| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Virtute itaque et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtute in communi, hic determinat de quibusdam principiis actuum virtutis. Dixerat enim, definiens virtutem, quod virtus est habitus electivus, eo scilicet quod virtus per electionem operatur: et ideo nunc consequenter de electione determinat, et de voluntario et voluntate. Horum trium voluntarium commune est. Nam voluntarium dicitur, omne quod sponte fit. Electio autem est eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sed voluntas respicit ipsum finem. Dividitur ergo pars ista in partes duas. In prima determinat de tribus praedictis principiis virtuosorum actuum. In secunda parte comparat huiusmodi principia ad actus virtutum, ibi, existente utique voluntabili et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo determinat de voluntario et involuntario. Secundo determinat de electione, ibi, determinatis autem et cetera. Tertio determinat de voluntate, ibi: voluntas autem quoniam quidem finis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod ad praesentem doctrinam pertinet considerare de voluntario et involuntario; secundo determinat de eis, ibi: videntur autem involuntaria et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas rationes.
| 382. After the Philosopher has treated virtue in general, he treats here certain principles of virtuous acts. In defining virtue, he said (305) that virtue is a habit of correct choosing because virtue works by means of choice. Now he logically discusses choice together with the voluntary and “willing.” The voluntary is common to these three: for the voluntary is anything that is freely done, choice however concerns the things that are for the end, and willing considers the end itself. Hence this section falls into two parts. In the first part [I] he deals with the three previously mentioned principles of virtuous actions. In the second part, at “Since willing regards the end etc.” (B. 1113 b 3), he compares these principles with the acts of the virtues [Lect. 11]. His initial point calls for a threefold procedure. First [A] he determines the voluntary and the involuntary. Next [Lect. 5; B], at “After the treatise etc.” (B. 1111 b 4), he deals with choice. Last [Lect. 10; C], at “As was stated before etc.” (B.1113 a 15), he treats the act of willing. In regard to the first of these he does two things. Initially [A’] he shows that it pertains to the present discussion to consider the voluntary and the involuntary. Then [B’] at “Involuntary actions seem etc..” he actually treats them. Two reasons are advanced in proof of the first point.
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| Quarum prima sumitur ex eo quod est proprium praesenti considerationi, quae est de virtutibus. Et concludit ex praemissis, quod virtus moralis, de qua nunc agitur, est circa passiones et operationes; ita scilicet quod in his quae sunt voluntaria circa operationes et passiones, fiunt laudes, cum aliquis operatur secundum virtutem, et vituperia quando aliquis operatur contra virtutem; quando autem aliquis involuntarie operatur, si quidem id quod est secundum virtutem, non meretur laudem: si autem contra virtutem, meretur veniam ex eo, quod involuntarie agit, ut scilicet minus vituperetur. Quandoque autem meretur misericordiam, ut scilicet totaliter a vituperio reddatur immunis.
| 383. The first of these reasons [1] is taken from what is peculiar to our present study which concerns the virtues. He concludes from his previous remarks that moral virtue, our present concern, deals with passions and actions in such a way that in the things which are voluntary in regard to actions and passions, praise is due anyone acting virtuously and blame for anyone acting viciously. But when someone involuntarily performs an action in accordance with virtue, he does not merit praise, On the other hand, if his action is contrary to virtue he deserves pardon because he acted involuntarily, and so is less blameworthy. Sometimes he even deserves pity, and should be entirely freed from blame.
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| Vel possunt distingui venia et misericordia ut dicatur venia, quando diminuitur seu totaliter dimittitur vituperium seu poena ex iudicio rationis, misericordia autem quando hoc fit ex passione. Laus autem et vituperium proprie debentur virtuti et vitio. Et ideo voluntarium et involuntarium, secundum quae diversificatur ratio laudis et vituperii debent determinari ab his qui intendunt de virtute considerare.
| 384. Pardon can also be distinguished from pity in this way: we speak of pardon when censure, i.e., a penalty is lessened or entirely absolved as a consequence of the judgment of reason. Pity, on the other hand, arises as a consequence of an emotion. But praise and blame are peculiarly due to virtue and vice. Therefore, the voluntary and the involuntary, according to which the reason for praise and blame is diversified, ought to be treated by those who intend to study virtue.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi utile autem et legislatoribus et cetera. Quae sumitur ex consideratione politica, ad quam praesens consideratio ordinatur. Et dicit, quod utile est legislatoribus, quod considerent voluntarium et involuntarium ad hoc quod statuant honores bene agentibus, vel poenas peccantibus, in quibus diversitatem facit voluntarii et involuntarii differentia.
| 385. At “It is useful” [2] he gives the second reason. This is taken from the viewpoint of political science to which the present study is ordered. It is useful for legislators, he says, to consider the voluntary and the involuntary that they may decree honors for the law-abiding and punishments for the law-breakers, for in regard to these the distinction of voluntary and involuntary is of importance.
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| Deinde cum dicit: videntur autem involuntaria etc., determinat de voluntario et involuntario. Et primo de involuntario. Secundo de voluntario, ibi, existente autem involuntario etc. et ratio ordinis est, quia involuntarium ex simplici causa procedit, puta ex sola ignorantia vel ex sola violentia; sed ad voluntarium oportet plura concurrere. Circa primum tria facit. Primo dividit involuntarium. Secundo determinat de uno membro divisionis, ibi, violentum autem est et cetera. Tertio determinat de alio, ibi, quod autem propter ignorantiam et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod involuntaria videntur aliqua esse dupliciter: scilicet vel illa quae fiunt per violentiam, vel illa quae fiunt propter ignorantiam. Et ratio huius divisionis est, quia involuntarium est privatio voluntarii. Voluntarium autem importat motum appetitivae virtutis, qui praesupponit cognitionem apprehensivae virtutis, eo quod bonum apprehensum movet appetitivam virtutem; dupliciter igitur aliquid est involuntarium. Uno modo per hoc quod excluditur ipse motus appetitivae virtutis. Et hoc est involuntarium per violentiam. Alio modo quia excluditur cognitio virtutis apprehensivae. Et hoc est involuntarium per ignorantiam.
| 386. Then [B’], at “Involuntary actions seem,” he deals with the voluntary and the involuntary. First [B’, I] he treats the involuntary, and second [Lect. 4], at “Since the involuntary etc.” (B. 1111 a 22), he treats the voluntary. The reason for this order is that the involuntary proceeds from a simple cause, as ignorance alone, or violence alone, but the voluntary has to take place by the concurrence of many factors. The explanation of the involuntary [B’, 1] is achieved in three stages. First [a] he divides the involuntary. Second [b], at “The ‘compulsory action’ is etc.,” he treats one member of the division. Third [Lect. 3; c], at “Every action done etc.” (B. 1110 b 18), he treats the other member. He says first that some involuntary actions seem to be of two kinds: those arising from violence, or those arising from ignorance. This division is made in order to indicate that the involuntary is a privation of the voluntary. But the voluntary implies a movement of the appetitive power presupposing a knowledge via sense or reason because a good perceived moves the appetitive power. A thing is involuntary on two accounts: one, because the movement of the appetitive power is excluded—this is the involuntary resulting from violence—the other, because a mental awareness is excluded-this is the involuntary resulting from ignorance.
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| Deinde cum dicit: violentum autem est etc., determinat de involuntario per violentiam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quid sit violentum. Secundo excludit circa hoc errorem, ibi, si quis autem delectabilia et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quid sit simpliciter violentum. Secundo quid sit violentum secundum quid ibi, quaecumque autem propter timorem etc.; tertio epilogat, ibi: qualia utique dicendum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod violentum est cuius principium est extra. Dictum est enim quod violentia excludit motum appetitivum. Unde, cum appetitus sit principium intrinsecum, consequens est quod violentum sit a principio extrinseco; sed quia ipse etiam appetitus moveri potest ab aliquo extrinseco, non omne cuius principium est extra est violentum, sed solum quod ita est a principio extrinseco, quod appetitus interior non concurrit in idem. Et hoc est quod dicit quod oportet tale esse violentum in quo nihil conferat, scilicet per proprium appetitum, homo qui et dicitur operans, in quantum facit aliquid per violentiam, et dicitur patiens inquantum violentiam patitur. Et ponit exemplum: puta si spiritus, idest ventus, per suam violentiam impulerit rem aliquam ad aliquem locum, vel si homines dominium et potestatem habentes asportaverunt aliquem contra eius voluntatem.
| 387. Next [b], at “The compulsory action,” he deals with the involuntary resulting from violence. Here he proceeds in two ways: first [i] he discloses what the “compulsory action” (violentum) is. Next [Lect. 2; ii], at “If someone should say etc.” (B. 1110 b 9), he rejects an error about this. His initial point requires a triple consideration. First [i, x] he makes known what the “physically forced action” (simpliciter violentum) is, and second [i, y], at “Some things are done because of the fear,” what the “morally forced action” (violentum secundum quid) is. Third [Lect. 2; z], at “What sort of actions etc.” (B. 1110 b), he concludes with a summary. He says first that the forced action is one whose principle is from outside. It was just noted (385) that violence excludes the appetitive movement. Hence, since the appetitive faculty is an intrinsic principle, it is appropriate that the forced action arise from an extrinsic principle. However, not every action whose principle is from the outside is a forced action but only that action which is derived from an extrinsic principle in such a way that the interior appetitive faculty does not concur in it. This is what he means by his statement that a forced action must be such that a man contributes nothing to it by means of his own appetitive faculty. A man is here said to be an agent (operans) inasmuch as he does something because of violence and a patient inasmuch as he suffers something because of violence. Aristotle gives an example: if the air or wind drives a thing to some place by its violence, or if rulers having dominion and power exile someone against his will.
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| Deinde cum dicit quaecumque autem etc., ostendit quid sit violentum secundum quid. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo movet dubitationem; secundo solvit, ibi, mixtae quidem igitur sunt et cetera. Tertio solutionem manifestat, ibi, in operationibus autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quaedam sunt, quae aliquis operatur propter timorem maiorum malorum, quae scilicet timet incurrere; vel propter bonum aliquod, quod scilicet timet amittere. Puta si aliquis tyrannus habens in suo dominio et potestate parentes et filios alicuius, praecipiat ei quod aliquid turpe operetur tali condicione ut, si ipse operetur illud turpe, conserventur filii et parentes eius in vita, si autem non operetur, occidantur.
| 388. At “Some things” [i, y], he explains what a morally forced action is. Three steps clarify this conclusion. First [aa] he raises a doubt. Next [bb], at “Operations of this kind etc.,” he solves the doubt. Third [Lect. 2; cc], at “People doing such actions etc.” (B. 1110 a 19), he clarifies the solution. He says first that a man sometimes performs an action because he fears to incur greater evils or because he is afraid to lose some good. A tyrant, for instance, has under his dominion and power the parents or children of a certain man. This tyrant commands the man to do a disgraceful deed on condition that if he does it his relatives will be spared; if he refuses they will be killed.
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| Est ergo dubitatio utrum illa quae ex tali timore fiunt, sint dicenda voluntaria, vel potius involuntaria. Et ponit aliud exemplum de his qui in tempestatibus maritimis existentes eiciunt res suas in mari, quod quidem simpliciter loquendo nullus facit voluntarius. Sed ad hoc quod ipse et illi qui cum eo sunt salventur, faciunt hoc omnes qui habent intellectum bene dispositum.
| 389. There is then a doubt whether things done because of such fear should be called voluntary or involuntary. He gives another example of sailors who during storms at sea throw merchandise overboard. Absolutely speaking, no man does this voluntarily but what he and his shipmates do in order to save their lives, any sensible man in a similar situation does.
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| Deinde cum dicit: mixtae quidem igitur etc., solvit praemissam dubitationem, concludens ex eo quod dictum est, quod praedictae operationes, quae ex timore fiunt, sunt mixtae, idest habentes aliquid de utroque; de involuntario quidem inquantum nullus vult simpliciter res suas in mare proiicere; de voluntario autem, inquantum quilibet sapiens hoc vult pro salute suae personae et aliorum. Sed tamen magis accedunt ad voluntarias operationes quam ad involuntarias. Cuius ratio est quia hoc quod est proiicere res in mare, vel quicquid est aliud huiusmodi potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo absolute et in universali, et sic est involuntarium. Alio modo secundum particulares circumstantias quae occurrunt in tempore in quo hoc est agendum, et secundum hoc est voluntarium. Quia vero actus sunt circa singularia, magis est iudicanda conditio actus secundum considerationes singularium quam secundum considerationem universalem. Et hoc est quod dicit quod praedictae operationes ex timore factae sunt voluntariae tunc quando sunt operatae, idest consideratis omnibus singularibus circumstantiis quae pro tempore illo occurrunt, et secundum hoc singulare tempus est finis et complementum operationis.
| 390. Then [bb], at “Operations of this kind,” he solves this doubt by concluding from his previous remarks (387) that the afore-mentioned actions done out of fear are mixed, i.e., have something both of the involuntary (inasmuch as no one absolutely wishes to throw his goods overboard) and of the voluntary (inasmuch as a sensible man wishes this for the safety of himself and others). However, these actions approach more closely to the voluntary than to the involuntary. The reason is that throwing merchandise overboard, or any action of this kind, can be considered in two ways: one, absolutely and in general (involuntary); the other, in the particular circumstances occurring at the time the action is to be done (voluntary). But, since actions are concerned with particulars, the nature of the action must be judged rather according to the considerations of particulars than according to the consideration of what is general. This is what he means in his statement that these actions were done voluntarily at the time they were performed (i.e., after having considered all the particular circumstances then occurring), and the end and completion of the action conform to this particular time.
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| Et ideo dicendum est proprie aliquid voluntarium et involuntarium secundum considerationem temporis, quando aliquis operatur. Manifestum est autem quod tunc operatur volens. Quod patet ex hoc quod in talibus operationibus principium movendi organicas partes, idest applicandi membra corporis ad operandum, est in ipso homine. Aliter autem esset si ipsemet non moveret membra, sed ab aliquo potentiori moverentur. Ea autem quae fiunt ex principio intrinseco sunt in potestate hominis, ut ea operetur vel non operetur, quod pertinet ad rationem voluntarii. Unde manifestum est quod tales operationes proprie et vere sunt voluntariae. Sed tamen simpliciter, idest in universali considerando eas, sunt involuntariae, quia nullus quantum est in se eligeret operari aliquid talium nisi propter timorem, ut dictum est.
| 391. Therefore, an action must be properly called voluntary or involuntary in view of the time at which the agent performed it. It is obvious that he acts voluntarily at the time. This is evident because in these actions the principle moving the bodily members to act is within the man himself. It would be different, however, if his members were not moved by himself but by a more powerful agent. The things done by an intrinsic principle are in the power of man to do or not to do, and this belongs to the nature of the voluntary. Obviously then actions of this kind are properly and truly voluntary. They are, however, involuntary simply, that is considering them in general, because no one as far as in him lies would choose to do a thing of this kind except out of fear, as was just stated (390).
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| In operationibus autem et cetera. Postquam philosophus solvit dubitationem motam circa ea quae fiunt propter metum, ostendens huiusmodi operationes magis esse voluntarias, hic solutionem manifestat per hoc quod laus et vituperium, honor et poena debentur huiusmodi operationibus, quae tamen non debentur nisi operationibus voluntariis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter huiusmodi operationibus debeatur laus et vituperium, honor vel poena; secundo manifestat difficultatem circa hoc imminentem, ibi: est autem difficile et cetera. Circa primum ponit tres gradus talium operationum quae fiunt per metum quantum ad hoc quod mereantur laudem vel vituperium.
| 392. After the Philosopher has solved the doubt raised about the actions done because of fear, showing that such actions are voluntary, he now clarifies the solution [cc] by explaining that praise and blame, honor and punishment are due to voluntary actions of this kind. On this point he does two things. First [a’] he discloses in what way these actions merit praise and blame, honor and punishment. Next [b’], at “Sometimes it is difficult etc.,” he makes known the pending difficulties about this. In regard to the first he distinguishes three grades of these actions performed by reason of fear, as far as they merit praise or blame.
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| Et quantum ad primum dicit quod in talibus operationibus quas dixit esse mixtas ex voluntario et involuntario, quandoque aliqui laudantur ex eo quod sustinent aliquod turpe, non quidem peccatum, sed ignominiam aliquam, vel etiam aliquod triste, idest aliquod afflictivum, propter hoc quod perseverent in aliquibus magnis et bonis, puta in aliquibus virtuosis actibus. Quando autem accidit e converso, vituperantur, quia proprium pravi hominis esse videtur, ut sustineat turpissima, idest aliquas magnas confusiones pro nullo vel modico bono. Nullus enim sustinet aliquod malum pro conservatione alicuius boni, nisi illud bonum praeponderet in corde suo illis bonis quibus opponuntur mala quae sustinet; pertinet autem ad inordinationem appetitus quod aliquis parva bona praeeligat magnis, quae tolluntur per magna mala. Et ideo dicit hoc esse pravi hominis, qui habet appetitum inordinatum.
| 393. Considering now the first grade [a’, A], he shows that regarding such actions, which he says are a mixture of the voluntary and the involuntary, some persons are praised for suffering something dishonorable—not indeed of a sinful nature but a kind of ignominy —or even saddening or grievous in order to persevere in certain great and good things, or example, virtuous actions. When the opposite happens they are blamed since it seems that only a perverse man suffers very dishonorable things, i.e., great disorders in exchange for little or no good. No one suffers any evil to preserve a good unless that good is of greater value in his estimation than the other goods to which the evil he suffers are opposed. It belongs to a disordered desire to prefer small goods to great ones that are destroyed by greater evils. Therefore, he says this pertains to a perverse man, i.e., one who has a disordered desire.
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| Secundum gradum ponit ibi in aliquibus autem et cetera. Et dicit quod in quibusdam operationibus propter metum factis non meretur aliquis laudem, sed solum conceditur venia, ut scilicet aliquis inde non multum vituperetur, quando scilicet aliquis operatur quaedam quae non oportet, puta aliqua non decentia ad statum suum, cum tamen non sint multum gravia, propter timorem aliquorum malorum, quorum sustinentia excedit humanam naturam, et quae nullus posset sustinere, praecipue propter hanc causam, puta si alicui immineret sustinere ignis adustionem, nisi diceret aliquod iocosum mendacium. Vel nisi aliqua vilia et abiecta opera faceret quae non decerent eius dignitatem.
| 394. At “Some actions” [a’, B], he sets down the second grade, stating that some actions performed because of fear do not deserve praise but only pardon. A person should not be blamed very much for doing certain things he ought not do, such as actions unbefitting his state. These actions should not be considered seriously binding on account of the fear of evils beyond human endurance. No one would undergo such evils especially for the reason alleged, for example, if some one is threatened with punishment by fire unless he tells a jocose lie, or he performs some lowly menial tasks unbecoming his dignity.
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| Tertium gradum ponit ibi: quaedam autem fortassis et cetera. Et dicit quod quaedam operationes sunt adeo malae quod ad eas faciendas nulla sufficiens coactio adhiberi potest, sed magis debet homo sustinere mortem patiendo durissima tormenta, quam talia operari, sicut beatus Laurentius sustinuit adustionem craticulae ne idolis immolaret. Et hoc ideo philosophus dicit, vel quia morienti propter virtutem remanet post mortem gloria, vel quia fortiter persistere in bono virtutis est tantum bonum ut ei aequiparari non possit diuturnitas vitae, quam homo moriendo perdit. Et ideo dicit quod Alcmaeona, idest carmina de Alcmaeone facta ab Euripide poeta, videntur esse derisoria, in quibus narratur quod Alcmaeon coactus fuit matrem occidere ex praecepto patris sui, qui hoc sibi praeceperat in bello Thebano moriens, ad quod ierat ex uxoris consilio.
| 395. At “Yet it is probable” [a’, c], he treats the third grade. He states that other actions are so evil that no amount of force can compel them to be done but a man ought to undergo death of the cruelest kind rather than do such things, as St. Lawrence endured the roasting on the gridiron to avoid sacrificing to idols. The Philosopher affirms this either because glory remains after death for one dying for the sake of virtue or because courageous perseverance in virtue is so great a good that continuance of life—which a man loses by death—cannot equal it. He says, therefore, that Alcmaeona or the poems about Alcmaeon written by Euripides seem to be satirical. These poems narrate the story of Alcmaeon who was forced to kill his mother by the command of his father. The father had ordered this when dying in the Theban war to which be had gone by the advice of his wife.
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| Deinde cum dicit: est autem difficile etc., ponit duas difficultates quae imminent circa praedictas operationes. Quarum prima pertinet ad iudicium rationis. Et dicit quod quandoque difficile est iudicare quid sit eligendum pro hoc quod aliquis evitet aliquod malum, et quid mali sit sustinendum pro hoc quod aliquis non deficiat ab aliquo bono.
| 396. Then [b’], at “Sometimes it is,” he brings forward two difficulties which threaten the above-mentioned activities. The first of these pertains to the judgment of reason [b’, A]. Sometimes it is difficult, he says, to judge what is to be chosen so that one may avoid evil and what evil is to be endured so that one may not be lacking in some good.
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| Secunda difficultas pertinet ad immutabilitatem affectus. Quam ponit ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. Et dicit quod adhuc difficilius est immorari perseveranter in his quae homo cognoscit per iudicium rationis, quam recte iudicare. Et assignat rationem difficultatis dicens quod, sicut plurimum contingit, illa quae expectantur, id est quae timentur, sunt tristia, idest afflictiva vel dolorosa, illa autem ad quae homines coguntur per horum timorem sunt turpia. Difficile est autem quod affectus hominis ex timore doloris non moveatur, et tamen quia illa ad quae aliquis per huiusmodi cogitur sunt turpia, consequens est quod circa eos qui coguntur ad huiusmodi turpia agenda per timores tristium, fiant vituperia; circa eos autem qui ad hoc cogi non possunt, fiant laudes.
| 397. The second difficulty [b, B], which he gives at “It is still more,” pertains to the stability of the affection. He says that it is even more difficult to be steadfast in a reasonable decision that has been made than to make a right judgment. He assigns the reason for the difficulty saying that—as often happens—the things that are expected are painful, i.e., afflicting or sorrowful, but those to which men are forced because of fear are disgraceful. It is difficult, however, for a man’s affections not to be moved by fear of pain. Since those actions to which one is forced by a motive of this kind are disgraceful, it is fitting that for those who are forced to do such things by fear of painful effects, blame should be forthcoming. Put those who cannot be forced to do them are worthy of praise.
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| Deinde cum dicit: qualia utique etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt ut quorundam rationem assignet. Et primo resumit quaestionem principalem, scilicet qualia sint dicenda violenta. Secundo resumit responsionem quantum ad ea quae sunt absolute violenta, et dicit quod simpliciter, id est absolute, violenta sunt quorum causa est exterius, ita quod ille qui operatur propter violentiam nihil ad hoc conferat. Tertio resumit de operationibus mixtis. Et dicit quod illa quae secundum seipsa, idest absolute et universaliter considerata, sunt involuntaria, efficiuntur voluntaria secundum certum tempus et propter certos eventus. Horum autem quamvis secundum se sint involuntaria, principium tamen est in operante, et ideo dicenda sunt voluntaria secundum hoc tempus et pro istis causis; et sic patet quod magis assimulantur voluntariis quam involuntariis, quia sunt voluntaria consideratis singularibus in quibus operationes consistunt.
| 398. Next [i], at “What sort of actions then,” he sums up in conclusion the things that have been said and assigns a reason for them. First he reviews the principal question, what sort of actions are to be called compulsory (violenta). Then, he sums up the answer so far as concerns the entirely (absolute) compulsory actions, the cause of which is from the outside so that the person involved contributes nothing because of violence. Third he gives a résumé of mixed actions. He says that those actions that in themselves, i.e., abstractly (absolute) and universally considered, are involuntary become voluntary at a definite time and by reason of certain events. Although they are involuntary in themselves, their principle is in the agent. Therefore, they should be called voluntary at this time and for these reasons. Thus it is evident that these actions are more like the voluntary than the involuntary because they are voluntary when we consider the particular circumstances in which the actions are performed.
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| Quarto resumit quod dixerat de difficultate in talibus contingente. Et dicit quod non est facile tradere qualia oporteat pro qualibus eligere. Et rationem assignat ex hoc quod multae differentiae sunt in singularibus. Et ideo iudicium de eis non potest sub certa regula comprehendi, sed relinquitur existimationi prudentis.
| 399. Last, he recapitulates what he had stated about the difficulty occurring in things of this kind. He says that it is not easy to assign the sort of thing we must choose in such circumstances. He assigns as the reason that many differences are found in singulars. Hence the judgment of them cannot be comprised under an exact rule but they are to be left to the evaluation of a prudent man.
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| Deinde cum dicit: si quis autem delectabilia etc., excludit errorem quorumdam de his quae per violentiam fiunt. Quia enim homo est id quod est secundum rationem, visum est quibusdam quod illud solum homo per se et quasi voluntarie faceret quod facit secundum rationem; quandoque autem contingit quod homo contra rationem operatur, vel propter concupiscentiam alicuius delectationis facit, vel propter cupiditatem alicuius exterioris boni; et ideo dicebant quod delectabilia et exteriora bona, puta divitiae, sunt violenta effective, inquantum scilicet, cum sint quaedam extrinseca, cogunt hominem ad agendum contra rationem. Sed hoc ipse improbat quinque rationibus,
| 400. At “If someone” [ii], he rejects an error of certain philosophers concerning actions done as a result of violence. Because man is what he is by reason, it seemed to some that man of himself, and as it were voluntarily, does only that which he performs according to reason. But when it happens that man acts contrary to reason either on account of the desire of some pleasure or greed for some external good, he acts in a violent manner. They say, therefore, that pleasurable and external goods like riches cause forced actions inasmuch as being external things they force man to act against his reason. Aristotle shows this to be false for five reasons.
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| Quarum prima talis est. Si exteriora inquantum sunt delectabilia et videntur bona violentiam inferunt, sequetur quod omnia quae nos agimus sint violenta et nihil in rebus humanis et nihil sit voluntarium: quia omnes homines quaecumque operantur, operantur gratia horum, id est propter aliquod delectabile vel propter aliquod quocumque modo bonum. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Ergo et primum.
| 401. The first reason is this [ii, v]. If external things, precisely as they are pleasurable and seemingly good, cause violence, it would follow that all actions we perform in human affairs are forced actions and none is voluntary. (All men do what they do for the sake of these things, i.e., for something that is pleasurable or good under a certain aspect.) But this is unreasonable. Therefore, the first (that these external things cause violence) is also untenable.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi et qui quidem et cetera. Quae talis est. Omnes qui operantur ex violentia et involuntarii operantur cum tristitia. Unde et in V metaphysicae dicitur quod necessitas est contristans, quia contrariatur voluntati. Sed illi qui operantur propter aliquod bonum seu propter aliquod delectabile adipiscendum, operantur cum delectatione. Non ergo operantur per violentiam et nolentes.
| 402. He sets down the second reason at “Those who act” [ii, w]. All who act as a result of violence, act involuntarily and with sadness. Hence in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 5,1015 a 26 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 6, 829-831), it is well said that necessitation is saddening because it is opposed to the will. But those who act to acquire something enjoyable act with pleasure. They do not then act by violence and involuntarily.
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| Tertiam rationem ponit ibi ridiculum autem et cetera. Et dicit quod ridiculum est causari, idest incusare, exteriora bona et non incusare se ipsum ex eo quod reddit se venabilem, idest permittit se superari, a talibus appetibilibus; non enim voluntas nostra ex necessitate movetur a talibus appetibilibus, sed potest eis inhaerere vel non inhaerere, eo quod nihil eorum habet rationem universalis et perfecti boni, sicut felicitas, quam omnes ex necessitate volumus.
| 403. He gives the third reason at “It is ridiculous” [ii, x]. He says it is ridiculous that a man plead as an excuse or blame external goods and not accuse himself that he was spared, i.e., permitted himself to be overcome by such pleasures. Our will is not of necessity moved by these desirable things but it can cling to them or desert them. None possesses the nature of a universal and perfect good, as happiness (which everyone necessarily wishes) does.
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| Quartam rationem ponit ibi et bonorum quidem se ipsum et cetera. Et dicit quod ridiculum est, quod aliquis dicat se ipsum esse causam bonorum, id est virtuosarum operationum, et quod delectabilia sint causa turpium operationum in quantum alliciunt concupiscentiam. Ideo autem hoc dicit esse ridiculum, quia contrariae operationes reducuntur in eamdem potentiam rationalem, sicut in causam. Et ideo oportet quod sicut ratio secundum seipsam agens est causa virtuosae operationis, ita etiam sit causa vitiosae operationis sequendo passiones.
| 404. He assigns the fourth reason at “while he takes” [ii, y]. It is ridiculous, he says, that a person should call himself the cause of his good and virtuous works, and pleasurable things the cause of his shameful deeds inasmuch as they induce desire. Aristotle says it is ridiculous because directly opposed operations are referred back to the same power as a cause. Consequently it is necessary that as reason operating according to itself is the cause of virtuous action so also in following the passions it should be the cause of vicious action.
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| Quintam rationem ponit ibi videtur utique violentum et cetera. Et dicit, quod violentum est cuius principium est extra ita quod ille qui patitur vim nihil conferat ad actionem. Sed ille qui agit propter bona exteriora confert aliquid ad actionem. Ergo, quamvis principium inclinans eius voluntatem sit extra, non tamen eius operatio est violenta: neque simpliciter, quia aliquid confert ad operationem; neque per aliquam mixtionem, quia in operationibus mixtis, non redditur aliquid simpliciter voluntarium, sicut accidit hic. Et ideo ibi operatur homo cum tristitia, hic autem cum delectatione, ut dictum est.
| 405. He gives the fifth reason at “It seems that” [ii, z], saying that the forced action is one whose source is from the outside in such a way that he who suffers by reason of it contributes nothing to the action. But the man who acts on account of external goods does contribute something to the action. Accordingly, although the principle inclining his will is from outside, his action is forced neither wholly (simpliciter) because he contributes something to the action, nor by some mixture because in mixed actions a thing is not rendered simply voluntary, as happens here. Therefore, a man acts in that case with sadness but not with pleasure, as has been stated (402).
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Quod autem propter ignorantiam et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de involuntario per violentiam, hic determinat de involuntario per ignorantiam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo sit aliquid involuntarium per ignorantiam. Secundo manifestat quaedam quae dixerat, ibi, forsitan igitur non malum et cetera. Circa primum ponit tres differentias circa ignorantiam. Quarum prima attenditur secundum quod aliquid propter ignorantiam fit, sed diversimode se habet ad voluntatem: quandoque enim est voluntati contrarium: et tunc proprie dicitur involuntarium. Quandoque autem non est contrarium voluntati, sed est praeter voluntatem in quantum est ignoratum et hoc non dicitur involuntarium, sed non voluntarium.
| 406. After the Philosopher has determined the involuntary resulting from violence, he now turns his attention to the involuntary resulting from ignorance [c]. Concerning it he does two things. First [i] he shows how’ there is an involuntary resulting from ignorance. Second [ii], at “Perhaps it is etc.,” he explains some of his statements. In regard to the initial point he sets down three differences concerning ignorance. The first of these [i, x] is considered insofar as what is done on account of ignorance is related to the will in different ways. Sometimes it is opposed to the will, and then it is properly called an involuntary. But other times it is not opposed to the will but is over and above the will precisely as it is unknown. In this sense it is not called involuntary but non-voluntary.
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| Dicit ergo, quod hoc quod fit propter ignorantiam, ita scilicet quod ignorantia sit causa eius, universaliter est non voluntarium, ex hoc scilicet quod actus voluntatis non fertur in illud. Non enim potest actus voluntatis ferri in id quod est penitus ignoratum, cum obiectum voluntatis sit bonum cognitum. Sed tunc solum id quod ex ignorantia causatur, dicitur involuntarium, quasi voluntati contrarium, quando postquam cognoscitur inducit tristitiam et poenitudinem, quae est tristitia de his quae quis fecit; ex hoc enim aliquid est contristans quod est voluntati contrarium, ut dicitur in V metaphysicae.
| 407. He says then that what is done on account of ignorance in such a way that ignorance is the cause, is not voluntary in any case because the act of the will is not moved to it. The act of the will cannot be moved to what is entirely unknown since the will’s object is the known good. But only then is that which is done out of ignorance called involuntary—as it were opposed to the will—when on becoming known, sorrow and repentance (which is sorrow over one’s past actions) follow. A thing is sorrowful because it is opposed to the will, as is stated in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 5, 1015 a 26 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 6, 829-830).
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| Ille enim qui propter ignorantiam operatur aliquid, et non tristatur de hoc quod operatus est illud postquam cognoscit, puta si accipiat argentum aestimans se accipere stamnum, non potest dici quod volens acceperit argentum, cum non cognoverit illud esse argentum; neque potest dici quod nolens, idest contra suam voluntatem acceperit argentum, cum non tristetur de eo quod propter ignorantiam argentum accepit. Ille enim videtur esse nolens, qui habet tristitiam et poenitudinem de eo quod propter ignorantiam fecit. Sicut si aliquis accepisset e converso stamnum putans accipere argentum. Sed quia ille qui non paenitet alter est ab illo qui paenitet qui dicitur nolens, vocetur ille non volens. Quia enim differt a nolente secundum rem, melius est quod habeat nomen proprium et distinctum.
| 408. One who does something on account of ignorance and is not sorry about what he did after he knows it, for instance, if he takes silver thinking he took tin, cannot be said to have voluntarily (willingly) taken silver since he did not know that it was silver. It cannot be said that he involuntarily (unwillingly), i.e., against his will, took silver since he is not sorry that he did take silver by reason of ignorance. He seems to have acted involuntarily who has sorrow or repents for the fact that he took silver by reason of ignorance, just as if someone had, on the contrary, taken in thinking he has taken silver. But because he who does not repent is different from the man who does repent (he is said to be unwilling) let the first be called non-willing. Since he really differs from the one who is unwilling, it is better that he have a proper and separate name.
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| Secundam differentiam ponit ibi alterum autem videtur et cetera. Quae quidem accipitur secundum differentiam respectus eius quod fit ad ignorantiam, quae quandoque est causa eius, quandoque vero procedit ex alia causa. Dicit ergo, quod alterum videtur esse quod aliquis operetur propter ignorantiam ab eo quod aliquis operetur ignorans. Quandoque enim aliquis operatur ignorans, sed non propter ignorantiam. Sicut ebrius vel iratus, non operatur propter ignorantiam, sed propter ebrietatem vel iram. Et tamen neuter eorum operatur sciens, sed ignorans, quia ex ebrietate et ira causatur ignorantia, simul cum tali operatione: et ita ignorantia se habet ut concomitans operationem, et non sicut causa eius.
| 409. He sets down the second difference at “There seems to be” [i, y]. This is taken according to the difference of what is done in ignorance; for ignorance sometimes is the cause of an action, but sometimes the act proceeds from another cause. He says that a person acting on account of ignorance seems to be different from a person acting in ignorance. Sometimes one acts in ignorance but not on account of ignorance. A drunken or angry person does not act on account of ignorance but on account of drunkenness or anger. Neither of these, however, acts knowingly because ignorance is caused at the same time as the action by drunkenness and anger. Thus ignorance is concomitant with the action and is not its cause.
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| Ex hoc autem concludit quod, sicut iratus operatur ignorans, non autem propter ignorantiam, sed propter iram: ita omnis malus operatur non quidem propter ignorantiam, sed ignorans in particulari quae bona oporteat facere et a quibus malis oporteat fugere, inquantum scilicet aestimat hoc malum sibi nunc esse faciendum, et ab hoc bono sibi nunc esse cessandum. Et propter hoc peccatum, quia scilicet operantur quae non oportet. Ignorantes autem universaliter fiunt iniusti quoad alios, et mali quoad seipsos. Ex quo patet, quod ex hoc quod aliquis operatur ignorans, et non propter ignorantiam, non causatur involuntarium. Quia nullus propter id quod involuntarius facit, est iniustus vel malus.
| 410. From this he concludes that as an angry person acts in ignorance and not on account of ignorance but on account of anger, so every wicked person acts not indeed on account of ignorance but partly in ignorance of the good he ought to do and of the evil he ought to avoid, inasmuch as he thinks that at this moment he should do this evil and refrain from this good. For this reason he sins because he does what he ought not to do. Men who act in ignorance universally become unjust with respect to others and wicked with respect to themselves. From this it is evident that when someone acts in ignorance, and not on account of ignorance, he does not cause an involuntary. The reason is that no one, by reason of what he does involuntarily, is unjust or wicked.
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| Tertiam differentiam ponit ibi involuntarium autem vult dici et cetera. Quae quidem sumitur ex parte eius quod ignoratur. Ubi considerandum est quod duorum potest esse ignorantia. Uno modo secundum quod aliquis ignorat quid oporteat facere vel vitare. Et hanc ignorantiam dicit esse eius quod confert, idest quod operari oportet. Talis autem ignorantia non causat involuntarium, quia ignorantia huiusmodi non potest homini habenti usum rationis provenire nisi ex negligentia. Quia quilibet tenetur adhibere sollicitudinem ad sciendum quid oporteat eum facere vel vitare: unde si ipsa ignorantia reputatur voluntaria, dum homo eam non vult vitare sicut tenetur, consequens est quod nec id quod per huiusmodi ignorantiam fit, involuntarium iudicetur. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod involuntarium vult, idest natum est dici, non si quis ignorat quod confert, idest quod est expediens ad operandum. Hoc autem potest aliquis ignorare dupliciter.
| 411. He assigns the third difference at “When we speak” [i, z]. This is taken from the object of the person’s ignorance. Here we must consider that ignorance can be of two kinds. According to one, a person is ignorant of what he ought to do or avoid. He says this is ignorance of what is fitting—of what he ought to be doing. This ignorance does not cause an involuntary because ignorance of this kind cannot happen to a man with the use of reason except from negligence. The reason is that everyone is bound to be solicitous about knowing what he is obliged to do and to avoid. Hence if a man does not wish to avoid (as he is bound) ignorance that is considered voluntary, it follows that what is done through this ignorance should not be judged involuntary. This is the meaning of the saying that one does not wish an involuntary (i.e., what is by nature an involuntary) if he is ignorant of what he does, that is, of what is suitable under the circumstances. Of this someone can be ignorant in two ways:
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| Uno modo in aliquo particulari eligibili; puta cum aliquis propter concupiscentiam aestimat sibi nunc esse fornicandum. Alio modo in universali, ut patet in erroneo qui opinatur omnem fornicationem esse licitam. Utraque autem ignorantia est eius quod confert. Unde neutra involuntarium causat. Et hoc est quod subdit quod illa ignorantia quae est in electione, per quam scilicet aliquis aestimat hoc malum sibi nunc esse faciendum, non est causa involuntarii, sed magis est causa malitiae, idest peccati. Neque etiam ignorantia quae est in universali est causa involuntarii, quia propter huiusmodi ignorantiam aliquis vituperatur. Non autem vituperatur aliquis propter involuntarium, ut supra habitum est.
| 412. One is in a particular choice. For instance, because of sensual desire a person thinks he should commit fornication at this time. The other way is in general, as is evident in one who is of the opinion that fornication is always lawful. Both kinds of ignorance concern what is done. Hence neither causes an involuntary. This is what is meant by saying that that ignorance accompanying choice (by which a person thinks he should do this evil at this time) is not the cause of an involuntary but is rather the cause of vice or sin. Neither is the ignorance that is of a general nature the cause of an involuntary since a person is blamed on account of ignorance of this kind. But no one is censured because of an involuntary, as was said previously (410).
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| Alia autem est ignorantia singularium conditionum, puta quod ista mulier sit uxor, vel quod iste vir sit pater, vel quod iste locus sit sacer. Et ista sunt circa quae et in quibus est operatio humana, per quorum iustam ignorantiam aliquis meretur misericordiam et veniam, eo quod ille qui ignorat aliquid horum, operatur involuntarie. Unde patet, quod ignorantia talium singularium circumstantiarum, causat involuntarium, non autem ignorantia eius quod confert.
| 413. The other ignorance (the first is in 411) is of singular conditions, for instance, that this woman is married, that this man is a parent, that this place is holy. It is about these conditions and on them that human activity is exercised; by reason of a justifiable ignorance of such conditions that a person deserves mercy and pardon because he who is ignorant of one of these conditions acts involuntarily. Therefore, it is obvious that ignorance of particular circumstances of this kind—not however ignorance of what one should do—is the cause of an involuntary.
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| Deinde cum dicit: forsitan igitur non malum etc., manifestat quod dixerat: scilicet quae sunt istae circumstantiae, quarum ignorantia causat involuntarium. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quae sint istae circumstantiae; secundo qualiter ignorentur, ibi, omnia quidem igitur, et cetera. Tertio, qualiter earum ignorantia involuntarium causet, ibi: circa omnia utique haec et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod circumstantiae nihil aliud sunt, quam quaedam singulares conditiones humani actus: quae quidem possunt accipi, vel ex parte causarum actus, vel ex parte ipsius actus. Causa autem actus est efficiens, vel finis. Efficiens autem est vel agens principale vel instrumentale; ex parte autem actus, tria accipi possunt: scilicet ipsum genus actus, materia sive obiectum ipsius et modum agendi; et secundum hoc philosophus ponit hic sex circumstantias et dicit, quod non est malum, immo oportunum, determinare quae et quot sint ista singularia, quorum ignorantia, involuntarium facit. Et utitur adverbio dubitandi, sicut et in multis aliis locis in hoc libro propter incertitudinem moralis materiae.
| 414. Then [ii], at “Perhaps it is not,” he explains what he had referred to: those circumstances the ignorance of which is a cause of an involuntary. In regard to this he does three things. First [ii, x] he points out what these circumstances are. Next [ii, y], at “No one but etc.,” he shows in what way ignorance of them may be present. Last [ii, z], at “Since ignorance can be etc.,” he explains how ignorance of these circumstances is the cause of an involuntary. On the first point we must consider that circumstances are nothing else but certain particular conditions of a human act. These can be taken either on the part of the causes of the act or on the part of the act itself. The cause of the act is efficient or final. The efficient cause is either the principal or the instrumental agent. On the part of the act three things can be understood: the genus of the act, the matter or the object itself, and the mode of acting. In agreement with this the Philosopher here places six circumstances. He says that it is not out of place-indeed it is very appropriate-to determine what and how many are these particular circumstances, the ignorance of which is the cause of an involuntary. He uses an adverb (forsitan) indicating doubt, as in many other places of this book because of the uncertainty in moral matters.
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| Enumerans ergo haec singularia, dicit, quis, quod pertinet ad personam principalis agentis. Et quid scilicet agat, quod pertinet ad genus actus. Et circa quid, quod pertinet ad materiam vel obiectum. Apponit autem et circa hoc, id quod pertinet ad mensuram actus aut agentis, id est locum vel tempus, cum dicit, vel in quo operatur. Quia omnes res exteriores videntur similem habitudinem habere ad actum humanum. Tullius autem hoc quod dicitur circa quid, comprehendit sub hoc quod dicitur quid. Quod autem dicitur in quo, dividit in duas circumstantias, scilicet in quando et ubi.
| 415. Enumerating then these particular things he names “who,” which refers to the person of the principal agent; “what is done,” which refers to the genus of the act; and “concerning what,” which refers to the matter or the object. But he adds also “concerning this”—which refers to the measure of the act—as belonging to the agent, i.e., place or time, since he says “or in what he operates.” The reason is that all external things seem to have relation to the human act. Cicero includes what we call “concerning what” under “what.” What is here called “in what” he divides into two circumstances: time and place.
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| Quantum autem ad agens instrumentale subdit. Quandoque autem et quo, puta instrumento. Non enim omnis actio fit per instrumentum, puta intelligere et velle. Loco autem huius ponitur a quibusdam, quibus auxiliis. Nam ille cui praebetur auxilium, utitur auxiliis sicut instrumento. Quantum autem ad finem dicit: et cuius gratia, puta cum medicus vulnerat causa salutis. Quantum autem ad modum agendi, dicit et qualiter, puta quiete, id est leviter, vel vehementer, id est fortiter.
| 416. So far as concerns the instrumental agent Aristotle adds: sometimes also “by what” (quo), for instance an instrument, since not every action is performed through an instrument, for example, understanding and willing. In place of this some put “by what means” (helps), for one to whom help is given uses help as an instrument. Referring to the end he says “for the sake of which,” for instance, a doctor cuts for the sake of health. Referring to the mode of acting he says “and in what manner,” for example, quietly, or violently, that is, strongly.
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| Deinde cum dicit: omnia quidem igitur etc., ostendit qualiter praedictae circumstantiae ignorentur. Et dicit, quod nullus est, qui omnes praedictas circumstantias ignoret, nisi sit totaliter insanus. Et inter ceteras circumstantias, manifestum est, quod non potest ignorare quis sit operans, quia sic ignoraret se ipsum, quod est impossibile. Potest autem ignorare id quod quis operatur, sicut illi qui dicunt aliqua quae non erant dicenda, dicunt excusando seipsos quod excidit a memoria eorum, vel quod nunquam sciverunt quod talia erant ineffabilia, idest quod talia non erant dicenda, sicut revelata sunt mystica, id est secreta, Hayscili, id est cuiusdam poetae; ille ergo qui talia loquitur ignorat quid facit, quia nescit hoc esse revelationem secretorum.
| 417. Next [ii, y], at “No one but,” he shows in what way there may be ignorance about the preceding circumstances. He says that only a totally insane person is ignorant of all these circumstances. Among the other circumstances it is obvious that a man cannot be ignorant of what is meant by the one acting, because in this case he would be ignorant about himself (which is impossible). But someone can be ignorant of what he does, as those who disclose things that should not be disclosed say in excusing themselves that it slipped their mind or they never knew that such things were secret, i.e., were not to be spoken. Thus were revealed the sacred mysteries or secrets by Aeschylus, a certain poet. He who speaks such things is ignorant of what he does because he does not know this is a revelation of secrets.
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| Et ponit aliud exemplum quantum ad facta: sicut sagittator qui vult monstrare discipulo suo qualiter sit sagittandum, et mittit aliquid, scilicet telum; talis etiam nescit quid facit, quia nescit se dimittere telum. Deinde ponit exemplum de ignorantia eius quod est circa quid: sicut si aliquis filium suum credat esse hostem qui impugnet domum eius et interficiat eum. Sicut quaedam mulier dicta Meropes interfecit filium suum; et sic patet quod in tali facto scit homo quid facit, quia scit se interficere, sed nescit circa quid, quia nescit se interficere filium.
| 418. He gives another example so far as concerns what is done, for instance, an archer wishing to teach a pupil how archery is practised shoots an arrow into something. Such a one does not know what he does because he does not know he is shooting an arrow. Then he exemplifies ignorance “concerning what” (circa quid), thus if a man should mistake his son for an enemy besieging his home, and kill him, just as a certain woman named Merope killed her son. So it is obvious that in a case of this kind a man knows what he does because he knows he kills, but he does not know the “concerning what” of his act because he does not know he kills his son.
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| Postea ponit exemplum de ignorantia instrumenti; sicut si aliquis in hastiludio utatur hasta lanceata, quam putat esse rotundatam, scilicet per amotionem ferri; vel si quis aestimet lapidem quo utitur esse pumicem.
| 419. Then he gives an example of ignorance of the instrument, thus if a lancer should use a piked lance that he thought was blunted or if a thrower of rocks thinks what he throws are pumice stones.
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| Ulterius autem ponit exemplum de ignorantia finis. Et dicit quod si aliquis medicus vel minutor percutiens hominem propter salutem corporalem, vel magister propter salutem spiritualem, occidat, iste habet ignorantiam finis; non quidem eius quem intendebat, sed eius qui ex opere consequitur. Ignorabat enim quod opus eius ad talem finem perveniret.
| 420. Farther on he gives an example of ignorance of the end. He says that a doctor or a blood-letter lancing a patient to make him better, or a teacher striking a pupil to correct him, may take a life. These have ignorance of the end, not indeed of what they intended but of what followed from their action. They were ignorant that their action would lead to such an end.
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| Ultimo autem ponit exemplum de ignorantia modi actionis; puta cum aliquis aestimat se leviter ducere manum ad ostendendum alicui qualiter sit percutiendum, sicut faciunt pugiles, et fortiter percutiat; talis enim ignoranter fortiter percutit.
| 421. Last, he illustrates ignorance of the manner of the action, for instance, a man thinks he is tapping with his fist to show how to hit like boxers do but he strikes with force. Such a man strikes with force in ignorance or unknowingly.
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| Deinde cum dicit: circa omnia utique haec etc., ostendit quomodo praedictorum ignorantia involuntarium causat. Et primo dicit quod, cum ignorantia possit esse circa quodlibet praedictorum quinque quae concurrunt ad operationem, ille videtur nolens sive involuntarius operari qui ignorat aliquod praedictorum. Non autem aequaliter quantum ad omnia; sed praecipue si sit ignorantia in principalissimis circumstantiis.
| 422. At “Since ignorance can be” [ii, z], he shows how ignorance of the previously named things is a cause of the voluntary. First [aa] he says that since ignorance can be concerned with any one of the five afore-mentioned that concur with the action, that man seems to act unwillingly or involuntarily who is ignorant of one of the preceding. This does not apply in equal measure to all but it does apply especially if the ignorance concerns the most important circumstances.
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| Secundo ibi: principalissima autem etc., manifestat quae sunt principalissimae circumstantiae. Et dicit quod principalissimae circumstantiae esse videntur in quibus est operatio, idest obiectum sive materia actus. Et cuius gratia, idest finis. Quia actus specificantur secundum obiecta. Sicut autem materia est obiectum exterioris actus, ita finis est obiectum interioris actus voluntatis.
| 423. Next [bb], at “These seem to be,” he shows what he considers the most important circumstances. He says that the principal circumstances seem to be those on which the act takes place, i.e., the object or the matter of the act, and that “for the sake of which” or the end, because acts are specified by their objects. just as the matter is the object of the external act so the end is the object of the internal act of the will.
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| Tertio ibi: secundum talem utique ignorantiam etc., ostendit quod ignorantia horum non sufficit ad involuntarium. Et dicit quod cum involuntarium dicatur secundum praedictorum ignorantiam, adhuc requiritur ad involuntarium quod operatio sit cum tristitia et poenitudine, ut supra dictum est.
| 424. Last [cc], at “For an action,” he says that ignorance of these very things is not enough for an involuntary. He states that although an action may be called involuntary according to the preceding ignorance, a further requirement is that the action be connected with sadness and repentance, as was pointed out before (408).
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Existente autem involuntario et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de involuntario, hic determinat de voluntario. Et primo ostendit quid sit voluntarium. Secundo excludit circa hoc quemdam errorem, ibi, forsitan enim non bene dicitur et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est quod, quamvis involuntarium videatur dici secundum remotionem voluntarii, tamen, si ad causas respiciamus, voluntarium dicitur aliquid per remotionem eorum quae causant involuntarium, scilicet violentiae et ignorantiae; et quia unumquodque cognoscitur per suam causam, ideo definitionem voluntarii tradit removendo causas involuntarii. Et dicit quod, cum involuntarium sit quod fit propter vim illatam et propter ignorantiam, ut supra dictum est, voluntarium videtur esse cuius principium est in ipso operante. Et sic excluditur violentia; ita tamen quod ipse operans sciat singulares circumstantias quae concurrunt ad operationem. Et per hoc excluditur ignorantia quae causat involuntarium.
| 425. After the Philosopher has considered the involuntary, he next turns his attention to the voluntary. First [I] he shows what the voluntary is. Then [II], at “Perhaps it is not accurate etc.,” he dismisses an erroneous view of it. On the first point we must consider that although the term involuntary seems to indicate the removal of the voluntary, nevertheless the causes lead us to understand that a thing is called voluntary by reason of the removal of the things causing an involuntary, such as violence and ignorance. Because every single thing is known through its cause, he gives the definition of the voluntary by taking away the cause of the involuntary. He says that since the involuntary comes about through physical compulsion and ignorance, as has been determined previously (386), the voluntary seems to be: that which the agent himself originates (thus violence is excluded) in such a way that the agent knows the individual circumstances that concur with the action. Thus ignorance as the cause of the involuntary is excluded.
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| Deinde cum dicit forsitan enim etc., excludit quemdam errorem. Et primo ponit ipsum. Quidam enim putabant quod non omne illud cuius principium est intra, etiam cum scientia circumstantiarum, est voluntarium; potest enim contingere quod illud principium quod est intra non sit appetitus rationalis qui dicitur voluntas a qua denominatur voluntarium, sed aliqua passio appetitus sensitivi, puta ira vel concupiscentia vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi; quod philosophus dicit non esse bene dictum. Et est notandum quod, quia passiones appetitus sensitivi excitantur a rebus exterioribus apprehensis per sensum, hic error eiusdem rationis esse videtur cum eo quem supra removit, secundum quem dicebatur quod res exteriores inferunt violentiam. Sed illud fuit ibi dicendum ubi agebatur de violento cuius principium est extra. Hoc autem est hic agendum ubi agitur de voluntario cuius principium est intra; nam passiones intra nos sunt.
| 426. Then [II], at “Perhaps it is,” he rejects an error. First [A] he explains it. Certain people were of the opinion that not everything, which the agent originates through a knowledge of circumstances, is a voluntary. It can happen that that principle which is from within is not the rational appetitive faculty called the will (voluntas), whence the voluntary receives its name, but a passion of the sensitive appetitive faculty, for instance, anger, sensual desire, or something else of this kind. This, the Philosopher says, is not an accurate statement. It should be noted that because the passions of the sensitive appetitive faculty are aroused by external things grasped by means of an external sense, this error seems to be of the same nature as the one he discarded previously (400-405), according to which it was indicated that external things bring about violence. It was imperative to state that in that context it was a question of violence, whose origin is external. But this must be treated here where it is a question of the voluntary, the principle of which is intrinsic, for the passions are within us.
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| Secundo ibi: primum quidem enim etc., improbat praedictam opinionem quinque rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Quaecumque operantur bruta animalia et etiam pueri, operantur secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi: non autem secundum appetitum intellectivum, quia carent usu rationis. Si ergo quae per iram et concupiscentiam et alias passiones appetitus sensitivi fiunt, essent involuntaria, sequeretur quod neque bruta animalia neque pueri voluntarie operarentur. Dicuntur autem voluntarie operari, non quia operentur ex voluntate, sed quia proprio motu sponte agunt, ita quod a nullo exteriori moventur. Hoc enim dicimus esse voluntarium quod quis sponte et proprio motu operatur. Ea ergo quae propter iram vel concupiscentiam fiunt, sunt voluntaria.
| 427. Second [B], at “The main reason is,” he rejects this opinion for five reasons. Here is his primary reason [a]. Whatever irrational animals and children do, they do in conformity with the affections of the sensitive faculty, and not in conformity with the rational faculty because they lack the use of reason. If then the things that are done through anger, sensual desire, and the other affections of the sensitive faculty were involuntary it would follow that neither animals nor children would act voluntarily. But agents are said to act voluntarily, not because they operate under the impulse of the will, but because they operate of their own accord by their proper movement in such a way that they are not moved by any external thing. It follows then that things done by reason of anger or sensual desire are voluntary.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi deinde utrum nihil et cetera. Quae talis est. Si ea quae fiunt propter iram vel concupiscentiam non sunt voluntaria: aut hoc est universaliter verum aut hoc est verum in malis, non autem in bonis, ut scilicet bona, quae quis facit ex passione voluntarie faciat, mala autem non voluntarie. Quod forte ideo dicebant quia bona concordant rationi, cui mala contrariantur. Voluntas autem in ratione est. Sed hoc secundum videtur esse ridiculosum: cum sit una causa omnium quae homo facit, sive sint bona sive mala: scilicet voluntas. Non enim quantumcumque ira vel concupiscentia increscat, homo prorumpit ad agendum nisi adveniat consensus rationabilis appetitus. Similiter etiam inconveniens videtur primum, scilicet quod aliquis dicat non voluntaria bona, quae oportet appetere etiam secundum passionem. Nam ad ea quae oportet appetere ratio per voluntatem inducit. Oportet autem in quibusdam irasci, puta ad coercendum peccata. Et similiter oportet concupiscere quaedam, puta sanitatem vel disciplinam. Relinquitur ergo falsum esse, quod ea quae propter passionem fiunt, non sint voluntaria.
| 428. He gives the second reason at “Are none” [b]. If the things that are done because of anger or sensual desire are not voluntary, either this is universally true or it is true of evil actions, not of good actions, so that the good actions that a person does by reason of passion he does voluntarily but the evil actions involuntarily. The proponents of this view were probably influenced by the fact that good actions conform to and evil actions are opposed to reason. But this second supposition seems unacceptable since the one cause of all human actions, both good and bad, is the will. A man does not rush to do whatsoever is rendered desirable by anger or sensual desire without the consent of the rational appetitive faculty. Likewise, the first supposition seems unreasonable, namely, that someone should call not-voluntary the good things that he ought to seek even according to passion, for the reason by means of the will incites to the things we ought to seek. We ought to be angry under certain conditions, for instance, to curb sin. Likewise we ought to desire certain things, for example, health and learning. It remains false then to hold that the things done on account of passion are not voluntary.
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| Tertiam rationem ponit ibi videntur autem involuntaria et cetera. Quae talis est. Involuntaria sunt cum tristitia. Sed illa quae fiunt secundum concupiscentiam, fiunt cum delectatione. Non ergo sunt involuntaria.
| 429. He assigns the third reason at “Involuntary things” [c]. It is this. Actions resulting from violence are accompanied by sadness, but those which are done in agreement with sensual desire are done with pleasure. Consequently they are not involuntary.
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| Quartam rationem ponit ibi adhuc autem quid differunt et cetera. Quae talis est. Sicut supra habitum est, peccata quae sunt voluntaria sunt vituperabilia et fugienda. Quod non potest dici de involuntariis; quia neque potest ea homo fugere neque propter ea vituperatur. Sed sicut peccata quae fiunt secundum cogitationem, idest per deliberationem, sunt fugienda et vituperabilia, ita etiam peccata quae fiunt propter iram, vel aliam passionem. Potest enim homo per voluntatem passioni resistere. Unde si propter passionem aliquid turpe operetur, vituperatur. Non ergo differunt ea quae fiunt ex passione ab his quae fiunt ex deliberatione quantum ad hoc quod sint voluntaria.
| 430. The fourth reason given at “Further, what” [d], is this. As has been pointed out before (383, 393), voluntary faults are to be censured and avoided. This cannot be said of the involuntary because a man is neither able to avoid these nor is he censured on account of them. But as sins that are committed after reflection, that is, with deliberation, are to be avoided and are blameworthy so also sins that are committed on account of anger or another passion. A man can, by means of his will, resist passion. Hence if he does a disgraceful act because of passion he is blamed. Therefore, they do not differ from things done by deliberation so far as they are voluntary.
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| Quintam rationem ponit ibi videntur autem et cetera. Quae talis est. Passiones irrationabiles, id est appetitus sensitivi, videntur esse humanae, inquantum scilicet appetitus sensitivus potest obedire rationi, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et operationes quae sunt ab ira et concupiscentia et aliis passionibus, sunt humanae. Sed nulla operatio involuntaria est humana. Non enim attribuuntur homini quae operatur involuntarius, neque ad laudem, neque ad vituperium. Inconveniens ergo est dicere quod ea quae fiunt ex passione sint involuntaria.
| 431. He assigns the fifth reason at “The irrational passions” [e]. Irrational passions, i.e., of the sensitive appetitive faculty, seem to be human insofar as the sensitive appetitive faculty can obey reason, as was stated before (272). Therefore, the actions proceeding from anger, sensual desire, and the other passions are human. But no involuntary operation is human, for neither praise nor blame are imputed to a man who acts involuntarily. Therefore, it is unreasonable to say that things done out of passion are involuntary.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Determinatis autem voluntario et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de voluntario et involuntario, hic determinat de electione. Et primo determinat de ipsa electione. Secundo de consilio quod in definitione electionis ponitur, ibi, consiliantur autem utrum de omnibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod ad praesentem doctrinam pertinet considerare de electione. Secundo inquirit quid sit electio, ibi: electio utique voluntarium et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod postquam determinatum est de voluntario et involuntario, consequens est quod pertranseunter de electione determinetur, quia videlicet breviter proponit ea quae sunt necessaria ad considerandum de electione. Quod autem ad hanc doctrinam pertineat de electione determinare, probat per hoc quod electio maxime videtur esse propria virtuti, de qua ad praesens principaliter intenditur.
| 432. After the Philosopher has treated the voluntary and the involuntary, he here makes a study of choice. First he gives an explanation of choice itself [I], and then [Lect. 7, II] of counsel (which is placed in the definition of choice) at “Should men take counsel about all things etc.” (B. 1112 a 19). Regarding the initial point he does two things. First [A] he shows that it belongs to our present study to consider choice. Next [B], at “Choice certainly is something,” he investigates the nature of choice. He says first that, after the treatise (382-431) on the voluntary and the involuntary, he will undertake a passing consideration of choice. Here then he proposes briefly the things necessary to study choice. He proves here that it belongs to our science to consider choice because choice seems especially proper to virtue, which is our principal concern at present.
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| Et huius ratio manifestatur ex hoc quod cum ex habitu virtutis procedat et interior electio et exterior operatio, mores virtuosi vel etiam vitiosi magis diiudicantur ex electione quam ex operationibus exterioribus; omnis enim virtuosus eligit bonum; sed quandoque non operatur propter aliquod exterius impedimentum. Et vitiosus quandoque operatur opus virtutis, non tamen ex electione virtuosa, sed ex timore, vel propter aliquem inconvenientem finem, puta propter inanem gloriam, vel propter aliquid aliud huiusmodi: unde patet quod ad praesentem intentionem pertinet considerare de electione.
| 433. Its appropriateness is clearly shown by the fact that although both inner choice and outward action flow from the habit of virtue, virtuous or vicious practices are judged rather by choice than by outward works. Every virtuous man chooses good but sometimes he does not do it because of some external hindrances. On the other hand the vicious man sometimes performs a virtuous deed not out of virtuous choice but out of fear or for some unbecoming motive, for instance, vainglory or something else of this kind. Hence it obviously pertains to our present purpose to consider choice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: electio utique etc., ostendit quid sit electio. Et primo inquirit genus eius. Secundo differentias ipsius, ibi, dicentes autem ipsam et cetera. Tertio concludit definitionem eius, ibi: quid igitur vel quale quid et cetera. Genus autem electionis est voluntarium, quia praedicatur universaliter de electione et est in plus. Unde dicit primo quod omnis electio est quiddam voluntarium, non autem omnino sunt idem electio et voluntarium, sed voluntarium est in plus. Quod probat duplici ratione.
| 434. Then [B], at “Choice certainly” he shows what choice is. First [A’] he investigates its genus, and next [B’] its different aspects, at “Those who say that choice etc.” Last [Lect. 6, C’], at “What, then, is its genus etc.” (B. 1112 a 13), he concludes the definition. The voluntary is the genus of choice because it is universally predicated of choice and of other things besides. Hence first he says that every choice is voluntary, but choice and the voluntary are not identical, for the voluntary is more extensive. He proves this in twofold fashion:
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| Quarum primam ponit ibi, voluntario quidem enim et cetera. Quae talis est. Pueri et alia animalia communicant ipso voluntario, inquantum scilicet proprio motu aliquid sponte operantur, ut supra dictum est. Non autem communicant electione, quia non operantur ex deliberatione, quod requiritur ad electionem: ergo voluntarium est in plus quam electio.
| 435. The first proof he gives by the words “... participate in voluntariety etc.” It is this. Children and the various brutes participate in voluntariety inasmuch as of their own accord they do things by their own movement, as has been noted above (427). But they do not communicate in choice because they do not act with deliberation, which is required for choice. Therefore, the voluntary is more extensive than choice.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi, et repentina et cetera. Quae talis est. Ea quae repente facimus, dicimus esse voluntaria, quia scilicet principium eorum in nobis est; non autem dicuntur esse secundum electionem, quia scilicet non fiunt ex deliberatione. Ergo voluntarium est in plus quam electio.
| 436. He assigns a second reason by the words “Then too the things done on the spur of the moment etc.” It is this. The things we do on the spur of the moment are called voluntary because their origin is within us. However, they are not said to be according to choice because they are not done with deliberation. Therefore, the voluntary is more extensive than choice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: dicentes autem ipsam etc., investigat differentias electionis, probando scilicet eam differre ab his cum quibus videtur convenire. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, non enim commune, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quidam dixerunt electionem esse concupiscentiam, quia scilicet utrumque importat motum appetitus in bonum. Quidam autem posuerunt electionem esse iram, forte propter hoc quod in utroque est quidam usus rationis. Iratus enim utitur ratione, inquantum iudicat iniuriam illatam esse dignam vindicta. Quidam vero considerantes, quod electio est sine passione, attribuerunt electionem parti rationali, vel quantum ad appetitum, dicentes eam esse voluntatem, vel quantum ad apprehensionem, dicentes eam esse quamdam opinionem. Et simpliciter in his quatuor comprehenduntur omnia principia humanorum actuum: quae sunt ratio ad quam pertinet opinio, appetitus rationalis, quae est voluntas: appetitus sensitivus, qui dividitur in irascibilem, ad quam pertinet ira, et concupiscibilem, ad quam pertinet concupiscentia. Dicit autem philosophus, quod non videntur recte dicere, qui dicunt electionem esse aliquid horum.
| 437. Next [B’], at “Those who say,” he investigates the different aspects of choice, proving that choice differs from things with which it appears to agree. On this question he does two things. First [1] he explains his intent. Then [2], at “Choice does not belong etc.,” he proves it. He says first that some philosophers have held that choice is sensual desire because both imply a movement of the appetitive faculty toward good. Others maintained that choice is anger, perhaps because in both there is a certain use of reason. The angry person uses reason inasmuch as he judges that an injury received deserves punishment. Still others who consider that choice is without passion ascribe choice to the rational part, either so far as concerns the appetitive faculty (saying it is wishing) or so far as it concerns perception (saying it is opinion). In these four states all the principles of human actions are included in a simple way: reason to which opinion belongs; the rational appetitive faculty that is the will; the sensitive appetitive faculty divided into irascible to which belong anger, and concupiscible to which belong sensual desire. The Philosopher says, however, that those who hold that choice is one of these do not speak accurately.
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| Deinde cum dicit: non enim commune etc., probat propositum. Et primo ostendit, quod electio non sit concupiscentia. Secundo quod non sit ira, ibi, ira autem, et cetera. Tertio, quod non sit voluntas, ibi, sed neque voluntas, et cetera. Quarto quod non sit opinio, ibi, neque iam opinio, et cetera. Circa primum ponit quatuor rationes. Quarum prima communis est concupiscentiae et irae, et est talis. Concupiscentia et ira communiter inveniuntur in hominibus, et in animalibus irrationabilibus. Sed in irrationabilibus non invenitur electio, ut dictum est. Ergo electio non est neque concupiscentia neque ira.
| 438. At “Choice does not” [2], he proves his proposition. He shows first [a] that choice is not sensual desire; next [b], at “There is less argument etc.,” that it is not anger; third [c], at “Choice is not identical etc.,” that it is not wishing; last [Lect. 6, d], that it is not opinion, at “Choice is not opinion etc.” (B. 1111 b 31). Regarding the first he gives four reasons. The first of these [a, i], common to sensual desire and anger, is this. Sensual desire and anger are found both among men and brutes. But choice is not met with among the brutes as has been said (435). Therefore, choice is neither sensual desire nor anger.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi et incontinens et cetera. Quae talis est. Si electio esset concupiscentia, quicumque operatur eligens, operaretur concupiscens, et e converso. Hoc autem est falsum. Quia incontinens operatur secundum concupiscentiam, non autem secundum electionem. Quia non immanet proprie electioni propter concupiscentiam. Continens autem e converso operatur ex electione, non autem ex concupiscentia cui per electionem resistit, ut infra in septimo patebit. Ergo electio non est idem concupiscentiae.
| 439. He gives the second reason at “The incontinent man” [a, ii]. It is this. If choice were sensual desire, whoever acts with choice would act with sensual desire. This, however, is false because the incontinent man acts in conformity with sensual desire but not in conformity with choice, for he does not reasonably direct his choice because of his sensual desire. But the continent man on the contrary acts from choice and not from sensual desire, which he resists by choice, as will be made evident in the seventh book (1143)Therefore, choice is not the same as sensual desire.
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| Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: et electioni quidem et cetera. Quae talis est. Concupiscentia contrariatur electioni, in eo scilicet qui est continens vel incontinens. Contrarium enim eligit uterque secundum rationem ei quod concupiscit secundum appetitum sensitivum. In neutro autem concupiscentia contrariatur concupiscentiae; quia tota concupiscentia utriusque ad idem tendit, scilicet ad delectabile sensus. Non est autem intelligendum, quod nulla concupiscentia contrarietur alteri concupiscentiae. Inveniuntur enim concupiscentiae contrariorum: puta cum unus concupiscit moveri, et alius quiescere. Ergo patet quod electio non est idem concupiscentiae.
| 440. He assigns the third reason at “Sensual desire is opposed” [a, iii]. It is this. Sensual desire is opposed to choice in one who is continent or incontinent. One chooses according to reason the opposite of that which the other desires according to the sensitive appetitive faculty. But the sensual desire in the one is not opposed to the sensual desire in the other, because the whole sensual desire of each one tends to the same thing, the pleasure of the senses. But this must not be understood in the sense that one desire may not be opposed to another. We do find desires of contraries, for instance, one man desires to move and another to remain in repose. Therefore it is evident that choice is not identical with sensual desire.
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| Quartam rationem ponit ibi et concupiscentia quidem et cetera. Quae talis est. Concupiscentia semper est cum delectatione, scilicet propter praesentiam rei concupitae, vel cum tristitia propter eius carentiam. Ad omnem enim passionem sequitur delectatio et tristitia ut in secundo habitum est. Sed electio non est ex necessitate cum delectatione vel tristitia. Potest enim esse absque omni passione, ex solo iudicio rationis. Ergo electio non est concupiscentia.
| 441. The fourth reason, given at “Sensual desire is accompanied” [a, iv], is this. Sensual desire is always accompanied by pleasure because of the presence of the thing desired, or by sorrow because of the absence of that thing. Every passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, as has been pointed out in the second book (296). But choice is not necessarily associated with pleasure or sorrow, for it can occur without any passion by the judgment of reason alone. Therefore, choice is not sensual desire.
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| Deinde cum dicit: ira autem etc., ostendit quod electio non sit idem irae. Et dicit quod adhuc electio minus est ira quam concupiscentia. Quia etiam secundum apparentiam ea quae facta sunt propter iram, non videntur esse facta secundum electionem, eo quod propter velocitatem motus irae ea quae fiunt ex ira maxime sunt repentina. Quamvis enim in ira sit aliquis usus rationis, inquantum scilicet iratus incipit audire rationem iudicantem quod iniuria debet vindicari, non tamen perfecte audit eam determinantem modum et ordinem vindictae; unde ira maxime excludit deliberationem, quae requiritur ad electionem. Concupiscentia autem non ita repente operatur. Unde ea quae fiunt secundum concupiscentiam, non videntur esse remota ab electione sicut ea quae fiunt per iram.
| 442. Then [b], at “There is less argument,” he shows that choice is not the same as anger. As to this, he says that there is less argument in favor of choice being anger than sensual desire. The reason is that even according to appearances the things done from anger do not seem to be done by choice because, by reason of the swiftness of the movement of wrath, the actions done through anger are very sudden. Although in anger there is some use of reason, insofar as the angry person begins to attend to his reason as it judges that an injury ought to be avenged, nevertheless he does not perfectly heed reason in determining the manner and the order of the vengeance. Hence anger especially excludes deliberation, which is necessary for choice. But sensual desire does not act so suddenly. Hence things done in conformity with sensual desire do not seem to be remote from choice as the things done out of anger.
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| Deinde cum dicit sed neque voluntas etc., ostendit differentiam electionis ad voluntatem. Et primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, electio quidem enim, et cetera. Tertio concludit radicem differentiae voluntatis et electionis, ibi, universaliter autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod neque etiam electio est voluntas, quamvis videatur esse propinqua voluntati. Utrumque enim pertinet ad unam potentiam; scilicet ad appetitum rationalem, qui voluntas dicitur. Sed voluntas nominat actum huius potentiae secundum quod fertur in bonum absolute. Electio autem nominat actum eiusdem potentiae relatum in bonum secundum quod pertinet ad nostram operationem, per quam in aliquod bonum ordinamur.
| 443. Next [c], at “Choice is not identical,” he explains the difference between choice and wish. First [c’ I] he sets forth his proposition. Then [c, ii], at “Choice is not concerned etc.,” he proves it. Last [c, iii], at “In general, choice,” he deduces the origin of the difference between choice and wishing. He says first that choice is not even wishing although it seems to be closely connected with wishing. Both belong to the one power, the rational appetitive faculty or the will. Wishing designates an act of this power related to good absolutely. But choice designates an act of the same power related to good according as it belongs to an act by which we are ordered to some good.
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| Deinde cum dicit: electio quidem enim etc., probat propositum tribus rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Electio enim, quia refertur ad nostram operationem, non dicitur esse impossibilium. Et si quis dicat se eligere aliquid impossibilium, videbitur esse stultus. Sed voluntas, quia respicit bonum absolute, potest esse cuiuscumque boni, licet sit impossibile, sicut potest aliquis velle esse immortalis, quod est impossibile secundum statum huius corruptibilis vitae. Ergo electio et voluntas non sunt idem.
| 444. At “Choice is not concerned” [c, ii], he proves the statement by three reasons, of which the first is this [x]. Because choice refers to our activity, it is said that choice is not concerned with impossible things. If a person should say that he chooses something impossible he will appear foolish. But wishing can be directed to any good even the impossible because it regards good absolutely. Thus a man can wish to be immortal, an impossible thing according to the condition of this perishable life. Therefore, choice and wish are not the same.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi et voluntas quidem est et cetera. Quae talis est. Voluntas alicuius potest esse circa ea quae non fiunt per ipsum: sicut ille qui circumspicit duellum, potest velle quod vincat aliquis ypocrita, id est simulatam gerens personam, puta qui ingreditur campum quasi pugil, cum non sit pugil, vel etiam quod vincat ille qui vere est athleta. Sed nullus eligit talia quae fiunt per alium, sed solum illa quae existimat posse fieri per ipsum. Ergo electio differt a voluntate.
| 445. He gives the second reason at “Wishing can be” [y]. The wishing of someone can be concerned with things not done by himself. Thus he who is a spectator at a duel can wish that a pretender playing an assumed role may win (for example, a man who comes into the ring as a boxer when he is not a boxer) or even that one who is really an athlete may win. No one, however, chooses these things that are done by another but only those that he thinks he can do himself. Therefore, choice differs from wishing.
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| Tertiam rationem ponit ibi adhuc autem voluntas et cetera. Et dicit quod voluntas magis est finis quam eius quod est ad finem. Quia ea quae sunt ad finem volumus propter finem. Propter quod autem unumquodque, illud magis. Sed electio est solum eorum quae sunt ad finem, non autem ipsius finis. Quia finis praesupponitur, ut iam praedeterminatus. Ea vero quae sunt ad finem, inquiruntur ut a nobis disponenda in finem. Sicut sanitatem, quae est finis medicationis, volumus principaliter. Sed eligimus medicinalia per quae sanemur. Et similiter volumus esse felices, quod est ultimus finis, et hoc dicimus nos velle, sed non congruit dicere quod eligamus nos esse felices. Ergo electio non est idem voluntati.
| 446. He assigns the third reason at “Moreover, wishing.” He says that wishing is directed rather to the end than to the means because we wish the means on account of the end. But that for the sake of which something exists is itself greater. But choice concerns only the means and not the end itself because the end as already predetermined is presupposed. The means, however, are sought by us as things to be ordered to the end. Thus we wish health principally since it is the end of healing. But we choose the remedies by which we are restored to health. Likewise we wish to be happy—happiness is our ultimate end—and we say we wish this. Yet it is not suitable to say that we elect or choose to be happy. Therefore, choice is not the same as wish.
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| Deinde cum dicit universaliter autem etc., ponit radicem totius differentiae, ad quam universaliter omnes praedictae differentiae referuntur. Et dicit, quod electio videtur esse circa ea quae sunt in potestate nostra. Et haec est causa quare nec est impossibilium, neque eorum quae per alios fiunt, neque finis, qui ut plurimum praestituitur nobis a natura.
| 447. Then [c, iii], at “In general, choice,” he gives the root of the whole difference to which all the previous differences in general are referred. He says that choice seems to be directed to the things that are within our power. This is the reason why it does not concern impossibles, things done by others, nor the end that, for the most part, is prearranged for us by nature.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Neque iam opinio utique erit et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod electio non est idem neque concupiscentiae neque irae, quae pertinent ad appetitum sensitivum, neque etiam voluntati quae pertinet ad appetitum rationalem, hic ostendit quod non est idem opinioni quae pertinet ad ipsam rationem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit, quod electio non est idem cuilibet opinioni. Secundo, quod non est idem specialiter opinioni quae est de operandis a nobis ibi sed neque cuidam, et cetera. Tertio movet quamdam dubitationem, quam insolutam relinquit, ibi, si autem praesit opinio et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod secundum praedicta apparet, quod electio non est idem quod opinio universaliter sumpta: et hoc probat duabus rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Opinio potest esse circa omnia et non minus circa necessaria et impossibilia quam circa ea quae sunt in potestate nostra. Sed electio est solum circa ea quae sunt in nobis, ut dictum est. Ergo electio non est idem opinioni.
| 448. After the Philosopher has shown that choice is not the same as sensual desire; nor anger, which belongs to the sensitive appetitive faculty; nor wishing, which belongs to the rational appetitive faculty, he here shows [d] that choice is not the same as opinion, which pertains to reason itself. He illustrates this point by a threefold consideration. First [i] he shows that choice is not the same as opinion in general. Next [ii], at “Nor is choice etc.,” he shows that choice is not the same as that particular opinion that concerns itself with the things we do. Last [iii], at “Whether opinion should be,” he raises a doubt (which he leaves unsolved). He says first—this is apparent from the premises—that choice is not the same as opinion in general. He proves the statement by two reasons, the first of which is this [i, y]. Opinion can concern everything—no less eternal and impossible things than things lying within our power. But choice concerns these things only within our capacity, as was just noted (447). Therefore, choice is not the same as opinion.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi, et falso et vero et cetera. Quae talis est. Ea quae diversis differentiis dividuntur, differunt, nec sunt idem. Sed opinio dividitur vero et falso, quia pertinet ad vim cognitivam, cuius obiectum est verum, non autem dividitur bono et malo quibus dividitur electio, quae pertinet ad vim appetitivam, cuius obiectum est bonum. Et ex hoc concludit, quod electio non est idem opinioni universaliter acceptae. Et hoc est adeo manifestum, quod nullus contrarium dicit.
| 449. He gives the second reason at “Then, too, opinion is divided etc.” [i, z]. It is this. The things that are distinguished by various reasons are said to differ and not to be the same. Opinion, however, is divided into true and false since it pertains to the faculty of knowledge, the object of which is the truth. Opinion is not divided into good and bad as is the case with choice which belongs to the appetitive faculty, the object of which is the good. He concludes from this that choice is not the same as opinion in general. This is so obvious that no one affirms the contrary.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sed neque cuidam etc., ostendit quod electio non est idem cuidam opinioni, quae scilicet est de his quae cadunt sub nostra operatione. Et hoc ostendit quinque rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Ex hoc quod eligimus bona vel mala dicimur quales quidam, id est boni vel mali, non autem ex hoc quod opinamur bona vel mala, sive vera vel falsa, dicimur boni vel mali. Ergo electio non est idem opinioni quae est de eligibilibus.
| 450. Then [ii], at “Nor is choice,” he shows that choice is not identical with that opinion which deals with the things we do. He proves this by (five) reasons, the first of which is this [ii, v]. From the fact that we choose good or bad things we are said to be such, that is, good or bad. But from the fact that we have an opinion about good or bad things, or about true or false things, we are not said to be good or bad. Therefore choice is not identical with opinion, which refers to eligible things.
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| Huius autem differentiae ratio est quia bonus vel malus dicitur aliquis non secundum potentiam, sed secundum actum, ut habetur in IX metaphysicae, id est non ex hoc quod est potens bene operari, sed ex hoc quod bene operatur: ex hoc autem, quod homo est perfectus secundum intellectum fit homo potens bene operari, non autem bene operans, sicut ille qui habet habitum grammaticae ex hoc ipso est potens loqui congrue; sed ad hoc quod congrue loquatur, requiritur quod hoc velit. Quia habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit, ut dicit Commentator in tertio de anima. Unde patet, quod bona voluntas facit hominem bene operari, secundum quamcumque potentiam vel habitum rationi obedientem. Et ideo aliquis dicitur simpliciter bonus homo ex hoc, quod habet bonam voluntatem. Ex hoc autem, quod habet bonum intellectum, non dicitur bonus homo simpliciter, sed secundum quid: puta bonus grammaticus, vel bonus musicus. Et ideo, quia electio pertinet ad voluntatem, opinio autem ad intellectum, ex electione dicimur boni vel mali, non autem ex opinione.
| 451. The reason for this difference is that a man is not called good or bad on account of his capabilities but on account of his actions (as noted in the ninth book of the Metaphysics: Ch. 9, 1051 a 4-15; St. Th. Lect. 10, 1883-1885), that is, not because he is able to act well but because he does in fact act well. When a man understands perfectly he becomes able to act well but he does not yet act well. Thus one who has the habit of grammar is able by that very fact to speak correctly, but that he actually speak correctly he must will it. The reason is that a habit is that quality by which a person acts when he wishes, as the Commentator says on the third book De Anima. It is obvious then that good will makes a man act well according to every capability or habit obedient to reason. Therefore a man is called good simply because he has a good will. However, from the fact that he has a good intellect he is not called good simply but relatively good, for example, a good grammarian or a good musician. Therefore, since choice pertains to the will but opinion to the intellect, we are called good or bad by reason of choice but not by reason of opinion.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi, et eligimus quidem et cetera. Quae talis est. Electio praecipue respicit actiones nostras. Eligimus enim quod accipiamus hoc vel fugiamus, vel quicquid est aliud quod ad actiones nostras pertinet. Sed opinio principaliter respicit res. Opinamur enim quid est hoc, puta quod est panis, vel ad quid conferat, vel qualiter sit eo utendum. Non est autem opinio principaliter circa operationes nostras, puta quod opinemur nos accipere aliquid vel fugere. Quia actiones nostrae sunt quaedam singularia contingentia, et cito transeuntia. Unde earum cognitio vel opinio, non multum quaeritur propter veritatem quae sit in eis, sed solum propter opus. Ergo electio non est idem opinioni.
| 452. He gives the second reason at “We choose to accept” [ii, w]. Choice has to do especially with our actions. We choose to accept or reject this thing, or whatever else there is that pertains to our actions. But opinion principally refers to things. We have an opinion as to what this thing is (for instance, what bread is) or what effect it has or how one must use it. Opinion, however, does not principally concern our actions, for example, that we are of an opinion about accepting or rejecting something. The reason is that our actions are particular contingent things and quickly passing. Hence a knowledge or opinion of them is not often sought for the sake of the truth in them but only because of something done. Therefore choice is not identical with opinion.
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| Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: et electio quidem laudatur et cetera. Quae talis est. Bonum electionis in quadam rectitudine consistit, prout scilicet appetitus recte ordinat aliquid in finem. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod electio magis laudatur in hoc, quod est eius cuius oportet quasi recte, sed opinio laudatur in hoc, quod vere est alicuius. Et sic bonum et perfectio opinionis est veritas. Quorum autem sunt diversae perfectiones, et ipsa sunt diversa. Ergo electio non est idem opinioni.
| 453. He assigns a third reason at “Choice is” [ii, x]. It is this. The good of choice consists in a kind of rectitude, that is, the appetitive faculty rightly orders something to an end. This is what he means saying that choice is rather praised because it chooses what it ought, as it were in the right way, while opinion is praised because it has the truth about something. Thus the good and perfection of choice is rectitude but the perfection of opinion consists in truth. Things which have different perfections are themselves different. Therefore choice is not opinion.
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| Quartam rationem ponit ibi et eligimus quidem et cetera. Quae talis est. Electio est cum quadam certitudine. Illa enim eligimus, quae maxime scimus esse bona. Sed opinio est sine certitudine. Opinamur enim illa quae non multum scimus esse vera. Ergo non sunt idem.
| 454. The fourth reason, given at “We choose those things” [ii, y], is this. Choice is accompanied by certitude, for we choose those things which we especially know are good. But opinion lacks certitude, for we have an opinion about the things we are not sure are true. Therefore choice and opinion are not identical.
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| Quintam rationem ponit ibi et videntur et cetera. Si enim opinio et electio essent idem, oporteret quod idem essent illi qui eligunt optima et qui habent veram opinionem de eis. Sed hoc patet esse falsum. Quidam enim vere opinantur in universali quid sit melius, sed propter malitiam non eligunt quod melius est, sed quod est deterius. Ergo electio et opinio non sunt idem.
| 455. He assigns the fifth reason at “And it is not necessarily” [ii, z]. if opinion and choice were identical, those who make the best choices and those who have true opinions about them would necessarily be identified. This is obviously false, however, for some men form a true opinion in general of what is better but on account of bad will they do not choose what is better but what is worse. Therefore choice and opinion are not identical.
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| Deinde cum dicit: si autem praesit etc., movet quamdam dubitationem: utrum scilicet opinio praecedat electionem, vel sequatur ad ipsam. Et dicit, quod hoc nihil differt ad propositum. Quia nunc non intendimus determinare ordinem eorum, sed solum utrum electio sit idem alicui opinioni. Sciendum tamen, quod opinio, quum pertineat ad vim cognoscitivam, per se loquendo praecedit electionem quae pertinet ad vim appetitivam, quae movetur a cognoscitiva. Per accidens tamen contingit quandoque, quod opinio sequitur electionem; puta cum aliquis ex affectu eorum quae eligit mutat opinionem quam prius habebat.
| 456. At “Whether opinion” [iii] he raises a doubt whether opinion should be said to precede choice or follow it. He states that it does not matter for the present because we do not intend to determine the order of these things but only whether choice is identical with a particular opinion. Nevertheless, we must know that opinion, since it pertains to the faculty of knowledge, strictly speaking, precedes choice pertaining to the appetitive faculty, which is moved by the cognoscitive power. However, it sometimes happens accidentally that opinion follows choice, for instance, when a person on account of the affection for things he loves changes the opinion he formerly held.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quid igitur etc., ostendit quid sit electio. Et dicit quod cum non sit aliquod quatuor praedictorum, oportet considerare quid sit secundum genus, vel quale quid est secundum differentiam. Et quantum ad genus videtur, quod sit voluntarium. Non tamen omne voluntarium est eligibile, ut supra dictum est, sed voluntarium praeconsiliatum. Et quod haec differentia sit addenda, manifestat per hoc, quod consilium est actus rationis, et ipsa electio oportet quod sit cum actu rationis et intellectus. Et hoc videtur subsignare, idest occulte signare ipsum nomen eius, quod signat ut aliquid prae aliis accipiatur. Hoc autem pertinet ad rationem conferentem, ut unum aliis praeferatur.
| 457. Then [C’], at “What then,” he shows what choice is. He says that, since it is none of the four things previously mentioned, we must consider what it is according to its genus and what according to its specific difference. As to its genus, seemingly it is a voluntary. However, not every voluntary is a thing chosen (as has been pointed out before, 434-436), but only the deliberately intentional voluntary. That this difference should be given attention is clear from the fact that counsel is an act of the reason, and choice itself must be accompanied by an act of reason and intellect. The very name—meaning that one be accepted rather than another—seems to imply or signify this in a hidden way. It pertains to deliberative reason to prefer one to others.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Consiliantur autem utrum de omnibus et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de electione, hic determinat de consilio. Et primo de consilio secundum se. Secundo per comparationem ad electionem, ibi consiliabile autem, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit de quibus debeat esse consilium. Secundo determinat de modo et ordine consiliandi, ibi, consiliamur autem non de finibus, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit; primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur propositum, ibi, de aeternis autem, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quaestionem, quam tractare intendit. Et est quaestio, utrum homines consilientur de omnibus rebus, ita quod unumquodque sit consiliabile, aut quaedam sint de quibus non est consilium.
| 458. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on choice, he here [II] takes up the question of counsel. First [A] he treats counsel in itself; and then [Lect. 9; B], at “The objects of counsel etc.” (B. 1113 a 3), he treats it in comparison with choice. On the initial point he does two things. First [A’] he shows the things about which counsel ought to be taken. Next [Lect. 8; B’], at “We do not take counsel about ends etc.” (B.1112 b 13), he treats the method and order of taking counsel. He handles the first consideration in two steps. First [1] he puts forward his proposition; and then [2], he executes it at “... about: (1) eternal things etc.” In regard to this first he also does two things. Initially [1, a] he proposes the question he intends to treat. The question is: should men take counsel about all things in such a way that everything is worthy of deliberation, or are some things not objects of counsel?
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| Secundo ibi dicendum autem forsitan etc., exponit propositam quaestionem. Et dicit quod non dicitur illud consiliabile, de quo quandoque consiliatur aliquis insipiens, qui scilicet habet usum rationis, sed perversum; vel insanus, qui totaliter usu rationis caret. Sed illud vere dicitur consiliabile de quo consiliantur homines habentes intellectum recte dispositum. Tales enim non consiliantur nisi de rebus, quae in natura sua talia sunt ut de eis consilium haberi debeat, quae proprie dicuntur consiliabilia; insipientes autem quandoque consiliantur etiam de his, quae in natura sua sunt talia ut de eis consilium haberi non debeat.
| 459. Next [1, b], at “A thing must not,” he explains the proposed question with the observation that a thing is not said to be worthy of deliberation from the fact that sometimes counsel is taken in the matter by some foolish person who perversely uses his reason, or by an insane person entirely lacking the use of reason. But something is deemed worthy of deliberation inasmuch as men with good sense do deliberate about it. Men of this type take counsel only about things that of their nature require careful consideration and that are properly said to be worthy of deliberation. Foolish people sometimes deliberate even about things wherein no counsel is required.
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| Deinde cum dicit: de aeternis autem etc., ostendit de quibus sit consilium. Et primo distinguendo res secundum causas secundo distinguendo eas secundum artes quascumque, ibi, et quidem circa certas etc.; tertio distinguendo eas secundum ipsarum rerum conditiones, ibi, consiliari autem oportet, et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit de quibus non sit consilium. Secundo concludit de quibus sit ibi, consiliamur autem, etc.; tertio ostendit conclusionem sequi ex praemissis, ibi, haec autem et sunt reliqua, et cetera. Circa primum quinque facit. Primo dicit quod nullus consiliatur de aeternis, idest de his quae semper sunt et sine motu. Huiusmodi autem sunt, vel illa quorum substantiae motui non subduntur, sicut substantiae separatae, et ipsa mundi universitas. Vel etiam ea quae, etsi secundum esse sint in materia mobili, tamen secundum rationem ab huiusmodi materia abstrahuntur, sicut sunt mathematica. Unde ponit exemplum de diametro quadrati, et costa idest latere eius, de quibus nullus consiliatur an sint commensurabiles.
| 460. Then [2], at “... about: (1) eternal things,” he shows where counsel should function, first [2, a] by distinguishing things according to their own causes; next [2, b], at “About certain etc.,” by distinguishing things according to every cause; and last [2, c], at “Counsel has to concern etc.,” by distinguishing things according to the qualities of the things themselves. On the first point he does (three) things. First [a, i] he shows where counsel is unnecessary. Then [a, ii], at “But we do take counsel etc.,” he infers the areas with which counsel does deal. Last [a, iii], at “There is actually etc.,” he shows that the conclusion follows from the premises. In regard to the first, five considerations require his attention. First [i, v] he says that no one takes counsel about eternal things, that is, about things existing always and without motion. Examples of this sort are either those, the substances of which are not subject to motion (as separated substances and the whole universe itself), or those which, even though they exist in movable matter, nevertheless according to reason are separated from such matter, as mathematical entities. Hence he gives the example of the diagonal of a square and its rib or side—no one takes counsel about the commensurability of such things.
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| Secundo ibi: sed neque de his etc., dicit quod etiam nullus consiliatur de his quae etsi moveantur, motus tamen eorum semper est uniformis; sive uniformitas motus eorum sit ex necessitate non propter aliquam aliam causam sicut ea quae sunt necessaria per seipsa, sive hoc sit per naturam corporum mobilium, sive hoc sit propter aliquam causam separatam, prout ponuntur substantiae immateriales, moventes orbes caelestes, de quibus hic loquitur. Unde exemplificat de versionibus, idest de circularibus motibus solis et ortibus eius.
| 461. Next [i, w], at “things that are in motion,” he says that no one takes counsel even about things that are in action provided their motion is always uniform. This uniformity of motion may be either of necessity and not by reason of any other cause (as are those things which are of themselves necessary) or from the nature of movable bodies or through the agency of some separated cause as immaterial substances, movers of the heavenly bodies, about which he speaks here. Hence he takes an example from the revolutions or circular motions of the sun and its risings, and so forth.
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| Tertio ibi: neque de his quae alias etc., dicit quod neque etiam est consilium de his quae in motu consistunt, et ut in pluribus eodem modo fiunt, aliquando tamen licet in paucioribus aliter accidunt; sicut sunt siccitates, quae ut frequentius accidunt in aestate, et imbres, qui ut pluries accidunt in hieme, licet quandoque aliter accidat.
| 462. Third [i, x], at “things that sometimes,” he says that deliberation is unnecessary about things in motion and usually following the same pattern, even though sometimes in a minor number of cases they happen otherwise. Such are the droughts that generally occur in summer and the rains that commonly fall in, winter; although this may at times vary.
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| Quarto ibi: neque de his quae etc., dicit quod neque consilium etiam est de his quae fiunt a fortuna, sicut de inventione thesauri. Sicut enim ea de quibus supra habitum est, non sunt ex operatione nostra, ita fortuita non possunt esse ex nostra praemeditatione, quia sunt improvisa, et praeter intentionem.
| 463. Fourth [i, y], at “things that happen,” he says that counsel is not taken about things that happen by chance as the finding of a treasure. just as the things spoken of above (461-462) do not depend on our action, so things happening by chance cannot depend upon our forethought because they are unforeseen and beyond our control.
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| Quinto ibi: sed neque de humanis etc., dicit quod non solum homines non consiliantur de necessariis, et naturalibus, et fortuitis, sed nec etiam de omnibus rebus humanis; sicut Lacedaemonii non consiliantur qualiter Scythae, qui sunt ab eis valde remoti, optime debeant conversari. Et subiungit rationem communem respondentem omnibus praedictis, cum dicit. Non enim fiet, et cetera. Quia scilicet nihil eorum, quae scilicet sunt necessaria vel naturalia, vel fortuita, vel per alios homines facta, fit per nos.
| 464. Fifth [i, z], at “all human things,” he says, as men do not take counsel about necessary, natural, and fortuitous things, so neither do they take counsel about all human things. Thus the Spartans do not take counsel about how the Scythians—who dwell a long way from them—ought best to live their lives. He then subjoins a common reason valid in all the afore-mentioned cases when he says “None of these things will take place etc.,” because none of these things that are necessary or natural or fortuitous or done by other men take place by reason of our efforts.
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| Deinde cum dicit consiliamur autem de his etc., dicit quasi concludens ex praemissis, de quibus sit consilium. Et dicit, quod consiliamur de operabilibus, quae in nobis, idest in nostra potestate existunt. Consilium enim ad operationem ordinatur.
| 465. Then [a, ii], at “But we do take counsel,” he concludes as it were from the premises about the Proper field for counsel. He says that men take counsel about practicable things within us, that is, in our power. Counsel is ordered to action.
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| Deinde cum dicit: haec autem sunt etc., ostendit hoc sequi ex praemissis: quia scilicet praeter praemissa, de quibus dictum est quod non est consilium, ista sola sunt reliqua, scilicet ea quae sunt in nobis, de quibus dicimus esse consilium. Et hoc probat dividendo causas. Videntur enim esse quatuor causae rerum, scilicet natura, quae est principium motus, sive eorum quae semper eodem modo moventur, sive eorum quae ut in pluribus uniformitatem motus servant; et necessitas, quae est causa eorum, quae semper eodem modo sunt sine motu. Et fortuna, quae est causa per accidens, praeter intentionem agens, sub qua etiam comprehenditur casus. Et praeter has causas adhuc est causa intellectus, et quicquid est aliud, quod producit id quod per hominem fit; sicut voluntas et sensus, et alia huiusmodi principia. Et haec causa diversificatur secundum diversos homines; ita quod singuli homines consiliantur de his operabilibus quae possunt fieri per ipsos, ex quo de his quae per alias causas fiunt, consilium non est, ut dictum est.
| 466. Next [a, iii], at “There is actually,” he shows that this follows from the premises because, besides the things just mentioned about which it has been indicated that counsel does not apply, there remain these situations within us on whose behalf counsel is required. He proves his contention by separating the causes. Seemingly there are four causes of things: nature, which is the principle of motion either in the case of things always moved in the same way or of things for the most part preserving uniform motion; necessity, which is the cause of things existing always in the same way without motion; fortune, an accidental cause outside the intention of the agent, under which is also included chance. Besides these causes there is the intellect and whatever else is man’s agent, as the will, the senses, and other principles of this kind. This cause is different in different men so that each takes counsel about those practicable matters which can be done by him. From this it follows that counsel is not taken about things done by other causes, as already noted (464).
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| Deinde cum dicit: et quidem circa certas etc., ostendit de quibus potest esse consilium secundum diversas artes operativas secundum quas operamur ea quae in nobis sunt. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit circa quas artes sit consilium, et circa quas non. Et dicit quod circa illas operativas disciplinas quae habent certos modos operandi et sunt per se sufficientes, ita scilicet quod effectus operis earum non dependet ex eventu alicuius extrinseci, circa has inquam artes non est consilium, sicut de litteris conscribendis. Et huius ratio est quia non consiliamur nisi in dubiis. Non est autem dubium qualiter debeat scribi, quia certus est modus scribendi et non dependet effectus Scripturae nisi ex arte et manu scribentis. Sed de his est consilium quaecumque fiunt per nos, id est in quibus oportet per nos determinari qualiter fiant, quia non sunt in se certa et determinata.
| 467. At “About certain” [2, b] he shows about what subjects counsel can be taken in the creative arts according to which we do what is within our power. On this point he does (three) things. First [b, i] he shows in the arts where counsel is taken and where it is unnecessary. He says that those creative arts which have a fixed mode of procedure and are self-sufficient to the extent that what is done rests on nothing, extrinsic do not require counsel, as writing the letters of the alphabet. The reason for this is that we deliberate only about doubtful matters. And there is no doubt about how a letter should be formed because there is a fixed method of writing which is not doubtful and the written work depends only on the art and hand of the scribe. But counsel is taken about those situations in which we must fix for ourselves in advance how to proceed since they are not certain and determined in themselves.
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| Secundo ibi: non similiter autem etc., ostendit quod de his non eodem modo est consilium; sed de quibusdam magis et de quibusdam minus. Et primo ostendit hanc differentiam inter artes operativas adinvicem. Et dicit quod non semper de his quae per nos determinantur, similiter, idest aequali dubitatione consiliamur, sed de quibusdam magis, quae sunt minus determinata et in quibus plura exteriora oportet considerare: sicut in arte medicinali, in qua oportet attendere ad virtutem naturae eius qui sanatur, et in negotiativa, in qua oportet attendere ad necessitates hominum et abundantiam rerum venalium, et in gubernativa in qua oportet attendere ad flatus ventorum; et in his magis consiliamur quam in arte gignastica, id est luctativa vel exercitativa, quae magis habet certos et determinatos modos, quanto praedictae artes sunt minus certae. Et idem intelligendum est in aliis artibus.
| 468. Next [b, ii], at “In these matters,” he shows that in these matters counsel is not taken in the same way but that some cases require more deliberation and others less. First he explains this difference among the creative arts themselves. He states that in those cases in which we have the final say, we do not always take counsel in the same way, that is, with equal deliberation. We deliberate more about some things which are less certain and in which we must take into consideration more external things: in the art of medicine we must be mindful of the natural strength of the sick person; in business we must assess the needs of men and the supply of goods; and in navigation we must take into account the winds. In all these, we take more counsel than in gymnastics, i.e., the arts of wrestling and exercising that have more fixed and determined methods. According as the previously mentioned arts are less settled, by so much must we take more counsel in them. The same must be understood of other arts.
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| Secundo ibi: magis autem etc., ostendit differentiam quantum ad necessitatem consilii inter artes operativas et scientias speculativas. Et dicit quod magis necesse habemus consiliari circa artes, scilicet operativas, quam circa disciplinas, scilicet speculativas: in quibus non est consilium quantum ad ea de quibus sunt, quia huiusmodi sunt ex necessitate vel ex natura, sed quantum ad usum earum, ut puta quomodo vel quo ordine sit in eis procedendum. In quo tamen minus est necesse consiliari quam in scientiis practicis, circa quas magis dubitamus propter magnam varietatem quae in istis artibus accidit.
| 469. Last [b, iii], at “It is more necessary,” he shows the difference relative to the necessity of counsel in the creative arts and in the speculative sciences. He indicates that counsel is more necessary in the arts (the practicable) than in the sciences (the speculative). In the latter, deliberation occurs not in regard to their subject matter, for these exist necessarily or by nature, but as regards the use of these things, for example, how and in what order we are to proceed in the sciences. In this, however, counsel is less mandatory than in the practical sciences about which we have more doubts because of the great variety occurring in these skills.
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| Deinde cum dicit: consiliari autem oportet etc., ostendit de quibus debeat esse consilium, considerando conditiones ipsarum rerum. Et circa hoc ponit tres conditiones rerum de quibus est consilium. Et primo dicit quod oportet consiliari de his quae saepius accidunt. Tamen quia possunt aliter evenire, incertum est qualiter contingent. Si quis enim vellet in consilium deducere ea quae rarissime accidunt, puta si pons lapideus per quem transeundum est, cadat, nunquam homo aliquid operaretur.
| 470. Then [2, c], at “Counsel has to,” he shows about which things counsel ought to be taken, by considering the qualities of the things themselves. On this point he puts forward three qualities of things with which counsel deals. First [c, i] he says that counsel has to do with things which occur more frequently. However, because they can happen otherwise it is uncertain in what way they may take place. If a man should wish to deliberate about things that rarely happen, for instance, about the possible collapse of a stone bridge over which he must pass, he will never get anything done.
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| Secundo ibi: et in quibus etc., dicit quod oportet consiliari de illis in quibus non est determinatum qualiter oporteat agere. Iudex enim non consiliatur qualiter debeat sententiare in his quae sunt lege statuta, sed forte in casibus in quibus non est aliquid lege determinatum.
| 471. Second [c, ii], at “It must concern,” he says that counsel must attend to those situations in which no determination has yet been made of their outcome. A judge does not take counsel about how he ought to pass sentence on the cases stated in the law but rather about cases in which something is not determined in the law.
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| Tertio ibi: consiliatores autem etc., dicit quod assumimus nobis alios ad consiliandum in rebus magnis, quasi non credentes nobis ipsis ut simus sufficientes ad discernendum quid oporteat nos facere. Et sic patet quod consilium non debet esse de minimis quibuscumque, sed de rebus magnis.
| 472. Third [c, iii], at “We invite counsellors,” he says that we take others into our confidence for advice in things of importance, as if we did not acknowledge our own capability of deciding what we ought to do. Thus it is obvious that counsel ought not to be taken about trifling things of every kind but only about things of importance.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Consiliamur autem non de finibus et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit de quibus sit consilium, hic determinat de modo et ordine consiliandi. Et quia consilium est quaedam inquisitio, circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit modum consiliativae inquisitionis. Secundo effectum eius, ibi, et si quidem impossibile etc.; tertio ostendit huius inquisitionis terminum, ibi, videtur autem quemadmodum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo proponit modum consiliandi; secundo manifestat quaedam quae dixerat, ibi, qui enim consiliatur et cetera. Cum autem consilium sit quaedam inquisitio practica de operabilibus; necesse est quod sicut in inquisitione speculativa supponuntur principia et quaedam alia inquiruntur, ita etiam et in consilio fiat. Unde primo ostendit quid supponitur in consilio. Secundo quid in consilio quaeratur, ibi, sed ponentes finem et cetera.
| 473. After the Philosopher has shown about what things counsel is taken, he here he treats the method and order of taking counsel. Because counsel is a kind of inquiry, he does three things concerning it. First [1] he shows the method of deliberative inquiry; next [2], at “if those taking counsel etc.,” he shows its effect; last [3], at “As has been previously stated etc.,” he determines the limit of this inquiry. On the initial point he does two things. First [i, a] he proposes a method of deliberation. Second [i, b], at “One who takes counsel etc.,” he explains his statement. Counsel is a practical deliberation about things to be done. Hence as in a speculative inquiry, where principles are necessarily taken for granted and certain other things are sought, so also should it be with counsel. Therefore, he shows first [a, i] what is taken for granted regarding counsel. Second [a, ii], at “But having taken etc.,” he shows what is the objective in taking counsel.
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| Est autem considerandum quod in operabilibus finis est sicut principium; quia ex fine dependet necessitas operabilium, ut dicitur in II physicorum; et ideo in consiliis oportet finem supponere. Et hoc est quod dicit quod non consiliamur de finibus, sed de his quae sunt ad fines; sicut in speculativis non inquiritur de principiis, sed de conclusionibus. Hoc autem quod dixerat manifestat per exempla: quia scilicet medicus non consiliatur an debeat sanare infirmum, sed hoc supponit quasi finem; nec etiam rhetor consiliatur si debeat persuadere, sed hoc intendit quasi finem. Nec etiam politicus, idest rector civitatis consiliatur an debeat facere pacem quae se habet ad civitatem sicut sanitas ad corpus hominis, quae consistit in convenientia humorum sicut pax in convenientia voluntatum; et sic etiam nullus aliorum operantium consiliatur de fine.
| 474. We must consider that in practicable things the end holds the place of the principle because the necessity of practicable things depends on the end, as has been mentioned in the second book of the Physics (Ch. 9, 200 a 15 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 15, 273-274). On this account we must take the end for granted. This is what he means when he says that we do not take counsel about ends but about the means to the end. Thus in speculative matters we do not inquire about the principles but about the conclusions. He clarifies what he has said by examples: a doctor does not deliberate whether he ought to cure a patient but this is taken f or granted as an end; an orator does not deliberate whether he ought to persuade people, for he intends this as an end; a statesman or a ruler of the state does not deliberate whether he ought to achieve peace which is compared to the state as health to the human body (health consists in the harmony of the humors as peace consists in the harmony of wills). Neither does any other agent take counsel about the end in this way.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sed ponentes finem etc., ostendit de quibus et quomodo sit inquisitio consilii. Circa quod tria ponit. Quorum primum est quod supposito aliquo fine, prima intentio consiliantium est qualiter, idest quo motu vel actione possit perveniri ad illum finem; et per quae instrumenta oporteat moveri vel agere ad finem, puta per equum vel navem. Secunda autem intentio est quando ad finem aliquem per plura perveniri potest sive instrumenta sive actiones, per quid eorum et facilius et melius perveniatur. Et hoc pertinet ad iudicium in quo quandoque aliqui deficiunt bene se habentes in inventione viarum ad finem. Tertia autem intentio est, si contingat quod per unum solum instrumentum vel motum vel per unum optime perveniatur ad finem, ut procuretur qualiter per hoc ad finem perveniatur. Ad quod requiritur constantia et sollicitudo. Et si illud per quod est deveniendum ad finem non habeatur in promptu, oportet inquirere ulterius per quid haberi possit et similiter de illo, quousque perveniatur ad causam quae occurrit prima in operando, quae est ultima in inventione consilii.
| 475. Then [a, ii], at “But having take, the end for granted,” he shows about what and how deliberative inquiry should be made. He introduces three things concerning this. The first of these is that, having taken the end for granted, the primary intention of the one taking counsel is how (i.e., by what motion or action) he can attain that end, and by what means he must move or work toward the end, as by horse or ship. His next intention is—when he can attain some end by several things, either instruments or actions—to know by which of these he can better and more easily achieve his goal. This pertains to judgment in finding ways to the end in which some men are at times deficient. His last intention is—if it should happen that the end can be attained by one means or motion alone, or most aptly by a particular means—that the end be procured in such a way that it is reached through this means. For this, perseverance and care are necessary. If the means for attaining the end should not be at hand, we must inquire how it can be gained and so on until we arrive at a cause which holds first place in operating (this will be last in the order of discovery).
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| Deinde cum dicit: qui enim consiliatur etc., manifestat quod dixerat per similitudinem inquisitionis speculativae. Et dicit quod ideo causa quae est prima in operatione est ultima in inventione, quia ille qui consiliatur videtur inquirere, sicut dictum est, per modum resolutionis cuiusdam. Quemadmodum diagramma, id est descriptio geometrica in qua qui vult probare aliquam conclusionem oportet quod resolvat conclusionem in principia quousque pervenit ad principia prima indemonstrabilia. Omne autem consilium est quaestio, idest inquisitio quaedam, etsi non omnis quaestio, idest inquisitio, sit consilium, sicut inquisitio mathematica. Sola enim inquisitio de operabilibus est consilium. Et quia consilians resolutive inquirit, necesse est quod eius inquisitio perducatur usque ad id quod est primum in operatione, quia illud quod est ultimum in resolutione est primum in generatione sive in operatione.
| 476. Next [i, b], at “One who,” he further clarifies his statement by its likeness to speculative inquiry. He says that the cause that is first in operation is the last in the order of discovery because one who deliberates seems to inquire (as was just pointed out in 473) by some analytic method, just as he who wishes to prove a conclusion by a diagram or a geometrical explanation must resolve the conclusion into principles until he reaches the first indemonstrable principles. All counsel is an investigation, i.e., a kind of inquiry, although not every investigation or inquiry is counsel, for example, an inquiry in mathematics. Only an inquiry about practicable things is counsel. Because the man who takes counsel inquires in an analytic manner, his inquiry must lead to that which is the principle in operation. The reason is that what is last in analysis is first in production or activity.
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| Deinde cum dicit: et si quidem etc., ostendit effectum consilii. Et primo ostendit propositum. Secundo manifestat quaedam quae dicta sunt, ibi, quaeruntur autem quandoque et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod postquam inquisitio consilii pervenerit ad id quod oportet primum operari, si inveniant consiliantes illud esse impossibile, discedunt, idest dimittunt totum illud negotium quasi desperantes. Puta si ad negotium aliquod persequendum indiget homo pecuniis ad dandum aliquibus et non possit eas dare, oportet dimittere negotium. Si autem appareat quod sit possibile illud quod inventum est per consilium, statim incipiunt operari: quia, ut dictum est, oportet esse primum in operatione id ad quod terminatur resolutiva inquisitio consilii. Possibile autem dicitur aliquid operanti non solum secundum propriam potentiam, sed etiam secundum potentiam aliorum. Unde dicit quod possibilia sunt quae fiunt per nos, sub quibus comprehenduntur ea quae fiunt per amicos, quia ea quae fiunt per amicos aliqualiter fiunt per nos, in quantum scilicet principium horum est in nobis prout ipsi intuitu nostri hoc faciunt.
| 477. At “If those taking counsel” [2] he shows the effect of counsel. First [2, a] he exposes his proposition. Second [2, b] he explains certain things that were said by the words “At times we inquire etc.” He says first that if those taking counsel, on reaching the point in the deliberative inquiry where the first operation must be done, find this impossible they give up, i.e., dismiss the whole matter as if without hope of success. For example, if in order to carry out a business venture, a man needs money to pay certain persons and he cannot pay it, he must abandon the project. But if it is apparent that what was discovered by means of counsel is possible, operation begins immediately because, as was just mentioned (476), the point at which the analytic inquiry of counsel ends must be the beginning of operation. A thing is said to be possible to an agent not only through his own power but also through the power of others. Hence things done by friends are enumerated by him among possibles because what our friends do is done in some way by us, inasmuch as the principle of the work is found in us, for they themselves do this in consideration of us.
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| Deinde cum dicit quaeruntur autem etc., manifestat quod dixerat; videlicet quae sunt illa inquisita quae quandoque inveniuntur impossibilia, quandoque non. Et dicit quod quandoque inquiruntur per consilium instrumenta, puta equus aut gladius. Quandoque autem necessitas, idest opportunitas eorum, id est qualiter oporteat eis uti; et ita etiam est in reliquis artibus: quod quandoque quaeritur per quid aliquid fiat, quandoque autem qualiter vel propter quid, quae pertinent ad necessitatem praedictam.
| 478. Then [2, b], when he says “At times we inquire,” he explains his previous statement, namely, the kinds of things that upon investigation we sometimes find possible and sometimes impossible. At times, he says, by counsel we inquire about instruments, for instance, a horse or a sword, and at times we inquire about the need or suitability of the instruments, that is, how we ought to use them. It is the same in the other arts: sometimes we seek the means of doing a thing, sometimes we inquire how or why (these belong to the end just mentioned).
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| Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem, quemadmodum etc., ostendit quod sit terminus sive status in inquisitione consilii. Et hoc quidem secundum tria. Primo quidem ex parte ipsius operantis. Unde dicit quod sicut supra dictum est, homo est principium suarum operationum. Consilium autem uniuscuiusque hominis est de his quae sunt operabilia ab ipso. Et ideo quando inquisitio consilii pervenit ad id quod homo habet in sua potestate, ut faciat, ibi terminatur consilium.
| 479. Next [3], at “As has been previously stated,” he determines the limit or status of the deliberative inquiry. He does this under three headings. First [3, a] on the part of the agent himself. Hence he says, as has been previously stated (292), that man is the principle of his activity. Every individual takes counsel about the things which can be done by him. For this reason when he arrives, in the deliberative inquiry, at what he himself can achieve, at that point counsel ceases.
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| Secundo ibi: operationes autem etc., ostendit quod consilium habet terminum vel statum ex parte finis. Et dicit, quod operationes omnes sunt aliorum gratia, id est finium. Unde de ipso fine non est consilium, sed de his quae sunt ad finem. Et sic patet, quod status est in inquisitione consilii et ex parte finis et ex parte agentis sicut in demonstrationibus, et in sursum et in deorsum, quasi ex parte utriusque extremi.
| 480. Second [3, b], at “Actions are,” he shows that counsel has a limit or condition on the part of the end. All operations, he says, are performed for the sake of other things, that is, ends. Hence counsel is not taken about the end but about the means to the end. Evidently then there is a limit in deliberative inquiry (both on the part of the end and on the part of the agent) as in demonstrations (both from above and below) as it were on the part of either extreme.
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| Tertio ibi: neque utique singularia etc., ostendit quod est status in inquisitione consilii ex parte singularium instrumentorum, quibus utimur in operationibus sicut quibusdam mediis ad perveniendum in finem. Et dicit, quod neque etiam consilium est de rebus singularibus, qualia sunt, puta, si hoc quod proponitur sit panis, vel si est digestus, idest coctus, vel confectus sicut oportet. Hoc enim discernit sensus.
| 481. Third [3, c], at “We do not,” he shows the status of deliberative inquiry on the part of particular instruments which we use in our operations as available means for arriving at the end. He says that we do not deliberate about particular things, such as whether what is set before us is bread, whether it is properly prepared, i.e., baked or made as it should be. This belongs to sense perception.
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| Quod autem secundum haec tria in consiliis sit status, sicut et in demonstrationibus, probat per impossibile. Quia si aliquis semper consiliaretur, deveniret hoc in infinitum, quod sub ratione non cadit, et per consequens neque sub consilio, quod est quaedam ratiocinativa inquisitio, sicut dictum est.
| 482. That the status of counsel-as also of demonstration-is according to these three considerations is proved by an argument leading to an impossible conclusion. If a man would always be taking counsel, he would be reaching to infinity, which does not fall under the consideration of the reason and consequently not under counsel, which is a kind of inquiry belonging to reason, as has been pointed out (476).
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Consiliabile autem et eligibile et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de consilio absolute, hic determinat de consilio per comparationem ad electionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo comparat consilium ad electionem. Secundo ex hoc concludit quid sit electio, ibi: existente autem eligibili et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, quod enim consilio, et cetera. Comparat ergo primo consilium ad electionem dupliciter. Uno quidem modo quantum ad obiectum sive materiam utriusque in quo conveniunt. Et quantum ad hoc dicit, quod idem est consiliabile et eligibile; quia videlicet, tam consilium quam electio est de his quae operamur propter finem; alio autem modo quantum ad ordinem utriusque. Et quantum ad hoc dicit, quod quando iam determinatum est aliquid per consilium, tunc primo eligitur, quasi consilio praecedente electionem.
| 483. After the Philosopher has considered counsel in itself, he now [B] treats counsel in comparison with choice. A twofold procedure clarifies this point. First [1] he compares counsel with choice. Second [2], at “Since the object of choice” [2], he concludes from this what choice is. In regard to the initial point he does two things. First [a] he introduces his proposition; second [b], at “What was previously judged etc.,” he proves it. First he compares counsel with choice in two ways. In one way relative to the object or matter of each where they are in agreement. Touching on this he says that an object of counsel and an object of choice are the same because both counsel and choice deal with things that act for an end. The other way is relative to the order of each. Touching on this he says that when something has already been decided by means of counsel then it is first chosen, counsel preceding choice as it were.
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| Deinde cum dicit quod enim consilio etc., manifestat quod dixerat. Et primo quidem per rationem sumptam ex his quae supra dicta sunt de consilio. Et dicit, quod ideo determinatio consilii praecedit electionem, quia oportet, quod post inquisitionem consilii sequatur iudicium de inventis per consilium. Et tunc primo eligitur id quod prius est iudicatum. Et quod iudicium rationis consequatur inquisitionem consilii, manifestat per hoc, quod unusquisque qui inquirit consiliando qualiter debeat operari, desistit a consiliando, quando inquisitionem suam resolvendo perducit ad id quod ipse potest operari. Et si plura possit operari, quando reduxerit in antecedens, idest in id quod ei primo operandum occurrit. Et hoc est quod eligitur, id scilicet quod primo operandum occurrit. Unde relinquitur quod electio praesupponit determinationem consilii.
| 484. Then [b], at “What was,” he explains what he has said, by a reason [b, i] taken from his previous observations (473-484) about counsel. The decision of counsel, he says, precedes choice because after the inquiry of counsel a judgment concerning the things discovered must follow. Then what was previously judged is first chosen. He shows clearly that the judgment of the reason should follow the investigation of counsel, by the fact that every individual who inquires by taking counsel how he ought to act ceases from deliberation when, by analysing his investigation, he is led to what he himself can do. If he can do several things, then, when he reduces them to the preceding, that is, to what he considers should be done first, this is what is chosen, namely, what presents itself to be done first. Hence it remains that choice presupposes the decision of counsel.
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| Secundo ibi: manifestum autem hoc etc., probat quod dixerat, per exemplum. Et dicit, quod hoc, scilicet quod electio sequatur determinationem consilii, patet ex antiquis urbanitatibus, idest ex consuetudine antiquarum civilitatum secundum quam reges non habebant dominativam potestatem in multitudine, ut facerent omnia, prout eis videretur; sed erant rectores multitudinis ad quam pertinebat eligere ea quae a principibus consilio determinata erant. Et ideo dicit, quod antiquitus reges annunciabant plebi ea quae ipsi elegerant per determinationem sui consilii, ut scilicet plebs eligeret quod ab eis determinatum erat. Et hoc secutus fuit Homerus, inducens principes Graecorum, ea quae in consilio determinaverant plebi annunciantes.
| 485. Second [b, ii], at “Our point is also brought out,” he proves his view by an example. That choice ought to follow the decision of counsel is brought out by the regal procedure of old, i.e., by the custom of ancient states according to which kings did not possess dictatorial power over the multitude so that they could do whatever they wished but were guides of the citizens to whom it belonged to choose the things decided by the kings in counsel. For that reason he says that the kings of old declared to the people the things they themselves had chosen by the decision of their counsel so that the people might choose what had been determined. Homer followed this by presenting the Greek rulers as proclaiming to the people what they had decided in counsel.
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| Deinde cum dicit: existente autem etc., ostendit ex praemissis quid sit electio. Et dicit, quod cum eligibile nihil aliud sit, quam quiddam de numero eorum quae sunt in nostra potestate quod ex consilio desideratur, consequens est, quod electio nihil aliud sit, quam desiderium eorum quae sunt in nostra potestate, ex consilio proveniens. Est enim electio actus appetitus rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas. Ideo autem dixit electionem esse desiderium consiliabile, quia ex hoc quod homo consiliatur pervenit ad iudicandum ea quae sunt per consilium inventa ---, quod quidem desiderium est electio.
| 486. Next [2], at “Since the object,” he shows from the premises what choice is. He says that, since an object of choice is simply one of the number of the things within our power and which is considered by means of counsel, it follows that choice is only a desire (arising by reason of counsel) for things in our power. Choice is an act of the rational appetitive faculty called the will. On this account he said that choice is a deliberating desire inasmuch as, via counsel, a man arrives at a judgment regarding the things which were discovered by means of counsel. This desire is choice.
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| Ultimo autem ostendit qualis sit praedicta diffinitio de electione data. Et dicit, quod nunc est definita electio tipo, id est figuraliter, non secundum quod est consuetum sibi determinare id quod est secundum subscriptionem, idest secundum definitionem cuius singulae partes investigantur. Sed universaliter tradita est definitio electionis. Et dictum est circa qualia sit, scilicet circa ea quae sunt in nobis. Et supra etiam dictum est, quod est eorum quae sunt ad finem, de quibus etiam est consilium.
| 487. Last [2], at “Choice has now,” he shows of what nature this definition of choice is. He says that choice has now been defined by type, that is, in outline, and not as he customarily determines a thing through a full explanation, i.e., giving a definition and then investigating each element of it. But the definition of choice has been given in a general way. It has been stated (486) of what nature the things are with which choice deals, i.e., things in our power. Also it has been said that choice is concerned with things that are ordered to ends—about these, too, counsel treats.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Voluntas autem quoniam quidem finis et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de voluntario et electione, hic determinat de voluntate. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quod manifestum est de voluntate. Secundo inducit quamdam dubitationem, ibi: videtur autem his quidem et cetera. Tertio solvit, ibi, si autem utique, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod dictum est supra, quod voluntas sit ipsius finis. Et loquitur hic de voluntate secundum quod nominat actum potentiae voluntatis. Cuiuslibet enim potentiae actus denominatus ab ipsa potentia respicit id in quod potentia primo et per se tendit: sicut visio dicitur actus potentiae visivae in ordine ad visibilia. Et per hunc modum intellectus dicitur respectu primorum principiorum ad quae primo et per se comparatur intellectiva potentia; unde et voluntas dicitur proprie ipsorum finium, quos sicut principia quaedam primo et per se respicit potentia voluntatis.
| 488. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on the voluntary and on choice, he here begins the study of willing [C]. He initiates his discussion by three stages. First [1] he takes notes of what is obvious about willing. Next [2], at “To some it seems etc.,” he raises a doubt. Last [3], at “If these conclusions etc.,” he solves the doubt. First he restates what he has previously insisted on (466) that willing is concerned with the end itself. He speaks here of willing (voluntas) as it denotes the act of the faculty of the will. The act of any faculty is named from the faculty itself and regards that to which the faculty primarily and of itself tends. Thus the act of the visive faculty is called vision in relation to visible things. In this manner understanding (intellectus) is named in relation to first principles that of themselves are referred primarily to the intellective faculty. Hence also willing is properly said to concern ends themselves which, as certain principles, the faculty of the will primarily and of itself regards.
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| Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem etc., inducit quamdam dubitationem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim proponit contrarias opiniones circa voluntatem. Et dicit, quod quibusdam videtur, quod voluntas sit eius quod est per se bonum; aliis autem videtur, quod sit eius quod est apparens bonum.
| 489. Then [2], at “To some it seems,” he raises a doubt. Regarding it he does three things. First [2, a] he sets forth contrary opinions about willing. He says that to some it seems that willing has for its object what is of itself good, but to others what is apparently good.
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| Secundo ibi: contingit autem etc., improbat primam positionem. Et dicit, quod illis qui dicunt quod nihil est voluntabile, idest in quod fertur voluntas, nisi id quod est per se bonum, sequitur quod non sit voluntabile quod vult ille qui non recte vult. Quia secundum eorum positionem sequeretur, si esset voluntabile, quod esset bonum. Contingit autem quandoque, quod est malum. Non ergo semper voluntas est per se boni.
| 490. Next [2, b], at “For those who say,” he disproves the first opinion stating that for those who say that only the good in itself is the object of willing (i.e., to which the will tends), it follows that that thing which a person does not rightly will is not an object of willing. The reason is that, according to their opinion, it would follow that if something were an object of willing, it would be good, but it happens sometimes that it is evil. Therefore willing does not always have real good as its object.
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| Tertio ibi: rursus autem etc., improbat secundam positionem. Et dicit, quod illis, qui dicunt quod voluntabile sit apparens bonum, sequitur, quod nihil sit secundum naturam voluntabile, sed unicuique sit voluntabile id quod sibi videtur. Diversis autem diversa videntur voluntabilia, et quandoque contraria. Sicut si non esset visibile color, sed id quod videtur color, sequeretur quod nihil esset naturaliter visibile. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Quia cuiuslibet potentiae naturalis est aliquod obiectum naturaliter determinatum. Non ergo verum est, quod voluntas sit apparentis boni.
| 491. Last [2, c], at “On the other hand,” he disproves the second opinion, stating that for those who say the object of willing is apparent good, it follows that there is no natural object of willing but for each one the object of willing is what seems so to him. But for different men different and sometimes contrary things seem to be the object of willing. Thus if color were not visible but only what seemed to be color were visible, it would follow that nothing would be by nature visible. This, however, would not be fitting for every natural faculty has some object determined by its nature. Therefore it is not true that the object of willing is apparent good.
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| Deinde cum dicit: si autem utique haec etc., solvit praedictam dubitationem. Et primo ponit solutionem secundum quamdam distinctionem. Et dicit quod si dicta inconvenientia quae consequuntur ad ambas praedictas opiniones non acceptantur, dicendum est distinguendo, quod simpliciter et secundum veritatem voluntabile est per se bonum, sed secundum quid, id est per respectum ad hunc vel ad illum, est voluntabile id quod ei videtur bonum.
| 492. At “If these conclusions” [3], he solves the afore-mentioned doubt. First [3, a] he gives a solution according to a certain distinction. He says that if these disagreeable conclusions following from both these opinions are unacceptable, we must answer with a distinction that what seems good to a man is desirable either without qualification or under some aspect, i.e., in relation to this or that.
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| Secundo ibi: studioso quidem etc., ostendit cui conveniat utrumque membrum distinctionis praemissae. Et dicit quod studioso, id est virtuoso, est voluntabile id quod est voluntabile secundum veritatem, idest simpliciter bonum: sed pravo, id est vitioso homini, est voluntabile quod contingit, id est quicquid sit illud indeterminate, quod sibi videtur bonum. Et adhibet exemplum in corporalibus. Videmus enim, quod hominibus quorum corpora sunt bene disposita, sunt sana illa quae secundum veritatem sunt talia. Sed infirmis sunt sana quaedam alia, quae scilicet sunt temperativa malitiae complexionis eorum. Similiter etiam amara et dulcia secundum veritatem videntur illis qui habent gustum bene dispositum, et calida his qui habent tactum bene dispositum, et gravia bene diiudicant illi, qui habent virtutem corporalem bene dispositam. His enim qui sunt debiles etiam levia videntur gravia.
| 493. Second [3, b], at “For the good man,” he shows with whom both parts of this distinction agree. He says that for the good man that thing is an object of willing which is truly worthy of being willed, i.e., good in itself. But for the wicked or vicious man that thing is the object of willing which attracts him, i.e., whatever seems pleasing to himself. He exemplifies this in things of the body. We see that for men whose bodies are in good health those things are healthful that are really so. But for the sick, certain other things are healthful, namely, those that moderate their diseased condition. Likewise things really bitter and sweet seem bitter and sweet to those who have a healthy taste, things really warm seem warm to those who have a normal sense of touch. Those who have normal bodily strength properly estimate the weight of objects; those who are weak think light objects heavy.
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| Tertio ibi: studiosus enim etc., manifestat quod dixerat. Et primo quantum ad virtuosos. Et dicit, quod virtuosus singula, quae pertinent ad operationes humanas, recte diiudicat et in singulis videtur ei esse bonum id quod vere est bonum. Et hoc ideo quia unicuique habitui videntur bona et delectabilia ea quae sunt ei propria, idest ea quae ei conveniunt. Habitui autem virtutis conveniunt ea quae sunt secundum veritatem bona. Quia habitus virtutis moralis definitur ex hoc quod est secundum rationem rectam; et ideo ea quae sunt secundum rationem, quae sunt simpliciter bona, videntur ei bona. Et in hoc plurimum differt studiosus ab aliis, quod in singulis operabilibus videt quid vere sit bonum, quasi existens regula et mensura omnium operabilium. Quia scilicet in eis iudicandum est aliquid bonum vel malum secundum quod ei videtur.
| 494. Third [3, c], at “The virtuous person,” he explains what he said, first 1c, i] as it affects virtuous men. He says that the virtuous person correctly passes judgment on individual things that pertain to human activity. In each case that which is really good seems to him to be good. This happens because things seem naturally pleasurable to each habit that are proper to it, that is, agree with it. Those things are agreeable to the habit of virtue that are in fact good because the habit of moral virtue is defined by what is in accord with right reason. Thus the things in accord with right reason, things of themselves good, seem good to it. Here the good man differs very much indeed from others, for he sees what is truly good in individual practicable matters, being as it were the norm and measure of all that is to be done because in these cases a thing must be judged good or bad according as it seems to him.
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| Secundo ibi: multis autem etc., manifestat quod dixerat quantum ad pravos. Et dicit quod multis, scilicet pravis, deceptio in discretione boni et mali accidit praecipue propter delectationem. Ex qua contingit quod delectabile quod non est bonum desiderent tamquam bonum, et aliquid tristabile ipsis, quod in se est bonum, fugiant tamquam malum. Quia scilicet non sequuntur rationem, sed appetitum sensitivum.
| 495. Next [c, ii], at “Many men,” he explains what he said as it affects vicious men. He says that for many, the vicious, deception in the distinction between good and evil occurs especially because of pleasure. As a consequence of this it happens that they desire as good the pleasurable, which is not good, and seek to avoid as evil what is for them painful but in itself good. The explanation is that they do not follow reason but the senses.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Existente utique et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de voluntario, electione et consilio et voluntate quae sunt principia humanorum actuum, hic applicat ea quae dicta sunt ad vitia et virtutes. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo determinat veritatem. Secundo excludit errorem, ibi, dicere autem quod nullus volens et cetera. Tertio epilogat quae dicta sunt de virtutibus, ibi, communiter quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo secundum ea quae dicta sunt ostendit virtutem esse in nobis, idest in potestate nostra. Secundo ostendit idem de malitia, ibi, similiter autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit consequentiae rationem, ibi, si autem in nobis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum voluntas sit de fine, consilium autem et electio de his quae sunt ad finem, consequens est quod operationes quae sunt circa haec, scilicet circa ea quae sunt ad finem, sint secundum electionem, et per consequens quod sint voluntariae, quia electio voluntarium quoddam est, ut supra dictum est. Sed operationes virtutum sunt circa praedicta. Ergo sunt voluntariae. Et per consequens oportet quod etiam ipsa virtus sit voluntaria et in nobis, idest in potestate nostra existens.
| 496. After the Philosopher has treated the voluntary, choice, counsel, and willing that are principles of human acts, he here applies what has been said to vices and virtues. Concerning this question he does three things. First [I] he determines the truth. Then [II], at “It is said that no one etc.,” he rejects an error. Last [Lect. 13; III], at “We have discussed virtues etc.” (B. 1114 b 26), he concludes with a summary of what has been said about virtue. On the first point he does three things. First [I, A], on the basis of his previous discussion, he shows that virtue is within us, i.e., in our power. Next [I, B], at “For a similar reason etc.,” he shows the same about vice. Last [I, C], at “If it is in our power etc.,” he shows the reason for this necessary consequence. He says first that since willing regards the end but counsel and choice the means to the end, it follows that actions concerning this (i.e., the means to the end) are in accordance with choice and are consequently voluntary. The reason is that choice is a voluntary as was indicated before (434-436, 457). But virtuous actions deal with the afore-mentioned (means) and are voluntary. Consequently, virtue itself must be voluntary and within us, that is, in our power.
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| Deinde cum dicit: similiter autem etc., ostendit idem de malitia, id est de vitio virtuti opposito. Et dicit quod simili ratione etiam malitia est voluntaria et in nobis existens, quia operationes eius sunt tales. Et hoc sic probat: quia si operari est in potestate nostra, oportet etiam quod non operari sit in potestate nostra. Si enim non operari non esset in potestate nostra, impossibile esset nos non operari: ergo necesse esset nos operari: et sic operari non esset ex nobis, sed ex necessitate. Et similiter dicit quod in quibus rebus non operari est in potestate nostra, consequens est quod etiam operari sit in potestate nostra. Si enim operari non esset in potestate nostra, impossibile esset nos operari. Ergo necesse esset nos non operari: et sic non operari non esset ex nobis, sed ex necessitate.
| 497. Then [I, B], at “For a similar reason,” he shows the same thing about badness, i.e., about vice as opposed to virtue. He says that badness is likewise voluntary and within us because its operations are of this kind. He proves this in the following way: if the capacity to act is within us, the capacity not to act must also be in our power. If the capacity not to act were not in our power, it would be impossible that we would not act. Therefore, it would be necessary that we act, and so the capacity to act would not come from us but from necessity.
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| Sic ergo dicendum est quod in quibuscumque rebus affirmatio est in nobis, et negatio, et e converso. Operationes autem virtutum et vitiorum, differunt secundum affirmationem et negationem. Puta si honorare parentes est bonum et actus virtutis, non honorare parentes est malum et ad vitium pertinens. Et si non furari pertinet ad virtutem, furari pertinet ad vitium. Unde consequens est quod si operatio virtutum est in nobis, ut probatum est, quod etiam operatio vitii sit in nobis. Et ita per consequens ipsum vitium erit in nobis, id est in potestate nostra.
| 498. As a consequence we must conclude that wherever affirmation is within our power, negation is also; and conversely. Virtuous and vicious actions differ according to affirmation and negation. For instance, if honoring parents is good and an act of virtue, then not to honor one’s parents is evil and pertains to vice. If not to steal pertains to virtue, to steal pertains to vice. Hence it follows that if the operation of virtue is within us, as has been proved (496), then the operation of vice also is within us. So consequently vice itself is within us, that is, in our power.
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| Deinde cum dicit: si autem in nobis etc., assignat rationem praedictae consequentiae: scilicet quod si operationes sint in nobis, quod et habitus sint in nobis. Et dicit quod si in potestate nostra est operari vel non operari bona vel mala, ut nunc ostensum est, quum per hoc quod homo operatur vel non operatur bonum vel malum, fiat bonus vel malus, ut in secundo ostensum est, consequens est quod in potestate nostra sit esse decentes, id est bonos secundum habitum virtutis, et pravos secundum habitum vitii.
| 499. Next [I, C], at “If it is,” he assigns the reason for this necessary inference: if the operations are within us, the habits too are within us. He says that if it is in our power to do or not to do good or evil actions, as has now been shown (497-498), while by reason of the fact that man works or does not work good or evil he becomes good or evil as was pointed out in the second book (250-253), it follows that it is within our power to be virtuous, i.e., good in conformity with the habit of virtue, and vicious in conformity with the habit of vice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: dicere autem quod nullus etc., excludit errorem circa praedicta. Et primo excludit ipsum errorem. Secundo radices eius, ibi, sed forsitan talis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo proponit erroris exclusionem. Secundo movet super hoc dubitationem, ibi, vel in nunc dictis et cetera. Tertio determinat veritatem, ibi, si autem haec videntur et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod quidam dixerunt quod nullus est malus volens, neque aliquis est beatus vel bonus nolens; quod ideo dicebant quia voluntas per se tendit in bonum. Nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt, et per consequens voluntas per se refugit malum. Dicit ergo quod unum horum verisimiliter apparet esse mendacium, scilicet quod nullus sit malus volens, quia malitia est quiddam voluntarium; alterum autem videtur esse verum, scilicet quod nullus sit beatus vel bonus nolens.
| 500. At “It is said” [II], he rejects an error about the afore-mentioned teaching. First [II, A] he removes the error itself. Second [Lect. 12; II, B], at “Perhaps such a person etc.” (B. 1114 a 3], he removes its roots. On the first point his division is threefold. First [A’] he explains his rejection of the error. Next [B’], at “Must we dispute even about what etc.,” he raises a doubt over this. Last [C’], at “If these things etc.,” he determines the truth. In regard to the first we must consider that some have held that no one is voluntarily evil, nor is anyone unwillingly happy or good. They say this because the will of itself tends to good. Good is what all desire and consequently the will of itself seeks to avoid evil. He says, therefore, that one of these statements is in all likelihood false, namely, that no one is willingly evil since vice is something voluntary. The other seems to be true, that no one is unwillingly good and happy.
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| Deinde cum dicit vel in nunc dictis etc., movet dubitationem circa praedicta. Si enim verum est quod actiones virtutum et vitiorum sint voluntariae, et per consequens virtus et malitia, planum est verum esse quod nunc dictum est. Sed numquid est aliquis qui credat esse dubitandum de praedictis, ita quod dicat hominem non esse principium suorum operum neque genitorem per modum quo pater est principium filiorum? Quasi dicat: mirum est si aliquis hoc dicat.
| 501. Then [B’], at “Must we dispute,” he raises a doubt about things said before. If it is true that virtuous and vicious actions (and consequently virtue and vice) are voluntary, obviously what has presently been said is true. But is there anyone who believes there should be a doubt about what has been said, so that he might say that a man is not the principle and begetter of his actions as a father is the principle of his children? He as much as says: that anyone would say this, is to be wondered at.
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| Deinde cum dicit: si autem haec videntur etc., confirmat veritatem. Et primo per rationem. Secundo per signa, ibi, his autem videntur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, si haec, scilicet consilium et electio et voluntas, quae sunt in potestate nostra, videntur esse principia operationum nostrarum, et non possumus reducere operationes nostras in alia principia nisi in ea quae sunt in potestate nostra, scilicet consilium et electio, consequens est quod etiam operationes nostrae bonae vel malae sint in potestate nostra. Quia illa quorum principia sunt in potestate nostra, et ipsa sunt in potestate nostra, et sunt voluntaria.
| 502. Next [C’], at “If these things,” he confirms the truth first [i] by reason; and then [2], at “This view seems etc.,” by signs. He says first that if counsel, choice, and willing—which are in our power—are seen as principles of our actions and we cannot reduce our actions to principles other than those that are in our power (i.e., counsel and choice) it follows that our good and bad actions are within our power. Because their principles are in our power, they themselves are in our power and hence are voluntary.
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| Deinde cum dicit: his autem videntur etc., manifestat propositum per signa. Et primo in his quae manifeste sunt voluntaria. Secundo in his quae videntur aliquid de involuntario habere, ibi, etenim in ipso ignorare et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod his quae dicta sunt, scilicet quod operationes virtutum et vitiorum sint in nobis, videntur attestari propria quae fiunt a singulis privatis personis. Quilibet enim paterfamilias punit filium vel servum male agentem. Et similiter attestantur ea quae fiunt a legislatoribus qui habent curam reipublicae; ipsi enim puniunt levius vel cruciant gravius eos qui operantur mala, dum tamen non faciant hoc per violentiam vel propter ignorantiam, cuius scilicet ignorantiae ipsi non sunt causa. Si enim per vim aut ignorantiam operarentur, non essent eorum opera voluntaria, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde manifestum est quod puniunt eos tamquam voluntarie operantes.
| 503. At “This view seems” [2], he explains his proposition by means of signs: first [2, a] in the things that are clearly voluntary; and then [2, b], at “A man who is ignorant etc.,” in the things that seem to have something of the involuntary. He says first that the particular things that are done by individual private persons seem to bear witness to what has been said, i.e., that virtuous and vicious actions are within our power. Any father of a family punishes a child or a servant who does wrong. Likewise the things that are done by legislators, who care for the welfare of the state, bear witness. They give sometimes a light, other times a heavy sentence to criminals, provided however the wrongdoers do not act under coercion or through ignorance (of which they are not the cause); if they acted by compulsion or ignorance, their acts would not be voluntary, as is evident from what was said before (400-405). Hence it is clear that they were punished as acting voluntarily.
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| Et similiter honorant operantes bona voluntarie: quasi per honores provocantes bonos ad bona et per poenas prohibentes malos a malis. Nullus autem provocat aliquem ad operandum ea quae non sunt in potestate nostra neque voluntaria. Quia in talibus suasio ante opus est omnino inutilis. Sicut si aliquis suadeat alicui ut in aestate non calefiat vel in infirmitate non doleat vel subtractis cibis non esuriat, vel si aliquid aliud est tale quod non sit in potestate nostra, quia nihil minus propter suasionem pateremur haec. Si ergo non provocamur ad ea quae non sunt in nobis, provocamur autem ad faciendum bona et vitandum mala, consequens est quod ista sint in nobis.
| 504. Likewise legislators decree honors for those who voluntarily do good: as it were encouraging the virtuous to good deeds by means of honors, and restraining the vicious from evil by means of punishments. No one encourages a man to do the things that are not in his power and not voluntary because in such matters encouragement before the act is entirely useless. It is useless, for instance, to urge a man in summer not to be hot, or in sickness not to be afflicted or not to be hungry when there is no food. or to do anything beyond his power. The reason is that he would suffer these things notwithstanding encouragement. If, therefore, we are not urged to do the things that are not within our power, but are urged to do good and avoid evil, such things are in our power.
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| Deinde cum dicit: et enim in ipso ignorare etc., manifestat idem in his quae videntur habere aliquid de involuntario. Ignorantia autem involuntarium causat, ut supra dictum est: si tamen nos simus ignorantiae causa, erit ignorantia voluntaria, et pro ea puniemur. Est autem aliquis causa ignorantiae dupliciter. Uno modo directe aliquid agendo; sicut patet de his qui se inebriant, et ex hoc redduntur ignorantes; qui dupliciter sunt increpandi, primo quidem quia se inebriaverunt. Secundo quia ex ebrietate aliquod peccatum fecerunt. Principium enim ebrietatis est in potestate ipsius hominis, quia homo est dominus eius, quod non inebrietur, idest in sua potestate hoc habet: ebrietas autem est causa ignorantiae et sic per consequens homo est ignorantiae causa.
| 505. Then [2, b], at “A man who is,” he manifests the same truth in those things which seem to have something of the involuntary. Ignorance causes an involuntary, as was explained before (406-424). If, however, we are the cause of the ignorance, the ignorance will be voluntary and we will be punished for it. A man can be the cause of his own ignorance in two ways. in one way directly, by doing something, as is evident in those who get drunk and for this reason are rendered ignorant. These should be doubly blamed. First because they drank too much, and next because they committed a sinful deed in their drunkenness. The principle of drunkenness is in the man himself because he has the power to remain sober and his drunkenness is the cause of his ignorance. Accordingly in this way a man is the cause of ignorance.
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| Alio autem modo est homo causa ignorantiae indirecte per hoc quod non agit illud quod agere debet; et propter hoc ignorantia eorum quae scire tenetur et potest, reputatur voluntaria, et pro ea homines puniuntur, et hoc est quod dicit quod legislatores puniunt ignorantes ea quae sunt lege statuta, quae omnes scire oportet, sicut quod non est furandum; et non sunt difficilia, sicut subtilitates iuris quas non tenentur omnes scire, quia nec possent. Et idem etiam est in aliis quaecumque homines videntur ignorare propter negligentiam; quia in potestate eorum erat ut non ignorarent; sunt enim domini, id est in potestate sua habentes, ut sint diligentes et non negligentes.
| 506. In the other way a man is the cause of ignorance indirectly by reason of the fact that he does not do what he ought to do. On account of this, ignorance of the things a man can and is bound to know is considered voluntary and therefore he is punished for it. This is why he says that legislators punish those who are ignorant of laws everyone ought to know (as that which forbids stealing), but not those who are ignorant of laws which are difficult to know and which not all are bound to know (because it is not possible). The same is true of those things which men do not know apparently by reason of negligence, because they could have learned. They are masters of themselves and they can be diligent and not negligent.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Sed forsitan talis aliquis et cetera. Postquam philosophus exclusit errorem dicentium quod nullus est voluntarie malus, hic excludit radices huius erroris. Et primo quidem quantum ad interiorem dispositionem ex qua posset aliquis (se) inclinari ad malum praeter suam voluntatem. Secundo quantum ad vim apprehensivam per quam aliquid iudicatur bonum vel malum, ibi. Si autem quis dicat et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit id cui posset aliquis inniti ad sustinendum errorem praedictum. Secundo hoc improbat, ibi: sed eius quod est tales fieri et cetera. Dixerat autem supra philosophus quod in hominis potestate est quod aliquis sit diligens vel negligens circa aliquid. Sed hoc posset aliquis negare, dicens quod aliquis naturaliter talis est ut non sit diligens. Sicut videmus phlegmaticos naturaliter esse pigros, cholericos autem iracundos, melancholicos tristes et sanguineos iucundos. Et secundum hoc sequitur quod non sit in potestate hominis quod sit diligens.
| 507. After the Philosopher has rejected the error of those who hold that no one is voluntarily evil, he now [B] removes the roots of this error: first [A’] in regard to the internal disposition by reason of which (contrary to his own will) someone can tend to evil. Then [Lect. 13; B’], at “Someone may say” (B.1114 a 32), in the matter of the faculty of knowledge by which a thing is judged good or bad. He handles the first point in two steps. First [1] he proposes that which one can depend on in support of the preceding error. Then [2], at “But men make themselves,” he disproves this. The Philosopher has stated (506) that it is in the power of man to be diligent or negligent about something. But someone could deny this, saying that some person is naturally not diligent. Thus we see that men with phlegmatic temperaments are naturally lazy, men with choleric temperaments are naturally irascible, men with melancholic temperaments are naturally sad and men with sanguine temperaments are naturally joyful. According to this, it is not within man’s power to be diligent.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sed eius quod est tales fieri etc., excludit quod dictum est. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod aliquis potest dici aliqualis dupliciter. Uno modo secundum dispositionem corporalem sive consequentem corporis complexionem, sive consequentem impressionem caelestium corporum: et ex huiusmodi dispositione non potest immediate immutari intellectus vel voluntas quae sunt penitus incorporeae potentiae non utentes organo corporeo, ut patet per philosophum in tertio de anima. Potest autem per huiusmodi dispositionem sequi aliqua immutatio ex parte appetitus sensitivi qui utitur corporeo organo, cuius motus sunt animae passiones. Et secundum hoc ex huiusmodi dispositione nihil amplius movetur ratio et voluntas quae sunt principia humanorum actuum, quam ex passionibus animae, de quibus supra in I dictum est quod sint suasibiles ratione. Alia autem est dispositio ex parte animae: quae quidem est habitus ex quo inclinatur voluntas vel ratio in operatione.
| 508. Then [2], at “But men make,” he rules out what was just said. To understand this we must consider that a man can be said to be of a particular bent in two ways. In one way according to bodily disposition following either the temperament of the body or the influence of the heavenly bodies. By reason of this disposition there can be no direct change of the intellect or will, which are faculties altogether incorporeal not using a bodily organ, as is made clear by the Philosopher in the third book De Anima (Ch. 4, 429 a 29-429 b 4; St. Th. Lect. 7, 687-699). But by this type of disposition some change can follow in the sensitive appetitive faculty, which does use a bodily organ, the movements of which are the passions of the soul. Accordingly, from such a disposition there is no more movement of the reason and will (which are principles of human acts) than is had from the passions of the soul, and concerning these it was likewise pointed out in the first book (241) that they are susceptible of persuasion by the reason. The other disposition is on the part of the soul. This is a habit by means of which the will or reason is inclined in operation.
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| Et ideo philosophus, praetermissis dispositionibus vel qualitatibus corporalibus, agit de sola dispositione habituum. Circa hoc ergo duo facit: primo enim ostendit quod habitus animae secundum quos aliquis est negligens vel iniustus, sunt voluntarii ex hoc quod propter eos aliquis increpatur; secundo ostendit quod etiam defectus corporales qui sunt increpabiles sunt voluntariae, ibi: non solum autem animae malitiae et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod habitus animae sunt voluntarii quantum ad eorum generationem. Secundo ostendit quod non sunt voluntarii postquam iam eorum generatio est completa. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, quae enim circa singula et cetera.
| 509. On this account the Philosopher, having passed over the dispositions or qualities of the body, treats only the disposition of habits. On this point he does two things. First [2, a] he shows that habits of the soul according to which a man is negligent or unjust are voluntary from the fact that he is censured on account of them. Second [2, b], at “Not only vices of the soul etc.,” he indicates that even bodily defects which are blameworthy are voluntary. Regarding the first he does two things. First [a, i] he indicates that habits of the soul are voluntary with respect to their formation. Then [a, ii] he shows that they are not voluntary after their formation has already been completed. Touching on the first he does two things. First [i, x] he brings forward his proposition; and next [i, y], at “A man’s outlook etc.,” he proves it.
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| Est autem considerandum quod habitus mali differunt, sicut et actus mali. Quidam enim sunt mali habitus ex eo quod retrahunt a bene agendo; et quantum ad huiusmodi habitus dicit quod ipsi homines sibiipsis sunt causa, ut fiant tales, idest non diligentes ad bene operandum, per hoc quod vivunt remisse, idest absque conatu ad bonas operationes. Alii autem habitus mali sunt per quos aliquis inclinatur ad male agendum; sive hoc sit, in nocumentum aliorum, sive in propriam deordinationem. Et quantum ad hoc dicit quod homines sibiipsis sunt causa quod sint iniusti, in quantum mala faciunt aliis, et incontinentes inquantum vitam suam ducunt in superfluis potibus et in aliis huiusmodi quae ad delectabilia tactus pertinent.
| 510. We must consider that evil habits differ as evil acts do. Some habits are evil from the fact that they withdraw a man from doing good. With respect to habits of this kind he says that men are the cause of their own evil lives for they are not diligent in doing good; they live carelessly without attempting good works. Other habits are evil because through them a man is inclined to do evil, whether this brings about the injury of others or one’s own disordered condition. With respect to these he says men by their own volition are the reason why they are unjust inasmuch as they do evil to others, and incontinent inasmuch as they live their lives in unnecessary drinking and in other things of this kind which pertain to the pleasures of touch.
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| Deinde cum dicit quae enim circa singula etc., probat propositum. Et primo per similitudinem in aliis. Videmus enim quod in singulis operationes faciunt tales, id est dispositos ad similia operanda. Et istud manifestum est ex illis qui student et operam dant ad quodcumque exercitium, puta luctae vel militiae, aut quamcumque operationem. Omnes enim ex hoc quod operantur multoties fiunt tales, ut possint similia perfecte facere. Cum ergo hoc videamus contingere in omnibus, hoc videtur esse hominis quasi sensu carentis, quod ignoret ex operationibus habitus generari.
| 511. Next [i, y], at “A man’s outlook,” he proves the proposition first [y, aa] by means of a likeness in other things. We see that things done in individual actions make men of that particular stamp, i.e., disposed to do similar things. This is clearly manifest in the case of those who are diligent in and take pains with an exercise (like wrestling or soldiering) or any activity whatsoever. Everyone, from the fact that he does the action many times, becomes so adept that he can do similar things perfectly. Since then we see this happen in all cases, it seems that only a man lacking understanding would be ignorant that habits are produced by operations.
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| Secundo ibi: adhuc autem irrationabile etc., ostendit idem ratione sumpta ex ordine actus ad habitum. Si enim aliquis vult aliquam causam ex qua scit sequi talem effectum, consequens est quod velit illum effectum. Et quamvis forte non velit illum effectum secundum se, potius tamen vult illum effectum esse quam causa non sit. Sicut si aliquis velit ambulare in aestu, praesciens se sudaturum, consequens est quod velit sudare. Quamvis enim hoc secundum se non velit, vult tamen potius sudorem pati quam ab itinere abstinere. Nihil enim prohibet aliquid non esse secundum se voluntarium quod tamen est voluntarium propter aliud, sicut potio amara propter sanitatem. Aliter autem esset si homo nesciret quod talis effectus sequeretur ex tali causa. Puta si aliquis ambulans in via, incidit in latrones, non efficitur hoc voluntarium, quia non fuit praescitum. Manifestum est autem quod homines iniusta facientes fiunt iniusti, et stupra committentes fiunt incontinentes. Ergo irrationabile est quod aliquis velit iniusta facere et non velit esse iniustus, aut velit stupra committere et non velit esse incontinens. Sed manifestum est quod, si non ignorans operatur voluntarie illa ex quibus sequitur quod sit iniustus, voluntarie erit iniustus.
| 512. Then [y, bb], at “Moreover, it is,” he shows the same thing by a reason taken from the relation of an act to a habit. If a man wills some cause from which he knows a particular effect results, it follows that he wills that effect. Although perhaps he does not intend that effect in itself, nevertheless he rather wishes that the effect exist than that the cause not exist. Thus if someone wishes to walk when it is hot, knowing beforehand he will work up a sweat, it follows that he wishes to perspire. Although he does not wish this in itself, nevertheless he wishes rather to perspire than to forego the walk. Nothing hinders a thing from being non-voluntary in itself, although it may be voluntary on account of something else, as a bitter potion taken for health. It would be otherwise if a man were ignorant that such an effect would follow from such a cause, e.g., a voluntary is not effected when a man who walks along the road falls among robbers because he did not know this beforehand. Obviously then men who do unjust actions become unjust and those committing seduction become incontinent. Therefore, it is unreasonable for a man to will to do unjust actions and nevertheless not intend to be unjust or to will to perpetrate seductions and not will to be incontinent. Thus obviously if a man who is aware of his action does voluntarily those things which make him unjust, he will be voluntarily unjust.
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| Deinde cum dicit: non tamen si velit etc., ostendit quod habitus mali non subiacent voluntati omnino, postquam sunt generati. Et dicit quod non ideo, quia voluntarie fit aliquis iniustus, quandocumque volet desinet esse iniustus et fiet iustus. Et hoc probat per simile in dispositionibus corporalibus. Si enim sit aliquis qui quum sanus esset, volens in aegritudinem incidit per hoc quod vivit incontinenter, utendo scilicet immoderato cibo et potu et non obediendo medicis, a principio inerat in eius potestate non aegrotare; sed postquam emisit actionem, sumpto scilicet iam superfluo aut nocivo cibo, non adhuc est in potestate eius ut non aegrotet. Sicut ille qui proiecit lapidem potest, non proiicere: non tamen in potestate eius est quod resumat quando proiecerit, et tamen dicimus quod emittere vel proiicere lapidem sit in hominis potestate, quia a principio sic erat. Sic etiam est et de habitibus vitiorum: quia a principio in potestate hominis est quod non fiat iniustus vel incontinens. Unde dicimus quod homines volentes sunt iniusti et incontinentes: quamvis postquam facti sunt tales, non adhuc sit hoc in eorum potestate, ut scilicet statim desinant esse iniusti vel incontinentes; sed ad hoc requiritur magnum studium et exercitium.
| 513. At “Because a person becomes unjust” [a, ii], he shows that evil habits are not subject to the will after they have been formed. He says that because a person becomes unjust voluntarily, it does not follow that he ceases to be unjust and becomes just whenever he may will. He proves this by means of a likeness in the dispositions of the body. A man who in good health willingly falls into sickness by living incontinently i.e., by eating and drinking to excess and not following the doctor’s advice, had it in his power in the beginning not to become sick. But after he has performed the act, having eaten unnecessary or harmful food, it is no longer in his power not to be sick. Thus he who throws a stone is able not to throw it; however once he has thrown the stone he has not the power to take back the throwing. Nevertheless we do say that it is within a man’s power to cast or throw a stone because it was from a principle under his control. So it is also with the habits of vice; that a man not become unjust or incontinent arises from a principle under his control. Hence we say that men are voluntarily unjust and incontinent, although, after they have become such, it is no longer within their power to cease being unjust or incontinent immediately, but great effort and practice are required.
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| Deinde cum dicit: non solum autem etc., ostendit per similitudinem corporalium defectuum quod habitus vitiosi sint voluntarii. Et dicit quod non solum malitiae animae sunt voluntariae, sed in quibusdam defectus corporales. Et tales homines iuste increpamus. Nullus enim iuste increpat eos qui sunt turpes naturaliter, sed solum eos qui sunt turpes propter aliquam negligentiam debiti cultus. Et similiter se habet de debilitate aut de caecitate: nullus enim iuste improperabit ei qui est caecus a nativitate vel ex infirmitate vel ex aliqua plaga, quia hoc non est voluntarium, sed magis propter hoc homines miserentur eorum. Et sic patet quod malitiarum sive defectuum corporalium illi increpantur qui sunt in potestate nostra, non autem illi qui non sunt in nostra potestate. Unde manifestum est quod etiam in aliis, id est in his quae ad animam pertinent, malitiae, id est habitus vitiosi, qui increpantur in nostra potestate existunt.
| 514. Then [2, b], at “Not only,” he shows by means of a likeness to bodily defects that vicious habits are voluntary. He says that not only vices of the soul are voluntary but also defects of the body in certain men. Such men we justly reproach. No one reproaches those who are born ugly but only those who are ugly by reason of some negligence in proper care. The same is true with weaknesses and blindness. No one justly taunts a man who is blind from birth or disease or a wound which is not voluntary. But on account of those things sympathy rather is shown to the victim. Thus it is evident that we are reproached for those vices and bodily defects which are within our power. Hence obviously in other things, i.e., those things which pertain to the soul, the vices or vicious habits are in our power.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Si autem quis dicat et cetera. Postquam philosophus exclusit radicem ponentium malitiam non esse voluntariam ex parte dispositionis inclinantis appetitum, hic excludit aliam radicem ex parte virtutis cognoscitivae. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit dictam radicem. Secundo excludit eam, ibi, siquidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum, considerandum est, quod bonum movet appetitum inquantum est apprehensum. Sicut enim appetitus seu inclinatio naturalis, sequitur formam naturaliter inhaerentem, ita appetitus animalis sequitur formam apprehensam. Ad hoc igitur quod aliquid appetatur, praeexigitur quod apprehendatur ut bonum. Et inde est quod unusquisque desiderat id quod apparet sibi esse bonum.
| 95. After the Philosopher has overthrown the fundamental principle of those who hold that vice is not voluntary on the part of the disposition inclining the appetitive faculty, he here [B’] excludes another fundamental principle on the part of the cognoscitive power. On this point he does two things. First [1] he explains this fundamental principle; and second [2], at “Since, therefore, etc.,” he rejects it. In regard to the first we must consider that good precisely as it is perceived moves the desire. As the natural desire or inclination follows the form naturally inherent, so the animal desire follows the perceived form. In order then that a thing be desired, it is first required that it be perceived as good. Hence everyone desires what appears good to him.
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| Potest ergo aliquis dicere quod hoc non est in potestate nostra quod hoc videatur vel appareat nobis bonum quasi nos simus domini phantasiae, idest apparitionis vel visionis: sed qualis est unusquisque, talis finis videtur ei: idest tale aliquid videtur ei appetendum quasi bonum et finis. Secundum enim propriam formam est aliquid unicuique conveniens, sicut igni ferri sursum et terrae ferri ad medium. Et sic etiam videmus in animalibus quod unumquodque animal appetit aliquid tamquam bonum et finis secundum dispositionem suae naturae. Unde diversa animalia habent diversos motus et operationes, quamvis omnia animalia unius speciei habeant similes motus et operationes. In specie autem humana inveniuntur diversi habentes diversos motus et operationes. Unde aestimaverunt aliqui quod hoc esset propter diversam naturalem dispositionem propter quam videtur quidem huic hoc bonum, alii autem illud, ita quod hoc non subiaceat hominis dominio sive potestati.
| 96. Therefore someone can say it is not in our power that this thing should seem or appear good to us. The reason is that we are not in command of our imagination, i.e., over the way things appear or seem to us. But in accord with the disposition of a man, so does his end seem to him, that is, such as a thing seems to a person, it must be desired as good and an end. A thing is agreeable to each according to its proper form: as fire tends upward, and things of earth tend to the center. So also we see that among the animals each one strives after something as good and an end according to its own natural disposition. Hence different animals have different activities and operations, although all animals of one species have similar movements and operations. But in the human species individuals are found having different movements and operations. Hence some were of the opinion that this arose from a natural disposition on account of which this thing seems good to one person and that to another in such a way that the procedure was not subject to a man’s control.
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| Deinde cum dicit: si quidem igitur sibi etc., excludit radicem praedictam. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit rationem removentem quod dictum est. Secundo in contrarium subdit solutionem interimentem, ibi: si autem nullus sibi causa etc.; tertio improbat eam, ibi, si utique haec sunt vera et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod aliquid potest alicui bonum apparere dupliciter.
| 517. Then [2], at “Since, therefore,” he excludes the afore-mentioned principle, and concerning it he does three things. First [a] he gives the reason repudiating these allegations (516). Next [b], at “Perhaps no one etc.,” he adds an answer which seems to counter this. Last [c], at “If this is true,” he disproves the counter-argument. On the first point we must consider that a thing can appear good to someone in two ways.
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| Uno modo in universali, quasi speculativa quadam consideratione. Et huiusmodi iudicium de bono non consequitur aliquam dispositionem particularem, sed universalem vim rationis syllogizantis in operabilibus sicut et in his quae sunt a natura. Sed quia operabilia sunt contingentia, non cogitur ratio ad assentiendum huic vel illi, sicut accidit in demonstrativis: sed in potestate habet homo, quod assentiat uni vel alii parti contradictionis; sicut accidit in omnibus opinabilibus et maxime circa operabilia in quibus plurima attenduntur, secundum quorum quodlibet aliquid potest iudicari bonum vel non bonum.
| 518. In one way in general, it is so by a kind of speculative consideration. Such a judgment about good follows not any particular disposition but the universal power of reason syllogizing about actions, as it does in the case of natural things. Since practicable things are contingent, reason is not forced to assent to this or that as it does when demonstration occurs. But man has the power to give assent to one or the other part of a contradiction, as happens in all practicable things especially when we have under consideration many objects, any one of which can be judged good.
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| Alio modo potest aliquid apparere bonum alicui quasi practica cognitione per comparationem ad opus. Et de huiusmodi iudicio nunc philosophus loquitur, quod quidem potest super aliquo ferri, quod sit bonum, dupliciter. Uno modo ut aliquid videatur alicui simpliciter et secundum se bonum; et hoc videtur bonum secundum rationem finis. Alio autem modo ut videatur aliquid alicui bonum non simpliciter et secundum se, sed prout nunc.
| 519. In the other way a thing can appear good to someone, as it were by a practical knowledge, by reason of a comparison with what is to be done. The Philosopher here speaks of this type of judgment that can be made in two ways about some good. In one way, a thing may appear good to someone absolutely and in itself. This seems to be a good in conformity with the nature of the end. In the other way, a thing may appear to someone not absolutely in itself but judged by present considerations.
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| Cum autem appetitus inclinetur in aliquid dupliciter; uno modo secundum animae passionem; alio modo secundum habitum: ex passione contingit quod aliquid iudicetur bonum prout nunc. Sicut illi qui timet submersionem, propter passionem timoris videtur bonum ut nunc, quod merces in mare proiciat, et concupiscenti quod fornicetur, sed iudicium quo homo iudicat aliquid esse bonum ut secundum se et simpliciter provenit ex inclinatione habitus, et de hoc nunc agitur. Et ideo dicit quod, cum homo aliqualiter sit causa sui habitus mali propter consuetudinem peccandi, ut ostensum est, consequens est, quod ipse etiam sit sibi causa phantasiae consequentis talem habitum, idest apparitionis qua sibi videtur hoc esse secundum se bonum.
| 520. The appetitive faculty is inclined to an object on two accounts: one, by reason of a passion of the soul, the other by reason of habit. Under the impulse of passion it happens that a thing is judged good as it is at present. Thus to one who is afraid of drowning it appears good at the moment to throw his merchandise overboard; as does fornication to one filled with lust. But the judgment, by which a man accounts a thing good in itself and absolutely, arises from the inclination of habit. This we will discuss now. He, therefore, says that since a man in some measure is the. cause of his own evil habit by reason of his continual sinning—as has been pointed out (509-92)—it follows that he himself is also the cause of the imaginative reaction that follows such a habit, i.e., of the appearance by which this thing seems to be good in itself.
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| Deinde cum dicit: si autem nullus etc., ponit responsionem adversarii interimentis quod dictum est. Et dicit quod forte aliquis ponet quod nullus est sibi causa quod male faciat, sed hoc facit unusquisque propter ignorantiam finis, inquantum scilicet aestimat optimum aliquid consequi per id quod male operatur. Quod autem aliquis desiderat debitum finem, non provenit homini propria sponte, sed oportet quod ex sua nativitate hoc ei conveniat: ut scilicet sicut homo visum exteriorem, quo homo bene iudicat colores, habet ex sua nativitate, ita etiam ex sua nativitate habeat bonam dispositionem interioris visus quo bene iudicet, et desideret id quod est secundum veritatem bonum. Et sic ille dicendus erit bonam nativitatem habens, cui praedictum iudicium bene inditum est ex sua nativitate; illa enim videtur esse perfecta et vere bona nativitas per quam homini bene et optime innascitur illud quod est maximum et optimum, et quod non potest homo alterius auxilio vel disciplina accipere; sed oportet quod tale id habeat quale inditum est sibi a natura. Ergo quod homo hoc bene habeat ex sua nativitate, duplici de causa reddit nativitatem laudabilem. Uno modo propter excellentiam huius boni. Alio modo propter impossibilitatem aliter acquirendi.
| 521. Next [b], at “Perhaps no one,” he gives the counter-argument of the adversary against the point that has just been made (518-520). He says that perhaps someone will maintain that nobody is himself the cause of his own evil acts but each individual does evil because of ignorance of the end, inasmuch as he thinks that something very good is to follow from what he does wrongly. That a person desires a proper end does not arise from his own free will but must belong to him from birth. As from birth a man has external sight by which he correctly distinguishes colors, so also from birth he should have a well-disposed internal vision by which he may judge well and desire what is really good. Thus he must be said to be of good birth in whom the previously mentioned judgment has been implanted from birth. When a man innately has in good and perfect fashion what is greatest and best for him, this is a perfect and truly good birth. For man cannot gain this through the help or guidance of another; rather it is proper for him to possess it in the manner that nature has endowed him with it. Therefore, that a man should have this from birth renders his birth doubly praiseworthy: in one way through the excellence of the good, in the other because of the impossibility of otherwise acquiring it.
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| Considerandum est autem, quod haec videtur esse positio quorumdam mathematicorum ponentium quod homo in sua nativitate disponitur ex virtute caelestium corporum, ut hoc vel illud agat. Quam quidem positionem Aristoteles in libro de anima attribuit his qui non ponebant differentiam inter sensum et intellectum. Si enim aliquis dicat, sicut ibi dicitur: talis est voluntas in hominibus, qualem in die ducit pater virorum deorumque, idest caelum vel sol, consequens erit quod voluntas, et ratio in qua est voluntas, sit aliquid corporeum, sicut est sensus. Non enim est possibile, quod id quod in se est incorporeum a corpore moveatur. Et sic intellectus et voluntas habebit organum corporale et in nullo different a sensu et appetitu sensitivo. Unde et hic similitudinem ponit visus sensitivi, et visus quo rem iudicat.
| 522. We must consider that this seems to be the opinion of certain mathematicians who hold that man is disposed at his birth by the power of the heavenly bodies to do this or that. This opinion is attributed by Aristotle in his work De Anima (Bk. III, Ch. 3, 426 a 21 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 4, 616-623) to those who did not hold the distinction between sense and intellect. If anyone should say, as in fact it is said in that place (ibid.), that the human will is impelled by the father of men and gods, i.e., the heavens or the sun, it will follow that the will (and the reason in which the will resides) is something corporeal as the senses are. It is not possible that what is in itself incorporeal should be moved by a body. Thus the will and intellect will contain a bodily organ and they will differ in no way from the senses and the sensitive appetitive faculty. Wherefore he draws a comparison between the sense of sight and intellectual vision by which we judge a thing.
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| Est ergo dicendum, quod ex caelestibus corporibus potest aliqua dispositio causari in corpore humano ex qua inclinatur appetitus sensitivus, cuius motus est passio animae; unde ex inclinatione caelestium corporum non habet homo inclinationem ad hoc quod iudicet aliquid esse bonum simpliciter et secundum se, sicut fit per habitum electivum virtutis et malitiae, sed ad iudicandum aliquid esse bonum ut nunc, sicut fit per passionem. Et idem est dicendum de inclinatione quae accidit ex complexione corporis. Nunc autem non agitur de iudicio quo iudicatur aliquid bonum ex passione; quia voluntas potest hoc non consequi, ut dictum est, sed de iudicio quo iudicatur aliquid esse bonum per habitum. Unde ista responsio non excludit Aristotelis rationem.
| 523. It must be said then that the heavenly bodies can cause in the human body a disposition inclining the sensitive appetitive faculty, the motion of which is a passion of the soul. Hence by reason of the influence of the heavenly bodies, a man does not have the inclination to judge that a thing is good absolutely and in itself (as through the habit of choice in virtue and vice) but to judge that a thing is good as it is at the moment, for example, in accordance with passion. The same observation must be made about the inclination that occurs from bodily temperament. In the present context, however, there is no question of a judgment by which we judge something good in accordance with passion, for the will is able to reject this—as was stated in (516)—but of a judgment by which we judge that something is good by means of habit. Therefore, this answer does not destroy the reason of Aristotle.
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| Deinde cum dicit: si utique haec sunt vera etc., excludit praedictam responsionem ex suppositione eorum, quae adversarius supponebat. Supponebat enim adversarius quod virtus esset voluntarium, quod de malitia negabant. Et ideo, resumens ea quae praedicta sunt, quae usque huc suspenduntur, dicit, quod si ista sunt vera quae nunc dicta sunt, scilicet quod desiderium finis insit homini a natura, nulla est ratio quare magis virtus quam malitia sit voluntarium. Similis enim ratio est quod ambobus, scilicet et virtuoso et vitioso, insit finis a natura, vel qualitercumque aliter ei videatur quantum ad apprehensionem, et adiaceat quantum ad appetitum. Et quamvis operatio virtutis et vitii non solum sit circa finem, sed etiam circa ea quae sunt ad finem, sed tamen reliqua, idest ea quae sunt ad finem, homines operantur referendo ad finem non a natura, sed qualitercumque eis videtur.
| 524. At “If this is” [c] he rejects this answer on the basis of the presuppositions of the adversary who took for granted that virtue is a voluntary but denied this of vice. Then returning to his earlier discussion (516)—which he had interrupted—he says that if this is true, namely, that the desire of the end exists in man by nature, there is no greater reason why virtue more than vice is voluntary. Reasoning in a similar fashion we say that, for both the virtuous and the vicious man, the goal must be innate no matter in what way it may seem to be perceived and actually desired. Although virtuous and vicious operation is concerned not only with the end but also with the means to the end, nevertheless men act by referring the remaining things (i.e., means to the end) to an end not from nature but howsoever it seems to them.
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| Sive ergo dicatur quod finis non videtur unicuique esse talis a natura, sed apud ipsum est, idest in potestate eius, ut inhaereat tali vel tali fini, sive etiam finis sit naturalis et in reliqua operando homo fiat voluntarie virtuosus, virtus tamen erit voluntaria. Et similiter malitia: quia similiter et vitioso competit id quod est propter finem in operationibus, sicut et virtuoso, quemadmodum et similiter se habent in fine. Si ergo, sicut supra ostensum est, virtutes sunt voluntariae ex eo quod nos sumus causae habituum, ex quibus disponimur ad hoc quod talem finem nobis ponamus, sequitur quod etiam malitiae sint voluntariae, quia similis ratio est de utrisque.
| 525. Therefore either it should be said that the end for every man does not seem to be such by nature but that it is relative to each man as it is in his power to cling to such or such an end, or even that the end is natural and by working on the means, man becomes voluntarily virtuous. Then virtue nonetheless will be voluntary. The same is true about vice because what is for the sake of the end in operations is attributable to the vicious man not less than to the virtuous, just as they are alike in regard to the end—as has been pointed out before (358-362). Therefore, if virtues are voluntary because of the fact that we are the causes of the habits by which we are disposed to fix an end of such a kind, it follows that vices also are voluntary because a similar reason holds for one as well as the other.
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| Deinde cum dicit communiter igitur etc., epilogat ea quae supra dicta sunt. Et primo ostendit quid iam dictum sit de virtutibus. Secundo quid restat dicendum. Dicit ergo primo, quod dictum est de virtutibus in communi et earum genus typo, id est figuraliter, manifestatum est, dum dictum est quod sunt medietates, quod pertinet ad genus propinquum, et quod sunt habitus, quod pertinet ad genus remotum, sub quo etiam continentur vitia. Dictum est etiam quod virtutes easdem operationes generant ex quibus causantur: dictum est etiam quod sunt in potestate nostra, et quod sequuntur rectam rationem, et quod aliter sunt voluntariae operationes quam habitus, quia nos sumus domini operationum a principio usque ad finem, dummodo sciamus singulares circumstantias, sed domini habituum non sumus nisi a principio. Postmodum autem nobis ignorantibus per singulas operationes adiicitur aliquid in generatione habituum. Sicut etiam accidit in aegritudinibus causatis ex voluntariis actibus, ut supra dictum est. Sed quia a principio erat in potestate nostra, ut sic vel non sic ageremus, propter hoc etiam ipsi habitus dicuntur voluntarii.
| 526. Then [III], at “We have discussed,” he sums up in conclusion the material previously discussed (224525). First [A] he shows what has already been said about virtues, and then [B] what remains to be treated. He states first that virtues in general have been treated (ibid.) and their genus has been clearly manifested in type, i.e., according to their general characteristics. Then it has been said (324-331) what the mean is (this belongs to the proximate genus) and what the habits are (this belongs to the remote genus under which the vices are also contained). It has been affirmed also (255-279) that habits produce the same actions by which the habits themselves were caused. It has been stated too (496-525) that habits are in our power, that they follow right reason and that voluntary operations are otherwise than habits because we have control over operations from the beginning to the end, provided we know the particular circumstances. Although we do have control of habits from the beginning, afterwards, when we are inattentive, something is added in the generation of habits by means of particular operations. Thus it happens in sicknesses brought on by voluntary actions, as has been noted (513). But because it was in our power from the beginning to act or not to act in this way, the habits themselves are called voluntary.
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| Deinde cum dicit resumentes utique etc., ostendit quid restat dicendum. Et dicit quod oportet iterato resumere considerationem de virtutibus ut dicamus de unaquaque virtute quae sit, et circa qualem materiam, et qualiter operetur. Et sic etiam manifestum erit quot sunt virtutes. Et primo dicetur de fortitudine.
| 527. Next [B], at “Taking up again,” he shows what remains to be treated. He says we must take up again the consideration of the virtues in order to determine what each virtue is, its subject matter, and its mode of operation. Thus we will clearly see also how many virtues there are. First we will treat the virtue of fortitude.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Quoniam quidem igitur medietas et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus moralibus in communi, hic incipit determinare de singulis in speciali. Et primo determinat de virtutibus quae sunt circa passiones interiores. Secundo de iustitia quae est circa operationes exteriores, in quinto libro, ibi, de iustitia autem et iniustitia et cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in partes duas: in prima determinat de virtutibus moralibus, quae sunt circa principales passiones, respicientes ipsam hominis vitam. Secundo determinat de virtutibus moralibus quae sunt circa quasdam secundarias passiones, respicientes exteriora hominis bona, in quarto libro, ibi, dicamus autem deinceps et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de fortitudine quae est circa passiones respicientes corruptiva vitae humanae; secundo determinat de temperantia quae est circa passiones respicientes ea quibus humana vita conservatur, scilicet cibos et venerea, ibi, post haec de temperantia et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo investigat materiam fortitudinis. Secundo determinat modum operationis ipsius, ibi, terribile autem non in omnibus quidem et cetera. Tertio determinat quasdam virtutis proprietates, ibi, circa audacias autem et timores et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo resumit quod manifestum est ex praemissis de materia fortitudinis, scilicet circa quas passiones sit. Secundo inquirit obiecta illarum passionum, prout circa eas est fortitudo, ibi, timemus autem et cetera.
| 528. After Aristotle has finished the treatise on virtues in general, he begins here a particularized study of the individual virtues. First he treats the virtues concerned with the interior passions. Next, he treats justice and injustice (concerned with external actions) in the fifth book (Lect. 1) at “We must give our attention to justice and injustice etc.” (B. 1129). The first section falls into two parts. In the first part [I] he treats the moral virtues dealing with the principal passions touching the very life of man. Next, he treats the moral virtues that are concerned with the secondary passions touching the external goods of man, in the fourth book (Lect. 1) at “Let us next discuss etc.” (1119 b 21). Concerning the first part he does two things. First [A] he studies fortitude, which deals with the passions touching things destructive of human life. Then [Lect. 19] he studies temperance, which deals with the passions touching things preservative of human life, i e., food and sex, at “Following this treatise (on fortitude) we must etc.” (B.1117 b 22). On the first point he does three things. First [A’] he investigates the matter of fortitude. Next, “The same thing is not terrifying etc,” [Lect. 15], he treats the method of its operation (B. 1115 b 7). Last, at “Although fortitude is concerned etc.” [Lect. 18], he determines certain properties of the virtue (B.1117 a 29). In regard to the first he does two things. First [1] he reviews what was clearly evident from the premises about the matter of fortitude, i.e., with what passions it deals. Next [2], at “Terrifying things are what etc.,” he investigates the objects of these passions as fortitude is concerned with them.
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| Dicit ergo, quod iam supra dictum in secundo, quod fortitudo est quaedam medietas circa timores et audacias. Importat enim fortitudo quamdam animi firmitatem, per quam animus stat immobilis contra periculorum timores.
| 529. He says, as has already been explained in the second book (267, 341), that fortitude is a kind of mean dealing with fear and rashness. Fortitude denotes a firmness of soul by which it remains unmoved by the fear of dangers.
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| Deinde cum dicit: timemus autem etc., investigat obiecta passionum praedictarum secundum quod circa eas est fortitudo: et specialiter ex parte timoris circa quem principalius est fortitudo: ut infra dicetur. Eadem autem sunt obiecta timoris et audaciae. Nam illud idem quod per timorem aliquis refugit, per audaciam aggreditur. Circa hoc ergo tria facit. Primo ostendit quae sint obiecta timoris. Secundo ostendit circa quod genus horum sit fortitudo, quia circa timorem mortis, ibi, non enim circa omnia et cetera. Tertio ostendit in speciali circa cuius mortis timorem sit fortitudo, ibi: videbitur autem utique et cetera.
| 530. Then [2], at “Terrifying things,” he investigates the objects of the previously mentioned passions according as fortitude treats them, especially on the part of fear about which fortitude is principally concerned, as will be pointed out later (536). The objects of fear and rashness are identical, for what one man flees because of fear, another attacks in his rashness. On this point three considerations demand his attention. First [2, a] he shows what the objects of fear are. Next [2, b], at “But fortitude does not etc.,” he explains with what class of these objects fortitude deals, Since it is concerned with fear of death. Finally [2, c], at “It does not seem etc.,” he shows in particular what kind of death fortitude envisages.
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| Dicit ergo primo, quod terribilia sunt quae timemus, quasi timoris obiecta. Huiusmodi autem sunt, ut universaliter dicatur, quaecumque mala. Unde et philosophi definiunt timorem, dicentes quod est expectatio mali. Et sumitur hic expectatio communiter pro quolibet motu appetitus in aliquod futurum; cum tamen expectatio proprie loquendo non sit nisi boni, sicut nec spes. Manifestum est igitur quod omnes timemus aliqua mala, sicut malam opinionem, idest infamiam, quae contrariatur honestati; inopiam, id est paupertatem, quae contrariatur bonis fortunae exterioris; aegritudinem et inimicitiam et mortem quae contrariantur bonis personalibus.
| 531. He says first that terrifying things are those we are afraid of, objects of fear, so to speak. All evil things are universally of this kind. Hence philosophers in giving a definition of fear say that it is the expectation of evil. Expectation is here taken generally for any movement of the appetitive faculty toward some future things, although expectation properly speaking is directed only to good, as is hope. It is evident then that we all fear some evils, like a bad reputation and disgrace (which are contrary to respectability), destitution and poverty (which are contrary to the goods of external fortune), sickness, enmity, and death (which are contrary to personal goods).
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| Deinde cum dicit: non enim circa omnia etc., ostendit circa quorum malorum timorem sit fortitudo. Et primo ostendit circa quae non sit. Secundo concludit circa quid sit, ibi: circa qualia utique terribilium et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit; scilicet quod fortitudo non videtur esse circa timorem omnium malorum.
| 532. Next [2, b], at “But fortitude does not,” he shows that fortitude deals with the fear of some particular evils. First [b, i] he shows about what evils it is not concerned. Second [b, ii], at “About what kind of terrifying things etc.,” he concludes about what evils it is concerned. on the first point he does two things. First [b, i, x] he sets forth his proposition that fortitude does not seem to deal with the fear of all evils.
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| Secundo ibi: quaedam enim etc., probat propositum. Et primo, quod fortitudo non sit circa timorem infamiae. Fortis enim laudatur ex eo quod non timet. Sed quaedam sunt quae oportet timere ad bene vivendum. Et bonum est ea timere, inquantum scilicet ipse timor non solum necessarius est ad honestatem conservandam, sed etiam ipse timor est quiddam honestum, quod autem aliquis non timeat huiusmodi mala, est quoddam malum inhonestum; ut patet de infamia quam qui timet, laudatur quasi decens, idest compositus in moribus et verecundus. Ille autem qui huiusmodi malum non timet, vituperatur quasi inverecundus. Ergo patet quod fortitudo non est circa timorem talium malorum. Quandoque tamen ille qui non timet infamiam, a quibusdam metaphorice nominatur fortis; qui assimulatur forti in quantum est impavidus.
| 533. Second [b, i, y], at “For, to fear some things,” he proves his proposition, the first part of which is that fortitude does not deal with the fear of a bad reputation [b, i, y, aa]. The brave man is praised because he does not fear. But there are certain things which we ought to fear in order to live a good life. It is good to fear these things inasmuch as fear is not only necessary for the preservation of respectability, but even fear itself is something honorable. There is a kind of disgrace attached to the person who does not fear evils of this sort. This is obvious from the fact that one who fears a bad reputation is praised as decent, i.e., morally good and modest. But one who does not fear evil of this kind is blamed as shameless. It is evident, therefore, that fortitude is not concerned with fear of these evils. Sometimes, it is true, a man who does not fear a bad reputation is called by some brave, in a metaphorical sense, because he has a likeness to a brave man inasmuch as he is without fear.
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| Secundo ibi: inopiam autem etc., ostendit quod fortitudo non est circa timorem paupertatis. Et dicit, quod paupertatem non oportet timere prout dicebatur de infamia; sicut neque aegritudinem neque aliquid eorum quae non pertinent ad malitiam hominis, cuius ipse est causa. Frustra enim homo timet illa quae vitare non potest. Hoc igitur debet homo circa talia timere, ne ex propria malitia in aliquod horum incidat. Quia sic timor est utilis ad ista vitanda, non autem aliter. Nec tamen, quamvis ista non oporteat timere, ille qui circa haec est impavidus vocatur fortis nisi forte secundum similitudinem. Quia non timere paupertatem videtur ad aliam virtutem pertinere, scilicet ad liberalitatem ex cuius actu aliqui laudantur, inquantum audacter audent pecunias expendere, qui tamen in maioribus periculis, scilicet bellicis, simpliciter timidi dicuntur. Non ergo circa timorem inopiae est fortitudo.
| 534. In the second part (of his proposition) at “Poverty is not to be feared” [b, i, y, bb], he shows that fortitude does not deal with the fear of poverty. He says that poverty is not to be feared in the way that a bad reputation is to be feared (533). Neither is sickness to be feared, nor indeed any of those things that do not pertain to wickedness of which man himself is the cause. It is useless for man to fear what he is unable to avoid. In regard to such things, therefore, a man ought to fear lest he fall into any of them by his own wickedness. The reason is that fear is useful to avoid these very things, but not otherwise. Although it is not necessary to fear things of this sort, nevertheless one who has no fear of them is not called brave except perhaps in a metaphorical sense. The reason is that not to fear poverty seems to belong to another virtue, liberality. Some are praised for the act of this virtue, inasmuch as they spend money freely. Yet they are called complete cowards in the greater dangers of war. Therefore, fortitude is not concerned with the fear of poverty.
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| Tertio ibi: neque utique si quis etc., ostendit quod fortitudo non est circa quoscumque timores malorum personalium. Et dicit quod homo non dicitur timidus ex eo quod timet ne aliquis iniurietur vel invideat sibi aut filiis aut uxori, vel quodcumque aliud huiusmodi; neque etiam aliquis dicitur fortis ex eo quod non timet flagellari, sed audacter flagella sustinet, quia ista non sunt maxime terribilia. Dicitur autem aliquis fortis simpliciter ex eo quod est fortis circa maxime terribilia. Qui autem in aliquibus aliis est intrepidus, non dicitur fortis simpliciter, sed in genere illo.
| 535. In the third part, at “No one is” [b, i, y, cc], he shows that fortitude does not deal with any fear whatsoever of personal evils. He says that a man is not called cowardly because he fears injury or envy of himself, his children or his wife, or any other thing of this kind. A person is not said to be brave because he does not fear the lash but boldly endures it, since these things are not especially terrifying. But a person is brave without qualification from the fact that he is brave in the face of the most terrifying dangers. One who is undaunted in some other circumstances is not called absolutely brave, but brave in that particular category.
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| Deinde cum dicit: circa qualia utique etc., ostendit circa quorum malorum timorem sit fortitudo. Et dicit quod aliquis dicitur simpliciter fortis ex eo quod est intrepidus circa ea quae sunt maxime terribilia. Virtus enim determinatur secundum ultimum potentiae, ut dicitur in I de caelo, et ideo oportet quod virtus fortitudinis sit circa ea quae sunt maxime terribilia, ita quod nullus magis sustineat pericula quam fortis. Inter omnia autem maxime terribile est mors. Et huius ratio est quia est terminus totius praesentis vitae et nihil post mortem videtur esse homini vel bonum vel malum de his quae pertinent ad praesentem vitam, quae nobis sunt nota, ea enim quae pertinent ad statum animarum post mortem, non sunt visibilia nobis. Valde autem terribile est id per quod homo perdit omnia bona quae cognoscit. Unde videtur quod fortitudo proprie sit circa timorem periculorum mortis.
| 536. At “About what kind of” [b, ii] he shows that fortitude is concerned with the fear of certain evils, saying that man is called absolutely brave from the fact that he is fearless in the face of dangers which are most terrifying. Virtue is determined according to the maximum of the faculty, as is pointed out in the first book of De Coelo (Ch. II, 281 a 8; St. Th. Lect. 25, 249)Therefore, the virtue of fortitude must deal with the things that are most terrifying, so that no one endures greater dangers than the brave man. Among all dangers the most frightening is death. The reason is that death is the end of all present life, and after death there does not seem to be any good or evil equal to those things of this life that inflict death on us. Things belonging to the state of the soul after death are not visible to us, but that by which a man loses all his goods is appallingly frightening. Hence it seems that fortitude is properly concerned with fear of the dangers of death.
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| Deinde cum dicit: videbitur autem utique etc., ostendit circa cuius mortis timorem sit fortitudo. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit circa quod genus mortis sit fortitudo. Secundo ostendit quo ordine se habeat etiam circa omnia genera mortis, ibi, principaliter autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi: in maximo enim et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod neque etiam fortitudo est circa mortem quam quis sustinet in quocumque casu vel negotio, sicut in mari vel in aegritudine; sed circa mortem quam quis sustinet pro optimis rebus, sicut contingit cum aliquis moritur in bello propter patriae defensionem. Et eadem ratio est de quacumque alia morte, quam quis sustinet propter bonum virtutis. Sed specialiter facit mentionem de morte in bello, quia in tali negotio ut frequentius homines moriuntur propter bonum.
| 537. Then [2, c], at “It does not seem,” he shows that fortitude is concerned with the fear of a particular kind of death. On this point he does two things. First [c, i] he shows with what kind of death fortitude deals. Next [c, ii], at “A man is called brave etc.,” he explains the relation of fortitude to all the kinds of death. In regard to the first he does two things. First [c, i, x] he sets forth his proposition. Then [c, i, y I, at “Such men lose their lives etc.,” he proves his proposition. He says first that fortitude is not even concerned with death that a man suffers in some kind of accident or employment, as at sea or in sickness, but with death that he suffers from the best of causes, as happens when a man dies fighting in defense of his country. The same reason holds in the case of any other death that a person undergoes for the good of virtue. But he makes a special mention of death in battle because in that undertaking men more frequently suffer death for the sake of good.
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| Deinde cum dicit: in maximo enim etc., probat dupliciter propositum. Primo quidem quia mors quae est in bello, est in maximo periculo, quia de facili ibi moritur homo; est etiam in optimo periculo, quia huiusmodi pericula sustinet homo propter bonum commune, quod est optimum, ut in I dictum est. Virtus autem est circa maximum et optimum. Ergo virtus fortitudinis maxime est circa mortem quae est in bello.
| 538. Then [c, i, y], at “Such men lose,” he proves his proposition by two reasons. The first [c, i, y, aa] is that death in battle happens in the greatest danger since a man easily loses his life there. It happens also in the most noble of dangers since a man undergoes the danger in that case on account of the common good that is the greatest good, as has been noted in the beginning (30). But virtue is concerned with what is greatest and best. Therefore, the virtue of fortitude especially deals with death that takes place in battle.
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| Secundo ibi: concordes autem etc., probat idem ex hoc quod morientibus tali morte vel illis qui fortiter se exponunt periculis huiusmodi mortis, exhibentur honores tam in civitatibus quae vivunt in communitate, quam etiam apud monarchias, idest apud reges qui soli dominantur. Quia fortiter in bello dimicantibus, et in vita et post mortem aliqui honores exhibebantur. Honor autem est praemium virtutis. Ergo circa huiusmodi mortem consideratur virtus fortitudinis.
| 539. Next [c, i, y, bb], at “Honors are given,” he proves the same thing from the fact that honors are given to those who die such a death or bravely expose themselves to the danger of a death of this kind. (This is the practice both in city-states that exist by association and in monarchies where kings alone rule.) The reason is that those who fight bravely in battle are honored both while they live and after death. But honor is the reward of virtue. Therefore, the virtue of fortitude is considered as dealing with death of this kind.
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| Deinde cum dicit principaliter autem etc., ostendit quo ordine se habeat fortitudo circa omnia genera mortis. Et primo quomodo se habeat in timendo mortem. Secundo quomodo se habeat in audacia, quae fit circa huiusmodi pericula, ibi: similiter autem (et) viriliter agunt et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit circa quam mortem principaliter sit fortitudo. Et dicit quod principaliter dicitur aliquis fortis ex eo quod impavide se habet circa bonam mortem, sicut et omnis virtus ordinatur ad bonum, et circa pericula illativa mortis, praecipue si sint repentina; in his enim quae (ex) repente operari oportet maxime ostenditur quod aliquis ex habitu operetur. In aliis autem potest aliquis ex praemeditatione operari similia his quae fiunt ex habitu. Maxime autem sunt talia, scilicet ad bonum pertinentia et repentina, pericula bellica. Unde circa ista principaliter est intimidus fortis.
| 540. At “A man is called brave” [c, ii] he shows how fortitude has a relation to all the kinds of death. First [c, ii, x] he shows the way fortitude is related to the fear of death. Next [c, ii, y], at “Likewise, brave men etc.,” he shows its relation to boldness which is a reaction to dangers of this kind. On the first point he does two things. First [c, ii, x, aa] he explains the death about which fortitude is principally concerned. A man is called brave, he says, mainly because he is not afraid of death for a good cause, nor is he afraid of the threats—especially sudden threats—of death. The reason is that every virtue is ordered to good. Actions that must be done on the spur of the moment show in a special way that a person acts from habit. In other situations a man after careful deliberations can perform actions like those that proceed from the habit. Actions pertaining to good and the unexpected dangers in battle are especially of this kind. Hence the brave man who is not afraid is concerned principally with these actions.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sed adhuc (et) in mari etc., ostendit quomodo se habeat impavide fortis circa alias mortes. Et dicit quod etiam consequenter et in mari et in aegritudinibus fortis est intimidus, quia videlicet non stupescit nec turbatur propter timorem talium. Aliter tamen sunt intimidi fortes in mari quam marinarii. Nam fortes etiam si non sperent salvari, tamen non timent, contemnentes huiusmodi mortem, non enim tantum de ea curant ut inordinate commoveantur. Sed marinarii sunt intimidi in periculis maris in quantum sperant se bene posse evadere propter experientiam.
| 541. Next [c, ii, x, bb], at “Moreover, brave men,” he shows how the brave man himself is without fear of other kinds of death. He says that as a consequence brave men are unafraid both in storms at sea and in sickness because they do not lose their heads and become upset because of fear of, such dangers. In storms, however, they differ from sailors. Even if the brave have no hope of rescue, they nevertheless despise death and are without fear. But sailors are unafraid of dangers from the sea by reason of their experience, for they have hope of being easily able to escape them.
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| Deinde cum dicit: similiter autem etc., ostendit quod non solum fortitudo est principaliter circa timorem mortis bellicae, sed etiam circa audacias talium periculorum. Et dicit quod similiter etiam fortes viriliter agunt aggrediendo pericula in illis rebus in quibus laudabilis est fortitudo vel in quibus bonum est mori, sicut est in rebus bellicis. Bonum est enim quod homo vitam suam exponat pro bono communi. Sed in praedictis corruptionibus, scilicet in morte quae est in mari vel in aegritudine, neque est fortitudo laudabilis neque ex morte aliquod bonum sequitur. Unde audacter aggredi talia pericula, non pertinet ad virtutem fortitudinis.
| 542. Then [c, ii, y], at “Likewise, brave men,” he shows that fortitude is principally concerned not only with fear of death but also with boldness in dangers of this kind. He says that brave men likewise act manfully by meeting dangers in those circumstances where fortitude is praiseworthy and where it is noble to die, as in battle. It is good that a man endanger his life for the common welfare. But in the aforesaid modes of death, by shipwreck or by sickness, fortitude is not honorable nor does any good follow from death. Hence it does not belong to the virtue of fortitude to meet such dangers boldly.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Terribile autem non in omnibus et cetera. Postquam philosophus inquisivit materiam fortitudinis, hic determinat de actu ipsius. Et primo distinguit actum eius ab actibus vitiorum oppositorum. Secundo determinat de quibusdam quae habent actum similem fortitudini, ibi: dicuntur autem et aliae et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat quomodo actus diversificari possunt circa materiam supra inquisitam. Secundo ostendit quis sit proprius actus fortitudinis per comparationem ad actus oppositorum vitiorum, ibi, qui quidem igitur quae oportet et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo assignat rationem diversificandi actus circa praedictam materiam. Secundo ostendit quomodo diversificantur, ibi: fortis autem instupescibilis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod non est idem terribile quoad omnes.
| 543. After the Philosopher has investigated the matter of fortitude, he now treats its act. First [I] he distinguishes the act of fortitude from the acts of the opposite vices. Next [Lect. 16; II], at “Other kinds of fortitude are enumerated etc.,” he treats certain things that have an act similar to fortitude (B.1116 a 16). He discusses the first point under two aspects. First [A] he determines how acts can be differentiated in the matter presently investigated. Then [B], at “One who endures etc.,” he shows what the proper act of fortitude is by comparison with the acts of the opposite vices. He handles the first point in a twofold manner. First [A, A’] he assigns the reason for differentiating acts in this matter. Second [A, B’], at “The brave man does not lose etc.,” he shows how they are differentiated. He observes first that the same thing is not terrifying to all.
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| Cum timor sit in irascibili cuius obiectum est arduum, non est timor nisi alicuius mali quod est aliqualiter elevatum supra facultatem timentis. Unde aliquid est terribile puero quod non est terribile viro perfecto. Est autem aliquod malum quod excedit facultatem humanam, per quam ei resisti non potest, sicut terraemotus, inundationes maris et alia huiusmodi; unde huiusmodi malum est terribile cuilibet homini sapienti qui habet rectum iudicium intellectus. Illud autem terribile quod est secundum hominem quasi non excedens facultatem ipsius ad resistendum differt dupliciter. Uno modo secundum diversam rei magnitudinem; puta maius terribile est si conveniant multi hostes quam si pauci. Alio modo secundum magis et minus, puta quod magis vel minus odiunt aut magis vel minus appropinquant. Et quod dictum est de terribilibus est etiam similiter dicendum de ausibilibus. Quia circa idem sunt timor et audacia, ut supra dictum est.
| 544. Since fear is in the irascible part—the object of which is the difficult—fear is concerned only with an evil which is in some way above the power of the one fearing. Hence a thing is terrifying to a child which is not terrifying to a mature man. There are evils that exceed human power to overcome, such as earthquakes, tidal waves, and other disasters of this sort. Hence evils of this kind are terrifying to every sensible man endowed with good judgment. But that terrifying thing which does not seem to exceed man’s power to resist may be viewed in a twofold way. One, according to the different magnitude of the thing, for example, it is more terrifying to have many enemies come together than to have only a few. The other, according to degree, for instance, that enemies have greater or less hatred, or that they are closer or farther away. What has been said about terrifying things must be said likewise about things inspiring courage because fear and boldness have the same object, as has been said previously (530).
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| Deinde cum dicit: fortis autem instupescibilis etc., ostendit secundum praedictam rationem quomodo diversificantur actus circa materiam praedictam. Et dicit quod cum dicitur quod fortis non obstupescit propter timorem, intelligendum est secundum quod convenit homini qui, si intellectum habeat, timebit ea quae sunt supra hominem. Unde et fortis talia timebit. Sed tamen in casu necessitatis vel utilitatis sustinebit talia sicut oportet, et sicut iudicabit recta ratio quae propria est homini. Ita scilicet quod propter timorem talium non discedet a iudicio rationis, sed sustinebit huiusmodi terribilia, quantumcumque magna, propter bonum quod est finis virtutis.
| 545. Then [A, B’], at “The brave man,” he shows by the reason just given how acts are differentiated in this matter. When it is affirmed that the brave man does not lose his head because of fear, this must be understood as referring to a man of sound judgment. Such a one will fear the things which are above man. Hence the brave man too will fear them. However, in case of necessity or utility, he will undergo such things as he ought and as right reason, which is proper to man, will judge. In this way he will not forsake the judgment of reason on account of the fear of such things, but will endure terrifying things of this kind, no matter how great, on account of the good which is the end of virtue.
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| Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis magis vel minus timet terribilia quae sunt supra hominem vel secundum hominem magis vel minus quam ratio iudicet; et adhuc, quod plus est, contingit quod ea quae non sunt terribilia timet quasi terribilia: et in hoc consistit peccatum hominis, quod est praeter rationem rectam. Et sicut aegritudo contingit in corpore per inordinationem cuiuscumque humoris, ita etiam peccatum contra rationem contingit in anima ex inordinatione cuiuscumque circumstantiae. Unde circa timorem quandoque peccatur ex hoc quod aliquis timet quod non oportet timere; quandoque vero ex hoc quod timet quando non oportet timere. Et idem dicendum est de aliis circumstantiis supra positis. Et quod dictum est de terribilibus, intelligendum est etiam de ausibilibus, de quibus est eadem ratio, sicut dictum est.
| 546. It happens at times that a man fears terrifying things that are above his power, or within his power more or less than reason judges. What is more, it happens that he fears the things which are not terrifying as if they were terrifying. Man’s sin consists principally in what is contrary to right reason. As sickness takes place in the body by reason of a disorder of some humor, so too sin against reason takes place in the soul by reason of a disorder of some circumstance. Hence sometimes a person sins in the matter of fear from the fact that he fears what he ought not to fear, but other times from the fact that he fears when he ought not to fear. The same must be said about the other circumstances enumerated above (544). What has been affirmed about terrifying things is to be understood about things inspiring boldness where a similar reason is found, as has been said (544).
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| Deinde cum dicit: qui quidem igitur etc., ostendit quis sit actus fortitudinis per comparationem ad vitia opposita. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit actum virtutis et vitiorum. Secundo comparat virtutem ad quaedam quae ei similia videntur, ibi: et audaces quidem praevolantes et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo determinat actum virtutis et vitiorum quantum ad timorem et audaciam. Secundo quantum ad spem et desperationem, ibi: desperans utique quis et cetera. Tertio epilogat, ibi circa haec quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat actum virtuosi. Secundo actus vitiosorum, ibi, superabundantium autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit; secundo manifestat quiddam quod dixerat, ibi, finis autem omnis et cetera.
| 547. Next [B], at “One who,” he shows what the act of fortitude is by means of a comparison with the opposite vices. He treats this under two headings. First [1] he explains the act of the virtue and of the vices. Next [2], at “The reckless are etc.,” he compares the virtue with certain things that seem similar to it. He discusses the first point in a threefold manner. First [1, a] he defines the acts of the virtue and the vices relating to fear and rashness; and then [1, b], at “The coward is etc.,” those relating to hope and despair. Finally [1, c], at “The coward, the reckless etc.,” he concludes with a summary. He handles the first point from two aspects. First [a, i] he defines the act of the virtuous man; and then [a, ii], at “Of those who go etc.,” the acts of the vicious man. He considers the first point in a twofold way. First [i, x] he expounds his proposition. Next [i, y], at “The end etc.,” he makes clear something he had said.
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| Dicit ergo primo, quod ille qui sustinet quae oportet sustinere et fugit per timorem ea quae oportet vitare, et facit hoc eius gratia cuius oportet et eo modo quo oportet et quando oportet, vocatur fortis. Qui etiam similiter audet quae oportet, et cuius gratia et cetera. Et huius rationem assignat dicens quod quia fortis et virtuosus patitur per timorem et operatur per audaciam, secundum quod dignum est et secundum quod recta ratio dictat. Omnis enim virtus moralis est secundum rationem rectam, ut supra habitum est.
| 548. He says first that one who endures the things he ought to endure and flees through fear the things he ought to avoid with the right motivation, in the right manner, and at the right time is called brave. Likewise, he who dares in the things he ought for the right motive and so forth is also brave. He assigns the reason for this when he says that a brave and virtuous man endures on account of fear and he acts by means of daring in conformity with what is fitting and as right reason indicates. Every moral virtue is in accord with right reason, as was stated previously (323, 326).
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| Deinde cum dicit: finis autem omnis etc., manifestat quiddam quod dixerat, scilicet cuius gratia oporteat fortem operari. Et dicit quod finis cuiuslibet operationis virtuosae est secundum convenientiam proprii habitus. Movet enim habitus ex consuetudine causatus per modum naturae eo quod consuetudo est sicut quaedam natura, sicut dicitur in libro de memoria. Finis autem ultimus agentis naturalis operantis est bonum universi quod est bonum perfectum. Sed finis proximus est ut similitudinem suam in aliud imprimat. Sicut finis calidi est ut per suam actionem calidum faciat. Similiter autem et finis virtutis operantis ultimus quidem est felicitas, quae est bonum perfectum, ut in primo habitum est. Sed finis proximus et proprius est ut similitudo habitus existat in actu.
| 549. At “The end” [i, y] he makes clear something he had said, namely, the right motive for operating. He remarks that the end of every virtuous operation is in conformity with the nature of its own habit. A habit caused by custom operates after the manner of a nature because custom is a kind of nature, as is noted in the book De Memoria et Reminiscentia (Ch. 2, 452 a 28; St. Th. Lect. 6, 383). The ultimate end of an agent naturally operating is the good of the universe, a perfect good; but the proximate end is to imprint its likeness in another. Thus the end of a warm object is to make things warm by means of its activity. Likewise the ultimate end of operative virtue is happiness, a perfect good, as was said in the first book (45, 111, 112, 117-118, 201, 222). But the proximate and proper end is to impress a likeness of the habit on the act.
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| Et hoc est quod dicit, quod bonum quod intendit fortis, est fortitudo. Non quidem habitus fortitudinis qui iam praeexistit, sed similitudo ipsius in actu. Et hoc etiam est finis, quia unumquodque quod est propter finem determinatur in propria ratione secundum proprium finem quia ex fine sumitur ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo finis fortitudinis est aliquid ad rationem fortitudinis pertinens. Sic igitur fortis sustinet et operatur gratia boni. Et hoc est inquantum intendit operari ea quae sunt secundum fortitudinem.
| 550. This is what he means in his statement that the good, which the brave man intends, is fortitude—not the habit of fortitude, for this already exists, but the likeness of it in the act. This also is the end since every means is determined by its proper end because the character of means to the end is derived from the end. For this reason the end of fortitude is something pertaining to the nature of fortitude. In this way the brave man endures and works for the sake of good, that is, inasmuch as he intends to perform the actions which are in conformity with fortitude.
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| Deinde cum dicit superabundantium autem etc., determinat actus vitiosorum. Et primo eius qui deficit in timendo. Secundo eius qui superabundat in audendo, ibi, qui autem in audendo et cetera. Tertio eius qui abundat in timendo, ibi, qui autem in timendo et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod inter vitia ad superabundantiam pertinentia ille est innominatus qui superabundat in impaviditate, qui scilicet nil timet. Supra autem dictum est, quod multa sunt innominata. Et hoc praecipue contingit in his quae raro accidunt. Talis autem impaviditas raro accidit. Non enim contingit nisi in aliquo insano, vel in aliquo qui non habet sensum doloris, quod scilicet nihil timeat, puta neque terraemotum, nec inundationes, nec aliquid talium, sicut dicitur accidere quibusdam qui vocantur Celtae, quod est nomen gentis. Hic autem dicit esse sine sensu doloris, quia eadem sunt quae timemus futura et de quibus, cum fuerint praesentia, dolemus.
| 551. Then [ii], at “Of those who go to excess,” he defines the acts of vicious men: first [ii, x] of the man deficient in fear; next [ii, y], of the man excessive in daring, at “He who is excessive in daring etc.” Last [ii, z], at “One who is excessive in fearing etc.,” he defines the acts of the man excessive in fearing. He says first that there is no special term for the man who abounds-speaking of the vices pertaining to excess in fearlessness, i.e. who fears nothing. It was said before (341) that many vices have no names. This particularly happens in things that rarely occur. And fearlessness of this sort rarely happens. It occurs only in the case of madmen and insensible persons who fear nothing—not even earthquakes, floods, or anything of this kind. This is said to happen among certain people called Celts (the name of a race). He speaks here of one who is insensible or without a sense of pain because the future things we fear and the things that cause us pain when present are the same.
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| Deinde cum dicit: qui autem in audendo etc., agit de his qui superabundant in audendo. Et dicit quod ille qui circa terribilia superabundat in audendo, ut scilicet audacter terribilia aggrediatur ultra quam ratio dictat, vocatur audax. Est autem aliquis qui non est vere audax, sed videtur, scilicet superbus quoniam fingit se esse fortem. Unde sicut fortis vel audax se habet circa terribilia, ita superbus quaerit apparere. Et propter hoc quando potest sine periculo imitatur opera fortis vel audacis. Unde multi eorum qui videntur fortes vel audaces sunt timidi quia, cum audacter se habeant in his quae habent parum periculi, quando ea quae sunt multum terribilia superveniunt, non sustinent ea.
| 552. Next [ii, y], at “He who,” he treats those who are excessive in daring. He says that the man who, dealing with terrifying things, abounds in daring by boldly attacking them beyond what reason suggests is called reckless. But there is also one who is apparently but not really reckless, the vain man who pretends to be brave. Hence as the brave or reckless man really is in regard to terrifying things, so the vain man seeks to appear. Because of this the vain man imitates the works of the brave or reckless man when he can do so without danger. Hence many of those who seem brave or reckless are cowardly. Many of those who are reckless in circumstances having little danger do not endure when truly frightening things occur.
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| Deinde cum dicit: qui autem in timendo etc., determinat de eo qui superabundat in timendo; et dicit quod talis vocatur timidus qui timet quae non oportet timere et eo modo quo non oportet et similiter secundum alias circumstantias. Et iste quidem qui superabundat in timendo deficit in audendo. Nulla est enim ratio quare aliquis non aggrediatur aliqua terribilia ad destruenda ipsa, nisi propter timorem. Sed defectus timoris potest esse absque audacia aggrediendi. Non enim sequitur quod quicumque non fugit sicut oportet, invadat plusquam oportet. Sed quicumque deficit ab invadendo quod oportet non facit hoc nisi propter timorem. Et ideo defectum timoris separavit a superabundantia audaciae, sed superabundantiam timoris coniungit defectui audaciae. Et quamvis timidus superabundet in timendo et deficiat in audendo, magis tamen est manifestus ex hoc quod superabundat in timore tristitiarum, quam ex hoc quod deficit in audendo, quia defectus non ita percipitur sicut abundantia.
| 553. At “One who” [ii, z], he treats of one who is excessive in fearing. The Philosopher says a man is a coward when he fears what he should not fear, in the way he should not fear, and so on. The man inordinate in fear is lacking in daring. The only reason why a person does not attack to destroy frightening things is fear. But the lack of fear can exist without the recklessness of attack. It does not follow then that everyone, who does not flee as he ought, attacks more than he ought. But whoever is deficient in attacking the right things is motivated only by fear. For this reason Aristotle separates the defect of fear from the excess of recklessness, but joins the excess of fear with the defect of recklessness. Although the coward is extreme in fearing and deficient in daring, nevertheless he is more conspicuous from the fact that he abounds in the fear of painful situations than from the fact that he is lacking in daring, because the defect is not so easily seen as the excess.
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| Deinde cum dicit desperans utique etc., ostendit quomodo praedicta se habeant ad spem et desperationem. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod audaciae et timoris obiectum est malum. Spei autem et desperationis obiectum est bonum. In bonum autem per se appetitus tendit, sed per accidens refugit ipsum ratione alicuius mali adiuncti. Similiter etiam malum per se refugit appetitus; quod autem est per se est causa eius quod est per accidens. Et ideo spes, cuius est tendere in bonum, est causa audaciae quae tendit in malum quod aggreditur. Et eadem ratione timor qui refugit malum est causa desperationis quae recedit a bono. Et ideo dicit quod timidus est desperans inquantum timet circa omnia deficere. Fortis autem e contrario, in quantum audet ostenditur esse bonae spei.
| 554. Then [i, b], at “The coward is,” he shows, how the previously named things are related to hope and despair. For an understanding of this we must consider that the object of recklessness and fear is evil. But the object of hope and despair is good. The appetitive faculty of itself tends towards the good, but incidentally flees the good by reason of some evil attached. Likewise, the appetitive faculty of itself flees the evil. But what is essential causes that which is incidental. For this reason, hope—whose characteristic is to tend towards good—causes recklessness that tends towards the evil it attacks. For the same reason fear, which flees evil, is the cause of despair, which withdraws from good. He says, therefore, that the coward is a despairing man inasmuch as he fears his deficiency in everything. On the contrary the brave man has great hope because he is courageous.
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| Deinde cum dicit circa haec quidem igitur etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt, concludens ex praedictis, quod circa praedictas passiones sunt et timidus et audax et fortis, sed differenter se habent ad eas. Nam audax et timidus superabundant et deficiunt in audendo et timendo. Sed fortis medio modo se habet in his et sicut oportet, id est secundum rationem rectam.
| 555. Next [i, c], at “The cowardly, the reckless,” he sums up what has been said, concluding from the premises that the cowardly, the reckless, and the brave man all are concerned with these passions but related to them in a different way. The reckless man exceeds in daring and is lacking in fear; the cowardly man exceeds in fear and is lacking in daring. But the brave man follows a middle course in these matters as he ought according to right reason.
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| Deinde cum dicit: et audaces quidem etc., comparat fortitudinem ad quaedam sibi similia. Et primo ostendit differentiam fortis ad audacem; secundo ad eum qui mortem sustinet propter vitandas aliquas molestias, ibi, quemadmodum igitur dictum est et cetera. Timidi autem in nullo videntur cum fortibus convenire, et ideo non curat inter eos differentiam assignare. Dicit ergo primo quod audaces ante pericula sunt praevolantes et volentes, id est velociter et ardenter ad ipsa currentes, quia moventur ex impetu passionis praeter rationem. Quando autem sunt in ipsis periculis discedunt, quia motus passionis praecedentis vincitur a difficultate imminente. Sed fortes quando sunt in ipsis operibus difficilibus, sunt acuti: quia iudicium rationis ex quo agunt non vincitur ab aliqua difficultate. Sed priusquam ad pericula veniant, sunt quieti: quia non agunt ex impetu passionis, sed ex deliberatione rationis.
| 556. At “The reckless” [2] he compares fortitude with things similar to it. First [2, a] he shows the difference between the brave and the reckless man. Next [2, b], at “As has been pointed out etc.,” he shows the difference between the brave man and the man who undergoes death to escape misfortunes. The coward seems to have nothing in common with the brave man, and for this reason Aristotle does not care to assign the difference between them. He remarks that the reckless are impetuous, rushing into danger, i.e., swiftly and spiritedly going out to meet it, because they are moved by a surge of passion beyond reason. When they are actually in the danger they are checked, for the movement of the preceding passion is overcome by the threatening danger. But when the brave are in the very midst of the dangers, they are vigorous because the judgment according to which they act is not overcome by any danger. But before they meet the difficulties, they are calm because they do not act from violence of passion but from deliberate reason.
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| Deinde cum dicit quemadmodum igitur etc., ostendit differentiam fortis ad eum qui sustinet mortem ut vitet molestias. Et dicit quod, sicut dictum est, fortitudo est medietas circa ausibilia et terribilia, quae sunt mala, et in quibus dictum est, scilicet in periculis mortis; et desiderat operari virtuose, et sustinet talia pericula, ut eveniat aliquod bonum, scilicet honestum, vel ut fugiat aliquod turpe, scilicet inhonestum. Sed quod aliquis moriatur sibi ipsi manus iniiciens, vel ab alio mortem illatam libenter patiens ad fugiendum inopiam vel cupidinem alicuius rei quam non potest habere, vel quicquid est aliud quod ingerit tristitiam, non pertinet ad fortem, sed magis ad timidum, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia videtur esse quaedam mollities animi contraria fortitudini, quod aliquis non possit sustinere laboriosa et tristia. Secundo quia non sustinet mortem propter bonum honestum, sicut fortis, sed fugiendo malum tristabile.
| 557. Then [2, b], at “As has been pointed out,” he shows the difference between a brave man and the man who undergoes death to escape misfortune. He says, as has been noted (535-540), that fortitude is a mean in terrifying things, which are evils concerned with the dangers of death spoken of before (535-540); that fortitude tends to operate virtuously and sustains sufferings of this kind in order to bring about something good and honorable, or in order to flee something disgraceful and dishonorable. However, that one should die by laying hands on himself or by voluntarily suffering death inflicted by another (in order to escape poverty or a longing for a thing which he cannot possess or whatever else there is that causes sorrow) does not belong to a brave man but rather to a coward. This happens for two reasons. First, because a certain effeminacy of soul, contrary to fortitude, seems to exist when a person is unable to undergo hardships and sorrows. Second, because such a one does not suffer death for an honorable good, as the brave man does, but to escape a painful evil.
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| Ultimo autem concludit quod ex praedictis potest sciri quid sit fortitudo.
| 558. Finally, he concludes that we can know, from what was said, the nature of fortitude.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Dicuntur autem et aliae secundum quinque modos et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit qualis sit actus verae fortitudinis et oppositorum vitiorum; hic determinat de quibusdam quae habent actum similem fortitudini, sed deficiunt a vera fortitudine. Quod quidem quinque modis contingit. Cum enim vera fortitudo sit virtus moralis, ad quam requiritur scire, et propter hoc eligere, potest quidem aliquis exercens actum fortitudinis tripliciter a vera fortitudine deficere. Uno modo quia non operatur sciens, et sic est unus modus non verae fortitudinis secundum quem dicitur aliquis fortis per ignorantiam. Alio modo quia aliquis non operatur ex electione, sed ex passione: sive sit passio impellens ad pericula subeunda, sicut est ira; sive passio quietans animum a timore, sicut est spes: et secundum hoc sumuntur duo modi non verae fortitudinis.
| 559. After the Philosopher has ascertained how the act of real fortitude and of the opposite vices is constituted, he treats here certain dispositions having an act similar to but lacking real fortitude (II). This happens in five ways. Since real fortitude is a moral virtue (for which knowledge is required and because of this, choice), a person exercising an act of fortitude can fall short of real virtue in three ways. In one way because he does not operate with knowledge. This is the fifth type of counterfeit fortitude, according to which a person is said to be brave through ignorance. In another way because a person does not operate by choice but by passion (whether it is a passion urging one to undergo dangers as anger does, or a passion quieting fear of the mind as hope does). According to this consideration, there are two kinds of counterfeit fortitude.
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| Tertio modo deficit aliquis a vera fortitudine ex eo quod aliquis ex electione quidem operatur, sed aut (non) eligit id quod eligit fortis, scilicet pericula sustinere, dum propter armorum peritiam reputat sibi non esse periculosum in bello confligere, sicut apparet in militibus. Aut quia eligit aliquis pericula sustinere, sed non propter illum finem propter quem eligit fortis, sed propter honores vel poenas, quae a rectoribus civitatum proponuntur.
| 560. The third way a person falls short of real fortitude is that he operates by choice, but he does not choose what the brave man chooses. In undergoing dangers he does not think it hazardous, because of his skill, to fight in battle, as is evident among soldiers; or he chooses to undergo the dangers not on account of the end that a brave man chooses but on account of honors or punishments decreed by rulers of states.
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| Secundum hoc ergo dividitur pars ista in quinque partes. In prima parte determinat de fortitudine politica sive civili. In secunda de fortitudine militari, ibi: videtur autem et experientia et cetera. In tertia parte de fortitudine quae est per iram, ibi, et furorem autem super fortitudinem etc.; in quarta parte de fortitudine quae est per spem, ibi, neque utique bonae spei et cetera. In quinta de fortitudine quae est per ignorantiam, ibi, fortes autem videntur et ignorantes et cetera. Circa primum ponit tres gradus politicae fortitudinis. Quorum primus est eorum, qui sustinent pericula propter honorem; secundus eorum, qui sustinent propter timorem poenarum, ibi, ponet autem utique etc.; tertius eorum qui aggrediuntur et sustinent periculosa propter praesentem coactionem, ibi, et qui praecipiunt et cetera. Circa primum tria facit.
| 561. Accordingly, this portion falls into five parts. In the first part [A] he treats civic fortitude or fortitude of the citizen; in the second [B], the fortitude of the soldier at “In particular cases etc.”; in the third part [Lect.17, C], fortitude that operates through anger, at “People confuse rage etc.” (B.1116 b 23); in the fourth part [Lect. 17, D], fortitude that operates through hope, at “Likewise the confident etc.” (B.1117 a ii); in the fifth part [Lect. 17, E], fortitude that operates through ignorance, at “Those who operate in ignorance etc.” (B.1117 a 23). In regard to the first he indicates three kinds of civic fortitude. The first kind [A, 1] belongs to those who undergo dangers for the sake of honor. The second [A, 2], to those who undergo dangers because of the fear of punishments, at “Those who are under compulsion etc.” The third [A, 3], at “Rulers do the same etc.,” to those who attack and expose themselves to dangerous situations because of pressing compulsion. He discusses the first point under three headings.
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| Primo proponit hunc gradum fortitudinis, et dicit quod, cum praeter fortitudinem veram dicantur quaedam aliae fortitudines secundum quinque modos; primum locum inter eas tenet fortitudo politica idest civilis, eo quod talis fortitudo maxime assimilatur verae. Sustinent enim cives pericula ut vitent increpationes et opprobria quae secundum statuta legum civilium inferuntur timidis, et ut adipiscantur honores qui secundum easdem leges fortibus exhibentur. Et inde est quod apud illas civitates in quibus timidis adhibentur vituperia, fortibus autem honores, inveniuntur viri fortissimi secundum hanc fortitudinem, et fortassis etiam secundum veram, propter assuetudinem.
| 562. First [i, a] he brings out this kind of fortitude. He says that over and above real fortitude, certain other kinds of fortitude are enumerated according to five types. Among these, civic fortitude or fortitude of the citizen holds first place because this type is very similar to real fortitude. Citizens undergo dangers to avoid penalties and disgrace which, according to the civil laws, are inflicted on the cowardly, and to acquire honors which by the same laws are bestowed on the brave. So in those states where blame is heaped on the cowardly and honors on the brave, men are found most brave according to this type of fortitude, and perhaps even according to the real virtue by reason of habit.
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| Secundo ibi: tales autem etc., inducit exempla ex Homero, qui describens Troianum bellum inducit taliter fortes, scilicet propter honores vel vituperia, puta Diomedem ex parte Graecorum, et Hectorem ex parte Troianorum. Inducit enim Hectorem dicentem haec verba: Polidamas, idest quidam dux Troianorum, primum redargutionem reponet mihi, id est primo me redarguet nisi fortiter egero. Et Diomedes dicebat seipsum exhortans ad fortiter agendum: Hector concionando apud Troianos dicet, ut laudans se et me vituperans, Titides, id est Diomedes qui sic nominatus est a patre, a me scilicet fugit vel victus est.
| 563- Second [i, b], at “Homer mentions,” he gives examples taken from Homer who, describing the Trojan War, introduces men brave for honor or fear of blame: Diomede among the Greeks and Hector for the Trojan side. He represents Hector as saying these words: “Polydamas, the Trojan leader, will be the first to reproach me (i.e., he will find fault first of all with me) if I do not fight manfully.” And Diomede exhorting himself to act bravely said: “Hector haranguing the Trojans will say in praise of himself and in vituperation of me that Tydides (a name given him from his father’s), alias Diomede, has fled from me and has been beaten.
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| Tertio ibi assimilatur autem etc., manifestat quod dixerat, scilicet quod ista fortitudo maxime assimilatur verae. Et dicit quod haec politica fortitudo maxime assimulatur ei de qua supra dictum est quod fit propter virtutem. Haec enim politica fortitudo fit propter verecundiam, quae est timor de turpi, inquantum scilicet aliquis fugit opprobria, et fit propter boni, id est honesti, desiderium, inquantum ista fortitudo quaerit honorem, qui est testimonium honestatis. Et ideo hoc exponens subdit, quod huiusmodi fortitudo fit propter honorem et propter fugam opprobrii quod turpe existit. Quia igitur honor propinquum aliquid est bono honesto, et vituperium turpi inhonesto, inde est quod ista fortitudo propinqua est verae fortitudini quae intendit honestum, et fugit inhonestum.
| 564. Third [i, c], at “This fortitude,” he clarifies what he has said: that this kind of fortitude is very similar to the genuine virtue. He says that the citizen’s fortitude is much like the one of which we have spoken (562), since it is for the sake of virtue. This fortitude of the citizen is practiced through shame or fear of the disgraceful, inasmuch as someone flees disgrace, and through a desire of the good or honorable insofar as this fortitude seeks honor, which is the testimony of goodness. For this reason he adds in explanation that fortitude of this sort is motivated by honor and avoidance of opprobrium, which is the disgraceful. Since then honor is a thing near to an honorable good, and blame to the disgraceful, it follows that this fortitude is close to real fortitude, which seeks what is honorable and flees from what is shameful.
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| Deinde cum dicit: ponet autem aliquis etc., ponit secundum gradum fortitudinis politicae, qui est propter timorem poenae. Et dicit quod ad eundem modum politicae fortitudinis possunt reduci illi, qui sunt fortes propter hoc quod timore poenarum coguntur a principibus civitatis. Sunt tamen deteriores praemissis, inquantum non agunt fortiter propter verecundiam turpitudinis, sed propter timorem poenae. Et hoc est quod subdit, quod non fugiunt turpe, idest inhonestum, sed triste aliquid idest dolorosum vel damnosum ex quo aliquis tristatur. Per hoc enim domini cogunt suos subditos fortiter pugnare. Sicut secundum Homerum, Hector Troianis comminabatur dicens: ille quem intelligam fugientem sine bello, idest sine hoc quod fortiter pugnet, ita male tractabo eum quod non erit sufficiens ad fugiendum canes.
| 565. Then [A, 2], at “Those who,” he indicates the second kind of civic fortitude that is practiced on account of punishment. He says that those who are brave, because compelled by the fear of punishments inflicted by rulers of the state, can be assigned the same type of civic fortitude. They are, however, inferior to the previously mentioned insofar as they do not act bravely on account of the shame of disgrace but on account of fear of punishment. This is why he adds that they do not flee what is disgraceful or dishonorable but what is sorrowful, i.e., painful or injurious, from the fact that someone is made sad. In this way the masters compel their subjects to fight bravely. According to Homer, Hector threatened the Trojans in these words: “Anyone running away and not doing battle, i.e., without fighting bravely, I will handle so roughly that he will not have a chance to escape the dogs.”
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| Deinde cum dicit: et qui praecipiunt etc., ponit tertium gradum politicae fortitudinis, prout scilicet aliqui coguntur a principibus praesentialiter et non solum timore futurarum poenarum. Et hoc est quod dicit quod idem operantur sua actione principes qui praecipiunt subditis, ut non fugiant a praelio, et eos qui recedunt percutiunt, et similiter illi qui ante pugnatores ne fugere possint constituunt muros et foveas et alia huiusmodi impedimenta fugae. Omnes enim principes talia facientes, cogunt subditos ad pugnandum. Sed illi qui sic coguntur non sunt vere fortes. Quia oportet virtuosum esse fortem non propter necessitatem quam patitur, sed propter bonum virtutis.
| 566. Next [A, 3], at “Rulers do the same,” he presents the third kind of civic fortitude according as some are compelled by their rulers then and there and not only by fear of future punishment. This is why he says that rulers do the same thing by their actions when they command their subjects not to run away from battle, and beat those who do. A similar judgment is to be passed on those who, before battle, construct walls and trenches and other such obstacles to retreat so that their subjects cannot take to flight. All rulers who do things of this kind coerce their subjects to fight. And those who act under compulsion in this way are not really brave, because the virtuous man must be brave not on account of the constraint he suffers but because of the good of virtue.
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| Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem et experientia etc., determinat de fortitudine militari. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim ostendit milites (per experientiam aptos esse) ad fortiter agendum; secundo comparat militarem fortitudinem ad politicam, ibi, milites autem timidi sunt et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod in singulis experientia videtur esse quaedam fortitudo. In quolibet enim negotio audacter et sine timore operatur ille, qui est expertus, sicut Vegetius dicit in libro de re militari: nemo facere dubitat quod se bene didicisse confidit. Et propter hoc Socrates aestimavit quod fortitudo esset scientia quaedam quae etiam per experientiam acquiritur: aestimavit etiam omnes alias virtutes esse scientias. Sed de hoc infra in sexto agetur. Sic ergo cum quidam alii sint fortes per experientiam in quibusdam aliis rebus, in rebus bellicis milites sunt fortes per experientiam.
| 567. At “In particular cases” [B] he treats the fortitude of the soldier. He explains this question in a twofold manner. First [B, 1] he shows what leads soldiers to fight bravely. Next [B, 2] he compares the fortitude of the soldier and the citizen, at “Soldiers turn cowards.” He says first that in individual cases experience seems to be a kind of fortitude. In any undertaking one who has knowledge from experience works boldly and without fear, as Vegetius says in his book on military affairs: “No one fears to do what he believes he has learned to do well.” For this reason Socrates thought fortitude was knowledge which is acquired by experience. He even thought all the virtues are kinds of knowledge. But this question will be studied later in the sixth book (1286). Therefore, since certain others are brave by experience in particular affairs, so soldiers are brave in warfare by reason of experience.
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| Ex qua quidem duo consequuntur. Quorum primum est quod in bellis multa sunt inania, quae scilicet inexpertis terrorem incutiunt, quamvis parum vel nihil periculi habeant; sicut fragor armorum, concursus equorum et alia huiusmodi, quae quidem milites maxime aspexerunt per experientiam non esse terribilia. Unde videntur fortes, cum talibus sine timore se ingerunt, quae aliis, scilicet inexpertis, periculosa videntur, quia nesciunt qualia sint. Secundo consequuntur ex experientia quod possunt facere, idest gravare adversarios, et non pati, id est non gravari ab eis, custodiendo scilicet se ab ictibus et percutiendo alios inquantum habent potestatem ad bene utendum armis, et alia huiusmodi habent, quae sunt efficacia ad hoc quod ipsi possint laedere alios, ita quod non laedantur. Unde manifestum est, quod ipsi pugnant cum aliis sicut armati cum inermibus. Quasi enim inermis videtur qui armis non potest uti aut nescit.
| 568. Two things follow from this. The first is that in war there are many great things like the clash of arms, the charge of the cavalry, and so on that strike the inexperienced with terror, although there is little or no danger in them. These things, as the professional soldiers know, are not really to be dreaded. Hence men seem brave when engaging, without fear, in exercises that appear dangerous to others who are inexperienced and ignorant of the nature of what is taking place. Second, it follows that by reason of experience professional soldiers in fighting can do hurt to their adversaries, and not suffer or be harmed in turn. They can guard themselves from blows and can strike back, for they are clever in the use of weapons, and they possess other skills effective in enabling them to inflict injury while they themselves are not injured. Hence it is obvious they fight against others as the armed against the unarmed. A man is in effect unarmed if he does not know how or is unable to use arms.
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| Et simile est de athletis, idest pugilibus fortibus et instructis cum idiotis, idest rusticis inexpertis. Quia in talibus agonibus, scilicet athletarum, non illi qui maxime possunt pugnare sunt fortissimi, sed illi qui sunt potentes secundum virtutem corporalem, ut habentes corpora bene disposita.
| 569. The same can be said of athletes, i.e., strong and well-trained boxers compared to simple and inexperienced farm boys. In such athletic contests it is not the brave who can fight the most but those who are: physically powerful and well- conditioned.
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| Deinde cum dicit: milites autem timidi sunt etc., comparat militarem fortitudinem ad politicam. Et dicit quod milites tamdiu fortiter agunt quandiu non vident periculum imminere, sed quando periculum excedit peritiam, quam habent in armis, et quando non habent multitudinem secum nec alias praeparationes bellicas, tunc efficiuntur timidi. Et tunc primi fugiunt: non enim propter aliud erant audaces, nisi quia aestimabant sibi periculum non imminere. Et ideo quando vident periculum primi fugiunt; sed illi qui sunt civiliter fortes, permanentes in periculis moriuntur. Sicut accidit in quodam loco ubi militibus fugientibus cives remanserunt. Quia cives turpe reputabant fugere, et magis eligebant mortem quam salvari per fugam. Sed milites a principio exponebant se periculis quasi existimantes se potentiores. Sed postquam cognoverunt adversarios esse potentiores, fugerunt, magis timentes mortem quam turpem fugam. Non est autem ita de forti, qui magis timet turpitudinem quam mortem.
| 570. Then [B, 2] at “Soldiers turn,” he compares the fortitude of the soldier and the citizen. He says that soldiers fight bravely so long as they do not see danger threatening. But when the danger exceeds the skill they have in arms and when they lack numbers and adequate military preparations, they become cowardly. Then they are the first to run away; they were daring for no other reason than that they thought the danger was not imminent. Therefore, when they first see the danger, they take to their heels. But those who possess the fortitude of the citizen—refusing to leave the danger—lose their lives, as happened in a certain place where the citizens remained after the soldiers had fled. The reason is that citizens think it disgraceful to run away, and choose to die rather than save themselves by flight. But soldiers expose themselves to dangers because, from the beginning, they think themselves more powerful. But after they have recognized that the enemy is more powerful, they take to flight fearing death more than ignominious escape. It is not so with the brave man who fears disgrace more than death.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Et furorem autem super fortitudinem et cetera. Positis duobus modis fortitudinis non verae, hic ponit tertium modum, qui scilicet est per iram impellentem ad actum fortitudinis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim ostendit quomodo furor inclinet ad actum fortitudinis. Secundo ostendit differentiam ad veram fortitudinem, ibi, fortes quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod homines in communi usu loquendi inferunt furorem supra fortitudinem, dum scilicet fortitudini attribuunt ea quae per furorem fiunt. Furentes enim vel irati videntur esse fortes. Sicut et bestiae, quae in furorem concitatae irruunt in homines qui eas vulnerant; habet enim fortitudo quamdam furoris similitudinem, inquantum scilicet furor cum maximo impetu inducit in pericula. Fortis autem cum magna virtute animi in pericula tendit.
| 571. After having disposed of two types of counterfeit fortitude, he proposes here [C] to treat a third kind operating by means of rage which urges to the act of fortitude. He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [C’ 1] he shows how rage inclines to the act of fortitude. Next [C, 2], at “The brave are etc.,” he shows how this fortitude differs from real fortitude. He observes first that men in common usage of speech confuse rage with fortitude when they attribute to fortitude things that enraged or angry people do. Indeed the enraged and angry do seem to be brave. So too do beasts who, when aroused to rage, attack men beating them. Fortitude has some likeness to rage inasmuch as rage incites against danger with a very strong impulse. But the brave strives against danger with strength of soul.
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| Et inducit ad hoc exempla Homeri qui admonendo quemdam dicit: virtutem immitte furori, ut scilicet furor per virtutem animi reguletur. Et virtutem erige et furorem, ut scilicet per iram virtus animi promptior ad actum reddatur. Et alibi dicit de quibusdam, quod per singulas nares emittebant austeram virtutem, scilicet furorem, qui propter calefactionem cordis facit cum magno impetu respirare, intantum quod aliquando ex impetu irae ebullit sanguis per nares. Et subdit philosophus quod praedicta verba Homeri videntur significare quod furor erigatur, et impetum faciat ad actus fortitudinis.
| 572. As an example he quotes the verses of Homer who warned someone in these words: “Put strength into your wrath” so that wrath may be directed by the virtue of the soul; “Arouse your might and wrath” that the virtue of your soul may be rendered more prompt by anger. Elsewhere he remarks that certain people “pant harsh courage through both nostrils;” in other words, wrath, because of the beating of the heart, makes breathing so heavy that sometimes “the blood boils up” through the nostrils from the force of rage. And the Philosopher observes that Homer’s statements here seem to indicate that anger is aroused and gives impetus to fortitude’s act.
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| Deinde cum dicit: fortes quidem igitur etc., ostendit differentiam huius fortitudinis ad veram fortitudinem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quid conveniat verae fortitudini. Secundo quid conveniat furori bestiarum, ibi, ferae autem propter tristitiam et cetera. Tertio quid conveniat furori humano, ibi, et homines utique irati et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod fortes non impelluntur ad opera fortitudinis peragenda ex impetu furoris, sed ex intentione boni; sed furor secundario se habet in actu eorum ad modum cooperantis.
| 573. Then [C, 2], at “The brave,” he explains the difference between this and genuine fortitude. He discusses this point from three aspects. First [2, a] he shows what pertains to true fortitude; next [2, b], at “Wild animals attack etc.,” what pertains to the rage of beasts; and finally [2, c], at “Angry men,” what pertains to human rage. He says that the brave are not incited to perform works of fortitude by the impulse of rage but by the intention of good. Rage, however, does operate secondarily in these acts in the manner of a co-operator.
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| Deinde cum dicit: ferae autem propter tristitiam etc., ostendit quomodo ira bestiarum se habeat ad actum fortitudinis. Et dicit, quod ferae aggrediuntur pericula propter tristitiam, id est malorum, quae actu patiuntur, puta cum vulnerantur, vel propter timorem eorum, quae timent se passuras, puta si timeant se vulnerandas, ex hoc enim incitatae ad iram homines invadunt, quia si essent in silva vel in palude, non vulnerarentur neque timerent vulnerari et ita non venirent ad homines invadendos. Unde patet quod in eis non est vera fortitudo, quia impelluntur ad pericula solum dolore et furore, cum tamen nihil periculorum praevideant, sicut illi, qui ex electione fortiter operantur. Si enim bestiae, quae ex passione agunt, fortes essent, pari ratione et asini essent fortes, qui propter concupiscentiam cibi non desistunt a pascuis, quando esuriunt, licet percutiantur. Et similiter etiam (adulteri) propter concupiscentiam venereorum, multa ausibilia aggrediuntur, nec tamen in his est vera fortitudo. Quia non operantur ex electione boni, sed propter passionem. Et sic patet, quod nec etiam animalia, quae propter dolorem impelluntur ad pericula (non) habent veram fortitudinem.
| 574. Next [2, b], at “Wild animals,” he shows how the anger of beasts compares with the act of fortitude. He remarks that wild animals attack dangers out of pain from harmful things—which they are actually suffering when wounded, for instance—or because of the dread of the things they fear they are about to suffer, e.g., when incited to anger by fear of being wounded, they attack men. The reason is that if they were in the woods or swamps they would not be wounded nor fear to be wounded, so would not come out to attack men. Hence it is clear that real fortitude is not found in these animals because they are aroused against the dangers only by pain and rage, since they do not foresee dangers, as those who act bravely by choice. If beasts who act by passion were brave, then by the same argument hungry jackasses (who, because of the desire for food do not stop eating even when beaten) would be brave. Adulterers too undertake many risks for the sake of lust, but real fortitude is not found in them because they do not act by choice of good, but by reason of passion. So it is clear that animals who are incited against danger on account of pain do not have true fortitude.
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| Et quamvis posita sit similitudo de concupiscentia et furore, inter omnes tamen passiones illa fortitudo videtur esse connaturalior verae fortitudini, quae est propter furorem: ita quod si praeaccipiat electionem et debitum finem cuius gratia operetur, erit vera fortitudo. Et signanter dicit praeaccipiens quia in vera fortitudine furor debet sequi electionem rationis, non praeire.
| 575. However much is the likeness between desire and rage, nevertheless among all the passions fortitude out of rage seems to be more connatural to genuine fortitude, so that if rage be antecedently directed by choice and the motivation of a fitting end, real fortitude will be present. He expressly says “antecedently directed” because in true fortitude rage ought to follow rather than precede choice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: et homines utique irati etc., ostendit quid conveniat fortitudini, quae est ex ira in hominibus, qui quidem videntur ex electione operari et aliquem finem intendere, scilicet punitionem eius contra quem irascitur. Unde dicit quod homines dum sunt irati dolent propter iniuriam illatam et nondum vindicatam, sed quando iam puniunt, tunc delectantur, utpote suum desiderium implentes. Qui autem propter hoc fortiter operantur, possunt quidem dici pugnantes, sed non fortes. Quia non operantur propter bonum neque ductu rationis, sed propter passionem qua vindictam appetunt. Habent tamen aliquid simile verae fortitudini ut ex praedictis patet.
| 576. At “Angry men” [2, c] he shows what belongs to fortitude that operates by the anger of men who seem to act by choice and to intend some purpose—the punishment of the person with whom they are angry. For this reason he says that angry men are grieved over an injury received and as yet unavenged. But when they are taking vengeance they are delighted in the satisfaction of their desire. Those who work vigorously at this may perhaps be called pugnacious but hardly brave because they are not doing the right thing, nor are they led by reason but rather by passion for the sake of which they desire vengeance. However, they do possess something similar to genuine fortitude as is evident from the premises (571-572).
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| Deinde cum dicit neque utique bonae spei etc., ponit quartum modum fortitudinis, secundum quod aliqui fortes dicuntur propter spem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit hunc modum fortitudinis. Secundo comparat hunc modum ad veram fortitudinem, ibi, consimiles autem et cetera.
| 577. Then [D], at “Likewise the confident ‘ “ he mentions a fourth kind of fortitude according to which some are called brave by reason of hope. He develops this idea in a threefold fashion. First [D, i] he explains this type of fortitude. Next [D, 2], he compares this type with true fortitude at “However, such confident people etc.”
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| Tertio infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, ibi, propter quod fortioris et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod sicut illi, qui propter iram fortiter agunt, non sunt vere fortes, ita neque illi qui propter solam spem victoriae, vere fortes dicuntur, est tamen in eis aliqua praeeminentia per quam differunt ab aliis, quia propter hoc quod multoties vicerunt in periculis existentes, confidunt etiam nunc se victoriam obtinere, non propter aliquam peritiam, quam ex experientia sint adepti, hoc enim pertinet ad secundum modum fortitudinis, sed propter solam fiduciam, quam ex frequentibus victoriis acceperunt.
| Finally [D, 3], he deduces a corollary from what has been said, at “Therefore, that man etc.” He says first that, as those who act bravely on account of anger are not truly brave, so neither are they who act bravely for the sole reason of their hope for victory. But they have a certain preeminence by which they differ from others. From the fact that they have very often conquered in the midst of danger, they are now confident of obtaining victory not by reason of any skill acquired through experience—this belongs to the second type of fortitude—but solely by reason of a confidence derived from their frequent victories in the past.
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| Deinde cum dicit: consimiles autem etc., comparat hanc fortitudinem verae fortitudini. Et dicit quod isti qui sic sunt bene sperantes, sunt consimiles vere fortibus, quia ambo sunt audaces, idest pericula audacter aggredientes, non autem secundum quod audax dicitur aliquis vitiose. Sed differunt, quia fortes audacter aggrediuntur propter praedicta, scilicet ex electione, et propter bonum; sed isti qui sunt bonae spei, aggrediuntur audacter propter hoc quod aestimant se esse meliores in pugna, et nihil se passuros contrarium ab aliis. Et est simile de inebriatis, qui etiam multiplicatis spiritibus propter vinum efficiuntur bonae spei. Sed quando talibus non accidunt ea quae sperant, non persistunt sed fugiunt. Sed proprium est fortis ut sustineat propter bonum vel ad vitandum turpitudinem inhonesti, ea quae sunt homini terribilia secundum rei veritatem, et non solum secundum apparentiam.
| 578. Next [D, 2], at “However, such confident people,” he compares this fortitude to real fortitude. He notes that those who have abundant confidence in this manner are like the truly brave because both are daring-resolute in meeting dangers-but not in the way that a reckless person is at fault. They differ however since the brave boldly attack in the fashion already indicated, i.e., by choice and on account of good. But those who have high hopes attack boldly because they think themselves more able fighters and are not going to suffer any reverse from others. They resemble drunkards who also become confident when their spirits are reinforced by wine. But when such persons fail to get what they expect, they do not persist; they run away. It is a mark of the brave man, however, to suffer—for the sake of what is honorable and to avoid disgrace—evils that are terrifying to men, real evils and not merely apparent ones.
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| Deinde cum dicit propter quod fortioris etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis. Quia enim ad fortem pertinet secundum inclinationem proprii habitus terribilia sustinere, magis videtur esse fortis, qui in repentinis timoribus non timet neque perturbatur, quam si hoc accidat in his quae (non) sunt prius manifesta. Magis enim videtur esse ab habitu, inquantum minus videtur se praeparasse ad talia sustinenda. Illa enim quae sunt praemanifesta potest aliquis eligere per rationem et deliberationem etiam contra inclinationem habitus vel passionis. Nulla enim est tam vehemens inclinatio habitus vel passionis, cui ratio non possit resistere, dummodo remaneat homini rationis usus per quem se habet ad opposita; sed in repentinis homo non potest deliberare. Unde videtur operari ex interiori inclinatione, quae est secundum habitum.
| 579. At “Therefore, that man” [D, 3] he deduces a corollary from what has been said. Because the brave man characteristically endures terrifying things according to the inclination of a proper habit, that person seems to be braver who is not more afraid or disturbed by unexpected terrors than by those which were apparent beforehand. Such a one seems to act more from habit inasmuch as he apparently has had less opportunity to prepare himself to endure these evils. A man can choose by reason and deliberation (even contrary to the inclination of habit and passion) the things that are foreseen. In no case is the inclination of habit or passion so vehement that reason is unable to resist provided that the use of reason—which of itself has a relation to contraries—remains with man. But in unexpected events a man, cannot deliberate. Hence he seems to; operate by an interior inclination according to habit.
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| Deinde cum dicit: fortes autem videntur etc., ponit quintum modum fortitudinis non verae. Et dicit quod etiam illi qui ignorant pericula videntur esse fortes, dum scilicet audacter aggrediuntur ea quae sunt periculosa, licet eis non videantur. Et non longe differunt ab his qui sunt fortes propter bonam spem. Utrique enim aestimat non imminere eis pericula.
| 580. Then [E], at “Those who operate,” he introduces the fifth kind of counterfeit fortitude. He says that those who are ignorant of dangers seem to be brave when they resolutely attack things equally dangerous, but which do not seem so dangerous to them. They do not differ much from people who are brave by reason of great confidence. Each thinks that dangers do not threaten him.
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| Sed in hoc differunt, quod ignorantes non aestimant ea quae ipsi aggrediuntur esse simpliciter et in se ipsis periculosa, illi autem qui sunt bonae spei cognoscunt quidem qualia sint in se ipsis ea quae aggrediuntur. Sed tamen non reputant ea esse sibi periculosa. Unde illi qui sunt ignorantes, tanto sunt deteriores illi qui sunt bonae spei, quanto nullam dignitatem habent, sed ex solo defectu scientiae ad pericula currunt. Illi autem qui sunt bonae spei habent aliquam dignitatem in quantum propter consuetudinem vincendi bene de se confidunt. Et ideo illi qui sunt bonae spei etiam postquam cognoscant pericula, permanent per aliquod tempus, donec scilicet magnitudo periculi superet eorum spem. Sed illi qui per ignorantiam sunt fortes statim cum cognoscunt aliud esse quam suspicarentur, fugiunt. Quod passi sunt Argeny, qui erant quidam cives Graeciae, et dum putarent contra Syconios pugnare, qui erant alii cives eis infirmiores, inciderunt in quosdam alios fortiores.
| 581. They differ, however, in that the ignorant do not consider the evils they attack to be dangers in themselves and without qualification. On the other hand those who have high hopes know the nature of the evils they assail but do not think that these constitute dangers for them. Those who are ignorant are the more inferior to those who have high hopes inasmuch as the ignorant have no self-reliance at all, but go out to meet dangers only because of the lack of knowledge. But those who have great hopes remain for some time—even after they recognize the dangers—until the greatness of the danger overwhelms their hope. Those who are brave through ignorance, however, take flight as soon as they know the situation is different from what they suspected. The Argives, Greek citizens, reacted in this way when thinking they were fighting against Sicyonians—citizens weaker than themselves—they in fact fell upon other stronger soldiers.
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| Ultimo autem concludit quod hi de quibus dictum est dicuntur fortes, inquantum existimantur fortes propter actus similitudinem, non quod vere sint fortes.
| 582, He concludes that those we have discussed (571-581) are called brave inasmuch as they are considered brave by a similitude and not because they are truly brave.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Circa audacias autem et timores et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit materiam et actum fortitudinis, hic determinat quasdam proprietates fortitudinis secundum quod fortitudo se habet ad delectationem vel tristitiam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit fortitudinis proprietates. Secundo excludit eas a militari fortitudine, ibi: milites autem nihil forsitan et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quomodo se habet fortitudo ad timorem et audaciam. Secundo quomodo fortitudo se habeat ad tristitiam, ibi: in sustinendo utique et cetera. Tertio quomodo se habeat ad delectationem, ibi: sed adhuc videbitur utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod cum fortitudo sit circa audacias et timores, non aequaliter est circa utrumque. Sed magis laus huius virtutis est in hoc quod aliquis bene se habet circa terribilia. Ille enim qui in terribilibus non perturbatur, sed circa ea se habet sicut oportet, magis commendatur quod sit fortis quam ille qui bene se habet circa audacias. Et hoc ideo quia timor imminet homini ab aliquo fortiori contra ipsum insurgente. Audacia autem consurgit ex hoc quod aliquis aestimat eum quem invadit, suam non excedere potestatem. Difficilius autem est stare contra fortiorem, quam insurgere in aequalem vel minorem.
| 583. After the Philosopher has treated the matter and the act of fortitude, he considers here certain properties according as it is related to pleasure and pain. On this point he does two things. First [1] he details the properties of fortitude. Then [2] he excludes them from fortitude of the soldier, at “Nothing hinders etc.” He develops the first consideration in three ways. First [a] he shows how fortitude is related to fear and daring; next [b], how fortitude is related to pain, at “As has been said etc.”; last [c], how fortitude is related to pleasure, at “Still the brave man seems etc.” He says first that although fortitude is concerned with both daring and fear, it is not concerned with each in the same manner. But praise of this virtue consists rather in this, that a person behaves well with respect to terrifying things. One who is not disturbed by frightening evils but conducts himself as he ought in regard to them is more commended for bravery than one who conducts himself well in regard to daring. The reason is that fear is a threat to a man from someone stronger rising up against him. But daring originates from the fact that a man thinks that the one he attacks is not too powerful to overcome. It is more difficult to stand against a stronger man than to rise up against an equal or weaker one.
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| Deinde cum dicit: in sustinendo utique etc., ostendit qualiter fortitudo se habeat circa tristitiam. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod idem est obiectum timoris et tristitiae, scilicet malum, sed differt secundum differentiam praeteriti et futuri. Nam malum futurum est terribile; malum autem praesentialiter imminens est contristans. Ad fortem autem pertinet non solum stare contra timores futurorum periculorum, sed etiam in ipsis periculis persistere, sicut prius dictum est. Et ideo dicit quod aliqui praecipue dicuntur fortes ex eo quod bene sustinent tristia, id est pericula praesentialiter imminentia, puta percussiones et vulnera. Et inde est quod fortitudo habet tristitiam adiunctam.
| 584. Then [b], at “As has been said,” he shows in what manner fortitude is concerned with pain. To understand this we must consider that the object of fear and pain is the same, evil. But they differ according to past and future. Future evil is something terrifying while evil threatening in the present is something afflicting. It pertains to the brave man not only to stand against the fear of future dangers but also to continue steadfastly in the midst of these very dangers, as was noted previously (548). For this reason he says that men are called brave particularly because they stout-heartedly endure distressing things, i.e., immediately threatening things like blows and wounds. So it is that fortitude has pain connected with it.
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| Et ex hoc iuste laudatur quod non recedit a bono virtutis ad hoc quod fugiat tristitiam. Rationabiliter autem ex hoc fortitudo est maxime laudabilis, quia laus virtutis maxime consistit in hoc quod aliquis bene operetur circa difficilia. Difficilius autem est quod aliquis sustinet tristia, quod pertinet ad fortitudinem, quam quod abstineat a delectabilibus, quod pertinet ad temperantiam. Unde laudabilior est fortitudo quam temperantia.
| 585. Consequently, fortitude is justly praised because it does not withdraw from the good of virtue to escape pain. On this account it is reasonable that fortitude is most praiseworthy, since the praise of virtue consists especially in the fact that a person deals courageously with troublesome matters. It is more difficult to endure distressing things (which pertains to fortitude) than to abstain from pleasurable things (which pertains to temperance). Therefore fortitude is more praiseworthy than temperance.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sed adhuc videbitur etc., ostendit quomodo fortitudo se habeat circa delectationem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo excludit errorem, ibi: et quanto utique et cetera. Tertio infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, ibi, non utique in omnibus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum fortitudo sit in sustinendo tristia, videtur quidem fortis habere aliquam delectationem ex consecutione finis propter quem fortiter agit; sed ista delectatio evanescit, idest debiliter sentitur propter circumstantes tristitias, sicut accidit in agonibus gignasticis, in quibus scilicet pugiles nudi pugnant.
| 586, Next [c], at “Still the brave man, ‘ he shows in what manner fortitude is related to pleasure. He discusses this point from three aspects. First [i] he submits his proposition. Next [ii], he rejects an error, at “As a man is more perfect etc.” Last [iii], he deduces a corollary from what has been said, at “The pleasurable operation etc.” He says first that since fortitude consists in enduring distressing things, the brave man seems to take some pleasure in attaining the end for which he bravely struggles. But this pleasure is vapid, i.e., feebly felt on account of the accompanying griefs, as happens in athletic contests in which boxers fight with no protection.
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| Delectantur enim pugiles in fine, cuius gratia pugnant, scilicet quia coronantur et honorantur. Sed sustinere percussiones est eis dolorosum. Et hoc negare est negare eos esse carnales. Quia si habent carnem sensibilem, necesse est quod laesiva inferant eis dolorem. Et similiter omnis labor quem sustinent in pugnando, est eis tristabilis. Et quia multa sunt haec tristabilia et dolorosa quae sustinent, et bonum quod habent pro fine est aliquid parvum, non videntur aliquam delectationem sentire, quia delectatio absorbetur a maiori tristitia. Et ita etiam accidit in actu fortitudinis, quia mors et vulnera sunt dolorosa et tristia forti, quamvis fortis ea sustineat volens propter assequendum bonum virtutis et propter vitandam turpitudinem vitiosam, qui quidem finis est potior quam pugilum. Unde magis remanet aliquid de delectatione finis.
| 587. Boxers take pleasure in the end they strive for, i.e., that they may receive the crown and be honored. But to take a beating is painful to them. To deny this is to deny that they have flesh and blood, because if they have sensitive flesh, hurtful things must cause them pain. Likewise, all the drudgery they suffer in fighting is disagreeable to them. Since there are many disagreeable and painful experiences they undergo, and since the good they possess as an end is something insignificant, they do not seem to be sensible of any pleasure because the pleasure is absorbed by the stronger pain. So it occurs too in the act of fortitude, for death and wounds are painful to the brave man, although he endures them to attain the good of virtue and to avoid disgrace—an end more important than that of boxers. Hence some pleasure abides rather by reason of the end.
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| Deinde cum dicit: et quanto utique etc., excludit errorem Stoicorum qui ponebant quod virtuosus nullam tristitiam habet. Circa hoc autem duo facit: primo ostendit quod forti imminet maxima tristitia. Secundo, quod per hoc non minuitur eius fortitudo, sed augetur, ibi: sed nihil minus et cetera. Arguit autem in prima parte ex eo quod supponebant Stoici, scilicet quod nihil esset bonum hominis nisi virtus. Et ideo dicebant virtuosum non tristari, quia in proprio bono non patitur aliquod detrimentum. Sed e converso philosophus dicit quod quanto aliquis est magis perfectus in virtute et magis felix secundum felicitatem praesentis vitae, tanto magis imminet ei tristari in morte secundum considerationem bonorum praesentis vitae.
| 588. At “As a man is more” [ii] he rejects the error of the Stoics who held that virtuous men feel no pain. He considers this point in a twofold manner. First [x] he proves that very intense pain befalls the brave man; and next y I that, because of this, his fortitude is not lessened but increased, at “This is saddening etc.” He argues in the first part from what the Stoics took for granted, that there was no human good except virtue. Therefore, they said that the virtuous man is not subject to grief because, by reason of his own good, he suffers no harm. On the contrary, the Philosopher says that as a man is more perfect in virtue and happier according to the happiness of the present life, so much more he is saddened (according to the consideration of the goods of this life) by the imminence of death.
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| Duo enim sunt quae augent tristitiam alicuius hominis in amissione alicuius boni. Primo quidem quando privatur bono quo dignus erat. Secundo propter magnitudinem boni quo privatur. Et utrumque accidit in proposito quia virtuoso maxime dignum est quod vivat. Privatur etiam virtuosus scienter maximis bonis, scilicet optima vita sua et virtutibus quas amittit quantum ad usum praesentis vitae. Et hoc infert ei tristitiam, etiam dato quod non immineat ei tristitia respectu quorumcumque aliorum malorum quae tolerantur salva vita.
| 589. A man’s sadness at the loss of any good can be increased by two circumstances. First if the loss is of a deserved good, and second if the loss is of something great. Both things are present in our case because the virtuous man most of all deserves to live. Likewise he is knowingly deprived of the most excellent good, i.e., the best life and the virtues which he loses so far as the use in the present life is concerned. This causes him distress, even granted that sorrow does not befall him in respect of any other evils whatsoever that are suffered without the loss of life.
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| Considerandum tamen quod aliquibus virtuosis propter spem futurae vitae fit mors desiderabilis. Sed neque Stoici sic loquebantur, neque ad philosophum pertinebat de his quae ad statum alterius vitae pertinent, in praesenti opere loqui.
| 590. We must consider, however’ that to some virtuous men death is desirable on account of the hope of a future life. But the Stoics did not discuss this, nor did it pertain to the Philosopher in this work to speak of those things that belong to the condition of another life.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sed nihil minus etc., dicit quod praedicta tristitia non minuit fortitudinem. Sed ex hoc dicitur aliquis magis fortis, ex eo quod bonum fortitudinis quod quaeritur in bello eligit prae illis bonis quae moriendo amittit, magis appetens unum magnum bonum facere quam multa minora bona servare, sicut infra in IX huius dicetur.
| 591. Then [y], at “This is saddening,” he says that this sorrow, of which we were speaking, does not lessen fortitude. Rather someone is said to be brave from the fact that he chooses the good of fortitude—which is sought in battle—in preference to those goods that he loses by death, desiring more to do one great good than to preserve many lesser goods, as will be explained later in the ninth book of this work (1879-1880).
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| Deinde cum dicit: non utique autem etc., concludit ex praemissis quod, licet in primo et secundo dictum sit, quod operationes virtutum sunt delectabiles, non tamen in omnibus virtutibus existit operatio delectabilis nisi secundum quod attingit finem. Et hoc dicitur propter fortitudinem, ut ex dictis patet.
| 592. Next [iii], at “The pleasurable operation,” he concludes from the premises that, although it was stated in the first and second books (154-160, 267, 275-279) that virtuous operations are pleasurable, the pleasurable operation is not found in all virtues, except as it attains to the end. This is noted on account of fortitude, as is evident from what was just said (586-587).
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| Deinde cum dicit: milites autem etc., excludit praedictas proprietates a militari fortitudine. Et dicit quod nihil prohibet aliquos esse optimos milites qui non sunt tales quales descripsimus esse fortes. Sed forte illi qui sunt minus fortes sunt milites meliores, et nullum aliud bonum attendunt, sicut nec fortitudinis; sunt enim isti parati ad pericula non propter aliquod bonum virtutis, sed vitam suam, quam exponunt discrimini, quodammodo commutant ad parva lucra, puta stipendiorum vel praedae.
| 593. At “Nothing hinders” [2] he excludes the previously mentioned properties from the fortitude of the soldier. He says that nothing hinders some men from being very good soldiers, who are not such as we have described the brave man to be. But perhaps those who are less brave and attend to no other good, not even the good of fortitude, are better soldiers. They are prepared for danger not by reason of any good of virtue, but in a measure they barter their life, which they expose to risk, for trifling gains of money and booty for instance.
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| Deinde cum dicit: de fortitudine quidem igitur etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt. Et dicit quod tantum dictum est de fortitudine et ex his quae dicta sunt potest figuraliter accipi quid est fortitudo: ut dicamus quod fortitudo est virtus medio modo se habens secundum rationem rectam circa timores et audacias propter bonum.
| 594. Then [3], at “So much then,” he sums up in conclusion what has been said. He states that the definition of fortitude can be understood according to its general outlines, so that we may say that it is a virtue consisting in a mean according to right reason dealing with fear and daring on account of the good.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Post haec de temperantia dicamus et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de fortitudine quae respicit terribilia quae sunt corruptiva humanae vitae, hic agit de temperantia quae respicit delectabilia, quibus humana vita conservatur, scilicet cibos et venerea. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur propositum, ibi, quoniam quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod post haec quae dicta sunt de fortitudine, dicendum est de temperantia. Et rationem continuationis assignat ex hoc quod istae duae virtutes conveniunt in subiecto. Utraque enim est irrationabilium partium, prout scilicet irrationabilis pars animae dicitur quae nata est et contraire et oboedire rationi, ut supra in I habitum est. Huiusmodi autem est appetitus sensitivus, ad quem pertinent animae passiones.
| 595. After the Philosopher has treated fortitude concerned with terrifying things which are destructive of man’s life, he now takes up the question of temperance concerned with pleasurable things which preserve human life, i.e., food and sex. On this point he does two things. First [I] he indicates what he intends to do. Next [II] he carries out his intention, at “Temperance is a mean etc.” He says first that, after the treatise on fortitude, we must speak about temperance. He finds the reason for this succession in the fact that these two virtues agree in subject. Both pertain to the irrational part, according as that part of the soul is called irrational which is designed by nature both to conform to, and to obey reason, as was stated in the beginning (239). Such is the sensitive appetite to which the passions of the soul belong.
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| Unde oportet quod in appetitu sensitivo sint omnes virtutes quae sunt circa passiones. Est autem fortitudo circa passionem timoris et audaciae quae sunt in irascibili; temperantia autem circa delectationes et tristitias quae sunt in concupiscibili. Unde fortitudo est in irascibili, sed temperantia in concupiscibili.
| 596. Hence all the virtues dealing with the passions must be placed in the sensitive appetite. Fortitude is concerned with the passions of fear and daring, which reside in the irascible part, but temperance is concerned with pleasures and pains, which reside in the concupiscible part. Consequently, fortitude is placed in the irascible part, but temperance in the concupiscible Part.
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| Considerandum tamen est quod delectationes circa quas est temperantia sunt communes nobis et brutis, scilicet delectationes ciborum et venereorum. Et similiter timores circa quos est fortitudo sunt communes nobis et brutis, scilicet timores mortis. Et ideo specialiter dixit quod hae duae virtutes sunt irrationabilium partium, quia ad irrationabiles partes animae pertinent, non solum propter ipsas passiones, sed etiam propter passionum obiecta. Sunt enim quaedam passiones ex quarum obiectis bruta animalia non patiuntur, sicut divitiae, honores et alia huiusmodi.
| 597. We must consider that the pleasures of food and sex, with which temperance deals, are common to us and the brutes. Likewise, the fear of death, with which fortitude is concerned, is common to us and them. For this reason he notes particularly that these two virtues are of the irrational parts, because they belong to the irrational parts of the soul not only on account of the passions themselves but also because of the objects of the passions. There are some passions whose objects do not concern the brutes, like riches, honors and so on.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quoniam quidem igitur etc., incipit determinare de temperantia. Et primo inquirit quae sit materia temperantiae. Secundo determinat actum ipsius et oppositorum vitiorum, ibi, concupiscentiarum autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit in generali materiam temperantiae. Secundo inquirit materiam specialem, ibi, circa quales igitur et cetera. Circa primum resumit tria quae supra in secundo dicta sunt. Quorum primum est quod temperantia medium tenet circa delectationes. Secundum est quod ipsa etiam est circa tristitias, quae scilicet proveniunt ex absentia delectabilium, unde minus est temperantia circa tristitias quam circa delectationes quia efficacius aliquid agit per suam praesentiam quam per suam absentiam. Tertium autem quod intemperantia est similiter circa delectationes et tristitias, eo quod contraria fiunt circa idem.
| 598. Then [II], at “Temperance is a mean,” he begins to define temperance. First [A] he inquires what the matter of temperance is. Second [Lect. 20, B], at “Some desires are,” he defines the act of temperance and of the opposite vices (B.1118 b 8). He considers the first point under two aspects. First [A’] he proposes the matter of temperance in general. Next [B’], at “We must now determine etc.,” he inquires about its special matter. In regard to the first point he reviews three considerations which were discussed in the second book (342). The first is that temperance keeps a mean concerning pleasures. The second is that temperance deals also with sorrows that arise from the absence of pleasures. Temperance is less concerned, however, with sorrows than with pleasures because a thing acts more efficaciously by its presence than by its absence. The third is that intemperance likewise deals with pleasures and sorrows because contraries are concerned about the same thing.
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| Deinde cum dicit: circa quales igitur etc., inquirit specialem materiam temperantiae. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo distinguit delectationes, ibi: determinentur autem etc.; tertio ostendit circa quales delectationes sit temperantia, ibi, qui autem tales et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum temperantia sit circa delectationes, oportet nunc determinare circa quales delectationes sit ut etiam in speciali ratio temperantiae cognoscatur.
| 599. Next [B’], at “We must now determine,” he inquires about the special matter of temperance. Three aspects claim his attention. First [1] he says what he intends to do. Then [2], at “There are,” he distinguishes the kinds of pleasures. Last [3], at “Men are not called etc.,” he shows with what kind of pleasures temperance deals. He says first that, since temperance deals with pleasures, we must now determine with what kind of pleasures it deals, so that the nature of temperance in particular may be known.
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| Deinde cum dicit: determinentur autem etc., distinguit delectationes. Et dicit quod earum quaedam sunt animales, quaedam corporales. Corporales quidem delectationes sunt, quae consummantur in quadam corporali passione exterioris sensus. Animales autem delectationes sunt quae consummantur ex sola apprehensione interiori. Et exemplificat de delectationibus animalibus, incipiens a causa delectationis quae est amor. Unusquisque enim delectatur ex hoc quod habet id quod amat. Invenitur autem in quibusdam amor honoris, et in quibusdam amor disciplinae, quae non apprehenduntur exteriori sensu, sed interiori apprehensione animae, unde uterque horum, scilicet et ille qui est amator honoris, et ille qui est amator disciplinae, gaudet per id quod amat, dum scilicet habet ipsum. Et hoc gaudium non fit per aliquam corporis passionem, sed per solam apprehensionem mentis.
| 600. At “There are” [2] he distinguishes the kinds of pleasure. He says that some of them are of the soul, others of the body. Pleasures of the body are those that are completed in some bodily affection of an external sense. Pleasures of the soul are those that are completed by interior apprehension alone. He gives an example of pleasures of the soul, beginning with the cause of pleasure—which is love. Every one takes pleasure from the fact that he possesses what he loves. In some men we find the love of honor; in others, the love of learning. This love is not perceived by an external sense but by an apprehension of the soul, which is interior. Therefore each of these, i.e., the man who loves honor or learning, rejoices on account of what he loves while he has it. This joy does not arise as the result of any bodily passion, but as a result of the mind’s awareness alone.
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| Deinde cum dicit: qui autem circa tales etc., ostendit quod circa animales delectationes non est temperantia. Et designat tria genera harum delectationum. Quaedam enim sunt animaliter delectabilia, quae habent quamdam speciem honestatis, sicut honor et disciplina, sicut praemissum est. Et ideo dicit quod circa huiusmodi delectationes non dicuntur aliqui neque temperati neque intemperati, quia temperantia et intemperantia videntur respicere aliquas delectationes turpitudinem habentes. Sunt tamen et circa delectationes honorum et disciplinae quaedam alia media et extrema pertinentia ad alias virtutes, ut patebit in quarto.
| 601. Then [a], at “Men are not called,” he shows that temperance is not concerned with pleasures of the soul. He indicates three classes of these pleasures. Some [a, i] that have an appearance of propriety like honor and learning, as we have just noted (600), are pleasurable to the soul. For this reason he says that men are not called temperate or intemperate on account of such pleasures, since temperance seems to refer to pleasures which have something of shame about them. Concerned with the pleasures of honor and learning there are, however, certain other means and extremes pertaining to other virtues, as will be clearly shown in the fourth book (792-799).
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| Secundo autem ibi: similiter autem etc., ponit quasdam alias delectationes animales, quae consistunt in dictis vel factis hominum. Et dicit quod sicut temperantia non est circa delectationes honoris et disciplinae, ita etiam non est circa alias delectationes, quae non sunt corporales. Illos enim qui amant audire fabulas et narrare, et totum diem terunt vel expendunt in quibuscumque contingentibus dictis vel factis, scilicet non necessariis neque utilibus, dicimus esse garrulos, sed non dicimus eos esse intemperatos. Quia intemperantia non solum habet vanitatem, sed etiam turpitudinem quamdam.
| 602. Second [a, ii], at “Likewise, temperance,” he now recalls other pleasures of the soul which consist in the sayings and deeds of men. He says that, as temperance is not concerned with pleasures of honor or learning, so also it is not concerned with other pleasures which are not of the body. Those who love to listen to and tell stories, and who waste the whole day talking about all kinds of contingent remarks and deeds (unnecessary and useless affairs) are said to be garrulous but we do not call them intemperate. The reason is that intemperance has not only a futility about it, but also a certain baseness.
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| Tertio ibi: neque contristatos in pecuniis etc., ponit tertium genus animalium delectationum, quae sunt respectu exteriorum rerum sicut sunt pecuniae et amici. Unde dicit quod illi, qui inordinate contristantur in subtractione pecuniarum et amicorum, non dicuntur intemperati, sed possunt dici secundum aliquid aliud vitiosi, quia tales tristitiae non habent turpitudinem, sed solam inordinationem appetitus. Et ex his concludit quod ex quo temperantia non est circa aliquod genus animalium delectationum, quod sit circa corporales delectationes.
| 603. Third [a, iii], at “Those who are,” he introduces a third class of pleasures of the soul which refer to money and friends. Hence he says that those, who are in ordinately saddened by the loss of money and friends, are not called intemperate. But they can be called vicious from one aspect, because such sorrows do not show turpitude but only a disordered condition of the appetite. From this, that temperance is not concerned with any class of pleasures of the soul, he concludes that it does concern pleasures of the body.
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| Deinde cum dicit non omnes autem etc., ostendit quod temperantia non sit circa omnes delectationes corporales, sed circa aliquas. Et primo ostendit quod temperantia non sit circa delectationes trium sensuum qui per exterius medium sentiunt. Secundo ostendit quomodo sit circa delectationes duorum sensuum, qui sentiunt per medium coniunctum, ibi: videntur utique et gustu et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quod temperantia non sit circa delectationes trium sensuum praedictorum. Secundo ostendit quod huiusmodi delectationes non conveniunt animalibus brutis, ibi, non est autem neque in aliis et cetera. Tertio infert quamdam conclusionem ex dictis, ibi circa tales igitur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo manifestat quod temperantia non sit circa delectationes visus.
| 604. Then [b], at “but not with all,” he shows that temperance is not concerned with all but with some bodily pleasures. First [b, i] he discloses that temperance does not regard the pleasures of the three senses which perceive through a separate (from the sense organ) medium. Next [Lect. 20; b, ii], at “Any use of taste etc.,” he explains in what manner temperance regards the pleasures of the other two senses which perceive through a contiguous (with the sense organ) medium (B.1118 a 26). He develops the first point [b, i] in three steps. First [i, x] he shows that temperance does not deal with the pleasures of the three previously mentioned senses. Next [i, y], at “Other animals do not etc.,” he shows that such pleasures do not belong to brutes. Last [i, z], at “Temperance and intemperance etc.,” he draws a conclusion from what has been said. Regarding the first he excludes the three senses. First [x, aa] he proves that temperance does not concern pleasures of sight.
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| Et dicit quod temperantia non est circa omnes delectationes corporales, quae fiunt per exteriores sensus. Illi enim qui delectantur in visibilibus, non dicuntur ex hoc temperati neque intemperati. Et exemplificat de tribus generibus visibilium. Quorum quaedam sunt sensibilia propria visus, sicut colores. Quaedam autem sunt sensibilia communia, quae tamen per visum maxime cognoscuntur, sicut figurae. Quaedam autem sunt sensibilia per accidens, sicut Scriptura, ratione eius quod per Scripturam significatur.
| 605. He says that temperance is not concerned with all bodily pleasures which arise by means of the external external senses. Those who take delight in things seen are not on that account called temperate or intemperate. He gives examples of three classes of visible objects. Some are the proper sensibles of sight, as colors. Others are common sensibles, which however are known most particularly through sight, as figures, Still others are sensible incidentally, as writing, by reason of what is signified through the writing.
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| Nec hoc dicitur quin in his possit esse virtus et vitium, contingit enim quod in talibus aliquis delectetur sicut oportet, idest medio modo, et secundum superabundantiam et defectum, quae pertinent ad curiositatem, non autem ad intemperantiam, quae est circa delectationes vehementiores.
| 606. This does not mean that virtue and vice are not to be encountered here. It happens in such matters that a person may take pleasure as he ought this is the mean, or according to excess and defect, but this pertains to curiosity and not to intemperance which regards the more vehement pleasures.
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| Secundo ibi: similiter autem etc., ostendit quod temperantia non est circa delectationes proprias auditus. Et dicit quod similiter se habet et in delectationibus quae sunt circa auditum, quod scilicet circa eas non est temperantia vel intemperantia. Si enim aliquis in melodiis, idest in consonantiis humanarum vocum, et hypocrisi, idest simulatione humanae vocis quae fit per musica instrumenta, aliquis gaudeat vel superabundanter, vel secundum quod oportet, non ex hoc dicetur temperatus vel intemperatus, quia nec etiam hae sunt multum vehementes delectationes. Potest autem hoc pertinere ad aliam virtutem vel vitium.
| 607. Next [x, bb], at “Temperance is related,” he proves that temperance does not have to do with the pleasures proper to hearing. He says that temperance is related in a similar way to the pleasures concerned with hearing; neither it nor intemperance is involved. If someone delights too much, or as he ought, in melodies (i.e., harmonies of human voices) and symphony (that is, the imitation of the human voice achieved through instruments) he will not be called temperate or intemperate on this account because these are not very vehement pleasures either. But this matter can belong to another virtue or vice,
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| Tertio ibi: neque eos etc., ostendit quod temperantia non sit circa delectationes olfactus. Circa quod considerandum est, quod sicut in libro de sensu et sensato dicitur, species odorum dupliciter distinguuntur. Uno modo secundum se. Alio modo per comparationem ad species saporum. Dicit ergo, quod neque illi dicuntur temperati vel intemperati, qui delectantur in odoribus in se consideratis secundum quod oportet vel plus quam oportet; sed solum si delectentur secundum accidens, idest secundum quod coincidunt odores cum delectabilibus gustus et tactus.
| 608. Third [x, cc], at “The same is to be said,” he proves that temperance does not have to do with the pleasures of smell. Regarding this we must consider that, as stated in the work De Sensu et Sensato (Ch. 5, 443 b 17 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 13, 177-186), the kinds of scents are distinguished in two ways. In one way in themselves. In the other way by a comparison with the species of savors. He says then that they are not called temperate and intemperate who take reasonable or excessive pleasure in odors considered in themselves but only when they take pleasure in odors incidentally, i.e., according as these odors coincide with the pleasures of taste and touch.
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| Illos enim qui gaudent odoribus pomorum vel rosarum vel thymiamatum, qui sunt species odorum secundum se, non dicimus intemperatos. Sed illos, qui delectantur in odoribus pulmentorum vel unguentorum quibus mulieres unguntur. In his enim delectantur intemperati propter memoriam quorumdam aliorum quae concupiscunt. Et hoc manifestat per exemplum eorum qui esuriunt, qui gaudent odoribus ciborum, in quibus non delectantur cum sunt repleti. Et sic patet quod non delectantur in odoribus secundum se, sed per accidens. Sic enim gaudere odoribus pertinet ad intemperatum, cui sunt concupiscibilia ea quae per odores repraesentantur.
| 609. We do not call intemperate those who take pleasure in the fragrance of apples or roses or incense, which are species of odor in itself, but those who take pleasure in the aroma of foods or the perfume of cosmetics used by women. The intemperate delight in these pleasures on account of memory of certain things they long for. He clearly shows this by the example of the hungry who take pleasure in odors that do not interest them when they have eaten. So it is evident that these men do not take pleasure in odors as such but incidentally. In this way it pertains to the intemperate man—to whom the things represented by the odors are desirable—to take pleasure in those odors.
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| Deinde cum dicit: non est autem neque in aliis etc., ostendit quod delectationes praedictorum sensuum non conveniunt aliis animalibus per se, sed solum per accidens. Et dicit quod in aliis animalibus non fit delectatio secundum praedictos tres sensus nisi secundum accidens, id est in ordine ad gustum et tactum. Et hoc manifestat primo in sensu olfactus; quia canes non delectantur in odore leporum propter ipsum odorem, sed propter cibum quem sperant, cuius sensum per odorem accipiunt. Secundo ostendit idem in sensu auditus. Et dicit, quod leo non delectatur in voce bovis, sed in eius comestione, quem appropinquare cognoscit per vocem. Unde videtur gaudere voce bovis. Sed hoc est per accidens. Tertio manifestat idem in visu. Et dicit, quod etiam leo non delectatur in aspectu cervi vel caprei, quem vocat agrestem capram, quando invenit aliquid huiusmodi, sed delectatur in spe habendi cibum.
| 610. At “Other animals do not take” [i, y] he proves that pleasures arising from these senses belong only indirectly to other animals. He says that the brutes find pleasure via these three senses indirectly, i.e., by reference to taste and touch. He clearly shows this first in regard to the sense of smell. Hounds do not take pleasure in the scent of rabbits on account of the scent itself but on account of the expected food, the sensation of which they receive through smell. Second, he makes the same point in regard to the sense of hearing. He says that the lion takes pleasure in the lowing of an ox because the lion knows from the sound that a meal is near. Hence he seems to delight in the bellow of the bull, but this is incidental. Third, Aristotle manifests the same thing in regard to seeing. He says that the lion does not take pleasure even at the sight of the stag or roe (which he calls a wild she-goat) when he finds something of this kind, but he is delighted by the hope of getting a meal.
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| Horum autem ratio est, quia appetitus animalium aliorum movetur solo instinctu naturae. Et ideo non delectantur nisi in his quae pertinent ad sustentationem naturae, propter quam dantur huiusmodi sensus animalibus; sed hominibus dantur propter cognitionem sensibilium, ex quibus proceditur ad cognitionem rationis, quae movet hominis appetitum. Et inde est quod homo delectatur in ipsa sensibilium convenientia secundum se consideratorum, etiam si non ordinentur ad sustentationem naturae.
| 611. The reason for these things is that the appetite of the other animals is moved by the instinct of nature alone. On this account animals take pleasure only in the things referring to the preservation of nature; that is why senses of this kind were given them. But senses have been given to men for the perception of sensible things leading in turn to a knowledge of reason which moves the appetite of man. So it is that man takes pleasure in the very appropriateness of sensible things considered in themselves, even if they are not ordered to the conservation of nature.
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| Deinde cum dicit: circa tales igitur operationes etc., concludit ex praemissis quod temperantia est circa tales operationes seu delectationes, in quibus et reliqua animalia communicant cum homine; et similiter intemperantia. Unde huiusmodi delectationes videntur esse serviles et bestiales. Quia id in quo communicamus cum bestiis est in nobis servile et naturaliter rationi subiectum. Huiusmodi autem sunt delectationes tactus et gustus, qui sunt duo sensus praeter tres praedictos.
| 612. Then [i, z], at “Temperance and intemperance,” he concludes from the premises that temperance has to do with such operations or pleasures as the other animals have in common with man. The same is true of intemperance. Hence pleasures of this kind seem to be servile and brutish because what we have in common with irrational animals is slavish and naturally subject to reason in us. Such are the pleasures of touch and taste which are the two senses besides the three mentioned before.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Videntur utique et gustu et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod temperantia et intemperantia non sunt circa delectationes trium sensuum, sed circa delectationes duorum, scilicet gustus et tactus, hic ostendit qualiter sit circa delectationes utriusque. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quod directe temperantia non est circa delectationes gustus, sed circa delectationes tactus. Secundo manifestat quod dixerat per exemplum, ibi, propter quod et oravit et cetera. Tertio infert conclusionem ex dictis: communissimus autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod temperantia et intemperantia parum vel nihil videntur uti eo, quod proprie pertinet ad gustum, prout scilicet ad gustum pertinet iudicare de saporibus. Sic autem utuntur gustu, illi qui probant vina, vel qui condiunt pulmenta et experiuntur utrum convenientem saporem pulmentis dederint.
| 613. After the Philosopher has proved that temperance and intemperance do not deal with the pleasures of three senses but with the pleasures of two, i.e., taste and touch, he shows now [b, ii] what concerns the pleasures of taste and touch. He treats this from three aspects. First [ii, x] he shows that temperance does not deal directly with the pleasures of taste but with the pleasures of touch. Next [ii, y], at “On this account etc.,” he clarifies by an example what he has affirmed. Finally [ii, z], at “Touch, with which etc.,” he draws a conclusion from what has been said. He says first that temperance and intemperance seem to make little or no use of what is proper to taste, namely, the discernment of flavors. Those who test wine use taste in this way; likewise, those who season food and sample to see whether their dishes have a delicious taste.
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| In hoc autem non multum delectantur intemperati, vel etiam non subtrahitur eis multum de delectatione, si ciborum sapores non bene discernant. Sed tota eorum delectatio consistit in usu quarumdam rerum delectabilium, puta in sumptione ciborum et potuum, et in usu venereorum, qui quidem usus fit per tactum. Unde manifestum est, quod delectatio intemperati, directe est circa tactum. Circa gustum autem, non est nisi secundum quod sapores faciunt delectabiliorem usum ciborum. Et ideo dixit supra quod in parum utitur intemperantia gustu, scilicet secundum id quod ordinatur ad tactum, vel nihil quantum ad id quod secundum se convenit gustui.
| 614. The intemperate do not take much delight in this, and they are not deprived of much pleasure when they do not perfectly discern the flavors of food. But all their delight consists in the enjoyment of certain pleasurable things, for instance, in eating, drinking, and sex—all of which occur through touch. It is obvious, therefore, that the pleasure of the intemperate has to do directly with the sense of touch, and with taste only because flavors make the enjoyment of food delectable. For this reason he previously said (608-611, 613) that intemperance has little use for taste, i.e., as it is ordered to touch, or no use, i.e., in respect to what belongs to taste in itself.
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| Deinde cum dicit propter quod et oravit etc., manifestat quod dixerat per exemplum. Quidam enim Philosenus nomine, Erixius patria, cum voraciter comederet pultes, desideravit quod guttur eius fieret longius gutture gruis, ut scilicet diu cibus in eius gutture remaneret. Ex quo patet quod non delectabatur gustu, qui non viget in gutture sed in lingua, sed delectabatur solo tactu.
| 615. Then [ii, y], at “On this account,” he clarifies by an example what he had said. A certain man named Philoxenus Erichius who, since he ate his meals greedily, desired to have a throat longer than a crane’s so the food would remain a long while in his throat. From this it is evident that he did not take pleasure in taste (which is active in the tongue and not in the throat) but in touch alone.
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| Deinde cum dicit communissimus autem etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis. Sensus enim tactus, circa quem est intemperantia, est communissimus inter omnes sensus, quia in hoc sensu communicant omnia animalia. Et ideo intemperantia videtur esse iuste exprobrabilis, quia inest hominibus non quantum ad id quod est proprium hominis, sed quantum ad id in quo communicat cum aliis animalibus. Delectari autem in talibus, et huiusmodi diligere tamquam maxima bona, videtur esse maxime bestiale. Et inde est quod vitia intemperantiae maximam turpitudinem habent, quia per ea homo bestiis assimilatur. Et inde est quod ex huiusmodi vitiis redditur homo maxime infamis et vituperabilis.
| 616. Next [ii, z], at “Touch, with which,” he draws a corollary from what has been said. The sense of touch, which temperance deals with, is the most common of all the senses because all the animals share in it. On this account intemperance seems to be really despicable since it does not exist in man as belonging to what is proper to him, but to what he has in common with other animals. But to take pleasure in things of this sort and to love them as the highest goods seems to be especially animal-like. So it is that vices of intemperance possess the most disgusting shamefulness because they make man like the brutes. Therefore, by reason of such vices, man is rendered notoriously evil and blameworthy.
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| Et quia posset aliquis dicere, quod etiam in his quae ad tactum pertinent, est aliquid proprium homini quod non est bestiale, ideo ad hanc obviationem excludendam subdit, quod temperantiae subtrahuntur illae delectationes quae sunt maxime liberales, utpote hominibus appropriatae, et secundum rationem factae, sicut sunt delectationes quae fiunt in gignasiis, id est in exercitiis ludorum, per contritionem et calefactionem, dum aliqui ad invicem luctantur aut aliter exercentur, non per ordinem ad concupiscentias ciborum vel venereorum. Delectatio enim tactus quam intemperatus quaerit, non est circa totum corpus, sed circa quasdam corporis partes.
| 617. Someone might say that even in things pertaining to touch there is some properly human good that is not bestial. In order to answer this objection, he adds that we exclude from temperance those pleasures of touch that are especially liberal—appropriate for humans—and used according to reason. Such pleasures are found in gymnasia by massage and heat-treatment in view of the games (since some are going to wrestle or indulge in other sports). These pleasures of touch are not ordered to the desire of food or sex. The pleasure of touch which the intemperate man seeks is not that of the whole body but of certain parts of the body.
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| Deinde cum dicit concupiscentiarum autem etc., ostendit qualis sit actus temperantiae circa praedictam materiam et etiam oppositorum vitiorum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo comparat vitia intemperantiae ad quaedam alia vitia, ibi, voluntario autem magis assimilatur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo determinat de intemperantia, ostendens qualiter operetur circa praeinquisitam materiam. Secundo determinat de insensibilitate, ibi, deficientes autem et cetera. Tertio de temperantia, ibi, temperatus autem medie et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo intemperantia se habeat circa delectationes; secundo quomodo se habeat circa tristitias, ibi, circa tristitias autem et cetera. Sicut autem supra dictum est, quod ad idem ordinantur timor et tristitia, quia tristitia est praesentium malorum, sicut timor futurorum, ita etiam in idem ordinantur concupiscentia, quae est futurorum bonorum, et delectatio quae est praesentium; unde et temperantia est eadem ratione circa concupiscentias et delectationes. Primo ergo ponit quamdam divisionem concupiscentiarum. Secundo manifestat eam, ibi: puta quae cibi etc.; tertio ostendit qualiter intemperantia sit circa utrasque concupiscentias, ibi, in naturalibus quidem igitur et cetera.
| 618. At “Some desires” [13] he shows how the act of temperance (in the previously mentioned matter) and of the opposite vices is constituted. Here he proceeds in twofold fashion. First [A] he explains his proposition. Next [Lect. 22, B’], at “Intemperance is more etc.” ( B. 1119 a 21 ), he compares the vices of intemperance with certain other vices. Regarding the first he has three considerations. First [i] he treats intemperance, showing in what manner it operates in the previously investigated matter. Next [Lect. 21, 2], at “It does not happen etc.,” he treats insensibility (B. 1119 a 5). Last [Lect. 21, 3], at “The temperate man etc.,” he treats temperance (B. 1119 a 12). In regard to the first he does two things. First [a] he shows how temperance is related to pleasures. Then [Lect. 21, b], at “With regard to sorrows etc.,” how it is related to sorrow (B.1118 b 29). Fear and sorrow are ordered to the same thing—we noted this before (584)—because sorrow has to do with present evils, as fear with future ones. So also desire (which concerns future goods) and pleasure (which concerns present goods) are ordered to the same thing. Temperance is in the reason concerned with sensual desires and pleasures First [a, i] he makes a certain division of desires. Next [a, ii], at “The desire for food etc.,” he explains the division. Last [a, iii], at “In natural desires etc.,” he shows in what manner intemperance deals with both desires.
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| Dicit ergo primo quod quaedam concupiscentiae sunt communes, et quaedam sunt propriae, quae se habent per appositionem quamdam ad communes.
| 619. He says first that some desires are common and others are proper, being in addition to the common.
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| Deinde cum dicit puta quae cibi etc., manifestat divisionem praemissam. Et primo manifestat quae sunt concupiscentiae communes. Et dicit, quod concupiscentia cibi in communi est naturalis, utpote consequens totam naturam speciei aut etiam generis. Et inde est, quod omnis homo ad subveniendum indigentiae naturae concupiscit siccum alimentum quod dicitur cibus, vel humidum quod dicitur potus et quandoque utrumque. Sicut etiam Homerus dicit, quod omnis homo tam iuvenis quam crescens, idest adolescens concupiscit lectum in quo requiescat.
| 620. Then [a, ii], at “The desire for food,” he explains this division. First [a, ii, x] he points out what the common desires are, saying that the desire for food in general is natural, as following the whole nature of the species and genus. Hence every man desires dry nourishment called food or moist nourishment called drink—and sometimes both—in order to succor a natural need, just as according to Homer every man (the young as well as the growing, i.e., the adolescent) longs for a bed to rest in.
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| Secundo etiam ibi talem autem etc., ostendit quae sint propriae delectationes. Et dicit, quod non omnes homines concupiscunt talem vel talem lectum, puta stratum plumis aut pretiosis tegumentis. Similiter etiam non omnes desiderant talem vel talem cibum, puta pretiosum aut delicate paratum; neque etiam omnes idem concupiscunt; sed quidam in talibus, concupiscunt hoc, quidam aliud. Unde huiusmodi concupiscibilia videntur esse nostra, quia scilicet ad ea non inclinamur ex natura, sed potius ex nostra adinventione. Nihil tamen prohibet etiam in his esse aliquid naturale quasi pertinens ad naturam individui licet non pertineat ad naturam generis vel speciei. Videmus enim quod diversa sunt delectabilia diversis, secundum diversas complexiones eorum. Et quibusdam sunt quaedam delectabiliora quam alia indifferenter propter naturalem complexionem eorum.
| 621. Next [a, ii, y], at “Not all men however,” he points out what the proper desires are, saying that not all men want this particular bed—say a couch strewn with feathers and costly covering. Likewise, not everyone craves such and such a food, an expensive dish for example, or one daintily prepared. All do not yearn for the same gratification, but in such matters some desire one thing, others another. Hence desires of this kind seem to be our very own because we are not inclined to them by nature but by our own devising. Here nothing hinders a thing from being natural as belonging to the nature of the individual, although it may not belong to the nature of the genus or species. We see that different people enjoy different pleasures according to their different temperaments. And because of natural temperament, some persons take more pleasure in certain kinds of things than in other commonplace objects.
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| Deinde cum dicit: in naturalibus quidem igitur etc., ostendit qualiter sit intemperantia circa concupiscentias praedictas. Et dicit quod in concupiscentiis naturalibus quae sunt communes, pauci peccant. Et non est peccatum in hoc nisi uno modo, scilicet secundum quod plus aliquis quam natura requirat comedit vel bibit. Contingit enim quod aliquis comedit vel bibit quicquid ei detur, si tamen hoc faciat usque ad superfluam repletionem, in quo est superabundantia respectu multitudinis cibi vel potus quam natura requirit; natura enim non concupiscit nisi quod suppleatur indigentia. Unde quod aliquis assumat ultra indigentiam, est excessus supra naturam.
| 622. At “In natural desires” [a, iii] he explains in what manner intemperance has to do with the desires just mentioned. He says that in the natural desires that are common [a, iii, x] few men go astray. Here transgression occurs only in one way, according as someone takes more than nature requires. This happens when someone eats or drinks what is given him in an immoderate amount, in which there is an excess in regard to the quantity of food nature needs. Nature desires only that the need be supplied. Therefore, that someone should take more than he needs is an excess above nature.
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| Et ideo tales dicuntur gastrimargi, a gastir, quod est venter, et margos, quod est furor vel insania, quasi furor vel insania ventris, quia scilicet implent naturam praeter indigentiam. Et tales fiunt illi qui sunt multum bestiales, quia videlicet ad hoc solum adhibent curam, ut ventrem impleant absque discretionem, sicut et bestiae.
| 623. People of this type are called “belly-mad” (gastrimargoi: from gastir meaning belly and marges meaning a raving or madness) as if they had a raving or mad stomach, because they stuff nature beyond requirement. Such persons are very brutish because their only concern is to fill their bellies without discrimination like animals.
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| Secundo ibi: circa proprias autem delectationes etc., ostendit qualiter se habeat intemperantia circa proprias concupiscentias sive delectationes. Et dicit quod circa eas multi et multipliciter peccant, scilicet secundum omnes circumstantias. Illi enim qui sunt amatores talium delectationum peccant eo quod gaudent in his quibus non oportet, puta in sumendo cibos non convenientes eis, vel etiam peccant, quasi magis gaudentes eis quibus oportet; puta si quis nimis delectetur in sumptione convenientium ciborum; vel etiam quia in his delectantur absque discretione, sicut stultorum multitudo, vel etiam non servant debitum modum ut delectentur sicut oportet. In omnibus enim his superabundant intemperati, quia gaudent de quibusdam, de quibus non oportet gaudere, quia sunt indecentia, et secundum suam naturam odibilia. Et si in quibusdam talium oporteat gaudere, gaudent magis quam oportet et absque discretione sicut multi gaudent.
| 624. Next [a, iii, y], at “But in regard to proper desires,” he explains in what manner intemperance has to do with proper desires or pleasures. He says that in regard to them, many sin in numerous ways, i.e., according to all the circumstances. Those who love such pleasures sin because they enjoy things they should not (like eating food which does not agree with them) or they sin by taking more enjoyment than they should (for instance, someone takes too much pleasure in eating agreeable dishes). Others sin by taking pleasure in foods without discernment—like most fools do—or finally they do not observe due measure in enjoyment, as they should. The intemperate are excessive in all these ways because they enjoy objects highly indecorous and blameworthy by nature, which they ought not to enjoy. Even when pleasure in certain things may be lawful, they commonly take more enjoyment than they ought without discrimination.
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| Et sic ultimo concludit quod, cum intemperantia sit superabundantia circa huiusmodi delectationes, quod est vituperabilis, sicut et aliae superabundantiae, ut supra in II dictum est.
| 625. So he concludes that, since intemperance is excess in regard to pleasures of this kind, it is blameworthy like other excesses, as was explained in the second book (333-334).
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Circa tristitias autem non quemadmodum et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit qualiter temperantia sit circa delectationes, hic ostendit quomodo sit circa tristitias. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo diversimode se habeat circa tristitiam fortis, temperatus et intemperatus. Secundo manifestat quod dixerat, ibi, intemperatus quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod non similiter se habent circa tristitiam fortis, temperatus et intemperatus. Fortis enim patitur quidem magnas tristitias; sed laudatur in hoc quod bene sustinet eas, ut supra dictum est. Sed temperatus non laudatur ex eo quod sustineat tristitias. Neque intemperatus vituperatur in hoc quod non sustineat eas, sicut vituperatur timidus. Sed vituperatur intemperatus de hoc quod magis tristatur quam oportet. Et est eius tristitia non ex aliquo laesivo imminenti, sicut est tristitia timidi; sed tristatur de hoc quod non adipiscitur delectabilia quae concupiscit. Et sic delectatio per suam absentiam causat in eo tristitiam. E contrario autem temperatus laudatur in hoc quod non tristatur in hoc quod abstinet a delectabilibus, sed promptus est a delectabilibus abstinere. Quia non multum ea concupiscit. Est autem potior effectus qui consequitur ex praesentia causae alicuius, quam qui consequitur ex absentia.
| 626. After the Philosopher has defined in what way temperance is concerned with pleasures, he now explains how it is concerned with sorrows. On this point he does two things. First [(1) b] he shows that the brave, the temperate, and the intemperate are affected in different ways by sorrow. Then [(1) c], at “The intemperate mail then etc.,” he makes clear his assertion. He says first that the brave, the temperate, and the intemperate are not disposed toward sorrow in the same way. The brave man indeed suffers many sorrows, but he is praised for this very endurance which is done nobly. This has already been remarked (584, 596). The temperate man however is not praised because he undergoes sorrows. Nor is the intemperate man blamed for not undergoing them, although the cowardly man is blamed. But the intemperate man is censured for the f act that he grieves more than he should. His sorrow does not arise from any harmful thing threatening him—which is the cause of the coward’s sorrow—but he is sorry because he does not get the pleasures he wants. Thus it is by its very absence that pleasure causes him grief. On the contrary the temperate man is praised for not grieving and for undertaking to abstain from pleasures that he does not desire very much. An effect that follows from the presence of a cause is more important than an effect that follows from its absence.
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| Et ideo fortitudo principalius est circa tristitias quae consequuntur ex praesentia nocivorum, temperantia autem est secundario circa tristitias quae consequuntur ex absentia delectabilium, principaliter autem circa delectationes quae ex delectabilium praesentia consequuntur.
| 627. For this very reason fortitude is primarily concerned with sorrows which follow from the presence of harmful things. Temperance, however, is secondarily concerned with sorrows that follow from the absence of pleasures but primarily with pleasures following from the presence of pleasurable things.
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| Deinde cum dicit intemperatus quidem igitur etc., manifestat quod dixerat, scilicet quod intemperato delectatio tristitiam faciat. Hoc enim accidit quia intemperatus concupiscit delectabilia omnia. Appetit enim delectationem propter seipsam. Et ideo appetit omnia quae delectationem faciunt, vel appetit ea quae maxime sunt delectabilia, in quorum comparatione alia delectabilia minus curat. Et inde est quod eius electio non regitur ratione, sed ducitur a concupiscentia, ut eligat delectabilia, et praecipue quae maxime sunt talia, supra alia bona quae sunt utilia vel honesta. Postponunt enim intemperati utile et honestum, ut delectationem assequantur. Et ideo intemperatus tristatur quando non adipiscitur delectationem, quam concupiscit. Concupiscentia enim quando non adipiscitur rem concupitam est cum tristitia.
| 628. Then [(i) c], at “The intemperate man then” he makes evident his assertion, that pleasure is the occasion of sorrow for the intemperate man. This happens because the intemperate man desires all pleasurable things. He strives after pleasure itself. On this account he strives after everything giving pleasure and he strives after the thing pleasurable in the highest degree in comparison with which he cares less for other delightful things. Therefore his pleasure is not guided by reason, but led by sensual desire to choose pleasurable things—especially those which are most abundantly so—in preference to all other useful and honorable goods. The intemperate put aside what is useful and decent in order that they may obtain pleasure. For this reason the intemperate man is saddened when he does not get the pleasure he wants. Sensual desire brings sorrow when it does not gain the thing coveted.
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| Et licet hoc videatur esse inconveniens secundum superficialem verisimilitudinem quod aliquis propter delectationem tristetur, tamen verum est intemperatum propter delectationem tristari. Non enim tristatur nisi propter eius absentiam, sicut et navis perit propter gubernatoris absentiam.
| 629. Although, according to a superficial likelihood, it seems incongruous that anyone should be saddened by reason of pleasure, nevertheless’ it is true that the intemperate man is distressed by pleasure. He is saddened only by its absence, like a ship lost by the absence of its pilot.
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| Deinde cum dicit: deficientes autem etc., determinat de vitio intemperantiae opposito, quod deficit circa delectationes. Et dicit quod non multum contingit quod aliqui deficiant circa delectationes, ita ut minus gaudeant quam oportet, idest quam requiratur ad sanitatem et bonam habitudinem corporis et ad decentem conversationem cum aliis, in quo consistit vitiosus defectus, quem supra in secundo nominavit insensibilitatem: quae non convenit humanae naturae, quia etiam reliqua animalia discernunt cibos, in quorum quibusdam delectantur, in aliis autem non. Et sic acceptare aliquas delectationes videtur pertinere ad communem naturam generis.
| 630. Next [2], at “It does not happen,” he considers the vice opposite to temperance which falls short in regard to pleasures. He says it does not happen very often that men become deficient in pleasures (so that they take less enjoyment than they ought, i.e., than is required for the health and well-being of the body and for decent living with others) in which this vice consists and which we have called insensibility in the second book (262, 342). This defect is not in keeping with human nature because the other animals differentiate foods in this, that they take pleasure in some, and in others not. So it seems to belong to the common nature of the genus to take some pleasure.
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| Unde si aliquis sit cui nihil sit delectabile, iste videtur esse longe a natura humana. Et quia hoc raro contingit, ille qui sic deficit non habet aliquod nomen nisi quod supra vocavit eum insensibilem. Non autem ad supra vocavit insensibilem. Non autem ad hanc insensibilitatem pertinet quod aliqui a delectationibus abstineant propter aliquem finem utilem vel honestum, sicut negotiatores propter lucra et milites propter victoriam. Hoc enim non fit praeter id quod oportet, quod pertinet ad vitium defectus.
| 631. Therefore, if there is anyone, who does not take pleasure in anything, he seems to be a long way from being human. Because this rarely happens, he who falls short in this manner does not have a special name, except that before (262, 342) we called him insensible. When men abstain from pleasures for a useful or honorable reason, as merchants for gain and soldiers for victory, we do not have instances of insensibility. This is not beyond what is reasonable, as is the case with the vice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: temperatus autem etc., ostendit qualiter temperatus se habeat circa praedictam materiam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit a quibus temperatus abstineat. Secundo quibus et qualiter utatur, ibi: quaecumque autem ad sanitatem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod temperatus medio modo se habet circa praedicta, scilicet circa delectationem, tristitiam et concupiscentiam. Nam primo quidem quantum ad delectationes non delectatur in illis turpibus in quibus maxime delectatur intemperatus, sed magis tristatur, si quando aliquid tale occurrat, et universaliter non delectatur in quibus non oportet, neque etiam vehementius delectatur quam oportet. Et similiter secundum nullam aliam circumstantiam superabundat. Secundo autem quantum ad tristitias non superflue tristatur in absentia delectabilium. Tertio autem quantum ad concupiscentiam non concupiscit delectabilia absentia quia non multum curat de eis vel concupiscit ea cum debita mensura, quam non excedit neque concupiscens magis quam oportet neque concupiscens quando non oportet neque secundum aliquam aliam circumstantiam mensuram rationis excedit.
| 632. At “The temperate man follows” [3], he explains in what way the temperate man should conduct himself in regard to the matter previously mentioned. He clarifies this point in two stages. First [3, a] he shows from what things the temperate should abstain, Next [3, b], at “The temperate man desires etc.,” he shows what things the temperate man should enjoy and in what manner. He says first that the temperate man follows the golden mean regarding the preceding, i.e., pleasure, sorrow, and desire. First in regard to pleasure, he does not delight in those shameful things in which the intemperate take pleasure but rather is saddened if any such thing should occur. In general he does not rejoice in things he ought not, nor does he rejoice more ardently than he ought. Likewise he is not excessive according to any other circumstance. Next, in respect to sorrow he is not saddened beyond measure by the absence of pleasurable, things. Third, in respect to desire he does not long for absent pleasures, because he cares little for them, or he longs for them in the right measure which is not excessive; he does not crave pleasure more than he ought, nor when he ought not, nor according to any other circumstance exceeding the norm of reason.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quaecumque autem etc., ostendit quibus et qualiter utatur temperatus. Et dicit quod quaecumque delectabilia expediunt ad sanitatem corporis vel ad bonam habitudinem, ut scilicet homo sit promptus et expeditus ad ea quae habet facere, huiusmodi temperatus appetet, tamen secundum debitam mensuram et secundum quod oportet. Si qua autem sunt alia delectabilia, quae non sint necessaria ad duo praedicta, appetet ea temperatus triplici tamen conditione observata.
| 633. Then [3, b], at “The temperate man desires,” he shows which pleasures the temperate man enjoys and in what way. He says that the temperate man desires whatever pleasures are useful to the health of the body or its well-being so that he may be prompt and unimpeded for the things of this kind which he has to do. He desires these pleasures, however, according to the right measure and as he ought. If there are other pleasures not necessary for the two reasons previously named, the temperate man desires them under the three following conditions.
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| Primo quidem ut non sint impeditiva sanitatis et bonae habitudinis, sicut est superfluus cibus vel potus. Secundo ut non sint praeter bonum, idest praeter honestatem, sicut est delectatio adulterii. Tertio ut non sint super substantiam, idest ut non excedant facultatem hominis, sicut si pauper velit uti cibariis nimis sumptuosis. Ille enim qui sic se habet ut appetat delectationes impeditivas sanitatis et bonae habitudinis atque contrarias honestati vel excedentes divitias suas, magis amat delectationes quam dignum sit. Quod non convenit temperato qui amat eas secundum rationem rectam.
| 634. First, that they are not hindrances to health and well-being, like superfluous food or drink. Second, that they are not contrary to good, i.e., opposed to decency, like the pleasure of fornication. Third, that they are not beyond his means, i.e., they do not exceed a man’s power to possess, as would be the case if a poor man desired to enjoy foods which are too costly. One who is so disposed that he longs for pleasures harmful to health and well-being, and contrary to decency, or exceeding his means takes more enjoyment than is reasonable. This does not pertain to the temperate man who loves these pleasures in conformity with right reason.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Voluntario autem magis assimulatur et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de actu temperantiae et oppositorum vitiorum, hic comparat peccatum intemperantiae ad alia peccata. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo comparat intemperantiam ad vitium timiditatis. Secundo ad vitia puerorum, ibi: nomen autem intemperantiae et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod intemperantia plus habeat de voluntario quam timiditas. Secundo ostendit quod alio ordine invenitur voluntarium in utroque vitio, ibi, videbitur autem utique et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod intemperantia plus habeat de voluntario quam timiditas. Secundo infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, ibi, propter quod exprobrabilius et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod intemperantia magis assimilatur voluntario quam timor, quia scilicet plus habet de voluntario. Et hoc probat duabus rationibus.
| 635. After the Philosopher has treated the act of temperance and the opposite vices, he now compares the sin of intemperance with other sins [B’]. He makes two points here. First [1] he compares intemperance with the vice of cowardice; and then, with the sins of children, at “We transfer the name” [2]. He clarifies the first point by a twofold distinction. First [1, a] he shows that intemperance has more of the voluntary than cowardice has. Next [1, b], at “There does not appear etc.,” he shows that the voluntary in each vice is found in a different order. In regard to the first he does two things. First [a, i] he explains that intemperance has more of the voluntary than cowardice has. Next [a, ii], at “For this reason intemperance etc.,” he infers a corollary from his discussion. He says first that intemperance is more like the voluntary than fear is, because intemperance has more of the voluntary. He proves this by two reasons.
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| Quarum prima sumitur ex eo quod proprie consequitur ad voluntarium et involuntarium. Unusquisque enim delectatur in eo quod voluntarie agit: tristatur autem in eo quod est involuntarium. Manifestum est autem quod intemperatus agit propter delectationem quam concupiscit. Timidus autem agit propter tristitiam quam fugit. Horum autem duorum, delectatio est desiderabilis, quia non solum delectatur ille qui delectatione actualiter fruitur, sed etiam ille qui delectationem quaerit propter spem delectationis consequendae. Tristitia autem est fugienda, et per consequens involuntaria. Et sic manifestum est quod intemperantia movetur ab eo quod est per se voluntarium. Timiditas autem movetur ab eo quod est fugiendum et involuntarium. Plus igitur accedit ad voluntarium intemperantia, quam timiditas.
| 636. The first of these is taken from what follows the voluntary and the involuntary as a property [i, x]. Everyone delights in what he does voluntarily, but is sad over what is contrary to his will. It is obvious that the intemperate man acts for the pleasure he desires. The coward, on the other hand, acts because of the pain which he flees. (Of course the operation of both is pleasing because not only is actual pleasure a matter for joy but even the hope of future pleasure.) But pain is a thing to be avoided and consequently is contrary to the will. So it is evident that intemperance is caused by what is of itself voluntary. Cowardice, however, is caused by something involuntary and repugnant. Therefore intemperance comes closer to the voluntary than cowardice.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi et tristitia quidem et cetera. Quae sumitur ex ignorantia quae causat involuntarium. Quia enim tristitia consequitur ex praesentia alicuius contrarii et nocivi, sequitur quod tristitia stupefaciat et corrumpat naturam eius qui habet tristitiam, et inde est quod sensus hominis ex tristitia impeditur a propria cognitione. Sed delectatio causatur ex praesentia convenientis quod non corrumpit naturam. Unde delectatio non stupefacit, neque corrumpit sensum eius qui delectatur. Ex quo sequitur quod intemperantia quae operatur propter delectationem plus habeat de voluntario quam timor qui movetur propter tristitiam.
| 637. He gives the second reason at “Pain stupefies” [i, y]. This is taken from the fact that ignorance causes an involuntary. Because pain follows from the presence of some contrary and harmful principle, it stupefies and corrupts the nature of its possessor. So it is that the mind of man is impeded by pain from proper knowledge. But pleasure is caused by the presence of an agreeable object that does not corrupt the nature. Hence pleasure does not stupefy nor corrupt the mind of the one who takes pleasure. From this it follows that intemperance, which operates on account of pleasure, has more of the voluntary than fear does -which is caused by pain.
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| Deinde cum dicit propter quod exprobrabilius etc., concludit quod quia voluntariis debetur laus in bonis et vituperium in malis, quod vitium intemperantiae sit exprobrabilius quam vitium timiditatis quod habet minus de voluntario. Ad quod etiam addit aliam rationem ex eo quod tanto aliquod vitium est magis exprobrabile, quanto facilius vitari potest.
| 638. Then [a, ii], at “For this reason intemperance,” he concludes that, since in voluntary acts praise is due to the good and blame to the evil, the vice of intemperance is more disgraceful than the vice of cowardice which has less of the voluntary. To this he adds also another reason taken from the fact that a vice is more worthy of reproach insofar as it is more easily avoidable.
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| Vitari autem potest unumquodque vitium per assuetudinem ad contrarium. Facile autem est assuescere bene operari in his circa quae est temperantia, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia delectabilia ciborum et potuum et aliorum huiusmodi multotiens occurrunt in vita humana. Unde non deest homini occasio assuescendi bene operari circa talia. Secundo quia assuescere bene operari in talibus non habet periculum, non enim est magnum periculum si aliquis abstineat aliquando ab aliquo delectabilium tactus. Sed in vitio timiditatis est e converso, quia et raro occurrunt bellica pericula. Et huiusmodi aggredi periculosum est. Unde consequens est quod exprobrabilius est vitium intemperantiae quam timiditatis.
| 639. Each vice can be avoided by the contrary habit. For two reasons it is easy to become accustomed to good actions in matters of temperance. First, because pleasures in food, drink, and so forth take place very often in man’s life. Hence there is no lack of opportunity to get used to virtuous actions in such matters. Second, becoming accustomed to good deeds of temperance does not constitute a danger. A person does not run any great risk in abstaining at times from some pleasure of touch. But quite the reverse is true in the vice of cowardice because the dangers from war happen rarely. Besides it is dangerous to get mixed up in wars. It follows then that the vice of intemperance is more worthy of reproach than the vice of cowardice.
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| Deinde cum dicit videbitur autem utique etc., ostendit quod non eodem ordine voluntarium invenitur in utroque vitio. Et primo ostendit quo ordine inveniatur in timiditate. Secundo quo ordine inveniatur in intemperantia, ibi: intemperato autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod timor non videtur similiter voluntarium habere in universali et in singularibus. Universalia enim videntur esse sine tristitia, puta quod aliquis vadat ad pugnam et invadat hostes. Sed singularia quae occurrunt, puta quod aliquis vulneretur et depellatur et alia huiusmodi patiatur, tantam tristitiam ingerunt ut homines propter huiusmodi stupefiant in tantum quod proiciant arma et alia huiusmodi turpiter faciant. Unde quia in universali sunt voluntaria et in singulari involuntaria redduntur, videntur esse violenta, inquantum scilicet ab exteriori principio homo inducitur ad hoc quod deserat hoc quod prius volebat.
| 640. Next [1, b], at “There does not appear” he shows that the voluntary in each vice is not found in the same order. First [1, b, i] he shows in what order the voluntary is found in cowardice; and second in intemperance, at “In regard to intemperance etc. [1, b, ii]. He says first that fear does not seem to be voluntary in the same way for the universal and for particular cases. Universals seem to be without pain, for example, anyone may go into battle and attack the enemy. But particular happenings, for instance, that a man is wounded or routed or suffers other misfortune, bring such great pain that men are stupefied on account of these things-so much so that they throw away their arms and do other disgraceful actions. Hence, since in reference to the universal these acts are voluntary, and in reference to the particular they become involuntary, they seem to be done under compulsion (inasmuch as a man is induced by an external principle to give up what he had previously wished).
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| Deinde cum dicit: intemperato autem etc., ostendit quis sit ordo circa intemperantiam. Et dicit quod ibi est ordo conversus; quia singularia sunt maxime voluntaria, quia proveniunt secundum quod homo concupiscit et appetit. Sed totum in universali consideratum est minus voluntarium, puta quod aliquis adulterium faciat. Nullus enim concupiscit esse intemperatus in universali. Sed singularia quibus homo fit intemperatus sunt delectabilia.
| 641. At “In regard to intemperance” [1, b, ii ], he shows what the order is in regard to intemperance. He says that in this case the order is reversed, for singular things are voluntary in the highest degree because they occur in accordance with what a man strives for and desires. But the whole, considered in the abstract, is less voluntary-for instance, that anyone should commit adultery. No one desires to be intemperate in general. However particular things, by which a man becomes intemperate, are delightful.
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| Huius autem differentiae ratio sumenda est ex hoc quod tristitia, quae movet timorem, pertinet ad involuntarium, sicut delectatio, quae movet intemperantiam, pertinet ad voluntarium. Omnis autem affectio animae circa singularia vehementior est. Et ideo circa singularia timiditas plus habet de involuntario, intemperantia vero plus de voluntario. Et ideo in vitiis intemperantiae maxime nocivum est immorari cogitatione per quam homo ad singularia descendit quae alliciunt voluntatem.
| 642. The reason for this difference is taken from this: pain that causes fear pertains to the involuntary, as pleasure that causes intemperance pertains to the voluntary. Every inclination of the soul towards particular things is rather vehement. For this reason cowardice regarding particular things has more of the involuntary but intemperance more of the voluntary. Therefore in sins of intemperance it is exceedingly harmful to dwell upon the thought by which a man comes down to the particular that entices the will.
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| Deinde cum dicit: nomen autem intemperantiae etc., comparat vitium intemperantiae ad peccata puerorum. Et primo ponit convenientiam quantum ad nomen. Secundo rationem convenientiae assignat, ibi, non male autem videtur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod nomen intemperantiae transfertur ad peccata puerorum; quod quidem in lingua nostra magis apparet ex parte virtutis quam ex parte vitii. Dicimus enim castitatem temperantiae speciem sicut et pueros disciplinatos dicimus castigatos. Eos autem, qui sunt indisciplinati, possumus dicere incastigatos. Sicut et ille, qui non est castus, dicitur incestuosus. Et huiusmodi translationis ratio est, quia habent quamdam similitudinem huiusmodi peccata, ut postea ostendetur. Sed quid horum nominetur ab alio, non refert ad propositum. Manifestum est tamen quod id cui posterius est nomen impositum nominatur ab eo cui nomen fuit impositum prius.
| 643. Then [2], at “We transfer the name,” he compares the vice of intemperance with the sins of children. First [2, a] he states the agreement as to the name. Next [2, b], at “This transference etc.,” he assigns the reason for the agreement. He says first that the name intemperance is transferred to the sins of children. This is more apparent in our language on the part of the virtue than on the part of the vice. We call chastity a species of temperance, as we say that disciplined children are chastened. And those who are not disciplined can be called unchastised. So too one who is not chaste is said to be “incestuosus” (in-castus). The reason for this transference is that sins of this kind have a certain likeness, as will be shown later (647). But which of these is named from the other does not concern us now. It is clear, however, that the thing given the name later was called after that which had the name earlier.
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| Deinde cum dicit: non male autem videtur etc., assignat rationem praedictae translationis nominis secundum similitudinem peccati intemperantiae ad peccata puerorum. Et primo quantum ad necessitatem castigationis, sive refrenationis. Secundo quantum ad modum castigandi vel refrenandi, ibi: propter quod oportet et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod non male videtur esse facta translatio huius nominis ab uno peccato ad aliud. Et hoc propter similitudinem, secundum quam translationes fiunt. Oportet enim puniri, id est castigari et refrenari eum qui prava appetit, et cuius malus appetitus multum augetur: in quo conveniunt concupiscentia et puer.
| 644. Next [2, b], at “This transference,” he assigns the reason for the previous transference in accordance with the likeness of the sin of intemperance to the sins of children. First [2, b, i] in respect to the necessity of chastising or restraining; and second 12, b, ii] in respect to the manner of chastising and restraining, at “For this reason sensual desire etc.” He says first that the transference of this name from one sin to another does not seem to be unsuitable because of the likeness according to which the transferences are made. It is necessary to punish, i.e., chastise and discipline, one who strives after improper things and whose evil inclination is greatly increased points on which sensual desire and the child are in agreement.
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| Et haec convenientia videtur esse rationabilis; quia pueri maxime vivunt secundum concupiscentiam, quia ipsi appetunt maxime delectationem, quod pertinet ad rationem concupiscentiae. Causa autem quare appetant delectationem, dicetur in septimo. Et ideo si puer et concupiscentia non bene ratione persuadeantur, perveniunt ad quoddam dominium et ad multum augmentum, ita scilicet quod dominabitur delectationis appetitus, qui est concupiscentia.
| 645. This agreement seems to be reasonable because children live especially in accord with sensual desire, since they strive most of all after pleasure, which belongs to the nature of sensual desire. The reason why they strive after pleasure will be given in the seventh book (1531). Therefore, if the child and sensual desire are not rightly restrained by reason, they come to rule and increase so that the appetite for pleasure, i.e., sensual desire, will be lord and master.
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| Et huius ratio est, quia appetitus delectationis est insatiabilis; quinimmo quanto plus gustatur plus concupiscitur, eo quod est secundum se appetibilis. Et inde est, quod sicut puero insipienti, ita etiam concupiscentiae propria operatio auget cognatum, id est hoc quod est eis simile; nam, si puer insipiens dimittatur operari secundum suam insipientiam, magis in eo insipientia crescet; et si homo concupiscentiae satisfaciat, magis concupiscentia crescit in homine, et dominatur. Et praecipue si concupiscentiae vel delectationes sint magnae, ex parte obiecti, id est de rebus multum delectabilibus, et vehementes ex parte eius qui concupiscit et delectatur, qui multum ex eis afficitur, in tantum quod impediant hominis cogitationem sive ratiocinationem, quae quanto magis remanet, tanto concupiscentia minus potest dominari.
| 646. The reason for this is that the desire of pleasure is insatiable; indeed the more pleasure is enjoyed, the more it is desired in that pleasure itself is desirable. Hence, just as with a child and a simpleton so with sensual desire-the proper operation increases what is innate, i.e., that which is like them. If a child and a simpleton should be allowed to work according to their folly, the folly increases more in them. When a man satisfies sensual desire, it increases more in him and becomes master. This is especially true if sensual desire or pleasure is great by reason of the object, that is, things very delightful and also vehement for the man who desires and takes pleasure. This man is so influenced by pleasures that they may impede his knowledge or reasoning. The power of thought remains more efficient, the less sensual desire can dominate.
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| Deinde cum dicit propter quod oportet etc., ostendit similitudinem utrorumque peccatorum, quantum ad modum castigandi, sive refrenandi. Et dicit, quod quia concupiscentia et delectatio, si sit vehemens, facit sui augmentum, ideo oportet, quod sint mensuratae, idest non excedentes in magnitudine, sive in vehementia affectionis, et paucae secundum numerum, et quod nil contrarientur rationi quantum ad speciem concupiscentiae seu delectationis, quae sumitur ex parte obiecti. Et illud quod ita se habet in concupiscentiis et delectationibus, dicimus esse bene persuasum et punitum, idest castigatum a ratione. Sicut enim oportet quod puer vivat secundum praeceptum paedagogi, sic oportet, quod vis concupiscibilis consonet rationi. Intentio enim utriusque, scilicet et rationis et paedagogi, est ad bonum. Et ita se habet concupiscibile in homine temperato, qui concupiscit quae oportet et sicut oportet et quando oportet, prout ordinat ratio.
| 647. Then [2, b, ii], at “For this reason sensual desire,” he shows the likeness between the two sins in respect to the manner of chastising or restraining. He says that, since sensual desire and pleasure are vehement, they grow by themselves. For this reason they must be moderated, i.e., not excessive in extent or in vehemence of inclination or in number. They must not be contrary to reason in any way, especially in regard to the species of sensual desire or pleasure taken on the part of the object. That which is so disposed in the matter of sensual desires and pleasures is said to be readily obedient and chastised, i.e., corrected by reason. As a child must live according to the instructions of his tutor, so the faculty of sensual desire must be in conformity with reason. Each, i.e., reason and the tutor, aspires to the good. The concupiscent part in the temperate man is so disposed that he desires the right things, in the right way, and at the right time—as reason directs.
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| Ultimo autem concludit, quod ista sunt, quae dicta sunt a nobis de temperantia. Et in hoc finitur tertius liber.
| 648. He says in conclusion that these are the things we have discussed about temperance. With this the third book ends.
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