Notes
“World” is here taken in a negative sense, as an enemy of God, cf. note 41 above.
Return 1De Natura Boni, Ch. 3 (P.L. 42, 553). Translated by A. Newman in N.P.N.F. Vol. 4, 1887, p. 352. As St. Thomas interprets these in S.T. I, 5, 5, measure (“modus”) refers to the prerequisites of a being, for instance, sub-atomic particles are prerequisites for the chemical elements. Form (“species”) is what the being is, its immanent intelligibility, cf. note 37 above. Order (“ordo”) refers to an inclination in a being to achieve a goal, produce an act, or the like, e.g., the unstable chemical elements possess an “ordo” toward forming compounds. The balanced harmony (“tranquillitas”) which results from the proper interplay of these three is by no means equivalent to static immobility; it often is very dynamic. These three aspects of a being admit of a wide variety of applications on many levels. On the plane of human existence and its relation to God, sin destroys the proper unfolding of man’s “ordo” toward God and so disrupts the harmony in the measure, form and order of grace (S.T. I-I, 85, 4). Contrariwise, God’s redeeming love for man and man’s response in love effects a true harmony or peace (ibid., II-II, 29, 1-4). St. Thomas remarks that this balanced harmony “is achieved when each possesses what is proper to himself” because diversity is an essential element in the building up of the Body of Christ (1 Cor. 12:1 ff.; and Ch. 4, Lect. 4 below). St. Augustine’s immediate application of measure, form, and order, are to the good, but Aquinas uses them in a definition of peace in view of Augustine’s reflections in The City of God, XIX, 13 (cf. S.T. II-II, 29, 1 ad 1).
Return 1“Constituting what neither are separately” translates “tertium constituentium.” The body and soul constitute what neither of them are in isolation, a man, cf. S.T. I, 75. The human soul is the central intelligibility unifying man’s physical, chemical, biological, psychological and intellectual multiplicity. For St. Thomas’ teaching in summary form, cf. Longergan, “Me Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,” T.S. Sept. 1946, pp. 366-68. For a contemporary formulation, cf. his Insight, pp. 431-37, 514-20.
Return 1The Piana-Cai has either a variant or a misprint: reading as “spem speratam” instead of the Parma’s “rem speratam.”
Return 1“This is the Catholic faith...” are among the opening and closing words of the Athanasian Creed. It was composed in the fourth or fifth century and ascribed to St. Athanasius because of its forthright and exact Trinitarian and Christological doctrine. On “habit of faith” cf. notes 7, 50 and 51 above.
Return 1Cf. note 10 above.
Return 1Among the “auctoritates” which theology appeals to in support of its positions, Holy Scripture naturally holds the primary place. Other authorities are Conciliar or Papal decisions and the Church Fathers, cf. S.T. 1, 1, 8; S.C.G. I, 9; on Patristic authority in St. Thomas, cf. G. Greenen, “Saint Thomas et les pères” D.T.C. 15-A, col. 738-61. For a brief treatment of the use of authorities in the Middle Ages, cf. Chenu, Introduction à l’étude de saint Thomas d’Aquin, pp. 109-25.
Return 1In Eph. 4:8 St. Paul quotes from the Septuagint version of Ps.67:19. The Hebrew Massoretic text and the Vulgate read, “thou hast received gifts among men.”
Return 1The doctrine of the Hypostatic Union, as formulated in the Councils of Chalcedon (451 A.D.) and II Constantinople (553), teaches that the Divine Nature and Human Nature of Christ are united in the unity of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. “Nature” signifies what something is, whereas “person” signifies he who has such and such a nature. Thus the union of two natures could not occur in one or the other of the natures themselves since they are mutually exclusive, humanity is not divinity and vice versa. But the two natures can be united in the Person who thereby possesses two natures, cf. S.T. III, 2, 2-3. In the next two sentences some editions of the Parma omit the words, “He who ascends is the Son of Man, raising human nature” and simply have “For he who descended, as was said, is the Son of God taking on human nature to the preeminence of immortal life.”
Return 1Cf. note 33 above. The reference here is to Chapters 5 and 6 of the Ecclesiastica Hierarchia (P.G. 3, 505 ff.). By “state of perfection” St. Thomas is not referring to the technically theological sense of “status perfectionis,” by which the Episcopacy and religious institutes are designated. He is rather referring to the more general sense in which all Christians who strive to perfect their love of God and men are in a state or condition of perfection, cf. S.T. II-II, 184, 1-3. The role of religious institutes and the Episcopacy is to give certain types of external expression to this inner search for, and attainment of, the perfection of love, ibid., 184, 4 ff. For men need to express their love and worship externally, ibid., 27, 6 ad 3; 30, 4 ad 1; 81, 7; 84, 2.
Return 1The Vulgate text St. Thomas is quoting reads: “Consummatio abbreviata inundabit justitiam. Consummationem enim, et abbreviationem Dominus Deus exercituum faciet.” In his commentary on Isaias 10:22-23 St. Thomas takes the literal meaning of “consummatio abbreviata” as referring to the destruction of Jerusalem and Judaea by Sennacherib. Modern biblical scholars tend to agree; the new Confraternity Edition translates the difficult Hebrew passage: “Their destruction is decreed, as overwhelming justice demands. Yes, the destruction he has decreed, the Lord, the God of hosts, will carry out within the whole land.” Aquinas also notes there (Comm. In Is. 10:22) that in Rom. 9:27-29 this same passage is used in reference to those who will be saved, the remnant; it could be in this sense that he is quoting it here. Aquinas also notes that in the Septuagint it reads “an abbreviated word” (logon suntelon) instead of “a consumption abridged.” Following Patristic exegesis, be sees this as either a reference to the Gospel as a summation of perfection (cf. Mt. 22:40), or to the Word Incarnate who, in himself, sums up all that had been revealed through many prophets, cf. H. de Lubac, S.J., Exégèse médiévale, (Paris: Aubier, 1961) 2-18, pp. 181-97). Thus, here he could be saying that the evangelical character of the Church’s ministry will share in the Gospel’s perfecting power. Most likely, in quoting this passage of Isaias Aqinas had all of these nuances in mind, for the “perfecting of the saints” translates “ad consummationem sanctorum” so that the occurrence of “consummatio” in Is. 10:22 suggested itself. On this use of parallel texts and verbal association in Aquinas’ exegesis, cf. Spicq, op. cit., 703, 721.
Return 1The “speaking with tongues” St. Paul is here referring to should not be confused with the Pentecostal “gift of tongues” (Ac. 2:1-13) which possibly meant that the first disciples spoke, or were understood in, other languages, cf. S.T. II-II, 176, 1. (This has been called into question by no less an authority than S. Lyonnet, S.J., who holds that the Pentecostal “gift of tongues” was also a question of prayer and not of preaching, cf. Verbum Domini, Vol. 24 (1944), pp. 65-7,5). The phenomenon of “glossolalia” mentioned here and in 1 Cor. 14 was the utterance of unintelligible sounds or incoherent words during an ecstatic state. Hence Paul’s insistence that this charisma should not dominate the liturgical assembly unless someone was present who had the gift of interpreting the sounds so that those present could receive some instruction.
Return 1In Scripture the eagle is a symbol of the saints or heavenly beings (cf. Ez. 1:10; 10:14; Apoc. 4:7) whose life has been renewed (cf. Is. 40:31; Ps. 103:5).
Return 1In Gal. 4:1 St. Paul says that all men under the Old Covenant were like a young boy who is an heir (and they were heirs to the New Covenant) and yet is under tutors (the Old Law) until Christ comes. Since the “body of the Church is made up of men who existed from the beginning of the world until its end” (S.T. III, 8, 3c) it also underwent this gradual development. And it grows now as new members are, brought into it.
Return 1St. Thomas is here referring to a supposed incident in the death of Arius as related by St. Athanasius in his De Morte Arii, (P.G. 25 col. 688). Like the death of Judas recorded in Acts 1:18, Arius was suddenly stricken down, either from a fall or a swelling (the Greek Athanasius uses is exactly that of Acts 1:18), and his abdomen burst asunder—“crepuit medius.” Historians see no reason to deny that Arius died suddenly, cf. G. Bardy in Histoire de l’Eglise, t. 3 (Bloud et Gay, 1947) p. 113; but the details are certainly tendentious. Aquinas’ harshness with Arius is probably due to the storm of controversy and political intrigue involved in the spread of his heretical teaching. He was condemned at Alexandria in 321 and at Nicea in 325 for denying the Divinity of the Word. Without a distinction between Nature and Person, he could not grasp how the Son is as fully God is the Father. Hence he held that the Word is God’s first and most perfect creature (ktima, poiema), created from nothing. Nicea countered this with its belief that the Word is consubstantial (homoousion) with the Father. Despite the condemnation, Arius’ doctrine and influence spread widely due mostly to the active support of the emperors Constantius II and Valens, as well as his subtle use of the Greek terminology involved to bypass the orthodox formulations.
Return 1On charity as the form of all the supernatural virtues, cf. note 12 above. For the “truth” of virtue in which a man acts in conformity with his natural and supernatural existence, cf. S.T. I, 16, 4 ad 3.
Return 1The words “binding force which flows out from each member according to the degree of grace given him, and also through the actual” are an interpolation made by Remigius Nannini, O.P., in his edition of 1562. He claimed that “compositionem ab unoquoque membro egredientem, secundum mensurain gratiae sibi datae, et actualem” were to be found in the margins of one of the oldest manuscripts. He put the words in the margin of his own edition but, by the time of the Veneta edition of 1593, they were included in the text itself. No trace of the manuscript he referred to has been located and the authenticity of the interpolation is questioned, cf. the preface of R. Cai, O.P., in his re-edition of the Piana Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura (Rome: Marietti, 1953) pp. x-xiv.
Return 1The Glossator is Peter Lombard in his Collectanea, P.L. 192, col. 203.
Return 1The words “Regarding this he does two things: First, he gives them precepts by which they can remain in ecclesial unity”are another interpolation by Remigius Nannini; they merely repeat what was said in the previous sentence.
Return 1The Vulgate translated the Greek noos of Eph. 4:17 as “sensus,” which in the Douay-Rheims is rendered “mind.” The commentary is not clear as to whether the “reason” St. Thomas is here referring to is the practical reason which is the subjectum of prudence (cf. S.T. II-II, 47, 1-3) or the “ratio particularis,” or internal sense of appraisal, which is also called the “vis cogitativa” or “vis apprehensiva” in its more directly cognitative aspects. That he does mean by “reason” this “ratio particularis” is favored by his later identification of “sensus” with “vis apprehensiva.” This power is generically of the same type as that found in lower animals (S.T. I, 78, 4 ad 5), but in man it is brought to greater perfection because of the influence his intellectual reason exerts over its activities (ibid., 1, 78, 4c). Whereas lower animals must rely on instinct in their appraisal of what is good (liked) or bad (disliked), man’s “particular reason”—which might be rendered as “the faculty of direct appraisal”—is able to be checked by his intellect (ibid., I, 81, 3c), and so enjoy a greater freedom (ibid., I, 83, 1c). For example, man can freely choose to undergo medicinal treatment that is painful. The terms “reason” and “judgment” in reference to this faculty of direct appraisal must not be taken in a strictly intellectual sense. As Aquinas points out here, it can be upright or perverted depending on whether or not man’s intellectual powers guide it according to the proper moral standards. These latter are termed “synderesis” which is the habit of primary or general moral principles applicable to the sphere of human activity (ibid., 1, 79, 12) as the immanent standards in men which give their consciences a normative force (ibid., 79, 13); e.g., the most basic one of doing good and avoiding evil. By “the divine law or God” Aquinas is referring to the Eternal Law which God himself is (ibid., I-II, 91, 1 ad 3; 93,1-2) and from whom all other norms of action are derived (ibid., 93, 3). For a further discussion of the “ratio particularis” cf. R. E. Brennan, O.P., Thomistic Psychology (New York: Macmillan, 1949), pp. 133-35, 144-46, 201-02; compare with the contemporary treatment of these psychological phenomena by M. B. Arnold, Emotion and Personality (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1960), Vol. 1, pp. 61-66, 171-77, 189-91, 231-33, and Vol. 2, pp. 193-202.
Return 1The Greek has the infinitive apothesthai, to put off; this is followed by most Of the Vulgate codices with “deponere.” But a sixth or seventh century Vulgate codex, and several Patristic citations, have the imperative form “deponite.” This latter was also adopted by the Vulgate edition Of Sixtus V, St. Thomas’ parenthetical remark above about “if” sometimes meaning “because” is correct. However, it is not the correct interpretation here since the Greek has ei ge, “if indeed.”
Return 1To deny Providence is also to deny predestination and reprobation (cf. S.T. I, 23, 1) along with the moral guilt which sin produces (ibid., I-II, 87, 1c).
Return 1“Imaginative spirit, translates “spiritus phantasticus” referring to the phantasm or imagination (cf. S.T. I, 78, 4) which embraces the “ratio particularis” mentioned in note 124 above. The word “spirit” is used in connection with these interior psychological functions, even when they are also possessed by animals lower than man, cf. S.C.G. IV, 2-3. Mind here is definitely a rationally spiritual faculty and not that discussed in lecture 6 above (cf. note 124) since here it translates mens whereas there the word was sensus—even though the same Greek word is used by St. Paul, noos.
Return 1“Passiones” is here translated by “emotions” (cf. Brennan, op. cit., pp. 151 ff.). The concupiscible emotions might be represented as comparatively mild reactions to either favorable stimuli—so love, desire, joy—or unfavorable stimuli—hatred, aversion, sorrow. in these terms, the irascible emotions would be emergency reactions either to favorable stimuli—such as hope when the object can be attained, and despair when it cannot—or unfavorable stimuli—such as courage, fear or rage. Cf. S.T. I, 81, 2; I-II, 23, 1-2; 25, 1-4; also R. E. Brennan, O.P., General Psychology (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 266-71; and M. B. Arnold, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 193-99.
Return 1This does not mean that the poor who cannot find jobs are not permitted to relieve their own real necessities by taking what is superfluous to others. As St. Thomas explains in S.T. II-II, 66, 7c, this is not theft since by the divine and natural laws temporal goods are meant to supply men with what is necessary for their human existence.
Return 1The “necessity of precept” refers to Gen. 3:19 and the admonitions of St. Paul quoted previously.
Return 1God cannot receive or “suffer” anything (“pati” in the sense of reception from which the “passiones” or emotions get their name) since he is the fullness of all Being, cf. S.T. I, 2, 3; 3, 1. Anger is metaphorically attributed to God because of an analogy with the results of human anger. When men are mad they punish, so when God punishes he is said to be angered, ibid., 1, 3, 2 ad 2; 59, 4 ad 1; I-II, 47, 1 ad 1. Yet, even in the punishment of hell God’s mercy is evident, ibid., I, 21, 4 ad 1; Suppl. 99, 3 ad 4.
Return 1Men are angered because of some imaginary or real wrong done to themselves (S.T. I-II, 47, 1); St. Thomas believes that these injuries can be reduced to a feeling, on the part of the angered man, that those who injure him are taking his importance too lightly—“parvipensio” (ibid., 47, 2).
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