Sentencia libri De anima
COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S
DE ANIMA

TEXT
418a26–418b26
BOOK II, CHAPTER VII
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ζ'

SIGHT. ITS OBJECT

418a26   1. Οὗ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁρατόν, ὁρατὸν δ' ἐστὶ χρῶμά τε καὶ ὃ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν· δῆλον δὲ ἔσται ὃ λέγομεν προελθοῦσι.	That of which there is sight is the visible; and the visible is colour, and also something which, though it has no name, we can state descriptively. It will be evident what we mean when we have gone further into the matter. § 399
τὸ γὰρ ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶμα, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ὁρατοῦ· καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ οὐ τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ὁρατόν. πᾶν δὲ χρῶμα 418b κινητικόν ἐστι τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις· διόπερ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἄνευ φωτός, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἑκάστου χρῶμα ἐν φωτὶ ὁρᾶται. διὸ περὶ φωτὸς πρῶτον λεκτέον τί ἐστιν.	For the visible is colour, and it is this of which visibility is predicated essentially; not, however, by definition, but because :it has in itself the cause of being visible. For every colour is a motivating force upon the actually transparent: this is its very nature. Hence nothing, is visible without light; but by light each and every colour can be seen. Wherefore, we must first decide what light is. §§ 400-3
2. ἔστι δή τι διαφανές. διαφανὲς δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔστι μὲν ὁρατόν, οὐ καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀλλότριον χρῶμα. τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστιν ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν στερεῶν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὕδωρ οὐδ' ᾗ ἀὴρ διαφανές, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔστι τις φύσις ἐνυπάρχουσα ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀϊδίῳ τῷ ἄνω σώματι.	There is, accordingly, something transparent. By transparent I mean that which is, indeed, visible, yet not of itself, or absolutely, but by virtue of concomitant colour. Air and water and many solids are such. But transparency does not depend on either air or water as such, but on the same quality being found in both, and in the eternal sphere above as well. § 404
φῶς δέ ἐστιν ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια, τοῦ διαφανοῦς ᾗ διαφανές. δυνάμει δέ, ἐν ᾧ τοῦτ' ἐστί, καὶ τὸ σκότος. τὸ δὲ φῶς οἷον χρῶμά ἐστι τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ὅταν ᾖ ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου οἷον τὸ ἄνω σῶμα· καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ τι ὑπάρχει ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν.	Light is the act of this transparency, as such: but in potency this [transparency] is also darkness. Now, light is a kind of colour of the transparent, in so far as this is actualised by fire or something similar to the celestial body; which contains indeed something of one and the same nature as fire. § 405
τί μὲν οὖν τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τί τὸ φῶς, εἴρηται, ὅτι οὔτε πῦρ οὔθ' ὅλως σῶμα οὐδ' ἀπορροὴ σώματος οὐδενός (εἴη γὰρ ἂν σῶμά τι καὶ οὕτως), ἀλλὰ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τινὸς παρουσία ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ·	We have then indicated what the transparent is, and what light is; that light is not fire or any bodily thing, nor any emanation from a body—[if it were this last,] it would be a sort of body, and so be fire or the presence of something similar in the transparent. § 406
οὔτε γὰρ δύο σώματα ἅμα δυνατὸν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι,	For it is impossible for two bodies to exist in the same place at the same time. § 407
3. δοκεῖ τε τὸ φῶς ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ σκότει· ἔστι δὲ τὸ σκότος στέρησις τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἐκ διαφανοῦς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ τούτου παρουσία τὸ φῶς ἐστιν.	Light seems to be the contrary of darkness; and the latter is the privation of this quality in the transparent. So it is plain that the presence of this is light. § 408
καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, οὐδ' εἴ τις ἄλλος οὕτως εἴρηκεν, ὡς φερομένου τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ γιγνομένου ποτὲ μεταξὺ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος, ἡμᾶς δὲ λανθάνοντος· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐνάργειαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα· ἐν μικρῷ μὲν γὰρ διαστήματι λάθοι ἄν, ἀπ' ἀνατολῆς δ' ἐπὶ δυσμὰς τὸ λανθάνειν μέγα λίαν τὸ αἴτημα.	Empedocles (or anyone else who may have said the same) was wrong when he said that light was borne along and extended between the earth and its envelope, unperceived by us. This is in contradiction alike to sound reasoning and to appearance. Such a thing might happen unobserved over a small space: but that it should remain unnoticed from the, east to the west is a very extravagant postulate. §§ 409-26

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418b2–419b27
BOOK II, CHAPTER VII, CONTINUED

SIGHT. HOW COLOUR IS SEEN

4. ἔστι δὲ χρώματος μὲν δεκτικὸν τὸ ἄχρουν, ψόφου δὲ τὸ ἄψοφον. ἄχρουν δ' ἐστὶ τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον ἢ τὸ μόλις ὁρώμενον, οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ σκοτεινόν. τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ διαφανὲς μέν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅταν ᾖ ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανές, ἀλλ' ὅταν δυνάμει· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ φύσις ὁτὲ μὲν σκότος ὁτὲ δὲ φῶς	Now that only can receive colour which has none, as only that which is soundless, can receive sound. What is without colour is the transparent and the invisible, or what is barely seen, being dark. The transparent is precisely of this nature when it is not in act, but in potency. For the same substance is sometimes dark, sometimes light. §§ 427-8
Not in Greek	Not all visible things, however, are visible in light, but only the colour proper to each. There are certain things which are, indeed, not seen in light, but which produce a sensation in darkness, such as those which burn or are luminous. These are not called by any one term. Such are the fungi of certain trees, horn, fish-heads, scales, and eyes. But the colour proper to each of these is not perceived. Why these things are thus seen is matter for another enquiry. §§ 429-30
419a   5. νῦν δ' ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον φανερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐν φωτὶ ὁρώμενον χρῶμα (διὸ καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται ἄνευ φωτός· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ χρώματι εἶναι, τὸ κινητικῷ εἶναι τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς), ἡ δ' ἐντελέχεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς φῶς ἐστιν. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου φανερόν· ἐὰν γάρ τις θῇ τὸ ἔχον χρῶμα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ὄψιν, οὐκ ὄψεται· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν χρῶμα κινεῖ τὸ διαφανές, οἷον τὸν ἀέρα, ὑπὸ τούτου δὲ συνεχοῦς ὄντος κινεῖται τὸ αἰσθητήριον.	At present what is dear is that what is seen in light is colour; [and that] therefore it is not seen without light. For to be colour is to be able to move the transparent into act; and this act of the transparent is light. A plain proof whereof is that if one places on the sight itself a coloured object, it is not seen. But colour moves the transparent medium (say, air); and the sensitive organ is moved by this extended continuum. §§ 43 1-2
6. οὐ γὰρ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγει Δημόκριτος, οἰόμενος, εἰ γένοιτο κενὸν τὸ μεταξύ, ὁρᾶσθαι ἂν ἀκριβῶς καὶ εἰ μύρμηξ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ εἴη· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν. πάσχοντος γάρ τι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ γίνεται τὸ ὁρᾶν· ὑπ' αὐτοῦ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ὁρωμένου χρώματος ἀδύνατον· λείπεται δὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ μεταξύ, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖόν τι εἶναι μεταξύ· κενοῦ δὲ γενομένου οὐχ ὅτι ἀκριβῶς, ἀλλ' ὅλως οὐθὲν ὀφθήσεται. 7. δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν τὸ χρῶμα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν φωτὶ ὁρᾶσθαι, εἴρηται.	Democritus put forward the erroneous opinion that if the medium were a vacuum, perception would be everywhere exact, even of an ant in the sky. This is, however, impossible; for only when the sensitive faculty is affected does vision occur. This cannot, however, be effected by the colour seen, in itself. It must therefore be due to the medium. If there were a vacuum, a thing, so far from being perceived clearly, would not be seen at all. We have stated, then, why it is necessary that colour be seen in light. §§ 433-5
πῦρ δὲ ἐν ἀμφοῖν ὁρᾶται, καὶ ἐν σκότει καὶ ἐν φωτί, καὶ τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τὸ γὰρ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ τούτου γίνεται διαφανές.	But fire is seen in both darkness and light: necessarily, for the transparent is made light by it. § 436
8. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ψόφου καὶ ὀσμῆς ἐστιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενον τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μὲν ὀσμῆς καὶ ψόφου τὸ μεταξὺ κινεῖται, ὑπὸ δὲ τούτου τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἑκάτερον· ὅταν δ' ἐπ' αὐτό τις ἐπιθῇ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὸ ψοφοῦν ἢ τὸ ὄζον, οὐδεμίαν αἴσθησιν ποιήσει. περὶ δὲ ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἔχει μὲν ὁμοίως, οὐ φαίνεται δέ· δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν, ὕστερον ἔσται δῆλον.	The same account holds for both sound and smell. No sensation is produced when either of these touches the organ: but a medium is affected by sound and smell, and the sense organ of one or the other sense by the medium. But if one places an object that sounds or smells upon the sense-organ itself, no sensation occurs. The same holds good of touch and taste, although this is not obvious. The reason for this will be made clear later. § 437
9. τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ψόφων μὲν ἀήρ, ὀσμῆς δ' ἀνώνυμον· κοινὸν γάρ τι πάθος ἐπ' ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος ἔστιν, ὥσπερ τὸ διαφανὲς χρώματι, οὕτω τῷ ἔχοντι ὀσμὴν ὃ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχει τούτοις· φαίνεται γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἔνυδρα τῶν ζῴων 419b ἔχειν αἴσθησιν ὀσμῆς. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τῶν πεζῶν ὅσα ἀναπνεῖ, ἀδυνατεῖ ὀσμᾶσθαι μὴ ἀναπνέοντα. ἡ δ' αἰτία καὶ περὶ τούτων ὕστερον λεχθήσεται.	The medium of sound is air; that of smell has no special name. For as there is a common quality for colour, to wit, the transparent, in air and water, so there is a common quality in them for smell. For it seems that aquatic animals possess a sense of smell. But man, and whatever living things breathe, are unable to smell except when breathing. The cause of this will be dealt with later. § 438

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419b3-419b33
BOOK II, CHAPTER VIII
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Η'

SOUND. ITS CAUSES. ECHO

419b4  1. Νῦν δὲ πρῶτον περὶ ψόφου καὶ ἀκοῆς διορίσωμεν. ἔστι δὲ διττὸς ὁ ψόφος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐνέργειά τις, ὁ δὲ δύναμις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὔ φαμεν ἔχειν ψόφον, οἷον σπόγγον, ἔρια, τὰ δ' ἔχειν, οἷον χαλκὸν καὶ ὅσα στερεὰ καὶ λεῖα, ὅτι δύναται ψοφῆσαι (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἐμποιῆσαι ψόφον ἐνεργείᾳ)·	Now let us start by treating of sound and hearing. Sound is twofold: the sort that is actual, and the sort that is potential. For certain things, we say, have no sound, such as sponges, wool and fur; while others, such as bronze and all other smooth and hard things, have sound, because they are able to produce it, i.e. to cause actual sound in the medium and in the hearing. §§ 439-41
2. γίνεται δ' ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ψόφος ἀεί τινος πρός τι καὶ ἔν τινι· πληγὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ποιοῦσα. διὸ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἑνὸς ὄντος γενέσθαι ψόφον· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ τύπτον καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον· ὥστε τὸ ψοφοῦν πρός τι ψοφεῖ· πληγὴ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φορᾶς.	Sound in act is always of something, on something, in something: for it is caused by percussion. Hence it is impossible for anything by itself, as a single thing, to produce sound. For there must be one thing that strikes and another that is struck; hence whatever emits sound does so ‘on something’. i.e. by contact with something—which, when touched with a blow, sounds. And the blow necessarily implies movement. § 442
ὥσπερ δ' εἴπομεν, οὐ τῶν τυχόντων πληγὴ ὁ ψόφος· οὐθένα γὰρ ποιεῖ ψόφον ἔρια ἂν πληγῇ, ἀλλὰ χαλκὸς καὶ ὅσα λεῖα καὶ κοῖλα· ὁ μὲν χαλκὸς ὅτι λεῖος, τὰ δὲ κοῖλα τῇ ἀνακλάσει πολλὰς ποιεῖ πληγὰς μετὰ τὴν πρώτην, ἀδυνατοῦντος ἐξελθεῖν τοῦ κινηθέντος.	As we said before, it is not a blow upon anything whatever that gives sound: wool makes no sound, although it be struck; but bronze, or anything smooth and hollow, is such. Bronze because it is smooth; whilst hollow things by repercussion produce many ‘blows’ after the first, since what is set in motion cannot find an outlet. § 443-4
3. ἔτι ἀκούεται ἐν ἀέρι, κἀν ὕδατι, ἀλλ' ἧττον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ψόφου κύριος ὁ ἀὴρ οὐδὲ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ στερεῶν πληγὴν γενέσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ὑπομένῃ πληγεὶς ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ μὴ διαχυθῇ. διὸ ἐὰν ταχέως καὶ σφοδρῶς πληγῇ, ψοφεῖ· δεῖ γὰρ φθάσαι τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ ῥαπίζοντος τὴν θρύψιν τοῦ ἀέρος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σωρὸν ἢ ὁρμαθὸν ψάμμου τύπτοι τις φερόμενον ταχύ.	Further: sound is heard in air and water, but less in water. It is, however, neither air nor water that, properly, sounds; there must be a percussion of solid objects on each other, and on air. This happens if air is confined when struck, and cannot disperse. Hence if the striking is rapid and violent sound results. For the movement of what strikes must be sudden, if it is to out-run the breaking-up of the air; just as if one were to strike a rapidly-moving heap of sand or pile of stones. §§ 445-6
4. ἠχὼ δὲ γίνεται ὅταν, ἀέρος ἑνὸς γενομένου διὰ τὸ ἀγγεῖον τὸ διορίσαν καὶ κωλῦσαν θρυφθῆναι, πάλιν ὁ ἀὴρ ἀπωσθῇ, ὥσπερ σφαῖρα.	Echo arises when air rebounds like a ball against air rendered a compact unity by a restraining vessel that prevents its dispersion. §§ 447-9
ἔοικε δ' ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι ἠχώ, ἀλλ' οὐ σαφής, ἐπεὶ συμβαίνει γε ἐπὶ τοῦ ψόφου καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ φωτός· καὶ γὰρ τὸ φῶς ἀεὶ ἀνακλᾶται (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἐγίνετο πάντῃ φῶς, ἀλλὰ σκότος ἔξω τοῦ ἡλιουμένου), ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ἀνακλᾶται ὥσπερ ἀφ' ὕδατος ἢ χαλκοῦ ἢ καί τινος ἄλλου τῶν λείων, ὥστε σκιὰν ποιεῖν, ᾗ τὸ φῶς ὁρίζομεν.	It seems there is always some echo, but not always a clear one. For the same occurs with sound as with light; which also is always, reflected: otherwise it would not spread to every part, but beyond the area illuminated by the sun there would be darkness. Still, it is not [always] reflected as it is reflected by water or bronze or other smooth things; hence it makes the shadow by which we discern the boundaries of light.

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419b33-420b5
BOOK II, CHAPTER VIII, CONTINUED

HEARING. ITS MEDIUM. HIGH AND LOW SOUNDS

5. τὸ δὲ κενὸν ὀρθῶς λέγεται κύριον τοῦ ἀκούειν. δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι κενὸν ὁ ἀήρ, οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν ἀκούειν, ὅταν κινηθῇ συνεχὴς καὶ εἷς. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ψαθυρὸς 420a εἶναι οὐ γεγωνεῖ, ἂν μὴ λεῖον ᾖ τὸ πληγέν. τότε δὲ εἷς γίνεται ἅμα διὰ τὸ ἐπίπεδον· ἓν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ λείου ἐπίπεδον. 6. ψοφητικὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ κινητικὸν ἑνὸς ἀέρος συνεχείᾳ μέχρις ἀκοῆς.	Empty space is rightly said to be necessary for hearing,—for by that is meant air which, when moved as a simple continuum, causes hearing. On account of its ‘instability, however, it gives no sound unless what is struck be smooth; then it has the required unity, holding together on account of the even surface, for the surface of a smooth thing is uniform. The sonorous, therefore, is that which moves a compact mass of air continuous as far as the organ of hearing. §§ 451-452
ἀκοῇ δὲ συμφυὴς <ἔστιν> ἀήρ· διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀέρι εἶναι, κινουμένου τοῦ ἔξω ὁ εἴσω κινεῖται. διόπερ οὐ πάντῃ τὸ ζῷον ἀκούει, οὐδὲ πάντῃ διέρχεται ὁ ἀήρ· οὐ γὰρ πάντῃ ἔχει ἀέρα τὸ κινησόμενον μέρος καὶ ἔμψυχον.	Hearing is naturally conjoined with air; and because it is in air, therefore by a movement in the air outside is caused an interior movement also. Hence an animal does not hear all over its body, nor does air pass through every member. For the animate body and the part to be set in motion have not air throughout (as [also liquid is only in the eyeball]). § 453
αὐτὸς μὲν δὴ ἄψοφον ὁ ἀὴρ διὰ τὸ εὔθρυπτον· ὅταν δὲ κωλυθῇ θρύπτεσθαι, ἡ τούτου κίνησις ψόφος. ὁ δ' ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ἐγκατῳκοδόμηται πρὸς τὸ ἀκίνητος εἶναι, ὅπως ἀκριβῶς αἰσθάνηται πάσας τὰς διαφορὰς τῆς κινήσεως.	Of itself air is soundless; for, being mobile, it easily yields. But when its motion cannot be diffused a sound arises. There is air, built into the ears, so as to be immobile; and it accordingly registers every variety of motion with exactitude. § 454
διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐν ὕδατι ἀκούομεν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσέρχεται πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν συμφυῆ ἀέρα· ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰς τὸ οὖς, διὰ τὰς ἕλικας. ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο συμβῇ, οὐκ ἀκούει· οὐδ' ἂν ἡ μῆνιγξ κάμῃ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κόρῃ δέρμα [ὅταν κάμῃ].	On this account therefore we hear also in water, for this does not penetrate to that inner air, nor, by reason of its many convolutions, into the ear. Should it do so, one would not hear; nor if the eardrum were ailing—just as we do not see if the cornea of the pupil is diseased. §§ 455-7
ἀλλ' οὐ σημεῖον τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ μὴ τὸ ἠχεῖν τὸ οὖς ὥσπερ τὸ κέρας· ἀεὶ γὰρ οἰκείαν τινὰ κίνησιν ὁ ἀὴρ κινεῖται ὁ ἐν τοῖς ὠσίν, ἀλλ' ὁ ψόφος ἀλλότριος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτό φασιν ἀκούειν τῷ κενῷ καὶ ἠχοῦντι, ὅτι ἀκούομεν τῷ ἔχοντι ὡρισμένον τὸν ἀέρα.	A test of good hearing on the contrary is whether there is a continual ringing in the ear, like a horn. For then the air in the ear is perpetually moving by a motion of its own; whereas sound is from without, and is not the ear’s own. And for this reason they say that we hear by a “resounding vacuum” because we hear by what holds air in constraint. § 458
420a.19   7. πότερον δὲ ψοφεῖ τὸ τυπτόμενον ἢ τὸ τύπτον; ἢ καὶ ἄμφω, τρόπον δ' ἕτερον; ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ψόφος κίνησις τοῦ δυναμένου κινεῖσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὅνπερ τὰ ἀφαλλόμενα ἀπὸ τῶν λείων, ὅταν τις κρούσῃ. οὐ δὴ πᾶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ψοφεῖ τυπτόμενον καὶ τύπτον, οἷον ἐὰν πατάξῃ βελόνη βελόνην, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸ τυπτόμενον ὁμαλὸν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸν ἀέρα ἀθροῦν ἀφάλλεσθαι καὶ σείεσθαι.	Is it that which strikes, or that which is struck, which sounds? Or both, but in different ways? For sound is a movement of something that can move in the way that a bouncing body flies off a smooth surface one flings it at. As has been said, not everything that strikes or is struck gives a sound, for instance one needle struck against another. But what is struck must have a plane surface smooth and regular so that the air rebound and be set in motion instantaneously. §§ 459-60
8. αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ τῶν ψοφούντων ἐν τῷ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ψόφῳ δηλοῦνται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐχ ὁρᾶται τὰ χρώματα, οὕτως οὐδ' ἄνευ ψόφου τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ.	Differences in sonorous things are apparent in the act of sounding. For just as colours are not seen without light, so there is no high or low note apart from sounding. § 461
ταῦτα δὲ λέγεται κατὰ μεταφορὰν ἀπὸ τῶν ἁπτῶν·	These terms are used by metaphor from things perceived by touch. § 462
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀξὺ κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἐπὶ πολύ, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ ἐν πολλῷ ἐπ' ὀλίγον.	A high note moves the sense-organ much in a brief space of time; the low note, little, in a longer time. § 463
οὐ δὴ ταχὺ τὸ ὀξύ, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ βραδύ, ἀλλὰ γίνεται τοῦ μὲν διὰ τὸ τάχος ἡ κίνησις τοιαύτη, τοῦ δὲ διὰ βραδυτῆτα,	But this does not mean that the fast is the high and the slow the low; rather, the former arises because of swiftness of motion, the latter because of slowness. § 464
420b καὶ ἔοικεν ἀνάλογον ἔχειν τῷ περὶ τὴν ἁφὴν ὀξεῖ καὶ ἀμβλεῖ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀξὺ οἷον κεντεῖ, τὸ δ' ἀμβλὺ οἷον ὠθεῖ, διὰ τὸ κινεῖν τὸ μὲν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τὸ δὲ ἐν πολλῷ, ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸ μὲν ταχὺ τὸ δὲ βραδὺ εἶναι.	So there seems to be an analogy with the tangible, as sharp and blunt. For the ‘sharp’ pierces, while the ‘blunt’ thuds; and the reason is that the one moves in a brief period, the other in a greater. Hence it comes about that the former is swift, the latter slow.
9. περὶ μὲν οὖν ψόφου ταύτῃ διωρίσθω.	Let this serve to define sound. § 465

TEXT
420b5–42a6
BOOK II, CHAPTER VIII, CONTINUED

VOICE

ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ψόφος τίς ἐστιν ἐμψύχου· τῶν γὰρ ἀψύχων οὐθὲν φωνεῖ, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγεται φωνεῖν, οἷον αὐλὸς καὶ λύρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν ἀψύχων ἀπότασιν ἔχει καὶ μέλος καὶ διάλεκτον. ἔοικε γάρ, ὅτι καὶ ἡ φωνὴ ταῦτ' ἔχει.πολλὰ δὲ τῶν ζῴων οὐκ ἔχουσι φωνήν, οἷον τά τε ἄναιμα καὶ τῶν ἐναίμων ἰχθύες (καὶ τοῦτ' εὐλόγως, εἴπερ ἀέρος κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν ὁ ψόφος), ἀλλ' οἱ λεγόμενοι φωνεῖν, οἷον <οἱ> ἐν τῷ Ἀχελῴῳ, ψοφοῦσι τοῖς βραγχίοις ἤ τινι ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ,	Voice is the sound of a living thing. No inanimate being utters voice, though, by analogy, the flute and the harp are said to ‘speak’; and so, too, other inanimate objects which sound with duration, harmony and significance. The resemblance arises from voice also having these qualities. §§ 466-9
πολλὰ δὲ τῶν ζῴων οὐκ ἔχουσι φωνήν, οἷον τά τε ἄναιμα καὶ τῶν ἐναίμων ἰχθύες (καὶ τοῦτ' εὐλόγως, εἴπερ ἀέρος κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν ὁ ψόφος), ἀλλ' οἱ λεγόμενοι φωνεῖν, οἷον <οἱ> ἐν τῷ Ἀχελῴῳ, ψοφοῦσι τοῖς βραγχίοις ἤ τινι ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ,	Many animals have no voice, such as the bloodless, and, among those with blood, fish. And this is reasonable if, in fact, sound is a movement. But the fish that are said to have voice, such as those in the Achelous, make a sound through their gills, or in some other such way. §§ 470-1
10. φωνὴ δ' ἐστὶ ζῴου ψόφος οὐ τῷ τυχόντι μορίῳ. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πᾶν ψοφεῖ τύπτοντός τινος καί τι καὶ ἔν τινι, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀήρ, εὐλόγως ἂν φωνοίη ταῦτα μόνα ὅσα δέχεται τὸν ἀέρα.	Voice is a sound made by an animal, but not from any part of its frame. Since all things sound by something striking another in a medium. (which is air), it is reasonable that those only will have voice which inhale air. § 472
τῷ γὰρ ἤδη ἀναπνεομένῳ καταχρῆται ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα-καθάπερ τῇ γλώττῃ ἐπί τε τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, ὧν ἡ μὲν γεῦσις ἀναγκαῖον (διὸ καὶ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχει), ἡ δ' ἑρμηνεία ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ, οὕτω καὶ τῷ πνεύματι πρός τε τὴν θερ- μότητα τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀναγκαῖον <ὄν> (τὸ δ' αἴτιον ἐν ἑτέροις εἰρήσεται) καὶ πρὸς τὴν φωνὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ τὸ εὖ.	For Nature employs air, inhaled for two operations; as it does the tongue for both taste and speech; of which one, taste, is a necessity; whence it exists in more species; while the other, self-expression, is for well-being. So with breath: it [regulates] interior heat—and this is necessary to existence (the reason for this will be stated elsewhere); and it also serves voice, which is for well-being. § 473
11. ὄργανον δὲ τῇ ἀναπνοῇ ὁ φάρυγξ· οὗ δ' ἕνεκα τὸ μόριόν ἐστι τοῦτο, πνεύμων· τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ μορίῳ πλέον ἔχει τὸ θερμὸν τὰ πεζὰ τῶν ἄλλων. δεῖται δὲ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τόπος πρῶτος. διὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἴσω ἀναπνεόμενον εἰσιέναι τὸν ἀέρα. ὥστε ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μορίοις ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην ἀρτηρίαν φωνή ἐστιν	Now the organ of respiration is the windpipe, and the purpose of this organ is to serve the lungs. Quadrupeds have more heat in this part than in others, so respiration is needed, and first of all around the heart. Hence it is necessary that air enter when [an animal] draws breath. Hence a striking by the soul (in these parts) upon air inhaled through the windpipe is voice. § 476
(οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ζῴου ψόφος φωνή, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ ψοφεῖν καὶ ὡς οἱ βήττοντες-ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἔμψυχόν τε εἶναι τὸ τύπτον καὶ μετὰ φαντασίας τινός· σημαντικὸς γὰρ δή τις ψόφος ἐστὶν ἡ φωνή)· καὶ οὐ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος ὥσπερ ἡ βήξ, 421a ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τύπτει τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ πρὸς αὐτήν.	For not every animal sound is voice, as we have said; there is clicking the tongue, and the noise made by coughing. There is needed a living being to utter the sound, and some accompanying phantasm. For voice is a significant sound; not that (merely) of air respired, as coughing is; rather, with it the air in the windpipe is struck against the windpipe. § 477
12. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φωνεῖν ἀναπνέοντα μηδ' ἐκπνέοντα, ἀλλὰ κατέχοντα· κινεῖ γὰρ τούτῳ ὁ κατέχων. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διότι οἱ ἰχθύες ἄφωνοι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι φάρυγγα. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μόριον οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι οὐ δέχονται τὸν ἀέρα οὐδ' ἀναπνέουσιν. δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν, ἕτερός ἐστι λόγος.	A sign of this is that we cannot produce voice while inhaling air nor while exhaling it, but only while retaining it. For what holds the air also sets it in motion. It is thus clear why fish have no voice; for they have no windpipe. They lack this member because they do not inhale air or breathe. Those who say otherwise are wrong. The cause of this, however, is another question. § 478

TEXT
421a6–421b7
BOOK II, CHAPTER IX
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Θ'

SMELL. ITS OBJECT

421a7  1. Περὶ δὲ ὀσμῆς καὶ ὀσφραντοῦ ἧττον εὐδιόριστόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων· οὐ γὰρ δῆλον ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἡ ὀσμή, οὕτως ὡς ὁ ψόφος ἢ τὸ χρῶμα. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τὴν αἴσθησιν ταύτην οὐκ ἔχομεν ἀκριβῆ, ἀλλὰ χείρω πολλῶν ζῴων· φαύλως γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὀσμᾶται, καὶ οὐθενὸς αἰσθάνεται τῶν ὀσφραντῶν ἄνευ τοῦ λυπηροῦ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἀκριβοῦς τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου. 2. εὔλογον δ' οὕτω καὶ τὰ σκληρόφθαλμα τῶν χρωμάτων αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ διαδήλους αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν χρωμάτων πλὴν τῷ φοβερῷ καὶ ἀφόβῳ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος.	It is not so easy to come to conclusions about odour and the odorous as about the sense-objects already discussed. What odour is is less obvious than what sound is, or the visible or light; the reason being that our sense of smell lacks precision; it is inferior to that of many animals. For man smells but feebly, discerning nothing odorous save with some special pleasure or disgust, as though our organ for the perception of smells were defective. It is arguable indeed that, as hard-eyed animals see colour, yet so that delicate differences are not sharply defined to them, except as these cause fear or not, so are smells to the human species. §§ 479-80
ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ ἀνάλογον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν γεῦσιν, καὶ ὁμοίως τὰ εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν τοῖς τῆς ὀσμῆς, ἀλλ' ἀκριβεστέραν ἔχομεν τὴν γεῦσιν διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν ἁφήν τινα, ταύτην δ' ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀκριβεστάτην· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις λείπεται πολλῶν τῶν ζῴων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν πολλῷ τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως ἀκριβοῖ· διὸ καὶ φρονιμώτατόν ἐστι τῶν ζῴων. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρὰ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο εἶναι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἀφυεῖς, παρ' ἄλλο δὲ μηδέν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς.	For it seems that while smell has an analogy with taste, and the species of savour with odours, yet we have a sharper perception of taste, because this is a sort of touch,—the sense which man possesses to the highest degree of precision. Whereas in the other senses he is inferior to many animals, by touch he can discriminate with exactness far beyond the rest of the animal world. Hence man is the most sagacious of animals. A sign of this is that within the human race, men are gifted or not intellectually in virtue of this sense, and of no other. For coarse-bodied people are mentally inert, whilst the tenderly-fleshed are quick of understanding. §§ 481-6
421a26  3. ἔστι δ', ὥσπερ χυμὸς ὁ μὲν γλυκὺς ὁ δὲ πικρός, οὕτω καὶ ὀσμαί, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔχουσι τὴν ἀνάλογον ὀσμὴν καὶ χυμόν, λέγω δὲ οἷον γλυκεῖαν ὀσμὴν καὶ γλυκὺν χυμόν, τὰ δὲ τοὐναντίον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δριμεῖα καὶ αὐστηρὰ καὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ λιπαρά ἐστιν ὀσμή. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, διὰ τὸ μὴ σφόδρα διαδήλους εἶναι τὰς ὀσμὰς ὥσπερ τοὺς χυμούς, [ἀπὸ τούτων] εἴληφε τὰ 421b ὀνόματα καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῶν πραγμάτων, ἡ μὲν γλυκεῖα κρόκου καὶ μέλιτος, ἡ δὲ δριμεῖα θύμου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	As some flavours are sweet, some bitter, so with odours. But some things are analogously endowed with savour and odour: I mean, have a pleasant taste and pleasant smell. In others, however, these qualities are contrary. Likewise odours are pungent, harsh, sharp or oily: but since, as we have said, odours are not very distinct, whereas flavours are, they take their names from the latter, according to resemblance. For a sweet smell comes from saffron and honey: a pungent smell from thyme; and so in other cases. §§ 487-9
4. ἔστι δ' ὥσπερ ἡ ἀκοὴ καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ καὶ ἀνηκούστου, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου, καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ καὶ ἀνοσφράντου. ἀνόσφραντον δὲ τὸ μὲν παρὰ τὸ ὅλως ἀδύνατον <εἶναι> ἔχειν ὀσμήν, τὸ δὲ μικρὰν ἔχον καὶ φαύλην. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄγευστον λέγεται.	Furthermore, as hearing (and the same obtains in each of the senses) bears on the audible and the inaudible (and sight on the visible and the invisible), so smell is of the odorous and the odourless. The odourless is either that which simply cannot have a smell at all, or that which has smell but a poor one and feeble in quality. The same can be said of the tasteless. § 490

TEXT
421b8–422a7
BOOK II, CHAPTER IX, CONTINUED

SMELL. HOW IT OCCURS

5. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, οἷον ἀέρος ἢ ὕδατος· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἔνυδρα δοκοῦσιν ὀσμῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁμοίως καὶ τὰ ἔναιμα καὶ τὰ ἄναιμα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἔνια πόρρωθεν ἀπαντᾷ πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν ὕποσμα γινόμενα.	Smelling also takes place through a medium, which is either air or water. For aquatic animals seem also to perceive odours, both those with blood and those without, like animals that live in the air; for some of them traverse long distances for their food, being drawn to it by smell. §§ 491-5
6. διὸ καὶ ἄπορον φαίνεται εἰ πάντα μὲν ὁμοίως ὀσμᾶται, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος ἀναπνέων μέν, μὴ ἀναπνέων δὲ ἀλλ' ἐκπνέων ἢ κατέχων τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ ὀσμᾶται, οὔτε πόρρωθεν οὔτ' ἐγγύθεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐπὶ τοῦ μυκτῆρος ἐντὸς τεθῇ· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τιθέμενον τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι κοινὸν πάντων, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἴδιον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· δῆλον δὲ πειρωμένοις· ὥστε τὰ ἄναιμα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀναπνέουσιν, ἑτέραν ἄν τιν' αἴσθησιν ἔχοι παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας.	So there seems to be a difficulty. If operations of smell are of the same type, yet man smells by inhaling: when exhaling or holding his breath he smells nothing, neither from a distance, nor close at hand, not even if the object is placed inside the nose. (That a thing should be imperceptible when placed on the very organ of sensation, is indeed common to all, but to be unable to perceive without breathing is peculiar to man. This is evident to those who. make the experiment). Since then, bloodless animals do not breathe, they would seem to have some other sense besides those which have been spoken of. § 496
ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἴπερ τῆς ὀσμῆς αἰσθάνεται· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ δυσώδους καὶ εὐώδους ὄσφρησίς ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ φθειρόμενα φαίνεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ὀσμῶν ὑφ' ὧνπερ ἄνθρωπος, οἷον ἀσφάλτου καὶ θείου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ὀσφραίνεσθαι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναπνέοντα.	But this is impossible, if it is odour they perceive. For the sense for odours, good odours or bad, is smell. Furthermore, they seem to be overcome by the same strong odours as man, such as asphalt; brimstone and the like. Therefore, even if they do not breathe, they must smell. §§ 497-8
7. ἔοικε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διαφέρειν τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ὥσπερ τὰ ὄμματα πρὸς τὰ τῶν σκληροφθάλμων-τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει φράγμα καὶ ὥσπερ ἔλυτρον τὰ βλέφαρα, ἃ μὴ κινήσας μηδ' ἀνασπάσας οὐχ ὁρᾷ· τὰ δὲ σκληρόφθαλμα οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' εὐθέως ὁρᾷ τὰ γινόμενα ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ-οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον τοῖς μὲν 422a ἀκαλυφὲς εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸ ὄμμα, τοῖς δὲ τὸν ἀέρα δεχομένοις ἔχειν ἐπικάλυμμα, ὃ ἀναπνεόντων ἀποκαλύπτεται, διευρυνομένων τῶν φλεβίων καὶ τῶν πόρων. 8. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ἀναπνέοντα οὐκ ὀσμᾶται ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὀσφρανθῆναι ἀναπνεύσαντα, τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ ἀδύνατον.	Now this sense seems to differ as between man and other animals, as human eyes differ from the hard eyes of some animals. The former have a covering or protection, the eye-lids, and unless these are moved or withdrawn, one does not see. Hard-eyed animals have nothing like, this; they see at once whatever happens to be present in the transparent medium. In the same way, then, the organ of smell is in some animals like an eye with no covering; in others, which inhale air, it has a covering that is withdrawn when they respire and so distend the veins and pores. And for this reason animals that breathe do not smell in water. For they must respire if they are to be affected by odour, and they cannot do this in a liquid. § 499
ἔστι δ' ἡ ὀσμὴ τοῦ ξηροῦ (ὥσπερ ὁ χυμὸς τοῦ ὑγροῦ), τὸ δὲ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον δυνάμει τοιοῦτον.	Odour is of dry things as savour of liquid; and the sense-organ of smell is such in potency. § 500

TEXT
422a8–422b17
BOOK II, CHAPTER X
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ι'

TASTE. ITS MEDIUM, OBJECT, ORGAN, KINDS OF FLAVOUR

422a8  1. Τὸ δὲ γευστόν ἐστιν ἁπτόν τι· καὶ τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ εἶναι αἰσθητὸν διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος σώματος· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῇ ἁφῇ. καὶ τὸ σῶμα δὲ ἐν ᾧ ὁ χυμός, τὸ γευστόν, ἐν ὑγρῷ ὡς ὕλῃ· τοῦτο δ' ἁπτόν τι.	The tasteable is a sort of tangible; hence, it is not perceptible through an extraneous body as medium, any more than the object of touch. And the body in which is savour, i.e. the tasteable, is in liquid as its material, which is tangible. §§ 501-4
διὸ κἂν εἰ ἐν ὕδατι ἦμεν, ᾐσθανόμεθ' ἂν ἐμβληθέντος τοῦ γλυκέος, οὐκ ἦν δ' ἂν ἡ αἴσθησις ἡμῖν διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μιχθῆναι τῷ ὑγρῷ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποτοῦ. τὸ δὲ χρῶμα οὐχ οὕτως ὁρᾶται τῷ μίγνυσθαι, οὐδὲ ταῖς ἀπορροίαις. ὡς μὲν οὖν τὸ μεταξὺ οὐθὲν ἔστιν· ὡς δὲ χρῶμα τὸ ὁρατόν, οὕτω τὸ γευστὸν ὁ χυμός.	Hence, if we were in water, we should taste a sweet thing put into it; not that the sensation would then operate through a medium, but because the savour would be mixed with the water, as in a drink. (Colour, however, is not thus seen because of any mixture or efflux.) There is then nothing corresponding to a medium [in tasting]. As colour is the visible, so savour is the tasteable. §§ 505-7
οὐθὲν δὲ ποιεῖ χυμοῦ αἴσθησιν ἄνευ ὑγρότητος, ἀλλ' ἔχει ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ δυνάμει ὑγρότητα, οἷον τὸ ἁλμυρόν· εὔτηκτόν τε γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ συντηκτικὸν γλώττης.	It causes no sensation of taste except in liquid; but it must be moist, actually or potentially; as [with] saliva which is very liquid and moistens the tongue. § 508
ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄψις ἐστὶ τοῦ τε ὁρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου (τὸ γὰρ σκότος ἀόρατον, κρίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ὄψις), ἔτι τε τοῦ λίαν λαμπροῦ (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀόρατον, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῦ σκότους), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ψόφου τε καὶ σιγῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀκουστὸν τὸ δ' οὐκ ἀκουστόν, καὶ μεγάλου ψόφου καθάπερ ἡ ὄψις τοῦ λαμπροῦ (ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ μικρὸς ψόφος ἀνήκουστος, τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ὁ μέγας τε καὶ ὁ βίαιος), ἀόρατον δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅλως λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλων τὸ ἀδύνατον, τὸ δ' ἐὰν πεφυκὸς μὴ ἔχῃ ἢ φαύλως, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄπουν καὶ τὸ ἀπύρηνον-οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις τοῦ γευστοῦ τε καὶ ἀγεύστου, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μικρὸν ἢ φαῦλον ἔχον χυμὸν ἢ φθαρτικὸν τῆς γεύσεως. 422b δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἀρχὴ τὸ ποτὸν καὶ ἄποτον (γεῦσις γάρ τις ἀμφοτέρου· ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν φαύλη καὶ φθαρτική [τῆς γεύσεως], τοῦ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν)· ἔστι δὲ κοινὸν ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως τὸ ποτόν.	As sight is of the visible and the invisible (for darkness is invisible, and sight discerns this also, as it does, in addition, the extremely bright, which is also invisible, but in quite another way); [and as] the same holds of hearing, which is of sound and silence, one being audible, the other inaudible, and [the latter includes] excess of sound, which is to hearing as brilliance is to sight; for as a feeble sound is in a way inaudible, so, in another way, is an extremely violent one. (‘Invisible’ indeed can mean either what is absolutely such, or [the term may also be used] as in other cases of ‘the impossible’ where [this concept] is applied both to what lacks what it ought to have by nature, and to what has this defectively,—as we say of a footless [animal] that it is motionless.) So, in the same way, taste is of the savourable and the non-savourable, the latter being what has either only a faint savour, or one altogether destructive of the taste. It would seem that the principle of this is the drinkable or the non-drinkable; and taste is of both, but the latter as either a faint taste or one that destroys the sense: whilst the ‘former is according to nature. The drinkable is common to taste and touch. §§ 509-11
ἐπεὶ δ' ὑγρὸν τὸ γευστόν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον αὐτοῦ μήτε ὑγρὸν εἶναι ἐντελεχείᾳ μήτε ἀδύνατον ὑγραίνεσθαι· πάσχει γάρ τι ἡ γεῦσις ὑπὸ τοῦ γευστοῦ, ᾗ γευστόν. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ὑγρανθῆναι τὸ δυνάμενον μὲν ὑγραίνεσθαι σωζόμενον, μὴ ὑγρὸν δέ, τὸ γευστικὸν αἰσθητήριον.	Since what is tasteable is liquid, it is necessary that the sense-organ be neither liquid actually, nor incapable of becoming so. For taste is affected by the savourable thing as such. It is therefore necessary that the sensorium be moistened, yet in such a way that it keeps its potentiality thereto; the tasting sense being non-humid. § 512
σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτε κατάξηρον οὖσαν τὴν γλῶτταν αἰσθάνεσθαι μήτε λίαν ὑγράν· αὕτη γὰρ ἁφῇ γίνεται τοῦ πρώτου ὑγροῦ, ὥσπερ ὅταν προγευματίσας τις ἰσχυροῦ χυμοῦ γεύηται ἑτέρου, καὶ οἷον τοῖς κάμνουσι πικρὰ πάντα φαίνεται διὰ τὸ τῇ γλώττῃ πλήρει τοιαύτης ὑγρότητος αἰσθάνεσθαι.	There is a sign of this in that the tongue cannot perceive taste either when it is dry or when it is too moist. In the latter case contact takes place with the original moisture; as when one who has first tasted a very strong flavour then tastes another, or those burdened [with fever] taste all things as bitter because the tongue is saturated in a liquid of that sort. § 513
2. τὰ δ' εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χρωμάτων, ἁπλᾶ μὲν τἀναντία, τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν, ἐχόμενα δὲ τοῦ μὲν τὸ λιπαρόν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἁλμυρόν· μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων τό τε δριμὺ καὶ τὸ αὐστηρὸν καὶ στρυφνὸν καὶ ὀξύ· σχεδὸν γὰρ αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι διαφοραὶ χυμῶν. ὥστε τὸ γευστικόν ἐστι τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, γευστὸν δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐντελεχείᾳ αὐτοῦ.	The species of savour are, like colours, the simple contraries; sweet and bitter. Adjoining these, however, are, with the former, the succulent, with the latter, the saline. Then there are the intermediary flavours: pungent, harsh, stringent and piquant. These seem to be about all the varieties of savour that exist; to which taste, as such, therefore, is in potency; the savourable being what reduces it to act. §§ 514-16

TEXT
422b17–423a22
BOOK II, CHAPTER XI
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΑ'

TOUCH. ONE SENSE OR MANY? ITS MEDIUM

422b17  1. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ περὶ ἁφῆς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἁφὴ μὴ μία ἐστὶν αἴσθησις ἀλλὰ πλείους, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ ἁπτὰ αἰσθητὰ πλείω εἶναι. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν πότερον πλείους εἰσὶν ἢ μία, καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὸ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ, πότερον ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν ἐστι τὸ μεταξύ, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον αἰσθητήριον ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐντός.	The same reasoning holds for the tangible and touch. If touch is not one sense, but several, then the tangible sense-objects must necessarily be several. But it is a problem whether it is one sense or several: and what the organ is—whether it is the flesh, or what corresponds to flesh in other [animals], or not; and if not, then this [flesh] would be the medium, while the primary sense organ would be something else within. §§ 517-18
2. πᾶσα γὰρ αἴσθησις μιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως εἶναι δοκεῖ, οἷον ὄψις λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος, καὶ ἀκοὴ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, καὶ γεῦσις πικροῦ καὶ γλυκέος· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἁπτῷ πολλαὶ ἔνεισιν ἐναντιώσεις, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, σκληρὸν μαλακόν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τοιαῦτα.	For every sense seems to be of a single contrariety, as sight of white and black, hearing of high and low, taste of sweet and bitter. But in the tangible order there are several contrarieties, hot and cold, dry and wet, hard and soft, and the like. § 519
ἔχει δέ τινα λύσιν πρός γε ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων εἰσὶν ἐναντιώσεις πλείους, οἷον ἐν φωνῇ οὐ μόνον ὀξύτης καὶ βαρύτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος καὶ μικρότης, καὶ λειότης καὶ τραχύτης φωνῆς, καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα.	Here is a partial solution of this problem: that in other senses also there are several contraries; as in voice there is not only high and low but also loud and soft, smooth and rough, and other such qualities. There is also a like variety of differences in colour. § 520
εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ χρῶμα διαφοραὶ τοιαῦται ἕτεραι. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ ἓν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ ἀκοῇ ψόφος, οὕτω τῇ ἁφῇ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἔνδηλον.	But it is not clear what is the underlying unity of touch, as sound is of hearing. §§ 521-4
3. πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον ἐντός, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ' 423a εὐθέως ἡ σάρξ, οὐδὲν δοκεῖ σημεῖον εἶναι τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα θιγγανομένων. καὶ γὰρ νῦν εἴ τίς <τι> περὶ τὴν σάρκα περιτείνειεν οἷον ὑμένα ποιήσας, ὁμοίως τὴν αἴσθησιν εὐθέως ἁψάμενος ἐνσημανεῖ· καίτοι δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τούτῳ τὸ αἰσθητήριον (εἰ δὲ καὶ συμφυὲς γένοιτο, θᾶττον ἔτι διικνοῖτ' ἂν ἡ αἴσθησις)·	It is not evidence as to whether the sense-organ is interior or is the flesh, immediately, that the sensation arises simultaneously with contact. For if, as things are, one were to stretch a covering or membrane over the skin, a sensation would still arise immediately on making contact; yet it is obvious that the sense-organ was not in this membrane. And if it were ingrown the sensation would reach the sensorium even sooner. §§ 525-6
4. διὸ τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τοῦ σώματος ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ κύκλῳ ἡμῖν περιεπεφύκει ὁ ἀήρ· ἐδοκοῦμεν γὰρ ἂν ἑνί τινι αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ ψόφου καὶ χρώματος καὶ ὀσμῆς, καὶ μία τις αἴσθησις εἶναι ὄψις ἀκοὴ ὄσφρησις. νῦν δὲ διὰ τὸ διωρίσθαι δι' οὗ γίνονται αἱ κινήσεις, φανερὰ τὰ εἰρημένα αἰσθητήρια ἕτερα ὄντα. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἁφῆς τοῦτο νῦν ἄδηλον· ἐξ ἀέρος μὲν γὰρ ἢ ὕδατος ἀδύνατον συστῆναι τὸ ἔμψυχον σῶμα· δεῖ γάρ τι στερεὸν εἶναι· λείπεται δὴ μικτὸν ἐκ τῆς καὶ τούτων εἶναι, οἷον βούλεται εἶναι ἡ σὰρξ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον· ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον τὸ σῶμα εἶναι τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ προσπεφυκός, δι' οὗ γίνονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις πλείους οὖσαι.	Therefore it appears that the relation of this part of the body [to the whole] is comparable to that which air would have if it formed a natural covering that grew all round our bodies. For then it would appear that we perceived sound and odour and colour through some one common medium, and even that there were but one sense for hearing, seeing and smelling. Since in fact, however, there exists something definite through which the motions [of these senses] are produced, it is evident that each of these senses is diverse. But in the case of touch, this is still far from clear. It is impossible that an animated body be constituted from air or water, for it must be solid. It can, then, only be a mixture from earth and the other elements, as flesh (or its counterpart) requires. Wherefore it is necessary that the medium of touch be a body conjoined [to the organism] through which its sensations, which are several, may come about. §§ 527-8
5. δηλοῖ δ' ὅτι πλείους ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης ἁφή· ἁπάντων γὰρ τῶν ἁπτῶν αἰσθάνεται κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον καὶ χυμοῦ. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ ἄλλη σὰρξ ᾐσθάνετο τοῦ χυμοῦ, ἐδόκει ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μία εἶναι αἴσθησις ἡ γεῦσις καὶ ἡ ἀφή· νῦν δὲ δύο διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν.	That they are several is proved by the fact that there is touch in the tongue; for that same member feels all kinds of tangible objects, as well as savours. If every part of the flesh perceived savours it would seem that touch and taste were one and the same. But we know that the are two, in that one organ cannot be substituted for the other. § 529

TEXT
423a23–424a15
BOOK II, CHAPTER XI, CONTINUED

THE MEDIUM OF TOUCH CONTINUED
ITS ORGAN AND OBJECT

6. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ πᾶν σῶμα βάθος ἔχει, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τρίτον μέγεθος, ὧν δ' ἐστὶ δύο σωμάτων μεταξὺ σῶμά τι, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ταῦτα ἀλλήλων ἅπτεσθαι, τὸ δ' ὑγρὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ σώματος, οὐδὲ τὸ διερόν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ὕδωρ εἶναι ἢ ἔχειν ὕδωρ, τὰ δὲ ἁπτόμενα ἀλλήλων ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, μὴ ξηρῶν τῶν ἄκρων ὄντων, ἀναγκαῖον ὕδωρ ἔχειν μεταξύ, οὗ ἀνάπλεα τὰ ἔσχατα, εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἀδύνατον ἅψασθαι ἄλλο ἄλλου ἐν ὕδατι, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι (ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει ὁ ἀὴρ πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, λανθάνει δὲ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ζῷα 423b εἰ διερὸν διεροῦ ἅπτεται)	A Problem arises, on the assumption that every body has depth, that is, the third dimension. Bodies having [between them] a medium which is a body cannot touch one another. Now every liquid involves body, and so does everything moistened; it must either be water or contain water. But things in contact with one another in water must necessarily have water as a medium covering their extremities, unless these last be dry. If this is true, it is impossible for one body to touch another in water. The same holds good of air (for air is to the things that are in it as water to things in water) although this fact is less evident to us, just as animals that live in water are unaware that bodies that touch in water are all wet. §§ 530-40
—πότερον οὖν πάντων ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἡ αἴσθησις, ἢ ἄλλων ἄλλως, καθάπερ νῦν δοκεῖ ἡ μὲν γεῦσις καὶ ἡ ἁφὴ τῷ ἅπτεσθαι, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ἄποθεν. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν δι' ἑτέρων αἰσθανόμεθα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ψοφητικὸν καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δ' ἐγγύθεν, διὸ λανθάνει· ἐπεὶ αἰσθανόμεθά γε πάντων διὰ τοῦ μέσου, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τούτων λανθάνει. καίτοι καθάπερ εἴπομεν καὶ πρότερον, κἂν εἰ δι' ὑμένος αἰσθανοίμεθα τῶν ἁπτῶν ἁπάντων λανθάνοντος ὅτι διείργει, ὁμοίως ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι· δοκοῦμεν γὰρ νῦν αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσου.	The question then is, whether there is one way of sensing for all objects of sense, or different ways for diverse objects. The latter at first sight seems to be the case,—taste and touch being effected by contact, the others from a distance. But this is not so: we perceive the hard and the soft through something intervening, just as we do the audible and the visible and the odorous. But of these objects, some operate at a distance, others close at hand. That is why the fact escapes us: we do perceive everything through a medium, but the fact is not evident in the latter cases. Indeed, as we said before, if we were to perceive all tangible objects through a membrane, not knowing what was interpolated, we should think we touched the objects themselves, as we now do in air and water: for in these cases we think we touch the objects and that there is no medium. §§ 541-2
8. ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τὸ ἁπτὸν τῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ τῶν ψοφητικῶν, ὅτι ἐκείνων μὲν αἰσθανόμεθα τῷ τὸ μεταξὺ ποιεῖν τι ἡμᾶς, τῶν δὲ ἁπτῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλ' ἅμα τῷ μεταξύ, ὥσπερ ὁ δι' ἀσπίδος πληγείς· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀσπὶς πληγεῖσα ἐπάταξεν, ἀλλ' ἅμ' ἄμφω συνέβη πληγῆναι.	But the tangible differs from the visible and the audible; for we perceive the latter in that the medium itself produces some effect in us; whereas the tangible does not affect us through the medium so much as with the medium, simultaneously, as when one is struck on a shield. For the shield does not strike its holder after it is itself struck; but the two are struck at once. §§ 543-4
9. ὅλως δ' ἔοικεν ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα, ὡς ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν καὶ τὴν ὄσφρησιν ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητήριον ὥσπερ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον. αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἁπτομένου οὔτ' ἐκεῖ οὔτ' ἐνταῦθα γένοιτ' ἂν αἴσθησις, οἷον εἴ τις σῶμά τι λευκὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄμματος θείη τὸ ἔσχατον. ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐντὸς τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ αἰσθητικόν. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν συμβαίνοι ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἐπιτιθεμένων γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιτιθεμένων αἰσθάνεται· ὥστε τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ ἡ σάρξ.	It would seem in general that flesh and the tongue stand to the sense-organ precisely as water and air to sight and hearing and smell, each to its respective sense. When the sense organ is touched (as when one places a white object on the surface of the eye), no sensation is produced in either case. Hence the organ of the tangible is internal; for the same thing happens in this sense as in the others; what is placed on the organ they do not perceive. What, however, is placed on the flesh they do perceive; flesh, then, is the medium of touch. § 545
10. ἁπταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ᾗ σῶμα· λέγω δὲ διαφορὰς αἳ τὰ στοιχεῖα διορίζουσι, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, περὶ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν στοιχείων. 11. τὸ δὲ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν τὸ ἁπτικόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡ καλουμένη ἁφὴ ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις πρώτῳ, τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτόν ἐστι μόριον· 424a τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι ἐστίν· ὥστε τὸ ποιοῦν, οἷον αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ, δυνάμει ὄν. διὸ τοῦ ὁμοίως θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ, ἢ σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ, οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων· καὶ δεῖ ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον αἰσθήσεσθαι λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος μηδέτερον αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ, δυνάμει δ' ἄμφω (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἁφῆς μήτε θερμὸν μήτε ψυχρόν.	Tangible objects vary therefore with differences, of body as is such—I mean the differences by which the elements are distinguished, as hot and cold, wet and dry, as is stated in our work on the elements. The sense organ for these, the tactile, in which the sense called touch is principally lodged, is the part in potency to these qualities. For to perceive is to receive an impression. Hence whatever makes the organ to be such as itself is actually, does so, the organ being in potency thereto. Hence we do not perceive what has heat, or cold or hardness or softness to an exact similitude of our own heat, and so forth, but rather the extremes of these: the sense being, as it were, in a mean state between the contrary extremes in the objects perceived; which is how it discriminates between them. For a mean is discriminative; in the presence of either extreme it becomes the contrary one. Hence, as whatever is to perceive black or white must have neither of these in itself actually, but both potentially (and so with the other sense-objects), so touch must be actually neither hot nor cold. §§ 546-8
12. ἔτι δ' ὥσπερ ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου ἦν πως ἡ ὄψις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἁφὴ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ ἀνάπτου· ἄναπτον δ' ἐστὶ τό τε μικρὰν ἔχον πάμπαν διαφορὰν τῶν ἁπτῶν, οἷον πέπονθεν ὁ ἀήρ, καὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί, ὥσπερ τὰ φθαρτικά.	Further: as sight is, in a way, of the visible and the invisible (and similarly with the rest of such opposites), so touch is of both the tangible and the intangible. The intangible is that which has the distinguishing quality of tangibles to a very small extent, as air is affected; and also the excessively tangible, such as things destructive.
καθ' ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴρηται τύπῳ.	We have now said in outline something about each of the senses. §§ 549-50

TEXT
424a16–424b20
BOOK II, CHAPTER XII
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΒ'

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON SENSATION

424a17  1. Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ τοιονδί, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.	It must be taken as a general rule that all sensation is the receiving of forms without matter, as wax receives a seal without the iron or gold of the signet-ring. It receives an imprint of the gold or bronze, but not as gold or bronze. Similarly the sense of any sense-object is acted upon by a thing having colour or flavour or sound; not, however, in respect of what each, is called as a particular thing, but in so far as each has a certain quality and according to its informing principle. §§ 551-4
2. αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ταὐτόν, τὸ δ' εἶναι ἕτερον· μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οὐ μὴν τό γε αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι οὐδ' ἡ αἴσθησις μέγεθός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου.	The primary sensitive part is that in which a power of this sort resides. They [part and power] are indeed the same thing, but differ in mode of being. What receives sensation will be an extended magnitude, but neither being sensitive nor sensation is a magnitude. Each is, rather, a certain ratio and power of a magnitude. § 555
3. φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ φθείρουσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια (ἐὰν γὰρ ᾖ ἰσχυροτέρα τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἡ κίνησις, λύεται ὁ λόγος-τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἡ αἴσθησις-ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συμφωνία καὶ ὁ τόνος κρουομένων σφόδρα τῶν χορδῶν), 4. καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τὰ φυτὰ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχοντά τι μόριον ψυχικὸν καὶ πάσχοντά τι ὑπὸ τῶν ἁπτῶν (καὶ γὰρ ψύχε- 424b ται καὶ θερμαίνεται)· αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα, μηδὲ τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οἵαν τὰ εἴδη δέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ πάσχειν μετὰ τῆς ὕλης.	It is clear from these facts why the excess of sensible qualities destroys the sense-organs. For if the change is too violent for the sense-organ, the ratio [of the latter] is lost,—which [ratio] is the sense. It is as with tone and harmony when the strings are violently struck. Also it is plain why plants have no sensation, though they have some share in soul, and are affected by tangible objects to become hot or cold. The reason is that they lack a mean or principle of this kind, able to receive the forms of sense-objects; they are acted upon materially. §§ 556-7
424b.3  5. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις εἰ πάθοι ἄν τι ὑπ' ὀσμῆς τὸ ἀδύνατον ὀσφρανθῆναι, ἢ ὑπὸ χρώματος τὸ μὴ δυνάμενον ἰδεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	It might be asked, is anything affected by odour if it cannot have the sense of smell—or by colour, if it is unable to see? And so in the other cases. § 558
εἰ δὲ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν ὀσμή, εἴ τι ποιεῖ, τὴν ὄσφρησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ ποιεῖ· ὥστε τῶν ἀδυνάτων ὀσφρανθῆναι οὐθὲν οἷόν τε πάσχειν ὑπ' ὀσμῆς (ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων)· οὐδὲ τῶν δυνατῶν, ἀλλ' <ἢ> ᾗ αἰσθητικὸν ἕκαστον.	But if what can be smelt is odour, whatever causes smell is odour.]. Hence things incapable of smelling cannot be affected by odour. The same argument holds for the other senses. And of subjects that can perceive, the ability belongs to them only in virtue of each being sensitive. § 559
ἅμα δὲ δῆλον καὶ οὕτως· οὔτε γὰρ φῶς καὶ σκότος οὔτε ψόφος οὔτε ὀσμὴ οὐδὲν ποιεῖ τὰ σώματα, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς ἐστίν, οἷον ἀὴρ ὁ μετὰ βροντῆς διίστησι τὸ ξύλον.	The same is evident thus: neither light or darkness or sound or odour affect bodies; but only what they occur in does so; e.g. it is the air which accompanies thunder that smashes trees. § 560
6. ἀλλὰ τὰ ἁπτὰ καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ ποιοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ μή, ὑπὸ τίνος ἂν πάσχοι τὰ ἄψυχα καὶ ἀλλοιοῖτο;	But things tangible and savours do so affect things. If not, what is it that inanimate things are affected and changed by? § 561
ἆρ' οὖν κἀκεῖνα ποιήσει; ἢ οὐ πᾶν σῶμα παθητικὸν ὑπ' ὀσμῆς καὶ ψόφου, καὶ τὰ πάσχοντα ἀόριστα, καὶ οὐ μένει, οἷον ἀήρ (ὄζει γὰρ ὥσπερ παθών τι);	Therefore, do not also the other sense-objects have a like effect? But not every body is affected by odour or sound, such recipients being only things indefinite and unstable like air: which may smell as though affected somehow. § 562
τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι παρὰ τὸ πάσχειν τι; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁ δ' ἀὴρ παθὼν ταχέως αἰσθητὸς γίνεται;	What then is to smell, save to be ‘affected somehow’? But to smell is to sense. Air, however, being so affected, becomes rapidly sensible. § 563

ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΤΡΙΤΟΝ
Liber 3
BOOK THREE

TEXT
424b22–425b10
BOOK III, CHAPTER I
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Α'

IS THERE A SIXTH SENSE?
THE ‘COMMON’ SENSE-OBJECTS

424b.22  1. Ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις ἑτέρα παρὰ τὰς πέντε (λέγω δὲ ταύτας ὄψιν, ἀκοήν, ὄσφρησιν, γεῦσιν, ἁφήν), ἐκ τῶνδε πιστεύσειεν ἄν τις.	That there is no other sense besides the five enumerated—I mean, sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch—is tenable for the following reasons: §564-7
Not in Greek	(and this is so arranged that (a) if more than one kind of sensible object is perceivable through a single medium, the possessor of a sense-organ homogeneous with that medium has the power of perceiving both kinds of objects; for example, if the sense-organ is made of air, and air is a medium both for sound and for colour; and that (b) if more than one medium can transmit the same kind of sensible objects, as e.g. water as well as air can transmit colour, both being transparent, then the possessor of either alone will be able to perceive the kind of objects transmissible through both);
εἰ γὰρ παντὸς οὗ ἐστὶν αἴσθησις ἁφὴ καὶ νῦν αἴσθησιν ἔχομεν (πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ ᾗ ἁπτὸν πάθη τῇ ἁφῇ ἡμῖν αἰσθητά ἐστιν), ἀνάγκη τ', εἴπερ ἐκλείπει τις αἴσθησις, καὶ αἰσθητήριόν τι ἡμῖν ἐκλείπειν, καὶ ὅσων μὲν αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι αἰσθανόμεθα, τῇ ἁφῇ αἰσθητά ἐστιν, ἣν τυγχάνομεν ἔχοντες, ὅσα δὲ διὰ τῶν μεταξὺ καὶ μὴ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι, τοῖς ἁπλοῖς, λέγω δ' οἷον ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι, 2. ἔχει δ' οὕτως ὥστ' εἰ μὲν δι' ἑνὸς πλείω αἰσθητὰ ἕτερα ὄντα ἀλλήλων τῷ γένει, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἔχοντα τὸ τοιοῦτον αἰσθητήριον ἀμφοῖν αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι (οἷον εἰ ἐξ ἀέρος ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ ψόφου καὶ χρόας), εἰ δὲ πλείω 425a τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον χρόας καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ (ἄμφω γὰρ διαφανῆ), καὶ ὁ τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἔχων μόνον αἰσθήσεται τοῦ δι' ἀμφοῖν,	For if we have sensation of all the objects of the sense of touch (all varieties of the tangible being in fact perceptible by us through touch) then, if we lack some [class of] sensation, we must be lacking also in some sense-organ. Now whatever we perceive by contact is perceptible to us through that sense of touch which we do in fact possess. But whatever we perceive through a medium and without contact is perceived through intervening simple elements (I mean such as air and water); and [in this case] things are so disposed that if several sense-objects, differing generically from one another, are perceptible through one medium, then, necessarily, what has a sense-organ of this kind can perceive either object—e.g. if the organ is constituted of air, then air is medium for both colour and sound. But if there are several media for the same sense object, as air and water are for colour (both being transparent), what is possessed of either [medium] alone will perceive what comes through either or both. §§ 568-70
3. τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν ἐκ δύο τούτων αἰσθητήρια μόνον ἐστίν, ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος (ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόρη ὕδατος, ἡ δ' ἀκοὴ ἀέρος, ἡ δ' ὄσφρησις θατέρου τούτων), τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἢ οὐθενὸς ἢ κοινὸν πάντων (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἄνευ θερμότητος αἰσθητικόν), γῆ δὲ ἢ οὐθενός, ἢ ἐν τῇ ἁφῇ μάλιστα μέμικται ἰδίως, διὸ λείποιτ' ἂν μηθὲν εἶναι αἰσθητήριον ἔξω ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος, 4. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔχουσιν ἔνια ζῷα—πᾶσαι ἄρα αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἔχονται ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀτελῶν μηδὲ πεπηρωμένων (φαίνεται γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἀσπάλαξ ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα ἔχουσα ὀφθαλμούς)· ὥστ' εἰ μή τι ἕτερον ἔστι σῶμα, καὶ πάθος ὃ μηθενός ἐστι τῶν ἐνταῦθα σωμάτων, οὐδεμία ἂν ἐκλείποι αἴσθησις.	The sense-organs are formed of these two simple bodies only, air and water. For the pupil is of water; the [organ of] hearing, of air; and smell of either. But fire is found in none, or is common to all; for nothing without heat is sensitive. Earth either belongs to none, or is especially involved in touch. Whence it remains that there is no sense-organ without air and water. Now these organs certain animals do in fact possess. All the senses therefore are found in animals neither incomplete or defective (for even the mole is observed to have eyes beneath its skin). Therefore, if there is no other kind of body, and no qualities other than those of the bodies here present, no sense will be lacking to any [such] animal. §§ 571-4
5. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν κοινῶν οἷόν τ' εἶναι αἰσθητήριόν τι ἴδιον, ὧν ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόμεθα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον κινήσεως, στάσεως, σχήματος, μεγέθους, ἀριθμοῦ·	But there cannot be a sense proper to the common qualities which we perceive by any one sense, yet not incidentally merely: such as movement, rest, shape, size, number, unity. §§ 575-6
ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα [κινήσει] αἰσθανόμεθα, οἷον μέγεθος κινήσει (ὥστε καὶ σχῆμα· μέγεθος γάρ τι τὸ σχῆμα),	For we know all these by motion: that is, we know size by movement and from size, shape; for shape is itself a kind of size. § 577
τὸ δ' ἠρεμοῦν τῷ μὴ κινεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς, καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις (ἑκάστη γὰρ ἓν αἰσθάνεται αἴσθησις)· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ὁτουοῦν ἰδίαν αἴσθησιν εἶναι τούτων, οἷον κινήσεως·	What is at rest we know as not moving, and number as the negation of continuity and identity. For each sense perceives some one thing, so that it is impossible that there should be a sense specially adapted to any of these. § 578
οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται ὥσπερ νῦν τῇ ὄψει τὸ γλυκὺ αἰσθανόμεθα· 6. τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἀμφοῖν ἔχοντες τυγχάνομεν αἴσθησιν, ᾗ ὅταν συμπέσωσιν ἅμα γνωρίζομεν. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδαμῶς ἂν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ᾐσθανόμεθα (οἷον τὸν Κλέωνος υἱὸν οὐχ ὅτι Κλέωνος υἱός, ἀλλ' ὅτι λευκός, τούτῳ δὲ συμβέβηκεν υἱῷ Κλέωνος εἶναι)· 7. τῶν δὲ κοινῶν ἤδη ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν κοινήν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐκ ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἰδία· οὐδαμῶς γὰρ ἂν ᾐσθανόμεθα ἀλλ' ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ εἴρηται [τὸν Κλέωνος υἱὸν ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν]. τὰ δ' ἀλλήλων ἴδια κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθάνονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις, οὐχ ᾗ αὐταί, ἀλλ' ᾗ μία, ὅταν 425b ἅμα γένηται ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον χολῆς ὅτι πικρὰ καὶ ξανθή (οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἑτέρας γε τὸ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἄμφω ἕν)· διὸ καὶ ἀπατᾶται, καὶ ἐὰν ᾖ ξανθόν, χολὴν οἴεται εἶναι.	The situation would, in that case, be as when we perceive what is sweet by sight. This happens because we take account of the sensation of both these, so that when they coincide we are aware of it. if it were not so, we should perceive this only incidentally, as when we see the son of Cleon not as the son of Cleon but as something white; with which object there happens to coincide the fact of being the son of Cleon. But we have a general sense for common qualities, And this not merely incidentally. Hence, there is not a proper sense [for them]. [If there were] we should never perceive them except in the way we have said that we see the son of Cleon. The senses perceive incidentally what is proper to one another; [perceiving] not in their specific capacity, but in so far as they form one sense,—as in the perception of bile as both reddish in colour and bitter. It does not pertain to either sense to judge that these are qualities of one thing. Hence arises the mistaken view that, if a thing is reddish, it is bile. §§ 579-81
8. ζητήσειε δ' ἄν τις τίνος ἕνεκα πλείους ἔχομεν αἰσθήσεις, ἀλλ' οὐ μίαν μόνην. ἢ ὅπως ἧττον λανθάνῃ τὰ ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ κοινά, οἷον κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἀριθμός; εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἡ ὄψις μόνη, καὶ αὕτη λευκοῦ, ἐλάνθανεν ἂν μᾶλλον κἂν ἐδόκει ταὐτὸν εἶναι πάντα διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἅμα χρῶμα καὶ μέγεθος. νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ αἰσθητῷ τὰ κοινὰ ὑπάρχει, δῆλον ποιεῖ ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν.	One might ask why we have several senses and not one only. Is it in order that the common qualities, which are consequent on the proper, should be less obscure—movement, dimension, number? For if there were no sense but sight alone, and that only of white as an object, these qualities would certainly be very obscure to the apprehension, and all things would appear alike, because colour and dimension always accompany each other. But the fact that there are common qualities attained by various senses, makes it evident that each of them is a distinct object. §§ 582-3

TEXT
425b11–426b8
BOOK III, CHAPTER II
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Β'

SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN SENSATION

425b12  1. Ἐπεὶ δ' αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἀνάγκη ἢ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ὁρᾷ, ἢ ἑτέρᾳ.	Since we perceive that we see and hear, we must see that we see either by sight or by another sense. § 584
ἀλλ' ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χρώματος, ὥστε ἢ δύο τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔσονται ἢ αὐτὴ αὑτῆς.	And if by another sense, then either this is the sense by which we see, or another sense altogether. But [then] the same sense will bear on the coloured object and the sense of sight. Hence, either there will be two senses for one object, or one sense must be its own object. § 585
2. ἔτι δ' εἰ καὶ ἑτέρα εἴη ἡ τῆς ὄψεως αἴσθησις, ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν ἢ αὐτή τις ἔσται αὑτῆς· ὥστ' ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης τοῦτο ποιητέον.	Further, if the sense perceptive of sight is other, either there is a process to infinity, or there must be some sense which takes account of its own operation: hence it is better to admit this in the first instance. § 586
ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν ὁρᾶν, ὁρᾶται δὲ χρῶμα ἢ τὸ ἔχον, εἰ ὄψεταί τις τὸ ὁρῶν, καὶ χρῶμα ἕξει τὸ ὁρῶν πρῶτον.	Here is a problem: if to perceive by sight is to see, and colour, or what possesses it, is what is seen, then that which first sees must be coloured. § 587
3. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐχ ἓν τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν μὴ ὁρῶμεν, τῇ ὄψει κρίνομεν καὶ τὸ σκότος καὶ τὸ φῶς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως.	It is clear, then, that ‘to perceive by sight’ has not only one meaning. For even when we are not seeing, it is by sight that we distinguish between light and dark, though not in the same way. § 588
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν ἔστιν ὡς κεχρωμάτισται· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητήριον δεκτικὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἕκαστον· διὸ καὶ ἀπελθόντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔνεισιν αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις. 4. ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐταῖς· λέγω δ' οἷον ὁ ψόφος ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀκοὴν ἔχοντα μὴ ἀκούειν, καὶ τὸ ἔχον ψόφον οὐκ ἀεὶ ψοφεῖ, ὅταν δ' ἐνεργῇ τὸ δυνάμενον ἀκούειν καὶ ψοφῇ τὸ δυνάμενον ψοφεῖν, τότε ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀκοὴ ἅμα γίνεται καὶ ὁ κατ' 426a ἐνέργειαν ψόφος, ὧν εἴπειεν ἄν τις τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἄκουσιν τὸ δὲ ψόφησιν.	Moreover, that which sees is, in a way, coloured; for each sensitive faculty is receptive of the sense-object without its material concomitant. Hence, in the absence of the sense-objects there remain sensation’s and phantasms in the sense-powers. The act of the sense-object and the sensation are one and the same: but these—I mean, for instance, sound in act or sight in act—are not identical in their being. For it happens that what has hearing does not hear all the time, and what has sound is not always sounding. But when that which is able to hear operates, and that which is able to sound sounds, both hearing in act and sound in act arise simultaneously. (of which two, one might call one ‘hearing’, the other ‘sounding’.) §§ 589-91
5. εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις (καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ τὸ πάθος) ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ψόφον καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐν τῷ κατὰ δύναμιν εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἐγγίνεται· διὸ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν κινεῖσθαι. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ψοφητικοῦ ἐνέργειά ἐστι ψόφος ἢ ψόφησις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀκουστικοῦ ἀκοὴ ἢ ἄκουσις· διττὸν γὰρ ἡ ἀκοή, καὶ διττὸν ὁ ψόφος. 6. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων καὶ αἰσθητῶν. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ ἡ πάθησις ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ. ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν ὠνόμασται, οἷον ἡ ψόφησις καὶ ἡ ἄκουσις, ἐπ' ἐνίων δ' ἀνώνυμον θάτερον· ὅρασις γὰρ λέγεται ἡ τῆς ὄψεως ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ τοῦ χρώματος ἀνώνυμος, καὶ γεῦσις ἡ τοῦ γευστικοῦ, ἡ δὲ τοῦ χυμοῦ ἀνώνυμος.	If then movement and action and passion are in that which is acted upon, it follows that sound and hearing in act reside in that which is these potentially. For the act of what moves or causes is realised in the recipient; hence it is not necessary that what moves be itself in motion. The act of the sound-producing is therefore sound or a sounding; and of the hearing faculty, is hearing or audition. For ‘hearing’ ‘and ‘sounding’ are both twofold. And the same reasoning applies to the other senses and their objects. For as the action and the reception are in the recipient, not in the agent, so the act of the sense-object and of the sense faculty are in the sensitive recipient. However, whereas both are named in some cases (as sounding and audition) in others one or the other is nameless. Vision is the act of seeing, but that of colour has no name; and tasting is the act of the tasting faculty, but the act of savour has no name. §§ 592-3
7. ἐπεὶ δὲ μία μέν ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, τὸ δ' εἶναι ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φθείρεσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι τὴν οὕτω λεγομένην ἀκοὴν καὶ ψόφον, καὶ χυμὸν δὴ καὶ γεῦσιν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως· τὰ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν λεγόμενα οὐκ ἀνάγκη·	Since the act of the sense-object and of the sense faculty is one and the same (though each has its own being) it is necessary that they pass away or remain simultaneously, as in the above-mentioned case of hearing and sounding; and, therefore, of taste and flavour and the rest. It is not, however, necessary to hold this of the potency.
8. ἀλλ' οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον, οὐθὲν οἰόμενοι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν εἶναι ἄνευ ὄψεως, οὐδὲ χυμὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, τῇ δ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς· διχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, τῶν μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν τῶν δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, ἐπὶ τούτων μὲν συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων οὐ συμβαίνει. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι ἁπλῶς ἔλεγον περὶ τῶν λεγομένων οὐχ ἁπλῶς.	But on this point the earlier natural philosophers spoke erroneously, holding that there was no black or white without sight, no flavour without taste. In one way what they said was right, in another wrong. Inasmuch as both the sense-object and the sense-faculty exist in two ways, one in potency the other in act, what they alleged applies to the latter, but not to the former. But they made bald assertions about matters which call for distinctions. §§ 595-6
9. εἰ δ' ἡ φωνὴ συμφωνία τίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἔστιν ὡς ἕν ἐστι [καὶ ἔστιν ὡς οὐχ ἓν τὸ αὐτό], λόγος δ' ἡ συμφωνία, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν λόγον τινὰ εἶναι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ φθείρει ἕκαστον ὑπερβάλλον, καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ, τὴν ἀκοήν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν χυμοῖς τὴν 426b γεῦσιν, καὶ ἐν χρώμασι τὴν ὄψιν τὸ σφόδρα λαμπρὸν ἢ ζοφερόν, καὶ ἐν ὀσφρήσει ἡ ἰσχυρὰ ὀσμή, καὶ γλυκεῖα καὶ πικρά, ὡς λόγου τινὸς ὄντος τῆς αἰσθήσεως. διὸ καὶ ἡδέα μέν, ὅταν εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἄμικτα ὄντα ἄγηται εἰς τὸν λόγον, οἷον τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ ἁλμυρόν, ἡδέα γὰρ τότε· ὅλως δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ μικτόν, συμφωνία, ἢ τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ βαρύ, ἁφῇ δὲ τὸ θερμαντὸν ἢ ψυκτόν· ἡ δ' αἴσθησις ὁ λόγος· ὑπερβάλλοντα δὲ λύει ἢ φθείρει.	Now, if voice is a harmony of some sort, and voice and the hearing of it are somehow one, and also, somehow, not one and the same; and if harmony is a proportion; then the hearing must be a kind of proportion. For this reason anything excessively shrill or deep destroys the hearing; and the same in flavours destroys the taste; and in colours, the sight, whether the excessively brilliant or the dark; and in smell, a strong odour, whether sweet or bitter; as if the sense were a certain proportion. Hence, too, those [savours] become delectable which, from having been pure and unmixed (e.g. the bitter or sweet or saline) are brought into a proportion. Then indeed they give pleasure. And in general what is compounded is more of a harmony than the sharp or low [sounds] alone; or in the case of touch, what can be both heated and chilled. Sense is a ‘proportion’ which is hurt or destroyed by extremes. § 597-8

TEXT
426b8–421a15
BOOK III, CHAPTER II, CONTINUED

THE COMMON SENSE

10. ἑκάστη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ᾗ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφοράς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψις, γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεῦσις· ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	Each of the senses, then, is of a sensible object and in a sense-organ, precisely as such, and it discerns the differences within its object—for example sight, black and white; taste, sweet and bitter; and likewise with the other senses. §§ 599-600
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον κρίνομεν, τινὶ καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι διαφέρει. ἀνάγκη δὴ αἰσθήσει· αἰσθητὰ γάρ ἐστιν. 11. ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἁπτόμενον αὐτὸ κρίνειν τὸ κρῖνον.	Since we distinguish, however, between black and sweet, and any other of the sense-objects, comparing them and perceiving that they differ, there must be some sense for this operation too; for these objects are all in the sense-order. Hence it is also clear that flesh is not the ultimate sense-organ; for, in that case, this discrimination would have to be effected by touching. §§ 601-2
οὔτε δὴ κεχωρισμένοις ἐνδέχεται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἑνί τινι ἄμφω δῆλα εἶναι —οὕτω μὲν γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ μὲν ἐγὼ τοῦ δὲ σὺ αἴσθοιο, δῆλον ἂν εἴη ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, δεῖ δὲ τὸ ἓν λέγειν ὅτι ἕτερον· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ· λέγει ἄρα τὸ αὐτό· ὥστε ὡς λέγει, οὕτω καὶ νοεῖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται— 12. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ οἷόν τε κεχωρισμένοις κρίνειν τὰ κεχωρισμένα, δῆλον·	Nor could it be by divided [powers] that the sweet is discerned as other than the white: but both must be presented to some one faculty. For [otherwise] it would be like my perceiving one thing and you another: it would then certainly be evident that the two were different; but some one single [power] must say that they differ—i.e. sweet from white. Therefore it is one single power that asserts this; and as it asserts, so it understands and senses. It is patent that it is not possible to distinguish separate objects by faculties themselves separate. §§ 603-4
ὅτι δ' οὐδ' ἐν κεχωρισμένῳ χρόνῳ, ἐντεῦθεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, οὕτω καὶ ὅτε θάτερον λέγει ὅτι ἕτερον καὶ θάτερον (οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ὅτε, λέγω δ', οἷον νῦν λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον, οὐ μέντοι ὅτι νῦν ἕτερον, ἀλλ' οὕτω λέγει, καὶ νῦν καὶ ὅτι νῦν)· ἅμα ἄρα. ὥστε ἀχώριστον καὶ ἐν ἀχωρίστῳ χρόνῳ.	And the same holds with regard to separate points of time, as the following considerations show. For the faculty that says that good and bad differ says that they differ now, and this now is not extrinsic to the statement (I mean, as in saying now that they are different, but not that there is now a difference; whereas this [faculty] both says now and that the difference is now). Therefore they are discerned simultaneously; an undifferentiated principle distinguishes the two in an indivisible time. § 605
13. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀδύνατον ἅμα τὰς ἐναντίας κινήσεις κινεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ᾗ ἀδιαίρετον, καὶ ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ. εἰ γὰρ γλυκύ, ὡδὶ κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν 427a 14 ἢ τὴν νόησιν, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν ἐναντίως, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἑτέρως.	But it is impossible for one and the same thing, if indivisible, to be moved by contrary movements in an indivisible point of time. For if the object be sweet, it so affects the sense or the mind, but if bitter, contrariwise, and if white, in another way. § 606
ἆρ' οὖν ἅμα μὲν ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώριστον τὸ κρῖνον, τῷ εἶναι δὲ κεχωρισμένον; ἔστι δὴ [πως] ὡς τὸ διαιρετὸν τῶν διῃρημένων αἰσθάνεται, ἔστι δ' ὡς ᾗ ἀδιαίρετον· τῷ εἶναι μὲν γὰρ διαιρετόν, τόπῳ δὲ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον.	Therefore [perhaps] what discriminates is, numerically indivisible and inseparable, yet in essence distinct. For it is in one way capable of multiplicity because it perceives things divided off from one another: but in another way, it is indivisible. Thus in its essence indeed it is divisible, but it is indivisible locally and numerically. § 607
ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε; δυνάμει μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τἀναντία, τῷ δ' εἶναι οὔ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνεργεῖσθαι διαιρετόν, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅμα λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν εἶναι, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὰ εἴδη πάσχειν αὐτῶν, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ νόησις.	But this is not possible; one and the same indivisible thing can be in contrary states potentially, but not in its very essence. It can divide in its activities indeed; but it cannot be black and white at the same time; and therefore neither can it receive the forms of both—if this is how sensation and understanding occur. § 608
15. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἣν καλοῦσί τινες στιγμήν, ᾗ μία καὶ δύο, ταύτῃ <καὶ ἀδιαίρετος> καὶ διαιρετή. ᾗ μὲν οὖν ἀδιαίρετον, ἓν τὸ κρῖνόν ἐστι καὶ ἅμα, ᾗ δὲ διαιρετὸν ὑπάρχει, δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ χρῆται σημείῳ ἅμα· ᾗ μὲν οὖν δὶς χρῆται τῷ πέρατι, δύο κρίνει καὶ κεχωρισμένα, ἔστιν ὡς κεχωρισμένως· ᾗ δὲ ἑνί, ἓν καὶ ἅμα.	But it is just as some speak of a point as one or as two, and in this sense as divisible. As indivisible [this faculty] is a unity making an instantaneous act of discernment. But as divisible, it is not a unity; for it uses the same point twice. In so far as it takes a third, as two, it takes account of two objects which are distinct, as in a separate principle. Yet in so far as it is one, it acts instantaneously and by a single act.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ᾗ φαμὲν τὸ ζῷον αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.	So much then by way of defining the principle by which we call any animal sentient. §§ 609-14

TEXT
427a16–427b26
BOOK III, CHAPTER III
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Γ'

DISTINCTION OF SENSE FROM INTELLECT
ERROR, IMAGINATION AND OPINION

427a17  1. Ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο διαφοραῖς ὁρίζονται μάλιστα τὴν ψυχήν, κινήσει τε τῇ κατὰ τόπον καὶ τῷ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι εἶναι (ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ τούτοις κρίνει τι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων),	Now, if the soul is defined principally by two differences, by motion in place and by what it is to understand, discern and sense, it would seem that both to understand and to judge are a kind of sense-perception,—for in either case the soul discerns and knows reality. §§ 615-16
καὶ οἵ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν-ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς εἴρηκε "πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν" καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις "ὅθεν σφίσιν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται", τὸ δ' αὐτὸ τούτοις βούλεται καὶ τὸ Ὁμήρου "τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστίν",	The early philosophers, indeed, said that rational judgement and sensation were the same thing, as when Empedocles says: ‘The will is increased in man in the present moment’, and in another place: ‘Whence it always affords them new objects of knowledge.’ To the same purport is that line of Homer: ‘The mind of mortals is such as the father of gods and men brings into light’. §§ 617-21
2. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ νοεῖν σωματικὸν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί τε καὶ φρονεῖν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς λόγοις διωρίσαμεν	All these suppose the intellect to be something corporeal, like sensation, and that both sensing and judging are of ‘like by like’, as we explained at the beginning of this treatise. §§ 622-3
(καίτοι ἔδει ἅμα καὶ περὶ 427b τοῦ ἠπατῆσθαι αὐτοὺς λέγειν, οἰκειότερον γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἐν τούτῳ διατελεῖ ἡ ψυχή· διὸ ἀνάγκη ἤτοι, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι λέγουσι, πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου θίξιν ἀπάτην εἶναι, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνωρίζειν·	But they ought at the same time to have treated of error, which is a state more natural to animals [than truth], and in which the soul spends the greater part of its time. So it must follow, either that all that seems to be really is (as some maintain) or that error is a contact with what is unlike this being the contrary of knowing like by like. §§ 624-7
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι)	It would appear, however, that error and knowledge are the same with respect to contraries. § 628
3. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν, φανερόν· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσι μέτεστι, τοῦ δὲ ὀλίγοις τῶν ζῴων.	Now it should be evident that rational judgement and sensation are not the same. The latter is in all animals, the former in but few. § 629
ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τὸ ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς, τὸ μὲν ὀρθῶς φρόνησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα ἀληθής, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς τἀναντία τούτων-οὐδὲ τοῦτό ἐστι ταὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ ἀληθής, καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις, διανοεῖσθαι δ' ἐνδέχεται καὶ ψευδῶς, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει ᾧ μὴ καὶ λόγος·	Nor again is understanding [the same as sensation]. It may be correct or incorrect,—correct as prudence, science and sound opinion; incorrect as the opposite of these. This is not the same as sensation. For sensation is always true of its own proper objects, and is found in all animals, whereas intelligence is sometimes accompanied by error, and is found in no species that lack reason. §§ 630-1
4. φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας, αὕτη τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις.	For imagination is other than both sensation and intellect. Yet it cannot occur without sensation, and without it there is no opinion. § 632
ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις, φανερόν. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ὅταν βουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες), δοξάζειν δ' οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ἢ ἀληθεύειν.	It is evident that opinion and imagination are not identical. The latter state arises in us at will, as a picture before our eyes, like the imagery employed by those who cultivate memory training. But opinion is not within our power in this way; it must express the true or the false, of necessity. § 633
ἔτι δὲ ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν θαρραλέον· κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα.	Further, when we think that anything is arduous or fearful, we are at once emotionally affected; and likewise, if there be occasion for confidence. But in imagining, it is as though we were regarding in a picture things arduous or encouraging. §§ 634-5
5. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφοραί, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ τἀναντία τούτων, περὶ ὧν τῆς διαφορᾶς ἕτερος ἔστω λόγος.	These are, besides, the various modes of making a judgement: speculative science, opinion and prudence; with their contraries. Let the question of their differences be discussed elsewhere. § 636

TEXT
427b27–428b9
BOOK III, CHAPTER III, CONTINUED

IMAGINATION: WHAT IT IS NOT

περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἕτερον τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις, περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας οὕτω περὶ θατέρου λεκτέον.	Concerning understanding, since it is one thing and sensation another, while imagination seems to differ from both of these and from opinion also, let us settle first what imagination is, and then speak of the other matter [opinion]. § 637
428a  6. εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ' ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἴ τι κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν, <ἆρα> μία τις ἔστι τούτων δύναμις ἢ ἕξις καθ' ἃς κρίνομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα; τοιαῦται δ' εἰσὶν αἴσθησις, δόξα, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς.	If, then, imagination is that by which we say that some phantasm arises within us, it follows (if we are not speaking metaphorically) that it is one of the faculties or dispositions in virtue of which we perceive and pronounce either falsely or truly. Such faculties are sensation, opinion, knowledge, understanding. §§ 638-40.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις, δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε. αἴσθησις μὲν γὰρ ἤτοι δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὄψις καὶ ὅρασις, φαίνεται δέ τι καὶ μηδετέρου ὑπάρχοντος τούτων, οἷον τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις.	That it is not sensation is evident. For sensation is either in potency or in act: the faculty of sight, or the actual seeing. But appearances occur when neither of these is present; as when we dream. § 641
εἶτα αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ πάρεστι, φαντασία δ' οὔ.	Further, sensation is always to be found, in potency in all animals that are not defective. Not so imagination. § 642
εἰ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό, πᾶσιν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν· δοκεῖ δ' οὔ, οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ, σκώληκι δ' οὔ.	But if they were the same in act, it would happen that imagination was present in all animals. But this apparently is not so—e.g. in the ant, the bee, the worm. §§ 643-4
εἶτα αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς ἀεί, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται αἱ πλείους ψευδεῖς.	Again, sensations are always true: but many phantasms are false. § 645
ἔπειτα οὐδὲ λέγομεν, ὅταν ἐνεργῶμεν ἀκριβῶς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὅτι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν μὴ ἐναργῶς αἰσθανώμεθα πότερον ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής.	Again, we do not say, when we are functioning accurately with regard to sense-objects: ‘that seems to us a man; we say this rather when our sensation is indistinct; in which case it may be true or false. § 646
καὶ ὅπερ δὴ ἐλέγομεν πρότερον, φαίνεται καὶ μύουσιν ὁράματα.	And, as we said before, such appearances come to men in their sleep. § 647
8. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀεὶ ἀληθευουσῶν οὐδεμία ἔσται, οἷον ἐπιστήμη ἢ νοῦς· ἔστι γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ψευδής.	And it is certainly not one of the qualities which are always truthful, such as knowledge or understanding: or imagination can be true or false. § 648
λείπεται ἄρα ἰδεῖν εἰ δόξα· γίνεται γὰρ δόξα καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδής, ἀλλὰ δόξῃ μὲν ἕπεται πίστις (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ πιστεύειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, φαντασία δὲ πολλοῖς.	It remains therefore to consider whether it is opinion. For opinion can be either true or false. But belief follows immediately on opinion, for one never finds a man not believing the opinion that seems to him to be true. But there is no such thing as belief amongst animals, although there is imagination in many. § 649
[ἔτι πάσῃ μὲν δόξῃ ἀκολουθεῖ πίστις, πίστει δὲ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι, πειθοῖ δὲ λόγος· τῶν δὲ θηρίων ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν ὑπάρχει, λόγος δ' οὔ.]	Further: belief attaches to all opinion, and is due to conviction, which in turn is due to reasoning. Now imagination is found in some beasts; but reason in none. § 650
428a.24  9. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, φαντασία ἂν εἴη,	It is therefore evident, on these grounds, that neither opinion accompanying sensation, nor through sensation, nor a combination of opinion and sensation, will constitute imagination. § 651
διά τε ταῦτα καὶ διότι οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἔσται ἡ δόξα, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ ἔστιν, οὗ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις· λέγω δ', ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λευκοῦ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἡ συμπλοκὴ φαντασία ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῆς δόξης μὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, αἰσθήσεως δὲ τῆς τοῦ 428b λευκοῦ. τὸ οὖν φαίνεσθαι ἔσται τὸ δοξάζειν ὅπερ αἰσθάνεται, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.	And it is clear that opinion would have simply the same objects as sensation. I mean, that an imagining of ‘white’ would be a combination of the sensed ‘white’ and the opinion that it is ‘white’. For it would not be produced by an opinion of ‘white’ and a sensation of ‘good’. To imagine, then, would be having an opinion of the same thing as what one senses—the same absolutely speaking. § 652
10. φαίνεται δέ γε καὶ ψευδῆ, περὶ ὧν ἅμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, οἷον φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πιστεύεται δ' εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης· συμβαίνει οὖν ἤτοι ἀποβεβληκέναι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀληθῆ δόξαν, ἣν εἶχε, σωζομένου τοῦ πράγματος, μὴ ἐπιλαθόμενον μηδὲ μεταπεισθέντα, ἢ εἰ ἔτι ἔχει, ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ. ἀλλὰ ψευδὴς ἐγένετο ὅτε λάθοι μεταπεσὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα. οὔτ' ἄρα ἕν τι τούτων ἐστὶν οὔτ' ἐκ τούτων ἡ φαντασία.	False appearances, however, are possible about which at the same time one holds a true opinion: and indeed the sun seems to be a foot across, yet is believed to be greater than the inhabited world. Therefore it comes about, either that one discards the true opinion which one had formed, the thing itself remaining, and one neither forgets nor ceases to hold [that opinion]: or, if one still retains it, the same must be both true and false. But a false [opinion] is produced if there is an unnoticed transformation in the facts. Imagination therefore is neither one of these, nor constituted from these. §§ 653-4

TEXT
428b10–429a9
BOOK III, CHAPTER III, CONTINUED

IMAGINATION: WHAT IT IS

11. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἔστι κινηθέντος τουδὶ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίνεσθαι ἀλλ' αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἴσθησις ἔστιν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ.	But since it can happen that, one thing moving, another is moved by it; and imagination seems to be a movement, and to arise only with sensation, and in sentient beings, and to be of such objects as are sensed; and since a motion may be caused by actual sensation, and such necessarily resembles sensation,-then imagination will be just this movement, never originated apart from sensation, incapable of existing in non-sentient beings, and enabling its possessor to act and to be affected in many ways, and being itself both true and false. §§ 655-9
12. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τάδε· ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ἀληθής ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος. δεύτερον δὲ τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα <ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς>· καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐνδέχετα διαψεύδεσθαι· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκόν, οὐ ψεύδεται, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λευκὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι, ψεύδεται. τρίτον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἑπομένων τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει τὰ ἴδια (λέγω δ' οἷον κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος) [ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς]· περὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἤδη ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. 13. ἡ δὲ κίνησις ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως γινομένη διοίσει, ἡ ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν τριῶν αἰσθήσεων, καὶ ἡ μὲν πρώτη παρούσης τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀληθής, αἱ δ' ἕτεραι καὶ παρούσης καὶ ἀπούσης εἶεν ἂν ψευδεῖς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν πόρρω τὸ αἰσθητὸν ᾖ. εἰ οὖν μηθὲν ἄλλο ἔχει τὰ εἰρημένα ἢ 429a φαντασία (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ λεχθέν), ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη.	This happens because sense-perception is true of its own proper objects, or has the least possible amount of falsehood; but secondarily it bears on that in which these qualities inhere, and here it can be deceived. Sensation is reliable as to whether a thing is white or not, but not as to whether it is this or that. Thirdly, there are the common qualities consequent on the accidents in which the proper qualities inhere. I mean, such as movement and dimension, which belong to sense-objects—and about these deception very easily arises in sensing. The movement derived from actual sensation differs from the sensations by which these three objects are perceived. Although the first [movement] is true, the sensation itself being present, the others can easily be false, whether sensation be present or not, and especially when the sense-object is distant. if, therefore, nothing except imagination possesses what has been described, then the statement is true, namely that imagination is a movement produced by sensation actuated. §§ 660-7
14. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἴσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους εἴληφεν, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν.	Since sight is the most prominent sense, [imagination] has taken its name from light, as there is no seeing without light. § 668
15. καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσῳ ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι.	And since these images dwell within, and resemble sense experiences, animals do many things in accordance with them; some animals, as lacking reason, namely beasts; but some, i.e. men, when their intellect is veiled either by passion, or by sickness, or by sleep.
περὶ μὲν οὖν φαντασίας, τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον.	Let so much suffice, therefore, on imagination, its nature and its function. §§ 669-70

TEXT
429a10–429b4
BOOK III, CHAPTER, IV
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Δ'

THE INTELLECT IN GENERAL

429a10  1. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ, εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἴτε μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον, σκεπτέον τίν' ἔχει διαφοράν, καὶ πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν.	As to the part. Of the soul by which it knows and is wise (whether separate spatially or only in idea) we must consider how it is differentiated and, further, how the operation of understanding arises. §§ 671-4
2. εἰ δή ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. 3. ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά.	For if understanding is like sensing, it will be some kind of reception from an intelligible object, or some thing of that nature. It must then be impassible and yet receptive of a species, which it must already be potentially but not actually: And as the sense faculty stands to the sense-object, so will the intellective to the intelligible. §§ 675-6
ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ (παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀντιφράττει)· ὥστε μηδ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι φύσιν μηδεμίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατός. ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχή) οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν·	It is also necessary, since its understanding extends to everything, that, as Anaxagoras says, it be uncompounded with anything so that it may command, i.e. know. For what appeared inwardly would prevent and impede what was without. Hence it has no nature and is not one, except in being potential. What then is called the ‘intellect’ of the soul (I mean that mind by which the soul forms opinions and understands) is not, before it understands, in act of any reality. §§ 677-83
4. διὸ οὐδὲ μεμῖχθαι εὔλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποιός τις γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἢ ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμός, κἂν ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ· νῦν δ' οὐθὲν ἔστιν.	Hence, it is a reasonable inference that it is not involved in the body. Were it so, it would also have some quality either hot or cold, and it would have an organ, like the sensitive faculties; but there is in fact none such. §§ 684-5
καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν, πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλ' ἡ νοητική, οὔτε ἐντελεχείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἴδη.	And they spoke to the point who said, that the soul was the place of forms—yet not the whole soul, but the intellectual part; nor actually, but only potentially, is it any form. § 686
5. ὅτι δ' οὐχ ὁμοία ἡ ἀπάθεια τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νοητικοῦ, φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις οὐ δύναται 429b αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα αἰσθητοῦ, οἷον ψόφου ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων ψόφων, οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὀσμῶν οὔτε ὁρᾶν οὔτε ὀσμᾶσθαι· ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητόν, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός.	That the impassibility of the sensitive faculty is not like that of the intellective faculty, is evident from the organs and from sensation itself. For the sense cannot receive an impression from too violent a sense-object—e.g. a sound from very great sounds, whilst from over-powerful odours there comes no smell, nor from over-strong colour any seeing. But when the intellect understands something highly intelligible, it does not understand what is inferior to these less than before, but more so. For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate. §§ 687-99

TEXT
429b5–429b22
BOOK III, CHAPTER IV, CONTINUED

INTELLECTUAL ABSTRACTION

6. ὅταν δ' οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται ὡς ὁ ἐπιστήμων λέγεται ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν (τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν δύνηται ἐνεργεῖν δι' αὑτοῦ), ἔστι μὲν καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὑρεῖν· καὶ αὐτὸς δι' αὑτοῦ τότε δύναται νοεῖν.	But when it becomes particular objects, as in a man, of science, the intellect is said to be in act. (This comes about as soon as such a one is able to operate of himself.) It is, then, in a way still in potency, but not in the way it was before it learned or discovered. And then, too, it is able to think itself. §§ 700-704
7. ἐπεὶ δ' ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι, καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ὕδατι εἶναι (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων· ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι), τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι καὶ σάρκα ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι κρίνει· ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ σιμόν, τόδε ἐν τῷδε. τῷ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικῷ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν κρίνει, καὶ ὧν λόγος τις ἡ σάρξ· ἄλλῳ δέ, ἤτοι χωριστῷ ἢ ὡς ἡ κεκλασμένη ἔχει πρὸς αὑτὴν ὅταν ἐκταθῇ, τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι κρίνει.	Now, as dimension is one thing and the being of dimension another, and as water is one thing and the being water another, and so with many other things (but not all things, for in certain things ‘flesh’ is the same as ‘being flesh’) accordingly it discriminates either by some other [faculty] or by the same faculty differently disposed. For flesh is not separable from matter; it is like the snub of a nose, one, [thing] existing in the other. There is discerned therefore by the sensitive faculty what is hot, what is cold, and anything else of which the flesh is a certain ratio. But either by another and separate faculty, or as if it were bent back upon itself (whereas it was previously straight), does it perceive the being of flesh. §§ 705-13
8. πάλιν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφαιρέσει ὄντων τὸ εὐθὺ ὡς τὸ σιμόν· μετὰ συνεχοῦς γάρ· τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι, εἰ ἔστιν ἕτερον τὸ εὐθεῖ εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὐθύ, ἄλλο· ἔστω γὰρ δυάς. ἑτέρῳ ἄρα ἢ ἑτέρως ἔχοντι κρίνει. ὅλως ἄρα ὡς χωριστὰ τὰ πράγματα τῆς ὕλης, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν νοῦν.	Again, in the abstract sphere the straight line is as the snub-nose; for it goes with the continuum. But its essence, if being [straight] is other than a straight line, is different. Let it be, for instance, Duality. Then [the mind] discerns either by another faculty or by the same differently disposed. In general, then, as things are separable from matter, so are intellectual operations. §§ 714-19

TEXT
429b23-430a9
BOOK III, CHAPTER IV, CONTINUED

PROBLEMS ARISING
INTELLECT AS INTELLIGIBLE

429b.22  9. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἁπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηθενὶ μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί ἐστιν (ᾗ γάρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν),	One might well enquire (if the intellect is simple and impassible, having nothing in common with anything else, as Anaxagoras said) how it understands, if understanding is a receiving. For it seems that one thing acts and another is acted on, only in so far as there is a factor common to the two. § 720
10. ἔτι δ' εἰ νοητὸς καὶ αὐτός; ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις νοῦς ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἄλλο αὐτὸς νοητός, ἓν δέ τι τὸ νοητὸν εἴδει, ἢ μεμιγμένον τι ἕξει, ὃ ποιεῖ νοητὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τἆλλα.	Again, if it is itself an intelligible: then either there is intellect in other intelligible things—(unless it is intelligible by virtue of some extrinsic principle) the intelligible being specifically one; or it will have, mixed with itself, something that makes it intelligible, as other things have. §§ 721-2
11. ἢ τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι διῄρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πώς ἐστι τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν νοῇ· δυνάμει δ' οὕτως 430a ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηθὲν ἐνυπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον· ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ.	Or what about the receptivity in a general sense, already alluded to in making distinctions on this point? Before it makes an act of understanding, the intellect is its intelligible objects potentially, but not actually. It must be as with a tablet on which there is nothing actually written; and so indeed it is in the case of intellect. §§ 722-3
12. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητός ἐστιν ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν	And it is itself an intelligible like other intelligible objects. For in things separated from the material, intellect and what is understood by it are identical. Speculative knowledge is the same as what is knowable in this way. §§ 724-6
(τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ νοεῖν τὸ αἴτιον ἐπισκεπτέον)· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην δυνάμει ἕκαστον ἔστι τῶν νοητῶν. ὥστ' ἐκείνοις μὲν οὐχ ὑπάρξει νοῦς (ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης δύναμις ὁ νοῦς τῶν τοιούτων), ἐκείνῳ δὲ τὸ νοητὸν ὑπάρξει	The reason why there is not always understanding must be considered. In material things, each intelligible object exists only potentially. Hence in them is no intellect, for the mind that understands such things is an immaterial potency. The intelligible exists, however [in them]. § 727

TEXT
430a10–430a25
BOOK III, CHAPTER V
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ε'

THE AGENT INTELLECT

4310a10  1. Ἐπεὶ δ' [ὥσπερ] ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ [τι] τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἑκάστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὃ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκεῖνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα.	Now since in all nature there is a factor that is as matter in the genus, and is potentially all that is in the genus, and something else which is as cause and agent as making everything in it (thus art is related to its material): so there must be these differences in the soul. There is that intellect, which is such as being able to become everything; and there is that which acts upon everything, as a sort of state, like light; for light too, in a way, makes potential colours actual. §§ 728-31
καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνέργεια· 2. ἀεὶ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης.	And this is intellect separable, uncompounded and incapable of being acted on, a thing essentially in act. For the agent is always more excellent than the recipient, and the principle than its material. §§ 732-9
[τὸ δ' αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι· ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δ' οὐ νοεῖ.]	Knowledge in act is the same as the thing itself. But what is potential has temporal priority in the individual; yet this, is not true universally, even with respect to time. Mind does not know at one time and not know at another time. §§ 740-1
χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον	Only separated, however, is it what it really is. And this alone is immortal and perpetual. §§ 742-3
(οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός)· καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.	It does not remember, because it is impassible; the passive intellect is corruptible, and the soul understands nothing apart from this latter. § 744-5 [See NOTE.]

TEXT
430a26–431b4
BOOK III, CHAPTER VI
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ς'

INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS
SIMPLE AND COMPLEX ‘INTELLIGIBLES’

430a27  1. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές σύνθεσίς τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ ἓν ὄντων-καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἔφη "ᾗ πολλῶν μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν", ἔπειτα συντίθεσθαι τῇ φιλίᾳ, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα κεχωρισμένα συντίθεται, οἷον τὸ ἀσύμμετρον καὶ ἡ διάμετρος - 2. ἂν δὲ 430b γενομένων ἢ ἐσομένων, τὸν χρόνον προσεννοῶν [καὶ] συντίθησι. τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει ἀεί· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ λευκὸν μὴ λευκὸν <φῇ, τὸ λευκὸν καὶ> τὸ μὴ λευκὸν συνέθηκεν· ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ διαίρεσιν φάναι πάντα. ἀλλ' οὖν ἔστι γε οὐ μόνον τὸ ψεῦδος ἢ ἀληθὲς ὅτι λευκὸς Κλέων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ἦν ἢ ἔσται. τὸ δὲ ἓν ποιοῦν ἕκαστον, τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς.	Intelligence of what is not complex is in a sphere where there can be no deception. But in matters where there is false or true, there is also some composition of things understood as of many brought to a unity. As Empedocles said, ‘The heads of many grew with no neck’, [but] concord afterwards brought them to unity; so in the same way these disjunct terms are combined, like ‘the diagonal’ and ‘the incommensurate’. If the composition be of things done, or of future events, time also is taken into the reckoning, as one of the component elements. Falsity is always in a combination, as for instance when one brings together ‘white’ and a not-white object, or ‘not-white’ with a white one. All these statements can also be divisions. It is not only, then, false or true that Cleon is white, but that this fact was true or will be true. It is the intellect which imposes a unity in each case. §§ 746-5 1
430b6  3. τὸ δ' ἀδιαίρετον ἐπεὶ διχῶς, ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐθὲν κωλύει νοεῖν τὸ <διαιρετὸν ᾗ> ἀδιαίρετον, <οἷον> ὅταν νοῇ τὸ μῆκος	As the indivisible is twofold, the actual and the potential, there is nothing to prevent the intellect from apprehending an indivisible when it apprehends an extended length.
(ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ), καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἀδιαιρέτῳ· ὁμοίως γὰρ ὁ χρόνος διαιρετὸς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος τῷ μήκει. οὔκουν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ ἡμίσει τί ἐνόει ἑκατέρῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἂν μὴ διαιρεθῇ, ἀλλ' ἢ δυνάμει. χωρὶς δ' ἑκάτερον νοῶν τῶν ἡμίσεων διαιρεῖ καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἅμα, τότε δ' οἱονεὶ μήκη· εἰ δ' ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τῷ ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν.	For this length is actually undivided, and is [understood] in an undivided space of time: for time is divided or undivided like the length. It is not right to say that [the mind] understands both by halving both; There is no half, save potentially, unless an actual division has been made. However, in apprehending separately each of the halves, it divides the time also, which is then [divided] like the length. But if this is considered as a whole made up of two halves, then there is something corresponding to each in the time also. §§ 752-4
4. [τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει νοεῖ ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς.] κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δέ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ἐκεῖνα, διαιρετὰ ὃ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ᾗ <ἐκεῖνα> ἀδιαίρετα· ἔνεστι γὰρ κἀν τούτοις τι ἀδιαίρετον, ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐ χωριστόν, ὃ ποιεῖ ἕνα τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸ μῆκος. καὶ τοῦθ' ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπαντί ἐστι τῷ συνεχεῖ, καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ μήκει. 430b20α <τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει νοεῖ ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ <τῳ> τῆς ψυχῆς.>	But whatever is not indivisible quantitatively, but specifically, the mind apprehends both in an instant of time and by a single act of the soul; incidentally, however, [it apprehends division] not in so far as what the mind understands and the time in which it understands are divisible, but as they are indivisible; for there is in these something indivisible, but perhaps not separable, which gives unity to time and extension; and this holds of all that is continuous, whether by time or extension. §§ 755-6
430b20  5. ἡ δὲ στιγμὴ καὶ πᾶσα διαίρεσις, καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἀδιαίρετον, δηλοῦται ὥσπερ ἡ στέρησις. καὶ ὅμοιος ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον πῶς τὸ κακὸν γνωρίζει ἢ τὸ μέλαν· τῷ ἐναντίῳ γάρ πως γνωρίζει. 6. δεῖ δὲ δυνάμει εἶναι τὸ γνωρίζον καὶ ἐνεῖναι ἐν αὐτῷ. εἰ δέ τινι μηδὲν ἔστιν ἐναντίον [τῶν αἰτίων], αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ γινώσκει καὶ ἐνέργειά ἐστι καὶ χωριστόν.	A point, and anything separated out and thus incapable of further analysis, is shown as a privation. A similar principle holds in other matters, as in the way we know air or blackness. For in some way the knowledge is by contrariety; but the knowing faculty must be in potency, and one [of the contraries] be in it. But if there is some cause that includes no contrary, it is self-knowing, and in act, and separate. §§ 757-9
7. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φάσις τι κατά τινος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις, καὶ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς πᾶσα· ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἀληθής, καὶ οὐ τὶ κατά τινος· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ ὁρᾶν τοῦ ἰδίου ἀληθές, εἰ δ' ἄνθρωπος τὸ λευκὸν ἢ μή, οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀεί, οὕτως ἔχει ὅσα ἄνευ ὕλης.	Now every utterance, e.g. an affirmation, is of something, about some subject; and is always either true or false. Yet not all understanding is thus; understanding is true about what anything is, in the sense of the quiddity of it; not as to every fact about a subject, but, as sight is always true about its proper object, yet it is not always true about a white thing being a man or not. So it stands with whatever is immaterial. §§ 760-3
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ζ'	CHAPTER VII
431a  1. Τὸ δ' αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι. ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ· ἔστι γὰρ ἐξ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα.	Knowledge in act is identical with the thing. But what is potential is prior in time in the individual; though universally it is not prior, even in time; for all that comes into existence comes from an actual existent. § 764

TEXT
431a4–43lb19
BOOK III, CHAPTER VII, CONTINUED

SENSE AND INTELLECT COMPARED
THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT
ABSTRACTION AGAIN

—φαίνεται δὲ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ποιοῦν· οὐ γὰρ πάσχει οὐδ' ἀλλοιοῦται. διὸ ἄλλο εἶδος τοῦτο κινήσεως· ἡ γὰρ κίνησις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ἐνέργεια, ἡ δ' ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα, ἡ τοῦ τετελεσμένου.	And it seems that the sense-object [simply] brings the sense-faculty from a state of potency to one of act; for [the latter] is not affected or altered. Hence it is a specifically distinct kind of movement. For movement is the actuality of the incomplete; whereas in its plain meaning act is different, as being of the thing completed. §§ 765-6
2. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν· ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα διώκει ἢ φεύγει· καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ταὐτό, ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ φευκτικόν, οὔτ' ἀλλήλων οὔτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο.	Sensation therefore is like mere uttering and understanding; but, given a pleasant or painful object, the soul pursues or avoids with, so to say, affirmation or negation. To be ‘pleased’ or to feel pain is to act in the sensitive mean in relation to the good or the bad as such; and pursuit or avoidance are this operation in act. And the faculties of desire and avoidance are not distinct,—nor distinct from the sensitive faculty; though in essence they differ. §§ 767-9
3. τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει, ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει· διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή.	Imaginative phantasms are to the intellective soul as sense- objects. But when it affirms or denies good or evil it pursues or avoids. Hence the soul never understands apart from phantasms. §§ 770-2
—ὥσπερ δὲ ὁ ἀὴρ τὴν κόρην τοιανδὶ ἐποίησεν, αὕτη δ' ἕτερον, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ὡςαύτως, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἕν, καὶ μία <ἡ> μεσότης, τὸ δ' εἶναι αὐτῇ πλείω ... 431a.20  4. -τίνι δ' ἐπικρίνει τί διαφέρει γλυκὺ καὶ θερμόν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον, λεκτέον δὲ καὶ ὧδε.	This is comparable to the way that air affects the pupil with such and such a quality, and this in turn affects another part with the same quality: and the hearing operates likewise. The ultimate is one, a single common mean whose essence, however, is various. With what it discerns how the sweet differs from the hot has been stated already and must be reaffirmed here.
ἔστι γὰρ ἕν τι, οὕτω δὲ ὡς ὁ ὅρος, καὶ ταῦτα, ἓν τῷ ἀνάλογον καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὄντα, ἔχει <ἑκάτερον> πρὸς ἑκάτερον ὡς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα· τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἀπορεῖν πῶς τὰ μὴ ὁμογενῆ κρίνει ἢ τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν; ἔστω δὴ ὡς τὸ Α τὸ λευκὸν πρὸς τὸ Β τὸ μέλαν, τὸ Γ πρὸς τὸ Δ [ὡς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα]· ὥστε καὶ ἐναλλάξ. εἰ δὴ τὰ ΓΑ ἑνὶ εἴη ὑπάρχοντα, οὕτως ἕξει, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ΔΒ, τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν καὶ ἕν, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό-κἀκεῖνα ὁμοίως. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς 431b λόγος καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν Α τὸ γλυκὺ εἴη, τὸ δὲ Β τὸ λευκόν.	For it is a unity in the sense of a terminus; and this unity—according to analogy and number—is related to distinct objects as they to one another. (What difference indeed does it make whether the comparison be of qualities not homogeneous, or of contraries, like black and white?). Thus, as A (white) is to B (black) so is C to D; hence therefore, also, alternating the proportions. If then C and D pertain to one uniting principle, they are to each other as A and B: identical though distinct in essence; so too is the aforesaid [principle]. The same relation holds if A be the sweet and B the white. §§ 773-6
5. τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις ὥρισται αὐτῷ τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτόν, καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων ᾖ, κινεῖται· οἷον, αἰσθανόμενος τὸν φρυκτὸν ὅτι πῦρ, τῇ κοινῇ ὁρῶν κινούμενον γνωρίζει ὅτι πολέμιος· 6. ὁτὲ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν, ὥσπερ ὁρῶν, λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα· καὶ ὅταν εἴπῃ ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, ἐνταῦθα φεύγει ἢ διώκει.	The intellectual faculty therefore understands forms in phantasms. And as in these [forms] what is to be pursued by it, or avoided, is marked out for it, so too when these are in the imagination apart from sensation, is it moved. [For in stance] when one sees something fearful [e.g. fire], seeing the fire move one knows in general that someone is fighting. Sometimes, however, it is by means of the phantasms or concepts in the soul that one calculates as if seeing, and that one deliberates on future or present matters; and when one has said that the pleasing or the disagreeable is present, then one pursues or avoids. §§ 777-8
καὶ ὅλως ἓν πράξει. καὶ τὸ ἄνευ δὲ πράξεως, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ· ἀλλὰ τῷ γε ἁπλῶς διαφέρει καὶ τινί.	And generally in practical affairs, and apart from action, true and false are in the same category, whether good or evil. But they differ in being absolute and relative. §§ 779-80
7. -τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα <νοεῖ> ὥσπερ, εἴ <τις> τὸ σιμὸν ᾗ μὲν σιμὸν οὔ, κεχωρισμένως δὲ ᾗ κοῖλον [εἴ τις] ἐνόει [ἐνεργείᾳ], ἄνευ τῆς σαρκὸς ἂν ἐνόει ἐν ᾗ τὸ κοῖλον-οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικά, οὐ κεχωρισμένα <ὄντα>, ὡς κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ, ὅταν νοῇ <ᾗ> ἐκεῖνα. 8. ὅλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστιν, ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, τὰ πράγματα.	The mind understands by abstraction, so called, as one might understand a snub-nose: as snub-nose, not in separation; but as curved, then, if the understanding be actual, the mind thinks of the curve apart from the flesh in which it exists. Thus, understanding mathematical objects, the mind understands things not separated as separated. And in general, the mind in the act of understanding is the thing itself. §§ 781-4
ἆρα δ' ἐνδέχεται τῶν κεχωρισμένων τι νοεῖν ὄντα αὐτὸν μὴ κεχωρισμένον μεγέθους, ἢ οὔ, σκεπτέον ὕστερον.	Whether it is possible for a mind that is not itself separated from extension to understand anything separated or no, is to be considered later. §§ 785-6

TEXT
431b20–432a14
BOOK III, CHAPTER, VIII
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Η'

RECAPITULATION
INTELLECT. SENSE. IMAGINATION

431b20  1. Νῦν δέ, περὶ ψυχῆς τὰ λεχθέντα συγκεφαλαιώσαντες, εἴπωμεν πάλιν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα· ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητά πως, ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά· 2. πῶς δὲ τοῦτο, δεῖ ζητεῖν. τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἡ μὲν δυνάμει εἰς τὰ δυνάμει, ἡ δ' ἐντελεχείᾳ εἰς τὰ ἐντελεχείᾳ· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν δυνάμει ταὐτά ἐστι, τὸ μὲν <τὸ> ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ <τὸ> αἰσθητόν.	Now, recapitulating what we have said about the soul, let us repeat that the soul is somehow all that exists; for things are either sensible or intelligible; and knowledge is in some way the knowable, and sensation is the sense object. But how this is so we must enquire. For knowledge and sensation are divided into realities: the potential answers to things that are really in potency, the actual to things really in act. In the soul the sensitive faculty and that which can know are these [things] in potency; the latter [faculty] the understandable, the former the sensible. §§ 787-8
ἀνάγκη δ' ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ εἴδη εἶναι. αὐτὰ μὲν δὴ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ 432a εἶδος· ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἴ- σθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν.	Now they must be the things themselves or their forms. But they are certainly not the things themselves: no stone is in the soul, but only its form. Thus the soul is like a hand: the hand is the instrument that includes other instruments,, and the intellect is the form that includes other forms, and sense the form that includes sensible things. §§ 789-90
3. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα οὐθὲν ἔστι παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον, ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά τε ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα καὶ ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι οὐδὲ ξυνείη, ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν· τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης.	But since there are no real things apart from things sensible and extended (so it would seem), then in the sensible species are the intelligible, both what are predicated as a result of abstraction and whatever qualities and habits are found in sensible things. And on this account, what does not perceive by sensation acquires no knowledge or understanding at all; and when thinking occurs there must be at the same time a phantasm as its object; for phantasms are as sense objects save that they are without matter. §§ 791-2
ἔστι δ' ἡ φαντασία ἕτερον φάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως· συμπλοκὴ γὰρ νοημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος.	Imagination is other than affirmation and negation: for the true and the false are a combining of intellectual concepts. § 793
τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τί διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ ταῦτα φαντάσματα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων.	What difference have the primary concepts that they should not be phantasms? But neither are the others phantasms, though they do not exist apart from phantasms. § 794

TEXT
432a15–433a8
BOOK III, CHAPTER IX
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Θ'

THE PRINCIPLE OF MOVEMENT IN LIVING BEINGS
WHAT IT IS NOT

432a15  1. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ δύο ὥρισται δυνάμεις ἡ τῶν ζῴων, τῷ τε κριτικῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἔτι τῷ κινεῖν τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν, περὶ μὲν αἰσθήσεως καὶ νοῦ διωρίσθω τοσαῦτα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ κινοῦντος, τί ποτέ ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς, σκεπτέον, πότερον ἕν τι μόριον αὐτῆς χωριστὸν ὂν ἢ μεγέθει ἢ λόγῳ, ἢ πᾶσα ἡ ψυχή, καὶ εἰ μόριόν τι, πότερον ἴδιόν τι παρὰ τὰ εἰωθότα λέγεσθαι καὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, ἢ τούτων ἕν τι.	Since the soul is defined by two powers found in animate beings, the one, discernment, the work of intellect and sensation, the other, movement by local motion; and as a certain amount has been decided about sensation and understanding, we must now consider what can be the moving factor in the soul: whether this is a single part of it, separate either spatially or by definition, or the whole soul; and, if it is a part of the soul, whether it is a special part other than those generally acknowledged and already dealt with, or some one among these. § 795
2. ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν εὐθὺς πῶς τε δεῖ μόρια λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόσα. τρόπον γάρ τινα ἄπειρα φαίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἅ τινες λέγουσι διορίζοντες, λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, οἱ δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον·	A difficulty at once arises as to how it is possible to speak at all of parts of the soul, or to say how many they are. For in one way their number seems to be infinite and not merely, as some say, the reasoning, the irascible and the concupiscible [parts]; or as others say, the rational and irrational. §§ 796-7
κατὰ γὰρ τὰς διαφορὰς δι' ἃς ταῦτα χωρίζουσι, καὶ ἄλλα φαίνεται μόρια μείζω διάστασιν ἔχοντα τούτων, περὶ ὧν καὶ νῦν εἴρηται, τό τε θρεπτικόν, ὃ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ὃ οὔτε ὡς ἄλογον οὔτε ὡς λόγον ἔχον θείη ἄν τις ῥᾳδίως·	For according to the differences by which these are distinguished, other parts seem to show greater diversity than [we see] in those just mentioned. In particular: the vegetative part, which is in plants and all living things; and the sensitive, which one cannot easily place among either the irrational or the rational elements. §§ 798-800
3. ἔτι δὲ τὸ φανταστικόν, 432b ὃ τῷ μὲν εἶναι πάντων ἕτερον, τίνι δὲ τούτων ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, εἴ τις θήσει κεχωρισμένα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς·	Further, there is the imaginative power, which seems in essence to be quite different from any other. With which of these others it is identical, or from which it differs, are difficult problems: if one is to suppose that parts of the soul are separate. § 801
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ὃ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ δυνάμει ἕτερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι πάντων. καὶ ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τοῦτο διασπᾶν· ἔν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός· εἰ δὲ τρία ἡ ψυχή, ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσται ὄρεξις.	Furthermore, there is the appetitive faculty, which, both by its notion and as a capacity, seems to be diverse from all others; and it would be unreasonable to split this up. For will operates in the rational part, desire and anger in the irrational; and if the soul is in three parts, appetition will be in each. §§ 802-6
4. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐνέστηκε, τί τὸ κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον τὸ ζῷόν ἐστιν; τὴν μὲν γὰρ κατ' αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν κίνησιν, ἅπασιν ὑπάρχουσαν, τὸ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον δόξειεν ἂν κινεῖν, τὸ γεννητικὸν καὶ θρεπτικόν· περὶ δὲ ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ἐκπνοῆς, καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα πολλὴν ἀπορίαν.	But to come to the matter that is now before us: what is it that moves the animal by local motion? For the movement which is in all animals, by which they grow and decay, would certainly seem to be due to the principle of generation and nutrition. Of respiration and exhalation, sleep and waking, we must treat later on: these also raise many difficulties. § 807
5. ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως, τί τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ζῷον τὴν πορευτικὴν κίνησιν, σκεπτέον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ θρεπτικὴ δύναμις, δῆλον· ἀεί τε γὰρ ἕνεκά του ἡ κίνησις αὕτη, καὶ μετὰ φαντασίας καὶ ὀρέξεώς ἐστιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ μὴ ὀρεγόμενον ἢ φεῦγον κινεῖται ἀλλ' ἢ βίᾳ·	But of local motion: what, we must consider, is it that moves an animal from place to place? It is obviously not the vegetative power. For a movement of this sort is always directed towards an end, and is accompanied by phantasm or desire. For nothing moves unless, with desire or dislike, except under compulsion. § 808
ἔτι κἂν τὰ φυτὰ κινητικὰ ἦν, κἂν εἶχέ τι μόριον ὀργανικὸν πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν ταύτην.	Further: plants would also move about, and would possess some organic part suitable for such movement. § 809
6. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστι τῶν ζῴων ἃ αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχει, μόνιμα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκίνητα διὰ τέλους. εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μήτε ποιεῖ μάτην μηθὲν μήτε ἀπολείπει τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, πλὴν ἐν τοῖς πηρώμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀτελέσιν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ζῴων τέλεια καὶ οὐ πηρώματά ἐστιν (σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἐστὶ γεννητικὰ καὶ ἀκμὴν ἔχει καὶ φθίσιν) -ὥστ' εἶχεν ἂν καὶ τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη τῆς πορείας.	Likewise, it is not. the sensitive power. Many animals endowed with sensation are fixed and motionless all their lives. Yet if Nature does nothing in vain and is never deficient in what is necessary (save in imperfect or injured specimens; but such animals are complete and not defective, and there is proof of this in that they reproduce, grow and decay), it follows that they should also have the parts requisite for moving about. §§ 810-11
7. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ κινῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς οὐθὲν θεωρεῖ πρακτόν, οὐδὲ λέγει περὶ φευκτοῦ καὶ διωκτοῦ οὐθέν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἡ κίνησις ἢ φεύγοντός τι ἢ διώκοντός τί ἐστιν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὅταν θεωρῇ τι τοιοῦτον, ἤδη κελεύει φεύγειν ἢ διώκειν, οἷον πολλάκις διανοεῖται φοβερόν τι ἢ ἡδύ, οὐ κελεύει δὲ φοβεῖσθαι, ἡ δὲ καρδία 433a κινεῖται, ἂν δ' ἡδύ, ἕτερόν τι μόριον.	Nor is the reasoning faculty or what is called intellect the moving power; for the speculative function does not consider in view of action, and has nothing to say about the avoidable or the desirable. But movement is always the avoidance or the pursuit of something. Nor, even when it does consider something of this kind, does it at once command pursuit or avoidance—for instance, it often thinks about some object of terror or delight, but without enjoining fear; though the heart moves, or, in the case of something pleasant, some other part. §§ 812-15
8. ἔτι καὶ ἐπιτάττοντος τοῦ νοῦ καὶ λεγούσης τῆς διανοίας φεύγειν τι ἢ διώκειν οὐ κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει, οἷον ὁ ἀκρατής. καὶ ὅλως δὲ ὁρῶμεν ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἰατρικὴν οὐκ ἰᾶται, ὡς ἑτέρου τινὸς κυρίου ὄντος τοῦ ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ἐπιστήμης.	Further; when the mind and the understanding do command avoidance or pursuit, the soul does not move [accordingly] but acts according to desire, as in the case of the incontinent. And in general we observe that one who knows the art of medicine does not [necessarily] heal,—as though it were the function of some power other than science to act according to science. § 816
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἡ ὄρεξις ταύτης κυρία τῆς κινήσεως· οἱ γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖς ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες οὐ πράττουσιν ὧν ἔχουσι τὴν ὄρεξιν, ἀλλ' ἀκολουθοῦσι τῷ νῷ.	But not even appetition imperates such movement as this. For the self-restrained do not act according to their desires even while they are actually wanting and desiring; instead they obey reason. § 817

TEXT
433a9–433b27
BOOK III, CHAPTER X
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ι'

THE PRINCIPLES OF MOVEMENT IN LIVING BEINGS CONTINUED
WHAT THEY ARE

433a9  1. Φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα, ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα· πολλοὶ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς φαντασίαις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις οὐ νόησις οὐδὲ λογισμὸς ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία. ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις,	It seems that there are two motive-forces, mind and appetency (if one is to account imagination a sort of mind. For many follow the imagination instead of intellectual knowledge, while in other animals there is no intellect or reason at all, but only imagination). Both of these effect movement in place then,—intellect and appetency. §§ 818-19
2. νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις <δ'> ἕνεκά του πᾶσα· οὗ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ, τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως. ὥστε εὐλόγως δύο ταῦτα φαίνεται τὰ κινοῦντα, ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτική· τὸ ὀρεκτὸν γὰρ κι- νεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστι τὸ ὀρεκτόν. 3. καὶ ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινῇ, οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως. ἓν δή τι τὸ κινοῦν, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. εἰ γὰρ δύο, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, ἐκίνουν, κατὰ κοινὸν ἄν τι ἐκίνουν εἶδος· νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως (ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὄρεξις, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῆται, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται), ἡ δ' ὄρεξις κινεῖ καὶ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξίς τίς ἐστιν.	Now, the intellectual power which reasons to some purpose in view, and is practical, differs in its end from the speculative. Appetition also is always for a purpose; for that of which there is desire is the principle of the practical ‘intellect. The last end is the first principle of action. Hence, it seems reasonable to take these two as the motive forces, appetition, and the practical reason. For the object of appetite causes motion; and it is for this that reason also initiates movement, the desirable being its principle. And when imagination moves, it only does so with appetition. Therefore there is one single mover,—the object desired. For if there were two movers, intellect and appetition, they would move in virtue of some common principle. Now reason does not appear to cause movement apart from appetency; for will is an appetency. When there is movement by reason there is also movement by will. But appetition moves apart from reason, for concupiscence is a sort of appetition. §§ 820-5
4. νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός ἐστιν· ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. διὸ ἀεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· οὐ πᾶν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. πρακτὸν δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. 5. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις κινεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἡ καλουμένη 433b ὄρεξις, φανερόν.	All intellect, then, is right, but imagination and appetition may be right or not right. Hence, while the object of appetite is always what motivates, this can be either a good or only a seeming good. Not, however, every good, but the practical good. Now a practical object is that which is able to be other than it is. It is therefore evident that what moves the soul is a power of this kind called appetite. §§ 826-7
τοῖς δὲ διαιροῦσι τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐὰν κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις διαιρῶσι καὶ χωρίζωσι, πάμπολλα γίνεται, θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, νοητικόν, βουλευτικόν, ἔτι ὀρεκτικόν· ταῦτα γὰρ πλέον διαφέρει ἀλλήλων ἢ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικόν.	For those who divide the soul into parts, if they split it up by: distinguishing its powers, a great many parts result: the vegetative, the sensitive, the intellective, the deliberative, and lastly the appetitive. These differ from one another much more than do the concupiscible and irascible. § 828
6. ἐπεὶ δ' ὀρέξεις γίνονται ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι ἐναντίαι ὦσι, γίνεται δ' ἐν τοῖς χρόνου αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἤδη· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἤδη ἡδὺ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον),	Since appetites may run counter to one another, this occurs when reason and desire are contrary (and only in beings possessing a time-sense. Reason commands restraint for the sake of some future thing, but desire is for what is now present. For what appears desirable at any given instant appears desirable without qualification and good without qualification, because the future is not apparent). § 829
εἴδει μὲν ἓν ἂν εἴη τὸ κινοῦν, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ᾗ ὀρεκτικόν-πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὀρεκτόν· τοῦτο γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον, τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι-ἀριθμῷ δὲ πλείω τὰ κινοῦντα.	The motive-force will therefore be specifically one,—the desirable, or the appetite itself; and first of all the desirable, for this is what causes motion without itself being moved, simply through being understood or imagined,—but numerically there are several moving factors. § 830
7. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τρία, ἓν μὲν τὸ κινοῦν, δεύτερον δ' ᾧ κινεῖ, ἔτι τρίτον τὸ κινούμενον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον, ἔστι δὴ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὀρεκτικόν (κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον ᾗ ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν, ἡ ἐνεργείᾳ), τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῷον· ᾧ δὲ κινεῖ ὀργάνῳ ἡ ὄρεξις, ἤδη τοῦτο σωματικόν ἐστιν — διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις θεωρητέον περὶ αὐτοῦ.	Since there are these three: the mover; secondly, that by which it moves; thirdly, that which is moved; and since the mover is double (the immobile one, and the mover that is also moved) the immobile mover is, accordingly, the practical good, whereas that which both moves and is moved is the appetite. For the subject desiring is moved in so far as it desires, and its desire is an act or movement of a certain kind. What receives the motion is the animal. But that by which it moves is an organ, already something corporeal. Hence, what pertains to it must be studied along with activities common to body and soul. § 831
8. νῦν δὲ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, τὸ κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτό-οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δ' ἀρχή (διὸ τὸ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται), λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα, μεγέθει δ' ἀχώριστα. πάντα γὰρ ὤσει καὶ ἕλξει κινεῖται· διὸ δεῖ, ὥσπερ ἐν κύκλῳ, μένειν τι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἄρχεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν.	Now, in short, organic movement arises where the principle and term are the same: as in the joint of a hinge are the convex and the concave,—the latter being the end, the former the beginning. Hence one is at rest while the other moves They are distinct in idea, but inseparable spatially. All things move by pushing and pulling. Hence there must, as in a circle, be something that stays still; from which [point] movement begins. §§ 832-5

TEXT
433b27–434a21
BOOK III, CHAPTER X, CONTINUED
THE PRINCIPLES OF MOVEMENT IN LIVING BEINGS, CONTINUED

9. ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ᾗ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ αὑτοῦ κινητικόν· ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας· φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική. ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει.	Generally, then an animal is self-moving inasmuch as it is appetitive, as we have said. But there is never appetition apart from imagination; and all imagination is either rational or sensitive. It is in the latter, then, that other animals also participate. §§ 836-7
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΑ'	CHAPTER XI
433b31  1. Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτελῶν τί τὸ κινοῦν ἐστιν, 434a οἷς ἁφῇ μόνον ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις, πότερον ἐνδέχεται φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν τούτοις, ἢ οὔ, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. φαίνεται γὰρ λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐνοῦσα, εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνάγκη. φαντασία δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐνείη; ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ κινεῖται ἀορίστως, καὶ ταῦτ' ἔνεστι μέν, ἀορίστως δ' ἔνεστιν.	Now we must consider the motive force in those imperfect animals in which there exists no sense but touch; and whether or no they have imagination and desire. Pain and pleasure do seem to be present in them; and if these, then, necessarily, desire as well. But how can there be imagination in them? It may be that as they are moved indeterminately, so these qualities are present indeed in them, but only indeterminately. §§ 838-9
2. ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπάρ- χει, ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον· καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει· ὥστε δύναται ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν). καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, αὕτη δὲ κινεῖ· 3. διὸ τὸ βουλευτικὸν οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὄρεξις·	Sensitive imagination, then, is found in other animals, as we have said; but the deliberative only in rational beings. For [to deliberate] whether to do this or that is the work of reason, and there must be a single standard to measure by; for the agent follows the more excellent. Hence [reason] is able to make one phantasm out of several. And this is why the [irrational animals] are thought not to have opinion; they lack that which derives from reasoning; which, indeed, involves opinion. For this reason [the lower] appetite is without deliberation. §§ 840-2,
νικᾷ δ' ἐνίοτε καὶ κινεῖ ὁτὲ μὲν αὕτη ἐκείνην, ὁτὲ δ' ἐκείνη ταύτην, ὥσπερ σφαῖρα <σφαῖραν>, ἡ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρεξιν, ὅταν ἀκρασία γένηται· φύσει δὲ ἀεὶ ἡ ἄνω ἀρχικωτέρα καὶ κινεῖ· ὥστε τρεῖς φορὰς ἤδη κινεῖσθαι.	Appetite sometimes overcomes and moves deliberation. But sometimes the latter moves the former, like a heavenly sphere; one appetition governing another, as in continence. Naturally the higher principle always holds priority, and originates motion, so that movement occurs on three courses. §§ 843-4
4. τὸ δ' ἐπιστημονικὸν οὐ κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ μένει. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον (ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν, ἡ δὲ ὅτι τόδε τοιόνδε, κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε), ἢ δὴ αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου, ἢ ἄμφω, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἠρεμοῦσα μᾶλλον, ἡ δ' οὔ.	The cognitive faculty does not move, but remains at rest. But since one judgement or conception is universal, while the other is particular, it is the former that dictates that such and such a man should perform such and such an action; whilst the latter says that this is such an action and I am such and, such a man. It is this opinion, not the universal, that causes movement; or both together; but the one as being more at rest, the other less so. §§ 845-6

TEXT
434a23–435a10
BOOK III, CHAPTER XII
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΒ'

SENSITIVITY AND LIFE
TOUCH IS THE FUNDAMENTAL SENSE

434a21  1. Τὴν μὲν οὖν θρεπτικὴν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἔχειν ὅτι περ ἂν ζῇ καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχῃ, ἀπὸ γενέσεως καὶ μέχρι φθορᾶς· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ γενόμενον αὔξησιν ἔχειν καὶ ἀκμὴν καὶ φθίσιν, ταῦτα δ' ἄνευ τροφῆς ἀδύνατον· ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐνεῖναι τὴν θρεπτικὴν δύναμιν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς φυομένοις καὶ φθίνουσιν·	All living things have the vegetative soul; and this from generation to corruption. For everything generated must grow, maintain itself and then decay; and this is impossible without nutriment. Of necessity, then, a vegetative power is found in all that is born and dies. §§ 847-8
2. αἴσθησιν δ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ζῶσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ὅσων τὸ σῶμα ἁπλοῦν ἐνδέχεται αὐτὴν ἔχειν, [οὔτε ἄνευ ταύτης οἷόν τε οὐθὲν εἶναι ζῷον] οὔτε ὅσα μὴ δεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης.	Sensation, however, is not necessarily found in everything that lives. Beings whose bodies are uncompounded even lack touch, without which no animal can exist at all; nor can those be animals which are unable to receive forms without matter. §§ 849-50
3. τὸ δὲ ζῷον ἀναγκαῖον αἴσθησιν ἔχειν, 434a.30α <οὐδὲ ἄνευ ταύτης οἷόν τε οὐθὲν εἶναι ζῷον,> εἰ μηθὲν μάτην ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις. ἕνεκά του γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχει τὰ φύσει, ἢ συμπτώματα ἔσται τῶν ἕνεκά του. εἰ οὖν πᾶν σῶμα πορευτικόν, μὴ ἔχον αἴσθησιν, φθείροιτο ἂν καὶ  434b εἰς τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἔλθοι, ὅ ἐστι φύσεως ἔργον (πῶς γὰρ θρέψεται; τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μονίμοις ὑπάρχει τοῦτο ὅθεν πεφύκασιν,	But if Nature does nothing in vain, animals must have sensation. For all things in Nature exist for a purpose, or accompany that which exists for a purpose. Every body that is able to move about, if it lacked sensation, would soon be destroyed, and would never attain its end, which is the purpose of Nature. For how would it be nourished? Immobile animals indeed find nourishment in that out of which they are produced. §§ 851-3
4. οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ σῶμα ἔχειν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν κριτικόν, αἴσθησιν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, μὴ μόνιμον ὄν, γενητὸν δέ-ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγένητον· διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἕξει; ἢ γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ βέλτιον ἢ τῷ σώματι, νῦν δ' οὐδέτερον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ οὐ μᾶλλον νοήσει, τῷ δ' οὐθὲν ἔσται μᾶλλον δι' ἐκεῖνο) -οὐθὲν ἄρα ἔχει ψυχὴν σῶμα μὴ μόνιμον <ὂν> ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως.	But a body, generated, not stationary, cannot possess a soul and intellectual discernment and yet not have sensation, (nor indeed can an ungenerated one). For why should it not have it? For the good [presumably] of either the soul or the body. But neither, surely. The soul would not thin better nor the body benefit on that account. No animal then, whose body is mobile, lacks sensation. §§ 965-7
5. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε αἴσθησιν ἔχει, ἀνάγκη τὸ σῶμα εἶναι ἢ ἁπλοῦν ἢ μικτόν. οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ ἁπλοῦν· ἁφὴν γὰρ οὐχ ἕξει, ἔστι δὲ ἀνάγκη ταύτην ἔχειν. τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.	But having sensation, a body must needs be either simple or compound. It cannot, however, be simple; for then it would lack touch, and it must have this sense. § 858
6. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον σῶμα ἔμψυχόν ἐστι, σῶμα δὲ ἅπαν ἁπτόν, [ἁπτὸν δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἁφῇ,] ἀνάγκη [καὶ] τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα ἁπτικὸν εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει σώζεσθαι τὸ ζῷον. αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις δι' ἑτέρων αἰσθάνονται, οἷον ὄσφρησις ὄψις ἀκοή· ἁπτόμενον δέ, εἰ μὴ ἕξει αἴσθησιν, οὐ δυνήσεται τὰ μὲν φεύγειν τὰ δὲ λαβεῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀδύνατον ἔσται σώζεσθαι τὸ ζῷον.	Which is evident from these considerations. Since an animal is an animate body, and every body is tangible, and the tangible is what is perceptible by touch, the animal’s body must be able to touch if it is to survive. For the other senses perceive through an extraneous medium; e.g. smell, sight, hearing. But if the animal that comes into contact [with other things] had no sense of touch it could not avoid certain things and seize upon others; and thus it could not preserve its existence. §§ 859-60
7. διὸ καὶ ἡ γεῦσίς ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἁφή τις· τροφῆς γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ τὸ σῶμα ἁπτόν. ψόφος δὲ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ὀσμὴ οὐ τρέφει, οὐδὲ ποιεῖ οὔτ' αὔξησιν οὔτε φθίσιν· ὥστε καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν ἀνάγκη ἁφὴν εἶναί τινα, διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ θρεπτικοῦ αἴσθησιν εἶναι· αὗται μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖαι τῷ ζῴῳ, καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ ἁφῆς εἶναι ζῷον,	This is why taste is a kind of touch; for food is a tangible body. But sound and colour and smell do not nourish, or contribute to growth or, decay. Taste must then be a kind of touch, being a sense of the tangible and the nutritive. These senses then are necessary to the animal. Hence it is plain that no animal can exist without touch. § 86-1
8. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι τοῦ τε εὖ ἕνεκα καὶ γένει ζῴων ἤδη οὐ τῷ τυχόντι· ἀλλὰ τισίν, οἷον τῷ πορευτικῷ, ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν· εἰ γὰρ μέλλει σώζεσθαι, οὐ μόνον δεῖ ἁπτόμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄποθεν. τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη, εἰ διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ αἰσθητικὸν εἴη τῷ ἐκεῖνο μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ πάσχειν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, αὐτὸ δ' ὑπ' ἐκείνου.	The others exist for its greater good; and then not in every kind of animal, but in some, namely in those that need to move from place to place. For if [such] an animal is to survive it must perceive not only what is in contact with it, but also what is afar; and this will happen, if it perceives through a medium, this being affected and moved by the sense object, and the animal itself by the medium. § 862
9. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον μέχρι του μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ, καὶ τὸ ὦσαν ἕτερον ποιεῖ ὥστε ὠθεῖν, καὶ ἔστι διὰ μέσου ἡ κίνησις, καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κινοῦν ὠθεῖ οὐκ ὠθούμενον, τὸ δ' ἔσχατον μόνον ὠθεῖται οὐκ ὦσαν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἄμφω, 435a πολλὰ δὲ τὰ μέσα, οὕτω καὶ ἐπ' ἀλλοιώσεως, πλὴν ὅτι μένοντος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ ἀλλοιοῖ, οἷον εἰ εἰς κηρὸν βάψειέ τις, μέχρι τούτου ἐκινήθη, ἕως ἔβαψεν· λίθος δὲ οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὕδωρ μέχρι πόρρω· ὁ δ' ἀὴρ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον κινεῖται καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει, ἐὰν μένῃ καὶ εἷς ᾖ. διὸ καὶ περὶ ἀνακλάσεως βέλτιον ἢ τὴν ὄψιν ἐξιοῦσαν ἀνακλᾶσθαι τὸν ἀέρα πάσχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ σχήματος καὶ χρώματος, μέχρι περ οὗ ἂν ᾖ εἷς. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ λείου ἐστὶν εἷς· διὸ πάλιν οὗτος τὴν ὄψιν κινεῖ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸ ἐν τῷ κηρῷ σημεῖον διεδίδοτο μέχρι τοῦ πέρατος.	It is [as when] a thing is moving locally: it operates till it affects a change and, impelling something else, causes another impulsion, so that movement traverses a medium. The first mover causes motion and is unmoved: the last is moved, moving nothing else; but the intermediary is both; or the many intermediaries. So it is with the alteration in question, except that what is changed remains in the same place. If one clips an object into wax, the wax moves to the extent that the object enters it; whereas a stone is not moved at all; but water a long way, and air most of all, giving and receiving motion, so long as it remains a unity. Hence, as regards reflection, it is better to say that the air is affected by shape and colour, so long as it retains unity, than to say that the sight proceeds out and is reflected back. On a smooth surface [air] has unity, and so in turn, moves the sight; as if a seal were to sink into and right through wax. §§ 863-4

TEXT
435a11-435b25
BOOK III, CHAPTER XIII
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΓ'

TOUCH, THE FUNDAMENTAL SENSE

435a11 1. Ὅτι δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε ἁπλοῦν εἶναι τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα, φανερόν, λέγω δ' οἷον πύρινον ἢ ἀέρινον. ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ ἁφῆς οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἔχειν (τὸ γὰρ σῶμα ἁπτικὸν τὸ ἔμψυχον πᾶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται)· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἔξω γῆς αἰσθητήρια μὲν ἂν γένοιτο, πάντα δὲ τῷ δι' ἑτέρου αἰσθάνεσθαι ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ διὰ τῶν μετα- ξύ, ἡ δ' ἁφὴ τῷ αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαί ἐστιν, διὸ καὶ τοὔνομα τοῦτο ἔχει. καίτοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητήρια ἁφῇ αἰσθάνεται, ἀλλὰ δι' ἑτέρου· αὕτη δὲ δοκεῖ μόνη δι' αὑτῆς. ὥστε τῶν μὲν τοιούτων στοιχείων οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη σῶμα τοῦ ζῴου. οὐδὲ δὴ γήϊνον. πάντων γὰρ ἡ ἁφὴ τῶν ἁπτῶν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ μεσότης, καὶ δεκτικὸν τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐ μόνον ὅσαι διαφοραὶ γῆς εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπτῶν ἁπάντων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ὀστοῖς καὶ ταῖς θριξὶ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μορίοις οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅτι γῆς ἐστιν, 435b καὶ τὰ φυτὰ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδεμίαν ἔχει αἴσθησιν, ὅτι γῆς ἐστιν· ἄνευ δὲ ἁφῆς οὐδεμίαν οἷόν τε ἄλλην ὑπάρχειν, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε γῆς οὔτε ἄλλου τῶν στοιχείων οὐδενός.	It is clearly impossible for the body of an animal to be a simple element: to be, I mean, fire or air. For no other sense can exist without touch; since every animate body, as we have seen, is tactual. The sense organs, indeed, can be constituted of other elements (except earth) for they effect sensation by perceiving through some other thing, i.e. through a medium. But touch occurs by immediate contact with things; that is why it has this name. Other senses no doubt also perceive by contact, but through something else; touch alone, it would seem, through itself. Hence the body of an animal will not be of such elements as these; nor yet be earthy. For touch is a kind of mean between all tangible objects, and is receptive, not only of all the differences that characterise earth, but also heat and cold and all other tangible qualities. This is why we do not feel with the bones or hair or other such parts,—because they are earthy. Plants, too, have no sensation, for the same reason,—they are of earth; and without touch there can be no other sense; and this sense does not consist either of earth or of any other [single] element. §§ 865-8
2. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μόνης ταύτης στερισκόμενα τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὰ ζῷα ἀποθνήσκειν· οὔτε γὰρ ταύτην ἔχειν οἷόν τε μὴ ζῷον ὄν, οὔτε ζῷον ὂν ἄλλην ἔχειν ἀνάγκη πλὴν ταύτην. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς οὐ διαφθείρει τὸ ζῷον, οἷον χρῶμα καὶ ψόφος καὶ ὀσμή, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὰ αἰσθητήρια (ἂν μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἂν ἅμα τῷ ψόφῳ ὦσις γένηται καὶ πληγή), καὶ ὑπὸ ὁραμάτων καὶ ὀσμῆς ἕτερα κινεῖται, ἃ τῇ ἁφῇ φθείρει (καὶ ὁ χυμὸς δὲ ᾗ ἅμα συμβαίνει ἁπτικὸν εἶναι, ταύτῃ φθείρει), 3. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἁπτῶν ὑπερβολή, οἷον θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ σκληρῶν, ἀναιρεῖ τὸ ζῷον· παντὸς μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ αἰσθητοῦ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ αἰσθητήριον, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἁπτὸν τὴν ἁφήν, ταύτῃ δὲ ὥρισται τὸ ζῷον· ἄνευ γὰρ ἁφῆς δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον εἶναι ζῷον. διὸ ἡ τῶν ἁπτῶν ὑπερβολὴ οὐ μόνον τὸ αἰσθητήριον φθείρει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ζῷον, ὅτι ἀνάγκη μόνην ἔχειν ταύτην.	It is then evident that animals must perish if they are deprived of this sense alone. For it is neither possible for what is not an animal to possess this, nor, to be an animal, is any other necessary. And this again is why no other sense-object (e.g. colour, smell and sound) will destroy the animal by excessive intensity, but only the [corresponding] faculty of sense;—except incidentally, as when, for example, together with a sound, a thrust and a blow take place; or when other [things] are set in motion, by objects seen or smelled, which destroy by contact; and flavour too, in so far as it happens also to be tangible, may destroy thus. But an excess of tangible qualities, of heat or cold or hardness, destroys the animal itself. For as every excess in a sense-object is destructive of the sense, so may the tangible destroy touch; and by touch life itself is defined. For it has been shown that without touch no, animal can exist. Hence an excess in the tangible destroys not the sense only, but the whole animal; for only this one sense is necessary to animals. §§ 869-71
τὰς δ' ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ἔχει τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὐ τοῦ εἶναι ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ εὖ, οἷον ὄψιν, ἐπεὶ ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι, ὅπως ὁρᾷ, ὅλως δ' ἐπεὶ ἐν διαφανεῖ, γεῦσιν δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, ἵνα αἰσθάνηται τὸ ἐν τροφῇ καὶ ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ κινῆται, ἀκοὴν δὲ ὅπως σημαίνηταί τι αὐτῷ [γλῶτταν δὲ ὅπως σημαίνῃ τι ἑτέρῳ].	As we have said, the animal has other senses, not for being, but for well-being. Thus [it has] sight so that [living] in, air, water, or generally in what is transparent, it may see. Taste it has on account of the pleasant or unpleasant, that it may perceive what it desires in food, and, be moved towards it. Hearing it has that it may receive signs, and a tongue to signify something to another. §§ 872-4