake.” Yet Scripture attributes each of these to Christ, for we read in Hebrews (2:11; 13:12): “Both he that sanctifies, and they who are sanctified, are all of one”; and again: “Jesus also, that He might sanctify the people by His own blood, suffered without the gate.” Our Lord Himself insisted that He had the “power to forgive sins,” and confirmed this by a miracle as is told in Matthew (9:16). This is also what the angel foretold of Him when he said: “He shall save His people from their sins” (Mat. 1:21). Christ, therefore, who both sanctifies and forgives sins, is not called God as they are called gods who are sanctified, and whose sins are forgiven, but as one who has the power and the nature of divinity.
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| Illa vero Scripturae testimonia quibus ostendere nitebantur quod Christus non esset Deus per naturam, efficacia non sunt ad eorum propositum ostendendum. Confitemur enim in Christo Dei filio, post incarnationis mysterium, duas naturas, humanam scilicet et divinam. Unde de eo dicuntur et quae Dei sunt propria, ratione divinae naturae; et quae ad defectum pertinere videntur, ratione humanae naturae, ut infra plenius explanabitur. Nunc autem, ad praesentem considerationem de divina generatione, hoc sufficiat monstratum esse secundum Scripturas quod Christus Dei filius et Deus dicitur non solum sicut purus homo per gratiam adoptionis, sed propter divinitatis naturam.
| [16] The Scriptural testimonies by which they tried to show that Christ was not God by nature are useless for establishing their proposition. For it is our confession that in Christ the Son of God, after the mystery of the Incarnation, there were two natures; namely, human and divine. And so, things are said of Him which are proper to God by reason of the divine nature, and things are also said which seem to involve deficiency by reason of the human nature, as will be more fully explained later. But now, for the present consideration of the divine generation, let it suffice to have pointed out in accord with the Scriptures that Christ the Son of God is also called God, not only as a pure man is by the grace of adoption, but by reason Of the nature of divinity.
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Caput 5
Opinio Sabellii de filio Dei, et eius improbatio
| Chapter 5
THE OPINION OF SABELLIUS ON THE SON OF GOD, AND ITS REFUTATION
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| Quia vero omnium de Deo recte sentientium haec est fixa mentis conceptio, quod non possit esse nisi unus Deus, quidam, ex Scripturis concipientes quod Christus sit vere et naturaliter Deus ac Dei filius, unum Deum esse confessi sunt Christum Dei filium et Deum patrem: nec tamen quod Deus filius dicatur secundum suam naturam aut ab aeterno, sed ex tunc filiationis nomen accepit ex quo de Maria virgine natus est per incarnationis mysterium. Et sic omnia quae Christus secundum carnem sustinuit, Deo patri attribuebant: puta esse filium virginis, conceptum et natum esse ex ipsa, passum, mortuum et resurrexisse, et alia omnia quae Scripturae de Christo secundum carnem loquuntur.
| [1] Since, of course, the fixed mental conception of all who think rightly about God is this: There can be but one God—certain men, conceiving from the Scriptures that Christ is truly and naturally God and the Son of God, have confessed that the one God is Christ the Son of God and God the Father; and that God, nevertheless, is not called Son in His nature or from eternity, but that He then received the name of sonship when He was born of the Virgin Mary in the mystery of the Incarnation. Thus, all the things which Christ bore in the flesh they used to attribute to God the Father: for example, that He was the son of the Virgin, conceived and born of her, that He suffered, died and rose again, and all else which the Scriptures say of Christ in the flesh.
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| Hanc autem positionem confirmare nitebantur Scripturae auctoritatibus. Dicitur enim Exod. 20: audi, Israel, dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est. Et Deut. 32-39: videte quod ego sum solus, et non est alius praeter me. Et Ioan. 5: pater in me manens, ipse facit opera et 14-9 qui videt me, videt et patrem; et, ego in patre, et pater in me est. Ex quibus omnibus concipiebant Deum patrem ipsum filium dici ex virgine incarnatum.
| [2] They attempted to strengthen their position by Scriptural authorities. For it says in Exodus (i.e., Deut. 6:41): “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord”; and in Deuteronomy (32:39): “I alone am and there is no other God besides Me”; and John (14:10, 9, 11): “The Father who abides in Me, He doth the works”; and again: “He that sees Me, sees the Father also... I am in the Father and the Father in Me.” From all these they used to conceive that God the Father was being called the very Son incarnate of the Virgin.
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| Haec autem fuit opinio Sabellianorum, qui et Patripassiani sunt dicti, eo quod patrem passum esse confitentur, asserentes ipsum patrem esse Christum.
| [3] This was, of course, the opinion of the Sabellians, who were also called Patripassionists because they confess that the Father suffered, holding that the Father Himself was Christ.
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| Haec autem positio, etsi a praedicta differat quantum ad Christi divinitatem, nam haec Christum verum et naturalem Deum esse confitetur, quod prima negabat; tamen quantum ad generationem et filiationem, utraque est conformis opinio: nam sicut prima positio asserit filiationem et generationem qua Christus filius dicitur, non fuisse ante Mariam, ita et haec opinio confitetur. Neutra igitur positio generationem et filiationem ad divinam naturam refert, sed solum ad naturam humanam. Habet etiam et hoc proprium ista positio, quod, cum dicitur filius Dei, non designatur aliqua subsistens persona, sed quaedam proprietas superveniens praeexistenti personae: nam ipse pater, secundum quod carnem sumpsit ex virgine, filii nomen accepit; non quasi filius sit aliqua subsistens persona a persona patris distincta.
| [4] Now, the latter position differs from the one just de scribed with respect to Christ’s divinity (for the latter confesses that Christ is true and natural God which the first denied); nevertheless, with respect to generation and sonship, each of the two opinions conforms with the other: for, as the first holds that there was no sonship and generation by which Christ is said to be Son before Mary, so the latter also maintains. Therefore, neither of these positions relates the generation and sonship to the divine nature, but to the human nature only. The second position has this special feature: that when one says “Son of God” one designates not a subsisting person but a kind of additional property of a pre-existing person, for the Father Himself, in that He assumed flesh from the Virgin, received the name of Son; it is not as though the Son is a subsisting Person distinct from the Person of the Father.
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| Huius autem positionis falsitas manifeste ostenditur auctoritate Scripturae. Nam Christus non solum virginis filius dicitur in Scripturis, sed etiam filius Dei: ut ex superioribus patet. Hoc autem esse non potest, ut idem sit filius sui ipsius: cum enim filius generetur a patre, generans autem det esse genito, sequeretur quod idem esset dans et accipiens esse; quod omnino esse non potest. Non est igitur Deus pater ipse filius, sed alius est filius et alius pater.
| [5] The authority of Scripture makes the falsity of this position quite manifest. For Scripture does not call Christ merely the Virgin’s son, but also the Son of God. We made this clear before. But it cannot be that one be his own son, for, since a son is begotten by a father, and he who begets gives being to the begotten, it would follow that he who gives is identified with him who receives being-and this is entirely impossible. Therefore, God the Father is not Himself the Son, but the Son is other than He, and the Father is other than the Son.
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| Item. Dominus dicit: descendi de caelo, non ut faciam voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem eius qui misit me, Ioan. 6-38; et 17-5: clarifica me, pater, apud temetipsum. Ex quibus omnibus, et similibus, ostenditur filius esse alius a patre.
| [6] Then, too, our Lord says: “I came down from heaven, not to do My own will, but the will of Him that sent Me”; and: “Glorify Me, O Father with Yourself” (John 6:38; 17:5). From all, of these and similar sayings the Son is shown to be other than the Father.
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| Potest autem dici secundum hanc positionem, quod Christus dicitur filius Dei patris solum secundum humanam naturam: quia scilicet ipse Deus pater humanam naturam quam assumpsit, creavit et sanctificavit. Sic igitur ipse secundum divinitatem sui ipsius secundum humanitatem dicitur pater. Et ita etiam nihil prohibet eundem secundum humanitatem distinctum esse a seipso secundum divinitatem.
| [7] Of course, it can be said within this position that Christ is called the Son of God the Father in His human nature only; namely, because God the Father Himself created and sanctified the human nature which He assumed. Thus, then, the same one is in His divinity called His own Father in His humanity. Thus, there is also no objection to saying that the same one in His humanity is distinct from Himself in His divinity.
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| Sed secundum hoc sequetur quod Christus dicatur filius Dei sicut et alii homines, vel ratione creationis, vel ratione sanctificationis. Ostensum est autem quod alia ratione Christus dicitur Dei filius quam alii sancti. Non igitur modo praedicto potest intelligi quod ipse pater sit Christus et filius sui ipsius.
| But in this fashion it will follow that Christ is called a son of God as are other men, whether by reason of creation, or by reason of sanctification. It has, however, already been shown that Christ is called the Son of God for another reason than other holy men are. It cannot, therefore, be understood that the Father Himself is Christ and His very own son.
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| Praeterea. Ubi est unum suppositum subsistens, pluralis praedicatio non recipitur. Christus, autem de se et de patre pluraliter loquitur, dicens: ego et pater unum sumus. Non est ergo filius ipse pater.
| [8] There is more. Where there is one subsisting supposit, it does not receive a plural predication. But Christ speaks of Himself and the Father in the plural; He says: “I and the Father are one (John 10:30). The Son, therefore, is not the Father Himself.
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| Adhuc. Si filius a patre non distinguitur nisi per incarnationis mysterium, ante incarnationem omnino nulla distinctio erat. Invenitur autem ex sacra Scriptura etiam ante incarnationem filius a patre fuisse distinctus. Dicitur enim Ioan. 1-1: in principio erat verbum, et verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat verbum. Verbum igitur, quod apud Deum erat, aliquam distinctionem ab ipso habebat: habet enim hoc consuetudo loquendi, ut alius apud alium esse dicatur. Similiter etiam Proverb. 8-30, genitus a Deo dicit: cum eo eram componens omnia. In quo rursus associatio et quaedam distinctio designatur. Dicitur etiam Osee 1-7: domui Iuda miserebor, et salvabo eos in domino Deo suo: ubi Deus pater de salvandis in Deo filio populis loquitur quasi de persona a se distincta, quae Dei nomine digna habeatur. Dicitur etiam Gen. 1-26: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram: in quo expresse pluralitas et distinctio facientium hominem designatur. Homo autem per Scripturas a solo Deo conditus esse docetur. Et sic Dei patris et Dei filii pluralitas et distinctio fuit etiam ante Christi incarnationem. Non igitur ipse pater filius dicitur propter incarnationis mysterium.
| [9] Furthermore, if it is by the mystery of the Incarnation alone that the Son is distinguished from the Father, there was no distinction whatever before the Incarnation. In the sacred Scripture, however, the Son is found to have been distinct from the Father even before the Incarnation. For it says in John (1:1): “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” So, the Word who was with God had some distinction from Him. This is our usual manner of speaking: one is said “to be with” another. In the same way in Proverbs (8:30) the Begotten says: “I was with Him forming all things.” Here, again, an association and some distinction is designated. It says also in Hosea (1:7): “I will have mercy on the house of Judah, and I will save them by the Lord their God,” where God the Father is speaking of saving the people in God the Son, as of a person distinct from Himself, who is held worthy of the name of God. We read, also, in Genesis (1:26): “Let us make man to our image and likeness”; and in this the plurality and distinction of those who make man is expressly designated. Yet Scripture teaches that man was made by God alone. Thus, there was a plurality and distinction of God the Father and God the Son even before the Incarnation of Christ. Therefore, the Father Himself is not called the Son by reason of the mystery of the Incarnation.
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| Amplius. Vera filiatio ad ipsum suppositum pertinet eius qui dicitur filius: non enim manus vel pes hominis filiationis nomen proprie accipit, sed ipse homo, cuius ista sunt partes. Paternitatis autem et filiationis nomina distinctionem requirunt in illis de quibus dicuntur: sicut et generans et genitum. Oportet igitur, si aliquis vere dicitur filius, quod supposito a patre distinguatur. Christus autem vere est Dei filius: dicitur enim 1 Ioan. ult.: ut simus in vero filio eius Iesu Christo. Oportet igitur quod Christus sit supposito distinctus a patre. Non igitur ipse pater est filius. Adhuc. Post incarnationis mysterium pater de filio protestatur: hic est filius meus dilectus. Haec autem demonstratio ad suppositum refertur. Christus igitur secundum suppositum est alius a patre.
| [10] Furthermore, true sonship relates to the supposit of the one called son, for it is not a man’s hand or foot which receives the name of sonship properly speaking, but the man himself whose parts they are. But the names of “paternity” and of “sonship” require a distinction in those to whom they are applied, just as “begetting” and “begotten” do. Necessarily, then, if one is truly called son he must be distinguished in supposit from his father. But Christ is truly the Son of God, for we read in 1 John (5:20): “That we may be in His true Son, Jesus Christ.” Necessarily, then, Christ is distinct in supposit from the Father. Therefore, the Father Himself is not the Son. Furthermore, after the mystery of the Incarnation the Father proclaims of the Son: “This is My beloved Son” (Mat. 3:17). Such a designation is a reference to a supposit. Christ is, therefore, as a supposit other than the Father.
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| Ea vero quibus Sabellius suam positionem nititur confirmare, id quod intendit non ostendunt, ut infra plenius ostendetur. Non enim per hoc quod Deus est unus, vel quod pater est in filio et filius in patre, habetur quod filius et pater sit unum supposito: potest enim et duorum supposito distinctorum aliqua unitas esse.
| [11] The points by which Sabellius attempts to strengthen his position do not prove what he intends to prove. We will make this clear more fully later on. For, by reason of the truth that “God is one,” or that “the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father,” one does not bold that the Father and the Son are one in supposit; there can be a unity of two who are distinct in supposit.
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Caput 6
De opinione Arii circa filium Dei
| Chapter 6
THE OPINION OF ARIUS ABOUT THE SON OF GOD
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| Cum autem doctrinae sacrae non congruat quod filius Dei a Maria initium sumpserit, ut Photinus dicebat; neque ut is qui ab aeterno Deus fuit et pater est, per carnis assumptionem filius esse coeperit, ut Sabellius dixerat: fuerunt alii hanc de divina generatione quam Scriptura tradit opinionem sumentes, quod filius Dei ante incarnationis mysterium extiterit, et etiam ante mundi conditionem; et quia iste filius a Deo patre est alius, aestimaverunt eum non esse eiusdem naturae cum Deo patre; non enim intelligere poterant, nec credere volebant, quod aliqui duo, secundum personam distincti, habeant unam essentiam et naturam. Et quia sola natura Dei patris, secundum fidei doctrinam, aeterna creditur, crediderunt naturam filii non ab aeterno extitisse, licet fuerit filius ante alias creaturas. Et quia omne quod non est aeternum, ex nihilo factum est et a Deo creatum, filium Dei ex nihilo factum esse, et creaturam praedicabant. Sed quia auctoritate Scripturae cogebantur ut etiam filium Deum nominarent, sicut in superioribus est expressum, dicebant eum unum cum Deo patre, non quidem per naturam, sed per quandam consensus unionem, et per divinae similitudinis participationem super ceteras creaturas. Unde, cum supremae creaturae, quas Angelos dicimus, in Scripturis et dii et filii Dei nominentur, secundum illud Iob 38-4 ubi eras cum me laudarent astra matutina, et iubilarent omnes filii Dei? Et in Psalmo, Deus stetit in synagoga deorum, hunc Dei filium et Deum prae aliis dici oportebat, utpote nobiliorem inter ceteras creaturas, in tantum quod per eum Deus pater omnem aliam condiderit creaturam.
| [1] Now, sacred doctrine does not agree that the Son of God took His beginning from Mary, as Photinus used to say, nor that He who was God from eternity and is the Father began to be the Son by taking flesh, as Sabellius had said. And so, there were others who developed this opinion about the divine generation of which Scripture treats: that the Son of God existed before the mystery of the Incarnation and even before the foundation of the world; and, because that Son of God is other than God the Father, they judged He was not of the same nature with God the Father, for they could not understand and did not wish to believe that any two who are distinct as persons have one essence and nature. And because in the faith’s teaching only the nature of God the Father is believed to be eternal, they believed that the nature of the Son did not exist from eternity, although the Son was before other creatures. And since whatever is not eternal is made from nothing and created by God, they used to preach that the Son of God was made from nothing and was a creature. But, since the authority of Scripture forced them to name the Son also, as was brought out in the foregoing they used to say that He was one with God the Father—not to be sure, by nature, but by a kind of union of consent, and by a participation in the divine likeness above all other creatures. Now, the highest creatures whom we call angels are named “gods” and “sons of God” in Scripture, as in Job (58:4, 7): “Where were you when the morning stars praised Me together, and all the sons of God made a joyful melody?” and in a Psalm (81:1): “God has stood in the congregation of gods: Accordingly, this one should be called Son of God and God more than the others, to show that He is more noble than any other creature in that through Him God the Father established all the rest of creation.
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| Hanc autem positionem confirmare nitebantur sacrae Scripturae documentis.
| [2] They used to try to strengthen this position by the testimonies of sacred Scripture.
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| Dicit enim filius, Ioan. 17-3, ad patrem loquens: haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum. Solus ergo pater Deus verus est. Cum ergo filius non sit pater, filius Deus verus esse non potest.
| [3] For the Son says, speaking to the Father in John (17:3): “This is eternal life: that they may know You, the only true God.” The Father alone, therefore, is true God. Since, therefore, the Son is not the Father, the Son cannot be true God.
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| Item. Apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. ult.: serves mandatum sine macula irreprehensibile usque in adventum domini nostri Iesu Christi, quem suis temporibus ostendet beatus et solus potens rex regum et dominus dominantium, qui solus habet immortalitatem et lucem habitat inaccessibilem, in quibus verbis ostenditur distinctio Dei patris ostendentis ad Christum ostensum. Solus ergo Deus pater ostendens est potens rex regum et dominus dominantium, et solus habet immortalitatem et lucem habitat inaccessibilem. Solus ergo pater Deus verus est. Non ergo filius.
| [4] The Apostle also says: “Keep the commandment without spot, blameless, unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, which in His times He shall show who is the Blessed and only Mighty, the King of kings, and Lord of lords; who only has immortality, and inhabits light inaccessible” (1 Tim. 6:14-16). These words make a distinction between the Father who shows and Christ who is shown. Therefore, only the Father who shows is the King of kings and Lord of lords; He alone is immortal and dwells in inaccessible light. Therefore, the Father alone is true God. Therefore, the Son is not.
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| Praeterea. Dominus dicit, Ioan. 14-28: pater maior me est; et apostolus dicit filium patri esse subiectum, I ad Cor. 15-28: cum omnia subiecta illi fuerint, tunc ipse filius subiectus erit illi, scilicet patri, qui sibi subiecit omnia. Si autem esset una natura patris et filii, esset etiam una magnitudo et maiestas: non enim filius esset minor patre, nec patri subiectus. Relinquitur ergo ex Scripturis quod filius non sit eiusdem naturae cum patre ut credebant.
| [5] Furthermore, our Lord says: “The Father is greater than I” (John 14:28); and the Apostle says: “When all things shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall be subject unto Him,” namely, to the Father, “that put all things under Him” (1 Cor. 15:28). But if the nature of the Father and Son were one, their greatness and majesty would also be one. For then the Son would not be less than the Father, or subject to the Father. It follows, then, from Scripture that the Son is not of the same nature as the Father, so they believed.
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| Adhuc. Natura patris non patitur indigentiam. In filio autem indigentia invenitur: ostenditur enim ex Scripturis quod a patre recipit; recipere autem indigentis est. Dicitur enim Matth. 11-27: omnia tradita sunt mihi a patre meo, et Ioan. 3-35: pater diligit filium, et omnia dedit in manu eius. Videtur igitur filius non esse eiusdem naturae cum patre.
| [6] The nature of the Father, furthermore, suffers no need. But one finds need in the Son, for it is shown from Scripture that He receives from the Father—and he who receives is in need. For Matthew (13:27) says: “All things are delivered to Me by My Father”; and John (3:35): “The Father loves the Son: and He has given all things into His hand.” The Son, therefore, seems not to be of the same nature with the Father.
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| Amplius. Doceri et adiuvari indigentis est. Filius autem a patre docetur et iuvatur. Dicitur enim Ioan. 5-19: non potest filius a se facere quicquam, nisi quod viderit patrem facientem; et infra: 20 pater diligit filium, et omnia demonstrat ei quae ipse facit; et Ioan. 15-15, filius dicit discipulis: omnia quaecumque audivi a patre meo, nota feci vobis. Non igitur videtur esse eiusdem naturae filius cum patre.
| [7] He is in need, moreover, who is taught and is helped. But the Son is taught and is helped by the Father. For John (5:19-20; 14:15) says: “The Son cannot do any thing of Himself, but what He sees the Father doing”; and later: “The Father loves the Son, and shows Him all that he is doing”; and the Son says to the disciples: “What I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you.” Therefore, the Son appears not to be of the same nature as the Father.
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| Praeterea. Praeceptum recipere, obedire, orare, et mitti, inferioris esse videtur. Haec autem de filio leguntur. Dicit enim filius, Ioan. 14-31: sicut mandatum dedit mihi pater, sic facio. Et Philipp. 2-8: factus est obediens patri usque ad mortem. Et Ioan. 14-16: ego rogabo patrem, et alium Paracletum dabit vobis. Et Galat. 4-4, dicit apostolus: cum venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus filium suum. Est ergo filius minor patre, et ei subiectus.
| [8] There is more. To receive a command, to obey, to be sent seem proper to an inferior. But these we read about the Son. For the Son says in John (14:31): “As the Father has given Me commandment, so do I”; and the Apostle: “Becoming obedient unto death” (Phil. 2:8). And John (1436): “I shall ask the Father, and He will give you another paraclete!” And the Apostle also says: “When the fulness of the time was come God sent His Son” (Gal. 4:4). Therefore, the Son is less than the Father and is subject to Him.
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| Item. Filius clarificatur a patre: sicut ipse dicit, Ioan. 12-28: pater, clarifica nomen tuum; et sequitur: venit vox de caelo, et clarificavi, et iterum clarificabo. Apostolus etiam dicit, ad Rom. 8-11, quod Deus suscitavit Iesum Christum a mortuis. Et Petrus dicit, Act. 2-33, quod est dextera Dei exaltatus. Ex quibus videtur quod sit patre inferior.
| [9] Furthermore, the Son is glorified by the Father, as He Himself says in John (13:28): “Father, glorify your name”; and thereafter: “A voice, therefore, came from heaven: I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again.” The Apostle also says that God “raised up Jesus Christ from the dead” (Rom. 8:11). And Peter says that He “was exalted by the right hand of God” (Acts 2:33). And from these it seems that the Son is inferior to the Father.
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| Praeterea. In natura patris nullus defectus esse potest. In filio autem invenitur defectus potestatis: dicit enim Matth. 20-23: sedere ad dexteram meam vel sinistram, non est meum dare vobis, sed quibus paratum est a patre meo. Defectus etiam scientiae: dicit enim ipse, Marc. 13-32: de die autem illa et hora nemo scit, neque Angeli in caelo, neque filius, nisi pater. Invenitur etiam in eo defectus quietae affectionis: cum in eo Scriptura asserat tristitiam fuisse, et iram, et alias huiusmodi passiones. Non igitur videtur filius esse eiusdem naturae cum patre.
| [10]] In the Father’s nature, furthermore, there can be no failure. But one finds a failure in power in the Son, for He says in Matthew (20:23): “To sit on My right or left hand is not Mine to give to you, but to them for whom it is pre pared by My Father.” There is a failure also in knowledge; for He Himself says: “That day or hour no man knows, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father” (Mark 13:22). There is also a failure in stability of love, since Scripture asserts that there was sadness in the Son and anger and other changes of this sort. Therefore, the Son does not appear to be of the same nature as the Father.
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| Adhuc. Expresse in Scripturis invenitur quod filius Dei sit creatura. Dicit enim Eccli. 24-12: dixit mihi creator omnium, et qui creavit me, requievit in tabernaculo meo. Et iterum: ab initio et ante saecula creata sum. Est igitur filius creatura.
| [11] It is, furthermore, found expressly in Scripture that the Son of God is a creature. For Sirach (24:12, 14) says: “The creator of all things said to Me: and He that made Me rested in My tabernacle”; and again: “From the beginning, and before the world, was I created.” Therefore, the Son is a creature.
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| Praeterea. Filius creaturis connumeratur. Dicitur enim Eccli. 24-5, ex persona sapientiae: ego ex ore altissimi prodii, primogenita ante omnem creaturam. Et apostolus, ad Coloss. 1-15, dicit de filio quod est primogenitus creaturae. Videtur ergo quod filius ordinem cum creaturis habeat, quasi primum inter eas obtinens gradum.
| [12] What is more, the Son is numbered among creatures. For it says in the person of Wisdom: “I came out of the mouth of the most High, the firstborn before all creatures” (Sirach 24:5). And the Apostle says of the Son that He is “the firstborn of every creature” (Col. 1:15). The Son, then, seems to belong to the order of creatures as one who holds the first rank therein.
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| Amplius. Filius dicit, Ioan. 17-22, pro discipulis ad patrem orans: ego claritatem quam dedisti mihi, dedi eis, ut sint unum, sicut et nos unum sumus. Sic igitur pater et filius unum sunt sicut discipulos unum esse volebat. Non autem volebat discipulos esse per essentiam unum. Non ergo pater et filius sunt per essentiam unum. Et sic sequitur quod sit creatura, et patri subiectus.
| [13] The Son, moreover, says in John (17:22), praying for the disciples to the Father: “The glory which You hast given Me, I have given to them; that they may be one, as We also are one.” Therefore, the Father and Son are one as He wished the disciples to be one. But He did not wish the disciples to be essentially one. Therefore, the Father and Son are not essentially one. Thus it follows that He is a creature and subject to the Father.
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| Est autem haec positio Arii et Eunomii. Et videtur a Platonicorum dictis exorta, qui ponebant summum Deum, patrem et creatorem omnium rerum, a quo primitus effluxisse dicebant quandam mentem, in qua essent omnium rerum formae, superiorem omnibus aliis rebus, quam paternum intellectum nominabant; et post hanc, animam mundi; et deinde alias creaturas. Quod ergo in Scripturis sacris de Dei filio dicitur, hoc de mente praedicta intelligebant: et praecipue quia sacra Scriptura Dei filium Dei sapientiam nominat et verbum Dei. Cui etiam opinioni consonat positio Avicennae, qui supra animam primi caeli ponit intelligentiam primam, moventem primum caelum, supra quam ulterius Deum in summo ponebat.
| [14] Now, this is the position of Arius and Eunomius. And it seems to have arisen from the sayings of the Platonists, who used to hold that there was a supreme God, the Father and Creator of all things, and from Him there emanated a certain “Mind” in which were the forms of all things, and it was superior to all things; and they named this the “paternal intellect”; after this they put the soul of the world, and then the other creatures. Therefore, what is said in sacred Scripture of the Son of God they used to understand of the mind just mentioned; and the more so because sacred Scripture names the Son of God “the Wisdom of God” and “the Word of God.” And with this opinion the position of Avicenna agrees; he holds that above the soul of the first heaven there is a first intelligence moving the first heaven, and further beyond this he placed God at the summit.
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| Sic igitur Ariani de Dei filio suspicati sunt quod esset quaedam creatura supereminens omnibus aliis creaturis, qua mediante Deus omnia creasset: praecipue cum etiam quidam philosophi posuerunt quodam ordine res a primo principio processisse, ita quod per primum creatum omnia alia sint creata.
| [15] In this way, then, the Arians were inclined to think that the Son of God was a kind of creature, pre-eminent over all other creatures, the medium by which God had created all things; they were all the more so inclined by the fact that certain philosophers also held that things proceeded from their first source in an order, resulting in the creation of all things through one first creature.
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Caput 7
Improbatio opinionis Arii de filio Dei
| Chapter 7
REFUTATION OF THE OPINION OF ARIUS ON THE SON OF GOD
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| Hanc autem positionem divinae Scripturae repugnare manifeste potest percipere, si quis sacrarum Scripturarum dicta diligenter consideret.
| [1] That this opinion is manifestly repugnant to divine Scripture anyone can see who considers diligently what sacred Scripture says.
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| Cum enim Scriptura divina et Christum Dei filium, et Angelos Dei filios nominet, alia tamen et alia ratione: unde apostolus, Hebr. 1-5, dicit: cui dixit aliquando Angelorum, filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te? Quod ad Christum asserit esse dictum. Secundum autem positionem praedictam, eadem ratione Angeli filii dicerentur et Christus: utrisque enim nomen filiationis competeret secundum quandam sublimitatem naturae, in qua creati sunt a Deo.
| [2] For, when divine Scripture names Christ the Son of God and angels the sons of God it does so for different reasons. Hence, the Apostle says: “To which of the angels has He said at any time, ‘You are My Son, today have I begotten You” (Heb. 1:5). And it was to Christ that this was said, he asserts. But, according to the aforesaid position, angels are called sons for the same reason as Christ, for the name of sonship is fitting to each according to a kind of sublimity of nature in which they were created by God.
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| Nec obstat si Christus sit excellentioris naturae prae aliis Angelis: quia etiam inter Angelos ordines diversi inveniuntur, ut ex superioribus patet, et tamen omnibus eadem filiationis ratio competit. Non igitur Christus filius Dei dicitur secundum quod asserit praedicta positio.
| [3] Neither is this objection met if Christ is of a nature more excellent than other angels. For, even among the angels diverse orders are discovered, which became clear above, and for all that, to all of them the same notion of sonship is suitable. Therefore, Christ is not called the Son of God in the way the position described maintains.
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| Item. Cum ratione creationis nomen filiationis divinae multis conveniat, quia omnibus Angelis et sanctis; si etiam Christus eadem ratione filius diceretur, non esset unigenitus, licet, propter excellentiam suae naturae, inter ceteros primogenitus posset dici. Asserit autem eum Scriptura esse unigenitum, Ioan. 1-14: vidimus eum quasi unigenitum a patre. Non igitur ratione creationis Dei filius dicitur.
| [4] Again, since by reason of creation the name of divine sonship is suitable to many—for it belongs to all the angels and saints—if Christ also were called Son on the same ground, He would not be “only-begotten; although by reason of the excellence of His nature over all others He could be called “firstborn.” However, Scripture asserts that He is only-begotten: “We saw His glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father” (John 1:14). It is not, therefore, by reason of creation that He is called the Son of God.
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| Amplius. Nomen filiationis proprie et vere generationem viventium consequitur, in quibus genitum ex substantia generantis procedit: alias enim nomen filiationis non secundum veritatem, sed potius secundum similitudinem accipitur, cum filios dicimus aut discipulos, aut hos quorum gerimus curam. Si igitur Christus non diceretur filius nisi ratione creationis, cum id quod creatur a Deo, non ex substantia Dei derivetur, Christus vere filius dici non posset. Dicitur autem verus filius, I Ioan. ult.: ut simus, inquit, in vero filio eius, Iesu Christo. Non igitur Dei filius dicitur, quasi a Deo creatus in quantacumque naturae excellentia, sed quasi ex Dei substantia genitus.
| [5] Moreover, the name of sonship properly and truly follows on the generation of living things in which the begotten proceeds from the substance of the one begetting; otherwise, the name of sonship is taken not in truth but in similitude, as when we call either students or others who are in our charge our sons. If, then, Christ were not called Son except by reason of creation, since that which is created by God is not derived from the substance of God, Christ could not be called Son truly. But He is called the true Son in 1 John (5:20): “that we may be; he says, “in His true Son, Jesus Christ.” Therefore, He is not called the Son of God as created by God in an excellence of nature, however great, but as one begotten of God’s substance.
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| Praeterea. Si Christus ratione creationis filius dicitur, non erit verus Deus: nihil enim creatum Deus potest dici nisi per quandam similitudinem ad Deum. Ipse autem Iesus Christus est verus Deus: cum enim Ioannes dixisset, ut simus in vero filio eius, subdit: hic est verus Deus et vita aeterna. Non igitur Christus filius Dei dicitur ratione creationis.
| [6] What is more, if Christ is called Son by reason of creation, He will not be truly God. For nothing created can be called God unless by some similitude to God. But this same Jesus Christ is true God, for, when John had said: “that we may be in His true Son,” he added: “This is the true God and life eternal.” Therefore, Christ is not called the Son of God by reason of creation.
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| Amplius. Apostolus, ad Rom. 9-5, dicit: ex quibus Christus est secundum carnem, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula, amen. Et Tit. 2-13: expectantes beatam spem, et adventum gloriae magni Dei et salvatoris nostri Iesu Christi. Et Ierem. 23 dicitur: suscitabo David germen iustum et postea subditur, et hoc est nomen quod vocabunt eum, dominus iustus noster, ubi in Hebraeo habetur nomen tetragrammaton, quod de solo Deo certum est dici. Ex quibus apparet quod filius Dei est verus Deus.
| [7] Furthermore, the Apostle says: “Of whom is Christ, according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed forever. Amen” (Rom. 9:5); and in Titus (2:13): “Looking for the blessed hope and coming of the glory of the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ.” And Jeremiah (23:5-6) says: “I will raise up to David a just branch”; and adds below: “and this is the name that they shall call Him: The Lord our just one.” There in Hebrew the name is the tetragrammaton, which certainly is said of God alone. From these sayings it is clear that the Son of God is true God.
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| Praeterea. Si Christus verus filius est, de necessitate sequitur quod sit verus Deus. Non enim vere filius potest dici quod ab alio gignitur, etiam si de substantia generantis nascatur nisi in similem speciem generantis procedat: oportet enim quod filius hominis homo sit. Si igitur Christus est verus filius Dei, oportet quod sit verus Deus. Non est igitur aliquid creatum.
| [8] Moreover, if Christ be the true Son, of necessity it follows that He is true God. For, that cannot truly be called son which is begotten of another, even if the thing be born of the substance of the one begetting unless it comes forth in species like the one begetting; the son of a man must be a man. If, therefore, Christ be the true Son of God, He must be true God. Therefore, He is not anything created.
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| Item. Nulla creatura recipit totam plenitudinem divinae bonitatis: quia, sicut ex superioribus patet, perfectiones a Deo in creaturas per modum cuiusdam descensus procedunt. Christus autem habet in se totam plenitudinem divinae bonitatis: dicit enim apostolus, ad Coloss. 2-9: in ipso habitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis. Christus ergo non est creatura.
| [9] Again, no creature receives the complete fullness of divine goodness, because, as was made clear above, perfections proceed from God to creatures in a kind of descent. But Christ has in Himself the complete fullness of the divine goodness, for the Apostle says: “In Him dwells all the fulness of the Godhead” (Col. 2:9). Therefore, Christ is not a creature.
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| Adhuc. Licet intellectus Angeli perfectiorem cognitionem habeat quam intellectus hominis, tamen multum deficit ab intellectu divino. Intellectus autem Christi non deficit in cognitione ab intellectu divino: dicit enim apostolus, ad Coloss. 2-3, quod in Christo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi. Non est igitur Christus filius Dei creatura.
| [10] Grant, furthermore, that the intellect of an angel has a more perfect knowledge than the intellect of man; it is still in great want from the divine intellect. But the intellect of Christ is not in want of knowledge from the divine intellect, for the Apostle says that in Christ “are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” (Col. 2:3). Therefore, Christ the Son of God is not a creature.
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| Amplius. Quicquid Deus habet in seipso, est eius essentia, ut in primo ostensum est. Omnia autem quae habet pater, sunt filii: dicit enim ipse filius, Ioan. 16-15: omnia quae habet pater, mea sunt; et Ioan. 17-10, ad patrem loquens, ait: mea omnia tua sunt, et tua mea sunt. Est ergo eadem essentia et natura patris et filii. Non est igitur filius creatura.
| [11] Furthermore, whatever God has in Himself is His essence, as was shown in Book I. But, all things the Father has are the Son’s. For the Son Himself says: “All things whatsoever the Father has are Mine” (John 16:15); and in John (17:10), speaking to the Father, he says: “All My things are Yours, and Yours are Mine.” The essence and nature, then, of the Father and Son is the very same. Therefore, the Son is not. a creature.
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| Praeterea. Apostolus dicit, Philipp. 2, quod filius, antequam exinaniret semetipsum formam servi accipiens, in forma Dei erat. Per formam autem Dei non aliud intelligitur quam natura divina: sicut per formam servi non intelligitur aliud quam humana natura. Est ergo filius in natura divina. Non est igitur creatura.
| [12] What is more, the Apostle says that the Son, before He emptied himself taking the form of a servant, was “in the form of God” (Phil. 2:6-7). By the form of God, however, nothing is understood but the divine nature, just as by the form of the servant human nature is understood. The Son, then, is in the divine nature. Therefore, He is not a creature.
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| Item. Nihil creatum potest esse Deo aequale. Filius autem est patri aequalis. Dicitur enim Ioan. 5-18: quaerebant eum Iudaei interficere, quia non solum solvebat sabbatum, sed et patrem suum dicebat Deum, aequalem se Deo faciens. Haec est autem Evangelistae narratio, cuius testimonium verum est, quod Christus filium Dei se dicebat et Deo aequalem, et propterea eum Iudaei persequebantur. Nec dubium est alicui Christiano quin illud quod Christus de se dixit, verum sit: cum et apostolus dicat, Philipp. 2-6, hoc non fuisse rapinam, quod aequalem se esse patri arbitratus est. Est ergo filius aequalis patri. Non est igitur creatura.
| [13] Furthermore, nothing created can be equal to God. The Son, however, is equal to the Father. For John (5:18) says: “The Jews sought the more to kill Him, because He did not only break the Sabbath, but also said God was His Father, making Himself equal to God.” And this is the narrative of the Evangelist whose “testimony is true” (John 19:13; 21:74): that Christ said He was the Son of God and the equal of God, and that for these things the Jews were persecuting Him. Nor is there doubt for any Christian that what Christ said of Himself is true, when the Apostle also says that He “thought it not robbery to be equal with God” (Phil. 2:6). The Son, therefore, is equal to the Father. He is not, then, a creature.
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| Amplius. In Psalmo legitur non esse similitudinem alicuius ad Deum etiam inter Angelos qui filii Dei dicuntur: quis, inquit, similis Deo in filiis Dei? Et alibi: Deus, quis similis erit tibi? Quod de perfecta similitudine accipi oportet: quod patet ex his quae in primo libro tractata sunt. Christus autem perfectam sui similitudinem ad patrem ostendit etiam in vivendo: dicitur enim Ioan. 5-26: sicut pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et filio vitam habere in semetipso. Non est igitur Christus computandus inter filios Dei creatos.
| [14] Moreover, in the Psalms (88:7; 82:1) we read that there is no likeness of anyone to God even among the angels who are called the sons of God. “Who,” it says, “among the sons of God shall be like God?” And elsewhere: “O God, who shall be like to You?” This should be understood of perfect likeness; which is clear from the things treated in Book I. But Christ showed his perfect likeness to the Father even in living, for John (5:26) says: “As the Father has life in Himself, so He has given to the Son also to have life in Himself.” Therefore, Christ is not to be counted among the created sons of God.
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| Adhuc. Nulla substantia creata repraesentat Deum quantum ad eius substantiam: quicquid enim ex perfectione cuiuscumque creaturae apparet, minus est quam quod Deus est; unde per nullam creaturam sciri potest de Deo quid est. Filius autem repraesentat patrem: dicit enim de eo apostolus, ad Coloss. 1-15, quod est imago invisibilis Dei. Et ne aestimetur esse imago deficiens, essentiam Dei non repraesentans, per quam non possit cognosci de Deo quid est, sicut vir dicitur imago Dei, I ad Cor. 11-7; ostenditur perfecta esse imago, ipsam Dei substantiam repraesentans, Hebr. 1-3, dicente apostolo: cum sit splendor gloriae, et figura substantiae eius. Non est igitur filius creatura.
| [15] Furthermore, no created substance represents God in His substance, for, whatever be the perfection of any creature whatever that appears, it is less than that which God is; hence, there is no creature through whom we can know what-He-is about God. But the Son does represent the Father, for of Him the Apostle says that He “is the image of the invisible God” (Col. 1:15). And lest He be judged a deficient image, one not representing the essence of God, one through which what-He-is could not be known of God (thus is man called the “image of God” in 1 Cor. 11:7); He is shown to be the perfect image, representing the very substance of God, when the Apostle says: “Who being the brightness of His glory, and the figure of His substance” (Heb. 1:3). Therefore, the Son is not a creature.
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| Praeterea. Nihil quod est in aliquo genere, est universalis causa eorum quae sunt in genere illo, sicut universalis causa hominum non est aliquis homo, nihil enim est sui ipsius causa: sed sol, qui est extra genus humanum, est universalis causa generationis humanae, et ulterius Deus. Filius autem est universalis causa creaturarum: dicitur enim Ioan. 1-3: omnia per ipsum facta sunt; et Proverb. 8-30, dicit sapientia genita: cum eo eram componens omnia, et apostolus dicit, ad Coloss. 1-16: in ipso condita sunt universa in caelo et in terra. Ipse igitur non est de genere creaturarum.
| [16] There is more. Nothing which is in a genus is the universal cause of those things which are in that genus. So, the universal cause of men is not a man for nothing is the cause of itself, but the sun which is outside the human genus is the universal cause of human generation, and beyond it God is. But, the Son is the universal cause of creatures, for John (1:3) says: “All things were made by Him”; and in Proverbs (8:30) the begotten Wisdom says: “I was with Him forming all things”; and the Apostle says: “In Him were all things created in heaven and on earth” (Col. 1:16). Therefore, He Himself is not in the genus of creatures.
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| Item. Ex ostensis in secundo libro manifestum est quod substantiae incorporeae, quas Angelos dicimus, non possunt aliter fieri quam per creationem; et etiam ostensum est quod nulla substantia potest creare nisi solus Deus. Sed Dei filius Iesus Christus est causa Angelorum, eos in esse producens: dicit enim apostolus: sive throni, sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt. Ipse igitur filius non est creatura.
| [17] Similarly, it is clear from what was shown in Book II that the incorporeal substances that we call angels cannot be made except by creation, and it was also shown that no substance can create but God alone. But the Son of God, Jesus Christ, is the cause of the angels, bringing them into being, for the Apostle says: “whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by Him and in Him” (Col. 1:16)., Therefore, the Son Himself, is not a creature.
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| Praeterea. Cum propria actio cuiuslibet rei sequatur naturam ipsius, nulli competit propria actio alicuius rei cui non competit illius rei natura: quod enim non habet humanam speciem, nec actionem humanam habere potest. Propriae autem actiones Dei conveniunt filio: sicut creare, ut iam ostensum est; continere et conservare omnia in esse; et peccata purgare; quae propria esse Dei ex superioribus patet. Dicitur autem de filio, ad Coloss. 1-17, quod omnia in ipso constant; et ad Hebr. 1-3, dicitur quod portat omnia verbo virtutis suae, purgationem peccatorum faciens. Filius igitur Dei est naturae divinae, et non est creatura.
| [18] Furthermore, since the proper action of anything at all follows its very nature, a thing’s proper action is fitting to nothing to which the nature of that thing is not fitting; thus, what does not have the human species does not have the human action. Now, the proper actions of God belong to the Son: to create (as already shown), to contain and conserve all things in being; and to wipe away sins. That these are proper to God is clear from the foregoing. But of the Son it is said that “by Him all things consist” (Col. 1: 3-7); and that He upholds “all things by the word of His power, making purgation of sins” (Heb. 1:3). The Son of God, then, is of the divine nature, and is not a creature.
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| Sed quia posset Arianus dicere quod haec filius facit non tanquam principale agens, sed sicut instrumentum principalis agentis, quod per propriam virtutem non agit, sed solum per virtutem principalis agentis, hanc rationem dominus excludit, Ioan. 5-19, dicens: quaecumque pater facit haec et filius similiter facit. Sicut igitur pater per se operatur et propria virtute, ita et filius.
| [19] But because an Arian might say that the Son does these things not as a principal agent, but as an instrument of the principal agent which acts not by its own power but by the power of the principal agent, our Lord excluded this argument, saying in John (5:19): “what things soever the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner.” Then, just as the Father operates of Himself and by His proper power, so also does the Son.
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| Ulterius etiam ex hoc verbo concluditur, quod sit eadem virtus et potestas filii et patris. Non solum enim dicit quod filius similiter operatur sicut et pater, sed quod eadem et similiter. Idem autem non potest esse operatum eodem modo a duobus agentibus nisi vel dissimiliter, sicut idem fit a principali agente et instrumento: vel, si similiter, oportet quod conveniant in una virtute. Quae quidem virtus quandoque congregatur ex diversis virtutibus in diversis agentibus inventis, sicut patet in multis trahentibus navem: omnes enim similiter trahunt, et quia virtus cuiuslibet imperfecta est et insufficiens ad istum effectum, ex diversis virtutibus congregatur una virtus omnium, quae sufficit ad trahendum navem. Hoc autem non potest dici in patre et filio: virtus enim Dei patris non est imperfecta, sed infinita, ut in primo ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod eadem numero sit virtus patris et filii. Et cum virtus consequatur naturam rei, oportet quod eadem numero sit natura et essentia patris et filii. Quod etiam ex praecedentibus concludi potest. Nam si in filio est natura divina, ut multipliciter ostensum est; cum natura divina multiplicari non possit, ut in primo libro ostensum est: sequitur de necessitate quod sit eadem numero natura et essentia in patre et filio.
| [20] A still further conclusion from this saying is that virtue and power are identified in the Son and the Father. For He says that the Son works not only like the Father but the same things “in like manner.” But the same operation cannot be performed by two agents unless in dissimilarity: as the same thing done by a principal agent and its instrument; or, if in similarity, it must be that the agents come together in one power. Now, this power is sometimes collected from diverse powers in diverse agents, as when many men draw up a boat, for they all draw it up in the same way, and because the power of each is imperfect and insufficient for that effect, from the diverse powers is collected one power of them all which is sufficient for drawing up the boat. But, one cannot say this in the case of the Father and the Son, for the power of the Father is not imperfect but infinite, as was shown in Book I. There must, then, be numerical identity in the power of the Father and the Son. And since power follows nature, there must be numerical identity in the nature and essence of the Father and the Son. This also can be concluded from the things that were said earlier. For, if in the Son there is the divine nature (as has been shown in many ways), and if the divine nature cannot be multiplied as was shown in Book I, it follows necessarily that there is numerical identity of nature and essence in the Father and the Son.
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| Item. Ultima nostra beatitudo in solo Deo est; in quo etiam solo spes hominis debet poni; et cui soli est honor latriae exhibendus, ut in tertio libro ostensum est. Beatitudo autem nostra in Dei filio est. Dicit enim, Ioan. 17-3: haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, scilicet patrem, et quem misisti, Iesum Christum. Et I Ioan. ult., dicitur de filio quod est verus Deus et vita aeterna. Certum est autem nomine vitae aeternae in Scripturis sacris ultimam beatitudinem significari. Dicit etiam Isaias de filio, ut apostolus inducit: erit radix Iesse, et qui exurget regere gentes, in eo gentes sperabunt. Dicitur etiam in Psalmo: et adorabunt eum omnes reges, omnes gentes servient ei. Et Ioan. 5-23 dicitur: omnes honorificent filium sicut honorificant patrem. Et iterum in Psalmo dicitur: adorate eum omnes Angeli eius: quod de filio apostolus introducit Hebr. 1-6. Manifestum est igitur filium Dei verum Deum esse.
| [21] Again, our beatitude is ultimately in God alone, in whom alone also the hope of man must be placed, to whom alone also the honor of adoration must be given, as was shown in Book III. But our beatitude is in the Son of God. For He says in John (17:3): “This is eternal life: that they may know You,” namely, the Father, “and Jesus Christ whom You hast sent.” And 1 John (5:20) says of the Son that He is “true God and life eternal,” Now, it is certain that by the name “life eternal” the sacred Scripture signifies ultimate beatitude. Isaiah also says of the Son, as the Apostle brings out: “‘there shall be a root of Jesse, and He that shall rise up to rule the Gentiles, in Him the Gentiles shall hope” (Rom. 15:12; Isa. 11:10). It is said also in a Psalm (71:11): “And all the kings of the earth shall adore Him; all nations shall serve Him.” And John (5:23): “That all men may honour the Son, as they honour the Father.” And again a Psalm (96:7) says: “Adore Him, all you His angels.” That this is said of the Son the Apostle sets forth in Hebrews (1:6). Manifestly, therefore, the Son of God is true God.
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| Ad hoc etiam ostendendum valent ea quae superius contra Photinum inducta sunt ad ostendendum Christum Deum esse non factum, sed verum.
| [22] The arguments are also valid for establishing this point which were previously used against Photinus to show that Christ is not made God but true God.
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| Ex praemissis igitur et consimilibus sacrae Scripturae documentis Ecclesia Catholica docta, Christum verum et naturalem Dei filium confitetur, aeternum, patri aequalem, et verum Deum, eiusdem essentiae et naturae cum patre, genitum, non creatum nec factum.
| [23] Taught, therefore, by those mentioned and very similar testimonies of sacred Scripture, the Catholic Church maintains that Christ is the true and natural Son of God, eternal, equal to the Father, true God, identical in essence and nature with the Father, begotten, not created, and not made.
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| Unde patet quod sola Ecclesiae Catholicae fides vere confitetur generationem in Deo, dum ipsam generationem filii ad hoc refert quod filius accepit divinam naturam a patre. Alii vero haeretici ad aliquam extraneam naturam hanc generationem referunt: Photinus quidem et Sabellius ad humanam; Arius autem non ad humanam, sed ad quandam naturam creatam digniorem ceteris creaturis.
| [24] Wherefore it is clear that only in the Catholic Church does faith truly confess generation in God, when it relates the very generation of the Son to this: the Son has received the divine nature from the Father. But others who are heretics relate this generation to some extraneous nature: Photinus and Sabellius to human nature, indeed; Arius, however, to some created nature more worthy than all other creatures.
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| Differt etiam Arius a Sabellio et Photino quod hic generationem praedictam asserit ante mundum fuisse; illi vero eam fuisse negant ante nativitatem ex virgine.
| Arius also differs from Sabellius and Photinus in this: the former asserts that such generation was before the world was; the latter two deny that it was before the birth from the Virgin.
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| Sabellius tamen a Photino differt in hoc, quod Sabellius Christum verum Deum confitetur et naturalem, non autem Photinus neque Arius: sed Photinus purum hominem; Arius autem quasi commixtum ex quadam excellentissima creatura divina et humana. Hi tamen aliam esse personam patris et filii confitentur, quod Sabellius negat.
| Sabellius nevertheless differs from Photinus in this: Sabellius confesses that Christ is true and natural God, but Photinus does not; neither does Arius. Photinus holds that He is pure man; Arius, that He is a kind of mixture of a certain very excellent creature both divine and human. The latter two, however, confess that the Person of the Father is other than the Person of the Son; this Sabellius denies.
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| Fides ergo Catholica, media via incedens, confitetur, cum Ario et Photino, contra Sabellium, aliam personam patris et filii, et filium genitum, patrem vero omnino ingenitum: cum Sabellio vero, contra Photinum et Arium, Christum verum et naturalem Deum et eiusdem naturae cum patre, licet non eiusdem personae. Ex quo etiam indicium veritatis Catholicae sumi potest: nam vero, ut philosophus dicit, etiam falsa attestantur: falsa vero non solum a veris, sed etiam ab invicem distant.
| [25] Therefore, the Catholic faith, keeping to the middle road, holds with Arius and Photinus against Sabellius that the Person of the Father is other than the Person of the Son, that the Son is begotten, but the Father entirely unbegotten; but with Sabellius against Photinus and Arius that Christ is true and natural God, the same in nature as the Father, although not the same in person. And from this, also, an indication of the Catholic truth can be gathered. For, as the Philosopher says, [Prior Analytics II, 2] even falsehoods give witness, for falsehoods stand apart not only from the truth but from one another.
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Caput 8
Solutio ad auctoritates quas Arius pro se inducebat
| Chapter 8
SOLUTION OF THE AUTHORITIES WHICH ARIUS PROPOSED FOR HIMSELF
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| Quia vero veritas veritati contraria esse non potest, manifestum est ea quae ex Scripturis veritatis ab Arianis introducta sunt ad suum errorem confirmandum, eorum sententiae accommoda non esse. Cum enim ex Scripturis divinis ostensum sit patris et filii eandem numero essentiam esse et naturam divinam, secundum quam uterque verus dicitur Deus, oportet patrem et filium non duos deos, sed unum Deum esse. Si enim plures dii essent, oporteret per consequens divinitatis essentiam in utroque partitam esse sicut in duobus hominibus est alia et alia humanitas numero: et praecipue cum non sit aliud divina natura et aliud ipse Deus, ut supra ostensum est; ex quo de necessitate consequitur quod, existente una natura divina in patre et filio, quod sint pater et filius unus Deus. Licet ergo patrem confiteamur Deum, et filium Deum, non tamen recedimus a sententia qua ponitur unus solus Deus, quam in primo et rationibus et auctoritatibus firmavimus. Unde, etsi sit unus solus verus Deus, tamen hoc et de patre et de filio praedicari confiteamur.
| [1] Since, however, truth cannot be truth’s contrary, it is obvious that the points of Scriptural truth introduced by the Arians to confirm their error cannot be helpful to their teaching. For, since it was shown from divine Scripture that the essence and divine nature of the Father and Son are numerically identical, and according to this each is called true God, it must be that the Father and Son cannot be two gods, but one God. For, if there were many gods, a necessary consequence would be the partition in each of the essence of divinity, just as in two men the humanity differs in number from one to the other; and the more so because the divine nature is not one thing and God Himself another. This was shown above. From this it follows necessarily that, since there exists one divine nature in the Father and the Son, the Father and the Son are one God. Therefore, although we confess that the Father is God and the Son God, we are not withdrawing from the teaching which sets down that there is one only God, which we established both by reasonings and by authorities in Book I. Hence, although there is one only true God, we confess that this is predicated of the Father and of the Son.
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| Cum ergo dominus, ad patrem loquens, dicit, ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum, non sic intelligendum est quod solus pater sit verus Deus, quasi filius non sit verus Deus, quod tamen manifeste Scripturae testimonio probatur: sed quod illa quae est una sola vera deitas patri conveniat, ita tamen quod non excludatur inde et filius. Unde signanter non dicit dominus, ut cognoscant solum Deum verum, quasi solus ipse sit Deus; sed dixit, ut cognoscant te, et addit solum verum Deum, ut ostenderet patrem, cuius se filium protestabatur, esse Deum in quo invenitur illa quae sola est vera divinitas. Et quia oportet verum filium eiusdem naturae esse cum patre, magis sequitur quod illa quae sola est vera divinitas filio conveniat, quam ab ea filius excludatur. Unde et Ioannes, in fine primae suae canonicae, quasi haec verba domini exponens, utrumque istorum vero filio attribuit quae hic dominus dicit de patre, scilicet quod sit verus Deus, et quod in eo sit vita aeterna, dicens: ut cognoscamus verum Deum, et simus in vero filio eius. Hic est verus Deus, et vita aeterna.
| [2] When our Lord, therefore, speaking to the Father, says “that they may know You the only true God,” it is not so to be understood that the Father alone is true God, as though the Son is not true God (the contrary is proved clearly by Scriptural testimony); but it must be understood that the one sole true deity belongs to the Father, in such wise, nonetheless, that the Son is not excluded therefrom. Hence, it is significant that our Lord does not say: “that they may know the one only true God,” as though He alone be God, but said: “that they may know You,” and added “the only true God” to show that the Father, whose Son He insisted He was, is the God in whom one finds that only true divinity. And because a true son must be of the same nature as his father, it follows that the only true divinity belongs to the Son, rather than that the Son is excluded from it. Wherefore John, also, at the end of his first canonical Epistle (5:20)—expounding, as it were, these words of our Lord—attributes to the true Son each of the things which our Lord here says of the Father; namely, that He is true God and that in Him is eternal life. John says (5:20): “That we may know the true God, and may be in His true Son. He is the true God and life eternal.”
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| Si tamen confessus esset filius quod solus pater esset verus Deus, non propter hoc a vera divinitate filius excludi intelligendus esset: nam quia pater et filius sunt unus Deus, ut ostensum est, quicquid ratione divinitatis de patre dicitur, idem est ac si de filio diceretur, et e converso. Non enim propter hoc quod dominus dicit, Matth. 11-27, nemo novit filium nisi pater, neque patrem quis novit nisi filius, intelligitur vel pater a sui cognitione excludi, vel filius.
| If the Son had nevertheless confessed that the Father alone is true God, one would not for this reason need to understand that the Son is excluded from true divinity. For, since the Father and Son are one God, as was shown, whatever is said of the Father by reason of divinity is the same as if it were said of the Son, and conversely. For, by reason of the fact that our Lord says: “No one knows the Son but the Father: neither does any one know the Father but the Son” (Mat. 11:27), it is not understood that the Father is excluded from knowledge of Himself, or that the Son is.
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| Ex quo etiam patet quod vera filii divinitas non excluditur ex verbis apostoli quibus dicit, quem suis temporibus ostendet beatus et solus potens, rex regum et dominus dominantium. Non enim in his verbis pater nominatur, sed id quod est commune patri et filio. Nam quod et filius sit rex regum et dominus dominantium, manifeste ostenditur Apoc. 19-13, ubi dicitur: vestitus erat veste aspersa sanguine, et vocabatur nomen eius: verbum Dei et postea subditur: et habet in vestimento et in femore suo scriptum: rex regum et dominus dominantium. Nec ab hoc quod subditur, qui solus habet immortalitatem, excluditur filius: cum et sibi credentibus immortalitatem conferat; unde dicitur Ioan. 11-26: qui credit in me, non morietur in aeternum. Sed et hoc quod subditur, quem nemo hominum vidit, sed nec videre potest, certum est filio convenire: cum dominus dicat, Matth. 11-27: nemo novit filium nisi pater. Cui non obstat quod visibilis apparuit: hoc enim secundum carnem factum est. Est autem invisibilis secundum deitatem, sicut et pater: unde apostolus, in eadem epistola, dicit: manifeste magnum est pietatis sacramentum, quod manifestatum est in carne. Nec cogit quod haec de solo patre dicta intelligamus quia dicitur quasi oporteat alium esse ostendentem et alium ostensum. Nam et filius seipsum ostendit: dicit enim ipse, Ioan. 14-21: qui diligit me, diligetur a patre meo, et ego diligam eum, et manifestabo ei meipsum. Unde et ei dicimus: ostende faciem tuam, et salvi erimus.
| [3] It is also clear from this that the true divinity of the Son is not excluded by the words of the Apostle: “Which in His times He shall show who is the Blessed and only Mighty, the King of kings, and Lord of lords.” In these words the Father is not named, but that which is common to the Father and the Son. That the Son is the King of kings and Lord of lords is manifestly shown in the Apocalypse (19:13), which says: “He was clothed with a garment sprinkled with blood; and His name is called THE WORD OF GOD”; and adds below: “And He has on His garment and on His thigh written: KING OF KINGS, AND LORD OF LORDS” (19:16). Nor is the Son excluded from that which is added: “Who only has immortality,” since He also bestows immortality on those who believe in Him. Thus, John (11: 26) says: “Who believes in Me shall not die for ever.” But what is added,” “Whom no man has seen, nor can see,” certainly is also suitable to the Son, since our Lord says: “No one knows the Son but the Father” (Mat. 11:27). To this it is not an objection that He appeared visibly, for this was according to the flesh. However, He is invisible in His deity just as the Father is; wherefore the Apostle says in the same Epistle (1 Tim. 3:16): “Evidently great is the mystery of godliness, which was manifested in the flesh.” Nor are we forced to understand these sayings of the Father alone because it is said that there must be one who shows and another who is shown. The Son also shows Himself, for He says: “He that loves Me shall be loved of My Father: and I will love him, and will manifest Myself to him” (John 14:21.). Accordingly, we also say to Him: “Show us your face, and we shall be saved” (Ps. 79:4).
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| docet. Cum enim maius referatur ad minus, oportet intelligi hoc dici de filio secundum quod est minoratus. Ostendit autem apostolus eum esse minoratum secundum assumptionem formae servilis, ita tamen quod Deo patri aequalis existat secundum formam divinam: dicit enim, ad Philipp. 2-6 cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo, sed semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens. Nec est mirum si ex hoc pater eo maior dicatur, cum etiam ab Angelis eum minoratum apostolus dicat, Hebr. 2-9: eum inquit, qui modico ab Angelis minoratus est, vidimus Iesum, propter passionem mortis, gloria et honore coronatum.
| [4] But how the saying of our Lord, “The Father is greater than I” must be understood we are taught by the Apostle. Since “greater” is referred to ‘lesser,” one must understand that this is said of the Son so far as He is lessened. Now, the Apostle shows that He is lessened by taking on the servile form—in such wise, however, that in the divine form He exists the equal of God the Father, for he says: “Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant” (Phil. 2:6-7). Nor is it wondrous if for this reason the Father be said to be greater than He, since He was even made lesser than the angels; the Apostle says: “We see Jesus, who was made a little lesser than the angels, for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour” (Heb. 2:9).
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| Quod autem dominus dicit, pater maior me est, qualiter sit intelligendum, apostolus Ex quo etiam patet quod secundum eandem rationem dicitur filius esse patri subiectus, scilicet secundum humanam naturam. Quod ex ipsa circumstantia litterae apparet. Praemiserat enim apostolus: per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum; et postea subiunxerat quod unusquisque resurget in suo ordine: primum Christus, deinde ii qui sunt Christi; et postea addit, deinde finis, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et patri; et ostenso quale sit hoc regnum, quia scilicet oportet ei omnia esse subiecta consequenter subiungit: cum subiecta illi fuerint omnia, tunc ipse filius subiectus erit ei qui subiecit sibi omnia. Ipse ergo contextus litterae, ostendit hoc de Christo debere intelligi secundum quod est homo: sic enim mortuus est et resurrexit. Nam secundum divinitatem, cum omnia faciat quae facit pater ut ostensum est, etiam ipse sibi subiecit omnia: unde apostolus dicit ad Philipp. 3-20 salvatorem expectamus dominum Iesum Christum, qui reformabit corpus humilitatis nostrae configuratum corpori claritatis suae, secundum operationem qua possit sibi subiicere omnia.
| From this it is also clear that in the same way the Son is said to be “subject to the Father”; namely, in His human nature. This is to be gathered from the very context of the expression. For the Apostle had already said: “For by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead”; and afterwards he had subjoined: “Everyone shall rise in his own order: the firstfruits Christ, then they that are of Christ”; and later he added: “Afterwards the end, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father”; and when he has shown what sort of kingdom this is, namely, that things must be subject to it, he consequently subjoins: “When all things shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all things under Him” (1 Cor. 15:23-28). The very context of the expression, therefore, shows that this ought to be understood of Christ so far as He is man, for thus did He die and rise again. Now, in His divinity, since “whatever He does the Father does,” as was shown, He Himself also subjects all things to Himself; wherefore the Apostle says: “We look for the Savior, our Lord Jesus Christ, who will reform the body of our lowliness, made like to the body of His glory, according to the operation whereby also He is able to subdue all things unto Himself” (Phil. 3:20-21).
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| Ex eo autem quod pater filio dare dicitur in Scripturis, ex quo sequitur ipsum recipere, non potest ostendi aliqua indigentia esse in ipso, sed hoc requiritur ad hoc quod filius sit: non enim filius dici posset nisi a patre genitus esset; omne autem genitum a generante naturam recipit generantis. Per hoc ergo quod pater filio dare dicitur, nihil aliud intelligitur quam filii generatio, secundum quam pater filio dedit suam naturam. Et hoc ipsum ex eo quod datur, intelligi potest. Dicit, enim dominus, Ioan. 10-29: pater quod dedit mihi, maius omnibus est. Id autem quod maius omnibus est, divina natura est, in qua filius est patri aequalis. Quod ipsa verba domini ostendunt. Praemiserat enim quod oves suas nullus de manu eius rapere posset; ad cuius probationem inducit verbum propositum, scilicet quod id quod est sibi a patre datum, maius omnibus sit, et quia de manu patris, ut subiungit, nemo rapere potest. Ex hoc sequitur quod nec etiam de manu filii. Non autem sequeretur nisi per id quod est sibi a patre datum, esset patri aequalis. Unde, ad hoc clarius explicandum, subdit: ego et pater unum sumus.
| [5] From the fact that the Father is said in the Scriptures “to give!” to the Son—from which it follows that He “receives”—one cannot show any indigence in Him.” But this is required by His being the Son, for He could not be called Son if He were not begotten by the Father. For everything which is generated receives from the generator the nature of the generator. Therefore, by this giving of the Father to the Son is understood nothing but the generation of the Son in which the Father gave the Son His nature. This very thing can be understood from that which is given. For our Lord says: “That which My Father has given Me is greater than all” (John 10:29). But that which is greater than all is the divine nature, in which the Son is equal to the Father. And this our Lord’s very words show, for He had said before that no man should pluck His sheep from His hand (John 10:28-30). For proof of this He introduces the word stated; namely, that which is given to Him by the Father is greater than all, and that “out of the hand of My Father”—as He adds—nothing can be plucked.” From this it follows that neither can it be plucked from the hand of the Son. But this would not follow unless through that which is given to Him by the Father He were equal to the Father. And so, to explain this more clearly, He adds: “I and the Father are one.”
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| Similiter etiam apostolus, ad Philipp. 2-9, dicit: et dedit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen, ut in nomine Iesu omne genu flectatur, caelestium, terrestrium et Infernorum. Nomen autem omnibus nominibus altius, quod omnis creatura veneratur, non est aliud quam nomen divinitatis. Ex hac ergo datione generatio ipsa intelligitur, secundum quam pater filio veram divinitatem dedit. Idem etiam ostenditur ex hoc quod omnia sibi dicit esse data a patre. Non autem essent sibi data omnia, nisi omnis plenitudo divinitatis, quae est in patre, esset in filio.
| Similarly, the Apostle also says that God “has given Him a name which is above all names: that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth” (Phil. 2:9-10). But the name higher than all names which every creature venerates is none other than the name of divinity. By this giving, therefore, the generation itself is understood in which the Father gave the Son true divinity. The same thing is shown by His saying that “all things are delivered to Me by My Father” (Mat. 11:27). But all things would not be given to Him unless “all the fullness of the Godhead” (Col. 2:9) which is in the Father were in the Son.
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| Sic igitur ex hoc quod sibi patrem dedisse asserit, se verum filium confitetur, contra Sabellium. Ex magnitudine vero eius quod datur, patri se confitetur esse aequalem, ut Arius confundatur. Patet igitur quod talis donatio indigentiam in filio non designat. Non enim ante fuit filius quam sibi daretur: cum generatio eius sit ipsa donatio. Neque plenitudo dati hoc patitur, ut indigere possit ille cui constat esse donatum.
| [6] Thus, by asserting that the Father has given to Him He therefore confesses that He is the true Son—against Sabellius. Yet, from the greatness of that which is given He confesses that He is equal to the Father—so Arius is confounded. Clearly, therefore, such gift-giving does not indicate indigence in the Son. He was not the Son before He was given to Himself, since His generation is the very gift-giving. Nor does the fullness of the given allow that He can be in need to whom this gift was clearly made.
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| Nec obviat praedictis quod ex tempore filio pater dedisse legitur in Scripturis: sicut dominus post resurrectionem dicit discipulis, data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra; et apostolus, ad Philipp. 2, dicit quod propter hoc Deus Christum exaltavit et dedit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen, quia factus fuerat obediens usque ad mortem, quasi hoc nomen non habuerit ab aeterno. Est enim consuetus Scripturae modus ut aliqua dicantur esse vel fieri quando innotescunt. Hoc autem quod filius ab aeterno universalem potestatem et nomen divinum acceperit, post resurrectionem, praedicantibus discipulis, mundo est manifestatum. Et hoc etiam verba domini ostendunt. Dicit enim dominus, Ioan. 17-5: clarifica me, pater, apud temetipsum, claritate quam habui priusquam mundus fieret. Petit enim ut sua gloria, quam ab aeterno a patre recepit ut Deus, in eo iam homine facto esse declaretur.
| [7] Nor is this an obstacle to what has been said: that one reads in Scripture that the Father has given to the Son at a point in time; our Lord after the Resurrection, for example, says to the disciples: “All power has been given to Me in heaven and in earth” (Mat. 28:18); and the Apostle speaks of the cause for which God “exalted” Christ and “gave Him a name which is above all names” (Phil. 2:8-9), that is, He had become “obedient unto death,” as though He has not had this name from eternity. For it is usual of Scripture to say that some things are or are made when they begin to be known. Now, the fact that the Son has from eternity received all power and the divine name was made known to the world after the Resurrection by the preaching of the disciples. And this, too, the words of our Lord reveal. For our Lord says: “Glorify Me, O Father, with Thyself, with the glory which I had, before the world was” (John 17:5). For He asks that His glory which eternally He has received from the Father as God be declared to be in Him now made man.
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| Ex hoc autem manifestum est quomodo filius doceatur, cum non sit ignorans. Ostensum est enim in primo libro quod intelligere et esse in Deo idem sunt. Unde communicatio divinae naturae est etiam intelligentiae communicatio. Communicatio autem intelligentiae demonstratio, vel locutio, sive doctrina potest dici. Per hoc ergo quod filius sua nativitate a patre naturam divinam acceperit, dicitur vel a patre audivisse, vel pater ei demonstrasse, vel si quid aliud simile legitur in Scripturis: non quod prius filius ignorans aut nesciens fuerit, et postmodum eum pater docuerit. Confitetur enim apostolus, I ad Cor. 1-24, Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam: non est autem possibile quod sapientia sit ignorans, neque quod virtus infirmetur.
| [8] Now, from this it is manifest how the Son is taught, although He is not ignorant. For it was shown in Book II that in God to understand and to be are identical. Wherefore, communication of the divine nature is also the communication of understanding. Now, the communication of understanding can be called “showing” or “speech” or “teaching.” By reason of the fact, then, that the Son received the divine nature in His birth from the Father, it is said that He has “heard something from the Father,” or that the Father “has shown Him something,” or one reads something else like this in the Scriptures; but not that first the Son was ignorant or did not know and afterward the Father taught Him. For the Apostle confesses: “Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor. 1:24). Now, it is not possible that wisdom be ignorant, nor that power be feeble.
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| Ideo etiam quod dicitur, non potest filius a se facere quicquam, nullam infirmitatem agendi demonstrat in filio: sed quia, cum Deo non sit aliud agere quam esse, nec sua actio sit aliud quam sua essentia ut supra probatum est, ita dicitur quod filius non possit a se agere sed agat a patre, sicut quod non potest a se esse, sed solum a patre: si enim a se esset, iam filius non esset. Sicut ergo filius non potest non esse filius, ita a se agere non potest. Quia vero eandem naturam accipit filius quam pater, et ex consequenti eandem virtutem, licet filius a se non sit nec a se operetur, tamen per se est et per se operatur: quia sicut est per propriam naturam, quam accepit a patre, ita per propriam naturam, a patre acceptam, operatur. Unde postquam dominus dixerat, non potest filius a se facere quicquam, ut ostenderet quod, licet non a se, tamen per se filius operatur, subiungit: quaecumque ille fecerit, scilicet pater, haec et filius similiter facit.
| [9] The saying also, then, “the Son cannot do anything of Himself,’” does not point to any Weakness of action in the Son. But, because for God to act is not other than to be, and His action is not other than His essence, as was proved above, so one says that the Son cannot act from Himself but only from the Father, just as He is not able to be from Himself but only from the Father. For, if He were from Himself, He would no longer be the Son. Therefore, just as the Son cannot not be the Son, so neither can He act of Himself. However, because the Son receives the same nature as the Father and, consequently, the same power, although the Son neither is of Himself nor operates of Himself, He nevertheless is through Himself and operates through Himself, since just as He is through His own nature received from the Father, so He operates through His own nature received from the Father. Hence, after our Lord had said: “the Son cannot do anything of Himself,” to show that, although the Son does not operate of Himself, He does operate through Himself, He adds: “Whatever He does”—namely, the Father—“these the Son does likewise.”
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| Ex praemissis etiam apparet qualiter pater praecipiat filio; aut filius obediat patri; aut patrem oret; aut mittatur a patre. Haec enim omnia filio conveniunt secundum quod est patri subiectus, quod non est nisi secundum humanitatem assumptam, ut ostensum est. Pater ergo filio praecipit ut subiecto sibi secundum humanam naturam. Et hoc etiam verba domini manifestant. Nam cum dominus dicat: ut cognoscat mundus quia diligo patrem, et sicut mandatum dedit mihi pater, sic facio, quod sit istud mandatum ostenditur per id quod subditur, surgite, eamus hinc: hoc enim dixit ad passionem accedens, mandatum autem patiendi manifestum est filio non competere nisi secundum humanam naturam. Similiter, ubi ait, si praecepta mea servaveritis, manebitis in dilectione mea: sicut et ego praecepta patris mei servavi, et maneo in eius dilectione, manifestum est haec praecepta ad filium pertinere prout a patre diligebatur ut homo, sicut ipse discipulos ut homines diligebat.
| [10] From the foregoing it also is clear how “the Father commands the Son” or “the Son obeys the Father” or “the Son prays to the Father” or “is sent by the Father.” For, all these things are suitable to the Son inasmuch as He is subject to the Father. And this is only according to the humanity He has assumed, as was shown. The Father, therefore, commands the Son as subject to Him in His human nature. The very words of our Lord make this clear. For, when our Lord says “that the world may know that I love the Father: and as the Father has given Me commandment, so do I,” (John 24:31), what the commandment is is shown by what is added: “Arise, let us go hence.” He said this approaching His passion. But the commandment to suffer clearly pertains to the Son only in His human nature. In the same way, where He says: “If you keep My commandments, you shall abide in My love; as I also have kept My Father’s commandments, and do abide in His love,” (John 15:10), these precepts clearly pertain to the Son as He is loved by the Father as man; just as He loved His disciples as men.
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| Et quod praecepta patris ad filium accipienda sint secundum humanam naturam a filio assumptam, apostolus ostendit, dicens filium obedientem patri fuisse in his quae pertinent ad humanam naturam: dicit enim, ad Philipp. 2-8: factus est obediens patri usque ad mortem. Ostendit etiam apostolus quod orare filio conveniat secundum humanam naturam. Dicit enim, ad Hebr. 5-7, quod in diebus carnis suae preces supplicationesque ad eum qui possit eum salvum a morte facere, cum clamore valido et lacrimis offerens, exauditus est pro sua reverentia. Secundum quid etiam missus a patre dicatur, apostolus ostendit, ad Gal. 4-4, dicens: misit Deus filium suum factum ex muliere. Eo ergo dicitur missus quo est factus ex muliere: quod quidem secundum carnem assumptam certum est sibi convenire. Patet igitur quod per haec omnia non potest ostendi filius patri esse subiectus nisi secundum humanam naturam. Sed tamen sciendum est quod filius mitti a patre dicitur etiam invisibiliter inquantum Deus, sine praeiudicio aequalitatis quam habet ad patrem: ut infra ostendetur, cum agetur de missione spiritus sancti.
| That the Father’s commandments to the Son must be understood as pertaining to the human nature assumed by the Son is shown by the Apostle. He calls the Son obedient to the Father in the things which belong to His human nature, for he says: “He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross” (Phil. 2:8). The Apostle also shows that praying belongs to the Son in His human nature, for he says: “Who in the days of His flesh, with a strong cry and tears, offering up prayers and supplications to Him that was able to save Him from death, was heard for His reverence” (Heb. 5:7). The way in which He “was sent” by the Father is also shown by the Apostle. “God sent His Son, made of a woman” (Gal. 4:4). He is, therefore, said to be sent in that He was made of a woman, and certainly this belongs to Him in the flesh He has assumed. Clearly, then, in none of these can it be shown that the Son is subject to the Father except in His human nature. For all that, one should recognize that the Son is said to be sent by the Father invisibly and as divine, without prejudice to His equality to the Father, as will he shown below when we deal with the sending of the Holy Spirit.
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| Similiter etiam patet quod per hoc quod filius a patre clarificatur; vel suscitatur; vel exaltatur, non potest ostendi quod filius sit minor patre, nisi secundum humanam naturam. Non enim filius clarificatione indiget quasi de novo claritatem accipiens, cum eam profiteatur se ante mundum habuisse: sed oportebat quod sua claritas, quae sub infirmitate carnis erat occultata, per carnis glorificationem et miraculorum operationem manifestaretur in fide credentium populorum. Unde de eius occultatione dicitur Isaiae 53-3: vere absconditus est vultus eius. Unde nec reputavimus eum. Similiter autem secundum hoc Christus suscitatus est quod est passus et mortuus, idest secundum carnem. Dicitur enim I Petr. 4-1: Christo passo in carne, et vos eadem cogitatione armamini. Exaltari etiam eum oportuit secundum hoc quod fuit humiliatus. Nam et apostolus dicit, Philipp. 2-8: humiliavit semetipsum factus obediens usque ad mortem, propter quod Deus exaltavit illum.
| [11] It is clear, and in the same way, that from the fact that “the Son is glorified by the Father” or “raised up” or “exalted” one cannot show that the Son is less than the Father except in His human nature. For, the Son needs no glory as one who receives new glory, since He professes that He had it “before the world was” (John 17:5). But His glory, hidden under the weakness of the flesh, necessarily had to be manifested by the glorification of the flesh, and the working of miracles, in the faith of peoples believing. Hence, of His glory being hidden, Isaiah (53:3) says: “His look was as it were hidden and despised, whereupon we esteemed him not.” And the way in which Christ was raised up is like the way He s ere and died, that is, in the flesh. For it says in 1 Peter (4:1): “Christ having suffered in the flesh, be you also armed with the same thought.” To be exalted also became Him in the way in which He was humiliated, for the Apostle says: “He humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death.... For which cause God also has exalted Him” (Phil. 2:8-9).
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| Sic ergo per hoc quod pater clarificat filium, suscitat et exaltat, filius non ostenditur minor patre, nisi secundum humanam naturam. Nam secundum divinam naturam, qua est patri aequalis, est eadem virtus patris et filii, et eadem operatio. Unde et ipse filius propria virtute se exaltat: secundum illud Psalmi: exaltare, domine, in virtute tua. Ipse seipsum suscitat: quia de se dicit, Ioan. 10-18: potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam, et iterum sumere eam. Ipse etiam non solum seipsum clarificat, sed etiam patrem: dicit enim Ioan. 17-1: clarifica filium tuum, ut et filius tuus clarificet te; non quod pater velamine carnis assumptae sit occultatus, sed suae invisibilitate naturae. Quo etiam modo filius est occultus secundum divinam naturam: nam patri et filio commune est quod dicitur Isaiae 45-15: vere tu es Deus absconditus, sanctus Israel, salvator. Filius autem patrem clarificat, non claritatem ei dando, sed eum mundo manifestando: nam et ipse ibidem dicit: manifestavi nomen tuum hominibus.
| [12] Thus, then, the fact that the Father glorifies, raises up, and exalts the Son does not show that the Son is less than the Father, except in His human nature. For, in the divine nature by which He is equal to the Father, the power of the Father and the Son is the same and their operation is the same. Hence, the Son Himself exalts Himself by His own power, as the Psalmist says: “Be Thou. exalted, O Lord, in your own strength” (Ps. 70:14). He Himself raises Himself up, because He says of Himself: “I have power to lay down My life, and I have power to take it up again!” (John 10:18). He also glorifies not Himself alone, but the Father as well, for in John (17:1) He says: “Glorify your Son, that your Son may glorify You.” This is not because the Father is hidden by the veil of flesh He has assumed, but by the invisibility of His nature. In this way the Son also is hidden according to the divine nature, for common to both Father and Son is the saying of Isaiah (45:35): “Verily You are a bidden God, the God of Israel, the savior.” The Son, of course, glorifies the Father, not by giving Him glory, but by manifesting Him to the world; for He Himself says in the same place: “I have manifested your name to men” (John 17:6).
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| Non est autem credendum quod in Dei filio sit aliquis potestatis defectus: cum ipse dicat: data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra. Unde quod ipse dicit: sedere ad dexteram meam vel sinistram non est meum dare vobis, sed quibus paratum est a patre meo, non ostendit quod filius distribuendarum caelestium sedium potestatem non habeat: cum per huiusmodi sessionem participatio vitae aeternae intelligatur, cuius collationem ad se pertinere ostendit cum dicit, Ioan. 10-27 oves meae vocem meam audiunt, et ego cognosco eas, et sequuntur me, et ego vitam aeternam do eis. Dicitur etiam Ioan. 5-22, quod pater omne iudicium dedit filio; ad iudicium autem pertinet ut pro meritis aliqui in caelesti gloria collocentur: unde et Matth. 25-33 dicitur quod filius hominis statuet oves a dextris et haedos a sinistris. Pertinet ergo ad potestatem filii statuere aliquem vel a dextris vel a sinistris: sive utrumque referatur ad differentem gloriae participationem; sive unum referatur ad gloriam, et alterum referatur ad poenam. Oportet igitur ut verbi propositi sensus ex praemissis sumatur. Praemittitur namque quod mater filiorum Zebedaei accesserat ad Iesum petens ut unus filiorum eius sederet ad dextram et alius ad sinistram: et ad hoc petendum mota videbatur ex quadam fiducia propinquitatis carnalis quam habebat ad hominem Christum. Dominus ergo sua responsione non dixit quod ad eius potestatem non pertineret dare quod petebatur, sed quod ad eum non pertinebat illis dare pro quibus rogabatur. Non enim dixit, sedere ad dextram meam vel sinistram non est meum dare alicui: quin potius ostendit quod suum erat hoc dare illis quibus erat paratum a patre suo. Non enim hoc dare ad eum pertinebat secundum quod erat filius virginis, sed secundum quod erat filius Dei. Et ideo non erat suum hoc dare aliquibus propter hoc quod ad eum pertinebant secundum quod erat filius virginis, scilicet secundum propinquitatem carnalem: sed propter hoc quod pertinebant ad eum secundum quod erat filius Dei, quibus scilicet paratum erat a patre per praedestinationem aeternam. Sed quod etiam haec praeparatio ad potestatem filii pertineat, ipse dominus confitetur dicens, Ioan. 14-2: in domo patris mei mansiones multae sunt. Si quo minus, dixissem vobis: quia vado parare vobis locum. Mansiones autem multae sunt diversi gradus participandae beatitudinis, qui ab aeterno a Deo in praedestinatione praeparati sunt. Cum ergo dominus dicit, quod si in aliquo minus esset, idest, si deficerent praeparatae mansiones hominibus ad beatitudinem introducendis; et subdit, dixissem, quia vado parare vobis locum; ostendit huiusmodi praeparationem ad suam potestatem pertinere.
| [13] One must not, however, believe that in the Son of God there is any failure of power, since He Himself says: “All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth” (Mat. 28:18). Hence, His own saying, “To sit on My right or left hand is not Mine to give to you, but to those for whom it is prepared by My Father” (cf. Mat. 20:23), does not show that the Son lacks the power of distribution over the seats of heaven, since by seating of this kind one understands participation in eternal life, and that its bestowal belongs to Him He shows when He says: “My sheep hear My voice: and I know them, and they follow Me. And I give them life everlasting” (John 10: 27). One reads also: “The Father has given all judgment to the Son” (John 5:22); and it does belong to judgment that some are to be established in heavenly glory according to their merits. Hence, we read that the Son of Man “shall set the sheep on His right hand, but the goats on His left” (Mat. 25:33). It does, then, belong to the Son’s power to set someone on His. right hand or His left. This is true if each of these acts refers to differing participation in glory, or if the one refers to glory and the other to punishment. Therefore, one must take the meaning of the sentence proposed (Mat. 20: 23) from what went before it Now, this is what went before it (Mat. 20:20-21): The mother of the sons of Zebedee had approached Jesus to ask Him that one of her sons should sit at His right hand and the other at His left. She seems to have been stimulated to this request by a certain confidence in her close blood relationship to the man, Christ. Our Lord, then, in His answer did not say that it did not belong to His power to give what was asked, but that it did not belong to Him to give it to those for whom it was asked. For He did not say: “To sit on My right hand or My left is not Mine to give anyone.” Indeed, He shows rather that it is His to give to “those for whom it is prepared” by His Father. For to give this was not proper to Him as the Son of the Virgin, but as the Son of God. Accordingly, this favor was not His to give to some just because they belonged to Him in so far as He was the Virgin’s Son, that is, in close blood relationship. It was His to give to those who belonged to Him as the Son of God; namely, to those for whom it had been prepared by the Father through eternal predestination. But, that this very preparation is included in the power of the Son, our Lord Himself indicates, saying: “In My Father’s house there are many mansions. If not, I would have told you: because I go to prepare a place for you” (John 14:2). The many mansions are the different grades of participation in beatitude, which in predestination God has eternally prepared. When, therefore, our Lord says: “If not,” that is, if there were a deficiency of mansions prepared for the men who are to enter into beatitude, and adds: “I would have told you: because I go to prepare a place for you,” He is showing that preparation of this sort belongs to His power.
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| Neque etiam potest intelligi quod filius horam adventus sui ignoret: cum in eo sint omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi, ut apostolus dicit; et cum id quod maius est perfecte cognoscat, scilicet patrem. Sed hoc intelligendum est quia filius, inter homines homo constitutus, ad modum ignorantis se habuit, dum discipulis non revelavit. Est enim consuetus modus loquendi in Scripturis ut Deus dicatur aliquid cognoscere si illud cognoscere facit: sicut habetur Gen. 22-12: nunc cognovi quod timeas dominum idest, nunc cognoscere feci. Et sic, per oppositum, filius nescire dicitur quod non facit nos scire.
| [14] Nor, again, can it be understood that the Son is ignorant of the hour of His coming, since in Him “are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” (Col. 7:3), as the Apostle says, and since He knows perfectly that which is greater; namely, the Father (Mat. 11:27). But one must understand here that the Son, set as a man among men, considered Himself as ignoring something so long as He did not reveal it to His disciples. For it is usual in Scripture to say that God knows something if He makes someone know it; so we find in Genesis (22:12): “Now I know that you fear God,” that is, “now I have made men begin to know it.” Thus, conversely, the Son is said not to know that which He does not make us know.
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| Tristitia vero et timor, et alia huiusmodi, manifestum est ad Christum pertinere secundum quod homo. Unde per hoc nulla minoratio potest in divinitate filii deprehendi.
| [15] Sorrow, of course, and fear, and other things of this sort manifestly belong to Christ so far as He is man. Hence, one cannot apprehend in this fact any lessening of the divinity of the Son.
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| Quod autem dicitur sapientia esse creata primo quidem, potest intelligi, non de sapientia quae est filius Dei, sed de sapientia quam Deus indidit creaturis. Dicitur enim Eccli. 1-9 ipse creavit eam, scilicet sapientiam, spiritu sancto, et effudit illam super omnia opera sua. Potest etiam referri ad naturam creatam assumptam a filio: ut sit sensus, ab initio et ante saecula creata sum, idest, praevisa sum creaturae uniri. Vel, per hoc quod sapientia et creata et genita nuncupatur, modus divinae generationis nobis insinuatur. In generatione enim quod generatur accipit naturam generantis, quod perfectionis est: sed in generationibus quae sunt apud nos, generans ipse mutatur, quod imperfectionis est. In creatione vero creans non mutatur, sed creatum non recipit naturam creantis. Dicitur ergo simul filius creatus et genitus, ut ex creatione accipiatur immutabilitas patris, et ex generatione unitas naturae in patre et filio. Et sic huiusmodi Scripturae intellectum synodus exposuit: ut per Hilarium patet.
| [16] Consider, now, the saying that wisdom “is created.” First of all, one can understand it not of the Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of the wisdom which God bestowed on creatures. For one reads in Sirach (1:9-10): “He created her,” namely, wisdom, “in the Holy Spirit.... and He poured her out upon all His works.” One can also refer this to the created nature assumed by the Son. Then the meaning is: “From the beginning, and before the world, was I created” (Sirach 24:14); that is, “I was foreseen in union with a creature.” Or it may be that Wisdom is named (cf. Prov. 8:24-25), since both “created” and “begotten” suggest to us the mode of divine generation. For in generation the begotten receives the nature of him who begets, and this is a mark of perfection. But, in the generations which take place among us, he who begets is himself changed, and this is a mark of imperfection. In creation, on the other hand, the creator is not changed, but the created does not receive the nature of the creator. Therefore, the Son is called “created” and “begotten” at the very same time, that from creation one may gather the immutability of the Father, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. It was thus that the Synod expounded the meaning of this sort of Scriptural expression. Hilary makes this clear [De synodis, 17-18].
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| Quod vero filius dicitur primogenitus creaturae, non ex hoc est quod filius sit in ordine creaturarum: sed quia filius est a patre et a patre accipit, a quo sunt et accipiunt creaturae. Sed filius accipit a patre eandem naturam: non autem creaturae. Unde et filius non solum primogenitus dicitur, sed etiam unigenitus, propter singularem modum accipiendi.
| [17] However, that the Son is called the “first-born of every creature” is not because the Son is in the order of creatures, but because the Son both is from the Father and receives from the Father, from whom creatures both are and receive. But the Son receives from the Father the very same nature; creatures do not. Hence, the Son is not called merely “first begotten,” but “only-begotten” as well (John 1:18), by reason of His unique manner of receiving from the Father.
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| Per hoc autem quod dominus ad patrem dicit de discipulis, ut sint unum sicut et nos unum sumus, ostenditur quidem quod pater et filius sunt unum eo modo quo discipulos unum esse oportet, scilicet per amorem: hic tamen unionis modus non excludit essentiae unitatem, sed magis eam demonstrat. Dicitur enim Ioan. 3-35: pater diligit filium, et omnia dedit in manu eius: per quod plenitudo divinitatis ostenditur esse in filio, ut dictum est.
| [18] Now, our Lord says to the Father about the disciples: “that they may be one, as We also are one” (John 17:22). This only shows that the Father and Son are one in the way in which the disciples should be one, namely, through love. Nevertheless, this mode of union does not exclude unity of essence; rather, it points to it, for John (3:35) says. “The Father loves the Son: and He has given all things into His hand.” By this is the fullness of divinity shown to be in the Son, as was said.
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| Sic igitur patet quod testimonia Scripturarum quae Ariani pro se assumebant, non repugnant veritati quam fides Catholica confitetur.
| [19] Thus, then, it is clear that the testimonies of the Scriptures which the Arians were taking for themselves are not hostile to the truth which the Catholic faith maintains.
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Caput 10
Rationes contra generationem et processionem divinam
| Chapter 10
ARGUMENTS AGAINST DIVINE GENERATION AND PROCESSION
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| Omnibus igitur diligenter consideratis, manifeste apparet hoc nobis de generatione divina in sacris Scripturis proponi credendum, quod pater et filius, etsi personis distinguantur, sunt tamen unus Deus, et unam habent essentiam seu naturam. Quia vero a creaturarum natura hoc invenitur valde remotum, ut aliqua duo supposito distinguantur et tamen eorum sit una essentia; humana ratio ex creaturarum proprietatibus procedens, multipliciter in hoc secreto divinae generationis patitur difficultatem.
| [1] When all things are carefully considered, it is clear and manifest that sacred Scripture proposes this for belief about the divine generation: that the Father and Son, although distinguished as persons, are nevertheless one God and have one essence or nature. But one finds this far removed from the nature of creatures: that any two be distinguished in supposit, yet one in their essence; so, human reason, proceeding from the properties of things, experiences difficulties in a great variety of ways in this secret of divine generation.
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| Nam cum generatio nobis nota mutatio quaedam sit, cui opponitur corruptio, difficile videtur in Deo generationem ponere, qui est immutabilis, incorruptibilis, et aeternus, ut ex superioribus patet.
| [2.] Since the generation known to us is a certain mutation to which corruption is opposed, it seems hard to put generation in God, who is immutable, incorruptible, and eternal, as is clear from the foregoing.
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| Amplius. Si generatio mutatio est, oportet omne quod generatur, mutabile esse. Quod autem mutatur, exit de potentia in actum: nam motus est actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi. Si igitur filius Dei est genitus, videtur quod neque aeternus sit, tanquam de potentia in actum exiens; neque verus Deus, ex quo non est actus purus, sed aliquid potentialitatis habens.
| [3] If generation, moreover, is a change, whatever is generated must be changeable. But what is changed goes from potency to act, for “change is the act of the potential as such.” If, therefore, the Son of God is begotten, He is not eternal, it seems, as one going from potency to act; nor is He true God, since He is not pure act, but something which has potentiality.
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| Adhuc. Genitum naturam accipit a generante. Si ergo filius genitus est a Deo patre, oportet quod naturam quam habet, a patre acceperit. Non est autem possibile quod acceperit a patre aliam naturam numero quam pater habet et similem specie, sicut fit in generationibus univocis, ut cum homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem: supra enim ostensum est quod impossibile est esse plures numero deitates. Videtur etiam esse impossibile quod receperit eandem naturam numero quam pater habet. Quia si recipit partem eius, sequitur divinam naturam esse divisibilem; si autem totam, videtur sequi quod natura divina, si sit tota transfusa in filium, desinat esse in patre; et sic pater generando corrumpitur. Neque iterum potest dici quod natura divina per quandam exuberantiam effluat a patre in filium, sicut aqua fontis effluit in rivum et fons non evacuatur: quia natura divina, sicut non potest dividi, ita nec augeri. Videtur ergo reliquum esse quod filius naturam a patre acceperit, non eandem numero nec specie quam pater habet, sed omnino alterius generis: sicut accidit in generatione aequivoca, ut, cum animalia ex putrefactione nata virtute solis generantur, ad huius speciem non attingunt. Sequitur ergo quod Dei filius neque verus filius sit, cum non habeat speciem patris: neque verus Deus, cum non recipiat divinam naturam.
| [4] The begotten, furthermore, receives its nature from the generator. If, then, the Son is begotten by the Father, it follows that He has received the nature which He has from the Father. But it is not possible that He has received from the Father a nature numerically other than the Father has, but the same in species, as happens in univocal generations, when man generates man, or fire, fire. For we showed above the impossibility of a numerical plurality of deities. It seems equally impossible that He has received nature numerically the same as the Father has. For, if He receives a part of it, it follows that the divine nature is divisible; but, if the whole is transfused into the Son, it ceases to be in the Father; and so, in generation, the Father is corrupted. Nor, again, can it be said that by a kind of exuberance the divine nature flows from the Father to the Son, as the water of a spring flows into a stream and the spring is not emptied, for the divine nature cannot be divided, just as it cannot be increased. It seems, therefore, to remain that the Son has received from the Father a nature which is neither in number nor in species the same as the Father’s, but of another genus altogether. This is what happens in equivocal generation when animals born of putrefaction are generated by the power of the sun, but do not belong to its species. It follows, then, that the Son of God is neither a true Son, since the Father’s species is not His; nor true God, since He does not receive the divine nature.
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| Item. Si filius recipit naturam a Deo patre, oportet quod in eo aliud sit recipiens, et aliud natura recepta: nihil enim recipit seipsum. Filius igitur non est sua essentia vel natura. Non est igitur verus Deus.
| [5] If the Son, again, receives a nature from God the Father, the recipient in Him must be other than the nature received, for nothing receives itself. The Son, then, is not His own essence or nature. Therefore, He is not true God.
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| Praeterea. Si filius non est aliud quam essentia divina; cum essentia divina sit subsistens, ut in primo probatum est; constat autem quod etiam pater est ipsa essentia divina: videtur relinqui quod pater et filius conveniant in eadem re subsistente. Res autem subsistens in intellectualibus naturis vocatur persona. Sequitur igitur, si filius est ipsa divina essentia, quod pater et filius conveniant in persona. Si autem filius non est ipsa divina essentia, non est verus Deus: hoc enim de Deo probatum est in primo libro. Videtur igitur quod vel filius non sit verus Deus, ut dicebat Arius: vel non sit alius personaliter a patre, ut Sabellius asserebat.
| [6] Moreover, let the Son be not other than the divine essence; let the divine essence be something subsistent, as was proved in Book I; clearly, the Father, also, is the divine essence. The conclusion appears to be that the Father and Son coincide in the very same subsisting thing. Now, “the subsistent thing in intellectual natures is called a person.” It follows, then, that if the Son is Himself the divine essence the Father and the Son coincide in person. But if the Son is not the very divine essence He is not true God. For we proved this about God in Book I. It seems, therefore, either that the Son was not true God, as Arius used to say, or that personally He is not other than the Father, as Sabellius asserted.
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| Adhuc. Illud quod est principium individuationis in unoquoque, impossibile est inesse alteri quod supposito distinguatur ab eo: quod enim in multis est, non est individuationis principium. Ista autem essentia Dei est per quam Deus individuatur: non enim essentia Dei est forma in materia, ut per materiam individuari posset. Non est igitur aliud in Deo patre per quod individuetur, quam sua essentia. Eius igitur essentia in nullo alio supposito esse potest. Aut igitur non est in filio: et sic filius non est verus Deus, secundum Arium. Aut filius non est alius supposito a patre: et sic est eadem persona utriusque, secundum Sabellium.
| [7] Furthermore, that in a thing which is the principle of its individuation cannot possibly be in a second thing distinguished as a supposit from the first. For what is in many is not a principle of individuation. But the essence of God is that by which God is individuated, for the essence of God is not a form in matter so that God could be individuated by matter. There is, therefore, nothing in God the Father by which He might be individuated except His essence. Therefore, His essence cannot be in any other supposit. His essence, therefore, is not in the Son, and so the Son is not true God, following Arius; or the Son is not other in supposit than the Father, and so the Person of each is the same, following Sabellius.
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| Amplius. Si pater et filius sunt duo supposita, sive duae personae, et tamen sunt in essentia unum, oportet in eis esse aliquid praeter essentiam per quod distinguantur: nam essentia communis utrique ponitur; quod autem commune est, non potest esse distinctionis principium. Oportet igitur id quo distinguuntur pater et filius, esse aliud ab essentia divina. Est ergo persona filii composita ex duobus, et similiter persona patris: scilicet ex essentia communi, et ex principio distinguente. Uterque igitur est compositus. Neuter ergo est verus Deus.
| [8] Again, if the Father and Son are two supposits or two Persons, yet are one in essence, there must be in them something other than the essence by which they are distinguished, for a common essence is ascribed to each and what is common cannot be a distinguishing principle. Therefore, that which distinguishes the Father from the Son must be other than the divine essence. The Person of the Son, then, is a composite of two, and so is the Person of the Father a composite of two: the common essence and the distinguishing principle. Therefore, each of the two is a composite and neither of the two is true God.
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| Si quis autem dicat quod distinguuntur sola relatione, prout unus est pater et alius filius; quae autem relative praedicantur, non aliquid videntur praedicare in eo de quo dicuntur, sed magis ad aliquid; et sic per hoc compositio non inducitur:- videtur quod haec responsio non sit sufficiens ad praedicta inconvenientia vitanda.
| [9] But one may say that they are distinguished by a relation only, inasmuch as one is the Father, the other the Son. What is predicated relatively, however, seems not to predicate a something in that of which it is said, but rather a to something. Thus, by such predication no composition is brought in. But this answer appears not adequate for avoiding the awkward results just mentioned.
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| Nam relatio non potest esse absque aliquo absoluto: in quolibet enim relativo oportet intelligi quod ad se dicitur, praeter id quod ad aliud dicitur; sicut servus aliquid est absolute, praeter id quod ad dominum dicitur. Relatio igitur illa per quam pater et filius distinguuntur, oportet quod habeat aliquod absolutum in quo fundetur. Aut igitur illud absolutum est unum tantum: aut sunt duo absoluta. Si est unum tantum, in eo non potest fundari duplex relatio: nisi forte sit relatio identitatis, quae distinctionem operari non potest, sicut dicitur idem eidem idem. Si ergo sit talis relatio quae distinctionem requirat, oportet quod praeintelligatur absolutorum distinctio. Non ergo videtur possibile quod personae patris et filii solis relationibus distinguantur.
| [10] For there can be no relation without something absolute. In whatever is relative there must be understood that which is said of itself (ad se) and, additionally, that which is said referring to another (ad aliud). Thus is something said absolutely of “servant” and, additionally, something is said referring “to the master.” Therefore, that relation by which the Father and the Son are distinguished must have something absolute on which it is founded. Now, then, either that absolute is one only, or there are two absolutes. If it is one only, a twofold relation cannot be founded upon it, unless, of course, it be a relation of identity which can produce no distinction—as when one says that the same is the same as the same. Therefore, if the relation be such that it calls for a distinction, there must be a prior understanding of a distinction of absolutes. Accordingly, it does not seem possible that the Persons of the Father and the Son are distinguished by relations only.
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| Praeterea. Oportet dicere quod relatio illa quae filium distinguit a patre, aut sit res aliqua: aut sit in solo intellectu. Si autem sit res aliqua; non autem videtur esse illa res quae est divina essentia, quia divina essentia communis est patri et filio; erit ergo in filio aliqua res quae non est eius essentia. Et sic non est verus Deus: ostensum est enim in primo quod nihil est in Deo quod non sit sua essentia. Si autem illa relatio sit in intellectu tantum, non ergo potest personaliter distinguere filium a patre: quae enim personaliter distinguuntur, realiter oportet distingui.
| [11] One ought, along the same line, to say that the relation which distinguishes the Son from the Father either is a thing or is in the intellect alone. Let it, then, be a thing, and it seems not to be that thing which is the divine essence, since the divine essence is common to the Father and the Son. Therefore, in the Son there will be something which is not His essence. Thus, He is not true God, for we showed in Book I that there is nothing in God which is not His essence. But let that relation be in the intellect only, and it cannot, then, distinguish the Son from the Father personally, for things which are personally distinguished must be really distinguished.
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| Item. Omne relativum dependet a suo correlativo. Quod autem dependet ab altero, non est verus Deus. Si igitur personae patris et filii relationibus distinguantur, neuter erit verus Deus.
| [12] Again, every relative depends on its correlative. But what depends on another is not true God. If, then, the persons of the Father and the Son are distinguished by relations, neither of them is true God.
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| Adhuc. Si pater est Deus et filius est Deus, oportet quod hoc nomen Deus de patre et filio substantialiter praedicetur: cum divinitas accidens esse non possit. Praedicatum autem substantiale est vere ipsum de quo praedicatur: nam cum dicitur, homo est animal, quod vere homo est, animal est; et similiter, cum dicitur, Socrates est homo, quod vere Socrates est, homo est. Ex quo videtur sequi quod impossibile sit ex parte subiectorum inveniri pluralitatem, cum unitas sit ex parte substantialis praedicati: non enim Socrates et Plato sunt unus homo, licet sint unum in humanitate; neque homo et asinus sunt unum animal, licet sint unum in animali. Si ergo pater et filius sunt duae personae, impossibile videtur quod sint unus Deus.
| [13] If the Father, moreover, is God and the Son is God, this name “God” ought to be predicated substantially of the Father and the Son, since divinity cannot be an accident.” But a substantial predicate is truly that of which it is predicated. For, when one says “Man is animal,” what is truly man is animal; in the same way, when one says “Socrates is man,” what is truly Socrates is man. And from this there seems to follow the impossibility of discovering a plurality on the part of the subjects when there is unity on the part of the substantial predicate: Socrates and Plato are not one man, although they are one in humanity. Nor are man and ass one animal, although they are one in animal. Therefore, if the Father and the Son are two Persons, it seems impossible that they are one God.
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| Amplius. Opposita praedicata pluralitatem ostendunt in eo de quo praedicantur. De Deo autem patre et de Deo filio opposita praedicantur: nam pater est Deus ingenitus et generans, filius autem est Deus genitus. Non igitur videtur esse possibile quod pater et filius sint unus Deus.
| [14] Opposed predicates, furthermore, show a plurality in that of which they are predicated. But opposites are predicated of God the Father and of God the Son. The Father is God unbegotten and generating, but the Son is God begotten. Therefore, it does not seem possible that the Father and Son are one God.
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| Haec igitur et similia sunt ex quibus aliqui, divinorum mysteria propria ratione metiri volentes, divinam generationem impugnare nituntur. Sed quia veritas in seipsa fortis est et nulla impugnatione convellitur, oportet intendere ad ostendendum quod veritas fidei ratione superari non possit.
| [15] These, then, and others like these are the arguments by which some whose will it is to measure divine mysteries by their own reason strive to attack divine generation. But, because truth is strong in itself and is overcome by no attack, it must be our intention to show that the truth of faith cannot he overcome by reason.
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Caput 11
Quomodo accipienda sit generatio in divinis, et quae de filio Dei dicuntur in Scripturis
| Chapter 11
HOW GENERATION IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN DIVINITY, AND WHAT IS SAID OF THE SON OF GOD IN SCRIPTURE
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| Principium autem huius intentionis hinc sumere oportet, quod secundum diversitatem naturarum diversus emanationis modus invenitur in rebus: et quanto aliqua natura est altior, tanto id quod ex ea emanat, magis ei est intimum.
| [1] As starting point for this intention, one must take this: Following a diversity of natures, one finds a diverse manner of emanation in things, and, the higher a nature is, the more intimate to the nature is that which flows from it.
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| In rebus enim omnibus inanimata corpora infimum locum tenent: in quibus emanationes aliter esse non possunt nisi per actionem unius eorum in aliquod alterum. Sic enim ex igne generatur ignis, dum ab igne corpus extraneum alteratur, et ad qualitatem et speciem ignis perducitur.
| [2] For, in all things, inanimate bodies have the lowest place. There can be no emanations in these except by the action of some one upon another one. For this is the way in which fire is generated by fire, when an extraneous body is changed by the fire and is brought to the quality and species of fire.
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| Inter animata vero corpora proximum locum tenent plantae, in quibus iam emanatio ex interiori procedit inquantum scilicet humor plantae intraneus in semen convertitur, et illud semen, terrae mandatum, crescit in plantam. Iam ergo hic primus gradus vitae invenitur: nam viventia sunt quae seipsa movent ad agendum; illa vero quae non nisi exteriora movere possunt, omnino sunt vita carentia. In plantis vero hoc indicium vitae est, quod id quod in ipsis est, movet ad aliquam formam. Est tamen vita plantarum imperfecta: quia emanatio in eis licet ab interiori procedat, tamen paulatim ab interioribus exiens quod emanat, finaliter omnino extrinsecum invenitur. Humor enim arboris primo ab arbore egrediens fit flos; et tandem fructus ab arboris cortice discretus, sed ei colligatus; perfecto autem fructu, omnino ab arbore separatur, et in terram cadens, sementina virtute producit aliam plantam. Si quis etiam diligenter consideret, primum huius emanationis principium ab exteriori sumitur: nam humor intrinsecus arboris per radices a terra sumitur, de qua planta suscipit nutrimentum.
| [3] Among animate bodies the next place is held by the plants, and in these the emanation does proceed somewhat from what is within: to the extent, namely, that the internal humor of the plant is converted into seed and that the seed committed to the soil grows into a plant. Here, then, one has already found the first grade of life, for living things are those which move themselves to action, but those which can move only things external to them are entirely devoid of life. And in plants this is the mark of life: that which is within, them moves toward some form. The life of plants is nevertheless imperfect; this is because, although the emanation in plants proceeds from what is within, what comes forth little by little in the emanation is, at the end, found to be entirely external. For the humor first emerging from the tree becomes a blossom, and at length a fruit distinct from the tree’s bark, yet still fastened to it. But, when the fruit is perfected, it is separated from the tree altogether; it falls to the ground and its seeding power produces another plant. If one also considers this carefully, he will see that originally this emanation comes from what is external, for the internal humor of the tree is taken through the roots from the soil from which the plant receives nourishment.
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| Ultra plantarum vero vitam, altior gradus vitae invenitur, qui est secundum animam sensitivam: cuius emanatio propria, etsi ab exteriori incipiat, in interiori terminatur; et quanto emanatio magis processerit, tanto magis ad intima devenitur. Sensibile enim exterius formam suam exterioribus sensibus ingerit; a quibus procedit in imaginationem; et ulterius in memoriae thesaurum. In quolibet tamen huius emanationis processu, principium et terminus pertinent ad diversa: non enim aliqua potentia sensitiva in seipsam reflectitur. Est ergo hic gradus vitae tanto altior quam vita plantarum, quanto operatio huius vitae magis in intimis continetur: non tamen est omnino vita perfecta, cum emanatio semper fiat ex uno in alterum.
| [4] Beyond the life of plants one finds a higher grade of life: that of the sensitive soul. Its emanation may have an external beginning, but has an internal termination, and, the more fully the emanation proceeds, the more it reaches what is within. For the exterior sensible impresses its form on the exterior senses; from these it proceeds to the imagination and, further, to the storehouse of the memory. Nevertheless, in each step of this emanation the principle and the term refer to different things; no sensitive power reflects upon itself. This grade of life, then, is higher than the life of plants—higher to the extent that its operation takes place within the principles which are within; it is, nevertheless, not an entirely perfect life, since the emanation is always from some first to some second.
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| Est igitur supremus et perfectus gradus vitae qui est secundum intellectum: nam intellectus in seipsum reflectitur, et seipsum intelligere potest. Sed et in intellectuali vita diversi gradus inveniuntur. Nam intellectus humanus, etsi seipsum cognoscere possit, tamen primum suae cognitionis initium ab extrinseco sumit: quia non est intelligere sine phantasmate, ut ex superioribus patet. Perfectior igitur est intellectualis vita in Angelis, in quibus intellectus ad sui cognitionem non procedit ex aliquo exteriori, sed per se cognoscit seipsum. Nondum tamen ad ultimam perfectionem vita ipsorum pertingit: quia, licet intentio intellecta sit eis omnino intrinseca, non tamen ipsa intentio intellecta est eorum substantia; quia non est idem in eis intelligere et esse, ut ex superioribus patet. Ultima igitur perfectio vitae competit Deo, in quo non est aliud intelligere et aliud esse, ut supra ostensum est, et ita oportet quod intentio intellecta in Deo sit ipsa divina essentia.
| [5] That, then, is the supreme and perfect grade of life which is in the intellect, for the intellect reflects upon itself and the intellect can understand itself. But even in the intellectual life one finds diverse grades. For the human intellect, although it can know itself, does indeed take the first beginning of its knowledge from without, because it cannot understand without a phantasm, as is clear from the things said before. There is, therefore, a more perfect intellectual life in the angels. In them the intellect does not proceed to self-knowledge from anything exterior, but knows itself through itself. Nonetheless, it is not the ultimate perfection to which their life belongs. The reason is this: Although the intention understood is entirely intrinsic to them, the very intention understood is not their substance, for in them understanding is not identified with being (as is clear from the foregoing). Therefore, the ultimate perfection of life belongs to God, in whom understanding is not other than being, as has been shown; accordingly, the intention understood in God must be the divine essence itself.
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| Dico autem intentionem intellectam id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta. Quae quidem in nobis neque est ipsa res quae intelligitur; neque est ipsa substantia intellectus; sed est quaedam similitudo concepta in intellectu de re intellecta, quam voces exteriores significant; unde et ipsa intentio verbum interius nominatur, quod est exteriori verbo significatum. Et quidem quod praedicta intentio non sit in nobis res intellecta, inde apparet quod aliud est intelligere rem, et aliud est intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam, quod intellectus facit dum super suum opus reflectitur: unde et aliae scientiae sunt de rebus, et aliae de intentionibus intellectis. Quod autem intentio intellecta non sit ipse intellectus in nobis, ex hoc patet quod esse intentionis intellectae in ipso intelligi consistit: non autem esse intellectus nostri, cuius esse non est suum intelligere.
| [6] Now, I mean by the “intention understood” what the intellect conceives in itself of the thing understood. To be sure, in us this is neither the thing which is understood nor is it the very substance of the intellect. But it is a certain likeness of the thing understood conceived in the intellect, and which the exterior words signify. So, the intention itself is named the “interior word” which is signified by the exterior word. Indeed, that the intention aforesaid is not within us the thing understood is clear from this: It is one thing to understand a thing, and another to understand the intention itself, yet the intellect does so when it reflects on its own work; accordingly, some sciences are about things, and others are about intentions understood. Now, that the intention understood is not the very intellect within us is clear from this: The act of being of the intention understood consists in its very being understood; the being of our intellect does not so consist; its being is not its act of understanding.
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| Cum ergo in Deo sit idem esse et intelligere, intentio intellecta in ipso est ipse eius intellectus. Et quia intellectus in eo est res intellecta, intelligendo enim se intelligit omnia alia, ut in primo ostensum est; relinquitur quod in Deo intelligente seipsum sit idem intellectus, et res quae intelligitur, et intentio intellecta.
| [7] Since in God, therefore, being and understanding are identical, the intention understood in Him is His very intellect. And because understanding in Him is the thing understood (for by understanding Himself He understands all other things, as was shown in Book I), it follows that in God, because He understands Himself, the intellect, the thing understood, and the intention understood are all identical.
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| His igitur consideratis, utcumque concipere possumus qualiter sit divina generatio accipienda. Patet enim quod non est possibile sic accipi generationem divinam sicut in rebus inanimatis generatio invenitur, in quibus generans imprimit suam speciem in exteriorem materiam. Oportet enim, secundum positionem fidei, quod filius a Deo genitus veram habeat deitatem, et sit verus Deus. Ipsa autem deitas non est forma materiae inhaerens; neque Deus est ex materia existens; ut in primo probatum est. Similiter autem non potest accipi divina generatio ad modum generationis quae in plantis invenitur, et etiam in animalibus, quae communicant cum plantis in nutritiva et generativa virtute. Separatur enim aliquid quod erat in planta vel animali, ad generationem similis in specie, quod in fine generationis est omnino extra generantem. A Deo autem, cum indivisibilis sit, non potest aliquid separari. Ipse etiam filius a Deo genitus non est extra patrem generantem, sed in eo: sicut ex superioribus auctoritatibus patet. Neque etiam potest generatio divina intelligi secundum modum emanationis quae invenitur in anima sensitiva. Non enim Deus ab aliquo exteriori accipit ut in alterum influere possit: non enim esset primum agens. Operationes etiam animae sensitivae non complentur sine corporalibus instrumentis: Deum autem manifestum est incorporeum esse. Relinquitur igitur quod generatio divina secundum intellectualem emanationem sit intelligenda.
| [8] From these considerations, then, we can somehow conceive how divine generation is to be taken. For, it is clearly impossible that divine generation is to be taken as one finds generation in inanimate things wherein the generating thing impresses its species on an exterior matter. For, as the faith sets down, the Son begotten by the Father must have true deity and be true God. But deity is not a form inhering in matter, nor is God a form existing out of matter, as was proved in Book I. In the same way, divine generation cannot be taken in the mode of the generation one finds in plants, and even in animals which have nutritive and generative powers in common with plants. For something which was in the plant or the animal is separated from it for the generation of one like it in species, and this, at the term of generation, is entirely outside the generator. But, since God is indivisible, nothing can be separated from Him. The very Son begotten by the Father is not outside the Father, but in Him (which is clear from the authorities cited above). Neither can one understand divine generation in the manner of emanation found in the sensitive soul. For, God does not receive from something exterior so as to able to influence some second thing, He would not then be the primary agent. Nor are the operations of the sensitive soul completed without bodily instruments. But, God is manifestly incorporeal. We are, therefore, left to understand the divine generation according to an intellectual emanation.
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| Hoc autem sic manifestari oportet. Manifestum est enim ex his quae in primo declarata sunt, quod Deus seipsum intelligit. Omne autem intellectum, inquantum intellectum, oportet esse in intelligente: significat enim ipsum intelligere apprehensionem eius quod intelligitur per intellectum; unde etiam intellectus noster, seipsum intelligens, est in seipso, non solum ut idem sibi per essentiam, sed etiam ut a se apprehensum intelligendo. Oportet igitur quod Deus in seipso sit ut intellectum in intelligente. Intellectum autem in intelligente est intentio intellecta et verbum. Est igitur in Deo intelligente seipsum verbum Dei quasi Deus intellectus: sicut verbum lapidis in intellectu est lapis intellectus. Hinc est quod Ioan. 1-1 dicitur: verbum erat apud Deum.
| [9] This should be made clear in the following way. It is manifest, on the basis of Book I, that God understands Himself. Now, whatever is understood should, as understood, be in him who understands, for the significance of the very act of understanding is this: the grasping of that which is understood by an intellect; hence, even our intellect understanding itself is within itself, not only as identified with itself by its essence, but also as grasped by itself in the act of understanding. God, therefore, must be in Himself as the thing understood in him who understands. But, the thing understood is in him who understands the intention understood and the word. There is, therefore, in God understanding Himself the Word of God, as it were, God understood; so the intellect’s word of the stone is the stone understood. And to this point is the saying in John (1:1) : “The Word was with God.”
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| Quia vero intellectus divinus non exit de potentia in actum, sed semper est actu existens, ut in primo probatum est; ex necessitate oportet quod semper seipsum intellexerit. Ex hoc autem quod se intelligit, oportet quod verbum ipsius in ipso sit, ut ostensum est. Necesse est igitur semper verbum eius in Deo extitisse. Est igitur coaeternum Deo verbum ipsius, nec accedit ei ex tempore, sicut intellectui nostro accedit ex tempore verbum interius conceptum, quod est intentio intellecta. Hinc est quod Ioan. 1-1 dicitur: in principio erat verbum.
| [10] The divine intellect, of course, since it does not pass from potency to act, but is always actually existent (which was proved in Book I), must necessarily have always understood itself. And from its understanding of itself it follows that the Word of that intellect is in it; this has been shown. Therefore, His Word necessarily always existed in God. His Word, then, is co-eternal with God, and is not acquired by Him in time, as our intellect acquires in time its interiorly conceived word which is the intention understood. Hence is the saying in John (1:1): “In the beginning was the Word.”
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| Cum autem intellectus divinus non solum sit semper in actu, sed etiam sit ipse actus purus, ut in primo probatum est; oportet quod substantia intellectus divini sit ipsum suum intelligere, quod est actus intellectus; esse autem verbi interius concepti, sive intentionis intellectae, est ipsum suum intelligi. Idem ergo esse est verbi divini, et intellectus divini; et per consequens ipsius Dei, qui est suus intellectus. Esse autem Dei est eius essentia vel natura, quae idem est quod ipse Deus, ut in primo ostensum est. Verbum igitur Dei est ipsum esse divinum et essentia eius, et ipse verus Deus. Non autem sic est de verbo intellectus humani. Cum enim intellectus noster seipsum intelligit, aliud est esse intellectus, et aliud ipsum eius intelligere: substantia enim intellectus erat in potentia intelligens antequam intelligeret actu. Sequitur ergo quod aliud sit esse intentionis intellectae, et aliud intellectus ipsius: cum intentionis intellectae esse sit ipsum intelligi. Unde oportet quod in homine intelligente seipsum, verbum interius conceptum non sit homo verus, naturale hominis esse habens; sed sit homo intellectus tantum, quasi quaedam similitudo hominis veri ab intellectu apprehensa. Ipsum vero verbum Dei, ex hoc ipso quod est Deus intellectus, est verus Deus, habens naturaliter esse divinum: eo quod non est aliud naturale esse Dei et aliud eius intelligere, ut dictum est. Hinc est quod Ioan. 1-1 dicitur: Deus erat verbum. Quod quia absolute dicitur, demonstrat verbum Dei verum Deum debere intelligi. Verbum enim hominis non posset dici simpliciter et absolute homo, sed secundum quid, scilicet homo intellectus: unde haec falsa esset, homo est verbum; sed haec vera potest esse, homo intellectus est verbum. Cum ergo dicitur, Deus erat verbum, ostenditur verbum divinum non solum esse intentionem intellectam, sicut verbum nostrum; sed etiam rem in natura existentem et subsistentem. Deus enim verus res subsistens est: cum maxime sit per se ens.
| [11] Now, since the divine intellect is not only always in act, but is itself pure act, as we proved in Book I, the substance of the divine intellect must be its very act of understanding, and this is the act of the intellect. But the being of the Word interiorly conceived, or intention understood, is the very act of being understood. Therefore, the being of the divine Word is identical with that of the divine intellect and, consequently, with that of God, who is His own intellect. The being of God, of course, is His essence or nature, which is the same as God Himself, as was shown in Book I. The Word of God, therefore, is the divine being and His essence, and is true God Himself. Of course, such is not the case with the word of the human intellect. For, when our intellect understands itself, the being of the intellect is one being, and that of its act of understanding another, for the substance of the intellect was in potency to understanding before it actually understood. Consequently, the being of the intention understood is one being and that of the intellect itself is another being, since the being of the intention understood is the very being understood. Necessarily, then, in a man understanding himself, the word interiorly conceived is not a true man having the natural being of man, but is only man understood, a kind of likeness, as it were, of the true man which the intellect grasps. But the Word of God, precisely because He is God understood, is true God, having the divine being naturally, because the natural being of God is not one being and that of His understanding another, as was said. This is why it says in John (1:1): “God was the Word.” The fact that this is said absolutely shows that the Word of God must be understood to be true God. For the word of man could not be called “man” simply and absolutely, but relatively: namely, “man understood”; hence, this would be false: “ man is a word”; but this can be true: “man understood is a word.” When, therefore, this is said: “God was the Word,” this is shown: The divine Word is not merely an intention understood, as our word is, but it is also a thing existing and subsisting in nature. For God is a true subsistent thing, since His is substantial being in the highest degree.
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| Non sic autem natura Dei est in verbo ut sit una specie et numero differens. Sic enim verbum habet naturam Dei sicut intelligere Dei est ipsum esse eius, ut dictum est. Intelligere autem est ipsum esse divinum. Verbum igitur habet ipsam essentiam divinam non solum specie, sed numero eandem.
| [12] But the nature of God is not in the Word of God thus: it is one in species and differs in number. The way in which the Word has the nature of God is the way in which God’s act of understanding is His very being, as was said. Now, the act of understanding is the divine being itself. The Word, therefore, has the divine essence itself; has it with an identity not only of species but of number.
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| Item, natura quae est una secundum speciem, non dividitur in plura secundum numerum nisi propter materiam. Divina autem natura omnino immaterialis est. Impossibile est igitur quod natura divina sit una specie et numero differens. Verbum igitur Dei in eadem natura numero communicat cum Deo. Propter quod verbum Dei, et Deus cuius est verbum, non sunt duo dii, sed unus Deus. Nam quod apud nos duo habentes humanam naturam sint duo homines, ex hoc contingit quod natura humana numero dividitur in duobus. Ostensum est autem in primo libro ea quae in creaturis divisa sunt, in Deo simpliciter unum esse: sicut in creatura aliud est essentia et esse; et in quibusdam est etiam aliud quod subsistit in sua essentia, et eius essentia sive natura, nam hic homo non est sua humanitas nec suum esse; sed Deus est sua essentia et suum esse.
| A nature, again, which is one in species, is not divided into a numerical many except by reason of matter. But the divine nature is entirely immaterial. It is, therefore, impossible that the divine nature be specifically one and numerically different. The Word of God, therefore, has a nature in common with God and has it with numerical identity. For this reason the Word of God and the God whose Word He is are not two gods, but one God. For the fact that among us two who have human nature are two men hinges on the fact that human nature is numerically divided in those two. But we showed in Book II that things which are divided in creatures are in God simply one being; thus, in creatures the essence is one thing and the act of being another; and in some creatures even what subsists in the essence is one thing, and its essence or nature another; for this man is neither his humanity nor his act of being. But God is both His essence and His act of being.
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| Et quamvis haec in Deo unum sint verissime, tamen in Deo est quicquid pertinet ad rationem vel subsistentis, vel essentiae, vel ipsius esse: convenit enim ei non esse in aliquo, inquantum est subsistens; esse quid, inquantum est essentia; et esse in actu, ratione ipsius esse. Oportet igitur, cum in Deo sit idem intelligens, et intelligere, et intentio intellecta, quod est verbum ipsius; quod verissime in Deo sit et quod pertinet ad rationem intelligentis; et quod pertinet ad rationem eius quod est intelligere; et quod pertinet ad rationem intentionis intellectae, sive verbi. Est autem de ratione interioris verbi, quod est intentio intellecta, quod procedat ab intelligente secundum suum intelligere, cum sit quasi terminus intellectualis operationis: intellectus enim intelligendo concipit et format intentionem sive rationem intellectam, quae est interius verbum. Oportet igitur quod a Deo secundum ipsum suum intelligere procedat verbum ipsius. Comparatur igitur verbum Dei ad Deum intelligentem, cuius est verbum, sicut ad eum a quo est: hoc enim est de ratione verbi. Cum igitur in Deo intelligens, intelligere, et intentio intellecta, sive verbum, sint per essentiam unum, et per hoc necesse sit quod quodlibet horum sit Deus; remanet tamen sola distinctio relationis, prout verbum refertur ad concipientem ut a quo est. Hinc est quod Evangelista, quia dixerat, Deus erat verbum; ne omnino distinctio sublata intelligeretur verbi a Deo dicente sive concipiente verbum, subiunxit: hoc erat in principio apud Deum: quasi dicat: hoc verbum, quod Deum esse dixi, aliquo modo distinctum est a Deo dicente, ut sic possit dici apud Deum esse.
| [13] And although in God these are most truly one, there is still in God whatever belongs to the notion of a subsistent, or of essence, or of being itself: for it is suitable to Him that He should not be in something, in that He is subsistent; that He be what He is, in that He is essence; and that He be in act, by reason of His act of being. Therefore, since in God the one understanding, the act of understanding, and the intention understood are the same as His own Word, there must most truly be in God that which belongs to the notion of the one understanding, that which belongs to the notion of the act of understanding, and that which belongs to the notion of the intention understood, or word. But in the essence of interior word which is the intention understood there is this: that it proceeds from the one understanding in accord with his act of understanding, since it is, so to say, the intellectual term of the operation. For, in the act of understanding, the intellect conceives and forms the intention or the essence understood, and this is the interior word. From God, therefore, in His very act of understanding must His Word proceed. The Word of God is, therefore, compared to God understanding (whose Word He is) as to Him from whom He is, for this is essential to a word. Therefore, although in God the one understanding, the act of understanding and the intention understood, or Word, are by essence one, and although for this reason each is necessarily God, there remains the distinction of relation alone, in so far as the Word is related to the one who conceives as to Him from whom He is. This is why the Evangelist, seeing that he had said: “God was the Word,” to keep one from understanding that all distinction between the Word and God speaking or conceiving the Word was taken away, added this: “This was in the beginning with God”; as though to say: “This Word, whom I have called God, is in a way distinct from God speaking, and so it can be said that He was with God.”
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| Verbum autem interius conceptum est quaedam ratio et similitudo rei intellectae. Similitudo autem alicuius in altero existens vel habet rationem exemplaris, si se habeat ut principium: vel habet potius rationem imaginis, si se habeat ad id cuius est similitudo sicut ad principium. Utriusque autem exemplum in nostro intellectu perspicitur. Quia enim similitudo artificiati existens in mente artificis est principium operationis per quam artificiatum constituitur, comparatur ad artificiatum ut exemplar ad exemplatum: sed similitudo rei naturalis in nostro intellectu concepta comparatur ad rem cuius similitudo existit ut ad suum principium, quia nostrum intelligere a sensibus principium accipit, qui per res naturales immutantur. Cum autem Deus et seipsum intelligat et alia, ut in primo ostensum est, eius intelligere principium est rerum intellectarum ab ipso, cum ab eo causentur per intellectum et voluntatem: sed ad intelligibile quod est ipse, comparatur ut ad principium; est enim hoc intelligibile idem cum intellectu intelligente, cuius quaedam emanatio est verbum conceptum. Oportet igitur quod verbum Dei comparetur ad res alias intellectas a Deo sicut exemplar; et ad ipsum Deum, cuius est verbum, sicut eius imago. Hinc est quod de verbo Dei dicitur, Coloss. 1-15, quod est imago invisibilis Dei.
| [14] Of course, the word interiorly conceived is a kind of account and likeness of the thing understood. Now, a likeness of one thing existing in another is essentially an exemplar if it stands to the other as principle, or it is essentially an image if it is related to that whose likeness it is as to a principle. Now, in our intellect one sees an example of each of these situations. For, since the likeness of the artefact existing in the mind of the artist is the principle of the operation which constitutes the artefact, the likeness is related to the artefact as an exemplar to that exemplified; but the likeness of a natural thing conceived in our intellect is related to the thing whose likeness it is as to its beginning, for our act of understanding takes its beginning from the senses which are changed by natural things. Since, of course, God understands both Himself and other things, as was shown in Book I, His act of understanding is the principle of things understood by Him, since they are caused by His intellect and will; but His act of understanding is referred to the intelligible which He Himself is as to a beginning, for this intelligible is identified with the intellect understanding, whose emanation, so to say, is the Word conceived. Therefore, the Word of God must be referred to the other things understood by God as exemplar, and must be referred to God Himself whose Word He is as image. Hence, one reads of the Word of God in Colossians (1:15) that He is “the image of the invisible God.”
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| Est autem differentia inter intellectum et sensum: nam sensus apprehendit rem quantum ad exteriora eius accidentia, quae sunt color, sapor, quantitas, et alia huiusmodi; sed intellectus ingreditur ad interiora rei. Et quia omnis cognitio perficitur secundum similitudinem quae est inter cognoscens et cognitum, oportet quod in sensu sit similitudo rei sensibilis quantum ad eius accidentia: in intellectu vero sit similitudo rei intellectae quantum ad eius essentiam. Verbum igitur in intellectu conceptum est imago vel exemplar substantiae rei intellectae. Cum ergo verbum Dei sit imago Dei, ut ostensum est, necesse est quod sit imago Dei quantum ad eius essentiam. Hinc est quod apostolus dicit, Hebr. 1-3, quod est figura substantiae Dei.
| [15] Now, there is a difference between intellect and sense, for sense grasps a thing in its exterior accidents, which are color, taste, quantity and others of this kind, but intellect enters into what is interior to the thing. And, since every knowledge is perfected by the likeness between the knower and the known, there must be in the sense a likeness of the thing in its sensible accidents, but in the intellect there must be a likeness of the thing understood in its essence. Therefore, the word conceived in the intellect is the image or the exemplar of the substance of the thing understood. Since, then, the Word of God is the image of God (as we have shown), it is necessarily the image of God in His essence. Hence, we have what the Apostle says, that He is “the figure of the substance of God” (Heb. 1:3).
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| Imago autem alicuius rei est duplex. Est enim aliqua imago quae non communicat in natura cum eo cuius est imago: sive sit imago eius quantum ad exteriora accidentia, sicut statua aenea est imago hominis, nec tamen est homo; sive sit imago quantum ad substantiam rei; ratio enim hominis in intellectu non est homo, nam, ut philosophus dicit, lapis non est in anima sed species lapidis. Imago autem alicuius rei quae eandem naturam habet cum re cuius est imago, est sicut filius regis, in quo imago patris apparet et est eiusdem naturae cum ipso. Ostensum est autem quod verbum Dei est imago dicentis quantum ad ipsam eius essentiam; et quod in eadem natura cum dicente communicat. Relinquitur igitur quod verbum Dei non solum sit imago, sed etiam filius. Non enim sic esse imaginem alicuius ut eiusdem naturae cum illo sit, in aliquo invenitur qui filius dici non possit, dummodo hoc in viventibus accipiatur: nam quod procedit ex aliquo vivente in similitudinem speciei, dicitur filius eius. Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur: dominus dixit ad me, filius meus es tu.
| [16] However, things have images of two kinds. For there is an image which does not share the nature with that whose image it is: whether it be its image in respect to the exterior accidents (a bronze statue is the image of a man, yet is not, for all that, a man); or if it be an image in respect of the thing’s substance, for the essence of man in the intellect is not a man. The reason, as the Philosopher says, is that “it is not the stone which is present in the soul, but the species of the stone.” But the image of a thing which has the same nature with that whose image it is is like the son of a king: in him the image of his father appears and he is the same in nature as his father. Now, it was shown that the Word of God is the image of the speaker in respect of His very essence and that the Word has the very nature in common with the speaker. The conclusion, therefore, is that the Word of God is not only the image, but also the Son. For so to be one’s image as to be of the same nature with him is not discovered in one who cannot be called a son-so long as we are speaking of living things. For that which proceeds from a living thing in the likeness of species is called son. Hence, we read in a Psalm (2:7): “The Lord bath said to Me: You are My Son.”
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| Rursus considerandum est quod, cum in qualibet natura processio filii a patre sit naturalis, ex quo verbum Dei filius Dei dicitur, oportet quod naturaliter a patre procedat. Et hoc quidem supra dictis convenit: ut ex his quae in intellectu nostro accidunt, perspici potest. Intellectus enim noster aliqua naturaliter cognoscit: sicut prima intelligibilium principia, quorum intelligibiles conceptiones, quae verba interiora dicuntur, naturaliter in ipso existunt et ex eo procedunt. Sunt etiam quaedam intelligibilia quae non naturaliter intellectus noster cognoscit, sed in eorum cognitionem ratiocinando pertingit: et horum conceptiones in intellectu nostro naturaliter non existunt, sed cum studio quaeruntur. Manifestum est autem quod Deus seipsum naturaliter intelligit, sicut et naturaliter est: suum enim intelligere est suum esse, ut in primo probatum est. Verbum igitur Dei seipsum intelligentis naturaliter ab ipso procedit. Et cum verbum Dei sit eiusdem naturae cum Deo dicente, et sit similitudo ipsius; sequitur quod hic naturalis processus sit in similitudinem eius a quo est processio cum identitate naturae. Haec est autem verae generationis ratio in rebus viventibus, quod id quod generatur, a generante procedat ut similitudo ipsius et eiusdem naturae cum ipso. Est ergo verbum Dei genitum vere a Deo dicente: et eius processio generatio vel nativitas dici potest. Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur: ego hodie genui te: idest, in aeternitate, quae semper est praesens, et nulla est in ea ratio praeteriti et futuri. Unde patet falsum esse quod Ariani dixerunt, quod pater genuit filium voluntate. Quae enim voluntate sunt, non naturalia sunt.
| [17] Consideration must, furthermore, be given to this: Since in any nature the procession of the son from the father is natural, from the fact that the Word of God is called the Son of God He must proceed naturally from the Father. This is in agreement with the things said above, as one can perceive from what takes place in our intellect. For our intellect knows some things naturally; thus the first principles of the intelligibles, whose intelligible conceptions—called interior words—naturally exist in the intellect and proceed from it. There are also certain intelligibles which our intellect does not know naturally; rather, it arrives at the knowledge of these by reasoning. The conceptions of these last do not exist in our intellect naturally, but are sought after by study. Manifestly, however, God understands Himself naturally just as He is naturally. For His act of understanding is His being (as was proved in Book I). Therefore, the Word of God understanding Himself naturally proceeds from Him. And, since the Word of God is of the same nature as God speaking and His likeness, this follows: This natural proceeding is unto a likeness of Him from whom He does proceed with identity of nature. But, this is the essential of true generation in living things: that which is generated proceeds from him who generates as his likeness, and as identified with him in nature. Therefore, the Word of God is truly begotten by God speaking the Word; and His proceeding can be called “generation” or “birth.” This is why the Psalmist says: “This day have I begotten You” (Ps. 7:7); that is, in eternity which always is present and in which essentially there is neither past nor future. In this way the falsity of what the Arians maintained is clear, that the Father generated the Son by His will. For things which are by will are not natural things.
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| Considerandum est etiam quod id quod generatur, quandiu in generante manet, dicitur esse conceptum. Verbum autem Dei ita est a Deo genitum quod tamen ab ipso non recedit, sed in eo manet, ut ex superioribus patet. Recte ergo verbum Dei potest dici a Deo conceptum. Hinc est quod Proverb. 8-24, Dei sapientia dicit: nondum erant abyssi, et ego iam concepta eram. Est autem differentia inter conceptionem verbi Dei, et materialem conceptionem quae apud nos in animalibus invenitur. Nam proles, quandiu concepta est et in utero clauditur, nondum habet ultimam perfectionem, ut per se subsistat a generante secundum locum distinctum: unde oportet quod in corporali generatione animalium aliud sit genitae prolis conceptio, atque aliud partus ipsius, secundum quem etiam loco separatur proles genita a generante, ab utero generantis egrediens. Verbum autem Dei, in ipso Deo dicente existens, est perfectum, in se subsistens, distinctum a Deo dicente: non enim expectatur ibi localis distinctio, sed sola relatione distinguuntur, ut dictum est. Idem est ergo in generatione verbi Dei et conceptio et partus. Et ideo, postquam ex ore sapientiae dictum est, ego iam concepta eram, post pauca subditur: ante colles ego parturiebar.
| [18] One must also consider that what is generated, so long as it remains in the generator, is said to be “conceived.” But the Word of God is begotten by God in such wise that it does not withdraw from Him, but abides in Him. (This is clear from the above.) Rightly, therefore, the Word of God can be called “conceived” by God. Hence, the Wisdom of God says in Proverbs (8:24): “The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived.” But there is a difference between the conception of the Word of God and the material conception discovered by us in animals. For the offspring, so long as it is conceived and is inclosed in the womb, does not have its final perfection so as to subsist of itself in a place distinct from the one generating; hence, in the corporeal generation of animals, the conception of the offspring begotten is necessarily one thing and the delivery another; in the latter the offspring begotten is even spatially separated from the generator when it proceeds from the womb. Now, the Word of God existing in God Himself speaking the Word is perfect, subsists in Himself, and is distinct from God speaking: for one does not look for a local distinction there, but they are distinguished only by a relation as was said. Therefore, in the generation of the Word of God conception and delivery are identified. Therefore, after this saying from the mouth of Wisdom, “I was already conceived,” there is shortly added: “Before the hills I was brought forth” (Prov. 8:24-25).
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| Sed quia conceptio et partus in rebus corporalibus cum motu sunt, oportet in eis quandam successionem esse: cum conceptionis terminus sit esse concepti in concipiente; terminus autem partus sit esse eius qui paritur distinctum a pariente. Necesse est igitur in corporalibus quod id quod concipitur, nondum sit; et id quod parturitur, in parturiendo non sit a parturiente distinctum. Conceptio autem et partus intelligibilis verbi non est cum motu, nec cum successione: unde simul dum concipitur, est; et simul dum parturitur, distinctum est; sicut quod illuminatur, simul dum illuminatur, illuminatum est, eo quod in illuminatione successio nulla est. Et cum hoc inveniatur in intelligibili verbo nostro, multo magis competit verbo Dei: non solum quia intelligibilis conceptio et partus est; sed quia in aeternitate existit utrumque, in qua prius et posterius esse non possunt. Hinc est quod, postquam ex ore sapientiae dictum est, ante colles ego parturiebar; ne intelligeretur quod, dum parturiretur, non esset, subditur: quando praeparabat caelos, aderam: ut sic, cum in generatione carnali animalium prius aliquid concipiatur, deinde parturiatur, et deinde conveniat sibi adesse parturienti, quasi sibi consociatum ut ab eo distinctum; haec omnia in divina generatione simul esse intelligantur; nam verbum Dei simul concipitur, parturitur et adest. Et quia quod paritur, ex utero procedit, sicut generatio verbi Dei, ad insinuandam perfectam distinctionem eius a generante, dicitur partus, simili ratione dicitur generatio ex utero, secundum illud Psalmi: ex utero ante Luciferum genui te. Quia tamen non est talis distinctio verbi a dicente quae impediat verbum esse in dicente, ut ex dictis patet; sicut ad insinuandam distinctionem verbi, dicitur parturiri, vel ex utero genitum esse; ita, ad ostendendum quod talis distinctio non excludit verbum esse in dicente, dicitur Ioan. 1-18, quod est in sinu patris.
| However, since in corporeal things conception and bearing involve motion, in these things there must be a certain succession: the term of conception is the being of the conceived in the one conceiving, the term of bearing is the being of the one born apart from the parent. Thus, in corporeal things, that which is conceived is necessarily not yet in being and that which is brought forth is in the bearing not distinct from the parent. Now, the conception and birth of an intelligible word involves neither motion nor succession. Hence, at once it is conceived and it is; at once it is born and is distinct; just as that which is illuminated, at the moment of being illuminated, is illuminated because in illumination there is no succession. Since one discovers this situation in our intelligible word, by so much the more is it proper to the Word of God—not only because the intelligible conception is also birth, but because each of the two exists in eternity in which there can be neither before nor after. Accordingly, after the saying of Wisdom: “Before the hills I was brought forth,” to keep us from thinking that while He was being brought forth He was not, this is added: “While He was preparing the heavens I was present” (Prov. 8:27). In this way—although in the fleshly generation of animals first a thing is conceived, then it is brought forth, and finally it acquires a presence to the parent at once associated with and distinct from the parent—we can understand that in divine generation all these are simultaneous. For the Word of God is at once conceived, brought forth, and present. And since what is born proceeds from a womb, just as the generation of the Word of God to convey His perfect distinction from the generator is called birth, it is called for a like reason “generation from the womb”; so we read in a Psalm (109:3): “From the womb before the day star I begot You.” Nevertheless, since the distinction of the Word from the speaker is not the kind which prevents the Word from being in the speaker (as the things said make clear)—just as the distinctness of the Word is conveyed by calling Him “brought forth” or “begotten from the womb”—so, to show that this kind of distinction does not keep the Word from being in the speaker, John (1:8) says that He is “in the bosom of the Father.”
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| Attendendum est autem quod generatio carnalis animalium perficitur per virtutem activam et passivam: et ab activa quidem virtute dicitur pater, a passiva vero dicitur mater. Unde eorum quae ad generationem prolis requiruntur, quaedam conveniunt patri, quaedam conveniunt matri: dare enim naturam et speciem prolis competit patri; concipere autem et parturire competit matri, tanquam patienti et recipienti. Cum autem processio verbi secundum hoc dicta sit esse quod Deus seipsum intelligit; ipsum autem divinum intelligere non est per aliquam virtutem passivam, sed quasi activam, quia intellectus divinus non est in potentia, sed actu tantum: in generatione verbi Dei non competit ratio matris, sed solum patris. Unde quae in generatione carnali distinctim patri et matri conveniunt, omnia in generatione verbi patri attribuuntur in sacris Scripturis: dicitur enim pater et dare filio vitam, et concipere et parturire.
| [19] One should, of course, note carefully that the fleshly generation of animals is perfected by an active power and by a passive power; and it is from the active power that one is named “father,” and from the passive power that one is named “mother.” Hence, in what is required for the generation of offspring, some things belong to the father, some things belong to the mother: to give the nature and species to the offspring belong to the father, and to conceive and bring forth belong to the mother as patient and recipient. Since, however, the procession of the Word has been said to be in this: that God understands Himself; and the divine act of understanding is not through a passive power, but, so to say, an active one; because the divine intellect is not in potency but is only actual; in the generation of the Word of God the notion of mother does not enter, but only that of father. Hence, the things which belong distinctly to the father or to the mother in fleshly generation, in the generation of the Word are all attributed to the Father by sacred Scripture; for the Father is said not only “to give life to the Son” (cf. John 5:26), but also “to conceive” and to “bring forth.”
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Caput 13
Quod non est nisi unus filius in divinis
| Chapter 13
THAT THERE IS BUT ONE SON IN THE DIVINITY
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| Quia vero Deus, intelligendo seipsum omnia alia intelligit, ut in primo ostensum est; seipsum autem uno et simplici intuitu intelligit, cum suum intelligere sit suum esse necesse est verbum Dei esse unicum tantum. Cum autem in divinis nihil aliud sit filii generatio quam verbi conceptio, sequitur quod una sola sit generatio in divinis, et unicus filius solus a patre genitus. Unde Ioan. 1-14 dicitur: vidimus eum quasi unigenitum a patre; et iterum: unigenitus, qui est in sinu patris, ipse nobis enarravit.
| [1] However, since God by understanding Himself understands all else, as Book I showed, but understands Himself by a single simple inward look, since His act of understanding is His act of being, necessarily the Word of God is unique. Since, of course, in divinity the generation of the Son is not other than the conception of the Word. it follows that there is one sole generation in divinity and that a unique Son is alone, begotten by the Father. Hence, John says: “We saw Him, as it were the only-begotten of the Father”; and again: “The only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared Him” (1:14, 18).
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| Videtur tamen ex praemissis sequi quod et verbi divini sit aliud verbum, et filii sit alius filius. Ostensum est enim quod verbum Dei sit verus Deus. Oportet igitur omnia quae Deo conveniunt, verbo Dei convenire. Deus autem ex necessitate seipsum intelligit. Et verbum igitur Dei seipsum intelligit. Si igitur ex hoc quod Deus seipsum intelligit, verbum ab eo genitum in Deo ponitur, consequi videtur quod etiam et verbo, inquantum seipsum intelligit, aliud verbum attribuatur. Et sic verbi erit verbum, et filii filius; et illud verbum, si Deus est, iterum seipsum intelliget et habebit aliud verbum; et sic in infinitum generatio divina procedet.
| [2] For all that, it seems to follow from the foregoing both that the divine Word has another word and the divine Son another son. For it was shown that the Word of God is true God. Whatever, therefore, belongs to God must belong also to the Word of God. But God necessarily understands Himself. Therefore, the Word of God also understands Himself. If, then, one says that because He understands Himself there is in God a Word begotten by Him, it seems to follow that in the Word so far as He understands Himself one must allow another word. And thus there will be a word of the Word and a son of the Son. And that word, if he be God, will again understand himself and will have another word. In this way, the divine generation will proceed to infinity.
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| Huius autem solutio ex praemissis haberi potest. Cum enim ostensum sit quod verbum Dei sit Deus, ostensum tamen est quod non est alius Deus a Deo cuius est verbum, sed unus omnino, hoc solo ab eo distinctum quod ab eo est ut verbum procedens. Sicut autem verbum non est alius Deus, ita nec est alius intellectus, et per consequens nec aliud intelligere: unde nec aliud verbum. Nec tamen sequitur quod sit verbum sui ipsius, secundum quod verbum seipsum intelligit. Nam in hoc solo verbum a dicente distinguitur, ut dictum est, quod est ab ipso. Omnia ergo alia communiter attribuenda sunt Deo dicenti, qui est pater, et verbo, quod est filius, propter hoc quod etiam verbum est Deus: sed hoc solum, ut ab eo sit verbum, adscribendum est proprie patri; et hoc quod est esse a Deo dicente, attribuendum est proprie filio.
| [3] Now, the solution of this difficulty can be gathered from the foregoing. For, when it was shown that the Word of God is God, it was nevertheless shown that He is not a god other than that God whose Word He is, but a God entirely one. In this alone is He distinct from Him: He is the Word proceeding from Him. But, just as the Word is not another god, so neither is He another intellect; consequently, not another act of understanding; hence, not another word. Neither does it follow from this that there is a word of the Word Himself because the Word understands Himself. For, in this alone is the Word distinguished from the speaker (as we said): that it is from Him. Everything else, therefore, must be attributed commonly to God speaking, who is the Father, and to the Word, who is the Son, precisely because the Word also is God. But this alone: that the Word is from Him must be ascribed properly to the Father; and this alone: being from God speaking must be attributed properly to the Son.
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| Ex quo etiam patet quod filius non est impotens, etsi generare filium non possit, cum tamen pater generet filium. Nam eadem potentia est patris et filii, sicut et eadem divinitas. Et cum generatio in divinis sit intelligibilis verbi conceptio, secundum scilicet quod Deus intelligit seipsum, oportet quod potentia ad generandum in Deo sit sicut potentia ad intelligendum seipsum. Et cum intelligere seipsum in Deo sit unum et simplex, oportet et potentiam intelligendi seipsum, quae non est aliud quam suus actus, esse unam tantum. Ex eadem ergo potentia est et quod verbum concipiatur et quod dicens verbum concipiat. Unde ex eadem potentia est quod pater generet, et quod filius generetur. Nullam ergo potentiam habet pater quam non habeat filius; sed pater habet ad generare generativam potentiam, filius autem ad generari; quae sola relatione differre ex dictis patet.
| [4] From this it is also clear that the Son is not impotent, although He cannot generate a Son, whereas the Father does generate a Son. For the very same power is the Father’s and the Son’s as is the very same divinity. And, since generation in divinity is the intelligible Word’s conception, namely, in that God understands Himself, it must be that the power to generate in God is like the power to understand Himself. And, since the act of understanding Himself is in God one and simple, the power of understanding Himself, which is not other than His act, must be only one power. Therefore, it is from the same power that the Word is conceived and that the speaker conceives the Word. Hence, it is from the same power that the Father generates and that the Son is generated. Therefore, the Father has no power which the Son does not have, but the Father has the generative power to beget, the Son has it to be begotten; that these are different only in relation is clear from what has been said.
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| Sed quia apostolus filium Dei dicit verbum habere, ex quo sequi videtur quod filii sit filius, et verbi verbum; considerandum est qualiter verba apostoli hoc dicentis sint intelligenda. Dicit enim Hebr. 1-2 diebus istis locutus est nobis in filio, et postea: qui, cum sit splendor gloriae et figura substantiae eius, portans omnia verbo virtutis suae, et cetera. Huius autem intellectum sumere oportet ex his quae iam dicta sunt. Dictum est enim quod conceptio sapientiae, quae est verbum, sapientiae sibi vindicat nomen. Ulterius autem procedentibus apparet quod etiam exterior effectus ex conceptione sapientiae proveniens sapientia dici potest, per modum quo effectus nomen causae sibi assumit: dicitur enim sapientia alicuius esse non solum id quod sapienter excogitat, sed etiam id quod sapienter facit. Ex quo contingit ut etiam explicatio divinae sapientiae per opus in rebus creatis Dei sapientia dicatur: secundum illud Eccli. 1-9 ipse creavit illam, scilicet sapientiam, spiritu sancto et postea dicit, et effudit illam super omnia opera sua. Sic igitur et id quod ex verbo efficitur, verbi accipit nomen: nam et in nobis expressio interioris verbi per vocem, dicitur verbum, quasi sit verbum verbi, quia est interioris verbi ostensivum. Sic igitur non solum divini intellectus conceptio dicitur verbum, quod est filius, sed etiam explicatio divini conceptus per opera exteriora, verbum verbi nominatur. Et sic oportet intelligi quod filius portet omnia verbo virtutis suae, sicut et id quod in Psalmo legitur: ignis, grando, nix, glacies, spiritus procellarum, quae faciunt verbum eius: quia scilicet per virtutes creaturarum explicantur divinae conceptionis effectus in rebus.
| [5] However, since the Apostle says that the Son of God has a word from which it seems to follow that there is a son of the Son and a word of the Word, one must weigh the fashion in which the words of the Apostle as he says this are to be understood. He says in Hebrews (1:2-3): “In these days He has spoken to us by His Son,” and, later: “Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure of His substance, and upholding all things by the word of His power,” etc. Now, our understanding of this must be taken from the things already said, for it was said that the conception of wisdom, which is a word, deserves the name of wisdom for itself. Now, if one goes further, it is apparent that even the exterior effect which comes from the conception of wisdom can be called wisdom in the way in which an effect takes for itself the name of its cause. One’s wisdom is not only that which he thinks out wisely, but also that which be does wisely. Thus it happens that even the unfolding of divine wisdom by His work in things created is called God’s wisdom; for example, Sirach (1:9-10): “He created her” (wisdom) “in the Holy Spirit”; and later: “And He poured her out upon all His works.” Thus, also, then, what is effected by the Word gets the name of word. Even in our case the expression of the interior word by the voice is called a word, as though it were the “word’s word,” because it tends to manifest the interior word. Thus, then, not only is the conception of the divine intellect called a Word, which is the Son, but even the unfolding of the divinely conceived in exterior works is named the word of the Word. And thus must one understand that the Son upholds all things “by the word of His power,” and thus what one reads in the Psalmist: “Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds which fulfill His word” (Ps. 148:8); and that is this: by the powers of creatures the effects of the divine conception are unfolded in things,
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| Cum vero Deus, intelligendo seipsum, omnia alia intelligat, ut dictum est, oportet quod verbum in Deo conceptum ex eo quod seipsum intelligit, sit etiam verbum omnium rerum. Non tamen eodem modo est verbum Dei, et aliarum rerum. Nam Dei quidem verbum est ex eo procedens: aliarum autem rerum, non sicut ex eis procedens, non enim Deus a rebus scientiam sumit, sed magis per suam scientiam res in esse producit, ut supra ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod verbum Dei omnium quae facta sunt, ratio perfecta existat. Qualiter autem singulorum ratio esse possit, ex his quae in primo libro tractata sunt, manifestum est, ubi ostensum est quod Deus omnium propriam cognitionem habet.
| [6] However, since God by understanding Himself understands all other things—as was said—the Word conceived in God by His understanding of Himself must also be the Word of all things. Nevertheless, He is not in the very same way the Word of God and of other things. For He is God’s Word as proceeding from Him; and He is the Word of other things, but not as proceeding from them. For God does not gather knowledge from things; rather, by His knowledge He produces things in being, as was shown above. Therefore, the Word of God must for all the things which are made be the perfect existing intelligibility. But how He can be the intelligibility Of things taken singly is manifest from the points treated in Book I. There it was shown that God has a proper knowledge of all things.
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| Quicumque autem facit aliquid per intellectum, operatur per rationem rerum factarum quam apud se habet: domus enim quae est in materia, fit ab aedificatore per rationem domus quam habet in mente. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus res in esse produxit, non naturali necessitate, sed quasi per intellectum et voluntatem agens. Fecit igitur Deus omnia per verbum suum, quod est ratio rerum factarum ab ipso. Hinc est quod dicitur Ioan. 1-3: omnia per ipsum facta sunt. Cui consonat quod Moyses, mundi originem describens, in singulis operibus tali utitur modo loquendi, dixit Deus, fiat lux, et facta est lux; dixit Deus, fiat firmamentum; et sic de aliis. Quae omnia Psalmista comprehendit, dicens, dixit, et facta sunt: dicere enim est verbum producere. Sic ergo intelligendum est quod Deus dixit et facta sunt, quia verbum produxit, per quod res in esse produxit, sicut per earum rationem perfectam.
| [7] Whoever, of course, makes anything by understanding does his work through the account of the things made which be has in himself, for the house which is material is made by the builder according to the account of the house which he has in his mind. Now, it was shown above that God produced, things in being not by a natural necessity, but as an intellectual and voluntary agent. Therefore, God made all things by His Word, which is the intelligibility of things made by Him. Hence, we read in John (1:3): “All things were made by Him.” In agreement with this, Moses, describing the origin of the universe, uses such a manner of speech for the single works: “God said: Be light made and light was made... God said: Let there be a firmament made” (Gen. 1:1-3), and so of the rest, All of which the Psalmist includes, saying: “He spoke and they were made (Ps. 148:5), for to speak is to produce a word. Thus, therefore, one must understand that God spoke and they were made because He produced the Word by which He produced things in being as by their perfect intelligibility.
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| Sed quia idem est causa conservationis rerum et productionis ipsarum, sicut omnia per verbum facta sunt, ita omnia per Dei verbum conservantur in esse. Unde Psalmista dicit: verbo domini caeli firmati sunt; et apostolus dicit, ad Hebr. 1-3, de filio, quod portat omnia verbo virtutis suae; quod quidem qualiter accipi oporteat, iam dictum est.
| [8] But, since there is identity between the cause of the conservation of things and of their production as all things were made by the Word, so by the Word of God all things are conserved in being. Hence, the Psalmist says: “By the Word of the Lord the heavens were established,” (Ps. 32:6), and the Apostle speaks of the Son “upholding all things by the word of His power” (Heb. 1:3). How this is to be taken was explained above.
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| Sciendum tamen quod verbum Dei in hoc differt a ratione quae est in mente artificis, quia verbum Dei Deus subsistens est: ratio autem artificiati in mente artificis non est res subsistens, sed solum intelligibilis forma. Formae autem non subsistenti non competit proprie ut agat, agere enim rei perfectae et subsistentis est: sed est eius ut ea agatur, est enim forma principium actionis quo agens agit. Ratio igitur domus in mente artificis non agit domum: sed artifex per eam domum facit. Verbum autem Dei, quod est ratio rerum factarum a Deo, cum sit subsistens, agit, non solum per ipsum aliquid agitur. Et ideo Dei sapientia loquitur, Proverb. 8-30: cum eo eram cuncta componens; et Ioan. 5-17, dominus dicit: pater meus operatur, et ego operor.
| [9] One nevertheless ought to know that the Word of God differs from an account in the mind of an artist in this: The Word of God is subsistent God; the account of the artefact in the mind of the artist is not a subsistent thing, but only an intelligible form. But, if a form is not subsistent, it does not properly belong to it to act, for action belongs to a finished and subsistent thing; but the latter acts by the form, for form is the principle by which an agent acts. Therefore, the plan of the house in the mind of the architect does not build the house; the architect builds it according to the plan. However, the Word of God, which is a plan of things made by God, does—since He is subsistent—act, there is not merely an action through Him. For this reason, the Wisdom of God says: I was with Him forming all things” (Prov. 8:30); and in John (5:17) our Lord says: “My Father works, and I work.”
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| Considerandum est etiam quod res facta per intellectum praeexistit in ratione intellecta ante etiam quam sit in seipsa: prius enim domus est in ratione artificis quam perducatur in actum, verbum autem Dei est ratio omnium eorum quae a Deo sunt facta, ut ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod omnia quae sunt facta a Deo, praeextiterint in verbo Dei antequam sint etiam in propria natura. Quod autem est in aliquo est in eo per modum eius in quo est, et non per proprium modum: domus enim in mente artificis intelligibiliter et immaterialiter existit. Res igitur intelligendae sunt in verbo Dei praeextitisse secundum modum verbi ipsius. Est autem modus ipsius verbi quod sit unum, simplex, immateriale, et non solum vivens, sed etiam vita: cum sit suum esse. Oportet igitur quod res factae a Deo praeextiterint in verbo Dei ab aeterno, immaterialiter, et absque omni compositione, et quod nihil aliud in eo sint quam ipsum verbum, quod est vita. Propter quod dicitur Ioan. 1-3 quod factum est, in ipso vita erat, idest, in verbo.
| [10] Consideration should also be given to this: A thing made by an understanding pre-exists in the plan understood even before it is in itself, for the house exists in the understanding of the architect before it is brought to actuality. Now, the Word of God is the knowledge of all those things which are made by God—as was shown. Necessarily, then, all those things which are made by God have pre-existed in the Word of God even before they are in their own proper nature. Now, what is in something is in it in the way proper to that in which it is; it is not in that thing in its own proper manner, for the building in the mind of the architect exists intelligibly and immaterially. Things must, therefore, be understood to have pre-existed in the Word of God in the manner of the Word Himself. The manner of the Word Himself is this: He is one, simple, immaterial, and not only living but even life, since He is His own being. Necessarily, then, the things made by God have pre-existed in the Word of God from eternity, immaterially, without any composition. Moreover, they can be nothing else in Him but the Word Himself who is life. For this reason, we read: “that which was made in Him,” that is, in the Word, “was life” (John 1:3-4).
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| Sicut autem operans per intellectum per rationem quam apud se habet, res in esse producit; ita etiam qui alium docet, per rationem quam apud se habet, scientiam causat in illo: cum scientia discipuli sit deducta a scientia docentis, sicut imago quaedam ipsius. Deus autem non solum est causa per intellectum suum omnium quae naturaliter subsistunt, sed etiam omnis intellectualis cognitio ab intellectu divino derivatur, sicut ex superioribus patet. Oportet igitur quod per verbum Dei, quod est ratio intellectus divini, causetur omnis intellectualis cognitio. Propter quod dicitur Ioan. 1-4: vita erat lux hominum: quia scilicet ipsum verbum, quod vita est, et in quo omnia vita sunt, manifestat, ut lux quaedam, mentibus hominum veritatem. Nec est ex defectu verbi quod non omnes homines ad veritatis cognitionem perveniunt, sed aliqui tenebrosi existunt. Provenit autem hoc ex defectu hominum, qui ad verbum non convertuntur, nec eum plene capere possunt: unde adhuc in hominibus tenebrae remanent, vel maiores vel minores, secundum quod magis et minus convertuntur ad verbum et capiunt ipsum. Unde Ioannes, ut omnem defectum a manifestativa verbi virtute excludat, cum dixisset quod vita est lux hominum, subiungit quod in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt. Non enim tenebrae sunt ex hoc quod verbum non luceat, sed ex hoc quod aliqui lucem verbi non capiunt: sicut, luce corporei solis per orbem diffusa, tenebrae sunt ei qui oculos vel clausos vel debiles habet.
| [11] Now, just as an intellectual agent, because of the account he has in himself, produces things in being, so also a teacher, because of the account he has in himself, causes science in another, since the science of the learner is drawn from the science of the teacher, as a kind of image of the latter. God is not only the cause by His intellect of all things which naturally subsist, but even every intellectual cognition is derived from the divine intellect, as is clear from the foregoing.” Necessarily, then, it is by the Word of God, which is the knowledge of the divine intellect, that every intellectual cognition is caused. Accordingly, we read in John (1:4): “The life was the light of men,” that is, because the Word Himself who is life and in whom all things are life does, as a kind of light, make the truth manifest to the minds of men. Nor is it a failure of the Word that not all men arrive at a knowledge of the truth, but that some exist in darkness. This comes, rather, from a failure of men who are not converted to the Word and cannot fully grasp Him. Hence, there still remains darkness among men greater or less, as men are more or less converted to the Word and cleave to Him. Hence, John, to exclude every defect from the clarifying power of the Word when he had said that the “life was the light of men,” adds that it “shines in the darkness and the darkness did not comprehend it” (1:5). The darkness is not because the Word does not shine, but because some do not grasp the light of the Word, just as with the light of the bodily sun diffused through the world there is darkness for him whose eyes are closed or weak.
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| Haec igitur sunt quae de generatione divina, et de virtute unigeniti filii Dei, ex sacris Scripturis edocti, utcumque concipere possumus.
| [12] Such, then, are the points on divine generation and the power of the only-begotten Son which—taught by holy Scripture—we can in some way comprehend.
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Caput 14
Solutio ad rationes supra inductas contra generationem divinam
| Chapter 14
SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST DIVINE GENERATION PREVIOUSLY INTRODUCED
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| Quia vero veritas omnem falsitatem excludit et dubietatem dissolvit, in promptu iam fit ea dissolvere quae circa generationem divinam difficultatem afferre videbantur.
| [1] The truth, of course, excludes every falsehood and dissolves every doubt therefore it is now time to dispose of the arguments which appeared to offer difficulty about divine generation.
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| Iam enim ex dictis patet quod in Deo generationem intelligibilem ponimus, non autem talem qualis est in materialibus rebus, quarum generatio mutatio quaedam est, corruptioni opposita: quia neque verbum in intellectu nostro cum aliqua mutatione concipitur, neque habet oppositam corruptionem; cui quidem conceptioni similem esse filii Dei generationem, iam patet ex dictis.
| [2] From what we have said it is already clear that we assert an intelligible generation in God, and not such as that we find in material things wherein the generation is a kind ?of change which is the opposite of corruption. For not even in our intellect is the word conceived with some change, nor does it have an opposing corruption. It is to this conception that the generation of the Son of God is similar, as is now clear.
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| Similiter etiam verbum quod in mente nostra concipitur, non exit de potentia in actum nisi quatenus intellectus noster procedit de potentia in actum. Nec tamen verbum oritur ex intellectu nostro nisi prout existit in actu: simul autem cum in actu existit, est in eo verbum conceptum. Intellectus autem divinus nunquam est in potentia, sed solum in actu ut supra ostensum est. Generatio igitur verbi ipsius non est secundum exitum de potentia in actum: sed sicut oritur actus ex actu, ut splendor ex luce, et ratio intellecta ex intellectu in actu. Unde etiam apparet quod generatio non prohibet Dei filium esse verum Deum, aut ipsum esse aeternum. Quin magis necesse est ipsum esse coaeternum Deo, cuius est verbum: quia intellectus in actu nunquam est sine verbo.
| [3] In like manner, too, the word conceived by our intellect does not proceed from potency to act except in so far as the intellect proceeds from potency to act. For all that, the word does not arise in our intellect except as it exists in act; rather, simultaneously with its existence in act, there is a word conceived therein. But the divine intellect is never in potency, but is actual only, as was shown above. Therefore, the generation of the Word Himself is not like the process from potency to act rather, it is like the origin of act from act, as is brilliance from light and an understanding understood from an understanding in act. Hence, clearly also, generation does not prevent the Son of God from being true God, nor from being Himself eternal. Rather, He is indeed necessarily coeternal with God whose Word He is, for an intellect in act is never without its word.
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| Et quia filii Dei generatio non est materialis, sed intelligibilis, stulte iam dubitatur si pater totam naturam dedit aut partem. Manifestum est enim quod, si Deus se intelligit, oportet quod tota plenitudo ipsius contineatur in verbo. Nec tamen substantia filio data desinit esse in patre: quia nec etiam apud nos desinit esse propria natura in re quae intelligitur, ex hoc quod verbum nostri intellectus ex ipsa re intellecta habet ut intelligibiliter eandem naturam contineat.
| [4] And since the Son of God’s generation is not material, but intelligible, it is now stupid to doubt whether the Father gave His nature wholly or partially. For, manifestly, if God understands Himself, the whole fullness of Himself must be contained in His Word. Nevertheless, the substance given to the Son does not cease to be in the Father, for not even in our case does the proper nature cease to be in the thing which is understood. ne word of our intellect owes it to the very thing understood that it contains intelligibly that very same nature.
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| Ex hoc etiam quod divina generatio non est materialis, manifestum est quod non oportet in filio Dei esse aliud recipiens, et aliud naturam receptam. Hoc enim in materialibus generationibus accidere necesse est inquantum materia generati recipit formam generantis. In generatione autem intelligibili non sic est. Non enim sic verbum ab intellectu exoritur quod pars eius praeintelligatur ut recipiens, et pars eius ab intellectu effluat, sed totaliter verbum ab intellectu originem habet: sicut et in nobis totaliter unum verbum ex aliis oritur, ut conclusio ex principiis. Ubi autem totaliter aliquid ex alio oritur, non est assignare recipiens et receptum, sed totum quod exoritur ab eo est a quo oritur.
| [5] Since, again, divine generation is not material, clearly there need not be in the Son of God something which receives and something else which is the nature received. For this necessarily happens in material generations in that the matter of the generated receives the form of the one generating. But, in an intelligible generation, such is not the case. For it is not thus that a word arises within an intellect: one part of it is previously understood as receiving, and one part as flowing from the intellect; but in its entirety the word has its origin from the intellect, as even in our case one word in its entirety has its origin from others—a conclusion, for example, from principles. Where one thing in its entirety rises from another there is no marking off a receiver from the thing received, but the entire thing which arises is from him from whom it rises.
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| Similiter etiam patet quod non excluditur divinae generationis veritas ex hoc quod in Deo plurium subsistentium distinctio esse non possit. Essentia enim divina, etsi subsistens sit, non tamen potest separari a relatione quam oportet in Deo intelligi ex hoc quod verbum conceptum divinae mentis est ab ipso Deo dicente. Nam et verbum est divina essentia, ut ostensum est; et Deus dicens, a quo est verbum, est etiam divina essentia; non alia et alia, sed eadem numero. Huiusmodi autem relationes non sunt accidentia in Deo, sed res subsistentes: Deo enim nihil accidere potest, ut supra probatum est. Sunt igitur plures res subsistentes, si relationes considerentur: est autem una res subsistens, si consideretur essentia. Et propter hoc dicimus unum Deum, quia est una essentia subsistens: et plures personas, propter distinctionem subsistentium relationum. Personarum enim distinctio, etiam in rebus humanis, non attenditur secundum essentiam speciei, sed secundum ea quae sunt naturae speciei adiuncta: in omnibus enim personis hominum est una speciei natura, sunt tamen plures personae, propter hoc quod distinguuntur homines in his quae sunt adiuncta naturae. Non ergo in divinis dicenda est una persona propter unitatem essentiae subsistentis: sed plures, propter relationes.
| [6] In this same way it is clear that the truth of divine generation is not ruled out by this: in God there can be no distinction of a plurality of subsistents. The divine essence, subsistent though it be, cannot for all that be separated from the relation which must be understood to be in God, because the conceived Word of the divine mind is from God Himself speaking. For the Word, too, is the divine essence, as was shown, and God speaking—from whom the Word is—is the divine essence; not a first and a second, but an essence numerically the same. But relations like this are not accidents in God; they are subsistent things; for nothing can happen to God, as was proved above. There are, therefore, many things subsisting if one looks to the relations; there is but one subsistent thing, of course, if one looks to the essence. And on this account we speak of one subsisting God, because He is one subsisting essence; and we speak of a plurality of Persons, because of the distinction of subsisting relations. For the distinction of persons, even in things human, is not worked out in accordance with the specific essence, but in accordance with things adjoined to the specific nature. Now, in all the persons of men there is unity in the specific nature; there is, nevertheless, a plurality of persons simply because men are distinguished in these things which are adjoined to the nature. In divinity, therefore, one must not speak of one Person by reason of the unity of the subsisting essence, but of many Persons by reason of the relations.
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| Ex hoc autem patet quod id quod est quasi individuationis principium, non sequitur esse in alio: nam neque essentia divina est in alio Deo, neque paternitas est in filio.
| [7] From this, of course, it clearly does not follow that what serves as principle of individuation is in some other, because the divine essence is not in another god, nor is the paternity in the Son.
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| Quamvis autem duae personae, patris scilicet et filii, non distinguantur essentia, sed relatione, non tamen relatio est aliud quam essentia secundum rem: cum relatio in Deo accidens esse non possit. Nec hoc impossibile reputabitur si quis diligenter consideret ea quae in primo determinata sunt, ubi ostensum est quod in Deo sunt omnium entium perfectiones, non secundum compositionem aliquam, sed secundum simplicis essentiae unitatem. Nam diversae perfectiones quas res creata per multas obtinet formas, Deo competunt secundum unam et simplicem eius essentiam. Homo enim aliquis per aliam formam vivit, et per aliam est sapiens, et per aliam est iustus: quae omnia Deo per essentiam suam conveniunt. Sicut igitur sapientia et iustitia in homine quidem sunt accidentia, in Deo autem sunt idem quod divina essentia: sic aliqua relatio, puta paternitatis et filiationis, etsi in hominibus sit accidens, in Deo est divina essentia.
| [8] Although, of course, the two Persons—namely, that of the Father and that Of the Son—are differentiated not by essence, but by a relation, the relation is not, for all that, other than the essence in reality, since a relation in God cannot be an accident. Neither will this be looked on as impossible if one earnestly considers the points established in Book I. There it was shown that in God are the perfections of all beings, not in any composition, but in the unity of a simple essence, for the diversity of perfections which a created thing acquires by many forms is God’s in His one and simple essence. For a man lives by one form, is wise by another, and is just by another; and all of these belong to God by His essence. Therefore, just as wisdom and justice in a man are accidents indeed, but in God the same as the divine essence, so a relation (say, that of paternity or of sonship), although it be an accident in men, in God is the divine essence.
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| Non autem ideo dicitur quod divina sapientia sit eius essentia, cum in nobis sapientia super essentiam addat, quasi divina sapientia a nostra sapientia deficiat: sed quia eius essentia nostram essentiam excedit, ita quod id ad quod essentia nostra non sufficit, scilicet scire et iustum esse, Deus secundum suam essentiam habet perfecte. Oportet igitur quod quicquid nobis convenit secundum essentiam et sapientiam distinctum, simul Deo secundum essentiam suam attribuatur. Et similis ratio in aliis est observanda. Cum igitur divina essentia sit ipsa paternitatis vel filiationis relatio, oportet quod quicquid est paternitatis proprium Deo conveniat, licet paternitas sit ipsa essentia. Est autem hoc proprium paternitatis, ut a filiatione distinguatur: dicitur enim pater ad filium quasi ad alium, et haec est ratio patris ut sit filii pater. Licet ergo Deus pater sit divina essentia, et similiter Deus filius, ex hoc tamen quod est pater, distinguitur a filio, licet sint unum ex hoc quod uterque est divina essentia.
| [9] It is not, of course, said that the divine wisdom is His essence whereas in us wisdom adds something to the essence, because the divine wisdom is, as it were, something lesser than our wisdom; it is said because His essence exceeds our essence, so that a thing which exceeds our essence (namely, to know and to be just) is possessed by God in His essence perfectly. Therefore, whatever is fitting to us which is distinguished in accord with essence and with wisdom must be ascribed to God by reason of His essence at one and the same time. And a like proportion must be observed in other cases. Now, since the divine essence is the very relation of paternity or of sonship, whatever is the property of paternity must belong to God, although paternity be His very essence. However, this is the property of paternity: to be distinguished from sonship. For one is said to be a father to a son as to another. And this is, essential to a father: to be the father of a son. Therefore, although God the Father is the divine essence, and in the same way God the Son is, from His being the Father He is distinguished from the Son, even though they be one in that each of the two is the divine essence.
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| Ex hoc etiam patet quod relatio in divinis non est absque absoluto. Aliter tamen comparatur ad absolutum in Deo quam in rebus creatis. Nam in rebus creatis comparatur relatio ad absolutum sicut accidens ad subiectum: non autem in Deo, sed per modum identitatis, sicut est et de aliis quae de Deo dicuntur. Idem autem subiectum non potest oppositas relationes in se habere, ut sit idem homo pater et filius. Sed essentia divina, propter omnimodam eius perfectionem, idem est et sapientiae et iustitiae et aliis huiusmodi, quae apud nos in diversis generibus continentur. Et similiter nihil prohibet unam essentiam esse idem et paternitati et filiationi, et patrem et filium unum Deum esse, licet pater non sit filius: eadem enim essentia est quae est res habens esse naturaliter, et verbum intelligibile sui ipsius.
| [10] From this it is also evident that a relation in divinity is not without an absolute. But a comparison to an absolute in God is other than a comparison to an absolute in created things. For in created things a relation is compared to an absolute as an accident to a subject; not in God, of course—there the comparison is by way of identity, just as it is also in other. things which are said about God. An identical subject, of course, cannot have opposed relations in itself: the same man, for example, being his father and his son. But the divine essence, by reason of its all round perfection, is identified with its wisdom and its justice and other things of this kind, which in our case are contained in differing genera. And in the same way nothing stops the one essence from being identified with paternity and sonship, and the Father and the Son from being one God, although the Father is not the Son; for it is by an identical essence that God has by nature being and His very own intelligible Word.
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| Ex his etiam quae dicta sunt, potest esse manifestum quod relationes in Deo sunt secundum rem, et non solo intellectu. Omnis enim relatio quae consequitur propriam operationem alicuius rei, aut potentiam aut quantitatem aut aliquid huiusmodi, realiter in eo existit: aliter enim esset in eo solo intellectu, sicut apparet de scientia et scibili. Relatio enim scientiae ad scibile consequitur actionem scientis, non autem actionem scibilis, scibile enim eodem modo se habet, quantum in se est, et quando intelligitur et quando non intelligitur: et ideo relatio in sciente realiter est, in scibili autem secundum intellectum tantum; dicitur enim quod intelligitur scibile ad scientiam relative ex eo quod scientia refertur ad ipsum. Simile quoque apparet in dextro et sinistro. In animalibus enim distinctae sunt virtutes ex quibus relatio dextri et sinistri consurgit: propter quod talis relatio vere et realiter in animali existit; unde, qualitercumque vertatur animal, semper relatio eodem modo manet, nunquam enim pars dextra sinistra dicetur. Res vero inanimatae, quae praedictis virtutibus carent, non habent in se huiusmodi relationem realiter existentem sed nominantur secundum relationem dextri aut sinistri ex eo quod animalia aliquo modo se habent ad ipsam: unde eadem columna nunc dextra, nunc sinistra dicitur, secundum quod animal ex diverso situ ei comparatur. Relatio autem verbi ad Deum dicentem, cuius est verbum, in Deo ponitur ex hoc quod Deus seipsum intelligit, quae quidem operatio in Deo est, vel magis est ipse Deus, ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur praedictas relationes in Deo esse vere et realiter, et non solum secundum intellectum nostrum.
| [11] From what has been said it can be made clear that the relations in God are in reality, and not in understanding alone. For every relation which follows on the proper operation of any thing—whether potency, or quantity, or anything of this kind—really exists in that thing; otherwise, it would be in the thing by understanding alone, as is apparent in the instance of knowledge and the knowable. For the relation of knowledge to the knowable follows on the action of the knower; not, of course, on the action of the knowable. The knowable maintains itself as it is in itself, both when it is understood and when it is not understood. Accordingly, the relation is in the knower really, but it is in the knowable consequently upon understanding only, since one says that the knowable is understood relatively to the knowledge because the knowledge is related to the knowable. A like situation appears in the case of right and left. For there is in animals a distinction of the powers from which the relation of right and left arises, on which account such a relation truly and really exists in the animal. Hence, no matter how the animal is turned around, the relation always maintains itself in the same way, for the right part is never called the left. Inanimate things, to be sure, which lack the powers just mentioned, have no relation of this kind really existing in them, but one names them in the relation of right or of left from this: the animals in some way present themselves to the inanimate. Hence, the same column is called now right, now left, inasmuch as the animal is compared to it in a different situation. Of course, the relation of the Word to God who speaks and whose Word He is in the divinity is based on the fact that God understands Himself. This operation is, indeed, in God, or, rather, is God Himself, as was shown above. One concludes that the relations aforesaid are in God truly and really and not solely according to our understanding.
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| Quamvis autem in Deo ponatur esse relatio, non tamen sequitur quod in Deo sit aliquid habens esse dependens. In nobis enim relationes habent esse dependens, quia earum esse est aliud ab esse substantiae: unde habent proprium modum essendi secundum propriam rationem, sicut et in aliis accidentibus contingit. Quia enim omnia accidentia sunt formae quaedam substantiae superadditae, et a principiis substantiae causatae; oportet quod eorum esse sit superadditum supra esse substantiae, et ab ipso dependens; et tanto uniuscuiusque eorum esse est prius vel posterius, quanto forma accidentalis, secundum propriam rationem, fuerit propinquior substantiae vel magis perfecta. Propter quod et relatio realiter substantiae adveniens et postremum et imperfectissimum esse habet: postremum quidem, quia non solum praeexigit esse substantiae, sed etiam esse aliorum accidentium, ex quibus causatur relatio, sicut unum in quantitate causat aequalitatem, et unum in qualitate similitudinem; imperfectissimum autem, quia propria relationis ratio consistit in eo quod est ad alterum, unde esse eius proprium, quod substantiae superaddit, non solum dependet ab esse substantiae, sed etiam ab esse alicuius exterioris. Haec autem in divinis locum non habent: quia non est in Deo aliquod aliud esse quam substantiae; quicquid enim in Deo est, substantia est. Sicut igitur esse sapientiae in Deo non est esse dependens a substantia, quia esse sapientiae est esse substantiae; ita nec esse relationis est esse dependens neque a substantia, neque ab alio exteriori, quia etiam esse relationis est esse substantiae. Non igitur per hoc quod relatio in Deo ponitur, sequitur quod sit in eo aliquod esse dependens; sed solum quod in Deo sit respectus aliquis, in quo ratio relationis consistit; sicut ex hoc quod sapientia in Deo ponitur, non sequitur quod sit in eo aliquid accidentale, sed solum perfectio quaedam in qua ratio sapientiae consistit.
| [12] Although, of course, one holds that there is a relation in God, it does not, for all that, follow that there is in God something which has a dependent being, for in us the relations have a dependent being because their being is other than the being of the substance. Hence, they have a proper mode of being in their proper essence, just as happens in the case of the other accidents. In view of the fact that all accidents are forms of a sort superadded to the substance and caused by the principles of the substance, it must be that their being is superadded to the being of the substance and dependent on that being. And by as much as the being of each and every one of them is prior or posterior, by that much the accidental form in its proper essence will be more like a substance or more perfect. For this reason even a relation really accruing to a substance has a being which is last in order and quite imperfect: last in order, that is, because not only is the being of the substance prerequisite, but also the being of other accidents, out of which the relation is caused (thus to be one in quantity causes equality, and one in quality similarity); quite imperfect in turn, because the proper essence of the relation consists in its being toward-another—hence, its proper being, which it adds to the substance, depends not only on the being of the substance, but on the being of some exterior thing as well. This situation, of course, has no place in divinity, since there is in God no other being than that of substance, for whatever is in God is substance. Just as the being of wisdom in God, therefore, is not being by depending on substance (since the being of wisdom is the being of substance), so the being of relation is not being by depending either on substance or on another exterior thing (since the being of relation is also the being of substance). From the fact, then, that one puts a relation in God it does not follow that there is in Him some dependent being, but only that there is in Him some aspect in which aspect the essence of relation consists. just so from the fact that one puts wisdom in God it does not follow that there is something accidental in Him, but only that there is a certain perfection in which the essence of wisdom consists.
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| Per quod etiam patet quod ex imperfectione quae in relationibus creatis esse videtur, non sequitur quod personae divinae sint imperfectae, quae relationibus distinguuntur: sed sequitur quod divinarum personarum minima sit distinctio.
| [13] Thus clearly, also, from the imperfection in created relations it does not follow that the divine persons—distinguished by relations—are imperfect, but it does follow that the distinction of the divine persons is minimal.
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| Patet etiam ex praedictis quod, licet Deus de patre et filio substantialiter praedicetur, non tamen sequitur, si pater et filius sint plures quidam, quod sint plures dii. Sunt enim plures propter distinctionem subsistentium relationum: sed tamen sunt unus Deus propter unitatem essentiae subsistentis. Hoc autem in hominibus non contingit, ut plures aliqui sint unus homo: quia essentia humanitatis non est una numero in utroque; neque essentia humanitatis est subsistens, ut humanitas sit homo.
| [14] Clearly, also, from the points made, although God is substantially predicated of the Father and the Son, it does not for all that follow that, if the Father and the Son are a kind of plurality, they are a plurality of gods. For they are many by reason of the distinction of subsistent relations, yet one God, nevertheless, by reason of the unity of subsistent essence. This does not happen among men, of course—that is, that some plurality is one man—since the essence of humanity is not numerically one in each of the plurality, nor is the essence of humanity subsistent; that is, humanity is not a man.
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| Ex hoc autem quod in Deo est essentiae unitas et relationum distinctio, manifestum fit quod nihil prohibet in uno Deo opposita quaedam inveniri: illa dumtaxat opposita quae relationis distinctionem consequuntur, ut generans et genitum, quae opponuntur relative, et genitum et ingenitum, quae opponuntur ut affirmatio et negatio. Ubicumque enim est aliqua distinctio, oportet inveniri negationis et affirmationis oppositionem. Quae enim secundum nullam affirmationem et negationem differunt, penitus indistincta sunt: oportet enim quod quantum ad omnia unum esset quod et alterum, et sic essent penitus idem, et nullo modo distincta.
| [15] From the fact that in God there is unity of essence and distinction of relations it becomes manifest that nothing stops one’s finding opposites in the one God, at least those opposites which follow the distinction of relation: begetting and begotten, for instance, which are opposed relatively, and begotten and unbegotten which are opposed as affirmation and negation. For wherever there is a distinction one must find the opposition of negation and affirmation. Things which differ in no affirmation or negation are entirely undifferentiated, for the first would have to be in every respect one with the second, and thus they would be thoroughly identified, and in no way distinct.
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| Haec igitur de generatione divina dicta sufficiant.
| [16] Let these points on the divine generation suffice, then.
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Caput 16
Rationes ex quibus aliqui spiritum sanctum existimaverunt esse creaturam
| Chapter 16
ARGUMENTS WHICH MADE SOME THINK THE HOLY SPIRIT A CREATURE
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| Opinati sunt autem quidam spiritum sanctum creaturam esse, aliis creaturis excelsiorem: ad cuius assertionem sacrae Scripturae testimoniis utebantur.
| [1] Now, in the opinion of some, the Holy Spirit is a creature exalted over other creatures. They used the testimony of sacred Scripture for this assertion.
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| Dicitur enim Amos 4-13, secundum litteram Septuaginta: ecce formans montes, et creans spiritum, et annuntians homini verbum eius. Et Zach. 12-1: dicit dominus, extendens caelum, et fundans terram, et creans spiritum hominis in eo. Videtur igitur quod spiritus sanctus sit creatura.
| [2] Amos (4:13) says, if we take the Septuagint literally: “Behold He who forms the mountains and creates the spirit and declares His word to man.” And Zechariah (12:1): “Thus says the Lord who stretches forth the heavens, and lays the foundations of the earth, and creates the spirit of man in it.” It seems, then, that the Holy Spirit is a creature.
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| Adhuc. Dicit dominus, Ioan. 16-13, de spiritu sancto loquens: non loquetur a semetipso, sed quaecumque audiet, loquetur: ex quo videtur quod nihil ultroneae potestatis auctoritate loquatur, sed iubenti per ministerium famuletur; loqui enim quae quis audit, famulantis esse videtur. Videtur igitur spiritus sanctus esse creatura Deo subiecta.
| [3] Moreover, our Lord says, speaking of the Holy Spirit: “He shall not speak of Himself, but what things soever He shall hear, He shall speak” (John 16:23), and from this it appears that He speaks not with the authority of a further power, but to one who commands He is in a service of obedience, for to speak what one hears is proper to a servant. Therefore, the Holy Spirit seems to he a creature subject to God.
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| Item. Mitti inferioris esse videtur: cum in mittente importetur auctoritas. Spiritus autem sanctus a patre et filio mittitur. Dicit enim dominus, Ioan. 14-26: Paraclitus spiritus sanctus, quem mittet pater in nomine meo, ille vos docebit omnia; et Ioan. 15-26: cum venerit Paraclitus, quem ego mittam vobis a patre. Spiritus ergo sanctus et patre et filio minor esse videtur.
| [4] Again, “to be sent” appears proper to an inferior, since there is in the sender an implication of authority. The Holy Spirit, of course, is sent by the Father and the Son, for our Lord says: “The Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in My name, He will teach you all things”; and: “Men the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father” (John 14:26; 25:26). The Holy Spirit, therefore, appears to be less than the Father and the Son.
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| Adhuc. Scriptura divina, filium patri associans in his quae divinitatis esse videntur, de spiritu sancto mentionem non facit: ut patet Matth. 11-27, cum dominus dicit: nemo novit filium nisi pater, neque patrem quis novit nisi filius, de spiritu sancto mentione non facta. Et Ioan. 17-3 dicitur: haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, solum Deum verum, et quem misisti, Iesum Christum, ubi etiam de spiritu sancto mentio non fit. Apostolus etiam, ad Rom. 1-7, dicit: gratia vobis et pax a Deo patre nostro, et domino Iesu Christo; et I ad Cor. 8-6: nobis unus Deus pater, ex quo omnia et nos in illo et unus dominus Iesus Christus, per quem omnia et nos per ipsum: in quibus etiam nihil de spiritu sancto dicitur. Videtur igitur spiritus sanctus Deus non esse.
| [5] Moreover, divine Scripture, associating the Son with the Father in matters of divinity, makes no mention of the Holy Spirit. This is clear from Matthew (11:27), when our Lord says: “No one knows the Son but the Father: neither doth any one know the Father but the Son,” making no mention of the Holy Spirit. And John (17:3) says: “This is eternal life: that they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom You sent.” There, again, no mention is made of the Holy Spirit. The Apostle also says: “Grace to you and peace from God our Father, and from the Lord Jesus Christ” (Rom. 2:7); and: “To us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto Him; and one Lord Jesus Christ by whom are all things and we by Him” (1 Cor. 8:6); and in these places also there is nothing said about the Holy Spirit. It seems, therefore, that the Holy Spirit is not God.
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| Amplius. Omne quod movetur creatum est: ostensum est enim in primo Deum immobilem esse. Spiritui autem sancto Scriptura divina motum attribuit. Dicitur enim Gen. 1-2: spiritus domini ferebatur super aquas. Et Ioel. 2-28: effundam de spiritu meo super omnem carnem. Videtur igitur spiritus sanctus creatura esse.
| [6] There is more. Whatever is moved is created, for it was shown in Book I that God is immobile. But to the Holy Spirit motion is attributed by divine Scripture. One reads in Genesis (1:2): “And the Spirit of God was moved over the waters”; and in Joel (2:28): “I will pour out My spirit upon all flesh.” It seems, therefore, that the Holy Spirit is a creature.
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| Praeterea. Omne quod potest augeri vel dividi, mutabile est et creatum. Haec autem spiritui sancto in Scripturis sacris attribui videntur. Dicit enim dominus, Num. 11, ad Moysen: congrega mihi septuaginta viros de senioribus Israel, et auferam de spiritu tuo, tradamque eis. Et IV Reg. 2, dicitur quod Eliseus ab Elia petiit, obsecro quod fiat spiritus tuus duplex in me et Elias respondit, si videris quando tollar a te, erit quod petisti. Videtur ergo spiritus sanctus esse mutabilis, et non esse Deus.
| [7] Moreover, everything that can be increased or divided is mutable and created. These seem to be attributed to the Holy Spirit in sacred Scripture. For the Lord said to Moses: “Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of Israel; and I will take of your spirit, and will give to them” (Num. 11:16-17). And 2 Samuel (2:9-10) says that Elishah begged of Elijah: “I beseech you that in me may be your double spirit”; and Elijah answered: “If you see me when I am taken from you, you shall have what you asked.” The Holy Spirit, therefore, appears to be mutable and not to be God.
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| Item. In Deum tristitia cadere non potest: cum tristitia passio quaedam sit, Deus autem impassibilis est. Cadit autem tristitia in spiritum sanctum. Unde apostolus dicit, Ephes. 4-30: nolite contristare spiritum sanctum Dei. Et Isaiae 63-10 dicitur: ipsi ad iracundiam provocaverunt, et afflixerunt spiritum sanctum eius. Videtur igitur spiritus sanctus Deus non esse.
| [8] Again, no sorrow can come upon God, since sorrow is passion of a sort and God is not subject to passion. But passion does come upon the Holy Spirit; as the Apostle reveals: “Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God” (Eph. 4:30); and Isaiah (63:10) says: “They provoked to wrath and afflicted His Holy Spirit.” The Holy Spirit, therefore, seems not to be God.
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| Adhuc. Deo non convenit orare, sed magis orari. Spiritui autem sancto orare convenit: dicitur enim ad Rom. 8-26: ipse spiritus postulat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus. Spiritus ergo sanctus non esse Deus videtur.
| [9] What is more, it is not suitable for God to entreat, but to be entreated. But to entreat is suitable to the Holy Spirit; we read in Romans (8:2.6): “The Spirit Himself asks for us with unspeakable groanings.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit appears not to be God.
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| Amplius. Nullus congrue donat nisi id cuius habet dominium. Sed Deus pater dat spiritum sanctum, et similiter filius. Dicit enim dominus, Lucae 11-13: pater vester de caelo dabit spiritum bonum petentibus se; et Act. 5-32, Petrus dicit quod Deus spiritum sanctum dedit obedientibus sibi.
| [10] Moreover, no one makes a thing a gift appropriately unless he has dominion over it. But God the Father gives the Holy Spirit, and so does God the Son. For our Lord says: “Your Father from heaven will give the good Spirit to them that ask Him” (Luke 11:13); and Peter speaks of “the Holy Spirit whom God has given to all that obey Him” (Acts 5:32).
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| Ex his igitur videtur quod spiritus sanctus Deus non sit.
| [11] For these reasons it seems, then, that the Holy Spirit is not God.
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| Item. Si spiritus sanctus verus Deus est, oportet quod naturam divinam habeat: et sic, cum spiritus sanctus a patre procedat, ut dicitur Ioan. 15-26, necesse est quod ab eo naturam divinam accipiat. Quod autem accipit naturam eius a quo producitur, ab eo generatur: proprium enim est geniti ut in similem speciem sui principii producatur. Spiritus ergo sanctus genitus erit, et per consequens filius. Quod sanae fidei repugnat.
| [2] Once again, if the Holy Spirit is truly God, He ought to have the divine nature. Thus, when the Holy Spirit “proceeds from the Father” (as John 15:26 has it), necessarily He receives the divine nature from the Father. Of course, what receives its nature from a thing which produces it is generated by that thing. For it is proper to one begotten to be produced unto a similarity in species to its principle. Therefore, the Holy Spirit will be begotten and, consequently, the Son. And this is repugnant to sound faith.
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| Praeterea. Si spiritus sanctus naturam divinam a patre accipit et non quasi genitus, oportet divinam naturam duobus modis communicari: scilicet per modum generationis, quo procedit filius; et per illum modum quo procedit spiritus sanctus. Hoc autem uni naturae competere non videtur, ut duobus modis communicetur, si quis universas naturas inspiciat. Oportet igitur, ut videtur, cum spiritus sanctus, naturam per generationem non accipiat quod nullo modo accipiat eam. Et sic videtur non esse verus Deus.
| [13] If the Holy Spirit, furthermore, receives the divine nature from the Father and not as one begotten, the divine nature must be communicated in two ways: by way of generation in which the Son proceeds, and in that way in which the Holy Spirit proceeds. But one nature seems not to have two fitting modes of communication if one examines natures universally. It seems, therefore, that the Holy Spirit, since He does not receive the divine nature by generation, does not receive it in any way at all. He thus appears not to be true God.
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| Fuit autem haec positio Arii, qui filium et spiritum sanctum dixit esse creaturas; filium tamen maiorem spiritu sancto, et spiritum sanctum eius ministrum; sicut et filium minorem patre esse dicebat. Quem etiam quantum ad spiritum sanctum secutus est Macedonius, qui de patre et filio recte sensit quod unius eiusdemque substantiae sint, sed hoc de spiritu sancto credere noluit, creaturam eum esse dicens. Unde quidam Macedonianos Semiarianos vocant, eo quod cum Arianis in parte conveniunt, et in parte differunt ab eisdem.
| [14] Now, this was the position of Arius, who said that the Son and the Holy Spirit were creatures: the Son, to be sure, greater than the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit the servant of the Son; just so, he said that the Son was lesser than the Father. Arius was followed in respect of the Holy Spirit by Macedonius, “who rightly held that the Father and the Son were of one and the same substance, but was unwilling to believe this of the Holy Spirit. He said that the Holy Spirit was a creature.” Hence, some call the Macedonians Semi-Arians, because they are in partial agreement with the Arians, and in partial disagreement with the same group.
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Caput 17
Quod spiritus sanctus sit verus Deus786
| Chapter 17
THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS TRUE GOD
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| Ostenditur autem evidentibus Scripturae testimoniis quod spiritus sanctus sit Deus. Nulli enim templum consecratur nisi Deo: unde et in Psalmo dicitur: Deus in templo sancto suo. Deputatur autem templum spiritui sancto: dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. 6-19: an nescitis quoniam membra vestra templum sunt spiritus sancti? Spiritus ergo sanctus Deus est. Et praecipue cum membra nostra, quae templum spiritus sancti esse dicit, sint membra Christi: nam supra praemiserat: nescitis quoniam corpora vestra membra sunt Christi? Inconveniens autem esset, cum Christus sit verus Deus, ut ex superioribus patet, quod membra Christi templum spiritus sancti essent, nisi spiritus sanctus Deus esset.
| [1] One shows, of course, by clear testimonies from Scripture that the Holy Spirit is true God. For to none but God is a temple consecrated, and so the Psalmist speaks of “God in His holy temple” (Ps. 10:5). Yet there is a temple assigned to the Holy Spirit, for the Apostle says: “Or know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit?” The Holy Spirit, therefore, is God. This is especially clear since our members, which the Apostle calls the temple of the Holy Spirit, are the members of Christ. For just above he had set down: “Know you not that your bodies are the members of Christ?” (1 Cor. 6:19, 15). It obviously would be awkward (since Christ is true God, as is clear from the foregoing) to have the members of Christ a temple of the Holy Spirit if the Holy Spirit were not God.
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| Item. A sanctis latriae servitus non nisi vero Deo exhibetur: dicitur enim Deut. 6-13: dominum Deum tuum timebis, et illi soli servies. Serviunt autem sancti spiritui sancto: dicit enim apostolus, Philipp. 3-3: nos sumus circumcisio, qui spiritui Deo servimus. Et licet quidam libri habeant, qui spiritu domini servimus, tamen Graeci libri, et antiquiores Latini, habent, qui spiritui Deo servimus. Et ex ipso Graeco apparet quod hoc de servitute latriae intelligendum est, quae soli Deo debetur. Est igitur spiritus sanctus verus Deus, cui latria debetur.
| [2] Again, holy men do not give the cult of adoration except to the true God, for Deuteronomy (6:13) says: “You shall fear the Lord your God, and shall serve Him only.” But holy men serve the Holy Spirit, as the Apostle says: “We are the circumcision who serve the Spirit of God” (Phil. 3:3). And although some books have “who serve in the spirit of the Lord,” the Greek books and some Of the more ancient Latin ones have: “who serve the Spirit of God.” And from the Greek itself, this clearly must be understood as the cult of adoration which is due to God alone. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is true God to whom adoration is due.
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| Adhuc. Sanctificare homines proprium Dei opus est: dicitur enim Levit. 22-32: ego dominus, qui sanctifico vos. Est autem spiritus sanctus qui sanctificat: dicit enim apostolus, I Cor. 6-11: abluti estis, sanctificati estis, iustificati estis, in nomine domini nostri Iesu Christi, et in spiritu Dei nostri; et II ad Thess. 2-13, dicitur: elegit nos Deus primitias in salutem in sanctificatione spiritus et fide veritatis. Oportet igitur spiritum sanctum Deum esse.
| [3] Further, to sanctify men is the proper work of God, for Leviticus (22:32) says: “I am the Lord who sanctify you.” It is, of course, the Holy Spirit who sanctifies, as the Apostle says: “You are washed, you are sanctified, you are justified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the Spirit of our God” (1 Cor. 6:11). And in 2 Thessalonians (2:12) one reads: “God has chosen you first fruits unto salvation, in sanctification of the Spirit and faith of the truth.” Necessarily, therefore, the Holy Spirit is God.
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| Amplius. Sicut vita naturae corporis est per animam, ita vita iustitiae ipsius animae est per Deum: unde dominus dicit, Ioan. 6-58: sicut misit me vivens pater, et ego vivo propter patrem, et qui manducat me, et ipse vivet propter me. Huiusmodi autem vita est per spiritum sanctum: unde ibidem subditur: spiritus est qui vivificat; et ad Rom. 8-13, dicit apostolus: si spiritu facta carnis mortificaveritis, vivetis. Spiritus ergo sanctus divinae naturae est.
| [4] And further, just as the life of corporeal nature is from the soul, so the life of justice of the soul itself is from God; and so our Lord says: “As the living Father has sent Me, and I live by the Father, so He that eats Me, the same also shall live by Me” (John 6:58). Of course, this kind of life is from the Holy Spirit, and so our Lord adds in the same place: “It is the Spirit that gives life” (John 6:54); and the Apostle says: “If by the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live” (Rom. 8:13). Therefore, the Holy Spirit is of the divine nature.
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| Praeterea. Dominus, in argumentum suae divinitatis contra Iudaeos, qui sustinere non poterant ut se Deo aequalem faceret, asserit in se esse resuscitandi virtutem: dicens, Ioan. 5-21: sicut pater suscitat mortuos et vivificat, sic et filius quos vult vivificat. Virtus autem resuscitativa ad spiritum sanctum pertinet: dicit enim apostolus, Rom. 8-11: si spiritus eius qui suscitavit Iesum Christum a mortuis, habitat in vobis, qui suscitavit Iesum Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra, propter inhabitantem spiritum eius in vobis. Spiritus ergo sanctus est divinae naturae.
| [5] Our Lord, furthermore, when arguing His divinity against the Jews who could not bear the fact that He made Himself equal to God, asserts that there is in Him a power of raising to life. He says in John (5:21): “As the Father raises up the dead and gives life, so the Son also gives life to whom He will.” The power of raising to life, of course, belongs to the Holy Spirit; as the Apostle says: “If the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you; He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwells in you” (Rom. 8:11). Therefore, the Holy Spirit is of the divine nature.
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| Item. Creatio solius Dei opus est, ut supra ostensum est. Pertinet autem creatio ad spiritum sanctum: dicitur enim in Psalmo: emitte spiritum tuum, et creabuntur; et Iob 33-4, dicitur: spiritus Dei fecit me; et Eccli. 1-9, dicitur de Deo: ipse creavit illam, scilicet sapientiam, spiritu sancto. Est ergo spiritus sanctus divinae naturae.
| [6] Again, creation is the work of God alone, as was shown above. But creation belongs to the Holy Spirit; as the Psalmist says: “Send forth your Spirit, and they shall be created” (Ps. 103:30); and Job (33:4) says: “The Spirit of God made me”; and Sirach (1:9) says of God: “He created her,” meaning wisdom, “in the Holy Spirit.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit is of the divine nature.
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| Adhuc. Apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. 2-10 spiritus omnia scrutatur, etiam profunda Dei. Quis enim scit quae sunt hominis nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est? Ita et quae Dei sunt nemo cognovit nisi spiritus Dei. Comprehendere autem omnia profunda Dei non est alicuius creaturae: quod patet ex hoc quod dominus dicit, Matth. 11-27: nemo novit filium nisi pater, neque patrem quis novit nisi filius. Et Isaiae 24-16, ex persona Dei, dicitur: secretum meum mihi. Ergo spiritus sanctus non est creatura.
| [7] The Apostle says, further: “The Spirit searches all things, yea, the deep things of God. For what man knows the things of a man but the spirit of a man that is in him? So the things also that are of God no man knows, but the Spirit of God” (1 Cor. 2:10-11). But to comprehend all the deep things of God is not the act of a creature. And this is clear from our Lord’s words: “No one knows the Son but the Father, neither doth any one know the Father but the Son” (Mat. 11:27). And Isaiah (24:16) says in the person of God: “My secret to Myself.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit is not a creature.
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| Praeterea. Secundum praedictam apostoli comparationem, spiritus sanctus se habet ad Deum sicut spiritus hominis ad hominem. Spiritus autem hominis intrinsecus est homini, et non est extraneae naturae ab ipso, sed est aliquid eius. Igitur et spiritus sanctus non est naturae extraneae a Deo.
| [8] What is more, in the comparison by the Apostle just given, the Holy Spirit is to God as the spirit of man is to man. Now, the spirit of man is intrinsic to man and is not extraneous to him in nature, but is of his nature. Therefore, the Holy Spirit as well is not by nature extraneous to God.
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| Amplius. Si quis conferat verba apostoli praemissa verbis Isaiae prophetae, manifeste percipiet spiritum sanctum Deum esse. Dicitur enim Isaiae 64-4: oculus non vidit, Deus, absque te, quae praeparasti expectantibus te. Quae quidem verba apostolus cum introduxisset, subiungit verba praemissa scilicet quod spiritus scrutatur profunda Dei. Unde manifestum est quod spiritus sanctus illa profunda Dei cognoscit quae praeparavit expectantibus eum. Si ergo haec nullus vidit praeter Deum, ut Isaias dicit, manifestum est spiritum sanctum Deum esse.
| [9] If one further compares the just quoted words of the Apostle with those of the Prophet Isaiah, he will see clearly that the Holy Spirit is God. For Isaiah (64:4) says: “The eye has not seen, O God, besides You, what things You hast prepared for them that wait for You.” And the Apostle, indeed, when he had introduced these words (1 Cor. 7:9) adds the words just mentioned, to wit, that “the Spirit searches the deep things of God” (1 Cor. 2:9-10). Manifestly, therefore, the Holy Spirit knows those deep things of God “which He has prepared for those that wait for Him.” Therefore, if none sees these besides God, as Isaiah says, clearly the Holy Spirit is God.
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| Item. Isaiae 6 dicitur: audivi vocem Dei dicentis: quem mittam, et quis ibit nobis? Et dixi: ecce ego sum, mitte me. Et dixit: vade, et dices populo huic: audite audientes et nolite intelligere. Haec autem verba Paulus spiritui sancto attribuit: unde dicitur Act. ult., quod Paulus dixit Iudaeis: bene spiritus sanctus locutus est per Isaiam prophetam dicens: vade ad populum istum et dic ad eos: aure audietis et non intelligetis. Manifestum est ergo spiritum sanctum Deum esse.
| [10] Isaiah, once again (6:8-9), says: “I heard the voice of God saying: Whom shall I send? And I said: Lo, here am I, send me. And He said: Go, and you shall say to His people: Hearing, hear, and understand not.” Now, Paul ascribes these words to the Holy Spirit; and thus we are told that Paul said to the Jews: “Well, did the Holy Spirit speak... by Isaiah the Prophet, saying: Go to this people and say to them: With the ear you shall hear and shall not understand” (Acts 28:2526). Manifestly, therefore, the Holy Spirit is God.
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| Adhuc. Ex sacris Scripturis apparet Deum esse qui locutus est per prophetas: dicitur enim Num. 12-6, ex ore Dei: si quis fuerit inter vos propheta domini, in visione apparebo ei, vel per somnium loquar ad illum; et in Psalmo dicitur: audiam quid loquatur in me dominus Deus. Manifeste autem ostenditur spiritum sanctum locutum esse in prophetis. Dicitur enim Act. 1-16: oportet enim impleri Scripturam quam praedixit spiritus sanctus per os David. Et Matth. 22, dominus dicit: quomodo dicunt Scribae Christum filium David esse? Ipse enim dicebat in spiritu sancto: dixit dominus domino meo, sede a dextris meis. Et II Petr. 1-21 dicitur: non enim voluntate humana allata est aliquando prophetia, sed spiritu sancto inspirati locuti sunt sancti Dei homines. Manifeste ergo ex Scripturis colligitur spiritum sanctum Deum esse.
| [11] It is further apparent from sacred Scripture that it is God who speaks by the Prophets. For from the mouth of God, Numbers (12:6) says: “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream.” And a Psalm (84:9) says: “I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me.” But it is plain to see that the Holy Spirit has spoken in the Prophets. One reads in Acts (1:16): “The Scripture must needs be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit spoke before by the mouth of David.” And in Matthew our Lord says: “How do the scribes say that Christ is the son of David. For David himself says by the Holy Spirit: The Lord said to my Lord: Sit you at My right hand.” And in 2 Peter (1:71) we read: “For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit.” Therefore, one plainly gathers from the Scriptures that the Holy Spirit is God.
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| Item. Revelatio mysteriorum proprium opus Dei ostenditur in Scripturis: dicitur enim Dan. 2-28: est Deus in caelo revelans mysteria. Mysteriorum autem revelatio opus spiritus sancti ostenditur: dicitur enim I ad Cor. 2-10: nobis revelavit Deus per spiritum suum; et 14-2 dicitur: spiritus loquitur mysteria. Spiritus ergo sanctus Deus est.
| [ 12] Again, that the revelation of mysteries is a proper work of God is shown in Scripture, for in Daniel (2:28) it says: “There is a God in heaven that reveals mysteries.” But the revelation of mysteries is seen to be a work of the Holy Spirit, for we read in 1 Corinthians (2:10; 14:2): “To us God has revealed them, by his Spirit”; and: “By the Spirit He speaks mysteries.” The Holy Spirit, therefore, is God.
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| Praeterea. Interius docere proprium opus Dei est: dicitur enim in Psalmo de Deo: qui docet hominem scientiam; et Dan. 2-21: dat sapientiam sapientibus, et scientiam intelligentibus disciplinam. Hoc autem proprium opus spiritus sancti esse manifestum est: dicit enim dominus, Ioan. 14-26: Paraclitus spiritus sanctus, quem mittet pater in nomine meo, ille vos docebit omnia. Spiritus ergo sanctus est divinae naturae.
| [13] What is more, to teach within is a proper work of God, for the Psalmist says of God: “He who teaches man knowledge” (93:16); and Daniel (2:21): “He gives wisdom to the wise, and knowledge to them that have understanding.” ]out that such is the proper work of the Holy Spirit is plain, for our Lord speaks in John (14:26): of “the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit whom the Father will send in My name: He will teach you all things.” The Holy Spirit, therefore, is of the divine nature.
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| Adhuc. Quorum est eadem operatio, oportet esse eandem naturam. Est autem eadem operatio filii et spiritus sancti. Quod enim Christus in sanctis loquatur, apostolus ostendit, II ad Cor. ult., dicens: an experimentum quaeritis eius qui in me loquitur, Christus? Hoc etiam opus spiritus sancti esse manifeste apparet: dicitur enim Matth. 10-20: non vos estis qui loquimini, sed spiritus patris vestri, qui loquitur in vobis. Est ergo eadem natura filii et spiritus sancti, et per consequens patris: cum ostensum sit patrem et filium unam esse naturam.
| [14] Furthermore, those who are identical in operation must be identical in nature. But the operation of the Son and the Holy Spirit is identical. For Christ speaks in the saints, as the Apostle shows in the words of 2 Corinthians (13:3): “Do you seek a proof of Christ that speaks in me?” This also plainly appears to be a work of the Holy Spirit, for we read in Matthew (10:20): “It is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you.” There is, then, an identical nature in the Son and the Holy Spirit and, consequently, the Father, since it has been shown that the Father and Son are one nature.
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| Amplius. Inhabitare mentes sanctorum proprium Dei est: unde apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. 6-16: vos estis templum Dei vivi, sicut dicit dominus. Quoniam inhabitabo in illis. Hoc autem idem apostolus spiritui sancto attribuit: dicit enim, I ad Cor. 3-16: nescitis quia templum Dei estis, et spiritus sanctus habitat in vobis? Est ergo spiritus sanctus Deus.
| [15] Moreover, to dwell in the minds of the saints is the proper work of God, and so the Apostle says: “You are the temple of the living God; as God says: I will dwell in you” (2 Cor. 6:16). But the Apostle attributes the same thing to the Holy Spirit, for he says: “Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwells in you?” (1 Cor. 3:16). Therefore, the Holy Spirit is God.
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| Item. Esse ubique proprium Dei est, qui dicit Ier. 23-24: caelum et terram ego impleo. Hoc spiritui sancto convenit. Dicitur enim Sap. 1-7: spiritus domini replevit orbem terrarum; et in Psalmo: quo ibo a spiritu tuo? Et quo a facie tua fugiam? Si ascendero in caelum, tu illic es, et cetera. Dominus etiam discipulis dicit, Act. 1-8: accipietis virtutem supervenientis spiritus sancti in vos, et eritis mihi testes in Ierusalem, et in omni Iudaea et Samaria, et usque ad ultimum terrae. Ex quo patet quod spiritus sanctus ubique est, qui ubicumque existentes inhabitat. Spiritus ergo sanctus Deus est.
| [16] Once again, to be everywhere is proper to God, who says in Jeremiah (23:24): “I fill heaven and earth.” This belongs to the Holy Spirit, for we read in Wisdom (1:7): “The Spirit of the Lord bath filled the whole world,” and the Psalmist says: “Whither shall I go from your Spirit? Or whither shall I flee from your face? If I ascend into heaven, You are there,” and so forth (Ps. 138:7-8). Our Lord also says to the disciples: “You shall receive the power of the Holy Spirit coming upon you, and you shall be witnesses unto Me in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and Samaria, and even to the uttermost parts of the earth” (Acts 1:8), from which it is clear that the Holy Spirit is everywhere; He dwells in those existing in every place. The Holy Spirit, therefore, is God.
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| Praeterea. Expresse in Scriptura spiritus sanctus Deus nominatur. Dicit enim Petrus, Act. 5-3: Anania, cur tentavit Satanas cor tuum mentiri te spiritui sancto? Et postea subdit: non es mentitus hominibus, sed Deo. Spiritus ergo sanctus est Deus.
| [17] There is more. Scripture expressly names the Holy Spirit God, for Peter says: “Ananias, why did Satan tempt your heart, that you should lie to the Holy Spirit?” Later on, he adds: “You hast not lied to men, but to God” (Acts 5:3-4). The Holy Spirit, therefore, is God.
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| Item. I ad Cor. 14-2 dicitur: qui loquitur lingua, non hominibus loquitur, sed Deo: nemo enim audit, spiritus autem loquitur mysteria, ex quo dat intelligere quod spiritus sanctus loquebatur in his qui variis linguis loquebantur. Postmodum autem dicit: in lege scriptum est: quoniam in aliis linguis et labiis aliis loquar populo huic, et nec sic exaudiet me, dicit dominus. Spiritus ergo sanctus, qui loquitur mysteria diversis labiis et linguis, Deus est.
| [18] We read again, in 1 Corinthians (14:2, 21): “He that speaks in a tongue speaks not unto men, but unto God; for no one hears. Yet by the Spirit He speaks mysteries,” from which he gives one to understand that the Holy Spirit was speaking in those who spoke with different tongues. Later on, of course, he says: “In the Law it is written: In other tongues and other lips I will speak to this people; and neither so will they hear me, says the Lord.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit who speaks mysteries with diverse lips and tongues is God.
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| Adhuc. Post pauca subditur: si omnes prophetent, intret autem quis infidelis vel idiota, convincitur ab omnibus, diiudicatur ab omnibus: occulta enim cordis eius manifesta fiunt, et ita, cadens in faciem, adorabit Deum, pronuntians quod vere Deus in vobis sit. Patet autem per id quod praemisit, quod spiritus loquitur mysteria, quod manifestatio occultorum cordis a spiritu sancto sit. Quod est proprium divinitatis signum: dicitur enim Ierem. 17-9 pravum est cor hominis et inscrutabile: quis cognoscet illud? Ego dominus, scrutans corda et probans renes. Unde ex hoc indicio etiam infidelis perpendere dicitur quod ille qui haec occulta cordium loquitur, sit Deus. Ergo spiritus sanctus Deus est.
| [19] Furthermore, after a bit, this is added: “If all prophesy, and there come in one that believes not, or an unlearned person, he is convinced of all, he is judged of all. The secrets of his heart are made manifest; and so, falling down on his face, he will adore God, affirming that God is among you indeed” (1 Cor. 14:24-2-5). Clearly, of course, from what he had previously set down, “the Spirit speaks mysteries,” the manifestation of the secrets of the heart is from the Holy Spirit. And this is a proper mark of divinity, for we read in Jeremiah (17:9-10): “The heart of man is perverse... and inscrutable, who can know it? I am the Lord who search the heart and prove the reins: And so from this indication even an unbeliever (cf. 1 Cor. 14:24) is said to consider carefully that He who speaks these secrets of hearts is God. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is God.
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| Item. Parum post dicit: spiritus prophetarum prophetis subiecti sunt; non enim est dissensionis Deus, sed pacis. Gratiae autem prophetarum, quas spiritus prophetarum nominavit, a spiritu sancto sunt. Spiritus ergo sanctus, qui huiusmodi gratias sic distribuit ut ex eis non dissensio, sed pax sequatur, Deus esse ostenditur in hoc quod dicit, non est dissensionis Deus, sed pacis.
| [20] Again, a bit later, the Apostle says: “The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets. For God is not the God of dissension, but of peace” (1 Cor. 14:32-33). Of course, the graces of the Prophets which he named “the spirits of the prophets” are from the Holy Spirit. Therefore, he shows that the Holy Spirit who distributes graces of this kind in such wise that from them follows not dissension but peace is God by these words: “God is not the God of dissension, but of peace.”
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| Amplius. Adoptare in filios Dei non potest esse opus alterius nisi Dei. Nulla enim creatura spiritualis dicitur filius Dei per naturam, sed per adoptionis gratiam: unde et hoc opus filio Dei, qui verus Deus est, apostolus attribuit, ad Gal. 4, dicens: misit Deus filium suum, ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus. Spiritus autem sanctus est adoptionis causa: dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. 8-15: accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum, in quo clamamus, abba (pater). Ergo spiritus sanctus non est creatura, sed Deus.
| [21] Furthermore, to adopt as sons can be the work of no other than God. For no spiritual creature is called son of God by nature, but by the grace of adoption. Hence, the Apostle attributes this work to the Son of God who is true God: “God sent His Son that we might receive the adoption of sons” (Gal. 4:4-5). But the Holy Spirit is the cause of the adoption, as the Apostle says: “You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)” (Rom. 8:15). Therefore, the Holy Spirit is not a creature, but God.
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| Item. Si spiritus sanctus non est Deus, oportet quod sit aliqua creatura. Planum est autem quod non est creatura corporalis. Nec etiam spiritualis. Nulla enim creatura spirituali creaturae infunditur: cum creatura non sit participabilis sed magis participans. Spiritus autem sanctus infunditur sanctorum mentibus, quasi ab eis participatus: legitur enim et Christus eo plenus fuisse, et etiam apostoli. Non est ergo spiritus sanctus creatura, sed Deus.
| [22] Again, if the Holy Spirit is not God, He must be a creature. Plainly enough, He is not a bodily creature, And neither is He a spiritual creature, for no creature is infused into a spiritual creature, since a creature is not participable, but rather participating. The Holy Spirit, of course, is infused into the minds of the saints, as it were participated by them, for we read that Christ was full of Him (Luke 4:1) and even the Apostles (Acts 7:4). The Holy Spirit, therefore, is not a creature but God.
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| Si quis autem dicat praedicta opera, quae sunt Dei, spiritui sancto attribui non per auctoritatem ut Deo, sed per ministerium quasi creaturae: expresse hoc esse falsum apparet ex his quae apostolus dicit, I Cor. 12-6, dicens: divisiones operationum sunt, idem vero Deus qui operatur omnia in omnibus; et postea, connumeratis diversis donis Dei, subdit: haec omnia operatur unus atque idem spiritus, dividens singulis prout vult. Ubi manifeste expressit spiritum sanctum Deum esse: tum ex eo quod spiritum sanctum operari dicit quae supra dixerat Deum operari; tum ex hoc quod eum pro suae voluntatis arbitrio operari confitetur. Manifestum est igitur spiritum sanctum Deum esse.
| [23] But, if one says that the aforesaid works which are God’s are not attributed to the Holy Spirit in principalship as to God, but in ministry as it were to a creature, he says what is expressly false. And this is clear from the words of the Apostle: “There are diversities of operations, but the same God, who works all in all.” Afterwards, when the Apostle had enumerated the different gifts of God, he adds: “All these things one and the same Spirit works, dividing to every one according as He will” (1 Cor. 12:6, 11). Therein clearly he has set forth that the Holy Spirit is God: not only by saying that the Holy Spirit performs the works which he said before that God performs, but also by proclaiming that the Holy Spirit performs them according to a decision of His will. Manifestly, therefore, the Holy Spirit is God.
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Caput 18
Quod spiritus sanctus sit subsistens persona
| Chapter 18
THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS A SUBSISTENT PERSON
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| Sed quia quidam spiritum sanctum asserunt non esse personam subsistentem, sed vel ipsam divinitatem patris et filii, ut quidam Macedoniani dixisse perhibentur; vel etiam aliquam accidentalem perfectionem mentis a Deo nobis donatam, puta sapientiam vel caritatem, vel aliquid huiusmodi, quae participantur a nobis sicut quaedam accidentia creata: contra hoc ostendendum est spiritum sanctum non esse aliquid huiusmodi.
| [1] But, since some assert that the Holy Spirit is not a subsistent person, but, rather, the divinity of the Father and the Son (so some Macedonians are held to have said); or even an accidental perfection of the mind bestowed on us by God—wisdom, for instance, or charity or something of this sort (and these are participated by us as certain created accidents); one must on the contrary show that the Holy Spirit is nothing of this kind.
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| Non enim formae accidentales proprie operantur, sed magis habens eas pro suae arbitrio voluntatis: homo enim sapiens utitur sapientia cum vult. Sed spiritus sanctus operatur pro suae arbitrio voluntatis, ut ostensum est. Non igitur est aestimandus spiritus sanctus velut aliqua accidentalis perfectio mentis.
| [2] For accidental forms have no proper operations; instead, one has them in accord with the decision of his will, for the wise man uses wisdom when he wills. But the Holy Spirit operates in accord with the decision of His will. This has been shown. One must not, therefore, think of the Holy Spirit as an accidental perfection of the mind.
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| Item. Spiritus sanctus, ut ex Scripturis docemur, causa est omnium perfectionum humanae mentis. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. 5-5: caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis; et I ad Cor. 12-8 alii per spiritum datur sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae, secundum eundem spiritum, et sic de aliis. Non ergo spiritus sanctus est aestimandus quasi aliqua accidentalis perfectio mentis humanae, cum ipse omnium huiusmodi perfectionum causa existat.
| [3] The Holy Spirit, again, so we are taught by Scripture, is the cause of all the perfections of the human mind. For the Apostle says: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us” (Rom. 5:5)” and: “To one indeed, by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit” (1 Cor. 12:8), and so of the rest. The Holy Spirit, therefore, must not be thought of as an accidental perfection of the human mind, since He is, of all perfections of this kind, the existing cause.
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| Quod autem in nomine spiritus sancti designetur essentia patris et filii, ut sic a neutro personaliter distinguatur, repugnat his quae divina Scriptura de spiritu sancto tradit. Dicitur enim Ioan. 15-26, quod spiritus sanctus procedit a patre; et Ioan. 16-14, quod accipit a filio: quod non potest de divina essentia intelligi, cum essentia divina a patre non procedat, nec a filio accipiat. Oportet igitur dicere quod spiritus sanctus sit subsistens persona.
| [4] Of course, that in the name of the Holy Spirit the essence Of the Father and Son is designated so as to be personally distinguished from neither of them conflicts with what divine Scripture hands on to us about the Holy Spirit. It says that the Holy Spirit “proceeds from the Father” and that He receives from the Son (John 15:26; 16:14). And this cannot be understood of the divine essence, since the divine essence neither proceeds from the Father nor receives from the Son. One must, then, say that the Holy Spirit is a subsisting Person.
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| Item. Sacra Scriptura manifeste de spiritu sancto loquitur tanquam de persona divina subsistente: dicitur enim Act. 13-2: ministrantibus illis domino et ieiunantibus, dicit illis spiritus sanctus: segregate mihi Barnabam et Saulum in opus ad quod assumpsi eos; et infra: et ipsi quidem, missi a spiritu sancto, abierunt; et Act. 15-28, dicunt apostoli: visum est spiritui sancto et nobis nihil ultra imponere oneris vobis etc.; quae de spiritu sancto non dicerentur nisi esset subsistens persona. Est igitur spiritus sanctus subsistens persona.
| [5] Again, sacred Scripture manifestly speaks of the Holy Spirit as of a subsisting divine person, for it says: “As they were ministering to the Lord, and fasting, the Holy Spirit said to them: “Separate Me Saul and Barnabas, for the work whereunto I have taken them”; and later: “So they, being sent by the Holy Spirit, went” (Acts 13:2). And in Acts (15:28) the Apostles say: “It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us, to lay no further burden upon you,” and so forth; and these things would not be said of the Holy Spirit if He were not a subsistent person. The Holy Spirit is, therefore, a subsistent person.
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| Amplius. Cum pater et filius sint personae subsistentes et divinae naturae, spiritus sanctus non connumeraretur eisdem nisi et ipse esset persona subsistens in divina natura. Connumeratur autem eisdem: ut patet Matth. ult., dicente domino discipulis, euntes docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti; et II ad Cor. ult., gratia domini nostri Iesu Christi, et caritas Dei, et communicatio sancti spiritus, sit semper cum omnibus vobis; et I Ioan. ult., tres sunt qui testimonium dant in caelo, pater, verbum et spiritus sanctus, et hi tres unum sunt. Ex quo manifeste ostenditur quod non solum sit persona subsistens, sicut pater et filius, sed etiam cum eis essentiae habeat unitatem.
| [6] Furthermore, since the Father and Son are subsisting persons and of the divine nature, the Holy Spirit would not be numbered along with them unless He also were a person subsisting in the divine nature. He is numbered with them, of course. This is clear from Matthew (28:19), where our Lord says to the disciples: “Go, therefore, teach all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit”; and from 2 Corinthians (13:13): “The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity of God, and the communication of the Holy Spirit be with you all”; and from 1 John (5:7): “There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit.” From this it shows clearly that He is not only a subsistent person like the Father and the Son, but has unity of essence with them.
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| Posset autem aliquis contra praedicta calumniari, dicens aliud esse spiritum Dei, et aliud spiritum sanctum. Nam in quibusdam praemissarum auctoritatum nominatur spiritus Dei, in quibusdam vero spiritus sanctus. Sed quod idem sit spiritus Dei et spiritus sanctus, manifeste ostenditur ex verbis apostoli dicentis, I ad Cor. 2-10, ubi, cum praemisisset, nobis revelavit Deus per spiritum sanctum, ad huius confirmationem inducit: spiritus enim omnia scrutatur, etiam profunda Dei; et postea concludit: ita et quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei; ex quo manifeste apparet quod idem sit spiritus sanctus et spiritus Dei.
| [7] One could, of course, calumniate against the foregoing, saying that the “Spirit of God” is one thing and the “Holy Spirit” another. To be sure, in certain of the authorities set down, the “Spirit of God” is named, and in certain others “the Holy Spirit,” but the identity of the “Spirit of God” and “the Holy Spirit” is clearly shown from the words of the Apostle, when he had premised: “God has revealed them, by His Spirit,” by way of confirmation he says: “the Spirit searches all things, yes, the deep things of God”; and finally he concludes: “so the things also that are of God no man knows, but the Spirit of God” (1 Cor. 2:10-11). From this there is manifestly apparent the identity of the Holy Spirit and the Spirit of God.
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| Idem apparet ex hoc quod Matth. 10-20, dominus dicit: non estis vos qui loquimini, sed spiritus patris vestri qui loquitur in vobis. Loco autem horum verborum Marcus dicit: non estis vos loquentes, sed spiritus sanctus. Manifestum est igitur idem esse spiritum sanctum et spiritum Dei.
| [8] The same point is apparent from this: our Lord says in Matthew (10:20): “It is not you that speak but the Spirit of your Father that speaks in you.” But in place of these words Mark says (13:11): “It is not you that speak, but the Holy Spirit.” Manifestly, the Holy Spirit is the same as the Spirit of God.
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| Sic ergo, cum ex praemissis auctoritatibus multipliciter appareat spiritum sanctum non esse creaturam, sed verum Deum; manifestum est quod non cogimur dicere eodem modo esse intelligendum quod spiritus sanctus mentes sanctorum impleat et eos inhabitet, sicut Diabolus aliquos implere vel inhabitare dicitur: habetur enim Ioan. 13-27, de Iuda, quod post bucellam introivit in eo Satanas; et Act. 5-3 dicit Petrus, ut quidam libri habent: Anania, cur implevit Satanas cor tuum? Cum enim Diabolus creatura sit, ut ex superioribus est manifestum, non implet aliquem participatione sui; neque potest mentem inhabitare per suam substantiam; sed dicitur aliquos implere per effectum suae malitiae, unde et Paulus dicit ad quendam, Act. 13-10: o plene omni dolo et omni fallacia. Spiritus autem sanctus, cum Deus sit, per suam substantiam mentem inhabitat, et sui participatione bonos facit: ipse enim est sua bonitas, cum sit Deus; quod de nulla creatura verum esse potest. Nec tamen per hoc removetur quin per effectum suae virtutis sanctorum impleat mentes.
| [9] Since from the authorities set down it is clear in so many ways that the Holy Spirit is not a creature, but true God, it is accordingly manifest that we are not compelled to say that one must understand the Holy Spirit filling and dwelling in the minds of the saints in the same way that one understands the devil to be filling and dwelling in some minds. One finds in John (13:27): “After the morsel, Satan entered into him”; and in Acts (5:3) Peter says—so some books have it: “Ananias, why has Satan tempted your heart?” For, since the devil is a creature, as was manifested in the foregoing, he fills no one by a participation in himself, and he cannot dwell in a mind through his substance; rather, he is said to fill some men by the effect of his wickedness. Hence, Paul says to a certain one: “O full of all guile and of all deceit” (Acts 13:10). The Holy Spirit, of course, since He is God, dwells in a mind by His substance and makes men good by participation in Himself. For He is His own goodness, since He is God. And this can be true of no creature. Neither does this, for all that, change the fact that by the effect of His power He fills the minds of the holy.
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Caput 19
Quomodo intelligenda sunt quae de spiritu sancto dicuntur
| Chapter 19
HOW ONE MUST UNDERSTAND WHAT IS SAID ABOUT THE HOLY SPIRIT
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| Sanctarum igitur Scripturarum testimoniis edocti, hoc firmiter de spiritu sancto tenemus, quod verus sit Deus, subsistens, et personaliter distinctus a patre et filio. Oportet autem considerare qualiter huiusmodi veritas utcumque accipi debeat, ut ab impugnationibus infidelium defendatur.
| [1] Taught by holy Scripture, therefore, we maintain this firmly about the Holy Spirit: that He is true God, subsistent, personally distinct from the Father and the Son. But one ought to consider how a truth of this kind must be grasped somehow, in order to defend it from the attacks of unbelievers.
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| Ad cuius evidentiam praemitti oportet quod in qualibet intellectuali natura oportet inveniri voluntatem. Intellectus enim fit in actu per formam intelligibilem inquantum est intelligens, sicut res naturalis fit actu in esse naturali per propriam formam. Res autem naturalis per formam qua perficitur in sua specie, habet inclinationem in proprias operationes et proprium finem, quem per operationes consequitur: quale enim est unumquodque, talia operatur, et in sibi convenientia tendit. Unde etiam oportet quod ex forma intelligibili consequatur in intelligente inclinatio ad proprias operationes et proprium finem. Haec autem inclinatio in intellectuali natura voluntas est, quae est principium operationum quae in nobis sunt, quibus intelligens propter finem operatur: finis enim et bonum est voluntatis obiectum. Oportet igitur in quolibet intelligente inveniri etiam voluntatem.
| [2] To get at the evidence one must first premise that in every intellectual nature a will must be discovered. For an intellect is made to be in act by an intelligible form so far as it is understanding, as a natural thing is made to be in act in its natural being by its proper form. But a natural thing, through the form by which it is perfected in its species, has an inclination to its proper operations and to its proper end, which it achieves by operations, “for as everything is so does it operate,” and it tends to what is fitting for itself. Hence, also, from an intelligible form there must follow in one who understands an inclination to his proper operations and his proper end. Of course, this inclination in an intellectual nature is the will, which is the principle of operations in us, those by which he who understands operates for an end. For end and the good are the will’s object. One must, therefore, discover a will in everyone who understands.
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| Cum autem ad voluntatem plures actus pertinere videantur, ut desiderare, delectari, odire, et huiusmodi, omnium tamen amor et unum principium et communis radix invenitur. Quod ex his accipi potest. Voluntas enim, ut dictum est, sic se habet in rebus intellectualibus sicut naturalis inclinatio in rebus naturalibus, quae et naturalis appetitus dicitur. Ex hoc autem oritur inclinatio naturalis, quod res naturalis habet affinitatem et convenientiam secundum formam, quam diximus esse inclinationis principium, cum eo ad quod movetur, sicut grave cum loco inferiori. Unde etiam hinc oritur omnis inclinatio voluntatis, quod per formam intelligibilem aliquid apprehenditur ut conveniens vel afficiens. Affici autem ad aliquid, inquantum huiusmodi, est amare ipsum. Omnis igitur inclinatio voluntatis, et etiam appetitus sensibilis, ex amore originem habet. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid amamus, desideramus illud si absit, gaudemus autem cum adest, et tristamur cum ab eo impedimur, et odimus quae nos ab amato impediunt, et irascimur contra ea.
| [3] Although several acts seem to belong to the will, to desire, to delight in, to hate, and others of this kind, nevertheless for all of these love is found to be the one principle and the common root. This can be gathered from the following points. The will, as was said, is related to intellectual things as natural inclination to natural things (this is also called natural appetite). But natural inclination arises thus: The natural thing has an affinity and correspondence from its form (which we have called the principle of the inclination) with that to which it is moved. The heavy has such a relation with the lower place. Hence, also, every inclination of the will arises from this: by an intelligible form a thing is apprehended as suitable or affective. To be affected toward something—so far as it is of this kind—is to love that thing. Therefore, every inclination of will and even of sensible appetite has its origin from love. For from the fact that we love something we desire that thing if it be absent; we rejoice, of course, if it be present; and we are sad when we are kept from it; and we hate those things which keep us from the beloved, and grow angry against them.
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| Sic igitur quod amatur non solum est in intellectu amantis, sed etiam in voluntate ipsius: aliter tamen et aliter. In intellectu enim est secundum similitudinem suae speciei: in voluntate autem amantis est sicut terminus motus in principio motivo proportionato per convenientiam et proportionem quam habet ad ipsum. Sicut in igne quodammodo est locus sursum ratione levitatis, secundum quam habet proportionem et convenientiam ad talem locum: ignis vero generatus est in igne generante per similitudinem suae formae.
| [4] Thus, then, what is loved is not only in the intellect of the lover, but in his will as well; but in one way and another. It is in the intellect by reason of the likeness of its species; it is in the will of the lover, however, as the term of a movement is in its proportioned motive principle by reason of the suitability and proportion which the term has for that principle. just so, in a certain way, there is in fire the upper place by reason of that lightness which gives it proportion and suitability to such a place, but the fire which is generated is in the fire which generates by reason of the likeness of its form.
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| Quia igitur ostensum est quod in omni natura intellectuali est voluntas; Deus autem intelligens est, ut in primo ostensum est: oportet quod in ipso sit voluntas: non quidem quod voluntas Dei sit aliquid eius essentiae superveniens, sicut nec intellectus, ut supra ostensum est, sed voluntas Dei est ipsa eius substantia. Et cum intellectus etiam Dei sit ipsa eius substantia, sequitur quod una res sint in Deo intellectus et voluntas. Qualiter autem quae in aliis rebus plures res sunt, in Deo sint una res, ex his quae in primo dicta sunt, potest esse manifestum.
| [5] Since, then, it has now been shown that in every intellectual nature there is will, and that God, of course, is intelligent was shown in Book I, there must, then, be will in Him; the will of God, to be sure, is not something which accrues to His essence, just as His intellect is not, as was shown above, but the will of God is His very substance. And since the intellect of God, as well, is His very substance, it follows that the one thing in God is intellect and will. However, the manner in which what in other things are many things in God are one thing can be manifest from the points made in Book I.
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| Et quia ostensum est in primo quod operatio Dei sit ipsa eius essentia; et essentia Dei sit eius voluntas: sequitur quod in Deo non est voluntas secundum potentiam vel habitum, sed secundum actum. Ostensum est autem quod omnis actus voluntatis in amore radicatur. Unde oportet quod in Deo sit amor.
| [6] And because it was shown in Book I that the operation of God is His very essence, and that the essence of God is His will, it follows that will is not in God by way of potency, or of habit, but by way of act. It was shown, of course, that every act of will is rooted in love. Hence, in God there must be love.
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| Et quia, ut in primo ostensum est, proprium obiectum divinae voluntatis est eius bonitas, necesse est quod Deus primo et principaliter suam bonitatem et seipsum amet. Cum autem ostensum sit quod amatum necesse est aliqualiter esse in voluntate amantis; ipse autem Deus seipsum amat: necesse est quod ipse Deus sit in sua voluntate ut amatum in amante. Est autem amatum in amante secundum quod amatur; amare autem quoddam velle est; velle autem Dei est eius esse, sicut et voluntas eius est eius esse; esse igitur Dei in voluntate sua per modum amoris, non est esse accidentale, sicut in nobis, sed essentiale. Unde oportet quod Deus, secundum quod consideratur ut in sua voluntate existens, sit vere et substantialiter Deus.
| [7] And because, as was shown in Book I, the proper object of the divine will is His goodness, necessarily it is first and principally His goodness and Himself that God loves. But, since it has been shown that the beloved must somehow be in the will of the lover, and that God Himself loves Himself, it needs must be that God Himself is in His will as the beloved in the lover. But the beloved is in the lover so far as it is loved—an act of love, of course, is a kind of act of will—but the act of will of God is His being, just as His will is His being. Therefore, the being of God in His will by way of love is not an accidental one—as it is in us—but is essential being. And so it must be that God, when He is considered existing in His own will, is truly and substantially God.
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| Quod autem aliquid sit in voluntate ut amatum in amante, ordinem quendam habet ad conceptionem qua ab intellectu concipitur, et ad ipsam rem cuius intellectualis conceptio dicitur verbum: non enim amaretur aliquid nisi aliquo modo cognosceretur; nec solum amati cognitio amatur, sed secundum quod in se bonum est. Necesse est igitur quod amor quo Deus est in voluntate divina ut amatum in amante, et a verbo Dei, et a Deo cuius est verbum, procedat.
| [8] But a thing’s being in the will as a beloved in a lover bears a certain order to the conception by which the intellect conceives the thing, and to the thing itself whose intellectual conception is called a word. For it would not be loved unless it were somehow known; neither is the beloved’s knowledge alone loved, but the beloved as good in itself. Necessarily, therefore, does the love by which God is in the divine will as a beloved in a lover proceed both from the Word of God and from the God whose Word He is.
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| Cum autem ostensum sit quod amatum in amante non est secundum similitudinem speciei, sicut intellectum in intelligente; omne autem quod procedit ab altero per modum geniti, procedit secundum similitudinem speciei a generante: relinquitur quod processus rei ad hoc quod sit in voluntate sicut amatum in amante, non sit per modum generationis, sicut processus rei ad hoc quod sit in intellectu habet rationem generationis, ut supra ostensum est. Deus igitur procedens per modum amoris, non procedit ut genitus. Neque igitur filius dici potest.
| [9] Now, since it has been shown that the beloved is not in the lover by a likeness of species, as the thing understood is present in the one understanding, whereas whatever proceeds from another as one generated does proceed by a likeness of species from the generator, this follows: A thing’s proceeding in order to be in the will as the beloved is in the lover is not a proceeding by way of generation, just as a thing’s proceeding in order to be in the intellect does have the essentials of generation, as was shown above. Therefore, God proceeding by way of love does not proceed as begotten. And He, therefore, cannot be called Son.
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| Sed quia amatum in voluntate existit ut inclinans, et quodammodo impellens intrinsecus amantem in ipsam rem amatam; impulsus autem rei viventis ab interiori ad spiritum pertinet: convenit Deo per modum amoris procedenti ut spiritus dicatur eius, quasi quadam spiratione existente.
| [10] But, because the beloved in the will exists as inclining, and somehow inwardly impelling the lover toward the very thing beloved, and an impulse of a living thing from within belongs to a spirit, this is suitable: that God proceeding by way of love be called His “spirit; as it were a kind of existing spiration.
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| Hinc est quod apostolus spiritui et amori impulsum quendam attribuit: dicit enim, Rom. 8-14: qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt; et II ad Cor. 5-14. Caritas Christi urget nos.
| [11] Hence it is that the Apostle attributes to the Spirit and to Love a kind of impulse; for he says in Romans (8:14): “Whoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God,” and: “The charity of Christ presses us” (2 Cor. 5:14).
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| Quia vero omnis intellectualis motus a termino denominatur; amor autem praedictus est quo Deus ipse amatur: convenienter Deus per modum amoris procedens dicitur spiritus sanctus; ea enim quae Deo dicata sunt, sancta dici consueverunt.
| [12] However, since every intellectual motion is named from its term, and the love aforesaid is that by which God Himself is loved, quite fittingly is God proceeding by way of love called “Holy Spirit”; for the things assigned to God have customarily been called “holy.”
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Caput 21
De effectibus attributis spiritui sancto in sacra Scriptura respectu rationalis creaturae, quantum ad ea quae Deus nobis largitur
| Chapter 21
ON THE EFFECTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE HOLY SPIRIT IN SCRIPTURE REGARDING THE RATIONAL CREATURE, SO FAR AS GOD’S GIFTS TO US ARE CONCERNED
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| Considerandum est etiam, quantum ad effectus quos proprie in natura rationali facit, quod ex hoc quod divinae perfectioni utcumque assimilamur, huiusmodi perfectio a Deo nobis dari dicitur: sicut sapientia a Deo nobis donatur secundum quod divinae sapientiae utcumque assimilamur. Cum igitur spiritus sanctus procedat per modum amoris quo Deus seipsum amat, ut ostensum est; ex hoc quod huic amori assimilamur Deum amantes, spiritus sanctus a Deo nobis dari dicitur. Unde apostolus dicit, Rom. 5-5: caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis.
| [1] Looking to the effects which He properly produces in the rational nature, we must also give consideration to this fact: When we are somehow made like a divine perfection, perfection of this kind is said to be given us by God; so wisdom is said to be a gift from God to us when we are somehow made like the divine wisdom. Since, then, the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of the love by which God loves Himself, as was shown, from the fact that in loving God we are made like to this love, the Holy Spirit is said to be given to us by God. Hence the Apostle says: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Spirit, who, is given to us” (Rom. 5:5).
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| Sciendum tamen est quod ea quae a Deo in nobis sunt, reducuntur in Deum sicut in causam efficientem et exemplarem. In causam quidem efficientem, inquantum virtute operativa divina aliquid in nobis efficitur. In causam quidem exemplarem, secundum quod id quod in nobis a Deo est, aliquo modo Deum imitatur. Cum ergo eadem virtus sit patris et filii et spiritus sancti, sicut et eadem essentia; oportet quod omne id quod Deus in nobis efficit, sit, sicut a causa efficiente, simul a patre et filio et spiritu sancto. Verbum tamen sapientiae, quo Deum cognoscimus, nobis a Deo immissum, est proprie repraesentativum filii. Et similiter amor quo Deum diligimus, est proprium repraesentativum spiritus sancti. Et sic caritas quae in nobis est, licet sit effectus patris et filii et spiritus sancti, tamen quadam speciali ratione dicitur esse in nobis per spiritum sanctum.
| [2] One should realize, for all that, that what is in us from God is related to God as to an efficient and as to an exemplar cause. We say as to an efficient cause inasmuch as something is accomplished in us by the divine operative power. We say as to an exemplar cause so far as we are, thanks to that in us which is from God, imitating God. Since, then, the power of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit is identical just as the essence is, necessarily whatever God effects in us must be, as from an efficient cause, simultaneously from the Father and the Son and the, Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, the “word of wisdom” (cf. Dan. 1:20) by which we know God, and which God sends into us, is properly representative of the Son. And in like fashion the love by which we love God is properly representative of the Holy Spirit. And thus the charity which is in us, although it is an effect of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, is nonetheless for a special sort of reason said to be in us through the Holy Spirit.
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| Quia vero effectus divini non solum divina operatione esse incipiunt, sed etiam per eam tenentur in esse, ut ex superioribus patet, nihil autem operari potest ubi non est, oportet enim operans et operatum in actu esse simul, sicut movens et motum: necesse est ut, ubicumque est aliquis effectus Dei, ibi sit ipse Deus effector. Unde, cum caritas, qua Deum diligimus, sit in nobis per spiritum sanctum, oportet quod ipse etiam spiritus sanctus in nobis sit, quandiu caritas in nobis est. Unde apostolus dicit, I Cor. 3-16: nescitis quoniam templum Dei estis, et spiritus sanctus habitat in vobis? Cum igitur per spiritum sanctum Dei amatores efficiamur; omne autem amatum in amante est, inquantum huiusmodi: necesse est quod per spiritum sanctum pater etiam et filius in nobis habitent. Unde dominus dicit, Ioan. 14-23: ad eum veniemus, scilicet diligentem Deum, et mansionem apud eum faciemus. Et I Ioan. 3-24, dicitur: in hoc scimus quoniam manet in nobis de spiritu quem dedit nobis.
| [3] However the divine effects not only begin to be by the divine operation, by it they are also maintained in being (as is clear from the foregoing). And nothing operates where it is not, for the agent and that acted upon must be simultaneously in act, just as the mover and the moved. Necessarily, then, wherever there is an effect of God, there God Himself is efficient. Hence, since the charity by which we love God is in us by the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit Himself must also be in us, so long as the charity is in us. And so the Apostle says: “Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwells in you?” (1 Cor. 3:16). Therefore, since we are made lovers of God by the Holy Spirit, and every beloved is in the lover as such, by the Holy Spirit necessarily the Father and the Son dwell in us also. And so our Lord says: “We will come to him”—He means to one who loves God—“and will make our abode with him” (John 14:23). And in 1 John. (3:7.4) we read: “In this we know that He abides in us, by the Spirit which He has given us.”
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| Rursus. Manifestum est quod Deus maxime amat illos quos sui amatores per spiritum sanctum constituit, non enim tantum bonum nisi amando conferret, unde Proverb. 8-17 dicitur ex persona domini: ego diligentes me diligo; non quasi nos prius dilexerimus Deum, sed quoniam ipse prior dilexit nos, ut dicitur I Ioan. 4-10. Omne autem amatum in amante est. Necesse est igitur quod per spiritum sanctum non solum Deus sit in nobis, sed etiam nos in Deo. Unde dicitur I Ioan. 4-16: qui manet in caritate in Deo manet, et Deus in eo; et iterum: in hoc intelligimus quoniam in eo manemus, et ipse in nobis, quoniam de spiritu suo dedit nobis.
| [4] Moreover, God manifestly loves in the greatest degree those whom He has made lovers of Himself through the Holy Spirit, for He would not confer so great a good save by loving us. Hence, we read in Proverbs (8:17) from the Person of God: “I love those who love Me”; “not as though we had loved God, but because He has first loved us,” as we read in 1 John (4:10). Of course, every beloved is in a lover. Therefore, by the Holy Spirit not only is God in us, but we also are in God. Hence, we read in 1 John (4:16, 13): “He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him;” and: “In this we know that we abide in Him and He in us: because He has given us of His Spirit.”
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| Est autem hoc amicitiae proprium, quod amico aliquis sua secreta revelet. Cum enim amicitia coniungat affectus, et duorum faciat quasi cor unum, non videtur extra cor suum aliquis illud protulisse quod amico revelat: unde et dominus dicit discipulis, Ioan. 15-15: iam non dicam vos servos, sed amicos meos: quia omnia quae audivi a patre meo, nota feci vobis. Quia igitur per spiritum sanctum amici Dei constituimur, convenienter per spiritum sanctum hominibus dicuntur revelari divina mysteria. Unde apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. 2-9 scriptum est quod oculus non vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se; nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum sanctum.
| [5] Of course, this is the proper mark of friendship: that one reveal his secrets to his friend. For, since charity unites affections and makes, as it were, one heart of two, one seems not to have dismissed from his heart that which he reveals to a friend; and so our Lord says to His disciples: “I will not now call you servants but friends: because all things whatsoever I have heard of My Father I have made known to you” (John 15:15). Therefore, since by the Holy Spirit we are established as friends of God, fittingly enough it is by the Holy Spirit that men are said to receive the revelation of the divine mysteries. Hence, the Apostle says: “It is written that eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither has it entered into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for them that love Him. But to us God has revealed them, by His Spirit” (1 Cor. 2:9-10).
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| Et quia ex his quae homo novit, formatur eius loquela, convenienter etiam per spiritum sanctum homo loquitur divina mysteria: secundum illud I Cor. 14-2: spiritu loquitur mysteria; et Matth. 10-20: non enim vos estis qui loquimini, sed spiritus patris vestri qui loquitur in vobis. Et de prophetis dicitur II Petr. 1-21, quod spiritu sancto inspirati locuti sunt sancti Dei homines. Unde etiam in symbolo fidei dicitur de spiritu sancto: qui locutus est per prophetas.
| [6] It is from the things a man knows that his speech is formed; fittingly, therefore, a man speaks the mysteries through the Holy Spirit. Hence, the words of 1 Corinthians (14:2): “By the Spirit He speaks mysteries”; and Matthew (10:20): “It is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaks in you.” And of prophets, 2 Peter (1:21) says that “the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit.” Hence, also, in the Creed of our faith we say of the Holy Spirit: “Who spoke through the prophets.”
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| Non solum autem est proprium amicitiae quod amico aliquis revelet sua secreta propter unitatem affectus, sed eadem unitas requirit quod etiam ea quae habet, amico communicet: quia, cum homo amicum habeat ut se alterum, necesse est quod ei subveniat sicut et sibi sua ei communicans; unde et proprium amicitiae esse ponitur velle et facere bonum amico; secundum illud I Ioan. 3-17: qui habuerit substantiam huius mundi, et viderit fratrem suum necessitatem habentem, et clauserit viscera sua ab eo: quomodo caritas Dei manet in eo? Hoc autem maxime in Deo habet locum, cuius velle est efficax ad effectum. Et ideo convenienter omnia dona Dei per spiritum sanctum nobis donari dicuntur: secundum illud I Cor. 12-8: alii datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae; alii autem sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum; et postea, multis enumeratis: haec omnia operatur unus atque idem spiritus, dividens singulis prout vult.
| [7] Now, it is not only proper to love that one reveal his secrets to a friend by reason of their unity in affection, but the same unity requires that what he has he have in common with the friend. For, “since a man has a friend as another self,” he must help the friend as he does himself, making his own possessions common with the friend, and so one takes this as the property of friendship “to will and to do the good for a friend.” This agrees with 1 John (3:17): “He who has the substance of this world, and sees his brother in need, and shuts up his bowels from him: how does the charity of God abide in him?” But such is especially the case with God whose will is efficacious on its effect. Therefore, it is fitting that all the gifts of God are said to be gifts from the Holy Spirit; thus, in 1 Corinthians (12:8, 11): “To one, indeed, by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit”; and later on, having mentioned many, it says: “One and the same Spirit works, dividing to every one according as He will.”
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| Manifestum est autem quod, sicut ad hoc quod corpus aliquod ad locum ignis perveniat, oportet quod igni assimiletur levitatem acquirens, ex qua motu ignis proprio moveatur; ita ad hoc quod homo ad beatitudinem divinae fruitionis, quae Deo propria est secundum suam naturam, perveniat, necesse est, primo quidem quod per spirituales perfectiones Deo assimiletur; et deinde secundum eas operetur; et sic tandem praedictam beatitudinem consequetur. Dona autem spiritualia nobis per spiritum sanctum dantur, ut ostensum est. Et sic per spiritum sanctum Deo configuramur; et per ipsum ad bene operandum habiles reddimur; et per eundem ad beatitudinem nobis via paratur. Quae tria apostolus insinuat nobis, II Cor. 1, dicens: unxit nos Deus; et signavit nos; et dedit pignus spiritus in cordibus nostris. Et Ephes. 1-13 signati estis spiritu promissionis sancto, qui est pignus hereditatis nostrae. Signatio enim ad similitudinem configurationis pertinere videtur; unctio autem ad habilitatem hominis ad perfectas operationes; pignus autem ad spem qua ordinamur in caelestem hereditatem, quae est beatitudo perfecta.
| [8] This, too, is manifest: just as, to get a body to the place of fire, it must be likened to fire by acquiring that lightness according to which fire is moved by its own motion; so also, to get a man to the beatitude of divine enjoyment which is proper to God in His own nature, these are necessary: first, that by spiritual perfections he be likened to God; then, that he operate with these perfections; and thus, lastly, achieve that beatitude we mentioned. Of course, the spiritual gifts are given to us by the Holy Spirit, as was shown. And thus by the Holy Spirit we are configured to God and through Him we are made ready for good operation. And by the same Spirit the road to beatitude is opened to us. The Apostle implies all three of these when he says: “He who confirms us... is God who also has sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts” (2 Cor. 1:21, 22). And in Ephesians (1:13, 14): ‘You were signed with the Holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance: For the “signing” seems to belong to the likeness of configuration; the “confirming” to man’s readiness for perfect operation; the “pledge,” of course, to the hope by which we are ordered to the heavenly inheritance, and this is perfect beatitude.
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| Et quia ex benevolentia quam quis habet ad aliquem, contingit quod eum sibi adoptat in filium, ut sic ad eum hereditas adoptantis pertineat; convenienter spiritui sancto adoptio filiorum Dei attribuitur; secundum illud Rom. 8-15: accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum, in quo clamamus, abba (pater).
| [9] Further, since out of the good will which one has to another it comes about that he adopt that other as his son—and so the inheritance belongs to that other as adopted—it is fitting that the adoption of the sons of God is attributed to the Holy Spirit, in the words of Romans (8:15): “You have received the Spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father).”
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| Per hoc autem quod aliquis alterius amicus constituitur, omnis offensa removetur, amicitiae enim offensa contrariatur: unde dicitur Proverb. 10-12: universa delicta operit caritas. Cum igitur per spiritum sanctum Dei amici constituamur, consequens est quod per ipsum nobis a Deo remittantur peccata: et ideo dominus dicit discipulis, Ioan. 20-22: accipite spiritum sanctum: quorum remiseritis peccata, remittentur. Et ideo Matth. 12-31, blasphemantibus in spiritum sanctum peccatorum remissio denegatur, quasi non habentibus illud per quod homo remissionem consequitur peccatorum.
| [10] Of course, by the fact that one is established as the friend of another, every offense is removed, because friendship and offense are contraries. Thus, we read in Proverbs (10:12): “Charity covers all sins.” Therefore, since we are established as friends of God by the Holy Spirit, it is by Him that God remits our sins, and so our Lord says to His disciples (John 20:22-23): “Receive the Holy Spirit. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven.” Therefore, also, in Matthew (12:31) blasphemers against the Holy Spirit are denied the remission of sins, as though they do not have that by which a man achieves the remission of his sins.
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| Inde etiam est quod per spiritum sanctum dicimur renovari, et purgari, sive lavari: secundum illud Psalmi: emitte spiritum tuum et creabuntur, et renovabis faciem terrae; et Ephes. 4-23: renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae; et Isaiae 4-4: si abluerit dominus sordes filiorum Sion, et sanguinem filiarum laverit de medio eius, in spiritu iudicii et spiritu ardoris.
| [11] Hence, also, it is by the Holy Spirit that we are said to be renewed, and cleansed or washed; as the Psalmist has it: “Send forth your Spirit, and they shall be created, and You shall renew the face of the earth” (Ps. 103:30); and Ephesians (4:23): “Be renewed in the Spirit of your mind”; and Isaiah (4:4): “If the Lord shall wash away the filth of the sons of Zion and cleanse away the blood of her daughters in the midst by the Spirit of judgment and the Spirit of burning.”
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Caput 23
Solutio rationum supra inductarum contra divinitatem spiritus sancti
| Chapter 23
AN ANSWER TO THE ARGUMENTS GIVEN ABOVE AGAINST THE DIVINITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT
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| Restat autem solvere supra positas rationes, quibus concludi videbatur quod spiritus sanctus sit creatura, et non Deus.
| [1] One must now answer the arguments previously given, those in which the conclusion seemed to be that the Holy Spirit is a creature, and not God.
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| Circa quod considerandum est primo, quod nomen spiritus a respiratione animalium sumptum videtur, in qua aer cum quodam motu infertur et emittitur. Unde nomen spiritus ad omnem impulsum et motum vel cuiuscumque aerei corporis trahitur: et sic ventus dicitur spiritus, secundum illud Psalmi, ignis, grando, nix, glacies, spiritus procellarum, quae faciunt verbum eius. Sic etiam vapor tenuis diffusus per membra ad eorum motus, spiritus vocatur. Rursus, quia aer invisibilis est, translatum est ulterius spiritus nomen ad omnes virtutes et substantias invisibiles et motivas. Et propter hoc et anima sensibilis, et anima rationalis, et Angeli, et Deus, spiritus dicuntur: et proprie Deus per modum amoris procedens, quia amor virtutem quandam motivam insinuat. Sic igitur quod Amos dicit, creans spiritum, de vento intelligit: ut nostra translatio expressius habet; quod etiam consonat ei quod praemittitur, formans montes. Quod vero Zacharias de Deo dicit, quod est creans, vel fingens spiritum hominis in eo, de anima humana intelligit. Unde concludi non potest quod spiritus sanctus sit creatura.
| [2] In this matter our first consideration must be that the name “spirit” seems to be taken from the respiration of animals, in which with some change air is taken in and expelled. And so the name “spirit” is extended to every impulse and movement of every single airy body; thus, the wind is called a “spirit” in the words of the Psalmist: “Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds which fulfill His word” (Ps. 148:8). Thus, also, the fine vapor diffused through the members for their movements is called “spirit.” Again, because air is invisible, the name “spirit” was carried further to all invisible and motive powers and substances. And on this account the sensible soul, the rational soul, the angels, and God are called “spirits”—and properly God proceeding by way of love, because love implies a kind of moving force. Accordingly, one understands the saying of Amos, “creating a spirit,” as referring to the wind; so our translation more expressly says, and this is also harmonious with what goes before: “forming mountains.” But what Zechariah says about God “creating” or “forming the spirit of man in him” one understands of the human soul. Hence, the conclusion cannot be that the Holy Spirit is a creature.
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| Similiter autem nec ex hoc quod dominus dicit de spiritu sancto, non loquetur a semetipso, sed quaecumque audiet loquetur, concludi potest quod sit creatura. Ostensum est enim quod spiritus sanctus est Deus de Deo procedens. Unde oportet quod essentiam suam ab alio habeat: sicut et de filio Dei dictum est supra. Et sic, cum in Deo et scientia et virtus et operatio Dei sit eius essentia, omnis filii et spiritus sancti scientia et virtus et operatio est ab alio: sed filii a patre tantum, spiritus autem sancti a patre et filio. Quia igitur una de operationibus spiritus sancti est quod loquatur in sanctis viris, ut ostensum est, propter hoc dicitur quod non loquitur a semetipso, quia a se non operatur. Audire autem ipsius est accipere scientiam, sicut et essentiam, a patre et filio, eo quod nos per auditum scientiam accipimus: est enim consuetum in Scriptura ut divina per modum humanorum tradantur. Nec movere oportet quod dicit, audiet, quasi de futuro loquens, cum accipere spiritum sanctum sit aeternum: nam aeterno verba cuiuslibet temporis aptari possunt, eo quod aeternitas totum tempus complectitur.
| [3] In the same way, of course, one cannot from our Lord’s saying about the Holy Spirit, “He shall not speak of Himself; but what things soever He shall hear, He shall speak,” conclude that the Holy Spirit is a creature. For it was shown that the Holy Spirit is God. Hence, He must have His essence from another, just as we said about the Son of God above. And thus, since in God the knowledge and the power and the operation of God are His essence, in the Son and in the Holy Spirit all the knowledge and power and operation are from another. But the Son’s is from the Father only; that of the Holy Spirit is from the Father and from the Son. Therefore, since one of the operations of the Holy Spirit is His speaking in saintly men, as was shown, it is on this score said that “He shall not speak of Himself,” since He does not operate of Himself. “To bear,” of course, in His case is to receive knowledge, as He does essence, from the Father and the Son; and this because we receive knowledge by bearing, for it is customary in Scripture to deal with things divine in the fashion of things human. Nor need one be disturbed by His saying: “He shall hear,” speaking of future time, so to say. For the Holy Spirit receives eternally, and the verbs of any tense can be applied to the eternal, because eternity embraces the whole of time.
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| Secundum eadem etiam apparet quod missio qua spiritus sanctus mitti dicitur a patre et filio, non potest concludere eum esse creaturam. Dictum est enim supra quod filius Dei secundum hoc missus fuisse dicitur, quod in carne visibili hominibus apparuit, et sic novo quodam modo fuit in mundo, quo prius non fuerat, scilicet visibiliter, in quo tamen fuerat semper invisibiliter ut Deus. Quod autem hoc filius ageret, ei a patre fuit: unde et secundum hoc a patre dicitur missus. Sic autem et spiritus sanctus visibiliter apparuit: vel in specie columbae super Christum in Baptismo; vel in linguis igneis super apostolos. Et licet non fuerit factus columba vel ignis, sicut filius factus est homo; tamen sicut in signis quibusdam ipsius in huiusmodi visibilibus speciebus apparuit; et sic etiam ipse quodam novo modo, scilicet visibiliter, in mundo fuit. Et hoc ei fuit a patre et filio: unde et ipse a patre et filio dicitur missus. Quod non minorationem in ipso, sed processionem ostendit.
| [4] Following the same points, it is also clear that the sending of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son does Hot justify concluding that He is a creature. For it was said above that in this the Son of God is said to have been sent: that He appeared to men in visible flesh. Thus, He was in a new kind of fashion in the world, a fashion in which previously He had not been—namely, visibly; and for all that He had always been in it invisibly as God. The Son’s doing so, of course, was His from the Father, and so in this He is said to have been sent by the Father. Thus, of course, the Holy Spirit visibly appeared: “as a dove” (Mat. 3:1.6) above Christ at His baptism, or “in tongues of fire” (Acts 2:3) above the Apostles. And, granted He did not become a dove or a fire as the Son became man, He nevertheless did appear in certain signs of His own in visible appearances Of this kind; thus, He also .in a new kind of fashion—namely, visibly—was in the world. And this presence was His from the Father and the Son; wherefore, He, too, is called sent by the Father and the Son. Yet this indicates not His being the lesser, but His proceeding.
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| Est tamen et alius modus quo tam filius quam spiritus sanctus invisibiliter mitti dicuntur. Patet enim ex dictis quod filius procedit a patre per modum notitiae, qua Deus cognoscit seipsum; et spiritus sanctus procedit a patre et filio per modum amoris, quo Deus amat seipsum. Unde, sicut dictum est, cum aliquis per spiritum sanctum amator Dei efficitur, spiritus sanctus est inhabitator ipsius: et sic quodam novo modo in homine est, scilicet secundum novum proprium effectum ipsum inhabitans. Et quod hunc effectum in homine faciat spiritus sanctus, est ei a patre et filio: et propter hoc a patre et filio invisibiliter dicitur mitti. Et pari ratione, in mente hominis filius dicitur mitti invisibiliter, cum aliquis sic in divina cognitione constituitur quod ex tali cognitione Dei amor procedat in homine. Unde patet quod nec iste etiam modus missionis in filio aut spiritu sancto minorationem inducit, sed solum processionem ab alio.
| [5] Nevertheless, there is another way in which both the Son and the Holy Spirit are said to be invisibly sent. For from what has been said it is plain that the Son proceeds from the Father by way of the knowledge by which God knows Himself, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son by way of the love by which God loves Himself. Hence, as was said,” when by the Holy Spirit one is made a lover of God, the Holy Spirit is dwelling within that one, and thus in a new kind of way He is in a man: to wit, dwelling in the man according to a new proper effect. And that the Holy Spirit produce this effect in man is His from the Father and the Son; and on this account He is said to be sent invisibly by the Father and the Son. And reasoning equally, in a human mind the Son is said to be invisibly sent when a man is in such wise established in the divine knowledge that the love of God comes forth in the man. Hence, clearly, neither does that fashion of being sent indicate in the Son or in the Holy Spirit His being the lesser, but His proceeding from another.
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| Similiter etiam nec spiritum sanctum a divinitate excludit quod pater et filius interdum connumerantur, non facta mentione de spiritu sancto: sicut nec filium a divinitate excludit quod interdum fit mentio de patre, non facta mentione de filio. Per hoc enim tacite Scriptura insinuat quod quicquid, ad divinitatem pertinens, de uno trium dicitur, de omnibus est intelligendum, eo quod sunt unus Deus. Nec etiam potest Deus pater sine verbo et amore intelligi, nec e converso: et propter hoc in uno trium omnes tres intelliguntur. Unde et interdum fit mentio de solo filio, in eo quod commune est tribus: sicut est illud Matth. 11-27, neque patrem quis novit nisi filius: cum tamen et pater et spiritus sanctus patrem cognoscant. Similiter etiam de spiritu sancto dicitur I Cor. 2-11: quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei, cum tamen certum sit quod ab hac cognitione divinorum neque pater neque filius excludantur.
| [6] Similarly, also, the Holy Spirit is not excluded from the Divinity by the occasional connumeration of the Father and the Son without mention of the Holy Spirit, just as the Son is not excluded from the Divinity by occasional mention of the Father without the Son. In this way Scripture tacitly suggests that whatever relating to Divinity is said of one of the Three must be understood of all, because they are one God. Nor is it possible to understand God the Father without a Word and a Love, nor is the converse possible. For this reason, in one of the Three all Three are understood. Hence, mention occasionally is made of the Son on a point common to the Three; such is the case in Matthew (11:27): “Neither does any one know the Father, but the Son,” although both the Father and the Holy Spirit know the Father. In the same way, we read about the Holy Spirit in 1 Corinthians (2:11): “The things... of God no one knows, but the Spirit of God,” whereas it is certain that from this cognition of Divinity neither the Father nor the Son is excluded.
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| Patet etiam quod non potest ostendi spiritus sanctus esse creatura per hoc quod de ipso in Scriptura sacra aliqua ad motum pertinentia dicta inveniuntur. Sunt enim accipienda metaphorice. Sic enim et Deo aliquando Scriptura sacra motum attribuit: ut est illud Gen. 3-8, cum audissent vocem domini deambulantis in Paradiso; et 18-21, descendam, et videbo utrum clamorem opere compleverint. Quod ergo dicitur, spiritus domini ferebatur super aquas, intelligendum est eo modo dictum esse sicut dicitur quod voluntas fertur in volitum, et amor in amatum. Quamvis et hoc quidam non de spiritu sancto, sed de aere intelligere velint, qui habet naturalem locum super aquam, unde ad eius multimodas transmutationes significandas, dictum est quod ferebatur super aquas. Quod etiam dicitur, effundam de spiritu meo super omnem carnem, ea ratione dictum esse oportet intelligi qua spiritus sanctus dicitur mitti hominibus a patre vel filio, ut dictum est. In verbo autem effusionis abundantia effectus spiritus sancti intelligitur; et quod non stabit in uno, sed ad plures deveniet, a quibus etiam quodammodo in alios derivetur, sicut patet in his quae corporaliter effunduntur.
| [7] Clearly, also, one cannot show that the Holy Spirit is a creature because one finds sacred Scripture saying things about Him which pertain to motion. They must be taken metaphorically. For sometimes, also, sacred Scripture attributes motion to God; for example, Genesis (3:8; 18:21): “When they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in paradise; and later: “I will go down and see whether they have done according to the cry that is come to Me.” Therefore, the saying, “the Spirit of God was borne over the waters,” must be understood to be said as the will is said to be borne on the willed, or the love on the beloved. This, also, by the way, some choose not to understand of the Holy Spirit, but of the air which has its natural place above the water, and so it was to indicate its manifold mutation that Scripture said it “was moved over the waters.” This further saying, “I will pour out My Spirit upon all flesh,” must be understood as said of the way in which the Holy Spirit is sent to men by the Father and the Son. This was mentioned. Of course, in the word, “poured out,” the abundance of the effect of the Holy Spirit is grasped: He will not be stopped at one but will move on to many, and from these also somehow to others; this is clear when things are poured out corporeally.
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| Similiter autem quod dicitur, auferam de spiritu tuo tradamque eis, non ad ipsam essentiam seu personam spiritus sancti referendum est, cum indivisibilis sit: sed ad ipsius effectus, secundum quos in nobis habitat, qui in homine possunt augeri et minui; non tamen ita quod id quod subtrahitur uni, idem numero alteri conferatur sicut in rebus corporalibus accidit; sed quia aliquid simile potest accrescere uni in quo alii decrescit. Nec tamen requiritur quod ad hoc quod accrescat uni, alteri subtrahatur: quia res spiritualis potest simul absque detrimento cuiuslibet a pluribus possideri. Unde nec intelligendum est quod de donis spiritualibus oportuerit aliquid subtrahi Moysi ad hoc quod aliis conferretur, sed ad actum sive ad officium referendum est: quia quod spiritus sanctus prius per solum Moysen effecerat, postea per plures implevit.
| [8] In like manner, the saying, “I will take of your Spirit, and will give to them,” must not be referred to the essence or person of the Holy Spirit, since He is indivisible. The reference is to His effects, by which He dwells in us, and these can be increased or diminished in a man: not with the result, for all that, that what is subtracted from one is bestowed on another remaining numerically identical (this happens in bodily things), but so that a like thing may increase in one which decreases in another. Nor does this demand that to increase the effect in one it must be subtracted from another, for a spiritual thing can be possessed by many simultaneously without any loss. Hence, concerned with spiritual gifts, one must not understand that something was withdrawn from Moses to be conferred on others; the reference is rather to his act or office, for what the Holy Spirit had previously done through Moses alone He later effected through many.
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| Sic etiam nec Elisaeus petiit ut spiritus sancti essentia seu persona duplicata augeretur: sed ut duos effectus spiritus sancti qui fuerant in Elia, scilicet prophetia et operatio miraculorum, essent etiam in ipso. Quamvis etiam non sit inconveniens quod effectum spiritus sancti unus alio abundantius participet, secundum duplam vel quantamcumque aliam proportionem: cum mensura utriusque sit finita. Non tamen hoc praesumpsisset Elisaeus petere, ut in effectu spirituali superaret magistrum.
| Thus, also, Elishah did not beg that the essence or person of the Holy Spirit be increased by duplication, but that the twofold effect of the Holy Spirit which had been in Elijah—namely, prophecy and the working of miracles—be also in himself. To be sure, there is no awkwardness in one’s participating in the Holy Spirit more abundantly than another, be it by the double or by any other ratio whatever, for the measure in each participant is finite. For all that, Elishah would not have had the presumption to ask that in a spiritual effect he should be greater than his master.
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| Patet etiam ex consuetudine sacrae Scripturae quod per quandam similitudinem humani animi passiones transferuntur in Deum: sicut dicitur in Psalmo: iratus est furore dominus in populum suum. Dicitur enim Deus iratus per similitudinem effectus: punit enim, quod et irati faciunt; unde et ibidem subditur: et tradidit eos in manus gentium. Sic et spiritus sanctus contristari dicitur per similitudinem effectus: deserit enim peccatores, sicut contristati deserunt contristantes.
| [9] Again, it is plainly the custom of sacred Scripture to pass over into God a likeness to the passions of the human spirit; we read in the Psalms (105:40-41): “And the Lord was exceedingly angry with His people.” God is said to be angered by similarity in the effect, for He punishes, which is what the angered do; so this is added below: “And He delivered them into the hands of the nations.” Thus, the Holy Spirit is said to be ‘made sorrowful,” for He leaves sinners as those who are made sorrowful leave those who make them sorrowful.
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| Est etiam consuetus modus loquendi in sacra Scriptura ut illud Deo attribuatur quod in homine facit: secundum illud Gen. 22-12: nunc cognovi quod timeas dominum, idest, nunc cognoscere feci. Et hoc modo dicitur quod spiritus sanctus postulat, quia postulantes facit: facit enim amorem Dei in cordibus nostris, ex quo desideramus ipso frui, et desiderantes postulamus.
| [10] It is also the usual manner of speech in sacred Scripture to attribute to God what He does in man; hence, Genesis (22:12): “Now I know that you fear God”—that is, “now I have made you know.” And in this way the Holy Spirit is said to petition, for He makes others petition; He makes the love of God be in our hearts; out of this we desire to enjoy Him, and in our desiring we petition.
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| Cum autem spiritus sanctus procedat per modum amoris quo seipsum Deus amat; eodem autem amore Deus se et alia propter suam bonitatem amat: manifestum est quod ad spiritum sanctum pertinet amor quo Deus nos amat. Similiter etiam et amor quo nos Deum amamus: cum nos Dei faciat amatores, ut ex dictis patet. Et quantum ad utrumque, spiritui sancto competit donari. Ratione quidem amoris quo Deus nos amat, eo modo loquendi quo unusquisque dicitur dare amorem suum alicui cum eum amare incipit:- quamvis Deus neminem ex tempore amare incipiat, si respiciatur ad voluntatem divinam qua nos amat; effectus tamen sui amoris ex tempore causatur in aliquo, cum eum ad se trahit. Ratione autem amoris quo nos Deum amamus, quia hunc amorem spiritus sanctus facit in nobis: unde secundum hunc amorem in nobis habitat, ut ex dictis patet, et sic eum habemus ut cuius ope fruimur. Et quia hoc est spiritui sancto a patre et filio, quod per amorem quem in nobis causat, in nobis sit et habeatur a nobis, convenienter dicitur a patre et filio nobis dari. Nec per hoc patre et filio minor ostenditur: sed ab ipsis habet originem. Dicitur etiam et a seipso dari nobis, inquantum amorem secundum quem nos inhabitat, simul cum patre et filio in nobis causat.
| [11] Of course, since the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of the love by which God loves Himself, and by that same love and for His own goodness God loves Himself and other things, manifestly that love pertains to the Holy Spirit, the love by which God loves us. So, also, does the love by which we love God, for He makes us lovers of God. This has been explained. It is in regard to each of these loves that “to be bestowed” is fitting to the Holy Spirit. It is fitting by reason of the love by which God loves us in that manner of speech wherein each is said “to give his love” to someone when he begins to love him. Although there is no one whom God begins to love in time, if one considers the divine will by which He loves us, there is, nevertheless, an effect of His love caused in time in the one whom He draws to Himself. It is fitting to the Holy Spirit by reason of the love by which we love God, for the Holy Spirit makes this love in us. Hence, in accord with this love, He dwells in us—clearly from what has been said—and so we possess Him as one whose resources we enjoy. Now, this is in the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son: that by the love which He causes in us He be in us and be possessed by us. Fittingly, therefore, He is said “to be bestowed” upon us by the Father and the Son. Nor does this show Him to be one lesser than the Father and the Son, but to be one who has His origin from them. He is said also to be given us even by Himself in that He causes in us the love by which He dwells in us together with the Father and the Son.
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| Quamvis autem spiritus sanctus verus sit Deus, et veram naturam divinam habeat a patre et filio, non tamen oportet quod filius sit. Filius enim dicitur aliquis ex eo quod genitus est: unde, si res aliqua naturam alterius ab eo acciperet non per genituram, sed per alium quemcumque modum, ratione filiationis careret; ut puta si aliquis homo, virtute sibi divinitus ad hoc concessa, faceret hominem ex aliqua sui corporis parte, vel etiam exteriori modo, sicut facit artificiata, productus homo producentis filius non diceretur, quia non procederet ab eo ut natus. Processio autem spiritus sancti rationem nativitatis non habet, ut supra ostensum est. Unde spiritus sanctus, licet a patre et filio divinam naturam habeat, non tamen eorum filius dici potest.
| [12] Although the Holy Spirit is, of course, true God and has the true divine nature from the Father and the Son, He need not, for all that, be a son. For son is said of one because he is begotten. Hence, if a thing should receive its nature from another not by begetting, but in any other way whatever, it would lack the essential of sonship. If, for example, a man had the power divinely conceded to him to make a man out of some part of his own body, in some exterior fashion as one makes artefacts, the man produced would not be called the son of the producing, for he would not proceed from him by birth. But the procession of the Holy Spirit does not have the essentials of birth (as was shown above). Hence, the Holy Spirit, although He has the divine nature from the Father and the Son, cannot, for all that, be called Their son.
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| Quod autem in sola natura divina pluribus modis natura communicatur, rationabile est. Quia in solo Deo eius operatio est suum esse. Unde, cum in eo, sicut in qualibet intellectuali natura, sit intelligere et velle, id quod procedit in eo per modum intellectus ut verbum, aut amoris et voluntatis ut amor, oportet quod habet esse divinum, et sit Deus. Et sic tam filius quam spiritus sanctus est verus Deus.
| [13] But that in the divine nature alone nature be communicated in several ways is reasonable. For in God alone is His operation His being. Hence, since in Him, as in any intellectual nature, there is an act of understanding and an act of will, that which proceeds in Him by way of understanding as Word, or by way of love and will as Love, must have the divine being and be God. And thus, not only the Son but the Holy Spirit is true God.
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| Haec igitur de spiritus sancti divinitate dicta sint. Alia vero quae circa eius processionem difficultatem habent, ex his quae de nativitate filii dicta sunt, considerare oportet.
| [14] Let these, then, be our points about the divinity of the Holy Spirit. But other difficulties about His procession ought to he considered in the light of what has been said about the nativity of the Son.
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Caput 24
Quod spiritus sanctus procedat a filio
| Chapter 24
THE HOLY SPIRIT PROCEEDS FROM THE SON
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| Quidam vero circa spiritus sancti processionem errare inveniuntur, dicentes spiritum sanctum a filio non procedere. Et ideo ostendendum est spiritum sanctum a filio procedere.
| [1] We find some who make this mistake about the procession of the Holy Spirit: they say the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. For this reason we must show that the Holy Spirit does proceed from the Son.
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| Manifestum est enim ex sacra Scriptura quod spiritus sanctus est spiritus filii: dicitur enim Rom. 8-9: si quis spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius. Sed ne aliquis posset dicere quod alius sit spiritus qui procedit a patre, et alius qui est filii, ostenditur ex verbis eiusdem apostoli quod idem spiritus sanctus sit patris et filii. Nam hoc quod inductum est, si quis spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius, subiunxit postquam dixerat, si spiritus Dei habitat in nobis, et cetera. Non autem potest dici spiritus sanctus esse spiritus Christi ex hoc solo quod eum habuit tanquam homo, secundum illud Luc. 4-1, Iesus, plenus spiritu sancto, regressus est a Iordane. Dicitur enim Galat. 4-6: quoniam estis filii Dei, misit Deus spiritum filii sui in corda vestra, clamantem, abba (pater). Ex hoc ergo spiritus sanctus nos facit filios Dei, inquantum est spiritus filii Dei. Efficimur autem filii Dei adoptivi per assimilationem ad filium Dei naturalem: secundum illud Rom. 8-29: quos praescivit, et praedestinavit fieri conformes imaginis filii eius, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Sic igitur est spiritus sanctus spiritus Christi, inquantum est filius Dei naturalis. Non potest autem secundum aliam habitudinem spiritus sanctus dici spiritus filii Dei nisi secundum aliquam originem: quia haec sola distinctio in divinis invenitur. Necesse est igitur dicere quod spiritus sanctus sic sit filii quod ab eo procedat.
| [2] It is manifest in sacred Scripture that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, for Romans (8:9) says: “If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His.” But that one might not be able to say that the Spirit that proceeds from the Father is one, and the Son’s Spirit another, it is shown from the words of the same Apostle that the Holy Spirit of the Father and of the Son is identified. For the words just cited, “If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His,” the Apostle added after he had said: “If so be that the Spirit of God dwell in us,” and so forth. But one cannot say that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ merely because He had Him as man, according to the words of Luke (4:1): “Jesus being full of the Holy Spirit, returned from the Jordan.” For one reads in Galatians (4:6): “Because you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying: Abba (Father).” The Holy Spirit, therefore, makes us the sons of God precisely because He is the Spirit of the Son of God. But we are made the adoptive sons of God by assimilation to the natural Son of God, as Romans (8:29) has it: “Whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn amongst many brethren.” Thus, then, is the Holy Spirit the Spirit of Christ: so far as He is God’s natural Son. But there is no relation in accord with which the Holy Spirit can be called the Spirit of the Son of God except a relation of origin, for this is the only distinction we find in divinity. Therefore, one must say that the Holy Spirit is the Son’s Spirit by proceeding from Him.
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| Item. Spiritus sanctus a filio mittitur: secundum illud Ioan. 15-26: cum venerit Paraclitus, quem ego mittam vobis a patre. Mittens autem auctoritatem aliquam habet in missum. Oportet igitur dicere quod filius habeat aliquam auctoritatem respectu spiritus sancti. Non autem dominii vel maioritatis, sed secundum solam originem. Sic igitur spiritus sanctus est a filio. Si quis autem dicat quod etiam filius mittitur a spiritu sancto, quia dicitur Luc. 4-18.21, quod dominus dixit in se impletum illud Isaiae, spiritus domini super me, evangelizare pauperibus misit me: sed considerandum est quod filius a spiritu sancto mittitur secundum naturam assumptam. Spiritus autem sanctus non assumpsit naturam creatam, ut secundum eam possit dici missus a filio, vel filius habere auctoritatem respectu ipsius. Relinquitur igitur quod respectu personae aeternae filius super spiritum sanctum auctoritatem habeat.
| [3] The Holy Spirit, again, is sent by the Son; consider John (15:26): “When the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father.” But whoever sends has an authority over the one sent. One must, then, say that the Son has an authority in regard to the Holy Spirit: not, of course, that of being master or being greater, but in accord with origin only. In this wise, then, the Holy Spirit is from the Son. Now, let one say that the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit as well, because we read in Luke (4:18-21) that our Lord said Isaiah’s words (61:1) were fulfilled in Him: “The Spirit of the Lord is upon Me, He has sent Me to preach the gospel to the poor.” But consideration must be given this: the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit in accord with the assumed nature. But the Holy Spirit has not assumed a created nature, so that in accord with it He can be called sent by the Son, or so as to give the Son authority in His regard. Therefore, this remains: it is considered as an eternal person that the Son has authority over the Holy Spirit.
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| Amplius. Ioan. 16-14, dicit filius de spiritu sancto: ille me clarificabit, quia de meo accipiet. Non autem potest dici quod accipiat id quod est filii, non tamen accipiat a filio: utputa si dicatur quod accipiat essentiam divinam, quae est filii a patre; unde et subditur, omnia quaecumque habet pater, mea sunt. Propterea dixi vobis quia de meo accipiet:- si enim omnia quae patris sunt et filii sunt, oportet quod auctoritas patris, secundum quam est principium spiritus sancti, sit et filii. Sicut ergo spiritus sanctus accipit de eo quod est patris a patre, ita accipit de eo quod est filii a filio.
| [4] There is more. In John (16:14-15), the Son says of the Holy Spirit: “He shall glorify Me because He shall receive of Mine.” Of course, this cannot be said: He receives what is the Son’s, but does not receive from the Son; by saying, for instance, that He receives the Son’s divine essence from the Father. Hence, our Lord adds: “All things whatsoever the Father has are mine. Therefore, I said that He shall receive of Mine.” For, if all things which are the Father’s are the Son’s as well, the Father’s authority as principle of the Holy Spirit must be the Son’s as well. Therefore, just as the Holy Spirit receives what is the Father’s from the Father, so He receives what is the Son’s from the Son.
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| Ad hoc etiam induci possunt auctoritates doctorum Ecclesiae, etiam Graecorum. Dicit enim Athanasius: spiritus sanctus a patre et filio, non factus nec creatus nec genitus, sed procedens. Cyrillus etiam, in epistola sua, quam synodus Chalcedonensis recepit, dicit: spiritus veritatis nominatur et est spiritus veritatis et profluit ab eo, sicut denique et ex Deo patre. Didymus etiam dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto: neque quid est aliud filius exceptis his quae ei dantur a patre; neque alia est spiritus sancti substantia praeter id quod ei datur a filio.
| [5] Here one can also introduce the testimonies of the Doctors of the Church, the Greeks included. Athanasius says: “The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son—not made, not created, not begotten, but proceeding.” Cyril, too, in his epistle received by the Council of Chalcedon, says: “The Spirit of the truth is named and is the Spirit of the Truth and flows from Him just as, indeed, from God the Father.” Didymus also says in his book On the Holy Spirit: “The Son is nothing else than what is given to Him by the Father, and the substance of the Holy Spirit is no other than that given Him by the Son.”
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| Ridiculosum est autem quod quidam concedunt spiritum sanctum esse a filio, vel profluere ab ipso, sed non procedere ab ipso. Verbum enim processionis inter omnia quae ad originem pertinent, magis invenitur esse commune: quicquid enim quocumque modo est ab aliquo, ab ipso procedere dicimus. Et quia divina melius per communia quam per specialia designantur, verbum processionis in origine divinarum personarum maxime est accommodum. Unde si concedatur quod spiritus sanctus sit a filio, vel profluat ab eo, sequitur quod ab eo procedat.
| Of course, it is ridiculous that some concede that the Holy Spirit “is from the Son” or “flows from the Son” but does not “proceed from. Him.” For the verb “to proceed,” among all those which refer to origin, turns up most commonly; for, if anything is in any way at all from something, we say it proceeds from that thing. And since divinity is better designated by what is common than by what is special, in the origin of the divine persons the verb proceeding is the most suitable. And so, if one concedes that the Holy Spirit “is from the Son” or “flows from the Son,” it follows that “He proceeds from the Son.”
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| Item. Habetur in determinatione quinti Concilii: sequimur per omnia sanctos patres et doctores Ecclesiae, Athanasium, Hilarium, Basilium, Gregorium theologum et Gregorium Nyssenum, Ambrosium, Augustinum, Theophilum, Ioannem Constantin., Cyrillum, Leonem, Proclum: et suscipimus omnia quae de recta fide et condamnatione haereticorum exposuerunt. Manifestum est autem ex multis auctoritatibus Augustini, et praecipue in libro de Trinitate, et super Ioannem, quod spiritus sanctus sit a filio. Oportet igitur concedi quod spiritus sanctus sit a filio sicut et a patre.
| [6] There is this, too, in the determination of the Fifth Council: “In all matters we follow the holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church: Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the theologian, and Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine, Theophilus, John of Constantinople, Cyril, Leo, Proclus; and we accept what they have set down on the correct belief and the condemnation of heretics.” But it is manifest from many testimonies of Augustine, especially his On the Trinity and his Exposition of John, that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. It must, then, be conceded that the Holy Spirit is from the Son just as He is from the Father.
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| Hoc etiam evidentibus rationibus apparet. In rebus enim, remota materiali distinctione, quae in divinis personis locum habere non potest, non inveniuntur aliqua distingui nisi per aliquam oppositionem. Quae enim nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem, simul esse possunt in eodem, unde per ea distinctio causari non potest: album enim et triangulare, licet diversa sint, quia tamen non opponuntur, in eodem esse contingit. Oportet autem supponere, secundum fidei Catholicae documenta, quod spiritus sanctus a filio distinguatur: aliter enim non esset Trinitas, sed dualitas in personis. Oportet igitur huiusmodi distinctionem per aliquam oppositionem fieri. Non autem oppositione affirmationis et negationis: quia sic distinguuntur entia a non entibus. Nec etiam oppositione privationis et habitus: quia sic distinguuntur perfecta ab imperfectis. Neque etiam oppositione contrarietatis. Quia sic distinguuntur quae sunt secundum formam diversa: nam contrarietas, ut philosophi docent, est differentia secundum formam. Quae quidem differentia divinis personis non convenit, cum earum sit una forma, sicut una essentia: secundum illud apostoli, Philipp. 2-6, de filio dicentis, qui cum in forma Dei esset, scilicet patris.
| [7] This is also clarified by straight reasoning. For among things, with the material distinction gone (and in the divine Persons such can have no place), one discovers no differentiation except by some opposition. For things which have no opposition to one another can be simultaneously in something identical; thus, no distinction can be caused by them. Take white and triangular. Although they are diverse, they can, because they are not opposed, be in an identical thing. But one must set down, according to the documents of the Catholic faith, that the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son; otherwise, there would not be a Trinity, but a duality of Persons. Therefore, a distinction of this kind must take place through some opposition. But it is not the opposition of affirmation and negation. for such is the distinction of being from non-being. Nor is it the opposition of privation and habit, for such is the distinction of the perfect from the imperfect. Neither is it the opposition of contrariety, for such is the distinction of diversity of form. For contrariety as philosophers teach, is a “difference following on form.” And this difference is not suited to the divine Persons, since their form is one, just as their essence is. Hence, the Apostle says, speaking of the Son, “being in the form of God” (Phil. 2:6), the form, namely, of the Father.
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| Relinquitur igitur unam personam divinam ab alia non distingui nisi oppositione relationis: sic enim filius a patre distinguitur secundum oppositionem relativam patris et filii. Non enim in divinis personis alia relativa oppositio esse potest nisi secundum originem. Nam relative opposita vel supra quantitatem fundatur, ut duplum et dimidium; vel super actionem et passionem, ut dominus et servus, movens et motum, pater et filius. Rursus, relativorum quae super quantitatem fundantur, quaedam fundantur super diversam quantitatem, ut duplum et dimidium, maius et minus; quaedam super ipsam unitatem, ut idem, quod significat unum in substantia; et aequale, quod significat unum in quantitate; et simile, quod significat unum in qualitate. Divinae igitur personae distingui non possunt relationibus fundatis super diversitatem quantitatis: quia sic tolleretur trium personarum aequalitas. Neque iterum relationibus quae fundantur super unum: quia huiusmodi relationes distinctionem non causant, immo magis ad convenientiam pertinere inveniuntur, etsi forte aliqua eorum distinctionem praesupponunt. In relationibus vero omnibus super actionem vel passionem fundatis, semper alterum est ut subiectum, et inaequale secundum virtutem, nisi solum in relationibus originis, in quibus nulla minoratio designatur, eo quod invenitur aliquid producere sibi simile et aequale secundum naturam et virtutem. Relinquitur igitur quod divinae personae distingui non possunt nisi oppositione relativa secundum originem. Oportet igitur quod, si spiritus sanctus a filio distinguitur, quod sit ab eo: non enim est dicere quod filius sit a spiritu sancto, cum spiritus sanctus magis filii esse dicatur, et a filio detur.
| Therefore, the conclusion remains that one divine Person is not distinguished from another except by the opposition of relation: thus, the Son is distinguished from the Father consequently to the relative opposition of father and son. It is because in the divine Persons there can be no relative opposition except, consequently, on origin. For a relative opposition is founded on quantity—say the double or the half; or on action and passion—say master and servant, mover and moved, father and son. Further, among the relative oppositions founded on quantity, some are founded on diversity of quantity—say the double and the half, the greater and the lesser, some on unity itself—say identity, which means one in substance, and equality, which means one in quantity, and similarity, which means one in quality. The divine Persons, therefore, cannot be distinguished by relations founded on diversity of quantity, because this would take away the equality of the three Persons. Nor, again, by the relations which are founded on unity, because relations of this kind cause no distinction; rather, in them one finds more of what pertains to agreement, although some of them may presuppose a distinction. In all relations founded on action and passion, however, there is always one of the two which is a subject and unequal in power to the other; here, exception is made only for the relations of origin, and in such there is no lesser indicated, because one finds there something producing that which is similar and equal to itself in nature and power. The conclusion, therefore, must be that the divine Persons cannot be distinguished except by relative opposition in origin. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son, He is necessarily from the Son, for we do not say that the Son is from the Holy Spirit, since the Holy Spirit is, rather, said to be of the Son and given by the Son.
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| Item. A patre est filius et spiritus sanctus. Oportet igitur patrem referri et ad filium et ad spiritum sanctum ut principium ad id quod est a principio. Refertur autem ad filium ratione paternitatis, non autem ad spiritum sanctum: quia tunc spiritus sanctus esset filius; paternitas enim non dicitur nisi ad filium. Oportet igitur in patre esse aliam relationem qua referatur ad spiritum sanctum, et vocetur spiratio. Similiter, cum in filio sit quaedam relatio qua refertur ad patrem, quae dicitur filiatio, oportet quod in spiritu sancto sit etiam alia relatio qua referatur ad patrem, et dicatur processio. Et sic secundum originem filii a patre sint duae relationes, una in originante, alia in originato, scilicet paternitas et filiatio; et aliae duae ex parte originis spiritus sancti, scilicet spiratio et processio. Paternitas igitur et spiratio non constituunt duas personas, sed ad unam personam patris pertinent: quia non habent oppositionem ad invicem. Neque igitur filiatio et processio duas personas constituerent, sed ad unam pertinerent, nisi haberent oppositionem ad invicem. Non est autem dare aliam oppositionem nisi secundum originem. Oportet igitur quod sit oppositio originis inter filium et spiritum sanctum, ita quod unus sit ab alio.
| [8] Again, the Son is from the Father and so is the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the Father must be related both to the Son and the Holy Spirit as a principle to that which is from the principle. He is related to the Son by reason of paternity, but not to the Holy Spirit; for then the Holy Spirit would be the Son, because paternity is not said except of a son. There must, then, be another relation in the Father by which He is related to the Holy Spirit; and spiration is its name. In the same way, since there is in the Son a relation by which He is related to the Father, the name of which is sonship, there must also be in the Holy Spirit another relation by which He is related to the Father, and this is called procession. And thus, in accord with the origin of the Son from the Father, there are two relations, one in the originator, the other in the originated: to wit, paternity and sonship; and there are two others in reference to the Holy Spirit: namely, spiration and procession. Therefore, paternity and spiration do not constitute two Persons, but pertain to the one Person of the Father, for they have no opposition to one another. Therefore, neither would sonship and procession constitute two persons, but would pertain to one, unless they had an opposition to one another. But there is no opposition to assign save that by way of origin. Hence, there must be an opposition of origin between the Son and the Holy Spirit so that the one is from the other.
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| Adhuc. Quaecumque conveniunt in aliquo communi, si distinguantur ad invicem, oportet quod distinguantur secundum aliquas differentias per se, et non per accidens, pertinentes ad illud commune: sicut homo et equus conveniunt in animali, et distinguuntur ab invicem, non per album et nigrum, quae se habent per accidens ad animal, sed per rationale et irrationale, quae per se animal pertinent; quia, cum animal sit quod habet animam, oportet quod hoc distinguatur per hoc quod est habere animam talem vel talem, utputa rationalem vel irrationalem. Manifestum est autem quod filius et spiritus sanctus conveniunt in hoc quod est esse ab alio, quia uterque est a patre: et secundum hoc pater convenienter differt ab utroque, inquantum est innascibilis. Si igitur spiritus sanctus distinguatur a filio, oportet quod hoc sit per differentias quae per se dividant hoc quod est ens ab alio. Quae quidem non possunt esse nisi differentiae eiusdem generis scilicet ad originem pertinentes, ut unus eorum sit ab alio. Relinquitur igitur quod ad hoc quod spiritus sanctus distinguatur a filio, necesse est quod sit a filio.
| [9] What is more, when things come together by something common to them, they must, if they are to be distinguished, be distinguished by differences which belong per se and not accidentally to that common thing. Thus, man and horse meet in animal, and are distinguished from one another not by black and white, which are related accidentally to animal, but by rational and irrational, which are per se pertinent to animal. This is because animal is what has soul [animam], and this must be distinguished by having this or that kind of soul—say, rational or irrational. Now, manifestly, the Son and the Holy Spirit agree in their being from another, since each is from the Father. And in this the Father suitably differs from each, in that He can have no birth-origin [innascibilis]. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit be distinguished from the Son, this must take place by differences which per se divide this being from another. And such, indeed, can only be differences of the same genus—namely, pertaining to origin—so that one of them is from the other. One concludes, then, that the distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son requires that He be from the Son.
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| Amplius. Si quis dicat spiritum sanctum distingui a filio, non quia sit a filio, sed propter diversam originem utriusque a patre:- in idem hoc realiter redire necesse est. Si enim spiritus sanctus est alius a filio, oportet quod alia sit origo vel processio utriusque. Duae autem origines non possunt distingui nisi per terminum, vel principium, vel subiectum. Sicut origo equi differt ab origine bovis ex parte termini: secundum quod hae duae origines terminantur ad naturas specie diversas. Ex parte autem principii: ut si supponamus in eadem specie animalis quaedam generari ex virtute activa solis tantum; quaedam autem, simul cum hac, ex virtute activa seminis. Ex parte vero subiecti, differt generatio huius equi et illius secundum quod natura speciei in diversa materia recipitur. Haec autem distinctio quae est ex parte subiecti, in divinis personis locum habere non potest: cum sint omnino immateriales. Similiter etiam ex parte termini, ut ita liceat loqui, non potest esse processionum distinctio: quia unam et eandem divinam naturam quam accipit filius nascendo, accipit spiritus sanctus procedendo. Relinquitur igitur quod utriusque originis distinctio esse non potest nisi ex parte principii. Manifestum est autem quod principium originis filii est pater solus. Si igitur processionis spiritus sancti principium sit solus pater, non erit alia processio spiritus sancti a generatione filii: et sic nec spiritus sanctus distinctus a filio. Ad hoc igitur quod sint aliae processiones et alii procedentes, necesse est dicere quod spiritus sanctus non sit a solo patre, sed a patre et filio.
| [10] Let one say, further, that the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son not because He is from the Son, but by reason of their differing origin from the Father. The difficulty really returns to the same point, for, if the Holy Spirit is other than the Son, the origin or procession of each must be other. But two origins cannot be distinguished except by term, or by principle, or by subject. Thus, the origin of a horse differs from the origin of a cow by way of term, in that these two origins have their terms in natures diverse in species. There is difference by way of principle if we suppose that some animals in the same species are generated by the active power of the sun alone, and some others along with this power by the active power of the seed. There is difference by way of subject when the generation of this horse differs from that as the nature of the species is received in diverse matters. But this distinction on the part of subject can have no place in the divine Persons, since they are entirely immaterial. In the same way, also, on the part of the term, granting one may speak so, there can be no distinction of processions. For the divine nature, one and the same, which the Son receives by His birth, the Holy Spirit receives by His proceeding. It remains, therefore, that the distinction of each origin can be only on the part of the principle. Manifestly, of course, the principle of the origin of the Son is the Father alone. If, therefore, the principle of the procession of the Holy Spirit is the Father alone, the procession of the Holy Spirit will not be other than the generation of the Son; thus, neither will the Holy Spirit be distinct from the Son. Therefore, that there may be otherness in processions and otherness in those proceeding, one of necessity says that the Holy Spirit is not from the Father alone, but from the Father and the Son.
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| Si quis vero iterum dicat quod differunt processiones secundum principium inquantum pater producit filium per modum intellectus ut verbum, spiritum autem sanctum per modum voluntatis quasi amorem:- secundum hoc oportebit dici quod secundum differentiam voluntatis et intellectus in Deo patre distinguantur duae processiones et duo procedentes. Sed voluntas et intellectus in Deo patre non distinguuntur secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem: ut in primo libro ostensum est. Sequitur igitur quod duae processiones et duo procedentes differant solum ratione. Ea vero quae solum ratione differunt, de se invicem praedicantur: verum enim dicetur quod divina voluntas est intellectus eius, et e converso. Verum ergo, erit dicere quod spiritus sanctus est filius et e converso: quod est Sabellianae impietatis. Non igitur sufficit ad distinctionem spiritus sancti et filii dicere quod filius procedat per modum intellectus, et spiritus sanctus per modum voluntatis, nisi cum hoc dicatur quod spiritus sanctus sit a filio.
| [11] But, again, if one says that the processions differ in principle, in that the Father produces the Son by way of intellect as Word, and the Holy Spirit by way of will as Love, it will be necessary to say that in accord with a difference of intellect and will in God the Father the two processions and the two proceeding are to be distinguished. Will and intellect in God the Father are not distinguished really, but only rationally, as was shown in Book I. It follows, then, that the two processions and the two proceeding differ only rationally. Now, things which differ only rationally are predicated of each other: it will be truly said that the divine intellect is the divine will, and conversely. Therefore, it will be true to say that the Holy Spirit is the Son, and conversely. This is the Sabellian impiety. Therefore, it does not suffice for the distinction of the Holy Spirit and the Son to say that the Son proceeds by way of intellect and the Holy Spirit by way of will, unless along with this one says the Holy Spirit is from the Son.
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| Praeterea. Ex hoc ipso quod dicitur quod spiritus sanctus procedit per modum voluntatis, et filius per modum intellectus, sequitur quod spiritus sanctus sit a filio. Nam amor procedit a verbo: eo quod nihil amare possumus nisi verbo cordis illud concipiamus.
| [12] There is more. From the very fact of saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will and the Son by way of intellect it follows that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. For love proceeds from a word: we are able to love nothing but that which a word of the heart conceives.
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| Item. Si quis diversas species rerum consideret, in eis quidam ordo ostenditur: prout viventia sunt supra non viventia, et animalia supra plantas, et homo super alia animalia, et in singulis horum diversi gradus inveniuntur secundum diversas species; unde et Plato species rerum dixit esse numeros qui specie variantur per additionem vel subtractionem unitatis. Unde in substantiis immaterialibus non potest esse distinctio nisi secundum ordinem. In divinis autem personis, quae sunt omnino immateriales, non potest esse alius ordo nisi originis. Non igitur sunt duae personae ab una procedentes, nisi una earum procedat ab altera. Et sic oportet spiritum sanctum procedere a filio.
| [13] Again, if one considers the diverse species of things, a certain order appears in them: the living are above the nonliving; animals are above plants; and man is above the other animals. And in each of these, different grades are discovered according to different species; hence, even Plato said that the species of things are numbers, which are varied in species by the addition and subtraction of unity. Hence, in immaterial substances there can be no distinction except that of order. But in the divine Persons who are entirely immaterial there can be no other order than that of origin. Therefore, there are not two Persons proceeding from one, unless one of those proceeds from a second. And thus, necessarily, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.
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| Adhuc. Pater et filius, quantum ad unitatem essentiae, non differunt nisi in hoc quod hic est pater et hic est filius. Quicquid igitur praeter hoc est, commune est patri et filio. Esse autem principium spiritus sancti est praeter rationem paternitatis et filiationis: nam alia relatio est qua pater est pater, et qua pater est principium spiritus sancti, ut supra dictum est. Esse igitur principium spiritus sancti est commune patri et filio.
| [14] Moreover, the Father and the Son, unity of essence considered, do not differ save in this: He is the Father and He is the Son. So, anything other than this is common to the Father and the Son. But to be the principle of the Holy Spirit is not included in the notion of paternity and of sonship, for it is one relation by which the Father is Father, and another by which He is the principle of the Holy Spirit, as was said above. Therefore, to be the principle of the Holy Spirit is common to the Father and the Son.
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| Amplius. Quicquid non est contra rationem alicuius, non est impossibile ei convenire, nisi forte per accidens. Esse autem principium spiritus sancti non est contra rationem filii. Neque inquantum est Deus: quia pater est principium spiritus sancti. Neque inquantum est filius: eo quod alia est processio spiritus sancti et filii; non est autem repugnans id quod est a principio secundum unam processionem, esse principium processionis alterius. Relinquitur igitur quod non sit impossibile filium esse principium spiritus sancti. Quod autem non est impossibile, potest esse. In divinis autem non differt esse et posse. Ergo filius est principium spiritus sancti.
| [15] Furthermore, whenever one thing is not opposed to the essential intelligibility of another, there is no impossibility—unless, perhaps, accidentally—about their coming together. But to be the principle of the Holy Spirit is not contrary to the intelligibility of the Son: not in so far as He is God, because the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit; nor in so far as He is Son, because the procession of the Holy Spirit is other than that of the Son. It is, of course, not repugnant to have what is from a principle according to one procession he the principle of another procession. It follows, then, that it is not impossible for the Son to be the principle of the Holy Spirit. But that which is not impossible can be. “In divinity being and possibility do not differ.” Therefore, the Son is the principle of the Holy Spirit.
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Caput 26
Quod non sunt nisi tres personae in divinis pater, filius et spiritus sanctus
| Chapter 26
THAT THERE ARE BUT THREE PERSONS IN DIVINITY: THE FATHER, THE SON, AND THE HOLY SPIRIT
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| Ex his igitur quae dicta sunt, accipere oportet quod in divina natura tres personae subsistunt, pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, et quod hi tres sunt unus Deus, solis relationibus ad invicem distincti. Pater enim a filio distinguitur paternitatis relatione, et innascibilitate; filius autem a patre relatione filiationis; pater autem et filius a spiritu sancto spiratione, ut dicatur; spiritus autem sanctus a patre et filio processione amoris, qua ab utroque procedit.
| [1] From what has been said, then, one must hold that in the divine nature three Persons subsist: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and that these three are one God, distinguished from one another by relations only. For the Father is distinguished from the Son by the relations of paternity and innascibility; the Son from the Father by the relation of sonship; the Father and the Son from the Holy Spirit by spiration, so to say; and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son by the procession of love, by this He proceeds from each of Them.
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| Praeter has tres personas non est quartam in divina natura ponere. Personae enim divinae, cum in essentia conveniant, non possunt distingui nisi per relationem originis, ut ex dictis patet. Has autem originis relationes accipere oportet, non secundum processionem in exteriora tendentem, sic enim procedens non esset coessentiale suo principio: sed oportet quod processio interius consistat. Quod autem aliquid procedat manens intra suum principium, invenitur solum in operatione intellectus et voluntatis, ut ex dictis patet. Unde personae divinae multiplicari non possunt nisi secundum quod exigit processio intellectus et voluntatis in Deo. Non est autem possibile quod in Deo sit nisi una processio secundum intellectum: eo quod suum intelligere est unum et simplex et perfectum, quia intelligendo se intelligit omnia alia. Et sic non potest esse in Deo nisi una verbi processio. Similiter autem oportet et processionem amoris esse unam tantum: quia etiam divinum velle est unum et simplex, amando enim se amat omnia alia. Non est igitur possibile quod sint in Deo nisi duae personae procedentes: una per modum intellectus ut verbum, scilicet filius; et alia per modum amoris, ut spiritus sanctus. Est etiam et una persona non procedens, scilicet pater. Solum igitur tres personae in Trinitate esse possunt.
| [2] Beside these three Persons, no fourth in the divine nature can be asserted. For the divine Persons, since they agree in essence, cannot be distinguished except by relation of origin, as is clear. These relations of origin one must understand not as a procession which inclines to what is without—for what proceeds thus is not co-essential with its principle—one must understand them as proceeding within. Of course, a thing which proceeds and remains its own principle is found only in the operation of the intellect and will, as was made clear. Hence, the divine Persons cannot be multiplied save by the requirements of the procession of the intellect and will in God. It is, of course, not possible that there be in God more than one proceeding within His understanding, because His act of understanding is one, simple, and perfect, for in, understanding Himself He understands all things else. And thus, there can be in God but one proceeding of the Word. In like manner, too, must the proceeding of Love be one only, for the divine will act is one and simple—by loving Himself He loves all things else. Therefore, it is not possible that in God there be more than two Persons proceeding: one by way of intellect, as Word—namely the Son; the other by way of Love, as the Holy Spirit. There is also one Person who does not proceed—namely, the Father. Therefore, in the Trinity there can be only three Persons.
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| Item. Si secundum processionem oportet personas divinas distingui; modus autem personae quantum ad processiones non potest esse nisi triplex; ut scilicet sit aut omnino non procedens, quod patris est; aut a non procedente procedens, quod filii est; aut a procedente procedens, quod spiritus sancti est: impossibile est igitur ponere plures quam tres personas.
| [3] Again, let the divine Persons be distinguished by proceeding. But the mode of a person in proceeding can be but threefold: namely, to be altogether not proceeding, which is the Father’s mode; to be proceeding from one who does not proceed, which is the Son’s; to be proceeding from one who Proceeds, which is the Holy Spirit’s. Therefore, it is impossible to assert more than three Persons.
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| Licet autem in aliis viventibus possint relationes originis multiplicari, ut scilicet sint in natura humana plures patres et plures filii, in divina natura hoc omnino impossibile est esse. Nam filiatio, cum in una natura sit unius speciei, non potest multiplicari nisi secundum materiam aut subiectum, sicut est etiam de aliis formis. Unde, cum in Deo non sit materia aut subiectum; et ipsae relationes sint subsistentes, ut ex supra dictis patet: impossibile est quod in Deo sint plures filiationes. Et eadem ratio est de aliis. Et sic in Deo sunt solum tres personae.
| [4] We grant, of course, that in other living things relations of origin can be multiplied—for example, in human nature there can be many fathers and many sons—but in the divine nature this is altogether impossible. For sonship, since in one nature it is of one species, cannot be multiplied except by matter or by subject; this is also the case with other forms. Hence, since in God there is neither matter nor subject, and since the relations are themselves subsistent (which is clear from what was said above) it is impossible that there be a plurality of sonships of God. The same reasoning holds for the other Persons. Thus, in God there are only three Persons.
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| Si quis autem obiiciens dicat quod in filio, cum sit perfectus Deus, est virtus intellectiva perfecta, et sic potest producere verbum; et similiter, cum in spiritu sancto sit bonitas infinita, quae est communicationis principium, poterit alteri divinae personae naturam divinam communicare:- considerare debet quod filius est Deus ut genitus, non ut generans: unde virtus intellectiva est in eo ut in procedente per modum verbi, non ut in producente verbum. Et similiter, cum spiritus sanctus sit Deus ut procedens, est in eo bonitas infinita ut in persona accipiente, non ut in communicante alteri bonitatem infinitam. Non enim distinguuntur ab invicem nisi solis relationibus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Tota igitur plenitudo divinitatis est in filio, et eadem numero quae est in patre: sed cum relatione nativitatis, sicut in patre cum relatione generationis activae. Unde, si relatio patris attribueretur filio, omnis distinctio tolleretur. Et eadem ratio est de spiritu sancto.
| [5] Of course, an objector may say that in the Son who is perfect God there is infinite intellective power, and thus He can produce a word; in like fashion, since there is in the Holy Spirit infinite goodness which is the principle of communication, He will be able to communicate the divine nature to another person. But such a one ought to consider that the Son is God, as begotten not as begetting; and so the intellective power is in Him as proceeding in the way of the Word, and not in Him as producing the Word. Similarly, since the Holy Spirit is God as proceeding, there is infinite goodness in Him as the Person receiving, and not in Him as communicating the infinite goodness to another. For the Persons are not distinguished from one another except by relations, as is clear from the things said above. Therefore, all the fullness of divinity is the Son, numerically identical with that in the Father, but with the relation of birth, as it is in the Father with the relation of active generation. Hence, if the relation of the Father be attributed to the Son, all distinction is removed. And the same reasoning holds for the Holy Spirit.
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| Huius autem divinae Trinitatis similitudinem in mente humana possumus considerare. Ipsa enim mens, ex hoc quod se actu intelligit, verbum suum concipit in seipsa: quod nihil aliud est quam ipsa intentio intelligibilis mentis, quae et mens intellecta dicitur, in mente existens. Quae dum ulterius seipsam amat, seipsam producit in voluntate ut amatum. Ulterius autem non procedit intra se, sed concluditur circulo, dum per amorem redit ad ipsam substantiam a qua processio incoeperat per intentionem intellectam: sed fit processio ad exteriores effectus, dum ex amore sui procedit ad aliquid faciendum. Et sic tria in mente inveniuntur: mens ipsa, quae est processionis principium, in sua natura existens; et mens concepta in intellectu; et mens amata in voluntate. Non tamen haec tria sunt una natura: quia intelligere mentis non est eius esse, nec eius velle est eius esse aut intelligere. Et propter hoc etiam mens intellecta et mens amata non sunt personae: cum non sint subsistentes. Mens etiam ipsa, in sua natura existens, non est persona: cum non sit totum quod subsistit, sed pars subsistentis, scilicet hominis.
| [6] Now, this divine Trinity has a likeness in the human mind which we can consider. For the mind itself, because it understands itself, conceives within itself a word. And this is nothing but the intelligible intention of the mind, which is called the mind understood and exists within the mind. When this mind further loves itself, it produces its very self in the will as beloved. Of course, it does not proceed further within itself, but the cycle is concluded when by love it returns to the very substance from which the proceeding began by the intention understood. The proceeding extends to external effects when from love of itself it proceeds to make something. Thus, three things are discovered in the mind: the mind itself, the source of the proceeding, existing in its nature; and mind conceived in the intellect; and mind beloved in the will. For all that~ these three are not one nature, for the mind’s act of understanding is not its being; and its will act is neither its being, nor its act of understanding. For this reason, also, the mind understood and the mind beloved are not persons, since they are not subsisting. Even the mind itself existing in its nature is not a person, for it is not the whole which subsists, but a part of the subsistent; namely, of the man.
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| In mente igitur nostra invenitur similitudo Trinitatis divinae quantum ad processionem, quae multiplicat Trinitatem cum ex dictis manifestum sit esse in divina natura Deum ingenitum, qui est totius divinae processionis principium, scilicet patrem; et Deum genitum per modum verbi in intellectu concepti, scilicet filium; et Deum per modum amoris procedentem, scilicet spiritum sanctum. Ulterius autem intra divinam naturam nulla processio invenitur, sed solum processio in exteriores effectus. In hoc autem deficit a repraesentatione divinae Trinitatis, quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt unius naturae, et singulis horum est persona perfecta, eo quod intelligere et velle sunt ipsum esse divinum, ut ostensum est. Et propter hoc, sic consideratur divina similitudo in homine sicut similitudo Herculis in lapide: quantum ad repraesentationem formae, non quantum ad convenientiam naturae. Unde et in mente hominis dicitur esse imago Dei: secundum illud Gen. 1-26: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram.
| [7] Therefore, in our mind one finds a likeness of the divine Trinity in regard to proceeding, “and this multiplies the Trinity.” For from the exposition this is clear: there is in the divine nature God unbegotten, who is the source of the whole divine proceeding, namely the Father; there is God begotten by way of a word conceived in the intellect, namely the Son; there is God by way of love proceeding, namely the Holy Spirit. Of course, no further proceeding is discovered within the divine nature, but only a proceeding to exterior effects. In this, of course, the mind fails in representing the divine Trinity: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one in nature, and in each of these the person is perfect, simply because the act of understanding and the act of will are the divine being itself, as was shown. For this reason one considers the divine likeness in man just as one considers the likeness of Hercules in stone: with regard to the representation of form, not with regard to the agreement of nature. And so one says that in the mind of man there is the “image of God” according to the Word: “Let us make man to our image and likeness” (Gen. 1:26).
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| Invenitur etiam in aliis rebus divinae Trinitatis similitudo: prout quaelibet res in sua substantia una est: et specie quadam formatur; et ordinem aliquem habet. Sicut autem ex dictis patet, conceptio intellectus in esse intelligibili est sicut informatio speciei in esse naturali: amor autem est sicut inclinatio vel ordo in re naturali. Unde et species naturalium rerum a remotis repraesentat filium: ordo autem spiritum sanctum. Et ideo, propter remotam repraesentationem et obscuram in irrationabilibus rebus, dicitur in eis esse Trinitatis vestigium, non imago: secundum illud Iob 11-7: numquid vestigia Dei comprehendes et cetera.
| [8] One also finds in other things a likeness of the divine Trinity, so far as anything in its substance is one, formed in a kind of species, ordered in some fashion. just as is clear from the things said, the conception of the intellect in intelligible being is like the species formation in natural being, love, of course, is like the inclination or order in a thing of nature. And so the species of things in nature from afar represent the Son; their order, of course, the Holy Spirit. Accordingly, by reason of the remote and obscure representation in irrational things, one speaks of the “vestige” of the Trinity in them, not of the “image”; so we read in Job (11:7): “Would you comprehend the steps of God?” and so forth.
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| Et haec de divina Trinitate ad praesens dicta sufficiant.
| [9] And this is enough to say about the divine Trinity for the present.
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Caput 29
De errore Manichaeorum circa incarnationem
| Chapter 29
ON THE ERROR OF THE MANICHEANS ABOUT THE INCARNATION
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| Fuerunt autem et alii qui, veritate incarnationis negata, quandam fictitiam incarnationis similitudinem introduxerunt. Dixerunt enim Manichaei Dei filium non verum corpus, sed phantasticum assumpsisse. Unde nec verus homo esse potuit, sed apparens: neque ea quae secundum hominem gessit, sicut quod natus est, quod comedit, bibit, ambulavit, passus est et sepultus, in veritate fuisse, sed in quadam simulatione, consequitur. Et sic patet quod totum incarnationis mysterium ad quandam fictionem deducunt.
| [1] There also have been others who denied the truth of the Incarnation and introduced a kind of fictional incarnation. The Manicheans said that God’s Son assumed not a real, but a phantasy, body; thus, He could not be a true man, but only an apparent one. Consequently, the things He did as man—such as being born, eating, drinking, walking, suffering, and being buried—were done not in truth but in a kind of false appearance. Thus, clearly, they reduce the whole mystery of the Incarnation to a fiction.
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| Haec autem positio primo quidem Scripturae auctoritatem evacuat. Cum enim carnis similitudo caro non sit, neque similitudo ambulationis ambulatio, et in ceteris similiter, mentitur Scriptura dicens, verbum caro factum est, si solum phantastica caro fuit. Mentitur etiam dicens Iesum Christum ambulasse, comedisse, mortuum fuisse et sepultum, si haec in sola phantastica apparitione contigerunt. Si autem vel in modico auctoritati sacrae Scripturae derogetur, iam nihil fixum in fide nostra esse poterit, quae sacris Scripturis innititur, secundum illud Ioan. 20-31: haec scripta sunt ut credatis.
| [2] First, of course, this position wipes out the authority of Scripture. Since the likeness of flesh is not flesh, the likeness of walking not walking, and so of the rest, Scripture lies in saying: “The Word was made flesh” (John 1:14)—if it was but phantasy flesh. It also lies when it says that Jesus Christ walked, ate, died, and was buried—if these things took place only in an apparent phantasy. But, if even in a moderate way the authority of Scripture be decried, there will no longer be anything fixed in our faith which depends on sacred Scripture, as in John’s words (20:31): “These are written, that you may believe.”
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| Potest autem aliquis dicere Scripturae quidem sacrae veritatem non deesse, dum id quod apparuit, refert ac si factum fuisset: quia rerum similitudines aequivoce ac figurate ipsarum rerum nominibus nuncupantur, sicut homo pictus aequivoce dicitur homo; et ipsa sacra Scriptura consuevit hoc modo loquendi uti, ut est illud I Cor. 10-4, petra autem erat Christus. Plurima autem corporalia in Scripturis de Deo inveniuntur dici propter similitudinem solam: sicut quod nominatur agnus vel leo, vel aliquid huiusmodi.
| [3] Someone can say, of course, that the truth is certainly not lacking to sacred Scripture when it deals with an appearance as though it were a fact, because the likenesses of things are equivocally and figuratively called by the names of the things themselves; a man in a picture, for example, is called a man equivocally. Sacred Scripture itself is accustomed to this manner of speech; thus the Apostle: “And the rock was Christ” (1 Cor. 10:4). Of course, many bodily things are found to be said of God in Scripture by reason of mere metaphor: so He is named lamb, or lion, or something of the sort.
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| Sed licet rerum similitudines aequivoce rerum sibi nomina interdum assumant, non tamen competit sacrae Scripturae ut narrationem unius facti totam sub tali aequivocatione proponat, ita quod ex aliis Scripturae locis manifesta veritas haberi non possit: quia ex hoc non eruditio hominum, sed magis deceptio sequeretur; cum tamen apostolus dicat, Rom. 15-4, quod quaecumque scripta sunt, ad nostram doctrinam scripta sunt; et II Tim. 3-16, omnis Scriptura divinitus inspirata utilis est ad docendum et erudiendum. Esset praeterea tota evangelica narratio poetica et fabularis, si rerum similitudines apparentes quasi res ipsas narraret: cum tamen dicatur II Petr. 1-16: non enim indoctas fabulas secuti notam fecimus vobis domini nostri Iesu Christi virtutem.
| [4] However, although the likenesses of things may at times take the names of things by equivocation, it is nonetheless unsuitable to sacred Scripture to set down the whole story of one event under such an equivocation, and so to do it that from other Scriptural passages the plain truth cannot be had. For from this would follow not men’s instruction, but their deception instead, whereas the Apostle says: “For what things soever were written, were written for our learning” (Rom. 15:4); and in 2 Timothy (3:16): “All scripture, inspired of God, is profitable to teach and to instruct.” Moreover, the entire Gospel story would be but poetry and fable if it narrated the apparent similarities of things as the things themselves; whereas 2 Peter (1:16) says: “For we have not by following artificial fables made known to you the power of the Lord, Jesus Christ.”
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| Sicubi vero Scriptura narrat aliqua quae apparentiam et non rerum existentiam habuerunt, ex ipso more narrationis hoc intelligere facit. Dicitur enim Gen. 18-2: cumque elevasset oculos, Abraham scilicet, apparuerunt tres viri, ex quo datur intelligi quod secundum apparentiam viri fuerunt. Unde et in eis Deum adoravit et deitatem confessus est, dicens, 27 loquar ad dominum meum, cum sim pulvis et cinis; et iterum, 25 non est tuum hoc, qui iudicas omnem terram. Quod vero Isaias et Ezechiel et alii prophetae aliqua descripserunt quae imaginarie visa sunt, errorem non generat: quia huiusmodi ponunt non in narratione historiae, sed in descriptione prophetiae. Et tamen semper aliquid addunt per quod apparitio designatur: sicut Isaiae 6-1, vidi dominum sedentem etc.; Ezech. 1-3, facta est super me manus domini et vidi etc., Ezech. 8-3, emissa similitudo manus apprehendit me et adduxit et veni in Ierusalem in visione Dei.
| [5] But, when the Scriptural narrative is of things which had appearance, but not existence, the very manner of the narration makes us understand this. For Genesis (18:2, 27, 25) says: “And when he” (Abraham) “had lifted up his eyes, there appeared to him three men.” This gives us to understand that they were men by appearance. And so in them he adored God and acknowledged Divinity, and he said: “I will speak to my Lord whereas I am but dust and ashes”; and again: “This is not beseeming You, You who judge all the earth.” However, the fact that Isaiah and Ezekiel and other Prophets have described some things which were seen in imagination produces no error, for they do not set these things down in the narration of history, but in the description of prophecy. And they nonetheless add something which designates apparition: thus, Isaiah (6:1): “I saw the Lord sitting,” and so forth; Ezekiel (1:3-4; 8:3): “The hand of the Lord was there upon him. And I saw,” and so forth: “The likeness of a hand was put forth and took me and brought me in the vision of God into Jerusalem.”
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| Quod etiam aliqua in Scripturis de rebus divinis per similitudinem dicuntur, errorem generare non potest. Tum quia similitudines sumuntur a rebus tam vilibus ut manifestum sit quod haec secundum similitudinem, et non secundum rerum existentiam dicuntur. Tum quia inveniuntur aliqua proprie dicta in Scripturis per quae veritas expresse manifestatur quae sub similitudinibus in locis aliis occultatur. Quod quidem in proposito non accidit: nam nulla Scripturae auctoritas veritatem eorum quae de humanitate Christi leguntur, excludit.
| [6] Even the fact that Scripture sometimes speaks of things divine through a comparison cannot produce error, and this both for this reason—the likenesses are taken from things so lowly it is manifest that the passage deals with similitude and not with the existence of things; and for this reason—some things are found said properly in Scripture through which the truth is expressly clarified, and this truth in other places is hidden under similitudes. This, indeed, does not take place in this case, for there is no Scriptural authority touching what is read of Christ’s humanity which precludes the truth of what is said.
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| Forte autem quis dicat quod hoc datur intelligi per hoc quod apostolus dicit, Rom. 8-3: misit Deus filium suum in similitudinem carnis peccati. Vel per hoc quod dicit Philipp. 2-7: in similitudinem hominum factus, et habitu inventus ut homo. Hic autem sensus per ea quae adduntur excluditur. Non enim dicit solum in similitudinem carnis, sed addit peccati: quia Christus veram quidem carnem habuit, sed non carnem peccati, quia in eo peccatum non fuit, sed similem carni peccati, quia carnem passibilem habuit, qualis est facta caro hominis ex peccato. Similiter fictionis intellectus excluditur ab hoc quod dicit in similitudinem hominum factus, per hoc quod dicitur, formam servi accipiens. Manifestum est enim formam pro natura poni, et non pro similitudine, ex hoc quod dixerat, qui cum in forma Dei esset, ubi pro natura ponitur forma: non enim ponunt quod Christus fuerit similitudinarie Deus. Excluditur etiam fictionis intellectus per hoc quod subdit, factus obediens usque ad mortem. Non ergo similitudo accipitur pro similitudine apparentiae, sed pro naturali similitudine speciei: sicut omnes homines similes specie dicuntur.
| [7] Perhaps one may say that we are given so to understand by the words of the Apostle: “God sending His own Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh” (Rom. 8:3). Or by this in Philippians (2:7): “Made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man.” But here the meaning is excluded by what is added, for it does not merely say “in the likeness of flesh,” but adds “sinful,” because Christ had, indeed, true flesh, but not “sinful flesh”, for there was no sin in Him. But His was similar to “sinful flesh,” for His was the captive of suffering, and such did the flesh of man become through sin. In the same way, a fictional understanding is excluded from the saying, “Made in the likeness of men,” by the addition: “taking the form of a servant.” It is clear that “form” is put here in place of nature rather than of likeness because he had said: “Who being in the form of God” (Phil. 7:6). There, for nature, “form” is put, for the words do not assert that Christ was God by some mere similarity. Further exclusion of fictional understanding is in the addition: “Becoming obedient even unto death” (Phil. 2:8). Likeness is not, therefore, taken for the likeness of an appearance, but for natural likeness of the species; as all men are said to he alike in species.
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| Magis autem sacra Scriptura expresse phantasmatis suspicionem excludit. Dicitur enim Matth. 14-26, quod videntes discipuli Iesum ambulantem supra mare, turbati sunt, dicentes, quia phantasma est, et prae timore clamaverunt. Quam quidem eorum suspicionem dominus consequenter removit: unde subditur, 27 statimque Iesus locutus est eis, dicens: habete fiduciam, ego sum, nolite timere. Quamvis non rationabile videatur quod aut discipulos lateret quod non nisi corpus phantasticum assumpsisset, cum eos ad hoc elegerit ut de eo testimonium perhiberent veritatis ex his quae viderant et audierant: aut si eos non latebat, aestimatio phantasmatis non incussisset tunc eis timorem.
| [8] But sacred Scripture more expressly excludes the suspicion of apparition. For we read in Matthew (14:26-27) that the disciples, seeing Jesus “walking upon the sea, were troubled, saying: It is an apparition. And they cried out for fear.” This very suspicion of theirs our Lord consequently took away; and so the addition: “And immediately Jesus spoke to them saying: Be of good heart; it is I, fear not.” However one takes it, this appears irrational: that it should escape the disciples’ notice that He had assumed but a phantasy body, since He had chosen them to give testimony of the truth about Him from what they “had seen and heard” (Acts 4:20); or, if it did not escape their notice, then the thought of an apparition should not have stricken them with fear.
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| Adhuc autem expressius suspicionem phantastici corporis a mentibus discipulorum removit dominus post resurrectionem. Dicitur enim Lucae ult. quod discipuli, conturbati et conterriti, aestimabant se spiritum videre, dum scilicet viderunt Iesum. Et dixit eis: quid turbati estis, et cogitationes ascendunt in corda vestra? Videte manus meas et pedes meos, quia ego ipse sum. Palpate et videte: quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Frustra enim se palpandum praebuit, si non nisi corpus phantasticum habuisset.
| [9] But again, more expressly, the suspicion of a phantasy body was removed from the minds of the disciples by our Lord after the resurrection. For we read in Luke (24:37-39) that the disciples, “being troubled and frightened, supposed that they saw a spirit,” namely, when they saw Jesus. “And He said to them: Why are you troubled and why do thoughts arise in your hearts? See My hands and feet, that it is I Myself. Handle and see: for a spirit has not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.” For in vain did He offer Himself to be touched, if he had had none but a phantasy body.
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| Item. Apostoli seipsos idoneos Christi testes ostendunt: dicit enim Petrus, Act. 10-40 hunc, scilicet Iesum, Deus suscitavit tertia die, et dedit eum manifestum fieri non omni populo, sed testibus praeordinatis a Deo, nobis qui manducavimus et bibimus cum illo postquam resurrexit a mortuis. Et Ioannes apostolus, in principio suae epistolae, dicit: quod vidimus oculis nostris, quod perspeximus, et manus nostrae contrectaverunt de verbo vitae, hoc testamur. Non potest autem efficax sumi testimonium veritatis per ea quae non in rei existentia, sed solum in apparentia sunt gesta. Si igitur corpus Christi fuit phantasticum, et non vere manducavit et bibit, neque vere visus est et palpatus, sed phantastice tantum, invenitur non esse idoneum testimonium apostolorum de Christo. Et sic inanis est eorum praedicatio, inanis est et fides nostra, ut dicit Paulus I Cor. 15-14.
| [10] Again, the Apostles show themselves suitable witnesses of Christ, for Peter says: “Him,” namely, Jesus, “God raised up the third day, and gave Him to be made manifest. Not to all the people, but to witnesses preordained by God, even to us, who did eat and drink with Him after He arose again from the dead” (Acts 10:40-41). And John the Apostle, at the beginning of his Epistle, says: “That which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life: we witness” (1 John 1:1-2). But there can be no efficacy in witness to the truth based on things done, not in real existence, but in appearance only. If, therefore, the body of Christ was a phantasy and He did not truly eat and drink, and if He was not truly seen and handled, but in phantasy only, no fitness is found in the testimony of the Apostles about Christ. And thus, “vain is their preaching, and our faith is vain,” as Paul says (1 Cor. 15:14).
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| Amplius autem, si Christus verum corpus non habuit, non vere mortuus est. Ergo nec vere resurrexit. Sunt igitur apostoli falsi testes Christi, praedicantes mundo ipsum resurrexisse. Unde apostolus ibidem dicit: 15 invenimur autem et falsi testes Dei: quoniam testimonium diximus adversus Deum, quod suscitaverit Iesus, quem non suscitavit.
| [11] But, again, if Christ had no true body, He did not truly die. Therefore, neither is He truly risen. Therefore, the Apostles are false witnesses of Christ when they preach to the world that He has risen. Hence, the Apostle says in the same place: “We are found false witnesses of God: because we have given testimony against God, that He has raised up Christ; whom He has not raised up” (1 Cor. 15:15).
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| Praeterea. Falsitas non est idonea via ad veritatem: secundum illud Eccli. 34-4: a mendace quid verum dicetur? Adventus autem Christi in mundum ad veritatis manifestationem fuit: dicit enim ipse, Ioan. 18-37: ego autem in hoc natus sum, et ad hoc veni, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati. Non igitur in Christo fuit aliqua falsitas. Fuisset autem si ea quae dicuntur de ipso, in apparentia tantum fuissent: nam falsum est quod non est ut videtur. Omnia igitur quae de Christo dicuntur, secundum rei existentiam fuerunt.
| [12] What is more, falsity is not a suitable way to the truth. As Sirach (34:4) has it: “What truth can come from that which is false?” But Christ’s coming into the world was for the manifestation of truth. He Himself says: ‘Tor this was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the truth” (John 18:37). There was not then, any falsity in Christ. But there would have been if what He says of Himself had been about mere appearance, for the “false is that which is not as it seems.” Therefore, everything said of Christ was in accord with real existence.
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| Adhuc. Rom. 5-9, dicitur quod iustificati sumus in sanguine Christi; et Apoc. 5-9, dicitur: redemisti nos, domine, in sanguine tuo. Si igitur Christus non habuit verum sanguinem, neque vere pro nobis ipsum fudit. Neque igitur vere iustificati, neque vere redempti sumus. Ad nihil igitur utile est esse in Christo.
| [13] Moreover, we read in Romans (5:9) that “we are justified by His blood” and in the Apocalypse (5:9): “You have redeemed us, O Lord, in your blood.” Therefore, if Christ did not have true blood, He did not truly shed it for us. Therefore, we are neither truly justified nor truly redeemed. Therefore, there is no usefulness to being in Christ.
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| Item. Si non nisi phantasia intelligendus est adventus Christi in mundum, nihil novum in Christi adventu accidit: nam et in veteri testamento Deus apparuit Moysi et prophetis secundum multiplices figuras, ut etiam Scriptura novi testamenti testatur. Hoc autem totam doctrinam novi testamenti evacuat. Non igitur corpus phantasticum, sed verum filius Dei assumpsit.
| [14] Again, if there is nothing but apparition to be understood of Christ’s coming into the world, nothing new took place in Christ’s coming. For, in the Old Testament, God appeared to Moses and the Prophets under multiple figures, as even the writings of the New Testament witness. Yet this position wipes out the whole teaching of the New Testament. Therefore, it was not a phantasy body, but a true one, which the Son of God assumed.
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Caput 30
De errore Valentini circa incarnationem
| Chapter 30
THE ERROR OF VALENTINE ABOUT THE INCARNATION
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| His autem et Valentinus propinque de mysterio incarnationis sensit. Dixit enim quod Christus non terrenum corpus habuit, sed de caelo portavit: et quod nihil de virgine matre accepit, sed per eam quasi aquaeductum transivit. Occasionem autem sui erroris ex quibusdam verbis sacrae Scripturae accepisse videtur. Dicitur enim Ioan. 3-13 nemo ascendit in caelum nisi qui de caelo descendit, filius hominis, qui est in caelo (...). Qui de caelo venit, super omnes est. Et Ioan. 6-38, dicit dominus: descendi de caelo, non ut faciam voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem eius qui misit me. Et I Cor. 15-47: primus homo de terra, terrenus; secundus homo de caelo, caelestis. Quae omnia sic intelligi volunt ut Christus de caelo etiam secundum corpus descendisse credatur.
| 11] The opinions of Valentine, of course, were close to these in regard to the mystery of the Incarnation. For he said that Christ did not have an earthly body, but brought one from heaven; that He received nothing from the Virgin Mother, but passed through her as through an aqueduct. The occasion of his error he seems to have found in some words of sacred Scripture. For we read in John (3:13, 31): “No man has ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven, the Son of man who is in heaven... He that comes from above, is above all”; and in John (6:38) our Lord says: “I came down from heaven not to do My own will but the will of Him that sent Me.” And 1 Corinthians (15:47) has: “The first man was of the earth, earthly; the second man, from heaven, heavenly.” All of these they want to have so understood that one believes that Christ came down from heaven even in the body.
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| Procedit autem tam haec Valentini positio, quam Manichaeorum praemissa, ex una falsa radice: quia credebant quod haec omnia terrena a Diabolo sint creata. Unde, cum filius Dei in hoc apparuerit ut dissolvat opera Diaboli, sicut dicitur I Ioan. 3-8, non ei competebat ut de creatura Diaboli corpus assumeret: cum etiam Paulus dicat, II Cor. 6-14 quae societas lucis ad tenebras? Quae autem conventio Christi ad Belial?
| [2] But this position of Valentine and that of the Manicheans just mentioned proceed from one false root: they believed that all these earthly things were created by the devil. And so, since “the Son of God appeared that He might destroy the works of the devil,” as 1 John (3:8) says, it was unsuitable for Him to assume a body from a creature of the devil, since Paul also says: “What fellowship has light with darkness? What concord has Christ with Belial?” (Il Cor. 6:14-15).
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| Et quia quae ab eadem radice procedunt, similes fructus producunt, in idem falsitatis inconveniens relabitur haec positio cum praedicta. Uniuscuiusque enim speciei sunt determinata essentialia principia, materiam dico et formam, ex quibus constituitur ratio speciei in his quae sunt ex materia et forma composita. Sed sicut caro humana et os et huiusmodi sunt materia propria hominis, ita ignis, aer, aqua et terra, et huiusmodi, qualia sentimus, sunt materia carnis et ossis et huiusmodi partium. Si igitur corpus Christi non fuit terrenum, non fuit in ipso vera caro et verum os, sed omnia secundum apparentiam tantum. Et ita etiam non fuit verus homo, sed apparens: cum tamen, ut dictum est, ipse dicat: spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere.
| 13] And since things which come from the same root produce similar fruits, this position lapses into the same discordant falsity as the previous one. For in every single species there are determined essential principles (matter, I mean, and form) from which comes the essential constitution of the species in things composed of matter and form. But just as human flesh and bone and the like are the proper matter of man, so fire, air, earth, and water and the like, such as we sense, are the matter of flesh and bone and parts of this kind. Therefore, if the body of Christ was not earthly, it was not true flesh and true bone, but in appearance only. And thus, also, He was not a true, but an apparent man, whereas, as was noted, He Himself nonetheless says: “A spirit has not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have (Luke 24:39).
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| Adhuc. Corpus caeleste secundum suam naturam est incorruptibile et inalterabile, et extra suum ubi non potest transferri. Non autem decuit quod Dei filius dignitati naturae assumptae aliquid detraheret, sed magis quod eam exaltaret. Non igitur corpus caeleste aut incorruptibile ad inferiora portavit, sed magis assumptum terrenum corpus et passibile incorruptibile reddidit et caeleste.
| [4] A heavenly body, moreover, is in its nature incorruptible and inalterable, and cannot be moved outside of its own place. Of course, it was not seemly that the Son of God should diminish the dignity of the nature He assumed, but that He exalt it. Therefore, He did not carry a celestial or incorruptible body below; rather, He assumed an earthly body, capable of suffering, and rendered it incorruptible and heavenly.
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| Item. Apostolus dicit, Rom. 1-3, de filio Dei, quod factus est ex semine David secundum carnem. Sed corpus David terrenum fuit. Ergo et corpus Christi.
| [5] Again, the Apostle says about the Son of God that He “was made of the seed of David according to the flesh” (Rom. 1:3). But the body of David was earthly. Therefore, too, was the body of Christ.
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| Amplius. Idem apostolus dicit, Galat. 4-4, quod Deus misit filium suum factum ex muliere. Et Matth. 1-16, dicitur quod Iacob genuit Ioseph, virum Mariae, de qua natus est Iesus, qui vocatur Christus. Non autem vel ex ea factus, vel de ea natus diceretur, si solum per eam sicut per fistulam transisset, nihil ex ea assumens. Ex ea igitur corpus assumpsit.
| [6] The Apostle further says that “God sent His Son, made of a woman” (Gal. 4:4). And Matthew (1:16) says: “Jacob begot Joseph the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus, who is called Christ.” But He would not be called made of her, or born of her, if He had only passed through her as a channel, assuming nothing from her. Therefore, He assumed His body from her.
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| Praeterea. Non posset dici mater Iesu Maria, quod Evangelista testatur, nisi ex ea aliquid accepisset.
| [7] Furthermore, Mary could not be called the Mother of Jesus, which the Evangelist (Mat. 1:18) witnesses, unless He had received something from her.
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| Adhuc. Apostolus dicit, Hebr. 2-11 qui sanctificat, scilicet Christus, et qui sanctificantur, scilicet fideles Christi, ex uno omnes. Propter quam causam non confunditur eos vocare fratres, dicens: narrabo nomen tuum fratribus meis. Et infra: 14 quia ergo pueri communicaverunt carni et sanguini, et ipse similiter participavit eisdem. Si autem Christus corpus caeleste solum habuit, manifestum est, cum nos corpus terrenum habeamus, quod non sumus ex uno cum ipso, et per consequens neque fratres eius possumus dici. Neque etiam ipse participavit carni et sanguini: nam notum est quod caro et sanguis ex elementis inferioribus componuntur, et non sunt naturae caelestis. Patet igitur contra apostolicam sententiam praedictam positionem esse.
| [8] Again, the Apostle says: “Both He that sanctifies,” namely, Christ, “and they who are sanctified,” namely, Christ’s faithful, “are all of one. For which cause He is not ashamed to call them brethren saying: I will declare your name to My brethren”; and farther on: “Therefore, because the children are partakers of the flesh and blood, He also Himself in like manner has been partaker of the same” (Heb. 2:11-12, 14). But if Christ had a heavenly body only, clearly, since we have an earthly body, we are not one with Him, and, consequently, we cannot be called His brothers. Neither did He Himself partake of flesh and blood, for we know that flesh and blood are composed of the lower elements, and are not of the celestial nature. Plainly, therefore, the position aforesaid is contrary to the Apostolic teaching.
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| Ea vero quibus innituntur, manifestum est frivola esse. Non enim Christus descendit de caelo secundum corpus aut animam, sed secundum quod Deus. Et hoc ex ipsis verbis domini accipi potest. Cum enim diceret, Ioan. 3-13, nemo ascendit in caelum nisi qui descendit de caelo, adiunxit, filius hominis, qui est in caelo: in quo ostendit se ita descendisse de caelo quod tamen in caelo esse non desierit. Hoc autem proprium deitatis est, ut ita in terris sit quod et caelum impleat: secundum illud Ier. 23-24: caelum et terram ego impleo. Non ergo filio Dei, inquantum Deus est, descendere de caelo competit secundum motum localem: nam quod localiter movetur, sic ad unum locum accedit quod recedit ab altero. Dicitur igitur filius Dei descendisse secundum hoc quod terrenam substantiam sibi copulavit: sicut et apostolus eum exinanitum dicit, inquantum formam servi accepit, ita tamen quod divinitatis naturam non perdidit.
| [9] The points on which they rely are clearly frivolous. For Christ did not descend from heaven according to soul or to body, but inasmuch as He was God. And this can be gathered from the very words of our Lord. For, when He was saying: “No man has ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven,” he added: “the Son of Man who is in heaven” (John 3:13); in which He is pointing out that He has so descended from heaven that He has not, for all that, ceased to be in heaven. But this is proper to deity: so to be on earth as to fill the heaven also, as Jeremiah (23:24) has it: “I fill heaven and earth.” Therefore, the Son of God does not have to descend from heaven by a local motion, for what is moved locally so approaches one place as to withdraw from another. Therefore, the Son of God is said to have descended in that He joined an earthly substance to Himself: just as the Apostle calls Him ‘emptied” in that He took the form of a servant, in such wise, nonetheless, that He did not lose the nature of divinity.
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| Id vero quod pro radice huius positionis assumunt, ex superioribus patet esse falsum. Ostensum est enim in secundo libro quod ista corporalia non a Diabolo, sed a Deo sunt facta.
| [10] However, that which they assume for the root of this position the foregoing shows to be false, for it was made plain in Book II that bodily things are not from the devil, but are made by God.
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Caput 32
De errore Arii et Apollinaris circa animam Christi
| Chapter 32
ON THE ERROR OF ARIUS AND APOLLINARIS ABOUT THE SOUL OF CHRIST
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| Non solum autem circa corpus Christi, sed etiam circa eius animam aliqui male sensisse inveniuntur.
| [1] It is, however, not only about the body of Christ but also about His soul that one finds some bad opinions.
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| Posuit enim Arius quod in Christo non fuit anima, sed quod solam carnem assumpsit, cui divinitas loco animae fuit. Et ad hoc ponendum necessitate quadam videtur fuisse inductus. Cum enim vellet asserere quod filius Dei sit creatura et minor patre, ad hoc probandum illa Scripturarum assumpsit testimonia quae, infirmitatem humanam ostendunt in Christo. Et ne aliquis eius probationem refelleret, dicendo assumpta ab eo testimonia Christo non secundum divinam naturam, sed humanam convenire, nequiter animam removit a Christo, ut, cum quaedam corpori humano convenire non possint, sicut quod miratus est, quod timuit, quod oravit, necessarium fiat huiusmodi in ipsum filium Dei minorationem inferre. Assumpsit autem in suae positionis assertionem praemissum verbum Ioannis dicentis, verbum caro factum est: ex quo accipere volebat quod solam carnem verbum assumpserit, non autem animam. Et in hac positione etiam Apollinaris eum secutus est.
| [2] For Arius held that in Christ there was no soul, but that He assumed only flesh, and that divinity stood to this as soul. And he seems to have been led to this position by a certain necessity. For he wanted to maintain that the Son of God was a creature and less than the Father, and so for his proof he picked up those Scriptural passages which show human infirmity in Christ. And to keep anyone from refuting him by saying that the passages he picked referred to Christ not in His divine, but in His human, nature, he evilly removed the soul from Christ to this purpose: since some things are not harmonious with a human body, that He wondered, for example, that He feared, that He prayed—all such must necessarily imply the inferiority of the Son of God Himself. Of course, he picked up for the assertion of his position the words of John just mentioned, “The Word was made flesh,” and from this he wanted to gather that the Word only assumed flesh, not a soul. And in this position even Apollinaris followed him.
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| Manifestum est autem ex praemissis hanc positionem impossibilem esse. Ostensum est enim supra quod Deus forma corporis esse non potest. Cum igitur verbum Dei sit Deus, ut ostensum est, impossibile est quod verbum Dei sit forma corporis, ut sic carni pro anima esse possit.
| [3] But it is clear from what has been said that this position is impossible. For it was shown Ames that God cannot be the form of a body. Since, therefore, the Word of God is God, as was shown, it is impossible that the Word of God be the form of a body, so as to be able to stand as a soul to flesh.
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| Utilis autem est haec ratio contra Apollinarem, qui verbum Dei verum Deum esse confitebatur: et licet hoc Arius negaret, tamen etiam contra eum praedicta ratio procedit. Quia non solum Deus non potest esse forma corporis, sed nec etiam aliquis supercaelestium spirituum, inter quos supremum filium Dei Arius ponebat:- nisi forte secundum positionem Origenis, qui posuit humanas animas eiusdem speciei et naturae cum supercaelestibus spiritibus esse. Cuius opinionis falsitatem supra ostendimus.
| [4] This argument, of course, is useful against Apollinaris, who confessed the Word of God to be true God; and granted Arius would deny this last, the argument just given goes against him, also. For it is not God alone who cannot be the form of a body, neither can any of the supercelestial spirits among whom Arius held the Son of God supreme. Exception might be made for the position of Origen, who held that human souls were of the very same species and nature as the supercelestial spirits. The falsity of this opinion was explained above.
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| Item. Subtracto eo quod est de ratione hominis, verus homo esse non potest. Manifestum est autem animam principaliter de ratione hominis esse: cum sit eius forma. Si igitur Christus animam non habuit, verus homo non fuit: cum tamen apostolus eum hominem asserat, dicens, I ad Tim. 2-5: unus est mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus.
| [5] Take away, moreover, what is of the essence of man, and no true man can be. Clearly, of course, the soul is chiefly of the essence of man, since it is his form. Therefore, if Christ had no soul He was not true man, whereas the Apostle does call Him man: “There is one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus” (1 Tim. 2:5).
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| Adhuc. Ex anima non solum ratio hominis, sed et singularium partium eius dependet: unde, remota anima, oculus, caro et os hominis mortui aequivoce dicuntur, sicut oculus pictus aut lapideus. Si igitur in Christo non fuit anima, necesse est quod nec vera caro in eo fuerit, nec aliqua alia partium hominis: cum tamen dominus haec in se esse perhibeat, dicens, Lucae, ult.: spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere.
| [6] It is on the soul, furthermore, that not only man’s essence, but that of his single parts, depends; and so, with the soul gone, the eye, the flesh, and the bone of a dead man are equivocally named, “like a painted or a stone eye.” Therefore, if in Christ there was no soul, of necessity there was neither true flesh in Him nor any of the other parts of man, whereas our Lord says that He has these in Himself: “A spirit has not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have (Luke 24:39).
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| Amplius. Quod generatur ex aliquo vivente, filius eius dici non potest nisi in eandem speciem procedat: non enim vermis dicitur filius animalis ex quo generatur. Sed si Christus animam non habuit, non fuit eiusdem speciei cum aliis hominibus: quae enim secundum formam differunt, eiusdem speciei esse non possunt. Non igitur dici poterit quod Christus sit filius Mariae virginis, aut quod illa sit mater eius. Quod tamen in evangelica Scriptura asseritur.
| [7] Further, what is generated from another cannot be called his son unless he comes forth in the same species; the maggot is not called the son of the animal from which it is generated. But, if Christ had no soul, He was not of the same species as other men, for things which differ in form cannot be identical in species. Therefore, one will not be able to say that Christ is the Son of the Virgin Mary or that she is His Mother. Nonetheless, Scripture asserts this in the Gospels (Mat. 1:18; Luke 7:7).
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| Praeterea. In Evangelio expresse dicitur quod Christus animam habuit: sicut est illud Matth. 26-38, tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem; et Ioan. 12-27, nunc anima mea turbata est.
| [8] There is mo re. The Gospel expressly says that Christ had a soul; Matthew (26:38) for instance: “My soul is sorrowful even unto death,” and John (17:2.7): “Now is My soul troubled.”
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| Et ne forte dicant ipsum filium Dei animam dici, eo quod, secundum eorum positionem, loco animae carni sit: sumendum est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. 10-18, potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam, et iterum sumendi eam; ex quo intelligitur aliud esse quam animam in Christo, quod habuit potestatem ponendi animam suam et sumendi. Non autem fuit in potestate corporis quod uniretur filio Dei vel separaretur ab eo: cum hoc etiam naturae potestatem excedat. Oportet igitur intelligi in Christo aliud fuisse animam, et aliud divinitatem filii Dei, cui merito talis potestas tribuitur.
| [9] And lest they say perhaps that the very Son of God is called soul because in their position He stands to the flesh as soul, one must take our Lord’s own saying: “I have power to lay My soul down: and I have power to take it up again” (John 10:18). From this one understands that there is another than the soul in Christ, which had the power of laying the soul down and taking it up again. It was, of course, not in the power of the body to be united to the Son of God or be separated from Him, since this, too, exceeds the power of nature. One must, then, understand that in Christ the soul was one thing and the divinity of the Son of God another, to whom such power justly is attributed.
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| Item. Tristitia, ira et huiusmodi passiones sunt animae sensitivae: ut patet per philosophum in VII Phys. Haec autem in Christo fuisse ex Evangeliis comprobatur. Oportet igitur in Christo fuisse animam sensitivam: de qua planum est quod differt a natura divina filii Dei.
| [10] Another reason: Sorrow, anger and the like are passions of the sensitive soul; the Philosopher makes this plain. [Therefore Christ must have had a sensitive soul: This is plainly different from the divine nature of the Son of God.]
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| Sed quia potest dici humana in Evangeliis metaphorice dici de Christo, sicut et de Deo in plerisque locis sacrae Scripturae loquuntur, accipiendum est aliquid quod necesse sit ut proprie dictum intelligatur. Sicut enim alia corporalia quae de Christo Evangelistae narrant, proprie intelliguntur et non metaphorice, ita oportet non metaphorice de ipso intelligi quod manducaverit et esurierit. Esurire autem non est nisi habentis animam sensitivam: cum esuries sit appetitus cibi. Oportet igitur quod Christus habuit animam sensitivam.
| [11] But, since one can say that the human things in the Gospels are said of Christ metaphorically, just as the sacred Scriptures speak of God in many places, one must take something which is understood properly of necessity. For, just as other bodily things which the Evangelists relate of Christ are understood properly and not metaphorically, so it must not be understood of Christ metaphorically that He ate and that He hungered. Only he who has a sensitive soul hungers, since hunger is the appetite for food. Necessarily, then, Christ had a sensitive soul.
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Caput 34
De errore Theodori Mopsuesteni et Nestorii circa unionem verbi ad hominem
| Chapter 34
ON THE ERROR OF THEODORE OF MOPSUESTE AND NESTORIUS ON THE UNION OF THE WORD TO MAN
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| Ex praemissis igitur apparet quod Christo nec divina natura defuit, ut Ebion, Cerinthus et Photinus dixerunt; nec verum corpus humanum, secundum errorem Manichaei atque Valentini; nec etiam humana anima, sicut posuerunt Arius et Apollinaris. His igitur tribus substantiis in Christo convenientibus, scilicet divinitate, anima humana, et vero humano corpore, circa horum unionem quid sentiendum sit secundum Scripturarum documenta, inquirendum restat.
| [1] From the things set down, therefore, it appears that Christ was not without divine nature, as Ebion, Cerinthus, and Photinus said; nor without a true human body, as in the error of Mani and Valentine; nor without a human soul, as Arius and Apollinaris held. Since, then, these three substances met in Christ—namely, divinity, the human soul, and the true human body—what one should think about their union following the Scriptural teachings remains for inquiry.
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| Theodorus igitur Mopsuestenus et Nestorius eius sectator, talem sententiam de praedicta unione protulerunt. Dixerunt enim quod anima humana et corpus humanum verum naturali unione convenerunt in Christo ad constitutionem unius hominis eiusdem speciei et naturae cum aliis hominibus; et quod in hoc homine Deus habitavit sicut in templo suo, scilicet per gratiam, sicut et in aliis hominibus sanctis; unde dicitur Ioan. 2-19, quod ipse Iudaeis dixit, solvite templum hoc, et in tribus diebus excitabo illud, et postea Evangelista, quasi exponens, subdit, 21 ille autem dicebat de templo corporis sui; et apostolus, Coloss. 1-19, dicit quod in ipso complacuit omnem plenitudinem habitare. Et ex hoc consecuta est ulterius quaedam affectualis unio inter hominem illum et Deum, dum et homo ille bona sua voluntate Deo inhaesit, et Deus sua voluntate illum acceptavit, secundum illud Ioan. 8-29, qui me misit, mecum est, et non reliquit me solum, quia quae placita sunt ei facio semper; ut sic intelligatur talis esse unio hominis illius ad Deum, qualis est unio de qua apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. 6-17, qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est. Et sicut ex hac unione nomina quae proprie Deo conveniunt, ad homines transferuntur, ut dicantur dii, et filii Dei, et domini, et sancti, et Christi, sicut ex diversis locis Scripturae patet; ita et nomina divina homini illi conveniunt, ut, propter Dei inhabitationem et unionem affectus, dicatur et Deus, et Dei filius, et dominus, et sanctus, et Christus. Sed tamen, quia in illo homine maior plenitudo gratiae fuit quam in aliis hominibus sanctis, fuit prae ceteris templum Dei, et arctius Deo secundum affectum unitus, et singulari quodam privilegio divina nomina participavit. Et propter hanc excellentiam gratiae, constitutus est in participatione divinae dignitatis et honoris, ut scilicet coadoretur Deo. Et sic, secundum praedicta, oportet quod alia sit persona verbi Dei, et alia persona illius hominis qui verbo Dei coadoretur. Et si dicatur una persona utriusque, hoc erit propter unionem affectualem praedictam: ut sic dicatur homo ille et Dei verbum una persona, sicut dicitur de viro et muliere quod iam non sunt duo, sed una caro.
| [2] Now, then, Theodore of Mopsueste and Nestorius, his follower, offered one sort of opinion on the aforesaid union. They said that the human soul and the true human body came together in Christ by a natural union to constitute one man of the same species and nature with other men, and that in this man God dwelt as in His temple, namely, by grace, just as in other holy men. Hence, it says in John (2:19, 21), that He said to the Jews: “Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up”; and later the Evangelist by way of exposition adds: “But he spoke of the temple of His body”; and the Apostle says: “In Him it has well pleased the Father, that all fullness should dwell” (Col. 1:19). And out of these arose further a certain affective union between that man and God, when that man cleaved to God with his own good will, and God lifted up that man with His will, in the words of John (8:29): “He that sent me is with me, and He has not left me alone: for I do always the things that please Him.” Let one thus understand that the union of that man to God is such as was the union of which the Apostle said: “He who is joined to God is one spirit” (1 Cor. 6:17). And just as, from the latter union, names which properly befit God are transferred to men so that they are called “gods,” and “sons of God,” and “lords,” and “holy ones,” and “christs”—as is clear from a diversity of places in Scripture; so also the divine names befit that man so that, by reason of God’s indwelling and the affective union, he is called God, and the Son of God, and Holy, and Christ. Nonetheless, because there was in that man a greater fullness of grace than in other holy men, he was before all the rest the temple of God, he was united to God, more closely in affection, and it was by a singular kind of privilege that he shared the divine names. And because of this outstanding grace he was established in a share of the divine dignity and honor—namely, that he be co-adored with God. So, then, consequently on the things just said there must be one Person of the Word of God, and another person of that man who is co-adored with the Word of God. And if one Person of each of the two be mentioned, this will be by reason of the affective union aforesaid; so that man and the Word of God may be called one Person, as is said of man and woman that “now they are not two, but one flesh” (Mat. 19:6).
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| Et quia talis unio non facit ut quod de uno dicitur, de altero dici possit, non enim quicquid convenit viro, verum est de muliere, aut e converso; ideo in unione verbi et illius hominis hoc observandum putant, quod ea quae sunt propria illius hominis, ad humanam naturam pertinentia, de verbo Dei, aut de Deo, convenienter dici non possunt; sicut homini illi convenit quod sit natus de virgine, quod passus, mortuus et sepultus, et huiusmodi; quae omnia asserunt de Deo, vel de Dei verbo, dici non debere. Sed quia sunt quaedam nomina quae, etsi Deo principaliter conveniant, communicantur tamen hominibus per aliquem modum, sicut Christus, dominus, sanctus, et etiam filius Dei, de huiusmodi nominibus secundum eos nihil prohibet praedicta praedicari. Convenienter enim dicimus secundum eos quod Christus, vel dominus gloriae, vel sanctus sanctorum, vel Dei filius, sit natus de virgine, passus, mortuus et sepultus. Unde et beatam virginem non matrem Dei vel verbi Dei, sed matrem Christi nominandam esse dicunt.
| Now, such a union does not bring it about that what is said of the first can be said of the second (for not everything which becomes the man is true of the woman, or conversely); therefore in the union of the Word and that man they think this must be observed: The things proper to that man and pertinent to the human nature cannot be said becomingly of God’s Word, or of God. just so it becomes that man that he was born of a virgin, that he suffered, died, was buried, and this kind of thing; and all of these, they assert, ought not be said of God, or of the Word of God. But, since there are certain names which, although they are chiefly befitting to God, are nonetheless communicated to men in a fashion—“christ,” for instance, “lord,” “holy,” and even “son of God”—nothing according to them keeps one from the use of such names in predication of the things just mentioned. For, according to them, we say fittingly that Christ, or the “Lord of glory,” or the “Saint of saints,” or “God’s son” was born of a virgin, suffered, died and was buried. Hence, too, the Blessed Virgin must not be named the mother of God, or of the Word of God, but the mother of Christ, they say.
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| Sed si quis diligenter consideret, praedicta positio veritatem incarnationis excludit. Non enim secundum praedicta verbum Dei fuit homini illi unitum nisi secundum inhabitationem per gratiam, ex qua consequitur unio voluntatum. Inhabitatio autem verbi Dei in homine non est verbum Dei incarnari. Habitavit enim verbum Dei, et Deus ipse, in omnibus sanctis a constitutione mundi, secundum illud apostoli II ad Cor. 6-16, vos estis templum Dei vivi: sicut dicit dominus: quoniam inhabitabo in illis: quae tamen inhabitatio incarnatio dici non potest; alioquin frequenter ab initio mundi Deus incarnatus fuisset. Nec hoc etiam ad incarnationis rationem sufficit si verbum Dei, aut Deus, pleniori gratia habitavit in illo homine: quia magis et minus speciem non diversificant unionis. Cum igitur Christiana religio in fide incarnationis fundetur, evidenter apparet quod praedicta positio fundamentum Christianae religionis tollit.
| [3] But let one earnestly consider the matter and he will see that the position described excludes the truth of the Incarnation. For, in that position, the Word of God was united to that man only through an indwelling by grace, on which a union of wills follows. But the indwelling of God’s Word in a man is not for God’s Word to be made flesh. For the Word of God and God Himself have been dwelling in all the holy men since the world was founded; as the Apostle says: “You are the temple of the living God; as God says: I will dwell in them” (2 Cor. 6: 16). And this indwelling, for all that, cannot be called incarnation; otherwise, God would have repeatedly been made flesh since the beginning of the world. Nor does it suffice for the notion of incarnation if the Word of God or God dwelt in that man with a fuller grace, for “greater and less do not diversify the species of union.” Since the Christian religion is based on faith in the Incarnation, it is now quite evident that the position described removes the basis of the Christian religion.
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| Praeterea. Ex ipso modo loquendi Scripturarum, falsitas praedictae positionis apparet. Inhabitationem enim verbi Dei in sanctis hominibus consuevit sacra Scriptura his modis significare: locutus est dominus ad Moysen; dicit dominus ad Moysen; factum est verbum domini ad Ieremiam (aut ad aliquem aliorum prophetarum); factum est verbum domini in manu Aggaei prophetae. Nunquam autem legitur quod verbum domini factum sit vel Moyses, vel Ieremias, vel aliquis aliorum. Hoc autem modo singulariter unionem Dei verbi ad carnem Christi designat Evangelista, dicens, verbum caro factum est, ut supra expositum est. Manifestum est igitur quod non solum per modum inhabitationis verbum Dei in homine Christo fuit, secundum traditiones Scripturae.
| [4] In addition is the very manner of speech of Scripture, which makes the falsity of the position described plain. For the indwelling of the Word of God in holy men is usually designated by Scripture in these ways: “The Lord spoke to Moses”; ‘ne word of the Lord came to Jeremiah” (or to some other Prophet); “The word of the Lord came to the hand of Haggai the Prophet.” But one never reads the Word of the Lord was made Moses, or Jeremiah, or one of the others. Yet thus uniquely was the union of God’s Word to the flesh of Christ marked by the Evangelist: “The Word was made flesh,” as was explained before. Clearly, then, it was not by indwelling alone that God’s Word was in the man, Christ, if we follow Scripture.
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| Item. Omne quod factum est aliquid, est illud quod factum est: sicut quod factum est homo, est homo; et quod factum est album est album. Sed verbum Dei factum est homo, ut ex praemissis habetur. Igitur verbum Dei est homo. Impossibile est autem ut duorum differentium persona aut hypostasi vel supposito, unum de altero praedicetur: cum enim dicitur, homo est animal, id ipsum quod animal est, homo est; et cum dicitur, homo est albus, ipse homo albus esse significatur, licet albedo sit extra rationem humanitatis. Et ideo nullo modo dici potest quod Socrates sit Plato, vel aliquod aliud singularium eiusdem vel alterius speciei. Si igitur verbum caro factum est, idest homo, ut Evangelista testatur; impossibile est quod verbi Dei et illius hominis sint duae personae, vel duae hypostases, vel duo supposita.
| [5] Again, whatever was made is what it was made; thus, what was made man is man, and what was made white is white. But God’s Word was made man, as is gathered from the foregoing. So God’s Word is man. It is, of course, impossible when two things differ in person, or hypostasis or supposit that one he predicated of the other, for, when we say “Man is animal,” that which is animal man is. And when we say “Man is white,” the signification is that man himself is white, although whiteness is other than the essence of humanity. Accordingly, there is no way to say Socrates is Plato or anyone of the singulars of his own or another species. So, if “the Word was made flesh,” that is, “man,” as the Evangelist witnesses (John 1:14). it is impossible that there be two persons, or hypostases, or supposits of the Word of God and of that man.
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| Adhuc. Pronomina demonstrativa ad personam referuntur, vel hypostasim vel suppositum: nemo enim diceret, ego curro, alio currente; nisi forte figurative, utpote quod alius loco eius curreret. Sed ille homo qui dictus est Iesus, dicit de se, antequam Abraham fieret, ego sum, Ioan. 8-58; et Ioan. 10-30, ego et pater unum sumus; et plura alia quae manifeste ad divinitatem verbi pertinent. Ergo manifestum est quod persona illius hominis loquentis et hypostasis est ipsa persona filii Dei.
| [6] Demonstrative pronouns, moreover, refer to the person, or hypostasis, or supposit. For no one says “I run” when another is running, except figuratively, perhaps, when another is running in his place. But the man called Jesus says about Himself: “Before Abraham was made, I am”, and “I and the Father are one” (John 8:59; 10:30), and several other things which clearly pertain to the divinity of the Word. Therefore, the person and hypostasis of the man speaking is plainly the very person of the Word of God.
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| Amplius. Ex superioribus patet quod neque corpus Christi de caelo descendit, secundum errorem Valentini; neque anima, secundum errorem Origenis. Unde restat quod ad verbum Dei pertineat quod dicitur descendisse, non motu locali, sed ratione unionis ad inferiorem naturam, ut supra dictum est. Sed ille homo, ex persona sua loquens, dicit se descendisse de caelo, Ioan. 6-51: ego sum panis vivus, qui de caelo descendi. Necesse est igitur personam et hypostasim illius hominis esse personam verbi Dei.
| [7] There is more. From our exposition one sees that the body of Christ did not descend from heaven as in Valentine’s error, nor did His soul according to Origen’s. What is left is this: one can say pertinently of the Word of God that He descended, not by some local motion, but by reason of the union to a lower nature. This was said above. But that man, speaking in His own person, says that He descended from heaven in John (6:51): “I am the living bread which came down from heaven.” Necessarily, then, the person and hypostasis of that man must be the person of the Word of God.
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| Item. Manifestum est quod ascendere in caelum Christo homini convenit, qui videntibus apostolis elevatus est, ut dicitur Act. 1-9. Descendere autem de caelo verbo Dei convenit. Sed apostolus dicit, Ephes. 4-10: qui descendit, ipse est et qui ascendit. Ipsa igitur est persona et hypostasis illius hominis, quae est persona et hypostasis verbi Dei.
| [8] Again, to ascend into heaven plainly belongs to Christ the man who “was raised up while the disciples looked on,” as Acts (1:9) says. But to descend from heaven is proper to the Word of God. But the Apostle says: “He that descended is the same also that ascended above all the heavens” (Eph. 4:10). The very person and hypostasis of that man is, accordingly, the person and hypostasis of the Word of God.
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| Adhuc. Ei quod originem habet ex mundo, et quod non fuit antequam esset in mundo, non convenit venire in mundum. Sed homo Christus secundum carnem originem habet ex mundo, quia verum corpus humanum et terrenum habuit, ut ostensum est. Secundum animam vero non fuit antequam esset in mundo: habuit enim veram animam humanam, de cuius natura est ut non sit antequam corpori uniatur. Relinquitur igitur quod homini illi ex sua humanitate non conveniat venire in mundum. Ipse autem se dicit venisse in mundum: exivi, inquit, a patre, et veni in mundum, Ioan. 16-28. Manifestum est igitur quod id quod verbo Dei convenit, de homine illo dicitur vere: nam quod verbo Dei conveniat venire in mundum, manifeste ostendit Ioannes Evangelista, dicens: in mundo erat, et mundus per ipsum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit: in propria venit. Oportet igitur personam et hypostasim illius hominis loquentis esse personam et hypostasim verbi Dei.
| [9] Moreover, that whose origin is in the world, which had no being before the world, does not properly “come into the world.” But the man Christ in the flesh had His origin in the world, since He had a true, human, earthly body, as was shown. In His soul, as well, He had no being before He was in the world, for He had a true human soul in whose nature there is no being before it is united to the body. So, then, it does not belong to that man’s humanity to “come into the world.” He Himself says, of course, that He came into the world: “I came forth from the Father,” He says, “and I came into the world” (John 16:28). Plainly, then, what belongs to the Word of God is truly said of that man. For, that it belongs to the Word of God to come into the world John the Evangelist clearly shows (1:10-11) : “He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not; He came unto His own.” So, the person and hypostasis of the man speaking is the person and hypostasis of the Word of God.
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| Item apostolus dicit, Hebr. 10-5: ingrediens mundum dicit: hostiam et oblationem noluisti, corpus autem aptasti mihi. Ingrediens autem mundum verbum Dei est, ut ostensum est. Ipsi igitur Dei verbo corpus aptatur, ut scilicet sit proprium corpus eius. Quod dici non posset nisi esset eadem hypostasis Dei verbi et illius hominis. Oportet igitur esse eandem hypostasim Dei verbi et illius hominis.
| [10] Again, the Apostle says: “When He comes into the world He says: Sacrifice and oblation You did not want: but a body You fitted for Me” (Heb. 10:5). But He who enters the world is the Word of God, as was shown. It is, then, to God’s very Word that a body is fitted; namely, so as to be His own body. And one could not say this if the hypostasis of God’s Word were not identified with that of the man. Therefore, the hypostasis of the Word of God and of that man are the very same.
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| Amplius. Omnis mutatio vel passio conveniens corpori alicuius, potest attribui ei cuius est corpus: si enim corpus Petri vulneretur, flagelletur, aut moriatur, potest dici quod Petrus vulneratur, flagellatur, aut moritur. Sed corpus illius hominis fuit corpus verbi Dei, ut ostensum est. Ergo omnis passio quae in corpore illius hominis facta fuit, potest verbo Dei attribui. Recte igitur dici potest quod verbum Dei, et Deus, est passus, crucifixus, mortuus et sepultus. Quod ipsi negabant.
| [11] Every change or passion, furthermore, proper to ones body can be ascribed to him whose body it is, So, if the body of Peter is wounded, scourged, or dies, it can be said that Peter is wounded, scourged, or dies. But the body of that man is the body of the Word of God, as was just proved. Therefore, every suffering that took place in the body of that man can be ascribed to the Word of God. So it is right to say that the Word of God—and God—suffered, was crucified, died, and was buried. And this they used to deny.
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| Item. Apostolus dicit, Hebr. 2-10: decebat eum propter quem omnia, et per quem omnia, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat, auctorem salutis eorum, per passionem consummari: ex quo habetur quod ille propter quem sunt omnia, et per quem sunt omnia, et qui homines in gloriam adducit, et qui est auctor salutis humanae, passus est et mortuus. Sed haec quatuor singulariter sunt Dei, et nulli alii attribuuntur: dicitur enim Proverb. 16-4, universa propter semetipsum operatus est dominus; et Ioan. 1-3, de verbo Dei dicitur, omnia per ipsum facta sunt; et in Psalmo, gratiam et gloriam dabit dominus; et alibi, salus autem iustorum a domino. Manifestum est igitur recte dici Deum, Dei verbum, esse passum et mortuum.
| [12] The Apostle also says: “It became Him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, who, had brought many children into glory, to perfect the author of their salvation, by His passion” (Heb. 2:10). Thus one holds: He for whom all things are, through whom all things are, He who leads men to glory, and who is the Author of human salvation suffered and died. But these four are God’s in a singular way; they are attributed to no other. For we read in Proverbs (16:4): “The Lord has made all things for Himself”; in John (1:3) of the Word of God: “All things were made by Him”; in the Psalmist: “The Lord will give grace and glory”; and elsewhere: “The salvation of the just is from the Lord” (Ps. 83:12; 36:39). It is, then, plainly right to say that “God, God’s Word, suffered and died.”
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| Praeterea. Licet aliquis homo participatione dominii dominus dici possit, nullus tamen homo, neque creatura aliqua, potest dici dominus gloriae: quia gloriam futurae beatitudinis solus Deus ex natura possidet, alii vero per donum gratiae; unde et in Psalmo dicitur, dominus virtutum ipse est rex gloriae. Sed apostolus dicit dominum gloriae esse crucifixum, I ad Cor. 2-8. Vere igitur dici potest quod Deus sit crucifixus.
| [13] There is more. Granted someone may be called a lord by sharing in lordship: no man at all, no creature in fact, can be called “Lord of glory,” for God alone by His nature possesses the glory of the future beatitude. But others do so by the gift of grace, and so the Psalmist says: “The Lord of hosts, He is the King of glory” (Ps. 2-3:8-10). But the Apostle says the Lord of glory was crucified (1 Cor. 2:8). Then truly it can be said: God was crucified.
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| Adhuc. Verbum Dei dicitur Dei filius per naturam, ut ex supra dictis patet: homo autem, propter inhabitationem Dei, dicitur Dei filius per gratiam adoptionis. Sic igitur in domino Iesu Christo, secundum positionem praedictam, est accipere utrumque filiationis modum: nam verbum inhabitans est Dei filius per naturam; homo inhabitatus est Dei filius per gratiam adoptionis. Unde homo ille non potest dici proprius, vel unigenitus Dei filius, sed solum Dei verbum, quod, secundum proprietatem nativitatis, singulariter a patre genitum est. Attribuit autem Scriptura proprio et unigenito Dei filio passionem et mortem. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. cap. 8-32: proprio filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum. Et Ioan. 3-16: sic Deus dilexit mundum ut filium suum unigenitum daret, ut omnis qui credit in illum non pereat, sed habeat vitam aeternam. Et quod loquatur de traditione ad mortem, patet per id quod eadem verba supra praemiserat de filio hominis crucifixo, dicens: sicut Moyses exaltavit serpentem in deserto, ita oportet exaltari filium hominis, ut omnis qui credit in illum et cetera. Et apostolus mortem Christi indicium divinae dilectionis ad mundum esse ostendit, dicens, Rom. 5-8 commendat suam caritatem Deus in nobis, quoniam, cum adhuc inimici essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Recte igitur dici potest quod verbum Dei, Deus, sit passus et mortuus.
| [14] The Word of God, furthermore, is called God’s Son by nature, this was made plain above. But a man through the indwelling is called God’s son by the grace of adoption. But in the position now opposed, one must accept in our Lord Jesus Christ each of these modes of sonship, for the indwelling Word is the Son of God by nature; the man in whom He dwells is a son of God by the grace of adoption. Hence, that man cannot be called “the very own” or “only-begotten Son of God”; the Word of God alone in His own proper birth is uniquely begotten of the Father. But Scripture attributes the passion and death to God’s very own and only-begotten Son, for the Apostle says: “He has spared not even His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all” (Rom. 8:32); and John (3:16) says: “God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believes in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting.” And that He spoke of “giving” Him over to death is clear from this: John had previously used the very same words about the crucified Son of Man when he said: “As Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up, that whosoever believes in Him” (John 3:14), and the rest. And the Apostle makes the death of Christ an indication of the divine love for the world by saying: “God commends His charity towards us; because when as yet we were sinners, according to the time, Christ died for us” (Rom. 5:8-9). Rightly, then, does one say that the Word of God, that God, suffered and died.
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| Item. Ex hoc dicitur aliquis filius alicuius matris, quia corpus eius ex ea sumitur, licet anima non sumatur ex matre, sed ab exteriori sit. Corpus autem illius hominis ex virgine matre sumptum est: ostensum est autem corpus illius hominis esse corpus filii Dei naturalis, idest verbi Dei. Convenienter igitur dicitur quod beata virgo sit mater verbi Dei, et etiam Dei, licet divinitas verbi a matre non sumatur: non enim oportet quod filius totum quod est de sua substantia a matre sumat, sed solum corpus.
| [15] Again, one is said to be the son of a mother because his body is taken from her, although his soul is not taken from her, but has an exterior source. But the body of that man was taken from the Virgin Mother. Now, it was proved that the body of that man is the body of the natural Son of God, that is, of the Word of God. So it becomes us to say that the Blessed Virgin is “the Mother of the Word of God,” and even “of God”. Of course, the divinity of the Word is not taken from His Mother, for a son need not take the whole of his substance from his mother, but his body only.
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| Amplius. Apostolus dicit, ad Galat. 4-4: misit Deus filium suum factum ex muliere: ex quibus verbis ostenditur qualiter missio filii Dei sit intelligenda: eo enim dicitur missus quo factus est ex muliere. Quod quidem verum esse non posset nisi filius Dei ante fuisset quam factus esset ex muliere: quod enim in aliquid mittitur, prius esse intelligitur quam sit in eo quo mittitur. Sed homo ille, filius adoptivus, secundum Nestorium, non fuit antequam natus esset ex muliere. Quod ergo dicit, misit Deus filium suum, non potest intelligi de filio adoptivo, sed oportet quod intelligatur de filio naturali, idest de Deo Dei verbo. Sed ex hoc quod aliquis factus est ex muliere, dicitur filius mulieris. Deus ergo, Dei verbum, est filius mulieris.
| [16] The Apostle says further that “God sent His Son, made of a woman” (Gal. 4:4). These words show us how to understand the sending of the Son of God: He is called sent thither, where He was made of a woman. This could not, of course, be true if the Son of God had not been before He was made of a woman, for that which is sent into another is understood to be previously to its being in that other to which it is sent. But that man, the Nestorian adoptive son, had no being before he was born of the woman. The Apostle’s word, “God sent His Son,” cannot, therefore, be understood of the adoptive son, but must be understood of the natural Son, that is, of God the Word of God. But if one is made of a woman, he is called the woman’s son. Therefore, God the Word of God is the Son of a woman.
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| Sed forte dicet aliquis non debere verbum apostoli sic intelligi quod Dei filius ad hoc sit missus ut sit factus ex muliere: sed ita quod Dei filius qui est factus ex muliere et sub lege, ad hoc sit missus ut eos qui sub lege erant redimeret. Et secundum hoc, quod dicit filium suum, non oportebit intelligi de filio naturali, sed de homine illo qui est filius adoptionis. Sed hic sensus excluditur ex ipsis apostoli verbis. Non enim a lege potest absolvere nisi ille qui supra legem existit, qui est auctor legis. Lex autem a Deo posita est. Solius igitur Dei est a servitute legis eripere. Hoc autem attribuit apostolus filio Dei de quo loquitur. Filius ergo Dei de quo loquitur, est filius naturalis. Verum est ergo dicere quod naturalis Dei filius, idest Deus Dei verbum, est factus ex muliere.
| [17] Perhaps we will be told not to understand the word of the Apostle thus: that the Son of God was sent to be made of a woman; but to understand it thus: that God’s Son, made of a woman and under the Law, was sent “that He might redeem them who were under the Law” (Gal. 4:5). And in this reading “his son” need not be understood of the natural Son, but of that man who was the son by adoption. But the very words of the Apostle exclude this meaning. For no one can release from the Law save him who exists above the Law, the author of the Law. But the Law was established by God. Only God, then, can take away servitude to the Law. But the Apostle attributes this to the Son of God of whom he speaks. So, the Son of God of whom he speaks is the natural Son. Therefore, it is true to say: The natural Son of God, that is, God the Word of God, is made of a woman.
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| Praeterea. Idem patet per hoc quod redemptio humani generis ipsi Deo attribuitur in Psalmo: redemisti me, domine Deus veritatis.
| [18] The very same point is clarified by Scripture’s attribution of the redemption of the human race to God Himself, thus the Psalmist: “You have redeemed me, O Lord, the God of truth” (Ps. 30:6).
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| Adhuc. Adoptio filiorum Dei fit per spiritum sanctum: secundum illud Rom. 8-15: accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum. Spiritus autem sanctus non est donum hominis, sed Dei. Adoptio ergo filiorum non causatur ab homine, sed a Deo. Causatur autem a filio Dei misso a Deo et facto ex muliere: quod patet per id quod apostolus subdit, ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus. Oportet igitur verbum apostoli intelligi de filio Dei naturali. Deus igitur, Dei verbum, factus est ex muliere, idest ex virgine matre.
| [19] Furthermore, the adoption of God’s sons is made by the Holy Spirit, according to Romans (8:15): “You have received the spirit of adoption of sons.” But the Holy Spirit is a gift, not of man, but of God. And so, the adoption of sons is not caused by man, but by God. But it is caused by the Son of God sent by God and made of a woman. This is clear from the Apostle’s addition: “That we might receive the adoption of sons” (Gal. 4:5). One ought, then, to understand the Apostle’s expression of God’s natural Son. It is, accordingly, God the Word of God who “was made of a woman”; that is, of the Virgin Mother.
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| Item. Ioannes dicit: verbum caro factum est. Non autem habet carnem nisi ex muliere. Verbum igitur factum est ex muliere, idest ex virgine matre. Virgo igitur est mater Dei verbi.
| [20] And, again, John says: “The Word was made flesh.” But He has no flesh, except from a woman. The Word, then, is made of a woman; that is, of the Virgin Mother. Therefore, the Virgin is the Mother of God the Word.
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| Amplius. Apostolus dicit, Rom. 9-5, quod Christus est ex patribus secundum carnem, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Non autem est ex patribus nisi mediante virgine. Deus igitur, qui est super omnia, est ex virgine secundum carnem. Virgo igitur est mater Dei secundum carnem.
| [21] The Apostle further says that Christ is from the father, according to the flesh, Who is over all things, God blessed for ever” (Rom. 9:5). But he is not from the fathers save through the Virgin. God, then, who is above all things, is from the Virgin in the flesh. The Virgin, then, is the Mother of God in the flesh.
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| Adhuc. Apostolus dicit, Philipp. 2 de Christo Iesu, quod cum in forma Dei esset, exinanivit semetipsum, formam servi accipiens, in similitudinem hominum factus. Ubi manifestum est si, secundum Nestorium, Christum dividamus in duos, scilicet in hominem illum qui est filius adoptivus, et in filium Dei naturalem, qui est verbum Dei, quod non potest intelligi de homine illo. Ille enim homo, si purus homo sit, non prius fuit in forma Dei, ut postmodum in similitudinem hominum fieret: sed magis e converso homo existens divinitatis particeps factus est, in quo non fuit exinanitus, sed exaltatus. Oportet igitur quod intelligatur de verbo Dei, quod prius fuerit ab aeterno in forma Dei, idest in natura Dei, et postmodum exinanivit semetipsum, in similitudinem hominum factus.
| [22] The Apostle, once more, says of Christ Jesus that, “being in the form of God, emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men” (Phil. 2:6-7). Now, clearly, if, following Nestorius, we divide Christ into two—into that man who is the adoptive son, and into God’s natural Son who is the Word of God—this text cannot be understood of that man. For that man, if he be pure man, was not first in the form of God, so as to be made later in the likeness of man; rather conversely: the existing man was made to share in divinity; in this he was not emptied, but exalted. The text must, then, be understood of the Word of God who first was eternally in the form of God, that is, in the nature of God, and later emptied Himself, made in the likeness of man.
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| Non potest autem intelligi ista exinanitio per solam inhabitationem verbi Dei in homine Iesu Christo. Nam verbum Dei in omnibus sanctis, a principio mundi, habitavit per gratiam, nec tamen dicitur exinanitum: quia Deus sic suam bonitatem creaturis communicat quod nihil ei subtrahitur, sed magis quodammodo exaltatur, secundum quod eius sublimitas ex bonitate creaturarum apparet, et tanto amplius quanto creaturae fuerint meliores. Unde, si verbum Dei plenius habitavit in homine Christo quam in aliis sanctis, minus etiam hic quam in aliis convenit exinanitio verbi.
| But that emptying cannot be understood solely by the indwelling of the Word of God in the man Jesus Christ. For, since the beginning of the world, the Word of God has dwelt in all the saints by grace. It is not, for all that, emptied, since God communicates His goodness to creatures so that nothing is subtracted from Him. Rather, He is somehow exalted, in that the goodness of the creatures manifests His sublimity, and so much the more so as the creatures have been better. Hence, if the Word of God has dwelt more fully in the man Christ than in the other saints, then even less in this case than in others is the emptying harmonious with the Word.
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| Manifestum est igitur quod unio verbi ad humanam naturam non est intelligenda secundum solam inhabitationem verbi Dei in homine illo, ut Nestorius dicebat: sed secundum hoc quod verbum Dei vere factum est homo. Sic enim solum habebit locum exinanitio: ut scilicet dicatur verbum Dei exinanitum, idest parvum factum, non amissione propriae magnitudinis, sed assumptione humanae parvitatis; sicut si anima praeexisteret corpori, et diceretur fieri substantia corporea quae est homo, non mutatione propriae naturae, sed assumptione naturae corporeae.
| Plainly, then, the union of the Word with the human nature must not be understood in accordance merely with the indwelling of the Word of God in that man (as Nestorius held), but in accordance with this fact: The Word of God truly was made man. In this wise only, then, will there be place for “emptying”: namely, let the Word of God be called “emptied,” that is, made small, not by the loss of His own greatness, but by the assumption of human smallness; just so would it be if the soul were to pre-exist the body, and were said to be made the corporeal substance which man is: not by a change of its own nature, but by the assumption of corporeal nature.
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| Praeterea. Manifestum est quod spiritus sanctus in homine Christo habitavit: dicitur enim Lucae 4-1, quod Iesus plenus spiritu sancto regressus est a Iordane. Si igitur incarnatio verbi secundum hoc solum intelligenda est quod verbum Dei in homine illo plenissime habitavit, necesse erit dicere quod etiam spiritus sanctus erit incarnatus. Quod est omnino alienum a doctrina fidei.
| [23] There is more. Manifestly, the Holy Spirit dwelt in the man Christ, for Luke (4:11) says: “Jesus, being full of the Holy Spirit, returned from the Jordan.” If, then, our understanding of the Incarnation of the Word is this alone—the Word of God dwelt most fully in that man—we will have to say that the Holy Spirit was incarnate also. And this is altogether foreign to the teaching of the faith.
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| Adhuc. Manifestum est verbum Dei in sanctis Angelis habitare, qui participatione verbi intelligentia replentur. Dicit autem apostolus, Hebr. 2-16: nusquam Angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit. Manifestum est igitur quod assumptio humanae naturae a verbo non est secundum solam inhabitationem accipienda.
| [24] This is also clear: The Word of God dwells in the holy angels, and by sharing the Word they are filled with understanding. But the Apostle says: “Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels: but of the seed of Abraham he takes hold” (Heb. 2:16). Clearly, then, the assumption of human nature by the Word is not merely to be taken as indwelling.
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| Adhuc. Si, secundum positionem Nestorii, Christus separaretur in duos secundum hypostasim differentes, idest in verbum Dei et hominem illum, impossibile est quod verbum Dei Christus dicatur. Quod patet tum ex modo loquendi Scripturae, quae nunquam ante incarnationem Deum, aut Dei verbum, nominat Christum. Tum etiam ex ipsa nominis ratione. Dicitur enim Christus quasi unctus. Unctus autem intelligitur oleo exultationis, idest spiritu sancto, ut Petrus exponit, Act. 10-38. Non autem potest dici quod verbum Dei sit unctum spiritu sancto: quia sic spiritus sanctus esset maior filio, ut sanctificans sanctificato. Oportebit igitur quod hoc nomen Christus solum pro homine illo possit intelligi. Quod ergo dicit apostolus, ad Philipp. 2-5, hoc sentite in vobis quod et in Christo Iesu, ad hominem illum referendum est. Subdit autem, 6 qui cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo. Verum est igitur dicere quod homo ille est in forma, idest in natura Dei, et aequalis Deo. Licet autem homines dicantur dii, vel filii Dei, propter inhabitantem Deum, nunquam tamen dicitur quod sint aequales Deo. Patet igitur quod homo Christus non per solam inhabitationem dicitur Deus.
| [25] If, furthermore, as in the Nestorian position, Christ be separated into two differing in hypostasis—that is, into the Word of God and that man—the Word of God cannot possibly be called “Christ.” This is clear, for one thing, from Scripture’s manner of speaking: Scripture before the Incarnation never names God, or the Word of God, Christ. It is clear, as well, from the very account of the name. For one says “Christ” only as though to say “anointed.” But one understands anointed with the “oil of gladness” (Heb. 1:9; Ps. 44:8), that is, “with the Holy Spirit (Acts 10:38), as Peter explains. Yet, one cannot say that the Word of God is anointed with the Holy Spirit, for the Holy Spirit would thus be greater than the Son, as the sanctifier is greater than the sanctified. It will be necessary, then, to understand the name “Christ” only of that man. Therefore, this word of the Apostle, “Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus” (Phil. 2:5-6), must be referred to that man. Yet he adds: “Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with Cod.” Truly, then, one speaks of that man in the form, that is, the nature of God, and equal to God. Yet, granted men are called “gods” or “sons of God” by God’s indwelling, one never calls them “equal to God.” Clearly, then, the man Christ is not called God merely by reason of the indwelling.
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| Item. Licet nomen Dei ad sanctos homines transferatur propter inhabitationem gratiae, nunquam tamen opera quae sunt solius Dei, sicut creare caelum et terram, vel aliquid huiusmodi, de aliquo sanctorum propter inhabitationem gratiae dicitur. Christo autem homini attribuitur omnium creatio. Dicitur enim Hebr. 3-1 considerate apostolum et pontificem confessionis nostrae Iesum Christum, qui fidelis est ei qui fecit illum sicut et Moyses, in omni domo illius: quod oportet de homine illo, et non de Dei verbo intelligi tum quia ostensum est quod, secundum positionem Nestorii, verbum Dei Christus dici non potest; tum quia verbum Dei non est factum, sed genitum. Addit autem apostolus: 3 ampliori gloria iste prae Moyse dignus habitus est, quanto ampliorem honorem habet domus qui fabricavit illam. Homo igitur Christus fabricavit domum Dei. Quod consequenter apostolus probat, subdens: omnis namque domus fabricatur ab aliquo: qui autem omnia creavit, Deus est. Sic igitur apostolus probat quod homo Christus fabricavit domum Dei, per hoc quod Deus creavit omnia. Quae probatio nulla esset nisi Christus esset Deus creans omnia. Sic igitur homini illi attribuitur creatio universorum: quod est proprium opus Dei. Est igitur homo Christus ipse Deus secundum hypostasim, et non ratione inhabitationis tantum.
| [26] Granted, again, that the name of God is used for holy men by reason of the indwelling of grace, nonetheless works which are God’s alone—the creation of heaven and earth, for example, or something of the sort—are never ascribed to any saint by reason of the indwelling of grace. But to Christ the man the creation of all things is attributed. We read in Hebrews (3:1-4): “Consider the apostle and high priest of our confession Jesus Christ who is faithful to Him that made Him, as also was Moses in all His house.” This must be understood of that man and not of God’s Word; both because it was shown that in the Nestorian position God’s Word cannot be called Christ, as well as because God’s Word is not made, but begotten. The Apostle, of course, adds: “This man was counted worthy of greater glory than Moses, by so much as He that built the house bath greater honor than the house.” Now, the man Christ built the house. This the Apostle proves subsequently when he adds: “For every house is built by some man: but He that created all things is God.” Thus, then, the Apostle proves that the man Christ built the house of God from the fact that God created all things. But this would be no proof at all if Christ were not the God who creates all things. And so to that man the creation of the worlds is ascribed, a thing which is God’s very own work. The man Christ, then, is God Himself by hypostasis and not merely by reason of indwelling.
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| Amplius. Manifestum est quod homo Christus, loquens de se, multa divina dicit et supernaturalia: ut est illud Ioan. 6-40, ego resuscitabo illum in novissimo die; et Ioan. 10-28, ego vitam aeternam do eis. Quod quidem esset summae superbiae, si ille homo loquens non esset secundum hypostasim ipse Deus, sed solum haberet Deum inhabitantem. Hoc autem homini Christo non competit, qui de se dicit, Matth. 11-29: discite a me quia mitis sum et humilis corde. Est igitur eadem persona hominis illius et Dei.
| [27] Further, it is clear that the man Christ, speaking of Himself, says many divine and supernatural things: so this in John (6:40): “I will raise him up in the last day”; and again: “I give them life everlasting” (10:28). This would be the height of pride if that man speaking were not by hypostasis Cod Himself, but merely had God indwelling. But pride is not suited to the man Christ, who says of Himself: “Learn of me, because I am meek, and humble of heart” (Mat. 11:29). There is, then, identity in person between that man and God.
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| Praeterea. Sicut legitur in Scripturis quod homo ille est exaltatus, dicitur enim Act. 2-33, dextera igitur Dei exaltatus etc., ita legitur quod Deus sit exinanitus, Philipp. 2-7, exinanivit semetipsum et cetera. Sicut igitur sublimia possunt dici de homine illo ratione unionis, ut quod sit Deus, quod resuscitet mortuos, et alia huiusmodi; ita de Deo possunt dici humilia, ut quod sit natus de virgine, passus, mortuus et sepultus.
| [28] There is more. just as we read in Scripture that the man is “exalted”—as in Acts (2:33): “Exalted therefore by the right hand of God,” and the rest, so also we read that God is “emptied” in Philippians (2:7): “He emptied himself,” and the rest. Thus, just as sublime things can be said of that man by reason of the union—that He is God, that He raises the dead, and others of this sort—so of God can lowly things be said: that He was born of the Virgin, suffered, died, and was buried.
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| Adhuc. Relativa tam verba quam pronomina idem suppositum referunt. Dicit autem apostolus, Coloss. 1-16, loquens de filio Dei, in ipso condita sunt universa in caelo et in terra, visibilia et invisibilia; et postea subdit, 18 et ipse est caput corporis Ecclesiae, qui est principium, primogenitus ex mortuis. Manifestum est autem quod hoc quod dicitur, in ipso condita sunt universa, ad verbum Dei pertinet: quod autem dicitur, primogenitus ex mortuis, homini Christo competit. Sic igitur Dei verbum et homo Christus sunt unum suppositum, et per consequens una persona; et oportet quod quicquid dicitur de homine illo, dicatur de verbo Dei, et e converso.
| [29] Then, too, both relative verbs and pronouns bring out identity of supposit. The Apostle says, speaking of the Son of God: “In Him were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible; then, later, he adds: “And He is the head of the body, the Church, who is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead” (Col. 1:16, 18). Now, clearly, the text, “In Him were all things created,” refers to the Word of God; whereas the text, “first-born from the dead,” belongs to the man Christ. Therefore, God’s Word and the man Christ are one supposit and, consequently, one Person; and whatever is said of that man must he said of the Word of God, and conversely.
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| Item. Apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. 8-6: unus est dominus Iesus Christus, per quem omnia. Manifestum est autem quod Iesus, nomen illius hominis per quem omnia, convenit verbo Dei. Sic igitur verbum Dei et homo ille sunt unus dominus, nec duo domini nec duo filii, ut Nestorius dicebat. Et ex hoc ulterius sequitur quod verbi Dei et hominis sit una persona.
| [30] Again, the Apostle says: “There is one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are A things” (1 Cor. 8:6). But Jesus, the name of that man through whom all things are, clearly befits the Word of God. Thus, then, the Word of God and that man are one Lord; and these are not two lords, or two sons, as Nestorius held. From this it follows further that there is one person of the Word of God and the man.
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| Si quis autem diligenter consideret, haec Nestorii opinio quantum ad incarnationis mysterium, parum differt ab opinione Photini. Quia uterque hominem illum Deum dici asserebat solum propter inhabitationem gratiae: quamvis Photinus dixerit quod ille homo nomen divinitatis et gloriam per passionem et bona opera meruit; Nestorius autem confessus est quod a principio suae conceptionis huiusmodi nomen et gloriam habuit, propter plenissimam habitationem Dei in ipso. Circa generationem autem aeternam verbi multum differebant: nam Nestorius eam confitebatur; Photinus vero negabat omnino.
| [31] Let one consider the matter earnestly and he sees that this Nestorian opinion on the Incarnation differs very little from that of Photinus. For each held that the man was called God only by reason of the indwelling grace. Photinus, of course, said that the man merited the name and glory of divinity by suffering and good works; and Nestorius confessed that from the beginning of his conception he had this name and glory by reason of the fullness of God’s dwelling within him. Of course, on the eternal generation of the Word they differed greatly: Nestorius confessed it, but Photinus denied it completely.
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Caput 35
Contra errorem Eutychetis
| Chapter 35
AGAINST THE ERROR OF EUTYCHES
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| Quia ergo, sicut multipliciter ostensum est, ita oportet mysterium incarnationis intelligi quod verbi Dei et hominis sit una eademque persona, relinquitur quaedam circa huius veritatis considerationem difficultas. Naturam enim divinam necesse est ut sua personalitas consequatur. Similiter autem videtur et de humana natura: nam omne quod subsistit in intellectuali vel rationali natura, habet rationem personae. Unde non videtur esse possibile quod sit una persona et sint duae naturae, divina et humana.
| [1] Since the mystery of the Incarnation—as has been shown in many ways—must be understood thus: there is one and the same person of the Word of God and the man, a certain difficulty remains in the consideration of this truth. For necessarily its personality follows the divine nature. The case seems to be the same for human nature, for everything which subsists in an intellectual or a rational nature fulfills the account of person. Hence, it does not seem possible that there be one Person and two natures, divine and human.
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| Ad huius autem difficultatis solutionem diversi diversas positiones attulerunt. Eutyches enim, ut unitatem personae contra Nestorium servaret in Christo, dicit in Christo esse etiam unam naturam, ita quod, quamvis ante unionem essent duae naturae distinctae, divina et humana, in unione tamen coierunt in unam naturam. Et sic dicebat Christi personam ex duabus naturis esse, non autem in duabus naturis subsistere. Propter quod in Chalcedonensi synodo est condemnatus.
| [2] Now, for the solution of this difficulty various men have proposed various positions. Eutyches, for instance, to preserve the unity of person in Christ against Nestorius, says there is one nature, also. He says that, although before the union there were two distinct natures, the divine and human, they came together, nevertheless, in the union into one nature. And so he said that the person of Christ “is from two natures,” but does not “subsist in two natures.” For this he was condemned by the Council of Chalcedon.
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| Huius autem positionis falsitas ex multis apparet. Ostensum enim est supra quod in Christo Iesu et corpus fuit, et anima rationalis, et divinitas. Et manifestum est quod corpus Christi, etiam post unionem, non fuit ipsa verbi divinitas: nam corpus Christi, etiam post unionem, palpabile fuit, et corporeis oculis visibile, et lineamentis membrorum distinctum; quae omnia aliena sunt a divinitate verbi, ut ex superioribus patet. Similiter etiam anima Christi post unionem aliud fuit a divinitate verbi: quia anima Christi, etiam post unionem, passionibus tristitiae et doloris et irae affecta fuit; quae etiam divinitati verbi nullo modo convenire possunt, ut ex praemissis patet. Anima autem humana et corpus constituunt humanam naturam. Sic igitur, etiam post unionem, humana natura in Christo fuit aliud a divinitate verbi, quae est natura divina. Sunt igitur in Christo, etiam post unionem, duae naturae.
| [3] The falsity of this position, of course, appears in many ways. For we showed above that there was in Christ Jesus a body, a rational soul, and divinity. And, clearly, the body of Christ even after the union was not the very divinity of the Word; for the body of Christ even after the union could be touched, could be seen with bodily eyes, and had distinctly outlined members. All of these are foreign to the divinity of the Word, as the foregoing make clear. And in like fashion the soul of Christ after the union was other than the divinity of the Word, because after the union the soul of Christ was affected by the passions of sadness, of sorrow, and of anger. These, too, are entirely disproportionate to the divinity of the Word, as the foregoing shows. But a human soul and a human body constitute a human nature. Thus, then, even after the union, the human nature in Christ was other than the divinity of the Word which is the divine nature. Therefore, in Christ, even after the union, there are two natures.
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| Item. Natura est secundum quam res aliqua dicitur res naturalis. Dicitur autem res naturalis ex hoc quod habet formam, sicut et res artificialis: non enim dicitur domus antequam habeat formam artis, et similiter non dicitur equus antequam habeat formam naturae suae. Forma igitur rei naturalis est eius natura. Oportet autem dicere quod in Christo sint duae formae, etiam post unionem. Dicit enim apostolus, Philipp. 2, de Christo Iesu, quod, cum in forma Dei esset, formam servi accepit. Non autem potest dici quod sit eadem forma Dei, et forma servi: nihil enim accipit quod iam habet; et sic, si eadem est forma Dei et forma servi, cum iam formam Dei habuisset, non accepisset formam servi. Neque iterum potest dici quod forma Dei in Christo per unionem sit corrupta: quia sic Christus post unionem non esset Deus. Neque iterum potest dici quod forma servi sit corrupta in unione: quia sic non accepisset formam servi. Sed nec dici potest quod forma servi sit permixta formae Dei: quia quae permiscentur, non manent integra, sed partim utrumque corrumpitur; unde non diceret quod accepisset formam servi, sed aliquid eius. Et sic oportet dicere, secundum verba apostoli, quod in Christo, etiam post unionem, fuerunt duae formae. Ergo duae naturae.
| [4] Again. It is by its nature that something is called a natural thing. One calls it a natural thing because it has a form, as one does with an artificial thing; one does not call a house a house before it has the form of its architecture, nor a horse a horse before it has the form of its nature. The form of a natural thing is, then, its nature. But one must say that in Christ there are two forms, even after the union. For the Apostle says of Christ Jesus, when he was “in the form of God, He took the form of a servant” (Phil. 2:6-7). Of course, one cannot say that the form of God is the same as the form of the servant. For nothing receives what it already has, and so, if the form of God and of the servant are the same, He would not—since He already had the form of God—have received the form of servant. Neither, again, can one say that the form of God in Christ is corrupted by the union, because thus after the union Christ would not be God. Nor, again, can one say that the form of the servant was corrupted in the union, because thus He would not have received the form of the servant. But neither can one say that the form of the servant is mixed thoroughly with the form of God, for things mixed thoroughly do not retain their integrity; rather, each is in part corrupted, and so the Apostle would not say that He had received the form of the servant, but something of the servant. Hence, One ought to say respecting the words of the Apostle that in Christ even after the union there were two forms; therefore, two natures.
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| Amplius. Nomen naturae primo impositum est ad significandum ipsam generationem nascentium. Et exinde translatum est ad significandum principium generationis huiusmodi. Et inde ad significandum principium motus intrinsecum mobili. Et quia huiusmodi principium est materia vel forma, ulterius natura dicitur forma vel materia rei naturalis habentis in se principium motus. Et quia forma et materia constituunt essentiam rei naturalis, extensum est nomen naturae ad significandum essentiam cuiuscumque rei in natura existentis: ut sic natura alicuius rei dicatur essentia, quam significat definitio. Et hoc modo hic de natura est quaestio: sic enim dicimus humanam naturam esse in Christo et divinam.
| [5] The name “nature,” moreover, in its first imposition had as meaning the very generation of things being born. Thence it was carried over to meaning the principle of this kind of generation, and then to signifying the principle of motion intrinsic to the moveable thing. And because this kind of principle is matter or form, nature is further called the form or matter of a thing which has in itself a principle of motion. And since form and matter constitute the essence of the natural thing, the name was extended to meaning the essence of everything whatsoever which exists in nature. As a result of this, the nature of a thing is called “the essence signified by the definition.”O In this last fashion nature is in question here, for thus we say that there is in Christ human nature and divine.
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| Si igitur, ut Eutyches posuit, humana natura et divina fuerunt duae ante unionem, sed ex eis in unione conflata est una natura, oportet hoc esse aliquo modorum secundum quos ex multis natum est unum fieri.
| [6] Now, then, if, as Eutyches held, the human nature and the divine were two before the union, but from those in the union one nature was breathed together, this should take place in one of the ways in which it is natural that one comes to be from many.
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| Fit autem unum ex multis, uno quidem modo, secundum ordinem tantum: sicut ex multis domibus fit civitas, et ex multis militibus fit exercitus. Alio modo, ordine et compositione: sicut ex partibus domus coniunctis et parietum colligatione fit domus. Sed hi duo modi non competunt ad constitutionem unius naturae ex pluribus. Ea enim quorum forma est ordo vel compositio, non sunt res naturales, ut sic eorum unitas possit dici unitas naturae.
| [7] Now, one way in which one comes from many is the way of order alone; so from many homes a city comes to be, or from many soldiers an army. Another way is that of order and composition; so a house comes to be when they join together its parts and its walls. But neither of these two ways fits the constitution of one nature from a plurality. For things whose form is order or juxtaposition are not natural things. The result is that their unity cannot be called a unity of nature.
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| Tertio modo, ex pluribus fit unum per commixtionem: sicut ex quatuor elementis fit corpus mixtum. Hic etiam modus nullo modo competit ad propositum. Primo quidem, quia mixtio non est nisi eorum quae communicant in materia, et quae agere et pati ad invicem nata sunt. Quod quidem hic esse non potest: ostensum est enim in primo libro quod Deus immaterialis et omnino impassibilis est. Secundo, quia ex his quorum unum multum excedit aliud, mixtio fieri non potest: si quis enim guttam vini mittat in mille amphoras aquae, non erit mixtio, sed corruptio vini; propter quod etiam nec ligna in fornacem ignis missa dicimus misceri igni, sed ab igne consumi, propter excellentem ignis virtutem. Divina autem natura in infinitum humanam excedit: cum virtus Dei sit infinita, ut in primo ostensum est. Nullo igitur modo posset fieri mixtio utriusque naturae. Tertio quia, dato quod fieret mixtio, neutra natura remaneret salvata: miscibilia enim in mixto non salvantur, si sit vera mixtio. Facta igitur permixtione utriusque naturae, divinae scilicet et humanae, neutra natura remaneret, sed aliquod tertium: et sic Christus neque esset Deus neque homo. Non igitur sic potest intelligi quod Eutyches dixit, ante unionem fuisse duas naturas, post unionem vero unam in domino Iesu Christo, quasi ex duabus naturis sit constituta una natura. Relinquitur ergo quod hoc intelligatur hoc modo, quod altera tantum earum post unionem remanserit. Aut igitur fuit in Christo sola natura divina, et id quod videbatur in eo humanum fuit phantasticum, ut Manichaeus dixit; aut divina natura conversa est in humanam, ut Apollinaris dixit; contra quos supra disputavimus. Relinquitur igitur hoc esse impossibile, ante unionem fuisse duas naturas in Christo, post unionem vero unam.
| [8] In a third way, one comes from many by mixture, as from the four elements one gets a mixed body. And this way, too, does not fit the present consideration. The first reason is this: Mixture is only of things which have matter in common and by nature act and react reciprocally. Such cannot~ indeed, be the case here, for it was shown in Book I that God is entirely immaterial and subject to no action. The second reason is this: When one thing greatly exceeds another there can be no mixture, for, if a man puts a drop of wine into a thousand measures of water, he is not mixing, but spoiling, the wine. For the same reason we do not say that wood thrown into a furnace is mixed with the fire, but—by reason of the superior power of the fire—consumed by the fire. The divine nature, of course, exceeds the human by infinity, since the divine power is infinite, as was shown in Book I. There cannot, then, be any mixture at all of each nature. The third reason is this: If a mixture were to come into being, neither nature would be preserved. For things subject to mixture are not preserved in the mixed product, if it be a true mixture. Given, then, a thorough mixture of each of the two natures—the divine, namely, and the human—neither of the two natures would remain, but some third. What Eutyches said, then, cannot be understood thus: There were two natures before the union, but after the union one nature in our Lord Jesus Christ, as though from two natures one nature has been established. Therefore, the understanding of it which remains is this: Either the one or the other remained after the union. Either, then, there was in Christ the divine nature only and what appeared human in Him was but phantasy as Mani said; or the divine nature was converted into the human as Apollinaris said. But against these we have previously disputed. The conclusion, then, is that it is impossible that before the union there were two natures in Christ; after the union, but one.
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| Amplius. Nunquam invenitur ex duabus naturis manentibus fieri unam: eo quod quaelibet natura est quoddam totum, ea vero ex quibus aliquid constituitur, cadunt in rationem partis; unde, cum ex anima et corpore fiat unum, neque corpus neque anima natura dici potest, sicut nunc loquimur de natura, quia neutrum habet speciem completam, sed utrumque est pars unius naturae. Cum igitur natura humana sit quaedam natura completa, et similiter natura divina, impossibile est quod concurrant in unam naturam, nisi vel utraque vel altera corrumpatur. Quod esse non potest: cum ex supra dictis pateat unum Christum et verum Deum et verum hominem esse. Impossibile est igitur in Christo unam esse tantum naturam.
| [9] There is more. One never finds one coming to be from two abiding natures, because any nature is a kind of whole, but its constituents are accounted for as parts. Hence, when one comes to be from a soul and a body, neither the soul nor the body can be called a nature (as we are now speaking of nature), because neither has the complete species, but each is a part of the one nature. Since human nature, then, is a kind of complete nature, and the divine nature is similarly, it is impossible that they concur in one nature without the corruption either of each of the two, or of one of the two. Now, this cannot be, since from our previous points” the one Christ clearly is both true God and true man. It is impossible, then, that in Christ there is only one nature.
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| Item. Ex duobus manentibus una natura constituitur vel sicut ex partibus corporalibus, sicut ex membris constituitur animal: quod hic dici non potest, cum divina natura non sit aliquid corporeum. Vel sicut ex materia et forma constituitur aliquid unum, sicut ex anima et corpore animal. Quod etiam non potest in proposito dici: ostensum est enim in primo libro quod Deus neque materia est, neque alicuius forma esse potest. Si igitur Christus est verus Deus et verus homo, ut ostensum est, impossibile est quod in eo sit una natura tantum.
| [10] Again, from two abiding one nature is constituted: from bodily parts, if you like, as an animal is constituted of its members—which cannot be said in this case, since the divine nature is not something bodily; if you like, something one is constituted from matter and form, as an animal is constituted of its soul and body. Neither can this be said in the present discussion, for it was shown in Book II that God can neither be matter nor the form of anything. Then, if Christ is true God and true man, as was seen, it is impossible that in Him there be one nature only.
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| Adhuc. Subtractio vel additio alicuius essentialis principii variat speciem rei: et per consequens mutat naturam, quae nihil est aliud quam essentia, quam significat definitio, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc videmus quod differentia specifica addita vel subtracta definitioni, facit differre secundum speciem: sicut animal rationale, et ratione carens, specie differunt; sicut et in numeris unitas addita vel subtracta facit aliam speciem numeri. Forma autem est essentiale principium. Omnis igitur formae additio facit aliam speciem et aliam naturam, sicut nunc loquimur de natura. Si igitur divinitas verbi addatur humanae naturae sicut forma, faciet aliam naturam. Et sic Christus non erit humanae naturae, sed cuiusdam alterius: sicut corpus animatum est alterius naturae quam id quod est corpus tantum.
| [11] The subtraction or addition of an essential principle, furthermore, varies the species of a thing; consequently, it changes the nature which is not other than “the essence which the definition signifies.” For this reason we see that a specific difference added to a definition or subtracted from it makes a difference in species; so the rational animal and the one lacking reason differ in species, just as in numbers the addition or subtraction of unity makes another species of number. But form is an essential principle. So, every addition of form makes another species and another nature (as we are now speaking of nature). If, then, the divinity of the Word be added to the human nature as a form, it will make another nature. And thus Christ will not be of the human nature but of some other, just as an animated body is of another nature than that which is body only.
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| Adhuc. Ea quae non conveniunt in natura, non sunt similia secundum speciem, ut homo et equus. Si autem natura Christi sit composita ex divina et humana, manifestum est quod non erit natura Christi in aliis hominibus. Ergo non erit similis nobis secundum speciem. Quod est contra apostolum dicentem, Hebr. 2-17, quod debuit per omnia fratribus assimilari.
| [12] Then, again, things which do not agree in nature are not similar in species; man and horse, for example. But, if Christ’s nature be a composite of the divine and human, clearly Christ’s nature will not be in other men. Therefore, He will not be similar to us in species. And this is contrary to the Apostle’s word: “It behooved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren” (Heb. 2:17).
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| Praeterea. Ex forma et materia semper constituitur una species, quae est praedicabilis de pluribus actu vel potentia, quantum est de ratione speciei. Si igitur humanae naturae divina natura quasi forma adveniat, oportebit quod ex commixtione utriusque quaedam communis species resultet, quae sit a multis participabilis. Quod patet esse falsum: non enim est nisi unus Iesus Christus, Deus et homo. Non igitur divina et humana natura in Christo constituerunt unam naturam.
| [13] There is more. One species is always constituted of form and matter which is actually or potentially predicable of many according to the essentials of the species. If, then, the divine nature accrues to the human nature as a form, some common species must spring from the mixture of the two, and in this many should be able to share. And this is plainly false. For there is but one Jesus Christ (1 Cor. 8:6), God and man. Therefore, the divine and human natures have not established one nature in Christ.
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| Amplius. Hoc etiam videtur a fide alienum esse quod Eutyches dixit, ante unionem in Christo fuisse duas naturas. Cum enim humana natura ex anima et corpore constituatur, sequeretur quod vel anima, vel corpus, aut utrumque, ante Christi incarnationem fuerint. Quod per supra dicta patet esse falsum. Est igitur fidei contrarium dicere quod ante unionem fuerint duae naturae Christi, et post unionem una.
| [14] Moreover, even this saying of Eutyches seems foreign to the faith, that before the union there were two natures in Christ. For, since a human nature is constituted of a soul and a body, it would follow that the soul, or the body, or both were in being before Christ’s incarnation. And this the points made above show to be false. This, then, is contrary to the faith: to say that before the union there were two natures in Christ and, after the union, one.
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Caput 36
De errore Macarii Antiocheni ponentis unam tantum voluntatem in Christo
| Chapter 36
ON THE ERROR OF MACARIUS OF ANTIOCH, WHO HOLDS THERE IS BUT ONE WILL IN CHRIST
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| Fere autem in idem redire videtur et Macarii Antiocheni positio, dicentis in Christo esse unam tantum operationem et voluntatem.
| [1] Now, the position of Macarius of Antioch seems to come to just about the same thing. He says that in Christ there is only one operation and will.
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| Cuiuslibet enim naturae est aliqua operatio propria: nam forma est operationis principium, secundum quam unaquaeque natura habet propriam speciem. Unde oportet quod, sicut diversarum naturarum sunt diversae formae, ita sint et diversae actiones. Si igitur in Christo sit una tantum actio, sequitur quod in eo sit una tantum natura: quod est Eutychianae haeresis. Relinquitur igitur falsum esse quod in Christo sit una tantum operatio.
| [2] Every nature, of course, has a proper operation of its own, for the form is the principle of operation, and in accord with its form every nature has the species proper to it. Hence, as of diverse natures there are diverse forms, there must be also diverse actions. If, then, in Christ there be one action, it follows that there is in him but one nature. This last belongs to the Eutychean heresy. We then conclude that it is false to say there is but one operation in Christ.
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| Item. In Christo est divina natura perfecta, per quam consubstantialis est patri; et humana natura perfecta, secundum quam est unius speciei nobiscum. Sed de perfectione divinae naturae est voluntatem habere, ut in primo ostensum est: similiter etiam de perfectione humanae naturae est quod habeat voluntatem, per quam est homo liberi arbitrii. Oportet igitur in Christo esse duas voluntates.
| [3] Again. In Christ there is the perfect divine nature by which He is consubstantial with the Father, and a perfect human nature by which He is one in species, with us. But the perfection of the divine nature includes having will (this was shown in Book I); similarly, also, the perfection of human nature includes having a will by which a man has free choice. There must, then, be in Christ two wills.
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| Adhuc. Voluntas est una pars potentialis animae humanae, sicut et intellectus. Si igitur in Christo non fuit alia voluntas praeter voluntatem verbi, pari ratione nec fuit in eo intellectus praeter intellectum verbi. Et sic redibit positio Apollinaris.
| [4] The will, further, is one potential part of the human soul, as the intellect is. If, then, in Christ there was no other will than the will of the Word, by an equal account there was no other intellect than the intellect of the Word. Thus we return to the position of Apollinaris.
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| Amplius. Si in Christo fuit tantum una voluntas, oportet quod in eo fuerit solum voluntas divina: non enim verbum voluntatem divinam, quam ab aeterno habuit, amittere potuit. Ad voluntatem autem divinam non pertinet mereri: quia meritum est alicuius in perfectionem tendentis. Sic igitur Christus nihil, neque sibi neque nobis, sua passione meruisset. Cuius contrarium docet apostolus, Philipp. 2, dicens: factus est obediens patri usque ad mortem, propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum.
| [5] If, moreover, there was in Christ but one will, surely it was only the divine will. For the divine will which the Word had from eternity He could not lose. But the divine will is unrelated to merit because he merits who is tending toward perfection. Thus, then, Christ by His passion would have merited nothing—whether for Himself, or for us. The contrary of this is taught by the Apostle: “He was made obedient to the Father even unto death, for which cause God also has exalted Him” (Phil. 2:8-9).
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| Praeterea. Si in Christo voluntas humana non fuit, sequitur quod neque secundum naturam assumptam liberi arbitrii fuerit: nam secundum voluntatem est homo liberi arbitrii. Sic igitur non agebat Christus homo ad modum hominis, sed ad modum aliorum animalium, quae libero arbitrio carent. Nihil igitur in eius actibus virtuosum et laudabile, aut nobis imitandum, fuit. Frustra igitur dicit, Matth. 11-29: discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde; et Ioan. 13-15: exemplum dedi vobis, ut quemadmodum ego feci, ita et vos faciatis.
| [6] What is more, if there was no human will in Christ~ it follows that by His assumed nature He had no free choice. So, then, Christ used to act not after the fashion of man, but after the manner of the other animals who lack free choice. Then, nothing in His acts was virtuous or laudable, nothing a model for imitation by us. In vain, then, he says in Matthew (11:29): “Learn of Me because I am meek, and humble of heart”; and in John (13:15): “I have given you an example, that as I have done to you, so do you also.”
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| Adhuc. In uno homine puro, quamvis sit supposito unus, sunt tamen plures et appetitus et operationes, secundum diversa naturalia principia. Nam secundum rationalem partem, inest ei voluntas; secundum sensitivam, irascibilis et concupiscibilis; et rursus naturalis appetitus consequens vires naturales. Similiter autem et secundum oculum videt, secundum aurem audit, pede ambulat, lingua loquitur, et mente intelligit: quae sunt operationes diversae. Et hoc ideo est, quia operationes non multiplicantur solum secundum diversa subiecta operantia, sed etiam secundum diversa principia quibus unum et idem subiectum operatur, a quibus etiam operationes speciem trahunt. Divina vero natura multo plus distat ab humana quam naturalia principia humanae naturae ab invicem. Est igitur alia et alia voluntas et operatio divinae et humanae naturae in Christo, licet ipse Christus sit in utraque natura unus.
| [7] Again, in one who is pure man, although he is one in supposit there are many appetites and operations according to the diversity of natural principles. For in his rational part there is will; in his sensitive, the irascible and concupiscible appetites; and, further, the natural appetite following on natural powers. In the same way he sees with the eye, bears with the ear, steps with the foot, speaks with the tongue, and understands with the mind, and these are diverse operations. The case is such because the operations are not multiplied according to diverse subjects operating only, but as well according to diverse principles by which one and the same subject operates, and from which the operations take their species. But the divine nature is much more removed from human nature than the principles of human nature are from one another. Therefore, the will and operation of the divine and the human nature in Christ are distinguished from one another, although Christ Himself is one in each of the natures.
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| Item. Ex auctoritate Scripturae manifeste ostenditur in Christo duas voluntates fuisse. Dicit enim ipse, Ioan. 6-38: descendi de caelo non ut faciam voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem eius qui misit me, et Lucae 22-42: non mea voluntas, sed tua fiat; ex quibus patet quod in Christo fuit quaedam voluntas propria eius, praeter voluntatem patris. Manifestum est autem quod in eo fuit voluntas quaedam communis sibi et patri: patris enim et filii, sicut est una natura, ita etiam est una voluntas. Sunt igitur in Christo duae voluntates.
| [8] Furthermore, Scriptural authority clearly shows that in Christ there were two wills. He Himself says: “I came down from heaven, not to do My own will, but the will of Him that sent Me (John 6:38); and again: “Not My will, but Yours be done” (Luke 22:42). From these words it is clear that there was in Christ another will apart from the will of the Father. But clearly, there was in Him a will common to Him and the Father. For, just as the Father’s and the Son’s nature is one, so also is their will. Therefore, there are two wills in Christ.
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| Idem autem et de operationibus patet. Fuit enim in Christo una operatio sibi et patri communis, cum ipse dicat, Ioan. 5-19: quaecumque pater facit haec et similiter filius facit. Est autem in eo et alia operatio, quae non convenit patri, ut dormire, esurire, comedere, et alia huiusmodi, quae Christus humanitus fecit vel passus est, ut Evangelistae tradunt. Non igitur fuit in Christo una tantum operatio.
| [9] But this is as clear of their operations. For in Christ there was an operation common to Him and the Father, for He says: “Whatever the Father does the Son does likewise” (John 5:19). But there is another operation in Him which is not proper to the Father: to sleep, for example, to be thirsty, to eat, and others of this sort which Christ made man did or suffered; so the Evangelists tell us. Therefore, there was not one operation.
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| Videtur autem haec positio ortum habuisse ex hoc quod eius auctores nescierunt distinguere inter id quod est simpliciter unum, et ordine unum. Viderunt enim voluntatem humanam in Christo omnino sub voluntate divina ordinatam fuisse, ita quod nihil voluntate humana Christus voluit nisi quod eum velle voluntas divina disposuit. Similiter etiam nihil Christus secundum humanam naturam operatus est, vel agendo vel patiendo, nisi quod voluntas divina disposuit: secundum illud Ioan. 8-29: quae placita sunt ei, facio semper. Humana etiam operatio Christi quandam efficaciam divinam ex unione divinitatis consequebatur, sicut actio secundarii agentis consequitur efficaciam quandam ex principali agente: et ex hoc contigit quod quaelibet eius actio vel passio fuit salubris. Propter quod Dionysius humanam Christi operationem vocat theandricam, idest dei-virilem; et etiam quia est Dei et hominis. Videntes igitur humanam voluntatem et operationem Christi sub divina ordinari infallibili ordine, iudicaverunt in Christo esse tantum voluntatem et operationem unam; quamvis non sit idem, ut dictum est, ordinis unum et simpliciter unum.
| [10] Now, the present position seems to have had its rise in this: its authors did not know how to distinguish between what is simply one, and what is one by order. For they saw the human will in Christ ordered entirely beneath the divine will, so that Christ willed nothing with His human will except that which the divine will disposed Him to will. In like manner, also, Christ did nothing in His human nature, whether by acting or by suffering, except as the divine will disposed; hence we read: “I do always the things that please Him” (John 8:29). The human operation of Christ, also, achieved a kind of divine efficacy by union with the divinity, just as the action of a secondary agent achieves a kind of efficacy from the principal agent; and this resulted: every action or suffering of Hit was salutary. For this reason Dionysius calls the human operation of Christ “theandric,” that is, “God-mannish”; and also because it is of God and a man. So, those men, seeing the human operation and will of Christ ordered beneath the divine in an infallible order, decided that there was in Christ only one will and operation, although there is no identity (as was said) between one by order and one simply.
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Caput 37
Contra eos qui dixerunt ex anima et corpore non esse aliquid unum constitutum in Christo
| Chapter 37
AGAINST THOSE WHO SAID THAT THE SOUL AND BODY DO NOT CONSTITUTE A UNITY IN CHRIST
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| Ex praemissis igitur manifestum est quod in Christo est tantum una persona, secundum fidei assertionem, et duae naturae, contra id quod Nestorius et Eutyches posuerunt. Sed quia hoc alienum videtur ab his quae naturalis ratio experitur, fuerunt quidam posteriores talem de unione positionem asserentes. Quia enim ex unione animae et corporis constituitur homo, sed ex hac anima et ex hoc corpore hic homo, quod hypostasim et personam designat, volentes evitare ne cogerentur in Christo ponere aliquam hypostasim vel personam praeter hypostasim vel personam verbi, dixerunt quod anima et corpus non fuerunt unita in Christo, nec ex eis aliqua substantia facta est, et per hoc Nestorii haeresim vitare volebant. Rursus, quia hoc impossibile videtur quod aliquid sit substantiale alicui et non sit de natura eius quam prius habuit, absque mutatione ipsius; verbum autem omnino immutabile est: ne cogerentur ponere animam et corpus assumpta pertinere ad naturam verbi quam habuit ab aeterno, posuerunt quod verbum assumpsit animam humanam et corpus modo accidentali, sicut homo assumit indumentum; per hoc errorem Eutychetis excludere volentes.
| [1] From the foregoing it is clear that there is only one Person in Christ as the faith maintains; and that there are two natures, contrarily to what Nestorius and Eutyches held. Yet this appears foreign to what natural reason experiences, and therefore there were some later on who took a position on this union such as the following. The soul and body union constitutes a man, but the union of this soul and this body constitutes this man. And this is the designation of person or hypostasis. Wishing, then, to avoid being pushed into asserting in Christ some hypostasis or person other than the hypostasis or Person of the Word, these men said that the soul and body were not united in Christ, nor was a substance made from them. In saying this they were trying to avoid the Nestorian heresy. This also seemed impossible: that one thing be substantial to another, yet not be of the nature which that other previously had, without any mutation taking place; and the Word, of course, is entirely immutable. Therefore, lest they be forced to make the assumed soul and body belong to the nature which the Word had eternally, they laid it down that the Word assumed the human soul and body in an accidental fashion, just as a man puts on his clothes. By this they wished to exclude the error of Eutyches.
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| Sed haec positio omnino doctrinae fidei repugnat. Anima enim et corpus sua unione hominem constituunt: forma enim materiae adveniens speciem constituit. Si igitur anima et corpus non fuerint unita in Christo, Christus non fuit homo: contra apostolum dicentem I ad Tim. 2-5: mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus.
| [2] But this position is entirely repugnant to the teaching of the faith. For a soul and body by their union constitute a man, since a form which accrues to matter constitutes a species. If, then, soul and body were not united in Christ, Christ was not a man. This goes against the Apostle’s words: The mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus” (1 Tim. 2:5).
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| Item. Unusquisque nostrum ea ratione homo dicitur quia est ex anima rationali et corpore constitutus. Si igitur Christus non ea ratione dicitur homo, sed solum quia habuit animam et corpus licet non unita, aequivoce dicetur homo, et non erit eiusdem speciei nobiscum: contra apostolum dicentem, Hebr. 2-17, quod debuit per omnia fratribus assimilari.
| [3] Again, everyone of us is said to be a man on this account that he is constituted of a rational soul and a body. But, if Christ is not called man on that account but only because He had a soul and a body, although not united, He will be called man equivocally and will not be in the same species with us. This is against the Apostle’s words: “It behooved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren” (Heb. 2:17).
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| Adhuc. Non omne corpus pertinet ad humanam naturam, sed solum corpus humanum. Non est autem corpus humanum nisi quod est per unionem animae rationalis vivificatum: neque enim oculus, aut manus, aut pes, vel caro et os, anima separata, dicuntur nisi aequivoce. Non igitur poterit dici quod verbum assumpsit naturam humanam, si corpus animae non unitum assumpsit.
| [4] Furthermore, not every body belongs to human nature, but the human body alone. Of course, it is not a human body except for the fact that it has been vivified by union with the rational soul. For one says neither eye, nor hand, nor foot, nor flesh, nor bone—with the soul gone—except by equivocation. Therefore, one will not be able to say that the Word assumed human nature if He did not assume a body united to a soul.
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| Amplius. Anima humana naturaliter unibilis est corpori. Anima igitur quae nunquam corpori unitur ad aliquid constituendum, non est anima humana: quia quod est praeter naturam, non potest esse semper. Si igitur anima Christi non est unita corpori eius ad aliquid constituendum, relinquitur quod non sit anima humana. Et sic in Christo non fuit humana natura.
| [5] What is more, the human soul by its nature has a capacity for union with the body. Therefore, a soul which is never united to a body to constitute something is not a human soul, for “what is apart from nature can never be.” If then, the soul of Christ is not united to His body to constitute something, we conclude that it is not a human soul. And, thus, in Christ there was no human nature.
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| Praeterea. Si verbum unitum est animae et corpori accidentaliter sicut indumento, natura humana non fuit natura verbi. Verbum igitur, post unionem, non fuit subsistens in duabus naturis: sicut neque homo indutus dicitur in duabus naturis subsistere. Quod quia Eutyches dixit, in Chalcedonensi synodo est damnatus.
| [6] There is more. If the Word was united to the soul and body accidentally, as one is to clothing, the human nature was not the nature of the Word. Then the Word, after the union, was not subsisting in two natures; just as a man in his clothing is not said to subsist in two natures. It was for saying this that Eutyches was condemned at the Council of Chalcedon.
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| Item. Indumenti passio non refertur ad indutum: non enim dicitur homo nasci quando induitur, neque vulnerari si vestimentum laceretur. Si igitur verbum assumpsit animam et corpus sicut homo indumentum, non poterit dici quod Deus sit natus aut passus propter corpus assumptum.
| [7] Again, what the clothes suffer is not referred to the wearer. One does not say a man is born when he is dressed, nor wounded if his clothes are torn. If the Word, then, took on a soul and a body, as a man does his clothes, no one will be able to say that God was born, or that He suffered by reason of the body He assumed.
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| Adhuc. Si verbum assumpsit humanam naturam solum ut indumentum, quo posset hominum oculis apparere, frustra animam assumpsisset, quae secundum suam naturam invisibilis est.
| [8] If the Word, moreover, assumed human nature only as a garment in which to be apparent to the eyes of men, He would have assumed the soul in vain. This by its nature is invisible.
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| Amplius. Secundum hoc non aliter assumpsisset filius carnem humanam quam spiritus sanctus columbae speciem in qua apparuit. Quod patet esse falsum: nam spiritus sanctus non dicitur factus columba, neque minor patre, sicut filius dicitur factus homo, et minor patre secundum naturam assumptam.
| [9] Furthermore, in this fashion the Son’s assumption of the flesh would not have differed from the Holy Spirit’s assumption of the form of a dove in which He appeared (Mat. 3:16). And this is plainly false. For one does not say the Holy Spirit has “become dove” or is “less than the Father,” as one says that the Son “has become man” and is less than the Father in the nature, assumed (John 14:28).
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| Item. Si quis diligenter consideret ad hanc positionem diversarum haeresum inconvenientia sequuntur. Ex eo enim quod dicit filium Dei unitum animae et carni accidentali modo, sicut hominem vestimento, convenit cum opinione Nestorii, qui secundum inhabitationem Dei verbi in homine unionem esse factam asseruit: non enim Deum esse indutum potest intelligi per tactum corporeum, sed solum per gratiam inhabitantem. Ex hoc etiam quod dixit accidentalem unionem verbi ad animam et carnem humanam, sequitur quod verbum post unionem non fuit subsistens in duabus naturis, quod Eutyches dixit: nihil enim subsistit in eo quod sibi accidentaliter unitur. Ex eo vero quod dicit animam et carnem non uniri ad aliquid constituendum convenit partim quidem cum Ario et Apollinari, qui posuerunt corpus Christi non animatum anima rationali; et partim cum Manichaeo, qui posuit Christum non verum hominem, sed phantasticum fuisse. Si enim anima non est unita carni ad alicuius constitutionem, phantasticum erat quod videbatur Christus similis aliis hominibus ex unione animae et corporis constitutis.
| [10] Again, when it is earnestly weighed, the awkwardness of a diversity of heresies follows on this position. For in saying that the Son of God is united to the soul and the flesh in an accidental mode as a man is to his garments, it agrees with the opinion of Nestorius, who claimed the union took place by the indwelling of God’s Word in a man. God’s being clothed, of course, cannot be understood through bodily touch but only through indwelling grace. And in saying that the union of the Word to the soul and human flesh was accidental, one must be saying that the Word after the union was not subsistent in two natures. And this Eutyches said. For nothing subsists in that to which it is accidentally united. But, when this position says that the soul and body are not united to constitute something, it partially agrees with Arius and Apollinaris: they held that the body of Christ was not animated by the rational soul; and it partially agrees with Mani: he held that Christ was not true man, but a phantasy only. For, if the soul is not united to the flesh for the constitution of something, it was but phantasy when Christ appeared similar to other men constituted by the union of soul and body.
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| Sumpsit autem haec positio occasionem ex verbo apostoli dicentis, Philipp. 2-7: habitu inventus ut homo. Non enim intellexerunt hoc secundum metaphoram dici. Quae autem metaphorice dicuntur, non oportet secundum omnia similia esse. Habet igitur natura humana assumpta quandam indumenti similitudinem, inquantum verbum per carnem visibilem videbatur, sicut homo videtur per indumentum: non autem quantum ad hoc quod unio verbi ad humanam naturam in Christo fuerit modo accidentali.
| [11] This position, of course, had as its occasion the words of the Apostle: “In habit found as a man” (Phil. 2:70). They did not understand that this was said metaphorically. But things said metaphorically need not be similar in every respect. So, the human nature assumed by the Word has a kind of likeness to clothing, in that the Word was seen in His visible flesh just as a man is seen in his clothing; but the likeness is not in this, that the union of the Word to human nature in Christ was in an accidental mode.
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Caput 38
Contra eos qui ponunt duo supposita vel duas hypostases in una persona Christi
| Chapter 38
AGAINST THOSE WHO PUT TWO SUPPOSITS OR HYPOSTASES IN THE ONE PERSON OF CHRIST
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| Hanc igitur positionem, propter praedicta inconvenientia, alii quidem vitantes, posuerunt ex anima et carne in domino Iesu Christo unam substantiam constitutam esse, scilicet hominem quendam eiusdem speciei aliis hominibus; quem quidem hominem unitum dicunt verbo Dei, non quidem in natura, sed in persona, ut scilicet sit una persona verbi Dei et illius hominis; sed quia homo ille quaedam individua substantia est, quod est esse hypostasim et suppositum, dicunt quidam in Christo aliam esse hypostasim et suppositum illius hominis et verbi Dei, sed unam personam utriusque; ratione cuius unitatis dicunt verbum Dei de homine illo praedicari, et hominem illum de Dei verbo; ut sit sensus, verbum Dei est homo, idest, persona verbi Dei est persona hominis, et e converso; et hac ratione, quicquid de verbo Dei praedicatur, dicunt de homine illo posse praedicari, et e converso, cum quadam tamen replicatione, ut, cum dicitur, Deus est passus, sit sensus, homo, qui est Deus propter unitatem personae, est passus; et, homo creavit stellas, idest, ille qui est homo.
| [1] Others, indeed, have avoided this position by reason of the awkwardness described above. They have held that soul and flesh in our Lord Jesus Christ constitutes one substance, namely, a certain man of the same species as other men. They call this man united to the Word of God, not in nature, indeed, but in person, so that there is one person of the Word of God and of that man. But, since that man is a kind of individual substance—and this is to be an hypostasis and supposit—some say that in Christ the hypostasis and supposit of that man is one and that of the Word of God another, but that there is one person of each of the two. On account of this unity, the Word of God, as they say, is predicated of that man and that man of the Word of God. This sense results: “The Word of God is man,” and that is: “The person of the Word of God is the person of the man,” and conversely. And in this account whatever is predicated of the Word of God is, they say, able to be predicated of that man; and, conversely, although with a kind of reduplication, so that when it is said “God has suffered,” the sense is “A man who is God by unity of person has suffered,” and “A man created the stars” means “He who is man.”
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| Sed haec positio de necessitate in errorem Nestorii delabitur. Si enim differentia personae et hypostasis attendatur, invenitur persona esse non alienum ab hypostasi, sed quaedam pars eius. Nihil enim aliud est persona quam hypostasis talis naturae scilicet rationalis: quod patet ex definitione Boetii dicentis quod persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia: ex quo patet quod, licet non omnis hypostasis sit persona, omnis tamen hypostasis humanae naturae persona est. Si igitur ex sola unione animae et corporis constituta est in Christo quaedam substantia particularis quae est hypostasis, scilicet ille homo, sequitur quod ex eadem unione sit constituta persona. Sic igitur in Christo erunt duae personae, una illius hominis de novo constituta, et alia aeterna verbi Dei. Quod est Nestorianae impietatis.
| [2] But, of necessity, this position lapses into the error of Nestorius. For, if the difference of person and hypostasis be marked, one finds that person is not foreign to hypostasis, but a kind of part of hypostasis. For a person is nothing else than a hypostasis of a certain nature; namely, rational. This is clear from Boethius’ definition: “person is the individual substance of a rational nature.” Clearly, then, although not every hypostasis is a person, every hypostasis of human nature is, nonetheless, a person. If, therefore, from the mere union of soul and body in Christ there is constituted a certain particular substance which is the hypostasis—namely, that man—it follows that from the same union a person is constituted. There will be, then, in Christ two persons: one, and newly constituted, of that man; the other, eternal, of the Word of God. And this belongs to the Nestorian impiety.
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| Item. Etsi hypostasis illius hominis non posset dici persona, tamen idem est hypostasis verbi Dei quod persona. Si igitur hypostasis verbi Dei non est illius hominis, neque etiam persona verbi Dei erit persona illius hominis. Et sic falsum erit quod dicunt, quod persona illius hominis est persona verbi Dei.
| [3] Again, even if the hypostasis of that man could not be called a person, the hypostasis of the Word of God is nonetheless the same as His Person. If, therefore, the hypostasis of the Word of God is not that of the man, neither will the Person Of the Word of God be the person of the man. This will falsify their own assertion that the person of that man is the Person of the Word of God.
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| Adhuc. Dato quod persona esset aliud ab hypostasi verbi Dei vel hominis, non posset alia differentia inveniri nisi quod persona supra hypostasim addit proprietatem aliquam: nihil enim ad genus substantiae pertinens addere potest, cum hypostasis sit completissimum in genere substantiae, quod dicitur substantia prima. Si igitur unio facta est secundum personam et non secundum hypostasim, sequitur quod non sit facta unio nisi secundum aliquam proprietatem accidentalem. Quod iterum redit in errorem Nestorii.
| [4] If one were to grant, further, that person is other than the hypostasis of God’s Word or of the man, one could find no difference save one: person adds some property to hypostasis. Nothing, of course, pertaining to the genus of substance can he added, since hypostasis is the most complete thing in the genus of substance, and it is called “first substance.” If, then, the union is made in person and not in hypostasis, it follows that the union takes place only according to some accidental property. This, too, comes again back to the error of Nestorius.
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| Amplius. Cyrillus dicit, in epistola ad Nestorium, quae est in Ephesina synodo approbata: si quis non confitetur carni secundum subsistentiam unitum ex Deo patre verbum, unumque esse Christum cum sua carne, eundem videlicet Deum simul et hominem, anathema sit. Et fere ubique in synodalibus scriptis hoc errori Nestorii deputatur, qui posuit duas in Christo hypostases.
| [5] Cyril, moreover, in his letter to Nestorius approved by the Council of Ephesus, has this to say: “If anyone does not confess that the Word from the Father is united to the flesh in subsistence, that Christ is one with his flesh, that is to say, that the same one is God and man at the same time, let him be anathema.” And almost everywhere in the synodal writings this is assigned as the error of Nestorius, who put two hypostases in Christ.
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| Praeterea. Damascenus, in III libro, dicit: ex duabus naturis perfectis dicimus esse factam unionem: non secundum prosopicam, idest personalem, ut Dei inimicus dicit Nestorius, sed secundum hypostasim. Unde patet expresse quod haec fuit positio Nestorii, confiteri unam personam et duas hypostases.
| [6] Damascene, moreover, in Book III, says: “It was from a two perfect natures, we say, that the union took place, and not in a prosopic,” that is, personal way, “as God’s enemy Nestorius says, but according to the hypostasis.” Thus, clearly and expressly, this was the position of Nestorius: to confess one person and two hypostases.
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| Item. Hypostasis et suppositum oportet idem esse. Nam de prima substantia, quae est hypostasis, omnia alia praedicantur: scilicet et universalia in genere substantiae, et accidentia, secundum philosophum in praedicamentis. Si igitur in Christo non sunt duae hypostases, per consequens neque duo supposita.
| [7] Again, hypostasis and supposit must be identified. Everything else is predicated of the first substance, which is the hypostasis: namely, the universals in the genus of substance as well as accidents, as the Philosopher says in his Categories [3]. If, therefore, there are not two hypostases in Christ, neither are there two supposits.
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| Adhuc. Si verbum et homo ille supposito differunt, oportet quod, supposito homine illo, non supponatur verbum Dei, nec e converso. Sed distinctis suppositis, necesse est et ea quae de ipsis dicuntur, distingui: nam supposito hominis non conveniunt praedicta praedicata divina nisi propter verbum, neque e converso. Separatim igitur accipienda erunt quae de Christo in Scripturis dicuntur, divina scilicet et humana: quod est contra sententiam Cyrilli, in synodo confirmatam, dicentis: si quis personis duabus vel subsistentiis vel eas quae sunt in evangelicis et apostolicis Scripturis impertit voces, aut de Christo a sanctis dictas, aut ab ipso de se; et quasdam quidem velut homini praeter illud ex Deo verbum specialiter intellecto applicat, quasdam vero velut Deo decibiles, soli ex Deo patre verbo, anathema sit.
| [8] If the Word and that man, furthermore, differ in supposit, it must be that when that man is supposed the Word of God is not supposed, nor is the converse true. But, if the supposits are distinct, what is said of them must be distinguished, for the divine predicates mentioned are disproportionate to the man’s supposit except by reason of the Word; and the converse is true. Therefore, one must take separately the things said of Christ in Scripture; namely, the divine and the human. And this is contrary to the opinion of Cyril confirmed by the Synod: “If one divides between two persons or subsistences the words said in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures—whether they be said about Christ by the saints, or by Him about Himself, and marks off some of them, indeed, as for a man especially understood alongside that Word from God, and marks off others as capable of being said by God, for that Word from God the Father alone: let him be anathema.”
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| Amplius. Secundum positionem praedictam, ea quae verbo Dei conveniunt per naturam, de illo homine non dicerentur nisi per quandam associationem in una persona: hoc enim significat replicatio interposita cum sic exponunt, homo ille creavit stellas, idest, filius Dei, qui est homo ille, et similiter de aliis huiusmodi. Unde, cum dicitur, homo ille est Deus, sic intelligitur: homo ille verbo Deus existit. Huiusmodi autem locutiones condemnat Cyrillus, dicens: si quis audet dicere assumptum hominem coadorari oportere Dei verbo, conglorificari, et coappellari Deum, quasi alterum alteri (id enim quod est co semper quoties additur hoc intelligi cogit); et non magis una adoratione honorificat Emanuelem, et unam ei glorificationem adhibet, secundum quod factum est caro verbum: anathema sit.
| [9] Moreover, in the position described, things proportioned to the Word of God by nature would not be said of that man except by a certain association in one person; this is what the interposed reduplication means when they expound thus: “That man created the stars,” that is, “the Son of God, who is that man,” and similarly with others of that sort. Hence, when one says: “That man is God,” one understands it thus: “That man exists by the Word of God.” But it is this kind of expression that Cyril condemns when he says: “If anyone dares to say that the man assumed ought to be co-adored with God’s Word, co-glorified, and co-named God, a second of two with the first, so to speak (for that is what “co” forces us to understand as often as it is added), and does not honor Emmanuel with one adoration and offer Him one glorification, inasmuch as the Word was made flesh; let him be anathema.”
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| Praeterea. Si homo ille supposito est aliud a Dei verbo, non potest ad personam verbi pertinere nisi per assumptionem qua assumptus est a verbo. Sed hoc est alienum a recto sensu fidei. Dicitur enim in Ephesina synodo, ex verbis Felicis Papae et martyris: credimus in Deum nostrum Iesum de virgine Maria natum, quia ipse est Dei sempiternus filius et verbum, et non homo a Deo assumptus, ut alter sit praeter illum. Neque enim hominem assumpsit Dei filius, ut sit alter praeter ipsum: sed Deus existens perfectus, factus simul et homo perfectus, incarnatus de virgine.
| [10] There is more. If that man is other than the Word in supposit, he cannot belong to the person of the Word except by the assumption by which He was assumed by the Word. But this is foreign to a correct understanding of the faith, for the Council of Ephesus says in the words of Felix, Pope and martyr: “We believe in God our Jesus, born of the Virgin Mary: that He is God’s everlasting Son and Word, and not a an assumed by God so that there is another beside Him. Nor did God’s Son assume a man that there be another beside Him; but the perfect existing God was made at the same time perfect man, made flesh of the Virgin.”
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| Item. Quae sunt plura supposito, simpliciter plura sunt, nec sunt unum nisi secundum quid. Si igitur in Christo sunt duo supposita, sequitur quod sit simpliciter duo, et non secundum quid. Quod est solvere Iesum: quia unumquodque intantum est inquantum unum est; quod igitur non est simpliciter unum, non est simpliciter ens.
| [11] Again, things which are many in supposit are many simply, and they are but incidentally one. If, then, in Christ there are two supposits, it follows that He is two simply and not incidentally. And this is “to dissolve Jesus” (1 John 4:3), for everything, in so far as it is, is one.”
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Caput 40
Obiectiones contra fidem incarnationis
| Chapter 40
OBJECTIONS AGAINST FAITH IN THE INCARNATION
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| Sed contra hanc Catholicae fidei sententiam, plures difficultates concurrunt, propter quas adversarii fidei incarnationem impugnant.
| [1] But against this statement of the Catholic faith many difficulties come together, and by reason of these the adversaries of the faith attack the Incarnation.
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| Ostensum est enim in primo libro quod Deus neque corpus est, neque virtus in corpore. Si autem carnem assumpsit, sequitur quod vel sit mutatus in corpus, vel quod sit virtus in corpore, post incarnationem. Impossibile igitur videtur Deum fuisse incarnatum.
| [2] We showed in Book I that God is neither a body nor a power in a body. But, if He assumed flesh, it follows either that He was changed into a body or that He was a power in a body after the Incarnation. It seems, then, impossible that God was incarnate.
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| Item. Omne quod acquirit novam naturam, est substantiali mutationi subiectum: secundum hoc enim aliquid generatur, quod naturam aliquam acquirit. Si igitur hypostasis filii Dei fiat de novo subsistens in natura humana, videtur quod esset substantialiter mutata.
| [3] Again, whatever acquires a new nature is subject to substantial change; for in this is a thing generated, that it acquires a nature. Then, if the hypostasis of the Son of God becomes a subsistent anew in human nature, it appears that it was substantially changed.
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| Adhuc. Nulla hypostasis alicuius naturae extenditur extra naturam illam: quin potius natura invenitur extra hypostasim, utpote multas hypostases sub se habens. Si igitur hypostasis filii Dei sit per incarnationem facta hypostasis humanae naturae, sequitur quod filius Dei non sit ubique post incarnationem: cum humana natura ubique non sit.
| [4] Furthermore, no hypostasis of a nature extends outside that nature; rather, indeed, the nature is found outside the hypostasis, since there are many hypostases under the nature. If, then, the hypostasis of the Son of God becomes by the Incarnation the hypostasis of a human nature, the Son of God—one must conclude—is not everywhere after the Incarnation, since the human nature is not everywhere.
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| Amplius. Rei unius et eiusdem non est nisi unum quod quid est: hoc enim significat substantiam rei, quae unius una est. Sed natura cuiuslibet rei est quod quid est eius: natura enim rei est quam significat definitio. Impossibile est igitur, ut videtur, quod una hypostasis in duabus naturis subsistat.
| [5] Once again; one and the same thing has only one what-it-is, for by this one means a thing’s substance and of one there is but one. But the nature of any thing at all is its what-it-is, “for the nature of a thing is what the definition signifies.” It seems impossible, then, that one hypostasis subsist in two natures.
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| Praeterea. In his quae sunt sine materia, non potest esse aliud quidditas rei et res, ut supra ostensum est. Et hoc praecipue est in Deo, qui est non solum sua quidditas, sed etiam suum esse. Sed humana natura non potest esse idem quod divina hypostasis. Ergo impossibile esse videtur quod divina hypostasis subsistat in humana natura.
| [6] Furthermore, in things which are without matter, the quiddity of a thing is not other than the thing, as was shown above. And this is especially the case in God, who is not only His own quiddity, but also His own act of being. But human nature cannot be identified with a divine hypostasis. There, fore, it seems impossible that a divine hypostasis subsist in human nature.
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| Item. Natura est simplicior et formalior hypostasi quae in ea subsistit: nam per additionem alicuius materialis natura communis individuatur ad hanc hypostasim. Si igitur divina hypostasis subsistat in humana natura, videtur sequi quod humana natura sit simplicior et formalior quam divina hypostasis. Quod est omnino impossibile.
| [7] Once again; a nature is more simple and more formal than the hypostasis which subsists therein, for it is by the addition of something material that the common nature is individuated to this hypostasis. If, then, a divine hypostasis subsists in human nature, it seems to follow that human nature is more simple and more formal than a divine hypostasis. And this is altogether impossible.
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| Adhuc. In his solum quae sunt ex materia et forma composita, differre invenitur singulare et quidditas eius: ex eo quod singulare est individuatum per materiam designatam, quae in quidditate et natura speciei non includitur; in signatione enim Socratis includitur haec materia, non autem in ratione humanae naturae. Omnis igitur hypostasis in natura humana subsistens est constituta per materiam signatam. Quod de divina hypostasi dici non potest. Non est igitur possibile, ut videtur, quod hypostasis verbi Dei subsistat in humana natura.
| [8] It is, furthermore, only in matter and form composites that one finds a difference between the singular thing and its quiddity. This is because the singular is individuated by designated matter, and in the quiddity and nature of the species the latter is not included. For, in marking off Socrates, one includes this matter, but one does not in his account of human nature. Therefore, every hypostasis subsisting in human nature is constituted by signate matter. This cannot be said of the divine hypostasis. So, it does not seem possible that the hypostasis of God’s Word subsist in human nature.
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| Amplius. Anima et corpus in Christo non fuerunt minoris virtutis quam in aliis hominibus. Sed in aliis hominibus ex sua unione constituunt suppositum, hypostasim et personam. Igitur in Christo ex unione animae et corporis constituitur suppositum, hypostasis et persona. Non autem suppositum, hypostasis et persona Dei verbi, quae est aeterna. Igitur in Christo est aliud suppositum, hypostasis et persona, praeter suppositum, hypostasim et personam Dei verbi, ut videtur.
| [9] Furthermore, the soul and body in Christ were not less in power than in other men. But in other men their union constitutes a supposit an hypostasis, and a person. Therefore, in Christ the union of soul and body constitutes a supposit, hypostasis, and person of the Word of God; this is eternal. Therefore in Christ there is another supposit, hypostasis, and person beside the supposit, hypostasis, and person of the Word of God. Or so it seems.
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| Praeterea. Sicut ex anima et corpore constituitur humana natura in communi, ita ex hac anima et ex hoc corpore constituitur hic homo, quod est hypostasis hominis. Sed in Christo fuit haec anima et hoc corpus. Igitur ex eorum unione constituta est hypostasis, ut videtur. Et sic idem quod prius.
| [10] There is more. Just as soul and body constitute human nature in common, so this soul and this body constitute this man, and this is the hypostasis of a man. But this soul and this body were in Christ. Therefore, their union constitutes an hypostasis, it seems. And we conclude exactly as before.
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| Item. Hic homo qui est Christus, prout consideratur ex anima solum et carne consistens, est quaedam substantia. Non autem universalis. Ergo particularis. Ergo est hypostasis.
| [11] Again, this man who is Christ, considered as consisting of soul alone and body, is a certain substance; not, of course, a universal one; therefore, a particular one. Therefore, it is an hypostasis.
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| Adhuc. Si idem est suppositum humanae et divinae naturae in Christo, oportet quod de intellectu hominis qui est Christus, sit hypostasis divina. Non autem est de intellectu aliorum hominum. Homo igitur aequivoce de Christo dicetur et aliis. Et sic non erit eiusdem speciei nobiscum.
| [12] Moreover, if the supposit of the human and the divine nature in Christ is identified, then in one’s understanding of the man who is Christ there ought to be a divine hypostasis. Of course, this is not in one’s understanding of other men. Therefore, man will be said equivocally of Christ and others. Hence, He will not belong to the same species with us.
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| Amplius. In Christo tria inveniuntur, ut ex dictis patet: scilicet corpus, anima et divinitas. Anima autem, cum sit nobilior corpore, non est suppositum corporis, sed magis forma eius. Neque igitur id quod est divinum, est suppositum humanae naturae, sed magis formaliter se habet ad ipsam.
| [13] In Christ, what is more, one finds three things, as is clear from what was said: a body, a soul, and divinity. The soul, of course, since it is nobler than the body, is not the supposit of the body, but its form. Neither, then, is what is divine the supposit of the human nature; it is, rather, formally related to that nature.
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| Praeterea. Omne quod advenit alicui post esse completum, advenit ei accidentaliter. Sed, cum verbum Dei sit ab aeterno, manifestum est quod caro assumpta advenit ei post esse completum. Igitur advenit ei accidentaliter.
| [14] Furthermore, whatever accrues to something after its being is complete accrues to it accidentally. But, since the Word is from eternity, plainly the flesh assumed accrues to Him after His being is complete. Therefore, it accrues to Him accidentally.
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Caput 41
Quomodo oporteat intelligere incarnationem filii Dei
| Chapter 41
HOW ONE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE INCARNATION OF THE SON OF GOD
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| Ad horum igitur solutionem considerandam, paulo altius inchoandum est. Cum enim Eutyches unionem Dei et hominis factam esse posuerit in natura; Nestorius autem nec in natura nec in persona; fides autem Catholica hoc teneat, quod sit facta unio in persona, non in natura: necessarium videtur praecognoscere quid sit uniri in natura, et quid sit uniri in persona.
| [1] Now, to get at the solution of these objections, one must begin somewhat more fundamentally. Since Eutyches set it down that the union of God and man took place in nature; Nestorius, that it was neither in nature nor in person; but the Catholic faith holds this: that the union takes place in Person, not in nature—it seems necessary to know first what it is “to be made one in nature,” and what it is “to be made one in person.”
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| Natura igitur licet multis modis dicatur - nam et generatio viventium, et principium generationis et motus, et materia et forma natura dicuntur: item et aliquando natura dicitur quod quid est rei, continens ea quae ad speciei pertinent integritatem; sic enim dicimus naturam humanam communem esse omnibus hominibus, et similiter in ceteris:- illa ergo uniuntur in natura ex quibus constituitur integritas speciei alicuius: sicut anima et corpus humanum uniuntur ad constituendum speciem animalis, et universaliter quaecumque sunt partes speciei.
| [2] Grant, then, that nature is a word used in many ways: the generation of living things, and the principle of generation and of motion, and the matter and the form are all called nature. Sometimes, also, nature is said of the what-it-is of a thing, which includes the things that bear on the integrity of the species; in this way we say that human nature is common to all men, and say the same in all other cases. Those things, therefore, are made one in nature from which the integrity of a species is established; just as the soul and human body are made one to establish the species of the animal, so, universally, whatever the parts of a species are.
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| Est autem impossibile quod alicui speciei in sua integritate iam constitutae aliquid extraneum uniatur in unitatem naturae, nisi species solvatur. Cum enim species sint sicut numeri, in quibus quaelibet unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem si quid ad speciem iam perfectam addatur, necesse est iam aliam speciem esse: sicut si substantiae animatae tantum addatur sensibile, erit alia species; nam animal et planta diversae species sunt. Contingit tamen id quod non est de integritate speciei, in aliquo individuo sub illa specie contento reperiri: sicut album et vestitum in Socrate vel Platone, aut digitus sextus, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Unde nihil prohibet aliqua uniri in individuo quae non uniuntur in una integritate speciei: sicut humana natura et albedo et musica in Socrate, et huiusmodi, quae dicuntur esse unum subiecto. Et quia individuum in genere substantiae dicitur hypostasis, in substantiis autem rationalibus dicitur etiam persona, convenienter omnia huiusmodi dicuntur uniri secundum hypostasim, vel etiam secundum personam. Sic igitur patet quod nihil prohibet aliqua non unita esse secundum naturam, uniri autem secundum hypostasim vel personam.
| [3] Of course, it is impossible that to a species already established in its integrity something extrinsic be united for the unity of its nature without losing the species. For, since species are like numbers, and in these any unity added or subtracted makes the species vary, if to a species already perfected something be added, necessarily it is now another species; thus, if to animate substance one adds only sensible, one will have another species, for animal and plant are different species. It does happen, nonetheless, that one finds something which is not integral to the species; in an individual included under that species—white and dressed, for instance, in Socrates or in Plato, or a sixth finger, or something of the sort. Hence, nothing prevents some things being made one in the individual which are not united in one integrity of species; thus, human nature and whiteness and music in Socrates; and things of this kind are united and are called “one by subject.” Now, the individual in the genus of substance is called hypostasis, and even in rational substances is called person; therefore, all things such as those mentioned are suitably said to be, united “in the hypostasis” or even “in the person.” Clearly, then, nothing prevents some things not united in nature from being united in hypostasis or person.
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| Audientes autem haeretici in Christo unionem Dei et hominis esse factam, contrariis viis incesserunt ad hoc exponendum, praetermisso tramite veritatis. Aliqui enim hanc unionem aestimaverunt ad modum eorum quae uniuntur in unam naturam: sicut Arius et Apollinaris, ponentes quod verbum erat corpori Christi pro anima, sive pro mente; et sicut Eutyches, qui posuit ante incarnationem duas naturas Dei et hominis, post incarnationem vero unam.
| [4] But when the heretics heard that in Christ a union of God and man took place, they approached the exposition of this point in contrary ways, but neglected the way of the truth. For some thought of this union after the mode of things united into one nature: so Arius and Apollinaris, holding that the Word stood to the body of Christ as soul or as mind, and so Eutyches, who held that before the Incarnation there were two natures of God and man, but after the Incarnation only one.
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| Sed eorum dictum omnino impossibilitatem continet. Manifestum est enim naturam verbi ab aeterno in sua integritate perfectissimam esse, nec omnino corrumpi aut mutari posse. Unde impossibile est aliquid extrinsecum a natura divina, utpote naturam humanam vel aliquam partem eius, in unitatem naturae ei advenire.
| [not in O'Neil] But this opinion entails an impossibility. It is clear that the nature of the Word is from eternity most perfect in its integrity, and cannot be corrupted or changed in any way. So it is impossible for anything extrinsic to the divine nature, such as a human nature or any part of it, to come into a union of nature with it.
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| Alii vero, huius positionis impossibilitatem videntes, in viam contrariam diverterunt. Ea enim quae habenti aliquam naturam adveniunt nec tamen pertinent ad integritatem naturae illius, vel accidentia esse videntur, ut albedo et musica; vel accidentaliter se habere ad ipsum, sicut anulus, vestimentum, domus, et similia. Consideraverunt autem, quod, cum humana natura verbo Dei adveniat nec ad eius naturae integritatem pertineat, necesse est, ut putaverunt, quod humana natura accidentalem unionem haberet ad verbum. Et quidem manifestum est quod non potest inesse verbo ut accidens: tum quia Deus non est susceptivum accidentis, ut supra probatum est; tum quia humana natura, cum sit de genere substantiae, nullius accidens esse potest. Unde reliquum videbatur quod humana natura adveniret verbo, non sicut accidens, sed sicut accidentaliter se habens ad ipsum. Posuit igitur Nestorius quod humana natura Christi se habebat ad verbum sicut templum quoddam: ita quod secundum solam inhabitationem erat intelligenda unio verbi ad humanam naturam. Et quia templum seorsum habet suam individuationem ab eo qui inhabitat templum; individuatio autem conveniens humanae naturae est personalitas: reliquum erat quod alia esset personalitas humanae naturae, et alia verbi. Et sic verbum et ille homo erant duae personae.
| [5] But others, seeing the impossibility of this position, went off on a contrary road. Now, the things which accrue to one having a nature, but do not belong to the integrity of that nature, seem either to be accidents—say, whiteness and music; or to stand in an accidental relation—say, a ring, a garment, a house, and the like. Of course, they weighed this: Since the human nature accrues to the Word of God without belonging to the integrity of His nature, it is necessary (so they thought) that the human nature have an accidental union with the Word. To be sure, it clearly cannot be in the Word as an accident: both because God is not susceptible to an accident (as was previously proved); and because human nature, being in the genus of substance, cannot be the accident of anything. Hence there appeared to be this remaining: Human nature accrues to the Word, not as an accident, but as a thing accidentally related to the Word. Nestorius, then, held that the human nature of Christ stood to the Word as a kind of temple, so that only by indwelling was the union of the Word to the human nature to be understood. And because a temple possesses its individuation apart from him who dwells in the temple, and the individuation suitable to human nature is personality, this was left: that the personality of the human nature was one, and that of the Word another. Thus, the Word and that man were two persons.
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| Quod quidem inconveniens alii vitare volentes, circa humanam naturam talem dispositionem introduxerunt ut ei personalitas proprie convenire non possit, dicentes animam et corpus, in quibus integritas humanae naturae consistit, a verbo sic esse assumpta ut corpori anima non esset unita ad aliquam substantiam constituendam: ne cogerentur dicere illam substantiam sic constitutam rationem personae habere. Unionem vero verbi ad animam et corpus posuerunt sicut ad ea quae accidentaliter se habent, puta induti ad indumentum, in hoc quodammodo Nestorium imitantes.
| [6] To be sure, others wished to avoid this awkwardness. So, regarding the human nature they introduced a disposition such that personality could not be properly suitable to it. They said that the soul and the body, in which the integrity of human nature consists, were so assumed by the Word that the soul was not united to the body to establish any substance, lest they be forced to say that the substance so established fulfilled the account of person. But they held the union of the Word to soul and body to be like a union to things in an accidental relation, for instance, of the clothed to his clothes. In this they were somehow imitating Nestorius.
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| His igitur remotis per supra dicta, necessarium est ponere talem fuisse unionem verbi et hominis ut neque ex duabus una natura conflata sit; neque verbi ad humanam naturam talis fuerit unio sicut est alicuius substantiae, puta hominis, ad exteriora, quae accidentaliter se habent ad ipsum, ut domus et vestimentum; sed verbum in humana natura sicut in sibi propria facta per incarnationem, subsistere ponatur; ut et corpus illud vere sit corpus verbi Dei; et similiter anima; et verbum Dei vere sit homo.
| [7] Now, with these accounts set aside by the foregoing, it must be laid down that the union of the Word and the man was such that one nature was not breathed together out of two; and that the union of the Word to the human nature was not like that of a substance—a man, say—to those externals which are accidentally related to him, like a house and a garment. But let the Word be set down as subsisting in a human nature as in one made His very own by the Incarnation; and in consequence that body is truly the body of the Word of God, and the soul in like manner, and the Word of God is truly man.
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| Et quamvis haec unio perfecte ab homine non valeat explicari, tamen, secundum modum et facultatem nostram, conabimur aliquid dicere ad aedificationem fidei, ut circa hoc mysterium fides Catholica ab infidelibus defendatur.
| [8] And although to explain this union perfectly is beyond man’s strength, nonetheless, in accord with our measure and power, we will try to say something “for the upbuilding of the faith” (cf. Eph. 4:29), so that concerning this mystery the Catholic faith may be defended from the infidels.
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| In omnibus autem rebus creatis nihil invenitur huic unioni tam simile sicut unio animae ad corpus: et maior esset similitudo, ut etiam Augustinus dicit, contra Felicianum, si esset unus intellectus in omnibus hominibus, ut quidam posuerunt, secundum quos oporteret dicere quod intellectus praeexistens hoc modo de novo conceptui hominis uniatur ut ex utroque fiat una persona, sicut ponimus verbum praeexistens humanae naturae in personam unam uniri. Unde et propter hanc similitudinem utriusque unionis, Athanasius dicit, in symbolo quod, sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus.
| [9] Now, in all created things nothing is found so like this union as the union of soul to body. And the likeness would be greater, as Augustine also says, in Against Felician, if there were one intellect in all men. So some have held, and according to them one ought to say that the pre-existing intellect is in such wise united anew to a man’s conception that from each of these two a new person is made, just as we hold that the pre-existing Word is united to the human nature in a unity of person. Accordingly, and by reason of the likeness of these two unions, Athanasius says in the Creed: “as the rational soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ.”
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| Sed cum anima rationalis uniatur corpori et sicut materiae et sicut instrumento, non potest esse similitudo quantum ad primum modum unionis: sic enim ex Deo et homine fieret una natura, cum materia et forma proprie naturam constituant speciei. Relinquitur ergo ut attendatur similitudo secundum quod anima unitur corpori ut instrumento. Ad quod etiam dicta antiquorum doctorum concordant, qui humanam naturam in Christo organum quoddam divinitatis posuerunt, sicut et ponitur corpus organum animae.
| [10] However, since the rational soul is united to the body both as to matter and as to an instrument, there cannot be a likeness so far as the first mode of union is concerned, for thus from God and man one nature would be made, since the matter and the form properly establish the nature of a species. Therefore, what is left is to look upon the likeness so far as the soul is united to the body as an instrument. With this, also, there is the concordance of the ancient Doctors, who held that the human nature in Christ was “a kind of organ of the divinity,” just as the body is held to be an organ of the soul.
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| Aliter enim est animae organum corpus et eius partes, et aliter exteriora instrumenta. Haec enim dolabra non est proprium instrumentum, sicut haec manus: per dolabram enim multi possunt operari, sed haec manus ad propriam operationem huius animae deputatur. Propter quod manus est organum unitum et proprium: dolabra autem instrumentum exterius et commune. Sic igitur et in unione Dei et hominis considerari potest. Omnes enim homines comparantur ad Deum ut quaedam instrumenta quibus operatur: ipse enim est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere pro bona voluntate, secundum apostolum, Philipp. 2-13. Sed alii homines comparantur ad Deum quasi instrumenta extrinseca et separata: moventur enim a Deo non ad operationes proprias sibi tantum, sed ad operationes communes omni rationali naturae, ut est intelligere veritatem, diligere bona, et operari iusta. Sed humana natura in Christo assumpta est ut instrumentaliter operetur ea quae sunt operationes propriae solius Dei, sicut est mundare peccata, illuminare mentes per gratiam, et introducere in perfectionem vitae aeternae. Comparatur igitur humana natura Christi ad Deum sicut instrumentum proprium et coniunctum, ut manus ad animam.
| [11] Now, the body and its parts are the organ of the soul in one fashion; external instruments in quite another. For this axe is not the soul’s very own instrument, as this hand is, for by an axe many can operate, but this hand is deputy to this soul in its very own operation. For this reason the hand is an instrument of the soul united to it and its very own, but the axe is an instrument both external and common. This is the way, then, in which even the union of God and man can be considered. For all men are related to God as instruments of a sort, and by these He works: “for it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish according to His good will” (Phil. 2:3), as the Apostle says. But other men are related to God as extrinsic and separated instruments, so to say; for God does not move them only to operations which are His very own, but to the operations common to every rational nature, to understand the truth, for example, to love the good, to do what is just. But the human nature in Christ is assumed with the result that instrumentally He performs the things which are the proper operation of God alone: to wash away sins, for example, to enlighten minds by grace, to lead into the perfection of eternal life. The human nature of Christ, then, is compared to God as a proper and conjoined instrument is compared, as the hand is compared to the soul.
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| Nec discrepat a rerum naturalium consuetudine quod aliquid sit naturaliter proprium instrumentum alicuius quod tamen non est forma ipsius. Nam lingua, prout est instrumentum locutionis, est proprium organum intellectus: qui tamen prout philosophus probat, nullius partis corporis actus est. Similiter etiam invenitur aliquod instrumentum quod ad naturam speciei non pertinet, et tamen ex parte materiae competit huic individuo: ut sextus digitus vel aliquid huiusmodi. Nihil igitur prohibet hoc modo ponere unionem humanae naturae ad verbum quod humana natura sit quasi verbi instrumentum non separatum sed coniunctum, nec tamen humana natura ad naturam verbi pertinet, nec verbum est eius forma; pertinet tamen ad eius personam.
| [12] Nor is there departure from the course of natural things because one thing is by nature the proper instrument of another, and this other is not its form. For the tongue, so far as it is the instrument of speech, is the intellect’s very own organ; and the intellect is nevertheless, as the Philosopher proves, not the act of any part of the body. In like manner, too, one finds an instrument which does not pertain to the nature of the species, which is, nevertheless, on the material side fitted to this individual; a sixth finger, for example, or something of the sort. Therefore, nothing prevents our putting the union of the human nature to the Word in this way: that the human nature be, so to speak, an instrument of the Word—not a separated, but a conjoined, instrument; and the human nature, nonetheless, does not belong to the nature of the Word, and the Word is not its form; nevertheless the human nature belongs to His person.
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| Praedicta tamen exempla non sic posita sunt ut omnimoda similitudo in his sit requirenda: intelligendum est enim verbum Dei multo sublimius et intimius humanae naturae potuisse uniri quam anima qualicumque proprio instrumento, praecipue cum toti humanae naturae mediante intellectu coniunctum dicatur. Et licet verbum Dei sua virtute penetret omnia, utpote omnia conservans et portans, creaturis tamen intellectualibus, quae proprie verbo perfrui possunt et eius participes esse, ex quadam similitudinis affinitate, et eminentius et ineffabilius potest uniri.
| [23] But the examples mentioned have not been set down so that one should look in them for an all-round likeness; for one should understand that the Word of God was able to be much more sublimely and more intimately united to human nature than the soul to its very own instrument of whatever sort, especially since He is said to be united to the entire human nature with the intellect as medium. And although the Word of God by His power penetrates all things, conserving all, that is, and supporting all, it is to the intellectual creatures, who can properly enjoy the Word and share with Him, that from a kind of kinship of likeness He can be both more eminently and more ineffably united.
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Caput 49
Solutio rationum contra incarnationem superius positarum
| Chapter 49
SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE INCARNATION GIVEN ABOVE
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| His igitur habitis, ea quae contra incarnationis fidem supra opposita sunt, facile solvuntur.
| [1] With what has now been said the points made previously against faith in the Incarnation are easily disposed of.
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| Ostensum est enim incarnationem verbi non sic esse intelligendam quod verbum sit in carnem conversum, aut sit corpori unitum ut forma. Unde non est consequens ex hoc quod verbum est incarnatum, quod vere Deus sit corpus vel virtus in corpore, ut prima ratio procedebat.
| [2] For it has been shown that one must not understand the Incarnation of the Word thus: that the Word was converted into flesh or that He is united to the body as a form. Hence, it is not a consequence of the Word’s Incarnation that He who is truly God is a body or a power in a body as the first argument was trying to proceed.
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| Similiter etiam non consequitur quod verbum sit substantialiter mutatum per hoc quod naturam humanam assumpsit. Nulla enim mutatio in ipso verbo Dei facta est, sed solum in humana natura quae est a verbo assumpta, secundum quam competit verbo et generatum esse temporaliter et natum, non autem secundum seipsum.
| [3] Neither does it follow that the Word was substantially changed by the fact that He assumed human nature. For no change was made in the Word of God Himself, but only in the human nature which was assumed by the Word, in accord with which it is proper that the Word was both temporally generated and born, but to the Word Himself this was not fitting.
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| Quod etiam tertio proponitur, necessitatem non habet. Hypostasis enim non extenditur extra terminos illius naturae ex qua subsistentiam habet. Non autem verbum Dei subsistentiam habet ex natura humana, sed magis naturam humanam ad suam subsistentiam vel personalitatem trahit: non enim per illam, sed in illa subsistit. Unde nihil prohibet verbum Dei esse ubique, licet humana natura a verbo Dei assumpta ubique non sit.
| [4] What is proposed in the third argument is also without necessity. For an hypostasis is not extended beyond the limits of that nature from which it has subsistence. The Word of God, of course, has no subsistence from the human nature, rather, He draws the human nature to His subsistence or personality. It is not through, but in, human nature that He subsists. Hence, nothing prevents the Word of God from being everywhere, although the human nature assumed by the Word of God is not everywhere.
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| Ex hoc etiam solvitur quartum. Cuiuslibet enim rei subsistentis oportet esse unam naturam tantum per quam simpliciter esse habeat. Et sic verbum Dei per solam naturam divinam simpliciter esse habet: non autem per humanam naturam, sed per eam habet quod sit hoc, scilicet quod sit homo.
| [5] Thus, also, the fourth is answered. For in any subsistent thing there must be only one nature by which it has being simply. And so, the Word of God has being simply by, the divine nature alone, not, however, by the human nature, by human nature He has being this—namely, being a man.
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| Quintum etiam solvitur per hoc idem. Impossibile est enim quod natura per quam verbum subsistit, sit aliud quam ipsa persona verbi. Subsistit autem per naturam divinam: non autem per naturam humanam, sed eam ad suam subsistentiam trahit ut in ea subsistat, ut dictum est. Unde non oportet quod natura humana sit idem quod persona verbi.
| [6] The fifth also is disposed of in the very same way. For it is impossible that the nature by which the Word subsists be other than the very person of the Word. Of course, He subsists by the divine nature and not by the human nature, but He draws the latter to His own subsistence that He may subsist in it, as was said. Hence, it is not necessary that the human nature be identical with the person of the Word.
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| Hinc etiam excluditur id quod sexto obiiciebatur. Hypostasis enim est minus simplex, vel re vel intellectu, quam natura per quam constituitur in esse: re quidem, cum hypostasis non est sua natura; intellectu autem solo in illis in quibus idem est hypostasis et natura. Hypostasis autem verbi non constituitur simpliciter per humanam naturam, ut per eam sit: sed per eam solum habet verbum quod sit homo. Non igitur oportet quod natura humana sit simplicior quam verbum inquantum est verbum: sed solum inquantum verbum est hic homo.
| [7] From this also follows the exclusion of the sixth objection. For an hypostasis is less simple—whether in things or in the understanding—than the nature through which it is established in being: in the thing, indeed, when the hypostasis is not its nature, or in the understanding alone in the cases in which the hypostasis and the nature are identified. The hypostasis of the Word is not established simply by the human nature so as to have being through the human nature, but through it the Word has this alone: that He be man. It is, then, not necessary that the human nature be more simple than the Word so far as He is the Word, but only so far as the Word is this man.
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| Ex quo etiam patet solutio ad id quod septimo obiicitur. Non enim oportet quod hypostasis Dei verbi simpliciter sit constituta per materiam signatam, sed solum inquantum est hic homo. Sic enim solum per humanam naturam constituitur, ut dictum est.
| [8] From this also the way is open to solving the seventh objection. For it is not necessary that the hypostasis of the Word of God be constituted simply by signate matter, but only so far as He is this man. For only as this man is He constituted by the human nature, as was said.
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| Quod autem anima et corpus in Christo ad personalitatem verbi trahuntur, non constituentia aliquam personam praeter personam verbi, non pertinet ad minorationem virtutis, ut octava ratio procedebat, sed ad dignitatem maiorem. Unumquodque enim melius esse habet cum suo digniori unitur, quam cum per se existit: sicut anima sensibilis nobilius esse habet in homine quam in aliis animalibus, in quibus est forma principalis, non tamen in homine.
| [9] Of course, that the soul and body in Christ are drawn to the personality of the Word without constituting a person other than the person of the Word does not point to a lessened power, as the eighth argument” would have it, but to a greater worthiness. For everything whatever has, when united to what is worthier, a better being than it has when it exists through itself; just so, the sensible soul has a nobler being in nun than it has in the other animals in which it is the principal form, for all that it is not such in man.
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| Hinc etiam solvitur quod nono obiiciebatur. In Christo enim vere quidem fuit haec anima et hoc corpus: non tamen ex eis constituta est persona aliqua praeter personam Dei verbi, quia sunt ad personalitatem Dei verbi assumpta; sicut et corpus, cum est sine anima, propriam speciem habet, sed cum unitur animae, ab ea speciem sortitur.
| [10] Hence, also, comes the solution to the ninth objection. In Christ there was, indeed, this soul and this body, for all that there was not constituted from them another person than the person of God’s Word, because they were assumed unto the personality of God’s Word; just as a body, too, when it is without the soul, does have its own species, but it is from the soul, when united to it, that it receives its species.
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| Ex hoc etiam solvitur quod decimo proponebatur. Manifestum est enim quod hic homo qui est Christus, substantia quaedam est non universalis, sed particularis. Et hypostasis quaedam est, non tamen alia hypostasis quam hypostasis verbi: quia humana natura ab hypostasi verbi assumpta est ut verbum subsistat tam in humana natura quam in divina. Id autem quod in humana natura subsistit, est hic homo. Unde ipsum verbum supponitur cum dicitur hic homo.
| [11] Thus, also, one answers what the tenth argument proposed. It is clear that this man who is Christ is a certain substance which is not universal, but particular. And He is an hypostasis; nevertheless, not another hypostasis than the hypostasis of the Word, for human nature has been assumed by the hypostasis of the Word that the Word may subsist in human as well as in divine nature. But that which subsists in human nature is this man. Hence, the Word itself is supposed, when one says “this man.”
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| Sed si quis eandem obiectionem ad humanam naturam transferat, dicens eam esse substantiam quandam non universalem sed particularem, et per consequens hypostasim:- manifeste decipitur. Nam humana natura etiam in Socrate vel Platone non est hypostasis: sed id quod in ea subsistit, hypostasis est.
| [12] But, let one move the very same objection over to human nature and say it is a certain substance, not universal but particular and consequently an hypostasis—he is obviously deceived. For human nature even in Socrates or Plato is not an hypostasis, but that which subsists in the nature is an hypostasis.
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| Quod autem substantia sit et particularis, non secundum illam significationem dicitur qua hypostasis est particularis substantia. Substantia enim, secundum philosophum, dicitur dupliciter: scilicet pro supposito in genere substantiae, quod dicitur hypostasis; et de eo quod quid est, quod est natura rei. Sed neque partes alicuius substantiae sic dicuntur particulares substantiae quasi sint per se subsistentes, sed subsistunt in toto. Unde nec hypostases possunt dici: cum nulla earum sit substantia completa. Alias sequeretur quod in uno homine tot essent hypostases quot sunt partes.
| [13] But to call a human nature a substance and particular is not to use the meaning in which one calls an hypostasis a particular substance. “Substance” we speak of with the Philosopher [Categories 5] in two ways: for the supposit, namely, in the genus of substance which is called hypostasis; and for the what-it-is which is “the nature of a thing.” But the parts of a substance are not thus called particular substances—subsisting, so to say, in themselves; they subsist in the whole. Hence, neither can one call them hypostases, for none of them is a complete substance. Otherwise, it would follow that in one man there are as many hypostases as there are parts.
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| Quod vero undecimo oppositum fuit, ex eo solvitur quod aequivocatio inducitur ex diversa forma significata per nomen, non autem ex diversitate suppositionis: non enim hoc nomen homo aequivoce sumitur ex eo quod quandoque supponit pro Platone, quandoque pro Socrate. Hoc igitur nomen homo, et de Christo et de aliis hominibus dictum, semper eandem formam significat, scilicet naturam humanam. Unde univoce praedicatur de eis: sed suppositio tantum variatur, in hoc quod quidem secundum quod pro Christo sumitur, supponit hypostasim increatam; secundum vero quod pro aliis sumitur, supponit hypostasim creatam.
| [14] Now, to the eleventh argument in opposition. The solution is that equivocation is introduced by a diversity of the form signified by a name, but not by diversity of supposition. For this name “man” is not taken as equivocal because sometimes it supposes Plato, sometimes Socrates. Therefore, this name “man” said of Christ and of other men always signifies the same form; namely, human nature. This is why it is predicated of them univocally; but it is only the supposition which is changed, and, to be sure, in this: when it is taken for Christ it supposes an uncreated hypostasis, but when it is taken for others it supposes a created hypostasis.
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| Neque etiam hypostasis verbi dicitur esse suppositum humanae naturae quasi subiiciatur ei ut formaliori, sicut duodecima ratio proponebat. Hoc enim esset necessarium si hypostasis verbi per naturam humanam simpliciter constitueretur in esse. Quod patet esse falsum: dicitur enim hypostasis verbi humanae naturae supponi prout eam ad suam subsistentiam trahit, sicut aliquid trahitur ad alterum nobilius cui unitur.
| [15] Nor, again, is the hypostasis of the Word said to be the supposit of the human nature, as though subjected to the latter as to a more formal principle, as the twelfth argument proposed. This would, of course, be necessary if it were the human nature which establishes the hypostasis of the Word in being simply. This is obviously false: for the hypostasis of the Word is the subject of the human nature so far as He draws this latter unto His own subsistence, just as something drawn to a second and nobler thing to which it is united.
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| Non tamen sequitur quod humana natura accidentaliter verbo adveniat, ex hoc quod verbum ab aeterno praeextitit, sicut ultima ratio concludebat. Sic enim verbum humanam naturam assumpsit ut vere sit homo. Esse autem hominem est esse in genere substantiae. Quia igitur ex unione naturae humanae hypostasis verbi habet quod sit homo, non advenit ei accidentaliter: nam accidentia esse substantiale non conferunt.
| [16] For all that, it does not follow that the human nature accrues to the Word accidentally, because the Word pre-exists from eternity, as the final argument was trying to conclude. For the Word assumed human nature so as to be truly man. But to be man is to be in the genus of a substance. Therefore, since by union with human nature the hypostasis of the Word has the being of man, this does not accrue to the Word accidentally. For accidents do not bestow substantial being.
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Caput 51
Obiectiones contra peccatum originale
| Chapter 51
OBJECTIONS AGAINST ORIGINAL SIN
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| Sunt autem quaedam quae huic veritati adversari videntur.
| [1] There are, of course, certain things which appear to be adversaries of this truth.
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| Peccatum enim unius aliis non imputatur ad culpam: unde Ezech. 18-20 dicitur quod filius non portat iniquitatem patris. Et huius ratio est quia non laudamur neque vituperamur nisi ex his quae in nobis sunt. Haec autem sunt quae nostra voluntate committimus. Non igitur peccatum primi hominis toti humano generi imputatur.
| [7] For the sin of one man is not imputed as fault to others. So Ezekiel (18:7.0) says: “the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father.” And the reason for this is that we are neither praised nor blamed except for the things which are in ourselves. But these are the things to which we are committed by will. Therefore, the sin of the first man is not imputed to the entire human race.
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| Si vero quis dicat quod, uno peccante, omnes peccaverunt in ipso ut apostolus dicere videtur, et sic uni non imputatur peccatum alterius, sed suum peccatum:- hoc etiam, ut videtur, stare non potest. Quia illi qui ex Adam nati sunt, quando Adam peccavit, in eo nondum erant actu, sed virtute tantum, sicut in prima origine. Peccare autem, cum sit agere, non competit nisi existenti in actu. Non igitur in Adam omnes peccavimus.
| [3] But let one answer that when one sinned, “all sinned in him,” as the Apostle seems to say and so the sin of one is not imputed to another, but the sin is his own. Yet even this, it seems, cannot stand. For those born of Adam were, when Adam sinned, not yet in him actually, but only in his power, as in their first origin. But to sin, since it is to act, is proportionate only to one who actually exists. Therefore, we did not all sin in Adam.
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| Si autem ita dicatur nos in Adam peccasse quasi originaliter ab eo in nos peccatum proveniat simul cum natura:- hoc etiam impossibile videtur. Accidens enim, cum de subiecto ad subiectum non transeat, non potest traduci nisi subiectum traducatur. Subiectum autem peccati anima rationalis est, quae non traducitur in nos ex primo parente, sed a Deo singillatim creatur in unoquoque, ut in secundo ostensum est. Non igitur per originem peccatum ad nos ab Adam derivari potest.
| [4] But let it be said that we sinned in Adam as though originally the sin comes from him to us along with the nature. Even this seems impossible. For an accident, since it does not pass from one subject to another, cannot be passed on unless the subject is passed on. But the subject of sin is the rational soul, which is not passed on to us from our first parent, but is created by God in each and one by one, as was shown in Book II. Therefore, it is not by origin that the sin of Adam flowed on to us.
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| Adhuc. Si peccatum a primo parente in alios derivatur quia ab eo originem trahunt, cum Christus a primo parente originem duxerit, videtur quod ipse etiam peccato originali subiectus fuerit. Quod est alienum a fide.
| [5] Further, if the sin of our first parent flows into others because they take their origin from him, then, since Christ took His origin from our first parent, He, also, it seems, was subject to original sin. And this is foreign to the faith.
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| Praeterea. Quod consequitur aliquid secundum suam originem naturalem, est ei naturale. Quod autem est alicui naturale, non est peccatum in ipso: sicut in talpa non est peccatum quod visu caret. Non igitur per originem a primo homine peccatum ad alios potuit derivari.
| [6] Moreover, what follows on a thing from its natural origin is natural to that thing. But what is natural to a thing is not a sin in it, thus, the lack of vision is not a sin in a mole. Therefore, sin could not flow into others by reason of their origin from the first man.
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| Si autem dicatur quod peccatum a primo parente in posteros derivatur per originem, non inquantum est naturalis, sed inquantum est vitiata:- hoc etiam, ut videtur, stare non potest. Defectus enim in opere naturae non accidit nisi per defectum alicuius naturalis principii: sicut per corruptionem aliquam quae est in semine, causantur monstrosi partus animalium. Non est autem dare alicuius naturalis principii corruptionem in humano semine. Non videtur igitur quod aliquod peccatum ex vitiata origine derivetur in posteros a primo parente.
| [7] But let it now be said that the sin flows from the first parent into his descendants by way of origin, not inasmuch as the origin is natural, but inasmuch as the origin is vitiated; this also, it seems, cannot stand. For a failure in nature’s work takes place only through the failure of some natural principle, due to some corruption in the seed, for example, monstrous births in animals are caused. But one cannot grant the corruption of a natural principle in human seed. It seems, then, that a sin does not flow from the first parent into his descendants by a vitiated origin.
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| Item. Peccata quae proveniunt in operibus naturae per corruptionem alicuius principii, non fiunt semper vel frequenter, sed ut in paucioribus. Si igitur per vitiatam originem peccatum a primo parente in posteros derivetur, non derivabitur in omnes, sed in aliquos paucos.
| [8] Once again; the sins of nature, appearing among its works by the corruption of a principle, take place neither always nor frequently except in a few cases. Therefore, if by a vitiated origin sin flows from the first parent into his descendants, it will not flow into all, but into some few.
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| Praeterea. Si per vitiatam originem aliquis defectus in prole proveniat, eiusdem generis oportet esse illum defectum cum vitio qui est in origine: quia effectus sunt conformes suis causis. Origo autem, sive generatio humana, cum sit actus potentiae generativae, quae nullo modo participat rationem, non potest habere in se vitium quod pertineat ad genus culpae: quia in his solis actibus potest esse virtus vel vitium qui subduntur aliqualiter rationi; unde non imputatur homini ad culpam si propter vitiatam originem, nascatur leprosus vel caecus. Nullo igitur modo defectus culpabilis provenire potest a primo parente in posteros per vitiatam originem.
| [9] And if, furthermore, due to a vitiated origin, a failure appears in the offspring, that failure ought to be of the same genus as the vice which is in the origin, for effects are conformed to their causes. The origin, of course, of human generation, since it is a perfection of the generative power, which shares reason not at all, can have no vice in it which belongs to the genus of fault. For only in those acts can there be virtue or vice, which are subject to reason in some fashion. And so one does not call it a man’s fault if, due to a vitiated origin, he is born a leper or blind. Therefore, there is no way for a blameworthy failure to come down from the first parent to his descendant by origin.
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| Adhuc. Naturae bonum per peccatum non tollitur: unde etiam in Daemonibus manent naturalia bona, ut Dionysius dicit. Generatio autem est actus naturae. Non igitur per peccatum primi hominis vitiari potuit humanae generationis origo, ut sic peccatum primi hominis ad posteros derivaretur.
| [10] Yet again; nature’s good is not taken away by sin. Wherefore, even in the demons natural goods remain, as Dionysius says. But generation is an act of nature. Therefore, the sin of the first man could not vitiate the origin of human generation so that the sin of the first man should flow into his descendants.
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| Amplius. Homo generat sibi similem secundum speciem. In his ergo quae non pertinent ad generationem speciei, non oportet filium assimilari parentibus. Peccatum autem non potest pertinere ad rationem speciei: quia peccatum non est eorum quae sunt secundum naturam, sed magis corruptio naturalis ordinis. Non igitur oportet quod ex primo homine peccante alii peccatores nascantur.
| [11] Man, moreover, generates one like himself in species. In things, then, which have no bearing on the generation of the species, the son need not be made like his parents. But sin cannot bear on the essentials of the species, for sin is not among the things of nature; rather, it is a corruption of the natural order. There is, then, no necessity that from a first man sinning other sinners be born.
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| Praeterea. Filii magis similantur proximis parentibus quam remotis. Contingit autem quandoque quod proximi parentes sunt sine peccato, et in actu etiam generationis nullum peccatum committitur. Non igitur propter peccatum primi parentis peccatores omnes nascuntur.
| [12] There is more. Sons are more likened to their proximate than to their remote parents. But at times it happens that the proximate parents are without sin and even in the act of generation no sin takes place. It is not, therefore, by the sin of the first parent that all are born sinners.
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| Deinde, si peccatum a primo homine in alios derivatum est; maioris autem virtutis in agendo est bonum quam malum, ut supra ostensum est: multo magis satisfactio Adae, et iustitia eius, per eum ad alios transivit.
| [13] And again, if the sin of the first man flowed into others, and—on the other hand—the good is more powerful in acting than the evil (as was shown above), then by so much the more was the satisfaction of Adam, and his justice, transferred through him to others.
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| Adhuc. Si peccatum primi hominis per originem propagatur in posteros, pari etiam ratione peccata aliorum parentum ad posteros deveniunt. Et sic semper posteriores essent magis onerati peccatis quam priores. Quod praecipue ex hoc sequi necesse est, si peccatum transit a parente in prolem, et satisfactio transire non potest.
| [14] If the sin of the first man, moreover, was by origin propagated to his descendants, by an equal reason the sins of other parents pass down to their descendants. And in this way the later would always be more burdened with sins than the earlier generations. Especially must this follow if, in fact, the sin passes on from the parent to the offspring, and the satisfaction cannot pass on.
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Caput 52
Solutio obiectionum positarum
| Chapter 52
SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS PROPOSED
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| Ad horum igitur solutionem, praemittendum est quod peccati originalis in humano genere probabiliter quaedam signa apparent. Cum enim Deus humanorum actuum sic curam gerat ut bonis operibus praemium et malis poenam retribuat, ut in superioribus est ostensum, ex ipsa poena possumus certificari de culpa. Patitur autem communiter humanum genus diversas poenas, et corporales et spirituales. Inter corporales potissima est mors, ad quam omnes aliae ordinantur: scilicet fames, sitis, et alia huiusmodi. Inter spirituales autem est potissima debilitas rationis, ex qua contingit quod homo difficulter pervenit ad veri cognitionem, et de facili labitur in errorem; et appetitus bestiales omnino superare non potest, sed multoties obnubilatur ab eis.
| [1] Now, for the solution of these points one should first set down that certain signs of the original sin appear with probability in the human race. For, since God takes care of human acts so as to give reward for good works and set a penalty for bad works, as was previously shown, it is from the very penalty that we can assure ourselves of the fault. Now, the human race commonly suffers various penalties, both bodily and spiritual. Greatest among the bodily ones is death, and to this all the others are ordered: namely, hunger, thirst, and others of this sort. Greatest~ of course, among the spiritual penalties is the frailty of reason: from this it happens that man with difficulty arrives at knowledge of the truth; that with ease he falls into error, and that he cannot entirely overcome his beastly appetites, but is over and over again beclouded by them.
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| Posset tamen aliquis dicere huiusmodi defectus, tam corporales quam spirituales, non esse poenales, sed naturales defectus ex necessitate materiae consequentes. Necesse est enim corpus humanum, cum sit ex contrariis compositum, corruptibile esse; et sensibilem appetitum in ea quae sunt secundum sensum delectabilia moveri, quae interdum sunt contraria rationi; et cum intellectus possibilis sit in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, nullum eorum habens in actu, sed ex sensibus natus ea acquirere, difficulter ad scientiam veritatis pertingere, et de facili propter phantasmata a vero deviare. Sed tamen si quis recte consideret, satis probabiliter poterit aestimare, divina providentia supposita, quae singulis perfectionibus congrua perfectibilia coaptavit, quod Deus superiorem naturam inferiori ad hoc coniunxit ut ei dominaretur; et si quod huius dominii impedimentum ex defectu naturae contingeret, eius speciali et supernaturali beneficio tolleretur; ut scilicet, cum anima rationalis sit altioris naturae quam corpus, tali conditione credatur corpori esse coniuncta quod in corpore aliquid esse non possit contrarium animae, per quam corpus vivit; et similiter, si ratio in homine appetitui sensuali coniungitur et aliis sensitivis potentiis, quod ratio a sensitivis potentiis, non impediatur, sed magis eis dominetur.
| [2] For all that, one could say that defects of this kind, both bodily and spiritual, are not penalties, but natural defects necessarily consequent upon matter. For, necessarily, the human body, composed of contraries, must be corruptible; and the sensible appetite must be moved to sense pleasures, and these are occasionally contrary to reason. And, since the possible intellect is in potency to all intelligibles, possessing none of them actually, but by nature acquiring them from the senses, one must arrive at knowledge of the truth with difficulty, and due to the phantasms one with ease deviates from the truth. But, for all that, let one weigh matters rightly, and he will be able to judge with probability enough—granted a divine providence which for every perfection has contrived a proportionate perfectible—that God united a superior to an inferior nature for this purpose: that the superior rule the inferior, and that, if some obstacle to this dominion should happen from a failure of nature, it would be removed by His special and supernatural benefaction. And the result would be, since the rational soul is of a higher nature than the body, belief that the rational soul was united to the body under such a condition that in the body there can be nothing contrary to the soul by which the body lives; and, in like fashion, if reason in man is united to the sensual appetite and other sensitive powers, that the reason be not impeded by the sensible powers, but be master over them.
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| Sic igitur, secundum doctrinam fidei, ponimus hominem a principio taliter esse institutum quod, quandiu ratio hominis Deo esset subiecta, et inferiores vires ei sine impedimento deservirent, et corpus ab eius subiectione impediri non posset per aliquod impedimentum corporale, Deo et sua gratia supplente quod ad hoc perficiendum natura minus habebat; ratione autem aversa a Deo, et inferiores vires a ratione repugnarent, et corpus vitae, quae est per animam, contrarias passiones susciperet.
| [3] Thus, then, according to the teaching of the faith, we set it down that man from the beginning was thus established by God: As long as man’s reason was subject to God, not only did the inferior powers serve reason without obstacle, but the body also could not be impeded in subjection to reason by any bodily obstacle—God and His grace supplying, because nature had too little for perfecting this establishment. But, when reason turned away from God, not only did the inferior powers rebel from reason, but the body also sustained passions contrary to that life which is from the soul.
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| Sic igitur huiusmodi defectus, quamvis naturales homini videantur, absolute considerando humanam naturam ex parte eius quod est in ea inferius, tamen, considerando divinam providentiam et dignitatem superioris partis humanae naturae, satis probabiliter probari potest huiusmodi defectus esse poenales. Et sic colligi potest humanum genus peccato aliquo originaliter esse infectum.
| [4] Of course, although defects of this kind may seem natural to man in an absolute consideration of human nature on its inferior side, nonetheless, taking into consideration divine providence and the dignity of human nature on its superior side, it can be proved with enough probability that defects of this kind are penalties. And one can gather thus that the human race was originally infected with sin.
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| His igitur visis respondendum est ad ea quae in contrarium sunt obiecta.
| [5] These things now seen, one must answer to the points made as contrary objections.
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| Non enim est inconveniens quod, uno peccante, peccatum in omnes dicimus per originem esse propagatum, quamvis unusquisque ex proprio actu laudetur vel vituperetur: ut prima ratio procedebat. Aliter enim est in his quae sunt unius individui, et aliter in his quae sunt totius naturae speciei: nam participatione speciei sunt plures homines velut unus homo, ut Porphyrius dicit. Peccatum igitur quod ad aliquod individuum sive personam hominis pertinet, alteri non imputatur ad culpam nisi peccanti: quia personaliter unus ab alio divisus est. Si quod autem peccatum est quod ipsam naturam speciei respiciat, non est inconveniens quod ex uno propagetur in alterum: sicut et natura speciei per unum aliis communicatur. Cum autem peccatum malum quoddam sit rationalis naturae; malum autem est privatio boni: secundum illud bonum quod privatur, iudicandum est peccatum aliquod ad naturam communem, vel ad aliquam personam propriam pertinere.
| [6] Now, there is no awkwardness in saying that when one sins the sin is propagated to all in their origin, even though each is praised or blamed according to his own act; as the first argument attempted to proceed. For things go one way in matters of a single individual, and another way in matters of the entire nature of a species, since “by participation in the species many men are as one man,” as Porphyry says. A sin, then, which refers to an individual man or his person is not imputed to another as fault unless he be the sinner, since personally one is divided off from another. But, if there is a sin which looks to the nature of the species itself, there is nothing awkward about its propagation from one to another, just as the nature of the species is communicated through one to others. But, since sin is a kind of evil of rational nature, and evil a privation of good, one judges on the basis of the missing good whether a sin is related to a nature commonly or to a person
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| Peccata igitur actualia, quae communiter ab hominibus aguntur, adimunt aliquod bonum personae peccantis, puta gratiam et ordinem debitum partium animae: unde personalia sunt, nec, uno peccante, alteri imputatur. Primum autem peccatum primi hominis non solum peccantem destituit proprio et personali bono, scilicet gratia et debito ordine animae, sed etiam bono ad naturam communem pertinente. Ut enim supra dictum est, sic natura humana fuit instituta in sui primordio quod inferiores vires perfecte rationi subiicerentur, ratio Deo, et animae corpus, Deo per gratiam supplente id quod ad hoc deerat per naturam. Huiusmodi autem beneficium, quod a quibusdam originalis iustitia dicitur, sic primo homini collatum fuit ut ab eo simul cum natura humana propagaretur in posteros. Ratione autem per peccatum primi hominis se subtrahente a subiectione divina, subsecutum est quod nec inferiores vires perfecte rationi subiiciantur, nec animae corpus: et hoc non tantum in primo peccante, sed idem defectus consequens pervenit ad posteros, ad quos etiam dicta originalis iustitia perventura erat. Sic igitur peccatum primi hominis, a quo omnes alii secundum doctrinam fidei sunt derivati, et personale fuit, inquantum ipsum primum hominem proprio bono privavit; et naturale, inquantum abstulit sibi et suis posteris consequenter beneficium collatum toti humanae naturae. Sic igitur huiusmodi defectus in aliis consequens ex primo parente, etiam in aliis rationem culpae habet, prout omnes homines computantur unus homo per participationem naturae communis. Sic enim invenitur voluntarium huiusmodi peccatum voluntate primi parentis quemadmodum et actio manus rationem culpae habet ex voluntate primi moventis, quod est ratio: ut sic aestimentur in peccato naturae diversi homines quasi naturae communis partes, sicut in peccato personali diversae unius hominis partes.
| Of course, actual sins which are committed by all men commonly deprive the person of the sinner of a good: grace, for instance, and the due order of the parts of the soul. This is why they are personal, and why, when one sins, the sin is not imputed to another. But the first sin of the first man not only deprived him of his proper and personal good—namely, grace, and the due order of the parts of the soul—he was deprived as well of a good related to the common nature. For—as we said above—human nature was established in its first beginning so that the inferior powers were perfectly subject to reason, the reason to God, the body to the soul, and God was by His grace supplying what nature lacked for this arrangement. Now, this kind of benefit which some call “original justice” was conferred on the first man in such wise that he was to propagate it to his descendants along with human nature. But in the sin of the first man reason withdrew itself from the divine subjection. And it has followed thereon that the lower powers are not perfectly subject to the reason nor is the body to the soul; and this is not only the case for the first sinner, but the same consequent defect follows into his posterity and to the posterity in whom the original justice mentioned was going to follow. Thus, then, the sin of the first man from whom all other men are derived according to the teaching of faith was not only personal in that it deprived the first man of his own good, but natural, also, in that it deprived him and consequently his descendants of the benefit bestowed on the entire human nature. Thus, too, this kind of defect which is in others as a consequence from the first parent still has in others the essentials of fault so far as all men are counted as one man by participation in the common nature. For one discovers the voluntary character in a sin of this kind in the will of the first parent much as the action of the hand has the essentials of fault from the will of the first mover, which is the power of reason; as a result, in a sin of nature judgments are made about the diverse men as though parts of a common nature, much as they are made in a personal sin about diverse parts of one man.
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| Secundum hoc igitur verum est dicere quod, uno peccante, omnes peccaverunt in ipso, ut apostolus dicit: secundum quod secunda ratio proponebat. Non quod essent actu in ipso alii homines, sed virtute, sicut in originali principio. Nec dicuntur peccasse in eo quasi aliquem actum exercentes: sed inquantum pertinent ad naturam ipsius, quae per peccatum corrupta est.
| [7] In this way, then, it is true to say that when one sinned, “all sinned in him,” as the Apostle says, and on this basis the second argument made its proposal. Other men were present in Adam, however, not in act, but only in his power as in an Original principle. Nor are they said to have sinned in him as exercising any act, but so far as they belong to Adam’s nature which was corrupted by sin.
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| Nec tamen sequitur, si peccatum a primo parente propagatur in posteros, cum subiectum peccati sit anima rationalis, quod anima rationalis simul cum semine propagetur: secundum processum tertiae rationis. Hoc enim modo propagatur hoc peccatum naturae quod originale dicitur, sicut et ipsa natura speciei, quae, quamvis per animam rationalem perficiatur, non tamen propagatur cum semine, sed solum corpus ad susceptionem talis animae aptum natum, ut in secundo ostensum est.
| [8] Let the sin be propagated from the first parent to his descendants. Nevertheless, it does not follow, although the subject of sin is the rational soul, that the rational soul is propagated along with the seed; as the progress of the third argument had it. For the manner of propagating this sin of nature which is called original is like that of the very nature of the species, and this nature, although it is perfected by the rational soul, is for all that not propagated with the seed; such propagation is only of the body fitted by nature to receive such a soul. It was in Book II that we showed this.
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| Et licet Christus a primo parente secundum carnem descenderit, non tamen inquinationem originalis peccati incurrit, ut quarta ratio concludebat: quia materiam humani corporis solum a primo parente suscepit; virtus autem formativa corporis eius non fuit a primo parente derivata, sed fuit virtus spiritus sancti, ut supra ostensum est. Unde naturam humanam non ab Adam accepit sicut ab agente: licet eam de Adam susceperit sicut de materiali principio.
| [9] We grant that Christ was a descendant of the first parent in the flesh. For all that, He did not incur the contamination of original sin as the fourth argument concluded. For it was only the matter of His human body which He received from the first parent; the power to form His body was not derived from the first parent, but was the power of the Holy Spirit, as was shown. Accordingly, He did not receive human nature from Adam as an agent although He did receive it from Adam as from a material principle.
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| Considerandum est etiam quod praedicti defectus per naturalem originem traducuntur ex eo quod natura destituta est auxilio gratiae, quod ei fuerat in primo parente collatum ad posteros simul cum natura derivandum. Et quia haec destitutio ex voluntario peccato processit, defectus consequens suscipit culpae rationem. Sic igitur defectus huiusmodi et culpabiles sunt per comparationem ad primum principium, quod est peccatum Adae; et naturales sunt per comparationem ad naturam iam destitutam; unde et apostolus dicit, Ephes. 2-3: eramus natura filii irae. Et per hoc solvitur ratio quinta.
| [10] One should consider this, also: The natures origin passes along the defects mentioned because the nature has been stripped of that help of grace which had been bestowed on it in the first parent to pass on to his descendants along with the nature. Now, since this stripping came from a voluntary sin, the consequent defect has the character of fault. Hence, defects of this kind are faulty when referred to their first principle, which is the sin of Adam; and they are natural when referred to the nature already stripped. Accordingly, the Apostle says: ‘We were by nature children of wrath” (Eph. 2:3). In this way one answers the fifth objection.
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| Patet igitur secundum praedicta quod vitium originis ex quo peccatum originale causatur, provenit ex defectu alicuius principii, scilicet gratuiti doni quod naturae humanae in sui institutione fuit collatum. Quod quidem donum quodammodo fuit naturale: non quasi ex principiis naturae causatum, sed quia sic fuit homini datum ut simul cum natura propagaretur. Obiectio autem sexta procedebat secundum quod naturale dicitur quod ex principiis naturae causatur.
| [11] Clearly, then, from what has been said, the vice of origin in which the original sin is caused comes from the failure of a principle, namely, the gratuitous gift which human nature at its institution had had bestowed upon it. To be sure, this gift was in a sense natural: not natural as caused by the principles of the nature, but natural because it was given to man to be propagated along with his nature. But the sixth objection” was dealing with the natural which is caused by the principles of the nature.
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| Procedit etiam septima ratio, per modum eundem, de defectu principii naturalis quod pertinet ad naturam speciei: quod enim ex defectu huiusmodi naturalis principii provenit, accidit ut in paucioribus. Sed defectus originalis peccati provenit ex defectu principii superadditi principiis speciei, ut dictum est.
| [12] The seventh objection proceeds in the same way, from a defect of a natural principle belonging to the nature of the species. Of course, what comes from a defect of a natural principle of this kind happens in but few cases. But the defect of original sin comes from the defect of a principle added over and above the principles of the species, as we said.
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| Sciendum est etiam quod in actu generativae virtutis non potest esse vitium de genere actualis peccati, quod ex voluntate singularis personae dependet, eo quod actus generativae virtutis non obedit rationi vel voluntati, ut octava ratio procedebat. Sed vitium originalis culpae, quae ad naturam pertinet, nihil prohibet in actu generativae potentiae inveniri: cum et actus generativae potentiae naturales dicantur.
| [13] Be it observed, also, that in the act of the generative powers there can be no vice in the genus of actual sin which depends on the will of a single person, because the act of the generative power is not obedient to reason or to will, as the eighth objection went. But nothing prevents our finding the vice of original sin—this refers to nature—in an act of the generative power, since acts of the generative powers are called natural.
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| Quod vero nono obiicitur, de facili solvi potest secundum praemissa. Per peccatum enim non tollitur bonum naturae quod ad speciem naturae pertinet: sed bonum naturae quod per gratiam superadditum fuit, potuit per peccatum primi parentis auferri, ut supra dictum est.
| [14] The ninth objection, of course, can readily be answered from the points already made. For sin does not take away that good of nature which belongs to the nature’s species. But that good of nature which grace added over and above nature could be removed by the sin of our first parent. This was said before.
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| Patet etiam ex eisdem de facili solutio ad decimam rationem. Quia cum privatio et defectus sibi invicem correspondeant, ea ratione in peccato originali filii parentibus similantur, qua etiam donum, a principio naturae praestitum, fuisset a parentibus in posteros propagatum: quia licet ad rationem speciei non pertineret, tamen ex divina gratia datum fuit primo homini ut ab eo in totam speciem derivandum.
| [15] From the same points one easily answers the tenth objection. For, since privation and defect correspond to one another mutually, in that characteristic in original sin are the children made like to the parents in which the gift also, granted the nature in the beginning, would have been propagated to their descendants; for, although the gift did not belong to the essentials of the species, it was given by divine grace to the first man to flow from him into the entire species.
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| Considerandum est etiam quod, licet aliquis per gratiae sacramenta sic ab originali peccato mundetur ut ei non imputetur ad culpam, quod est personaliter ipsum a peccato originali liberari, non tamen natura totaliter sanatur: et ideo secundum actum naturae peccatum originale transmittitur in posteros. Sic igitur in homine generante inquantum est persona quaedam, non est originale peccatum; et contingit etiam in actu generationis nullum esse actuale peccatum, ut undecima ratio proponebat; sed inquantum homo generans est naturale generationis principium, infectio originalis peccati, quod naturam respicit, in eo manet et in actu generationis ipsius.
| [16] This, too, must be considered: Let one by the sacraments of grace be cleansed from original sin so that it is not imputed a fault in him (and for him personally this is to be freed from original sin); for all that, the nature is not entirely healed; therefore, in an act of the nature the original sin is transmitted to his descendants. Thus, then, in a man who generates there is no original sin in so far as he is a given person; and it also happens that in the act of generation there is no actual sin, which the eleventh argument was proposing. But so far as the man who generates is the natural principle of generation, the infection of the original sin which bears on nature remains in him and in his act of generation.
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| Sciendum etiam est quod peccatum actuale primi hominis in naturam transivit: quia natura in eo erat beneficio naturae praestito adhuc perfecta. Sed per peccatum ipsius natura hoc beneficio destituta, actus eius simpliciter personalis fuit. Unde non potuit satisfacere pro tota natura, neque bonum naturae reintegrare per suum actum: sed solum satisfacere aliquatenus potuit pro eo quod ad ipsius personam spectabat. Ex quo patet solutio ad duodecimam rationem.
| [17] Be it observed, also, that the actual sin of the first man passed over into nature because the nature in him had been further perfected by the benefit bestowed on the nature. But, when by his sin the nature was stripped of the benefit, his act was simply personal. Hence, he could not satisfy for the entire nature, nor could he make the good of nature whole once more by his act. But the only satisfaction of which he was somewhat capable was that which had a bearing on his own person. Therein the answer to the twelfth argument appears.
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| Similiter autem et ad tertiamdecimam: quia peccata posteriorum parentum inveniunt naturam destitutam beneficio primitus ipsi naturae concesso. Unde ex eis non sequitur aliquis defectus qui propagetur in posteros, sed solum qui personam peccantis inficiat.
| [18] In like manner, of course, one answers the thirteenth, for the sins of later parents find a nature stripped of the benefit which was at the outset granted to the nature itself. Hence, from those sins no defect follows which is propagated to the descendants, but only a defect which infects the person of the one sinning.
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| Sic igitur non est inconveniens, neque contra rationem, peccatum originale in hominibus esse: ut Pelagianorum haeresis confundatur, quae peccatum originale negavit.
| [19] Thus, then, it is neither unsuitable nor irrational to affirm the presence of original sin in men, and thus the heresy of the Pelagians, which was a denial of original sin, is confounded.
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Caput 53
Rationes quibus videtur probari quod non fuit conveniens Deum incarnari
| Chapter 53
ARGUMENTS WHICH SEEM TO PROVE THAT GOD’S INCARNATION WAS NOT SUITABLE
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| Quia vero incarnationis fides ab infidelibus stultitia reputatur, secundum illud apostoli, I Cor. 1-21, placuit Deo per stultitiam praedicationis salvos facere credentes; stultum autem videtur aliquid praedicare, non solum quia est impossibile, sed etiam quia est indecens: insistunt infideles ad incarnationis impugnationem, non solum nitentes ostendere esse impossibile quod fides Catholica praedicat, sed etiam incongruum esse, et divinam bonitatem non decere.
| [1] Faith in the Incarnation, of course, is counted foolishness by unbelievers, as the Apostle has it: “It pleased God by the foolishness of our preaching to save them that believe” (1 Cor. 1:21); and it seems foolish to preach a thing which is not just impossible, but also unbecoming; therefore, the unbelievers press on their fight against the Incarnation, and they try not only to show that what the Catholic faith preaches is impossible, but also that it is inharmonious, and that it ill befits the divine goodness.
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| Est enim divinae bonitati conveniens ut omnia suum ordinem teneant. Est autem hic ordo rerum, ut Deus sit super omnia exaltatus, homo autem inter infimas creaturas contineatur. Non igitur decet divinam maiestatem humanae naturae uniri.
| [2] For it does befit the divine goodness that all things stand fast in order. Now, the order of things is this: that God be exalted above all things, but man hemmed in among the lowest creatures. Therefore, it ill befits the divine majesty to be united to human nature.
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| Item. Si conveniens fuit Deum hominem fieri, oportuit hoc esse propter aliquam utilitatem inde provenientem. Sed quaecumque utilitas detur, cum Deus omnipotens sit, hanc utilitatem producere potuit sola sua voluntate. Cum igitur unumquodque fieri conveniat quam brevissime potest, non oportuit quod Deus propter huiusmodi utilitatem humanam naturam sibi uniret.
| [3] Once more; if it was suitable for God to become man, this had to be for some usefulness coming therefrom. But whatever be the usefulness granted, since God is omnipotent He could produce this usefulness merely by His will. Therefore, since it becomes everything whatever to be done as quickly as possible, it was unnecessary for a utility of this sort that God unite human nature to Himself.
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| Adhuc. Cum Deus sit universalis omnium causa, ad utilitatem totius universitatis rerum eum praecipue intendere oportet. Sed assumptio humanae naturae solum ad utilitatem hominis pertinet. Non igitur fuit conveniens quod, si alienam naturam Deus assumere debuit, quod solum naturam humanam assumpserit.
| [4] Since God is, moreover, the universal cause of all things. He should especially attend the usefulness of things in their universal entirety. But the assumption of human nature looks only to the usefulness of man. It was, therefore, not seemly for God, if He was to take on a foreign nature, to assume only human nature.
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| Amplius. Quanto aliquid est alicui magis simile, tanto ei convenientius unitur. Deo autem similior et propinquior est angelica natura quam humana. Non igitur conveniens fuit assumere naturam humanam, angelica praetermissa.
| [5] Moreover, the more one thing is like another, the more suitably it is united to the other. But the angelic nature is more like God and closer to Him than human nature. Therefore, it was not suitable to assume human nature and pass over the angelic.
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| Praeterea. Id quod est praecipuum in homine est intelligentia veritatis. In quo videtur homini impedimentum praestari si Deus humanam naturam assumpsit: datur enim ei ex hoc erroris occasio, ut consentiat his qui posuerunt Deum non esse super omnia corpora exaltatum. Non igitur hoc ad humanae naturae utilitatem conveniebat, quod Deus humanam naturam assumeret.
| [6] There is more. The chief thing in man is his understanding of the truth. And in this man seems to be impeded if God assumed human nature, for man is thus given an occasion of error, its result is agreement with those who held that God is not exalted above all bodies. Therefore, it contributed nothing useful to human nature for God to assume human nature.
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| Item. Experimento discere possumus quod circa incarnationem Dei plurimi errores sunt exorti. Videtur igitur humanae saluti conveniens non fuisse quod Deus incarnaretur.
| [7] Again, we can learn from experience that many an error concerning the Incarnation of God has arisen. It seems, then, that it was not becoming human salvation that God should be incarnate.
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| Adhuc. Inter omnia quae Deus fecit, istud videtur esse maximum, quod ipsemet carnem assumpserit. Ex maximo autem opere maxima debet expectari utilitas. Si igitur incarnatio Dei ad salutem hominum ordinatur, videtur fuisse conveniens quod ipse totum humanum genus salvasset: cum etiam omnium hominum salus vix videatur esse competens utilitas pro qua tantum opus fieri debuisset.
| [8] Furthermore, among all the things that God has done, that appears the greatest: His own assumption of flesh. But from the greatest work one should look for the greatest usefulness. If, then, the Incarnation of God is ordered to the salvation of men, it appears that it was becoming that He should have saved the entire human race, since even all men’s salvation scarcely seems to be useful enough that so great a work should have been done for it.
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| Amplius. Si propter salutem hominum Deus humanam naturam assumpsit, videtur fuisse conveniens ut eius divinitas hominibus per sufficientia indicia manifestaretur. Hoc autem non videtur contigisse: nam per aliquos alios homines, solo auxilio divinae virtutis absque unione Dei ad eorum naturam, inveniuntur similia miracula esse facta, vel etiam maiora quam fecerit Christus. Non igitur videtur Dei incarnatio sufficienter procurata fuisse ad humanam salutem.
| [9] What is more, if God assumed human nature for the salvation of men, apparently it was suitable that there be enough indications for men of His divinity. But it seems this did not happen, for some other men simply assisted by the divine power and without God’s union to their nature are discovered doing miracles like or even greater than those which Christ did (cf. John 24:12). It seems, then, that Gods, Incarnation did not take place with enough care for human salvation.
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| Praeterea. Si hoc necessarium fuit humanae saluti quod Deus carnem assumeret, cum a principio mundi homines fuerint, videtur quod a principio mundi humanam naturam assumere debuit, et non quasi in fine temporum: videtur enim omnium praecedentium hominum salus praetermissa fuisse.
| [10] There is more. If it was necessary for human salvation that God take on flesh, since there were men from the beginning of the world, it appears that from the beginning of the world He ought to have assumed human nature, and not, so to say, in the last days, for it seems that the salvation of all the preceding men was passed over.
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| Item. Pari ratione, usque ad finem mundi debuisset cum hominibus conversari, ut homines sua praesentia erudiret et gubernaret.
| [11] For the same reason, also, He should have dwelt among men to the very end of the world, in order to instruct men by His presence and govern them.
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| Adhuc. Hoc maxime hominibus utile est, ut futurae beatitudinis in eis spes fundetur. Hanc autem spem magis ex Deo incarnato concepisset, si carnem immortalem et impassibilem et gloriosam assumpsisset, et omnibus ostendisset. Non igitur videtur fuisse conveniens quod carnem mortalem et infirmam assumpserit.
| [12] Then, too, this is, above all, useful to men: to solidify in them the hope of future beatitude. But this hope would have been better conceived from an incarnate God if He had assumed an immortal, impassible, and glorious flesh and had displayed this to all men. Therefore, it seems not suitable to have assumed a mortal and frail flesh.
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| Amplius. Videtur fuisse conveniens, ad ostendendum quod omnia quae in mundo sunt, sint a Deo, quod ipse abundantia rerum mundanarum usus fuisset, in divitiis et in maximis honoribus vivens. Cuius contraria de ipso leguntur: quod pauperem et abiectam vitam duxit, et probrosam mortem sustinuit. Non igitur videtur esse conveniens quod fides de Deo incarnato praedicat.
| [13] Apparently it was suitable, furthermore, to show that whatever is in the world is from God, He should have put to use the abundance of earthly things, living in riches and the greatest honors. It is the contrary we read of Him: that He. led a poor and abject life, that He suffered a shameful death. Therefore, what the faith preaches about the incarnate God is not suitable.
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| Praeterea. Ex hoc quod ipse abiecta passus est, eius divinitas maxime fuit occultata: cum tamen hoc maxime necessarium fuerit hominibus ut eius divinitatem cognoscerent, si ipse fuit Deus incarnatus. Non igitur videtur quod fides praedicat humanae saluti convenire.
| [14] The fact, moreover, that He suffered abjectly did most to obscure His divinity. Nonetheless, the most necessary thing for men all the while was this: that they know His divinity—if He was God incarnate. It seems, then, that what the faith preaches, is not in harmony with human salvation.
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| Si quis autem dicat quod propter obedientiam patris filius Dei mortem sustinuit, hoc non videtur rationabile. Obedientia enim impletur per hoc quod obediens se conformat voluntati praecipientis. Voluntas autem Dei patris irrationabilis esse non potest. Si igitur non fuit conveniens Deum hominem factum mortem pati, quia mors contraria esse videtur divinitati, quae vita est, huius rei ratio ex obedientia ad patrem convenienter assignari non potest.
| [15] Let a man say that the Son of God underwent death by reason of His obedience to the Father—this also appears unreasonable. For obedience consists in one’s conforming himself to the will of him who commands. But the will of God the Father cannot be unreasonable. If, then, it was unbecoming for God made man to suffer death because death seems contrary to divinity which is life, the reason for this thing cannot suitably be found in obedience to the Father.
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| Praeterea. Voluntas Dei non est ad mortem hominum, etiam peccatorum, sed magis ad vitam: secundum illud Ezech. 18: nolo mortem peccatoris, sed magis ut convertatur et vivat. Multo igitur minus potuit esse voluntas Dei patris ut homo perfectissimus morti subiiceretur.
| [16] God’s will, moreover, is not for the death of men, even sinners, but for life, as Ezekiel (18:23, 32) says: “I will not the death Of the sinner, but rather that he be converted and live.” By so much the less, then, could it have been the will of God that the most perfect man be subject to death.
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| Amplius. Impium et crudele videtur innocentem praecepto ad mortem inducere: et praecipue pro impiis, qui morte sunt digni. Homo autem Christus Iesus innocens fuit. Impium igitur fuisset si praecepto Dei patris mortem subiisset.
| [17] It seems, furthermore, impious and cruel to command an innocent to be led to death, especially on behalf of the impious who are worthy of death. But the man Christ Jesus was innocent. Therefore, it would have been impious if at the command of God the Father He had undergone death.
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| Si vero aliquis dicat hoc necessarium fuisse propter humilitatem demonstrandam, sicut apostolus videtur dicere, Philipp. 2, quod Christus humiliavit semetipsum factus obediens usque ad mortem: nec haec quidem ratio conveniens videtur. Primum quidem, quia in eo commendanda est humilitas qui habet superiorem, cui subiici possit: quod de Deo dici non potest. Non igitur conveniens fuit Dei verbum humiliari usque ad mortem.
| [18] But let a man say that this was necessary as a demonstration of humility, as the Apostle appears to say, that Christ “humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death” (Phil. 2:8)—this reason is not suitable either, because, in the first place, one must commend humility in him who has a superior to whom he can be subject. This cannot be said of God. Therefore, it was not suitable for God’s Word to be humbled unto death.
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| Item. Satis homines ad humilitatem informari poterant verbis divinis, quibus est fides omnimoda adhibenda, et exemplis humanis. Non igitur ad demonstrandum humilitatis exemplum necessarium fuit verbum Dei aut carnem sumere, aut mortem subire.
| [19] Again, men were able to be informed sufficiently about humility by the divine words—to which faith must wholly cling—and by human examples. Therefore, to set an example of humility it was not necessary for the Word of God either to assume flesh or to undergo death.
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| Si quis autem iterum dicat quod propter nostrorum peccatorum purgationem necessarium fuit Christum mortem subire et alia quae videntur esse abiecta, sicut apostolus dicit quod traditus est propter peccata nostra, et iterum, mortuus est ad multorum exhaurienda peccata: nec hoc videtur esse conveniens. Primo quidem, quia per solam Dei gratiam hominum peccata purgantur.
| [20] But, again, let one say that it was necessary for the cleansing of our sins that Christ undergo death and the other seemingly abject things; as the Apostle says: “He was delivered up for our sins” (Rom. 4:25); and again: “He was offered once to exhaust the sins of many” (Heb. 9:28). This, too, seems awkward, because, in the first place, only by God’s grace are men cleansed of sins.
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| Deinde quia, si aliqua satisfactio requirebatur, conveniens fuit ut ille satisfaceret qui peccavit: quia in iusto Dei iudicio unusquisque onus suum debet portare.
| [21] In the next place, because, if satisfaction was required, it was suitable that he should give satisfaction who had sinned. For in the just judgment of God “every one shall bear his own burden” (Gal. 6:5).
|
| Item. Si conveniens fuit ut aliquis homine puro maior pro homine satisfaceret, sufficiens fuisse videtur si Angelus, carne assumpta, huiusmodi satisfactionem implesset: cum Angelus naturaliter sit superior homine.
| [22] Again, if it was becoming for someone greater than, pure man to satisfy for man, it seems it would have been sufficient for an angel to take flesh and fulfill this sort of satisfaction, since an angel is by nature superior to a man.
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| Praeterea. Peccatum non expiatur peccato, sed magis augetur. Si igitur per mortem Christus satisfacere debuit, talis debuit eius mors esse in qua nullus peccaret: ut scilicet non violenta morte, sed naturaliter moreretur.
| [23] What is more, sin is not expiated by sin, but increased. Then, if Christ had to satisfy by death, His death should have been such that no man sinned therein; that is to say, He should have died not a violent, but a natural, death.
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| Adhuc. Si pro peccatis hominum Christum mori oportuit, cum frequenter homines peccent, oportuisset eum frequenter mortem subire.
| [24] If Christ, moreover, had to die for the sins of men, since men sin frequently He should have had to undergo death frequently.
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| Si quis autem dicat quod specialiter propter peccatum originale necessarium fuit Christum nasci et pati, quod quidem totam naturam humanam infecerat, homine primo peccante:- hoc impossibile videtur. Si enim alii homines ad satisfaciendum pro peccato originali sufficientes non sunt, nec mors Christi pro peccatis humani generis satisfactoria fuisse videtur: quia et ipse secundum humanam naturam mortuus est, non secundum divinam.
| 125] Now, let one say that it was especially because of original sin that Christ had to be born and to suffer, and that sin had infected the whole human race when the first man sinned. But this seems impossible. For, if other men are not equal to satisfying for original sin, neither does the death of Christ seem to have been satisfactory for the sins of the human race, since He Himself died in His human, not in His divine nature.
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| Praeterea. Si Christus pro peccatis humani generis sufficienter satisfecit, iniustum videtur esse quod homines adhuc poenas patiantur, quas pro peccato Scriptura divina inductas esse commemorat.
| [26] Furthermore, if Christ made satisfaction enough for the sins of the human race, it seems unjust that men still suffer the penalties which were brought in, Scripture says, by sin.
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| Adhuc. Si Christus sufficienter pro peccatis humani generis satisfecit, non essent ultra remedia pro absolutione peccatorum quaerenda. Quaeruntur autem semper ab omnibus qui suae salutis curam habent. Non igitur videtur sufficienter Christum peccata hominum abstulisse.
| [27] There is more. If Christ made satisfaction enough for the sins of the human race, no further remedies for the absolution of sins need be sought. But they are constantly sought by all who have care for their salvation. Therefore, it seems that Christ did not sufficiently take away the sins of men.
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| Haec igitur sunt, et similia, ex quibus alicui videri potest ea quae de incarnatione fides Catholica praedicat, divinae maiestati et sapientiae convenientia non fuisse.
| [28] These and similar points, then, can make it appear to a man that what the Catholic faith preaches about the Incarnation has not been harmonious with the divine majesty and wisdom.
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Caput 54
Quod conveniens fuit Deum incarnari
| Chapter 54
THAT IT WAS SUITABLE FOR GOD TO BE MADE FLESH
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| Si quis autem diligenter et pie incarnationis mysteria consideret, inveniet tantam sapientiae profunditatem quod humanam cognitionem excedat: secundum illud apostoli: quod stultum est Dei, sapientius est hominibus. Unde fit ut pie consideranti semper magis ac magis admirabiles rationes huius mysterii manifestantur.
| [1] However, if one earnestly and devoutly weighs the mysteries of the Incarnation, he will find so great a depth of wisdom that it exceeds human knowledge. In the Apostle’s words: “The foolishness of God is wiser then men” (1 Cor. 1:25). Hence it happens that to him who devoutly considers it, more and more wondrous aspects of this mystery are made manifest.
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| Primum igitur hoc considerandum est, quod incarnatio Dei efficacissimum fuit auxilium homini ad beatitudinem tendenti. Ostensum est enim in tertio quod perfecta beatitudo hominis in immediata Dei visione consistit. Posset autem alicui videri quod homo ad hunc statum nunquam possit pertingere quod intellectus humanus immediate ipsi divinae essentiae uniretur ut intellectus intelligibili, propter immensam distantiam naturarum: et sic circa inquisitionem beatitudinis homo tepesceret, ipsa desperatione detentus. Per hoc autem quod Deus humanam naturam sibi unire voluit in persona, evidentissime hominibus demonstratur quod homo per intellectum Deo potest uniri, ipsum immediate videndo. Fuit igitur convenientissimum quod Deus humanam naturam assumeret ad spem hominis in beatitudinem sublevandam. Unde post incarnationem Christi homines coeperunt magis ad caelestem beatitudinem aspirare: secundum quod ipse dicit, Ioan. 10-10: ego veni ut vitam habeant, et abundantius habeant.
| [2] First, then, let this be taken into consideration: The Incarnation of God was the most efficacious assistance to man in his striving for beatitude. For we have shown in Book III, that the perfect beatitude of man consists in the immediate vision of God. It might, of course, appear to some that man would never have the ability to achieve this state: that the human intellect be united immediately to the divine essence itself as an intellect is to its intelligible; for there is an unmeasured distance between the natures, and thus, in the search for beatitude, a man would grow cold, held back by very desperation. But the fact that God was willing to unite human nature to Himself personally points out to men with greatest clarity that man can be united to God by intellect, and see Him immediately. It was, then, most suitable for God to assume human nature to stir up man’s hope for beatitude. Hence, after the Incarnation of Christ, men began the more to aspire after heavenly beatitude; as He Himself says: “I have come that they may have life and may have it more abundantly” (John 10:10).
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| Simul etiam per hoc homini auferuntur impedimenta beatitudinem adipiscendi. Cum enim perfecta hominis beatitudo in sola Dei fruitione consistat, ut supra ostensum est, necessarium est quod quicumque his quae infra Deum sunt inhaeret finaliter, a verae beatitudinis participatione impediatur. Ad hoc autem homo deduci poterat quod rebus infra Deum existentibus inhaereret ut fini, ignorando suae dignitatem naturae. Ex hoc enim contingit quod quidam, considerantes se secundum naturam corpoream et sensitivam, quam cum aliis animalibus habent communem, in rebus corporalibus et delectationibus carnis quandam beatitudinem bestialem requirunt. Quidam vero, considerantes quarundam creaturarum excellentiam super homines quantum ad aliqua, eorum cultui se adstrinxerunt: colentes mundum et partes eius, propter magnitudinem quantitatis et temporis diuturnitatem; vel spirituales substantias, Angelos et Daemones, propter hoc quod hominem excedere inveniuntur tam in immortalitate quam in acumine intellectus, aestimantes in his, utpote supra se existentibus, hominis beatitudinem esse quaerendam. Quamvis autem quantum ad aliquas conditiones homo aliquibus creaturis existat inferior: ac etiam infimis creaturis in quibusdam assimiletur: tamen secundum ordinem finis, nihil homine existit altius nisi solus Deus, in quo solo perfecta hominis beatitudo consistit. Hanc igitur hominis dignitatem, quod scilicet immediata Dei visione beatificandus sit, convenientissime Deus ostendit per hoc quod ipse immediate naturam humanam assumpsit. Unde ex incarnatione Dei hoc consecutum videmus, quod magna pars hominum, cultu Angelorum, Daemonum, et quarumcumque creaturarum praetermisso, spretis etiam voluptatibus carnis et corporalibus omnibus, ad solum Deum colendum se dedicaverunt, in quo solo beatitudinis complementum expectant; secundum quod apostolus monet: quae sursum sunt quaerite, ubi Christus est in dextera Dei sedens; quae sursum sunt sapite, non quae super terram.
| [3] At the same time, too, some obstacles to acquiring beatitude are removed from man. For, since the perfect beatitude of man consists in the enjoyment of God alone, as shown above, necessarily every man is kept from participation in the true beatitude who cleaves as to an end to these things which are less than God. But man was able to be misled into this clinging as to an end to things less than God in existence by his ignorance of the worthiness of his nature. Thus it happens with some. They look on themselves in their bodily and sentient nature—which they have in common with other animals—and in bodily things and fleshly pleasures they seek out a kind of animal beatitude. But there have been others who considered the excellence of certain creatures superior to man in some respects. And to the cult of these they bound themselves. They worshiped the universe and its parts because of the greatness of its size and its long temporal duration; or spiritual substances, angels and demons, because they found these greater than man both in immortality and in sharpness of understanding. They judged that in these, as existing above themselves, the beatitude of man should be sought. Now, although it is true, some conditions considered, that man stands inferior to some creatures, and even that in certain matters he is rendered like to the lowest creatures, nothing stands higher in the order of end than man except God alone, in whom alone man’s perfect beatitude is to be found. Therefore, this dignity of man—namely, that in the immediate vision of God his beatitude is to be found—was most suitably manifested by God by His own immediate assumption of human nature. And we look upon this consequence of God’s Incarnation: a large part of mankind passing by the cult of angels, of demons, and all creatures whatsoever, spurning, indeed, the pleasures of the flesh and all things bodily, have dedicated themselves to the worship of God alone, and in Him only they look for the fulfillment of this beatitude; and so the Apostle exhorts: “Seek the things that are above where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God. Mind the things that are above, not the things that are upon the earth” (Col. 5:1-2).
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| Adhuc. Quia beatitudo perfecta hominis in tali cognitione Dei consistit quae facultatem omnis intellectus creati excedit, ut in tertio ostensum est, necessarium fuit quandam huiusmodi cognitionis praelibationem in homine esse, qua dirigeretur in illam plenitudinem cognitionis beatae: quod quidem fit per fidem, ut in tertio ostensum est. Cognitionem autem qua homo in ultimum finem dirigitur, oportet esse certissimam, eo quod est principium omnium quae ordinantur in ultimum finem: sicut et principia naturaliter nota certissima sunt. Certissima autem cognitio alicuius esse non potest nisi vel illud sit per se notum, sicut nobis prima demonstrationis principia; vel in ea quae per se nota sunt resolvatur, qualiter nobis certissima est demonstrationis conclusio. Id autem quod de Deo nobis per fidem tenendum proponitur, non potest esse homini per se notum: cum facultatem humani intellectus excedat. Oportuit igitur hoc homini manifestari per eum cui sit per se notum. Et quamvis omnibus divinam essentiam videntibus sit quodammodo per se notum, tamen ad certissimam cognitionem habendam oportuit reductionem fieri in primum huius cognitionis principium, scilicet in Deum, cui est naturaliter per se notum, et a quo omnibus innotescit: sicut et certitudo scientiae non habetur nisi per resolutionem in prima principia indemonstrabilia. Oportuit igitur hominem, ad perfectam certitudinem consequendam de fidei veritate, ab ipso Deo instrui homine facto, ut homo, secundum modum humanum, divinam instructionem perciperet. Et hoc est quod dicitur Ioan. 1-18: Deum nemo vidit unquam: unigenitus, qui est in sinu patris, ipse enarravit. Et ipse dominus dicit, Ioan. 18-37: ego ad hoc natus sum et veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati. Propter quod videmus post Christi incarnationem evidentius et certius homines in divina cognitione esse instructos: secundum illud Isaiae 11-9: repleta est terra scientia domini.
| [4] Since man’s perfect beatitude, furthermore, consists in the sort of knowledge of God which exceeds the capacity of every created intellect (as was shown in Book III), there had to be a certain foretaste of this sort of knowledge in man which might direct him to that fullness of blessed knowledge; and this is done through faith, as we showed in Book III. But the knowledge by which man is directed to his ultimate end has to be most certain knowledge, because it is the principle of everything ordered to the ultimate end; so, also, the principles naturally known are most certain. But there cannot be a most certain knowledge of something unless the thing be known of itself, as the first principles of demonstration are known to us; or the thing be resolved into what is known of itself, in the way in which the conclusion of a demonstration is most certain for us. Of course, what is set forth for us to hold about God by faith cannot be known of itself to man, since it exceeds the capacity of the human intellect. Therefore, this had to be made known to man by Him to whom it is. known of itself. And, although to all who see the divine essence this truth is somehow known of itself, nevertheless, in order to have a most certain knowledge there had to be a reduction to the first principle of this knowledge—namely, to God. To Him this truth is naturally known of itself, and from Him it becomes known to all. And just so the certitude of a science is had only by resolution into the first indemonstrable principles. Therefore, man, to achieve perfect certitude about the truth of faith, had to be instructed by God Himself made man, that man might in the human fashion grasp the divine instruction. And this is what John (1: 18) says: “No man has seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared Him: And our Lord Himself says: “For this was I born and for this came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth” (John 18:37). And for this reason we see that after Christ’s Incarnation men were the more evidently and the more surely instructed in the divine knowledge; as Isaiah (11:9) has it: “The earth is filled with the knowledge of the Lord.”
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| Item. Cum beatitudo hominis perfecta in divina fruitione consistat, oportuit affectum hominis ad desiderium divinae fruitionis disponi: sicut videmus homini beatitudinis desiderium naturaliter inesse. Desiderium autem fruitionis alicuius rei ex amore illius rei causatur. Necessarium igitur fuit hominem, ad perfectam beatitudinem tendentem, ad amorem divinum induci. Nihil autem sic ad amorem alicuius nos inducit sicut experimentum illius ad nos. Amor autem Dei ad homines nullo modo efficacius homini potuit demonstrari quam per hoc quod homini uniri voluit in persona: est enim proprium amoris unire amantem cum amato, inquantum possibile est. Necessarium igitur fuit homini, ad beatitudinem perfectam tendenti, quod Deus fieret homo.
| [5] Again, since man’s perfect beatitude consists in the enjoyment of divinity, man’s love had to be disposed toward a desire for the enjoyment of divinity, as we see that there is naturally in man a desire of beatitude. But the desire to enjoy anything is caused by love of that thing. Therefore, man, tending to perfect beatitude, needed inducement to the divine love. Nothing, of course, so induces us to love one as the experience of his love for us. But God’s love for men could be demonstrated to man in no way more effective than this: He willed to be united to man in person, for it is proper to love to unite the lover with the beloved so far as possible. Therefore, it was necessary for man tending to perfect beatitude that God become man.
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| Amplius. Cum amicitia in quadam aequalitate consistat, ea quae multum inaequalia sunt, in amicitia copulari non posse videntur. Ad hoc igitur quod familiarior amicitia esset inter hominem et Deum, expediens fuit homini quod Deus fieret homo, quia etiam naturaliter homo homini amicus est: ut sic, dum visibiliter Deum cognoscimus, in invisibilium amorem rapiamur.
| [6] Furthermore, since friendship consists in a certain equality, things greatly unequal seem unable to be coupled in friendship. Therefore, to get greater familiarity in friendship between man and God it was helpful for man that God became man, since even by nature man is man’s friend;” and so in this way, “while we know God visibly, we may [through Him] be home to love of things invisible.”
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| Similiter etiam manifestum est quod beatitudo virtutis est praemium. Oportet igitur ad beatitudinem tendentes secundum virtutem disponi. Ad virtutem autem et verbis et exemplis provocamur. Exempla autem alicuius et verba tanto efficacius ad virtutem inducunt, quanto de eo firmior bonitatis habetur opinio. De nullo autem homine puro infallibilis opinio bonitatis haberi poterat: quia etiam sanctissimi viri in aliquibus inveniuntur defecisse. Unde necessarium fuit homini, ad hoc quod in virtute firmaretur, quod a Deo humanato doctrinam et exempla virtutis acciperet. Propter quod ipse dominus dicit, Ioan. 13-15: exemplum dedi vobis, ut quemadmodum ego feci, ita et vos faciatis.
| [7] In like fashion, too, it is clear that beatitude is the reward of virtue. Therefore, they who tend to beatitude must be virtuously disposed. But we are stimulated to virtue both by words and by examples. Of course, his examples and words of whose goodness we have the more solid opinion induce us the more effectively to virtue. But an infallible opinion of goodness about any pure man was never tenable— even the holiest of men, one finds, have failed in some things. Hence, it was necessary for man to be solidly grounded in virtue to receive from God made human both the teaching and the examples of virtue. For this reason our Lord Himself says: “I have given you an example that as I have done to you do also” (John 13:15).
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| Item. Sicut virtutibus homo ad beatitudinem disponitur, ita et peccatis impeditur. Peccatum autem virtuti contrarium, impedimentum affert beatitudini, non solum inordinationem quandam animae inducens secundum quod eam ab ordine debiti finis abducit, sed etiam Deum offendens, a quo beatitudinis praemium expectatur, secundum quod Deus humanorum actuum curam habet, et peccatum contrarium est caritati divinae, ut in tertio plenius ostensum est. Et insuper huius offensae homo conscientiam habens, per peccatum fiduciam accedendi ad Deum amittit, quae necessaria est ad beatitudinem consequendam. Necessarium est igitur humano generi, quod peccatis abundat, ut ei remedium aliquod adhibeatur contra peccata. Hoc autem remedium adhiberi non potest nisi per Deum, qui et voluntatem hominis movere potest in bonum, ut eam ad debitum ordinem reducat, et offensam in se commissam potest remittere; offensa enim non remittitur nisi per eum in quem offensa committitur. Ad hoc autem quod homo a conscientia offensae praeteritae liberetur, oportet quod sibi de remissione offensae per Deum constet. Non autem per certitudinem ei constare potest nisi a Deo de hoc certificetur. Conveniens igitur fuit, et humano generi ad beatitudinem consequendam expediens, quod Deus fieret homo, ut sic et remissionem peccatorum consequeretur per Deum, et huius remissionis certitudinem per hominem Deum. Unde et ipse dominus dicit, Matth. 9-6: ut autem sciatis quia filius hominis habet potestatem dimittendi peccata etc.; et apostolus, Hebr. 9-14, dicit quod sanguis Christi emundabit conscientias nostras ab operibus mortuis, ad serviendum Deo viventi.
| [8] By virtues, again, man is disposed to beatitude, and so by sin he is blocked therefrom. Sin, of course, the contrary of virtue, constitutes an obstacle to beatitude; it not only induces a kind of disorder in the soul by seducing it from its due end, but it also offends God to whom we look for the reward of beatitude, in that God has the custody of human acts. And sin is the contrary of divine charity, as we showed more fully in Book III. What is more, man, being aware of this offense, loses by sin that confidence in approaching God which is necessary to achieve beatitude. Therefore, the human race, which abounds in sins, needed to have some remedy against sin applied to it. But this remedy can be applied only by Cod, who can move the will of man to good and bring it back to the order due; who can, as well, remit the offense committed against Him—for an offense is not remitted except by him against whom the offense is committed. But, if man is to be freed from awareness of past offense, he must know clearly that God has remitted his offense. But man cannot be clear on this with certainty unless God gives him certainty of it. Therefore, it was suitable and helpful to the human race for achieving beatitude that God should become man; as a result, man not only receives the remission of sins through God, but also the certitude of this remission through the man-God. Hence, our Lord Himself says: “But that you may know that the Son of Man has power to forgive sins” (Mat. 9:6), and the rest; and the Apostle says that “the blood of Christ will cleanse our conscience from dead works to serve the living God” (Heb. 9:14).
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| Adhuc. Ex traditione Ecclesiae docemur totum humanum genus peccato esse infectum. Habet autem hoc ordo divinae iustitiae, ut ex superioribus patet, quod peccatum sine satisfactione non remittatur a Deo. Satisfacere autem pro peccato totius humani generis nullus homo purus poterat: quia quilibet homo purus aliquid minus est tota generis humani universitate. Oportuit igitur, ad hoc quod humanum genus a peccato communi liberaretur, quod aliquis satisfaceret qui et homo esset, cui satisfactio competeret; et aliquid supra hominem, ut eius meritum sufficiens esset ad satisfaciendum pro peccato totius humani generis. Maius autem homine, quantum ad ordinem beatitudinis, nihil est nisi solus Deus: nam Angeli, licet sint superiores quantum ad conditionem naturae, non tamen quantum ad ordinem finis, quia eodem beatificantur. Necessarium igitur fuit homini ad beatitudinem consequendam, quod Deus homo fieret ad peccatum humani generis tollendum. Et hoc est quod Ioannes Baptista dixit de Christo: ecce agnus Dei: ecce qui tollit peccata mundi. Et apostolus, ad Romanos dicit: sicut peccatum ex uno in omnes in condemnationem, ita gratia ex uno in omnes ad iustificationem.
| [9] The tradition of the Church, moreover, teaches us that the whole human race was infected by sin. But the order of divine justice—as is clear from the foregoing—requires that God should not remit sin without satisfaction. But to satisfy for the sin of the whole human race was beyond the power of any pure man, because any pure man is something less than the whole human race in its entirety. Therefore, in order to free the human race from its common sin, someone had to satisfy who was both man and so proportioned to the satisfaction, and something above man that the merit might be enough to satisfy for the sin of the whole human race. But there is no greater than man in the order of beatitude, except God, for angels, although superior to man in the condition of nature, are not superior in the order of end, because the same end beatifies them. Therefore, it was necessary for man’s achievement of beatitude that God should become man to take away the sin of the human race. And this is what John the Baptist said of Christ: “Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who takes away the sin of the world” (John 1:79). And the Apostle says: “As by the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification” (Rom. 5:16).
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| Haec igitur sunt, et similia, ex quibus aliquis concipere potest non fuisse incongruum bonitati divinae Deum hominem fieri, sed expedientissimum fuisse humanae saluti.
| [10] These points, then, and similar ones make us able too conceive that it was not out of harmony with the divine goodness for God to become man, but extremely helpful for human salvation.
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Caput 55
Solutio rationum supra positarum contra convenientiam incarnationis
| Chapter 55
ANSWER TO THE ARGUMENTS PREVIOUSLY SET DOWN AGAINST THE SUITABILITY OF THE INCARNATION
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| Ea vero quae contra hoc superius sunt opposita, non difficile est solvere.
| [1] Now, then, the points opposed to this doctrine above are disposed of easily.
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| Non enim est contrarium ordini rerum Deum hominem fieri, ut prima ratio procedebat. Quia quamvis natura divina in infinitum naturam humanam excedat, tamen homo secundum ordinem suae naturae habet ipsum Deum pro fine, et natus est ei per intellectum uniri; cuius unionis exemplum et documentum quoddam fuit unio Dei ad hominem in persona; servata tamen proprietate utriusque naturae, ut nec excellentiae divinae naturae aliquid deperiret, nec humana natura per exaltationem aliquam extra terminos suae speciei traheretur.
| [2] It is not contrary to the order of things for God to become man, as the first argument proceeded. This is the case because, although the divine nature exceeds the human nature to infinity, man in the order of his nature has God Himself for end and has been born to be united to God by his intellect And this union had as example and testimony of a sort the union of God to man in person; nonetheless, what was proper to each nature was preserved, so that nothing of the excellence of the divine nature was lost, nor was there an exaltation which drew the human nature beyond the bounds of its species.
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| Considerandum etiam quod, propter perfectionem et immobilitatem divinae bonitatis, nihil dignitatis Deo deperit ex hoc quod aliqua creatura quantumcumque ei appropinquat, etsi hoc creaturae accrescat. Sic enim ipsis creaturis suam bonitatem communicat quod ex hoc ipse nullum patitur detrimentum.
| [3] There is the following to be considered, also. By reason of the perfection and immobility of the divine goodness, God loses no dignity no matter how closely a creature draws near to Him, although this makes the creature grow in dignity. For He communicates His goodness to creatures in such wise that He Himself suffers no loss.
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| Similiter etiam, licet ad omnia facienda Dei voluntas sufficiat, tamen divina sapientia exigit ut rebus singulis secundum earum congruentiam provideatur a Deo: rebus enim singulis proprias causas convenienter instituit. Unde licet Deus sola sua voluntate efficere potuerit in humano genere omnes utilitates quas ex Dei incarnatione dicimus provenisse, ut secunda ratio proponebat: tamen congruebat humanae naturae ut huiusmodi utilitates inducerentur per Deum hominem factum, sicut ex inductis rationibus aliquatenus apparere potest.
| [4] In like fashion, too, one grants that God’s will suffices for doing all things; nevertheless, the divine wisdom requires that provision be made for the various classes of things in harmony with themselves, for He has suitably established the proper causes of various things. Be it granted, accordingly, that God was able by His will alone to effect in the human race every useful good which we are saying came from God’s Incarnation, as the second argument was proposing; nevertheless, it was in harmony with human nature to bring about these useful goods through God made man, just as the arguments giving make apparent to some extent.
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| Ad tertiam etiam rationem patet responsio. Homo enim, cum sit constitutus ex spirituali et corporali natura, quasi quoddam confinium tenens utriusque naturae, ad totam creaturam pertinere videtur quod fit pro hominis salute. Nam inferiores creaturae corporales in usum hominis cedere videntur et ei quodammodo esse subiectae. Superior autem creatura spiritualis, scilicet angelica, commune habet cum homine ultimi finis consecutionem, ut ex superioribus patet. Et sic conveniens videtur ut universalis omnium causa illam creaturam in unitatem personae assumeret in qua magis communicat cum omnibus creaturis.
| [5] The answer to the third argument is also plain. For, since man is constituted of a spiritual and of a bodily nature, and stands, so to say, on the boundary of each nature, that appears to belong to the whole of creaturehood which is done for the salvation of man. For the lesser bodily creatures seem to yield to man’s use and are in some way subject to him. But the superior spiritual, namely the angelic, creature has the achievement of the ultimate end in common with man (this is plain from the foregoing). Thus, it seems suitable that the universal cause of all things assume that creature into unity of person in which the cause shares more with other creatures.
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| Considerandum est etiam quod solius rationalis naturae est per se agere: creaturae enim irrationales magis aguntur naturali impetu quam agant per seipsas. Unde magis sunt in ordine instrumentalium causarum quam se habeant per modum principalis agentis. Assumptionem autem talis creaturae a Deo oportuit esse quae per se agere posset tanquam agens principale. Nam ea quae agunt sicut instrumenta, agunt inquantum sunt mota ad agendum: principale vero agens ipsum per se agit. Si quid igitur agendum fuit divinitus per aliquam irrationalem creaturam, suffecit, secundum huius creaturae conditionem, quod solum moveretur a Deo: non autem quod assumeretur in persona ut ipsamet ageret, quia hoc eius naturalis conditio non recepit, sed solum conditio rationalis naturae. Non igitur fuit conveniens quod Deus aliquam irrationalem naturam assumeret, sed rationalem, scilicet angelicam vel humanam.
| [6] This fact should be considered, also: To act of itself belongs only to the rational creature, for irrational creatures are more acted upon by a rational force than they are acting of themselves. Hence, they are rather in the order of instrumental causes than bearing themselves as principal agents. But the assumption of a creature by God had to be of the kind which could act of itself as a principal agent. For whatever acts as an instrument acts as moved into action, but a principal agent acts of itself. If, then, something was to be done divinely by an irrational creature, it sufficed, the creature’s condition considered, that it merely be moved by God. But it would not be assumed in person for the person to act, since its natural condition was not susceptible of this, it was only the condition. of the rational nature which was so susceptible. Therefore, for God to assume an irrational creature was not suitable, whereas to assume a rational one, whether human or angelic, was.
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| Et quamvis angelica natura quantum ad naturales proprietates inveniatur excellentior quam humana natura, ut quarta ratio proponebat, tamen humana congruentius fuit assumpta. Primo quidem, quia in homine peccatum expiabile esse potest: eo quod eius electio non immobiliter fertur in aliquid, sed a bono potest perverti in malum, et a malo reduci in bonum: sicut etiam in hominis ratione contingit, quae, quia ex sensibilibus et per signa quaedam colligit veritatem, viam habet ad utrumque oppositorum. Angelus autem, sicut habet immobilem apprehensionem, quia per simplicem intellectum immobiliter cognoscit, ita etiam habet immobilem electionem: unde vel in malum omnino non fertur; vel, si in malum feratur, immobiliter fertur; unde eius peccatum expiabile esse non potest. Cum igitur praecipua causa videatur divinae incarnationis esse expiatio peccatorum, ut ex Scripturis divinis docemur, congruentius fuit humanam naturam quam angelicam assumi a Deo. Secundo, quia assumptio creaturae a Deo est in persona, non in natura, ut ex superioribus patet. Convenientius igitur assumpta est hominis natura quam angelica: quia in homine aliud est natura et persona, cum sit ex materia et forma compositus; non autem in Angelo, qui immaterialis est. Tertio, quia Angelus, secundum proprietatem suae naturae, propinquior erat ad Deum cognoscendum quam homo, cuius cognitio a sensu oritur. Sufficiebat igitur quod Angelus a Deo intelligibiliter instrueretur de veritate divina. Sed conditio hominis requirebat ut Deus sensibiliter hominem de seipso homine instrueret. Quod per incarnationem est factum. Ipsa etiam distantia hominis a Deo magis repugnare videbatur fruitioni divinae. Et ideo magis indiguit homo quam Angelus assumi a Deo, ad spem de beatitudine concipiendam. Homo etiam, cum sit creaturarum terminus, quasi omnes alias creaturas naturali generationis ordine praesupponens, convenienter primo rerum principio unitur, ut quadam circulatione perfectio rerum concludatur.
| [7] And, although one finds in the angelic nature natural properties making it more excellent than the human nature, as the fourth argument was proposing, the human nature was nevertheless assumed with greater fitness. First, indeed, this is because in man sin is subject to expiation; and this is so because his choice is not unchangeably fixed on something, but can be perverted from good to evil, and from evil restored to good. In man’s reason, also, this happens: Since it gathers the truth from sensible things and certain signs, the way lies open to contradictory positions. But an angel, just as he has an unchangeable grasp of truth because he knows by simple understanding, so also he has an unchangeable choice. Accordingly, he is either not fixed upon evil at all, or, if he is fixed on evil, is fixed so immutably. Hence, his sin is not subject to expiation. Since, then, the chief cause of the divine incarnation appears to be the expiation of sin, as divine Scripture teaches us, it was more fitting that God assume a human than an angelic nature. Second, the assumption of the creature by God is in person, not in nature—as the foregoing makes clear. It was, therefore, more suitable to assume the human than the angelic nature because in man the nature is other than the person, for man is composite of matter and form; but this is not so in the angel, who is immaterial. Third, the angel, in what is proper to his nature, is closer to the knowledge of God than man is whose knowledge arises from the senses. Therefore, it was sufficient for the angel to be intelligibly instructed by God regarding divine truth. But the condition of man required that God instruct man sensibly about Himself as Man. This was done by the Incarnation. Then, again, the very distance of man from God seemed more repugnant to the divine enjoyment. Therefore, man needed to be assumed by God more than an angel did, that man’s hope for beatitude be stimulated. Lastly, man, since he is the term of creatures, presupposing, so to say, all other creatures in the natural order of generation, is suitably united to the first principle of things to finish a kind of cycle in the perfection of things.
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| Ex hoc autem quod Deus humanam naturam assumpsit, non datur erroris occasio, ut quinta ratio proponebat. Quia assumptio humanitatis, ut supra habitum est, facta est in unitate personae: non in unitate naturae, ut sic oporteat nos consentire his qui posuerunt Deum non esse super omnia exaltatum, dicentes Deum esse animam mundi, vel aliquid huiusmodi.
| [8] But the fact that God assumed human nature gives no occasion of error, as the fifth argument was trying to show. For the assumption of humanity, as already said, took place in a unity of person, not in a unity of nature, which might result in our agreement with those who held that God is not exalted above all things, and said that God was the soul of the universe, or something of the sort.
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| Licet autem circa incarnationem Dei sint aliqui errores exorti, ut sexto obiiciebatur, tamen manifestum est multo plures errores post incarnationem fuisse sublatos. Sicut enim ex creatione rerum, a divina bonitate procedente, aliqua mala sunt consecuta, quod competebat conditioni creaturarum, quae deficere possunt; ita etiam non est mirum si, manifestata divina veritate, sunt aliqui errores exorti ex defectu mentium humanarum. Qui tamen errores exercuerunt fidelium ingenia ad diligentius divinorum veritatem exquirendam et intelligendam: sicut et mala quae in creaturis accidunt, ordinat Deus ad aliquod bonum.
| [9] We grant, of course, that respecting God’s Incarnation certain errors have arisen, as the sixth argument objected; nevertheless, it is manifest that after the Incarnation many more errors were removed. For, just as in the creation of things which proceeded from the divine goodness some evils followed, and this was proportionate to the condition of creatures which are able to fail, so also in the manifestation of divine truth it is not astonishing that some errors have arisen from the failure of human minds. And these errors, for all that, exercised the talents of the faithful toward a more diligent penetration and understanding of divine truth, just as the evils which occur in creatures are ordered by God to some good.
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| Quamvis autem omne bonum creatum, divinae bonitati comparatum, exiguum inveniatur, tamen quia in rebus creatis nihil potest esse maius quam salus rationalis creaturae, quae consistit in fruitione ipsius bonitatis divinae; cum ex incarnatione divina consecuta sit salus humana, non parum utilitatis praedicta incarnatio attulit mundo, ut septima ratio procedebat. Nec oportuit propter hoc quod ex incarnatione divina omnes homines salvarentur: sed tantum illi qui praedictae incarnationi adhaerent per fidem et fidei sacramenta. Est siquidem incarnationis divinae virtus sufficiens ad omnium hominum salutem: sed quod non omnes ex hoc salvantur, ex eorum indispositione contingit, quod incarnationis fructum in se suscipere nolunt, incarnato Deo per fidem et amorem non inhaerendo. Non enim erat hominibus subtrahenda libertas arbitrii, per quam possunt vel inhaerere vel non inhaerere Deo incarnato: ne bonum hominis coactum esset, et per hoc absque merito et illaudabile redderetur.
| [10] Although, of course, every created good turns out to be negligible in comparison to the divine good, nevertheless, because in things created nothing can be greater than the salvation of the rational creature (which consists in the enjoyment of the divine goodness itself)—since human salvation has followed upon the divine Incarnation—it was no small usefulness which the Incarnation mentioned brought to the universe (so the seventh argument was proceeding). And it need not follow on this that all men should be saved, but only those who adhere to the Incarnation mentioned by faith and the sacraments of the faith. To be sure, the power of the divine Incarnation is equal to the salvation ‘of all men, but the fact that some are not saved thereby comes from their indisposition: they are unwilling to take unto themselves the fruit of the Incarnation; they do not cleave to the incarnate God by faith and love. For men were not intended to lose that freedom of choice by which they are able to cleave or not to cleave to the incarnate God, lest the good of man be produced by coercion—a good without merit and without praise.
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| Praedicta etiam Dei incarnatio sufficientibus indiciis hominibus manifestata est. Divinitas enim nullo modo convenientius manifestari potest quam per ea quae sunt propria Dei. Est autem Dei proprium quod naturae leges immutare possit, supra naturam aliquid operando, cuius ipse est auctor. Convenientissime igitur probatur aliquid esse divinum per opera quae supra leges naturae fiunt, sicut quod caeci illuminentur, leprosi mundentur, mortui suscitentur. Huiusmodi quidem opera Christus effecit. Unde et ipse per haec opera quaerentibus tu es qui venturus es, an alium expectamus? Suam divinitatem demonstravit, dicens: caeci vident, claudi ambulant, surdi audiunt et cetera. Alium autem mundum creare necesse non erat: nec ratio divinae sapientiae, nec rerum natura hoc habebat. Si autem dicatur, ut octava ratio proponebat, quod huiusmodi miracula etiam per alios esse facta leguntur: tamen considerandum est quod multo differentius et divinius Christus effecit. Nam alii orando haec fecisse leguntur: Christus autem imperando, quasi ex propria potestate. Et non solum ipse haec fecit, sed et aliis eadem et maiora faciendi tribuit potestatem, qui ad solam invocationem nominis Christi huiusmodi miracula faciebant. Et non solum corporalia miracula per Christum facta sunt, sed etiam spiritualia, quae sunt multo maiora: scilicet quod per Christum, et ad invocationem nominis eius, spiritus sanctus daretur, quo accenderentur corda caritatis divinae affectu; et mentes instruerentur subito in scientia divinorum; et linguae simplicium redderentur disertae, ad divinam veritatem hominibus proponendam. Huiusmodi autem opera indicia sunt expressa divinitatis Christi, quae nullus purus homo facere potuit. Unde apostolus, ad Hebr., dicit quod salus hominum, cum initium accepisset enarrari per dominum, per eos qui audierunt in nos confirmata est, attestante Deo signis et virtutibus et variis spiritus sancti distributionibus.
| [11] There have also been sufficient indications to make this Incarnation of God manifest to men. For there is no more suitable way to manifest divinity than by things which are God’s very own. But this is God’s very own: the power to change the laws of nature by doing something above that nature whose very author He is. Most suitably, then, is something proved divine by doing works above the laws of nature, to enlighten the blind, for instance, or to cleanse lepers, or to raise the dead. Works of this kind are what Christ did. Accordingly, when He was asked: “Are you He that is to come or look we for another?” by these works He Himself indicated His divinity in His reply: “The blind see, the lame walk, the deaf hear” (Mat. 11:15, 5), And so forth. But to create another world was not necessary; and this was not consonant either with the divine wisdom or with the nature of things. One may, of course, say—as the eighth argument was proposing—that we read of others also performing miracles of this kind, but it must be borne in mind that Christ performed them very differently and more divinely. For we read of others doing these things by praying; Christ did them by commanding by His very own power, so to say. And He not only did these things Himself, but even granted to others the power to do the same, and greater; and the latter used to do them by the mere invocation of the name of Christ. And not merely bodily miracles were worked through Christ, but spiritual ones as well, and these are much greater: namely, by Christ and at the invocation of His name the Holy Spirit is received, and so hearts are inflamed by the affection of divine charity; and minds suddenly are instructed in the knowledge of things divine; and the tongues of the unlettered are rendered skilled for setting divine truth forth to men. But works of this sort are express indications of the divinity of Christ; they are things so pare man was able to do. Hence, the Apostle says that the salvation of men “which, having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him, God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders, and divers miracles, and distributions of the Holy Spirit” (Heb. 2:3-4).
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| Licet autem saluti totius humani generis Dei incarnatio necessaria foret, non tamen oportuit quod a principio mundi Deus incarnaretur, ut nono obiiciebatur. Primo quidem, quia per Deum incarnatum oportebat hominibus medicinam afferri contra peccata, ut superius habitum est. Contra peccatum autem alicui convenienter medicina non affertur nisi prius suum defectum recognoscat: ut sic per humilitatem homo, de seipso non praesumens, iactet spem suam in Deum, a quo solo potest sanari peccatum, ut supra habitum est. Poterat autem homo de seipso praesumere et quantum ad scientiam, et quantum ad virtutem. Relinquendus igitur aliquando fuit sibi, ut experiretur quod ipse sibi non sufficeret ad salutem: neque per scientiam naturalem, quia ante tempus legis scriptae, homo legem naturae transgressus est; neque per virtutem propriam, quia, data sibi cognitione peccati per legem, adhuc ex infirmitate peccavit. Et sic oportuit ut demum homini, neque de scientia neque de virtute praesumenti, daretur efficax auxilium contra peccatum per Christi incarnationem: scilicet gratia Christi, per quam et instrueretur in dubiis, ne in cognitione deficeret; et roboraretur contra tentationum insultus, ne per infirmitatem deficeret. Sic igitur factum est quod essent tres status humani generis: primus ante legem; secundus sub lege; tertius sub gratia.
| [12] Granted, of course, that God’s Incarnation was necessary for the entire human race, it was not for all that, necessary that God be incarnate from the beginning of the world, as the ninth objection ran. Now first: by the incarnate God a remedy against sin had to be brought to men, as was shown above. But no one receives a suitable remedy against sin unless first he acknowledges his failure, so that man in his lowliness, not relying on himself, may put his ‘hope in God, by whom alone sin can be healed, as was said above. Man’s presumption was possible, of course, both in regard to knowledge and in regard to virtue. He had, then, to be left to himself for a while to discover that he was not equal to his own salvation: not equal by natural knowledge, for before the time of the written law man transgressed the law of nature; nor equal by his own virtue, for, when he was given knowledge of sin through the law, he still sinned out of weakness. Thus necessarily, man, presuming neither on his knowledge nor on his virtue, could at last be given efficacious help against sin by Christ’s Incarnation; namely, the grace of Christ by which he was not only to be instructed in doubtful matters lest he be deficient in knowledge, but also to be strengthened against the assaults of temptation lest he be deficient through frailty. And so it happened that there were three states of the human race: the first, before the Law; the second, under the Law; the third, under grace.
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| Deinde per Deum incarnatum praecepta et documenta perfecta hominibus danda erant. Requirit autem hoc conditio humanae naturae, quod non statim ad perfectum ducatur, sed manuducatur per imperfecta ut ad perfectionem perveniat: quod in instructione puerorum videmus, qui primo de minimis instruuntur, nam a principio perfecta capere non valent. Similiter etiam, si alicui multitudini aliqua inaudita proponerentur et magna, non statim caperet nisi ad ea assuesceret prius per aliqua minora. Sic igitur conveniens fuit ut a principio humanum genus instrueretur de his quae pertinent ad suam salutem per aliqua levia et minora documenta per patriarchas et legem et prophetas, et tandem, in consummatione temporum, perfecta doctrina Christi proponeretur in terris: secundum quod apostolus dicit, ad Gal.: at ubi venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus filium suum in terris. Et ibidem dicitur quod lex paedagogus noster fuit in Christo, sed iam non sumus sub paedagogo.
| Then, again, by the incarnate God precepts and perfect testimonies were to be given to men. Now, the condition of human nature requires that it be not led immediately to the perfect, but that it be led by the hand through the imperfect so as to arrive at perfection. We see this in the instruction of children. They are first instructed minimally; for they cannot grasp perfect things in the beginning. In the same way, also, if to some multitude things unheard of were proposed as great, the multitude would not grasp them immediately unless it became accustomed to these things by something less great. Thus, then, was it suitable that from the beginning the human race be instructed in the matter of its salvation by some light and lesser testimonies through the Patriarchs, and the Law, and the Prophets; and that at last, at the consummate time, the perfect teaching of Christ be set forth on earth. Thus, the Apostle says: “When the fullness of the time was come “sent His Son” into the world. And we read in the same place: “The law was our pedagogue in Christ. But we are no longer under a pedagogue” (Gal. 4:4; 3:24-2-5).
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| Simul etiam considerandum est quod, sicut adventum magni regis oportet aliquos nuntios praecedere, ut praeparentur subditi ad eum reverentius suscipiendum; ita oportuit adventum Dei in terras multa praecedere, quibus homines essent parati ad Deum incarnatum suscipiendum. Quod quidem factum est dum per praecedentia promissa et documenta hominum mentes dispositae sunt, ut facilius ei crederent qui ante praenuntiatus erat, et desiderantius susciperetur propter priora promissa.
| One must also consider this: as the coming of a great king must be preceded by a number of envoys to prepare his subjects to receive him more reverently, so many things had to precede the coming of God to the earth: to prepare men for the reception of the incarnate God. Indeed, this did take place when, because of the promises and testimonies that had gone before, the minds of men were disposed the more readily to believe Him who had had envoys before Him, and the more eagerly to receive Him because of the previous promises.
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| Et licet adventus Dei incarnati in mundum esset maxime necessarius humanae saluti, tamen non fuit necessarium quod usque ad finem mundi cum hominibus conversaretur, ut decima ratio proponebat. Hoc enim derogasset reverentiae quam homines debebant Deo incarnato exhibere: dum, videntes ipsum carne indutum aliis hominibus similem, nihil de eo ultra alios homines aestimassent. Sed eo, post mira quae gessit in terris, suam praesentiam hominibus subtrahente, magis ipsum revereri coeperunt. Propter quod etiam suis discipulis plenitudinem spiritus sancti non dedit quandiu cum eis conversatus fuit, quasi per eius absentiam eorum animis ad spiritualia munera magis praeparatis. Unde ipse eis dicebat: si non abiero, Paraclitus non veniet ad vos: si autem abiero, mittam eum ad vos.
| [13] One may also grant that the coming of the incarnate God was extremely necessary for human salvation; nevertheless, it was not necessary for human salvation that He converse with men even unto the end of the world, as the tenth argument was proposing. For this would have worked against the reverence which men ought to show to the incarnate God, so long as, seeing Him clothed in flesh similar to other men, they esteemed Him nothing beyond other men. But He, after the wondrous things which He did upon the earth, withdrew His presence from men, and they began to revere Him the more. For this reason He did not even give His disciples the fullness of the Holy Spirit so long as He conversed with them, as though by His absence their souls were more prepared for spiritual gifts. Hence, He Himself said to them: “If I go not the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go I will send Him to you” (John 16:7)
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| Non oportuit autem Deum carnem impassibilem et immortalem suscipere, secundum quod undecima ratio proponebat: sed magis passibilem et mortalem. Primo quidem, quia necessarium erat hominibus quod beneficium incarnationis cognoscerent, ut ex hoc ad divinum amorem inflammarentur. Oportuit autem, ad veritatem incarnationis manifestandam, quod carnem similem aliis hominibus sumeret, scilicet passibilem et mortalem. Si enim impassibilem et immortalem carnem suscepisset, visum fuisset hominibus, qui talem carnem non noverant, quod aliquod phantasma esset, et non veritas carnis.
| [14] It was not right for God to take flesh incapable of suffering and death, as the eleventh argument was proposing, but, rather, capable of suffering and death. First, indeed, because it was necessary for men to know the beneficence of the Incarnation so as to be thereby inflamed in the divine love. But to manifest the truth of the Incarnation He had to same flesh like that of other men; namely, capable of suffering and death. For, if He had taken flesh incapable of suffering and death, it would have seemed to men who did not know such flesh that it was a phantom and not the reality of flesh.
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| Secundo, quia necessarium fuit Deum carnem assumere ut pro peccato humani generis satisfaceret. Contingit autem unum pro alio satisfacere, ut in tertio ostensum est, ita tamen quod poenam pro peccato alteri debitam ipse, sibi non debitam, voluntarie assumat. Poena autem consequens humani generis peccatum est mors et aliae passibilitates vitae praesentis, sicut supra dictum est: unde et apostolus dicit, ad Rom.: per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors. Oportuit igitur ut carnem passibilem et mortalem Deus assumeret absque peccato, ut sic, patiendo et moriendo, pro nobis satisfaceret et peccatum auferret. Et hoc est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom., quod Deus misit filium suum in similitudinem carnis peccati, idest, habentem carnem similem peccatoribus, scilicet passibilem et mortalem; et subdit, ut de peccato damnaret peccatum in carne, idest, ut per poenam quam in carne pro peccato nostro sustinuit, peccatum a nobis auferret.
| Second, because it was necessary that God assume flesh to satisfy for the sin of the human race. It happens, of course, that one does satisfy for another (as was shown in Book III) in such wise, however, that the penalty for sin due to the second, and not due to the first, the first voluntarily assumes. But the penalty consequent on the sin of the human race is death and the other capacities for suffering of the present life, as was said above. Hence, the Apostle says: “By one man sin entered this world and by sin death” (Rom. 5:17.). Therefore, God had to assume without sin flesh capable of suffering and death, so that by suffering and dying He would satisfy for us and take away sin. And this is what the Apostle says, that “God sent His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh” (Rom. 8:3), that is, having flesh like that of sinners, namely, capable of suffering and death; and the Apostle adds “that of sin He might condemn sin in the flesh,” that is, in order that by the penalty which He sustained in the flesh for our sin He might take sin away from us.
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| Tertio, quia per hoc quod carnem passibilem et mortalem habuit, efficacius dedit nobis exempla virtutis, passiones carnis fortiter superando, et eis virtuose utendo.
| Third, because by having flesh capable of suffering and death He gave us examples of virtue more effectively by overcoming bravely the sufferings of the flesh, and making virtuous use of them.
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| Quarto, quia per hoc magis ad spem immortalitatis erigimur, quod ipse de statu carnis passibilis et mortalis mutatus est in impassibilitatem et immortalitatem carnis: quod etiam de nobis sperare possumus, qui carnem gerimus passibilem et mortalem. Si vero a principio carnem impassibilem et immortalem assumpsisset, nulla daretur occasio immortalitatem sperandi his qui in seipsis mortalitatem et corruptibilitatem experiuntur. Hoc etiam mediatoris officium requirebat quod, cum communem haberet nobiscum passibilem carnem et mortalem, cum Deo vero virtutem et gloriam: ut auferens a nobis quod nobiscum commune habebat, scilicet passionem et mortem, ad id nos duceret quod sibi et Deo erat commune. Fuit enim mediator ad coniungendum nos Deo.
| Fourth, because we are by this the more strengthened in the hope of immortality: that He from a state of flesh capable of suffering and death was changed into a state of flesh incapable of suffering and death; and this we can hope for ourselves, we who bear a flesh capable of suffering and death. But if from the beginning He had assumed flesh incapable of suffering and death, no occasion to hope for immortality would be given those who experience in themselves mortality and corruptibility. This, also, was required by His mission as mediator: that, while He had in common with us flesh capable of suffering and death, but in common with God power and glory, He should take away from us what He had in common with us—namely, suffering and death—in order to lead us to that which was common to Him and to God. For He was the mediator for uniting us to God.
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| Similiter etiam non fuit expediens quod Deus incarnatus vitam in hoc mundo ageret opulentam et honoribus seu dignitatibus sublimem, ut duodecima ratio concludebat. Primo quidem, quia ad hoc venerat ut mentes hominum, terrenis deditas, a terrenis abstraheret et ad divina elevaret. Unde oportuit, ut suo exemplo homines in contemptum divitiarum et aliorum quae mundani desiderant duceret, quod inopem et privatam vitam ageret in hoc mundo. Secundo quia, si divitiis abundasset et in aliqua maxima dignitate constitutus fuisset, id quod divine gessit magis potentiae saeculari quam virtuti divinitatis fuisset attributum. Unde efficacissimum argumentum suae divinitatis fuit quod absque adminiculo potentiae saecularis totum mundum in melius commutavit.
| [15] In like fashion, also, it was not expedient that the incarnate God live in this world a life of riches, and one excelling in honors or dignities, as the twelfth argument was concluding. First, to be sure, because He had come to draw the minds of men, devoted to earthly things, away from earthly things and to lift them up to things divine. Hence, that His example might lead men to a contempt of riches and the other things which the worldly desire, He had to lead a needy and private life in this world. Second, because, if He had abounded in wealth and been established in some great dignity, what He did divinely would have been attributed more to secular power than to the virtue of the divinity. Hence, the most efficacious argument for His divinity has been this: Without the support of the secular power He has changed the whole world for the better.
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| Unde patet etiam solutio ad id quod decimotertio obiiciebatur.
| [16] Accordingly, the solution is open to what was said in the thirteenth objection.
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| Non est autem procul a vero quod filius Dei incarnatus obediens praecepto patris mortem sustinuit, secundum doctrinam apostoli. Praeceptum enim Dei est ad homines de operibus virtutum: et quanto aliquis perfectius actum virtutis exequitur, tanto magis Deo obedit. Inter alias autem virtutes praecipua caritas est, ad quam omnes aliae referuntur. Christus igitur, dum actum caritatis perfectissime implevit, Deo maxime obediens fuit. Nullus enim est actus caritatis perfectior quam quod homo pro amore alicuius etiam mortem sustineat: secundum quod ipsemet dominus dicit: maiorem caritatem nemo habet quam quod animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis. Sic igitur invenitur Christus, mortem sustinens pro salute hominum et ad gloriam Dei patris, Deo maxime obediens fuisse, actum caritatis perfectum exequendo. Nec hoc repugnat divinitati ipsius, ut quartadecima ratio procedebat. Sic enim facta est unio in persona ut proprietas utriusque naturae maneret, divinae scilicet et humanae, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo, patiente Christo etiam mortem et alia quae humanitatis sunt, divinitas impassibilis mansit, quamvis, propter unitatem personae, dicamus Deum passum et mortuum. Cuius exemplum aliqualiter in nobis apparet, quia, moriente carne, anima remanet immortalis.
| [17] It is not, of course, far from true to say that the incarnate Son of God bore His death in obedience to a command of His Father, according to the Apostle’s teaching (Phil. 2:8). For God’s commandment to men deals with the works of virtue; and the more perfectly one carries out an act of virtue, the more is he obedient to God. Among the other virtues, charity is the outstanding one to which all the other are referred. Christ then, when He fulfilled the act of charity most perfectly was most obedient to God. For there is no act of charity more perfect than the one by which a man bears even death for another; as our Lord Himself says: “Greater love than this no man has that a man lay down his life for his friends” (John 15:13). Therefore, one finds that Christ bearing death for the salvation of men and for the glory of God the Father was extremely obedient to God and carried out a perfect act of charity. Nor is this repugnant to His divinity, as the fourteenth argument ran. For the union in person took place in such wise that what was proper to each of the natures remained, namely to the divine and to the human, as was explained above. Therefore, even when Christ suffered death and other things proper to humanity, the divinity remained incapable of suffering, although by the unity of person we say that God suffered and died. And somewhat of an instance of this appears in us because, although the flesh dies, the soul remains immortal.
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| Sciendum est etiam quod, licet voluntas Dei non sit ad mortem hominum, ut quintadecima ratio proponebat, est tamen ad virtutem, per quam homo mortem fortiter sustinet, et ex caritate periculis mortis se obiicit. Et sic voluntas Dei fuit de morte Christi, inquantum Christus eam ex caritate suscepit et fortiter sustinuit.
| [18] This, too, should be understood: Although the will of God is not for the death of men, as the fifteenth argument” set down, the will of God is for virtue by which a man bears death bravely, and in charity exposes himself to the dangers of death. Thus, the will of God was for the death of Christ, in that Christ undertook that death in charity and bore it bravely.
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| Unde patet quod non fuit impium et crudele quod Deus pater Christum mori voluit, ut sextadecima ratio concludebat. Non enim coegit invitum, sed complacuit ei voluntas qua ex caritate Christus mortem suscepit. Et hanc etiam caritatem in eius anima operatus est.
| [19] Hence, clearly, it was neither impiety nor cruelty that God the Father willed Christ to die, as the sixteenth argument was concluding, for He did not coerce one who was unwilling but was pleased with that will in whose charity Christ undertook His death. And God even wrought this charity in the soul of Christ.
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| Similiter etiam non inconvenienter dicitur quod propter humilitatem demonstrandam Christus mortem crucis voluit pati. Et revera quidem humilitas in Deum non cadit, ut decimaseptima ratio proponebat: quia virtus humilitatis in hoc consistit ut aliquis infra suos terminos se contineat, ad ea quae supra se sunt non se extendens, sed superiori se subiiciat; unde patet quod Deo humilitas convenire non potest, qui superiorem non habet, sed ipse super omnia existit. Si autem aliquis vel aequali vel inferiori se ex humilitate aliquando subiiciat, hoc est quia secundum aliquid eum qui simpliciter vel aequalis vel inferior est, superiorem se arbitratur. Quamvis igitur Christo secundum divinam naturam humilitatis virtus non competat, competit tamen sibi secundum humanam naturam, et eius humilitas ex eius divinitate laudabilior redditur: dignitas enim personae adiicit ad laudem humilitatis; puta quando, pro aliqua necessitate, expedit aliquem magnum aliqua infima pati. Nulla autem tanta dignitas esse potest hominis quam quod sit Deus. Unde hominis Dei humilitas maxime laudabilis invenitur, dum abiecta sustinuit quae pro salute hominum ipsum pati expediebat. Erant enim homines, propter superbiam, mundanae gloriae amatores. Ut igitur hominum animos ab amore mundanae gloriae in amorem divinae gloriae transmutaret, voluit mortem sustinere, non qualemcumque, sed abiectissimam. Sunt enim quidam qui, etsi mortem non timeant, abhorrent tamen mortem abiectam. Ad quam etiam contemnendam dominus homines animavit suae mortis exemplo.
| [20] In the same way, too, there is no awkwardness in saying that Christ willed the death on the cross as a demonstration of humility. To be sure, the humility does not touch God, as the seventeenth argument was proposing. Truly, the virtue of humility consists in this, that one keep himself within his own limits; he does not stretch himself to what is above him, but he subjects himself to his superior. Hence, clearly, God can have no proportionate humility, for He has no superior; He Himself exists above all things. But, if a man at times subjects himself in humility to an equal or inferior, this is because the one who is his equal or inferior simply is held by the man as his superior in a certain respect. Therefore, although the virtue of humility was not fitting to Christ in His divine nature, it was fitting to Him in His human nature, and His humility was Tendered the more praiseworthy by His divinity. For the dignity of the person contributes to the praise humility deserves; for example, when out of some necessity a great man has to suffer something lowly. But there can he no dignity of man so great as this: that he be God. Hence, the humility of the God-man was praiseworthy in the extreme when He bore those abject things which He was called on to suffer for the salvation of men. For men were by reason of pride lovers of worldly glory. Therefore, to change the spirits of men over from love of worldly glory to love of divine glory He willed to bear death—not just any sort of death, but a death abject in the extreme. For there are some who, although they do not fear death, abhor an abject death. And even to the contempt of such a death did our Lord inspire men by the example of His death.
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| Et licet homines ad humilitatem informari potuerint divinis sermonibus instructi, ut decimaoctava ratio proponebat: tamen ad agendum magis provocant facta quam verba et tanto efficacius facta movent, quanto certior opinio bonitatis habetur de eo qui huiusmodi operatur. Unde, licet aliorum hominum multa humilitatis exempla invenirentur, tamen expedientissimum fuit ut ad hoc hominis Dei provocarentur exemplo, quem constat errare non potuisse; et cuius humilitas tanto est mirabilior quanto maiestas sublimior.
| [21] One grants also that men instructed by the divine lessons were able to be informed about humility, as the eighteenth argument was proposing. For all that, deeds are more provocative of action than words; and deeds move the more effectively, the more certain is the opinion of the goodness of him who performs such deeds. Hence, although many examples of humility of other men are discoverable, it was most expeditious to arouse men to humility by the example of the God-man. He clearly could not make a mistake, and His humility is the more wondrous as His majesty is the more sublime.
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| Manifestum est etiam ex praedictis quod oportuit Christum mortem pati, non solum ut exemplum praeberet mortem contemnendi propter veritatis amorem, sed ut etiam aliorum peccata purgaret. Quod quidem factum est dum ipse, qui absque peccato erat, mortem peccato debitam pati voluit, ut in se poenam aliis debitam, pro aliis satisfaciendo, susciperet. Et quamvis sola Dei gratia sufficiat ad remittendum peccata, ut decimanona ratio proponebat, tamen in remissione peccati exigitur etiam aliquid ex parte eius cui peccatum remittitur: ut scilicet satisfaciat ei quem offendit. Et quia alii homines pro seipsis hoc facere non poterant, Christus hoc pro omnibus fecit, mortem voluntariam ex caritate patiendo.
| [22] This, too, is clear from what has been said: Christ had to suffer death not only to give an example of holding death in contempt out of love of the truth, but also to wash away the sins of others. This indeed took place when He who was without sin willed to suffer the penalty due to sin that He might take on Himself the penalty due to others, and make satisfaction for others. And although the grace of God suffices by itself for the remission of sins, as the nineteenth argument was proposing, nonetheless in the remission of sin something is required on the part of him whose sin is remitted: namely, that he satisfy the one offended. And since other men were unable to do this for themselves, Christ did this for all by suffering a voluntary death out of charity.
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| Et quamvis in puniendo peccata oportet illum puniri qui peccavit, ut vigesima ratio proponebat, tamen in satisfaciendo unus potest alterius poenam ferre. Quia dum poena pro peccato infligitur, pensatur eius qui punitur iniquitas: in satisfactione vero, dum quis, ad placandum eum quem offendit, voluntarie poenam assumit, satisfacientis caritas et benevolentia aestimatur, quae maxime apparet cum quis pro alio poenam assumit. Et ideo Deus satisfactionem unius pro alio acceptat, ut etiam in tertio libro ostensum est.
| [23] Be it granted, also, that in the punishment of sins he who sinned ought to be punished, as the twenties argument was proposing, for all that, in the matter of satisfaction one can bear another’s penalty. For, when penalty is inflicted for sin, we weigh his iniquity who is punished; in satisfaction, however, when to placate the one offended, some other voluntarily assumes the penalty, we consider the charity and benevolence of him who makes satisfaction, and this most especially appears when one assumes the penalty of another. And, there. fore, God does receive from one satisfaction for another, as was shown in Book III.
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| Satisfacere autem pro toto humano genere, ut supra ostensum est, nullus homo purus poterat: nec ad hoc Angelus sufficiebat, ut vigesimaprima ratio procedebat. Angelus enim, licet quantum ad aliquas proprietates naturales sit homine potior, tamen quantum ad beatitudinis participationem, in quam per satisfactionem reducendus erat, est ei aequalis. Et iterum: non plene redintegraretur hominis dignitas, si Angelo pro homine satisfacienti obnoxius redderetur.
| [24] But to satisfy for the whole human race (this was shown previously) was beyond the power of any mere man; neither was an angel equal to this, as the twenty-first argument was proceeding. For, granted an angel in some natural properties has a power beyond man, nonetheless in the sharing of beatitude (and by the satisfaction man was to be restored to this) the angel is man’s equal. And again, there would be no full restoration of man’s dignity if man were rendered obnoxious to the angel satisfying for man.
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| Sciendum autem est quod mors Christi virtutem satisfaciendi habuit ex caritate ipsius, qua voluntarie mortem sustinuit, non ex iniquitate occidentium, qui eum occidendo peccaverunt: quia peccatum non deletur peccato, ut vigesimasecunda ratio proponebat.
| [25] One should, of course, know that the death of Christ had its satisfying power from His charity in which He bore death voluntarily, and not from the iniquity of His killers who sinned in killing Him; because sin is not wiped out by sin, as the twenty-second argument proposed.
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| Et quamvis mors Christi pro peccato satisfactoria fuerit, non tamen toties eum mori oportuit quoties homines peccant, ut vigesimatertia ratio concludebat. Quia mors Christi sufficiens fuit ad omnium expianda peccata: tum propter eximiam caritatem qua mortem sustinuit; tum propter dignitatem personae satisfacientis, quae fuit Deus et homo. Manifestum est autem etiam in rebus humanis quod, quanto persona est altior, tanto poena quam sustinet pro maiori computatur, sive ad humilitatem et caritatem patientis, sive ad culpam inferentis.
| [26] And although the death of Christ was satisfactory for sin, it was unnecessary for Him to die just as many times as men sinned, as the twenty-third argument was concluding. The death of Christ was sufficient for the expiation of all sins; and this by reason of the extraordinary charity in which He bore death, as well as by reason of the dignity of the satisfying person who was God and man. But even in human affairs it is clear that by as much as the person is higher, by so much is the penalty he bears reckoned for more, whether reckoned by the humility and charity of the one suffering or by the fault of the one incurring the penalty.
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| Ad satisfaciendum autem pro peccato totius humani generis mors Christi sufficiens fuit. Quia, quamvis secundum humanam naturam solum mortuus fuerit, ut vigesimaquarta ratio proponebat, tamen ex dignitate personae patientis, quae est persona filii Dei, mors eius redditur pretiosa. Quia, ut supra dictum est, sicut maioris est criminis alicui personae inferre iniuriam quae maioris dignitatis existit, ita virtuosius est, et ex maiori caritate procedens, quod maior persona pro aliis se subiiciat voluntariae passioni.
| [27] Of course, for the satisfaction of the sin of the entire human race the death of Christ was sufficient. For, although He died only in His human nature, as the twenty-fourth argument” was proposing, the dignity of the person suffering—and this is the Person of the Son of God—renders His death precious. For, as was said above, just as it is a greater crime to commit an injury to a person who stands out more in dignity, so it is more virtuous and proceeds from greater charity that the greater person submit Himself voluntarily to suffering for others.
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| Quamvis autem Christus pro peccato originali sua morte sufficienter satisfecerit, non est tamen inconveniens quod poenalitates ex peccato originali consequentes remaneant adhuc in omnibus qui etiam redemptionis Christi participes fiunt: ut vigesimaquinta ratio procedebat. Hoc enim congruenter et utiliter factum est ut poena remaneret, etiam culpa sublata. Primo quidem, ut esset conformitas fidelium ad Christum, sicut membrorum ad caput. Unde sicut Christus prius multas passiones sustinuit, et sic ad immortalitatis gloriam pervenit; sic decuit ut fideles eius prius passionibus subiacerent, et sic ad immortalitatem pervenirent, quasi portantes in seipsis insignia passionis Christi, ut similitudinem gloriae eius consequerentur; sicut apostolus, ad Rom., dicit: heredes quidem Dei, coheredes autem Christi. Si tamen compatimur, ut et simul glorificemur. Secundo quia, si homines venientes ad Iesum statim immortalitatem et impassibilitatem consequerentur, plures homines ad Christum accederent magis propter haec corporalia beneficia quam propter spiritualia bona. Quod est contra intentionem Christi, venientis in mundum ut homines ab amore corporalium ad spiritualia transferret. Tertio quia, si accedentes ad Christum statim impassibiles et immortales redderentur, hoc quodammodo compelleret homines ad fidem Christi suscipiendam. Et sic meritum fidei minueretur.
| [28] But, although Christ has by His death satisfied sufficiently for original sin, there is nothing awkward in this: that the penalties consequent on original sin still remain in all, even in those who are given a share in Christ’s redemption, as the twenty-fifth argument was proceeding. For it was both fitting and useful to have the penalty remain even when the fault was taken away. First, indeed, to achieve conformity of the faithful to Christ as members to the head; hence, just as Christ first bore many sufferings, and thus arrived at the glory of immortality, it also was becoming to His faithful first to undergo sufferings and so to arrive at immortality, bearing in themselves, so to say, the marks of the passion of Christ, in order to achieve a likeness to His glory. So the Apostle says: “Heirs, indeed of God, and joint-heirs with Christ: yet so, if we suffer with Him, that we may be also glorified with Him” (Rom. 8:17). Second, because, if men coming to Jesus were forthwith to achieve immortality and impassibility, many men would approach Christ more for these bodily benefits than for spiritual goods. And this is against the intention of Christ who came into the world to change men from love of bodily things to love of spiritual things. Third, because, if those who come to Christ were forthwith rendered incapable of suffering and death, this would somehow compel men to accept faith in Christ. And thus the merit of faith would be diminished.
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| Quamvis autem sufficienter pro peccatis humani generis sua morte satisfecerit, ut vigesimasexta ratio proponebat, sunt tamen unicuique remedia propriae salutis quaerenda. Mors enim Christi est quasi quaedam universalis causa salutis: sicut peccatum primi hominis fuit quasi universalis causa damnationis. Oportet autem universalem causam applicari ad unumquemque specialiter, ut effectum universalis causae percipiat. Effectus igitur peccati primi parentis pervenit ad unumquemque per carnis originem: effectus autem mortis Christi pertingit ad unumquemque per spiritualem regenerationem, per quam homo Christo quodammodo coniungitur et incorporatur. Et ideo oportet quod unusquisque quaerat regenerari per Christum, et alia suscipere in quibus virtus mortis Christi operatur.
| [29] Granted, of course, that Christ has sufficiently satisfied for the sins of the human race by His death, as the twenty-sixth argument proposed, every single one, for all that, must seek the remedies of his own salvation. For the death of Christ is, so to say, a kind of universal cause of salvation, as the sin of the first man was a kind of universal cause of damnation. But a universal cause must be applied specially to each one, that he may receive the effect of the universal cause. The effect then, of the sin of the first parent comes to each one in the origin of the flesh, but the effect of the death of Christ comes to each one in a spiritual regeneration in which the man is somehow conjoined with Christ arid incorporated into Him. And for this reason each must seek to be regenerated through Christ, and must himself undertake to do those things in which ,the power of Christ’s death operates.
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| Ex quo patet quod effluxus salutis a Christo in homines non est per naturae propaginem, sed per studium bonae voluntatis, qua homo Christo adhaeret. Et sic quod a Christo unusquisque consequitur, est personale bonum. Unde non derivatur ad posteros, sicut peccatum primi parentis, quod cum naturae propagine producitur. Et inde est quod, licet parentes sint a peccato originali mundati per Christum, non tamen est inconveniens quod eorum filii cum peccato originali nascantur, et sacramentis salutis indigeant, ut vigesimaseptima ratio concludebat.
| [30] From this it is clear that the flow of salvation from Christ to men is not through a natural propagation, but through the zeal of good will in which a man cleaves to Christ. Hence, that which each accomplishes by Christ is a personal good. Wherefore, it is not passed on to descendants, as is the sin of the first parent, which is produced with the propagation of the nature. Accordingly, although the parents are cleansed of original sin by Christ, there is nothing awkward about the birth of their children in original sin, requiring the sacraments of salvation, as the twenty-seventh argument was concluding.
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| Sic igitur ex praemissis aliquatenus patet quod ea quae circa mysterium incarnationis fides Catholica praedicat, neque impossibilia neque incongrua inveniuntur.
| [31] Thus, then, from what has been set down it is to some extent clear that what the Catholic faith preaches about the Incarnation contains nothing impossible and nothing inharmonious.
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Caput 62
De errore infidelium circa sacramentum Eucharistiae
| Chapter 62
ON THE ERROR OF THE INFIDELS ABOUT THE SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST
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| Sicut autem, Christo proferente haec verba, quidam discipulorum turbati sunt, dicentes, durus est hic sermo. Quis potest eum audire? Ita et contra doctrinam Ecclesiae insurrexerunt haeretici veritatem huius negantes. Dicunt enim in hoc sacramento non realiter esse corpus et sanguinem Christi, sed significative tantum: ut sic intelligatur quod Christus dixit, demonstrato pane, hoc est corpus meum, ac si diceret, hoc est signum, vel figura corporis mei; secundum quem modum et apostolus dixit, I Cor. 10-4, petra autem erat Christus, idest, Christi figura; et ad hunc intellectum referunt quicquid in Scripturis invenitur similiter dici.
| [1] Of course, just as when Christ spoke these words, some of the disciples were troubled and said: “This saying is hard, and who can bear it?” (John 6:61), so, also, against the teaching of the Church some heretics have arisen to deny this truth. They say that the body and blood of Christ are not really present in this sacrament, but by way of sign only; thus, one understands Christ’s saying when He indicated the bread: “This is My body” (Mat. 26:26) as though He were saying: “This is a sign or figure of My body.” And in this way the Apostle spoke: “And the rock was Christ” (1 Cor. 10:4), that is, “a figure of Christ”; and to such an understanding they refer whatever is said in the Scriptures in a similar way.
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| Huius autem opinionis occasionem assumunt ex verbis domini, qui de sui corporis comestione et sanguinis potatione, ut scandalum discipulorum quod obortum fuerat sopiretur, quasi seipsum exponens, dixit: verba quae ego locutus sum vobis, spiritus et vita sunt: quasi ea quae dixerat, non ad litteram, sed secundum spiritualem sensum intelligenda essent.
| [2] Of course, the occasion of this opinion is taken from our Lord’s words. Speaking of eating His flesh and drinking His blood, to quiet the scandal which had arisen among the disciples He, said—as, though explaining Himself: “The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and life” (John 6:64); as though His words were to be understood not literally, but in a spiritual sense.
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| Inducuntur etiam ad dissentiendum ex multis difficultatibus quae ad hanc Ecclesiae doctrinam sequi videntur, propter quas hic sermo Christi et Ecclesiae durus eis apparet.
| [3] They are also induced to their dissent by the many difficulties which seem to follow this teaching of the Church; by reason of these “this saying” of Christ and the Church appears hard to them.
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| Et primo quidem, difficile videtur quomodo verum corpus Christi in altari esse incipiat. Aliquid enim incipit esse ubi prius non fuit, dupliciter: vel per motum localem, vel per conversionem alterius in ipsum; ut patet in igne, qui alicubi esse incipit vel quia ibi de novo accenditur, vel quia illuc de novo apportatur. Manifestum est autem verum corpus Christi non semper in hoc altari fuisse: confitetur enim Ecclesia Christum in suo corpore ascendisse in caelum.
| [4] In the first place, there seems to be a difficulty in the way in which the true body of Christ begins to be on the altar. For a thing begins to be where it was not before in two ways: either by local motion, or by the conversion of another into itself. This is clear in the case of fire, which begins to be in some place either because it is newly lighted there or because it is newly carried there. Manifestly, of course, the true body of Christ was not always on the altar; for the Church confesses that Christ in His body ascended into heaven.
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| Videtur autem impossibile dici quod aliquid hic de novo convertatur in corpus Christi. Nihil enim videtur converti in praeexistens: cum id in quod aliquid convertitur, per huiusmodi conversionem esse incipiat. Manifestum est autem corpus Christi praeextitisse, utpote in utero virginali conceptum. Non igitur videtur esse possibile quod in altari de novo esse incipiat per conversionem alterius in ipsum.
| [5] But it seems impossible to say that here something is newly converted into the body of Christ. For nothing seems converted into the pre-existent, since what is converted into something begins to be by this sort of conversion. But, manifestly, the body of Christ pre-existed, let us say, as conceived in the virginal womb. Therefore, it does not seem possible that on the altar it begins to be anew by the conversion of another into itself.
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| Similiter autem, nec per loci mutationem. Quia omne quod localiter movetur, sic incipit esse in uno loco quod desinit esse in alio, in quo prius fuit. Oportebit igitur dicere quod, cum Christus incipit esse in hoc altari, in quo hoc sacramentum peragitur, desinat esse in caelo, quo ascendendo pervenerat. Amplius. Nullus motus localis terminatur simul ad duo loca. Manifestum est autem hoc sacramentum simul in diversis altaribus celebrari. Non est ergo possibile, quod per motum localem corpus Christi, ibi esse incipiat.
| [6] In a similar fashion, it cannot be there by a change of place, since whatever is moved locally begins to be in one place in such wise that it ceases to be in another in which it was before. Therefore, one will have to say that when Christ begins to be on this altar whereon the sacrament is enacted He ceases to be in heaven where He arrived after His ascension. Furthermore, no local motion has two places simultaneously as its term. But, clearly, this sacrament is celebrated simultaneously on different altars. Therefore, it is not possible that the body of Christ begins to be thereon by local motion.
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| Secunda difficultas ex loco accidit. Non enim semotim partes alicuius in diversis locis continentur, ipso integro permanente. Manifestum est autem in hoc sacramento seorsum esse panem et vinum in locis separatis. Si igitur caro Christi sit sub specie panis, et sanguis sub specie vini, videtur sequi quod Christus non remaneat integer, sed semper cum hoc sacramentum agitur, eius sanguis a corpore separetur.
| [7] The second difficulty comes from the place. For parts are not contained in separated places if a thing remains a whole. But, manifestly, in this sacrament the bread and wine, are apart from one another in separate places. Therefore, if the flesh of Christ is under the appearance of bread and the blood under the appearance of wine, it seems to follow that Christ does not remain whole; but whenever this sacrament is performed His blood is separated from His body.
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| Adhuc. Impossibile videtur quod maius corpus in loco minoris includatur. Manifestum est autem verum corpus Christi esse maioris quantitatis quam panis qui in altari offertur. Impossibile igitur videtur quod verum corpus Christi totum et integrum sit ubi videtur esse panis. Si autem ibi est non totum, sed aliqua pars eius, redibit primum inconveniens, quod semper dum hoc sacramentum agitur, corpus Christi per partes discerpatur.
| [8] Furthermore, it seems impossible that a larger body be inclosed in the place of a smaller one. Clearly, of course, the true body of Christ is greater in quantity than the bread which is offered on the altar. It seems, then, impossible that the true body of Christ be whole and entire there where the bread is seen. Of course, if it is not the whole there, but one of its parts, then the first awkwardness recurs: Whenever this sacrament is performed the body of Christ is scattered into parts.
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| Amplius. Impossibile est unum corpus in pluribus locis existere. Manifestum est autem hoc sacramentum in pluribus locis celebrari. Impossibile igitur videtur quod corpus Christi in hoc sacramento veraciter contineatur. Nisi forte quis dicat quod secundum aliquam particulam est hic, et secundum aliam alibi. Ad quod iterum sequitur quod per celebrationem huius sacramenti corpus Christi dividatur in partes: cum tamen nec quantitas corporis Christi sufficere videatur ad tot particulas ex eo dividendas, in quot locis hoc sacramentum peragitur.
| [9] It is further impossible that one body should exist in many places. But, manifestly, this sacrament is celebrated in many places. Therefore, it seems impossible that the body of Christ is truthfully contained in this sacrament—unless one says, perhaps, that the body is contained in one of its particles here, and in another there. And on this it follows, once again, that by the celebration of this sacrament the body of Christ is divided into parts; for all that, at the same time, the quantity of the body of Christ does not seem to suffice for the division of as many particles from the body as there are places where this sacrament is performed.
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| Tertia difficultas est ex his quae in hoc sacramento sensu percipimus. Sentimus enim manifeste, etiam post consecrationem, in hoc sacramento omnia accidentia panis et vini, scilicet colorem, saporem, odorem, figuram, quantitatem et pondus: circa quae decipi non possumus, quia sensus circa propria sensibilia non decipitur.
| [10] The third difficulty lies in the things which we perceive by our senses in this sacrament. For, clearly, in this sacrament we sense, even after the consecration, all the accidents of bread and wine: color, taste, odor, figure, quantity, and weight; and concerning these we cannot be deceived, for “the sense is never deceived about the proper sensibles.”
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| Huiusmodi autem accidentia in corpore Christi esse non possunt sicut in subiecto; similiter etiam nec in aere adiacenti: quia, cum plurima eorum sint accidentia naturalia, requirunt subiectum determinatae naturae, non qualis est natura corporis humani vel aeris.
| [11] But accidents of this kind cannot be in the body of Christ as in a subject; in like fashion, neither can they be in the surrounding air; for, since many of them are natural accidents, they call for a subject of a determined nature, which is not like the nature of the human body or of the air.
|
| Nec possunt per se subsistere: cum accidentis esse sit inesse. Accidentia etiam, cum sint formae, individuari non possunt nisi per subiectum.
| [12] Nor can they subsist in themselves, since “the being of an accident is by inherence.”
|
| Unde remoto subiecto, essent formae universales. Relinquitur igitur huiusmodi accidentia esse in suis determinatis subiectis, scilicet in substantia panis et vini. Est igitur ibi substantia panis et vini, et non substantia corporis Christi: cum impossibile videatur duo corpora esse simul.
| [13] Also, since accidents are forms, they cannot he individuated except through a subject. Wherefore, with the subject removed they would be universal forms. Therefore, this remains: Accidents of this kind are in their determined subjects; namely, in the substance of bread and wine. Therefore, the substance of bread and wine is there, and the substance of the body of Christ is not, since it seems impossible that the two bodies be there simultaneously.
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| Quarta difficultas accidit ex passionibus et actionibus quae apparent in pane et vino post consecrationem sicut et ante. Nam vinum, si in magna quantitate sumeretur, calefaceret, et inebriaret: panis autem et confortaret et nutriret. Videntur etiam, si diu et incaute serventur, putrescere; et a muribus comedi; comburi etiam possunt et in cinerem redigi et vaporem; quae omnia corpori Christi convenire non possunt; cum fides ipsum impassibilem praedicet. Impossibile igitur videtur quod corpus Christi in hoc sacramento substantialiter contineatur.
| [14] The fourth difficulty arises from the actions and passions which appear in the bread and wine after the consecration just as they did before it. For the wine, if taken in large quantity, would make one warm and would make one drunk; the bread, of course, would strengthen and would nourish. They seem, also, if kept long and carelessly, to rat or to be eaten by mice, they can even be burned, and reduced to ashes and smoke. But none of this agrees with the body of Christ, since the faith preaches that it is incapable of suffering. Therefore, it seems impossible that the body of Christ be contained substantially in this sacrament.
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| Quinta difficultas videtur specialiter accidere ex fractione panis: quae quidem sensibiliter apparet, nec sine subiecto esse potest. Absurdum etiam videtur dicere quod illius fractionis subiectum sit corpus Christi. Non igitur videtur ibi esse corpus Christi, sed solum substantia panis et vini.
| [15] A fifth difficulty seems to arise especially from the breaking of the bread; indeed, this breaking appears sensibly and cannot be without a subject. It even seems absurd to say that the subject of that breaking is the body of Christ. Therefore, the body of Christ seems not to be there, but only the substance of the bread and wine.
|
| Haec igitur et huiusmodi sunt propter quae doctrina Christi et Ecclesiae circa hoc sacramentum dura esse videtur.
| [16] These, then, and points of this kind are the reason why the teaching of Christ and the Church concerning this sacrament appears hard.
|
Caput 63
Solutio praemissarum difficultatum, et primo quoad conversionem panis in corpus Christi
| Chapter 63
SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES SET DOWN: FIRST, ABOUT THE CONVERSION OF THE BREAD HIM THE BODY OF CHRIST
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| Licet autem divina virtus sublimius et secretius in hoc sacramento operetur quam ab homine perquiri possit, ne tamen doctrina Ecclesiae circa hoc sacramentum, infidelibus impossibilis videatur, conandum est ad hoc quod omnis impossibilitas excludatur.
| [1] Although, of course, the divine power operates with a greater sublimity and secrecy in this sacrament than a man’s inquiry can search out, nonetheless, lest the teaching of the Church regarding this sacrament appear impossible to unbelievers, one must make the endeavor to exclude every impossibility.
|
| Prima igitur occurrit consideratio, per quem modum verum Christi corpus esse sub hoc sacramento incipiat.
| [2] The first consideration we meet, then, is that of the way in which the true body of Christ begins to be under this sacrament.
|
| Impossibile autem est quod hoc fiat per motum localem corporis Christi. Tum quia sequeretur quod in caelo esse desineret quandocumque hoc agitur sacramentum. Tum quia non posset simul hoc sacramentum agi, nisi in uno loco: cum unus motus localis non nisi ad unum terminum finiatur. Tum etiam quia motus localis instantaneus esse non potest, sed tempore indiget. Consecratio autem perficitur in ultimo instanti prolationis verborum.
| [3] It is impossible, of course, that this take place by a local motion of the body of Christ. One reason is that it would follow that He ceases to be in heaven whenever this sacrament is performed. Another reason is that this sacrament could not be performed at the same time except in one place, since a local motion is not ended except at one term. Another reason, also, is that local motion cannot be instantaneous, but requires time. Consecration, however, is perfected in the ultimate instant of the pronouncement of the words.
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| Relinquitur igitur dicendum quod verum corpus Christi esse incipiat in hoc sacramento per hoc quod substantia panis convertitur in substantiam corporis Christi, et substantia vini in substantiam sanguinis eius.
| [4] Therefore, one concludes by saying that the true body of Christ begins to be in this sacrament by the fact that the substance of the bread is converted into the substance of the body of Christ, and the substance of the wine into the substance of His blood.
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| Ex hoc autem apparet falsam esse opinionem, tam eorum qui dicunt substantiam panis simul cum substantia corporis Christi in hoc sacramento existere; quam etiam eorum qui ponunt substantiam panis in nihilum redigi, vel in primam materiam resolvi. Ad utrumque enim sequitur quod corpus Christi in hoc sacramento esse incipere non possit nisi per motum localem: quod est impossibile, ut ostensum est.
| [5] But thus appears the falsity of the opinion: not only of those who say that the substance of the bread exists simultaneously with the substance of Christ in this sacrament, but also of those who hold that the substance of the bread is reduced to nothing or is resolved into prime matter. For on each of these positions it follows that the body of Christ does not begin to be in this sacrament except by local motion. And this is impossible, as we have shown.
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| Praeterea, si substantia panis simul est in hoc sacramento cum vero corpore Christi, potius Christo dicendum fuit, hic est corpus meum, quam, hoc est corpus meum: cum per hic demonstretur substantia quae videtur, quae quidem est substantia panis, si in sacramento cum corpore Christi remaneat.
| Furthermore, if the substance of the bread is simultaneous in this sacrament with the true body of Christ, Christ should rather have said: “My body is here” than: “This is My body.” For by “here” one points to the substance which is seen, and this is indeed the substance of the bread, if it remains in the sacrament with the body of Christ.
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| Similiter etiam impossibile videtur quod substantia panis omnino in nihilum redeat. Multum enim de natura corporea primo creata iam in nihilum rediisset ex frequentatione huius mysterii. Nec est decens ut in sacramento salutis divina virtute aliquid in nihilum redigatur. Neque etiam in materiam primam substantiam panis est possibile resolvi: cum materia prima sine forma esse non possit. Nisi forte per materiam primam prima elementa corporea intelligantur. In quae quidem si substantia panis resolveretur, necesse esset hoc ipsum percipi sensu: cum elementa corporea sensibilia sint. Esset etiam ibi localis transmutatio et corporalis alteratio contrariorum, quae instantanea esse non possunt.
| Similarly, also, it seems impossible that the substance of the bread returns to nothingness. For much of the bodily nature first created would have already returned into nothingness from the repetition of this mystery. Neither is it becoming that in a sacrament of salvation something be reduced to nothing by the divine power. Nor is it even possible that the substance of the bread is resolved into prime matter, since prime matter cannot be without form—except, perhaps, that one is to understand by “prime matter” the primary bodily elements. To be sure, if the substance of the bread were resolved into these, this very thing would necessarily be perceived by the senses, since the bodily elements are sensible. There would also be local transmutation in the place and bodily alteration of contraries. And these cannot be instantaneous.
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| Sciendum tamen est quod praedicta conversio panis in corpus Christi alterius modi est ab omnibus conversionibus naturalibus. Nam in qualibet conversione naturali manet subiectum, in quo succedunt sibi diversae formae, vel accidentales, sicut cum album in nigrum convertitur, vel substantiales, sicut cum aer in ignem: unde conversiones formales nominantur. Sed in conversione praedicta subiectum transit in subiectum, et accidentia manent: unde haec conversio substantialis nominatur. Et quidem qualiter haec accidentia maneant et quare, posterius perscrutandum est.
| [6] Nonetheless, it must be recognized that the aforesaid conversion of the bread into the body of Christ is of another mode than any natural conversion whatever. For in any natural conversion a subject persists in which different forms succeed themselves: these are accidental—white, for example, is converted into black, or they are substantial—air, for example, is converted into fire; wherefore these are named formal conversions. But in the conversion under discussion a subject passes over into a subject, and the accidents persist; hence, this conversion is named substantial. Indeed, how these accidents persist, and why, must be closely examined later.
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| Nunc autem considerare oportet quomodo subiectum in subiectum convertatur. Quod quidem natura facere non potest. Omnis enim naturae operatio materiam praesupponit per quam substantia individuatur; unde natura facere non potest quod haec substantia fiat illa, sicut quod hic digitus fiat ille digitus. Sed materia subiecta est virtuti divinae: cum per ipsam producatur in esse. Unde divina virtute fieri potest quod haec individua substantia in illam praeexistentem convertatur. Sicut enim virtute naturalis agentis, cuius operatio se extendit tantum ad immutationem formae, et existentia subiecti supposita, hoc totum in illud totum convertitur secundum variationem speciei et formae, utpote hic aer in hunc ignem generatum: ita virtute divina, quae materiam non praesupponit, sed eam producit, et haec materia convertitur in illam, et per consequens hoc individuum in illud: individuationis enim principium materia est, sicut forma est principium speciei.
| [7] But now we must consider how a subject is converted into a subject. And this, to be sure, nature cannot do. For every operation of nature presupposes matter which individuates the substance; wherefore, nature cannot bring it about that this substance ‘become that substance, that this finger, for example, become that finger. But matter is subject to the divine power, since the latter brings it into being. Hence, by divine power it can come about that this individual substance be converted into that pre-existing substance. Now, just as the power of a natural agent whose operation extends to the change of a form only—and the existence of the subject is supposed—changes this whole into that whole in a variation of the species and the form—this air, let us say, into that generated fire—so the divine power, which does not presuppose matter, but produces matter, converts this matter into that matter, and, in consequence, this individual into that individual; for the principle of individuation is matter, just as form is the principle of species.
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| Hinc autem manifestum est quod in conversione praedicta panis in corpus Christi non est aliquod subiectum commune permanens post conversionem: cum transmutatio fiat secundum primum subiectum, quod est individuationis principium. Necesse est tamen aliquid remanere, ut verum sit quod dicitur, hoc est corpus meum, quae quidem verba sunt huius conversionis significativa et factiva. Et quia substantia panis non manet, nec aliqua prior materia, ut ostensum est: necesse est dicere quod maneat id quod est praeter substantiam panis. Huiusmodi autem est accidens panis. Remanent igitur accidentia panis, etiam post conversionem praedictam.
| [8] In this way, of course, it is clear that in the aforesaid conversion of bread into the body of Christ there is not a common subject persisting after the conversion, since a transmutation takes place in the first subject, and this is the principle of the individuation. It is necessary, for all that, that something persist to make true the words: “This is My body”; the very words, in fact, which are significative and effective of this conversion. And the substance of the bread does not persist; neither does any prior matter (as was shown). Therefore, one necessarily says that what persists is other than the substance of the bread. Of this sort, of course, is the accident of the bread. Therefore, the accidents of the bread do persist even after the conversion mentioned.
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| Inter accidentia vero quidam ordo considerandus est. Nam inter omnia accidentia propinquius inhaeret substantiae quantitas dimensiva. Deinde qualitates in substantia recipiuntur quantitate mediante, sicut color mediante superficie: unde et per divisionem quantitatis, per accidens dividuntur. Ulterius autem qualitates sunt actionum et passionum principia; et relationum quarundam, ut sunt pater et filius, dominus et servus, et alia huiusmodi. Quaedam vero relationes immediate ad quantitates consequuntur: ut maius et minus, duplum et dimidium, et similia. Sic igitur accidentia panis, post conversionem praedictam, remanere ponendum est ut sola quantitas dimensiva sine subiecto subsistat, et in ipsa qualitates fundentur sicut in subiecto, et per consequens actiones, passiones et relationes. Accidit igitur in hac conversione contrarium ei quod in naturalibus mutationibus accidere solet, in quibus substantia manet ut mutationis subiectum, accidentia vero variantur: hic autem e converso accidens manet, et substantia transit.
| [9] Among accidents, however, there is a certain order to be considered. For, among all the accidents, that inhering more closely to the substance is the quantity which tends to measure. Then the qualities are received in the substance with the quantity as medium—color, for example, with the surface as medium; hence, even by the division of the quantity they are incidentally divided. But, in addition, the qualities are the principles of actions and passions, as well as of certain relations—father and son, let us say, or master and servant, and others of this kind. Of course, some relations follow immediately on the quantities—greater and less, for instance, or doubled and halved, and similar relations. Therefore, one ought to hold that the accidents of the bread persist after the conversion mentioned in such wise that only the quantity which tends to measure subsists without a subject, and on it the qualities are based as on a subject, and so in consequence are the accidents, passions, and relations. Therefore, in this conversion what takes place is the contrary of what usually takes place in natural mutations, for in these the substance persists as the subject of the mutation, whereas the accidents are varied; but here, conversely, the accident persists, the substance passes.
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| Huiusmodi autem conversio non potest proprie dici motus, sicut a naturali consideratur, ut subiectum requirat, sed est quaedam substantialis successio, sicut in creatione est successio esse et non esse, ut in secundo dictum est.
| [10] Of course, a conversion of this kind cannot properly be called motion as that is considered by the natural philosopher, since that requires a subject, but it is a kind of substantial succession; so there is in creation a succession of being and non-being, as was said in Book II.
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| Haec igitur est una ratio quare accidens panis remanere oportet: ut inveniatur aliquod manens in conversione praedicta.
| [11] This, then, is one reason why the accident of the bread must remain: that something be discoverable which persists in the conversion under discussion.
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| Est autem et propter aliud necessarium. Si enim substantia panis in corpus Christi converteretur et panis accidentia transirent, ex tali conversione non sequeretur quod corpus Christi, secundum suam substantiam, esset ubi prius fuit panis: nulla enim relinqueretur habitudo corporis Christi ad locum praedictum. Sed cum quantitas dimensiva panis remanet post conversionem, per quam panis hunc locum sortiebatur, substantia panis in corpus Christi mutata fit corpus Christi sub quantitate dimensiva panis; et per consequens locum panis quodammodo sortitur, mediantibus tamen dimensionibus panis.
| [12] But it is necessary for another reason. For, if the substance of the bread were converted into the body of Christ and the accidents were to pass on, it would not follow from such a conversion that the body of Christ in His substance would be where first there was bread, for no relationship between the body of Christ and the aforesaid place would be left. But since, after the conversion, the quantity of the bread which tends to measure does remain, and through this the bread acquired this place, the substance of the bread changed into the body of Christ becomes the body of Christ under the bread’s quantity tending to measure; in consequence, the body of Christ in some way acquires the place of the bread, with the measurements of the bread, nonetheless, mediating.
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| Possunt et aliae rationes assignari. Et quantum ad fidei rationem quae de invisibilibus est. Et eius meritum quod circa hoc sacramentum tanto maius est quanto invisibilius agitur, corpore Christi sub panis accidentibus occultato. Et propter commodiorem et honestiorem usum huius sacramenti. Esset enim horrori sumentibus, et abominationi videntibus, si corpus Christi in sua specie a fidelibus sumeretur. Unde sub specie panis et vini, quibus communius homines utuntur ad esum et potum, corpus Christi proponitur manducandum, et sanguis potandus.
| [13] Other reasons can also be given: respecting the essentials of faith, which deals with the invisible; respecting also its merit, which is so much the greater in connection with this sacrament, since it deals with the more invisible, for the body of Christ is hidden under the accidents of the bread; respecting, also, the more appropriate and worthy use of this sacrament, for it would be horrible for the receivers, and an abomination to those looking on, if the body of Christ were received by the faithful in its own appearance. Hence, it is under the appearance of bread and wine, which men use rather commonly for meat and drink, that the body of Christ is set forth to be eaten and His blood to be drunk.
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Caput 66
Solutio eorum quae obiiciebantur ex parte actionis et passionis
| Chapter 66
SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS REGARDING ACTION AND PASSION
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| His autem consideratis, quae ad quartam difficultatem pertinent consideranda sunt. Circa quae aliquid quidem est quod de facili expediri potest: aliquid quidem est quod maiorem difficultatem praetendit.
| [1] After the consideration of these points, one should consider those belonging to the fourth difficulty. And concerning these there is, indeed, something which can be dealt with easily; something else, however, offers a greater difficulty.
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| Quod enim in hoc sacramento eaedem actiones appareant quae prius in substantia panis et vini apparebant, puta quod similiter immutent sensum, similiter etiam alterent aerem circumstantem, vel quodlibet aliud, odore aut colore: satis conveniens videtur ex his quae posita sunt. Dictum est enim quod in hoc sacramento remanent accidentia panis et vini: inter quae sunt qualitates sensibiles, quae sunt huiusmodi actionum principia.
| [2] The fact that in this sacrament the same actions appear which previously appeared in the substance of the bread and wine (they change the senses in the same way, let us say; they even in the same way alter the surrounding air, or anything else, by odor or color) now seems fitting enough from what has been set down. For we said that in this sacrament the accidents of the bread and wine persist. And among these are the sensible qualities which are the principles of actions of this sort.
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| Rursus, circa passiones aliquas, puta quae fiunt secundum alterationes huiusmodi accidentium, non magna etiam difficultas accidit, si praemissa supponantur. Cum enim praemissum sit quod alia accidentia in dimensionibus fundantur sicut in subiecto, per eundem modum circa huiusmodi subiectum alteratio aliorum accidentium considerari potest, sicut si esset ibi substantia; ut puta si vinum esset calefactum et infrigidaretur, aut mutaret saporem, aut aliquod huiusmodi.
| [3] Again, concerning some passions (those, for instance, which take place in alterations of accidents of this kind), the difficulty which occurs is not so great, if the premises be granted. For, since it was premised that the other accidents are based on the measurements as on a subject, the alteration of the other accidents can be considered in the same way with respect to this subject as they would be if the substance were there; for example, if the wine had been warmed and became cold, or if it should change its flavor, or something of this kind.
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| Sed maxima difficultas apparet circa generationem et corruptionem quae in hoc sacramento videtur accidere. Nam si quis in magna quantitate hoc sacramentali cibo uteretur, sustentari posset, et vino etiam inebriari, secundum illud apostoli I Cor. 11-21, alius esurit, alius ebrius est: quae quidem accidere non possent nisi ex hoc sacramento caro et sanguis generaretur; nam nutrimentum convertitur in substantiam nutriti;- quamvis quidam dicant hominem sacramentali cibo non posse nutriri, sed solum confortari et refocillari, sicut cum ad odorem vini confortatur. Sed haec quidem confortatio ad horam accidere potest: non autem sufficit ad sustentandum hominem, si diu sine cibo permaneat. Experimento autem de facili inveniretur hominem diu sacramentali cibo sustentari posse.
| [4] But a very great difficulty appears regarding the generation and corruption which seems to take place in this sacrament. For if one were to use this sacramental food in large quantity he could be sustained, and by the wine even made drunk, as the Apostle has it: "One indeed is hungry and another is drunk" (1 Cor. 11:21). And these things could not take place unless, from this sacrament, flesh and blood were generated, for nourishment is converted into the substance of the one nourished. Some may, of course, say that a man is not nourished by this sacramental food, but only invigorated and refreshed, as when one is invigorated by the fragrance of wine. But this invigoration can happen for an hour; it does not, of course, suffice to sustain a man if he remains long without food. But a trial would readily show that a man can be sustained for a long time by the sacramental food.
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| Mirandum etiam videtur cur negent hominem hoc sacramentali cibo posse nutriri, refugientes hoc sacramentum in carnem et sanguinem posse converti: cum ad sensum appareat quod per putrefactionem vel combustionem in aliam substantiam, scilicet cineris et pulveris, convertatur.
| [5] It also seems a wonder why they should deny that a man can be nourished by this sacramental food, refusing to this sacrament the possible conversion into flesh and blood, when it appears to the senses that by putrefaction or combustion it is turned into another substance; namely, dust and ashes.
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| Quod quidem difficile tamen videtur: eo quod nec videatur possibile quod ex accidentibus fiat substantia: nec credi fas sit quod substantia corporis Christi, quae est impassibilis, in aliam substantiam convertatur.
| [6] And this, indeed, seems nonetheless difficult, since it does not seem possible to make a substance out of accidents; nor is it right to believe that the substance of Christ's body—which is not capable of suffering—be converted into another substance.
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| Si quis autem dicere velit quod, sicut miraculose panis in corpus Christi convertitur, ita miraculose accidentia in substantiam convertuntur: primum quidem, hoc non videtur miraculo esse conveniens, quod hoc sacramentum putrescat, vel per combustionem dissolvatur; deinde, quia putrefactio et combustio consueto naturae ordine huic sacramento accidere inveniuntur: quod non solet esse in his quae miraculose fiunt.
| [7] However, if one wishes to say that as the bread is miraculously converted into the body of Christ, so the accidents are converted miraculously into substance: first, indeed, this does not seem suitable for a miracle, the putrefaction of this sacrament, or its dissolution by combustion; and then that putrefaction and combustion are found taking place in this sacrament in the usual order of nature, which is not usually the case in things done miraculously.
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| Ad hanc dubitationem tollendam quaedam famosa positio est adinventa, quae a multis tenetur. Dicunt enim quod, cum contingit hoc sacramentum in carnem converti aut sanguinem per nutrimentum, vel in cinerem per combustionem aut putrefactionem, non convertuntur accidentia in substantiam; neque substantia corporis Christi; sed redit, divino miraculo, substantia panis quae prius fuerat, et ex ea generantur illa in quae hoc sacramentum converti invenitur.
| [8] To remove this hesitation a certain famous position was invented, which is held by many. They hold thus: When this sacrament happens to be converted into flesh or blood by nutrition, or into ashes by combustion or putrefaction, the accidents are not converted into substance; nor is the substance of the body of Christ converted; but by a divine miracle the substance of the bread which was there previously returns, and from it are generated the things into which we find the sacrament converted.
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| Sed hoc quidem omnino stare non potest. Ostensum est enim supra quod substantia panis in substantiam corporis Christi convertitur. Quod autem in aliquid conversum est, redire non potest nisi e converso illud reconvertatur in ipsum. Si igitur substantia panis redit, sequitur quod substantia corporis Christi reconvertitur in panem. Quod est absurdum.
| [9] But this, to be sure, simply cannot stand. For we have shown above that the substance of the bread is converted into the substance of the body of Christ. But that which is converted into another cannot return unless, conversely, that other be reconverted into it. If, therefore, the substance of the bread returns, it follows that the substance of the body of Christ is reconverted into bread. And this is absurd.
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| Adhuc, si substantia panis redit, necesse est quod vel redeat speciebus panis manentibus; vel speciebus panis iam destructis. Speciebus quidem panis durantibus, substantia panis redire non potest: quia quandiu species manent, manet sub eis substantia corporis Christi; sequeretur ergo quod simul esset ibi substantia panis et substantia corporis Christi. Similiter etiam neque, corruptis speciebus panis, substantia panis redire potest: tum quia substantia panis non est sine propriis speciebus; tum quia, destructis speciebus panis, iam generata est alia substantia, ad cuius generationem ponebatur quod substantia panis rediret.
| What is more, if the substance of the bread returns, it must return either while the appearances of bread persist or when the appearances of bread are already destroyed. In fact, while the appearances of bread persist, the substance of the bread cannot return, because, as long as the appearances remain, thereunder remains the substance of the body of Christ; it would follow, therefore, that simultaneously present there would be both the substance of the bread and the substance of the body of Christ. In like manner, also, if the appearances of the bread are corrupted, the substance of the bread cannot return—for this reason: The substance of the bread is not without its own appearances; and for this reason, as well: When the appearances of the bread are destroyed, another substance has already been generated, and it was for the generation of this second substance that (so they were holding) the substance of the bread should return.
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| Melius igitur dicendum videtur quod in ipsa consecratione, sicut substantia panis in corpus Christi miraculose convertitur, ita miraculose accidentibus confertur quod subsistant, quod est proprium substantiae: et per consequens quod omnia possint facere et pati quae substantia posset facere et pati, si substantia adesset. Unde sine novo miraculo, et inebriare et nutrire, et incinerari et putrefieri possunt, eodem modo et ordine ac si substantia panis et vini adesset.
| [10] Therefore, it seems better to say that in the consecration itself, just as the substance of the bread is miraculously converted into the body of Christ so this is miraculously conferred on the accidents: that they subsist which is proper to substance, and, as a consequence, are able to do and to suffer the things which the substance could do and suffer if the substance were present. And so, without a new miracle, they are able to inebriate and to nourish, to be burned and to rot, in the same way and order they would if the substance of the bread and wine were present.
|
Caput 71
Quod homo peccans post sacramentorum gratiam potest converti per gratiam
| Chapter 71
THAT A MAN SINNING AFTER THE GRACE OF THE SACRAMENTS CAN BE CONVERTED BY GRACE
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| Ex praemissis autem apparet ulterius quod homo post sacramentalem gratiam susceptam in peccatum cadens, iterum reparari potest ad gratiam.
| [1] However, from what has been said it further appears that a man falling into sin after receiving sacramental grace can once more be restored to grace.
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| Ut enim ostensum est, quandiu hic vivitur, voluntas mutabilis est secundum vitium et virtutem. Sicut igitur post acceptam gratiam potest peccare, ita et a peccato, ut videtur, potest ad virtutem redire.
| [2] For, as we showed, so long as we live here the will is mutable in the matter of vice and virtue. Therefore, as one can sin after grace is received, so also from sin, it seems, one can return to virtue.
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| Item. Manifestum est bonum esse potentius malo: nam malum non agit nisi in virtute boni, ut supra in tertio est ostensum. Si igitur voluntas hominis a statu gratiae per peccatum avertitur, multo magis per gratiam potest a peccato revocari.
| [3] Manifestly, again, good is more powerful than evil: for “evil acts only in the power of the good,” as was shown above in Book III. If, then, the will of man is turned away from the state of grace by sin, much more can grace call him back from sin.
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| Adhuc. Immobilitas voluntatis non competit alicui quandiu est in via. Sed quandiu hic homo vivit, est in via tendendi in ultimum finem. Non igitur habet immobilem voluntatem in malo, ut non possit per divinam gratiam reverti ad bonum.
| [4] Immobility of will, furthermore, is not proper to anyone so long as he is on the way. But, so long as man lives here, he is on the way which tends towards the ultimate end. He does not, then, have a will unmovable in evil, so that he is not able to return to the good by divine grace.
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| Amplius. Manifestum est quod a peccatis quae quis ante gratiam perceptam in sacramentis commisit, per sacramentorum gratiam liberatur: dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. 6-9 neque fornicarii, neque idolis servientes, neque adulteri, etc., regnum Dei possidebunt. Et hoc quidem fuistis aliquando, sed abluti estis, sed sanctificati estis, sed iustificati estis in nomine domini nostri Iesu Christi, et in spiritu Dei nostri. Manifestum est etiam quod gratia in sacramentis collata naturae bonum non minuit, sed auget. Pertinet autem hoc ad bonum naturae, quod a peccato reducibilis sit in statum iustitiae: nam potentia ad bonum quoddam bonum est. Igitur, si contingat peccare post gratiam perceptam, adhuc homo reducibilis erit ad statum iustitiae.
| [5] There is more. Manifestly, a man who committed sins before he received grace in the sacraments is delivered from those sins by the grace of the sacraments, for the Apostle says: “Neither fornicators nor idolaters, nor adulterers,” and so forth, “shall possess the kingdom of God. And such some of you were; but you are washed, but you are sanctified, but you am justified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ and the Spirit of our God” (1 Cor. 6:9-11). Manifestly, also, the grace bestowed in the sacrament does not diminish, but increases, nature’s good. Yet this belongs to the good of nature, that it can be led back from sin into the state of justice, for the capacity for good is a kind of good. If, then, sin takes place after grace is received, man can still be led back to the state of justice.
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| Adhuc. Si peccantes post Baptismum ad gratiam redire non possunt, tollitur eis spes salutis. Desperatio autem est via ad libere peccandum: dicitur enim ad Ephes. 4-19 de quibusdam quod desperantes tradiderunt semetipsos impudicitiae, in operationem omnis immunditiae et avaritiae. Periculosissima est igitur haec positio, quae in tantam sentinam vitiorum homines inducit.
| [6] If those, moreover, who sin after baptism cannot return to grace, their hope of salvation is entirely lost. But despair is the way to sinning freely, for the Apostle speaks of some who “despairing have given themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness, unto covetousness” (Eph. 4:19). This is, then, a very dangerous position which leads men to so great a cesspool of vices.
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| Praeterea. Ostensum est supra quod gratia in sacramentis percepta non constituit hominem impeccabilem. Si igitur post gratiam in sacramentis perceptam peccans ad statum iustitiae redire non posset, periculosum esset sacramenta percipere. Quod patet esse inconveniens. Non igitur peccantibus post sacramenta percepta reditus ad iustitiam denegatur.
| [7] There is more. We showed above that the grace received in the sacraments does not make a man unable to sin. Therefore, if one who sins after receiving grace in the sacraments could not return to the state of justice, it would be dangerous to receive the sacraments. And this is obviously unsuitable. Therefore, to those who sin after receiving the sacraments the return to justice is not denied.
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| Hoc etiam auctoritate sacrae Scripturae confirmatur. Dicitur enim I Ioan. 2-1: filioli mei, haec scribo vobis ut non peccetis. Sed et si quis peccaverit, advocatum habemus apud patrem, Iesum Christum iustum, et ipse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris: quae quidem verba manifestum est quod fidelibus iam renatis proponebantur. Paulus etiam de Corinthio fornicario scribit II Cor. 2-6 sufficit illi qui eiusmodi est obiurgatio haec quae fit a pluribus, ita ut e contrario magis doleatis et consolemini. Et infra, 7-9, dicit: gaudeo, non quia contristati estis, sed quia contristati estis ad poenitentiam. Dicitur etiam Ier. 3-1: tu autem fornicata es cum amatoribus multis: tamen revertere ad me, dicit dominus. Et Thren. ult.: converte nos, domine, ad te, et convertemur, innova dies nostros sicut a principio. Ex quibus omnibus apparet quod, si fideles post gratiam lapsi fuerint, iterum patet eis reditus ad salutem.
| [8] This also is confirmed by the authority of sacred Scripture, for we read in John: “My little children, these things I write to you, that you may not sin. But if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ, the just. And He is the propitiation for our sins” (1 John 2:1-2). And these very words were clearly being set forth to the faithful already reborn. Paul also writes about the Corinthian fornicator: “To him who is such a one, this rebuke is sufficient which is given by many: so that on the contrary you should rather forgive him and comfort him.” And later he says: “I am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance” (2 Cor. 2:6-7; 7:9). We also read in Jeremiah (3:1): “You prostituted yourself to many lovers; nevertheless, return to Me, says the Lord”; and in his Lamentations (5:21): “Convert us, O Lord, and we shall be converted: renew our days, as from the beginning.” And from all these one sees that if the faithful fall after receiving grace, there is open to them a second time a way back to salvation.
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| Per hoc autem excluditur error Novatianorum, qui peccantibus post Baptismum indulgentiam denegabant.
| [9] In this way, of course, one excludes the error of the Novatians, who used to deny forgiveness to those who sinned after baptism.
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| Ponebant autem sui erroris occasionem ex eo quod dicitur Hebr. 6-4 impossibile est eos qui semel sunt illuminati, et gustaverunt donum caeleste, et participes sunt facti spiritus sancti, gustaverunt nihilominus bonum verbum Dei, virtutesque saeculi venturi, et prolapsi sunt renovari rursum ad poenitentiam.
| [10] Now, they used to set down as the occasion of their error the saying in Hebrews (6:4-6): “It is impossible for those who were once illuminated, have tasted also the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Spirit, have moreover tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, and are fallen away: to be renewed again to penance.”
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| Sed ex quo sensu hoc apostolus dixerit, apparet ex hoc quod subditur: rursus crucifigentes sibimetipsis filium Dei, et ostentui habentes. Ea igitur ratione qui prolapsi sunt post gratiam perceptam renovari rursus ad poenitentiam non possunt, quia filius Dei rursus crucifigendus non est. Denegatur igitur illa renovatio in poenitentiam per quam homo simul crucifigitur Christo. Quod quidem est per Baptismum: dicitur enim Rom. 6-3: quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in morte ipsius baptizati sumus. Sicut igitur Christus non est iterum crucifigendus, ita qui peccat post Baptismum, non est rursus baptizandus. Potest tamen rursus converti ad gratiam per poenitentiam. Unde et apostolus non dixit quod impossibile sit eos qui semel lapsi sunt, rursus revocari vel converti ad poenitentiam, sed quod impossibile sit renovari, quod Baptismo attribuere solet, ut patet Tit. 3-5: secundum misericordiam suam salvos nos fecit, per lavacrum regenerationis et renovationis spiritus sancti.
| [11] But the sense in which the Apostle said this is apparent from what is immediately added: “Crucifying again to themselves the Son of God and making Him a mockery.” Therefore, the reason why those who have fallen after receiving grace cannot be renewed again to penance is that the Son of God must not be crucified again. One, therefore, denies to them that renewal again to penance in which a man is crucified along with Christ. And this indeed is in baptism, for we read: “All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus are baptized in His death” (Rom. 6:3). Therefore, as Christ must not be crucified once again, so he who sins after baptism must not be baptized again. Nonetheless, he can be converted to grace once again by penance. Hence, the Apostle did not say it was impossible that those once fallen should again be recalled or converted to penance, but impossible that they be “renewed”—which one usually attributes to baptism—as in Titus (3:5): “According to His mercy, He saved us, by the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Spirit.”
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Caput 72
De necessitate poenitentiae et partium eius
| Chapter 72
ON THE NECESSITY OF PENANCE AND OF ITS PARTS
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| Ex hoc igitur apparet quod, si aliquis post Baptismum peccet, remedium sui peccati per Baptismum habere non potest. Et quia abundantia divinae misericordiae, et efficacia gratiae Christi, hoc non patitur ut absque remedio dimittatur, institutum est aliud sacramentale remedium, quo peccata purgentur. Et hoc est poenitentiae sacramentum, quod est quaedam velut spiritualis sanatio. Sicut enim qui vitam naturalem per generationem adepti sunt, si aliquem morbum incurrant qui sit contrarius perfectioni vitae, a morbo curari possunt, non quidem sic ut iterato nascantur, sed quadam alteratione sanantur; ita Baptismus, qui est spiritualis regeneratio, non reiteratur contra peccata post Baptismum commissa, sed poenitentia, quasi quadam spirituali alteratione, sanantur.
| [1] From this, then, it is evident that if a man sins after baptism, he cannot have the remedy against his sin in baptism. And since the abundance of the divine mercy and the effectiveness of Christ’s grace do not suffer him to be dismissed without a remedy, there was established another sacramental remedy by which sins are washed away. And this is the sacrament of penance, which is spiritual healing of a sort. For just as those who receive a natural life by generation can, if they incur some disease which is contrary to the perfection of life, be cured of their disease: not, indeed, so as to be born a second time, but healed by a kind of alteration; so baptism, which is a spiritual regeneration, is not given a second time against sins committed after baptism, but they are healed by penance which is a kind of spiritual alteration.
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| Considerandum est autem quod corporalis sanatio quandoque quidem ab intrinseco totaliter est: sicut quando aliquis sola virtute naturae curatur. Quandoque autem ab intrinseco et extrinseco simul: ut puta quando naturae operatio iuvatur exteriori beneficio medicinae. Quod autem totaliter ab extrinseco curetur, non contingit: habet enim adhuc in seipso principia vitae, ex quibus sanitas quodammodo in ipso causatur. In spirituali vero curatione accidere non potest quod totaliter ab intrinseco fiat: ostensum est enim in tertio quod a culpa homo liberari non potest nisi auxilio gratiae. Similiter etiam neque potest esse quod spiritualis curatio sit totaliter ab exteriori: non enim restitueretur sanitas mentis nisi ordinati motus voluntatis in homine causarentur. Oportet igitur in poenitentiae sacramento spiritualem salutem et ab interiori et ab exteriori procedere.
| [2] Let this, however, be considered: bodily healing is at times wholly from within, as when one is cured by the power of nature alone. But there are times when one is cured from within and from without simultaneously, for example, when the operation of nature is helped by the external benefit of medicine. But it never happens that one is cured entirely from without, for he still has within himself the principles of life, and from these the healing is somehow caused within him. But spiritual healing, it happens, cannot be brought about entirely from within, for we showed in Book III that man cannot be delivered from fault except by the help of grace. In like fashion, also, neither can his spiritual cure be entirely from an external thing; for the soundness of his mind would not be restored unless ordered movements of will were caused in man. Therefore, the spiritual health in the sacrament of penance must proceed both from something internal and from something external.
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| Hoc autem sic contingit. Ad hoc enim quod aliquis a morbo corporali curetur perfecte, necesse est quod ab omnibus incommodis liberetur quae per morbum incurrit. Sic igitur et spiritualis curatio poenitentiae perfecta non esset nisi homo ab omnibus detrimentis sublevaretur in quae inductus est per peccatum. Primum autem detrimentum quod homo ex peccato sustinet, est deordinatio mentis: secundum quod mens avertitur ab incommutabili bono, scilicet a Deo, et convertitur ad peccatum. Secundum autem est quod reatum poenae incurrit: ut enim in tertio ostensum est, a iustissimo rectore Deo pro qualibet culpa poena debetur. Tertium est quaedam debilitatio naturalis boni: secundum quod homo peccando redditur pronior ad peccandum, et tardior ad bene agendum.
| [3] This comes about in this way. For a man to be perfectly cured of a bodily disease, he necessarily must be freed from all the inconveniences which the disease involves. Thus, then, even the spiritual cure of penance would not be perfected unless a man were relieved of all the damages into which he has been led by sin. Now, the first damage which man sustains from sin is the disordering of the mind; in that man is turned away from the incommutable good—namely, God—and is turned toward sin. But the second damage is that he incurs the guilt of punishment, for, as was shown in Book III, God the most just ruler requires a punishment for every fault. The third damage is a certain weakening of the natural good, in that man by sinning is rendered more prone toward sinning and more reluctant toward doing well.
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| Primum igitur quod in poenitentia requiritur, est ordinatio mentis: ut scilicet mens convertatur ad Deum, et avertatur a peccato, dolens de commisso, et proponens non committendum: quod est de ratione contritionis.
| [4] Therefore, the first thing required in penance is the ordering of the mind; namely, that the mind be turned toward God, and turned away from sin, grieving at its commission, and proposing not to commit it; and this belongs essentially to contrition.
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| Haec vero mentis reordinatio sine gratia esse non potest: nam mens nostra debite ad Deum converti non potest sine caritate, caritas autem sine gratia haberi non potest, ut patet ex his quae in tertio dicta sunt. Sic igitur per contritionem et offensa Dei tollitur et a reatu poenae aeternae liberatur, qui cum gratia et caritate esse non potest: non enim aeterna poena est nisi per separationem a Deo, cui gratia et caritate homo coniungitur. Haec igitur mentis reordinatio, quae in contritione consistit, ex interiori procedit, idest a libero arbitrio, cum adiutorio divinae gratiae.
| [5] But this reordering of the mind cannot be without grace, for our mind cannot duly be turned toward God without charity, but one cannot have charity without grace, as is clear from what was said in Book III. Thus, then, by contrition the offense to God is removed and one is also freed from that guilt of eternal punishment which cannot be simultaneously with grace and charity; for there is no eternal punishment except by separation from God, and by grace and charity man is united with Him. Therefore, this reordering of the mind, which consists of contrition, proceeds from within, that is, from the free will with the help of divine grace.
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| Quia vero supra ostensum est quod meritum Christi pro humano genere patientis ad expiationem omnium peccatorum operatur, necesse est ad hoc quod homo de peccato sanetur, quod non solum mente Deo adhaereat, sed etiam mediatori Dei et hominum Iesu Christo, in quo datur remissio omnium peccatorum: nam in conversione mentis ad Deum salus spiritualis consistit, quam quidem salutem consequi non possumus nisi per medicum animarum nostrarum Iesum Christum, qui salvat populum suum a peccatis eorum. Cuius quidem meritum sufficiens est ad omnia peccata totaliter tollenda, ipse est enim qui tollit peccata mundi, ut dicitur Ioan. 1-29: sed tamen non omnes effectum remissionis perfecte consequuntur, sed unusquisque in tantum consequitur in quantum Christo pro peccatis patienti coniungitur.
| [6] Since, however, it was established above that the merit of Christ suffering for the human race works for the expiation of all sins, if a man is to be healed of sin his mind must necessarily cleave not only to God, but also to the mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ, in whom rests the remission of all sins. For spiritual health consists in the turning of the mind to God, and, to be sure, we cannot achieve this health except through the physician of our souls, Jesus Christ, “who shall save His people from their sins” (Mat. 1:21). Indeed, His merit is sufficient to take away all sins altogether, for it is He “‘who takes away the sins of the world” as John (1:29) says. Nonetheless, not all achieve perfectly the effect of remission; each achieves it in the measure in which he is conjoined with Christ suffering for sins.
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| Quia igitur coniunctio nostri ad Christum in Baptismo non est secundum operationem nostram, quasi ab interiori, quia nulla res seipsam generat ut sit; sed a Christo, qui nos regenerat in spem vivam: remissio peccatorum in Baptismo fit secundum potestatem ipsius Christi nos sibi coniungentis perfecte et integre, ut non solum impuritas peccati tollatur, sed etiam solvatur penitus omnis poenae reatus; nisi forte per accidens in his qui non consequuntur effectum sacramenti propter hoc quod ficte accedunt.
| [7] Our conjunction, then, with Christ in baptism is not in accord with our operation (from within, so to say), because nothing generates itself in being, but it is from Christ, who “regenerated us unto a lively hope” (1 Peter 1:3); therefore, the remission of sins in baptism is made in accord with the power of Christ conjoining us perfectly and entirely with Himself, so as not only to take away every impurity of sin, but also to free us entirely from every guilt of punishment; except incidentally, perhaps, in the case of those who do not get the effect of the sacrament because they approach with a false attitude.
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| In hac vero spirituali sanatione Christo coniungimur secundum operationem nostram divina gratia informatam. Unde non semper totaliter, nec omnes aequaliter remissionis effectum per hanc coniunctionem consequimur. Potest enim esse conversio mentis in Deum et ad meritum Christi, et in detestationem peccati, tam vehemens quod perfecte remissionem peccati homo consequitur non solum quantum ad expurgationem culpae, sed etiam quantum ad remissionem totius poenae. Hoc autem non semper contingit. Unde quandoque, per contritionem amota culpa, et reatu poenae aeternae soluto, ut dictum est, remanet obligatio ad aliquam poenam temporalem, ut iustitia Dei salvetur, secundum quam culpa ordinatur per poenam.
| [8] In the later spiritual healing we are conjoined to Christ in accord with our own operation informed by divine grace. Hence, we do not always entirely, nor do we all equally, achieve the effect of remission by this conjunction. For there can be a turning of the mind toward God, and to the merit of Christ, and to the hatred of sin which is so vehement that a man perfectly achieves the remission of sin, not only with regard to wiping out the fault, but even with regard to remission of the entire punishment. But this does not always happen. Hence, after the fault is taken away by contrition and the guilt of eternal punishment is relieved (as was said), there sometimes persists an obligation to some punishment to maintain the justice of God which requires that fault be ordered by punishment.
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| Cum autem subire poenam pro culpa iudicium quoddam requirat, oportet quod poenitens, qui se Christo sanandum commisit, Christi iudicium in taxatione poenae expectet: quod quidem per suos ministros exhibet Christus, sicut et cetera sacramenta. Nullus autem potest iudicare de culpis quas ignorat. Necessarium igitur fuit confessionem institui, quasi secundam partem huius sacramenti, ut culpa poenitentis innotescat Christi ministro.
| [9] Since, however, to undergo punishment for a fault calls for a kind of judgment, the penitent who has committed himself to Christ for healing must look to Christ’s judgment for fixing the punishment; and this, indeed, Christ does through His ministers, just as He does in the other sacraments. But no one can judge of faults which he does not know. It was necessary, then, that confession be instituted, the second part of this sacrament, so to say, in order to make the fault of the penitent known to the minister of Christ.
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| Oportet igitur ministrum cui fit confessio, iudiciariam potestatem habere vice Christi, qui constitutus est iudex vivorum et mortuorum. Ad iudiciariam autem potestatem duo requiruntur: scilicet auctoritas cognoscendi de culpa, et potestas absolvendi vel condemnandi. Et haec duo dicuntur duae claves Ecclesiae, scilicet scientia discernendi, et potentia ligandi et solvendi, quas dominus Petro commisit, iuxta illud Matth. 16-19: tibi dabo claves regni caelorum. Non autem sic intelligitur Petro commisisse ut ipse solus haberet, sed ut per eum derivarentur ad alios: alias non esset sufficienter fidelium saluti provisum.
| [10] The minister, therefore, to whom confession is made must have judiciary power representing Christ, “who was appointed to be judge of the living and the dead” (Acts 10:42). For judiciary power two things are required: namely, the authority to know about the fault, and the power to absolve or condemn. And these two are called the “two keys of the Church,” namely, the knowledge to discern and the power to bind and loose which our Lord committed to Peter as Matthew (16:19) has it: “I will give to you the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” He is not understood to have committed these to Peter so that he alone might have them, but so that they might through him be passed on to others; otherwise, sufficient provision for the salvation of the faithful would not have been made.
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| Huiusmodi autem claves a passione Christi efficaciam habent, per quam scilicet Christus nobis aperuit ianuam regni caelestis. Et ideo, sicut sine Baptismo, in quo operatur passio Christi, non potest hominibus esse salus, vel realiter suscepto, vel secundum propositum desiderato, quando necessitas, non contemptus, sacramentum excludit; ita peccantibus post Baptismum salus esse non potest nisi clavibus Ecclesiae se subiiciant, vel actu confitendo et iudicium ministrorum Ecclesiae subeundo, vel saltem huius rei propositum habendo, ut impleatur tempore opportuno, quia, ut dicit Petrus, Act. 4-12 non est aliud nomen datum hominibus, in quo oporteat nos salvos fieri, nisi in nomine domini nostri Iesu Christi.
| [11] Of course, keys of this kind have their effectiveness from the suffering of Christ by which, we know, Christ opened for us the door of the kingdom of heaven. Accordingly, just as without baptism, in which the suffering of Christ works, there cannot be salvation for men—whether the baptism be really received, or desired to the purpose “when necessity, but not contempt, excludes the sacrament”—so for those sinning after baptism there can be no salvation unless they submit themselves to the keys of the Church, whether it be by actually confessing and undergoing the judgment of the ministers of the Church, or at least having this as a purpose to be fulfilled at the opportune time; because, as Peter says: “There is no other name given to men whereby we must be saved except by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ” (Acts 4:10-12).
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| Per hoc autem excluditur quorundam error qui dixerunt hominem posse peccatorum veniam consequi sine confessione et proposito confitendi: vel quod per praelatos Ecclesiae dispensari potest quod ad confessionem aliquis non teneatur. Non enim hoc possunt praelati Ecclesiae, ut claves frustrentur Ecclesiae, in quibus tota eorum potestas consistit: neque ut sine sacramento a passione Christi virtutem habente, aliquis remissionem peccatorum consequatur; hoc enim est solius Christi, qui est sacramentorum institutor et auctor. Sicut igitur dispensari non potest per praelatos Ecclesiae ut aliquis sine Baptismo salvetur, ita nec quod aliquis remissionem sine confessione et absolutione consequatur.
| [12] In this way one avoids the error of some who held that a man can achieve forgiveness of sins without confession and without the purpose of confessing, and that the prelates of the Church can dispense one from the obligation of confessing. For the prelates of the Church are unable “to make vain the keys of the Church” in which their entire power consists, and they cannot bring it about that one achieve the remission of his sins apart from a sacrament which has power from the passion of Christ. This belongs only to Christ, who established the sacraments and is their author. Thus, then, as there can be no dispensation from the prelates of the Church allowing one to be saved without baptism, neither can there be one allowing a man to achieve the remission of his sins without confession and absolution.
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| Considerandum tamen est quod sicut Baptismus efficaciam aliquam habet ad remissionem peccati etiam antequam actu suscipiatur, dum est in proposito ipsum suscipiendi - licet postmodum pleniorem effectum conferat et in adeptione gratiae et in remissione culpae, cum actu suscipitur; et quandoque in ipsa susceptione Baptismi confertur gratia, et remittitur culpa, ei cui prius remissa non fuit,- sic et claves Ecclesiae efficaciam habent in aliquo antequam eis se actu subiiciat, si tamen habeat propositum ut se eis subiiciat; pleniorem tamen gratiam et remissionem consequitur dum se eis actu subiicit confitendo, et absolutionem percipiendo; et nihil prohibet quin aliquando virtute clavium alicui confesso in ipsa absolutione gratia conferatur, per quam ei culpa dimittitur.
| [13] Nonetheless, there is this consideration. Baptism has some effectiveness for the remission of sins even before it is actually received, while one has the purpose of receiving it. We grant that afterwards—when it is actually received—it bestows a fuller effect both in the achievement of grace and in the remission of fault. Sometimes, too, grace is bestowed in the very reception of baptism and a fault is remitted for which previously there was no remission. And thus the keys of the Church have effectiveness in one before he actually submits himself to them, provided that he has the purpose of submitting himself to them; nevertheless, he achieves fuller grace and forgiveness when he actually submits himself to the keys by confessing and receiving absolution; and nothing prevents our thinking that sometimes a grace is conferred by the power of the keys on one who has confessed, in the course of the absolution itself, and that by this grace his fault is dismissed.
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| Quia igitur etiam in ipsa confessione et absolutione plenior effectus gratiae et remissionis confertur ei qui prius, propter bonum propositum, utrumque obtinuit; manifestum est quod virtute clavium minister Ecclesiae, absolvendo, aliquid de poena temporali dimittit, cuius debitor remansit poenitens post contritionem. Ad residuum vero sua iniunctione obligat poenitentem: cuius quidem obligationis impletio satisfactio dicitur, quae est tertia poenitentiae pars; per quam homo totaliter a reatu poenae liberatur, dum poenam exsolvit quam debuit; et ulterius debilitas naturalis boni curatur, dum homo a malis abstinet et bonis assuescit; Deo spiritum subiiciendo per orationem, carnem vero domando per ieiunium, ut sit subiecta spiritui; et rebus exterioribus, per eleemosynarum largitionem, proximos sibi adiungendo, a quibus fuit separatus per culpam.
| [14] Therefore, since even in the very confession and absolution a fuller effect of grace and remission is bestowed on him who—by reason of his good purpose—had previously obtained both, manifestly the minister of the Church, absolving by the power of the keys, dismisses. something of the temporal punishment for which the penitent remains in debt after contrition. He does, however, oblige the penitent to the balance by his command. And this fulfillment of the obligation is called satisfaction, which is the third part of penance. By this a man is entirely freed from the guilt of punishment when he pays the penalty which he owed; further, the weakness of the natural good is cured when a man abstains from bad things and accustoms himself to good ones: by subjecting his spirit to God in prayer, or by taming his flesh by fasting to make it subject to the spirit, and in external things by uniting himself by giving alms to the neighbors from whom his fault had separated him.
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| Sic igitur patet quod minister Ecclesiae in usu clavium iudicium quoddam exercet. Nulli autem iudicium committitur nisi in sibi subiectos. Unde manifestum est quod non quilibet sacerdos quemlibet potest absolvere a peccato, ut quidam mentiuntur: sed eum tantum in quem accepit potestatem.
| [15] Thus, clearly, then, the minister of the Church exercises a certain judgment in the use of the keys. But judgment is not granted to one unless it be judgment on those who are his subjects. Hence, it is manifest that it is not any priest at all who can absolve any man at all from sin—as some falsify it; he can absolve only one over whom he has received power.
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Caput 73
De sacramento extremae unctionis
| Chapter 73
ON THE SACRAMENT OF EXTREME UNCTION
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| Quia vero corpus est animae instrumentum; instrumentum autem est ad usum principalis agentis: necesse est quod talis sit dispositio instrumenti ut competat principali agenti; unde et corpus disponitur secundum quod congruit animae. Ex infirmitate igitur animae, quae est peccatum, interdum infirmitas derivatur ad corpus, hoc divino iudicio dispensante. Quae quidem corporalis infirmitas interdum utilis est ad animae sanitatem: prout homo infirmitatem corporalem sustinet humiliter et patienter, et ei quasi in poenam satisfactoriam computatur. Est etiam quandoque impeditiva spiritualis salutis, prout ex infirmitate corporali impediuntur virtutes. Conveniens igitur fuit ut contra peccatum aliqua spiritualis medicina adhiberetur, secundum quod ex peccato derivatur infirmitas corporalis, per quam quidem spiritualem medicinam sanatur infirmitas corporalis aliquando, cum scilicet expedit ad salutem. Et ad hoc ordinatum est sacramentum extremae unctionis, de quo dicitur Iacob. 5-14 infirmatur quis in vobis: inducat presbyteros Ecclesiae, et orent super eum, ungentes eum oleo in nomine domini; et oratio fidei sanabit infirmum.
| [1] Now, the body is the instrument of the soul, and an instrument is for the use of the principal agent: therefore, the disposition of the instrument necessarily must be such as becomes the principal agent. Hence, the body is disposed in harmony with the soul. Therefore, from the infirmity of the soul which is sin infirmity sometimes flows into the body, when the divine judgment so disposes. To be sure, this bodily infirmity is at times useful for the soundness of the soul: so far as a man bears bodily infirmity humbly and patiently, and so far as it is reckoned as satisfying punishment for him. At times, also, it tends to hinder spiritual health: so far as bodily infirmity hinders the virtues. Therefore, it was suitable to employ some spiritual medicine against sin, in accord with the fact that bodily infirmity flows out of sin; indeed, this spiritual medicine cures the bodily infirmity at times, namely, when this is helpful to salvation. And for this a sacrament was established extreme unction, about which James (5:14-15) says: “Is any man sick among you? Let him bring in the priests of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord. And the prayer of faith shall heal the sick man.”
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| Nec praeiudicat virtuti sacramenti si aliquando infirmi quibus hoc sacramentum confertur, non ex toto ab infirmitate corporali curantur: quia quandoque sanari corporaliter, etiam digne hoc sacramentum sumentibus, non est utile ad spiritualem salutem. Nec tamen inutiliter sumunt, quamvis corporalis sanitas non sequatur. Cum enim hoc sacramentum sic ordinetur contra infirmitatem corporis inquantum consequitur ex peccato, manifestum est quod contra alias sequelas peccati hoc sacramentum ordinatur, quae sunt pronitas ad malum et difficultas ad bonum: et tanto magis quanto huiusmodi infirmitates animae sunt propinquiores peccato quam infirmitas corporalis. Et quidem huiusmodi infirmitates spirituales per poenitentiam sunt curandae, prout poenitens per opera virtutis, quibus satisfaciendo utitur, a malis retrahitur et ad bonum inclinatur. Sed quia homo, vel per negligentiam, aut propter occupationes varias vitae, aut etiam propter temporis brevitatem, aut propter alia huiusmodi, praedictos defectus in se perfecte non curat, salubriter ei providetur, ut per hoc sacramentum praedicta curatio compleatur, et a reatu poenae temporalis liberetur, ut sic nihil in eo remaneat quod in exitu animae a corpore eam possit a perceptione gloriae impedire. Et ideo Iacobus addit: et alleviabit eum dominus. Contingit etiam quod homo omnium peccatorum quae commisit, notitiam vel memoriam non habet, ut possint per poenitentiam singula expurgari. Sunt etiam quotidiana peccata, sine quibus praesens vita non agitur. A quibus oportet hominem in suo exitu per hoc sacramentum emundari, ut nihil inveniatur in eo quod perceptioni gloriae repugnet. Et ideo addit Iacobus quod, si in peccatis sit, dimittentur ei.
| [2] Nor is the power of this sacrament prejudiced if at times the sick on whom it is conferred are not wholly cured of this bodily infirmity, for the restoration of bodily health—even in those who receive the sacrament worthily—sometimes is not useful for salvation. And they do not, for all that, receive it in vain, although bodily health may not follow on it. For, since this sacrament is set against bodily infirmity so far as this follows on sin, this sacrament manifestly was established against the other consequences of sin, which are proneness to evil and difficulty in good, and it is set so much the more as the soul’s infirmities of this sort are closer neighbors to sin than bodily infirmity is. Indeed, spiritual infirmities of this sort are to be cured by penance, in that the works of virtue which the penitent performs when he makes satisfaction withdraw him from evils and incline him to good. But, since man, whether due to negligence, or to the changing occupations of life, or even to the shortness of time, or to something else of the sort, does not perfectly heal within himself the weaknesses mentioned, a healthful provision for him is made by this sacrament: it completes the healing aforesaid, and it delivers him from the guilt of temporal punishment; as a result, nothing remains in him when the soul leaves the body which can obstruct the soul in the perception of glory. And therefore James adds: “And the Lord shall raise him up.” Perhaps, also, a man has neither awareness nor memory of all the sins which he has committed, so that they may be washed away individual by penance. There are also those daily sins without which one does not lead this present life. And from these a man ought to be cleansed at his departure by this sacrament, so that nothing be found in him which would clash with the perception of glory. And therefore James adds: “If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him.”
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| Unde manifestum est quod hoc sacramentum est ultimum, et quodammodo consummativum totius spiritualis curationis, quo homo quasi ad percipiendam gloriam praeparatur. Unde et extrema unctio nuncupatur.
| [3] Hence, it is clear that this sacrament is the last, that it somehow tends to consummate the entire spiritual healing, and that in it a man is, as it were, prepared for the perception of glory. For this reason also it is named extreme unction.
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| Ex quo manifestum est quod hoc sacramentum non quibuscumque infirmantibus est exhibendum, sed illis tantum qui ex infirmitate videntur propinquare ad finem. Qui tamen, si convaluerint, iterato potest hoc sacramentum eis conferri, si ad similem statum devenerint. Non enim huius sacramenti unctio est ad consecrandum, sicut unctio confirmationis, ablutio Baptismi, et quaedam aliae unctiones, quae ideo nunquam iterantur quia consecratio semper manet, dum res consecrata durat, propter efficaciam divinae virtutis consecrantis. Ordinatur autem huius sacramenti inunctio ad sanandum: medicina autem sanativa toties iterari debet quoties infirmitas iteratur.
| [4] From this it is apparent that this sacrament is not to be given to anyone at all who is sick, but only to those who seem in their weakness to be approaching the end. Nevertheless, if they get well, the sacrament can be conferred on them again if they return to a similar situation. For the anointing in this sacrament involves no consecration, as does the anointing in confirmation, or the washing in baptism, and certain other anointings which are never repeated—simply because the consecration always remains, so long as the thing consecrated endures, because of the effectiveness of the divine power which consecrates. But the anointing of this sacrament is ordered toward healing, and healing medicine ought to be repeated as often as the weakness is repeated.
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| Et licet aliqui sint in statu propinquo morti etiam absque infirmitate, ut patet in his qui damnantur ad mortem, qui tamen spiritualibus effectibus huius sacramenti indigerent: non tamen est exhibendum, nisi infirmanti, cum sub specie corporalis medicinae exhibeatur, quae non competit nisi corporaliter infirmato; oportet enim in sacramentis significationem servari. Sicut igitur requiritur in Baptismo ablutio corpori exhibita, ita in hoc sacramento requiritur medicatio infirmitati corporali apposita. Unde etiam oleum est specialis materia huius sacramenti, quia habet efficaciam ad sanandum corporaliter mitigando dolores: sicut aqua, quae corporaliter abluit, est materia sacramenti in quo fit spiritualis ablutio.
| [5] We grant that some are in a state close to death even without infirmity—this is clear in the case of those condemned to death—and they nevertheless would need the spiritual effects of this sacrament, but it is not to be given unless such a one is sick, since it is given under the appearance of bodily medicine, which is fitting only for one who has been weakened in the body. For in the sacraments the character of the sign must be maintained. Therefore, just as baptism requires that washing be used on a body, so this sacrament requires that medicine be applied for bodily weakness. Hence, also, oil is the special matter of this sacrament, because it has effectiveness for bodily healing by alleviating pain; just as water which cleans the body is the matter of the sacrament in which spiritual cleansing takes place.
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| Inde etiam manifestum est quod, sicut medicatio corporalis adhibenda est ad infirmitatis originem, ita haec unctio illis partibus corporis adhibetur ex quibus infirmitas peccati procedit: sicut sunt instrumenta sensuum et manus et pedes, quibus opera peccati exercentur, et, secundum quorundam consuetudinem, renes, in quibus vis libidinis viget.
| [6] Therein one also sees that, just as bodily medicine must be applied at the source of the infirmity, so this anointing is used on those parts of the body from which the weakness of sin proceeds: such are the organs of the senses, and the hands and feet by which the works of sin are carried On, and—in accord with the custom of some—the loins in which the libidinous force is strong.
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| Quia vero per hoc sacramentum peccata dimittuntur; peccatum autem non dimittitur, nisi per gratiam: manifestum est quod in hoc sacramento gratia confertur.
| [7] But, since sins are forgiven by this sacrament, and no sin, of course, is forgiven except by grace, manifestly grace is conferred in this sacrament.
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| Ea vero, in quibus gratia illuminans mentem confertur exhibere solum pertinet ad sacerdotes, quorum ordo est illuminativus, ut Dionysius dicit. Nec requiritur ad hoc sacramentum episcopus: cum per hoc sacramentum non conferatur excellentia status, sicut in illis quorum est minister episcopus.
| [8] Now, when things bestow enlightening grace on the mind, their use is proper only to priests, for their order tends to enlighten, as Dionysius says. Neither does this sacrament require a bishop, since this sacrament does not confer a state of excellence, as is the case with those whose minister is a bishop.
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| Quia tamen hoc sacramentum perfectae curationis effectum habet, et in eo requiritur copia gratiae; competit huic sacramento quod multi sacerdotes intersint, et quod oratio totius Ecclesiae ad effectum huius sacramenti coadiuvet. Unde Iacobus dicit: inducat presbyteros Ecclesiae, et oratio fidei sanabit infirmum. Si tamen unus solus presbyter adsit, intelligitur hoc sacramentum perficere in virtute totius Ecclesiae, cuius minister existit, et cuius personam gerit.
| [9] Nonetheless, since this sacrament has a perfect cure as its effect, and an abundance of grace is required in it, it becomes this sacrament to have many priests present, and to have the prayer of the whole Church help in the effect. Hence, James says: “Let him bring in the priests of the Church... and the prayer of faith shall save the sick man.” If, nonetheless, only one priest is present, it is understood that he fulfills this sacrament in the power of the entire Church whose minister he is, and which, in person, he represents.
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| Impeditur autem huius sacramenti effectus per fictionem suscipientis, sicut contingit in aliis sacramentis.
| [10] Of course, the effect of this sacrament is obstructed by pretense in the receiver, just as can be the case with the other sacraments.
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Caput 79
Quod per Christum resurrectio corporum sit futura
| Chapter 79
THAT THROUGH CHRIST THE RESURRECTION OF BODIES IS TO COME
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| Quia vero supra ostensum est quod per Christum liberati sumus ab his quae per peccatum primi hominis incurrimus; peccante autem primo homine, non solum in nos peccatum derivatum est, sed etiam mors, quae est poena peccati, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. 5-12: per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors: necessarium est quod per Christum ab utroque liberemur, et a culpa scilicet et a morte. Unde ibidem dicit apostolus: si in unius delicto mors regnavit per unum, multo magis accipientes abundantiam donationis et iustitiae, in vitam regnabunt per unum Iesum Christum.
| [1] Now, we have shown above that we have been freed by Christ from what we incurred by the sin of the first man; and, when the first man sinned, not only was the sin itself passed on to us, but also, death, which is the punishment of sin, in the Apostle’s words: “By one man sin entered into this world and by sin death” (Rom. 5:12). Therefore, it necessarily is by Christ that we are freed from each of these; namely, from the fault and from death. Accordingly, the Apostle says in the same place: “If by one man’s offence death reigned through vie; much more they who receive abundance... of the gift and of justice shall reign in life through one, Jesus Christ” (Rom. 5:37).
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| Ut igitur utrumque nobis in seipso demonstraret, et mori et resurgere voluit: mori quidem voluit ut nos a peccato purgaret, unde apostolus dicit, Hebr. 9-27: quemadmodum statutum est hominibus semel mori, sic et Christus semel oblatus est ad multorum exhaurienda peccata; resurgere autem voluit ut nos a morte liberaret unde apostolus, I Cor. 15-20 Christus resurrexit a mortuis, primitiae dormientium. Quoniam quidem per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum.
| [2] Therefore, in order to make each of these clear to us in Himself, He chose both to die and to rise. He chose to die, indeed, to cleanse us from sin; hence, the Apostle says: “As it is appointed unto men once to die, so also Christ was offered once to exhaust the sins of many” (Heb. 9). But He chose to rise to free us from death; hence, the Apostle says: “Christ is risen from the dead, the firstfruits of them that sleep. For by a man came death and by a man the resurrection of the dead” (1 Cor. 15:20-21).
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| Effectum igitur mortis Christi in sacramentis consequimur quantum ad remissionem culpae: dictum est enim supra quod sacramenta in virtute passionis Christi operantur.
| [3] It is, then, the effect of the death of Christ in regard to the remission of sin which we achieve in the sacraments, for, it has already been said, the sacraments work in the power of the passion of Christ.
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| Effectum autem resurrectionis Christi quantum ad liberationem a morte in fine saeculi consequemur, quando omnes per Christi virtutem resurgemus. Unde dicit apostolus, I Cor. 15-12 si Christus praedicatur quod resurrexit a mortuis, quomodo quidam dicunt in vobis quoniam resurrectio mortuorum non est? Si autem resurrectio mortuorum non est, neque Christus resurrexit, si autem Christus non resurrexit, inanis est praedicatio nostra, inanis est et fides nostra. Est igitur de necessitate fidei credere resurrectionem mortuorum futuram.
| [4] But the effect of the resurrection of Christ in regard to our liberation from death we shall achieve at the end of the world, when we shall all rise by the power of Christ. Hence, the Apostle says: “If Christ be preached that He arose again from the dead, how do some among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? If there be no resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not risen again. And if Christ be not risen again then is our preaching vain and our faith is vain (1 Cor. 15:12`14). It is, then, a necessary tenet of faith to believe that there will be a resurrection of the dead.
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| Quidam vero hoc perverse intelligentes, resurrectionem corporum futuram non credunt: sed quod de resurrectione legitur in Scripturis, ad spiritualem resurrectionem referre conantur, secundum quod aliqui a morte peccati resurgunt per gratiam.
| [5] There are, however, some who are perverse in their understanding of this and they do not believe in the future resurrection of bodies, but attempt to ascribe what we read about the resurrection in the Scriptures to a spiritual resurrection in which some arise from the death of sin by grace.
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| Hic autem error ab ipso apostolo reprobatur. Dicit enim II Tim. 2-16 profana et vaniloquia devita, multum enim proficiunt ad impietatem, et sermo eorum ut cancer serpit: ex quibus est Hymenaeus et Philetus, qui a veritate fidei exciderunt, dicentes resurrectionem iam factam esse: quod non poterat intelligi nisi de resurrectione spirituali. Est ergo contra veritatem fidei ponere resurrectionem spiritualem, et negare corporalem.
| [6] But this error is rejected by the Apostle himself, he says: “But shun profane and vain babblings: for they grow much towards ungodliness, And their speech spreads like a canker: of whom are Hymenaeus and Philebus: who have erred from the truth of the faith, saying that the resurrection is past already” (2 Tim. 2:16-18). And this was not understandable except of a spiritual resurrection. It is, therefore, contrary to the truth of the faith to accept a spiritual resurrection and deny a bodily one.
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| Praeterea. Manifestum est ex his quae apostolus Corinthiis dicit, quod praemissa verba de resurrectione corporali sunt intelligenda. Nam post pauca subdit: seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spirituale, ubi manifeste corporis resurrectionem tangit; et postmodum subdit: oportet corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induere immortalitatem. Hoc autem corruptibile et mortale est corpus. Corpus igitur est quod resurget.
| [7] There is more. It is clear from what the Apostle says to the Corinthians that the words cited are to be understood of a bodily resurrection. For, after a bit, he adds, “It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body,” wherein, manifestly, the body’s resurrection is touched on; and a little later he adds: “This corruptible must put on incorruption; and this mortal must put on immortality” (1 Cor. 15:44, 53). But the corruptible and the mortal mean the body. Therefore, it is the body that will rise.
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| Adhuc. Dominus, Ioan. 5-25, utramque resurrectionem promittit. Dicit enim: amen, amen dico vobis, quia venit hora, et nunc est, quando mortui audient vocem filii Dei, et qui audierint, vivent: quod ad resurrectionem spiritualem animarum pertinere videtur, quae tunc iam fieri incipiebat, dum aliqui per fidem Christo adhaerebant. Sed postmodum corporalem resurrectionem exprimit dicens: venit hora in qua omnes qui in monumentis sunt audient vocem filii Dei. Manifestum est enim quod animae in monumentis non sunt, sed corpora. Praedicitur ergo hic corporum resurrectio.
| [8] Moreover, our Lord promises both resurrections, for He says: “Amen, Amen, I say unto you that the hour comes and now is when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God and they that hear shall live.” And this seems to pertain to the spiritual resurrection of souls, which even then was beginning to be completed, when some were cleaving to Christ in faith. But, later, it is the bodily resurrection He expresses, saying: “The hour is coming, when all who are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God” (John 5:25, 28). For, clearly, souls are not in the graves, but bodies. Therefore, this predicts the bodily resurrection.
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| Expresse etiam corporum resurrectio praenuntiatur a Iob. Dicitur enim Iob 19-25: scio quod redemptor meus vivit, et in novissimo die de terra surrecturus sum, et rursus circumdabor pelle mea et in carne mea videbo Deum.
| [9] The bodily resurrection was also expressly foretold by Job. For he says: “I know that my Redeemer lives, and on the last day I shall rise out of the earth, and shall be clothed again with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see my God” (Job 19:75-76).
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| Ad ostendendum etiam resurrectionem carnis futuram evidens ratio suffragatur, suppositis his quae in superioribus sunt ostensa. Ostensum est enim in secundo animas hominum immortales esse. Remanent igitur post corpora a corporibus absolutae. Manifestum est etiam ex his quae in secundo dicta sunt, quod anima corpori naturaliter unitur: est enim secundum suam essentiam corporis forma. Est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse. Nihil autem quod est contra naturam, potest esse perpetuum. Non igitur perpetuo erit anima absque corpore. Cum igitur perpetuo maneat, oportet eam corpori iterato coniungi: quod est resurgere. Immortalitas igitur animarum exigere videtur resurrectionem corporum futuram.
| [10] Moreover, to establish that there will be a resurrection of the flesh there is an evident supporting argument which is based on the points made earlier. For we showed in Book II that the souls of men are immortal. They persist, then, after their bodies, released from their bodies. It is also clear from what was said in Book II that the soul is naturally united to the body, for in its essence it is the form of the body. It, then, contrary to the nature of the soul to be without the body. But nothing which is contrary to nature can be perpetual. Perpetually, then, the soul will not be without the body. Since, then, it persists perpetually, it must once again be united to the body; and this is to rise again. Therefore, the immortality of souls seems to demand a future resurrection of bodies.
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| Adhuc. Ostensum est supra, in tertio, naturale hominis desiderium ad felicitatem tendere. Felicitas autem ultima est felicis perfectio. Cuicumque igitur deest aliquid ad perfectionem, nondum habet felicitatem perfectam, quia nondum eius desiderium totaliter quietatur: omne enim imperfectum perfectionem consequi naturaliter cupit. Anima autem a corpore separata est aliquo modo imperfecta, sicut omnis pars extra suum totum existens: anima enim naturaliter est pars humanae naturae. Non igitur potest homo ultimam felicitatem consequi nisi anima iterato corpori coniungatur: praesertim cum ostensum sit quod in hac vita homo non potest ad felicitatem ultimam pervenire.
| [11] Furthermore, there was shown in Book III the natural desire of man to tend to happiness. But ultimate happiness is the perfection of the happy one. Therefore, anyone to whom some perfection is wanting does not yet have perfect happiness, because his desire is not entirely at rest, for every imperfect thing naturally desires to achieve its perfection. But the soul separated from the body is in a way imperfect, as is every part existing outside of its whole, for the soul is naturally a part of human nature. Therefore, man cannot achieve his ultimate happiness unless the soul be once again united to the body, especially since it was shown that in this life man cannot arrive at his ultimate happiness.
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| Item. Sicut in tertio ostensum est, ex divina providentia peccantibus poena debetur, et bene agentibus praemium. In hac autem vita homines ex anima et corpore compositi peccant vel recte agunt. Debetur igitur hominibus et secundum animam et secundum corpus praemium vel poena. Manifestum est autem quod in hac vita praemium ultimae felicitatis consequi non possunt, ex his quae in tertio ostensa sunt. Multoties etiam peccata in hac vita non puniuntur: quinimmo, ut dicitur Iob 21-7: hic impii vivunt, confortati sunt, sublimatique divitiis. Necessarium est igitur ponere iteratam animae ad corpus coniunctionem, ut homo in corpore et anima praemiari et puniri possit.
| [12] Moreover, as was shown in Book III, by divine providence sinners deserve punishment, and those who do well a reward. But in this life men, composed of soul and body, sin or act rightly. Therefore, in both the soul and the body men deserve reward or punishment. But that in this life they cannot achieve the reward of ultimate happiness is clear from the points made in Book III. And time after time sins are not punished in this life; rather, in fact, as we read in Job (21:7) here “the wicked live, are advanced, and are strengthened with riches.” Necessarily, then, we must assert a repeated union of the soul with the body, so that man can be rewarded and punished in the body as well as in the soul.
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Caput 81
Solutio praemissarum obiectionum
| Chapter 81
SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS MENTIONED
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| Ad horum igitur solutionem, considerandum est quod Deus, sicut supra dictum est, in institutione humanae naturae, aliquid corpori humano attribuit supra id quod ei ex naturalibus principiis debebatur: scilicet incorruptibilitatem quandam, per quam convenienter suae formae coaptaretur, ut sicut animae vita perpetua est, ita corpus per animam posset perpetuo vivere.
| [1] Now, toward a solution of these difficulties this consideration is required: God, as was said, above, when He established human nature, granted the human body something over and above that which was its due in its natural principles: a kind of incorruptibility, namely, by which it was suitably adapted to its form, with the result that, as the life of the soul is perpetual, so the body could live perpetually by the soul.
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| Et talis quidem incorruptibilitas, etsi non esset naturalis quantum ad activum principium, erat tamen quodammodo naturalis ex ordine ad finem, ut scilicet materia proportionaretur suae naturali formae, quae est finis materiae.
| [2] And this sort of incorruptibility, although not, of course, natural in its. active principle, was somehow natural in its order to the end; namely, as matter would be ordered to its natural form, which is the end of the matter.
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| Anima igitur, praeter ordinem suae naturae, a Deo aversa, subtracta est dispositio quae eius corpori divinitus indita erat, ut sibi proportionaliter responderet, et secuta est mors. Est igitur mors quasi per accidens superveniens homini per peccatum, considerata institutione humanae naturae.
| [3] When the soul, then, outside the order of its nature, was turned away from God, that disposition was lost which had been divinely bestowed on the soul’s body to make it proportionally responsive to the soul; and death followed. Death, therefore, is something added as an accident, so to say, to man through sin, if one considers the establishment of human nature.
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| Hoc autem accidens sublatum est per Christum, qui merito suae passionis mortem moriendo destruxit. Ex hoc igitur consequitur quod divina virtute, quae corpori incorruptionem dedit, iterato corpus de morte ad vitam reparetur.
| [4] . But this accident was taken away by Christ, who by the merit of His passion our “death by dying did destroy.” From this, then, it follows that by the divine power which gave the body incorruption the body may once again be restored from death to life.
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| Secundum hoc igitur ad primum dicendum quod virtus naturae deficiens est a virtute divina, sicut virtus instrumenti a virtute principalis agentis. Quamvis igitur operatione naturae hoc fieri non possit, ut corpus corruptum reparetur ad vitam, tamen virtute divina id fieri potest. Nam quod natura hoc facere non possit, ideo est quia natura semper per formam aliquam operatur. Quod autem habet formam, iam est. Cum vero corruptum est, formam amisit, quae poterat esse actionis principium. Unde operatione naturae, quod corruptum est idem numero reparari non potest. Sed divina virtus, quae res produxit in esse, sic per naturam operatur quod absque ea effectum naturae producere potest, ut superius est ostensum. Unde, cum virtus divina maneat eadem etiam rebus corruptis, potest corrupta in integrum reparare.
| [5] In this way, then, one must answer the first argument that the power of nature fails the divine power, as the power of an instrument fails the principal agent. Granted, then, that the operation of nature cannot bring it about that a corrupted body be restored to life, the divine power can bring it about. The reason nature is unable to do this is that nature always operates by a form. But what has a form, already is. When it was corrupted, of course, it lost the form which was able to be the principle of the action. Hence, by natures operation, what was corrupted cannot be restored with a numerical identity. But the divine power which produced things in being operates by nature in such wise that it can without nature produce natures effect, as was previously shown. Hence since the divine power remains the same even when things are corrupted, it can restore the corrupted to integrity.
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| Quod vero secundo obiicitur, impedire non potest quin homo idem numero resurgere possit. Nullum enim principiorum essentialium hominis per mortem omnino cedit in nihilum: nam anima rationalis, quae est hominis forma, manet post mortem, ut superius est ostensum; materia etiam manet, quae tali formae fuit subiecta, sub dimensionibus eisdem ex quibus habebat ut esset individualis materia. Ex coniunctione igitur eiusdem animae numero ad eandem materiam numero, homo reparabitur.
| [6] What is stated in the second objection, however, cannot be an obstacle to man’s ability to rise with numerical identity. For none of man’s essential principles yields entirely to nothingness in death, for the rational soul which is man’s form remains after death, as was shown above; the matter, also, which was subject to such a form remains in the same dimensions which made it able to be the individual matter. Therefore, by conjunction to a soul numerically the same the man will be restored to matter numerically the same.
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| Corporeitas autem dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est forma substantialis corporis, prout in genere substantiae collocatur. Et sic corporeitas cuiuscumque corporis nihil est aliud quam forma substantialis eius, secundum quam in genere et specie collocatur, ex qua debetur rei corporali quod habeat tres dimensiones. Non enim sunt diversae formae substantiales in uno et eodem, per quarum unam collocetur in genere supremo, puta substantiae; et per aliam in genere proximo, puta in genere corporis vel animalis; et per aliam in specie puta hominis aut equi. Quia si prima forma faceret esse substantiam, sequentes formae iam advenirent ei quod est hoc aliquid in actu et subsistens in natura: et sic posteriores formae non facerent hoc aliquid, sed essent in subiecto quod est hoc aliquid sicut formae accidentales. Oportet igitur, quod corporeitas, prout est forma substantialis in homine, non sit aliud quam anima rationalis, quae in sua materia hoc requirit, quod habeat tres dimensiones: est enim actus corporis alicuius. Alio modo accipitur corporeitas prout est forma accidentalis, secundum quam dicitur corpus quod est in genere quantitatis. Et sic corporeitas nihil aliud est quam tres dimensiones, quae corporis rationem constituunt. Etsi igitur haec corporeitas in nihilum cedit, corpore humano corrupto, tamen impedire non potest quin idem numero resurgat: eo quod corporeitas primo modo dicta non in nihilum cedit, sed eadem manet.
| [7] Corporeity, however, can be taken in two ways. In one way, it can be taken as the substantial form of a body as it is located in the genus of substance. Thus, the corporeity of any body is nothing else but its substantial form; in accord with this it is fixed in genus and species, and to this the bodily thing owes its having three dimensions. For there are not different substantial forms in one and the same thing, by one of which it is placed in the supreme genus—substance, say; by another in its proximate genus—body or animal, say; and by another in its species—say man or horse. Since, if the first form were to make the being substance, the following forms would be accruing to that which already is actually a definite something (hoc aliquid), and subsisting in nature; thus, the later forms would not make a definite something, but would be in the subject which is a definite something as accidental forms. Therefore, corporeity, as the substantial form in man, cannot be other than the rational soul, which requires in its own matter the possession of three dimensions, for the soul is the act of a body. Another way of taking corporeity is as an accidental form; in accord with this one says a body is in the genus of quantity. And corporeity thus is nothing other than the three dimensions which constitute the character of body. Therefore, although this corporeity yields to nothingness when the human body is corrupted, it cannot, for all that, be an obstacle to the body’s rising with numerical identity; the reason is that corporeity taken in the first way does not yield to nothingness, but remains the same.
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| Similiter etiam forma mixti dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo ut per formam mixti intelligatur forma substantialis corporis mixti. Et sic, cum in homine non sit alia forma substantialis quam anima rationalis, ut ostensum est: non poterit dici quod forma mixti, prout est forma substantialis, homine moriente cedat in nihilum. Alio modo dicitur forma mixti qualitas quaedam composita et contemperata ex mixtione simplicium qualitatum, quae ita se habet ad formam substantialem corporis mixti sicut se habet qualitas simplex ad formam substantialem corporis simplicis. Unde etsi forma mixtionis sic dicta in nihilum cedat, non praeiudicat unitati corporis resurgentis.
| [8] In the same fashion, also, the form of a compound can be taken in two ways. In one way it is so taken that by form of a compound one understands the substantial form of the compound body. And thus, since there is not in man any other substantial form than the rational soul, as was shown, one will not be able to say that the form of the compound, as it is the substantial form, yields to nothingness when man dies. Taken in a second way, a form of the compound is called that certain quality which is composed and balanced from the mixture of the simple qualities, and stands to the substantial form of the compound body as the simple quality stands to the substantial form of the simple body. Hence, although the form of the compounding when thus stated yields to nothingness, this is not prejudicial to the unity of the body arising.
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| Sic etiam dicendum est et de parte nutritiva, et sensitiva. Si enim per partem sensitivam et nutritivam intelligantur ipsae potentiae, quae sunt proprietates naturales animae, vel magis compositi, corrupto corpore corrumpuntur: nec tamen per hoc impeditur unitas resurgentis. Si vero per partes praedictas intelligatur ipsa substantia animae sensitivae et nutritivae, utraque earum est eadem cum anima rationali. Non enim sunt in homine tres animae, sed una tantum, ut in secundo libro ostensum est.
| [9] Thus, also, must one speak of the nutritive part and the sensitive part. For, if by sensitive part and nutritive part one understands those very capacities which are the natural properties of the soul, or, better, of the composite, then, when the body is corrupted, they are corrupted; nonetheless, this is no obstacle to the unity of the one arising. But, if by the parts mentioned the very substance of the sensitive and nutritive soul is understood, each of those parts is identified with the rational soul. For there are not three souls in man, but only one, as was shown in Book II.
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| De humanitate vero, non est intelligendum quod sit quaedam forma consurgens ex coniunctione formae ad materiam, quasi realiter sit alia ab utroque: quia, cum per formam materia fiat hoc aliquid actu, ut dicitur II de anima, illa tertia forma consequens non esset substantialis, sed accidentalis. Dicunt autem quidam quod forma partis eadem est et forma totius: sed dicitur forma partis secundum quod facit materiam esse in actu; forma vero totius dicitur secundum quod complet speciei rationem. Et secundum hoc, humanitas non est aliud realiter quam anima rationalis. Unde patet quod, corrupto corpore, non cedit in nihilum. Sed quia humanitas est essentia hominis; essentia autem rei est quam significat definitio; definitio autem rei naturalis non significat tantum formam, sed formam et materiam: necessarium est quod humanitas aliquid significet compositum ex materia et forma, sicut et homo. Differenter tamen. Nam humanitas significat principia essentialia speciei, tam formalia quam materialia, cum praecisione principiorum individualium, dicitur enim humanitas secundum quam aliquis est homo; homo autem non est aliquis ex hoc quod habet principia individualia, sed ex hoc solum quod habet principia essentialia speciei. Humanitas igitur significat sola principia essentialia speciei. Unde significatur per modum partis. Homo autem significat quidem principia essentialia speciei, sed non excludit principia individuantia a sui significatione: nam homo dicitur qui habet humanitatem, ex quo non excluditur quin alia habere possit. Et propter hoc homo significatur per modum totius: significat enim principia speciei essentialia in actu, individuantia vero in potentia. Socrates vero significat utraque in actu, sicut et differentiam genus habet potestate, species vero actu. Unde patet quod et homo redit idem numero in resurrectione, et humanitas eadem numero, propter animae rationalis permanentiam et materiae unitatem.
| [10] But, in speaking of humanity, one should not understand it as a kind of form coming forth from the union of the form to the matter, as though it were, really other than each of the two, because, since by the form the matter is made this actual something, as De anima II [ 1] says, that third form following would be not substantial, but accidental. Of course, some say that the form of the part is the same as the form of the whole: it is called form of the part in that it makes the matter actual being, but it is called form of the whole in that it completes the species essentially. In this way, humanity is not really other than the rational soul. Hence, clearly, when the body is corrupted it does not yield to nothingness. But humanity is the essence of man. The essence of a thing, of course, is, what the definition signifies; and the definition of a natural thing does not signify the form alone, but the form and the ,matter. Therefore, necessarily, humanity signifies something composite of matter and form, just as “man” does. Differently, nevertheless; for “humanity” signifies the essential principles of the species, both formal and material, prescinding from the individual principles. Humanity is used so far as one is a man; one is not a man by reason of having the individual principles, but only by having the essential principles of the species. Humanity, therefore, signifies only the essential principles of the species. Hence, it is signified in the way in which a part is signified. “Man” truly signifies the essential principles of the species, but does not exclude the individuating principles from .its signification, for he is called man who has humanity, and this does not shut out the ability to have other things. For this reason, man is signified as a whole is, for it signifies the essential principles actually, but the individuating principles potentially. “Socrates,” however, signifies each set of principles actually, just as the genus contains the difference in potency, but the species contains it actually. Hence, it is clear that man returns numerically the same both by reason of the permanence of the rational soul and by reason of the unity of matter.
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| Quod vero tertio obiicitur, quod esse non est unum quia non est continuum: falso innititur fundamento. Manifestum est enim quod materiae et formae unum est esse: non enim materia habet esse in actu nisi per formam. Differt tamen quantum ad hoc anima rationalis ab aliis formis. Nam esse aliarum formarum non est nisi in concretione ad materiam: non enim excedunt materiam neque in esse, neque in operari. Anima vero rationalis, manifestum est quod excedit materiam in operari: habet enim aliquam operationem absque participatione organi corporalis, scilicet intelligere. Unde et esse suum non est solum in concretione ad materiam. Esse igitur eius, quod erat compositi, manet in ipsa corpore dissoluto: et reparato corpore in resurrectione, in idem esse reducitur quod remansit in anima.
| [11] However, what is said in the third argument—that being is not one because it is not continuous—rests on a false foundation. For, clearly, the being of matter and form is one; matter has no actual being except by form. Nonetheless, in this respect the rational soul differs from other forms. For there is no being of other forms except in their concrete union with matter, since they exceed matter neither in being nor in operation. But the rational soul plainly exceeds matter in its operation, for it has an operation in which no bodily organ takes part; namely, the act of understanding. Hence, its being, also, is not merely in its concrete union with matter. Its being, therefore, which is that of the composite, remains in the soul even when the body is dissolved; when the body is restored in the resurrection, it is returned to the same being which persisted in the soul.
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| Quod etiam quarto obiicitur, resurgentis unitatem non tollit. Quod enim non impedit unitatem secundum numerum in homine dum continue vivit, manifestum est quod non potest impedire unitatem resurgentis. In corpore autem hominis, quandiu vivit, non semper sunt eaedem partes secundum materiam, sed solum secundum speciem; secundum vero materiam partes fluunt et refluunt: nec propter hoc impeditur quin homo sit unus numero a principio vitae usque in finem. Cuius exemplum accipi potest ex igne, qui, dum continue ardet, unus numero dicitur, propter hoc quod species eius manet, licet ligna consumantur et de novo apponantur. Sic etiam est in humano corpore. Nam forma et species singularium partium eius continue manet per totam vitam: sed materia partium et resolvitur per actionem caloris naturalis, et de novo adgeneratur per alimentum. Non est igitur alius numero homo secundum diversas aetates, quamvis non quicquid materialiter est in homine secundum unum statum sit in eo secundum alium. Sic igitur non requiritur ad hoc quod resurgat homo numero idem, quod quicquid fuit materialiter in eo secundum totum tempus vitae suae resumatur: sed tantum ex eo quantum sufficit ad complementum debitae quantitatis; et praecipue illud resumendum videtur quod perfectius fuit sub forma et specie humanitatis consistens. Si quid vero defuit ad complementum debitae quantitatis, vel quia aliquis praeventus est morte antequam natura ipsum ad perfectam quantitatem deduceret, vel quia forte aliquis mutilatus est membro; aliunde hoc divina supplebit potentia. Nec tamen hoc impediet resurgentis corporis unitatem: quia etiam opere naturae super id quod puer habet, aliquid additur aliunde, ut ad perfectam perveniat quantitatem, nec talis additio facit alium numero; idem enim numero est homo et puer et adultus.
| [12] The fourth objection, also, fails to remove the unity of the one who rises. For what is no obstacle to a man’s numerical unity while he continues to live manifestly cannot be an obstacle to the unity of one who rises. But in the body of man, so long as he is alive, it is not with respect to matter that he has the same parts, but with respect to his species. In respect to matter, of course, the parts are in flux, but this is not an obstacle to his being numerically one from the beginning of his life to the end of it. An example of this can be taken from fire: While it continues to bum, it is called numerically one because its species persists, yet wood is consumed and new wood is applied. It is also like this in the human body, for the form and species of its single parts remain continuously through a whole life; the matter of the parts is not only resolved by the action of the natural heat, but is replenished anew by nourishment. Man is not, therefore, numerically different according to his different ages, although not everything which is in him materially in one state is also there in another. In this way, then, this is not a requirement of man’s arising with numerical identity: that he should assume again whatever has been in him during the whole time of his life; but he need assume from that matter only what suffices to complete the quantity due, and that especially must be resumed which was more perfectly consistent with the form and species of humanity. But, if something was wanting to the fulfillment of the quantity due, either because one was overtaken by death before nature could bring him to the quantity due or because mutilation perhaps deprived him of some member, the divine power will supply this from another source. This, however, will be no obstacle to the unity of the body of the one rising, for even the work of nature adds to what a boy has from some other source to bring him to his perfect quantity. And this addition does not make him numerically other, for the man is the same in number whether he is boy or adult.
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| Ex quo etiam patet quod nec resurrectionis fidem impedire potest etiam si aliqui carnibus humanis vescantur, ut quinto obiiciebatur. Non enim est necessarium, ut ostensum est, quod quicquid fuit in homine materialiter, resurgat in eo: et iterum, si aliquid deest, suppleri potest per potentiam Dei. Caro igitur comesta resurget in eo in quo primo fuit anima rationali perfecta. In secundo vero, si non solis carnibus humanis est pastus sed et aliis cibis, resurgere poterit in eo tantum de alio quod ei materialiter advenit, quod erit necessarium ad debitam quantitatem corporis restaurandam. Si vero solis humanis carnibus sit pastus, resurget in eo quod a generantibus traxit: et quod defuerit, supplebitur omnipotentia creatoris. Quod et si parentes ex solis humanis carnibus pasti fuerint, ut sic et eorum semen, quod est superfluum alimenti, ex carnibus alienis generatum sit: resurget quidem semen in eo qui est natus ex semine, loco cuius ei cuius carnes comestae sunt, supplebitur aliunde. Hoc enim in resurrectione servabitur: quod si aliquid materialiter fuit in pluribus hominibus, resurget in eo ad cuius perfectionem magis pertinebat. Unde si fuit in uno ut radicale semen ex quo est generatus, in alio vero sicut superveniens nutrimentum, resurget in eo qui est generatus ex hoc sicut ex semine. Si vero in uno fuit ut pertinens ad perfectionem individui, in alio ut deputatum ad perfectionem speciei: resurget in eo ad quem pertinebat secundum perfectionem individui. Unde semen resurget in genito, et non in generante: et costa Adae resurget in Eva, non in Adam, in quo fuit sicut in naturae principio. Si autem secundum eundem perfectionis modum fuit in utroque, resurget in eo in quo primitus fuit.
| [13] From this it is clear, also, that there is no obstacle to faith in the resurrection—even in the fact that some men eat human flesh, as the fifth objection was maintaining. For it is not necessary, as has just been shown, that whatever has been in man materially rise in him; further, if something is lacking, it can be supplied by the power of God. Therefore, the flesh consumed will rise in him in whom it was first perfected by the rational soul. But in the second man, if he ate not only human flesh, but other food as well, only that will rise in him which came to him materially from the other food, and which will be necessary to restore the quantity due his body. But if he ate human flesh only, what rises in him will be that which he drew from those who generated him, and what is wanting will be supplied by the Creator’s omnipotence. But let it be that the parents, too, have eaten only human flesh, and that as a result their seed—which is the superfluity of nourishment—has been generated from the flesh of others; the seed, indeed, will rise in him who was generated from the seed, and in its place there will be supplied in him whose flesh was eaten something from another source. For in the resurrection this situation will obtain: If something was materially present in many men, it will rise in him to whose perfection it belonged more intimately. Accordingly, if something was in one man as the radical seed from which he was generated, and in another as the superfluity of nourishment, it will rise in him who was generated therefrom as from seed. If something was in one as pertinent to the perfection of the individual, but in another as assigned to the perfection of the species, it will rise in him to whom it belonged as perfection of the individual. Accordingly, seed will arise in the begotten, not in his generator; the rib of Adam will arise in Eve, not in Adam in whom it was present as in a principle of nature. But, if something was in both in the same degree of perfection, it will rise in him in whom it was the first time.
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| Ad id vero quod sexto obiectum est, ex his quae dicta sunt iam patet solutio. Resurrectio enim quantum ad finem naturalis est, inquantum naturale est animae esse corpori unitam: sed principium eius activum non est naturale, sed sola virtute divina causatur.
| [14] Now, however, what is said in the sixth objection can be answered from what has been said. Resurrection is natural if one considers its purpose, for it is natural that the soul be united to the body. But the principle of resurrection is not natural. It is caused by the divine power alone.
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| Nec etiam negandum est omnium resurrectionem esse futuram, quamvis non omnes per fidem Christo adhaereant, nec eius mysteriis sint imbuti. Filius enim Dei propter hoc naturam humanam assumpsit ut eam repararet. Id igitur quod est defectus naturae, in omnibus reparabitur, unde omnes a morte redibunt ad vitam. Sed defectus personae non reparabitur nisi in illis qui Christo adhaeserunt: vel per proprium actum, credendo in ipsum; vel saltem per fidei sacramentum.
| [15] Nor must one deny that there will be a resurrection of all, although not all cleave to Christ by faith, and are not imbued with His mysteries. For the Son of God assumed human nature to restore it. Therefore, what is a defect of nature will be restored in all, and so all will return from)death to life. But the failure of the person will not be restored except in those who have adhered to Christ; either by their own act, believing in Him; or at least through the sacrament of faith.
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Caput 82
Quod homines resurgent immortales
| Chapter 82
THAT MEN WILL RISE IMMORTAL
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| Ex quo etiam patet quod in futura resurrectione homines non sic resurgent ut sint iterum morituri.
| [1] From this it is clear, also, that in the resurrection to come men will not so rise that they are to die again.
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| Necessitas enim moriendi est defectus in naturam humanam ex peccato proveniens. Christus autem, merito suae passionis, naturae defectus reparavit qui in ipsam ex peccato provenerunt. Ut enim dicit apostolus Rom. 5-15: non sicut delictum, ita et donum. Si enim unius delicto multi mortui sunt, multo magis gratia Dei, in gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi in plures abundavit. Ex quo habetur quod efficacius est meritum Christi ad tollendum mortem, quam peccatum Adae ad inducendum. Illi igitur qui per meritum Christi resurgent a morte liberati, mortem ulterius non patientur.
| [2] For the necessity of dying is a deficiency brought upon human nature by sin. But Christ, by the merit of His passion, repaired the deficiencies of nature which sin had brought upon nature. For, as the Apostle says: “Not as the offence, so also the gift. For if by the offence many died, much more the grace of God, and the gift, by the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, has abounded unto many” (Rom. 5:15). From this one gathers that the merit of ‘Christ is more effective for removing death than the sin of Adam for introducing it. Therefore, those who will rise by the merit of Christ, freed from death, will suffer death no more.
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| Praeterea. Illud quod in perpetuum duraturum est, non est destructum. Si igitur homines resurgentes adhuc iterum morientur, ut sic mors in perpetuum duret, nullo modo mors per mortem Christi destructa est. Est autem destructa: nunc quidem in causa quod dominus per Osee praedixerat dicens: ero mors tua, o mors, Oseae 13-14; ultimo autem destruetur in actu, secundum illud: novissime inimica destruetur mors, I Cor. 15-26. Est igitur secundum fidem Ecclesiae hoc tenendum, quod resurgentes non iterum morientur.
| [3] Furthermore, that which is to last forever has not been destroyed. Therefore, if the men who rise will still die again so that death lasts forever, in the death of Christ death has by no means been destroyed. But it is destroyed: right now in its cause, as the Lord had foretold in Hosea (13:14): “O death, I will be your death”; at the end it will be actually destroyed, according to the word: “The enemy death shall be destroyed last” (1 Cor. 15:26). One must, then, hold with the faith of the Church that those who rise will not die again.
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| Adhuc. Effectus similatur suae causae. Resurrectio autem Christi causa est futurae resurrectionis, ut dictum est. Sic autem resurrexit Christus ut non ulterius moreretur, secundum illud Rom. 6-9: Christus resurgens ex mortuis iam non moritur. Homines igitur sic resurgent ut ulterius non moriantur.
| [4] An effect, moreover, is likened to its cause. But the resurrection of Christ is the cause of the future resurrection, as was said. But Christ so rose from the dead as to die no longer, in the Apostle’s words: “Christ rising again from the dead dies now no more” (Rom. 6:9). Therefore, men will so rise as to die no longer.
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| Amplius. Si homines resurgentes iterum moriantur, aut iterum ab illa morte iterato resurgent, aut non. Si non resurgent, remanebunt perpetuo animae separatae, quod est inconveniens, ut supra dictum est, ad quod evitandum ponuntur primo resurgere: vel, si post secundam mortem non resurgant, nulla erit ratio quare post primam resurgant. Si autem post secundam mortem iterato resurgent, aut resurgent iterum morituri, aut non. Si non iterum morituri, eadem ratione hoc erit ponendum in prima resurrectione. Si vero iterum morituri, procedet in infinitum alternatio mortis et vitae in eodem subiecto. Quod videtur inconveniens. Oportet enim quod intentio Dei ad aliquid determinatum feratur: ipsa autem mortis et vitae alternatio successiva est quasi quaedam transmutatio, quae finis esse non potest; est enim contra rationem motus quod sit finis, cum omnis motus in aliud tendat.
| [5] Moreover, if the men who rise are to die a second time, they will either rise again from that second death or they will not. If they do not rise, they will remain forever as separated souls—and this is awkward, as was said above In fact, to avoid this awkwardness, they were held to rise the first time; in other words, if after the second death they are not going to rise, there will be no argument for their rising after the first death. On the other hand, if after the second death they do rise again, they will either rise to die again or they will not. If they are not to die again, the same reasoning will have to hold for the first resurrection. But, if they are to die again, the alternation of death and life in the same subject goes on to infinity—and this seems awkward, for the intention of God ought to have a determinate term. But the successive alternation of life and death is a kind of changing back and forth, so to say, and this cannot be an end, for it is essentially contrary to motion that it be an end; every motion tends toward another.
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| Praeterea. Intentio inferioris naturae in agendo ad perpetuitatem fertur. Omnis enim naturae inferioris actio ad generationem ordinatur, cuius quidem finis est ut conservetur esse perpetuum speciei: unde natura non intendit hoc individuum sicut ultimum finem, sed speciei conservationem in ipso. Et hoc habet natura inquantum agit in virtute Dei, quae est prima radix perpetuitatis. Unde etiam finis generationis esse ponitur a philosopho, ut generata participent esse divinum secundum perpetuitatem. Multo igitur magis actio ipsius Dei ad aliquid perpetuum tendit. Resurrectio autem non ordinatur ad perpetuitatem speciei: haec enim per generationem poterat conservari. Oportet igitur quod ordinetur ad perpetuitatem individui. Non autem secundum animam tantum: hoc enim iam anima habebat ante resurrectionem. Ergo secundum compositum. Homo igitur resurgens perpetuo vivet.
| [6] There is more. In action, the intention of an inferior nature bears on perpetuity. For every action of an inferior nature is ordered to generation, and its very end is safeguarding the perpetual being of the species; wherefore, nature does not intend this individual as ultimate end, but the conservation in him of the species. And nature has this end, in that it acts by the power of God who is the first root of perpetuity. Hence, even the end of generation is held by the Philosopher [De gen. et corr. II, 10] to be this: that the generated share in the divine being by perpetuity. All the more, then, does the action of God Himself tend to something perpetual. But the resurrection is not ordered to the perpetuity of the species, for this could be safeguarded by generation. It must, then, be ordered to the perpetuity of the individual: but not in the soul alone, for the soul already had perpetuity before the resurrection; therefore, in the composite. Man rising, therefore, will live forever.
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| Adhuc. Anima et corpus diverso ordine comparari videntur secundum primam hominis generationem, et secundum resurrectionem eiusdem. Nam secundum generationem primam, creatio animae sequitur generationem corporis: praeparata enim materia corporali per virtutem decisi seminis, Deus animam creando infundit. In resurrectione autem corpus animae praeexistenti coaptatur. Prima autem vita, quam homo per generationem adipiscitur, sequitur conditionem corruptibilis corporis in hoc quod per mortem privatur. Vita igitur quam homo resurgendo adipiscitur, erit perpetua, secundum conditionem incorruptibilis animae.
| [7] Again, the soul and body appear to be related in a different order in the first generation of man and in his resurrection. Now, in the first generation the creation of the soul follows the generation of the body, for, when the bodily matter is prepared by the power of the separated seed, God infuses the soul by an act of creation. But in the resurrection the body is adapted to the pre-existing soul. Of course, that first life which man acquires by generation follows the condition of the corruptible body in this: man is deprived of that life by death. Then, the life which man acquires by resurrection will be perpetual according to the condition of the incorruptible soul.
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| Item. Si in infinitum succedant sibi in eodem vita et mors, ipsa alternatio vitae et mortis habebit speciem circulationis cuiusdam. Omnis autem circulatio in rebus generabilibus et corruptibilibus a prima circulatione incorruptibilium corporum causatur: nam prima circulatio in motu locali invenitur, et secundum eius similitudinem ad motus alios derivatur. Causabitur igitur alternatio mortis et vitae a corpore caelesti. Quod esse non potest: quia reparatio corporis mortui ad vitam facultatem actionis naturae excedit. Non igitur est ponenda huiusmodi alternatio vitae et mortis: nec per consequens, quod resurgentia corpora moriantur.
| [8] Again, if life and death succeed one another to infinity in the same subject, the alternation of life and death will in species be a kind of circular motion. But every circular motion in generable and corruptible things is caused by the first circular motion of the incorruptible bodies. For the first circular motion is found in local motion, and in its likeness is transferred to other motions. The alternation of death and life, therefore, will be caused by a celestial body. And this cannot be, because the restoration of a dead body to life is beyond the capacities of an action of nature. Therefore, that there is such alternation of life and death cannot be asserted, and, consequently, that the bodies which rise may die.
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| Amplius. Quaecumque succedunt sibi in eodem subiecto, habent determinatam mensuram suae durationis secundum tempus. Omnia autem huiusmodi subiecta sunt motui caeli, quem tempus consequitur. Anima autem separata non est subiecta motui caeli: quia excedit totam naturam corporalem. Alternatio igitur separationis eius et unionis ad corpus non subiacet motui caeli. Non igitur est talis circulatio in alternatione mortis et vitae, qualis sequitur si resurgentes iterum moriantur. Resurgent igitur de cetero non morituri.
| [9] Furthermore, whenever things succeed one another in the same subject they have a fixed measure of their duration in time. Everything of this kind is subject to the celestial motion on which time follows. But the separated soul is not subject to the celestial, for it exceeds the whole of bodily nature Therefore, an alternation of its separation from the body and union to it is not subject to celestial motion. Therefore, there is no circular motion in the alternation of death and life such as that which follows if those who rise are to die again. They will rise, then, never again to die.
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| Hinc est quod dicitur Isaiae 25-8: praecipitabit dominus mortem in sempiternum, et Apoc. 21-4: mors ultra non erit.
| [10] Hence, we read in Isaiah (25:8): “The Lord shall cast death down headlong forever”; and in the Apocalypse (21:4): “Death shall be no more.”
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| Per hoc autem excluditur error quorundam antiquorum gentilium, qui credebant eadem temporum temporaliumque rerum volumina repeti, verbi gratia: sicut in isto saeculo Plato philosophus in urbe Atheniensi, et in eadem schola, quae Academica dicta est, discipulos docuit, ita per innumerabilia retro saecula, multis quidem prolixis intervallis, sed tamen certis, et idem Plato, et eadem civitas, et eadem schola, iidemque discipuli repetiti, et per innumerabilia demum saecula repetendi sunt, ut Augustinus introducit in XII de Civ. Dei. Ad quod, ut ipse ibidem dicit, quidam referre volunt illud quod dicitur Eccle. 1-9 quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod futurum est. Quid est quod factum est? Ipsum quod faciendum est. Nihil sub sole novum, nec valet quisquam dicere, ecce hoc recens est: iam enim praecessit in saeculis quae fuerunt ante nos. Quod quidem non sic intelligendum est quod eadem numero per generationes varias repetantur, sed similia specie: ut Augustinus ibidem solvit. Et Aristoteles, in fine de generatione, hoc ipsum docuit, contra praedictam sectam loquens.
| [11] Thus, of course, one avoids the error of certain ancient Gentiles, who used to hold that “the same periods and events of time are repeated; as if, for example, the philosopher Plato having taught at the school in Athens which is called the Academy, so numberless ages before, at long but certain intervals, this same Plato and the same school, and the same disciples existed, and so also are to be repeated during the endless cycles yet to come”; so Augustine describes the position in the City of God. To this position, so he himself tells us in the same place, some like to refer the words of Ecclesiastes (1:9-10): “What is it that has been? The same thing that shall be. What is it that has been done? The same thing that shall be done. Nothing under the sun is new, neither is any man able to say: Behold this is new: for it has already gone before in the ages that were before us.” This is not, indeed, to be understood as though things numerically the same are repeated through various generations, but things similar in species. So Augustine explains in the same place. And Aristotle at the end of De generatione [II, 11], taught the same thing, speaking against the group mentioned.
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Caput 83
Quod in resurgentibus non erit usus ciborum neque venereorum
| Chapter 83
THAT AMONG THE RISEN THERE WILL BE NO USE OF FOOD OR SEXUAL LOVE
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| Ex praemissis autem ostenditur quod apud homines resurgentes non erit venereorum et ciborum usus.
| [1] From what has been set down it follows that among those who rise there will be no use of sexual activity or of food.
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| Remota enim vita corruptibili, necesse est removeri ea quae corruptibili vitae deserviunt. Manifestum est autem quod ciborum usus corruptibili vitae deservit: ad hoc enim cibos assumimus ut corruptio quae posset accidere ex consumptione naturalis humidi, evitetur. Est etiam in praesenti ciborum usus necessarius ad augmentum: quod post resurrectionem in hominibus non erit, quia omnes in debita quantitate resurgent, ut ex dictis patet. Similiter commixtio maris et feminae corruptibili vitae deservit, ordinatur enim ad generationem per quam quod perpetuo conservari non potest secundum individuum, in specie conservatur. Ostensum est autem quod resurgentium vita incorruptibilis erit. Non igitur in resurgentibus erit ciborum neque venereorum usus.
| [2] For, when the corruptible life is taken away, those things must be taken away which serve the corruptible life. But clearly, the use of food serves the corruptible life, for we take food to avoid the corruption which can follow on the consumption of natural moisture. At present, moreover, the use of food is necessary for growth; after the resurrection there will be no growth in men, since all will rise in their due quantity, as has been made clear. In the same way, the intimate union of man and woman serves the corruptible life, for it is ordered to that generation by which what cannot be perpetually preserved in the individual is preserved in the species. Now, it was shown that the life of those who rise will be incorruptible. Therefore, among those who rise there will be use neither for food nor for sexual activity.
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| Adhuc. Vita resurgentium non minus ordinata erit quam praesens vita, sed magis: quia ad illam homo perveniet solo Deo agente: hanc autem consequitur cooperante natura. Sed in hac vita ciborum usus ordinatur ad aliquem finem: ad hoc enim cibus assumitur ut per digestionem convertatur in corpus. Si igitur tunc erit ciborum usus, oportebit quod ad hoc sit quod convertatur in corpus. Cum ergo a corpore nihil resolvatur, eo quod corpus erit incorruptibile; oportebit dicere quod totum quod convertitur ex alimento, transeat in augmentum. Resurget autem homo in debita quantitate, ut supra dictum est. Ergo perveniet ad immoderatam quantitatem: immoderata est enim quantitas quae debitam quantitatem excedit.
| [3] Again, the life of those who rise will not be less ordered than the present life, but better ordered. For man will reach that life only through God’s action, but he leads this life with nature co-operating. In this life the use of food is ordered to an end, for one takes food to convert it into the body by digestion. If, then, there is to be food at that time, it will be for the purpose of converting it into the body. Therefore, since nothing will be resolved from the body, because it will be an incorruptible body, we will have to say that everything converted into the body from nourishment must be devoted to its growth. However, man will rise in his due quantify, as was said above. Therefore, he will achieve a size beyond moderation, for an immoderate size is that which exceeds the quantity due.
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| Amplius. Homo resurgens in perpetuum vivet. Aut igitur semper cibo utetur: aut non semper, sed per aliquod determinatum tempus. Si autem semper cibo utetur, cum cibus in corpus conversus a quo nihil resolvitur necesse sit quod augmentum faciat secundum aliquam dimensionem, oportebit dicere quod corpus hominis resurgentis in infinitum augeatur. Quod non potest esse: quia augmentum est motus naturalis; intentio autem virtutis naturalis moventis nunquam est ad infinitum, sed semper est ad aliquid certum; quia, ut dicitur in II de anima, omnium natura constantium terminus est et magnitudinis et augmenti. Si autem non semper cibo utetur homo resurgens, semper autem vivet, erit aliquod tempus dare in quo cibo non utetur. Quare hoc a principio faciendum est. Non igitur homo resurgens cibo utetur.
| [4] The man who rises, furthermore, will live forever. Therefore, either he will use food always, or not always but during a fixed time. But let him use food always: since the food will be converted into a body in which no dissolution takes place, it necessarily will cause an increase in some dimension and we will have to say that the body of the man who rises will be increased to infinity. And this cannot be, because increase is a natural motion and the intention of a natural moving power is never infinity, but is always something fixed. For, as the De anima [II, 4] says, “in everything established by nature there is a term of size and increase.” If the man who rises will not always use food, but will always live, one must grant a time in which he does not use food. Accordingly, this must be done from the beginning. Therefore, the man who rises will not use food.
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| Si autem non utetur cibo, sequitur quod neque venereorum usum habebit, ad quem requiritur decisio seminis. A corpore autem resurgentis semen decidi non poterit. Neque ex substantia eius. Tum quia hoc est contra rationem seminis: esset enim semen ut corruptum et a natura recedens; et sic non posset esse naturalis actionis principium, ut patet per philosophum in libro de generatione animalium. Tum etiam quia a substantia illorum corporum incorruptibilium existentium nihil resolvi poterit. Neque etiam semen esse poterit superfluum alimenti, si resurgentes cibis non utantur, ut ostensum est. Non igitur in resurgentibus erit venereorum usus.
| [5] But if he will not use food, it follows that neither will he have sexual union for which the separation of the seed is required. Of course, the seed will not be separable from the body of the one who rises, nor from his substance. There is this reason: It is contrary to the seed in its essentials, for it would be seed as corrupted and as withdrawing from nature, and so it could not be the principle of a natural action, which the Philosopher makes clear in his De generatione animalium [I, 18]. And there is this reason as well: Out of the substance of those existing incorruptible bodies nothing will be able to be resolved. Finally, the seed cannot be the superfluity of nutriment if those who rise do not use food, as was shown. Therefore, among those who rise there will be no sexual union.
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| Item. Venereorum usus ad generationem ordinatur. Si igitur post resurrectionem erit venereorum usus, nisi sit frustra, sequitur quod tunc etiam erit hominum generatio, sicut et nunc. Multi igitur homines erunt post resurrectionem qui ante resurrectionem non fuerunt. Frustra igitur tantum differtur resurrectio mortuorum, ut omnes simul vitam accipiant qui eandem habent naturam.
| [6] Again, sexual union is ordered to generation. If, then, after the resurrection there is to be sexual union, it follows—unless it is to be in vain—that there will be human generation then just as there is now. Therefore, there will be many men after the resurrection who were not before the resurrection. In vain, then, does the resurrection effect this great difference: that all who have the same nature receive life at the same time.
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| Amplius. Si post resurrectionem erit hominum generatio, aut igitur illi qui generabuntur iterum corrumpentur: aut incorruptibiles erunt et immortales. Si autem erunt incorruptibiles et immortales multa inconvenientia sequuntur. Primo quidem, oportebit ponere quod illi homines sine peccato nascantur originali, cum necessitas moriendi sit poena consequens peccatum originale: quod est contra apostolum dicentem Rom. 5-12, quod per unum hominem peccatum in omnes homines pervenit et mors. Deinde sequitur quod non omnes indigeant redemptione quae est a Christo, si aliqui sine peccato originali et necessitate moriendi nascantur: et sic Christus non erit omnium hominum caput, quod est contra sententiam apostoli dicentis I Cor. 15-22, quod sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. Sequitur etiam et aliud inconveniens, ut quorum est similis generatio, non sit similis generationis terminus: homines enim per generationem quae est ex semine nunc quidem consequuntur corruptibilem vitam; tunc autem immortalem. Si autem homines qui tunc nascentur, corruptibiles erunt et morientur: si iterato non resurgunt, sequetur quod eorum animae perpetuo remanebunt a corporibus separatae; quod est inconveniens, cum sint eiusdem speciei cum animabus hominum resurgentium. Si autem et ipsi resurgent, debuit et eorum resurrectio ab aliis expectari, ut simul omnibus qui unam naturam participant, beneficium conferatur resurrectionis, quod ad naturae reparationem pertinet, ut ex dictis patet. Et praeterea non videtur esse aliqua ratio quare aliqui expectentur ad simul resurgendum, si non omnes expectantur.
| [7] And again, if after the resurrection there is to be human generation, those who are generated will either be once again corrupted or they will be incorruptible and immortal. But, if they are to be incorruptible and immortal, the awkward consequences are many. First, indeed, one will have to hold that those men are born without original sin, since the necessity of dying is a punishment that follows on original sin. This is contrary to the Apostle’s word: “By one man came sin to all and by sin death” (Rom. 5:12). Next, it follows that not all would require the redemption which is from Christ, and so Christ will not be the bead of all men. And this is contrary to the Apostle’s teaching: “As in Adam all die so also in Christ all will live again” (1 Cor. 15:22). There would also be this awkward result: Men whose generation is the same would not have the same term of generation, for by generation from seed they achieve a corruptible life now, but then they would achieve an immortal one. Allow, on the other hand, that the men who will then be born will be corruptible and will die: if they do not rise again, it will follow that their souls will remain forever separated from their bodies. And this is awkward, since they are of the same species as the souls of the men who do rise. But if they, too, are to rise, their resurrection has to be waited for, by the others, that all who share the same nature may simultaneously receive that benefit of resurrection which is proper to the restoration of that nature (as is clear from what has been said). And, what is more, there does not seem to be a reason for waiting for the simultaneous resurrection of some, if one does not wait for the resurrection of all.
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| Adhuc. Si homines resurgentes venereis utentur et generabunt, aut hoc erit semper: aut non semper. Si semper, sequetur quod multiplicatio hominum erit in infinitum. Intentio autem naturae generantis post resurrectionem non poterit esse ad alium finem quam ad multiplicationem hominum: non enim erit ad conservationem speciei per generationem, cum homines incorruptibiliter sint victuri. Sequetur igitur quod intentio naturae generantis sit ad infinitum: quod est impossibile. Si vero non semper generabunt, sed ad aliquod determinatum tempus, post illud igitur tempus non generabunt. Quare et a principio hoc eis attribuendum est, ut venereis non utantur nec generent.
| [8] Again, if the men who rise will use sexual union and generate, this will always take place or it will not always take place. If it always takes place, the multiplication of men will go on to infinity. The intention of the generating nature after the resurrection cannot be for any other end than the multiplication of men; it will not be for the conservation of the species by generation, since men are going to live incorruptibly. It will follow, therefore, that the intention of the generating nature is infinity; and this is impossible. But, if they do not generate always, but only for a fixed time, they will not generate after that time. For this reason one should attribute to them right from the start no use of sexual union and no generation.
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| Si quis autem dicat quod in resurgentibus erit usus ciborum et venereorum, non propter conservationem vel augmentum corporis, neque propter conservationem speciei vel multiplicationem hominum, sed propter solam delectationem quae in his actibus existit, ne aliqua delectatio hominibus in ultima remuneratione desit:- patet quidem multipliciter hoc inconvenienter dici.
| [9] Now, let one say that in those who rise there will be eating and sexual union, not for the preservation and growth of the body, nor for the preservation of the species and multiplication of men, but simply for the pleasure which there is in these acts, so that no pleasure will be lacking in man’s final reward: in many ways, indeed, is it clear that such is an awkward position.
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| Primo quidem, quia vita resurgentium ordinatior erit quam vita nostra, ut supra dictum est. In hac autem vita inordinatum et vitiosum est si quis cibis et venereis utatur propter solam delectationem, et non propter necessitatem sustentandi corporis, vel prolis procreandae. Et hoc rationabiliter: nam delectationes quae sunt in praemissis actionibus, non sunt fines actionum, sed magis e converso; natura enim ad hoc ordinavit delectationes in istis actibus, ne animalia, propter laborem, ab istis actibus necessariis naturae desisterent: quod contingeret nisi delectatione provocarentur. Est ergo ordo praeposterus et indecens si operationes propter solas delectationes exerceantur. Nullo igitur modo hoc in resurgentibus erit, quorum vita ordinatissima ponitur.
| [10] The first reason is this: The life of those who rise will be better ordered than our life, as was said above. But in the present life it is a disordered and vicious thing to use food and sexual union for mere pleasure and not for the necessity of sustaining life and begetting offspring. And this is reasonable, for the pleasures which are in the activities mentioned are not the ends of those activities. It is, rather, the converse, for nature ordered the pleasure of those acts for this reason: lest the animals, in view of the labor, desist from those acts necessary to nature, which is what would happen if they were not stimulated by pleasure. Therefore, the order is reversed and inharmonious if those operations are carried out merely for pleasure. By no means, therefore, will such a thing be found among those who rise; their life is held to be one of perfect order.
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| Adhuc. Vita resurgentium ad conservandam perfectam beatitudinem ordinatur. Beatitudo autem et felicitas hominis non consistit in delectationibus corporalibus, quae sunt delectationes ciborum et venereorum, ut in tertio libro ostensum est. Non igitur oportet ponere in vita resurgentium huiusmodi delectationes esse.
| [11] The life of the risen, moreover, is ordered to the preservation of perfect beatitude. But the beatitude and felicity of man do not consist in bodily pleasures, and such are the pleasures of eating and of sexual union as was shown. in Book III. One should not, therefore, hold that there are pleasures of this kind in the life of those who rise.
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| Amplius. Actus virtutum ordinantur ad beatitudinem sicut ad finem. Si igitur in statu futurae beatitudinis essent delectationes ciborum et venereorum, quasi ad beatitudinem pertinentes, sequeretur quod in intentione eorum qui virtuosa agunt, essent aliqualiter delectationes praedictae. Quod rationem temperantiae excludit: est enim contra temperantiae rationem ut aliquis a delectationibus nunc abstineat ut postmodum eis magis frui possit. Redderetur igitur omnis castitas impudica, et omnis abstinentia gulosa. Si vero praedictae delectationes erunt, non tamen quasi ad beatitudinem pertinentes, ut oporteat eas esse intentas ab his qui virtuosa agunt:- hoc esse non potest. Quia omne quod est, vel est propter alterum, vel propter seipsum. Praedictae autem delectationes non erunt propter alterum: non enim erunt propter actiones ordinatas ad finem naturae, ut iam ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur, quod erunt propter seipsas. Omne autem quod est huiusmodi, vel est beatitudo vel pars beatitudinis. Oportet igitur, si delectationes praedictae in vita resurgentium erunt, quod ad beatitudinem eorum pertineant.
| [12] Furthermore, the acts of the virtues are ordered to beatitude as to an end. If, then, in the state of beatitude to come there be the pleasures of eating and sexual love, as constituents, so to say, of this beatitude, it would follow that in the intention of those who perform virtuous acts the pleasures mentioned are somehow or other present. And this excludes temperance by essence, for it is contrary to the essence of temperance that one abstain now from pleasures to become able to enjoy them the more later on. This would, therefore render all chastity wanton, and all abstinence gluttonous. But allow that the pleasures mentioned are to be, and are, nonetheless, not to be as constituents, so to say, of beatitude, so that they are in the intentions of those who act virtuously: even this cannot be. For whatever is, is for another or for itself. But the pleasures mentioned are not for another; they are not for the actions ordered to the end of nature, as was already shown. It follows, then, that they are for themselves. But everything like this is either beatitude or a part of beatitude. Therefore, if the pleasures mentioned are to be in the life of those who rise, it must be that they belong to its beatitude.
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| Quod esse non potest, ut ostensum est. Nullo igitur modo huiusmodi delectationes erunt in futura vita.
| And this cannot be, as was shown.” There is, then, no way for pleasures of this kind to be in the future life.
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| Praeterea. Ridiculum videtur delectationes quaerere corporales, in quibus nobiscum animalia bruta communicant, ubi expectantur delectationes altissimae, in quibus cum Angelis communicamus, quae erunt in Dei visione, quae nobis et Angelis erit communis, ut in tertio libro ostensum est. Nisi forte quis dicere velit beatitudinem Angelorum esse imperfectam, quia desunt eis delectationes brutorum: quod est omnino absurdum. Hinc est quod dominus dicit, Matth. 22-30, quod in resurrectione neque nubent neque nubentur, sed erunt sicut Angeli Dei.
| [13] There is more. It seems ridiculous to search for bodily pleasures which the brute animals share with us there where the loftiest pleasures which we share with the angels are expected—the pleasures in the vision of God which will be common to us and the angels, as was shown in Book III. Unless, perhaps, someone wants to say that the beatitude of the angels is imperfect because the angels lack the pleasures of the brutes—which is completely absurd. Pertinent to this is our Lord’s saying in Matthew (22:30), that “in the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married, but shall be as the angels of God.”
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| Per hoc autem excluditur error Iudaeorum et Saracenorum, qui ponunt quod in resurrectione homines cibis et venereis utentur, sicut et nunc. Quos etiam quidam Christiani haeretici sunt secuti, ponentes regnum Christi futurum in terris terrenum per mille annos, in quo spatio temporis dicunt eos qui tunc resurrexerint, immoderatissime carnalibus epulis vacaturos, in quibus sit cibus tantus ac potus ut non solum nullam modestiam teneant, sed modum quoque ipsius incredulitatis excedant. Nullo autem modo ista possunt nisi a carnalibus credi. Hi autem qui spirituales sunt, istos ista credentes Chiliastas appellant, Graeco vocabulo, quod, verbum e verbo exprimentes, nos possumus millenarios nuncupare, ut Augustinus dicit, XX de civitate Dei.
| [14] By this, of course, one avoids the error of the Jews and of the Saracens, who hold that in the resurrection men will have use for food and sexual pleasure as they do now. And even certain Christian heretics have followed them; they hold that there will be on earth for a thousand years an earthly kingdom of Christ, and in that space of time “they assert that those who rise again shall enjoy the leisure of immoderate carnal banquets, furnished with an amount of meat and drink such as not only to shock the feeling of the temperate, but even to surpass the measure of credulity itself, such assertions can be believed only by the carnal. Those who do believe them are called by the spiritual Chiliasts, a Greek word, which we may literally reproduce by the name Millenarians”; so Augustine says in the City of God [XX, 7, 1].
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| Sunt autem quaedam quae huic opinioni suffragari videntur. Et primo quidem, quia Adam ante peccatum vitam habuit immortalem: et tamen et cibis et venereis uti potuit in illo statu, cum ante peccatum illi sit dictum: crescite et multiplicamini, et iterum: de omni ligno quod est in Paradiso comede.
| [15] Some points, however, seem to favor this opinion. First, indeed, there is this: Before his sin Adam had an immortal life; nevertheless, eating and sexual love were in his power while in that state, for before his sin he was told: “Increase and multiply” and “Of every tree of paradise you shall eat” (Gen. 1:28; 2:16).
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| Deinde ipse Christus post resurrectionem legitur comedisse et bibisse. Dicitur enim Luc. ult., quod cum manducasset coram discipulis, sumens reliquias dedit eis. Et actuum 10, dicit Petrus: hunc, scilicet Iesum, Deus suscitavit tertia die, et dedit eum manifestum fieri, non omni populo, sed testibus praeordinatis a Deo, nobis, qui manducavimus et bibimus cum illo, postquam resurrexit a mortuis.
| [16] Again, one reads of Christ Himself that He ate and drank after His resurrection. For Luke (24:43) says that “when He had eaten before them, taking the remains, He gave to them.” And in Acts (10:40-41) Peter says: “Him,” namely Jesus, “God raised up the third day, and gave Him to be made manifest, not to all the people but to witnesses preordained by God, even to us, who did eat and drink with Him after He arose again from the dead.”
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| Sunt etiam quaedam auctoritates quae ciborum usum in huiusmodi statu hominibus repromittere videntur. Dicitur enim Isaiae 25-6: faciet dominus exercituum omnibus populis in monte hoc convivium pinguium medullatorum, vindemiae defaecatae. Et quod intelligatur quantum ad statum resurgentium, patet ex hoc quod postea subditur: praecipitabit mortem in sempiternum, et auferet dominus Deus omnem lacrymam ab omni facie. Dicitur etiam Isaiae 65-13: ecce, servi mei comedent, et vos esurietis. Ecce, servi mei bibent, et vos sitietis. Et quod hoc referendum sit ad statum futurae vitae, patet ex eo quod postea subditur: ecce, ego creabo caelum novum, et terram novam et cetera. Dominus etiam dicit, Matth. 26-29: non bibam amodo de hoc genimine vitis usque in diem illum cum illud bibam vobiscum novum in regno patris mei. Et Luc. 22 dicit: ego dispono vobis, sicut disposuit mihi pater meus, regnum: ut edatis et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo. Apocalypsis etiam 22-2, dicitur quod ex utraque parte fluminis, quod erit in civitate beatorum, erit lignum vitae, afferens fructus duodecim. Et 20, dicitur: vidi animas decollatorum propter testimonium Iesu, et vixerunt et regnaverunt cum Christo mille annis. Ceteri mortuorum non vixerunt donec consummarentur mille anni. Ex quibus omnibus praedictorum haereticorum opinio confirmari videtur.
| [17] There are also some authorities which seem to promise men the use of food in the state of which we speak. For Isaiah (25:6, 8) says: “The Lord of hosts shall make unto all people in this mountain a feast of fat things full of marrow, of wine purified from the lees.” And we are to understand this of the state of those who rise, as is clear from the addition: “He shall cast death down for ever: And the Lord God shall wipe away tears from every face.” Isaiah (65:13, 17) also says: “Behold my servants shall eat, and you shall be hungry; behold, my servants shall drink, and you shall be thirsty.” And that this refers to the future life is clear from the addition: “Behold, I create new heavens and a new earth,” and so forth. Our Lord also says: “I will not drink from henceforth of this fruit of the vine until that day when I shall drink it with you new in the kingdom of My Father” (Matt. 26:29); and He says in Luke (22:29-30): “I dispose to you as My Father hath disposed to Me, a kingdom; that you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom.” And we read in the Apocalypse (22:4) that “on both sides of the river” which will be in the City of the Blessed, there will be “the tree of life bearing twelve fruits.” It also says: “I saw... the souls of them that were beheaded for the testimony of Jesus... and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years” (Apoc. 20:4-5). From all of which the opinion of the heretics mentioned seems to be confirmed.
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| Haec autem non difficile est solvere. Quod enim primo obiicitur, de Adam, efficaciam non habet. Adam enim perfectionem quandam habuit personalem, nondum tamen erat natura humana totaliter perfecta, nondum multiplicato humano genere. Institutus ergo fuit Adam in tali perfectione quae competebat principio totius humani generis. Et ideo oportuit quod generaret ad multiplicationem humani generis; et per consequens quod cibis uteretur. Sed perfectio resurgentium erit natura humana totaliter ad suam perfectionem perveniente, numero electorum iam completo. Et ideo generatio locum non habebit, nec alimenti usus. Propter quod et alia erit immortalitas et incorruptio resurgentium, et alia quae fuit in Adam. Resurgentes enim sic immortales erunt et incorruptibiles ut mori non possint, nec ex eorum corporibus aliquid resolvi. Adam autem sic fuit immortalis ut posset non mori si non peccaret, et posset mori si peccaret: et eius immortalitas sic conservari poterat, non quod nihil resolvetur ab eius corpore, sed ut contra resolutionem humidi naturalis ei subveniri posset per ciborum assumptionem, ne ad corruptionem corpus eius perveniret.
| [18] But the solution of these points is not difficult. The first objection, about Adam, is not effective. For Adam did have a certain personal perfection, but human nature was not yet perfected when the human race was not yet multiplied. Adam, therefore, was established in the kind of perfection which suited the first source of the entire human race. Accordingly, he had to generate for the multiplication of the human race, and consequently had to take food. But the perfection of those who rise will be at a time when human nature is arriving at the fullness of its perfection and the number of the elect is already complete. Accordingly, generation will have no place, and neither will the use of food. For this reason the immortality and incorruption of those who rise will be of one kind; those which were in Adam were of another. For those who rise will be immortal and incorruptible in such wise that they cannot die; nor can any dissolution take place within their bodies. Adam, however, was immortal thus: he could not die if he did not sin; and be could die if he did sin. And the preservation of his immortality could take place not by the exclusion of dissolution within the body; rather, it could be helped by preventing loss of the natural moisture through the assumption of food, lest his body arrive at corruption.
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| De Christo autem dicendum est quod post resurrectionem comedit, non propter necessitatem, sed ad demonstrandum suae resurrectionis veritatem. Unde cibus ille non fuit conversus in carnem, sed resolutus in praeiacentem materiam. Haec autem causa comedendi non erit in resurrectione communi.
| [19] With regard to Christ, however, we ought to say that He ate after the resurrection not out of necessity, but to establish the truth of His resurrection. Hence, that food of His was not changed into flesh, but returned to the prior material state. But there will be no such reason for eating in the general resurrection.
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| Auctoritates vero quae ciborum usum post resurrectionem repromittere videntur, spiritualiter intelligendae sunt. Proponit enim nobis divina Scriptura intelligibilia sub similitudine sensibilium, ut animus noster ex his quae novit, discat incognita amare. Et secundum hunc modum delectatio quae est in contemplatione sapientiae, et assumptio veritatis intelligibilis in intellectum nostrum, per usum ciborum in sacra Scriptura consuevit designari: secundum illud Proverb. 9, quod de sapientia dicitur: miscuit vinum, et proposuit mensam suam. Et insipientibus locuta est, venite, comedite panem meum, et bibite vinum quod miscui vobis. Et Eccli. 15-3 dicitur: cibabit illum pane vitae et intellectus, et aqua sapientiae salutaris potabit illum. De ipsa etiam sapientia dicitur Proverb. 3-18: lignum vitae est his qui apprehenderint eam: et qui tenuerit eam, beatus. Non igitur praedictae auctoritates cogunt dicere quod resurgentes cibis utantur.
| [20] Now, as for the authorities which appear to promise the use of food after the resurrection: one must understand them spiritually. For divine Scripture proposes intelligible things to us in the likeness of sensible things, “so that the soul from what it knows may learn to love the things it knows not.” And in this fashion the pleasure of contemplation of wisdom and the assumption of the intelligible truth into our intellect is customarily indicated in sacred Scripture as the use of food; the saying of Proverbs (9:2, 4-5), for example, about wisdom: “She has mingled her wine and set forth her table... And to the unwise she said: Come, eat my bread and drink the wine I have mingled for you”; and Sirach (15:3): “With the bread of life and understanding, she shall feed him, and give him the water of wholesome wisdom to drink.” And of the same wisdom we read in Proverbs (3:18): “She is a tree of life to those who lay hold of her: and he who retains her is blessed.” Therefore, the authorities mentioned above do not require us to say that those who rise will make use of food.
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| Hoc tamen quod positum est de verbis domini quae habentur Matth. 26-29 potest et aliter intelligi: ut referatur ad hoc quod ipse cum discipulis post resurrectionem comedit, et bibit novum quidem vinum, idest, novo modo, scilicet non propter necessitatem, sed propter resurrectionis demonstrationem. Et dicit, in regno patris mei, quia in resurrectione Christi regnum immortalitatis demonstrari incoepit.
| [21] Of course, the words of our Lord in Matthew (26:29) can be understood in another sense. Thus, they can refer to the fact that He ate with His disciples after His resurrection and actually drank new wine, that is, “newly” namely not out of necessity, but as proof of His resurrection. He then says “in the kingdom of My Father” because in the resurrection of Christ there is a demonstrable beginning of the kingdom of immortality.
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| Quod vero in Apocalypsi dicitur de mille annis et prima resurrectione martyrum, intelligendum est quod prima resurrectio est animarum, prout a peccatis resurgunt: secundum illud apostoli, Ephes. 5-14: exsurge a mortuis, et illuminabit te Christus. Per mille autem annos intelligitur totum tempus Ecclesiae, in quo martyres regnant cum Christo, et alii sancti, tam in praesenti Ecclesia, quae regnum Dei dicitur, quam etiam in caelesti patria quantum ad animas: millenarius enim perfectionem significat, quia est numerus cubicus et radix eius est denarius qui solet etiam perfectionem significare.
| [22] Now, the saying of the Apocalypse (22:2) about “the thousand years” and the “first resurrection of the martyrs” must be understood of that first resurrection of souls from their sins, of which the Apostle says: “Arise from the dead and Christ shall enlighten you” (Eph. 5:14). And by the thousand years one understands the whole time of the Church in which the martyrs as well as the other saints reign with Christ, both in the present Church which is called the kingdom of God, and also—as far as souls are concerned—in the heavenly country: for “the thousand” means perfection, since it is the cube whose root is ten, which also usually signifies perfection.”
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| Sic ergo manifestum fit quod resurgentes non vacabunt cibis et potibus, neque venereis actibus.
| [23] Thus, then, it becomes clear that those who rise will not spend their time eating and drinking and in acts of sexual union.
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| Ex quo ultimo haberi potest quod omnes occupationes activae vitae cessabunt, quae ordinari videntur ad usum ciborum et venereorum et ad alia quae sunt necessaria corruptibili vitae. Sola ergo occupatio contemplativae vitae in resurgentibus remanebit. Propter quod Luc. 10-42, dicitur de Maria contemplante quod optimam partem elegit, quae non auferetur ab ea. Inde est etiam quod dicitur Iob 7-9 qui descendit ad Inferos, non ascendet, nec revertetur ultra in domum suam, neque cognoscet eum amplius locus eius, in quibus verbis talem resurrectionem Iob negat qualem quidam posuerunt, dicentes quod post resurrectionem homo redibit ad similes occupationes quas nunc habet, ut scilicet aedificet domos, et alia huiusmodi exerceat officia.
| [24] From this one can see, finally, that all the business of the active life—it seems ordered to the use of food, to sexual activity, to the other necessities of the corruptible life—will come to a halt. Therefore, only the occupation of the contemplative life will persist in the resurrection. This is the reason one reads in Luke (10:42) of Mary’s contemplation that she “has chosen the best part which shall not be taken away from her.” Hence, too, we read in Job (7:9-10): “He that shall go down to hell shall not come up. Nor shall be return any more into his house, neither shall his place know him any more.” In these words Job is denying the kind of resurrection some have asserted who said that after the resurrection a man will return to the kind of business he has now: to building houses, fm example, and carrying on other duties of this kind.
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Caput 84
Quod corpora resurgentium erunt eiusdem naturae
| Chapter 84
THAT THE BODIES OF THOSE WHO RISE WILL BE THE SAME IN NATURE
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| Occasione autem praemissorum quidam circa conditiones resurgentium erraverunt. Quia enim corpus ex contrariis compositum videtur ex necessitate corrumpi, fuerunt aliqui qui dixerunt homines resurgentes huiusmodi corpora ex contrariis composita non habere.
| [1] For some, of course, the points mentioned have been an occasion of error about the conditions of those who rise. For there were some who held that, since a body composed of contraries seems necessarily subject to corruption, those who rise do not have bodies composed of contraries in this way.
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| Quorum aliqui posuerunt corpora nostra non in natura corporali resurgere, sed transmutari in spiritum: moti ex eo quod apostolus dicit, I Cor. 15-44: seminatur corpus animale, surget spirituale. Alii vero ex eodem verbo sunt moti ut dicerent quod corpora nostra in resurrectione erunt subtilia, et aeri et ventis similia. Nam et spiritus aer dicitur: ut sic spiritualia aerea intelligantur. Alii vero dixerunt quod in resurrectione animae resument corpora, non quidem terrena, sed caelestia: occasionem accipientes ex eo quod apostolus dicit, I Cor. 15-40, de resurrectione loquens: sunt corpora caelestia, et corpora terrestria. Quibus omnibus suffragari videtur quod apostolus ibidem dicit, quod caro et sanguis regnum Dei non possidebunt. Et sic videtur quod corpora resurgentium non habebunt carnem et sanguinem, et per consequens nec aliquos humores.
| [2] Some among these held that our bodies do not rise in a bodily nature, but are changed into spirit. They were moved by what the Apostle says: “It is sown a natural body; it shall rise a spiritual body” (1 Cor. 15:44). But others were moved by the same words to say that our bodies in the resurrection would be subtle bodies, similar to the air and the winds. For air is called a “spiration”, so that airy things may be called “spiritual.” But others said that in the resurrection the souls will assume bodies: not earthly ones, to be sure, but heavenly. Their occasion is this word of the Apostle speaking of the resurrection: “There are bodies celestial and bodies terrestrial.” And all this seems supported by what the Apostle says in the same place: “Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of Cod” (1 Cor. 15:40, 50). It thus appears that the bodies of those who rise will not have flesh and blood and, consequently, no other humors.
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| Sed harum opinionum error manifeste apparet. Nostra enim resurrectio conformis erit resurrectioni Christi, secundum illud apostoli, Philipp. 3-21: reformabit corpus humilitatis nostrae configuratum corpori claritatis suae. Christus autem post resurrectionem habuit corpus palpabile, ex carnibus et ossibus consistens: quia, ut dicitur Lucae ult. post resurrectionem discipulis dixit: palpate et videte: quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Ergo et alii homines resurgentes corpora palpabilia habebunt, ex carnibus et ossibus composita.
| [3] But the error of these opinions is quite evident. For our resurrection will conform to the resurrection of Christ, as the Apostle has it: “He will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory” (Phil. 3:21). After His resurrection, of course, Christ had a body one could touch, constituted of flesh and bones, because after His resurrection—so we read in Luke (24:39)—He said to the disciples: “Handle and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see me to have.” Therefore, when other men rise, they will have bodies one can handle, composed of flesh and bones.
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| Adhuc. Anima unitur corpori sicut forma materiae. Omnis autem forma habet determinatam materiam: oportet enim esse proportionem actus et potentiae. Cum igitur anima sit eadem secundum speciem, videtur quod habeat eandem materiam secundum speciem. Erit ergo idem corpus secundum speciem post resurrectionem et ante. Et sic oportet quod sit consistens ex carnibus et ossibus, et aliis huiusmodi partibus.
| [4] The soul is, furthermore, united to the body as form to matter. Of course, every form has its determined matter, for there must be proportion between act and potency. Since, therefore, the soul is the same in species, it appears that its matter must be the same in species. Therefore, the body will be the same in species after the resurrection as before. And so it has to consist of flesh and bones and other parts of this kind.
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| Amplius. Cum in definitione rerum naturalium, quae significat essentiam speciei, ponatur materia, necessarium est quod, variata materia secundum speciem, varietur species rei naturalis. Homo autem res naturalis est. Si igitur post resurrectionem non habebit corpus consistens ex carnibus et ossibus et huiusmodi partibus, sicut nunc habet, non erit qui resurget eiusdem speciei, sed dicetur homo tantum aequivoce.
| [5] Again, in the definition of a natural thing which signifies the essence of the species, one includes the matter; necessarily, then, whenever the matter is varied in species, the species of the natural thing is varied. But man is a natural thing. If, therefore, after the resurrection he is not to have a body consisting of flesh and bones and parts of this kind as he has now, he who rises will not belong to the same species, but will be called man only equivocally.
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| Item. Magis distat ab anima unius hominis corpus alterius speciei, quam corpus humanum alterius hominis. Sed anima non potest iterato uniri corpori alterius hominis, ut in secundo ostensum est. Multo igitur minus poterit in resurrectione uniri corpori alterius speciei.
| [6] There is, moreover, a greater differentiation between the soul of a man and a body of some other species than there is between one human body and that of another man. But no soul can be united in turn to the body of a second man, as was shown in Book II. Much less, then, will it be able in the resurrection to be united to a body of another species.
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| Praeterea. Ad hoc quod homo idem numero resurgat, necessarium est quod partes eius essentiales sint eaedem numero. Si igitur corpus hominis resurgentis non erit ex his carnibus et his ossibus ex quibus nunc componitur, non erit homo resurgens idem numero.
| [7] There is more. For a man to rise with numerical identity there must also be numerical identity in his essential parts. Therefore, if the body of the man who rises is not to be composed of the flesh and bones which now compose it, the man who rises will not be numerically the same man.
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| Has autem omnes falsas opiniones manifestissime Iob excludit, dicens: rursum circumdabor pelle mea, et in carne mea videbo Deum, quem visurus sum ego ipse, et non alius.
| [8] But all these false opinions are most clearly rejected by the words of Job (19:26-27) who says: “Once again I shall be clothed with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see my God. Whom I myself shall see and not another.”
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| Habent autem et singulae praedictarum opinionum propria inconvenientia.
| [9] Of course, each of the opinions mentioned has its own awkward consequence.
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| Ponere enim corpus transire in spiritum est omnino impossibile. Non enim transeunt in invicem nisi quae in materia communicant. Spiritualium autem et corporalium non potest esse communicatio in materia: cum substantiae spirituales sint omnino immateriales, ut in secundo ostensum est. Impossibile est igitur quod corpus humanum transeat in substantiam spiritualem.
| [10] For to hold that a body changes into a spirit is altogether impossible. Things do not change into one another unless they have matter in common. But spiritual things and bodily things can have no communication by matter, because spiritual substances are entirely immaterial, as was shown in Book II. Therefore, it is impossible that the human body is changed into a spiritual substance.
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| Item. Si transeat in substantiam spiritualem corpus humanum, aut transibit in ipsam substantiam spiritualem quae est anima: aut in aliquam aliam. Si in ipsam, tunc post resurrectionem non esset in homine nisi anima, sicut et ante resurrectionem. Non igitur immutaretur conditio hominis per resurrectionem. Si autem transibit in aliam substantiam spiritualem, sequetur quod ex duabus substantiis spiritualibus efficietur aliquid unum in natura: quod est omnino impossibile, quia quaelibet substantia spiritualis est per se subsistens.
| [11] Again, if the human body is changed into a spiritual substance, it will be changed either into the same spiritual substance which the soul is or into some other. But, if it is into the soul itself, then after the resurrection there would be in a man only his soul, just as there was before the resurrection. Therefore, the condition of man would not be altered by the resurrection. But, if the body is to be changed into another spiritual substance, it will follow that from two spiritual substances some unit in nature is effected. And this is entirely impossible, for every spiritual substance subsists of itself.
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| Similiter etiam impossibile est quod corpus hominis resurgentis sit quasi aereum et ventis simile.
| [12] In like fashion, it is impossible that the body of man who rises be like air and kindred to winds.
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| Oportet enim corpus hominis, et cuiuslibet animalis, habere determinatam figuram et in toto et in partibus. Corpus autem habens determinatam figuram oportet quod sit in se terminabile: quia figura est quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur; aer autem non est in se terminabilis, sed solum termino alieno terminatur. Non est ergo possibile quod corpus hominis resurgentis sit aereum et ventis simile.
| [13] For the body of man and of any animal must have a determined figure both in the whole and in the parts. But a body which has a determinate figure must be terminable of itself, for figure is that which is comprised by a term or terms. Air, however, is not terminable in itself, but is terminated only by the term of something else. It is, therefore, not possible that the body of man when he rises be like the air or the winds.
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| Praeterea. Corpus hominis resurgentis oportet esse tactivum: quia sine tactu nullum est animal. Oportet autem ut resurgens sit animal, si sit homo. Corpus autem aereum non potest esse tactivum, sicut nec aliquod aliud corpus simplex: cum oporteat corpus per quod fit tactus, esse medium inter qualitates tangibiles, ut sit quodammodo in potentia ad eas, ut philosophus probat in libro de anima. Impossibile est igitur quod corpus hominis resurgentis sit aereum et simile ventis.
| [14] There is more. The body of man when he rises must have the capacity to touch, for without touch there is no animal. But that which rises must be animal if it is to be man. But an aerial body can have no capacity for touch, just as no simple body can, for the body in which the touch sensation takes place must be midway between the tangible qualities so as to be in potency to them, as the Philosopher prom in De anima [II, 11]. It is impossible, then, that the body of man who rises be like the air or the winds.
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| Ex quo etiam apparet quod non poterit esse corpus caeleste.
| [15] From this it is also apparent that it will not be able to be a celestial body.
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| Oportet enim corpus hominis, et cuiuslibet animalis, esse susceptivum tangibilium qualitatum, ut iam dictum est. Hoc autem corpori caelesti non potest convenire quod non est neque calidum neque frigidum, neque humidum neque siccum, neque aliquid huiusmodi, vel actu vel potentia, ut probatur in I de caelo. Corpus igitur hominis resurgentis non erit corpus caeleste.
| [16] For the body of manor of any animal must be receptive to tangible qualities, as was just said. But so to be is impossible for a celestial body which is not hot or cold, nor wet or dry, nor anything else of the sort, whether actually or potentially, as the Philosopher proves in De caelo [I, 3]. Therefore, the body of the man who rises will not be a celestial body.
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| Adhuc. Corpora caelestia sunt incorruptibilia, et transmutari non possunt a sua naturali dispositione. Naturaliter autem eis debetur figura sphaerica ut probatur in II de caelo et mundo. Non est igitur possibile quod accipiant figuram quae naturaliter humano corpori debetur. Impossibile est igitur quod corpora resurgentium sint de natura caelestium corporum.
| [17] Celestial bodies, moreover, are incorruptible and cannot be changed from their natural disposition. But the figure due to them naturally is the spherical, as the Philosopher proves. It is not possible, then, for them to receive the figure which is naturally due to the human body. It is, then, impossible that the bodies of the risen be in nature those of celestial bodies.
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Caput 91
Quod animae statim post separationem a corpore poenam vel praemium consequuntur
| Chapter 91
THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THEIR SEPARATION FROM THE BODY THE SOULS WILL RECEIVE PUNISHMENT OR REWARD
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| Ex his autem accipere possumus quod statim post mortem animae hominum recipiunt pro meritis vel poenam vel praemium.
| [1] From these points, of course, we can gather that immediately after death the souls of men receive either punishment or reward according to their merits.
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| Sunt enim animae separatae susceptibiles poenarum non solum spiritualium, sed etiam corporalium, ut ostensum est. Quod autem sint susceptibiles gloriae, manifestum est ex his quae in tertio sunt tractata. Ex hoc enim quod anima separatur a corpore, fit capax visionis divinae, ad quam, dum esset coniuncta corruptibili corpori, pervenire non poterat. In visione autem Dei ultima hominis beatitudo consistit, quae est virtutis praemium. Nulla autem ratio esset quare differretur poena et praemium, ex quo utriusque anima particeps esse potest. Statim igitur cum anima separatur a corpore, praemium vel poenam recipit pro his quae in corpore gessit.
| [2] For the separated souls are susceptible to punishment, not only to spiritual, but even to bodily, punishment, as has been shown. That they are susceptible to glory is manifest from the points treated in Book III. For the separation of the soul from the body makes it capable of the divine vision, and it was unable to arrive at this so long as it was united to the corruptible body. Now, in the vision of God consists man’s ultimate beatitude, which is the “reward of virtue.” But there would be no reason why punishment should differ from reward, in each of which the soul can share. Therefore, immediately after its separation from the body the man’s soul receives its reward or punishment “according as he bath done in the body (see 2 Cor. 5:10).
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| Adhuc. In vita ista est status merendi vel demerendi: unde comparatur militiae, et diebus mercenarii, ut patet Iob 7-1: militia est vita hominis super terram: et sicut mercenarii dies eius. Sed post statum militiae et laborem mercenarii statim debetur praemium vel poena bene vel male certantibus: unde et Levit. 19-13, dicitur: non morabitur opus mercenarii tui apud te usque mane. Dominus etiam dicit Ioel ult.: cito velociter reddam vicissitudinem vobis super caput vestrum. Statim igitur post mortem animae vel praemium consequuntur vel poenam.
| [3] In that life, too, there is the state of being paid or docked; hence, the comparison to “warfare” and “the days of the hireling,” as is clear in Job (7:1): “The life of man upon earth is a warfare, and his days are like the days of a hireling.” But, after the state of warfare and the labor of the hireling, the reward or punishment is straightway due those who have fought well or badly; hence, we read in Leviticus (19:13): `The wages of him that bath been hired by you shall not abide with you until the morning”; and in Joel (3:4): “I will very soon return you a recompense upon your own head.” Immediately after death, therefore, the souls receive either reward or punishment.
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| Amplius. Secundum ordinem culpae et meriti convenienter est ordo in poena et praemio. Meritum autem et culpa non competit corpori nisi per animam: nihil enim habet rationem meriti vel demeriti nisi inquantum est voluntarium. Igitur tam praemium quam poena convenienter ab anima derivatur ad corpus: non autem animae convenit propter corpus. Nulla igitur ratio est quare in punitione vel praemiatione animarum expectetur resumptio corporum: quin magis conveniens videtur ut animae, in quibus per prius fuit culpa et meritum, prius etiam puniantur vel praemientur.
| [4] There is, moreover, in the order of fault and merit a harmony with the order of punishment and reward. But merit and fault are fitted to the body only through the soul, since there is essentially no merit or demerit except so far as a thing is voluntary. Therefore, both reward and punishment flow suitably from the soul to the body, but it does not belong to the soul by reason of the body. There is, therefore, no reason in the infliction of punishment or bestowal of reward why the souls should wait for the resumption of their bodies; rather, it seems more fitting that, since the souls had priority in the fault or merit, they have priority also in being punished or rewarded.
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| Item. Eadem Dei providentia creaturis rationalibus praemia debentur et poena, qua rebus naturalibus perfectiones eis debitae adhibentur. Sic est autem in rebus naturalibus quod unumquodque statim recipit perfectionem cuius est capax, nisi sit impedimentum vel ex parte recipientis, vel ex parte agentis. Cum igitur animae statim cum fuerint separatae a corpore sint capaces et gloriae et poenae, statim utrumque recipient, nec differtur vel bonorum praemium vel malorum poena quousque animae corpora reassumant.
| [5] Then, too, the same providence of God owes rational creatures their reward or punishment which bestows on the natural things the perfections due them. But it happens this way in natural things: Everything immediately receives the perfection for which it has capacity unless there is an obstacle an the part of the one receiving or of the one giving the perfection. Therefore, since the souls immediately after they are separated from the body have a capacity for glory or punishment, they will straightway receive one or the other, and neither the reward of the good nor the punishment of the evil is put off until the souls take up their bodies again.
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| Considerandum tamen est quod ex parte bonorum aliquod impedimentum esse potest, ne animae statim a corpore absolutae ultimam mercedem recipiant, quae in Dei visione consistit. Ad illam enim visionem creatura rationalis elevari non potest nisi totaliter fuerit depurata: cum illa visio totam facultatem naturalem creaturae excedat. Unde Sap. 7-25, dicitur de sapientia quod nihil inquinatum incurrit in illam et Isaiae 35-8, dicitur: non transibit per eam pollutus. Polluitur autem anima per peccatum, inquantum rebus inferioribus inordinate coniungitur. A qua quidem pollutione purificatur in hac vita per poenitentiam et alia sacramenta, ut supra dictum est. Quandoque vero contingit quod purificatio talis non totaliter perficitur in hac vita, sed remanet adhuc debitor poenae: vel propter negligentiam aliquam aut occupationem; aut etiam quia homo morte praevenitur. Nec tamen propter hoc meretur totaliter excludi a praemio: quia haec absque peccato mortali contingere possunt, per quod solum tollitur caritas, cui praemium vitae aeternae debetur, ut apparet ex his quae in tertio dicta sunt. Oportet igitur quod post hanc vitam purgentur, antequam finale praemium consequantur. Purgatio autem haec fit per poenas, sicut et in hac vita per poenas satisfactorias purgatio completa fuisset: alioquin melioris conditionis essent negligentes quam solliciti, si poenam quam hic pro peccatis non implent, non sustineant in futuro. Retardantur igitur animae bonorum qui habent aliquid purgabile in hoc mundo, a praemii consecutione, quousque poenas purgatorias sustineant. Et haec est ratio quare Purgatorium ponimus.
| [6] Nonetheless, one must weigh the fact that in the case of the good there can be an obstacle to keep the souls from receiving their ultimate reward, which consists in the vision of God, right after their release from the body. To that vision no rational creature can be elevated unless it be thoroughly and entirely purified, since that vision exceeds the whole of the creatures natural powers. Hence, Wisdom (7:25) says of wisdom that “no defiled thing comes into her”; and Isaiah (55:8) says of “the holy way, the unclean shall not pass over it.” But by sin the soul is unclean in its disordered union to inferior things. To be sure, the soul is purified from this uncleanness in this life by penance and the other sacraments. as was said above, but it does at times happen that such purification is not entirely perfected in this life, one remains a debtor for the punishment, whether by reason of some negligence, or business, or even because a man is overtaken by death. Nevertheless, he I not entirely cut off from his reward, because such things can happen without mortal sin, which alone takes away the charity to which the reward of eternal life is due. And this is clear from what was said in Book III. They must, then, be purged after this life before they achieve the final reward. This purgation, of course, is made by punishments, just as in this life their purgation would have been completed by punishments which satisfy the debt; otherwise, the negligent would be better off than the solicitous, if the punishment which they do not complete for their sins here need not be undergone in the future. Therefore, if the souls of the good have something capable of purgation in this world, they are held back from the achievement of their reward while they undergo cleansing punishments. And this is the reason we hold that there is a purgatory.
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| Huic autem positioni suffragatur dictum apostoli I Cor. 3-15: si cuius opus arserit, detrimentum patietur, ipse autem salvus erit, sic tamen quasi per ignem. Ad hoc etiam est consuetudo Ecclesiae universalis, quae pro defunctis orat: quae quidem oratio inutilis esset si Purgatorium post mortem non ponatur. Non enim orat Ecclesia pro his qui iam sunt in termino boni vel mali, sed pro his qui nondum ad terminum pervenerunt.
| [7] This position, of course, is supported by the Apostle’s saying: “If any man’s work burn, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved yet so as by fire (1 Cor. 5: 15). There is also support in the universal custom of the Church which prays for the dead, such prayers would be useless, indeed, if one holds there is no purgatory after death. For the Church does not pray for those who are already at the goal of good or of evil, but for those who have not yet arrived at the goal.
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| Quod autem statim post mortem animae consequantur poenam vel praemium si impedimentum non sit, auctoritatibus Scripturae confirmatur. Dicitur enim Iob 21-13, de malis: ducunt in bonis dies suos: et in puncto ad Inferna descendunt; et Lucae 16-22: mortuus est dives, et sepultus est in Inferno; Infernus autem est locus ubi animae puniuntur. Similiter etiam et de bonis patet. Ut enim habetur Lucae 23-43, dominus in cruce pendens latroni dixit: hodie mecum eris in Paradiso; per Paradisum autem intelligitur praemium quod repromittitur bonis, secundum illud Apoc. 2-7: vincenti dabo edere de ligno vitae quod est in Paradiso Dei mei.
| [8] Now, the attainment immediately after death of the punishment or of the reward if there be no obstacle is established by Scriptural authorities. For Job (21:3) says of the wicked: “They spend their days in wealth, and in a moment they go down to hell”; and Luke (16:22): “And the rich man ,died and he was buried in hell.” Hell, of course, is the place where souls are punished. The same point is clear about the good, for, as Luke (23:43) has it, our Lord hanging on the cross said to the thief: “This day you shall be with Me in paradise.” By paradise one understands the reward which is promised to the good, as in the Apocalypse (2:7): “To him that overcomes I will give to eat of the tree of life which is in the paradise of My God.”
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| Dicunt autem quidam quod per Paradisum non intelligitur ultima remuneratio, quae erit in caelis, secundum illud Matth. 5-12: gaudete et exultate, quoniam merces vestra copiosa est in caelis; sed aliqualis remuneratio quae erit in terra. Nam Paradisus locus quidam terrenus esse videtur, ex hoc quod dicitur Gen. 2-8, quod plantaverat dominus Deus Paradisum voluptatis, in quo posuit hominem quem formaverat. Sed si quis recte verba sacrae Scripturae consideret, inveniet quod ipsa finalis retributio, quae in caelis promittitur sanctis, statim post hanc vitam datur. Apostolus enim II Cor. 4, cum de finali gloria locutus fuisset, dicens quod id quod in praesenti est tribulationis nostrae momentaneum et leve, supra modum in sublimitate aeternum gloriae pondus operatur in nobis, non contemplantibus nobis ea quae videntur, sed ea quae non videntur; quae enim videntur temporalia sunt, quae autem non videntur aeterna, quae manifestum est de finali gloria dici, quae est in caelis; ut ostenderet quando et qualiter haec gloria habeatur, subiungit: scimus enim quoniam si terrestris domus nostra huius habitationis dissolvatur, quod aedificationem ex Deo habemus, domum non manufactam, sed aeternam in caelis; per quod manifeste dat intelligere quod, dissoluto corpore, anima ad aeternam et caelestem mansionem perducitur, quae nihil aliud est quam fruitio divinitatis, sicut Angeli fruuntur in caelis.
| [9] However, some do say that by “paradise” one understands not the ultimate reward which will be in heaven, as in Matthew (5:12): “Be glad and rejoice for your reward is very great in heaven,” but an equal reward upon earth. For “paradise seems to be an earthly place, from what Genesis (2:8) says: “The Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure wherein He placed man whom He had formed.” But let a man consider rightly the words of sacred Scripture and he will find that the final recompense promised to the saints in heaven is given immediately after this life. For the Apostle, after he had spoken of the final glory, said: “That which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation works for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory, while we look not at the things which are seen but at the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal” (2 Cor. 4: 17-18). Clearly, he is speaking of the final glory which is in heaven, and to show when and how this glory is had he adds: “For we know, if our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, that we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in heaven” (2 Cor. 5: 1). By this he manifestly gives us to understand that when the body is dissolved the soul is led to an eternal and heavenly mansion which is nothing but the enjoyment of divinity as the angels enjoy it in heaven.
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| Si quis autem contradicere velit, dicens apostolum non dixisse, quod statim, dissoluto corpore, domum aeternam habeamus in caelis in re, sed solum in spe, tandem habituri in re: manifeste hoc est contra intentionem apostoli: quia etiam dum hic vivimus habituri sumus caelestem mansionem secundum praedestinationem divinam; et iam eam habemus in spe, secundum illud Rom. 8-24: spe enim salvi facti sumus. Frustra igitur addidit: si terrena domus nostra huius habitationis dissolvatur; suffecisset enim dicere: scimus quod aedificationem habemus ex Deo et cetera. Rursus expressius hoc apparet ex eo quod subditur: scientes quoniam, dum sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a domino: per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem. Audemus autem, et bonam voluntatem habemus magis peregrinari a corpore, et praesentes esse ad dominum. Frustra autem vellemus peregrinari a corpore, idest separari, nisi statim essemus praesentes ad dominum. Non autem sumus praesentes nisi quando videmus per speciem: quandiu enim ambulamus per fidem et non per speciem, peregrinamur a domino, ut ibidem dicitur. Statim igitur cum anima sancta a corpore separatur, Deum per speciem videt: quod est ultima beatitudo, ut in tertio est ostensum. Hoc autem idem ostendunt et verba eiusdem apostoli, Philipp. 1-23, dicentis: desiderium habens dissolvi et esse cum Christo. Christus autem in caelis est. Sperabat igitur apostolus statim post corporis dissolutionem se perventurum ad caelum.
| [10] But someone may choose to contradict and to assert that the Apostle did not say that immediately on the dissolution of the body we are to have an eternal home in heaven in fact, but merely in hope, and at long last we are to have it in fact. Clearly, however, this is contrary to the Apostle’s intention, for, even while we live here, we are to have the heavenly mansion according to divine predestination; and we already have it in hope, as Romans (8:24) says: “For we are saved by hope.” Vainly, then, he added: “if our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved,” for it would have been enough to say: “We know that we have a building of God,” and so forth. The point is again and more expressly clear in the addition: “Knowing that while we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by faith and not by sight. But we are confident and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and to be present to the Lord” (2 Cor. 5:6-8). But we should be willing in vain “to be absent from the body,” meaning “separated,” unless we were to be straightway present to the Lord. But we are not present except when we behold by sight, for as long as we walk by faith and not by sight “we are absent from the Lord,” as he says there. Straightway, therefore, when the holy soul is separated from the body, it sees God by sight. And this is the ultimate beatitude, as was shown in Book III. The same truth is also made manifest by the words of the same Apostle: “Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ” (Phil. 1:23). Now, Christ is in heaven. Therefore, the Apostle was hoping that immediately after the dissolution of his body he would arrive in heaven.
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| Per hoc autem excluditur error quorundam Graecorum, qui Purgatorium negant, et dicunt animas ante corporum resurrectionem neque ad caelum ascendere, neque in Infernum demergi.
| [11] In this way one avoids the error of some of the Greeks, who deny purgatory and say that before the resurrection souls neither ascend into heaven nor descend into hell.
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Caput 97
| Chapter 97
THE STATE OF THE WORLD AFTER THE JUDGMENT
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| Peracto igitur finali iudicio, natura humana totaliter in suo termino constituetur. Quia vero omnia corporalia sunt quodammodo propter hominem, ut in tertio est ostensum, tunc etiam totius creaturae corporeae conveniens est ut status immutetur, ut congruat statui hominum qui tunc erunt. Et quia tunc homines incorruptibiles erunt, a tota creatura corporea tolletur generationis et corruptionis status. Et hoc est quod dicit apostolus, Rom. 8-21, quod ipsa creatura liberabitur a servitute corruptionis in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei.
| [1] When, therefore, the last judgment is completed, human nature will be entirely established in its goal. However, since everything bodily is somehow for the sake of man (as was shown in Book III), at that time, also, the entire bodily creation will be changed—and suitably—to be in harmony with the state of the men who then will be. And because men will then be incorruptible, the state of generation and corruption will then be taken away from the whole bodily creation. And this is what the Apostle says: that “the creature also itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption, into the liberty of the glory of the children of God” (Rom. 8: 21).
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| Generatio autem et corruptio in inferioribus corporibus ex motu caeli causatur. Ad hoc igitur quod in inferioribus cesset generatio et corruptio, oportet etiam quod motus caeli cesset. Et propter hoc dicitur Apoc. 10-6, quod tempus amplius non erit.
| [2] Now, generation and corruption in inferior bodies are caused by the movement of the heavens. Therefore, that generation and corruption may come to a stop in the inferior bodies, the movement of the heavens must also come to a stop. And on this account the Apocalypse (10:6) says “that time shall be no longer.”
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| Non debet autem impossibile videri quod motus caeli cesset. Non enim motus caeli sic est naturalis sicut motus gravium et levium, ut ab aliquo interiori activo principio inclinetur ad motum: sed dicitur naturalis, inquantum habet in sua natura aptitudinem ad talem motum; principium autem illius motus est aliquis intellectus, ut in tertio est ostensum. Movetur igitur caelum sicut ea quae a voluntate moventur. Voluntas autem movet propter finem. Finis autem motus caeli non potest esse ipsum moveri: motus enim, cum semper in aliud tendat, non habet rationem ultimi finis. Nec potest dici quod finis caelestis motus sit, ut corpus caeleste reducatur secundum ubi de potentia in actum: quia haec potentia nunquam potest tota in actum reduci: quia dum corpus caeleste est actu in uno ubi, est in potentia ad aliud; sicut est et de potentia materiae primae respectu formarum. Sicut igitur finis naturae in generatione non est reducere materiam de potentia in actum, sed aliquid quod ad hoc consequitur, scilicet perpetuitas rerum, per quam ad divinam similitudinem accedunt; ita finis motus caelestis non est reduci de potentia in actum, sed aliquid consequens ad hanc reductionem, scilicet assimilari Deo in causando. Omnia autem generabilia et corruptibilia, quae causantur per motum caeli, ad hominem ordinantur quodammodo sicut in finem, ut in tertio est ostensum. Motus igitur caeli praecipue est propter generationem hominum: in hoc enim maxime divinam similitudinem consequitur in causando, quia forma hominis, scilicet anima rationalis, immediate creatur a Deo, ut in secundo est ostensum. Non autem potest esse finis multiplicatio animarum in infinitum: quia infinitum contrariatur rationi finis. Nihil igitur inconveniens sequitur si, certo numero hominum completo, ponamus motum caeli desistere.
| [3] It ought not, of course, seem impossible that the movement of the heavens come to a stop. For the movement of the heavens is not natural in the way the movement of heavy and light bodies is—that is, they are inclined to movement by an interior active principle—but it is called natural in that the heavenly body has an aptitude for such movement; the principle of that motion, however, is an intellect, as was shown in Book III. The heaven is moved, therefore, as are things moved by a will. But a will moves for a purpose. Of course, the purpose of the motion of the heavens cannot be the very movement itself, for motion, since it always tends toward another, does not have the character of an ultimate end. Neither can one say that the end of the heavenly motion is this: the reducing of the heavenly body from potency to act in place where. This potency can never be entirely reduced to act, for, while the heavenly body is actually in one place where, it is in potency to another such, just as is the case of prime matter with respect to forms. Therefore, just as nature in generation does not have as end the reduction of matter from potency to act, but something consequent on this reduction—namely, that perpetuity in things by which they approach a divine likeness—so the end of heavenly motion is not the being reduced from potency to act, but something consequent on this reduction: namely, to be made like to God in the act of causing. But all things generable and corruptible caused by the motion of the heaven are somehow ordered to man as to an end, as was shown in Book III. Therefore, the motion of the heaven is especially on account of the generation of men; in this it does most to accomplish a divine likeness in the act of causing, since man’s form—namely, the rational soul—is immediately created by God, as was shown in Book II. But the multiplication of souls to infinity cannot be an end, for infinity is contrary to the notion of end. Nothing awkward, then, ensues if we hold that, when a fixed number of men is filled out, the motion of the heavens ceases.
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| Cessante tamen motu caeli et generatione et corruptione ab elementis, eorum substantia remanebit, ex immobilitate divinae bonitatis: creavit enim res ut essent. Unde esse rerum quae aptitudinem habent ad perpetuitatem, in perpetuum remanebit. Habent autem naturam ut sint perpetua, secundum totum et partem, corpora caelestia; elementa vero secundum totum, licet non secundum partem, quia secundum partem corruptibilia sunt; homines vero secundum partem, licet non secundum totum, nam anima rationalis incorruptibilis est, compositum autem corruptibile. Haec igitur secundum substantiam remanebunt in illo ultimo statu mundi, quae quoquo modo ad perpetuitatem aptitudinem habent, Deo supplente sua virtute quod eis ex propria infirmitate deest.
| [4] Nonetheless, when the motion of the heavens and generation and corruption in the elements have come to a stop, their substance will continue to be by reason of the changelessness of the divine goodness, “for He created all things that they might be” (Wis. 1:14). Hence, the being of things which have an aptitude for perpetuity will remain in perpetuity. Both wholly and in part, of course, the heavenly bodies have the nature to be everlasting. The elements, however, have it wholly, but not in part, for in part they are corruptible. Man, of course, has it in part, but not wholly: for the rational soul is incorruptible; the composite, corruptible. These, then, which in any way at all have an aptitude for being everlasting will abide in their substance in that last state of the world, and God in His power will supply what is wanting in their own weakness.
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| Alia vero animalia, et plantae, et corpora mixta, quae totaliter sunt corruptibilia, et secundum totum et partem, nullo modo in illo incorruptionis statu remanebunt. Sic igitur intelligendum est quod apostolus dicit, I Cor. 7-31: praeterit figura huius mundi, quia haec species mundi quae nunc est, cessabit: substantia vero remanebit. Sic etiam intelligitur quod dicitur Iob 14-12: homo, cum dormierit, non resurget donec atteratur caelum: idest, donec ista dispositio caeli cesset qua movetur et in aliis motum causat.
| [5] But the other animals, the plants, and the mixed bodies, those entirely corruptible both wholly and in part, will not remain at all in that state of incorruption. In this way, then, must the saying of the Apostle be understood: “The fashion of this world passes away” (1 Cor. 7:31), that this appearance of the world which now is will cease to be, but the substance will remain. Thus, also, is understood what Job (24:12) says: “Man, when he is fallen asleep, shall not rise again: till the heavens be broken” that is, until that disposition of the heaven ceases to be, that in which it is moved and causes motion in others.
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| Quia vero inter alia elementa maxime activum est ignis, et corruptibilium consumptivum; consumptio eorum quae in futuro statu remanere non debent, convenientissime fiet per ignem. Et ideo secundum fidem ponitur quod finaliter mundus per ignem purgabitur, non solum a corruptibilibus corporibus, sed etiam ab infectione quam locus iste incurrit ex habitatione peccatorum. Et hoc est quod dicitur II Petri 3-7: caeli qui nunc sunt et terra eodem verbo repositi sunt, igni reservati, in diem iudicii: ut per caelos non ipsum firmamentum intelligamus, in quo sunt sidera, sive fixa sive errantia, sed istos caelos aereos terrae vicinos.
| [6] But since among the other elements fire is the most active, and tends to consume the corruptible, the consumption of the things which ought not remain in the future state will most suitably take place by fire. Hence, one holds in accord with the faith that at the last the world will be purified by fire, not from corruptible bodies alone, but from that infection which the place incurred by serving as the dwelling of sinners. And this is what is said in 2 Peter (3:7): “The heavens and the earth which are now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto, fire against the day of judgment,” so that we may understand by “heavens” not the very firmament in which the stars are, whether fixed or wandering, but those heavens of air which are close to the earth.
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| Quia igitur creatura corporalis finaliter disponetur per congruentiam ad hominis statum; homines autem non solum a corruptione liberabuntur, sed etiam gloria induentur, ut ex dictis patet: oportebit quod etiam creatura corporalis quandam claritatis gloriam suo modo consequatur.
| [7] Since, then, the bodily creation will at the last be disposed in harmony with the state of man—since men, of course, will not only be freed from corruption but also clothed with glory, as what has been said makes clear—necessarily even the bodily creation will achieve a kind of resplendence in its own way.
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| Et hinc est quod dicitur Apoc. 21-1: vidi caelum novum et terram novam; et Isaiae 65-17 ego creabo caelos novos, et terram novam, et non erunt in memoria priora, et non ascendent super cor: sed gaudebitis et exsultabitis usque in sempiternum. Amen.
| [8] AND, HENCE, THE SAYING OF THE APOCALYPSE (21:l): “I SAW A NEW HEAVEN AND A NEW EARTH.” AND ISAIAH (65:17-18): “BEHOLD I CREATE NEW HEAVENS, AND A NEW EARTH: AND THE FORMER THINGS SHALL NOT BE IN REMEMBRANCE AND THEY SHALL NOT COME UPON THE HEART. BUT YOU SHALL BE GLAD AND REJOICE FOREVER.” AMEN.
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