Liber contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem
by
Thomas Aquinastranslated by
John Procter, O.P.
in
AN APOLOGY FOR THE RELIGIOUS ORDERS
London: Sands & Co., 1902
English updated, many corrections, and chapters renumbered according to Latin, and html-edited by Joseph Kenny, O.P.
CONTENTS
PART ONE: What is Meant by Religion? What Does its Perfection Consist In?
PART 2: CHAPTERS:
- Is it Lawful for A Religious to Teach?
- Can A Religious Lawfully Belong to A College of Secular Teachers?
- Is it Lawful for A Religious, Who Has Not the Care of Souls, to Preach and Hear Confessions?
- Are Religious Bound to Manual Labour?
- Is it Lawful For a Religious to Leave All That He Has, Reserving for Himself No Property, Either Private Or Common?
- Is it Lawful for Religious to Live on Alms?
PART 3
PROLOGUE: How Religious Are Attacked by Their Enemies for Many Frivolous Reasons
- The Poverty of the Religious Habit is the First Point on Which They Are Assailed
- The Attacks Brought Against Religious on Account of Their Works of Charity
- How Religious Are Attacked on Account of the Journeys Which They Undertake for the Salvation of Souls
- >Attacks Made on Religious Because They Study
- Attacks Brought Against Religious on Account of Their Systematic Method of Preaching
PART 4:
- Accusations That Religious Procure Letters of Recommendation
- The Charges That Religious Resist Their Detractors
- Religious Are Condemned for Going to Law
- Religious Are Blamed for Causing Their Persecutors to Be Punished
- Religious Are Accused of Seeking to Find Favour with Men
- Objections Brought Against Religious, Because They Rejoice At the Good Works Which God Effects Through Their Instrumentality
- Religious Are Blamed for Frequenting the Courts of Sovereigns
PART 5
EPILOGUE
PROLOGUE: The Enemies of Religious Seek, in Every Way, to Defame Them
- First of All by Exaggerating Any Evil That May Exist Among Them
- The Enemies of Religious Spread Abroad Against Them Reports of Which the Truth is Doubtful, for Instance, They Accuse Religious of Seeking Popularity and of Desiring to Gain Glory for Themselves, Instead of Labouring for the Glory of God
- The Enemies of Religious Propagate Distinct Falsehoods Concerning Them, Affirming, for Instance That Religious Are False Apostles, False Prophets, and False Christs
- The Enemies of Religious Impute to Them All the Evils From Which the Church Has Ever Suffered. They Also Accuse Them of Being Wolves and Robbers and of Creeping Into Houses
- The Enemies of Religious Attribute to Them the Evils Which Will Befall the Church in the Latter Days. They Try to Prove That the Times of Antichrist Are At Hand
- The Opponents of Religious Life Strive to Prove That Religious Are Antichrists
- The Enemies of Religious Endeavour to Cast Suspicion Upon Such of Their Works As Are Clearly Good: E.g., Prayer and Fasting
Caput 1
Utrum alicui religioso docere liceatCHAPTER 1
Is it Lawful for A Religious to Teach?Doctrinam autem religiosorum, ne scilicet docere possint, multipliciter excludere nituntur. CONSTANT efforts have been made to hinder religious from becoming learned, and thereby, to ensure their inability to teach. Primo auctoritate domini dicentis, Matth. XXIII, 8: vos autem nolite vocari Rabbi: quod quidem consilium esse dicunt a perfectis observandum unde cum omnes religiosi perfectionem profiteantur, a magisterio abstinere debent. 1. The words of our Lord, “But be not ‘you called, Rabbi” (Matt. xxiii. 8), have been quoted in defence of these measures. It has been maintained, that, as, these words are a counsel to be observed by the perfect, Religious, as professors of perfection, ought in deference to them, to abstain from, teaching. Secundo auctoritate Hieronymi in epistola contra Vigilantium, et 16, qu. I: monachus non docentis sed plangentis habet officium: et 7, qu. I, cap hoc nequaquam dicitur: monachi vita subiectionis habet verbum et discipulatus: non docendi, vel praesidendi, vel pascendi alios. Et ita, cum canonici regulares et alii religiosi monachorum iure censeantur, ut dicitur extra, de postulando, ex parte, et de statu monachorum, quod Dei timorem; relinquitur quod nulli religioso docere liceat. 2. St. Jerome, likewise has been brought forward as an advocate against the propriety of teaching being undertaken by religious. This saint, in his epistle to Riparius and Desiderius against Vigilantius (and the words are quoted in Gratian, xvi. Quaest. I), writes thus: “The office of a monk is to mourn, not to teach.” Again, in VII. Quaest. I, cap. Hoc nequaquam, it is said, “The life of monks is one of subjection and discipline, not of teaching, nor ruling, nor of being pastors over others.” And as canons regular and other religious are classed as monks (as it is stated in Extra de postulando, ex parte, and Quod Dei timor), it follows that no religious way lawfully teach. Ad idem etiam addunt quod docere est contra religionis votum. Per votum enim religionis mundo abrenuntiatur. Omne autem quod est in mundo, est concupiscentia carnis, concupiscentia oculorum, et superbia vitae; per quae tria intelligunt divitias, delicias et honores. Magisterium autem honorem esse dicunt: quod probant per Glossam, quae est Matth. IV, 5 super illud statuit eum supra pinnaculum templi etc., in Palestina plana desuper erant tecta, et ibi erat sedes doctorum, unde populo loquerentur: ubi multos cepit Diabolus vanagloria, honore magisterii inflatos. Unde concludunt, quod docere est contra religionis votum. 3. It is further argued, that teaching is contrary to the vow of a religious, whereby he renounces the world. “For all that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life,” by which we understand riches, pleasures, and honour. Now teaching is considered to be an honour; and this theory is thought to be supported by the Gloss upon the words of St, Matthew (iv. 5), “He set Him upon the pinnacle.” “In Palestine,” says the Gloss, “ the roofs were flat, and the Doctors sat thereon, and spoke to the people. The devil seduced many of them with vainglory. For they were puffed up by the honour of teaching.” On these words is based the conclusion that teaching is contrary to the vow of religious. Item. Religiosi tenentur ad perfectam humilitatem, sicut ad perfectam paupertatem. Sed ita tenentur ad paupertatem, quod non licet eis aliquid proprium possidere. Ergo ita debent humilitatem servare quod nullo honore potiantur. Magisterium autem est honor, ut probatum est. Ergo magisterium est eis illicitum. 4. Again, it is urged, that, Religious are bound as stringently, to practise perfect humility, as they are obliged to observe perfect poverty. As their vow of poverty forbids them to possess anything of their own, so the humility, to which they are bound, does not permit them to enjoy any honour. Teaching is, as has been proved, an honour. It is not lawful, consequently, for religious to teach. Item. Dionysius, 4 cap. Eccl. Hierar., distinguit nostram hierarchiam in tria: scilicet in sacras actiones, et in communicantes eas, et in eos qui eas tantum recipiunt. Actiones autem sacras dividit in tria scilicet purgationem, illuminationem et perfectionem. Communicantes etiam divinas actiones dividit in tria in 5 cap.: scilicet in purgantes quod est diaconorum, in illuminantes quod est sacerdotum, in perficientes quod est episcoporum. Recipientes etiam divinas actiones dividit in tria in 6 capitulo, scilicet in immundos, qui purgantur per diaconos; in sacrum populum, qui illuminatur per sacerdotes; in monachos, qui sunt altioris gradus, qui perficiuntur per episcopos. Ergo patet quod monachorum non est sacra aliis communicare, sed ab aliis recipere. Sed quicunque docet, sacra aliis communicat. Ergo monachus non debet docere. 5. A passage from Dionysius (V. cap. Eccles. hierarch), is quoted as a proof that religious ought not to teach. This writer divides the hierarchy into three classes, those who perform sacred functions; those who share in these functions; and those who merely, receive the benefit of them. In the same chapter, he divides these functions likewise into three classes, viz., that of cleansing, which is the office of deacons; that of enlightening, which is, the office of priests; and that of making others perfect, which is the office of bishops. Those that receive the benefit of these sacred functions are also, again, divided into three classes, Of these, the first consists of the unclean, who are purified by the deacons; the second is composed of the holy people of God who are enlightened by priests ; and, the third class is formed by monks, who are of a higher rank than the other classes), and these are perfected by bishops. Hence the function of monks is to receive holiness, not to impart it to others. And as they who teach must instruct their pupils in sacred science, teaching is not the lawful work of monks. Item. Magis est remotum a vita monastica scholasticum officium quam ecclesiasticum. Sed, ut dicitur 16, quaest. I, nemo potest ecclesiasticis officiis deservire, et in monastica regula ordinate persistere. Ergo multo minus potest monachus scholasticis officiis vacare docendo vel audiendo. 6. Again, the scholastic office is more remote from the monastic life than is the ecclesiastical. But we find (XVI, quaest. I), that “no one can exercise the priestly functions, and persevere in the due observance of monastic rules.” Much less then can a monk devote himself to the scholastic office, by teaching or listening. Addunt iterum quod est contra apostolicam doctrinam II Cor. X, 13: nos autem non in immensum gloriabimur, sed secundum mensuram regulae quam mensus est nobis Deus: Glossa: tanta potestate utimur, quanta concessa est ab auctore, nec mensuram vel modum egredimur. Unde dicunt, quod quicumque religiosus ultra illum modum egreditur qui sibi ab auctore suae regulae est statutus, se ipsum superextendit contra apostolicam doctrinam veniens. Unde cum nulla religio in sui principio habuerit magistros, nulli religioso licet ad magisterium promoveri. 7. It is likewise supposed to be contrary to the doctrine of the Apostles for religious to teach. For St. Paul says (2 Cor. x. 13), “We will not glory beyond our measure, but according to the measure of the rule which, God has measured to us.” On these words, the Gloss thus comments: “We use power in-so-far as it has been given to us by the Author of our being: but we do not go beyond the limit, or measure, of our power.” The argument, drawn from these words, is that any religious, overstepping the measure of power assigned by the author of his rule, contravenes this Apostolic doctrine. An no religious order originally included teachers, no monk ought to be promoted to the scholastic office. Ulterius autem, et si non ex toto doctrinam religiosorum impedire possint, eam saltem attenuare nituntur, dicentes, quod in uno religiosorum collegio duo doctores esse non debent: inducentes illud quod dicitur Iac. III, I: nolite plures magistri fieri, fratres mei: Glossa: plures in una Ecclesia ne velitis esse magistri. Sed unum religiosorum collegium est una Ecclesia. Ergo in uno religiosorum collegio non debent esse plures magistri. Sed c. 1. Some enemies of religion, however, failing in their attempt to completely prevent religious from teaching, try to prove, that no religious community ought to have many teachers. In support of this theory they quote the words of St. James (iii. 1), “Let not many of you become teachers, my brethren.” These words the Gloss explains to mean, “Do not desire to have many teachers in the Church.” Now one community of religious is one Church. Hence there ought not to be many masters in a religious community. Item. Hieronymus ad rusticum monachum, et habetur 7, quaest. I: in apibus princeps est unus, grues unam sequuntur ordine litterato, et infra: in navi unus gubernator, in domo unus dominus. Ergo et in uno collegio religiosorum non debet esse nisi unus magister. Sed c. 2. St. Jerome writes thus to Rusticus—and the words are quoted in VII. quaest. 1.—“Bees have one queen. Cranes follow one leader. There is one captain to a vessel. And one lord in a house.” Hence in one community of religious, it is argued, there ought to be only one master. Item. Cum sint multa religiosorum collegia, si unum collegium haberet plus quam unum doctorem, sequeretur tanta multiplicatio religiosorum doctorum, quod saeculares magistri excluderentur propter auditorum paucitatem; praecipue cum oporteat in uno studio esse determinatum numerum magistrorum, ne ex doctorum multitudine doctrina sacra veniat in contemptum. Sed c. 3. Furthermore, it must be remembered that there are many religious communities. If each college has more than one teacher, there will be so many religions teachers, that secular masters will, from dearth of pupils, be altogether shut out from the profession. There ought, also, to be a definite number of teachers for every branch of learning; but this great multiplicity of religious professors will cause sacred science to be held in low esteem. Huius autem erroris assertores, priorum errantium semitas imitantur. Est enim errantium consuetudo, ut quia in medio veritatis non possunt consistere, unum errorem declinantes, in contrarium dilabantur. Sicut evitans divisionem essentiae, quam Arius introduxit, in confusionem personarum Sabellius declinavit, ut dicit Augustinus. Sic etiam Eutyches declinans divisionem personarum in Christo quam Nestorius asserebat, confusionem naturarum in Christo posuit, sicut dicit Boetius. Idem etiam patet de Pelagio et Manichaeo, et de multis aliis haereticis: propter quod dicitur II Tim. III, 8: homines reprobi corrupti mente circa fidem: Glossa: et nunquam in fide; quia in circuitu impii ambulant, in medio non sistentes. Body. These advocates of half measures, commit, in reality, as great an error, as those who desire to see religious totally excluded from the office of teaching. For, all who go astray and cannot keep on the beaten track of truth, fall, in their efforts to avoid one mistake, into the opposite error. Thus, Sabellius, as St. Augustine remarks, striving to keep clear of the Arian heresy of the division of the Divine Essence, fell into the error of confusing the Divine Persons. Boethius also observes that Eutyches, although avoiding the Nestorian heresy of dividing the Person of Christ, fell into the error of teaching that in Him there is unity of nature. The same observation applies to Pelagius, to Manichaeus and to other heretics. On this account St. Paul speaks (2 Tim iii. 8) of “men corrupted in mind, reprobate concerning the faith.” On which text the Gloss enlarges, by saying, that such men “do not stay in the faith, but walk round about it, never remaining on the mean line.” Fuit igitur quondam quorundam praesumptuosorum religiosorum error, quod ex hoc ipso quod monachi erant, de sua vita praesumentes, auctoritate propria sibi docendi officium usurpabant; et in hoc pax ecclesiastica turbabatur; ut habetur 16, quaest. I: quidam monachi nihil habentes sibi iniunctum a proprio episcopo, veniunt ad civitatem Constantinopolitanam, et in ea perturbationes ecclesiasticae tranquillitati inferunt: quod etiam plenius in ecclesiastica narratur historia: quorum praesumptionem sancti patres conati sunt reprimere rationibus et decretis. The passages quoted from the Decretals and the writings of the Fathers against the right of religious to teach owe their origin to the following fact. There existed, formerly, among certain presumptuous monks a mistaken idea, that, because they were monks, they, had a right to usurp the office of teachers. This assumption of authority, on their part, gave rise to considerable disturbance to the Church. We find this fact stated in XVI quaest. I, “Certain monks, bearing no commission from their own bishop, come to Constantinople, and cause confusion to arise in the church of that city.” This statement is fully corroborated in ecclesiastical history. The Fathers used every effort, both by arguments and decrees, to suppress these presumptuous monks. Eorum autem dictis quidam perversi nostri temporis abutuntur, ea indocti atque instabiles depravantes, sicut et ceteras Scripturas ad suam ipsorum perditionem, II Pet. ult., 16; intantum quod in contrarium errorem labuntur, asserentes quod non licet religioso doctoris officium exercere, vel suscipere; et quod non debet ei iniungi. Quod quidem esse falsum primo ostendamus, postmodum ad eorum probationes respondentes. Primo ergo inducatur auctoritas Hieronymi ad rusticum, quae habetur 16, quaest. I cap.: sic vive in monasterio, ut clericus esse merearis: multo tempore disce ut postmodum doceas. But certain men of our own day, being “unlearned and unstable, wrest” these decrees, “as they do also the other Scriptures, to their own destruction” (2 Peter iii. 16). They, thus, fall into an opposite error to that which the Fathers strove to rectify. For, it is now asserted by the enemies of religion, that no religions has any right to exercise, or to undertake, the function of teaching; and that such an office ought not to be open to religious orders. We will produce proofs that such a conclusion is utterly unfounded. We will then proceed to confute the arguments adduced in its support. Item ad eundem in cap. seq.: si clericatus te titillat desiderium, discas quod possis docere. Ex quibus accipi potest quod monachi possunt suscipere docendi officium. Hoc idem ostenditur exemplis sanctorum, qui in religione viventes docuerunt: sicut patet de Gregorio Nazianzeno, qui cum monachus esset, Constantinopolim est adductus, ut sacram Scripturam ibi doceret, ut ecclesiastica narrat historia. Hoc etiam patet de Damasceno; qui cum monachus esset, scholares docuit non solum in sacra Scriptura, sed etiam in liberalibus artibus, ut patet in Lib. de miraculis beatae virginis. Hieronymus etiam in prologo Bibliae, licet monachus esset, doctrinam sacrae Scripturae promittit Paulino monacho, scilicet quod eum docebit; quem etiam ad studium sacrae Scripturae hortatur. De Augustino etiam legitur, quod postquam monasterium instituit, in quo coepit vivere secundum regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam, scribebat libros, et docebat indoctos. Hoc etiam patet de aliis Ecclesiae doctoribus: scilicet Gregorio, Basilio, Chrysostomo et aliis multis; qui religiosi fuerunt, et praecipui Ecclesiae doctores. First, we quote the authority of St. Jerome, who writes thus to Rusticus (the words are cited in XVI, quaest. I), “Lead such a life in your monastery, that you may deserve to become a cleric. Learn, for a long time, that which, hereafter, you may teach,” Again he continues in the following, chapter, “If the desire for the priesthood attract you, learn what you can teach.” From these words it is plain that monks may accept the office of teaching. The same fact is proved by the example of the Saints, who taught while living in religious orders. We read in the History of the Church, that St. Gregory of Nazianzen, a monk, was sent to Constantinople, in order to teach Holy Scripture. St. Damasus, likewise a monk; instructed his scholars, not only in Scripture, but in liberal arts, We have proof of this in the book De miraculis beatae Virginis. St. Jerome, also, although a monk, promises, in his prologue to the Bible, to instruct Paulinus, (also a monk), in Holy Scripture, and he exhorts him to its study. St. Augustine, knew, we are told, after he had founded the monastery in which he lived by the rule drawn up by the Apostles, wrote books and instructed the unlearned. In fact, some of the greatest Doctors of the Church—such as Sts. Gregory, Basil, Chrysostom, and many others—were religious. Hoc etiam rationibus ostendere facile est. Doctrina enim sacrae Scripturae operibus comprobatur. Act. I, I: coepit Iesus facere et docere: Glossa: quod coepit facere et docere, bonum doctorem instruit, qui quod docet facit. Doctrina autem evangelica non solum praecepta, sed etiam consilia continet. Convenientissime ergo doctrinam evangelicam docet qui non solum praecepta, sed et consilia servat, cuiusmodi sunt religiosi. Our Lord Himself has set the same example. For, as we read (Acts i. 1), “Jesus began to do and to teach.” The Gloss thus comments on these words, “Christ, by beginning to do and to teach, shows that a good teacher must do what he teaches.” The Gospels contain not only doctrine, but likewise counsels. Therefore, he who not only instructs others in the Evangelical precepts, but likewise himself observes the counsels (as do religious) are the most fit exponents of the Scriptures. Item. Qui moritur alicui vitae, ab illis operibus decidit quae illi vitae congruunt; et qui vivere incipit aliqua vita, illa opera tunc sibi fiunt maxime convenientia quae illi vitae competunt: unde Dionysius, 2 cap. Eccl. Hierarch., ostendit, quod ante Baptismum, per quem homo divinam vitam accipit, non potest exercere operationes divinas: quia, sicut ipse dicit, oportet primum existere, et deinde operari. Sed religiosus per votum religionis saeculo moritur, Deo vivens. Ergo per hoc quod religiosus est, interdicuntur sibi actiones saeculares, sicut mercationes, et alia negotia saecularia; non autem actiones divinae, quae scilicet hominem in Deo viventem requirunt. Talis autem est divina confessio, quae fit per doctrinam. Psalmus non mortui laudabunt te, domine (...); sed nos qui vivimus etc.; et ita religiosi per votum religionis a doctrinae officio non excluduntur. Again, when a man dies, he passes away from the works belonging to the life which he quits. When he begins a new life, those works best beseem him which belong to the life on which he enters. Dionysius (2 cap. Eccles. Hierarch.)shows that before Baptism, whereby man receives Divine life, he is incapable of any Divine operation; for life must precede work. In like manner a religious, by his vows, dies to, the world in order to live to God. Hence he is excluded from any share in secular business, such as commerce; but he is not forbidden to perform those Divine functions which require for their exercise life in God. Among such offices, is that of giving praise to God, which is only rightly done by those who have knowledge of sacred things. “The dead shall not praise you, O Lord... But we who live” (Ps. cxiii. 17). Praeterea. Illi maxime sunt idonei ad docendum qui maxime divina per contemplationem capere possunt: unde Gregorius in 6 Moral.: quieti contemplantes sorbeant quod occupati erga proximos loquentes refundant. Sed ad vacandum contemplationi praecipue religiosi sunt deputati. Ergo ipsi per hoc quod sunt religiosi, redduntur magis ad docendum idonei quam impediantur. Another office from which religious are not excluded by their vows is that of teaching. On the contrary, being rendered by contemplation capable of understanding Divine things, they are certainly the most fit to impart them to others. Hence St. Gregory says (6, Moral.), “Those who contemplate with undistracted mind, drink in that knowledge, which they afterwards, when they are busied in speech, communicate to others.” Now religious are chiefly set apart for contemplation. Thus then we see, that religious become, by their vocation, more, rather than less, fit for teaching. Item. Ridiculum est dicere, quod ex hoc aliquis a doctrina repellatur per quod magis quietus ad vacandum studio et doctrinae redditur; sicut ridiculum esset quod a currendo impediretur qui impedientia cursum reliquit. Sed religiosi per triplex votum reliquerunt illa quibus animus maxime inquietatur ut ex praemissis patet: ergo eis maxime studere et docere competit. Eccli. XXXVIII, 25: sapientiam, Glossa, divinam, scribe in tabulis cordis, idest disce in tempore vacuitatis; et qui minoratur actu, percipiet sapientiam. It is ridiculous to assert, that a man is rendered incapable of teaching, because he has adopted a life which gives him more quiet and greater facility for study and learning. It would be as reasonable to say that a person is debarred from running, because he avoids the obstacles on his course. Now religious, as we have already seen, renounce by their vows all those things that chiefly disquiet the human heart. They, therefore, are the men beat adapted for study and for teaching. “Write wisdom (i.e., Divine wisdom, according to the Gloss) upon the tables of your heart” (Prov. vii. 3). “The wisdom of a scribe, comes by his time of leisure and he who is less in action, shall receive wisdom (Eccli. xxxviii. 25). Item. Pauperibus Christi maxime competit notitiam Scripturarum habere, ut patet per Hieronymum in Prol. Hebraicarum quaestionum super Genes.: ut nos humiles atque pauperes nec habemus divitias, nec oblatas dignamur accipere; ita et illi noverint non posse se notitiam Scripturarum, idest divitias Christi, cum mundi habere divitiis. Eis autem competit docere qui notitiam habent Scripturarum. Ergo religiosis, qui paupertatem profitentur, maxime competit docere. St. Jerome teaches, that the poor of Christ have a special claim to the knowledge of the Scripture. They know,” he says, (in prol. Hebraicarum quaestionum, super Gen.), “that we are poor and lowly, and do not own property nor accept alms. They know likewise that none can possess the treasure of Christ, i.e., the knowledge of the Scriptures, together with the riches of the world.” But it behoves those to teach, who have knowledge of the Scripture. Hence religious, who profess poverty, are peculiarly fitted to teach. Item. Sicut supra probatum est, ad quodlibet opus misericordiae exequendum potest aliqua religio institui. Sed docere est actus misericordiae, unde inter eleemosynas spirituales computatur. Ergo potest aliqua religio institui specialiter ad docendum. We have already pointed out that religious Orders may be founded for the prosecution of any work of charity. Now teaching is numbered amongst the spiritual works of mercy. Therefore a religious Order may be instituted for the purpose of teaching. Item. Magis videtur remotum a religionis proposito corporalis militia, quae armis corporalibus exercetur, quam militia spiritualis, quae utitur armis spiritualibus, scilicet sacris documentis ad errorum impugnationem: de quibus dicitur II ad Cor. X, 4: arma militiae nostrae non sunt carnalia et cetera. Sed religiones aliquae provide institutae sunt ad exequendam militiam corporalem in tutelam Ecclesiae ab hostibus corporalibus; quamvis non desint Ecclesiae principes saeculares, qui ex officio Ecclesiam defendere debent. Ergo et salubriter institutae sunt aliquae religiones ad docendum, ut sic per eorum doctrinam Ecclesia ab hostibus defendatur; quamvis etiam sint alii ad quos pertinet hoc modo Ecclesiam defensare. Certain religious Orders exist in the Church for the purpose of defending her against her enemies by force of arms, although there is no dearth of secular princes who are her official champions. Surely, warfare with sword and shield, must appear less consonant with a religious life, than is that spiritual combat waged against heresy by sacred writings, and suchlike intellectual weapons against heresy. It is of this spiritual armour that St. Paul says, “the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but powerful through God,” etc. (2 Cor. x. 4). Why then may not Orders be lawfully founded for the purpose of teaching, and thus of defending the Church against her enemies, although she has other defenders who are not religious? Item. Qui idoneus est ut assumi possit ad id quod maius est, et in quo aliud includitur, idoneus debet reputari ad id quod minus est, et quod in maiori includitur. Sed religiosus, etiamsi eius religio non sit ad docendum instituta, potest assumi ad praelationis officium, ut patet de monachis per multa capitula, 16, quaest. I. Cum ergo praelationis officium sit maius quam officium doctoris quod magistri legentes in scholis exercent, et cum etiam praelationis officium simul habeat et doctrinam adiunctam; non debet inconveniens reputari, si monachus auctoritate eius ad quem spectat, ad praedictum doctrinae officium assumatur. We must remember, once more, that he who is fit for a greater thing in which a lesser is included ought to be accounted fit for the lesser, included in the greater one. Now a religious, even if he does not belong to an order founded for teaching, may, as we know (De monachis, cap. XVI. quaest. I), be promoted to the office of a prelate. As, therefore, the office of prelate is greater than that of a doctor (which is exercised by the masters who hold professorships in the schools), and, as a prelate is bound to be versed in sacred learning, it ought not to appear unseemly for a monk, by permission of lawful authority, to undertake the function of teaching. Item. Minora bona pro maioribus bonis intermitti possunt; ut dicit Glossa Luc. IX, 60 super illud: tu autem vade, et annuntia regnum Dei. Sed bonum commune praefertur bono privato. Cum ergo monachus in claustro ordinem suum servans, privato bono insistat, scilicet suae tantum saluti; doctrinae autem officium, quo plurimi erudiuntur, in bonum commune totius Ecclesiae redundet; non est inconveniens, si monachus extra claustrum vivat ad doctrinae officium assumptus de licentia eius ad quem spectat. “Lesser goods may be sacrificed for greater ones,” the Gloss remarks on the words, “Go, and preach the kingdom of God” (Luke ix. 60); but the common welfare must always be preferred to any private advantage. Now while a monk is observing his rule in his cloister, he is working only for his personal advantage, i.e., for his own salvation. When, however, he is instructing many, his efforts redound to the profit of the whole Church. Hence it is not unseemly for a religious to live outside his monastery, in order, by permission of lawful authority, to exercise the office of teaching. Nec valet quod dicunt, quod hoc posset fieri quando necessitas immineret, quae nunc non apparet, cum magistri saeculares ad copiam habeantur: quia utilitas communis non solum debet procurari ut sit quocumque modo, sed ut sit optimo modo quo fieri potest. Quanto autem doctores magis multiplicantur, tanto utilitas communis, quae ex doctrina provenit, magis crescit, quia uni manifestatur quod alii notum non est: propter quod dicitur Sap. VI, 26: multitudo sapientium sanitas est orbis terrarum; quo zelo Moyses ductus dixit Num. XI, 29: quis tribuat ut omnis populus prophetet? Glossa: fidelis praedicator optat, si fieri valeat, ut veritatem quam solus loqui non sufficit, ora cunctorum sonent; et infra: prophetare omnes voluit qui bonum quod habuit, non invidit. Neither is it a valid objection to urge, that monks ought not to act thus at present, while there is no dearth of secular teachers. For, the common welfare ought not to be sought by any means that may offer, but by the surest means possible. Now a plurality of teachers is greatly to the public advantage; for one will be well versed in subjects of which another is ignorant. Hence we read in Wisdom vi., 26, “The multitude of the wise is the welfare of the whole world.” “O that all the people might prophesy,” Moses cried out in his zeal for knowledge (Numb. xi. 29). The Gloss remarks upon his words, that, “a faithful preacher would have all men utter the truth, which he himself does not suffice to declare.” And, in another place, the Gloss continues, in the same strain, “He” (i.e., Moses) “wished all men to prophesy; for he was not jealous of the gift bestowed upon him.” Item. Eiusdem est verbo praesentes, et scripto docere absentes, unde II Cor. X, 11 dicit apostolus: quales sumus in verbo per epistolas, absentes, tales et praesentes. Sed nullus dubitat quin religiosus possit docere absentes scripto, cum omnia armaria plena inveniantur operibus, sive libris, quos religiosi fecerunt ad Ecclesiae instructionem. Ergo et praesentes possunt verbo docere. It matters little whether teaching be conveyed by the word of a master who is present, or by the writing of one who is absent. To quote St. Paul (2 Cor. x. 11), “Such as we are in word by epistles when absent; such we will be in deed when present.” Now no one has seen the libraries of books, composed by monks, for the instruction of the Church, doubts that they can teach by writing, when absent. Therefore, it is lawful for them to teach by word, when present. Ea autem quae in contrarium opponuntur, facile est solvere. We will now proceed to the easy task of confuting the objections brought against the right of religious to teach. Quod enim primo dicunt, esse domini consilium de vitando magisterio, patet multipliciter esse falsum. Primo quia supererogationes, de quibus dantur consilia, habent praemium eminentius, ut patet ex hoc quod dicitur Lucae X, 35: et quodcumque supererogaveris, ego, cum rediero, reddam tibi: quod Glossa de supererogatione consiliorum exponit. Unde abstinere ab illis actibus quibus excellens debetur praemium, sub consilio cadere non potest. Doctoribus autem debetur praemium excellens, sicut et virginibus, scilicet aureola, ut patet Dan. XII, 3: qui ad iustitiam erudiunt multos, Glossa, verbo et exemplo, erunt quasi stellae in perpetuas aeternitates. Sicut ergo inconveniens esset dicere, quod declinare virginitatem vel martyrium sub consilio caderet; ita inconveniens est dicere, quod abstinere ab actu docendi, sub consilio cadat. Ad 1. The first argument, namely, that Our Lord gave a counsel to His disciples not to be masters, is, for several reasons, misleading. First, because the works of supererogation, concerning which the counsels are given, are rewarded by a peculiar recompense. “Whatever you spend over and above, I, at my return, will repay you” (Luke x. 33). These words are applied by the Gloss to works of supererogation. Hence it cannot be a counsel to abstain from works that are to be specially rewarded. Now teachers, like virgins, are promised a peculiar recompense. For we read in Daniel xii. 3, “Those who instruct” (i.e., by word and example, as the Gloss explains) “many to justice, (shall shine) as stars for all eternity.” Hence there is no better ground for saying that it is a counsel to refrain from the function of teaching, than there is for maintaining that it is a matter of counsel to abstain from virginity, or from martyrdom. Item consilium non potest esse de eo quod contrariatur praecepto vel consilio. Sed docere sub praecepto cadit vel sub consilio, ut patet Matth. ult.: euntes, docete omnes gentes etc. et Gal. VI, I: vos, qui spirituales estis, instruite huiusmodi in spiritu lenitatis. Non ergo de non docendo potest esse consilium. Again, there cannot be a counsel which is contradictory either by another counsel, or by a precept. But teaching is a matter both of precept and of counsel. For our Lord said: “ Go, therefore, teach all nations” (Matt. viii. 19). St. Paul also writes: “You, who are spiritual, instruct such a one in the spirit of meekness” (Gal. vi. 1). Hence there can be no counsel forbidding us to teach. Item consilia quae dominus proposuit, immediate ab apostolis observari voluit, ut eorum exemplo alii ad servanda consilia provocarentur: unde Paulus, I Cor. VII, 7, consilium de virginitate servanda proponens, dixit: volo omnes homines esse sicut me ipsum. Sed observatio huius quod dicunt consilium, scilicet abstinere a docendo, ad apostolos non pertinebat, cum ipsi ad docendum universum orbem mitterentur. Non ergo abstinere a docendo sub consilio cadit. Again, our Lord willed that His Apostles, should themselves put, His counsels in practice, in order that by their example, others should be led to their observance. Hence St. Paul, giving the counsel of virginity, says, (1 Cor. vii. 7), “I wish all were as I myself am.” But the Apostles certainly did not observe the so-called counsel not to teach. For they themselves were sent forth to teach over the whole world. Thus, there can be no counsel against teaching. Nec potest dici quod sub consilio cadat abstinere ab his quae ad solemnitatem docendi pertinent: quia ea quae ad solemnitatem docendi pertinent, non causa elationis fiunt, alias enim essent ab omnibus vitanda, quia quilibet tenetur elationem vitare; sed sunt ordinata ad auctoritatem officii ostendendam; et ideo, sicut perfectioni nihil deperit, si sacerdos supra diaconum sedeat, aut sericis ornetur vestibus; ita nihil obsistit perfectioni, si quis magistralibus insigniis utatur: et hoc est quod dicit quaedam Glossa super illud Matth. XXIII, 6: amant primos recubitus. Magistros inquit primos sedere non vetat; sed eos arguit qui haec habita vel non habita indebite appetunt. Adhuc autem est magis ridiculum dicere, quod etsi abstinere a docendo sub consilio non cadat, tamen abstinere a magisterii nomine sub consilio cadit. Non enim potest esse praeceptum vel consilium de eo quod non est in nobis, sed in alio. In nobis quidem est docere vel non docere, de quo non esse consilium probatum est. Sed doctores aut magistros vocari non est in nobis, sed in eis qui sic nos nominant. Non ergo potest sub consilio cadere, ut non vocemur magistri. It is unreasonable to say that it is a counsel to abstain from those things that embrace the dignity of teaching. Solemnities pertaining to an office are not a cause of personal elation. Otherwise all men would be bound to shun them; since it is the duty of all to avoid pride. External insignia merely demonstrate the exalted character of an office. Hence as it is not imperfect for a priest to sit above a deacon, or to wear costly vestments, it can certainly be no imperfection to make use of the insignia pertaining to the scholastic office. Our Lord said of the Pharisees, “They love the first places at feasts” (Matt. iii. 6); but “He did not” (as the Gloss remarks) “forbid masters to occupy the first seats; he merely reproved the desire to have or not to have them.” It is truly absurd to say that, though it be not a counsel to refrain from teaching, it is a counsel to refuse the name of master. There cannot be a counsel or a precept regarding what is not in ourselves but in another. To teach or not to teach is our own concern, and we have shown that it is not a matter of counsel. But the fact that we are called master or doctor, is no affair of ours. It regards those who give us these names. Therefore, to refrain from being called master, cannot be a counsel. Item, cum nomina sint imposita ad significandum res, ridiculum est dicere quod nomen sit prohibitum, cum res non sit interdicta. Item, cum consiliorum observatio maxime ad apostolos pertinuit, quibus mediantibus ad alios pervenit. Magistri nomen nullo consilio est interdictum, cum ipsi apostoli se ipsos magistros et doctores nominaverint: I Tim. II, 7: veritatem dico in Christo Iesu, non mentior, doctor gentium in fide et veritate; II Tim. I, II: in quo positus sum ego praedicator et apostolus et magister gentium. Further, as names are used to mean certain things, it is foolish to say that a name is forbidden, while the thing signified by it is allowed. Likewise, the observance of the Counsels was primarily the duty of the Apostles. It is only through their instrumentality that they are observed by any other persons. Now the name of Master cannot be forbidden by any counsel, since the Apostles called themselves both masters and teachers. “I am appointed a preacher and an apostle—I say the truth and do not lie—a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth” (1 Tim. ii. 7). “In which I am appointed a preacher and an apostle, and a teacher of the Gentiles” (2 Tim. i. 11). Restat ergo dicendum, quod hoc quod dominus dixit, vos autem nolite vocari Rabbi, non sit consilium, sed praeceptum, ad quod omnes tenentur; nec prohibetur actus docendi vel magisterii nomen, sed ambitio magisterii: unde, cum subiungit, nec vocemini magistri, Glossa: ne appetatis vocari. Nec quemlibet appetitum interdicit, sed inordinatum; ut ex Glossa prius inducta apparet, et ex hoc etiam quod de inordinato Pharisaeorum appetitu praemiserat, dicens: amant primos recubitus et cetera. Potest tamen aliter intelligi, secundum Glossam, ut etiam ex circumstantia litterae patet. Simul enim dominus prohibet ibidem patris nomen et magistri, hac ratione quia unus est pater noster qui in caelis est, et quia magister noster unus est Christus. Deus enim, ut Glossa dicit ibidem, pater et magister natura dicitur: et homo dicitur indulgentia pater, et magister ministerio. Prohibet ergo dominus ne auctoritas vitae naturalis seu spiritualis, aut etiam sapientiae, alicui homini attribuatur: unde dicit Glossa: vos autem nolite vocari etc., id est ne quae Deo debentur, vobis praesumatis; nec alios Rabbi vocetis, ne divinum honorem hominibus deferatis. Unde in alia Glossa dicitur, quod pater vocandus est aliquis, ut honor aetati deferatur, non ut auctor vitae habeatur. Magister ex consortio veri magistri et tanquam eius nuntius, pro reverentia eius ad quod mittitur, honoretur. Sic ergo patet quod dominus non prohibuit simpliciter nec praecepto nec consilio nomen patris aut magistri: alias quomodo sancti patres sustinuissent ut illi qui praesunt monasteriis, abbates, idest patres, vocarentur? Quomodo etiam Christi vicarius, qui debet esse totius perfectionis exemplar, Papa, idest pater diceretur? Augustinus etiam et Hieronymus episcopos quibus scribunt, Papas, idest patres, frequenter nominant. Stultissimum ergo est dicere, quod hoc quod dicitur, nolite vocari Rabbi, sit consilium. It remains to be considered that our Lord’s words: “Do not be called Rabbi” are not a counsel but a precept, by which all men are bound. He did not wish to forbid the office of teaching, but the sin of ambition. Neither, when He added, “ nor masters,” did He forbid us to teach, nor yet to bear the name of master. What His words signify, according to the Gloss, is: “Do not desire to be called masters.” He forbids the desire of place. He does not forbid all such desire, but only such as is inordinate, and therefore unlawful. This has been proved both by a foregoing quotation from the Gloss, and also by Christ’s words about the Pharisees, “They love the first places,” etc. Nevertheless, these words, may (says the Gloss) bear another interpretation. If our Lord forbids us to be called by the name of master and teacher, He equally prohibits our bearing the name of Father; for we have one Father who is in Heaven and one Master Christ. “For God” (as the Gloss says) “is by nature both our Father and our Master.” A man may be called father to signify his tenderness; and master to denote the authority which he exercises. That which our Lord forbids is that to any man should be attributed either right over physical or spiritual life, or plenitude of wisdom. Hence the commentary of the Gloss on this prohibition of Christ is as follows: “Do not be called masters, as assuming to yourselves what is due to God. Do not you call others Rabbi, as paying to man Divine homage.” And in another place we find the following commentary on the same passage: “A man may be called father, as a mark of respect to his age, but not to denote that he is the author of life.” In the same way, a man may be addressed as master, meaning that he is united to the true master, and that we reverence Him whose commission he holds. But, if our Lord had absolutely forbidden, either by counsel or precept, the name of master to be given to men, the Fathers of the Church would certainly not have allowed monastic superiors to be called Abbots, a word equivalent to father. If the name father were forbidden, how could the Vicar of Christ, who ought to set an example of perfection, be called Pope or father? Again, both St. Augustine and St. Jerome frequently addressed bishops as popes or fathers. Hence it is the height of folly to pretend that the words, “Do not be called Rabbi,” are to be understood as a counsel. Dato autem quod sit consilium, non sequitur quod omnes perfecti ad istud consilium teneantur. Non enim qui perfectionis statum profitetur, ad omnia tenetur consilia, sed ad ea tantum ad quae ex voto se ligat: alias alii apostoli, qui in statu perfectionis erant, tenebantur ad hanc supererogationem quam Paulus faciebat, ut non acciperent stipendia ab Ecclesiis quibus praedicabant; et ita peccabant, cum hoc non observarent, ut patet I Cor. IX, 15. Sequeretur etiam ex hoc religionum confusio, si omnes ad supererogationes omnes et consilia tenerentur: quidquid enim una supererogaret, omnes supererogare tenerentur, et sic inter eas nulla distinctio remaneret: quod est inconveniens. Non ergo ad omnia consilia perfecti tenentur, sed solum ad ea ad quae se obligant. But, even granted that these words were intended by our Lord as a counsel, it does not follow that all such as are perfect would be bound to observe it. For, those who make profession of the state of perfection are not under an obligation to obey all the counsels, but only such as they, by their vows, are bound to observe. Were it otherwise, the Apostles, who were in the state of perfection, would have been bound to perform the work of supererogation which St. Paul practised in taking no stipend from the churches in which he preached; and they would have sinned had they acted otherwise (1 Cor ix.). Were all religious equally bound to observe every counsel, and to perform every work of supererogation, great confusion would ensue, and the distinctions which now differentiate the various Orders would be abolished. Those who are in a state of perfection are not bound to observe all the Counsels, but only those to which their vows oblige them. Quod etiam secundo obiiciunt, quod monachus non docentis, sed plangentis habet officium, non facit pro eis. Ibi enim Hieronymus ostendit, quid monacho, ex hoc quod est monachus, competat quia poenitentiam agere, non autem docere, sicut illi sibi usurpabant, de quibus diximus, quod ex hoc ipso quod monachi erant, docere volebant. Vel intendit ostendere, quod monachus, ex hoc quod est monachus, non obligatur ad docendum. Sic enim Hieronymus inducit hoc in epistola contra Vigilantium. Non autem sequitur, si monachus non habet docendi officium, quod accipere non possit; sicut non sequitur, si subdiaconus non habet officium legendi Evangelium, quod ad hoc officium assumi non possit: et hoc est quod Gratianus dicit 16, quaest. I, superiori. Voluit, inquit, Hieronymus distinguere inter personam monachi et personam clerici, ostendens quid unicuique ex proprio officio conveniat. Aliud enim convenit cuique ex eo quod monachus est, aliud ex eo quod clericus est. Ex eo enim quod monachus est, sua et aliorum peccata deflendi habet officium; ex eo autem quod clericus docendi et pascendi habet officium. Ex quo etiam patet intellectus alterius capituli suprainducti. Patet etiam quod Gratianus loquitur in illa quaestione de doctrina praedicationis, quae ad praelatos pertinet; non autem de doctrina scholastica, cui praelati non multum intendunt. Unde haec obiectio procedit in aequivoco. Ad 2. The argument; that the office of a religious is not to teach, but to mourn, carries no weight. St. Jerome meant, by the words quoted, that the chief duty of a monk, as a monk, is to do penance, not to teach. He thereby shows that a monk is not, by virtue of his profession, bound to teach; and he rebukes the presumption of those religious who claimed the function of teaching as their special prerogative. He writes in the same sense in his epistle to Vigilantius. But it does not, by any means, follow that, although a monk has not the office of teaching, it may not at some future time be imposed upon him. It is not the duty of a subdeacon to read the Gospel, but that does not prove that this office will never fall to his share, as Gratian points out (XVI quaest. I, Superiori). St. Jerome wished to emphasise the distinction between the person of a monk and that of a cleric, and to show, that certain duties were peculiar to the office of each. One function belongs to a monk, as a monk; another to an ecclesiastic as an ecclesiastic. The duty peculiar to a monk, by reason of his state of life, is to mourn for his own sins and those of others. The task especially allotted to an ecclesiastic is that of preaching to and instructing the people. This distinction appears still more clearly in another chapter of Gratian, in which he treats of the teaching conveyed by preaching, which is the special duty of prelates, not of scholastic teaching in which they are not specially well practised. Hence in raising this objection against the right of religious to teach, our adversaries are begging the question. Item, dato quod monachis docere non liceat, non sequitur quod canonicis regularibus non liceat docere, cum canonici regulares inter clericos computentur: de quibus Augustinus dicit in sermone de communi vita clericorum, et habetur (XII) q. 1 cap. X, qui habuerit proprium, vel habere voluerit, et de proprio vivere, parum est ut dicam, non mecum manebit, sed nec clericus erit. Ex quo patet quod illi qui sub beato Augustino sine proprio manebant, inter clericos computabantur. Quamvis Augustinus postea revocaverit hoc generale interdictum quod fecerat, ut nullus clericus esset nisi sine proprio viveret; non tamen revocavit quin illi qui sine proprio sub eo vivebant, clerici essent; ut patet per illud cap. quaest. eadem certe ego sum et cetera. But, even supposing that it be not lawful for a monk to teach, that does not prove that it is not right for Canons regular to teach; since these are counted as ecclesiastics. St. Augustine, in his sermon De communi vita clericorm (quoted XII quaest. I, Nemo), says, speaking of Canons regular: “He who possesses, or desires to possess private property and to live on his own means, virtually renounces his life with me, and is not a cleric.” This passage shows that those who lived under the rule of this Saint, in the practice of poverty, were recognised as clerics. Although St. Augustine withdrew the assertion that no one was a cleric who retained private property, he never contradicted his words, that those who lived under him without possessing anything of their own, were clerics (see cap. Certe ego sum, quaest. eadem). Quod autem obicit; quod canonici regulares et monachi ad paria censentur, intelligendum est in illis quae sunt communia omni religioni; sicut vivere sine proprio, abstinere a negotiationibus, et ab officio advocandi in causis, et huiusmodi: alias posset similiter concludere, quod canonici regulares tenentur abstinere a lineis indumentis, quia monachi ad hoc tenentur. Multo etiam fortius licet illis religiosis docere quorum religio est specialiter ad hoc statuta, et si monachis non liceret; sicut templariis licet armis uti, quod monachis non licet. When canons regular and monks are said to be equally counted as religious, it is to be understood, that they are equal in observance of the points common to all religious Orders, i.e., the renunciation of private property, abstention from commerce or from legal business, and the like. Unless this be made clear, it might be thought, that canons regular were bound to certain observances, e.g. the disuse of wearing linen apparel, to which monks are bound. Even if it be not lawful for monks to teach, this function is certainly permissible to religious belonging to Orders instituted for the purpose; just as it is lawful for the Knights Templar to bear arms, although the use of armour is forbidden to monks. Quod autem tertio obiiciunt, quod assumere magistri officium est contra votum religionis, patet multipliciter esse falsum. Religiosi enim per votum religionis non hoc modo abrenuntiant mundo, ut rebus mundi uti non possint; sed mundanae vitae, ut scilicet mundi actionibus non occupentur: unde et sunt in mundo, inquantum rebus mundi utuntur; et non sunt de mundo, inquantum a mundanis actionibus sunt liberi. Unde non est contra votum eorum, si utantur divitiis, vel etiam quandoque deliciis: alias quandocumque deliciose comederent, mortaliter peccarent, quod non est dicendum. Unde nec est contra votum eorum, si quandoque honoribus utantur. Ad 3. The objection, that the exercise of the teaching office is contrary to the religious vows, is, on several accounts, ill-founded. Religious do not renounce the world in the sense that they can make no use of secular things. They renounce a worldly life, i.e. they are not allowed, by their vows, to be employed in secular affairs. Even among men, living in the world, there are some who are not of the world, i.e. who are disengaged from temporal interests. But religious do not act contrary to their vows, by making use of the riches or even, at times, of the pleasures of the world. Otherwise occasional feasting would for them be a mortal sin. Which is, of course, out of the question. If it be not against the religious vows to make use of secular riches or pleasure, why should it be contrary to these vows, to make use of worldly honour? Item mundo, secundum quod ibi accipitur, non solum religiosi, sed etiam omnes homines abrenuntiare tenentur: quod patet ex hoc quod supra praemittit Ioannes: si quis dilexerit mundum, non est caritas Dei in eo: quoniam omne quod est in mundo etc., Glossa: omnes dilectores mundi nihil habent nisi haec tria, quibus omnia vitiorum genera comprehenduntur. Unde patet quod ad mundum ibi dicuntur pertinere non divitiae et deliciae simpliciter, sed inordinatus appetitus earum; et sic non solum religiosis, sed etiam omnibus interdicitur non quidem honor, sed ambitio honoris. Glossa ibi: superbia vitae, idest omnis ambitio saeculi. Item dato quod honor simpliciter ad mundum pertinere intelligatur, non tamen hoc posset dici de quolibet honore, sed de honore qui consistit in rebus mundanis. Non enim potest dici quod honor sacerdotii ad mundum pertineat, et similiter nec honor magisterii; cum doctrina, quam consequitur talis honor, sit de spiritualibus bonis. Sicut ergo religiosi per votum non abrenuntiant sacerdotio, ita nec magisterio. Item hoc est falsum quod magisterium sit honor: est enim officium cui debetur honor. Dato autem quod religiosi cuilibet honori abrenuntiassent, non tamen abrenuntiaverunt eis quibus debetur honor; alias renuntiassent operibus virtutum. Honor enim, secundum philosophum in Ethicis, est praemium virtutis. Nec propter hoc aliquis debet abstinere a magisterio, quia Diabolus aliquos inflatos honore magisterii decipit; sicut nec a bonis operibus, quia Augustinus dicit: superbia etiam bonis operibus insidiatur ut pereant. Not only religious, but all men are, in one sense, bound to renounce the world, as we learn from the words of St. John already quoted (1 Jn. ii. 15), “If any man love the world the charity of the Father is not in him, for all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life.” The Gloss says that “lovers of the world have nothing except these three things, viz. the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, from which sources spring every vice.” Hence we see, that it is not riches or pleasure simply, which are said to belong to the world, but the inordinate desire for them; and that not honour, but ambition, is forbidden, not to religious alone, but to all mankind. “The pride of life,” says the Gloss, “signifies worldly ambition.” But, even if honour be simply understood as belonging to the world, this would not be true of every kind of honour, but only of such as consists of worldly things. The honour of the priesthood cannot be said to belong to the world. Neither can the honour given to a teacher, when the teaching which is honoured concerns spiritual things. Thus, if religious do not, by their vows, renounce the priesthood, they need not renounce the office of teaching. Again, it is untrue to say that the act of teaching is an honour. It is the teacher’s office which is honourable. And, even if religious renounce all honours, they cannot renounce all honourable functions; otherwise they would renounce all those works of mercy which are most deserving of honour. “Honour,” to quote Aristotle, “is the reward of virtue” (I Ethic.). That the devil deceives some do men and fills them with pride on account of their office as teachers, is no more reason for refusing the work of teaching than it is for declining to do any virtuous actions. For, as St. Augustine says, “Pride insinuates itself into good works, to make them worthless.” Ad illud autem quod quarto obiiciunt, quod religiosi profitentur perfectam humilitatem, dicendum quod falsum est: non enim vovent humilitatem, sed obedientiam. Humilitas autem sub voto non cadit, sicut nec aliae virtutes; cum actus virtutum sint necessitatis, quia sunt in praecepto; votum autem est de eo quod est voluntatis. Similiter etiam nec perfectio humilitatis sub voto cadere potest, sicut nec perfectio caritatis; cum perfectio virtutum non sit ex nostro arbitrio, sed ex Dei munere. Ad 4. The assertion, that, religious profess perfect humility is absolutely untrue. They make no vow of humility. Their vow is of obedience. Neither humility, nor any other virtue, is a matter of vow. Acts of virtue, being a matter of precept, are a necessity. Vows are only concerned with that which is voluntary. Again, no one can make a vow of perfect humility, or of perfect charity. For perfection is a gift of God; it does not depend upon our will. Dato autem quod ad perfectam humilitatem religiosi tenerentur, non tamen sequeretur quod non possent aliquibus honoribus potiri, sicut non possunt possidere divitias propter hoc quod profitentur summam paupertatem, quia possidere divitias paupertati opponitur; non autem potiri honoribus opponitur humilitati, sed in honoribus se inordinate extollere: unde, ut Bernardus dicit in Lib. de consideratione: nulla splendidior gemma humilitate, scilicet in omni ornatu summi pontificis: quo enim celsior ceteris, eo humilitate apparet illustrior et se ipso: et Eccli. III, 20, dicitur: quanto maior es, humilia te in omnibus. Quis enim audeat dicere, quod Gregorio aliquid de perfectione deperierit, quia ad summum apicem ecclesiastici honoris promotus est? Patet etiam ex dictis quod magisterium non est honor: et sic ratio illa penitus nihil valet. Granted, however, that religious were bound to perfect humility, that would not hinder their receiving certain honours. The possession of property is certainly contrary to perfect poverty, but the acceptance of honours is not contrary to humility. For pride consists not in possessing honours, but in being unduly elated by them. Hence St. Bernard says (in Libro de consideratione), “Even in the time of the Sovereign Pontiff there is no jewel brighter than humility! He who is in a more exalted position than others, becomes, by humility, superior to himself.” And in the book of Sirach iii. 20 we read: “The greater you are, the more you should humble yourself in all things.” Who would dare to say that St. Gregory became less humble by being promoted to the highest ecclesiastical honour? Moreover, as we have said, the function of teaching is not an honour. Therefore, objections brought against it, on that ground, are, worthless. Ad illud quod quinto obiiciunt, dicendum, quod Dionysius distinguit monachos contra diaconos, presbyteros et episcopos. Patet ergo quod loquitur de monachis qui clerici non erant tempore Ecclesiae primitivae, ut patet 16, q. I, superiori. Monachos usque ad tempus Eusebii, Zosimi et Siricii clericos non fuisse, ecclesiastica testatur historia. Et sic non potest concludi per dictum Dionysii aliquid de monachis qui sunt episcopi, vel presbyteri, vel diaconi. Procedit etiam eorum ratio ex malo intellectu Dionysii. Vocat enim actiones sacras ecclesiastica sacramenta, Baptismum dicens esse purgationem, et illuminationem; sed confirmationem et Eucharistiam perfectionem, ut patet in 4 cap. Ecclesiast. hierarchiae: et haec dispensare non nisi praedictis ordinibus licet. Sed docere in scholis non est de istis sacris actionibus de quibus Dionysius loquitur; alias nullus posset docere in scholis nisi esset diaconus vel sacerdos. Item monachi clerici possunt conficere corpus Christi, quod nisi sacerdotibus non licet. Multo ergo fortius possunt docendi officio uti, ad quod sacer ordo non requiritur. Ad 5. Another argument brought against the right of religious to teach is that Dionysius distinguishes monks as apart from deacons, priests, and bishops. We know from ecclesiastical history that the monks of the primitive Church, until the time of Eusebius, Zozimus, and Siricius, were not clerics (XVI, quaest I, Superiori). Therefore, as it is of these monks that Dionysius speaks, we cannot, from his words, come to any conclusion about the monks who were bishops, priests, or deacons. Any difficulty on the point, arises from misunderstanding of the words of Dionysius. This author calls the Sacraments of the Church sacred actions. Baptism he terms cleansing and illumination. Confirmation and the Blessed Eucharist he names perfecting (IV cap. Eccl. hierarch.). Now it is not lawful for any, save bishops, priests or deacons, to perform these sacred functions. Teaching in the schools, however, is not one of the holy rites, or sacred actions, whereof he speaks; otherwise it could be undertaken by none save by a priest, or a deacon. Again, ordained monks can consecrate the Body of our Lord, a power pertaining to none but priests. Why then should they not exercise the function of teaching, for which no Orders are required? Ad illud quod sexto obiiciunt, quod nullus potest ecclesiasticis officiis deservire, et in monastica regula ordinate persistere, et ita multo minus scholastico, intelligendum est non de his quae ad substantiam religionis pertinent, ut etiam per apparatum ibi patet, quia hoc bene servare possunt ecclesiasticis vacantes officiis; sed intelligitur quantum ad alias observantias, sicut silentium, vigilias, et huiusmodi: quod etiam patet ex hoc quod sequitur in praedicto capitulo: ut ipse districtionem monasterii teneat qui quotidie in ministerio ecclesiastico cogitur deservire. A quibus observantiis regularibus non est inconveniens si aliqui abstineant, ut utilitati communi vacent docendo; sicut patet in illis qui ad praelationis officium assumuntur, cum etiam in claustris manentes in talibus quandoque dispensationem recipiant propter aliquam causam. Et praeterea aliqui religiosi sunt qui in claustris suis manentes et districtionem sui ordinis servantes, scholastico insistunt officio, quod ex institutione sui ordinis habent. Ad 6. It is further urged, that, as no monk can be employed in ecclesiastical duties, and yet keep his monastic rule aright, much less can he combine the work of teaching with regular observance. Our answer is that, as we have already shown, this objection does not hold good with regard to the essentials of religious life. For these can be practised by those who hold ecclesiastical office. As for such religious observances as silence, vigils, and the like, it is shown in another chapter, that, “he who is obliged to serve daily in the ministry of the Church, practises the strictness of his monastic life.” But it is not unseemly if anyone neglect regular observance for the sake of performing an action such as teaching, which is for the common good. Thus religious who are called to the office of prelates, sometimes while they are still in their monastery, accept a dispensation for such reason. There are also religious living in their cloister in strict observance, who exercise the function of teaching, because it is enjoined by their rule. Ad illud quod septimo obiiciunt, dicendum, quod ille se superextendit supra mensuram, ut patet per Glossam ibidem, qui se extendit ultra quam ei concedatur. Illud autem intelligitur concessum quod nulla lege prohibitum invenitur. Unde si religiosus aliquid faciat quod non sit sibi per regulam suam prohibitum, non extendit se supra mensuram, quamvis de illo faciendo in regula mentio nulla fiat: alias non liceret religiosis aliquibus, qui habent regulas latiores, assumere sibi perfectioris vitae consuetudines et statuta; quod est contra apostolum ad Philipp. III, 13 qui ea quae retro sunt obliviscens, ad ea quae sunt priora, se extendebat. Et praeterea aliqui religiosi sunt qui doctrinam ex institutione sui ordinis habent: et contra eos patet quod dicta obiectio non procedit. Ad 7. The seventh objection to the right of a religious to teach is, that by so doing, be oversteps his measure, or, as the Gloss says, goes further than is permitted to him. Now when we say that a thing is permitted, we mean that it is not forbidden by any law. Hence if a religious do something not prohibited by his rule, even though the thing be not mentioned in the Rule, he does not overstep his measure. Otherwise, religious who live under a mitigated rule, would have no right to undertake the customs and usages of a more perfect life. Such a prohibition would be opposed to the sentiments of St. Paul (Philipp. iii.), who says that, forgetting the things that were behind, he stretched forth himself to those that were before. We must further remember that some religious are, by the rule of their Order, destined for teaching. To them, of course, the foregoing objection cannot apply. Quod autem adiungunt, quod in uno religiosorum collegio duo doctores esse non debeant, manifeste patere potest iniquum esse. Cum enim religiosi non sint minus habiles ad docendum quam saeculares, ut supra probatum est, non debet in docendo peior esse religiosi conditio quam saecularis. Esset autem secundum positionem praedictam: quia non maior via pateret toti uni multitudini religiosorum veniendi ad magisterium quam uni saeculari, qui singulariter per se studet, qui magister fieri potest, si in studio proficiat. Item secundum hanc positionem profectus studii in religiosis impeditur. Sicut enim pugnanti esset impedimentum ad pugnam, si praemium pugnae ei subtraheretur; quia, ut philosophus in 3 Ethic. dicit, fortissimi pugnatores esse videntur apud quos sunt timidi inhonorati, fortes honorati; ita studenti est impedimentum ad studium, si ei magisterium subtrahatur, quod est quasi studentium praemium. The suggestion, that in one community of religious there ought not to be two teachers is manifestly unfair. Religious, as we have shown, are not less humble than are seculars; and their position in the office of teaching ought not to be worse than that of seculars. But, if the suggestion, to which we have alluded, were carried out in practice, religious would have far less chance of success in the profession of teaching, than would be the case with seculars. For a whole multitude of religious would have no more opportunity of promotion to a professorship than any individual layman would have who studied alone. Hence the progress of religious would be seriously impeded. We may compare their position to that of wrestlers, whose spirit in their match would be damped, if the prize for which they strove were withdrawn. For, as Aristotle says (III Ethics), “The bravest in the fight are those who despise cowardice, and honour courage.” In like manner, it is a hindrance to a student if the chance of a professorship, the prize for which he is working, be denied him. Item hoc reputaretur in poenam infligi alicui, si ei postquam in studio profecerit, magisterium denegaretur. Si ergo religiosus in magisterio consequendo plusquam alii impediatur ex hoc ipso quod religiosus est, punietur; et hoc est punire homines pro bono, quod est iniquum. It would be regarded as a penalty for some offence if a man who, by his learning, had gained a right to some scholastic post, were not allowed to occupy it; and in the same way, a religious would be punished for being a religious, were obstacles placed in the way of his gaining a professorship. Nothing could be more unjust, than thus to punish a man for leading a meritorious life. Ad primum ergo quod inducunt, dicendum, quod illa auctoritas non magis ad religiosos pertinet quam ad saeculares. Fratres enim in novo testamento omnes Christiani appellantur, ut per se patet: quorumlibet etiam Christianorum collegium Ecclesia dicitur. Non tamen numerus magistrorum interdicitur per auctoritatem praedictam religiosis seu saecularibus: quia, ut Augustinus dicit, multi magistri dicuntur, qui contraria docent; et multi docentes unus magister sunt; et sic contrarietas, non pluralitas doctorum prohibetur. Vel magis secundum litteram prohibetur ut non quilibet indifferenter ad magisterium assumatur, sed discreti, et in Scripturis docti, ut Glossa dicit; et hoc paucorum est: et alia Glossa dicit, quod non eruditos in verbo fidei ab officio verbi removet ne impediant veros praedicatores. Vel loquitur de magisterio quod competit praelatis Ecclesiarum: prohibetur enim ne unus pluribus Ecclesiis, aut plures uni Ecclesiae praesint: unde Glossa: in pluribus Ecclesiis, vel plures in una Ecclesia ne velitis esse magistri, idest praelati, qui soli sunt Ecclesiarum magistri: non enim qui de aliquo collegio docet, Ecclesiae magister est; quamvis collegium de quo est, Ecclesia dicatur. Sed c. 1. The authority of St. James, “be ye not many masters my brethren,” brought forward in support of this suggestion, applies as much to laymen as to religious. For, in the New Testament, all Christians are called brethren; and the Church is called a society of Christians. Neither is a multitude of religious teachers more stringently forbidden by the authority cited than is a multiplicity of secular teachers. For, as St. Augustine says, “by many teachers is meant teachers teaching contrary doctrines. Many who teach alike are but as one teacher.” Hence St. James’ prohibition is directed against divergence of doctrine, not against plurality of masters. His words may also be understood in their literal sense, as meaning that discrimination must be exercised in the choice of teachers; that only such men must be chosen for this office as are discreet and well versed in the Scriptures. But, as the Gloss remarks, there are not many such to be found. In another passage, the Gloss says that “they who are not learned in the word of faith should not be allowed to teach; lest true preachers be hindered in their work.” Or, again, the words of St. James which have been quoted may apply to masters in the sense of prelates of the Church. For it is forbidden for one bishop to govern several churches; or for several bishops to rule over one church. Hence the Gloss says, “Do not desire to be masters, i.e. prelates (who alone are ecclesiastical masters) in many churches; or to have many masters in one church.” For, he who teaches in a community is not a master of a church, although the community to which he belongs may be called a church. Ad secundum, dicendum, quod plures magistri qui sunt de uno collegio, non praesunt illi collegio sicut rector in navi, vel princeps in apibus; sed sic unusquisque praeest in schola sua. Unde per auctoritatem inductam non potest probari quod intendunt; sed solum quod in una schola non possunt esse plures magistri. Sed c. 2. We can answer the second argument of our adversaries by saying that, although there be several masters in one community, they do not rule, as a captain guides a ship, or a queen-bee reigns in a hive. Each master presides over his own school. Hence the words of St. Jerome (“among bees there is one queen”) cannot be understood in the sense in which our opponents use them. They only mean, that there should not be many masters in the same school. Ad tertium, dicendum est quod per hoc quod in uno religiosorum collegio multiplicantur plures magistri, non excluduntur saeculares a doctrina, quamvis sint multa religiosorum collegia; quia non semper de quolibet religiosorum collegio inveniuntur plures ad docendum idonei; sicut nec aliquis a docendo impeditur propter hoc quod de qualibet diocesi possunt esse tot magistri, quot ad hoc inveniuntur digni ratione eadem. Et si etiam multi invenirentur idonei, de utrisque essent magis idonei praeferendi, sive religiosi sive saeculares, sine personarum acceptione. Nec tamen ex multitudine doctorum sacra Scriptura venit in contemptum, dummodo sint sufficientes; sed magis ex insufficientia, etiamsi sunt pauci. Unde non esset conveniens determinatum numerum magistrorum esse, ne hac occasione idonei a magisterio repellantur. Sed c. 3. To the third argument brought against a multiplicity of religious teachers, we reply, that the fact that there may be several religious houses, each containing many masters, does not debar laymen from the profession of teaching. There are not always in a community of religious enough men capable of teaching. Again, the fact that in any diocese there may be a sufficiency of teachers does not exclude seculars from this function. Religious and laymen ought to be judged on the same lines; and the most capable masters, be they secular or religious, ought to be selected without distinction of person. We need not fear that the Holy Scriptures will fall into contempt on account of a multiplicity of teachers to expound them. There is more danger of this being the case when the professors of Scripture are few in number. Hence there is no reason why the number of teachers should be limited; or why, through fear of their being too many, men capable of teaching should be excluded from that office.