| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| De iustitia autem et iniustitia et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus moralibus quae sunt circa passiones, hic determinat de virtute iustitiae quae est circa operationes; et dividitur in partes duas. In prima determinat de iustitia proprie dicta. In secunda determinat de iustitia metaphorica, ibi, utrum autem contingit sibiipsi iniustum facere et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de virtute iustitiae. Secundo determinat de quadam virtute, scilicet epiichia, quae est communis iustitiae directiva, ibi: de epiikya vero et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur propositum, ibi, videmus utique et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit de quo intendat, quia de iustitia et iniustitia. Et proponit tria circa iustitiam consideranda, in quibus differt iustitia a supradictis virtutibus.
| 885. After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of the moral virtues dealing with the passions, he now begins to consider the virtue of justice dealing with actions. He divides the inquiry into two parts, in the first of which [I] he examines justice in the proper sense; and then [Lect. 17], at “Whether or not it is possible etc.” (B. 1138 a 4), in the metaphorical sense. He discusses the first point under two headings. Initially [A] he investigates the virtue of justice; and then [Lect. 16], at “Next we will treat equity etc.” (B. 1137 a 31), a certain virtue, namely, equity that gives direction to ordinary justice. He handles the initial point in a twofold manner. First [A’] he indicates what he intends to treat; and next [B’] at “Apparently everyone wants to call etc.,” he carries out his intention. He considers the first under two aspects. Initially [A’, 1] he shows what subject he intends to consider, viz., justice and injustice. Concerning justice he proposes for consideration three differences existing between justice an the previously mentioned virtues.
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| Quorum primum, tangit cum dicit quod intendendum est circa quales operationes sint iustitia et iniustitia. Virtutes enim et vitia de quibus supra dictum est, sunt circa passiones; quia scilicet in eis principaliter consideratur qualiter homo interius afficiatur secundum passiones; sed quid exterius operetur, non consideratur nisi ex consequenti, inquantum scilicet operationes exteriores ex interioribus passionibus proveniunt. Sed circa iustitiam et iniustitiam praecipue attenditur quid homo exterius operatur. Qualiter autem afficiatur interius non consideratur nisi ex consequenti, prout scilicet aliquis iuvatur vel impeditur circa operationem. Secundum autem tangit cum dicit et qualis medietas est iustitia et iustum, quod scilicet est obiectum iustitiae. In praehabitis enim virtutibus accipitur medium rationis et non rei. Sed in iustitia accipitur medium rei, ut infra dicetur. Tertium autem tangit cum dicit et quorum est medium. Quaelibet enim supradictarum virtutum est medium duorum vitiorum; iustitia autem non est medium duarum malitiarum ut infra patebit.
| 886. The first difference is touched upon when he says that we must aim it such operations as are done by justice and injustice. The virtues and vices discussed before (649-884) are concerned with the passions, for there we consider. in what way a man may be internally influenced by reason of the passions; but we do not consider what is externally done, except as something secondary, inasmuch as external operations originate from internal passions. However, in treating justice and injustice we direct our principal attention to what a man does externally; how he is influenced internally we consider only as a by-product, namely, according as he is helped or hindered in the operation. The second difference is touched upon when he says “what is the mean of justice and the just action,” i.e., the object of justice. In the virtues previously treated we took the mean of reason and not of the thing. But in justice the mean of the thing is used, as will be determined later (932-977). The third difference is touched upon when he says “and between what extremes the just action is the mean.” Each of the afore-mentioned virtues is a mean between two vices, but justice is not a mean between two vices, as will be clear afterwards (993-994).
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| Secundo ibi: intentio autem etc., ostendit secundum quem modum tractanda sunt praedicta. Et dicit quod intendendum est tractare de iustitia secundum eamdem artem, secundum quam tractatum est de praedictis virtutibus, scilicet figuraliter et aliis huiusmodi modis.
| 887. Then [A’, 2], at “It is our intention,” he shows by what method we are to examine the differences just mentioned. He says that we intend to investigate justice in the same way as we investigated the virtues just discussed, i.e., according to type and so on.
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| Deinde cum dicit: videmus utique etc., incipit determinare de iustitia. Et primo distinguit iustitiam particularem a iustitia legali. Secundo determinat de iustitia particulari, de qua principaliter intendit, ibi, eius autem quae secundum partem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo dividit iustitiam in legalem et particularem. Secundo ostendit quae et qualis sit iustitia legalis, ibi, quia autem illegalis et cetera. Tertio ostendit, quod praeter iustitiam legalem est quaedam particularis iustitia, ibi: quaerimus autem eam et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quid significetur nomine iustitiae vel iniustitiae. Secundo distinguit utrumque, ibi: consequitur autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo notificat iustitiam et iniustitiam. Secundo ostendit notificationem esse convenientem, ibi: neque enim eundem habet et cetera. Tertio infert corollarium ex dictis, ibi, multoties quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod omnes videntur velle dicere quod iustitia sit talis habitus per quem tria causantur in homine: primo quidem inclinatio ad opus iustitiae, secundum quam dicitur homo operativus iustorum. Secundum est operatio iusta. Tertium autem est, quod homo velit iusta operari. Et similiter dicendum est de iniustitia, quod est habitus a quo homines sunt operativi iniustorum, et faciunt et volunt iniusta. Et ideo hoc nobis primo supponendum est de iustitia, sicut id quod figuraliter apparet.
| 888. Next [B’], at “Apparently everyone etc.,” he begins the investigation of justice. First [B’, 1] he distinguishes particular from legal justice. Then [Lect. 4], at “One species of particular etc.” (B.1130 b 30), he considers particular justice, his principal concern. He discusses the first point in a threefold manner. First [i, a] he divides justice into legal and particular. Second [Lect. 2], at “Since it was said that etc.” (B.1129 b 12), he shows what the nature of legal justice is. Third [Lect. 3], at “We are now investigating etc.” (B. 1130 a 14), he explains that, besides legal justice, there is a particular justice. He treats the initial point in a twofold manner. First [a, i] he shows what the names, justice and injustice, signify; and then [a, ii], at “It follows in most instances etc.,” he distinguishes the two concepts. He develops the first under three headings. At the outset [i, x] he explains justice and injustice. Next [i, y], at “Likewise, the same etc.,” he shows that the explanation is reasonable. Last [i, z], at “Oftentimes then etc.,” he infers a corollary from the premises. He says in the beginning that all seem to contend that justice is the sort of habit that brings about three effects in man. The first is an inclination to a work of justice in accord with which a man is said to be disposed to just works. The second is a just action. The Third is that a man wants to perform just operations. We must say the same about injustice, namely, that it is a habit by which men are disposed to unjust deeds and by which they do and will unjust actions. For that reason we must presuppose these things about justice as apparently typical in such matters.
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| Et est considerandum, quod convenienter notificavit iustitiam per voluntatem, in qua non sunt passiones et tamen est exteriorum actionum principium, unde est proprium subiectum iustitiae quae non est circa passiones.
| 889. Likewise, we must take into consideration that he properly explained justice after the manner of a will, which does not have passions but nevertheless is the principle of external actions. Consequently, the will is a proper subject of justice, which is not concerned with the passions.
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| Deinde cum dicit neque enim eundem etc., ostendit praedictas notificationes esse convenientes, quantum ad hoc scilicet quod, iustitia notificata est per hoc quod se habet ad volendum et operandum iusta, iniustitia autem ad volendum et operandum iniusta. Non enim eodem modo se habet in habitibus, sicut in scientiis et potentiis. Contraria enim pertinent ad eamdem potentiam, sicut album et nigrum ad visum, et ad eamdem scientiam, sicut sanum et aegrum ad medicinam. Sed habitus contrarius non se habet ad contraria sibi.
| 890. At “Likewise, the same” [i, y] he shows that the preceding explanations are reasonable in this respect, viz., that justice is explained by the fact that its purpose is to will and perform just actions, and injustice to will and perform unjust actions. What is true of sciences and potencies is not true of habits, for contraries belong to the same potency (for example, white and black to sight) and to the same science (for instance, health and sickness to medicine). But in regard to habits, contrary things are not referred to them.
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| Et ponit exemplum de habitibus corporalibus. Nam a sanitate non procedunt ea quae sunt contraria sanitati, sed solum ea quae sanitati congruunt. Sicut dicimus, quod aliquis sane ambulat quando ita ambulat sicut ille qui sanus existit. Unde et ipsa scientia, licet secundum quod est cognitio quaedam, ad contraria se habeat, inquantum unum contrariorum est ratio cognoscendi aliud, tamen inquantum est habitus quidam, se habet tantum ad unum actum, qui est cognoscere veritatem; non autem se habet ad errorem contrarium. Sic igitur convenienter dictum est, quod per iustitiam operamur iusta et per iniustitiam iniusta.
| 891. He takes an example from habits of the body. Not the things that are contrary to health but only those in keeping with health proceed from health. In this way we say that a man walks with a vigorous step who is vigorous in health. Hence science itself, as it is a kind of knowledge, refers to contraries inasmuch as one of contraries is the reason for knowing the other; nevertheless, inasmuch as science is a certain habit, it is attributed to one act only (which is knowing the truth) and not to the contrary error. So then it was properly said that by justice we do just actions; by injustice, unjust actions.
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| Deinde cum dicit: multotiens quidem igitur etc., infert quoddam correlarium ex dictis. Quia enim contrarii habitus sunt contrariorum, et unus actus est determinate unius obiecti, inde est, quod multoties unus habitus contrarius cognoscitur per alium et multotiens habitus cognoscitur a suo obiecto, quod est quasi materia obiecta operationi habitus. Et hoc manifestat per exemplum. Si evexia sit manifesta, idest bona dispositio, et cachexia est manifesta, idest mala dispositio. Et sic habitus cognoscitur a suo contrario. Cognoscitur etiam ex obiecto, quia ex his quae faciunt hominem bene se habere fit manifesta euechia. Et hoc ulterius specialius manifestat, quia si ad evexiam pertinet, quod homo habeat carnes bene densatas, necessarium est, quod ad cachexiam pertineat, quod homo habeat carnes raras, id est incompactas propter indigestos humores. Et iterum necessarium est, quod illud quod facit hominem bene se habere, sit illud quod faciat eum habere carnes bene densatas.
| 892. Then [i, z], at “Oftentimes, then,” he infers a corollary from the premises. Since contrary habits belong to contraries, and one act belongs to one object in a fixed manner, it follows that frequently one contrary habit is known by another and oftentimes by its object which is, as it were, matter subject to the operation of the habit. He illustrates this by an example. If evexia or a healthy condition is known, cachexia or an unhealthy condition is also known. In this way a habit is known by its contrary. Likewise it is known from its object because from the things that make a man healthy, a healthy condition becomes known. This is further illustrated in a more particular way. If the fact that a man has very firm flesh is a characteristic of a healthy condition, then the fact that he has flabby flesh—as it were loosely compressed by reason of disordered humors—is necessarily characteristic of an unhealthy condition. Again, that which makes a man healthy is necessarily a condition making him have firm flesh.
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| Deinde cum dicit: consequitur autem etc., distinguit iustitiam et iniustitiam. Et primo ponit divisionem; secundo manifestat membra divisionis, ibi, quia autem avarus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit, quod multiplicitas iniustitiae manifestat multiplicitatem iustitiae. Quia ut in pluribus consequens est, ut si unum oppositorum dicatur multipliciter, et reliquum. Et ita etiam se habet de iusto et iniusto.
| 893. Next [a, ii], at “It follows in most instances,” he distinguishes justice and injustice. First [ii, x] he gives the division; and then [ii, y], at “Since the unjust man etc.,” the parts of the division. He treats the first point in three ways. At the outset [x, aa] he shows that various meanings of injustice indicate various meanings of justice. The reason is that it follows in most instances that if one of opposites may be spoken of in diverse ways, then the other can be. This is the case, too, with what is just and unjust.
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| Secundo ibi: videtur autem multipliciter etc., ostendit qualis sit horum multiplicitas. Et dicit quod tam iustitia quam iniustitia videtur multipliciter dici: sed multiplicitas eorum est latens, propter hoc, quod ea quae faciunt aequivocationem sunt propinqua adinvicem secundum convenientiam ipsorum. In his autem quae multum distant magis est manifesta aequivocatio si idem nomen eis imponatur, eo quod in promptu apparet multa differentia ipsorum, quae est secundum ideam, idest secundum rationem propriae speciei; sicut hoc nomen clavis aequivoce dicitur de instrumento quo clauduntur ostia, et de quodam operculo quod cooperit traceam arteriam, quae est in collo animalium.
| 894. Second [x, bb], at “Justice and injustice,” he explains the nature of their various meanings. He says that both justice and injustice can be spoken of in diverse ways, but their many meanings lie concealed because the things making for equivocation are close to one another in their agreement among themselves. But in widely separated things equivocation is evident, if the same name be given them, because their great difference in concept, i.e., in the essential element of the proper species, is immediately apparent. In this way the name key is used equivocally of an instrument which locks doors and of the clavicle (clavicula i.e. little key) which covers the artery in the shoulder of animals.
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| Tertio ibi: sumatur autem iniustus etc., ostendit quot modis praedicta dicantur: et dicit quod primo sumendum est quotiens dicatur iniustus. Dicitur enim tripliciter. Uno modo illegalis, qui scilicet facit contra legem. Alio modo dicitur iniustus avarus, qui scilicet vult plus habere de bonis. Tertio modo dicitur iniustus inaequalis, qui scilicet vult minus habere de malis.
| 895. Third [x, cc], at “The unjust man,” he explains in how many ways the previously mentioned habits may be signified, saying that first we must consider the unjust man in as many ways as he is designated. He is spoken of in three ways: in one way as the lawbreaking man, i.e., one who acts contrary to the law; in another way as the covetous man who wants too much prosperity; in the last way as the unfair man who determines to have too few burdens.
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| Unde manifestum est, quod iustus dicetur dupliciter: uno enim modo dicitur iustus legalis, idest ille qui est observator legis. Alio modo dicitur iustus aequalis, qui scilicet aequaliter vult habere de bonis et malis; aequale enim opponitur utrique, scilicet, et ei quod est in plus, et ei quod est in minus. Et ex hoc ulterius concludit quod iustum dicitur legale et aequale, et iniustum illegale et inaequale, inquantum obiecta notificantur per habitus, ut supra dictum est.
| 896. It is obvious then that the man is taken in two ways: in one way as a law-abiding person, i.e., as one who observes the law; in the other way as the fair person who is willing to have the smiles and frowns of fortune in equal measure. The equal is opposed to both, i.e., to what is excessive and to what is deficient. From this he draws a further conclusion that what is just is said to be according to the law and fair; and what is unjust, contrary to the law and unfair inasmuch as objects are made known by habits, as was said before (892).
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| Deinde cum dicit: quia autem avarus etc., manifestat membra praemissae divisionis. Et primo ostendit qualiter avarus dicatur iniustus. Et dicit quod quia avarus qui vult plus habere est iniustus, consequens est, quod sit circa bona quorum abundantiam homines appetunt. Non tamen circa omnia bona, sed solum circa illa circa quae est fortuna et infortunium; huiusmodi autem sunt simpliciter, id est absolute et in se considerata, semper bona, sed non semper sunt bona alicui, quia non semper sunt proportionata homini nec semper ei expediunt. Homines autem haec petunt a Deo, et in oratione, et suo desiderio haec inquirunt quasi semper essent eis bona et ex hoc efficiuntur avari et iniusti. Non autem ita fieri oportet: sed oportet orando a Deo petere, ut ea quae sunt secundum se bona efficiantur homini bona, ita quod unusquisque eligat id quod est sibi bonum, scilicet operari recte secundum virtutem.
| 897. At “Since the unjust man” [ii, y] he makes clear the parts: of the division just given. First [y, aa] he shows in what way the covetous man is said to be unjust. He affirms that since the covetous person who wants to have too much is unjust, it follows that he will be concerned about an abundance of goods which men desire. However, he will not be solicitous about all goods but only those pertaining to fortune and adversity. Goods of this kind are beneficial if we do not make qualification, i.e., they are good considered independently and in themselves. But they are not always beneficial for an individual because they are not always proportionate to him nor always expedient for him. However, men seek these goods from God, and pray for and desire them as if such things were always beneficial. By reason of this they become covetous and unjust. It should not be this way, but a man ought to pray that those things that are in themselves good be made good for him, so that each may choose what is good for him, i.e., the proper exercise of virtue.
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| Secundo ibi: iniustus autem etc., manifestat quomodo inaequalis dicatur iniustus. Et dicit, quod iniustus non semper dicitur aliquis ex eo quod plus eligit, sed ex eo quod minus eligit in his quae simpliciter et absolute considerata sunt mala, sicut sunt labores, inopia et alia huiusmodi. Sed quia etiam minus malum videtur aliqualiter esse bonum inquantum est eligibile, cum avaritia sit boni sicut dictum est, videtur propter hoc, quod ille qui appetit minus habere de malis sit quodam modo avarus. Sed verius dicitur quod sit inaequalis, quia hoc continet utrumque, et est commune ad plus et ad minus.
| 898. Then [y, bb], at “But the unjust man,” he shows how the unjust person is said to be unfair, stating that a man is not always called unjust because he chooses too much but because he chooses too little of the things that simply and considered in themselves are burdensome—like labors, lack of necessities and so on. However, since lesser evil apparently is in some way a good precisely as it is eligible—covetousness regards a good as was just said (897)—it seems for this reason that a person who desires too little of what is arduous is in some way covetous. But it is nearer the truth to say that he is unfair-a term that contains both and is common to excess and defect.
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| Tertio ibi: et illegalis etc., manifestat quomodo iniustus dicitur illegalis. Et dicit quod etiam illegalis dicitur iniustus. Haec enim illegalitas secundum quam dicitur aliquis illegalis, quae etiam est inaequalitas, inquantum homo non adaequatur regulae legis, continet universaliter omnem iniustitiam, et est quiddam commune respectu omnis iniustitiae ut infra patebit.
| 899. Last [y, cc], at “Besides, the unjust ,” he explains how the unjust man is said to be lawbreaking, affirming that he who is unlawful is also called unjust. A person is designated a lawbreaker by reason of unlawfulness which is also an inequality inasmuch as a man is not equal to the norm of the law. This unlawfulness contains in general all injustice and something common in respect of every kind of injustice, as will be made clear later (911, 919, 922).
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Quia autem illegalis et cetera. Postquam philosophus distinxit iustitiam, hic determinat de iustitia legali. Et primo determinat de ipso iusto legali, quod est obiectum legalis iustitiae. Secundo determinat de ipsa legali iustitia, ibi, ipsa quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod iustum legale determinatur secundum legem. Secundo ostendit qualia sunt illa, quae lege determinantur, ibi, leges autem dicunt et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia supra dictum est, quod illegalis est iniustus, et legalis est iustus, manifeste consequitur, quod omnia legalia sunt aliqualiter iusta.
| 900. After the Philosopher has given the division of justice, he now considers legal justice. First [A] he treats the legally just itself, which is the object of legal justice. Second [B], at “Justice itself then etc., he considers legal justice. He discusses the first point in a twofold manner. First [A, 1 ] he shows that the legally just is determined by law. Now [A, 2], at “But laws aim etc.,” he explains the nature of legal enactments. He affirms first that, since it was said above (895-896, 899) that the lawless man is unjust and the law-abiding man just, it clearly follows that all lawful acts are just in some measure.
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| Dicit autem aliqualiter, quia omnis lex datur in ordine ad aliquam politiam: non autem in omni politia est simpliciter iustum, sed in quibusdam est iustum solum secundum quid, ut patet per philosophum in III politicae, nam in politia democratica, in qua populus totus vult dominari, attenditur iustum secundum quid, sed non simpliciter: ut scilicet quia omnes cives sunt aequales secundum quid, scilicet secundum libertatem, ideo habeantur ut aequales simpliciter; unde nec ea quae secundum legem democraticam statuuntur sunt simpliciter iusta, sed aliqualiter. Dicit autem illa esse legalia, quae sunt statuta et determinata per legispositivam, quae competit legislatoribus. Et unumquodque eorum sic determinatorum dicimus esse aliqualiter iustum.
| 901. He says “in some measure” because every law is determined in relation to some state. Now, not every state possesses what is simply just but some states have only what is partially just, as is evident in the third book of the Politics (Ch. 9, 1281 a 10; St. Th. Lect. 7, 413). In a democratic state where all the people govern, what is partially just is observed but not what is simply just, so that because all the citizens are equal in one respect (i.e., in liberty), therefore they are considered equal in every respect. Consequently, acts that are prescribed by law in a democracy are not simply but only in some measure just. But Aristotle says that those enactments are lawful that have been fixed and determined by positive law, which is within the competence of legislators, and that each enactment so decreed is said to he just in some way.
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| Deinde cum dicit: leges autem dicunt etc., ostendit qualia sint, quae lege statuuntur. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit respectu cuius finis aliquid lege statuatur; secundo ostendit de quibus aliquid statuatur lege, ibi: praecipit autem lex et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod leges de omnibus loquuntur, secundum quod potest conici quod pertineat ad aliquid utile vel toti communitati, sicut est in rectis politiis, in quibus intenditur bonum commune. Vel ad aliquid quod sit utile optimis, idest aliquibus maioribus de civitate, per quos civitas regitur, qui et optimates dicuntur. Vel ad aliquid utile dominis, sicut contingit in politiis quae reguntur regibus vel tyrannis. Semper enim in legibus ferendis attenditur id quod est utile ei quod est principale in civitate.
| 902. Next [A’, 2] , at “But laws aim,” he explains with what the decrees of law are concerned. He considers this point from two aspects. First [2, a] he shows for whose sake a law is enacted. Then [2, b], at “A law commands,” he shows on what matters laws are made. He says first that laws touch on everything that can be of any possible utility for the community (as in the ideal states where the common good is kept in mind), or for the utility of the best (i.e., certain elders of the state who govern it and are called nobles), or for the utility of he rulers (as happens in states ruled by kings and tyrants). In the framing of laws attention is always given to what is useful to the affair of chief importance in the city.
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| Quod autem aliqui habeantur ut optimi vel ut dominantes, contingit quidem, vel secundum virtutem sicut in aristocratica politia, in qua aliqui propter virtutem principantur; vel secundum aliquem alium modum, puta in politia oligarchica, in qua aliqui pauci principantur propter divitias vel potentiam. Et quia omnis utilitas humana finaliter ordinatur ad felicitatem, manifestum est, quod secundum unum modum iusta legalia dicuntur ea quae sunt factiva et conservativa felicitatis et particularum ipsius, idest eorum quae ad felicitatem ordinantur, vel principaliter sicut virtutes, vel instrumentaliter sicut divitiae, et alia huiusmodi exteriora bona; et hoc per comparationem ad communitatem politicam ad quam respicit legispositio.
| 903. Some may be considered as best or as ruling either because of virtue (as in an aristocratic state where certain ones rule on account of virtue), or for the sake of something else (as in an oligarchy where the few rule on account of riches or power). Since human utility of every kind is finally ordered to happiness, obviously the legal enactments that bring about happiness and the means to it (i.e., the things that are ordered to happiness either principally, like the virtues, or instrumentally like riches and other external goods of this kind) are called just in some fashion. This is by comparison with the civic community to which the framing of a law is directed.
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| Deinde cum dicit: praecipit autem lex etc., ostendit de quibus aliquid lege statuatur. Et dicit, quod lex praecipit ea quae pertinent ad singulas virtutes. Praecipit enim facere opera fortitudinis, puta cum praecipit, quod miles non derelinquat aciem, et quod non fugiat, neque proiiciat arma. Similiter etiam praecipit ea quae pertinent ad temperantiam, puta cum praecipit quod nullus moechetur, et quod nullus faciat mulieri aliquod convicium in propria persona; et similiter etiam praecipit ea quae pertinent ad mansuetudinem: sicut cum praecipit quod unus non percutiat alium ex ira, et quod non contendat cum eo opprobria inferendo. Et similiter est de aliis virtutibus quarum actus lex iubet, et de aliis malitiis quarum actus lex prohibet.
| 904. At “A law commands” [2, b] he explains on what matters laws are made, saying that a law commands what belongs to individual virtues. It commands deeds of bravery, for instance, that a soldier should not leave the battle line, nor take flight, nor throw away his arms. Likewise, it commands things pertaining to temperance, for example, that no one should commit adultery, that no one should dishonor the person of a woman. Also it commands the things belonging to meekness: no one should strike another in anger, no one should contend with another by insults. It is the same with other virtues whose acts the law commands, and with other vices whose acts the law forbids.
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| Et si quidem lex recte ponatur ad hoc, dicetur lex recta: alias vero dicitur lex apostomasmenos, ab a quod est sine, et postochios, quod est scientia, et menos, quod est perscrutatio; quasi lex posita sine perscrutatione scientiae; vel schedos dicitur dictamen ex improviso editum, inde schediazo, idest ex improviso aliquid facio, unde potest dici lex aposchediasmenos, idest quae caret debita providentia.
| 905. If the law is rightly drafted according to this, it will be declared an excellent law. Otherwise it is called aposchediasmenos (from a meaning without, poschedias meaning knowledge, and menos meaning a searching) as if the law was drafted without a thorough knowledge, or the expression may come from schedos signifying a decree published without being thoroughly scanned, from which we have schediazo, i.e., I am doing something off-hand. Hence a law is said to be aposchediasmenos which lacks proper forethought.
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| Deinde cum dicit: ipsa quidem igitur etc., determinat qualis sit iustitia legalis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit conditionem legalis iustitiae. Secundo ostendit qualiter legalis iustitia se habeat ad alias virtutes, ibi: in iustitia autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ipsa iustitia est quaedam virtus perfecta non simpliciter, sed in comparatione ad alterum. Et quia esse perfectum non solum secundum se, sed etiam in comparatione ad alterum, potius est, propter hoc (cum) multoties dicitur, quod haec iustitia sit praeclarissima inter omnes virtutes; et proverbium inde sumitur, quod neque Hesperus, idest stella praeclarissima vespertina, neque Lucifer, idest stella praeclarissima matutina, ita fulgeat sicut iustitia.
| 906. Then [B], at “Justice itself then,” he determines how legal justice is constituted, showing first [B, 1] the nature of legal justice; and then [B, 2], at “But under justice,” in what way it is related to the virtues. He says first that justice itself is a certain perfect virtue not in terms of itself but in relation to another. Since it is better to be perfect not only in oneself but also in relation to another, therefore it is often said that this justice is the most excellent among all virtues. This is the origin of the proverb that neither Hesperus nor Lucifer, the brightest of the morning and evening stars, shine with such brilliance as justice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: in iustitia autem etc., ostendit ex hoc quod dictum est, qualiter iustitia legalis se habeat ad virtutes. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, perfecta autem est et cetera. Tertio determinat quiddam quod poterat esse dubium ex praedictis, ibi: quid autem differt virtus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia iustitia legalis consistit in usu virtutis qui est ad alterum et secundum omnem virtutem de qua lex praecipit, inde est, quod in ipsa iustitia simul comprehenditur omnis virtus, et ipsa est etiam virtus maxime perfecta.
| 907. Next [B, 2], at “But under justice,” he shows from our discussion thus far how legal justice is related to the virtues. He treats this point under three headings. First [B, 2, a] he sets forth his intention. Then [B, 2, b], at “Legal justice is perfect etc.,” he explains his proposition. Lastly [B, 2, c], at “How virtue and justice etc.,” he settles a point which could be called in question by the present discussion. He states first that justice itself comprehends every virtue at the same time and is even the perfect virtue in a special way. The reason is that legal justice consists in the exercise of virtue having do with another and is in agreement with every virtue prescribed by the law.
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| Deinde cum dicit: perfecta autem est etc., ostendit quod propositum est. Et primo quod iustitia legalis sit virtus maxime perfecta. Secundo quod comprehendat omnem virtutem, ibi, haec quidem igitur iustitia et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ideo iustitia legalis est perfecta virtus, quia ille qui habet hanc virtutem, potest uti virtute ad alterum, et non solum ad seipsum; quod quidem non contingit omnibus virtuosis; multi enim possunt uti virtute in propriis, qui non possunt ea uti in his quae sunt ad alterum. Et ad manifestationem praemissorum inducit duo quae communiter dicuntur sive proverbialiter.
| 908. At “Legal justice is perfect” [ B, 2, b] he explains what was set forth: first [b, i] that legal justice is an especially perfect virtue; and then, at “This virtue, therefore” [b, ii], that it includes every virtue. He says first that legal justice is a perfect virtue because a man who has this virtue can employ it in relation to another and not to himself only—something not characteristic of all virtuous people. Many can practice virtue in things pertaining to themselves but not in the things pertaining to others. To make clear the previous statements he introduces two common sayings or proverbs.
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| Bias enim, qui fuit unus de septem sapientibus, dixit, quod principatus ostendit virum, utrum scilicet sit perfectus, vel insufficiens. Ille enim qui est princeps iam se habet in communicatione ad alterum, quia ad eum pertinet disponere ea quae ordinantur ad bonum commune. Et ita ex hoc habetur, quod perfectio virtutis ostenditur ex hoc, quod unus bene se habet ad alterum. Aliud autem proverbialiter dictum inducit ad ostendendum, quod iustitia legalis sit ad alterum. Propter hoc enim sola iustitia inter virtutes videtur esse alienum bonum, quia est ad alterum in quantum intendit operari ea quae sunt utilia alteri, scilicet vel ipsi communitati vel principi communitatis; aliae vero virtutes intendunt operari bonum proprium, puta temperantia intendit quietare animum a turpibus concupiscentiis. Et idem est in aliis virtutibus.
| 909. Bias, one of the seven wise men, said that authority tests whether a man is perfect or deficient. The man who rules is already engaged in communication with another because it is his business to arrange the things which are ordered to the common good. So from this we see that the perfection of virtue is indicated by the fact that one person is in touch with another. He proposes another saying to show that legal justice refers to another. For this reason legal justice alone seems to be the good of another (that is, relates to our neighbor) inasmuch as it aims to perform actions useful to another, viz., to the community or the ruler of the community. But some virtues aim to achieve an individual’s good, for instance, temperance strives to quiet the disgraceful desires of the soul. The same is true of the other virtues.
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| Concludit igitur quod, sicut pessimus est ille, qui utitur malitia, non solum ad seipsum, sed etiam ad amicos, ita optimus dicitur ille, qui utitur virtute non solum ad seipsum, sed etiam in comparatione ad alterum. Hoc enim est maxime difficile. Sic igitur patet, quod iustus legalis est optimus, et iustitia legalis est perfectissima virtus.
| 910. He draws the conclusion that, as that man is most wicked who practices vice not only in regard to himself but also in regard to his friends, so, that man is most honorable who practices virtue in relation not only to himself but also to others. This is especially difficult. So then it is clear that the law-abiding just man is most virtuous and legal justice is the most perfect of virtues.
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| Deinde cum dicit: haec quidem igitur etc., concludit quod iustitia legalis includat omnem virtutem. Ad eam enim pertinet uti virtute ad alium. Qualibet autem virtute potest aliquis uti ad alterum. Unde manifestum est quod iustitia legalis non est quaedam particularis virtus, sed ad eam pertinet tota virtus. Neque etiam contraria malitia est pars malitiae, sed ad eam pertinet tota malitia, quia similiter qualibet malitia potest homo uti ad alterum.
| 911. Then [b, ii], at “This virtue, therefore,” he infers that legal justice embraces every virtue, for it pertains to legal justice to exercise virtue in regard to another. But a person can practice every virtue in his relation with another. Hence obviously legal justice is not a particular virtue but has a connection with virtue in general. Likewise, the opposite vice is not a particular vice but a general vice, since in a similar way man can exercise every vice in his relations with his neighbor.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quid autem differt virtus etc., manifestat quiddam quod possit esse dubium circa praemissa. Et dicit, quod ex dictis manifestum est in quo differant virtus et iustitia legalis. Quia secundum substantiam est eadem, sed secundum rationem non est idem; sed per comparationem ad alterum dicitur iustitia; inquantum autem est habitus operativus talis boni, est simpliciter virtus. Hoc autem intelligendum est quantum ad ipsum actum iustitiae et virtutis. Actus enim idem subiecto producitur a iustitia legali et a virtute simpliciter dicta, puta non moechari; tamen secundum aliam et aliam rationem. Verum, quia ubi est specialis ratio obiecti etiam in materia generali, oportet esse specialem habitum, inde est, quod ipsa iustitia legalis est determinata virtus habens speciem ex hoc quod intendit ad bonum commune.
| 912. Next [B, 2, c], at “How justice and virtue,” he clarifies something that may be doubtful from the premises. He says that it is clear, from what has been said, the way in which virtue and legal justice differ since they are the same in substance but different in concept. However, virtue in its relation to another is called justice, but precisely as it is a habit operative of such good, it is a virtue simply. This must be understood in regard to the act itself of justice and virtue, for an act identical in subject but diverse in concept is produced by legal justice and by virtue simply so called, for instance, not to commit adultery. But where a special formal aspect of an object exists even in general matter, thee a special habit must be found. For this reason it follows that legal justice is a definite virtue taking its species from this, that it tends to the common good.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Quaerimus autem eam quae in parte virtutis et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit qualis sit iustitia legalis quae est omnis virtus, hic ostendit, quod praeter eam est quaedam particularis iustitia. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo ostendit propositum, ibi: signum autem etc.; tertio epilogat quae dicta sunt et ostendit quae restant dicenda, ibi: quoniam quidem igitur sunt iustitiae plures et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, cum iustitia legalis sit omnis virtus, non eam nunc principaliter quaerimus, sed illam quae est pars totius virtutis sicut quaedam particularis virtus; est enim quaedam talis iustitia, sicut communiter dicimus. Et similiter etiam intendimus de iniustitia particulari.
| 913. After the Philosopher has shown that besides this there is a particular what is the nature of legal justice, which is a general virtue, now he shows justice. He treats this point under three headings. First [A] he indicates his proposition; and then [B], at “The proof for etc.,” he explains it. Last [C], at “Obviously then etc.,” he sums up what has already been said and shows what remains to be discussed. He says first that, while legal justice is a general virtue, we are not principally investigating this at present, but that which as a part of the general virtue is a particular virtue. As is commonly held, there is such a virtue. Also we intend to speak about particular injustice in a similar manner.
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| Deinde cum dicit: signum autem etc., ostendit propositum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quod praeter iustitiam legalem quae est omnis virtus est quaedam iustitia quae est particularis virtus; secundo assignat rationem quare communicat in nomine cum iustitia legali, ibi: univoca quoniam diffinitio et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est quod, ad ostendendum esse quandam iustitiam quae est particularis virtus, assumit probandum quod est quaedam iniustitia quae est particularis malitia; nam supra dictum est quod habitus ex contrariis manifestantur. Inducit autem ad hoc tres rationes. Quarum prima sumitur secundum separationem iniustitiae ab aliis malitiis, in quantum scilicet iniustitia invenitur sine aliis malitiis et e converso, ex quo patet quod iniustitia est quaedam particularis malitia ab aliis distincta.
| 914. Then [B], at “The proof for,” he explains the proposition. He discusses this point from two aspects. First [B, 1] he shows that besides legal justice, which is a general virtue, there is a justice that is a particular virtue. Next [B, 2], at “This justice etc.,” he assigns the reason why it has a name in common with legal justice. On this question we must consider that to prove there is a justice that is a particular virtue, he takes for granted that there is an injustice that is a particular vice, for we said above (892) that habits are made known by their contraries. He proposes three arguments for this. The first argument [B, 1, a] is taken according to the real distinction of injustice from other vices inasmuch as injustice is found without the others and conversely. From this it is evident that injustice is a particular vice distinct from other vices.
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| Dicit ergo quod hoc signum habemus quod sit quaedam particularis iustitia vel iniustitia, quia ille qui operatur secundum alias particulares malitias facit quidem iniuste secundum iniustitiam legalem, non tamen facit avare, ut scilicet aliquid accipiat de alieno; sicut cum aliquis miles abicit clipeum in bello propter timiditatem, vel qui dixit alicui opprobrium propter iram, vel qui non praestitit auxilium amico suo in pecuniis, propter vitium illiberalitatis. Et sic aliae malitiae possunt esse sine avaritia quae est specialis iniustitia. Quandoque autem est e converso quod aliquis peccat per avaritiam tollendo aliena, et tamen non peccat secundum unam aliquam aliarum malitiarum, neque secundum omnes, et tamen peccat secundum quamdam malitiam. Quod patet quia propter hoc vituperatur et quasi iniustus. Unde patet quod est quaedam alia iniustitia (quae est sicut pars totius malitiae, et quaedam alia iustitia) quae est sicut pars totius virtutis, sicut quaedam specialis virtus, et similiter etiam patet quod est quoddam iniustum quod est pars iniusti legalis, quod est commune iniustum.
| 915. He says that we have this proof that there is a particular justice and injustice because a man, who practices other particular vices acting unjustly according to legal injustice, nevertheless does not act covetously in taking something from his neighbor, for example, when a soldier throws away his shield because of cowardice, or a man casts opprobrium on someone because of anger, or a person refuses financial help to a friend because of the vice of stinginess. So other vices can exist without covetousness which is a special kind of injustice. Sometimes, on the contrary, it happens that a person sins by covetousness in taking another’s goods; although he does not sin by some one or all of the other vices, he does sin by a particular vice. This is clear because he is reproached as unjust for that reason. Hence obviously there is another justice-a part of the virtue-that is a special virtue. So evidently there exists also a certain unjust thing that is a part of what is legally unjust-the legally unjust being the unjust thing in general.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc si hic quidem et cetera. Quae sumitur ex ordine ad finem. Manifestum est enim quod, si actus unius vitii vel malitiae ordinetur ad alium finem indebitum, ex hoc ipso sortitur quamdam novam speciem malitiae. Sit ergo aliquis qui adulterium committat causa lucri, ut scilicet spoliet mulierem, vel qualitercumque ab ea accipiat. Contingit etiam quandoque quod aliquis adulterium committit propter concupiscentiam, non quidem ut lucretur, sed magis apponit aliquid de suo et in rebus suis patitur iacturam; talis autem proprie videtur esse luxuriosus, quia vitium luxuriae praecipue ordinatur ad satisfaciendum concupiscentiae. Ille autem qui moechatur ut accipiat aliena non videtur esse luxuriosus, per se loquendo, quia non intendit luxuriae finem. Sed magis videtur esse iniustus, quia propter lucrum contra iustitiam fecit. Sic ergo patet quod iniustitia est quaedam specialis malitia.
| 916. At “Moreover, if one man” [B, 1, b] he gives the second argument, which is taken from the order to the end. Clearly, if a vicious or evil act is ordered to another unbecoming end, from this fact it will obtain a new species of vice. This is so when a man commits adultery for the sake of gain, for example, to rob a woman or to take from her in any way whatsoever. Also it happens sometimes that a man commits adultery entirely because of concupiscence, so that he not only does not gain but rather gives something of his own and suffers a loss of is goods. A man of this sort seems to be lustful, essentially speaking (per se), since the vice of lust is strictly ordered to the satisfaction of concupiscence. But the man who commits adultery to take a woman’s goods does not seem to be lustful, absolutely speaking, because he does not intend lust as his end. He seems rather to be unjust since he sins against justice for the sake of gain. So it is clear then that injustice is a special vice.
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| Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc circa alias quidem et cetera. Quae sumitur per comparationem ad iustitiam legalem. Sicut enim nihil est in genere quod non sit in aliqua eius specie, ita omne quod fit secundum iniustitiam legalem reducitur ad quandam particularem malitiam; sicut si aliquis fecit contra legalem iustitiam moechando, hoc refertur ad vitium luxuriae. Si autem aliquis miles in bello derelinquat ducem exercitus, reducitur hoc ad malitiam timiditatis. Si autem inordinate percussit proximum, hoc reducitur ad malitiam irae. Si vero aliquis inordinate lucratus est surripiens aliena, hoc non reducitur ad aliquam aliam malitiam, sed ad solam iniustitiam. Unde relinquitur quod sit quaedam iniustitia particularis, praeter aliam iniustitiam quae est tota malitia. Et eadem ratione est alia iustitia particularis praeter iustitiam legalem quae est tota virtus.
| 917. At “Yet in all” [B, i, c] he assigns the third argument, which is taken by comparison with legal justice. As nothing is contained in a genus that is not contained in some species, so anything that is done according to legal injustice is reduced to a particular vice. If a man acts contrary to legal justice by committing adultery, this will be referred to the vice of lust. If a soldier deserts his general in battle, this will be attributed to the vice of cowardice. If anyone immoderately strikes his neighbor, this will be ascribed to the vice of a anger. But if a person inordinately enriches himself by pilfering another’s goods, this will not be ascribed to any other vice except injustice. Hence it remains that there is a particular injustice over and above the other injustice that is a general vice. For a like reason there is another particular justice besides legal justice that is a general virtue.
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| Deinde cum dicit: univoca etc., ostendit quare huiusmodi particularis virtus etiam iustitia nominetur. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim assignat rationem huius ex convenientia particularis iustitiae cum legali. Secundo ostendit differentiam inter ea, ibi: sed haec quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod iniustitia particularis est univoca, id est conveniens in nomine cum iniustitia legali, et hoc ideo quia conveniunt in diffinitione secundum idem genus, in quantum scilicet utraque est in eo quod est ad alterum: licet iustitia legalis attendatur in ordine ad aliud quod est bonum commune, iustitia autem particularis ordinatur ad alterum quod pertinet ad aliquam personam privatam.
| 918. Then [B, 2] at “This justice has,” he shows why a particular virtue of this kind is also named justice. First [B, 2, a] he assigns the reason for this from the agreement of particular with legal justice. Next [B, 2, b], at “But particular justice,” he explains the difference between them. He says first that particular justice is univocal, that is, has a common name with legal justice. The reason is that they agree in definition according to the same genus inasmuch as both are concerned about what relates to another. However, legal justice is taken into account in relation to what is the common good, while particular justice is ordered to another as pertaining to a private person.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sed haec quidem etc., ostendit differentiam utriusque iniustitiae ex parte materiae. Et dicit quod iniustitia particularis est circa illa, secundum quae attenditur communicatio inter homines; sicut honor et pecunia et ea quae pertinent ad salutem vel dispendium corporis, et circa alia huiusmodi. Est etiam particularis iniustitia non solum circa res exteriores, sed etiam propter delectationem quae consequitur ex lucro, per quod scilicet aliquis accipit aliena ultra quam debeat. Sed iustitia legalis et iniustitia est universaliter circa totam materiam moralem, qualitercumque potest aliquis circa aliquid dici studiosus vel virtuosus.
| 919. Next [B, 2, b], at “But particular justice,” he explains the difference between justice and injustice on part of the matter. He says that particular justice regards hose things hat take into account social intercourse, like honor, money, whatever pertains to the safety or harm to the body, and so on. Likewise, particular justice is concerned not alone with external things but also with pleasure consequent on the profit by which a man takes his neighbor’s goods beyond what he ought. But legal justice and injustice treat all moral matters in general in whatsoever way a man may be said to be good or virtuous about a thing.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quoniam quidem igitur etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt, et ostendit quid restat dicendum. Et primo proponit hoc in generali. Secundo resumit in speciali, ibi, determinatum est utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod manifestum est ex praemissis, quod sunt plures iustitiae, scilicet legalis et aequalis; et quod praeter iustitiam legalem quae est tota virtus, est quaedam alia particularis iustitia. Sed quae et qualis sit, posterius determinandum est.
| 920. At “Obviously then” [C] he summarizes what has been said and shows what remains to be discussed. First [C, 1] he sets this forth in a general way; and then [C, 2] at “We have determined etc.,” he takes it up in a specific way. He says first that it is clear from the premises (913-919) that there is more than one justice, viz., legal justice and justice aiming at equality, and that over and above legal justice, as a general virtue, there is a particular justice. But we must determine later on (927-1077) the nature and characteristics of particular justice.
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| Deinde cum dicit determinatum est utique etc., ostendit in particulari quid sit dictum et quid restat dicendum. Et primo resumit id quod dictum est de divisione iusti et iniusti. Et dicit quod determinatum est supra quod iniustum dicitur illegale et inaequale, sive in plus sive in minus, sed iustum dicitur e contrario legale et aequale.
| 921. Then [C, 2], at “We have determined,” he shows in detail what has been treated and what remains to be discussed. First [C, 2, a] he resumes what was said about the distinction between justice and injustice. He affirms that we have determined that the unjust thing is called illegal and unequal either by excess or defect. On the contrary, the just thing is called legal and equal.
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| Secundo ibi: secundum quidem igitur etc., resumit quod secundum duplex iustum est duplex iustitia. Et dicit quod secundum iniustum illegale est quaedam iniustitia, de qua supra dictum est quod est omnis malitia. Et similiter secundum iustum legale est quaedam iustitia legalis quae est omnis virtus. Sed quia iniustum inaequale et iniustum illegale non sunt penitus idem, sed alterum se habet ad alterum ut pars ad totum, ita scilicet quod omne iniustum inaequale est illegale, sed non convertitur, et iterum omne iniustum quod se habet ut in plus est inaequale, sed non convertitur, quia est etiam quaedam iniustitia inaequalis in hoc quod est habere minus de malis; quia (inquam) unum iniustum est pars alterius iniusti et non sunt penitus idem, ideo similiter iniustitia quae dicitur inaequalitas non est penitus idem cum iniustitia illegali; sed comparatur ad ipsam ut pars ad totum; et similiter comparatur iustitia aequalitatis ad iustitiam legalem.
| 922. Next [C, 2, b], at “Therefore, in accord with,” he resumes what he has said, viz., that as there is a twofold just thing, so there is a twofold justice. He affirms that in accord with the illegally unjust thing there is a certain injustice, previously discussed (911, 919), which is a general vice. Likewise, in accord with the just corresponding to the law, there is a certain justice that is a general virtue. Now, the unjust thing consisting in a desire for inequality and the illegally unjust thing are not altogether the same, but one is related to the other as a part to the whole so that every unjust thing consisting in a desire for inequality is an illegally unjust thing, but not the reverse. Again, every thing that is excessive is unequal but not the reverse, since there is a certain illegal injustice in having too few burdens. Because (I say) one unjust thing is a part of the other unjust thing, and they are not entirely the same; in a similar way, therefore, the injustice called inequality is not entirely the same as illegal injustice but is compared to it as a part to the whole. Also the justice aiming at equality is compared to legal justice in a similar manner.
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| Tertio ibi, itaque de ea etc., ostendit de qua harum sit agendum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo dicit quod agendum est infra de iustitia particulari et similiter de iusto et iniusto particulariter dicto.
| 923. Last [C, 2, c], at “We must then,” he shows which of these things we must discuss. On this point he does three things. First [c, i] he says that we must treat particular justice after this (927-1077), and similarly the just and the unjust thing particularly so called.
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| Secundo ibi: secundum quidem igitur etc., ostendit quod non est hic agendum de iustitia legali. Et dicit quod dimittenda est ad praesens iustitia legalis quae ordinatur secundum totam virtutem, in quantum scilicet ad eam pertinet usus totius virtutis ad alium. Et similiter dimittenda est iniustitia ei opposita ad quam pertinet usus totius malitiae. Manifestum est enim quomodo debeat determinari id quod dicitur iustum vel iniustum, secundum huiusmodi iustitiam vel iniustitiam, quia ea sunt quae determinantur lege. Maior enim pars legalium praeceptorum praecipiuntur secundum quod convenit toti virtuti, in quantum scilicet lex praecipit vivere secundum unamquamque virtutem, et prohibet vivere secundum quamcumque malitiam. Sunt vero quaedam lege determinata quae non pertinent directe ad usum alicuius virtutis, sed ad aliquam dispositionem exteriorum bonorum.
| 924. Then [c, ii], at “Justice that corresponds,” he explains that here we are not going to treat legal justice. He affirms that legal justice-which conforms to all of virtue inasmuch as the use of the whole of virtue referring to our neighbor pertains to it-is to be passed over for the present. Likewise, the opposite injustice (inasmuch as the use of the whole of vice pertains to it) is to be passed over. It is clear how what is just and unjust ought to be determined according to justice and injustice of this kind, because they are the precepts as laid down by the law. The greater part of legal prescriptions are enjoined in agreement with the whole of virtue inasmuch as the law commands us to live according to every virtue and forbids us to live according to any vice. However, there are certain determinations of the law that do not belong directly to the exercise of any virtue but to some disposition of external goods.
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| Tertio ibi: factiva autem totius etc., movet quandam dubitationem. Manifestum est enim quod illa quae sunt lege posita sunt factiva totius virtutis secundum disciplinam qua instruitur homo in ordine ad bonum commune. Est autem quaedam alia disciplina secundum quam instruitur homo ad actus virtutum secundum quod competit singulariter sibi in respectu scilicet ad proprium bonum, in quantum per hoc homo efficitur bonus in seipso. Potest ergo esse dubitatio, utrum huiusmodi disciplina pertineat ad politicam, vel ad aliquam aliam scientiam.
| 925. Last [c, iii], at “However, positive law,” he raises a doubt. It is evident that positive laws are productive of virtue in general by the instruction given a man in reference to the common good. But there is another kind of instruction by which a man is trained in virtuous actions as applicable to him individually, i.e., to his proper good inasmuch as in this way a man becomes virtuous in himself. Therefore, there can be a doubt whether instruction of this kind should belong to political science or to so-me other science.
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| Et hoc dicit, posterius esse determinandum, scilicet in libro politicae. In tertio enim libro politicae ostenditur quod non est idem esse simpliciter virum bonum et esse civem bonum, secundum quamcumque politiam. Sunt enim quaedam politiae, non rectae, secundum quas aliquis potest esse civis bonus, qui non est vir bonus; sed secundum optimam politiam non est aliquis civis bonus qui non est vir bonus.
| 926. He says that this question must be settled afterwards in the work on Politics. It is proved in the third book of the Politics (Ch. 4, 1276 b 16-1277 b 33; St. Th. Lect. 3, 365-377) that to be a good man simply and to be a good citizen are not the same in every state. There are some states not worthy of honor in which a person can be a good citizen yet not be a good man. Bt in the most worthy state no one is a good citizen who is not a good man.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Eius autem quae secundum partem et cetera. Postquam philosophus distinxit iustitiam particularem a iustitia legali, hic incipit de iustitia particulari determinare, praetermissa legali. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima determinat de iustitia particulari in communi per comparationem ad proprium obiectum; in secunda applicando ad subiectum, ibi: quia autem est iniustum facientem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo dividit iustitiam particularem. Secundo ostendit qualiter in ea accipiatur medium, ibi, quia autem et iniustus inaequalis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit unam speciem particularis iustitiae. Et dicit, quod una species eius, et similiter iusti, quod secundum ipsam dicitur, est illa, quae consistit in distributionibus aliquorum communium, quae sunt dividenda inter eos qui communicant civili communicatione: sive sit honor, sive sit pecunia, vel quicquid aliud ad bona exteriora pertinens, vel etiam ad mala; sicut labor, expensae et similia. Et quod hoc pertineat ad particularem iustitiam, probat, quia in talibus contingit accipere (unius ad alterum) aequalitatem vel inaequalitatem unius ad alterum, quae pertinent ad iustitiam vel iniustitiam particularem, ut supra dictum est.
| 927. After the Philosopher has differentiated particular justice from legal justice, he now begins to investigate particular justice without treating legal justice. He divides the investigation into two parts. In the first part [I] he considers particular justice in a general way by comparison with its proper object, and in the second part [Lect. 11], at “Since someone etc.” (B. 1134 a 16), he considers it in its application to the subject. In regard to the first part, he does two things. Initially [A] he makes a division of particular justice. Next [B], at “Since the unjust person etc.,” he explains how a mean may be taken in this virtue. He discusses the initial point from three aspects. First [A’] he indicates a species of particular justice. He says that one species—the same holds for the unjust thing corresponding to it—consists in the distribution of certain common goods (either honor or money or any other thing belonging to external goods or even to external evils, like labor, expenses and so on) that are to be apportioned among people who share in social community. He proves that this should belong to particular justice because in matters of this kind, equality and inequality—which belong to particular justice and injustice, as was stated before (922).Of one person to another are taken into consideration.
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| Secundo ibi: una autem etc., ponit secundam speciem particularis iustitiae. Et dicit, quod una alia species particularis iustitiae est, quae constituit rectitudinem iustitiae in commutationibus, secundum quas transfertur aliquid ab uno in alterum; sicut prima species iustitiae attendebatur secundum quod transfertur aliquid a communi ad singulos.
| 928. Next [B’], at “Another species,” he gives a second kind of particular justice. He says that another species establishes a measure of justice in transactions, by which a thing is transferred from one person to another -in the first species the transfer of a thing from the community to the individual was considered.
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| Tertio ibi: huius autem partes etc., subdividit iustitiam commutativam secundum differentiam commutationum. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo enim dicit, quod iustitiae commutativae sunt duae partes, eo quod duo sunt genera commutationum. Quaedam enim sunt voluntariae, quaedam involuntariae. Dicuntur autem voluntariae, propter hoc, quod principium commutationis est voluntarium ex utraque parte; sicut patet in venditione et emptione, quibus unus transfert dominium rei suae in alterum propter pretium inde acceptum. Et in mutatione, secundum quam aliquis rem suam tradit alteri ut aequale recipiat; et in fideiussione, per quam aliquis voluntarie se constituit debitorem pro alio. Et in usu, quo aliquis usum rei suae alteri gratis concedit reservato sibi dominio rei. Et in depositione, per quam aliquis deponit rem suam apud alium in custodiam. Et in conductione, per quam aliquis usum rei alienae accipit pro pretio.
| 929. Last [C’], at “There sire two parts,” he subdivides commutative justice according to the different kinds of transactions, making a twofold division. He says first [1] that there are two parts of commutative justice because there are two kinds of transactions. Some are voluntary, others involuntary. The voluntary are so-called because the principle of transaction is voluntary in both parties as is evident in selling and buying, by which one man transfers the dominion over his own property to another as compensation for a price received; in barter, by which someone gives what is his to another for something of equal value; in bail, by which a person voluntarily appoints himself a debtor for another; in a loan, by which a man grants the use of his property to another without recompense but reserves ownership of the thing to himself; in a deposit, by which one commits something of his to the custody of another; in rent, by which a person accepts the use of something belonging to another for a price.
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| Secundo ibi, involuntariarum autem etc., subdividit alterum membrum commutationum. Et dicit, quod involuntariarum commutationum quaedam sunt occultae, sicut furtum, quo aliquis accipit rem alterius eo invito; moechia, idest adulterium, quo aliquis occulte accedit ad uxorem alterius. Veneficium, quando scilicet aliquis occulte alteri venenum procurat, vel ad occidendum, vel ad laedendum qualitercumque, unde et magi venefici dicuntur, inquantum per aliqua maleficia occulte hominum nocumenta procurant; paragogia, idest derivatio vel deductio; puta cum aliquis occulte derivat aquam alterius ad alium locum; servi seductio, cum scilicet aliquis servum alterius seducit, ut a domino suo fugiat. Dolosa occisio, quae scilicet fit per vulnera fraudulenter illata. Falsum testimonium, quo scilicet aliquis veritatem occultat mendacio. Quaedam vero sunt involuntariae commutationes, quae fiunt per violentiam manifestam; sive aliquis inferat violentiam in personam verberando vel ligando vel occidendo; sive etiam in res, puta rapiendo bona, vel orbando parentes per occisionem filiorum, sive etiam inferatur violentia in famam, quod fit accusando, et iniurias sive contumelias irrogando.
| 930. Then [2], at “Some kinds of involuntary,” he subdivides the other division of transactions, saying that some involuntary transactions are occult: like theft by which one takes a thing belonging to another who is unwilling; adultery, by which a man secretly approaches the wife of another for sexual intercourse, poisoning, which a person poison another with intent either to kill or injure in some way. Also they are especially called poisoners who by some sorcery bring about murder or harm. Paragogia is a derivation or a leading away, for example the occult diversion of a stream belonging to one person to the property of another. The enticement of a slave takes place when someone induces another’s slave to flee from his master. Assassination is that slaying which happens from wounds inflicted by trickery. Testimony is false in which a person conceals the truth by lying. Other transactions are involuntary and done by manifest violence. Thus a man may use violence either upon a person by beating, fettering, murdering, or upon things by robbing another of his goods, by despoiling parents of their children through murder. Likewise, a man may use violence through infamy by using reproachful words, or through injury by inflicting outrage.
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| Est autem considerandum quod voluntarium et involuntarium in commutationibus diversificat iustitiae speciem; quia in commutationibus voluntariis fit subtractio solius rei, quam oporteat recompensari secundum aequalitatem iustitiae. In commutationibus autem involuntariis fit etiam quaedam iniuria. Unde raptor non solum compellitur reddere rem quam rapuit, sed etiam ultra punitur propter iniuriam quam intulit. Et quia involuntarium est duplex: scilicet per violentiam et per ignorantiam, ut in tertio dictum est, ideo involuntarias commutationes dividit in occultas, quasi per ignorantiam factas, et in eas quae manifeste per violentiam fiunt.
| 931. We must consider that the voluntary and involuntary in transactions make a difference in the species of justice because voluntary transactions cause the subtraction of only a thing which must be repaid according to the equality of justice. But involuntary transactions cause a certain injury. Hence the robber is forced not only to return the thing plundered but to undergo punishment because of the affront inflicted. Since the involuntary is twofold, viz., arising from force and from ignorance, he divides involuntary transactions into those which are occult, as it were through ignorance, and those that are done openly through violence.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quia autem et iniustus etc., ostendit qualiter medium in praedictis accipiatur. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo iustum sit medium. Secundo, quomodo iustitia sit medium, ibi, determinatis autem his et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo determinetur iustum in medio existens secundum utramque iustitiam. Secundo excludit errorem, ibi, videtur autem aliquibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quomodo accipiatur iustum in medio, secundum iustitiam distributivam; secundo quomodo accipiatur secundum iustitiam commutativam, ibi, reliqua autem una et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo probat, quod medium iustitiae distributivae accipiatur secundum quamdam proportionalitatem. Secundo ostendit qualis sit illa proportionalitas, ibi: est ergo iustum proportionale et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum ex ipsa ratione iustitiae. Secundo ex ratione dignitatis, ibi, adhuc ex eo et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit ex ipsa ratione iustitiae, quod iustum sit quoddam medium. Secundo ostendit quod sit medium, secundum aliquam proportionalitatem, ibi, est autem aequale et cetera.
| 932. Next [B], at “Since the unjust person,” he shows how a mean is understood in these matters. He discusses this point from two aspects. First [13, A’] he explains how the just thing is a mean; and then [Lect. 10], at “From these discussions etc.” (B. 1133 b 30), how justice is a mean. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [A’, 1 ] he shows in what way the just thing, consisting in a mean according to either justice, may be determined. Next [Lect. 8], at “Some philosophers seem to think etc.” (B. 1132 b 21), he rejects an error. He further discusses the first point in two stages. First [1, a] he explains how the just thing may be taken as a mean according to distributive justice; and second (Lect. 6], at “There remains another etc.” (B. 1131 b 25), according to commutative justice. He considers the first point in two ways. First [a, i] he proves that the mean of distributive should be taken according to a certain relationship of proportions. Next [Lect. 5],at “Therefore the just thing etc.” (B. 1131 a 30), he shows what the nature of that relationship of proportions is. On the initial point he does two things. First [i, x] he proves the proposition from the very concept of justice; and then [ i, y ], at “Moreover, this is clear etc.,” from the concept of merit. He treats the first point under two headings. First [x, aa] he shows from the very notion of justice that the just thing is a certain mean. Second [x, bb], at “However, the equal etc.,” he explains that the mean is according to a certain relationship of proportions.
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| Dicit ergo primo, quod sicut supradictum est, iniustus est inaequalis, et iniustum est inaequale, et secundum plus et secundum minus. In quibuscumque autem est plus et minus, ibi oportet accipere aequale. Aequale enim est medium inter plus et minus. Unde in quibuscumque est invenire aequalitatem, ibi est invenire medium. Patet ergo quod, si iniustum est quiddam inaequale, quod iustum sit quiddam aequale, et hoc etiam absque omni ratione probante est omnibus manifestum, quod scilicet iustum est quoddam aequale. Quia ergo aequale est medium inter plus et minus, ut dictum est: consequens est, quod iustum sit quoddam medium.
| 913. He says first that, as was said previously (898, 921), the unjust man is one who desires an inequality of good and evil, and the unjust thing is that which consists in an inequality, and concerns both too much and too little. But wherever there is more and less, there the equal must be found, for the equal is the mean between the greater and the less. Hence wherever we find equality, there we find a mean. It is clear then that the unjust thing is a kind of unequal thing. That the just thing is a kind of equal thing is obvious to everyone without any proof. Therefore, since the equal is a mean between more and less, as has been shown (310, 896, 898), it follows that the just thing is a kind of mean.
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| Deinde cum dicit: est autem aequale etc., ostendit quod iustum sit medium, secundum aliquam proportionalitatem. Et ad hoc probandum assumit, quod aequale ad minus consistit in duobus, inter quae consideratur aequalitas. Cum ergo iustum sit et medium et aequale, oportet quidem quod inquantum est iustum, sit ad aliquid, idest per respectum ad alterum, ut ex supra dictis patet; in quantum autem est aequale, sit in quibusdam rebus, secundum quas scilicet attenditur aequalitas inter duas personas. Et sic patet quod si consideremus iustum inquantum est medium, sic est medium inter duo, quae sunt plus et minus; inquantum est autem aequale, oportet quod sit duarum rerum: sed inquantum est iustum, oportet quod sit aliquorum ad aliquos alios, quia iustitia ad alterum est. Plus autem et minus respicit iustitia secundum quod est medium, velut quaedam extrinseca, sed duas res et duas personas respicit quasi intrinseca, in quibus scilicet constituitur iustitia. Sic ergo patet, quod necesse est iustum ad minus in quatuor consistere: duo enim sunt homines, quibus observatur iustitia, et duae sunt res in quibus eis iustitia fit.
| 934. At “However, the equal” [x, bb] he explains that the just thing is a mean according to a certain relationship of proportions. To prove this he takes for granted that the equal consists in at least two things between which an equality is considered. Therefore, since the just thing is both a mean and an equal, inasmuch as it is just, it is necessarily a relation to something, i.e., with respect to another, as is evident from what has been indicated (922); but inasmuch as it is an equal it pertains to certain matters in which equality between two persons is taken into account. Thus it is evident that if we consider the just thing precisely as a mean, it will then be a mean between two things that are more and less. But precisely as the just thing is an equal, it must be between two things (as a just thing, of course, it must concern some matters in relation to other persons, because justice regards another person). However, justice insofar as it is a mean, an extrinsic thing, considers more or less; but as something intrinsic it considers two things and two persons in which justice is established. So it is clear that what is just, necessarily consists in at least four objects, viz., two persons by whom justice is observed and two things about which justice is done.
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| Et oportet ad rationem iustitiae, quod sit eadem aequalitas personarum quibus fit iustitia et rerum in quibus fit: ut scilicet sicut se habent res ad invicem, ita et personae: alioquin non habebunt aequalia sibi. Sed ex hoc fiunt pugnae et accusationes quasi sit iustitia praetermissa; quia vel aequales non recipiunt aequalia in distributione bonorum communium, vel non aequalibus dantur aequalia; puta si inaequaliter laborantibus dantur aequalia stipendia vel aequaliter laborantibus dentur inaequalia. Sic igitur patet quod medium distributivae iustitiae accipitur secundum proportionalitatem quandam.
| 935. In the concept of justice there must be the same equality between persons who practice justice and between things about which justice is done, so that as the things are related to one another, so are the persons. Otherwise they will not have shares proportional to themselves. But, by reason of this quarrels and complaints arise as if justice had been neglected because, either persons who are equal do not receive equal shares, for example, if laborers are paid wages for doing an unequal amount of work, or are paid unequal wages for doing an equal amount of work. So then it is evident that the mean of distributive justice is taken according to a certain relationship of proportions.
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| Deinde cum dicit: adhuc ex eo etc., ostendit idem secundum rationem dignitatis. Et dicit quod etiam ex ratione dignitatis manifestum est quod iustum consistit in quadam proportionalitate. Sic enim aliquid dicitur esse iustum in distributionibus in quantum unicuique datur secundum dignitatem, id est prout cuique dignum est dari, in quo designatur proportionalitas quaedam, ut scilicet ita hoc sit dignum uni sicut aliud est dignum alteri.
| 936. Then [i, y], at “Moreover, this is,” he shows that it is obvious also by reason of merit that the just thing consists in a certain relationship of fore they think it proper that equal proportions. In this way a thing is said to be just in distributions inasmuch as allotment is made according to merit as each is worthy to receive. A certain relationship of proportions is designated by this—that as one person is deserving of one thing, so another is deserving of another thing.
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| Non tamen dignitatem distributionis omnes secundum idem attendunt; sed in democratica politia, in qua scilicet plebs dominatur, attenditur dignitas secundum libertatem, quia enim plebei sunt aequales aliis in libertate, ideo reputant dignum esse ut aequaliter eis principentur; sed in oligarchica politia, in qua aliqui pauci principantur, mensuratur dignitas secundum divitias vel secundum nobilitatem generis, ut scilicet illi qui sunt excellentiores genere vel divitiis plus habeant de bonis communibus; sed in politia aristocratica in qua aliqui principantur propter virtutem, mensuratur dignitas secundum virtutem; ut scilicet ille plus habeat qui plus abundat in virtute. Et sic patet quod medium iustitiae distributivae accipitur secundum proportionalitatem.
| 937. However, all do not judge merit in distribution in agreement with the same norm. In a democratic state where everyone governs, they judge merit according to a condition of freedom. Because the common people are the equal of others in freedom, therefore they think it proper that equal distribution be made to them. In an oligarchy where some few rule, they measure merit according to a man’s riches or according to nobility of birth, so that men who are more eminent by birth or riches should have more of the common goods. In an aristocracy where certain men govern because of their virtue, they measure merit according to a state of virtue, so that a man should have more who practices virtue more perfectly. Thus it is clear that the mean of distributive justice is understood according to a relationship of proportions.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Est ergo iustum proportionale et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod medium iustitiae distributivae accipitur secundum proportionalitatem quandam, hic ostendit secundum quam proportionalitatem accipiatur et quomodo. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo iustum accipiatur secundum quamdam proportionalitatem. Secundo ostendit quomodo iniustum praeter illam proportionalitatem accipiatur, ibi, iustum quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo praemittit quaedam de proportionalitate in communi. Secundo ostendit quomodo iustum distributivum in proportionalitate quadam consistit, ibi, est autem et iustum in quatuor et cetera. Tertio ostendit qualis sit proportionalitas secundum quam attenditur iustum in distributiva iustitia, ibi: vocant autem talem et cetera. Circa primum praemittit duo. Quorum primum, est quod non inconvenienter iustum dicitur esse secundum proportionalitatem; quia proportionalitas non solum invenitur in numero unitatum qui est numerus simpliciter, et hic vocatur numerus monadicus; sed universaliter invenitur proportionalitas in quibuscumque invenitur numerus.
| 938. After the Philosopher has shown that the mean of distributive justice is taken according to proportionality, he now shows according to what proportionality and in what way it is understood. He considers this point in a twofold manner. First [A] he explains in what way the just thing should be taken according to a certain proportionality. Second [B], at “This just thing etc.,” he shows how the unjust thing is outside that proportionality. He discusses the initial point under three aspects. First [A, 1] he presents in advance some general comments about proportionality. Then [A, 2], at “Like proportionality etc.,” he explains how the just thing consists in a certain proportionality. Last [A, 3], at “Mathematicians call etc.,” he shows the nature of proportionality by which a thing is judged just in distributive justice. On the first point he premises two comments. The first [1, a] is that the just thing is fittingly said to be according to proportionality, because proportionality is found not only in the enumeration of units (which is number simply taken and here called abstract number), but the quality of being proportionate is met with wherever number is found.
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| Et hoc ideo quia proportionalitas nihil est aliud quam aequalitas proportionis, cum scilicet aequalem proportionem habet hoc ad hoc, et illud ad illud. Proportio autem nihil est aliud quam habitudo unius quantitatis ad aliam. Quantitas autem habet rationem mensurae: quae primo quidem invenitur in unitate numerali, et exinde derivatur ad omne genus quantitatis, ut patet in X metaphysicae; et ideo numerus primo quidem invenitur in numero unitatum: et exinde derivatur ad omne aliud quantitatis genus quod secundum rationem numeri mensuratur.
| 939. This is so because proportionality is simply geometrical equality, i.e. this to this and that to that contains the proportion of equality. Proportion is only a relation of one quantity to another. But quantity has the nature of a measure. It is found in numerical unity and is transferred from there to every kind of quantity, as the tenth book of the Metaphysics indicates (Ch. 1, 1052 b 20 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 2, 1938). Therefore, number primarily is found in the enumeration of units, and thence is attributed to every genus of quantity which is measured according to the idea of number.
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| Secundum ponit ibi, et in quatuor minimis et cetera. Et dicit quod omnis proportionalitas ad minus consistit in quatuor. Est enim duplex proportionalitas: una quidem disiuncta et alia continua. Disiuncta quidem proportionalitas est aequalitas duarum proportionum non convenientium in aliquo termino. Cum ergo omnis proportio sit inter duo, manifestum est quod proportionalitas disiuncta in quatuor terminis consistit; ut si dicam: sicut se habet sex ad tria, ita se habet decem ad quinque; utrobique enim est dupla proportio. Continua autem proportionalitas est aequalitas duarum proportionum convenientium in uno termino, puta si dicam: sicut se habet octo ad quatuor, ita quatuor ad duo; utrobique enim est dupla proportio. In hac igitur continua proportionalitate sunt quodammodo quatuor termini; inquantum scilicet utimur uno termino ut duobus, unum terminum bis dicendo, scilicet in utraque proportione, ut si dicam: quae est proportio a ad b, puta octo ad quatuor, eadem est proportio b ad c, id est quatuor ad duo; sic igitur b dicitur bis; unde, quamvis b sit unum subiecto; quia tamen accipitur ut duo, erunt quatuor proportionata.
| 940. He makes the second comment at “Proportionality consists” [1, b], saying that every proportionality consists of four parts at least. It has a twofold division, one of which is a disjunctive proportionality and the other a continuous proportionality. The disjunctive proportionality is an equality of two proportions not alike in any term. Therefore, when any proportion exists between the two, it is evident that the disjunctive proportionality consists of four terms, as when I say: as six is to three as ten is to five. There is a double proportion on both sides. The continuous proportionality is an equality of two proportions alike in one term, for instance, if I say: as eight is to four so four is to two. There is a double proportion on both sides. Therefore in this continuous proportionality there are in some measure four terms inasmuch as we use one term in two different aspects, declaring it twice, i.e., in either proportion as when I say: the proportion of A to B (or eight to four) is the same as the proportion B to C (or four to two). There is a double proportion from both sides. In this way B is used twice. Hence, although B is one in subject, nevertheless, because it is taken in two different aspects there will be four proportioned terms.
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| Deinde cum dicit: est autem et iustum etc., ostendit quomodo secundum proportionalitatem medium distributivae iustitiae accipiatur. Et dicit quod sicut proportionalitas, ita et iustum ad minus in quatuor invenitur, in quibus attenditur eadem proportio; quia scilicet secundum eamdem proportionem dividuntur res quae distribuuntur et personae quibus distribuuntur. Sit ergo a unus terminus, puta duae librae: b autem sit una libra, g autem sit una persona, puta sortes qui duobus diebus laboravit. D autem sit Plato qui uno die laboravit. Sicut ergo se habet a ad b, ita se habet g ad d, quia utrobique invenitur dupla proportio; ergo et permutatim, sicut a se habet ad g, ita se habet b ad d, quaecumque enim sunt ad invicem proportionalia, etiam permutatim proportionalia sunt; sicut in praedicto exemplo: sicut se habet decem ad quinque, ita octo ad quatuor. Ergo commutatim, sicut se habet decem ad octo, ita se habet quinque ad quatuor: utrobique est sesquiquarta proportio; sic ergo permutatim verum erit dicere quod, sicut se habet a ad g, idest duae librae ad eum qui duobus diebus laboravit, ita b ad d, idest una libra ad eum qui uno die laboravit.
| 941. Then [A, 2], at “Like proportionality” he shows how the mean of distributive justice is taken according to proportionality. He says that, like proportionality, the just thing is found in four terms in which the same proportion is observed, because the things that are distributed and the persons to whom distribution is made are divided according to the same proportion. Therefore, let A be one term, for example, two pounds, and B one pound. But let G be one person, for example, Socrates who has worked two days, and D, Plato, who has worked one day. Therefore, as A is to B so G is to D, because a double proportion is found on the one side and the other. Hence by alternation, as A is to G, so B is to D. Whatever things are proportionable one to another are proportionable by alternation, as is evident in the preceding example (940), for instance, as ten is to five so eight is to four. Therefore, by alternation, as ten is to eight, so five is to four, for there is a ratio of five to four on one side and the other. In this way then, by alternation, it will be true to say that as A is to G, i.e., two pounds to the man who worked two days, so B is to D, i.e., one pound to the man who worked a day.
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| Est etiam in talibus considerandum quod in his quae sic sunt proportionalia, quae est proportio unius ad alterum, eadem est proportio totius ad totum. Puta, si quae est proportio decem ad octo, eadem est proportio quinque ad quatuor, sequitur ulterius quod quae est proportio decem ad octo et quinque ad quatuor, eadem etiam sit proportio decem et quinque simul acceptorum quae sunt quindecim, ad octo et quatuor simul accepta, quae sunt duodecim: quia hic etiam est sesquiquarta proportio.
| 942. In such matters we must also consider that in the things proportionable in this way, the ratio of one to the other is the ratio of the whole to the whole. For example, if the ratio ten to eight is the same as five to four, it follows further that the ratio ten to eight and five to four will be the same ratio as ten and five taken together’ i.e., fifteen to eight and four taken together, i.e., twelve. The reason is that here we have also the ratio of five to four. How does this happen? Because fifteen contains twelve and its fourth part, i.e., three.
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| Unde et in proposito sequitur quod, si sicut se habet ista res ad istam personam, ita se habet illa ad aliam personam; quod etiam ita se habet totum ad totum; idest utraque res simul accepta ad utramque personam simul acceptam: et hoc est quod distributio coniungit. Et si ita aliquis distribuendo res hominibus coniungat, iuste facit. Patet ergo quod coniunctio a cum g, idest rei duplae cum persona duplo digniore et b cum d, idest dimidii cum dimidio, est iustum distributivum et tale iustum est medium. Iniustum autem est quod est praeter hanc proportionalitatem. Proportionale enim est medium inter excessum et defectum; quia proportionalitas est aequalitas proportionis, ut dictum est. Et sic iustum, cum sit quoddam proportionale, est medium.
| 943. In the proposition it follows that, if as this thing is to this person, so that thing is to that person, then also the whole will be to the whole in the same way, i.e., both things taken together will be to both persons taken together. This is as distribution connects them. If in distribution man unites the things to the persons in this way, he acts justly. It is plain then that the union of A with G, i.e., of a thing doubled with a person doubly more deserving, and of B with D, i.e., of a half thing with a person deserving only half is the just thing in distribution and such a just thing is a mean. But the unjust thing is outside this proportionality. The proportional is a mean between excess and defect because the proportionality is an equality of proportion, as has been remarked (939). So the just thing is a mean since it is a certain proportional.
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| Deinde cum dicit: vocant autem talem etc., ostendit qualis sit proportionalitas secundum quam hoc iustum accipitur. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo dicit quod praedicta proportionalitas quae attenditur secundum aequalitatem proportionum, a mathematicis vocatur geometrica: in qua scilicet accidit quod ita se habet totum ad totum sicut altera partium ad aliam, ut in praemissis dictum est. Non autem hoc accidit in proportionalitate arithmetica, de qua infra dicetur.
| 944. At “Mathematicians call” [A, 3] he explains the nature of proportionality according to which this just thing is understood. On this point he does two things. First 13, a] he says that the above-mentioned proportionality, which is considered according to the equality of proportion, is called geometrical by mathematicians. In this it happens that as the whole is to the whole so one part is to another, as we have pointed out in previous discussions (939-940). But this does not take place in arithmetical proportionality, which we will treat later (950).
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| Secundo ibi: est autem non continua etc., dicit quod ista proportionalitas quae attenditur in iustitia distributiva non potest esse continua; quia ex una parte sunt res et ex alia parte sunt personae. Et ita non potest accipi aliquid quasi terminus communis, quae sit persona cui datur et res quae datur.
| 945. Next [3, b], at “But this” he says that this proportionality, which is observed in distributive justice, cannot be continuous because on one side are the things and on the other the persons. So it is not possible to take for a common term a person to whom distribution is made and the thing which is distributed.
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| Deinde cum dicit: iustum quidem igitur etc., agit de iniusto in distributionibus. Et dicit quod, quia iustum est proportionale, sequitur quod iniustum sit praeter proportionale. Quod quidem fit, vel in plus vel in minus quam exigat aequalitas proportionis, ut patet in ipsis operibus iustae vel iniustae distributionis. Ille enim qui iniustum facit circa bona, plus accipit sibi. Qui autem iniusta patitur, minus habet. In malis autem est e converso, quia minus malum habet rationem boni per comparationem ad maius malum: minus enim malum est magis eligibile, quam maius malum. Unumquodque autem eligitur sub ratione boni. Et ideo illud quod magis eligitur habet rationem maioris boni. Sic igitur una species iustitiae est quae dicta est.
| 946. Then [B], at “This just thing,” he considers what is unjust in distributions. He says that, since the just thing is proportionable, it follows that the unjust thing is outside the proportionable. This happens either by reason of more or less than the equality of proportion demands, as is evident in the very operations of just and unjust distribution. That man acts unjustly who accepts for himself too many goods, but he suffers unjustly who has too few. The reverse is true in regard to evils. Since a lesser evil has the aspect of good by comparison with a greater evil, the lesser evil is more to be preferred than the greater evil. Everything is chosen under the aspect of good, and for this reason the thing which has the aspect of greater good is more to be preferred. So then this is one species of justice that has been discussed.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Reliqua autem (una) directivum et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quomodo accipiatur medium in iustitia distributiva, hic ostendit quomodo accipiatur medium in iustitia commutativa. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit esse quamdam speciem iustitiae praeter distributivam. Secundo ostendit differentiam huius ad illam, ibi, hoc autem iustum et cetera. Tertio ostendit qualiter accipiatur medium in hac iustitiae specie, ibi, et quemadmodum linea et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod praeter praedictam speciem iustitiae quae consistit in distributionibus, relinquitur una quae est directiva in commutationibus, tam voluntariis quam involuntariis.
| 947. After the Philosopher has shown how the mean should be taken in distributive justice, he now explains in what way the mean should be understood in commutative justice. He discusses this point under three aspects. First [A] he shows there is a species of justice in addition to distributive. Then [B], at “This differs etc.,” he says this differs from the other justice. Third [Lect. 7], at “It is as though etc.” (B. 1132 a 25), he shows how a mean should be understood in this kind of justice. He says first that in addition to the preceding species of justice which exists in distributions, there remains one that is directive of transactions both voluntary and involuntary.
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| Deinde cum dicit: hoc autem iustum etc., ostendit differentiam huius speciei ad praemissam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit, dicens quod istud iustum quod consistit in commutationibus, est alterius speciei a supradicto iusto, quod consistit in distributionibus.
| 948. Then [B], at “This differs,” he shows the difference between this species and the preceding. He treats this point under two headings. First [ B, 1] he sets forth his proposition, saying that the just thing existing in transactions belongs to another species than distributive justice.
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| Secundo ibi, distributivum quidem enim etc., assignat differentiam. Et primo resumit quid pertineat ad distributivam iustitiam. Secundo ostendit quid pertineat ad iustitiam commutativam, ibi, in commutationibus autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod iustum supradictum semper est distributivum communium bonorum secundum supradictam proportionalitatem, scilicet geometricam, quae attenditur secundum aequalitatem proportionis. Et hoc manifestat; quia si communes pecuniae civitatis, vel aliquorum hominum debeant distribui in singulos, hoc erit ita faciendum ut singulis detur aliquid de communi, secundum illam proportionem secundum quam ipsi intulerunt in commune; puta in negotiationibus, quantum aliquis plus posuit in societatem, tanto maiorem partem accipit. Et in civitatibus, quanto aliquis plus servivit communitati, tanto plus accipit de bonis communibus. Et sicut iustum distributivum consistit in hac proportionalitate, ita iniustum oppositum consistit in hoc quod praetermittitur huiusmodi proportionabilitas.
| 949. Second [B, 2], at “What is just,” he presents the difference. First [2, a] he reviews something relevant to distributive justice. Then [2, b], at “However, in transactions etc.,” he shows what pertains to commutative justice. He says first that the justice mentioned before always directs the distribution of common goods in conformity with proportionality, i.e., the geometrical which is observed in the equality of proportion. This is clear because if wealth belonging to the city or to certain men must be distributed to individuals, the distribution will be made in such a way that each may receive from the community in that ratio according to which he contributed to the community. We suppose in business ventures that the more a man invests in a company the greater is his return. As the just thing directing distributions consists in this proportionality, so the opposite unjust thing consists in disregarding proportionality of this kind.
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| Deinde cum dicit: in commutationibus autem etc., ostendit quid pertineat ad iustitiam commutativam. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quid pertineat ad iustitiam commutativam. Secundo manifestat per exemplum, ibi, etenim cum hic quidem vulneretur et cetera. Tertio infert quaedam corollaria ex dictis, ibi, quare pluris quidem et minoris et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod iustum quod consistit in commutationibus, in aliquo quidem convenit cum iusto distributivo, quod scilicet iustum est aequale, et iniustum inaequale. Sed in hoc differunt: quod aequale in iustitia commutativa non attenditur secundum proportionalitatem illam, scilicet geometricam, quae attendebatur in distributivo iusto; sed magis secundum arithmeticam, quae scilicet attenditur secundum aequalitatem quantitatis, et non secundum aequalitatem proportionis sicut geometrica. Sex enim secundum arithmeticam proportionalitatem, medium est inter octo et quatuor. Exceditur enim ab uno, et excedit alterum duobus: sed non est proportio eadem utrobique. Nam sex se habet ad quatuor in sesquialtera proportione. Octo autem ad sex in sesquitertia. E contrario vero secundum geometricam proportionalitatem, medium exceditur et excedit secundum eamdem proportionem sed non secundum eamdem quantitatem: sic enim sex est medium inter novem et quatuor. Utrobique enim invenitur sesquialtera proportio, sed non eadem quantitas. Novem enim excedunt sex in tribus, sex vero quatuor in duobus.
| 950. At “However, in transactions” [2, b], he shows what pertains to commutative justice. He gives a threefold consideration of this notion. First [b, i ] he explains a f act relative to commutative justice. Next [b, ii], at “If one of two contestants etc.,” he clarifies this by an example. Third [b, iii], at “Therefore, that which etc.,” he deduces some corollaries from the premises. He says first that the Just thing that exists in transactions agrees somewhat with the just thing directing distributions in this-that the just thing is equal, and the unjust thing, unequal. But they differ in the fact that the equal in commutative justice is not observed according to that proportionality, viz., geometrical, which was observed in distributive justice, but according to arithmetical proportionality which is observed according to equality of quantity, and not according to equality of proportion as in geometry. By arithmetical proportionality six is a mean between eight and four, because it is in excess of the one and exceeds the other by two. But there is not the same proportion on the one side and the other, for six is to four in a ratio of three to two while eight is to six in a ratio of four to three. On the contrary by geometrical proportionality the mean is exceeded and exceeds according to the same proportion but not according to the same quantity. In this way six is a mean between nine and four, since from both sides there is a three to two ratio. But there is not the same quantity, for nine exceeds six by three and six exceeds four by two.
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| Quod ergo in commutativa iustitia attendatur aequale secundum arithmeticam proportionem manifestat per hoc, quod non consideratur ibi diversa proportio personarum. Nihil enim differt, quantum ad iustitiam commutativam, si aliquis bonus privavit per furtum vel rapinam aliquem malum re sua, vel e converso. Neque etiam differt si bonus vel malus commisit adulterium. Sed lex attendit solum ad differentiam nocumenti; ut scilicet qui plus nocuit plus recompenset, cuiuscumque conditionis sit. Et sic patet, quod si unus duorum iniustum faciat, et alter iniustum patiatur, et unus laedat et alter laedatur, lex utitur his duobus quasi aequalibus, quantumcumque sint inaequales. Unde et iudex, qui est minister legis, hoc attentat ut istud iniustum quo unus laesit alium, quod habet quamdam inaequalitatem, reducat ad aequalitatem, constituendo scilicet aequalitatem in ipsa quantitate rerum, non secundum proportionem diversarum personarum.
| 951. Therefore, in commutative justice the equal is observed according to arithmetic proportion. This is clear from the fact that here the different relations of persons are not considered. It does not matter, insofar as commutative justice is concerned, whether a good man has stolen or robbed an evil man of his property or an evil man has done it to a good citizen. Likewise, it does not matter whether a good or evil man commits adultery. The law takes into account only the nature of the injury, so that the man who has done more damage, whatever his condition, must make more restitution. So it is evident that if one of two contestants does an injustice and the other suffers an injustice, one injures and the other is injured, the law treats them as equals, however much they may be unequal. Hence a judge, who is a dispenser of the law, attempts to reduce that injustice-by which one man injures another and which has a certain inequality-to an equality by establishing an equality in the very quantity of things and not according to the relation of different persons.
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| Deinde cum dicit etenim cum hic etc., manifestat per exemplum, quod dixerat. Et primo proponit exemplum. Secundo removet quoddam dubium, ibi, dicitur enim ut simpliciter et cetera. Primo ergo ponit exemplum de laesione personali, in qua minus est manifestum. Et dicit, quod si duorum unus vulneretur et alius percutiat, vel etiam unus occidat et alius moriatur, divisa est hic actio et passio in inaequalia, quia scilicet percutiens vel occidens habet plus de aestimato bono, inquantum scilicet implevit voluntatem suam, et ita videtur esse quasi in lucro. Ille autem qui vulneratur vel etiam occiditur habet plus de malo, in quantum scilicet privatur incolumitate vel vita contra suam voluntatem; et ita videtur esse quasi in damno. Sed iudex tentat hoc adaequare, subtrahens a lucro et apponens damno, inquantum scilicet aufert aliquid percutienti vel occidenti contra suam voluntatem, et exhibet in commodum vel honorem vulnerati vel occisi.
| 952. Next [b, ii], at “If one of two contestants,” he clarifies what he had said, by an example. First [ii, x] he presents the example; and then [ii, y], at “In the interest of plain talk etc.,” he resolves a doubt. First he sets forth the example of a personal injury about which too little is clear. He says that if one of two contestants receives a wound and the other inflicts it, or even if one commits murder and the other is murdered, this division of action and passion brings about inequality because the assailant and the murderer have more of what is esteemed good, inasmuch as they have done their own will and so seem as it were to have gained. But the man who is wounded or murdered has more of evil insofar as he is deprived against his will of well-being or life, and so he seems as it were to have suffered loss. The judge tries to equalize this by subtracting from the gain and allotting compensation for the loss, inasmuch as he takes away something from the assailant and the murderer contrary to their will and bestows it to the gain or honor of the person wounded or murdered.
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| Deinde cum dicit dicitur enim etc., removet quoddam dubium quod possit oriri circa nomen lucri et damni. Et dicit quod, ut simpliciter loquamur, lucrum et damnum dicitur in talibus, quando scilicet aliquis habet plus vel minus. Et proprie accipiuntur haec nomina in bonis possessis: sed in aliquibus ista nomina non videntur proprie competere, puta in iniuriis personalibus, ut cum unus percutit et alius percutitur et in hoc quasi damnum patitur, eo quod non potest certa mensura accipi actionis et passionis in huiusmodi iniuriis personalibus, ut sic id quod est plus possit dici lucrum, et quod est minus possit dici damnum. Sed quando passio est mensurata, scilicet secundum mensuram iustitiae, tunc id quod est plus vocatur lucrum, et id quod est minus vocatur damnum.
| 953. Then [ii, y], at “In the interest of plain talk,” he resolves a certain doubt that could arise from the words “gain and loss.” He says that, in the interest of plain talk, the terms “gain and loss” are used in matters where a person has more or less. Strictly these words refer to what we possess, and sometimes they do not seem suitable, for example, in the case of personal injuries (as when one person receives a blow and another inflicts it, some injury results) because a fixed measure of action and passion cannot be taken in injuries of this kind so that what is more can be called gain and what is less, loss. But when passion is measured, i.e., according to the measure of justice, then what is more is called gain and what is less, loss.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quare pluris quidem etc., infert duas conclusiones. Primam quidem ex parte ipsius iusti; secundam ex parte iudicis, ibi, propter quod et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia iustum commutativum est quoddam aequale, (sit) quod sit medium inter plus et minus, ita quod lucrum et damnum se habeant sicut plus et minus. Diversimode tamen in bonis et malis. Nam habere plus de bono et minus de malo, pertinet ad rationem lucri. Contrarium autem pertinet ad rationem damni: inter quae duo, scilicet damnum et lucrum, medium est illud aequale quod dicimus iustum. Unde sequitur, quod iustum, quod est directivum in commutationibus, sit medium inter damnum et lucrum, communiter accipiendo utrumque.
| 954. At “Therefore, that which is just” [b, iii], he deduces two conclusions: the first [iii, x] on the part of the just thing itself; and the second [iii, y], at “For this reason etc.,” on the part of the judge. He says first that the just thing in transactions is a kind of equal that is a mean between more and less in such a way that gain is taken as more and loss as less. However, they are understood in different ways in good and evil, for to have more of good and less of evil belongs to the nature of gain. But the contrary pertains to the idea of loss. Between these two, gain and loss, stands a mean, that equal which we call the just thing. Consequently that just thing, which gives directions in transactions, is a mean between gain and loss as both these terms are commonly understood.
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| Deinde cum dicit propter quod et quando etc., infert conclusionem ex parte iudicis, de quo supra dixit, quod tentat adaequare. Et dicit, quod quia iustum est medium inter damnum et lucrum, inde est, quod quando homines dubitant de hoc, refugiunt ad iudicem, quod idem est ac si refugerent ad id quod est iustum; nam iudex debet esse quasi quoddam iustum animatum, ut scilicet mens eius totaliter a iustitia possideatur. Illi autem qui refugiunt ad iudicem, videntur quaerere medium inter partes quae litigant; et inde est, quod iudices vocant medios vel mediatores, ac si ipsi attingant medium in hoc quod perducunt ad id quod est iustum. Sic ergo patet, quod iustum, de quo nunc loquimur, est quoddam medium quia iudex, qui determinat hoc iustum medius est, inquantum scilicet constituit id quod est aequale inter partes: aequale autem medium est inter plus et minus, ut supra dictum est.
| 955. Next [iii, y], at “For this reason,” he draws a conclusion on the part of the judge of whom it was said (952) that he tries to bring about an equality. Aristotle affirms that because the just thing is a mean between gain and loss, it follows that when men are in doubt about the mean they have recourse to a judge. A judge ought to be, as it were, living justice, so that his soul is entirely possessed by justice. But the people who go to a judge seem to be seeking a mediator between parties who quarrel. Consequently, judges are called intermediaries or mediators as if they may attain the intermediate or the mean, and lead the way to what is just. So then it is evident that what is just, the subject of our discussion, is a certain mean because the judge, who determines this just thing, is the middle inasmuch as he proposes what is equal between the parties. But the equal is the mean or middle between more and less, as we have pointed out (310, 933).
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COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| Et quemadmodum linea et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit differentiam inter iustum quod est directivum commutationum et iustum distributivum, hic ostendit qualiter accipiatur medium in hoc iusto, quod est directivum commutationum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo manifestat originem horum nominum damnum et lucrum quibus usus fuerat, ibi: venerunt autem et nomina haec et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo inveniatur medium commutativae iustitiae circa easdem res. Secundo, quomodo inveniatur circa res diversarum artium, ibi, est autem et in aliis artibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo inducit exemplum ad ostendendum qualiter accipiatur medium in commutativa iustitia. Secundo manifestat quod dixerat, ibi si enim duobus aequalibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit exemplum ad propositum ostendendum. Secundo ostendit convenientiam exempli ex ipso modo loquendi, ibi, propter quod, et nominatur et cetera.
| 956. After the philosopher has shown the difference between the mean of justice regulating transactions and the mean of justice regulating distributions, now [C] he shows how the mean of that justice which regulates transactions is understood. He handles this point in a twofold fashion. First [ C, 1] he discloses his proposition. Then [C, 2], at “The names etc.,” he explains the origin of the names, gain and loss, which he has used. He discusses the initial point from two aspects. First [1, a] he shows how we may discover the mean of commutative justice in these things; next [1, b], at “This is true etc.,” how we may discover it in the matter of the different arts. He treats the first point in two ways. First [a, ij he introduces an example to show how the mean is applied in commutative justice. Then [a, ii], at “If there are etc.,” he clarifies what he has said. In regard to the initial point he first [i, x] gives the example to explain his proposition. Then [i, y], at “Therefore, this mean etc.,” he shows the appropriateness of the example from the very manner of speaking.
| | Dicit ergo primo quod ita iudex ad aequalitatem reducit, sicut si esset una linea divisa in partes inaequales, ille qui vellet ad aequalitatem reducere, auferret a maiori parte illud in quo excedit medietatem totius lineae et apponeret illud minori parti, ita quod medietas totius lineae esset quasi quaedam dica, id est regula vel mensura, per quam inaequalia reducerentur ad aequalitatem. Et sic quum totum quod est duorum hominum dividatur tali dica, id est mensura, tunc dicunt, quod unusquisque habet quod suum est, inquantum scilicet accipiunt aequale, quod est medium inter maius et minus, et hoc secundum arismeticam proportionalitatem, quia scilicet quantum medium iustitiae exceditur ab eo qui habebat plus, tantum excedit illum qui habet minus, quod pertinet ad proportionabilitatem arithmeticam, ut prius dictum est.
| 957. Aristotle says that this is the way a judge expresses a reduction to equality. If he wishes to reduce to equality a line divided into unequal parts, he takes away from the larger part that portion by which it exceeds the half of the whole line and adds it to the smaller part so that the half of the whole line is a certain dicha, i.e., rule or measure for reducing unequal portions to an equality. So when a whole thing belonging to two men is divided by such a dicha or measure, then it is said that each one has what is his inasmuch as he receives equality—which is the mean between more and less—according to arithmetic proportionality. The reason is that the mean of justice is exceeded by the one with more to the extent that it exceeds the person with less-this pertains to arithmetic proportionality, as we pointed out before (944,950).
| | Deinde cum dicit propter quod et nominatur etc., manifestat exemplum praemissum esse conveniens per modum loquendi apud Graecos. Et dicit, quod quia medium huius iustitiae est sicut quaedam dicha, inde est quod iustum apud Graecos, vocatur dicheon, sicut si aliquis volens huiusmodi nomina variare dicat quod dicaon est iustum et dicastes iustus et dicaste iustitia.
| 958. Then [i, y], at “Therefore, this mean,” he shows that the preceding example is suitable according to Greek usage. He says that since the mean of this justice is a certain dicha, hence it is that the just thing is called dicheon by the Greeks, as if a person wanting to vary the names should say that dicheon is the just thing, dichastes the just man, and dichaste justice.
| | Deinde cum dicit: si enim duobus etc., manifestat quod dixerat, scilicet quod oporteat subtrahere ab eo qui habet plus id in quo excedit medietatem, et apponere ei qui habet minus. Et primo manifestat quod dictum est. Secundo exponit in terminis, ibi: aequales in quibus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod si sint duo aequalia, quorum utrumque habeat duas mensuras, puta duas palmas, aut duos pedes, et medietas auferatur ab uno et apponatur alteri. Manifestum est quod illud cui apponitur superexcedit alterum in duobus: quia ei cui subtrahitur non remanet nisi unum, illud autem cui additur habet tria; sed si id quod subtrahitur ab uno non apponatur alteri, manifestum est quod non erit excessus nisi in uno. Per id autem cui nihil additur nec subtrahitur, intelligitur ipsum medium iustitiae, quia habet quod suum est et nec plus nec minus; per id autem cui additur intelligitur ille qui plus habet. Per id autem cui subtrahitur intelligitur ille qui minus habet.
| 959. Next [a, ii], at “If there are two equals,” he makes clear what he has said, viz., that it is necessary to take from one with more in the amount exceeding the mean and to give to one with less. First [ii, x] he explains his statement; and then [ii, y], at “Let us take etc.,” he expresses it by terminals. He says first, let us take two equal lines both of which are two measures long, for example, two palms breadth or two feet; let us subtract half from one line and add it to the other. Obviously, the line receiving the addition exceeds the other by two units because the line from which the subtraction was made has only one unit remaining, and the line to which the addition has been made has three units. But if the section subtracted from one line is not added to the other, there will be an excess of only one unit. By that line, to which nothing is added or from which nothing is subtracted, we understand the mean of justice, having as it does neither more nor less than what belongs to it. By the line to which addition has been made we understand the person who has too much. By the line from which subtraction has been made we understand the person who has too little.
| | Sic ergo patet quod ille qui plus habet excedit medium in uno, quod scilicet est sibi superadditum, medium vero excedit id a quo ablatum est in uno, quod scilicet est sibi subtractum. Hoc ergo, scilicet medio, cognoscemus et quid oportet auferre ab eo qui plus habet et quid oportet apponere ei qui minus habet; quia illud oportet apponere minus habenti in quo medium excedit ipsum, hoc autem oportet auferre a maximo, id est ab eo qui plus habet, in quo medium superexceditur ab eo.
| 960. In this way then it is evident that the man who has too much exceeds the mean by one unit, which has been added to it over and above, but the mean exceeds by one-which has been taken from it-that from which subtraction has been made. Therefore, we will know by this mean what we ought to take from him who has more and give to him who has less. Besides, we will know that we ought to take from the greater, i.e., from him who has more, the amount by which he exceeds the mean because we ought to give him who has less in the amount the mean exceeds him.
| | Deinde cum dicit aequales in quibus etc., proponit quae dicta sunt in terminis. Sint enim tres lineae aequales, in quarum una scribatur in terminis aa, in alia bb, in tertia gg; linea ergo bb maneat figura indivisa, linea vero aa dividatur per medium in puncto e, linea vero gg dividatur per medium in puncto z. Auferatur ergo a linea quae est aa, una pars quae est ae, et apponatur lineae quae est gg et vocetur hoc appositum gd; sic ergo patet quod tota linea quae est dgg superexcedit eam quae est ae in duobus, scilicet in eo quod est gd, et in eo quod est gz, sed lineam quae est bb excedit in uno solo, quod est gd. Sic ergo patet quod id quod est maximum excedit medium in uno, minimum autem in duobus, ad modum arismeticae proportionalitatis.
| 961. At “Let us take” [ii, y] he sets forth in figure what was said. Let us take three equal lines and mark the terminations of one AA, of another BB, of the third GG. Then let BB remain undivided, but divide AA in half at the point E, and divide GG in half at the point 3. Next, take away from line AA a section AE, add it to the line GG and call the addition GD. It is clear then that the whole line DG exceeds the line A E by two units, viz., by that which is GG and by that which is GD, but it exceeds the line BB by one unit only, viz., GD. Therefore, obviously, that which is longest exceeds the mean by one unit and the shortest by two units after the manner of arithmetic proportionality. E A—————A B—————B 3
G—————G——D
| | Deinde cum dicit: est autem et in aliis etc., ostendit quod illud quod dictum est, observari oportet etiam in commutatione diversarum artium. Destruerentur enim artes, si ille qui facit aliquod artificium non pateretur, id est non reciperet pro illo artificio tantum et tale quantum et quale fecit. Et ideo oportet commensurari opera unius artificis operibus alterius ad hoc quod sit iusta commutatio.
| 962. Then [1, b], at “This is true,” he shows that what has been said must be observed in transactions having to do with the different arts. The arts would be destroyed if the craftsman, who works at some handicraft, would not be supported, i.e., would not receive for his workmanship according to the quantity and quality of what he produced. For that reason the work of one craftsman must be commensurate with the work of another to the extent that there is a just transaction.
| | Deinde cum dicit: venerunt autem etc., ostendit originem horum nominum, damnum et lucrum. Et dicit quod ista nomina provenerunt ex commutationibus voluntariis in quibus primo fuit usus talium nominum. Cum enim aliquis plus haberet quam prius habuerat, dicebatur lucrari: quando autem minus, dicebatur damnificari, sicut in emptionibus et venditionibus et in omnibus aliis commutationibus quae sunt licitae secundum legem. Sed quando aliqui neque plus neque minus habebant eo quod a principio habuerant, sed ipsamet reportabant in aequali quantitate per commutationem eorum quae attulerant, tunc dicebantur habere ea quae eorum sunt et nihil lucrari neque amittere.
| 963. Next [C, 2], at “The names,” he explains the origin of the names, gain and loss, saying that they come from voluntary transactions in which names of this kind were first used. When a man owned more than he previously had owned, he was said to have gained; but when less, he was said to have suffered loss, as in buying, selling and in all other transactions which are permitted by law. However, when men have neither more nor less than they had in the beginning, but bring back in equal quantity the same as they had taken by their transactions, then they are said to have what belongs to them, neither gaining nor losing.
| | Concludit autem ulterius conclusionem principaliter intentam. Ex praemissis enim patet quod iustum de quo nunc agitur, est medium damni et lucri: quod quidem iustum nihil est aliud quam habere aequale ante commutationem et post, etiam praeter voluntatem; ut patet in eo qui, iudice cogente, restituit alteri quod plus habebat.
| 964. He draws the final inference that he had principally intended. It is evident from the premises that the justice we are now discussing is a mean between gain and loss, that justice is simply the possession of an equal amount before and after a transaction even an involuntary one, as we see in the person who, when constrained by a judge, restores to another what he had in excess.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Videtur autem aliquibus et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit qualiter accipiatur medium in utraque iustitiae specie, hic excludit quamdam falsam sententiam circa acceptionem medii iustitiae. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit sententiam erroneam. Secundo improbat eam, ibi, et contrapassum autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit in quibus et qualibus habeat veritatem, ibi, sed in communicationibus quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quibusdam visum est quod universaliter loquendo nihil aliud esset iustum quam contrapassum, ut scilicet aliquis pateretur secundum quod fecerat. Et haec fuit sententia Pythagoricorum, qui determinabant quod simpliciter iustum est idem quod contrapassum alii.
| 965. After the Philosopher has shown how the mean should be understood in both kinds of justice, now he rejects a false opinion about the understanding of the mean of justice. He discusses this point under three headings. First [I] he states the erroneous opinion. Next [II], at “However, reciprocation etc.,” he rejects it. Third [III], at “But in dealings etc.,” he shows where and how the truth may be found. He says first it seems to some that, generally speaking, justice is nothing other than reciprocation, viz., that a man should suffer according to what he has done. This was the opinion of the Pythagoreans who decided that justice is the same as reciprocation.
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| Deinde cum dicit contrapassum autem etc., improbat praedictam positionem. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo quidem quantum ad distributivam iustitiam; dicens quod contrapassum non congruit circa iustum distributivum: et huius ratio manifesta est. Iustum enim distributivum non attenditur secundum quod unus duorum, quos oportet per iustitiam aequari, agit in alium vel patitur ab alio, quod requiritur ad rationem contrapassi; sed quod aliquid communium bonorum distribuatur utrique secundum aequalitatem proportionis.
| 966. Then [II], at “However, reciprocation,” he rejects this opinion on two accounts; and first [II, A] in regard to distributive justice, he says that reciprocation does not correspond to what is just distributively. The reason for this is evident. The just thing in distributions is not judged according to what one of two, who must be equated by justice, does against the other or suffers from the other. This is necessary for the nature of reciprocation; but in distribution a share of the common goods is given to each by an equality of proportion.
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| Secundo ibi: neque in directivum etc., improbat praedictam positionem quantum ad iustitiam commutativam. Et primo proponit quod de hac iustitia intendebant. Et dicit quod contrapassum non congruit etiam omnibus modis circa iustum quod est directivum commutationum; quamvis illi qui protulerunt praedictam sententiam hoc voluerunt dicere quod in commutationibus sit idem iustum quod contrapassum: quod patet per hoc quod quidam legislator, nomine Rhadamantus, introduxit tale iustum quod si aliquis patiatur illa quae fecit, fit recta vindicta.
| 967. Next [II, B], at “Likewise, it is not,” he rejects the preceding error in the case of commutative justice. First [II, B, I] he proposes what he intends to do with commutative justice. He says that reciprocation does not coincide with all the processes in justice that regulate transactions, although the philosophers who expressed the foregoing opinion meant that in transactions justice is the same as reciprocation. This is clear from the fact that a legislator named Rhadamantus maintained that this justice is of such a nature that if a man suffers those very things he inflicted on others, justice is vindicated.
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| Secundo ibi: multis enim in locis etc., improbat quod dictum est, duabus rationibus. Circa quarum primam dicit quod in multis locis talis vindicta invenitur dissonare verae iustitiae, ut si aliquis in principatu constitutus percusserit aliquam privatam personam, non requirit hoc iustitia quod princeps repercutiatur, et similiter, si aliquis percutiat principem, oportet quod non solum percutiatur, sed quod etiam gravius puniatur.
| 968. Then [II, B, 2], at “Such justice,” he rejects this view for two reasons. In regard to the first [2, a] he says that in many situations vengeance of this kind is found to be at variance with true justice, for instance, if a ruler strikes a private person justice does not require that the ruler be struck. But if a person strikes a ruler it is necessary that such a person not only be struck but be more gravely punished.
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| Videtur autem hoc esse contra id quod philosophus supra dixerat, quod in iustitia commutativa non attenditur diversa conditio personarum, sed lex utitur omnibus quasi aequalibus. Sed attendendum est quod ibidem philosophus dixit quod in commutativa iustitia lex attendit solum ad differentiam nocumenti. Manifestum est autem quod quando nocumentum attenditur circa subtractionem rei exterioris, puta pecuniae, non variatur quantitas nocumenti secundum diversam conditionem personae, sed quando est nocumentum personale, tunc necesse est quod quantitas nocumenti diversificetur secundum conditionem personae. Manifestum est enim quod maius est nocumentum cum aliquis percutit principem, per quod non solum personam ipsius sed totam rempublicam laedit, quam cum percutit aliquam privatam personam. Et ideo non competit iustitiae in talibus simpliciter contrapassum.
| 969. This seems to contradict what the Philosopher said before (951) that in commutative justice the different rank of persons is not taken into account—all being equal under the law. But it should be noted what the Philosopher had said was this: in commutative justice the law considers only the nature of the damage. It is clear that when damage is considered in the taking of an external thing—money for instance—the amount of damage does not vary according to a person’s rank. Still when the injury is personal, the extent of the injury necessarily changes according to the rank of the person. Obviously, worse damage is done when someone strikes a ruler, by reason of the fact that injury is done not only to the person of the ruler but also the whole commonweal. Therefore, reciprocation simply taken is not suitable for justice in matters of this kind.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc involuntarium et cetera. Et dicit quod circa vindictas inferendas multum differt utrum aliquis iniuriam intulerit voluntarius an involuntarius, scilicet propter ignorantiam vel vim aut metum. Gravius enim debet vindicari si voluntarius peccavit quam si involuntarius, et hoc duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia in vindictis non solum attenditur quod aequalitas iustitiae reparetur per hoc quod aliquis restituat alteri quod ei subtraxit; sed etiam quod pro peccato commisso poenam sustineat; et propter hoc lege aliqui puniuntur etiam pro peccatis quibus nulla iniuria vel damnum alii irrogatur, et fur non solum compellitur restituere quod accepit, per quod aequalitas iustitiae reintegratur; sed etiam ulterius punitur pro culpa commissa. Culpa autem aggravatur vel diminuitur ex hoc quod quis peccat voluntarius vel involuntarius. Unde gravius punitur voluntarius quam involuntarius. Secundo quia maior est voluntarie peccantis iniuria; additur enim exteriori nocumento interior contemptus.
| 970. At “Moreover, it makes” [2, b] he gives the second reason. He says in the matter of imposing punishment, it makes a great deal of difference whether the offender inflicted the injury voluntarily or involuntarily, i.e., because of ignorance or violence or fear. The man who sinned voluntarily ought to be punished more severely than the man who sinned involuntarily, for two reasons. First, because in regard to punishments, consideration is given to the restoration of equality of justice not only by a person restoring what he has taken but also by his being punished for the crime. For this reason some are punished by law even for sins causing no injury or damage to another. Likewise a thief is compelled not only to restore what he took—by which the equality of justice is reestablished—but beyond that he is punished for the offense perpetrated. But the offense is increased or diminished by the fact that a man sins voluntarily or involuntarily. Hence the voluntary offender is punished more severely than the involuntary offender. The second reason is that the injury of the deliberate transgressor is greater, for internal contempt is added to the external damage.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sed in communicationibus quidem etc., ostendit in quibus et qualiter sit verum quod dictum est, scilicet quod contrapassum sit iustum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit, quod contrapassum oportet fieri in commutationibus secundum proportionalitatem. Secundo manifestat formam huius proportionalitatis, ibi, facit enim retributionem et cetera. Tertio ostendit quomodo talis forma observari possit, ibi, propter quod omnia comparabilia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, per contrafacere, enim et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod in communicationibus commutativis verum est quod tale iustum continet in se contrapassum, non quidem secundum aequalitatem, sed secundum proportionalitatem.
| 971. Next [III], at “But in dealings,” he explains in what matter and manner the statement is true that reciprocation is justice. He discusses this point from three aspects. First [III, A] he shows that there must be reciprocation in exchanges according to proportionality. Then [III, B], at “A conjunction by means etc.,” he explains the form of this proportionality. Last [Lect. 9; C], at “Therefore all etc.” (B. 1133 a 18), he shows how such a form can be observed. On the initial point he does two’ things. First [III, A, 1] he states his intention. Next [III, A, 2], at “By reason of proportional etc.,” he proves his statement. He says that in dealings of exchange it is true that justice is of such a nature that it includes reciprocation not according to equality but according to proportionality.
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| Videtur autem hoc esse contra id quod supra dictum est, quod scilicet in commutativa iustitia, medium accipitur non quidem secundum geometricam proportionalitatem, quae consistit in aequalitate proportionis, sed secundum arithmeticam, quae consistit in aequalitate quantitatis. Dicendum est autem, quod circa iustitiam commutativam, semper quidem oportet esse aequalitatem rei ad rem, non tamen actionis et passionis, quod importat contrapassum. Sed in hoc oportet adhiberi proportionalitatem ad hoc, quod fiat aequalitas rerum, eo quod actio unius artificis maior est quam actio alterius, sicut aedificatio quam fabricatio cultelli; unde si aedificator commutaret actionem suam pro actione fabri, non esset aequalitas rei datae et acceptae, puta domus et cultelli.
| 972. It seems this is contrary to what was said before (950), that in commutative justice the mean is taken not according to geometrical proportionality, which consists in an equality of proportion, but according to arithmetic proportionality, which consists in a quantitative equality. We must say that, in regard to commutative justice there should always be an equality of thing to thing, not, however, of action and passion, which implies corresponding requital. But in this, proportionality must be employed in order to bring about an equality of things because the work of one craftsman is of more value than the work of another, e.g., the building of a house than the production of a penknife. Hence, if the builder exchanged his work for the work of the cutler, there would not be equality of thing, given and taken, i.e., of house and penknife.
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| Deinde cum dicit: per contrafacere enim etc., probat propositum, dicens, quod per hoc manifestum esse potest, quod iustum commutativum contineat contrapassum secundum proportionalitatem, quia per hoc commanent cives sibiinvicem in civitate, quod sibiinvicem proportionaliter contrafaciunt, prout scilicet si unus pro alio facit aliquid, alius studet proportionaliter facere pro eodem. Et manifestum est, quod omnes cives hoc quaerunt, ut eis proportionaliter contrafiat: per hoc enim commanent homines adinvicem, quod sibiinvicem faciunt quod quaerunt. Numquid ergo hoc male quaerunt, quod scilicet eis proportionaliter contrafiat? Si autem non quaerunt hoc male, videtur esse servitus, si uni facienti, alius non contrafaciat proportionaliter; servile enim est, quod aliquis non adipiscatur ex suo opere id quod non male quaerit.
| 973. Then [III, A, 2], at “By reason of proportional,” he proves his statement, saying that justice in exchanges includes reciprocation according to proportionality. This can be shown by the fact that the citizens live together amicably because they have proportionate kindliness towards one another. Accordingly, if one does something for another, the other is anxious to do something in proportion in return. Obviously, all citizens desire that reciprocation be done to them proportionately. By reason of this all men can live together because they do for one another what they themselves seek. Therefore, they never seek in regard to evil that corresponding requital be done to them proportionately. But if they do not seek this in regard to evil, for example, when one man does not take vengeance on another who injures him, a kind of servility seems to result. Indeed it is servile when a man cannot gain by his own activity something that he does not desire in an evil way.
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| Vel dicemus, quod non solum non male quaerunt homines sibi proportionaliter contrafieri, sed etiam bene? Et sic, si non contrafiat eis proportionaliter, non fiet retributio debita. Per hoc autem homines commanent adinvicem, quod unus retribuat alteri pro his quae ab eo accepit. Et inde est, quod boni homines prompte exhibent suis benefactoribus gratiarum actionem quasi quiddam sacrum, ut per hoc eis retribuant; retribuere enim proprie pertinet ad gratiarum actionem. Oportet enim quod homo iterato serviat ei qui sibi fecit gratiam idest gratuitum beneficium impendit, et quod non sit contentus tantum facere quantum accepit, sed quod rursus ipse incipiat amplius exhibendo, quam accepit, ut sic ipse gratiam faciat.
| 974. We may even say that men not only do not desire that corresponding requital, when unjust, be done to the -m proportionately, but they do not desire that it be done when just. In this way if corresponding requital is not done them in a proportionate way, proper retribution will not be effected. But men live together because one makes a return to another for the favors he has received. So it is that virtuous men promptly express gratitude to their benefactors as if it were a sacred duty to make them a return in this way-repaying a favor is characteristic of gratitude. It is fitting that a man should be of service to one who has done him a favor, i.e., bestowed a gratuitous kindness, and that he be not content to give only as much as he received but that in return he begins to offer more than he got so that he himself may do a favor.
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| Deinde cum dicit facit enim retributionem etc., manifestat formam proportionalitatis secundum quam debet fieri contrapassum. Et primo proponit ipsam in coriario et aedificatore; secundo ostendit idem esse in aliis artibus, ibi: est autem hoc et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod coniugatio, quae est secundum diametrum, facit in commutationibus retributionem vel contrapassum secundum proportionalitatem. Ad cuius intellectum describatur quadratum abgd et ducantur duo diametri se intersecantes, scilicet ad et bg. Sit ergo aedificator a, coriarius b, figura domus quae est opus aedificatoris g, calceamentum, quod est opus coriarii, d. Oportet igitur quandoque quod aedificator accipiat a coriario opus eius, scilicet calceamentum. Debet autem et ipse pro retributione dare ei opus suum.
| 975. Next [III, B], at “A conjunction by means,” he makes known the form of proportionality according to which reciprocation ought to be made. First [III, B, 1] he gives an example in the shoemaker and the builder; then [III, B, 2], at “This is to be observed etc.,” he shows that the same is found in other arts. He says first that a conjunction by means of a diagonal shows how to make compensation or reciprocation according to proportionality. To understand this draw A B G D, make two diagonals intersecting one another, viz., AD and BD. Let A represent a builder, B a shoemaker, G a house that is the work of the builder, and D a sandal that is the work of a shoemaker. It is necessary at times that the builder should take from the shoemaker his product, a sandal. But the builder himself ought to give his product as a recompense to the shoemaker.
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| Si ergo primo adinveniatur secundum proportionalitatem aequalitas, ut scilicet constituantur ex una parte tot calceamenta contra unam domum quot plures expensas facit aedificator in una domo, quam coriarius in uno calceamento, deinde fiat contrapassum, ut scilicet aedificator accipiat multa calceamenta adaequata uni domui et coriarius unam domum, erit quod dicitur, scilicet retributio, secundum proportionalitatem facta per diametralem coniunctionem:
| 976. Therefore, if first an equality according to proportionality is found so that on one side a certain number of sandals be fixed as equal to one house (for a builder incurs more expense in building one house than a shoemaker in making one sandal), next, corresponding reciprocation is had so that the builder may receive many sandals equal to one house and the shoemaker one house, there will be recompense—as was said—made according to proportion by a diagonal conjunction. BUILDER: A
HOUSE: G |  | B: SHOEMAKER
D: SANDAL |
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| quia scilicet calceamenta proportionata dantur aedificatori, cui secundum diametrum opponuntur et domus coriario. Si autem non sic fiat retributio, non erit aequalitas rerum commutatarum, et sic homines non poterunt adinvicem commanere, eo quod nihil prohibet opus unius artificis esse melius quam opus alterius: sicut domus quam calceamentum: et ideo oportet haec adinvicem aequari secundum dictam proportionalitatem ad hoc quod fiat iusta commutatio.
| The reason is that a proportionate number of sandals are given to the builder, and the house to the shoemaker. But if compensation is not made in this way, there will not be an equality of things exchanged—and so men will not be able to live together—since nothing hinders the work of one craftsman from being worth more than the work of another, a house than a sandal. For this reason these things must be equated one with the other according to the previously mentioned proportionality, so that a just exchange may take place.
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| Deinde cum dicit: est autem hoc etc., ostendit idem esse in aliis artibus. Et dicit quod hoc quod dictum est de aedificatore et coriario, est etiam observandum in aliis artibus, ut scilicet fiat contrapassum commutatio secundum proportionalitatem diametralem. Destruerentur enim artes, si non tantum et tale reciperet aliquis, quantum et quale faceret. Et hoc oportet adinvenire, secundum modum praedictum. Non enim saepe communicant sibi mutuo sua opera duo homines unius artis, puta duo medici, sed plerumque homines diversarum artium, puta medicus et agricola, et omnino diversi et inaequales; quos tamen oportet aequari secundum modum praedictum.
| 977. Then [III, B, 2], at “This is to be observed,” he shows that the same thing is found in the other arts. He affirms that what was said (975, 976) about the builder and the shoemaker must be observed also in the other arts, so that reciprocation and exchange may take place according to diagonal proportionality. Indeed the arts would be destroyed if a workman did not receive according to the quantity and quality of what he produced—a thing that must be discovered in the way indicated. It is not common for men practicing one art, for example, two doctors, to communicate their work with one another, but very often men practicing different arts do, for instance, a doctor and a farmer, both entirely different and unequal. These must be equated in the preceding way.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Propter quod omnia comparabilia et cetera. Postquam philosophus proposuit formam proportionalitatis secundum quam contrapassum est idem quod iustum in commutationibus, hic ostendit qualiter praedicta forma proportionalitatis possit observari. Et primo ostendit propositum. Secundo manifestat quaedam, quae dicta sunt, ibi, quoniam autem indigentia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod ad praedictam formam proportionalitatis observandum necesse est omnia commensurare; secundo ostendit quomodo per huiusmodi commensurationem fiat iuste contrapassum in commutationibus, ibi, erit utique contrapassum et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quid sit illud per quod omnia commensurantur. Secundo ostendit quomodo talis commensuratio in commutationibus fiat, ibi, quanta quaedam utique et cetera. Tertio assignat rationem praedictae commensurationis, ibi, oportet enim uno aliquo et cetera.
| 978. After the Philosopher has proposed the form of proportionality, with which reciprocation is identified in exchange, he now shows [III, C] in what way this form of proportionality can be observed. First [C, 1] he explains his intention. Then [C, 2], at “That human demand etc.,” he clarifies the previous statements. He discusses the initial point in a twofold manner. First [1, a] he shows that to preserve the form of proportionality perfectly it is necessary to make everything commensurate. Next [1, b), at “When things have been etc.,” lie explains how a just reciprocation in exchanges may be effected by a commensuration of this kind. He treats the first point under three aspects. Initially [1, a, i] he explains the nature of that which measures all things, Then [1, a, ii], at “A certain number etc.,” he shows how such a commensuration is established in exchanges. Last [ 1, a, iii ], at “Therefore, it is etc.,” he indicates the nature of this commensuration.
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| Dicit ergo primo, quod ad hoc, quod opera diversorum artificum adaequentur, et sic commutari possint, oportet, quod omnia illa quorum potest esse commutatio, sint aliqualiter adinvicem comparabilia, ut scilicet sciatur quid eorum plus valeat et quid minus. Et ad hoc inventum est nummisma, id est denarius, per quem mensurantur pretia talium rerum, et sic denarius fit quodam modo medium, inquantum scilicet omnia mensurat, et superabundantiam et defectum, id est quantum una res superexcedat aliam, sicut supra dictum est, quod medium iustitiae est quasi dica quae mensurat superabundantiam et defectum.
| 979. He says first, in order that the products of the different workmen be equated and thus become possible to exchange, it is necessary that all things capable of exchange should be comparable in some way with one another so that it can be known which of them has greater value and which less. It was for this purpose that money or currency was invented, to measure the price of such things. In this way currency becomes a medium inasmuch as it measures everything, both excess and defect, to the extent that one thing exceeds another, as was pointed out before (955, 959-960). It is a mean of justice—as if someone should call it a measure of excess and defect.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quanta quaedam etc., ostendit quomodo, secundum commensurationem praedictam fit commutatio. Licet enim domus sit magis aliquid in pretio quam calciamentum, tamen aliquanta calceamenta adaequant in pretio unam domum, vel et cibum unius hominis per aliquod longum tempus. Oportet igitur ad hoc quod sit commutatio ut tanta calceamenta dentur pro una domo vel pro cibo unius hominis, quantum aedificator vel etiam agricola excedit coriarium in labore et expensis, quia si hoc non observetur, non erit commutatio rerum, neque homines sibiinvicem sua bona communicabunt. Id autem quod dictum est, scilicet quod aliqua calceamenta dentur pro una domo, non poterit esse nisi aliqualiter sint aequalia calceamenta domui.
| 980. Next [1, a, ii], at ‘W certain number,” he shows how exchange takes place according to the preceding commensuration. Although a house is worth more than a sandal, nevertheless, a number of sandals are equal in value to one house or the food required for one man during a long period. In order then to have just exchange, as many sandals must be exchanged for one house or for the food required for one man as the builder or the farmer exceeds the shoemaker in his labor and costs. If this is not observed, there will be no exchange of things and men will not share their goods with one another. But what has been said, that a number of sandals are exchanged for one house, is not possible unless the sandals are equated with the house in some way.
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| Deinde cum dicit: oportet enim etc., assignat rationem praedictae commensurationis, quae fit per numisma. Et dicit, quod ideo possunt omnia adaequari, quia omnia possunt commensurari per aliquid unum, ut dictum est; hoc autem unum, quod omnia mensurat secundum rei veritatem est indigentia, quae continet omnia commutabilia, in quantum scilicet omnia referuntur ad humanam indigentiam; non enim appretiantur res secundum dignitatem naturae ipsorum: alioquin unus mus, quod est animal sensibile, maioris pretii esset quam una margarita, quae est res inanimata: sed rebus pretia imponuntur, secundum quod homines indigent eis ad suum usum.
| 981. At “Therefore, it is” [i, a, iii] he indicates the nature of this commensuration made by means of money. He states that for this reason it is possible to equate things because all things can be measured by some one standard, as was pointed out (957). But this one standard which truly measures all things is demand. This includes all commutable things inasmuch as everything has a reference to human need. Articles are not valued according to the dignity of their nature, otherwise a mouse, an animal endowed with sense, should be of greater value than a pearl, a thing without life. But they are priced according as man stands in need of them for his own use.
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| Et huius signum est quia, si homines nullo indigerent, nulla esset commutatio; vel si non similiter indigerent, idest non his rebus non esset eadem commutatio, quia non darent id quod habent pro eo quo non indigerent. Et quod secundum rei veritatem indigentia omnia mensurat, manifestum est per hoc, quod numisma factum est secundum compositionem, idest secundum conventionem quamdam inter homines, propter commutationem necessitatis, idest rerum necessariarum. Est enim condictum inter homines quod afferenti denarium detur id quo indiget. Et inde est quod denarius vocatur numisma: nomos enim lex est, quia scilicet denarius non est mensura per naturam, sed nomo, id est lege; est enim in potestate nostra transmutare denarios et reddere eos inutiles.
| 982. An indication of this is that if man were not in need there would be no exchange, or if they did not have a similar need, i.e., of these things, exchange would not be the same because men would not exchange what they have for something they did not need. That demand really measures everything is evident from the fact that money originated by arrangement or a kind of agreement among men on account of the necessity of exchange, i.e., exchange of necessary goods. There is an agreement among men that what a person needs will be given him in exchange for currency. Hence currency is called money (numisma)—nomos means law—since currency is not a measure by nature but by law (nomos). It is in our power to change currencies and make them useless.
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| Deinde cum dicit: erit utique contrapassum etc., ostendit quomodo secundum praedictam commensurationem contrapassum iuste in commutationibus fiat. Et primo manifestat propositum. Secundo ponit in terminis, ibi: agricola a et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex quo omnia mensurantur per indigentiam naturaliter, et per denarium secundum condictum hominum, tunc iuste fiet contrapassum quando omnia secundum praedictum modum adaequabuntur, ita scilicet quod quantum agricola, cuius opus est cibus hominis, excedit coriarium cuius opus est calceamentum, in tanta proportione excedit secundum numerum opus coriarii opus agricolae, ut scilicet multa calciamenta dentur pro uno modio tritici. Et ita quando fit commutatio rerum oportet ducere res commutandas in diametralem figuram proportionalitatis, ut supra dictum est: et si hoc non fieret, alterum extremum haberet utrasque superabundantias. Puta si agricola daret modium tritici pro calceamento, haberet superabundantiam laboris in opere et haberet etiam superabundantiam doni, quia scilicet plus daret quam acciperet. Sed quando omnes habent quae sua sunt, sic sunt aequales et sibiinvicem communicant, quia praedicta aequalitas potest fieri in ipsis.
| 983. Then [i, b], at “When things have been,” he shows how just reciprocation takes place in exchanges according to the preceding commensuration. First [i, b, i] he explains his proposition; and then [i, b, ii], at “Let A represent etc.,” puts it in a diagram. He says first that the norm measuring all things by need according to nature and by currency according to human convention will then become reciprocation when everything will be equated in the way just mentioned. This is done in such a manner that as the farmer (whose work is raising food for men) excels the shoemaker (whose work is making sandals), in the same proportion the work of the shoemaker exceeds in number the work of the farmer, so that many sandals are exchanged for one bushel of wheat. Thus when exchange of things takes place, the articles to be exchanged ought to be arranged in a proportional figure with diagonals, as was stated previously (957). If this was not done, one extreme would have both excesses; if a farmer gave a bushel of wheat for a sandal, he would have a surplus of labor in his product and would have also an excess of loss because he would be giving more than he would receive. But when all have what is theirs, they are in this way equal and do business with one another because the equality previously mentioned is possible for them.
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| Deinde cum dicit agricola a etc., ponit in terminis quod dictum est de figura proportionalitatis. Describatur ergo, sicut et prius, quadratum abgd; et duo diametri se intersecantes ad, bg; et sit ergo agricola a, cibus quod est opus eius, g puta modius figura tritici; coriarius sit b, d vero sit opus coriarii adaequatum, idest tot calceamenta quae valeant modium tritici. Erit ergo iuste contrapassum si a coniungatur cum d et b cum g: et si non sit talis contrapassio, homines non communicabunt res suas invicem.
| 984. Next [1, b, ii], at “Let A represent,” he puts in a diagram what has been said about the proportional figure. Take then (as in the previous example) a square A, B, G, D, and two diagonals AD and BG intersecting one another. Let A represent the farmer and G the food, his product, e.g., a bushel of wheat. Let B represent the shoemaker and D his equated product, i.e., as many sandals as have the value of a bushel of wheat. There will then be a just reciprocation if A be joined with D and B with G. If there is not such a compensation men will not share their goods with one another. FARMER: A
FOOD: G | | B: SHOEMAKER
D: SANDAL |
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| Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem indigentia etc., manifestat planius quod supra dictum est. Et primo manifestat quomodo res mensurentur; secundo quomodo commensuratae commutentur, ibi: propter quod oportet et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod necessitas sit mensura secundum rei veritatem. Secundo quomodo denarius sit mensura secundum legis positionem, ibi, pro futura autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod hoc quod dictum est, quod indigentia hominum contineat omnia sicut una quaedam mensura, ostenditur per hoc quod quando homines hoc modo se habent adinvicem quod vel uterque vel saltem alter non indigeat re quam alius habet, non commutant adinvicem, sicut commutant cum aliquis qui habet frumentum indiget vino quod habet alius et ita dat frumentum pro vino. Oportet igitur ad hoc quod iusta sit commutatio quod aequetur frumentum vino, ut scilicet tantum de frumento detur quantum valet vinum.
| 985. At “That human demand” [C, 2] he explains more fully what has already been mentioned. First [2, a] he shows how things are made commensurate; and next [2, b], at “Everything then,” how the things made commensurate may be exchanged. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First [2, a, i] he shows that necessity is a measure according to reality; and then [2, a, ii], at “For future exchanges etc.,” how currency is a measure according to the provision of law. He says first the statement (981-982) that human need contains everything as a certain measure is explained in this way. When men are so situated among themselves that either both, or at least one, do not need a thing possessed by the other, they do not engage in mutual exchange. But exchange does take place when a man owning grain is in need of wine which his neighbor has, and thus gives the grain for the wine, so that a quantity of grain is allotted according to the value of the wine.
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| Deinde cum dicit: pro futura autem etc., manifestat quomodo denarius mensurat. Circa quod considerandum est, quod si semper homines in praesenti indigerent rebus quas invicem habent, non oporteret fieri commutationem nisi rei ad rem, puta frumenti ad vinum: sed quandoque contingit quod ille cui superabundat vinum ad praesens non indiget frumento quod habet ille qui indiget vino, sed forte postea indigebit vel frumento vel aliqua alia re. Sic ergo pro necessitate futurae commutationis numisma, id est denarius, est nobis quasi fideiussor quod si in praesenti homo nullo indiget sed indigeat in futuro, aderit sibi afferenti denarium illud quo indigebit.
| 986. Then [2, a, ii], at “For future exchanges,” he shows clearly how currency serves as a measure. On this point we must consider that if men always needed immediately the goods they have among themselves, they would have no need of any exchange except of thing for thing, e.g., wine for grain. But sometimes one man (who has a surplus of wine at present) does not need the grain that another man has (who is in need of wine), but perhaps later he will need the grain or some other product. In this way then for the necessity of future exchange, money or currency is, as it were, a surety that if a man has no present need but may want in the future, the thing he needs will be available when he presents the currency.
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| Oportet enim istam esse virtutem denarii, ut quando aliquis ipsum affert, statim contingat accipere illud quo homo indiget. Verum est autem quod etiam denarius patitur hoc idem quod aliae res, quod scilicet non semper pro eo homo accipit quod vult, quia non semper potest aequale, idest non semper est eiusdem valoris; sed tamen taliter debet esse institutus, ut magis permaneat in eodem valore quam aliae res.
| 987. The particular virtue of currency must be that when a man presents it he immediately receives what he needs. However, it is true that currency also suffers the same as other things, viz., that it does not always obtain for a man what he wants because it cannot always be equal or of the same value. Nevertheless it ought to be so established that it retains the same value more permanently than other things.
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| Deinde cum dicit propter quod oportet etc., manifestat quomodo secundum commensurationem denariorum fit commutatio. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit qualiter fit commutatio rerum quae denariis mensurantur. Secundo ostendit secundum quam rationem denarii mensurent, ibi, secundum veritatem quidem et cetera. Tertio ponit quod dictum est in terminis, ibi, domus in quo a et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, propter hoc (quod) denarius diutius manet in suo valore, oportet omnia appretiari denariis. Per hunc enim modum poterit esse commutatio rerum, et per consequens communicatio inter homines. Numisma quidem adaequat res commutabiles, sicut quaedam mensura faciens res commensuratas. Manifestat autem quae dicta sunt per hoc quod communicatio esse non poterit si non sit commutatio: quae non erit, si non constituatur aequalitas in rebus, et si hoc non sit, non erit commensuratio.
| 988. Next [2, b], at “Everything then,” he explains how, by the measure of currency, there is exchange of things which are made commensurate in currency. He discusses this point from three aspects. First [2, b, i] he shows in what manner there is exchange of goods that are measured in currency. Then [2, b, ii], at “It is impossible,” he discloses under what aspect currency serves as a measure. Last, [2, b, iii], at “Let A represent a house,” he puts in terminals what was said. He states first that, because currency as a measure ascertaining quantity retains its value longer, all goods must be evaluated in currency. In this way exchange of goods can take place and, consequently, association among men. Money equates commutable goods, as a certain measure making them commensurate. He clarifies what has been said by stating that association is not possible if there is no exchange. But exchange is impossible unless an equality is established in goods, which in turn cannot exist without commensuration.
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| Deinde cum dicit: secundum veritatem quidem etc., ostendit per quem modum denarii mensurent. Et dicit quod res tam differentes impossibile est commensurari secundum veritatem, idest secundum proprietatem ipsarum rerum; sed per comparationem ad indigentiam hominum sufficienter possunt contineri sub una mensura. Unde oportet esse unum aliquid quo omnia huiusmodi mensurentur, quod quidem non mensurat ex sui natura, sed quia ita positum est inter homines. Unde etiam vocatur nummisma; quod quidem omnia facit commensurata inquantum omnia mensurantur numismate.
| 989. Then [2, b, ii], at “It is impossible,” he shows in what way currency is used as a measure. He says that it is impossible that things so greatly different be made commensurate according to reality, i.e., according to the peculiar nature of the things themselves. But they can be sufficiently contained under one measure by comparison with the needs of men. Hence there must be some one criterion that measures all things of this kind and is not a measure by reason of nature but because so fixed by men. Therefore, this is called money owing to the fact that it makes all things commensurate insofar as they are measured by money.
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| Deinde cum dicit domus in quo a etc., manifestat quod dictum est in terminis, dicens: sit a domus quae valeat quinque mnas, b autem sit lectus qui valeat unam mnam, et sic lectus erit in valore quinta pars domus. Unde manifestum est quot lecti sint aequales in valore uni domui, scilicet quinque. Et manifestum est quod sic fiebat commutatio antequam essent denarii: dabantur enim quinque lecti pro una domo; nihil autem differt utrum dentur pro una domo quinque lecti vel quantum valent quinque lecti.
| 990. At “Let A represent a house” 12, b, iii] he explains in terminals what has been said, stating: let A be a house worth five minae, B a bed worth one mina, and in this way the bed will be one fifth the value of the house. Hence it is obvious how many beds are equal in value to one house, viz., five. Likewise it is obvious that barter took place before there was currency, since five beds have been exchanged for one house. But it makes no difference whether five or the value of five beds are given.
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| Ultimo autem epilogando concludit quod dictum est quid est iustum et quid iniustum.
| 991. He concludes saying that we have now discussed the nature of what is just and what is unjust.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Determinatis autem his et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quomodo iustum sit medium, hic ostendit quomodo iustitia sit medium. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, et quidem iustitia etc.; tertio epilogat quae dicta sunt, ibi: de iustitia quidem igitur et cetera. Quia vero habitus cognoscuntur per actus, circa primum duo facit: primo proponit quomodo operatio iustitiae sit medium. Secundo, quomodo ipsa iustitia sit medium, ibi, iustitia autem medietas et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex praemissis quae determinata sunt, manifestum est quod iusta operatio, quae est actus iustitiae, medium est inter iniustum facere et iniustum pati, quorum alterum est plus habere quam sit sibi debitum, scilicet iniustum facere, alterum autem, scilicet iniustum pati, est minus habere propter hoc quod privatur aliquis eo quod sibi debetur; actus autem iustitiae est facere aequale, quod est medium inter plus et minus; unde manifeste sequitur ex praemissis quod iusta operatio medium est inter iniustum facere et iniustum pati.
| 992. After the Philosopher has shown how the just thing is a mean, now he shows how justice is a mean. On this point he does three things. First [1] he states his intention. Then [2], at “Justice is also etc.,” he proves his statement. Finally [3], at “We have then discussed etc.,” he recapitulates what has been said. Since habits are known by acts, he treats two aspects of the initial point. First [1, a] he proposes that the operation of justice is a mean; and second [1, b], at “But justice etc.,” how justice itself is a mean. He says first that, from previous considerations (978-991), it is evident that a just operation, that is, an operation of justice, is a mean between doing what is unjust and suffering what is unjust. The first is to have more than is due to oneself, i.e., to do an unjust action; but the other, viz., to suffer an unjust thing, is to have too little by reason of the fact that a person has been deprived of what is due him. The act of justice is to do what is equal, i.e., the mean between too much and too little. Obviously then it follows from the premises that a just action is a mean between doing what is unjust and suffering what is unjust.
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| Deinde cum dicit: iustitia autem etc., ostendit qualiter iustitia sit medium. Et dicit, quod iustitia non est medietas eodem modo quo aliae virtutes morales, quarum unaquaeque medietas est inter duas malitias, sicut liberalitas, quae est media inter illiberalitatem et prodigalitatem, sed iustitia non est media inter duas malitias. Potest autem dici medietas effective, inquantum scilicet est constitutiva medii, quia scilicet actus eius est iusta operatio, quae est medium inter iniustum facere et iniustum pati, quorum duorum alterum tantum, scilicet iniustum facere, pertinet ad malitiam, scilicet iniustitiam, quae est extremorum, inquantum accipit sibi plus de bonis et minus de malis; sed iniustum pati, non pertinet ad aliquam malitiam, sed magis est poena.
| 993. Then [i, b], at “But justice,” he explains how justice is a mean, saying that justice is not a mean in the same way as the other moral virtues. Their mean lies between two vices; liberality is a mean between parsimony and extravagance. But justice is not a mean between two vices. However, it can be called a mean by reason of its effect inasmuch as it constitutes a mean, since its act is a just operation which is a mean between doing what is unjust and bearing the unjust. The first of these, active injustice pertains to a vice of injustice which is a habit of extremes inasmuch as it takes for itself too many goods and too few evils. But the other, i.e., the toleration of the injustice is not a vice, but a suffering.
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| Deinde cum dicit: et quidem iustitia etc., probat quod dictum est, scilicet quod iustitia non sit medietas duarum malitiarum, sicut aliae virtutes morales. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo assumit quid sit iustitia. Secundo adiungit quaedam ad concludendum propositum, ibi, iniustificationis autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo proponit quid sit iustitia. Secundo quid sit iniustitia, ibi, iniustitia autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod iustitia est habitus, secundum quem ille qui est iustus, dicitur esse operativus iusti; et hoc secundum electionem; quia sicut supra in secundo dictum est, virtus moralis est habitus electivus. Hoc autem, quod dicitur operativus iusti, potest referri ad iustitiam directivam commutationum, in qua magis apparet ratio iustitiae propter aequalitatem rei: unde addit et distributivus ut comprehendat etiam iustitiam distributivam, quae consistit in aequalitate proportionis.
| 994. Next [2], at “Justice is also,” he proves what was said, viz., that justice is not a middle course between two vices, as is the case with other moral virtues. He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [2, a] he takes up the nature of justice; then [2, b], at “One injustice etc.,” he adds some remarks to bring his subject to a conclusion. He discusses the first point from two aspects. Initially [a, i] he states what justice is; and next [a, ii] at “He does not act etc.,” what in justice is. He says first that justice is a habit by which the just man does the just thing—and this by deliberate choice because, as was previously pointed out in the second book (305, 308, 382), a moral virtue is a habit of correct choice. Doing the just thing can be referred to justice directing exchanges, in which the nature of justice is more apparent by reason of the equality of the thing. Hence he adds an “and to distribute” in order to include also distributive justice, which consists in the equality of proportion.
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| Potest autem aliquis secundum electionem operari iustum tam in commutationibus quam in distributionibus, dupliciter. Uno modo inter se et alterum: et quantum ad hoc dicit: et ipsi - sibi - ad alium; alio modo inter duos alios, quod pertinet ad iudicem vel arbitrum, unde subdit et alteri ad alterum. Quomodo autem iustus operetur iustum, manifestat per exclusionem contrarii, subdens: quod non sic facit, quod de rebus eligibilibus, puta divitiis et honoribus, plus conferat sibi et minus proximo; et de rebus nocivis, idest laboriosis et poenalibus, e converso plus proximo quam sibi; sed aequaliter secundum proportionem; et hoc observat non solum inter se et alium, sed etiam inter duos alios.
| 995. A man can do the just thing by choice, both in exchanges and in distributions, in two ways. In one way he does this between himself and another, and touching this point Aristotle says “both to himself in relation to his neighbor.” In the second way a man does this between two others—this pertains to a judge or an-arbiter—and so the Philosopher adds “and to one man in relation to another.” He explains, by exclusion of the contrary, how the just man does a just deed. He adds that the just man does not so act that in regard to desirable things (for example, riches and honors) he bestows more on himself and less on his neighbor, and in regard to harmful things (i.e., burdensome and painful), on the contrary, more on his neighbor than himself; but he makes an equal distribution according to proportion—a thing he observes not only between himself and another but also between two others.
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| Deinde cum dicit: iniustitia autem etc., proponit quid sit iniustitia; et dicit quod iniustitia e contrario est habitus secundum electionem operativus iniusti: quod quidem contingit in superabundantia vel defectu rerum utilium vel nocivarum, quas accipit praeter debitam proportionem. Propter quod sicut iustitia dicitur medietas, quia est operativa medii, ita etiam iniustitia dicitur superabundantia et defectus quia est factiva superabundantiae et defectus, ita quidem, quod iniustus attribuit sibiipsi superabundantiam rerum quae sunt simpliciter utiles, defectum autem rerum nocivarum; sed aliis quidem similiter attribuunt totum, idest superabundantiam et defectum, sed non in eisdem; sed defectum quidem utilium, superabundantiam vero nocivorum. Nec est determinatum qualiter iniustitia debitam proportionem relinquat, idest quantum plus vel quantum minus debito accipiat; sed hoc facit qualitercumque contingit, idest prout sibi occurrit.
| 996. At “He does not act” [a, ii] he presents the nature of injustice. He affirms that on the contrary injustice is a habit which does by choice what is unjust. This happens by excess or defect of useful or harmful things which the just man accepts according to due proportion. Hence, as justice is called a mean because it produces a mean, so also injustice is called excess and defect because it produces excess and defect in such a way that the unjust man bestows on himself an excess of things which are simply useful but a deficiency of things which are harmful. In a similar way he attributes to others both excess and defect, however not of the same things, but a defect of the useful and an excess of the harmful. Nevertheless, it has not been determined in what way injustice may depart from the proper proportion, i.e., how much more or how much less it may accept than is due. But injustice does this, howsoever it may happen.
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| Deinde cum dicit iniustificationis autem etc., adiungit quaedam necessaria ad concludendum propositum. Et dicit, quod duplex est iniustificatio: una quidem quae consistit in minus habere de bonis, ad quam refertur plus habere de malis, quod est eiusdem rationis: et hoc est iniustum pati. Alia autem iniustificatio est habere maius in bonis et minus in malis, et hoc est iniustum facere.
| 997. Next [2, b], at “One injustice,” he adds some remarks required to conclude the subject. He says there is a twofold injustice: one consists in a lack of beneficial things, and indicates an excess of onerous things-which amounts to the same. This is to suffer what is unjust. The other injustice is to have an excess of beneficial things and a lack of onerous things-and this is to do an injustice.
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| Ex his ergo potest sic argumentari: ad iniustitiam pertinet iniustum facere: sed habere minus in bonis vel plus in malis, non est iniustum facere sed iniustum pati; ergo hoc non pertinet ad malitiam iniustitiae. Iustitia vero est medium inter plus habere et minus habere, ut supra habitum est; ergo iustitia non est media inter duas malitias.
| 998. From what has been said we can come to three conclusions. To do an unjust act pertains to injustice. However, to have a lack of benefits or an excess of burdens is not to do what is unjust but to suffer what is unjust. Therefore this does not pertain to the vice of injustice. But justice is a mean between having too much and too little, as was pointed out before (992, 993). Consequently, injustice is not a mean between two vices.
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| Deinde cum dicit: de iustitia quidem igitur etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt. Et dicit dictum esse de iustitia et iniustitia quae sit natura utriusque; et similiter de iusto et iniusto in universali; nam quosdam particulares modos iusti et iniusti postea determinabit.
| 999. Then [3], at “We have then discussed,” he concludes by recapitulating what has been said. He affirms that we have discussed justice and injustice and the nature of both. Likewise we have treated what is just and what is unjust in a general way, for he will determine afterwards (1000-1008) certain particular modes of what is just and unjust.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Quia autem est iniustum facientem et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de iustitia et iusto et oppositis horum absolute, hic determinat de eis per comparationem ad subiectum, ostendendo scilicet qualiter aliquis, faciendo iniustum, fiat iniustus. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo determinat veritatem. Secundo movet quasdam dubitationes circa praedeterminata, ibi, dubitabit autem utique aliquis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo movet quaestionem. Secundo interponit quaedam, quae sunt necessaria ad quaestionis solutionem, ibi, oportet autem non latere et cetera. Tertio solvit quaestionem, ibi, existentibus autem iustis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo movet quaestionem intentam. Secundo ostendit quamdam aliam quaestionem prius esse determinatam, ibi: qualiter quidem igitur habet et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod contingit aliquem, qui facit aliquam rem iniustam, nondum esse iniustum. Et ideo quaerendum est quales iniustificationes, idest operationes iniustorum oporteat esse ad hoc quod ille qui facit iniusta, iam sit iniustus in unaquaque specie iniustitiae, puta furti, vel adulterii, vel latrocinii: vel potest dici, removendo praedicta, quod sic quidem nihil differt, id est quod nihil differt ad hoc quod homo sit iniustus secundum qualescumque operationes iniusta faciat.
| 1000. After the Philosopher has treated justice and the unjust thing in themselves together with their opposites, now he treats them in comparison with their subject, showing how a man in doing an unjust action becomes unjust. He handles this point under two headings. First [I] he determines the truth. Then [Lect. 14, [II], at “Someone may raise etc.” (B. 1136 a 10), he raises some doubts about matters previously settled. He discusses the initial point from three aspects. First [A] he asks a question. Next [B], at “We must not forget etc.,” he interposes some subjects necessary for a solution of the question. Finally [Lect. 13, C], at “Since just and unjust etc.” (B. 1135 a 15), he answers the question. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [A, A’] he presents the question. Then [A, B’], at “We have previously etc.,” he shows that another question was settled previously. He says first that a person who does an unjust action still may not be unjust. Therefore, we must inquire into the characteristics of injustice, i.e., the actions of unjust men must be of such a type that the man who does unjust deeds is already unjust in that particular species of injustice, for example, theft or adultery or robbery. Or, passing over the cases just mentioned, can it be said that for a man to be unjust it makes no difference in what actions he may act unjustly?
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| Ideo autem quaesitum est secundum quales iniustificationes, quia multipliciter contingit aliquem facere iniustum, quia contingit, quod aliquis commiscetur mulieri, quae est uxor alterius, non ignorans personam, quod faceret involuntarium, sed sciens cui commiscetur, non tamen hoc facit ex electione sed ex passione. Talis igitur facit quidem rem iniustam, non tamen videtur esse iniustus, quia non operatur ex electione; sicut etiam in speciali possumus dicere, quod aliquis non est fur licet sit furatus, quia non ex electione, et similiter non est moechus licet sit moechatus; et similis ratio est in aliis.
| 1001. For this reason we ask with what kind of injustice it occurs, because the doing of an unjust action takes place in many ways. A man may have sexual intercourse with a woman, the wife of another, and not be ignorant who the person is (ignorance could cause an involuntary) but know with whom he is having intercourse, and still not perform the act by deliberate choice but by passion. Such a man does an unjust act although he does not seem to be unjust because he does not act by deliberate choice. So also we can say in a particular case that a man is not a thief although he has stolen, since he did not commit theft by deliberate choice. In a similar way a man is not an adulterer although he has committed adultery. The same idea is found in other matters.
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| Deinde cum dicit: qualiter quidem igitur etc., ostendit quamdam dubitationem iam esse solutam; scilicet qualiter se habeat contrapassum ad iustum, de quo prius dictum est.
| 1002. Then [A, B’], at “We have previously,” he shows that a particular doubt has already been solved, viz., in what way reciprocation is related to justice—a point we discussed previously (971-972).
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| Deinde cum dicit: oportet autem non latere etc., interponit quaedam, quae sunt necessaria ad solutionem propositae quaestionis. Et primo quid sit simpliciter iustum. Secundo quid sit iustificatio, ibi, differt autem iniustificatio et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur propositum, ibi, hoc autem est et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ad evidentiam quaestionis, qua quaeritur quali operatione aliquis faciens iustum vel iniustum sit iustus vel iniustus, oportet non latere quod iustum, de quo nunc quaeritur est iustum simpliciter, quod est iustum politicum.
| 1003. Next [B], at “We must not forget,” he interposes some subjects that are necessary for the solution of the proposed question: first [B, A’] what is justice in the absolute sense; and second [Lect. 12; B, B’] at “There is a difference etc.” (B.1135 a 9), what is unjust action. He handles the initial point in a twofold fashion. First [A’, 1] he states his intention. Then [A’, 2] at “The latter consists etc.,” he carries out his intention. He says first that for a clear understanding of the question (in which we seek by what actions a man who does a just or an unjust act is said to be just or unjust) we must not forget the fact that the justice sought is justice in the absolute sense which is political justice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: hoc autem est etc., exequitur propositum. Et primo ostendit quid sit iustum politicum. Secundo dividit ipsum ibi, politici autem iusti et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit, scilicet quid sit iustum politicum. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, est enim iustum, quibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quid sit iustum politicum. Secundo concludit, quod sunt quaedam alia iusta ab hoc differentia, ibi, quare quantis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod iustum politicum consistit in quadam communitate vitae quae ordinatur ad hoc, quod sit per se sufficientia eorum quae ad vitam humanam pertinent. Et talis est communitas civitatis, in qua debent omnia inveniri quae sufficiant humanae vitae. Hoc autem iustum consistit in liberis non autem in servis, quia dominorum ad servos non est politicum iustum sed dominativum, ut infra dicetur; consistit etiam iustum politicum in personis aequalibus, id est quarum una non subditur alteri naturali ordine vel civili, sicut filius patri, inter quos, ut infra dicetur, non est politicum iustum sed paternum.
| 1004. Then [A’, 2], at “The latter consists’ “ he carries out his intention. First [2, a] he shows what political justice is. Then [Lect. XII; 2, b], at “One kind of political justice etc.” (B. 1134 b 18), he divides it. He treats the initial point under two aspects. First [a, i] he proposes what he intends, viz., what political justice is Next [a, ii], at “For justice exists etc.,’; he explains his intention. He discusses the first point under two headings. Initially [i, x] he shows what political justice is. Second [i, y], at “Therefore, among those persons etc.,” he concludes that there are other kinds of justice differing from this. He says first that political justice consists in a community of life that is ordered to a self-sufficiency of the things pertaining to human living. And the state-community should be such that everything sufficient for the needs of human life is found in it. This justice is found in free men, not slaves, because masters exercise towards slaves not political justice but the justice of dominion, of which more later (1006-1012). However, political justice is encountered with persons who are equal, i.e., one of whom is not subject to the other in the natural or political order, as a son to a father between whom there is no question of political justice but of paternal right.
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| Hoc autem iustum politicum, vel est secundum proportionalitatem, idest secundum aequalitatem proportionis quantum ad iustitiam distributivam; vel secundum numerum, id est secundum aequalitatem numeralis quantitatis, quantum ad iustitiam commutativam.
| 1005. This political justice is either according to proportionality, i.e., proportional equality pertaining to distributive justice, or numerical equality, i.e., the equality of numerical quantity pertaining to commutative justice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quare quantis etc., concludit quaedam alia iusta a praedicto differentia; dicens, quod ex quo iustum politicum consistit in liberis et aequalibus, quibuscumque non inest hoc, scilicet quod sint liberi et aequales, his non est adinvicem politicum iustum, quod est iustum simpliciter, sed quoddam iustum, idest dominativum vel paternum, quod est iustum secundum quid, in quantum habet aliquam similitudinem politici iusti.
| 1006. Next [i, y], at “Therefore, among those persons,” he concludes there are other kinds of justice differing from that just mentioned. He states that-since political justice exists among the free and equal—in people who do not have this (that they are free and equal) there is not found political justice, which is unqualified justice, but a peculiar justice, viz., of a master or father, which is a qualified justice inasmuch as it has some likeness to political justice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: est enim (iustum,) quibus etc., manifestat quod dictum est. Et primo quantum ad iustum politicum, quod est iustum simpliciter. Secundo quantum ad iustum dominativum vel paternum, quod est iustum secundum quid, ibi, dominativum autem iustum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo manifestat quod dictum est, scilicet quod iustum politicum sit in liberis et aequalibus. Secundo infert quaedam corollaria ex dictis, ibi, propter quod non sinimus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod ideo dictum est quod iustum politicum est in liberis et aequalibus, quia cum iustum politicum determinetur lege, necesse est quod in illis sit ad quos datur lex. Lex autem non datur principaliter pro servis, qui cohibentur a dominis, neque pro filiis qui cohibentur a patribus, sed pro liberis et aequalibus; unde in talibus est politicum iustum. Quod autem in illis sit politicum iustum ad quos datur lex, manifestum est per hoc, quod iustitia et iniustitia in eisdem sunt; lex autem ad illos se extendit in quibus potest esse iniustitia; quod patet ex hoc, quod vindicta, quae fit secundum legem, nihil aliud est quam iudicium de iusto et iniusto.
| 1007. At “For justice exists” [a, ii], he clarifies his statement: first [ii, x] in regard to political justice, which is unqualified justice; second [ii, y] in regard to justice of a master or a father, which is qualified justice, at “However, the justice of a master etc.” First [x, aa] he clarifies his statement, viz., that political justice is in free and equal persons. Next [x, bb], at “For this reason we do not etc.,” he draws some corollaries from the premises. He says first-as has been pointed out (1004).that political justice is in the free and equal because, being determined by law, it necessarily is found in those for whom the law is enacted. But law is enacted principally not for slaves who are restrained by masters nor for children who are restrained by fathers but for the free and equal. That political justice exists in men of this kind, for whom law is enacted, is obvious from this that justice and injustice exist in them. Now, law extends to persons in whom there can be injustice. This is clear from the fact that punishment, which is fixed by law, is nothing other than a judgment about what is just and unjust.
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| Et ex quo lex est, in quibus est iniustitia, sequitur quod sit in quibus est iniustum et per consequens in quibus est iustum, quia in quibuscumque est iniustitia, in his invenitur iniustum facere, sed non convertitur. Dictum est enim in secundo, quod contingit aliquem facere virtuosa absque virtute et similiter vitiosa absque habitu vitii: hoc autem iniustum nihil est aliud quam quod aliquis attribuat sibiipsi plus de his quae sunt simpliciter et absolute bona, sicut sunt divitiae et honores, et minus de his quae sunt simpliciter et absolute mala, sicut sunt contraria praedictorum.
| 1008. From this statement—the law exists for those between whom justice exists—it follows that it is for those between whom there is unjust action and for those between whom there is Just action. The reason is that in whomsoever there is injustice, in these the performance of an unjust act is found but not the reverse. It was pointed out in the second book (252-253) that the doing of a virtuous action may take place without virtue, and likewise the doing of vicious actions without the habit of vice. An unjust act arises from the fact that a person should attribute to himself too many of those things which are absolutely and of themselves good, like riches and too few of those things which are simply and of themselves evil, as the opposite of these.
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| Deinde cum dicit propter quod non sinimus etc., infert tria correlaria ex praedictis. Et primo dicit quod quia iniustum est quod aliquis sibi plus attribuat de bonis et minus de malis, inde est quod in recta gubernatione multitudinis non permittimus quod homines principentur, scilicet secundum voluntatem et passiones humanas, sed quod principetur ratio, id est lex quae est dictamen rationis, vel homo qui secundum rationem agat, quia, si princeps sequatur passiones humanas, faciet hoc sibi, scilicet, quod plus accipiet de bonis et minus de malis, et ita fiet tyrannus, quum hoc sit contra rationem principis. Ad hoc enim princeps institutus est ut custodiat iustitiam, et per consequens aequalitatem quam praeterit, dum sibi usurpat plus de bonis et minus de malis.
| 1009. Next [x, bb], at “For this reason we do not permit,” he draws three corollaries from the premises. First [bb, a’] he says that because injustice consists in this that a man attributes to himself too many of the benefits and too few of the burdens, it follows that in good government of the multitude we do not permit that men should rule, that is, according to whim and human passion but that the law, which is a dictate of reason, should rule man, or that man who acts according to reason should rule. The explanation is that if a prince follows human passions he will do this for himself; he will take more of the good things and less of the burdensome and so become a tyrant, although this is contrary to the concept of a prince. A prince was given the office to observe justice, and consequently equality, which he passes over when he usurps for himself too many beneficial and too few onerous things.
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| Secundum corollarium ponit ibi quia autem nihil ipsi et cetera. Et dicit, quod quia princeps, si sit iustus, nihil plus sibi attribuit de simpliciter bonis quam aliis nisi forte secundum debitam proportionem distributivae iustitiae, inde est, quod princeps non laborat ad utilitatem suam sed aliorum. Et propter hoc supra dictum est, quod iustitia legalis, secundum quam princeps gubernat multitudinem, est alienum bonum.
| 1010. He gives the second corollary [bb, b’] at “Since a prince.” He affirms that since a prince—if he is just—attributes no more of the good things to himself than to others (unless perhaps according to a proper ratio of distributive justice), it follows that he does not labor for the advantage of himself but of others. Because of this it was said before (909) that legal justice, by which the prince rules the multitude of the people, is the good of another.
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| Tertium corollarium ponit ibi merces ergo et cetera. Manifestum est enim, quod quilibet debet dare mercedem ei qui pro se laborat. Quia ergo princeps laborat pro multitudine, danda est ei merces a multitudine, scilicet honor et gloria, quae sunt maxima bonorum quae ab hominibus dari possunt; si autem sint aliqui principes, quibus ista non sufficiant pro mercede sed quaerant lucra, isti fiunt iniusti et tyranni. Super hanc autem mercedem ab hominibus exhibitam boni principes expectant mercedem a Deo.
| 1011. He presents the third corollary at “Consequently a reward” [bb, c]. It is clear that everyone should reward the man who labors for him. Therefore, since the prince labors for the multitude, a reward should be given by the multitude, namely, honor and glory, which are the greatest goods that can be offered by men. But if there are some princes who are not satisfied with these for a reward but seek wealth, they are unjust and tyrannical. Over and above this reward proffered by man, good princes look for a reward from God.
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| Deinde cum dicit dominativum autem iustum etc., manifestat quod supradictum est de eo quod non est iustum simpliciter, sed secundum similitudinem. Et primo quantum ad iustum dominativum et paternum. Secundo quantum ad iustum quod est viri ad uxorem, ibi, propter quod magis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit quod dominativum iustum, quod scilicet est domini ad servum, et paternum, quod scilicet est patris ad filium, non est idem his iustis quae sunt politica; sed habet aliquam similitudinem cum eis, secundum quod aliqualiter est ad alterum.
| 1012. Then [ii, y], at “However, the justice of a master,” he explains what was indicated previously about the fact that this is not justice in the absolute sense but by similitude. First [y, aa] (he explains) in regard to the justice of a master and of a father; and second [y, bb], at “Hence justice concerns etc.,” in regard to justice which belongs to a husband in relation to a wife. On the prior point he does three things. First [aa, a’] he proposes what he intends, saying that the justice of a master, i.e., of a lord over a slave, and paternal justice, i.e., of a father over a son, are not the same as political justice but have some likeness to it according as it has a relation to another in a way.
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| Secundo ibi: non enim est iniustitia etc., ostendit quod dictum est, quantum ad hoc, quod dominativum vel paternum iustum non est simpliciter iustum: manifestum est enim, quod non potest esse simpliciter iniustitia hominis ad ea quae sunt ipsius, sicut neque iustitia, quia utrumque est ad alterum. Sed servus est domini sicut possessio, et filius quousque est pelicon, idest magnus, et separetur a patre, per emancipationem, est quasi quaedam pars patris. Et quod non sit iniustitia ad seipsum, patet per hoc, quod nullus eligit nocere sibiipsi. Unde patet quod simpliciter loquendo non est iustum vel iniustum ad filium vel servum.
| 1013. Second [aa, b’], at “Toward one’s own things,” he explains what was pointed out regarding this that the justice of a master or of a father is not justice without qualification. It is evident that injustice cannot exist in an unqualified way for a man in regard to the things belonging to him, and neither can justice, because both have a relation to another. But the slave belongs to the master as a chattel, and a son is—so to speak—a part of the father until he is a certain age or mature and separated from the father by emancipation. That there is no injustice toward oneself is clear from the fact that no one chooses to injure himself. Hence it is obvious that absolutely speaking there is no justice or injustice towards a son or a slave.
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| Tertio ibi: neque iustum politicum etc., ostendit, quod dominativum et paternum iustum, etiam si esset simpliciter iustum, non esset politicum iustum, quia iustum politicum est secundum legem, et in quibus nata est esse lex. Et huiusmodi sunt illi quibus competit aequalitas quantum ad hoc quod est principari et subici, ita scilicet quod unus eorum non subicitur alteri, sicut servus subiicitur domino, et filius patri. Unde in his non est politicum iustum.
| 1014. Third [aa, c’], at “Nor is political justice,” he explains that even if the justice of a master and of a father would be justice without qualification, it would not be political justice because political justice is according to the law and in those for whom the law is designed by its nature. Such are those persons who have equality in regard to ruling and being ruled; but of these one is subject to another, e.g., a slave to a master and a son to a father. Hence political justice does not exist in these matters.
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| Deinde cum dicit: propter quod magis etc., determinat de iusto uxorio; et dicit, quod quia uxor minus est subiecta viro quam servus domino, vel filius patri; ideo plus habet de ratione iusti illud quod est viri ad uxorem quam id quod est patris ad natos, id est filios, et domini ad possessiones idest servos. Iustum enim quod est viri ad uxorem est oeconomicum, quia vir praeest in domo sicut princeps in civitate. Hoc tamen iustum oeconomicum est alterum a politico, sicut domus est aliud a civitate.
| 1015. Then [y, bb], at “Hence justice concerns,” he treats justice pertaining to a wife. He says that because a wife is less subject to a husband than a slave to a master or a son to a father, therefore the relation of a husband to a wife has more of the nature of justice than the relation of a father to his children, and of a master to his chattels or slaves. The justice that belongs to a husband in regard to a wife is domestic because the husband is the head of the home, as the prince of the state. However, domestic justice is different from political, as the home is different from the state.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Politici autem iusti et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quale sit politicum iustum, quod est simpliciter iustum, hic ponit divisionem huius iusti politici. Et primo dividit iustum politicum in species. Secundo tangit divisionem huius iusti in individua, ibi, iustorum autem, et legalium et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit divisionem. Secundo exponit eam, ibi, naturale quidem et cetera. Tertio excludit errorem contra divisionem praedictam, ibi: videtur autem quibusdam et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod politicum iustum dividitur in duo: quorum unum est iustum naturale, aliud autem iustum legale. Est autem haec eadem divisio cum divisione quam iuristae ponunt, quod iuris aliud est naturale, aliud est positivum; idem enim nominant illi ius quod Aristotiles iustum, nam et Isidorus dicit in libro Etymologiarum, quod ius dicitur quasi iustum. Videtur autem esse contrarietas quantum ad hoc, quod politicum idem est quod civile; et sic id quod apud philosophum ponitur ut divisum, apud iuristas videtur poni ut dividens, nam ius civile ponunt partem iuris positivi.
| 1016. After the Philosopher has shown the nature of political justice, i.e., unqualified justice, now [b] he makes a division of it. First [i] he divides political justice into species. Then [ii], at “Particular just and legal things etc.,” he touches upon the division of this justice into individual parts. He discusses the first point from three aspects. First [x] he proposes the division. Next [y], at “Natural justice etc.,” he explains it. Last [z], at “Some people were etc.,” he rejects an error opposed to the division. He says first that there is a twofold division of political justice: natural justice, and legal justice. This is the same as the division that the jurists make, namely, that one kind of right is natural and the other positive. They call right the very thing that Aristotle calls the just object. Isadore too says in Libri Etymologiarum (Bk. V, Ch. 3) that right is as it were what is just. But there seems to be inconsistency in that political is the same as civil. In this way what the Philosopher considers the whole division seems to be considered by the jurists as a part of the division, for they make civil law a part of positive law.
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| Sed attendendum est, quod aliter sumitur politicum vel civile hic apud philosophum et aliter apud iuristas; philosophus enim hic nominat politicum iustum vel civile ex usu, quo scilicet cives utuntur; iuristae autem nominant ius politicum vel civile ex causa, quod scilicet civitas aliqua sibi constituit, et ideo convenienter hic a philosopho nominatur legale, idest lege positum, quod et illi dicunt positivum; convenienter autem per haec duo dividitur iustum politicum, utuntur enim cives iusto et eo quod natura menti humanae indidit, et eo quod est positum lege.
| 1017. But we must take into account that political or civil is taken here in one way by the Philosopher and in another way by the jurists. The Philosopher here calls justice political or civil from the usage the citizens are accustomed to, but the jurists call right political or civil from the cause, viz., that some city has decreed for itself. For this reason the Philosopher appropriately designates legal or posited by law that which they call positive. Political justice then is properly divided by means of these two, for the citizens use justice to the extent that it is imparted to the human mind by nature and to the extent that it is posited by law.
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| Deinde cum dicit: naturale quidem etc., manifestat membra divisionis praemissae. Et primo manifestat iustum naturale dupliciter. Uno modo secundum effectum vel virtutem, dicens quod iustum naturale est quod habet ubique eandem potentiam, id est virtutem, ad inducendum ad bonum et ad arcendum a malo. Quod quidem contingit eo quod natura, quae est causa huius iusti, eadem est ubique apud omnes, iustum vero quod est ex positione alicuius civitatis vel principis apud illos tantum est virtuosum, qui subduntur iurisdictioni illius civitatis vel principis. Alio modo manifestat hoc iustum secundum causam, cum dicit, quod iustum naturale non consistit in videri vel non videri, idest non oritur ex aliqua opinione humana, sed ex natura. Sicut enim in speculativis sunt quaedam naturaliter cognita, ut principia indemonstrabilia et quae sunt propinqua his; quaedam vero studio hominum adinventa, ita etiam in operativis sunt quaedam principia naturaliter cognita quasi indemonstrabilia principia et propinqua his, ut malum esse vitandum, nulli esse iniuste nocendum, non esse furandum et similia, alia vero sunt per industriam hominum excogitata, quae dicuntur hic iusta legalia.
| 1018. Then [y], at “Natural justice,” he indicates the parts of the preceding, division. First [y, aa] he explains natural justice in two ways: in one way according to its effect or power, saying that that justice is natural which everywhere has the same force and power to induce to good and prevent evil. This happens because nature, the cause of this justice, is the same everywhere among all men. But justice by the decree of a state or prince has force only among those who are subject to the jurisdiction of that state or prince. In the other way he explains this justice according to its cause, when he says that natural justice does not consist in what seems or does not seem to be, i.e., it does not arise from human conjecture but from nature. In speculative matters there are some things naturally known, like indemonstrable principles, and truths closely connected with them; there are other things discovered by human ingenuity, and conclusions flowing from these. Likewise in practical matters there are some principles naturally known as it were, indemonstrable principles and truths related to them, as evil must be avoided, no one is to be unjustly injured, theft must not be committed and so on; others are devised by human diligence which are here called just legal enactments.
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| Est autem considerandum, quod iustum naturale est ad quod hominem natura inclinat. Attenditur autem in homine duplex natura. Una quidem, secundum quod est animal, quae est sibi aliisque animalibus communis; alia autem est natura hominis quae est propria sibi inquantum est homo, prout scilicet secundum rationem discernit turpe et honestum. Iuristae autem illud tantum dicunt ius naturale, quod consequitur inclinationem naturae communis homini et aliis animalibus, sicut coniunctio maris et feminae, educatio natorum, et alia huiusmodi. Illud autem ius, quod consequitur propriam inclinationem naturae humanae, inquantum scilicet homo est rationale animal, vocant ius gentium, quia eo omnes gentes utuntur, sicut quod pacta sint servanda, quod legati etiam apud hostes sint tuti, et alia huiusmodi. Utrumque autem horum comprehenditur sub iusto naturali, prout hic a philosopho accipitur.
| 1019. We must consider that that justice is natural to which nature inclines men. But a twofold nature is observed in man. One, is that which is common to him and other animals. The other nature belongs to man properly inasmuch as he is man, as he distinguishes the disgraceful: from the honorable by reason. However, jurists call only that right natural which follows the inclination of nature common to man and other animals, as the union of male and female, the education of offspring, and so forth. But the right which follows the inclination proper to the nature of man, i.e., precisely as he is a rational animal, the jurists call the right of the peoples (jus gentium) because all people are accustomed to follow it, for example, that agreements are to be kept, legates are safe among enemies, and so on. Both of these, though, are included under natural justice as it is here taken by the Philosopher.
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| Secundo ibi: legale autem etc., manifestat iustum legale. Et videtur ponere tres differentias huius iusti. Quarum prima est: cum universaliter vel communiter aliquid lege ponitur; et quantum ad hoc dicit quod legale iustum dicitur quod ex principio quidem, scilicet antequam lege statuatur, nihil differt utrum sic vel aliter fiat: sed quando iam ponitur, idest statuitur lege, tunc differt, quia hoc servare est iustum, praeterire iniustum. Sicut in aliqua civitate statutum est quod captivus redimatur mna, quocumque scilicet certo pretio, et quod sacrificetur capra, non autem quod sacrificentur duae oves.
| 1020. Next [y, bb ],at “That is called legal justice,” he explains legal justice and seems to give three differences in justice of this kind. The first is this: when something is universally or commonly imposed by law it becomes legal. Regarding this he says that that justice is called legal which in the beginning, i.e., before it becomes law, is indifferent whether something is done in this way or that, but when it is laid down, i.e., enacted into law, then a difference arises because observing it is just, disregarding it is unjust. Thus in some state it has been decreed that a prisoner may be redeemed at a fixed price and that a goat should be offered in sacrifice but that two sheep are not to be sacrificed.
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| Alia vero differentia iusti legalis est, secundum quod aliquid lege statuitur in aliquo singulari; puta cum civitas vel princeps alicui personae concedit aliquod privilegium, quod dicitur lex privata. Et quantum ad hoc dicit: quod adhuc sunt iusta legalia, non solum illa quae communiter statuuntur, sed quaecumque homines ponunt pro lege in aliquibus singularibus; sicut in quadam civitate statutum est quod sacrificetur cuidam mulieri, nomine Brasidae, quae magnam utilitatem civitati attulerat.
| 1020. The second difference in legal justice is that something is stated by law in a particular case, for instance, when a state or a prince grants some privilege—called a private law—to an individual person. Touching this point he says there are also legal enactments, not those that are decreed in a general way but whatever are prescribed by legislators as law in individual cases. It was enacted, for example, in a particular state that sacrifice should be offered to a woman named Brasidas who rendered great service to the state.
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| Tertia differentia iusti legalis est, prout sententiae a iudicibus datae dicuntur quaedam iusta legalia. Et quantum ad hoc subdit, quod etiam sententialia sunt iusta legalia.
| 1022. The third difference in legal justice is that sentences passed by judges are called a kind of legal justice. In regard to this he adds that the decrees of judges are also legal enactments.
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| Est autem hic considerandum, quod iustum legale sive positivum oritur semper a naturali, ut Tullius dicit in sua rhetorica. Dupliciter tamen aliquid potest oriri a iure naturali. Uno modo sicut conclusio ex principiis; et sic ius positivum vel legale non potest oriri a iure naturali; praemissis enim existentibus, necesse est conclusionem esse; sed cum iustum naturale sit semper et ubique, ut dictum est, hoc non competit iusto legali vel positivo. Et ideo necesse est quod quicquid ex iusto naturali sequitur, quasi conclusio, sit iustum naturale; sicut ex hoc quod est nulli esse iniuste nocendum, sequitur non esse furandum, quod item ad ius naturale pertinet. Alio modo oritur aliquid ex iusto naturali per modum determinationis; et sic omnia iusta positiva vel legalia ex iusto naturali oriuntur. Sicut furem esse puniendum est iustum naturale, sed quod sit etiam puniendum tali vel tali poena, hoc est lege positum.
| 1023. But here we must take into consideration that legal or positive justice always has its origin in natural justice, as Cicero says in his Rhetoric [Rhetorica, De Inventione, lib. II, cap. 53]. Origin from natural right can occur in two ways: in one way as a conclusion from a principle, and in such a manner positive or legal right cannot originate from natural right. The reason is that once the premises are stated the conclusion necessarily follows. But since natural justice exists always and everywhere, as has been pointed out (1018), this is not applicable to legal or positive justice. On this account it is necessary that whatever follows from natural justice as a conclusion will be natural justice. Thus, from the fact that no one should be unjustly injured it follows that theft must not be committed—this belongs to natural justice. In the other way something can originate from natural justice after the manner of a determination, and thus all positive or legal justice arises from natural justice. For example, that a thief be punished is natural justice but that he be punished by such and such a penalty is legal justice.
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| Attendendum est etiam quod iustum legale dupliciter oritur a naturali secundum modum praedictum. Uno modo cum permixtione. Alio modo sine permixtione alicuius humani erroris, et hoc etiam exempla Aristotilis demonstrant; naturaliter enim iustum est quod civi non ob suam culpam oppresso subveniatur et per consequens quod captivus redimatur: taxatio autem pretii, quae pertinet ad iustum legale, procedit ex praedicto iusto naturali absque omni errore. Est etiam naturale iustum quod benefactori honor exhibeatur; sed quod honor divinus exhibeatur homini est ex errore humano et tale est quod sacrificetur Brasidae. Sententialia vero iusta sunt applicationes iustorum legalium ad particularia facta.
| 1024. Also we must consider here that legal justice has its origin in two ways from natural justice in the preceding manner. In one way it exists with an admixture of some human error, and in the other without such error. Aristotle explains this by examples. It is natural justice that a citizen who is oppressed without any fault on his part should be aided, and consequently that a prisoner should be ransomed, but the fixing of the price pertains to legal justice which proceeds from natural justice without error. Likewise it is natural justice that honor be bestowed on a benefactor but that divine honor be given him—that he be offered sacrifice—arises from human error. But the just decrees of judges are applications of legal justice to particular cases.
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| Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem etc., excludit errorem contra praedictam divisionem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit errorem cum sua ratione. Secundo solvit, ibi, hoc autem non est et cetera. Tertio movet quamdam quaestionem ex solutione ortam. Dicit ergo primo quod quibusdam visum est quod omnia iusta sint talia, scilicet lege posita, ita quod nihil sit iustum naturale. Quae quidem fuit opinio Cirenaeorum, sectatorum Aristipi Socratici. Et movebantur tali ratione: quia illud quod est secundum naturam est immobile et ubicumque sit habet eamdem virtutem, (sicut patet de igne qui ardet et in Graecia et in Perside, quod non videtur esse verum circa iusta, quia omnia iusta videntur aliquando esse mota. Nihil enim videtur esse magis iustum quam quod deponenti depositum reddatur; et tamen non est reddendum depositum furioso reposcenti gladium vel proditori patriae reposcenti pecunias ad arma: sic ergo videtur quod nulla sint naturaliter iusta.
| 1025. At “Some people were of the opinion” [z] he rejects an error opposed to this division. On this point he does three things. First [z, aa] he proposes the error together with the reason for it. Second [z, bb], at “However, that opinion etc.,” he refutes it. Last [z, cc], at “Among the things etc.,” he asks a question occasioned by the refutation. He says first that some were of the opinion that all justice is that which is established by law and there is then no natural justice. This was the opinion of the followers of the Socratic philosopher Aristippus. They were influenced by this reason: that which is according to nature is invariable, and wherever it is it has the same force, as is obvious fire burns in Greece as well as in Persia. Apparently this is not true of justice because all just things seem to be changed at times. Nothing seems to be more just than that a deposit should be returned to the owner. Nevertheless the return must not be made to a madman demanding his sword or to a traitor to his country demanding money for arms. So then it seems that there is nothing just by nature.
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| Deinde cum dicit: hoc autem non est etc., ponit solutionem. Et dicit quod id quod dictum est quod naturalia sint immobilia, non ita se habet universaliter, sed aliquo modo est verum; quia natura rerum divinarum nequaquam aliter se habet, puta substantiarum separatarum et caelestium corporum, quae antiqui deos vocabant; sed apud nos homines, qui inter res corruptibiles sumus, est aliquid quidem secundum naturam, et tamen quicquid est in nobis est mutabile vel per se vel per accidens. Nihilominus tamen est in nobis aliquid naturale sicut habere pedes, et aliquid non naturale, sicut habere tunicam, et sic etiam, licet omnia quae sunt apud nos iusta aliqualiter moveantur, nihilominus tamen quaedam eorum sunt naturaliter iusta.
| 1026. Then [z, bb], at “However, that opinion,” he provides a refutation, saying that the statement that natural things are unchangeable is not so universally but is true in some respect. The reason is that the nature of divine things never changes, for example, the nature of separated substances and of the heavenly bodies, which the ancients called gods. But with us humans, who’ are counted among perishable things, there is something according to nature and yet whatever is in us is changeable either intrinsically or extrinsically. Moreover, there is in us something natural like having two feet, and something not natural like having a coat. Undoubtedly all the things that are just among us are variable, although some of them are naturally just.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quale autem natura etc., movet quamdam dubitationem ex praecedenti solutione exortam. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo proponit quaestionem; secundo solvit, ibi: manifestum et in aliis et cetera. Primo igitur proponit talem quaestionem. Si enim omnia iusta humana mobilia sunt, restat quaestio, inter ea quae contingunt aliter se habere, quale sit iustum secundum naturam, et quale non secundum naturam, sed secundum legis positionem et ad placitum hominum, ex quo ambo sunt similiter mobilia.
| 1027. Next [z, cc], at “Among the things,” he raises a doubt occasioned by the preceding refutation. He handles the first point in a twofold manner. First [cc, a’] he asks the question. Then [cc, b’], at “Obviously, the same,” he answers it. First he proposes this question. If all just human things are changeable the question remains: of the things that change, what kind is just by nature and what kind is just not by nature but by the decision of the law and agreement among men, if both are changeable in a similar way?
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| Deinde cum dicit manifestum et in aliis etc., solvit praedictam quaestionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter iusta naturalia sint mobilia. Secundo qualiter iusta legalia, ibi, quae autem secundum compositionem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo manifestum esse quod etiam in aliis naturalibus quae sunt apud nos eadem determinatio congruit sicut et in naturaliter iustis. Ea enim quae sunt naturalia apud nos sunt quidem eodem modo ut in pluribus, sed ut in paucioribus deficiunt; sicut naturale est quod pars dextra sit vigorosior quam sinistra, et hoc in pluribus habet veritatem; et tamen contingit ut in paucioribus aliquos fieri ambidextros, qui sinistram manum habent ita valentem ut dextram: ita etiam et ea quae sunt naturaliter iusta, utputa depositum esse reddendum, ut in pluribus est observandum, sed ut in paucioribus mutatur.
| 1028. At “Obviously, the same” [cc, b’] he answers the question just asked. He considers this point in a twofold manner. First [b’, a] he shows how things just by nature are changeable. Then [b’, b), at “Those things that are,” he shows how things just by law are changeable. He says it is obvious that the arrangement found in other natural things, likewise applies to things just by nature. Those things that are natural with us occur in the same way in the greater number of cases but fail in a few. Thus it is natural that the right hand is stronger than the left, and this is so in the greater number of instances, although it happens occasionally that some men are ambidexterous since their left hand is as strong as their right. So also the things that are just by nature, for example, that a deposit ought to be returned must be observed in the majority of cases but is changed in the minority.
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| Est tamen attendendum quod quia rationes etiam mutabilium sunt immutabiles, si quid est nobis naturale quasi pertinens ad ipsam hominis rationem, nullo modo mutatur, puta hominem esse animal. Quae autem consequuntur naturam, puta dispositiones, actiones et motus mutantur ut in paucioribus. Et similiter etiam illa quae pertinent ad ipsam iustitiae rationem nullo modo possunt mutari, puta non esse furandum, quod est iniustum facere. Illa vero quae consequuntur, mutantur ut in minori parte.
| 1029. However, we must keep in mind that the essences of changeable things are immutable; hence whatever is natural to us, so that it belongs to the very nature of man, is not changeable in any way, for instance that man is an animal. But things that follow a nature, like dispositions, actions, and movement, are variable in the fewer instances. Likewise those actions belonging to the very nature of justice cannot be changed in any way, for example, theft must not be committed because it is an injustice. But those actions that follow (from the nature of justice) are changeable in a few cases.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quae autem secundum compositionem etc., ostendit qualiter iusta legalia sunt mutabilia indifferenter. Et dicit quod illa quae sunt iusta secundum compositionem et conferens, idest secundum quod est condictum inter homines propter aliquam utilitatem, sunt similia mensuris rerum venalium, puta vini et frumenti. (Non enim sunt ubique aequales mensurae vini et frumenti,) sed ubi emuntur propter maiorem copiam sunt maiores, ubi autem venduntur propter minorem copiam sunt minores. Ita etiam iusta quae non sunt naturalia, sed per homines posita, non sunt eadem ubique, sicut non ubique eadem poena imponitur furi. Et huius ratio est, quia non est eadem ubique urbanitas sive politia. Omnes enim leges ponuntur secundum quod congruit fini politiae, sed tamen sola una est optima politia secundum naturam ubicumque sit.
| 1030. Then [b’, b], at ‘Those things that are,” he shows how the legally just are changeable without exception. He says that regulations that are just according to arrangement and advantage, i.e., by what is agreed among men for some utility, are similar to measures of salable commodities, wine and wheat. These are greater where products are bought wholesale but smaller where products are sold retail. So also things that are not naturally just but fixed by men are not the same everywhere, thus the same punishment is not inflicted everywhere for theft. The reason is that civil life and the administration of the state are not the same everywhere. All laws are framed as they are needed for the end of the state, although only one form of government is everywhere best according to nature.
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| Deinde cum dicit: iustorum autem etc., agit de divisione iusti in particularia. Et dicit quod unumquodque iustorum naturalium et etiam legalium se habet ad res humanas ut universale ad singularia; quia ea quae operantur secundum iustitiam sunt multa; sed unumquodque iustorum est unum quasi quoddam universale, sicut hoc quod est depositum esse reddendum est unum quod se habet ad multas personas et ad multas res.
| 1031. Next [ii], at “Particular just and legal things,” he treats the division of justice in regard to the individual parts. He says that each particular just and legal thing is related to human affairs as a universal to singulars. The reason is that actions which are done according to justice are many but each just thing is one, as it were a kind of universal. Thus, that a deposit must be returned is one which has a reference to many cases.
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| Deinde cum dicit: differt autem etc., ostendit quid sit iustificatio. Et primo quid sit iniustificatio. Secundo quid sit iustificatio, ibi, similiter autem et iustificatio et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod iniustificatio et iniustum differunt; quia iniustum est aliqua res quae est contra iustitiam, vel secundum naturam vel secundum ordinationem humanam, sicut furtum, sed quando aliquis hoc operatur, puta furando, vocatur hoc iniustificatio, quasi executio iniustitiae: sed antequam quis hoc operetur, non vocatur iniustificatio, sed iniustum.
| 1032. At “There is a difference” [B’] he shows what just action and unjust action are. First [1], what unjust action is. Then [2], at “It is the same etc.,” what just action is. He says first that unjust action and unjust thing differ, for an unjust thing is something that is contrary to justice either by nature or by human decree, as theft. But the doing of an action by someone, for instance, stealing is called unjust action, the execution of injustice so to speak. However, before this is done by anyone it is not called an unjust action but an unjust thing.
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| Deinde cum dicit: similiter autem etc., ostendit quid sit iustificatio. Et dicit quod similiter iustificatio est quando quis operatur iustum quod est natura vel ordine legis. Sed apud Graecos operatio iusti in communi magis vocatur dikeopraema, id est operatio iusti, iustificatio autem non videtur dici quaelibet operatio iusti, sed solum quando aliquis dirigit iniustificationes, scilicet reducendo id quod est iniustum ad iustitiam.
| 1033. Then [2], at “It is the same,” he shows what just action is. He says that in a similar way just action is present when a person does a thing which is just by nature or by regulation of law. But with the Greeks the doing of a just thing in general is rather called dicaeopragma or doing of what is just, but every doing of a just thing does not seem to be called justifying action but only when a person is corrected in the justifying action, i.e., by restoring what is unjust to justice.
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| Ultimo autem dicit quod, quales, et quot, et quae sint species iusti secundum unumquodque iustorum, scilicet naturalis et legalis, posterius est videndum, scilicet in politica.
| 1034. Finally, he says that we must discuss later, in the Politics (Bk. I, Ch. 6, 1255 a 3-1255 b 15; St. Th. Lect. 4, 75-88), the nature, the number, and the species of each type of justice, viz., natural and legal.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Existentibus autem iustis et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quid sit iustum simpliciter et quid sit iustificatio et iniustificatio, hic iam solvit quaestionem quam prius moverat, scilicet secundum quales iustificationes vel iniustificationes aliquis sit iustus vel iniustus. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo inducit quamdam divisionem ad manifestationem praedictorum, ibi: involuntariorum (autem) haec quidem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quando sit iustum vel iniustum sine hoc quod sit iustificatio vel iniustificatio. Secundo ostendit quando est iustificatio vel iniustificatio sine hoc quod ille qui operatur sit iustus vel iniustus, ibi, voluntariorum autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum; secundo manifestat quiddam quod dixerat, ibi, dico autem voluntarium quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum iusta et iniusta sint talia qualia supra dicta sunt, tunc aliquis facit iniustum ita quod sit iniustificatio et operatur iustum ita quod sit iustificatio vel dikeopraema quando aliquis operatur ipsa, scilicet iustum vel iniustum, volens. Sed quando aliquis operatur ipsa nolens, non est ibi facere iniustum vel operari iustum, nisi forte per accidens, in quantum scilicet accidit praeter intentionem operantis quod illa quae quis facit sint iusta vel iniusta.
| 1035. After the Philosopher has shown what justice in itself is, and what just action and unjust action are, now [C] he answers a question that he previously asked, viz., by what just or unjust actions may a man become just or unjust? He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [A’] he explains his plan. Then [B’], at “Some involuntary acts etc.,” he introduces a division to explain things mentioned previously. He discusses the initial point from two aspects. First [1] he shows when a just or unjust thing may exist without a just or unjust action. Next [2], at “We perform some voluntary etc.,” he shows that there is just or unjust action without the agent being just or unjust. He discusses the first point under two headings. Initially [1, a] he explains his intention. Second [1, b], at “As has been pointed out etc.,” he clarifies what he said. He affirms first that since just and unjust acts are such as have been described before (1000-1001), then a man acts unjustly or justly in this way: there is an act of injustice or a just action when he voluntarily does these very things, i.e., what is just and unjust. But when a man does them involuntarily he does not act justly or unjustly except perhaps incidentally; it happens contrary to his intention that the acts he does are just or unjust.
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| Illa enim dicimur per se facere et non per accidens, quae intendimus facere. Nihil autem specificatur per id quod est per accidens, sed solum per id quod est per se, et ideo iustificatio et dikeopraema, id est operatio iusti, et similiter iniustificatio determinatur per voluntarium et involuntarium; ita scilicet quod cum aliquid sit voluntarium laudatur aliquis vel vituperatur. Unde manifestum est quod erit ex parte ipsius operati aliquid iniustum, sed non erit iniustificatio quantum ad speciem operationis, si non assit voluntarium ex parte operantis. Et eadem ratio est de iustificatione.
| 1036. Those things that we intend to do are said to be done in themselves and not incidentally. However, nothing is specified by what is incidental but only by what is in itself (per se). Therefore the act of justice and the dicaeopragma or the just operation, and likewise the act of injustice are indicated by a voluntary or involuntary, in such a way that when something is voluntary a person is praised or blamed. Hence, obviously, on the part of the thing done there will be something unjust, but there will not be an unjust action as regards the species of the operation if there is not a voluntary on the part of the agent. The same holds for just action.
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| Deinde cum dicit: dico autem voluntarium etc., manifestat quaedam quae dicta sunt, scilicet quid sit voluntarium et quid involuntarium. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo manifestat propositum. Secundo ostendit quod praedicta manifestatio competit tam circa iusta quam circa iniusta, ibi, est autem similiter et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod voluntarium, sicut dictum est in tertio, dicitur esse quando aliquis operatur aliquid eorum quae sunt in sua potestate sciens et non ignorans, neque circa quem operetur neque quo instrumento neque etiam cuius gratia hoc faciat, puta quod sciat quem percutit et quo percutiat, sicut instrumento, et cuius gratia; et horum unumquodque sciat per se et non per accidens. Requiritur etiam ad hoc quod sit voluntarium quod non sit per violentiam: puta, si aliquis accipiat manum alicuius per violentiam et cum ea percutiat alterum, hoc quidem ille cuius est manus non facit voluntarius, quia non erat in eius potestate hoc vitare, sed cogitur.
| 1037. Then [1, b], at “As has been pointed out,” he clarifies some things that have been said, what a voluntary and an involuntary are. He handles this point in a twofold fashion. First [1, b, i] he indicates his intention. Second [1, b, ii], at “The same is true etc.,” he shows that the previous explanation is applicable to both just and unjust acts. He says first that a voluntary, as has been pointed out in the third book (382, 391, 427, 435, 436), is said to be present when a person knowingly does a thing that is in his power and is not ignorant either of what is done, or by what means, or for what end he does this. For example, he knows whom he struck, how he delivered the blow—as by an instrument—and the purpose of it; so too he knows each of these in themselves and not incidentally. In order that there be a voluntary it is necessary that the thing not happen by violence, for instance, if one takes a person’s hand by force and strikes another, he whose hand it is does not do this voluntarily, because it is not in his power to avoid being forced.
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| Exponit autem consequenter quomodo cognoscatur aliquid secundum accidens. Contingit enim quod ille qui est percussus ab aliquo sit pater eius. Ille autem qui percutit cognoscit quidem quod percussus est homo vel aliquis de praesentibus; sed ignorat quod ipse sit pater eius, et sic cognoscit patrem per accidens, inquantum cognoscit eum cui accidit esse patrem. Et sicut dictum est ex parte eius quem percutit, similiter est determinandum et ex parte eius cuius gratia et circa totam operationem, idest circa omnes circumstantias operationis. Et ex hoc quod dictum est quid sit voluntarium potest sciri quid sit involuntarium; quia si aliquid sit ignoratum vel cessante ignorantia, non sit in potestate eius qui operatur, vel magis fiat per violentiam, hoc erit involuntarium. Ideo autem additum est, per violentiam, quia multa quae non sunt in nobis non sunt involuntaria: multa enim sunt naturalia quae et operamur et patimur scientes, puta senescere vel mori; quorum tamen nullum est voluntarium vel involuntarium, quia utrumque eorum est circa ea quae (non) sunt nata in nobis esse. Si autem accidat per violentiam quod aliquid eorum non sit in nobis, tunc dicitur involuntarium.
| 1038. After this, he explains how a thing may be known incidentally. It is possible that the man struck is his father. He who delivers the blow knows that a human being or someone present was struck but not that his father was; thus he knows incidentally that this was his father inasmuch as he knows that the person to whom this happened was his father. As we have discussed the man who delivers the blow, similarly we must investigate the purpose of the whole operation, i.e., all the circumstances of the operation. From the statement of what the voluntary is we can know what the involuntary is. The reason is that if something is done through ignorance or (after ignorance has ceased) is not in the power of the agent, or still more is done through violences it will be an involuntary. On this account it was added “by violence” because many things that are in us are not involuntary, for there are many natural things we knowingly do and experience, for example, growing old and dying. Nevertheless none of these is voluntary or involuntary because each one of them concerns the things which are in us by nature. But if it happens through violence that one of them is not in us, then it is called an involuntary.
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| Deinde cum dicit: est autem similiter etc., manifestat id quod dictum est circa iusta et circa iniusta. Et dicit quod secundum accidens operari eo quod quis non operatur voluntarie, accidit similiter et circa iusta et circa iniusta. Circa iusta quidem, puta si aliquis reddat pignus ei cuius est non quidem voluntarius sed propter timorem, non est dicendum quod ibi sit operatio iusti vel dikeopraie, nisi per accidens. Et similiter, si aliquis coactus et nolens desistat reddere pignus, per accidens dicitur facere iniusta vel operari iniusta.
| 1039. Next [1, b, ii ], at “The same is true,” he explains what was said about just and unjust acts. In regard to just acts, for example, if a man hands over a deposit to its owner not willingly but on account of fear, we do not say there is just action in this case except incidentally. Likewise if a person forced against his will abstains from restoring a deposit, we say he does an unjust thing or acts unjustly by accident.
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| Deinde cum dicit voluntariorum autem etc., ostendit quando est iustificatio vel iniustificatio, et tamen ille qui operatur non est iustus vel iniustus. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo praemittit quamdam divisionem necessariam ad propositum ostendendum. Secundo ostendit propositum, ibi: tribus utique existentibus etc.; tertio manifestat quaedam quae dicta sunt, ibi, propter quod bene et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod voluntariorum quaedam operamur praeeligentes, et quaedam non praeeligentes quidem sive ex electione operamur illa quaecumque ex praecedenti consilio vel deliberatione facimus; sed illa sunt ineligibilia, idest absque electione facta, quaecumque fiunt impraeconsiliata, idest absque praecedenti deliberatione.
| 1040. At “We perform some voluntary actions” [2] he shows when there is just or unjust action and yet the agent himself is not just or unjust. First [2, a] he premises a division necessary to explain the statement. Next [2, b], at “Injury may occur etc.,” he explains the statement. Last [2, c], at “Therefore, it is etc.,” he clarifies some things that have been said. He states first that we do some voluntary actions by deliberate choice and others without deliberate choice. Whatever we do by deliberate choice we do with preceding counsel or deliberation; but whatever is not subject to choice or is performed without choice we do without previous counsel or deliberation.
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| Deinde cum dicit: tribus utique existentibus etc., ostendit propositum. Et primo resumit quando sit iniustum absque iniustificatione. Secundo quando est iniustificatio sine hoc quod ille qui operatur sit iniustus vel malus, ibi: quando autem sciens quidem etc.; tertio ostendit quando est iniustificatio cum iniustitia et malitia eius qui operatur, ibi, quando autem ex electione et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod sicut ex supra dictis apparet, tripliciter contingit aliquod nocumentum inferre circa communicationes hominum adinvicem. Uno modo per ignorantiam et involuntarie. Alio modo voluntarie quidem, sed sine electione. Tertio modo voluntarie et cum electione.
| 1041. Next [2, b], at “Injury may occur,” he explains the statement. First [2, b, i] he repeats when there may be an unjust thing without an unjust action. Then [2, b, ii], at “However, when etc.,” he restates when there is unjust action without the agent being unjust. Last [2, b, iii], at “But when injury etc.,” he shows when one is unjust by the injustice and wickedness of the agent. He says first, as appears from what has been stated previously (1037-1038), that injury may occur in dealings among men in three ways: in one way by ignorance and involuntarily, in another way voluntarily but without choice, and in a third way voluntarily and with choice.
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| Illa igitur peccata fiunt per ignorantiam quando aliquis neque scit quid faciat neque circa quem neque quo instrumento neque etiam cuius gratia existimavit se aliquid facturum, (haec) operatus est. Puta si non aestimavit se iacere telum, sed solum vibrare; vel non existimavit se percutere hoc instrumento, puta lancea ferrata, sed rotunda; vel non existimavit se percutere hunc, puta patrem, sed hostem. Vel non existimavit se huius gratia percussurum, sed accidit illud cuius gratia non existimavit, puta cum existimavit se percutere non ad vulnerandum sed ad pungendum. Et simile est cum est ignorantia quantum ad quem percutiat vel cum non cognoscit ut, id est quomodo, percutiat, puta lente vel fortiter.
| 1042. Those sins are committed through ignorance that are done by a man who does not know what he is doing, nor against whom he acts, nor with what means, nor for what end even if he was aware of performing an act. Thus a man thought that he landed a blow not with this instrument, e.g., a piked lance but with a rounded one; or he thought that he struck not this man, viz., not his father but an enemy; or he did not think he was about to strike for this objective but an objective was achieved he did not think of, for example, when he intended to strike not to wound but to tap. The case is similar when ignorance, exists in regard to the way a man landed a blow, mightily or lightly.
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| Sed circa hoc considerandum est quod quando nocumentum infertur paralogice, id est praeter rationem seu intentionem, tunc est omnino infortunium, puta cum aliquis putat vibrare telum et iacit. Sed quando aliquis infert nocumentum non paralogice, idest non absque intentione nocendi sed sine malitia, quia scilicet non putat multum nocere, vel non putat tali personae nocere, tunc est aliquod peccamen, licet non tantum; peccat enim aliquis cum principium inordinati actus est in se ipso per hoc quod intendit aliquid operari, sed quando principium operationis est totaliter ab extra quia praeter intentionem operatur, tunc est infortunium (est fortuna causa intellectiva agens praeter rationem, ut dicitur in II physicorum).
| 1043. But on this point we must consider that when injury is inflicted unintentionally, i.e., contrary to plan or intention, then an altogether unfortunate accident happens. For instance, a man means to brandish a spear and instead throws it. But when someone inflicts injury not unintentionally, that is, not without the intention of injuring but without malice in the sense that he does not mean to injure much or injure such a person, then there is some sin, although not so great a one. A man sins when the principle of an inordinate act is in his power in this that he intends to perform the act. But when the principle of operation is entirely external so that it works contrary to the intention, then an unfortunate accident occurs since fortune is an intellectual cause acting outside of reason, as is explained in the second book of the Physics (Ch. 5, 196 b 10-197 a 8; St. Th. Lect. 8, 207-216).
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| Deinde cum dicit: quando autem sciens etc., ostendit quando sit iniustificatio sine malitia vel iniustitia operantis. Et dicit quod, quando aliquis sciens quidem nocumentum infert, sed non praeconsilians, id est absque deliberatione, tunc est quidem iniustificatio; sicut quaecumque aliquis committit per iram et alias passiones, si tamen non sint naturales vel necessariae hominibus, sicut est concupiscentia cibi et potus in extrema necessitate, quae excusat a subtractione rei alienae. Illi igitur qui propter praedictas passiones nocent aliis et peccant, faciunt quidem iniustum et actus eorum sunt iniustificationes: non tamen propter hoc ipsi sunt iniusti et mali, quia non inferunt nocumentum propter malitiam sed propter passionem. Et tales sunt qui dicuntur propter infirmitatem peccare.
| 1044. Then [2, b, ii], at “However, when,” he shows when there may be unjust action without wickedness or injustice of the agent. He says that when a man inflicts injury knowingly but not with previous counsel, i.e., without deliberation, then there is a kind of injustice, as there is in any action that a person commits through anger and other passions-provided these passions are not natural and necessary to men, like desire for food and drink in extreme necessity which excuses the taking of what belongs to another. Therefore, those who injure others because of these passions sin and do an unjust thing and their acts are unjust actions. Nevertheless by reason of this they are not unjust and evil because they do not inflict injury from wickedness but from passion. Such people are said to sin from weakness.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quando autem ex electione etc., ostendit quando sit iniustificatio cum iniustitia operantis. Et dicit quod quando aliquis ex electione inducit alteri nocumentum, est iniustus et malus. Et talis dicitur ex certa malitia peccare.
| 1045. At “But when injury” [2, b, iii] he shows when there may be unjust action with injustice on the part of the agent. He says that when a man by deliberate choice causes injury to another, he is unjust and evil. Such a one is said to sin out of sheer wickedness.
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| Deinde cum dicit propter quod bene etc., manifestat quae dicta sunt. Et quia primum trium praedictorum, scilicet de his quae fiunt ex ignorantia, supra manifestum est, manifestat primo secundum, scilicet de his quae fiunt ex passione. Secundo tertium, scilicet de his quae fiunt ex electione, ibi, si autem ex electione et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia cum aliqui peccant ex ira, non propter hoc sunt mali vel iniusti; propter hoc, bene possumus hoc signum accipere praedictorum quod ea quae fiunt ex ira non iudicantur esse facta ex providentia. Et hoc consequenter, ibi, non enim et cetera. Probat duplici ratione. Quarum prima talis est: quia ille qui facit aliquid per iram non incipit ipse nocere, sed ille qui eum ad iram provocavit. Et ita non videtur ex providentia nocumentum processisse.
| 1046. Next [2, c], at “Therefore, it is,” he clarifies what has been said. Because the first of the three things mentioned previously (which treats of what is done from ignorance) was commented on before (1042-1043), in the beginning [2, c, i] he explains the second, which deals with what is done from weakness or passion. Then [2, C, ii], at “If a man inflicts injury by choice etc.,” he explains the third, which treats of what is done by deliberate choice. He says first that when people sin from anger they are not evil or unjust because of this. Therefore we are well able to judge from this proof of previous statements that what is done from anger is not considered to be done with premeditation. He proves this afterwards, at “for it is the man” [i, x], by two reasons. The first is this, that it is not the man himself who does something in anger that begins the process of injuring but the person who provoked him. So it does not seem that the injury arose with premeditation.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc neque de fieri et cetera. Et dicit quod quando aliquis infert nocumentum ex ira, non versatur tunc in dubio utrum faciat vel non faciat, sed utrum iuste faciat. Ira enim est quaedam iniustitia manifesta, idest manifeste operans. Vult enim iratus vindictam esse manifestam, sed videtur sibi quod iuste moveatur. Non enim ita est apud iratos sicut in commutationibus iniustis, puta in furto et similibus, in quibus dubitatur an factum sit: oportet enim alterum eorum esse malum, puta vel dare vel non dare peccatur enim quandoque per omissionem, quandoque per transgressionem, nisi forte excusentur per oblivionem, sicut cum aliquis obliviscitur reddere debitum creditori tempore statuto. Sed operantes ex ira confitentur de re idest de facto, sed dubitant an sit iniustum illud quod fecerunt; quod non contingit illis qui ex electione insidiose operantur, qui non ignorant se iniuste agere. Quare hic, idest insidiosus, existimat iniuste pati illum cui nocet; sed hic, idest iratus, non existimat hoc. Et ita patet, quod ille qui ex ira iniustum facit, non agit ex providentia.
| 1047. Then [i, y], at “Besides, it is not,” he gives the second reason. He says that when a man inflicts injury in anger there is no question whether he does the act or not but whether he does it justly, for by anger some injustice is obvious, i.e., operates openly. And the angry man wishes the punishment to be obvious but it seems to him that he is justly provoked. It is not the same thing with unjust dealings, like theft and so forth in which there is doubt whether the act should have been done. One of the things must be evil, for instance, giving or not giving; for we sin sometimes by omission, other times by transgression unless we are excused by reason of forgetfulness, as when a person forgets to pay a debt to a creditor at an agreed time. But people acting in anger admit the thing, or the fact, but doubt whether what they did is unjust. This does not happen to those who act deviously by choice and are not ignorant that they act unjustly. Wherefore, the insidious person judges that the man he injured suffers unjustly; but the angry person does not think this. So it is evident that he who does an unjust thing in anger does not act with premeditation.
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| Deinde cum dicit: si autem ex electione etc., manifestat tertium, scilicet de his quae fiunt ex electione. Et dicit, quod si aliquis ex electione noceat, manifestum est quod facit iniustum per se loquendo, quia voluntarie operatur. Et secundum huiusmodi iniustificationem iam dicitur ille qui facit, iniustus, quum hoc sit praeter proportionale, id est contra iustitiam distributivam, vel praeter aequale, idest contra iustitiam commutativam. Et similiter aliquis dicitur iustus cum ex electione operatur iustum. Si autem volens operetur et non eligens, dicetur iustum operans vel iustificans.
| 1048. At “If a man inflicts injury” [2, c, ii] he explains the third reason concerned with acts done by deliberate choice. He says that if a man inflicts injury by deliberate choice, it is obvious that absolutely speaking he acts unjustly, because he operates voluntarily. He who acts according to an injustice of this kind is called unjust since this action is contrary to the proportional, i.e., against distributive justice, or contrary to the equal, i.e., against commutative justice. In a similar way a man is called just when he acts justly by deliberate choice. However, if he should act voluntarily and not by choice he will be called the worker or doer of what is just.
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| Deinde cum dicit involuntariorum autem etc., ponit quamdam divisionem ad manifestationem praedictorum. Et dicit quod involuntariorum quaedam sunt venialia, idest venia digna, et quaedam non. Illa enim sunt venia digna quae homines peccant non solum ignorantes, idest habentes ignorantiam concomitantem, sed propter ignorantiam, quasi habentes ignorantiam causantem, quod accidit illis qui quando cognoscunt dolent. Sed illa non sunt digna venia quae aliqui non peccant propter ignorantiam causantem, sed peccant ignorantes propter passionem, quae non est naturalis neque humana, id est ratione regulata; in talibus enim passio causat et ignorantiam et peccatum, et de his supra in tertio plenius dictum est.
| 1049. Then [B’], at “Some involuntary things,” he gives a division to explain things mentioned previously. He says that some involuntary acts are venial, i.e., deserving of pardon, and others are not. Those sins deserve pardon that men commit not only in ignorance, that is, when they have concomitant ignorance, but on account of ignorance, viz., when ignorance is the cause so to speak-this happens to those who are sorry when they become aware. But those sins do not deserve pardon that men commit not on account of causative ignorance but in ignorance because of passion, which is neither natural nor human nor according to right reason. In actions of this kind passion is the cause of ignorance and sin; these have been more fully treated in the third book (406-424).
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Dubitabit autem utique aliquis et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit secundum quales iustificationes vel iniustificationes dicatur aliquis iustus vel iniustus, hic movet quasdam dubitationes circa praedicta. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo movet dubitationes et solvit eas. Secundo excludit quorumdam errores circa praedicta, ibi, homines autem in seipsis et cetera. Prima pars dividitur in duas, secundum duas quaestiones quas determinat. Secunda pars incipit ibi, adhuc autem quae praeeligimus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quaestionem. Secundo prosequitur eam, ibi, iustum operari enim et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit materiam quaestionis. Secundo format quaestionem, ibi: utrum enim ut vere est et cetera. Materia autem quaestionis, primo, quidem sumitur ex his quae supra determinata sunt. Unde dicit, quod aliquis potest dubitare: utrum per praemissa sit sufficienter determinatum de iniustum pati et de iniustum facere: dictum est enim quod iniustum facere est voluntarium; unde potest dubitari: utrum hoc referendum sit ad iniustum pati. Secundo materia dubitationis sumitur ex verbo Euripidis poetae, qui inconvenienter videtur introducere quemdam dicentem: matrem occidi meam; et ut breviter dicam, vel volens occidi volentem occidi, vel ego non volens occidi volentem occidi. In quorum utroque intelligitur, quod mater occidi voluerit.
| 1050. After the Philosopher has shown by what just actions a person may be called just or unjust, now [II] he raises some doubts about the questions just discussed. He treats this point from two aspects. First [A] he raises the doubts and solves them. Then [Lect. 15, B], at “Men are of the opinion etc.” (B. 1137 a 5), he refutes the errors of some philosophers about these subjects. The first part [A’] is divided into two according to the two questions he answers. The second part begins at [Lect. 15, B’] “There are still etc.” (B.1136 b 15). He handles the initial part under two headings. First [1] he proposes the question. Then [2], at “Every doing of justice,” he follows up the question. He discusses the first point in a two-fold manner. First [1, a] he proposes the matter of the question. Next [1, b], at “Is it true or not etc.,” he puts the questioning into form. in the first place the matter of the question is taken from material that was settled earlier (1035-1040). Hence he says that someone can raise a doubt whether the suffering and doing of injustice have been sufficiently discussed by reason of what has been said already. It was stated (1035) that doing justice is voluntary. So it can be questioned whether this must be referred to suffering injustice. In the second place the matter of the doubt is taken from the words of the poet Euripides who somewhat unbecomingly introduced a character saying: “I killed my mother—to make the story short, either I voluntarily killed her who wished to be put to death or else I killed her involuntarily.” In either case we understand that the mother had expressed a wish to be killed.
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| Deinde cum dicit: utrum enim ut vere est etc., format quaestionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit unam quaestionem, utrum scilicet vere contingat dicere quod aliquis volens patiatur iniustum, vel hoc non sit verum, sed omne pati iniustum sit involuntarium, sicut et omne facere iniustum est voluntarium.
| 1051. Then [1, b], at “Is it true or not,” he puts the questioning into form. He considers this in two ways. First [1, b, i] he proposes one question, viz., whether it is really proper to say that a man voluntarily suffers injustice or whether this is untrue, but that every suffering of injustice is involuntary, as every doing of injustice is voluntary.
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| Secundo ibi: et utrum omne etc., movet aliam quaestionem. Et est quaestio, utrum omne iniustum pati sit sic vel illo modo, ita scilicet quod vel omne iniustum pati sit voluntarium vel omne sit involuntarium? Sicut enim haec quaestio potest moveri de hoc quod est iniustum facere, utrum omne sit voluntarium aut quoddam sit voluntarium et quoddam involuntarium, similiter etiam potest moveri eadem quaestio et de iniustum pati.
| 1052. Second [1, b, ii], at “Is suffering injustice,” he proposes another question. The question is whether every suffering of injustice is constituted in this way or in such a way that every suffering of injustice is either voluntary or involuntary. As this question can be asked about doing injustice—whether every such action is voluntary or whether some are voluntary and others involuntary—so in a similar way the same question can be asked about the reception of justice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: iustum operari enim etc., prosequitur prius motam quaestionem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo argumentatur ad hoc quod omne iniustum pati sit voluntarium vel omne sit involuntarium. Secundo argumentatur ad hoc, quod non omne iniustum pati sit voluntarium, ibi, inconveniens autem utique videbitur et cetera. Tertio argumentatur ad hoc, quod non omne iniustum pati sit involuntarium, ibi, si autem (est) simpliciter et cetera. Ad primum ergo argumentatur sic: omne hoc quod est operari iustum est voluntarium, ut ex supradictis patet; sed operari iustum est oppositum ei quod est pati iustum: rationabile igitur videtur quod iniustum vel iustum pati simili modo opponatur secundum utrumque, scilicet voluntarium et involuntarium, ita ut vel omne huiusmodi sit voluntarium vel omne sit involuntarium.
| 1053. Next [2], at “Every doing of justice,” he follows up the question previously asked. He develops this in a threefold fashion. First [2, a] he argues that every reception of justice is voluntary or every reception is involuntary. Then [2, b], at “It seems unreasonable,” he argues that not every suffering of injustice is voluntary. Last [2, c], at “Doing an injustice,” he argues that not every suffering of injustice is involuntary. He argues in this way for the first point. Every doing of justice is voluntary, as is clear from what has been pointed out (1035). But doing justice is the opposite of receiving justice. Therefore it seems reasonable that receiving justice or injustice should be opposed similarly according to both, i.e., voluntary and involuntary, so that all of the one is voluntary and all of the other involuntary.
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| Deinde cum dicit inconveniens autem utique etc., argumentatur ad hoc, quod non omne iniustum pati sit voluntarium. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo argumentatur ad propositum; et dicit, quod inconveniens videtur si ponatur, quod omne iniustum pati sit voluntarium. Manifeste enim quidam patiuntur iniustum non volentes, sicut illi qui verberantur vel quibus aliquis sua furatur.
| 1054. At “It seems unreasonable” [2, b] he argues that not every suffering of injustice is voluntary. He treats this point from three aspects. First [2, b, i] he argues for the proposition, saying it seems unreasonable to hold that every suffering of injustice is voluntary. Obviously some people unwillingly suffer injustice, like those who are flogged or whose possessions are taken by others.
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| Secundo ibi: quia et hoc etc., movet circa hoc quamdam quaestionem: utrum scilicet omnis qui patitur id quod est iniustum materialiter et per accidens, possit dici quod sit iniustum patiens formaliter et per se. Sic enim posset aliquis obviare praedictae rationi dicendo quod ille qui non volens patitur rapinas vel verbera, patitur quidem id cui accidit esse iniustum, non tamen se habet quasi per se patiens iniustum.
| 1055. Second [2, b, ii], at “Wherefore, doubt can arise,” he asks a question on this point: whether everyone who suffers injustice materially and incidentally can be said to suffer injustice formally and in itself. Thus someone may readily object that the man who unwillingly suffers robberies or blows, suffers injustice incidentally, nevertheless he is not, so to speak, simply a victim of injustice.
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| Tertio ibi: vel quemadmodum etc., solvit motam quaestionem. Et dicit, quod sicut se habet et circa facere, ita se habet et circa pati: quia in utroque contingit transumere, idest accipere id quod est secundum accidens circa iusta et similiter circa iniusta. Et hoc manifestat, quia operari ea quibus accidit esse iniusta, non est idem ei quod est per se facere iniustum. Dictum est enim, quod quandoque aliquis ignorans facit per accidens id quod est iniustum, non tamen per se loquendo iniustificat. Et similiter pati ea quibus accidit esse iniusta non est idem ei quod est iniustum pati per se. Similiter etiam impossibile est quod ista sint eadem in eo quod est iustum operari et in eo quod est iustum pati; et quod sit eadem ratio circa facere et pati, tam circa iusta quam circa iniusta, manifestat consequenter per hoc quod non contingit aliquem pati iniustum vel iustum per se loquendo, nisi sit aliquis faciens iustum vel iniustum per se loquendo, quia passio est effectus actionis; si ergo aliquis faciat id quod est iniustum per accidens et non iniustificet per se, consequens est quod nec ille qui patitur per se iniustum patiatur. Et eadem ratio est de iusto.
| 1056. Last [2, b, iii], at “In regard to what is incidental” he answers the objection. He says that the same holds for doing as for receiving. The reason is that in both cases it is possible to take one for the other: to understand what is incidental about justice in a similar way to what is incidental about injustice. He gives this explanation, that performing acts incidentally unjust is not the same as doing an act unjust in itself. It was pointed out (1035-1036) that sometimes a person in ignorance does by chance what is unjust, nevertheless, absolutely speaking, he does not act unjustly. Similarly, undergoing things that are incidentally unjust is not the same as undergoing what is simply unjust. Likewise it is impossible that these things are the same in the doing of justice and in receiving justice; and that the same reason holds for the doing and receiving both in regard to just things and unjust things. He explains this afterwards by the fact that it is not possible to suffer something just or unjust simply speaking because passion is an effect of action. If then, a man does what is unjust incidentally and does not become unjust simply, it follows that neither does he suffer injustice simply who suffers an unjust thing. The same argument holds for justice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: si autem est simpliciter etc., argumentatur contra hoc, quod omne iniustum pati sit involuntarium. Et primo argumentatur ad propositum. Secundo solvit, ibi, vel non recta definitio et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas rationes. Circa quarum primam tria facit. Primo proponit quandam definitionem eius quod est iniustum facere, quae supra posita est: scilicet quod simpliciter et per se iniustum facere nihil est aliud quam quod aliquis volens noceat: et in hoc quod sit volens intelligitur, quod sciat et quem laedat, et quod nocumentum inferat, et ut, idest qualiter, et alias huiusmodi circumstantias.
| 1057. Then [2, c], at “Doing an injustice,” he argues against the idea that suffering injustice is involuntary. First [c, i], he argues for the proposition. Second [c, ii], at “Perhaps the definition etc.,” he solves the proposition. Concerning the initial point he offers two reasons. In regard to the first [i, x] of these he presents three considerations. First [x, aa] he gives a definition of doing injustice, which was defined previously (1035, 1045): doing injustice simply and in itself is simply the voluntary inflicting of injury. By voluntary is meant that one knows who is injured, what inflicts the injury, and how, i.e., in what manner together with other circumstances of this kind.
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| Secundo ibi, incontinens autem etc., argumentatur ex praemissa definitione. Manifestum est enim, quod incontinens volens nocet ipse sibi, in quantum scilicet volens operatur id quod scit sibi esse nocivum. Si ergo ad iniustum facere sequitur iniustum pati, sequitur quod ipse volens iniustum patiatur a se ipso ita quod contingat aliquem sibi ipsi iniustum facere: et sic sequitur, quod non omne iniustum pati sit involuntarium.
| 1058. Second [x, bb], at, “The incontinent person,” he argues from the definition given. It is obvious that the incontinent person voluntarily injures himself, inasmuch as he does voluntarily what he knows is harmful to him. If then suffering injustice resembles doing injustice, it follows that the person acting voluntarily himself may suffer injustice from himself, so it is possible for someone to do injustice to himself. Thus it follows that not every suffering of injustice is involuntary.
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| Tertio ibi: est autem et hoc etc., movet quamdam quaestionem incidentem: utrum scilicet contingat, quod aliquis sibiipsi faciat iniustum. Sed hanc quaestionem postea prosequetur.
| 1059. Third [x, cc], “But this is one,” he asks an incidental question: whether in fact someone can do an injustice to himself. But he takes up this question later (1091-1108).
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc volens et cetera. Et dicit, quod si contingit de aliquo quod propter incontinentiam sciens et volens laedatur ab alio, puta cum aliquis captus amore meretricis permittit se ab ea spoliari; contingit igitur quod aliquis volens patiatur iniustum. Et sic non omne iniustum pati est involuntarium.
| 1060. At “Moreover, it happens” [i, y] he gives the second reason. If it happens that anyone by reason of incontinence is knowingly and willingly injured by another (for example, a man ensnared by love of a prostitute allows himself to be robbed) then it is possible that a person may willingly suffer injustice. So, not every suffering of injustice is involuntary.
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| Deinde cum dicit: vel non recta etc., ponit solutionem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo corrigit definitionem supra positam eius quod est iniustum facere. Et ex hoc concludit veritatem quaestionis. Et dicit quod diffinitio supra posita, eius quod est iniustum facere, non est recta, sed debet aliquid apponi, ut dicatur quod iniustum facere est nocere aliquem, scientem circumstantias, alicui praeter illius voluntatem. Et secundum hoc sequitur quod licet aliquis volens laedatur et patiatur per accidens ea quae sunt iniusta, tamen nullus volens patitur iniustum, per se loquendo, ex quo per se iniustum facere est inferre nocumentum alicui praeter eius voluntatem.
| 1061. Then [c, ii], at “Perhaps the definition,” he gives the solution. He discusses this point from three aspects. First [ii, x] he corrects the definition of doing injustice given above (1057), and from it he infers the truth of the question. He says that the definition of doing injustice, stated without qualification, is not correct. But the statement should be added that doing injustice is present when someone with a knowledge of the circumstances inflicts injury on another against his will. From this it follows that although a person voluntarily may be injured and suffer incidentally what is unjust; nevertheless, no one voluntarily suffers injustice, absolutely speaking, because in itself doing injustice is to inflict harm on another against his will.
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| Secundo ibi: nullus enim vult etc., solvit primam rationem: et dicit quod nullus vult completa voluntate pati iniustum, neque etiam incontinens; sed incontinens operatur sibi nociva praeter voluntatem. Habet enim per se voluntatem boni, sed per concupiscentiam trahitur ad malum. Et hoc quod dictum est, probat per hoc, quod cum voluntas sit apparentis boni, nullus vult illud quod non aestimat esse bonum; incontinens autem extra passionem existens non reputat bonum illud quod facit, unde absolute non vult illud; sed tamen operatur illud quod aestimat non oportere operari, propter concupiscentiam quae est in appetitu sensitivo, voluntas autem in ratione est.
| 1062. Next [ii, y], at “No one wants,” he answers the first reason. No one wishes with a complete will to suffer injustice, not even the incontinent person, although he does things harmful to himself against his will. Essentially he wills good, but by concupiscence he is drawn to evil. Aristotle proves this statement from the fact that, since the will desires what appears good, no one wills what he does not think is good. But the incontinent person in a passionless moment does not think what he does is good and therefore he does not will it absolutely; nevertheless he does what he thinks he ought not to do, on account of concupiscence which is in the sensitive appetite, the will being in the reason.
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| Tertio ibi: qui autem quae ipsius etc., solvit secundam rationem de eo qui volens ab alio laeditur. Et dicit quod non patitur, per se loquendo, iniustum ille qui volens dat sua, sicut Homerus narrat de quodam, nomine Glauco, quod dedit Diomedi aurea arma pro aereis et centum boves pro novem bobus. Ideo autem talis non patitur iniustum, quia in potestate hominis est quod ipse det sua; sed iniustum pati non est in potestate eius qui iniustum patitur, sed oportet existere aliquem qui faciat iniustum. Ideo ergo iniustum pati est involuntarium, iniustum autem facere voluntarium, quia principium actionis est in agente, quod pertinet ad rationem voluntarii; principium autem passionis non est in patiente, sed in alio; et hoc pertinet ad rationem involuntarii.
| 1063. Last [ii, z], at “Anyone who gives,” he answers the second reason concerning the person who is willingly injured by another. He says that a man does not suffer injustice absolutely speaking who voluntarily gives what is his own, as Homer narrates [Iliad vi. 236] about an individual named Glaucus that he gave Diomede golden armor for brass armor and a hundred oxen for nine oxen. Therefore this type does not suffer injustice because it is in the man’s power to give what belongs to him. However, suffering injustice is not in the power of him who suffers injustice, but there must be someone who does the injustice. Consequently suffering injustice is involuntary, and doing injustice is voluntary because the principle of action is in the agent—this belongs to the nature of a voluntary. However, the source of suffering is not in the patient but in another—and this belongs to the nature of an involuntary.
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| Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, manifestum esse quod iniustum pati sit involuntarium.
| 1064. He concludes by way of summary that suffering injustice obviously is involuntary.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Adhuc autem quae praeeligimus et cetera. Postquam philosophus solvit unam dubitationem, hic accedit ad aliam. Et primo proponit ipsam; secundo prosequitur eam, ibi, si enim contingit et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod circa ea quae ad iustitiam et iniustitiam pertinent adhuc sunt duo quae prae aliis eligit dicere. Quorum primum est, quis duorum faciat iniustitiam circa distributiones, utrum ille qui dat aliquid alicui praeter dignitatem, vel ille qui recipit. Secundum est, utrum contingat quod aliquis faciat sibi ipsi iniustum, quod etiam supra movit et inferius prosequitur.
| 1065. After the Philosopher has then [2], at “If the first proposal etc.,” solved one doubt, now [B’] he comes he follows it up. He says first that in to another. First [1] he proposes it, the matter of justice and injustice two questions still remain which he wishes to treat in preference to others. The first of these is, which of the two persons does an injustice in regard to distribution: he who gives to someone without regard to worth or he who accepts? The second—Can a person do injustice to himself?—is a question he asked before (1059) and resolves later (1091-1108).
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| Deinde cum dicit: si enim contingit etc., prosequitur prius motam quaestionem. Et primo obiicit ad partem falsam. Secundo solvit, ibi: vel neque hoc et cetera. Tertio determinat veritatem, ibi, manifestum autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, si contingat illud quod prius positum est, scilicet quod male distribuens faciat iniustum et non ille qui plus accipit, videtur sequi inconveniens. Potest enim esse quod aliquis plus alteri quam sibi tribuat sciens et volens; et sic videtur quod iste faciat iniustum sibi ipsi. Quod est inconveniens, quia moderati homines hoc videntur facere, ut sibiipsis minora retineant. Pertinet enim ad virum modestum quod sit minorativus, idest minora sibi accipiens.
| 1066. Then [2], at “If the first proposal,” he follows up the question previously asked. First [2, a] he objects to the false part. Next [2, b], at “But it does not seem,” he solves it. Last [2, c], at “However it is,” he determines the truth. He says first that if what was just said (1065) is true, viz., that the dishonest distributor does injustice and not he who receives too much, something inappropriate seems to follow. It can happen that a person knowingly and willingly gives more to another than to himself, and so it seems that he may do injustice to himself a thing that is inappropriate. The reason is that moderate men apparently do this, as they retain things of less value for themselves. It is characteristic of the virtuous man that he belittles himself, i.e., accepts things of less value for himself.
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| Deinde cum dicit: vel neque hoc etc., solvit duabus solutionibus. Quarum prima est quod hoc non videtur simpliciter verum esse, quod distributor minora sibi retineat. Quamvis enim retineat sibi minora de bonis exterioribus, tamen superabundat in altero bono, scilicet gloria, vel simpliciter bono, idest honesto.
| 1067. Next [b, i], at “But it does not seem,” he solves this by two reasons. The first is that sometimes it is not entirely true that the distributor retains things of less value for himself. Although he keeps the less valuable external goods for himself, he nevertheless has an abundant share of another good, viz., glory, and of moral or honorable good.
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| Secundam solutionem ponit ibi: adhuc solvitur et cetera. Quae procedit secundum definitionem supra positam eius quod est iniustum facere. In qua additum est quod hoc sit praeter voluntatem patientis. Iste autem distributor nihil patitur praeter suam voluntatem. Et ideo sequitur quod non patiatur iniustum, sed solum patitur quoddam nocumentum.
| 1068. At “Again we can answer” [b, ii] be gives the second reason proceeding from the definition of doing justice given before (1061). To this an addition was made indicating that it is contrary to the will of him who suffers. But the distributor suffers nothing contrary to his will. Consequently he does not suffer injustice but only undergoes some damage.
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| Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem etc., determinat veritatem dicens, manifestum esse quod ille qui distribuit praeter dignitatem, facit iniustum; non tamen semper ille qui plus accipit, sed quandoque, quando ad hoc operatur.
| 1069. Then [2, c], at “However it is obvious,” he determines the truth. He says [c, i] that obviously the man who distributes more than one’s share does an injustice, yet this is not always true of him who accepts too much but only when he works to bring about this object.
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| Secundo ibi: non enim etc., probat propositum tribus rationibus. Quarum prima est quod non dicitur ille facere iniustum cui inest, quia sic ille qui laeditur faceret iniustum; sed ille facit iniustum cui accidit quod volens hoc faciat, id est in quo est principium actionis: quod quidem est in eo qui distribuit, non autem in accipiente: ergo distribuens facit iniustum, non autem accipiens.
| 1070. Next [c, ii], at “Not the man in whom,” he proves the proposition by three reasons. The first [ii, x] is that the man in whom the unjust thing exists is not said to do injustice, because in this way the one who is injured would do injustice; but he does injustice who wills to do it—he is the principle of action. This is the case of the person who distributes but not so with the recipient. Therefore the distributor does injustice and not the receiver.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc si multipliciter et cetera. Et dicit quod multipliciter dicitur aliquis facere. Uno modo sicut principale agens facit. Alio modo sicut instrumenta faciunt. Et hoc modo potest dici, quod quaedam inanimata, puta lapides, gladii vel sagittae, occidunt, et quod manus occidit, et quod famulus praecipientis occidit: quorum nihil, per se loquendo facit iniustum, quamvis faciat ea quibus accidit esse iniusta; quia iniustum facere, cum sit voluntarium, competit ei in quo est principium actionis, ut dictum est; manifestum est autem quod in distributione distribuens se habet ut principale agens, recipiens autem se habet ut agens instrumentale per modum obedientis; unde relinquitur quod distribuens faciat iniustum.
| 1071. Aristotle gives the second reason at “Action is said” [ii, y], affirming that a man is said to act in various ways. In one way he acts as a principal agent, and in another, as instruments act. In the latter way it can be said that inanimate things, like stones, swords, or arrows cause death, and that the hand or the servant of the one who commands brings about death. None of these, absolutely speaking, does injustice although they are the means by which unjust actions are done. The reason is that doing injustice, since it is voluntary, is attributable to the agent in whom the principle of action lies, as has been pointed out (1063). But it is clear that in distribution the distributor holds the place of the principal agent while the recipient holds the place of an instrument after the manner of one obeying. Hence it remains that the distributor does the injustice.
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| Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc siquidem ignorans et cetera. Et dicit quod si aliquis per ignorantiam legalis iusti male iudicet, per se loquendo non facit iniustum, neque iudicium, secundum quod est actio eius, est iniustum per se; sed tamen est quasi iniustum, quia id quod iudicatur iniustum est. Ideo autem dictum est de ignorantia legalis iusti, quia alterum est legale iustum, quod ignorari potest, et primum iustum, scilicet naturale quod non potest ignorari, quia naturaliter est menti humanae impressum; sed si aliquis cognoscens iustum legale iudicet iniuste, tunc ipse facit avare, idest iniuste, vel propter gratiam alicuius acquirendam, vel propter poenam evadendam.
| 1072. At “Moreover, he has formed” [ii, z] he gives the third reason. He says that if a person by reason of ignorance of legal justice wrongly judges, tic does not do injustice, absolutely speaking, nor is the judgment by which his action is done unjust in itself; but it is unjust in a way because the thing judged is unjust. Therefore we spoke of legal justice because one kind of justice is legal which can be unknown, another is natural which cannot be unknown because it is impressed by nature on the human mind. But if someone knowing legal justice judges unjustly, then he acts greedily, that is, unjustly either for the sake of acquiring the favor of another or to avoid a penalty.
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| Si quis enim velit per partes inaequales dividere iniustificationem, ille qui propter hoc iniuste iudicat, ut acquirat gratiam alicuius, plus habet de bono quam sibi competat; et ita avare facit, licet non plus habeat de illo bono in quo alterum damnificat: quia et in illis qui manifeste propter avaritiam lucri iniuste adiudicavit alicui aliquem agrum, non accepit ab eo agrum sed argentum; ita autem se habet distribuens in distributionibus, sicut iudex in commutationibus: unde, sicut iudex male iudicans scienter iniustum facit, ita et ille qui iniuste distribuit.
| 1073. If a man wishes to share injustice in unfair portions, he who judges unjustly to curry someone’s favor has more good than belongs to him. So he acts greedily, although he may not have more of that good in which he injured another. The reason is that in such affairs a man who unjustly awarded a field to someone obviously for profit, did not get the field but money. And so a distributor is situated in distribution as a judge in exchanges. Therefore as a judge wrongly judging with full knowledge does an injustice, so too does he who distributes unjustly.
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| Deinde cum dicit: homines autem in se ipsis etc., excludit quosdam errores. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo excludit quasdam falsas opiniones ex parte facientis iustum vel iniustum. Secundo ostendit in quibus consistant iusta et iniusta, ibi: sunt autem iusta et cetera. Circa primum excludit tres falsas opiniones. Quarum prima est circa facilitatem eius quod est esse iniustum. Et dicit quod homines multi aestimant quod statim in promptu habeant facere iniustum, unde reputant quod facile sit aliquem esse habitualiter iniustum. Sed hoc non est ita. Facile enim est, et statim in potestate hominis, quod aliquis faciat ea quae sunt iniusta, puta quod commisceatur uxori vicini sui et quod percutiat proximum et quod tollat argentum de manu alterius, vel quod de manu sua det aliquis argentum ad procurandum homicidium, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sed quod homines huiusmodi faciant sic se habentes, scilicet prompte et delectabiliter, non est facile, neque statim in potestate hominis; sed ad hoc pervenitur per longam consuetudinem.
| 1074. Then [B], at “Men are of the opinion,” he refutes some errors. Regarding this he does two things. First [B, 1] he refutes some false opinions concerned with one doing justice or injustice. Next [B, 2], at “Just acts are found,” he shows in whom just and unjust acts exist. In regard to the first point he refutes three false opinions. The first of these [1, a] concerns the facility in becoming unjust. He says that many people are of the opinion that they are ready to do even injustice immediately. Hence they think that it is easy to be habitually unjust. Certainly it is easy, and immediately in a man’s power, to do unjust things: to have sexual intercourse with his neighbor’s wife, to strike his neighbor, to take money from the hand of another, or to hand over money to have murder or some crime done. But that men should do actions of this kind in such a way that they act promptly and with pleasure is not easily nor immediately in a man’s power, but they come to this point through persistent habit.
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| Secundo ibi: similiter autem etc., excludit falsam opinionem circa cognitionem iustorum et iniustorum. Et dicit, quod quidam non aestimant esse magnae sapientiae quod aliquis cognoscat iusta et iniusta, propter hoc, quod non est difficile intelligere ea quae leges dicunt, quae sunt iusta legalia. Sed decipiuntur: quia haec simpliciter considerata non sunt iusta nisi secundum accidens, inquantum accidit ea esse iusta; sed vere iusta sunt secundum quod aliqualiter operantur et distribuuntur (idest attribuuntur) aliqualiter negotiis et personis; hoc autem, scilicet accommodare convenienter ea quae sunt lege posita negotiis et personis, est magis operosum et difficile quam scire sanativa, in quo consistit tota ars medicinae. Maior enim est diversitas rerum voluntariarum, in quibus consistit iustitia, quam corporalium complexionum in quibus consistit sanitas: quia et in sanativis scire virtutem mellis et vini et hellebori et effectum ustionis et incisionis, facile est; sed distribuere ista ad sanandum, sicut oportet et cui oportet et quando oportet, tanti operis est quanti et medicum esse, quia qui hoc scit, medicus est.
| 1075. Second [1, b], at “Similarly, some people,” he refutes a false opinion about the knowledge of just and unjust things. He says some people think great wisdom is not needed for a man to discern just and unjust acts because it is not difficult to understand the decrees of the law determining legally just acts. However, such people are self-deceived because these acts simply considered are just only accidentally inasmuch as it is an accident that such things are just. But they become genuinely just when in some way they are performed and distributed (i.e., attributed) in some way to affairs and persons. But proper adaptation to affairs and people is more laborious and difficult than knowing remedies in which the whole art of medicine consists. There is a greater diversity among voluntary acts about which justice is concerned than among the humors about which health is concerned. Also it is easy to know the virtue of honey, wine, and hellebore, and the effect of cautery and surgery, but to prescribe these things for the restoration of health in the right way, for the right person, and at the right time is as great an accomplishment as being a doctor, for one who has this knowledge is a doctor.
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| Tertio ibi: propter ipsum autem hoc etc., excludit falsam opinionem circa facilitatem eius quod est iustum operari iniusta. Et dicit, quod propter praedicta etiam homines aestimant quod nihil minus sit facile iusto facere iniustum quam cuicumque alii, quia per hoc quod aliquis est iustus non minus, sed magis scit et potest operari unumquodque horum quae dicuntur iniusta; sicut commisceri mulieri alterius et percutere alium et dimittere clypeum in bello, et quod aliquis faciat insultum in quemcumque. Sed decipiuntur, quia quod aliquis faciat opera timiditatis et facere iniustum, non est facere praedicta nisi secundum accidens, inquantum scilicet accidit ista quae fiunt esse iniusta: sed facere iniustum est facere praedicta sic se habentem, scilicet quod sit volens et promptus ad hoc; sicut et circa medicinam medicari et sanare non consistit in hoc solum quod est incidere vel non incidere vel dare pharmacum, idest medicinam laxativam vel non dare; sed in hoc quod aliquis sic det sicut oportet.
| 1076. Third [i, c], at “For this very reason, “ he refutes a false opinion concerning facility in doing justice and unjust things. He affirms that, on account of what has been said, people also are of the opinion that the just man can do injustice as readily as any one else, because from the fact that he is just he knows not less but more and can do any one of the things called unjust, like having sexual intercourse with another’s wife, striking another, throwing away his shield in battle; and a man can attack anyone he pleases. But they deceive themselves because the perpetration of cowardly actions and the doing of what is unjust is doing these things only incidentally inasmuch as it happens that the acts are unjust, but to do what is simply unjust is for someone to do these things in such a way that he is willing and prompt at it. So it is in medicine-healing and restoring to health do not consist in operating or not operating, in prescribing or not prescribing a drug, i.e., a laxative, but in a person prescribing them as he ought.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sunt autem iusta etc., ostendit in quibus competant iusta. Et dicit quod iusta competunt in illis personis quibus possunt adesse ea quae sunt bona simpliciter et absolute, sicut divitiae et alia huiusmodi, et tamen habent quandoque circa hoc superabundantiam et defectum, sicut sunt communiter homines. Quibusdam enim circa talia non est aliqua superabundantia; sed semper optime utuntur talibus bonis, sicut contingit hominibus perfectis in virtute, et forte diis, secundum errorem eorum qui ponebant eos talibus uti. Quibusdam vero, idest valde malis et insanabilibus a sua malitia nulla particula talium rerum est utilis, sed omnia eis nocent. Quibusdam vero non omnia nocent, sed usque ad aliquem determinatum terminum. Unde patet quod iustitia est humanum bonum, quia respicit communem hominum statum.
| 1077. Then [B, 2], at “Just acts are found,” he shows to whom they are attributable. We say that just acts are attributable to the people among whom are found things simply and in them-selves desirable, like riches and so on, although these persons (as is common among men) have excess and defect in this matter. For some there is no excess in such things that are used most laudably, as becomes men perfect in virtue and perhaps the gods (according to the error of people who hold that gods use things of this nature). For others, viz., the very wicked and the incurably evil no particle of these goods is useful but everything is harmful. For still others not everything is harmful but it becomes so at a certain fixed point. Hence it is evident that justice is a human good because it regards the general condition of man.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| De epiikia vero et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de iustitia communi, hic determinat de epiichia quae est communis iustitiae directiva. Et primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo prosequitur propositum, ibi, neque autem ut idem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod proximum praemissis est ut dicatur de epiichia quae nominat quemdam habitum, et de epiiche quod est obiectum eius. Dicendum est autem de eis qualiter quidem epiichia se habeat ad iustitiam, et qualiter eius obiectum quod dicitur epiches se habeat ad iustum quod est iustitiae obiectum. Dicitur autem in Graeco epiiches quasi id quod est conveniens vel decens, ab epy, quod est supra, et ycos, quod est oboediens; quia videlicet per epiichiam aliquis excellentiori modo obedit, dum observat intentionem legislatoris ubi dissonant verba legis.
| 1078. After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of justice in general, he now begins to consider equity which is a general directive of justice. First [I] he indicates his intention. Then [II], at “When we stop to think etc.,” he proceeds with his proposition. He says first that following what has been said, we should discuss equity that designates a certain habit and the equitable thing that is its object. In the discussion we should declare how equity is related to justice and how its object, which is called the equitable thing, is related to the just thing, the object of justice. In Greek epiiches is understood as what is reasonable or becoming; it is derived from epi meaning “above” and ikos meaning “obedient,” because by equity a person is obedient in a higher way when he follows the intention of the legislator where the words of the law differ from it.
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| Deinde cum dicit: neque autem ut idem etc., prosequitur propositum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo determinat de obiecto epiichiae. Secundo de subiecto eius, ibi: manifestum autem ex hoc etc.; tertio de ipso habitu, ibi, et habitus iste et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo movet dubitationem. Secundo solvit, ibi, habent autem omnia et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod si aliqui diligenter attendant, non videtur quod epiiches et iustum sint simpliciter idem, quia aliquando recedit a iusto legali: neque etiam videtur quod omnino sit diversum genere a iusto. Et horum assignat rationem: quia quandoque laudamus id quod est epiiches, dicentes hoc esse bene factum; et similiter laudamus talem virum qui hoc operatur; vel dicimus eum virum, idest virilem et perfectum. Et sic patet quod, cum transferimus laudem ad id quod est epiiches vel ad hominem quasi ad aliquid magis bonum, in hoc ostendimus quod epiikes sit aliquid melius quam iustum. Unde non videtur esse idem simpliciter cum iusto.
| 1079. Then [II], at “When we stop to think,” he proceeds with his proposition. He discusses it under three headings. First [II, A] he determines the object of equity. Second [II, B], at “From this it is obvious etc.,” the subject of it. Last [II, C], at “And this habit etc.,” he determines the habit. He considers the initial point in a twofold manner. First [A, 1] he raises a doubt; then [A, 2], at “Everything said is true,” he solves it. He says first that if we look closely, it does not seem that the equitable thing is absolutely the same as the just, because the equitable sometimes departs from what is legally just; nor does it seem to be altogether different in species from what is just. He assigns a reason for these things: sometimes we praise what is equitable and declare that it is well done. Likewise we praise the kind of man who does it-we even call him a manly and perfect individual. So it is evident that, when we transfer praise to what is equitable, or to a person, as if to a greater good, we show what is equitable as something better than what is just. Hence the equitable - does not seem to be the same absolutely as the just thing.
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| Ex alia vero parte, si velimus sequi rationem, videtur esse inconveniens, si id quod est epiiches sit laudabile et sit aliquid praeter iustum. Oportet enim ut videtur quod vel iustum non sit studiosum, idest bonum, vel quod id quod est epiiches si sit aliud a iusto, non sit bonum, quia bonum contingit uno modo, ut in secundo dictum est; vel oportet, si ambo sint bona, quod sint idem. Et sic concludit quod circa id quod est epiiches accidit dubitatio propter praedicta: quia ex una parte videtur quod non sit idem, inquantum laudatur ut melius quam iustum; ex alia parte videtur quod sit idem cum iusto, inquantum id quod est praeter iustum non videtur esse bonum et laudabile.
| 1080. On the other hand (if we wish to follow reason) it seems inappropriate if what is equitable is praiseworthy and something over and above the just. It seems necessary that either the just thing is not desirable, i.e., good, or that if what is equitable is different from the just, it is not good because good (in the law) is achieved in one way, as was pointed out in the second book (319-321); or it is necessary that if both are good, they are identical. So he infers that a doubt arises about what is equitable on account of the things just stated. On the one hand it seems that it is not the same inasmuch as it is praised as better than the just thing, on the other it seems that it is the same as the just thing, for what is beyond the just apparently is not good and praiseworthy.
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| Deinde cum dicit: habent autem omnia etc., solvit motam dubitationem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit veritatem. Secundo rationem assignat, ibi, facit autem dubitationem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod omnia quae dicta sunt pro utraque parte dubitationis quodammodo recte se habent; et si quis recte intelligat, nulla contrarietas ibi latet. Verum est enim quod id quod est epiikes est iustum quoddam et tamen est melius quodam alio iusto. Quia, ut supra dictum est, iustum quo cives utuntur dividitur in naturale et legale: est autem id quod est epiiches melius iusto legali, sed continetur sub iusto naturali. Et sic non dicitur melius quam iustum, quasi sit quoddam aliud genus separatum a genere iusti. Sic ergo patet quod idem est iustum et epiikes, quod sub genere iusti continetur, (et,) cum ambo sint bona, scilicet iustum legale et epiiches, melius est illud quod est epiiches.
| 1081. Next [A, 2], at “Everything Said is true,” he solves the question raised. He handles this point in two ways. First [2, a] he sets forth the truth. Then [2, b], at “What raises the doubt etc.,” he assigns the reason. He says first that everything that has been said for either side of the doubt is in some way right, and if correctly understood no opposition lies hidden there. It is true that what is equitable is one kind of just thing and is better than another just thing because, as was noted before (1016-1017), justice which citizens practice is divided into natural and legal. But what is equitable is better than what is legally just but is contained under the naturally just. Consequently it is not said to be better than the just thing as if it were some other kind of norm distinct from the genus of just things. Although both, viz., the legally just thing and the equitable, are good, the equitable is better.
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| Deinde cum dicit: facit autem dubitationem etc., assignat rationem praedictorum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo assignat rationem dubitationis. Secundo assignat rationem veritatis propositae, ibi, causa autem et cetera. Tertio concludit veritatem intentam, ibi, propter quod iustum quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod hoc est quod faciebat dubitationem, quia id quod est epiikes est quidem aliquod iustum, sed non est iustum legale, sed est quaedam directio iusti legalis. Dictum est enim quod continetur sub iusto naturali a quo oritur iustum legale; unumquodque enim natum est dirigi secundum principium a quo oritur.
| 1082. At “What raises the doubt” [2, b] he assigns the reason, treating it in a threefold manner. First [b, i] he assigns the reason for doubt. Second [b, ii], at “The reason for this etc.,” he indicates the reason for the truth proposed. Third [b, iii], at “For this reason what is equitable etc.,” he infers the truth intended. He says first that this is what raised the doubt: that the equitable is a just thing, yet it is not something legal. But it is a certain directing of legal justice, for we said (1023) that it was contained under natural justice from which legal justice has its origin.
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| Deinde cum dicit: causa autem etc., assignat rationem veritatis propositae, scilicet quare iustum legale indigeat directivo. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit iusti legalis defectum. Secundo ostendit quod talis defectus non excludit eius rectitudinem, ibi et est nihil minus et cetera. Tertio concludit directionis necessitatem, ibi, cum igitur dicat lex et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod causa quare iustum legale indiget directione est ista, quia omnis lex datur universaliter. Quia enim particularia sunt infinita, non possunt comprehendi ab intellectu humano, ut de singulis particularibus lex feratur; et ideo oportet quod lex in universali feratur, puta quod quicumque fecerit homicidium occidatur.
| 1083. Then [b, ii], at “The reason for this,” he assigns the reason for the truth proposed, i.e., why legal justice has need of direction. He discusses this point from three aspects. First [ii, x] he points out a defect in legal justice. Next [ii, y], at “Nevertheless the law,” he shows that this defect does not destroy the rectitude of legal justice. Last [ii, z], at “Therefore, when,” he infers the necessity for direction. He says first that the reason why legal justice has need of direction is that every law is proposed universally. Since particulars are infinite, our mind cannot embrace them to make a law that applies to every individual case. Therefore a law must be framed in a universal way, for example, whoever commits murder will be put to death.
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| Manifestum est autem quod de quibusdam intellectus noster potest aliquid verum dicere in universali, sicut in necessariis in quibus non potest defectus accidere. Sed de quibusdam non est possibile quod dicatur aliquid verum in universali, sicut de contingentibus; de quibus etsi aliquid sit verum ut in pluribus, in paucioribus tamen deficit; et talia sunt facta humana: de quibus dantur leges. Quia igitur in talibus necesse est quod legislator universaliter loquatur propter impossibilitatem comprehendendi particularia, nec tamen est possibile quod in omnibus recte se habeat id quod dicitur propter hoc quod deficit in paucioribus, legislator accipit id quod est ut in pluribus, et tamen non ignorat quod in paucioribus contingit esse peccatum: sicut etiam naturalis dicit quod homo habet quinque digitos et tamen novit quod propter errorem naturae, ut in paucioribus accidit aliquos habere plures vel pauciores.
| 1084. It is evident that our intellect can predicate something universally true about some things, in the case of what is necessary where no defect can occur. But about other things it is not possible that something true be predicated universally, in the case of what is contingent. Here even though something is true in most instances, nevertheless it errs as we know in a few instances. And of such a nature are human acts about which laws are framed. In, these things the legislator necessarily speaks in a universal way on account of the impossibility of comprehending particulars; however, he cannot be correct in all the situations for which he legislates since error arises in some few cases. For this reason the legislator accepts what happens in most cases, and nevertheless he is not ignorant that defect is possible in some cases. Thus the anatomist says that man has five fingers, although he knows that by a mistake of nature it happens that man has more or less in rarer cases.
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| Deinde cum dicit: et est nihil minus etc., ostendit quod praedictus defectus non tollit rectitudinem legis vel iusti legalis; dicens quod, licet peccatum accidat in aliquibus ex observantia legis, nihilominus lex recta est, quia peccatum illud non est ex parte legis, quae rationabiliter posita est, neque ex parte legislatoris qui locutus est secundum conditionem materiae, sed est peccatum in natura rei. Talis enim est materia operabilium humanorum, quod non sunt universaliter eodem modo, sed ut in paucioribus diversificantur; sicut reddere depositum secundum se iustum, est et ut in pluribus bonum; in aliquo tamen casu potest esse malum, puta si reddatur gladius furioso.
| 1085. Next [ii, y], at “Nevertheless the law,” he shows that the previously mentioned defect does not destroy the rectitude of law or of legal justice. He says that, although a fault may be committed in some cases by the observance of the law, nevertheless the law is good because that fault is not on the part of the law (since it was made according to reason) nor on the part of the legislator (who legislated according to the condition of the material), but the fault arises from the nature of the thing. Such is the nature of human actions that they are not done always in the same way but are done otherwise in certain infrequent instances. For example, the return of a deposit is in itself just and good, as it happens in most cases, but in a particular situation it can be bad, for instance, if a sword is returned to a madman.
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| Deinde cum dicit: cum igitur dicat etc., concludit necessitatem directionis iusti legalis. Et dicit quod cum lex proponit aliquid in universali, et in aliquo casu non sit utile illud observari, tunc recte se habet quod aliquis dirigat illud quod deficit legi, ubi scilicet legislator reliquit casum particularem in quo lex deficit, non determinatum et peccavit, idest rem defectibilem proposuit, in hoc quod simpliciter id est universaliter dixit. Quia et ipse legislator, si praesens esset ubi talis casus accidit, sic determinaret esse dirigendum et si a principio praescivisset, posuisset hoc in lege. Sed non potuit comprehendere omnes casus particulares. Sicut in quadam civitate statutum fuit sub poena capitis quod peregrini non ascenderent muros civitatis, ne scilicet possent dominium civitatis usurpare. Hostibus autem irruentibus in civitatem, peregrini quidam ascendentes muros civitatis defenderunt civitatem ab hostibus, quos tamen non est dignum capite puniri, esset enim hoc contra ius naturale ut benefactoribus poena rependeretur. Et ideo secundum iustum naturale oportet hic dirigere iustum legale.
| 1086. At “Therefore, when” [ii, z] he infers the necessity for directing legal justice. He says that when the law proposes something in a universal way, and the observance is not beneficial in a special instance, reason rightly dictates that a person should correct what is deficient in the law. Where the legislator evidently left indeterminate a particular case (in which the law falls short) he is at fault, i.e., he proposed a defective proposition in speaking absolutely or universally. The reason is that even the legislator himself, had he been present where such a case happened, would have determined in this way and the correction would have been made. Moreover, had he foreseen this from the beginning he would have put it in the law. But he could not comprehend all particulars; in a certain city it was decreed under penalty of death that strangers were not to climb the walls of the city for fear they would usurp the civil government. But during an enemy invasion some strangers by climbing the walls defended the city from the invaders. They do not deserve to be punished by death; it would be against the natural law to reward benefactors with punishment. Therefore in this case legal justice must be directed by natural justice.
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| Deinde cum dicit propter quod iustum quidem etc., concludit veritatem intentam. Et dicit quod propter praedicta manifestum est quod id quod est epiikes est quidem iustum et est melius quodam iusto, non quidem iusto naturali, quod simpliciter, id est universaliter, est observandum, sed iusto legali, in quo accidit peccatum propter hoc quod simpliciter, idest universaliter proponitur. Unde haec est natura eius quod est epiiches, ut sit directivum legis ubi lex deficit propter aliquem particularem casum. Quia enim lex deficit in particularibus, ista est causa quod non omnia possunt determinari secundum legem, quia de quibusdam quae raro accidunt, impossibile est quod lex ponatur, eo quod non possunt omnia talia ab homine praevideri. Et propter hoc necessaria est post legem latam sententia iudicum per quam universale dictum legis applicatur ad particulare negotium. Quia enim materia humanorum operabilium est indeterminata, inde est quod eorum regula, quae est lex, oportet quod sit indeterminata, quasi non semper eodem modo se habens.
| 1087. Then [b, iii], at “For this reason what is equitable” he infers the truth intended, affirming that by reason of what has been said it is clear what the equitable is. It is a just thing and it is better than one kind but not better than what is naturally just that is laid down absolutely, that is, universally. Hence the nature of the equitable is that it be directive of the law where the law is deficient for some particular case. Indeed the law does fail in particular cases. The reason why not everything can be determined according to the law is that the law cannot possibly be framed to meet some rare particular incidents, since all cases of this kind cannot be foreseen by man. On account of this, after the enactment of the law, a decision of the judges is required by which the universal statement of the law is applied to a particular matter. Because the material of human acts is indeterminate, it follows that their norm, which is the law, must be indeterminate in the sense that it is not absolutely rigid.
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| Et ponit exemplum de regula Lesbiae aedificationis. In Lesbia enim insula sunt lapides duri qui non possunt de facili ferro praecidi, ut sic redigantur ad omnimodam rectitudinem; et ideo aedificatores utuntur ibi regula plumbea. Et sicut illa regula complicata adaptatur ad figuras lapidum et non manet in eadem dispositione, ita oportet quod sententia iudicum adaptetur ad res secundum earum convenientiam. Sic ergo epilogando concludit, manifestum esse ex praedictis quod id quod est epiikes est quoddam iustum et quod est melius quodam iusto, scilicet legali.
| 1088. He offers an example of a norm for building in Lesbos. In this island there are certain hard stones that cannot easily be dressed by chisel so they may be arranged in an entirely correct position. Therefore the builders there use a leaden rule. just as this leaden rule conforms to the shape of the stone and does not stay in the same form, so the sentence of the judge must be adapted to things according to their suitableness. In this way then he ends by way of summary that it is clear from the premises what the equitable thing is, that it is something just which is better than one kind of just thing, viz., the legally just.
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| Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem ex hoc etc., determinat de subiecto epiichiae; et dicit manifestum esse ex hoc quod dictum est, quis homo sit epiiches, ille scilicet qui eligit et operatur ea quae dicta sunt. Et ponit quamdam proprietatem talis virtuosi; et dicit quod talis non est acrivodikeos, id est diligenter exequens iustitiam ad deterius, idest ad puniendum, sicut illi qui sunt rigidi in puniendo, sed diminuit poenas, quamvis habeat legem adiuvantem ad puniendum. Non enim poenae sunt per se intentae a legislatore, sed quasi medicina quaedam peccatorum. Et ideo epiiches non plus apponit de poena quam sufficiat ad cohibenda peccata.
| 1089. Next [B], at “From this it is obvious, —he determines the subject of equity. He affirms that it is evident from what has been proposed (1078-1088), who the equitable man is: he who chooses and does the things which have been discussed. He lays down a certain characteristic of this kind of virtuous person. He says that such a one is not acribodikaios, i.e., a zealous enforcer of justice in the worse sense, for vengeance, like those who are severe in punishing, but rather like those who mitigate the penalties although they may have the law on their side in punishing. The legislator does not intend punishments in themselves but as a kind of medicine for offenses. Therefore the equitable person does not add more punishment than is sufficient to prevent violations.
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| Deinde cum dicit: et habitus iste etc., determinat de ipso habitu virtutis. Et dicit quod iste habitus qui dicitur epiikia est quaedam species iustitiae et non est aliquis alius habitus a iustitia legali, sicut et de eius obiecto dictum est: habitus enim per obiecta cognoscuntur.
| 1090. At “And this habit” [C] he determines the habit of virtue. He says that this habit, called equity, is a particular species of justice and is not a habit different from legal justice; we said the same about its object, for habits are known by reason of their objects.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
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| Utrum autem contingit sibi ipsi et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de iustitia proprie dicta, hic intendit determinare de iustitia metaphorice dicta. Et quia huiusmodi iustitia consistit in his quae sunt ad se ipsum, ideo ostendit quod nullus potest, proprie loquendo, sibiipsi facere iniustum. Secundo ostendit quomodo hoc contingit secundum metaphoram. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit quod nullus potest sibi ipsi facere iniustum vel pati iniustum a se ipso; secundo ostendit quid sit peius, utrum facere iniustum vel pati iniustum, ibi: manifestum autem et quoniam ambo et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod huiusmodi quaestio ex supradictis determinari potest; secundo ponit quaedam per quae videtur quod aliquis sibiipsi possit facere iniustum, ibi: quaedam quidem enim etc.; tertio determinat veritatem, ibi, sed cui et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex dictis potest esse manifestum utrum contingat quod aliquis sibi ipsi faciat iniustum vel non. Hanc autem quaestionem supra movit; sed hic eam prosequitur propter proximitatem quam habet ad cognitionem metaphoricae iustitiae.
| 1091. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on justice in the proper sense, he now intends to treat justice in the metaphorical sense. Because justice of this kind exists in things that relate to oneself, therefore, he first [ I ] shows that no one, properly speaking, can do himself an injustice. Second [II], at “By metaphor etc.,” he shows how this takes place in a metaphorical sense. He develops this point in a twofold manner. First [A] he shows that no one can do himself an injustice nor suffer an injustice from himself. Then [B], at “Obviously both are evil etc.,” he shows whether it is worse to do an injustice or suffer an injustice. He considers the first under three aspects. Initially [A, A’] he suggests that a question of this kind can be settled from what has been said before. Next [A, B’] at “There are certain just acts etc.,” he proposes certain grounds on which it seems that a person can do himself an injustice. Last [A, C’] at “But to whom? etc.,” he determines the truth. He says first that from the premises it can be made clear whether a man may do an injustice to himself. He raised this question before (1059-1064). But here he follows it up because of the connection it has with an understanding of justice taken in a metaphorical sense.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quaedam quidem enim etc., ponit duas rationes, ex quibus videtur quod aliquis possit sibiipsi iniustum facere. Quarum prima talis est. Manifestum est, secundum supradicta, quod illa quae sunt iusta secundum quamcumque virtutem, ordinantur a lege. Unde illud quod in nullo casu ordinatur a lege, non videtur esse iustum secundum aliquam virtutem: et ita videtur esse iniustum. In nullo enim casu lex iubet quod aliquis se interficiat. Illa autem quae lex non iubet tamquam iusta, prohibet tamquam iniusta. Quod non est sic intelligendum, quasi nihil sit medium inter praeceptum et prohibitionem legis, cum multa sint quae a lege nec praecipiuntur nec prohibentur, sed permittuntur hominum voluntati, sicut emere rem aliquam vel non emere; sed est sic intelligendum quod illa sola lex in nullo casu iubet quae sunt prohibita quasi per se iniusta: et ita videtur quod occidere seipsum sit per se iniustum, cum hoc lex nunquam praecipiat.
| 1092. Then [A, B’] at “There are certain just acts,” he gives two reasons from which it seems that someone can do himself an injustice. The first is this [ B’, 1 ]. Obviously from what has been said before, the things that are just according to any virtue are ordered by law. Hence what is not ordered at all by law does not seem to be just in terms of any virtue and hence is unjust. In no case does the law command a man to take his own life. But those acts that the law does not command as just, it forbids as unjust. This is not to be understood as if no mean exists between the command and the prohibition of the law, since there are many acts that are neither commanded nor forbidden by the law but are left to man’s will, for example, buying or not buying a particular thing. But this is to be understood in the sense that it is only those things which are forbidden as unjust in themselves that the law in no case commands. So it seems that to take one’s own life is of itself unjust, since the law never commands it.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi adhuc autem etc. et dicit quod ille qui nocet alicui praeter legis praeceptum, ut cum lex praecipit aliquem puniri, dummodo non sit contranocens, idest resistens nocumento sibi ab altero illato, puta cum repercutit percutientem, talis inquam facit volens iniustum. Et in hoc quod dico volens, intelligitur quod sciat quid et quomodo faciat et alias circumstantias. Sed ille qui occidit seipsum propter iram, operatur praeter rectam legem volens hoc quod non permittit lex. Ergo facit iniustum. Ergo videtur quod aliquis possit sibiipsi iniustum facere.
| 1093. At “Again, however” [B’ 2] he gives the second reason, saying that one who injures another contrary to the precept of the law (as when the law commands that an action be punished provided it is not against a person defending himself, i.e., resisting injury inflicted on oneself by another), such a one, I say, willingly does injustice. When I say “willingly,” it is understood the person should know what he does, in what manner, and the other circumstances. But he who takes his own life because of anger acts contrary to a good law in willing something the law does not permit. Therefore he does injustice. Consequently it seems that a man can do himself an injustice.
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| Deinde cum dicit sed cui? et cetera, solvit praedictam dubitationem. Et primo ponit solutionem et confirmat eam; secundo ponit radicem principalem solutionis, ibi: totaliter autem solvitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo solvit dubitationem supra motam quantum ad iustitiam legalem. Secundo quantum ad iustitiam particularem, ibi, adhuc secundum quod iniustus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit solutionem. Et dicit quod ille qui interficit se ipsum facit quidem iniustum, sed considerandum est cui iniustum faciat. Facit enim iniustum civitati quam privat uno cive, sed non facit iniustum sibi ipsi.
| 1094. At “But to whom” [A, C] he solves the previously mentioned doubt. First [C, 1] he presents and confirms the solution. Second [C’, 2], at “ This question,” he gives the root of the solution. He treats the first point in two ways. Initially [1, a] he solves the doubt raised before, regarding legal justice. Second [1, b], at “Besides, inasmuch etc.,” he solves the doubt regarding particular justice. On the initial point he does two (three) things. First [a, i] he proposes the solution saying that the man who commits suicide does some injustice. But we must consider against whom he acts unjustly. Certainly he does an injustice to the state, which he deprives of a citizen, even if he does no injustice to himself.
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| Secundo ibi: volens enim etc., confirmat solutionem positam. Et primo quantum ad hoc quod non facit iniustum sibi. Ipse enim volens patitur occisionem; nullus autem patitur iniustum volens, ut supra habitum est: ergo iste non patitur iniustum. Non ergo facit sibi iniustum.
| 1095. Next [a, ii], at “He voluntarily suffers,” he confirms the solution given; first [a, ii, x] in regard to the fact that one does not do himself an injustice. He may willingly endure the slaying but no one willingly suffers injustice, as was said before (1094). Therefore this person does not suffer an injustice and does not do himself an injustice.
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| Secundo ibi: propter quod etc., confirmat solutionem quantum ad hoc quod facit iniustum civitati: et hoc per quoddam signum. Videmus enim quod civitas infert damnum quale possibile est, scilicet inhonorationem sive vituperium ei qui occidit seipsum; puta quod facit trahi cadaver eius vel dimittit ipsum insepultum, ut per hoc detur intelligi quod ipse fecit iniuriam civitati.
| 1096. Then [a, ii, y], at “For this reason,” he confirms the solution in regard to the injustice to the state-this by a certain sign. We see that the state imposes what punishment is possible, dishonor or censure on the suicide; that it has his body dragged or left unburied. In this way we are given to understand that this man committed injustice against the state.
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| Deinde cum dicit: adhuc secundum quod iniustus etc., ostendit quod nullus facit sibiipsi iniustum secundum iniustitiam particularem. Et primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit quod secundum quod aliquis dicitur iniustus non quasi totaliter pravus secundum omnem malitiam, sed solum quasi faciens iniustum particulare, secundum inquam hoc iniustum non contingit quod aliquis sibiipsi faciat iniustum. Hoc enim iniustum particulare est aliud ab iniusto legali de quo supra loquebamur. Contingit enim quod aliquis dicatur iniustus secundum aliquem modum non quasi habens totam malitiam, sed quasi habens aliquam particularem malitiam, sicut et aliquis dicitur timidus secundum particularem malitiam. Unde nec secundum istam iniustitiam particularem contingit quod aliquis sibiipsi faciat iniustum.
| 1097. At “Besides, inasmuch” [1, b] he shows that no one does himself an injustice according to particular justice. First [b, i] he proposes what he intends. He says that inasmuch as a person is called unjust not as being completely perverse in evil but only as doing particular injustice, according to this injustice it is not possible for a person to do injustice to himself. This particular injustice, which we discussed before (913-926), is different from legal injustice. A man may be called unjust in some measure not as being completely evil but as being partially evil, for example, someone is called cowardly according to a particular evil. Hence neither according to particular injustice can anyone do injustice to himself.
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| Secundo ibi, simul enim eidem etc., probat propositum quatuor rationibus. Quarum prima est quia ille qui facit iniustum secundum iniustitiam particularem, habet plus quam sibi debeatur; ille autem qui patitur habet minus; si ergo aliquis sibi ipsi faceret iniustum, sequeretur quod simul uni et eidem auferretur aliquid de suo et adiaceret sibi quasi superappositum; ergo impossibile est quod idem sit iniustum faciens et iniustum patiens a seipso. Sed tam iustum quam iniustum necesse est in pluribus personis inveniri.
| 1099. Next [b, ii], at “Indeed something,” he proves the proposition by four reasons. The first [b, ii, w] is that one who does injustice according to particular injustice has more than is due him, and he who suffers injustice has less. If then someone could do injustice to himself, it would follow that something could be taken from him and added to him at one and the same time-things that are opposites. Therefore it is impossible for the same person to be the one doing injustice and suffering injustice from himself. But justice and injustice necessarily implies more than one person.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc voluntarium et cetera. Et dicit quod iniustum facere oportet esse voluntarium et cum electione, et oportet etiam quod sit prius quam iniustum pati. Ille enim qui primo passus est iniustum et idem contrafacit secundo, quod lex permittit, non videtur facere iniustum, puta si reaccipit rem sibi ablatam. Sed si aliquis sibiipsi noceat, eadem simul et patitur et facit. Non ergo videtur sibiipsi facere iniustum.
| 1099. At “Again, doing injustice” [b, ii, x] he gives the second reason saying that doing injustice must be voluntary and with-choice, and must be previous to suffering injustice. That man, who first has suffered injustice and reacts against it according as the law allows, does not seem to do injustice, for example, if he repossesses a thing taken from him. But if a person injures himself, he suffers and inflicts the same act at the same time. Therefore he does not seem to do injustice to himself.
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| Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc erit utique et cetera. Voluntarie enim aliquis sibiipsi nocet. Si igitur talis iniustum patitur a seipso, sequitur quod iniustum pati sit voluntarium; quod supra improbatum est.
| 1100. Then [b, ii, y], at “Moreover, he will,” he offers the third reason. Certainly a person voluntarily does harm to himself. If then such a one suffers injustice from himself, it follows that suffering injustice is a voluntary. This we disproved before (1094-1096).
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| Quartam rationem ponit ibi, cum his autem et cetera. Quia si quis consideret in particularibus iniustificationibus, idest in speciebus particularis iniustitiae, maxime apparet quod nullus sibiipsi facit iniustum. Est enim una species particularis iniustitiae moechia, idest adulterium. Nullus autem moechatur, idest adulterat uxorem suam, neque aliquis dicitur suffossor murorum, quod pertinet ad aliam iniustitiae speciem, propter hoc quod suffodit proprium murum; neque etiam dicitur aliquis fur, si accipiat clam bona sua. Unde patet quod non contingit sibiipsi iniustum facere.
| 1101. Next [b, ii, z], at “Besides, no one,” he gives the fourth reason. If we look at particular injustice, that is, the species of particular injustice, it is apparent that no one does himself an injustice. One particular species of injustice is fornication, i.e., adultery. But no man fornicates or commits adultery with his own wife. No one is called a burglar—burglary belongs to another species of injustice—because he breaks into his own home, nor a thief if he secretly takes his own goods. Obviously then it is not possible to do oneself injustice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: totaliter autem solvitur etc., ponit principalem radicem praedictae solutionis. Et dicit quod totaliter solvitur praedicta quaestio de eo quod est iniustum facere sibiipsi, secundum hoc quod supra determinatum est de hoc quod impossibile est voluntarie aliquem iniustum pati. Ex hoc enim manifeste sequitur quod nullus sibi iniustum facit, cum iniustum facere sit voluntarium, ut supra dictum est.
| 1102. At “This question” [C’, 2] he gives the principal root of the previously mentioned solution. He says that this question about doing injustice to oneself is completely solved in accord with what was determined before (1063, 1071, 1099) on the point that it is impossible to suffer any injustice voluntarily. From this it clearly follows that no one unwillingly does injustice, since doing injustice is a voluntary, as was pointed out previously (1063, 1071, 1099).
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| Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem et quoniam ambo etc., comparat adinvicem ista duo. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quod utrumque eorum est malum. Secundo, quod iniustum facere per se est peius, ibi, sed tamen deterius etc.; tertio ostendit quod per accidens potest esse e converso, ibi, secundum accidens autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ambo, scilicet iniustum facere et iniustum pati, sunt prava. Quod quidem probat per hoc quod hoc quidem, scilicet iniustum pati est minus habere quam medium iustitiae requirat. Hoc autem, scilicet iniustum facere, est plus habere quam sit mensura iustitiae. Medium autem iustitiae quod dicitur iustum ita se habet in commutationibus et in distributionibus, sicut sanum in medicinali et bene habitivum in arte exercitativa; unde, sicut in medicinali et exercitativa illud quod est plus vel minus est malum, ita etiam circa iustitiam.
| 1103. Then [B], at “Obviously both,” he compares these two things with one another. In regard to the comparison he takes up three points. First [B, A’] he shows that both of them are evil. Next [B, B’], at “However, to do injustice etc.,” he shows that in itself it is worse to do injustice. Last [B, C’], at “although nothing hinders etc.,” he shows that by chance the contrary can be true. He says first that both, doing injustice and suffering injustice, are evil. He proves the statement from the fact that to suffer injustice is to have less than the mean of justice requires. But the first, to do injustice, is to have more than the measure of justice. Now the mean of justice, called the just thing, is related to exchanges and distributions as the healthful is to medicine and the well-conditioned to gymnastics. Consequently, as in medicine and gymnastics what is too much or too little is evil, so also in regard to justice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sed tamen deterius etc., ostendit quod peius sit iniustum facere quam iniustum pati. Quod quidem probat per hoc: quod iniustum facere est vituperabile et cum malitia: quod quidem intelligendum est vel de malitia perfecta et simpliciter, puta cum aliquis iniustum facit non solum voluntarie, sed ex electione; vel se habet proxime ad perfectam malitiam, ut patet de eo qui iniustum facit non ex electione, sed ex ira vel alia passione. Ostensum est enim supra, quod non omne voluntarium est cum iniustitia. Quandoque enim aliquis voluntarie iniustum facit et tamen non est iniustus, nihilominus tamen vituperatur. Sed iniustum pati est omnino sine malitia et iniustitia. Ille enim qui iniustum patitur nullo modo propter hoc dicitur iniustus vel malus. Manifestum est autem quod illud est magis malum a quo denominatur aliquis malus, quam a quo non denominatur malus; sicut albedo in actu, qua denominatur aliquis albus, magis dicitur vere albedo quam illa quae est in potentia, a qua non denominatur aliquis albus. Sequitur igitur quod iniustum pati secundum se sit minus malum quam iniustum facere.
| 1104. Next [B, B’], at “However, to do injustice,” he shows that it is worse to do injustice than to suffer injustice. This he proves from the fact that to do injustice is blameworthy and evil—a thing that is to be understood either as complete and absolute evil (for instance, when someone does injustice not only voluntarily but by choice) or “Coming close to complete evil (evident in the person who acts unjustly not by choice but by anger or some other passion). It has been explained before (1041) that not every voluntary accompanies injustice, because sometimes a man does an unjust act and nevertheless is not unjust, although he is blameworthy. But a person’s suffering injustice is entirely without evil and injustice, for he who suffers injustice can in no way be considered unjust or evil. But, obviously, that by which a man is called evil is worse than that by which he is not called evil, an actual whiteness by which a person is called white is whiteness in a greater degree than potential whiteness by which a person is not called white. It follows then that suffering injustice is in itself less evil than doing injustice.
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| Deinde cum dicit secundum accidens autem etc., ostendit quod secundum accidens potest esse e converso. Et dicit quod nihil prohibet quin iniustum pati per accidens sit magis malum quam iniustum facere, puta cum aliquis ex hoc quod iniustum patitur provocatur ad maiores iniustitias faciendas. Sed de hoc quod est per accidens non curat ars, sed iudicat secundum id quod est per se. Sicut ars medicinae dicit pleuresim, quae est apostema sub costis periculosum et mortale, esse maiorem aegritudinem quam sit offensio pedis, quamvis quandoque offensio pedis per accidens possit esse peior; puta cum aliquis propter hoc quod habet pedem laesum cadit, et sic accidit quod capiatur ab adversario et moriatur.
| 1105. At “although nothing hinders” [B, C’] he shows that the contrary can be true by chance. He says nothing prevents suffering injustice from being more evil by chance than doing injustice, as when a man is provoked to do greater injustice by the fact that he suffers unjustly. But this is by chance, and art does not care about what is by chance but judges only according to what is essential. Thus the art of medicine calls pleurisy a dangerous and deadly abscess under the ribs, a worse ailment than a sore foot that nevertheless can by chance be worse, for instance, when a man falls because of an injured foot and so by accident is captured and slain by an enemy.
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| Deinde cum dicit secundum metaphoram autem etc., ostendit qualis sit metaphorica iustitia. Et dicit quod secundum quamdam metaphoram et similitudinem contingit, non quidem quod sit iustum vel iniustum totius hominis ad seipsum, sed quod sit quaedam species iusti inter aliquas partes hominis adinvicem. Non tamen inter eas est omne iustum, sed solum iustum dominativum vel dispensativum, id est yconomicum. Quia secundum has rationes, scilicet dominii vel dispensationis videtur distare rationalis pars animae ab irrationali, quae dividitur in irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Nam ratio dominatur irascibili et concupiscibili et gubernat eas.
| 1106. Next [II], at “By metaphor and likeness,” he shows of what nature metaphorical justice is. He says that by a kind of metaphor and likeness, it is possible to have, not justice or injustice of the whole man toward himself, but a certain species of justice among the parts of man. However, this is not justice in the full sense but only the justice of a master or an administrator (viz., the head of a household), because corresponding to these reasons of dominion and administration the rational part of the soul seems to be distinguished from the irrational part, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible. The reason is master of the irascible and concupiscible parts and governs them.
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| Et ad ista respiciunt illi quibus videtur quod sit iniustitia hominis ad se ipsum propter hoc quod in talibus contingit aliquem pati propter proprios appetitus. Puta cum ex ira vel concupiscentia aliquis facit contra rationem. Sic igitur in his est quoddam iustum et iniustum, sicut inter imperantem et eum cui imperatur. Non autem est verum iustum, quia non est inter duos; sed est similitudinarium iustum, inquantum diversitas potentiarum animae assimulatur diversitati personarum.
| 1107. In view of such consideration some people think that a man’s justice extends to himself because, by reason of these parts, he can suffer from his own desires, for instance, when he acts against reason out of anger or concupiscence. Hence, among the parts a kind of justice and injustice is found, as between one who commands and one who obeys. However, it is not genuine justice because it is not between two, but it has a resemblance to justice inasmuch as the diversity in the soul is like the diversity between persons.
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| Ultimo autem epilogando concludit quod determinatum est de iustitia et aliis virtutibus moralibus secundum praedictum modum. Et in hoc terminatur sententia quinti libri.
| 1108. Finally, as a summary, he concludes that we have finished the treatise on Justice and the other moral virtues according to the preceding plan. With this the teaching of the fifth book is completed.
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