BOOK VI

INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES

LECTURE 1
Right Reason
Chapter 1
I.    HE SPEAKS OF WHAT HE PROPOSES.
      A.  He states that we must discuss right reason. — 1109
ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἱρεῖσθαι, μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν. But since we previously said that we ought to choose a mean, rejecting excess and defect, and that the mean is determined according to right reason, we may now make a division of right reason.
      B.  He shows what we must discuss about it.
            A’ He shows what can be understood from the things that were said before. — 1110
ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καί τις ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. In all habits previously considered and in other matters, there is some mark on which the man who possesses right reason keeps his eye, straining and relaxing; and this is the limit of the middle courses that we say are a mean between excess and defect in accord with right reason.
            B’ He discloses that this is not sufficient. — 1111
ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἄν τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. It is true indeed to say this, but nothing is made clear by it. In all occupations in which science is at work, it is true to say that neither too much nor too little ought to be done or passed over but what is moderate and as reason determines. But a man possessing only this knowledge will not know how to proceed further, for instance, what remedies must be given for the body, if someone suggests that it should be whatever medical art, as possessed by the doctor, prescribes.
            C’ He infers what should be added. — 1112
διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ μόνον ἀληθῶς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος. For this reason, not only must this true statement be made about the habits of the soul but also the nature of right reason and its limits must be determined.
      C.  He continues with what precedes. — 1113
τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ ἤθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως. We have, however, already divided the virtues of the soul, stating that some are moral and others intellectual. The moral virtues we have discussed, and the others we will now treat, after first speaking of the soul.
II.  HE EXPLAINS HIS PROPOSITION.
      A.  He explains what is to be discussed about the soul.
            A’ He resumes the division of the parts of the soul. — 1114
πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη δύ' εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον· We said before that there are two parts of the soul: rational and irrational.
            B’ He subdivides one member.
                   1.   HE PROPOSES THE DIVISION. — 1115
νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετέον. καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἓν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· Now we will speak of the rational part in the same way. Let us suppose two parts of the rational soul: one by which we consider the kind of things whose principles cannot be otherwise; the other by which we consider contingent things.
                   2.   HE EXPLAINS THE MEMBERS OF THE DIVISION.
                         a.   He explains the aforementioned division by this reasoning. — 1116
πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, To the objects, which differ in kind, correspond different kinds of parts of the soul,
                         b.  He explains the major proposition. — 1117
εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. since indeed the knowledge of the objects exists (in the parts) according to a certain species and reality.
                   3.   HE NAMES THE MEMBERS OF THE DIVISION. — 1118-1123
λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστιν ἕν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. Let one of these be called scientific but the other estimative, for deliberating and estimating are the same. No one deliberates about things that do not take place any other way. Therefore the estimative element is one part of the rational soul.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
Quia autem existimus prius dicentes et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus moralibus, in hoc sexto libro determinat de intellectualibus. Et primo prooemialiter dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo determinat propositum, ibi, prius quidem igitur dictum est et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo dicit quod dicendum est de ratione recta. Secundo ostendit quid de ea dicendum sit, ibi: in omnibus enim dictis habitibus etc.; tertio continuat se ad praecedentia, ibi, animae autem virtutes et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, quia supra in secundo dictum est quod in virtutibus moralibus, de quibus supra actum est, oportet eligere medium et praetermittere superabundantiam et defectum; medium autem determinatur secundum rationem rectam, ut in II habitum est, consequens est ut (hoc), scilicet rationem rectam et virtutem intellectualem, quae est rectitudo rationis, dividamus in suas species, sicut et supra divisimus virtutes morales. 1109. After the Philosopher has completed the explanation of the moral virtues, he begins in the sixth book to explain the intellectual virtues. First [I] by way of introduction, he speaks of what he proposes. Then [II], at “We said before etc.,” he explains his proposition. On the first point he does three things. Initially [I, A], he states that we must discuss right reason. Next [I, B], at “In all habits previously considered etc.,” he shows what we must discuss about it. Last [I, C], at “We have, however, already divided etc.,” he continues with what precedes. He says first that it was stated before (317) we must choose a mean, and reject excess and defect in the moral virtues that we have just discussed (245-1108); that the mean is determined according to right reason, as was decided in the second book (322). Consequently, we should divide right reason, an intellectual virtue that is rectitude of the reason, into its species, as in a similar fashion we have already divided the moral virtues.
Deinde cum dicit: in omnibus enim dictis etc., ostendit quid dicendum sit de ratione recta. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quid de ratione recta haberi possit per ea quae supra dicta sunt; secundo ostendit quod hoc non sufficit, ibi, est autem dicere quidem et cetera. Tertio concludit quid oporteat amplius dicere, ibi, propter quod oportet et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod in omnibus praedictis habitibus, id est in virtutibus moralibus, sicut et in aliis rebus, puta in artificialibus, est aliquid quasi signum ad quod respicit ille qui habet rectam rationem: et sic intendit et remittit, id est addit vel minuit, et considerat per hoc signum quis est terminus medietatum, idest quomodo debeat determinari medietas in unaquaque virtute, quas quidem medietates dicimus esse quoddam medium inter superabundantiam et defectum, et hoc secundum rationem rectam. Hoc autem signum quod est virtuoso sicut regula artifici, est id quod decet et convenit, a quo non oportet deficere nec ultra addere. Et hoc est medium virtutis: quae quidem supra in secundo manifestata sunt. 1110. Then [I, B ], at “In all habits previously considered” he shows what has to be discussed about right reason. On this point he does three things. First [I, B, A’] he shows what can be understood from the things that were said before. Next [I, B, B’] at “It is true indeed etc.,” he discloses that this is not sufficient. Last [I, B, C’], at “For this reason etc.,” he infers what should be added. He says first that in all habits previously considered, i.e., the moral virtues—as in other things, for example, the artistic—there is an object, as it were a mark, on which the man with right reason keeps his eye; and according to this he strives and makes modifications (i.e., he adds or subtracts) or considers by this mark what the limit of the middle course is, how it ought to be ascertained in each virtue. Such a middle course we say is a certain mean between excess and defect, and in accord with right reason. This mark, holding for the virtuous man the place of a rule for the craftsman, is what is becoming and fitting, that which we must not fall short of, nor add to; this is the mean of virtue. These matters have been clarified in the second book (327).
Deinde cum dicit: est autem dicere etc., ostendit quod hoc non sufficit cognoscere circa rationem rectam. Et dicit quod id quod dictum est, est quidem verum, sed non est sufficienter manifestum prout requiritur ad usum rationis rectae. Est enim id quod dictum est, quoddam commune quod verificatur in omnibus humanis studiis in quibus homines secundum scientiam practicam operantur, puta in militia et medicina et quibuscumque negotiis. In quibus omnibus verum est dicere, quod neque plura neque pauciora oportet aut facere aut negligere, sed ea quae medio modo se habent et secundum quod recta ratio determinat; sed solum ille qui hoc commune habet, non propter hoc sciet amplius procedere ad operandum. Puta si quaerenti qualia oportet dari ad sanandum corpus, aliquis responderet quod illa debent dari quae praecipit ars medicinae et ille qui habet hanc artem, scilicet medicus; non propter hoc interrogans sciret quid deberet dare infirmo. Sic autem se habet ratio recta prudentiae in moralibus, sicut recta ratio artis in artificialibus: unde patet quod non sufficit id quod dictum est. 1111. Next [ 1, B, B’] at “It is true,’ he shows that it is not enough to know this about right reason. He states that what was said (1110) is certainly true but does not make sufficiently clear what is required for the use of right reason; it is something common verified in all human occupations in which men operate according to a practical science, for instance, in strategy, medicine, and the various professions. In all these it is true to say that neither too much nor too little ought to be done or passed over but that which holds the middle and is in accord with what right reason determines. But the man, who considers the common feature alone, will not know how to proceed to action by reason of this generality. If a person were to ask what ought to be given to restore bodily health, and someone advised him to give what is prescribed by medical art and by one who has this art, i.e., a doctor, the interrogator would not know from such information what medicine the sick man needs. But as the right plan of prudence is the guide in moral matters so the right plan of art is the guide in art. Hence it is evident that the principle discussed is insufficient.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod oportet etc., concludit quod simili ratione circa habitus animae (oportet quod) non solum vere dicatur aliquid in communi, sed quod distincte determinetur quae sit ratio recta et quis sit terminus, idest definitio rationis rectae; vel etiam secundum quid ratio recta determinari possit. 1112. At “For this reason” [I, B, C] he concludes by like reasoning that a general statement on the soul’s habits is insufficient; a precise definition ‘of the limits of right reason and its norm must be determined.
Deinde cum dicit: animae autem virtutes etc., continuat se ad praecedentia. Et dicit quod cum supra in fine I diviserimus virtutes animae hoc modo quod quasdam diximus esse morales, quasdam intellectuales; ex quo de moralibus determinatum est, restat quod determinemus de reliquis, id est de intellectualibus, secundum quas ipsa ratio rectificatur: ita tamen quod prius aliqua dicenda sunt de ipsa anima, sine cuius cognitione non possunt cognosci animae virtutes, ut supra in fine primi dictum est. 1113. Then [I, C], at “We have, however, already divided etc.,” he continues, with a previous discussion. He says that in making the division at the end of the first book (234), we spoke of the virtues of the soul as being either intellectual or moral. Since we have completed the investigation of the moral virtues (245-1108), it remains for us to examine the intellectual virtues in accord with which reason itself is regulated, prefacing this with a discussion of certain things about the soul (for without this knowledge the virtues of the soul cannot be known), as was noted previously at the end of the first book (228).
Deinde cum dicit: prius quidem igitur etc., incipit prosequi propositum. Et primo determinat quae dicenda sunt de anima. Secundo prosequitur de virtutibus intellectualibus, ibi, sumendum ergo utriusque horum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo resumit divisionem partium animae supra positam in fine primi. Secundo subdividit alterum membrum, ibi, nunc autem de rationem habente et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod prius dictum est quod duae sunt partes animae: una quae est habens rationem et alia quae est irrationalis. Dictum est autem supra quod id quod est rationem habens per essentiam, perficitur per virtutes intellectuales; id autem quod est irrationale, participans tamen ratione, perficitur per virtutes morales. 1114. Next [II], at “We said before,” he begins to follow up his proposition. First [II, A] he explains what is to be discussed about the soul. Then [Lect. 2, (II), B] at “We must, then etc.,” he pursues the intellectual virtues (B. 1139 a 16). On the initial point he does three things. First [II, A, A’] he resumes the division of the parts of the soul given previously at the end of the first book. Second [II, A, B’], at “Now we will etc.,” he subdivides one member. He says first it was previously stated that there are two parts of the soul: one is rational, the other irrational. It has been explained before (243) that the part which is essentially rational is perfected by the intellectual virtues. But the irrational part, which, however, participates in rationality, is perfected by the moral virtues.
Deinde cum dicit: nunc autem etc., subdividit alterum membrum praedictae divisionis. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit divisionem. Secundo probat, ibi, ad ea enim quae genere altera et cetera. Tertio imponit nomina membris divisionis, ibi, dicatur autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, quia nunc intendimus de virtutibus intellectualibus quae perficiunt partem animae rationalem, ideo ad distinguendum virtutes intellectuales oportet dividere rationem habens eodem modo quo supra divisimus partes animae; non quasi ex principali intentione, sed secundum quod sufficit ad propositum. Supponatur ergo quod pars rationalis dividatur in duas: una quidem est per quam speculamur illa entia, scilicet necessaria, quorum principia non possunt aliter se habere, alia autem pars (est) per quam speculamur contingentia. 1115. At “Now we will” [II, A, B’] he subdivides one member of this division. On this point he does three things. First [ B’ 1] he proposes the division. Next [B’, 2], at “To the objects, which differ etc.’ “ he explains the members of the division. Last [ B’, 3 1, at “Let one of these be called etc.,” he names the members of the division. He says first that, since we have in mind the intellectual virtues that perfect the rational part of the soul, in order to distinguish the intellectual virtues we must divide the rational part in the same way as we have previously divided the parts of the soul (229)—not as it were by reason of its principal aspect but in a way sufficient for our purpose. Let us suppose, then, that the organ of reason is divided into two parts: one by which we consider those necessary things whose principles cannot be otherwise; the other, by which we consider contingent things.
Deinde cum dicit ad ea enim quae genere altera etc., probat praemissam divisionem tali ratione. Ad obiecta quae differunt genere necesse est quod diversa genera partium animae adaptentur. Manifestum est autem quod contingens et necessarium differunt genere, sicut habetur de corruptibili et incorruptibili decimo metaphysicae; relinquitur ergo quod sit diversum genus partium animae rationalis quo cognoscit necessaria et contingentia. 1116. Then [B’, 2], at “To the objects, which differ,” he explains the afore-mentioned division by this reasoning [2, a]. It is necessary that different kinds of parts of the soul should correspond to objects differing in kind. But obviously the contingent and the necessary differ in kind, as is noted concerning the corruptible and incorruptible in the tenth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 15, 1058 b 26 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 12, 2136-2145). Therefore we conclude that by a differentiation of parts the rational soul knows necessary and contingent things.
Maiorem autem propositionem probat ibi: si quidem secundum similitudinem et cetera. Et hoc tali ratione. Partibus animae inest cognitio secundum quod habent similitudinem quamdam ad res cognitas; non quidem ita quod res cognita sit actu in natura potentiae cognoscentis, sicut Empedocles posuit quod terra terram cognoscimus, igne ignem, et sic de aliis: sed inquantum quaelibet potentia animae secundum suam proprietatem est proportionata ad talia cognoscenda, sicut visus ad cognoscendos colores et auditus ad cognoscendos sonos. Sed eorum quae sunt invicem similia et proportionata est eadem ratio distinctionis. Ergo, sicut cognita per rationem genere differunt, ita et partes animae rationalis. 1117. Next [2, b], at “since indeed?” he explains the major proposition in this way. Knowledge exists in parts of the soul according as they have a certain likeness to the things known. By this we do not mean that the thing actually known is in the substance of the knowing faculty (as Empedocles held: that we know earth by earth, fire by fire, and so on) but inasmuch as each power of the soul according to its peculiar nature is proportioned to know objects of this kind, as sight to see color and hearing to perceive sound. But in things that are similar and proportioned to one another the same reason for distinction exists. Therefore, as the things known by reason differ in kind, so also the parts of the rational soul differ.
Deinde cum dicit: dicatur autem etc., imponit nomina praedictis partibus. Et dicit quod praedictarum partium rationalis animae una quidem quae speculatur necessaria potest dici scientificum genus animae, quia scientia de necessariis est; alia autem pars potest dici rationativa, secundum quod ratiocinari et consiliari pro eodem sumitur. Nominat enim consilium quamdam inquisitionem nondum determinatam, sicut et ratiocinatio. Quae quidem indeterminatio maxime accidit circa contingentia, de quibus solis est consilium. Nullus enim consiliatur de his quae non contingit aliter se habere; sic ergo sequitur quod ratiocinativum sit una pars animae rationem habentis. 1118. At “Let one of these be called” [B’, 3], he names the afore-mentioned parts. He says that, of these parts of the rational soul, the one that considers necessary things may be called the scientific kind of soul because its knowledge is of the necessary. But another part may be called the estimative kind (ratiocinativa) according as estimating and deliberating are taken for the same thing. He calls deliberation a certain inquiry not yet concluded, like argumentation. This indetermination of mind happens especially in regard to contingent things that are the only subjects of deliberation, for no one deliberates about things that take place in one fixed mode. So, then, it follows that the estimative element is one part of the rational soul.
Videtur autem quod philosophus hic determinat, dubitationem habere. Ipse enim in tertio de anima distinguit intellectum in duo, scilicet in agens et possibile: et dicit quod agens est quo est omnia facere, possibilis autem est quo est omnia fieri. Sic ergo tam intellectus agens quam possibilis secundum propriam rationem ad omnia se habet. Esset ergo contra rationem utriusque intellectus, si alia pars animae esset quae intelligit necessaria et quae intelligit contingentia. 1119. What the Philosopher here determines seems to be doubtful. In the third book De Anima (Ch. 4, 429 a 10 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 7, 671 sq.) he divides the intellect into two parts, viz., the active and the potential. He says that the active intellect is the power of operating on all things; and the potential, the power of becoming all things. So, then, both the active intellect and the potential by their very nature are in touch with all things. Therefore, it would be contrary to the nature of each intellect, if there was one part of the soul that understood necessary things, and another contingent things.
Rursum, verum necessarium et verum contingens videntur se habere sicut perfectum et imperfectum in genere veri. Eadem autem potentia animae cognoscimus perfecta et imperfecta in eodem genere, sicut visus lucida et tenebrosa: multo igitur magis eadem potentia intellectiva cognoscit necessaria et contingentia. 1120. Again, the true in necessary matter and the true in contingent matter resemble perfect and imperfect in the genus of what is true. But by the same power of the soul we know both perfect and imperfect things of the same genus, for example, sight perceives bright and dark objects. Much more, then, the same intellective power knows necessary and contingent things.
Item, universalius se habet intellectus ad intelligibilia quam sensus ad sensibilia. Quanto enim aliqua virtus est altior, tanto est magis unita. Sensus autem visus percipit et incorruptibilia, scilicet caelestia corpora, et corruptibilia, scilicet inferiora: quibus proportionaliter respondere videntur necessarium et contingens: multo igitur magis eadem intellectiva potentia cognoscit necessaria et contingentia. 1121. Likewise, the intellect touches intelligible objects in a more universal way than the senses touch sensible objects. Now the nobler the power the more united is its activity. But the sense of sight shares in both incorruptible (heavenly) bodies and corruptible (lower) bodies, to which the necessary and contingent proportionately correspond. For a far greater reason, then, the intellective power knows both necessary and contingent.
Videtur etiam et probatio quam inducit, efficax non esse. Non enim quaelibet diversitas generis in obiectis requirit diversas potentias, alioquin non eadem potentia visiva videremus plantas et alia animalia, sed sola illa diversitas quae respicit formalem rationem obiecti: puta si esset diversum genus coloris vel luminis, oporteret esse diversas potentias visivas. Obiectum autem intellectus proprium est quod quid est, quod est commune omnibus et substantiis et accidentibus, licet non eodem modo. Unde et eadem intellectiva potentia cognoscimus substantias et accidentia. Pari ergo ratione diversitas generis necessariorum et contingentium non requirit diversas potentias intellectivas. 1122. Moreover, the proof that he presents does not seem to be convincing. Not every difference in the classification of the object requires different powers (otherwise we would not see plants and other animals by the same power of sight) but that difference regarding the formal reason of the object. For instance, if there were a different genus of color or light there would have to be different powers of sight. But the proper object of the intellect is that which exists, something common to all substances and accidents, although not in the same way. Hence we know both substances and accidents by the same intellective power. Therefore, by the same token the difference in the classification of necessary and contingent things does not require different intellective powers.
Haec autem dubitatio de facili solvitur si quis consideret quod contingentia dupliciter cognosci possunt. Uno modo secundum rationes universales; alio modo secundum quod sunt in particulari. Universales quidem igitur rationes contingentium immutabiles sunt, et secundum hoc de his demonstrationes dantur et ad scientias demonstrativas pertinet eorum cognitio. Non enim scientia naturalis est solum de rebus necessariis et incorruptibilibus, sed etiam de rebus corruptibilibus et contingentibus. Unde patet quod contingentia sic considerata ad eandem partem animae intellectivae pertinent ad quam et necessaria, quam philosophus vocat hic scientificum; et sic procedunt rationes inductae. Alio modo possunt accipi contingentia secundum quod sunt in particulari: et sic variabilia sunt nec cadit supra ea intellectus nisi mediantibus potentiis sensitivis. Unde et inter partes animae sensitivas ponitur una potentia quae dicitur ratio particularis, sive vis cogitativa, quae est collativa intentionum particularium; sic autem accipit hic philosophus contingentia: ita enim cadunt sub consilio et operatione. Et propter hoc ad diversas partes animae rationalis pertinere dicit necessaria et contingentia, sicut universalia speculabilia et particularia operabilia. 1123. This doubt is easily solved by considering that contingent things can be understood in two ways: in one way according to their universal concepts (rationes), in the other way as they are in the concrete. Accordingly, the universal concepts of contingent things are immutable. In this way demonstrations are given about contingent things, and the knowledge of them belongs to the demonstrative sciences. Natural science is concerned not only with necessary and incorruptible things but also with corruptible and contingent things. Hence it is evident that contingent things considered in this way belong to the same part of the intellective soul (called scientific by the Philosopher) as necessary things, and the reasons presented proceed with this understanding. In the other way contingent things can be taken as they are in the real order. Thus understood they are variable and do not fall under the intellect except by means of the sensitive powers. So, among the parts of the sensitive soul we place a power called particular reason or the sensory power of judgment, which collates particular impressions. It is in this sense that the Philosopher here understands contingent things, for thus they are objects of counsel and operation. For this reason he says that necessary and contingent things, like speculative universals and individual operable things, belong to different parts of the rational soul.

LECTURE 2
Function Proper to Each Part of the Soul
Chapter 1
B.   He considers the particular intellectual virtues.
      A’ He investigates the ways of understanding the intellectual virtues.
            1.   HE PROPOSES THE COMMON NOTION OF VIRTUE. — 1124-1125
ληπτέον ἄρ' ἑκατέρου τούτων τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου, We must, then, ascertain what is the most excellent habit of each of these parts, for this is their virtue.
Chapter 2
ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον. But virtue is directed to the work that is proper.
            2.   HE INQUIRES WHAT THE GOOD OF THE RATIONAL SOUL IS IN REGARD TO EACH PART.
                   a.   He shows what the principles of human acts are.
                         i.    He proposes three ingredients that are called principles of human acts. — 1126
τρία δή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις. Three things in the soul seem to have power over action and truth: the senses, intellect, and appetitive faculty.
                         ii.   He excludes one of them. — 1127
τούτων δ' ἡ αἴσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. But one of these, viz., the senses is not a principle of any action. This is obvious because dumb animals have senses but do not share in action.
                         iii. He shows how the remaining two can harmonize.
                               x.   HE SHOWS HOW THEIR ACTIONS ARE PROPORTIONABLE. — 1128
ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγή· Now, affirmation and negation are in the mind, and corresponding to these in the appetitive faculty are pursuit and flight.
                               y.   HE SHOWS HOW THESE ACTIONS... ARE IN AGREEMENT. — 1129
ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτική, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτική· Therefore, since moral virtue is a habit of free choice, and choice is the appetitive faculty deliberating, then reason must be true and the appetitive faculty right if choice is to be good; and the same things that reason affirms, the appetitive faculty pursues. Hence this mind and its truth are practical.
                   b.   He seeks what the proper work of reason is.
                         i.    He shows how each part is related to truth. — 1130-1132
τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον· τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ. However, it is the function of the speculative mind (but not the practical) as it operates in good or faulty fashion, to express truth and falsity. This belongs to every intellect but the good of the practical intellect is truth conformable to a right appetitive faculty.
                         ii.   He shows how each part is related to action.
                               x.   HE EXPLAINS THAT THE MIND IS A PRINCIPLE OF ACTION. — 1133-1134
πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὔτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὔτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις· εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους οὐκ ἔστιν. Choice, then, is a principle of action, and so of motion but not as a final cause. But, for choice itself the principles are the appetitive faculty and the reason which is terminative. Hence choice does not exist without intellect and mind, nor without moral habit, for good and bad actions cannot exist without the intellect or mind and moral disposition.
                               y.   HE SHOWS OF WHAT MIND HE SPEAKS.
                                     aa.  He explains the proposition. — 1135-1136
διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική· αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει· ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρός τι καὶ τινός τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου. Still, mind itself does not move any thing, but the mind that has a purpose and is practical does so, for it governs even the operation which fashions some product. Indeed every worker produces for the sake of something he is not induced to act for an end in general but for a particular thing made for some use; he does not act merely for the sake of acting. The good action itself is an end but the appetitive faculty is for some particular end.
                                     bb. He infers a corollary. — 1137
διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος. Therefore, choice is either the appetitive intellect or the intellective faculty of appetition, and man is this kind of principle.
                               z.   HE EXPLAINS ABOUT WHAT KIND OF OBJECTS THE MIND IS A PRINCIPLE OF ACTION. — 1138-1139
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων
μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,
ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἅσς' ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα.
What has already taken place is not now an object of choice, e.g., no one now chooses to have captured Ilion. Nor does anyone give advice about something past, but about a future and contingent event. It is not possible that what has taken place did not occur. Therefore Agathon was right, for God lacks only this—to undo things already done.
                   c.   He draws the conclusion he sought to establish. — 1140
ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον. In any case the work of each of the intellect’s parts is the knowledge of the truth.
            3.   HE INFERS THE NATURE AND QUALITY OF THE VIRTUES OF EACH PART. — 1141
καθ' ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκάτερον, αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν. These habits according to which each part especially manifests the truth are the virtues of both divisions of the intellect.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
Sumendum ergo utriusque horum et cetera. Postquam philosophus distinxit partes animae rationem habentis secundum quod est necessarium ad propositum, hic incipit agere de ipsis virtutibus intellectualibus quibus utraque pars animae rationalis perficitur. Et primo determinat de singulis intellectualium virtutum. Secundo movet quamdam dubitationem de utilitate ipsarum, ibi, dubitabit autem utique aliquis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat rationes accipiendi virtutes intellectuales. Secundo incipit de eis agere, ibi, incipientes igitur superius et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit communem rationem virtutis, prout in primo dictum est, quod virtus alicuius est, quae opus eius bonum reddit. Secundo inquirit quid sit bonum opus animae rationem habentis, quantum ad utramque partem, ibi: tria autem sunt in anima et cetera. Tertio concludit quae vel quales sint virtutes utriusque partis, ibi, secundum quos igitur et cetera. 1124. After the Philosopher has divided the parts of the rational soul as required for his purpose, he now begins to examine the intellectual virtues themselves by which each part of the rational soul is perfected. First [B] he considers the particular intellectual virtues. Then [Lect. 10, I], at “Someone may raise a doubt etc.” (B. 1143 b 17), he expresses a certain doubt about their utility. On the first point he does two things. First [A’] he investigates the ways of understanding the intellectual virtues. Next [Lect. 3], at “Introducing again the subject etc.” (B. 1139 b 14), he sets himself to examine them. On the initial point he does three things. First [A’, 1 ] he proposes the common notion of virtue as stated in the beginning (65, 81): that which renders the work of a thing good is its virtue. Then [A’, 2], at “Three things in the soul etc.,” he inquires what the good of the rational soul is in regard to each part. Last [A’, 3], at “These habits according to which etc.,” he infers the nature and quality of the virtues of each part.
Dicit ergo primo, quod ex quo positae sunt duae partes rationem habentis, cui attribuuntur virtutes intellectuales, sumendum est, quis est optimus habitus utriusque praedictarum partium, quia talis habitus necesse est quod sit virtus utriusque partis. Dictum est autem supra, quod virtus uniuscuiusque rei determinatur ad proprium opus, quod scilicet bene perficitur secundum virtutem. Hic autem dicitur optimus habitus, quo optime perficitur aliquod opus. 1125. He says first that, because we have assigned two parts of the rational soul (to which the intellectual virtues are ascribed), we must understand which is the most excellent habit of each of these two parts. The reason is that each habit is necessarily a virtue of each part. It has been noted (308, 536) that the virtue of anything is directed to its characteristic operation, for this is perfected by virtue. Such a habit would be best when it insures that an action is performed in the best way.
Deinde cum dicit: tria autem sunt in anima etc., inquirit quid sit proprium opus utriusque praedictarum partium. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit, quae sint principia propriorum actuum hominis; secundo inquirit quid sit proprium opus rationis, ibi, speculativae autem mentis et cetera. Tertio infert conclusionem intentam, ibi, utrarumque utique et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit tria, quae videntur esse principia humanorum actuum; secundo excludit unum eorum, ibi, horum autem sensus et cetera. Tertio ostendit, quomodo duo reliqua adinvicem concordare possunt, ibi, est autem, quod in mente et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod duo opera videntur esse propria homini, scilicet cognitio veritatis et actus: inquantum scilicet homo agit tamquam dominus proprii actus et non sicut actus vel ductus ab alio. Super haec igitur duo videntur habere dominium et potestatem, tria quae sunt in anima, scilicet sensus et intellectus et appetitus. His enim tribus moventur animalia, ut dicitur in tertio de anima. 1126. Then [A’, 2 ], at “Three things in the soul,” he inquires what the proper good of each of these parts is. On this point he does three things. First [2, a] he shows what the principles of human acts are. Next [2, b], at “However, it is the function etc.,” he seeks what the proper work of reason is. Last [2, c], at “In any case the work etc.,” he draws the conclusion he sought to establish. On the initial point he does three things. First [a, i] he proposes three ingredients that are called principles of human acts. Then [a, ii], at “But one of these etc.,” he excludes one of them. Finally [a, iii], at “Now, affirmation and negation etc.,” he shows how the remaining two can harmonize with each other. In regard to the first we must consider that two works are said to be proper to man, namely, knowledge of truth and action, inasmuch as man assumes mastery of his own action (and as moved or led by something). Over these two, then three things in the soul: senses, intellect, and appetitive faculty, seem to have mastery and power. It is by the same three that animals move themselves, as was noted in the third book De Anima (Ch. 10, 433 a 9 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 15, 818-819).
Deinde cum dicit: horum autem etc., excludit ab eo, quod dictum est, unum eorum, scilicet sensum. Et de veritate quidem manifestum est, quod non pertinet neque ad sensum neque ad appetitum, proponit autem ulterius, quod inter praedicta tria, sensus nullius actus principium est, eo scilicet modo, ut per sensum haberi possit dominium actus. Quod quidem manifestum est per hoc, quod bestiae habent quidem sensum, non tamen communicant aliquem actum, quia non habent dominium sui actus. Non enim a seipsis agunt, sed moventur instinctu naturae. 1127. Next [a, ii], at “But one of these,” he excludes one of them, viz., the senses, from further consideration. It is certainly obvious that truth pertains neither to the senses nor to the appetitive faculty. He adds further that one of the three, the senses, is not a principle of any action, in such a way that mastery of the action can be established. This is clear from the fact that dumb animals have senses but do not have social action because they are not masters of their own action; they do not operate from themselves but are moved by natural instinct.
Deinde cum dicit: est autem quod in mente etc., ostendit quomodo opera duorum reliquorum, scilicet intellectus et appetitus, possint adinvicem concordare. Et primo ostendit quomodo eorum actus sunt sibi proportionales. Intellectus enim in iudicando habet duos actus, scilicet affirmationem qua assentit vero, et negationem qua dissentit a falso. Quibus duobus respondent duo proportionaliter in vi appetitiva, scilicet persecutio qua appetitus tendit in bonum et inhaeret ei, et fuga qua recedit a malo et dissentit ei. Et secundum hoc intellectus et appetitus possunt conformari, inquantum id quod intellectus affirmat bonum appetitus prosequitur, et id quod intellectus negat esse bonum appetitus fugit. 1128. At “Now, affirmation and negation,” [a, iii], he shows how the work of the remaining two, namely, intellect and appetitive faculty, can harmonize one with the other. First [a, iii, x] he shows how their actions are proportionable. In judging, the intellect has two actions, viz., affirmation by which it assents to what is true, and negation by which it dissents from what is false. To these two correspond proportionately two acts in the appetitive faculty, namely, pursuit by which the appetitive faculty tends and adheres to good, and flight by which it withdraws and dissents from evil. In this manner the intellect and the appetitive faculty can be brought into harmony inasmuch as what the intellect declares good the appetitive faculty pursues, and what the intellect denies to be good the appetitive faculty seeks to avoid.
Secundo ibi: quare quia moralis etc., quia concludit quomodo in moralibus virtutibus praedicti actus intellectus et appetitus sibi concordant. Virtus enim moralis est habitus electivus, ut dictum est in secundo. Electio autem est appetitus consiliativus, in quantum scilicet appetitus accipit quod praeconsiliatum est, ut dictum est in tertio. Consiliari autem est actus unius partis rationis, ut supra habitum est. Quia igitur ad electionem concurrit et ratio et appetitus; si electio debeat esse bona, quod requiritur ad rationem virtutis moralis, oportet quod et ratio sit vera, et appetitus sit rectus, ita scilicet quod eadem quae ratio dicit idest affirmat, appetitus prosequatur. Ad hoc enim quod sit perfectio in actu, oportet quod nullum principiorum eius sit imperfectum. Sed haec mens, scilicet ratio quae sic concordat appetitui recto, et veritas eius, est practica. 1129. Then [a, iii, y], at “Therefore, since moral virtue,” he shows how these actions of the intellect and appetitive faculty—touching the moral virtues—are in agreement. Moral virtue is a habit of free choice, as was said in the second book (305, 308, 382). Choice is the appetitive faculty deliberating inasmuch as the appetitive faculty takes what was pre-considered, as was stated in the third book (435, 436, 457). But to counsel is an act of one part of the reason, as was previously shown (473, 476, 482, 1118). Since then reason and appetitive faculty concur in choice, if choice ought to be good—this is required for the nature of a moral virtue—the reason must be true and the appetitive faculty right, so that the same thing which reason declares or affirms, the appetitive faculty pursues. In order that there be perfection in action it is necessary that none of its principles be imperfect. But this intellect or reason (which harmonizes in this way with the right appetitive faculty) and its truth are practical.
Deinde cum dicit speculativae autem mentis etc., ostendit quid sit opus rationem habentis, secundum utramque partem. Et primo ostendit quomodo utraque pars se habeat ad veritatem; secundo quomodo utraque pars se habeat ad actum, ibi, actus quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod bene et male mentis, idest intellectus vel rationis, quae est speculativa, et non practica, consistit simpliciter in vero et falso; ita scilicet quod verum absolutum est bonum eius, et falsum absolutum est malum ipsius. Dicere enim verum et falsum est opus pertinens ad quemlibet intellectum. Sed bonum practici intellectus non est veritas absoluta, sed veritas confesse se habens, idest concorditer ad appetitum rectum, sicut ostensum est, quod sic virtutes morales concordant. 1130. Next [2, b], at “However, it is the function” he explains what the work of the rational soul is in terms of each part. First [b, i] he shows how each part is related to truth. Then [b, ii], at “Choice, then, is etc.,” he shows how each part is related to action. He says first that the work of a good or faulty mind (i.e., intellect or reason), in the speculative rather than practical order, consists simply in the true and false, in such a way that the absolutely true is its good and the absolutely false is its evil. To express the true and the false is an essential function of every intellect. But the good of the practical intellect is not absolute truth but the “conformable” truth, i.e., corresponding to a right appetitive faculty, as has been shown 022, 326, 548), because on this point the moral virtues are united.
Videtur autem hic esse quoddam dubium. Nam si veritas intellectus practici determinatur in comparatione ad appetitum rectum, appetitus autem rectitudo determinatur per hoc quod consonat rationi verae, ut prius dictum est, sequetur quaedam circulatio in dictis determinationibus. Et ideo dicendum est, quod appetitus est finis et eorum quae sunt ad finem: finis autem determinatus est homini a natura, ut supra in III habitum est. Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non sunt nobis determinata a natura, sed per rationem investigantur; sic ergo manifestum est quod rectitudo appetitus per respectum ad finem est mensura veritatis in ratione practica. Et secundum hoc determinatur veritas rationis practicae secundum concordiam ad appetitum rectum. Ipsa autem veritas rationis practicae est regula rectitudinis appetitus, circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo secundum hoc dicitur appetitus rectus qui persequitur quae vera ratio dicit. 1131. However, there seems to be some difficulty here. If the truth of the practical intellect is determined by comparison with a right appetitive faculty and the rectitude of the appetitive faculty is determined by the fact that it agrees with right reason, as was previously shown, an apparent vicious circle results from these statements. Therefore, we must say that the end and the means pertain to the appetitive faculty, but the end is determined for man by nature, as was shown in the third book (524, 525). On the contrary, the means are not determined for us by nature but are to be investigated by reason. So it is obvious that rectitude of the appetitive faculty in regard to the end is the measure of truth for the practical reason. According to this the truth of the practical reason is determined by agreement with a right appetitive faculty. But the truth of the practical reason itself is the rule for the rectitude of the appetitive faculty in regard to the means. According to this, then, the appetitive faculty is called right inasmuch as it pursues the things that reason calls true.
Videtur etiam hic esse dubium de hoc, quod prosequitur de speculativo et practico intellectu quasi de duabus partibus supra positis, scilicet scientifico et ratiocinativo, cum tamen supra dixit esse diversas partes animae scientificum et rationativum, quod de intellectu speculativo et practico ipse negat in III de anima. Dicendum est ergo quod intellectus practicus principium quidem habet in universali consideratione, et secundum hoc est idem subiecto cum speculativo, sed terminatur eius consideratio in particulari operabili. Unde philosophus dicit in tertio de anima, quod ratio universalis non movet sine particulari, et secundum hoc rationativum ponitur diversa pars animae a scientifico. 1132. A further confusion arises here from the manner in which he connects the speculative and practical intellect—as with the two parts given above (1118): the scientific and the estimative—since he stated previously (1123) that the scientific and estimative were different parts, a thing he denies about the speculative and practical intellect in the third book De Anima (Ch. 10, 433 a 15 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 15, 820-821). Therefore, we must say that the practical intellect has a beginning in a universal consideration and, according to this, is the same in subject with the speculative, but its consideration terminates in an individual operable thing. Hence the Philosopher says in the third book De Anima (Ch. 11, 434 a 16 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 16, 845-846) that universal reason does not move without the particular. In this way the estimative is considered a different part from the scientific.
Deinde cum dicit: actus quidem igitur etc., ostendit quomodo utraque ratio se habeat ad actum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quod mens est principium actus; secundo quae mens, ibi: mens autem ipsa et cetera. Tertio ostendit circa qualia mens sit principium actus, ibi: non est autem eligibile et cetera. Concludit ergo primo ex his quae supra dicta sunt, quod ex quo electio est appetitus consiliativus, sequitur, quod sit actus principium unde motus, idest per modum causae efficientis, sed non cuius gratia, idest per modum causae finalis. Dictum est enim in tertio de anima, quod appetitus est movens in animalibus. Sed ipsius electionis sunt principia appetitus et ratio quae est gratia alicuius, id est quae ordinatur ad aliquod operabile sicut ad finem. Est enim electio appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem. Unde ratio proponens finem, et ex eo procedens ad ratiocinandum et appetitus tendens in finem comparantur ad electionem per modum causae. Et inde est, quod electio dependet et ab intellectu sive mente et ab habitu morali, qui perficit vim appetitivam, ita quod non est sine utroque eorum. 1133. At “Choice, then, is the principle” [b, ii], he shows that each reason has a relation to action. On this point he does three things. First [ii, x] he explains that the mind is a principle of action. Second [ii, y], at “Still, mind itself etc.,” he shows of what mind he speaks. Third [ii, z], at “What has already taken place,” he explains about what kinds of objects the mind is the active principle. First he concludes from what was just said (1129) that because choice is the appetitive faculty deliberating, consequently it is a principle of action, and so of motion, i.e., in the manner of an efficient cause but not for the sake of something, i.e., in the manner of a final cause. We have already said in the third book De Anima (Ch. 10, 433 b 27-31; St. Th. Lect. 15, 836-837) that the appetitive faculty is a source of movement in animals. But, for choice itself the principles are the appetitive faculty and the reason that is purposive, i.e., which is ordered to a practical thing as to an end, for the choice of the appetitive faculty is concerned with the things that are for the end. Hence reason proposing an end and thereupon proceeding to think discursively about it, and the appetitive faculty tending to the end, are compared to choice as a cause. So it is that choice depends on the intellect (or mind) and on the moral habit that perfects the appetitive power in such a way that it does not exist without either of them.
Et hoc probat per signum. Effectus enim electionis est actio, ut dictum est. Actio autem bona et contrarium in actione, idest mala actio, non potest esse sine mente et more, id est sine morali quacumque dispositione ad appetitum pertinente. Unde nec electio bona vel mala est sine mente et more. 1134. He gives a sign in proof of this, for the effect of choice is action, as was pointed out. But the action that is good, and its direct opposite in action (i.e., the action that is evil) cannot exist without the mind and disposition or moral condition, i.e., some inclination belonging to the appetitive faculty. Hence neither does choice, good or bad, exist without disposition and mind.
Deinde cum dicit: mens autem ipsa etc., ostendit, quae mens vel ratio sit principium actus. Et primo ostendit propositum. Secundo infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, ibi, propter quod, vel appetitivus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quamvis mens sit principium actus, tamen mens ipsa, secundum se absolute considerata idest ratio speculativa, nihil movet, quia nihil dicit de imitabili et fugiendo, ut dicitur in III de anima, et sic non est principium alicuius actus; sed solum illa quae est gratia huius, idest quae ordinatur ad aliquod particulare operabile sicut ad finem; et haec est mens vel ratio practica, quae quidem non solum principatur activae operationi, quae non transit in exteriorem materiam, sed manet in agente ut concupiscere et irasci: sed etiam factivae, quae transit in exteriorem materiam sicut urere et secare. 1135- Then [ii, y], at “Still, mind itself,” he shows what mind or reason is the principle of action. First [y, aa] he explains the proposition. Next [y, bb], at “Therefore, choice is either etc.,” he infers a corollary from what has been discussed. He says first that, although the mind is a principle of action, nevertheless the mind simply considered in itself (or the speculative reason) does not move anything because it prescribes nothing about pursuit or flight, as was stated in the third book De Anima (Ch. 9, 432 b 27-33; St. Th. Lect. 14, 812-815), Hence it is not the speculative mind that is a principle of action but the mind having a purpose or ordained to an individual operable thing as an end. This is the practical reason or mind, and it governs not only active operation, which does not pass into external matter but remains in the agent—like desiring and becoming angry—but also “factive” operation which does pass into external matter—burning and cutting for instance.
Et hoc probat per hoc, quod omnis faciens, puta faber aut aedificator, facit suum opus gratia huius, idest propter finem, et non propter finem in universali, sed ad aliquid particulare quod est factum, idest constitutum in exteriori materia, puta cultellus, aut domus; et non est finis aliquid actum, idest aliquid agibile in agente existens, puta recte concupiscere aut irasci; facit etiam omnis faciens propter aliquid factum quod est alicuius, id est quod habet aliquem usum, sicut usus domus est habitatio; et talis quidem est finis facientis, scilicet factum et non actum. Ideo autem non actum, quia in agibilibus ipsa bona actio est finis, puta bene concupiscere vel bene irasci. Et sicut mens practica est gratia huius finis vel facti vel actionis, ita etiam appetitus est alicuius particularis finis. 1136. He proves this by the fact that every worker, say the carpenter or builder, makes his product for the sake of something, i.e., for an end—not an abstract one but with a view to some particular thing that is made or established in external matter, for instance, a knife or a house. Moreover, the end is not something done, i.e., a practicable thing existing in the agent, like rightly desiring or becoming angry. Every worker acts for the sake of something belonging to a thing, i.e., which has some use, as -the use of a house is habitation. This then is the end of the worker, viz., something made and not a thing done, Therefore, it is not something done, since in immanent actions the good action itself is the end, for example, rightly desiring or justly becoming angry. As the practical mind is for the sake of this end, either a thing made or an action, so also the appetitive faculty is for the sake of some particular end.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex praemissis. Quia enim electio est principium actus et electionis principia sunt appetitus et ratio sive intellectus aut mens, quae mediante electione sunt principia actus, consequens est quod electio vel sit intellectus appetitivus, ita scilicet quod electio sit essentialiter actus intellectus, secundum quod ordinat appetitum; vel sit appetitus intellectivus, ita scilicet quod electio sit essentialiter actus appetitus, secundum quod dirigitur ab intellectu. Et hoc verius est: quod patet ex obiectis. Obiectum enim electionis est bonum et malum, sicut et appetitus; non autem verum et falsum, quae pertinent ad intellectum. Et tale principium est homo, scilicet agens, eligendo per intellectum et appetitum. 1137. Next [y, bb], at “Therefore, choice is either,” he draws a corollary from the premises. Because choice is a principle of action, and the principles of choice are the appetitive faculty and reason (i.e., intellect or mind), which by means of choice are principles of action, it follows that choice is of the appetitive intellect (in such a way that choice is essentially an act of the intellect according as it orders the appetitive faculty) or it is of the intellective faculty of appetition (in such a way that choice is essentially an act of the appetitive faculty according as it is directed by the intellect). The latter is nearer the truth, as is clear from the objects. The object of choice, as also of the appetitive faculty, is good and evil but not true and false which pertain to the intellect as such. A principle of this kind is man, viz., an agent choosing by means of intellect and appetitive faculty.
Deinde cum dicit: non est autem eligibile etc., ostendit circa qualia mens sit principium actus per electionem. Et dicit quod nihil factum, idest nullum praeteritum est eligibile, sicut nullus eligit Ilion, idest Troiam fuisse captam. Cuius ratio est, quia electio est appetitus praeconsiliati, ut dictum est. Nullus enim consiliatur de facto, id est de praeterito, sed de futuro. Et hoc probat: consilium non est nisi de aliquo contingenti, ut supra habitum est. Factum autem id est praeteritum, non est contingens, quia non contingit ipsum non fieri, idest quod non sit factum; et ad hoc inducit verbum Agathonis qui recte dixit: quod solo isto posse privatur Deus, ut faciat ingenita, id est non facta quae sunt facta. Et hoc recte dixit. 1138. At “What has already taken place” [ii, z] he explains the kinds of objects the mind is concerned with as the principle of action by power of choice. He says that nothing over and done with, i.e., nothing past is an object of choice, for instance, no one chooses Ilion, that is, to have captured Troy. The reason is that choice belongs to the deliberating faculty of appetition, as already noted (1129, 1133). But no one takes counsel about something done, i.e., about a past event but about a future and contingent one. He proves this from the fact that counsel is given only about a contingent event, as shown previously (460-472). Now what was done is not contingent, since it is not possible that the thing becomes undone, i.e., that it did not take place. Here he introduces the words of Agathon who rightly remarked: God lacks only this power to cause things to be unproduced, i.e., not to be made which are already made. This was well said.
Necesse est enim quod potestati cuiuslibet causae subsit omne illud quod potest contineri sub proprio obiecto virtutis eius, sicut ignis potest calefacere omne calefactibile. Virtus autem Dei, qui est universalis causa entium, extendit se ad totum ens: unde solum illud subtrahitur divinae potestati quod repugnat rationi entis, hoc est quod implicat contradictionem; et tale est quod factum est non fuisse. Eiusdem enim rationis est aliquid esse dum est, et fuisse dum fuit; et non esse quod est, et non fuisse quod fuit. 1139. Everything that can be contained under the proper object of any cause’s capacity is necessarily subjected to the influence of that cause, for instance, fire can heat anything capable of becoming hot. But the power of God, who is the universal cause of being, extends to the totality of being. Hence that only is withdrawn from the divine power which is inconsistent with the nature of being, as something which implies a contradiction. That a thing done be undone is of this kind, because it involves the same formality I for a thing to be (i.e., will be) while it is, and to have been (i.e., was to have been) while it was; and for what is, not to be-and what was, not to have been.
Deinde cum dicit utrarumque utique etc., concludit ex praemissis, quod cognitio veritatis est proprium opus utrarumque particularum intellectus, scilicet practici et speculativi, vel scientifici et ratiocinativi. 1140. Next [2, c], at “In any case the work,” he infers from the premises that knowledge of the truth is the work of each part of the intellect, namely, the practical and the speculative or the scientific and the estimative (ratiocinativi).
Deinde cum dicit secundum quos igitur etc., concludit ultimum, quod illi habitus sunt virtutes ambabus partibus intellectus secundum quos contingit verum dicere quod est bonum intellectivae partis. 1141. Then [A’, 31, at “Those habits according to which,” he deduces lastly that those habits by which the truth—the good of the intellective part—is manifested, are virtues of both divisions of the intellect.

LECTURE 3
An Enumeration of the Intellectual Virtues;
Every Science Can Be Taught
Chapter 3
I.    HE DISCUSSES THE PRINCIPAL INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.
      A.  He enumerates the intellectual virtues. — 1142-1143
ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι. Introducing again the subject treated above, let us discuss it further. There are five habits by which the soul expresses the truth by affirming or denying. They are: art, science, prudence, wisdom, and understanding; but not suspicion’ and opinion, which can express falsehood.
      B.  He discusses each of them.
            A’ He discusses ... them.
                   1.   HE DISCUSSES THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES PERFECTING THE INTELLECT REGARDING THE THINGS... DERIVED FROM PRINCIPLES.
                         a.   The science which perfects the intellect in regard to necessary things.
                               i.    Science on the part of the matter. — 1144-1146
ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα, μηδ' ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. ἀίδιον ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀίδια, τὰ δ' ἀίδια ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα. From this then it can be made clear what science is, if it is proper to science to know with certitude and not follow approximations to the truth. Indeed we all suppose that what we know scientifically cannot be in any other way. But contingent things are not of this kind, for when they pass from observation it is not known whether they exist or not. The object of science then concerns necessity, and therefore is eternal, because everything that is of necessity without qualification is eternal. Eternal things, however, are unproduced and indestructible.
                               ii.   (Science) on the part of the cause. — 1147-1149
ἔτι διδακτὴ ἅπασα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν. ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· ἣ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἣ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός· ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς· ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. Besides, every science can be taught and every object of science can be learned. But all teaching comes about by reason of previous knowledge, as we have indicated in the Analytics; one kind is by induction, the other by syllogism. Induction then gives us a first principle and a universal assent, but the syllogism proceeds from universals. Therefore, there are principles from which the syllogism proceeds principles not derived from the syllogism, and consequently arising from induction. Science then is a demonstrative habit having all the other requirements determined in the Analytics. When a man knows scientifically, he assents to and understands principles in some way; indeed, if he does not know them more than the conclusion, then he has science only incidentally. In this way, therefore, the question of science has been settled.
                         b.  The habits perfecting the intellect in regard to contingent things.
                               i.    He shows that there are two habits concerned with contingent things. — 1150-1152
τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ πρακτόν· ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις· ὥστε καὶ ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς ἕξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πρᾶξίς ἐστιν. The contingent is both something to be made and something to be done; and making is one thing and action another. We assent to these things even by proofs outside the science. For this reason the habit that is active under reason’s guidance is different from the habit that is productive through reason. Likewise action and making are not contained under one another, for action is not making, nor is making action.
                              ii.   He defines one of these (habits).
                                     x.    FIRST HE DEFINES ART IN ITSELF.
                                            aa. He shows what art is. — 1153
Chapter 4
ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἣ οὐ τέχνη, ταὐτὸν ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική. However, since architecture is a kind of art and also a kind of habit productive through reason, and no art is found that is not a habit of this sort; and again there is no such habit that is not an art, art then will be the same as a habit concerned with making, under the guidance of true reason.
                                            bb.      He shows what the subject matter of art is.
                                                   a’  He proposes the subject matter of art. — 1154-1155
ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ· But every art is concerned with realization, an artifact and observation; it considers particularly how contingent things may be made, and indicates that their principle is in the craftsman but not in the thing made.
                                                   b’. He shows from what things art differs according to its subject matter.
                                                         a.   IN RELATION TO DIVINE SCIENCES. — 1156
οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν, Art, however, does not deal with things that exist necessarily or come into being by necessity;
                                                         b.   TO NATURAL SCIENCE. — 1157
οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὑτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. nor with things that are according to nature, for they have these principles in themselves.
                                                         c.   (TO) PRUDENCE. — 1158
ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. Since making and action differ from one another, art necessarily directs making and not action.
                                                   c’ He shows with what it agrees in subject matter. — 1159
καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτά ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ
τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.
In some manner art and chance are concerned with the same things, as Agathon remarked: Art highly esteems chance, and chance art.
                                     y.    SECOND (HE DEFINES ART) BY COMPARISON WITH ITS OPPOSITE. — 1160
ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τοὐναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν. Art then, as was previously noted, is a kind of habit productive under the guidance of genuine reason On the contrary, however, unskillfulness is a habit productive under the guidance of incorrect reason operating on contingent matter.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
Incipientes igitur superius et cetera. Postquam philosophus investigavit rationem secundum quam accipiendae sunt intellectuales virtutes, hic iam incipit de ipsis intellectualibus virtutibus determinare. Et primo determinat de virtutibus intellectualibus principalibus. Secundo de virtutibus quibusdam adiunctis uni earum, scilicet prudentiae, ibi, oportet autem assumere et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo enumerat intellectuales virtutes. Secundo determinat de singulis earum, ibi, scientia quidem igitur quid est et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex quo posita est ratio accipiendi virtutes intellectuales, debemus rursus incipere ab eo quod superius determinatum est, ut sic tractemus de ipsis intellectualibus virtutibus. 1142. After the Philosopher has investigated the way in which the intellectual virtues are to be understood, he begins now to discuss the intellectual virtues themselves. First [I] he discusses the principal intellectual virtues. Then [Lect. 8], at “Now we must consider etc.” (B.1142 a 32), he defines certain virtues connected with one of them, namely, prudence. On the initial point he does two things. First [A] he enumerates the intellectual virtues. Next [B], at “From this then it can be made clear etc.,” he discusses each of them. He says first—after the way of understanding the intellectual virtues has been given—we ought to begin again from what has been settled before (1115), so that we may treat the intellectual virtues themselves.
Dictum est enim prius, quod virtutes intellectuales sunt habitus, quibus anima dicit verum. Sunt autem quinque numero quibus anima semper dicit verum vel affirmando vel negando: scilicet ars, scientia, prudentia, sapientia et intellectus. Unde patet quod ista quinque sunt virtutes intellectuales. Ab horum autem numero excludit suspicionem, quae per aliquas coniecturas habetur de aliquibus particularibus factis; et opinionem quae per probabiles rationes habetur de aliquibus universalibus. Quamvis enim per ista duo quandoque verum dicatur tamen contingit quod eis quandoque dicitur falsum, quod est malum intellectus, sicut verum est bonum ipsius; est autem contra rationem virtutis ut sit principium mali actus. Et sic patet quod suspicio et opinio non possunt dici intellectuales virtutes. 1143. It was previously pointed out (1125) that the intellectual virtues are habits by which the soul expresses the truth. But there are five habits by which the soul always expresses the truth by either affirming or denying, viz., art, science, prudence, wisdom, and understanding. Clearly then these are the five intellectual virtues. He omits suspicion, which is brought about by some conjectures concerning any particular facts, and opinion, which is brought about by some conjectures concerning any general things. Although these two sometimes do express the truth, nevertheless at other times it happens that they express falsehood, which is the evil of the intellect just as truth is the good of the intellect. But it is contrary to the nature of virtue to be the principle of an evil act. Obviously then suspicion and opinion cannot be called intellectual virtues.
Deinde cum dicit: scientia quidem igitur etc., determinat de virtutibus intellectualibus enumeratis. Et primo determinat de singulis earum; secundo ostendit quae sit principalior inter eas, ibi, et quemadmodum caput habens et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de virtutibus intellectualibus perficientibus intellectum circa ea quae sunt ex principiis. Secundo determinat de habitibus intellectualibus perficientibus intellectum circa prima principia, ibi, quia scientia de universalibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de scientia quae perficit intellectum circa necessaria. Secundo de habitibus perficientibus intellectum circa contingentia, ibi: contingentis autem aliter habere et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo notificat scientiam ex parte materiae. Secundo ex parte causae, ibi, adhuc docibilis omnis et cetera. 1144. Then [B], at “From this then it can be made clear,” he determines the intellectual virtues just enumerated. First [A’] he discusses each of them. Next [Lect. 6], at “As having supremacy” (B. 1141 a 20), he shows which is the principal one among them. On the initial point he proceeds in two ways. First [1] he discusses the intellectual virtues perfecting the intellect regarding the things which are derived from principles. Second [Lect. 5], at “Since science is an evaluation etc.” (B. 1140 b 31), he discusses the intellectual habits perfecting the intellect in regard to first principles. On the first point he does two things. Initially [a] he defines the science which perfects the intellect in regard to necessary things. Then [b], at “The contingent is both etc.,” he defines the habits perfecting the intellect in regard to contingent things. On the initial point he does two things. First [a, i] he explains science on the part of the matter. Next [a, ii], at “Besides, every science can be taught etc.,” he explains it on the part of the cause.
Dicit ergo primo, quod manifestum potest esse quid sit scientia ex his quae dicentur, si oportet per certitudinem scientiam cognoscere, et non sequi similitudines, secundum quas scilicet quandoque similitudinarie dicimus scire etiam sensibilia de quibus certi sumus. Sed certa ratio scientiae hinc accipitur, quod omnes suspicamur de eo quod scimus quod non contingit illud aliter se habere: alioquin non esset certitudo scientis, sed dubitatio opinantis. Huiusmodi autem certitudo, quod scilicet non possit aliter esse, non potest haberi circa contingentia aliter se habere. Tunc enim solum potest de eis certitudo haberi cum cadunt sub sensu. Sed quando fiunt extra speculari, idest quando desinunt videri vel sentiri, tunc latent utrum sint vel non sint, sicut patet circa hoc quod est sortem sedere. Sic ergo patet quod omne scibile est ex necessitate. Ex quo concludit quod sit aeternum; quia omnia quae sunt simpliciter ex necessitate, sunt aeterna. Huiusmodi autem neque generantur neque corrumpuntur. Talia ergo sunt de quibus est scientia. 1145. He affirms first that it can be made clear what science is from what has been said if it is proper to science to know with certitude and not follow approximations to the truth, for in this latter way we are sometimes said to know sensible things about which we are certain. But a well-founded notion of science is taken from the fact that we all agree that what we know cannot be in any other way; otherwise we would have the doubt of the guesser and not the certitude of the knower. However, certitude of this kind, viz., that cannot be in any other way, is not possible about things that can be in some other way, for in that case certitude can be attained about them only when they fall under the senses. But when they pass from observation, that is, cease to be seen or felt, then their existence or non-existence escapes us, as is obvious in the fact that Socrates is sitting. It is evident then that everything known by science is of necessity. From this he infers that it is eternal because everything which is of necessity without qualification is eternal. But things of this kind are neither produced nor destroyed. Therefore, it is about such things that science is concerned.
Potest autem et de generabilibus et corruptibilibus esse aliqua scientia, puta naturalis; non tamen secundum particularia quae generationi et corruptioni subduntur, sed secundum rationes universales quae sunt ex necessitate et semper. 1146. There can even be a science about producible and perishable things, for example, natural science; yet it cannot be based on particulars that are subject to generation and destruction, but on universal reasons which are necessary and eternal.
Deinde cum dicit: adhuc docibilis etc., notificat scientiam per causam. Et dicit quod omnis scientia videtur esse docibilis, id est potens doceri; unde in I metaphysicae dicitur quod signum scientis est posse docere. Per id enim quod est actu reducitur alterum de potentia in actum. Et eadem ratione omne scibile est discibile ab eo, scilicet qui est potentia sciens. Oportet autem quod omnis doctrina seu disciplina fiat ex aliquibus praecognitis, sicut dictum est in principio posteriorum analyticorum. Non enim possumus devenire in cognitionem alicuius ignoti nisi per aliquod notum. 1147. Next [a, ii], at “Besides, every science,” he explains science by its cause, saying that every science seems to be teachable. Hence it is stated in the first book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 2, 982 a 14; St. Th. Lect. 2, 39) that a characteristic of the one possessing science is his ability to teach, for a thing is led from potency to actuality by another which is actual. For the same reason every knowable thing can be learned by a man who has the potentiality. But all teaching or science must come about by reason of some previous knowledge, as was indicated in the beginning of the Posterior Analytics (Bk. I, Ch. 1, 71 a; St. Th. Lect. 1, 8). We cannot arrive at the knowledge of an unknown thing except by means of something known.
Est autem duplex doctrina ex praecognitis: una quidem per inductionem, alia vero per syllogismum. Inductio autem inducitur ad cognoscendum aliquod principium et aliquod universale in quod devenimus per experimenta singularium, ut dicitur in principio metaphysicae; sed ex universalibus principiis praedicto modo praecognitis procedit syllogismus. Sic ergo patet quod sunt quaedam principia ex quibus syllogismus procedit, quae non notificantur per syllogismum, alioquin procederetur in infinitum in principiis syllogismorum, quod est impossibile ut probatur in primo posteriorum. Sic ergo relinquitur quod principiorum syllogismi sit inductio. Non autem quilibet syllogismus est disciplinalis, quasi faciens scire, sed solus demonstrativus, qui ex necessariis necessaria concludit. 1148. There is a twofold teaching by means of things known: one by induction and the other by syllogism. Induction leads us to perceive some principle and something universal at which we arrive by experiments with singulars, as is noted in the first book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 1, 980 b 25-981 a 12; St. Th. Lect. 1, 17-19). But the syllogism proceeds from universal principles previously known in the aforementioned manner. Therefore, it is evident from this that there are certain principles from which the syllogism proceeds and which are not attested as accurate by the syllogism. Otherwise there would be a process to infinity in the principles of syllogisms-which is impossible, as is proved in the first book of the Posterior Analytics (Ch. 3, 72 b 25-73 a 20; St. Th. Lect. 8, 68-75. Ch. 19-22, 81 b 10-84 b 2; St. Th. 31-35, 255-307). So then it remains that the principle of the syllogism is induction. But not every syllogism is productive of knowledge, i.e., causes science, but only the demonstrative, which infers necessary things from the necessary.
Sic ergo manifestum est quod scientia est habitus demonstrativus, idest ex demonstratione causatus, observatis omnibus illis quaecumque circa scientiam demonstrativam determinata sunt in posterioribus analyticis. Oportet enim, ad hoc quod aliquis sciat, quod principia ex quibus scit (sint) per aliquem modum credita et cognita etiam magis quam conclusiones quae sciuntur. Alioquin non per se, sed per accidens habebit scientiam, inquantum scilicet potest contingere quod istam conclusionem sciat per quaedam alia principia et non per ista quae non magis cognoscit quam conclusionem. Oportet enim quod causa sit potior effectu. Unde id quod est causa cognoscendi oportet esse magis notum. Et ita per hunc modum determinatum est de scientia. 1149, So, obviously, science is a demonstrative habit, i.e., produced by demonstration, taking into consideration what has been noted about science in the Posterior Analytics. In order that a man may have science it is necessary that the principles by which he knows be assented to in some way and understood even more than the conclusions which are known. Otherwise he will not have science per se but only incidentally, inasmuch as it can happen that he knows this conclusion through certain other principles and not through these which he does not know better than the conclusion. The cause, certainly, must be more powerful than the effect. Hence that which is the cause of knowing must be more known. In this way then the question of science has been settled.
Deinde cum dicit contingentis autem etc., determinat de habitibus qui perficiunt intellectum circa contingentia. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit duos esse habitus circa contingentia. Secundo determinat de uno eorum, scilicet de arte, ibi, quia autem aedificativa et cetera. Tertio determinat de altero, scilicet de prudentia, ibi: de prudentia autem sic utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod contingens aliter se habere dividitur in duo, quia aliquid eius est agibile et aliquid est factibile, quod quidem cognoscitur per hoc quod alterum est factio et alterum est actio. 1150. Next [b], at “The contingent is both” he defines the habits which perfect the intellect in regard to contingent things. On this point he does three things. First [b, i] he shows that there are two habits concerned with contingent things. Second [b, ii], at “However, since architecture etc.,” he defines one of these. Third [Lect. 4], at “Let us now investigate etc.,” he defines the other, viz., prudence. He says first that the contingent is divided into two sections: something to be done, and something to be made. Thus we know that the one is an action and the other a making.
Et his possumus assentire per rationes exteriores, idest per ea quae determinata sunt extra istam scientiam, scilicet in IX metaphysicae; ibi enim ostensa est differentia inter actionem et factionem. Nam actio dicitur operatio manens in ipso agente, sicut videre, intelligere et velle, factio autem dicitur operatio transiens in exteriorem materiam ad aliquid formandum ex ea, sicut aedificare, urere et secare. Quia ergo habitus distinguuntur secundum obiecta, consequens est quod habitus qui est activus cum ratione, scilicet prudentia, sit alius ab habitu factivo qui est cum ratione qui est ars; et quod unus eorum non contineatur sub alio, sicut neque actio et factio continentur sub invicem, quia neque actio est factio, neque factio est actio. Distinguuntur enim oppositis differentiis, ut ex dictis patet. 1151. We can assent to these things by external reasons, i.e., by what has been determined outside this science, viz., in the ninth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 8, 1050 a 23-1050 b; St. Th. Lect. 8, 1862-1865). There the difference between action and making has been explained. Action is an operation remaining in the agent, like seeing, understanding, and willing. But making is an operation passing into external matter to fashion something out of it, like constructing and sawing. Since habits are distinguished according to the object, it follows that the habit that is active by means of reason, i.e., prudence, is different from the habit that is productive through reason, i.e., art. It follows also that one of these is not contained under the other, as action and making are not contained under one another, since neither is action making nor is making action. They are distinguished by opposing differences, as is clear from what has just been said.
Est autem considerandum quod quia contingentium cognitio non potest habere certitudinem veritatis repellentem falsitatem, ideo quantum ad solam cognitionem pertinet, contingentia praetermittuntur ab intellectu qui perficitur per cognitionem veritatis. Est autem utilis contingentium cognitio secundum quod est directiva humanae operationis quae circa contingentia est. Et ideo contingentia divisit tractans de intellectualibus virtutibus solum secundum quod subiiciuntur humanae operationi. Unde et solae scientiae practicae sunt circa contingentia, inquantum contingentia sunt, scilicet in particulari. Scientiae autem speculativae non sunt circa contingentia nisi secundum rationes universales, ut supra dictum est. 1152. We must consider that the knowledge of contingent things cannot possess the truth’s certitude rejecting untruth. Therefore, where there is question of knowledge alone, contingent things are passed over by the intellect which is perfected by the knowledge of the truth. But the knowledge of the contingent is useful according as it gives direction to human operation which is concerned with what is contingent. For that reason he makes the division of contingent things—when treating the intellectual virtues—only as they are subject to human operation. Hence, also, only the practical sciences are concerned with contingent things precisely as they are contingent, viz., in the area of the particular. The speculative sciences, on the other hand, do not deal with contingent things except according to universal reasons, as was noted before (1146).
Deinde cum dicit: quia autem aedificativa etc., determinat de arte. Et primo de ipsa arte secundum se; secundo de arte per comparationem ad oppositum eius, ibi, ars quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quid sit ars. Secundo quae sit artis materia, ibi, est autem ars omnis et cetera. Primum manifestat per inductionem. Videmus enim quod aedificativa est ars quaedam, et iterum quod est habitus quidam ad faciendum aliquid cum ratione. Et nulla ars invenitur cui hoc non conveniat, quod scilicet sit habitus factivus cum ratione, neque invenitur talis habitus factivus, scilicet cum ratione, qui non sit ars. Unde manifestum est quod idem est ars et habitus factivus cum vera ratione. 1153. Then [b, ii], at “However, since architecture,” he defines art. First [ii, x] he defines art in itself, and second [ii, y] at “Art then etc.,” by comparison with its opposite. On the initial point he does two things. First [x, aa] he shows what art is. Next [x, bb], at “But every art is concerned etc.,” he shows what the subject matter of art is. He makes the first point by induction. We see architecture as a kind of art, and also as a kind of habit for making something through reason. Likewise, every art is so constituted that it is a habit, concerned with making, under the guidance of reason. Likewise, no productive habit of this kind, i.e., directed by reason, is found which is not an art. Hence it is evident that art is the same as a habit concerned with making under the guidance of true reason.
Deinde cum dicit: est autem ars etc., determinat materiam artis. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo ponit artis materiam; secundo ostendit a quibus differat secundum suam materiam, ibi, neque enim de his etc.; tertio ostendit cum quo conveniat in materia, ibi, et secundum modum quemdam et cetera. Circa materiam autem artis duo est considerare, scilicet ipsam actionem artificis quae per artem dirigitur, et opus quod est per artem factum. Est autem triplex operatio artis. Prima quidem est considerare qualiter aliquid sit faciendum. Secunda autem est operari circa materiam exteriorem. Tertia autem est constituere ipsum opus. Et ideo dicit quod omnis ars est circa generationem, id est circa constitutionem et complementum operis, quod primo ponit tamquam finem artis: et est etiam circa artificiare, id est circa operationem artis qua disponit materiam, et est etiam circa speculari qualiter aliquid fiat per artem. 1154. Next [x, bb], at “But every art,” he considers the subject matter of art. On this point he does three things. First [bb, a’] he proposes the subject matter of art. Second [bb, b’], at “Art, however, does not,” he shows from what things art differs according to its subject matter. Third [bb, c’], at “In some manner etc.,” he shows with what it agrees in subject matter. We should consider two things about the subject matter of art: the very operation of the craftsman which is directed by the art, and the product manufactured. Now, there is a threefold operation of art: the first is to consider how an artifact is to be produced; the second is to operate on the external matter; the third is to accomplish the work itself. For this reason he says that every art is concerned with the creation, or the achievement and completion of the work which he places as the end of art. It is concerned also with the artistic, i.e., with the operation of art that disposes the material, and with observing how a thing may be made by art.
Ex parte vero ipsius operis duo est considerare. Quorum primum est quod ea quae fiunt per artem humanam sunt contingentia esse et non esse. Quod patet ex hoc, quod quando fiunt incipiunt esse de novo. Secundum est quod principium generationis artificialium operum est in solo faciente quasi extrinsecum ab eis, sed non in facto quasi intrinsecum. 1155. On the part of the work itself we should consider two things. The first of these is that the things that are made by art are contingent-can be or not be. This is evident from the fact that when they are made they begin to be in a new form. The second is that the principle of the creation of artistic works is in the craftsman alone, as it were, in something extrinsic to the artifact but is not in the thing made as something intrinsic to it.
Deinde cum dicit neque enim de his etc., manifestat quod dictum est, ostendens differentiam artis ad tria. Primo quidem ad scientias divinas et mathematicas, quae sunt de his quae ex necessitate sunt vel fiunt, de quibus non est ars. 1156. Then [bb, b’], at “Art, however, does not,” he explains what was just said (1154-1155), showing how art differs from three other areas of knowledge. First [b, A] in relation to the divine sciences and mathematics dealing with those things that exist or come into being by necessity; about these subjects there is no art.
Secundo ibi: neque de his etc., ostendit differentiam ad scientiam naturalem, quae est de his quae sunt secundum naturam, de quibus non est ars. Habent enim ea, quae sunt secundum naturam, in seipsis principium motus, ut dicitur in II physicorum, quod non competit operibus artis, ut dictum est. 1157. Next [b’, B], at “nor with things,” he shows the difference in relation to natural science which treats of those things that are according to nature, and about which there is no art. The things that are according to nature have the principle of motion in themselves, as was stated in the second book of the Physics (Ch. 1, 192 b 15; St. Th. Lect. 1, 142). This does not belong, to the works of art, as we just pointed out (1155).
Tertio ibi: quia autem etc., ostendit differentiam artis ad prudentiam. Et dicit, quod quia actio et factio sunt altera invicem, necesse est quod ars sit factionis directiva et non actionis, cuius est directiva prudentia. 1158. Third [b’, c], at “Since making,” he shows how art differs from prudence. He says that since action and making differ from one another, art is restricted to giving directions to making and not to action that prudence directs.
Deinde cum dicit: et secundum modum quendam etc., ostendit cum quo conveniat ars in materia. Et dicit quod fortuna et ars sunt circa eadem secundum aliquem modum; utraque enim est circa ea quae fiunt per intellectum; sed ars cum ratione, fortuna sine ratione. Et hanc convenientiam Agathon designavit dicens, quod ars dilexit fortunam, et fortuna artem, inquantum scilicet in materia conveniunt. 1159. At “In some manner” [bb, c’], he shows that with which art is in material agreement. He says that chance and art have to do with those things that are done by intellect: art in company with reason, and chance without reason. Agathon indicated this agreement when he said that art values chance and chance art, inasmuch as they agree in matter.
Deinde cum dicit: ars quidem igitur etc., determinat de arte per comparationem ad eius oppositum. Et dicit, quod sicut ars, ut praedictum est, est quidam habitus factivus cum vera ratione, ita athennia, id est inertia, e contrario est habitus factivus cum ratione falsa circa contingens aliter se habere. 1160. Then [ii, y], at “Art then,” he considers art by comparison with its opposite. He says that as art—this was previously noted (1153)—is a certain habit concerned with making under the guidance of true reason, so atechnia or unskillfulness, on the contrary, is a habit concerned with making directed by incorrect reason regarding what is contingent.

LECTURE 4
Prudence
Chapter 5
I.    HE SHOWS WHAT PRUDENCE IS.
      A.  He shows the nature of prudence.
            A’ He shows who is prudent.
                   1.   HE DETERMINES THE METHOD OF PROCEDURE. — 1161
περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. Let us now investigate prudence in this way, considering who are called prudent.
                   2.   HE SHOWS WHO ARE PRUDENT. — 1162
δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. It seems to pertain to the prudent man that he can give good advice about proper goods useful not for one aspect of life—as an example, what are useful for health or bodily strength—but for the benefit of the total life of man.
                   3.   HE MAKES KNOWN WHAT HE SAID, BY A SIGN. — 1163
σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοὺς περί τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μή ἐστι τέχνη. ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός. A sign of this is that we call men prudent in a particular matter when they can rightly conclude what is useful for a determined good end in things that do not belong to art. Therefore, a man will be absolutely prudent who gives advice about the whole of life.
            B’ He shows what prudence is.
                   1.   HE GIVES THE DEFINITION.
                         a.   He shows... the difference between prudence and other habits given above. — 1164-1165
βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πρᾶξαι. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μή ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. But no one takes counsel about things that either are incapable of being in any other way or are not within his power. Therefore, let us consider that science comes about by demonstration, and a demonstration is not possible in things whose principles can be in some other way--otherwise all the conclusions could be different; also, that b counsel is not about matters which are necessarily so. Prudence then will be neither a science nor an art. It is not a science because the thing to be done is contingent; it is not an art because the genus of action and making differ.
                         b.  He infers the definition of prudence. — 1166
λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά. It remains, therefore, that prudence is a genuine habit concerned with action under the guidance of reason, dealing with things good and bad for man.
                         c.   He assigns the reason for a statement he has made. — 1167
τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. Indeed the end of making is something other than itself. This is not always true in regard to action, for sometimes a good operation is its own end.
                   2.   HE MAKES... KNOWN (THE DEFINITION OF PRUDENCE) BY SIGNS.
                         a.   The first of these. — 1168
διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς. For this reason we think Pericles and others like him are prudent, because they can reckon what things are good both for themselves and others. We look upon stewards or dispensers of goods and statesmen or rulers of cities as men of this kind.
                         b.   He presents the second sign.
ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σώζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν. σώζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ' αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν. Hence we call temperance by the name sophrosyne, as it were, a thing preserving prudence. Prudence does preserve an estimation of the kind mentioned, for while pleasure and pain do not distort or pervert all judgments (for example, that a triangle has or has not three angles equal to two right angles), they do affect those dealing with the practicable. The principles of practicable things are the ends for which they are done. But the principle is not clear to a man corrupted by pleasure or pain, nor does he see the obligation to choose and do everything for the sake of it and on account of it, for vice is corruptive of principle. Consequently, prudence is of necessity a habit concerned with action, under the direction of correct reason, regard-
      B.  He shows how it (prudence) differs from art.
            A’ First... in art, a moral virtue regulating its use is required. — 1172
ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· Nevertheless, virtue is required for art but not for prudence.
            B’ He presents the second difference. — 1173
καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἧττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή τις ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τέχνη. Likewise in art a man who makes a deliberate mistake is the more acceptable, but in prudence, as in the virtues, it is the reverse. It is clear, therefore, that prudence is a particular kind of virtue and not an art.
II.  HE SHOWS WHAT ITS OBJECT IS. — 1174
δυοῖν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. But since there are two parts of the reasoning soul, prudence will be a virtue of the second part, viz., the estimative (opinativae), for opinion deals with the contingent as prudence does. Nevertheless, prudence is not a habit connected with reason alone, and a sign of this is that such a habit can be forgotten. But this is not true of prudence.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
De prudentia autem sic utique assumamus et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de arte, hic determinat de prudentia. Et primo ostendit quid sit prudentia. Secundo ostendit quid sit subiectum eius, ibi: duabus autem entibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quid sit prudentia; secundo ostendit differentiam eius ab arte, quantum ad rationem virtutis, ibi, sed tamen artis quidem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quis sit prudens. Secundo, quid sit prudentia, ibi, consiliatur autem nullus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo determinat modum agendi. Et dicit, quod sic oportet assumere de prudentia quid sit, considerando qui dicantur prudentes. 1161. After the Philosopher has finished his investigation of art, he begins now to investigate prudence. First [I] he shows what prudence is. Then [II], at “But since there are two parts etc.,” he shows what its object is. On the first point he does two things. First [A] he shows the nature of prudence. Next [B], at “Nevertheless, virtue etc,” he shows how it differs from art. On the initial point he does two things. First [A’] he shows who is prudent. Second [B’], at “But no one takes counsel etc.,” he shows what prudence is. On the first point he does three things. Initially [A’, 1] he determines the method of procedure, Saying that we must accept what prudence is from a consideration of people classed as prudent.
Secundo ibi: videtur autem prudentis esse etc., ostendit qui sint prudentes. Et dicit quod ad prudentem videtur pertinere, quod sit potens ex facultate habitus bene consiliari circa propria bona et utilia, non quidem in aliquo particulari negotio, puta qualia sint bona vel utilia ad sanitatem vel fortitudinem corporalem; sed circa ea quae sunt bona et utilia ad hoc quod tota humana vita sit bona. 1162. Second [A’, 2 ], at “It seems to pertain,” he shows who are prudent. He says that it seems to pertain to the prudent man that he can, by the power of habit, give good advice about proper and useful goods, not only in some particular matter—for example, what things are useful for health or bodily strength—but also about things good and useful for the benefit of the total life of man.
Tertio ibi: signum autem etc., manifestat quod dictum est per signum: quia scilicet illi dicuntur prudentes non simpliciter, sed circa aliquid determinatum, qui possunt bene ratiocinari de his quae sunt bona et utilia ad aliquem finem determinatum, dummodo ille finis sit bonus; quia ratiocinari de his quae pertinent ad malum finem est contrarium prudentiae, et dummodo hoc sit circa ea quorum non est ars; quia bene ratiocinari de huiusmodi non pertinet ad prudentiam, sed ad artem. Si ergo ille qui est bene consiliativus ad aliquid particulare est prudens particulariter in aliquo negotio; consequens est, quod ille sit totaliter et simpliciter prudens qui est bene consiliativus de his quae pertinent ad totam vitam. 1163. Last [A’, 3], at “A sign of this is etc.,” he gives a probative sign for his assertion. People are called prudent not absolutely but in a particular matter who can infer correctly what things are good or useful for some determined end. We suppose the end is good because to make deductions about things in reference to an evil end is contrary to prudence. We suppose likewise that there is question of things to which art does not apply because to conclude rightly in such matters (which are the concern of art) belongs not to prudence but to art. Therefore, if a man who is capable of giving good advice for a particular incident is presumed prudent in some matter, it follows that he will be absolutely prudent who gives good counsel about things touching the whole of life.
Deinde cum dicit consiliatur autem etc., ostendit quid sit prudentia. Et primo ponit definitionem prudentiae. Secundo manifestat eam per signa, ibi, propter quod Periclea et tales et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit ex praedictis differentiam prudentiae ad alios habitus supra positos, scilicet scientiam et artem. Secundo concludit definitionem prudentiae, ibi, relinquitur ergo et cetera. Tertio assignat rationem cuiusdam quod dixerat, ibi: factionis quidem enim et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod nullus consiliatur, neque de his quae sunt simpliciter impossibilia aliter se habere, neque de his quae sunt impossibilia agere illi. Accipiamus ergo ea quae supra dicta sunt: scilicet quod scientia est per demonstrationem: et iterum, quod demonstratio non potest esse de his quorum principia contingit aliter se habere, quia si principia possunt aliter se habere, omnia quae ex principiis illis consequuntur possunt aliter se habere non enim potest esse quod principia debilius esse habeant, quam ea quae sunt ex principiis. Coniungamus autem cum his ea quae nunc dicta sunt, scilicet quod consilium non sit de his quae sunt ex necessitate, et quod prudentia sit circa consiliabilia; quia dictum est supra, quod prudentis est bene consiliari. Ex quibus omnibus sequitur quod prudentia, neque sit scientia, neque ars. 1164. Then [A, B’], at “But no one takes counsel” he shows what prudence is. First [B’, i] he gives the definition. Next [B’, 2], at “For this reason we think etc.,” he makes it known by signs. on the initial point he does three things. First [1, a] he shows in this context the difference between prudence and other habits given above (1142-1160), viz., science and art. Second [1, b], at “It remains etc.,” he infers the definition of prudence. Third [1, c], at “Indeed the end of making etc.,” he assigns the reason for a statement he has made. He remarks first that no one deliberates either about things that absolutely cannot be in any other way, or about things not within his power. Let us then take the things stated above (11148-1149), viz., that science comes about by demonstration, and again that a demonstration is not possible in matter whose principles can be in some other way, otherwise all the conclusions from those principles could be different. it is not possible that principles should be weaker than the inferences drawn from the principles. But let us now join to these observations what has just been said, viz., that counsel is not about matters that are necessarily so, and that prudence is concerned with things worthy of deliberation, since it was previously stated (1162, 1163) that the prudent man’s special function is to give good counsel. From all this it follows that prudence is neither a science nor an art.
Et quod non sit scientia, patet per hoc quod agibilia de quibus est consilium et circa quae est prudentia, contingit aliter se habere, et circa talia non est scientia. Quod autem prudentia non sit ars, patet per hoc, quod aliud est genus actionis et factionis. Unde prudentia quae est circa actiones, differt ab arte quae est circa factiones. 1165. That it is not a science is evident from the fact that things to be done, about which counsel is given and prudence is concerned, are contingent; and there is no science about matters of this kind. But that it is not an art is evident because the genus of action and making are different. Consequently, prudence, which deals with action, differs from art, which deals with making.
Deinde cum dicit relinquitur ergo etc., concludit ex praemissis definitionem prudentiae. Et dicit, quod ex quo prudentia non est scientia, quae est habitus demonstrativus circa necessaria; et non est ars, quae est habitus cum ratione factivus; relinquitur, quod prudentia sit habitus cum vera ratione activus, non quidem circa factibilia, quae sunt extra hominem, sed circa bona et mala ipsius hominis. 1166. Next [i, b], at “It remains then,” he infers the definition of prudence from the premises. He says that, inasmuch as prudence is not a science (a habit of demonstration concerning necessary things) nor an art (a habit concerned with making under the guidance of reason), it follows that it is a habit dealing with action directed by genuine reason and is concerned not about things to be made—which are outside man—but about things good and bad for man himself.
Deinde cum dicit factionis quidem enim etc., assignat rationem eius quod dixerat: scilicet quod prudentia sit habitus activus circa hominis bona et mala. Manifestum est enim, quod semper finis factionis est aliquid alterum ab ipsa factione, sicut finis aedificationis est aedificium constructum. Ex quo patet, quod bonum ipsius factionis non est in faciente, sed in facto. Sic igitur ars, quae est circa factiones, non est circa hominis bona vel mala, sed circa bona vel mala artificiatorum. Sed finis actionis non semper est aliquid alterum ab actione, quia quandoque euprasia, idest bona operatio est finis ipsi, idest sibimet, vel etiam agenti: quod tamen non est semper, nihil enim prohibet unam actionem ordinari ad aliam sicut ad finem: sicut consideratio effectuum ordinatur ad considerationem causae. Finis autem est bonum uniuscuiusque. Et sic patet, quod bonum actionis est in ipso agente. Unde prudentia, quae est circa actiones, dicitur esse circa hominis bona. 1167. At “Indeed the end of making” [1, c] he assigns the reason for his statement (1166), that prudence is a habit dealing with action and concerned with things good and bad for man. Obviously the end of making is always something other than the making itself, as the end of building is a constructed edifice. Consequently, the good of making is not in the maker but in the thing made. So then art, which deals with making, is not concerned with the good and bad of man but with the good and bad of things wrought by art. But the end of action is not always something other than the action because sometimes eupraxia or good operation is its own end, i e., for itself, or even for the agent; this, however, is not always so. Nothing prevents one action from being ordered to another as an end, for example, the consideration of effects is ordered to a consideration of the cause, but the end of each is a good. Clearly then the good of action is in the agent himself. Hence prudence, which deals with action, is said to be concerned with the goods of man.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod Periclea etc., manifestat definitionem propositam per duo signa. Quorum primum est, quod quia prudentia est circa hominis bona et mala, propter hoc quendam qui dicebatur Pericles et alios similes existimamus esse prudentes, ex eo quod possunt considerare quae sint bona non solum sibiipsis, sed etiam aliis. Tales autem, scilicet qui sibi et aliis possunt bona speculari, existimamus oeconomicos idest dispensatores domorum, et politicos, id est gubernatores civitatum. 1168. Then [B’, 2], at “For this reason,” he gives two signs indicating the validity of the proposed definition. The first [2, a] of these is that, since prudence is concerned with things good and bad for man, therefore Pericles and others like him are thought to be prudent because they can consider what are the good things not only for themselves but also for others. Likewise, we think of stewards or dispensers of goods and of statesmen or governors of cities as men of this kind, viz., who can reckon good things for themselves and others.
Secundum signum ponit ibi, hinc et temperantiam et cetera. Et dicit quod quia prudentia est circa bona vel mala agibilia, inde est quod temperantia vocatur in Graeco soffrosini, quasi salvans mentem, a qua etiam prudentia dicitur fronesis. Temperantia autem, in quantum moderatur delectationes et tristitias tactus, salvat talem existimationem, quae scilicet est circa agibilia quae sunt hominis bona vel mala. Et hoc patet per contrarium: quia delectabile et triste quod moderatur temperantia, non corrumpit, scilicet totaliter, neque pervertit, in contrarium deducendo, quamcumque existimationem, puta speculativam, scilicet quod triangulus habeat vel non habeat tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Sed delectatio et tristitia corrumpit et pervertit existimationes quae sunt circa iudicia operabilium. 1169. At “Hence we call” [ 2, b ] he presents the second sign. He says that because prudence is concerned with good and bad things to be done, for this reason temperance is called in Greek sophrosyne (as it were, a thing preserving the reason) from which prudence gets the name phronesis. But temperance, precisely as it moderates the pleasures and pains of touch, preserves an estimation of this kind, namely, concerned with things to be done that are good or bad for man. Likewise this is made clear from the converse, since pleasure and pain—which temperance moderates—do not altogether distort (nor pervert by bringing about the exact opposite) every estimation, for example, the speculative judgment whether a triangle has or has not three angles equal to two right angles. But pleasure and pain do distort and pervert estimations that have to do with the practicable.
Qualiter fiat talis corruptio, ostendit consequenter. Manifestum est enim quod principia operabilium sunt fines, cuius gratia fiunt operabilia, qui ita se habent in operabilibus sicut principia in demonstrabilibus, ut habetur in secundo physicorum. Quando autem est vehemens delectatio vel tristitia, apparet homini quod illud sit optimum per quod sequitur delectationem et fugit tristitiam: et ita corrupto iudicio rationis non apparet homini verus finis qui est principium prudentiae circa operabilia existentis, nec appetit ipsum, neque etiam videtur sibi quod oporteat omnia eligere et operari propter verum finem, sed magis propter delectabile. Quaelibet enim malitia, idest habitus vitiosus, corrumpit principium, inquantum corrumpit rectam existimationem de fine. Hanc autem corruptionem maxime prohibet temperantia. 1170, Subsequently, he shows how this distortion comes about. It is evident that the principles of practicable things are the ends for the sake of which the practicable are done; these are in practicable matters like principles in demonstrations, as is stated in the second book of the Physics (Ch. 9, 200 a 15b 10; St. Th. Lect. 15, 273-274). But to a man experiencing intense pleasure or pain that thing appears best by which he attains pleasure and avoids pain. So, when the judgment of his reason is distorted, a man does not see clearly the end which is the principle of prudence regarding the practicable, nor does he desire the end; likewise it does not seem to him necessary to choose and do everything on account of the true end but rather on account of pleasure. Every vice or bad habit distorts the principle inasmuch as it distorts the correct estimation of the end. However, this distortion is prevented to a great degree by temperance.
Et sic concludit ex praedictis signis, quod necesse est prudentiam esse habitum operativum circa humana bona cum ratione vera. 1171. Thus he comes to the conclusion from the foregoing signs that prudence is necessarily a habit of action with correct reason regarding the good of man.
Deinde cum dicit: sed tamen artis etc., ostendit differentiam duplicem inter artem et prudentiam, secundum rationem virtutis humanae. Quarum prima est, quod circa artem requiritur virtus moralis, quae scilicet rectificet usum eius. Potest enim esse quod aliquis habet habitum artis quo potest bonam domum aedificare, tamen non vult propter aliquam aliam malitiam. Sed virtus moralis, puta iustitia, facit quod artifex recte arte sua utetur. Sed circa usum prudentiae non requiritur aliqua virtus moralis. Dictum est enim quod principia prudentiae sunt fines, circa quos conservatur rectitudo iudicii per virtutes morales. Unde prudentia, quae est circa humana bona, ex necessitate habet secum adiunctas virtutes morales tamquam salvantes sua principia; non autem ars quae est circa bona exteriora, sed postquam iam habetur ars, adhuc requiritur virtus moralis quae rectificet usum eius. 1172. Next [B], at “Nevertheless, virtue,” he shows a twofold difference between art and prudence from the nature of virtue. The first [B, A’] is that in the art a moral virtue regulating its use is required, for it is possible for a man to have the use of art enabling him to build a good building but not will it because of some other vice. But moral virtue, for instance, justice, causes a craftsman rightly to use his art. On the other hand, in the use of prudence an additional moral virtue is not required, for it was said (1170) that the principles of prudence are ends in regard to which rectitude of judgment is preserved by the moral virtues. Hence prudence, which is concerned with things good for man, necessarily has joined with it the moral virtues preserving its principles. This is not true of art, which deals with external goods, but, after art is acquired, moral virtue is still necessary to regulate its use.
Secundam differentiam ponit ibi: et in arte quidem et cetera. Manifestum est enim quod si aliquis peccat in arte ex propria voluntate, reputatur melior artifex quam si hoc non faciat sponte, quia tunc videretur ex imperitia artis procedere; sicut patet de his qui loquuntur incongrue propria sponte. Sed circa prudentiam minus laudatur qui volens peccat quam qui nolens, sicut et circa virtutes morales. Et hoc ideo quia ad prudentiam requiritur rectitudo appetitus circa fines, ad hoc quod sint ei salva sua principia. Ex quo patet, quod prudentia non est ars, quasi in sola veritate rationis consistens: sed est virtus ad modum moralium virtutum requirens rectitudinem appetitus. 1173. He presents the second difference at “Likewise in art” [B, B’]. Obviously if a man deliberately makes a mistake in art, he is considered a better artist than if he does not do this of his own will, because then he would seem to act out of ignorance of his art. This is evident, in those who deliberately make grammatical errors in their speech. But in the case of prudence a man who willingly sins is less commended than one who sins against his will; the same is true of the moral virtues. This is true because for prudence there is required a rectitude of the appetitive faculty concerning the ends, in order that its principles be preserved. Thus it is clear that prudence is not an art consisting, as it were, only in the truth of reason, but a virtue requiring rectitude of the appetitive faculty after the manner of the moral virtues.
Deinde cum dicit: duabus autem entibus etc., ostendit quid sit subiectum prudentiae. Et dicit quod cum duae sint partes animae rationalis, quarum una dicitur scientificum et alia ratiocinativum sive opinativum, manifestum est quod prudentia est virtus alterius horum, scilicet opinativi. Opinio enim est circa ea quae contingit aliter se habere, sicut et prudentia. Et tamen quamvis prudentia sit in hac parte rationis sicut in subiecto, ratione cuius dicitur virtus intellectualis; non tamen est cum sola ratione sicut ars vel scientia, sed requirit rectitudinem appetitus. Et huius signum est, quia habitus qui est in sola ratione potest oblivioni tradi, sicut ars et scientia, nisi sit habitus naturalis, sicut intellectus: prudentia non traditur oblivioni per dissuetudinem, aboletur cessante appetitu recto qui. Quandiu manet, facit rationem continue exerceri circa ea quae sunt prudentiae, ita quod oblivio subrepere non potest. 1174. Then [II], at “But since there are two parts,” he shows what the subject of prudence is. He says that since there are two parts of the rational soul—one of which is called scientific and the other estimative or conjectural (opinativum)—it is clear that prudence is a virtue of the second of these, viz., the conjectural. Opinion indeed deals with contingent things, as prudence does. Nevertheless, although prudence resides in this part of the reason as in a subject—because of this it is called an intellectual virtue—it is not connected with reason alone, as art or science, but it requires rectitude of the appetitive faculty. A sign of this is that a habit in the reason alone can be forgotten (for example, art and science), unless the habit is a natural one like understanding. Prudence, however, is not forgotten by disuse, but it is destroyed by the cessation of right desire which, while remaining, is continually engaged with the things belonging to prudence, so that oblivion cannot come along unawares.

LECTURE 5
Understanding, the Habit of First Principles; Wisdom
Chapter 6
1.   HE DISCUSSES UNDERSTANDING WHICH DEALS WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION. — 1175-1179
ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἳ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξίν ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι λέγω δὲ τρία φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν, λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν. Since science is an evaluation of universal and necessary truths, and since there are principles of demonstrable things and of every science (science is accompanied by demonstrative reason), the principle of the knowable is neither a science nor an art nor prudence. What is knowable is demonstrable, but these, viz., art and prudence, deal with contingent things. Likewise, wisdom does not treat these principles because it is the business of the man of wisdom to furnish demonstrations about some things. If intellectual habits are science, prudence, wisdom, and understanding—by which we have the truth and are never deceived about contingent or necessary things—and none of the three (viz., prudence, science, and wisdom) is concerned with those principles, it remains then that understanding treats them.
2.   HE CONSIDERS WISDOM WHICH DEALS WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF BEING.
      a.   He shows what wisdom is.
            i.    He shows what wisdom, understood in a special sense, is called. — 1180
Chapter 7
τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· We attribute “wisdom” to the most certain arts; accordingly we call Phidias a wise sculptor, and Polycletus a wise statuary. Here then by wisdom we mean nothing more than the excellence of the art.
            ii.   He shows what wisdom in the unqualified sense is. — 1181
εἶναι δέ τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ
τὸν δ' οὔτ' ἂρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὔτ' ἀροτῆρα
οὔτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.
But we consider some men wise in an unqualified sense and not just in a particular area or in some other way, as Homer says in his Margites: “The gods made this man neither a miner nor a farmer, nor wise in any other particular way.” It is clear then that wisdom is the most perfect of the modes of knowledge.
      b.   He infers a corollary from what was said. — 1182-1183
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, Therefore, the wise man must not only know the conclusions drawn from the principles but he must declare the truth about the principles. Hence wisdom will be a combination of understanding and science.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
Quia autem scientia de universalibus et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus intellectualibus quae perficiunt intellectum circa ea quae sunt ex principiis, hic determinat de virtutibus intellectualibus perficientibus intellectum circa ipsa principia. Et primo quidem determinat de intellectu, qui est circa principia demonstrationis. Secundo determinat de sapientia quae est circa principia entium, ibi, sapientiam autem in artibus et cetera. Ostendit ergo primo, quod praeter alias virtutes intellectuales, necesse est esse intellectum circa principia demonstrationis. Est enim scientia quaedam existimatio de universalibus et de his quae sunt ex necessitate particularia enim et contingentia non possunt attingere ad certitudinem scientiae, quia non sunt nota nisi secundum quod cadunt sub sensu. 1175. After the Philosopher has treated the intellectual virtues that perfect the intellect in respect to the things derived from principles, he will now consider the intellectual virtues perfecting the intellect in relation to the principles themselves. He does two things. First [i] he discusses understanding which deals with the principles of demonstration. Second [2], at “We attribute wisdom etc.,” he considers wisdom which deals with the principles of being. He shows first that, over and above the other intellectual virtues, there must be understanding concerning the principles of demonstration. Science is a certain evaluation of universals and things existing of necessity, for particulars and contingents cannot attain the certitude of science since they are only known insofar as they fall under the senses.
Est autem tertio considerandum circa scientiam quod eorum quae demonstrantur (et) ipsius scientiae quae est circa demonstrabilia necesse est esse quaedam principia quod ex hoc patet: quod scientia est cum ratione demonstrativa procedente ex principiis in conclusiones. Quia ergo ita se habet circa scientiam, necesse est quod principiorum scientiae neque sit scientia, neque ars, neque prudentia, de quibus iam dictum est. 1176. In regard to the science of the things that are demonstrated, we must consider that there are some principles of the science itself necessarily dealing with demonstrable things. This is clear from the fact that science is founded on demonstrative reason proceeding from principles to conclusions. Since this is the case with science, the principle of the science necessarily is neither a science, nor an art, nor prudence—which we have just discussed (1142-1174).
Quod autem horum non sit scientia, patet: quia id de quo est scientia est demonstrabile, prima autem demonstrationum principia non sunt demonstrabilia, alioquin procederetur in infinitum. Quod autem non sit horum principiorum ars vel prudentia, patet per hoc quod hae duae virtutes sunt circa ea quae contingit aliter se habere, quod non potest dici de principiis demonstrationis. Oportet enim ea esse certiora conclusionibus quae sunt ex necessitate. Ex hoc etiam patet quod horum principiorum non potest esse sapientia, quae est alia virtus intellectualis, de qua post dicetur; quia ad sapientem pertinet quod habeat demonstrationem de aliquibus rebus, idest de primis causis entium; principia autem sunt indemonstrabilia, ut dictum est. 1177. Obviously it is not a science because the subject matter of science is demonstrable. But the first principles of demonstrations are indemonstrable, otherwise we would proceed to infinity. That art and prudence have nothing to do with these principles is evident from the fact that these two virtues deal with contingent things. This cannot be said of the principles of demonstration, for principles must be more certain than necessary conclusions. Likewise it is clear that wisdom, another intellectual virtue which we will discuss subsequently (1180-1181), does not treat these principles. The reason is that it pertains to the wise man to frame a demonstration about some things, viz., the ultimate causes of being. But principles are indemonstrable, as has been said (1148).
Si ergo virtutes intellectuales quibus ita verum dicimus quod eis nunquam subest mendacium, sive circa necessaria quae non contingit aliter se habere, sive circa contingentia, sunt isti habitus, scientia, prudentia (sub qua comprehendit artem quae est etiam circa contingentia), et iterum sapientia et intellectus: cum nullum trium quae sunt prudentia, sapientia et scientia, possit esse circa principia indemonstrabilia, ut ex praedictis patet; relinquitur quod horum principiorum sit intellectus. 1178. If then the intellectual virtues—about which we so truly say that falsehood never underlies them whether concerned with necessary or contingent things—are these habits: science, prudence (under which he includes art which also has to do with what is contingent), and besides, wisdom and understanding, it remains that understanding treats these principles since none of the three, prudence, wisdom, or science, can be concerned with indemonstrable principles, as is clear from the foregoing.
Accipitur autem hic intellectus non pro ipsa potentia intellectiva, sed pro habitu quodam quo homo ex virtute luminis intellectus agentis naturaliter cognoscit principia indemonstrabilia. Et satis congruit nomen. Huiusmodi enim principia statim cognoscuntur cognitis terminis. Cognito enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim scitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. Dicitur autem intellectus ex eo quod intus legit intuendo essentiam rei. Unde et in tertio de anima dicitur, quod obiectum proprium intellectus est quod quid est. Et sic convenienter cognitio principiorum quae statim innotescunt cognito quod quid est circa terminos intellectus nominatur. 1179. Understanding is not taken here for the intellect itself but for a particular habit by which a man, in virtue of the light of the active intellect, naturally knows indemonstrable principles. The name is suitable enough, for principles of this kind are immediately understood from a knowledge of their terms. Once we know what a whole and what a part is, we grasp immediately that every whole is greater than its part. It is called understanding (intellectus) because it reads (legit) within, observing the essence of a thing. Hence his third book De Anima (Ch. 4, 429 b 5-23; St. Th., Lect. 8, 700-719) says that the proper object of the intellect is the essence of a thing. So the knowledge of principles, which immediately become known when the essence of the thing is understood, is suitably called “intellect” or understanding (intellectus).
Deinde cum dicit sapientiam autem etc., determinat de sapientia. Et primo ostendit quid sit sapientia. Secundo infert quoddam correlarium ex dictis, ibi: oportet ergo sapientem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quid dicatur sapientia particulariter sumpta. Et secundo ex hoc quid sit sapientia simpliciter, ibi, esse autem quosdam et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod inter artes nos assignamus nomen sapientiae certissimis artibus, quae scilicet cognoscentes primas causas in genere alicuius artificii dirigunt alias artes quae sunt circa idem genus; sicut architectonica ars dirigit manualiter operantes. Et secundum hunc modum dicimus Phydiam fuisse sapientem latomum, id est lapidum incisorem, et Policlitum sapientem statuificum, idest factorem statuarum: ubi nihil aliud dicimus sapientiam, quam virtutem artis, idest ultimum et perfectissimum in arte, quando scilicet aliquis attingit ad id quod est ultimum et perfectissimum in arte. Hoc enim est virtus uniuscuiusque rei, ut dicitur in I de caelo et mundo. 1180. Next [2], at “We attribute wisdom,” he considers wisdom. First [a] he shows what wisdom is. Then [b], at “Therefore, the wise man etc.,” he infers a corollary from what was said. On the initial point he does two things. First. [i] he shows what wisdom, understood in a special sense, is called. Second [ii], at “But we consider some etc.,” he shows what wisdom in the unqualified sense is. He says first that in the arts we attribute the name wisdom to the most certain ones—those which, knowing the ultimate causes in some category of handicraft, direct other arts concerned with the same category, for example, an architectonic art directs technical workers. In this way we say Phidias was a wise sculptor and Polycletus a wise statuary, i.e., a carver of statues. Here we call wisdom nothing other than the excellence of the art (i.e., its ultimate perfection) by which a man attains what is ultimate and most perfect in the art. In this the excellence of each thing consists, as was pointed out in the first book De Coelo (Ch. 11, 281 a 7-15; St. Th. Lect. 25, 248-249).
Deinde cum dicit: esse autem quosdam etc., ostendit quid sit sapientia simpliciter dicta. Et dicit quod sicut existimamus quosdam esse sapientes in aliquo artificio, ita etiam existimamus quosdam esse sapientes totaliter, idest respectu totius generis entium et non secundum aliquam partem, etiam si non sint sapientes circa aliquod aliud artificium; sicut Homerus dicit de quodam quod dii eum posuerant non fossorem neque aratorem neque aliquod aliud particulare artificium sapientem, sed sapientem simpliciter. Unde manifestum est, quod sicut ille qui est sapiens in aliquo artificio est certissimus in illa arte, ita illa quae est sapientia simpliciter est certissima inter omnes scientias, inquantum scilicet attingit ad prima principia entium, quae secundum se sunt notissima, quamvis aliqua eorum, scilicet immaterialia, sint minus nota quoad nos. Universalissima autem principia sunt etiam quoad nos magis nota, sicut ea quae pertinent ad ens inquantum est ens: quorum cognitio pertinet ad sapientiam simpliciter dictam, ut patet in quarto metaphysicae. 1181. Then [ii], at “But we consider,” he shows what wisdom in the unqualified sense is. He says that, as we consider some men wise in a particular handicraft, so too we consider others completely wise, i.e., with regard to the whole category of beings and not just a part of them, even though they are not wise in a particular handicraft. Thus Homer remarks that the gods did not make a certain man a miner or a farmer, nor make him gifted in any craft but simply made him wise. Hence it is clear that, as the man who is wise in some handicraft is most sure in that art, so that knowledge which is wisdom in an unqualified sense is the most certain of all modes of knowledge inasmuch as it treats first principles of being—in themselves most known, although some of them, the immaterial, are less known in regard to us. But the most universal principles are also more known in regard to us, for example, those belonging to being as being—the knowledge of which pertains to wisdom taken in this sense, as is evident in the fourth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 1, 1003 a 21-22; St. Th. Lect. 1, 529-530).
Deinde cum dicit: oportet ergo etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis. Et dicit quod quia sapientia est certissima, principia autem demonstrationum sunt certiora conclusionibus, oportet quod sapiens non solum sciat ea quae ex principiis demonstrationum concluduntur circa ea de quibus considerat; sed etiam quod verum dicat circa ipsa principia, non quidem quod demonstret ea, sed in quantum ad sapientem pertinet notificare communia, puta totum et partem, aequale et inaequale, et alia huiusmodi, quibus cognitis statim principia demonstrationum innotescunt; unde et ad huiusmodi sapientem pertinet disputare contra negantes principia, ut patet in quarto metaphysicae. 1182. At “Therefore, the wise man” [b] he infers a corollary from this: because wisdom is most certain and the principles of demonstrations more certain than the conclusions, the wise man should not only know the things inferred in the matter that he is considering but he should also declare the truth about first principles themselves not to prove them but to explain common notions, e.g., whole and part, equal and unequal, and suchlike-a function proper to a philosopher. When these common notions are known, the principles of demonstrations are clear. Hence the concern of such a man is to argue against those denying principles, as is evident in the fourth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 3, 1005 a 19-b 8; St. Th. Lect. 5, 588-595).
Sic ergo ulterius concludit, quod sapientia, inquantum dicit verum circa principia, est intellectus; inquantum autem scit ea quae ex principiis concluduntur, est scientia. Distinguitur tamen a scientia communiter sumpta, propter eminentiam quam habet inter alias scientias: est enim virtus quaedam omnium scientiarum. 1183. Finally, he draws a further conclusion that wisdom, in declaring the truth about principles, is understanding; but in knowing the things inferred from the principles, it is science. However, wisdom is distinguished from science, taken in the usual sense, by reason of the eminence which it has among other sciences; it is a kind of perfection of all sciences.

LECTURE 6
Wisdom, the Principal Intellectual Virtue
Chapter 7
I.    HE SHOWS WHICH (VIRTUE) IS ABSOLUTELY PRINCIPAL.
      A.  He shows that wisdom is principal among all...
            A’ He proposes what he intends. — 1184
ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων. As having supremacy it is the science of the most honorable things,
            B’ He rejects the opposite error.
                   1.   HE REJECTS THIS ERROR (FOR... TWO REASONS).
                         a.   It is unreasonable... to consider political science or prudence... the best of the sciences. — 1185-1186
ἄτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἴεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. for it is unreasonable to consider political science or prudence the best of the sciences if man is not the most excellent thing in the world.
                         b.  He gives the second reason. — 1187-1188
εἰ δὴ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ ταὐτὸν ἀεί, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταὐτὸ πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν, φρόνιμον δὲ ἕτερον· τὰ γὰρ περὶ αὑτὸ ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν φησὶν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψει αὐτά. διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὑτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικήν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὑτοῖς ἐροῦσι σοφίαν, πολλαὶ ἔσονται σοφίαι· οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἁπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζώων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων. What is healthful and what is good for men and fishes are different, but white and straight are always the same; and everyone would say that in godlike things what is wise is always the same. However, what is prudent may be different, for the man who can properly consider individual things pertaining to himself is called prudent and we entrust such matters to him. For this reason people call prudent all dumb animals who seem to have the ability to care for themselves. It will certainly be evident then that wisdom is not 30 the same as political science. If people call wisdom that science dealing with things useful to themselves, there will be many kinds of wisdom, for there is not one consideration regarding the good of all animals but there is a different consideration for individual animals. Likewise there is not one medicine for all beings.
                   2.   HE DISMISSES A CERTAIN OBJECTION. — 1189
εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν. That man is the most excellent of all animals makes no difference, because there are other creatures more divine by their nature, for instance, the very evident things that constitute the universe.
            C’ He infers the truth. — 1190
ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει. From what has been said it is obvious that wisdom is both science and understanding about the things most honorable by their nature.
      B.  He infers a corollary from the premises.
            A’ He introduces the corollary. — 1191-1193
διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους δ' οὔ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτούς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν. For this reason people say Anaxagoras and Thales, and others like them, are wise but not prudent: men, seeing them ignorant of what is useful to themselves, assert they know superfluous and wonderful things both difficult and divine, but that this knowledge is useless because they do, not seek human goods.
ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, βουλεύεται δ' οὐδεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ' ὅσων μὴ τέλος τι ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ' ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. Prudence has to do with human goods about which we deliberate, for skillful deliberation seems to be the special work of the prudent man. But no one deliberates about things that cannot be in any other way, nor about whatsoever is not ordered to some end -and this a practicable good. Moreover, that man is a good counsellor absolutely speaking who can conjecture, by reasoning what is best for man to do.
            B’ He manifests one aspect of it (the corollary). — 1194
οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἑτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια [κοῦφα καὶ] ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική· ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. Prudence not only considers universals but must also know singulars, for it is active, and action is concerned with singulars. Hence some men not informed scientifically but expert in different particulars are more effective than other men with scientific knowledge. Certainly, if a doctor knows that light meats are easily digestible and healthful but does not know what meats are light, lie will not make people the flesh well. But if he knows that the flesh of fowls is light and healthful he will be better able to effect a cure. Since prudence is concerned with action, therefore, it must have both kinds (of knowledge) but especially the latter (of particulars).

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
Et quemadmodum caput habens et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de singulis virtutibus intellectualibus, hic ostendit quae sit praecipua inter eas. Et primo ostendit, quae sit praecipua simpliciter. Secundo, quae sit praecipua in genere agibilium humanorum, ibi, erit autem utique quaedam et hic et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod sapientia sit simpliciter praecipua inter omnes. Secundo infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, manifestans per signum quoddam ea quae dicta sunt, ibi, propter quod Anaxagoram et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo excludit errorem contrarium, ibi, inconveniens enim et cetera. Tertio concludit veritatem, ibi, ex dictis utique manifestum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod sapientia non est qualiscumque scientia, sed scientia rerum honorabilissimarum, id est divinarum, ac si ipsa habeat rationem capitis inter omnes scientias. Sicut enim per sensus, qui sunt in capite, diriguntur motus et operationes omnium aliorum membrorum, ita sapientia dirigit omnes alias scientias, dum ab ea omnes aliae sua principia supponunt. 1184. After the Philosopher has defined the individual intellectual virtues, he now explains the principal one among them. First [I] he shows which is absolutely principal. Then [Lect. 7], at “But there will be etc.” (B. 1141 b 22), he shows which is principal in the, genus of the practicable in reference to man. On the first point he does two things. First [A] he shows that wisdom is principal among all without qualification. Next [B], at “For this reason etc.,” he infers a corollary from the premises, clarifying what has been said, by a sign. On the initial point he does three things. First [A, A’] he proposes what he intends. Then [A, B’], at “for it is unreasonable etc.,” he rejects the opposite error. Last [A, C’], at “From what has been said etc.,” he infers the truth. He says first that wisdom is not science of any sort whatever but the science of the most honorable and divine things, inasmuch as it has the essential elements to be head of all sciences. As the senses located in the head direct the movements and operations of all the other members, so wisdom directs all the other sciences since they take their principles from it.
Deinde cum dicit inconveniens enim etc., excludit quorumdam errorem, qui attribuebant principalitatem inter omnes scientias politicae, per quam gubernatur multitudo, vel prudentiae per quam aliquis gubernat seipsum, attendentes ad utilitatem magis, quam ad scientiae dignitatem. Scientiae enim speculativae, ut dicitur in principio metaphysicae non quaeruntur quasi ad aliquid utiles, sed sicut per se honorabiles. Unde circa hoc duo facit. Primo excludit hunc errorem. Secundo removet quamdam obiectionem, ibi, si autem, quoniam optimum et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas rationes. 1185. Then [A, B’], at “for it is unreasonable,” he rejects the error of certain philosophers who, considering usefulness rather than the dignity of science, assign primacy of the sciences to political science by which the multitude is governed, or to prudence by which a man governs himself. As was pointed out in the beginning of the Metaphysics (Bk. 1, Ch. 1, 981 b 13-25; St. Th. Lect. 1, 31-33), the speculative sciences are not sought as useful for some further end but simply as honorable in themselves. Hence he does two things on this point. First [1] he rejects this error. Next [2], at “That man etc.,” he dismisses an objection raised. For the first statement he gives two reasons.
Circa quarum primam dicit, quod inconveniens est si quis politicam vel prudentiam aestimet esse scientiam studiosam, idest optimam inter scientias. Quod quidem esse non posset nisi homo esset optimum eorum quae sunt in mundo. Scientiarum enim una est melior et honorabilior altera ex eo quod est meliorum et honorabiliorum, ut dicitur in primo de anima. Hoc autem est falsum quod homo sit optimum eorum quae sunt in mundo. Ergo neque politica seu prudentia, quae sunt circa res humanas, sunt optimae inter scientias. 1186. Concerning the first of these he says that [a] it is unreasonable for a man to consider political science or prudence the most desirable science, i.e., the best of the sciences. This could not be unless man were the most excellent of all things in the world, for one science is better and more honorable than another because it deals with better and more honorable subjects-as is said in the first book De Anima (Ch. 1, 402 a 1-5; St. Th. Lect. 1, 4-5). But it is false to say that man is the most excellent thing in the world. Consequently, neither political science nor prudence—both dealing with human affairs—are the best among the sciences.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi si utique sanum et cetera. Quae quidem procedit ex hoc, quod quaedam sunt quorum ratio consistit in proportione et habitudine ad aliquid. Et ideo huiusmodi non possunt esse eadem quantum ad omnia; sicut patet quod non idem est sanum et bonum hominibus et piscibus. Quaedam vero dicuntur absolute, sicut album in coloribus et rectum in figuris. Et quia sapientia est de his quae in se et absolute sunt talia (est enim de primis entium), oportet ab omnibus dici quod idem sit quod est sapiens in omnibus, et quod sit eadem sapientia simpliciter respectu omnium. Sed id quod est prudens oportet quod sit alterum apud diversos, propter hoc, quod prudentia dicitur secundum proportionem et habitudinem ad aliquid. Ille enim qui potest bene speculari singula quae pertinent ad seipsum, dicitur esse prudens, et tali conceditur sive attribuitur prudentia. Et inde est, quod per quandam similitudinem homines dicunt quasdam bestias esse prudentes, quaecumque scilicet videntur habere quamdam potentiam provisivam circa propriam vitam, non quidem ex ratione, quod proprie ad prudentiam pertinet. Sic igitur manifestum est quod sapientia, quae est praecipua inter omnes, non est idem quod politica. 1187. At “What is healthful etc.” [b] he gives the second reason. It arises from this, that there are certain things whose prime characteristic consists in a proportion and relation to another. For this reason such things cannot be the same in reference to all objects. Thus it is clear that what is healthful and what is good are not identical for men and fishes. But other things are predicated without limitation, for example, white of colors and straight of figures. Because wisdom is one of the things which are such simply and in themselves (it is numbered among the primary entities), everyone must say that what is wise is the same in all things and that wisdom is the same without qualification in relation to everything. But what is prudent must be a thing that may be different in different subjects, because prudence is predicated according to a proportion and a relation to something. The man who can properly consider each thing pertaining to him is said to be prudent and to such a one we grant or attribute prudence. Hence by a kind of analogy men say that certain dumb animals are prudent, viz., those that seem to be able to care for themselves, not however by means of reason which properly belongs to prudence. So then it is evident that wisdom, which is a particular virtue, is not the same as political science.
Si enim poneremus quod illa scientia, quae est circa utilia qualis est politica, esset sapientia quae est omnium caput, sequeretur quod essent multae sapientiae. Non enim potest esse una aliqua ratio circa ea quae sunt bona omnibus animalibus; sed oportet, quod circa singula animalia sit altera consideratio considerans quid sit bonum unicuique. Et eadem ratio est de medicina, quae non potest esse una omnium. Dictum est enim supra, quod sicut sanum, ita et bonum est alterum hominibus et piscibus. Oportet autem esse solam unam sapientiam, quia ad eam pertinet considerare ea quae sunt communia omnibus entibus. Unde relinquitur, quod politica, quae est gubernativa humanae multitudinis, non potest esse sapientia simpliciter; et multo minus prudentia communiter dicta, quae est gubernativa unius. 1188. If we would hold that a science such as politics, which deals with useful things, was wisdom—the chief of all the sciences—it would follow that there would be many kinds of wisdom. Certainly there cannot be one identical formality in the things which are good for all animals, but a different consideration must be accorded to individual animals, taking into account what is good for each. A similar reason holds for medicine that cannot be the same for all. It was just said (1187) that what is healthful and what is good differ for men and fishes. But there must be only one wisdom because its function is to consider things which are common to all entities. So it remains that political science, which governs a human multitude, cannot be wisdom without qualification; much less can ordinary prudence which governs one man.
Deinde cum dicit: si autem quoniam etc., excludit quamdam obiectionem. Posset enim aliquis dicere, politicam seu prudentiam, cum sit de rebus humanis, esse praecipuam, quia homo est excellentior inter alia animalia. Sed hoc nihil refert ad propositum: quia quaedam alia secundum suam naturam sunt multum diviniora propter sui excellentiam, quam homo. Et ut taceamus de Deo et substantiis separatis quae non subiacent sensibus, etiam ipsa quae manifestissima sunt sensui, ex quibus mundus constat, scilicet caelestia corpora, sunt homine potiora, sive comparemus corpus corpori, sive comparemus substantias moventes animae humanae. 1189. Then [2], at “That man’ “ he answers a certain objection. Someone could say that political science or (practical) prudence, treating as it does of human affairs, is the principal science because man is more excellent than other animals. But this has no relevance to our proposition because certain other things are by their nature more divine than man by reason of their excellence. And—as we may not treat of God and separated substances, for they do not come under the senses—even the objects most evident to the senses and constituting the universe, namely, the heavenly bodies, are better than men. This is so whether we compare body to body, or the moving substances to the human soul.
Deinde cum dicit: ex dictis utique manifestum etc., concludit veritatem intentam, scilicet quod sapientia sit scientia et intellectus, ut prius dictum est, non circa quaecumque, sed circa honorabilissima. Et hoc est ex dictis manifestatum, quia, si aliqua scientia esset honorabilior, hoc praecipue conveniret politicae et prudentiae, quod supra est improbatum. 1190. Next [A, C’], at “From what has been said,” he infers the truth, viz., that wisdom is science and understanding—as was previously pointed out [1183)—not of all possible things but of the most honorable. This is evident from the preceding, because if any science was more honorable it would be especially political science or prudence, and this view has just been rejected (1186-1188).
Deinde cum dicit propter quod Anaxagoram etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex praemissis; per quod manifestantur quaedam quae dicta sunt. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo inducit corollarium. Secundo manifestat quandam partem ipsius, ibi: neque enim prudentia et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod quia prudentia est circa bona humana sapientia autem circa ea quae sunt homine meliora, inde est, quod homines dicunt Anaxagoram, et quemdam alium philosophum qui vocabatur Thales, et alios similes esse quidem sapientes, non autem prudentes, eo quod homines vident eos ignorare ea quae sunt sibi ipsis utilia, et dicunt eos scire quaedam superflua, id est inutilia, et admirabilia, quasi excedentia communem hominum notitiam, et difficilia, quia indigent diligenti inquisitione, et divina propter nobilitatem naturae. 1191. At “For this reason” [B] he infers from the premises a corollary by which some things previously discussed are clarified. On this point he does two things. First [B, A’] he introduces the corollary. Then [B, B’], at “Prudence not only considers etc.,” he manifests one aspect of it. He says first that, because prudence deals with the goods of man, but wisdom with the things that are better than man, accordingly people call Anaxagoras and Thales the philosopher—and others like them—wise but not prudent. This is because men see these philosophers ignorant of things useful to themselves, but admit they know useless truths that are wonderful (is it were exceeding the common knowledge of mortals), difficult (needing careful investigation), and divine by reason of their exalted character.
Ponit autem specialiter exemplum de Thale et Anaxagora, qui specialiter super hoc reprehensi fuerunt. Cum enim Thales exiret domum, ut astra consideraret, incidit in foveam; eoque lugente, dixit ad eum quaedam vetula: tu quidem, o Thales, quae ante pedes nequis videre et quae in caelo sunt putas cognoscere? Anaxagoras etiam, cum nobilis et dives esset, paterna bona suis dereliquit, et speculationi naturalium se dedit, non curans de politicis, unde ut negligens reprehendebatur. Et dicenti sibi: non est tibi curae patria?, Respondit: mihi patria valde curae est, ostenso caelo. 1192. He gives in particular the example of Thales and Anaxagoras because they are especially censured on this point. When Thales was leaving his house to look at the stars he fell into a ditch; while he was bewailing the fact an old woman remarked to him: “You, O Thales, cannot see what is at your feet and you expect to see what is in the heavens?” And Anaxagoras, though noble and wealthy, left his family possessions to his relatives and devoted himself to the investigation of natural phenomena; taking no interest in civic affairs, he was consequently blamed for his negligence. When someone asked him: “Do you not care about your country?” He answered: “I will have great concern for my country after I have explained the heavens.”
Ideo autem homines dicunt eos scire inutilia, quia non inquirunt de bonis humanis, propter quod etiam non dicuntur esse prudentes. Nam prudentia est circa bona humana, de quibus contingit consiliari. Prudentis autem maxime videtur esse opus bene consiliari. Nullus autem consiliatur de necessariis, quae impossibile est aliter se habere, cuiusmodi sunt res divinae de quibus sapientes praedicti considerant. Neque etiam potest esse consilium de quibuscumque rebus non ordinatis ad aliquem finem, qui est operabile bonum, de quibus considerant scientiae speculativae, etiam si sint circa corruptibilia. Ille autem est simpliciter bonus consiliator, et per consequens prudens, qui ratiocinando potest coniicere quid sit optimum homini ad operandum. 1193. Therefore people say they know useless things, since they do not seek human goods; on this account, too, they are not called prudent, for prudence deals with human goods about which we deliberate. Now, to deliberate well seems to be the special work of the prudent man. But no one deliberates about necessary things which cannot possibly be in any other way; and the divine things, which these wise men consider, are necessary. Likewise deliberation is not possible about things in general that are not ordered to some end, i.e., to a practicable good—things that the speculative sciences consider, even when they treat what is corruptible. That man is a good counsellor without qualification, and consequently prudent, who can conjecture by reasoning what is best for man to do.
Deinde cum dicit neque enim prudentia etc., manifestat quiddam quod dixerat, assignans scilicet rationem quare prudentia sit circa operabilia. Prudentia enim non considerat solum universalia, in quibus non est actio; sed oportet quod cognoscat singularia, eo quod est activa, idest principium agendi. Actio autem est circa singularia. Et inde est, quod quidam non habentes scientiam universalium sunt magis activi circa aliqua particularia, quam illi qui habent universalem scientiam, eo quod sunt in aliis particularibus experti. Puta si aliquis medicus sciat quod carnes leves sunt bene digestibiles et sanae, ignoret autem quales carnes sint leves; non poterit facere sanitatem. Sed ille qui scit quod carnes volatilium sunt leves et sanae, magis poterit sanare. Quia igitur prudentia est ratio activa, oportet quod prudens habeat utramque notitiam, scilicet et universalium et particularium; vel, si alteram solum contingat ipsum habere, magis debet habere hanc, scilicet notitiam particularium, quae sunt propinquiora operationi. 1194. Then [B, B’], at “Prudence not only considers,” he makes clear something he had said, assigning the reason why the prudent man is concerned about practicable things. Prudence not only considers universals, in which action does not occur, but must know singulars because it is active, i.e., a principle of doing. But action has to do with singulars. Hence it is that certain people not possessing the knowledge of universals are more effective about some particulars than those who have universal knowledge, from the fact that they are expert in other particulars. Thus if a doctor knows that light meats are easily digestible and healthful but does not know which meats are light, he cannot help people to get well. But the man who knows that the flesh of fowls is light and healthful is better able to effect a cure. Since then prudence is reason concerning an action, the prudent person must have a knowledge of both kinds, viz., universals and particulars. But if it is possible for him to have one kind, he ought rather to have the latter, i.e., the knowledge of particulars that are closer to operation.

LECTURE 7
Prudence, the Principal Virtue in Human Affairs
Chapter 7
II.  HE NOW SHOWS WHAT IS PRIMARY IN HUMAN AFFAIRS.
      A.  He explains his proposition.
            1.   HE PROPOSES HIS OBJECTIVE. — 1195
εἴη δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική. But there will be a certain architectonic knowledge even here.
            2.   HE MAKES KNOWN HIS PROPOSITION.
                   a.   He distinguishes civic prudence from prudence as such. — 1196
Chapter 8
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς. However, civic prudence and prudence as such are really the same habit although they differ from one another.
                   b.   He defines civic prudence. — 1197-1198
τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν ἣ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἣ δὲ ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτική· αὕτη δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνον λέγουσιν· μόνοι γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι. One part of the habit dealing with the whole state is as it were architectonic prudence and is denominated legislative; the other part concerned with individual practicables goes by the general name of civic prudence. The latter is operative and deliberative, for a decree has to do with the practicable as a singular ultimate. Hence only those with civic prudence are said to be engaged in civic affairs because they alone are active like manual workers.
                   c.   He defines prudence.
                         i.    He shows what should be called prudence. — 1199-1201
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα· καὶ ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις· ἐκείνων δὲ ἣ μὲν οἰκονομία ἣ δὲ νομοθεσία ἣ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἣ μὲν βουλευτικὴ ἣ δὲ δικαστική. But that which is concerned with oneself seems to be prudence in a special way. This retains the general name, prudence; but of the others, one is called domestic, another legislative, and a third executive. Each of these is divided into consultative and judicial.
                         ii.   He infers a corollary. — 1202
εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως τὸ αὑτῷ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν· Therefore, to know what is to one’s advantage is a certain kind of human knowledge differing much from other human knowledge.
            3.   HE REJECTS AN ERROR.
                   a.   He presents it. — 1203
καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὰ περὶ αὑτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες· Moreover, that man seems to be prudent who knows and diligently cultivates the things pertaining to himself, but public officials seem to be busy about many affairs.
                   b.   He gives proof for it.
                         i.    First. — 1204
διὸ Εὐριπίδης
πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως
ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἠριθμημένον στρατοῦ
ἴσον μετασχεῖν;
τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καί τι πράσσοντας πλέον.
For this reason Euripides says: “How could I be prudent—I who have neglected to take care of myself and now share equally with many others in military service?”
                         ii.   He proposes a reason for this notion. — 1205
ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τούτους φρονίμους εἶναι· They (public officials) seem to be intent on superfluous things and to do more than is necessary. But men generally seek what is good for themselves and think they must work to secure it. Hence in this opinion only such men are prudent.
                   c.   He excludes the error. — 1206-1207
καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν, ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον. It may be, though, that the individual’s good cannot be attained without domestic prudence or civic virtue. But still it is not evident how the things pertaining to him are to be disposed, and this must be given attention.
      B.  He makes known something that he had stated above.
            1.   HE EXPLAINS HIS PROPOSITION.
                   a.   He offers two reasons.... The first.
                         i.    He gives a confirmation of the proposition. — 1208
σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ' ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· In evidence of this it may be noted that youths become geometricians and scientists and are learned in studies of this kind, yet do not seem to become prudent. The reason is that prudence deals with particulars that are known by experience. But a young man does not have experience, which requires a great deal of time.
                         ii.   He brings up a particular question. — 1209-1211
ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἄν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὔ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον; Here someone may ask why a boy can become a mathematician but not a philosopher or a scientist. The reason is that the truths (belonging to mathematics) are known by abstraction but the principles (of nature) are learned by experience. Then too these things (pertaining to wisdom) are mouthed but not grasped by youths while the nature of mathematics is not obscure to them.
                   b.   He gives the second reason. — 1212
ἔτι ἡ ἁμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον. Moreover, error in deliberating can happen either regarding a universal or a particular proposition, because a man can err, for example, about all sluggish waters being unhealthy or about this water being sluggish.
            2.   HE COMPARES PRUDENCE WITH SCIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING.
                   a.   First, with science. — 1213
ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. It is plain that prudence is not science because prudence deals with a singular ultimate, as was pointed out, and the practicable is of this nature.
                   b.   Next, with understanding.
                         i.    He shows the agreement. — 1214-1215
ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἣ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ [ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς] ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος. They (science and prudence) have some agreement with understanding. Understanding indeed concerns those principles requiring no proof. But prudence deals with a singular ultimate, an object not of scientific knowledge but of a kind of sense—not that by which we perceive proper sensibles—but the sense whereby in mathematics we perceive the external triangle (to which we conform our reasoning). This, however, is perception rather than prudence although it is another kind of perception.
                        ii.   He shows the difference. — 1216
Chapter 9
τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. But inquiry and deliberation differ, for deliberation is a kind of inquiry.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
Erit autem utique quaedam et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quid sit praecipuum simpliciter inter omnes virtutes intellectuales, hic ostendit quid sit praecipuum circa res humanas. Et primo ostendit propositum. Secundo manifestat quiddam quod supra dixerat, ibi, signum autem est eius et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi: est autem (et) politica etc.; tertio excludit quendam errorem, ibi: et videtur quae circa seipsum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quamvis in cognitione rerum humanarum non consistat sapientia quae est simpliciter principalis inter omnia, tamen est quaedam architectonica, idest principativa et dominativa ratio sive notitia hic, idest in genere rerum humanarum. 1195. After the Philosopher has shown what is absolutely primary among all the intellectual virtues, he now [II] shows what is primary in human affairs. First [A] he explains his proposition. Then [B], at “In evidence of this etc.,” he makes known something that he had stated above. On the initial point he does three things. First [A, 1], he proposes his objective. Next [A, 2], at “However, civic prudence etc.,” he makes known his proposition. Finally [A, 3], at “Moreover, that man etc.,” he rejects an error. He says first that although wisdom, which is absolutely primary, does not consist in the knowledge of human things, nevertheless there is a certain architectonic (i.e., guiding and governing) reason or knowledge here, viz., in the order of human affairs.
Deinde cum dicit: est autem et politica etc., manifestat propositum, distinguens ea quae pertinent ad notitiam rerum humanarum. Et primo distinguit politicam et prudentiam. Secundo determinat de politica, ibi, eius autem quae circa civitatem etc.; tertio determinat de prudentia, ibi, videtur autem et prudentia et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod politica et prudentia sunt idem habitus secundum substantiam, quia utraque est recta ratio rerum agibilium circa humana bona vel mala; sed differunt secundum rationem. Nam prudentia est recta ratio agibilium circa unius hominis bona vel mala, idest suiipsius. Politica autem circa bona vel mala totius multitudinis civilis. Ex quo patet quod ita se habet politica ad prudentiam, sicut iustitia legalis ad virtutem, ut supra in quinto habitum est. Positis autem duobus extremis, intelligitur medium, scilicet oeconomica quae medium est inter unum hominem et civitatem. 1196. Then [A, 2], at “However, civic prudence,” he makes known his proposition, distinguishing the things which pertain to a knowledge of human affairs. First [2, a] he distinguishes civic prudence from prudence as such. Next [2, b], at “One part of the habit etc.,” he defines civic prudence. Last [2, c], at “But that which is etc.,” he defines prudence. He says then that prudence and civic prudence are substantially the same habit because each is a right plan of things to be done about what is good or bad for man. But they differ specifically (secundum rationem), for prudence as such is the right plan of things to be done in the light of what is good or bad for one man, that is I oneself. Civic prudence, however, deals with things good or bad for the whole civic multitude. Consequently, civic prudence is to prudence simply as legal justice to virtue, as was indicated heretofore in the fifth book (906-910). When the extremes have been stated, we see the median, i.e., the prudence of the household, which holds a middle place between that regulating one man and the state.
Deinde cum dicit: eius autem quae circa civitatem etc., determinat de politica. Et distinguit eam in duas partes; dicens quod eius habitus qui est circa totam civitatem, una pars est quasi prudentia architectonica, quae dicitur legis positiva. Dicitur enim ars architectonica quae determinat aliis quid sit agendum. Unde principes imponentes legem suis subditis, ita se habent in civilibus sicut architectores in artificialibus. Et propter hoc ipsa lex positiva, idest ratio recta secundum quam principes leges rectas ponunt, dicitur architectonica prudentia. Alia autem pars politicae communi nomine vocatur politica, quae scilicet consistit circa singularia operabilia; leges enim comparantur ad opera humana, sicut universalia ad particularia, ut de iustis legalibus dictum est in quinto. Et sicut legis positiva est praeceptiva, ita et politica est activa et conservativa eorum quae lege ponuntur. 1197. Next [2, b], at “One part of the habit,” he defines civic prudence. He divides it into two parts, noting that one part of the habit dealing with the whole state is, so to speak, architectonic or legislative prudence. The name architectonic derives from its role, to determine for others what is to be done. Hence rulers imposing a law are in civic matters as architects regarding things to be built. Because of this, positive law itself (that is, right reason according to which rulers frame just laws) is called architectonic prudence. But the other part of civic prudence, namely, that which is concerned with individual operable things, goes by the general name, civic prudence. In fact, the laws are compared to works of man as universals to particulars, as the fifth book stated about legally just things (902-903). Likewise, as legislative prudence gives the precept, so also civic prudence puts it in effect and conserves the norms stated in the law.
Et hoc patet, quia ad huiusmodi politicam executivam pertinet sententia: quae nihil est aliud quam applicatio rationis universalis ad aliquod particulare operabile, non enim dicitur sententia nisi de aliquo operabili. Et quia omne operabile est singulare, inde est quod sententia est alicuius extremi, idest singularis: quod dicitur extremum, quia et ab eo incipit nostra cognitio ad universalia procedere, et ad ipsum terminatur in via descensus. Potest etiam et ipsa sententia dici extrema, quia est applicatio legis universaliter positae ad singulare operabile. Et quia ista executiva legis positae retinet sibi commune nomen politicae, inde est quod isti soli qui exequuntur leges positas dicuntur conversari civiliter, quia isti soli operantur in civilibus, sicut chiroteginae, id est manuales artifices, in artificialibus; et comparantur ad legis positores, sicut ad architectores. 1198. Obviously it belongs to executive civil prudence to frame a decree that is simply the application of universal reason to a particular practicable, for it is called a decree only in regard to some practicable. Moreover, since every practicable is individual, it follows that a decree concerns some singular ultimate, i.e., an individual norm or precept—it is called an ultimate because our knowledge begins from it, proceeding to universals, and terminates at the ultimate itself by way of descent. Likewise the decree itself can be called ultimate because it is the application of a law, universally stated, to an individual practicable. Because this executive prudence of positive law retains for itself the general name of civic prudence, it follows that only those who see to the execution of the enacted laws are said to be engaged in civil affairs since they alone are active among the people like chirotechnae, i.e., manual workers in things to be built; and legislators bear the same relation to them as do architects to those who execute their plans.
Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem etc., agit de prudentia. Et primo ostendit quae dicatur prudentia. Secundo infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, ibi, species quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quamvis politica tam legis positiva quam executiva sit prudentia, tamen maxime videtur esse prudentia quae est circa unum tantum, scilicet circa seipsum. Et talis ratio suiipsius gubernativa retinet sibi commune nomen prudentiae; quia aliae partes prudentiae habent propria nomina, quibus nominantur; earum enim quaedam quidem dicitur yconomia, id est prudentia dispensativa domus; quaedam vero dicitur legis positio, idest prudentia ponendi leges; quaedam vero est politica, idest prudentia exequendi leges, et quaelibet harum dividitur in consiliativam et iudicativam. Oportet enim in agibilibus, primo per inquisitionem consilii aliquid invenire, secundo de inventis iudicare. 1199. At “But that which is” [2, C] he treats prudence. First [c, i] he shows what should be called prudence. Then [c, ii], at “Therefore, to know etc.,” he infers a corollary from what has been said. He says first that although civic prudence, both legislative and executive, is prudence, nevertheless, that which is concerned with one person only, oneself, seems to be especially prudence. And reason of this type directive of oneself retains the general name prudence, since the other parts of prudence are qualified by particular names. One of these is called domestic, that is, the prudence that administers a household. Another is called legislative, that is, the prudence in making laws. Still another is civic, that is, the prudence in executing the laws. Each of these is divided into consultative and judicial; for in things to be done we must first investigate something by the inquiry of counsel, then judge the feasibility of the thing investigated.
Est autem considerandum, quod sicut supra dictum est, prudentia non est in ratione solum, sed habet aliquid in appetitu. Omnia ergo de quibus hic fit mentio, in tantum sunt species prudentiae, inquantum non in ratione sola consistunt, sed habent aliquid in appetitu. Inquantum enim sunt in sola ratione, dicuntur quaedam scientiae practicae, scilicet Ethica oeconomica et politica. 1200. As has been noted previously (1174), we must consider that prudence is not only in the reason but has a function likewise in the appetitive faculty. Therefore, everything mentioned here is a species of prudence, to the extent that it does not reside in the reason alone but has ramifications in the appetitive faculty. Inasmuch as they are exclusively in the reason they are called certain kinds of practical science, viz., domestic ethics and political science.
Est etiam considerandum, quod quia totum principalius est parte et per consequens civitas quam domus, et domus quam unus homo, oportet quod prudentia politica sit principalior quam oeconomica, et haec quam illa quae est suiipsius directiva. Unde et legis positiva est principalior inter partes politicae et simpliciter praecipua circa omnia agibilia humana. 1201. Likewise, we must consider that, because the whole is more important than the part, and consequently the city than the household and the household than one man, civic prudence must be more important than domestic and the latter more important than personal prudence. Moreover, legislative prudence has greater importance among the parts of civic prudence, and without qualification is absolutely principal about actions which man must perform.
Deinde cum dicit: species quidem igitur etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis. Et dicit quod ex quo prudentia quae est circa seipsum est pars communis prudentiae, consequens est quod scire ea quae sunt sibi ipsi bona, quod pertinet ad hanc prudentiam, sit quaedam species cognitionis humanae quae habet multam differentiam vel ab aliis speciebus cognitionis humanae vel propter diversitatem eorum quae ad unum hominem pertinent. 1202. Then [c, ii], at “Therefore, to know,” he infers a corollary from what has been discussed. He says that, because individual prudence is a part of general prudence, it follows that to know the things good for oneself—which belongs to this prudence—is a particular kind of human knowledge unlike others by reason of the diverse things pertaining to one man.
Deinde cum dicit: et videtur quae circa se ipsum etc., excludit quemdam errorem. Et primo ponit ipsum. Secundo inducit probationem eius, ibi, propter quod et Euripides et cetera. Tertio solvit improbans errorem, ibi, quamvis forte et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quibusdam videtur solus ille esse prudens qui habet scientiam et exercitium circa ea quae ad seipsum pertinent. Illi autem qui sunt politici non videntur esse prudentes, sed magis polipragmones, idest intromittentes se de multis, scilicet quae ad multitudinem pertinent. 1203. Next [A, 3], at “Moreover, that man,” he rejects an error. First [3, a] he presents it. Then [3, b], at “For this reason,” he gives a proof for it. Last [3, c], at “It may be, though etc.,” he excludes the error by disproving it. He says first that, to some people, only that man seems prudent who knows and diligently cultivates the things having to do with himself. However, those who are public officials do not seem to be prudent but rather polipragmones, i.e., busy with a variety of affairs pertaining to the multitude.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod et Euripedes etc., inducit probationem praedicti erroris. Et primo quidem per dictum Euripidis poetae, qui inducit quemdam pro sua civitate militantem talia dicentem: qualiter ego essem prudens, cui, scilicet mihi, aderam innegotiose, idest cum ego mea negotia non tractarem, sed quum sim numeratus inter multos, participo militia aequali mihi et aliis? 1204. At “For this reason” [3, b] he gives a proof of the foregoing error. He does this first [3, b, i] by a statement of Euripides the poet who has one of his characters, a soldier fighting for his country, say: “How could I be prudent when I have neglected to take care of myself, i.e., I did not attend to my own affairs but, one of many, I am sharing military service equally with them.”
Secundo ibi: superfluos enim etc., inducit ad idem rationem. Et dicit quod quidam dicunt politicos non esse prudentes, tamquam superfluos, id est supervacaneis rebus intendentes, et tamquam operantes aliquid amplius quam ad eos spectet. Homines enim propter privatum amorem quem inordinate ad seipsos habent, quaerunt solum id quod est sibiipsis bonum. Et existimant quod hoc solum oporteat unumquemque operari, quod scilicet sibi est bonum. Et ex hac opinione hominum venit quod illi soli sint prudentes qui propriis negotiis intendunt. 1205. Then [3, b, ii], at “They (public officials),” he proposes a reason for this notion. He says that some people affirm that public officials are not prudent, since they are intent on superfluous or vain things and are doing something more than their individual concern. Because of the inordinateness of their hidden self-love, men seek only what is good for themselves; and they are concerned that each one must do only what is good for himself. From this opinion of theirs it follows that, for some men, only those are prudent who are intent on their own affairs.
Deinde cum dicit quamvis forte etc., excludit hunc errorem. Et dicit quod proprium bonum uniuscuiusque singularis personae non potest esse sine yconomia, id est recta dispensatione domus, neque sine urbanitate, id est recta dispensatione civitatis, sicut nec bonum partis potest esse sine bono totius. Unde patet quod politici et oeconomici non intendunt circa aliquid superfluum, sed circa id quod ad seipsos pertinet. 1206. Next [3, c], at “It may be, though,” he rejects this error. He says that the particular good of each individual person cannot be attained without domestic prudence, i.e., without the proper administration of the household, nor without civic virtue, i.e., without the proper administration of the state, just as the good of the part cannot be attained without the good of the whole. Hence it is evident that statesmen and household stewards are not intent on anything superfluous but on what pertains to themselves.
Nec tamen sufficit politica et oeconomica sine prudentia propriorum. Quia recte disposita civitate et domo, adhuc est immanifestum qualiter oportet disponere ea quae ad seipsum pertinent. Et ideo oportet ad hoc intendere per prudentiam quae est circa proprium bonum. 1207. Nevertheless, civic and domestic prudence are not sufficient without personal prudence. The reason is that when the state and the household have been properly arranged, it is still not evident how one’s own personal affairs must be disposed. Therefore, it is necessary to attend to this by the prudence dealing with an individual’s good.
Deinde cum dicit: signum autem etc., manifestat quiddam quod supra dictum est: scilicet quod prudentia non sit solum circa universalia, sed etiam circa singularia. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo ex hoc comparat prudentiam scientiae et intellectui, ibi, quoniam autem prudentia et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas rationes. Circa quarum primam duo facit: primo manifestat propositum per signum quoddam. Secundo circa hoc quamdam quaestionem inducit, ibi: quia et hoc utique aliquis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod signum (est) eius quod supra dictum est, scilicet quod prudentia non sit solum circa universalia sed etiam circa particularia, quia iuvenes fiunt geometrici et disciplinati, idest in scientiis disciplinalibus sive mathematicis instructi, et fiunt sapientes in talibus, id est ad perfectionem et terminum harum scientiarum pertingentes, non autem videtur quod iuvenis fiat prudens. Cuius causa est, quia prudentia est circa singularia quae fiunt nobis cognita per experientiam. Iuvenis autem non potest esse expertus, quia ad experientiam requiritur temporis multitudo. 1208. At “In evidence of this” [B] he clarifies a previous assertion (1194): that prudence is not only concerned with universals but also with particulars. On this point he does two things. First [ B, i ] he explains his proposition. Next [B, 2], at “It is plain that prudence,” he compares prudence with science and understanding. For the initial point he offers two reasons. In regard to the first [B, 1, a] he does two things. First [a, i] he gives a confirmation of the proposition. Then [a, ii], at “Here someone etc.,” he brings up a particular question on this heading. He states first that a sign of the previous assertion (1194), that prudence is concerned not only with universals but also particulars, is that youths become geometricians and scientists, i.e., learned in the speculative sciences and in mathematics; they are erudite in studies of this kind, and attain perfection in these sciences. However, it does not seem that a youth can become prudent. The reason is that prudence deals with particulars which are made known to us by experience. But a lad does not have experience because much time is needed to get experience.
Deinde cum dicit quia et hoc utique etc., movet circa hoc quaestionem, scilicet quare puer posset fieri mathematicus, non autem possit fieri sapiens, id est metaphysicus, vel physicus, id est naturalis. Et ad hoc respondet quantum ad naturalem quia haec quidem, scilicet mathematica, cognoscuntur per abstractionem a sensibilibus quorum est experientia; et ideo non requiritur ad cognoscendum talia temporis multitudo, sed principia naturalium, quae non sunt abstracta a sensibilibus, per experientiam considerantur, ad quam requiritur temporis multitudo. 1209. Then [a, ii], at “Here someone,” he raises a question about why a boy can become a mathematician but cannot become wise, i.e., a metaphysician or natural philosopher. To this the Philosopher answers that the principles of mathematics are known by abstraction from sensible objects (whose understanding requires experience); for this reason little time is needed to grasp them. But the principles of nature, which are not separated from sensible objects, are studied via experience. For this much time is needed.
Quantum autem ad sapientiam, subiungit quod iuvenes sapientialia quidem scilicet metaphysicalia non credunt, idest non attingunt mente, licet ea dicant ore, sed circa mathematica non est immanifestum eis quod quid est. Cuius ratio est quia rationes mathematicorum sunt rerum imaginabilium, sapientialia autem sunt pure intellectualia; iuvenes autem de facili possunt capere ea quae sub imaginatione cadunt, sed ad illa quae excedunt sensum et imaginationem non attingunt mente, quia nondum habent intellectum validum et exercitatum ad tales considerationes, tum propter parvitatem temporis, tum propter plurimas mutationes naturae. 1210. As to wisdom, he adds that youths do not believe, i.e., grasp, although they mouth, things pertaining to wisdom or metaphysics. But the nature of mathematics is not obscure to them because mathematical proofs concern sensibly conceivable objects while things pertaining to wisdom are purely rational. Youths can easily understand whatever falls under imagination, but they do not grasp things exceeding sense and imagination; for their minds are not trained to such considerations both because of the shortness of their lives and the many physical changes they are undergoing.
Erit ergo hic congruus ordo addiscendi, ut primo quidem pueri logicalibus instruantur, quia logica docet modum totius philosophiae. Secundo autem instruendi sunt in mathematicis quae nec experientia indigent, nec imaginationem transcendunt. Tertio autem in naturalibus, quae, etsi non excedant sensum et imaginationem, requirunt tamen experientiam; quarto autem in moralibus, quae requirunt et experientiam et animum a passionibus liberum, ut in primo habitum est. Quinto autem in sapientialibus et divinis quae transcendunt imaginationem et requirunt validum intellectum. 1211. Therefore, the proper order of learning is that boys first be instructed in things pertaining to logic because logic teaches the method of the whole of philosophy. Next, they should be instructed in mathematics, which does not need experience and does not exceed the imagination. Third, in natural sciences, which, even though not exceeding sense and imagination, nevertheless require experience. Fourth, in the moral sciences, which require experience and a soul free from passions, as was noted in the first book (38-40). Fifth, in the sapiential and divine sciences, which exceed imagination and require a sharp mind.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc peccatum et cetera. Dictum est enim quod prudentis opus est bene consiliari. In consiliando autem dupliciter contingit peccare. Uno modo circa universale: puta an hoc sit verum, quod omnes aquae ponderosae sint pravae. Alio modo circa singulare, puta an haec aqua sit ponderosa. Ergo oportet, quod prudentia sit directiva, et circa universalia, et circa singularia. 1212. He gives the second reason at “Moreover” [B, i, b]. It was said (1164) that the work of prudence is to deliberate well. But in deliberating a twofold error can happen. One concerns the universal, e.g., whether it is true that all sluggish waters are unhealthy. The other concerns the particular, e.g., whether this water is sluggish. Therefore, prudence must give direction in regard to both universals and particulars.
Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem prudentia etc., comparat secundum praedicta (prudentiam) primo quidem scientiae. Secundo autem intellectui, ibi: susceptibiles quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex praedictis est manifestum, quod prudentia non est scientia. Scientia enim est universalium, ut supra habitum est, prudentia autem est extremi, id est singularis, quia est operabilis quod est singulare. Et sic patet, quod prudentia non est scientia. 1213. Then [B, 2], at “It is plain that prudence,” he compares prudence with the things mentioned above: first, with science [B, 2, a] and next, with understanding at “They (science and prudence) etc.” [B, 2, b]. He says first, it is evident from the premises that prudence is not science, for science has to do with universals, as was stated before (1145-1175). But prudence deals with a singular ultimate, viz., the particular, since it is of the nature of the practicable to be particular. So it is clear that prudence is not science.
Deinde cum dicit: susceptibiles quidem etc., comparat prudentiam intellectui. Et primo ostendit convenientiam. Secundo differentiam, ibi, quaerere autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod tam scientia quam prudentia sunt susceptibiles, vel attingibiles (secundum aliam litteram) intellectui, idest habent aliquam cohaerentiam cum intellectu, qui est habitus principiorum. Dictum est enim supra; quod intellectus est quorumdam terminorum sive extremorum, idest principiorum indemonstrabilium, quorum non est ratio, quia non possunt per rationem probari, sed statim per se innotescunt. Haec autem, scilicet prudentia, est extremi, scilicet singularis operabilis, quod oportet accipere ut principium in agendis: cuius quidem extremi non est scientia, quia non probatur ratione, sed est eius sensus, quia aliquo sensu percipitur, non quidem illo quo sentimus species propriorum sensibilium, puta coloris, soni et huiusmodi, qui est sensus proprius; sed sensu interiori, quo percipimus imaginabilia, sicut in mathematicis cognoscimus extremum trigonum, idest singularem triangulum imaginatum, quia etiam illic, idest in mathematicis statur ad aliquod singulare imaginabile, sicut etiam in naturalibus statur ad aliquod singulare sensibile. 1214. Next [B, 2, b], at “They (science and prudence),” he compares prudence with understanding. First [B, 2, b, i] he shows the agreement. Second [B, 2, b, ii], at “But inquiry and deliberation,” he shows the difference. He says first that both science and prudence are receptive of, or in contact with (according to another text), understanding, i.e., have some agreement with it as a habit of principles. It was previously pointed out (1175-1179) that understanding concerns certain principles or ultimates, that is, indemonstrable principles for which there is no proof, because they cannot be established by reason but immediately become known by themselves. But prudence is concerned with an ultimate, i.e., a singular practicable that must be taken as a principle in things to be done. Yet there is no scientific knowledge of the singular ultimate, for it is not proved by reason; there is, though, sensitive knowledge of it because this ultimate is perceived by one of the senses. However, it is not apprehended by that sense which perceives the species of proper sensibles (for instance, color, sound, and so on—this is the proper sense) but by the inner sense which perceives things sensibly conceivable. Similarly, in mathematics we know the exterior triangle, or the triangle conceived as singular, because there we also conform to a sensibly conceivable singular, as in the natural sciences we conform to a sensible singular.
Et ad istum sensum, idest interiorem, magis pertinet prudentia, per quam perficitur ratio particularis ad recte aestimandum de singularibus intentionibus operabilium. Unde et animalia bruta, quae habent bonam aestimativam naturalem dicuntur participare prudentia. Sed illius sensus, qui est circa propria sensibilia, est quaedam alia species perfectiva, puta industria quaedam discernendi colores et sapores et alia huiusmodi. Et ita prudentia convenit cum intellectu in hoc, quod est esse alicuius extremi. 1215. Prudence, which perfects particular reason rightly to judge singular practicable relations, pertains rather to this, i.e., the inner sense. Hence even dumb animals who are endowed with an excellent natural estimative power are said to be prudent. But that sense which is concerned with proper sensibles has a certain other perfecting quality, viz., a skill in discerning shades of color or taste and the like. So prudence agrees with understanding in this that it deals with an ultimate.
Deinde cum dicit: quaerere autem etc., ostendit differentiam inter prudentiam et intellectum. Intellectus enim non est inquisitivus; prudentia autem est inquisitiva: est enim consiliativa. Consiliari autem et quaerere differunt sicut proprium et commune. Nam consiliari est quoddam quaerere, ut in tertio dictum est. 1216 . Then [B, 2, b, ii], at “But inquiry and deliberation,” he shows the difference between prudence and understanding. Understanding is not given to inquiring, but prudence is, because it is deliberative. To deliberate and to inquire differ as proper and common, for deliberation is a kind of inquiry—as was said in the third book (473, 476, 482).

LECTURE 8
Eubulia (Excellence in Deliberating)
Chapter 9
I.    HE DEFINES (CERTAIN VIRTUES CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE) INDIVIDUALLY.
      A.  He investigates the genus of eubulia.
            1.   HE EXAMINES THE GENUS OF eubulia, SHOWING THAT IT IS A KIND OF RECTITUDE.
                   a.   He explains his intention. — 1217
Δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβουλίας τί ἐστι, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δοξα ἢ εὐστοχία, ἢ ἄλλο τι γένος. Now we must consider the nature of eubulia. Is it science, or opinion, or eustochia (the virtue of conjecturing well in practical matters), or does it belong to some other genus?
                   b.   He carries it out.
                         i.    He shows where (eubulia) does not belong.
                               x.   HE SHOWS THAT eubulia IS NOT SCIENCE. — 1218
ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐχ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἡ δ' εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. Certainly it is not science, for men do not inquire about things they already know. But eubulia is a kind of counsel that is given to inquiry and discursive thinking.
                               y.   HE SHOWS THAT IT IS NOT eustochia (FOR TWO REASONS).
                                     aa.  The first (reason). — 1219
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εὐστοχία· ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἡ εὐστοχία, βουλεύονται δὲ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευθέντα, βουλεύεσθαι δὲ βραδέως. However, it is not eustochia because eustochia exists without the inquiry of reason and is instantaneous, while eubulia requires much time for those who deliberate. As the proverb goes: Be slow to come to a decision; but when you have decided, act quickly.
                                     bb. The second reason. — 1220
ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια. Furthermore, quickness of mind and eubulia differ, for the former is a kind of eustochia.
                               z.   HE SHOWS THAT IT IS NOT OPINION. — 1221
οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. Nor is eubulia opinion in any sense whatever.
                         ii.   He determines its genus. — 1222
ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἁμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρθότης τις ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, But because the man errs who deliberates badly and the man who deliberates well does so rightly, it is evident that eubulia is a kind of rectitude,
            2.   HE SHOWS TO WHAT RECTITUDE IS LINKED.
                   a.   He shows whence it does not arise.
                         i.    He proposes what he intends. — 1223
οὔτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης· although not pertaining to either science or opinion,
                         ii.   He establishes his proposition.
                               x.   IN REGARD TO SCIENCE. — 1224
ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία, for rectitude, like error, is not applicable to science,
                               y.   IN REGARD TO OPINION, BY TWO ARGUMENTS.
                                     aa.  The first (argument). — 1225
δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· while truth is the rectitude of opinion.
                                     bb. The second argument. — 1226
ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισται ἤδη πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία. διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, ἐάν τε εὖ ἐάν τε καὶ κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται. Likewise, everything that is a matter of opinion has already been determined. Nevertheless eubulia is not without discursive knowledge, and so differs from opinion; it is not at all a declaration. And opinion is not an inquiry but a sort of declaration already made. However, the man who deliberates, well or badly, inquires and thinks discursively about a subject.
                   b.   (He shows) whence it does arise. — 1227
ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζητητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί. But eubulia is a certain rectitude of deliberation. Therefore, we must inquire what deliberation is and about what it is concerned.
            3.   HE SHOWS WHAT KIND OF RECTITUDE HE IS DISCUSSING (BY DETERMINING FOUR CONDITIONS OF EUBULIA).
                   a.   He says first that rectitude is used in various senses. — 1228-1229
ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὃ προτίθεται ἰδεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. Obviously, rectitude is taken in various senses because not every rectitude is eubulia. Indeed the incontinent and evil man will acquire by reasoning what he sets out to know. Wherefore one who keeps in view even some great evil will be said to deliberate rightly. But to deliberate well seems to be a good. And this rectitude of deliberation by which someone obtains a good end is eubulia.
                   b.   The second condition. — 1230-1231
ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οὐδ' αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ' ἣν οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι δι' οὗ ἔδει. But it is possible sometimes to determine this even by a false syllogism, so that we arrive at what we ought to do but not by the means we ought—the middle term being false. Therefore that, by which we attain what we ought but not in the way we ought, is not eubulia in the full sense.
                   c.   The third condition. — 1232
ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν, τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὣς καὶ ὅτε. Besides, it happens that one man deliberates too slowly but another too quickly. Hence genuine eubulia is found not in these exaggerations but in rectitude, which acts according to what is useful and proper in regard to the end, the manner, and the time.
                   d.   The fourth condition. — 1233-1234
ἔτι ἔστι καὶ ἁπλῶς εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ πρός τι τέλος. ἣ μὲν δὴ ἁπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, τὶς δὲ ἡ πρός τι τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν. Again, one person may deliberate well in the unqualified sense and another may simply concern himself about a particular end. Therefore eubulia without qualification will be that which directs deliberations in relation to an absolute end; but eubulia in a limited sense, that which directs deliberations in relation to a particular end. If indeed to deliberate well belongs to prudent people, eubulia will be rectitude conducing to that end about which prudence gives the true evaluation.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
Oportet autem assumere et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de prudentia et aliis virtutibus intellectualibus principalibus, hic determinat de quibusdam virtutibus adiunctis prudentiae. Et primo determinat de singulis earum secundum se. Secundo comparat eas adinvicem et ad prudentiam, ibi, sunt omnes habitus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo determinat de eubulia; secundo de synesi, ibi: est autem et synesis etc.; tertio de gnome, ibi, vocata autem gnome et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo inquirit genus eubuliae, ostendens, quod sit quaedam rectitudo. Secundo ostendit cuius sit rectitudo, ibi, neque scientiae autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit qualis rectitudo sit, ibi: quia autem rectitudo et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo (dicit) de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur, ibi, scientia quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod post tractatum de principalibus virtutibus intellectualibus, oportet assumere ad complementum cognitionis praedictarum virtutum de eubulia, quae dicitur bona consiliatio, quid sit: utrum scilicet sit scientia quaedam, vel saltem opinio, vel etiam Eustochia, idest bona coniecturatio, vel in quo alio genere sit. 1217. After the Philosopher has defined prudence and the other principal intellectual virtues, he now investigates certain virtues connected with prudence. First [I] he defines them individually, each in itself. Then [Lect. 9, II], at “All the preceding habits tend etc.” (B.1143 a 25), he compares them with one another and with prudence. On the first point he does three things. First [A] he investigates the genus of eubulia. Next [Lect. 9, B], at “Nor is synesis etc.” (B.1142 b 34), he investigates synesis. Last [Lect. 9, C], at “The virtue called gnome etc.” (B.1143 a 19), he investigates gnome. Regarding the initial point he does three things. First [A, 1] he examines the genus of eubulia, showing that it is a kind of rectitude. Then [A, 2], at “although not etc.,” he shows to what rectitude is linked. Last [A, 3], at “Obviously, rectitude etc.,” he shows what kind of rectitude he is discussing. On the first point he does two things. First [1, a], he explains his intention. Next [1, b], at “Certainly it is not etc.,” he carries it out. He says first that, after the tract on the principal intellectual virtues (1142-1216), he must treat the nature of eubulia (excellent deliberation) in order to have a complete knowledge of these virtues. Is it a kind of science, or at least opinion, or even eustochia—shrewd conjecturing? Or in what other genus is it?
Deinde cum dicit: scientia quidem etc., ostendit quid sit genus eubuliae. Et primo ostendit in quo genere non sit; secundo concludit genus eius, ibi: sed quia qui quidem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quod eubulia non sit scientia; secundo quod non sit Eustochia, ibi, sed tamen neque Eustochia etc.; tertio quod non sit opinio, ibi, neque utique opinio et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod eubulia non est scientia. Quod quidem patet per hoc, quod habentes scientiam iam non quaerunt de illis de quibus sciunt, sed habent certam notitiam de eis. Eubulia autem, cum sit quoddam consilium, est cum quadam inquisitione. Ille enim, qui consiliatur, quaerit et ratiocinatur. Sed scientia habetur in termino inquisitionis; ergo eubulia non est scientia. 1218. Then [1, b], at “Certainly it is not,” he shows what the genus of eubulia is. First [b, i] he shows where it does not belong. Next [b, ii], at “But because the man etc.,” he determines its genus. On the first point he does three things. First [i, x] he shows that eubulia is not science. Then [i, y], at “However, it is not etc.,” he shows that it is not eustochia. Last [i, z], at “Nor is eubulia etc.,” he shows that it is not opinion. He says first that eubulia is not science. This is clear from the fact that men already possessing science do not inquire about those things which they know, but have certain knowledge about them. But eubulia being a kind of deliberation is joined with some sort of inquiry, for the man who deliberates inquires and thinks discursively. But discursive knowledge is attained at the end of an inquiry. Therefore eubulia is not science.
Deinde cum dicit: sed tamen neque Eustochia etc., ostendit, quod eubulia non sit Eustochia, duplici ratione. Quarum prima talis est. Eustochia, idest bona coniecturatio est sine rationis inquisitione et est velox; provenit enim aliquibus ex hoc quod habent promptum iudicium intellectus vel sensitivae partis ad recte existimandum de aliquo, propter subtilitatem spirituum, et bonitatem imaginationis, et puritatem sensitivorum organorum. Cooperatur etiam ad hoc multa experientia. Et haec duo desunt eubuliae. Eubulia enim, ut dictum est, est cum inquisitione rationis, et ex alia parte non est velox, sed magis boni consiliatores consiliantur multo tempore, ut diligenter perquirant omnia quae pertingunt negotium; unde et in proverbio dicunt quod oportet ea quae sunt determinata in consilio velociter exequi, sed consiliari tarde. Unde patet, quod eubulia non est Eustochia. 1219. At “However, is it not” [i, y] he shows that eubulia is not eustochia, for two reasons. The first is this [y, aa]. Eustochia or happy conjecture exists without the inquiry of reason and is instantaneous. It is innate in some men, who, by reason of acuteness of powers, richness of imagination and sensitivity of the external senses, come to a prompt judgment based on intellect or sense whereby they correctly evaluate a situation. Wide experience also develops this. And these two things are lacking in eubulia, which is associated with the inquiry of reason, as was just mentioned (1218). Besides, eubulia is not instantaneous but rather takes time for those who deliberate so they may thoroughly explore everything touching the subject. Hence too the proverb saying that the matters of counsel ought to be carried out quickly but deliberated slowly. So, obviously, eubulia is not eustochia.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi adhuc sollertia et cetera. Quae talis est. Si eubulia esset idem quod Eustochia, oporteret quod quicquid continetur sub Eustochia contineretur sub eubulia. Sed sollertia est quaedam species Eustochiae, est enim bona coniecturatio circa inventionem medii, differt tamen solertia ab eubulia, quia eubulia non est circa finem, qui se habet in operabilibus sicut medium in syllogismis: non enim est consilium de fine, ut dictum est in tertio. Ergo eubulia non est idem quod Eustochia. 1220. At “Furthermore, quickness etc. [y, bb] he gives the second reason. If eubulia was identical with eustochia, then whatever was contained under eubulia would be contained under eustochia. But quickness of mind is a certain kind of eustochia; it is a rapid conjecture about finding a means. However, quickness of mind differs from eubulia since eubulia is not concerned with the end which in practical matters holds the place of the middle term in syllogisms, for counsel is not taken about the end, as was indicated in the third book (473-474). Therefore eubulia is not the same as eustochia.
Deinde cum dicit: neque utique opinio etc., ostendit, quod eubulia non sit opinio: ita scilicet quod non solum non omnis opinio sit eubulia, sed quod neque una, id est nulla, opinio sit eubulia. Et hoc patet eadem ratione quam supra proposuit de scientia. Licet enim opinans non sit certus, tamen iam determinavit se ad unum; quod non contingit consilianti. 1221. Next [i, z], at “Nor is eubulia,” he shows that eubulia is not opinion in such a way that not only is not every opinion eubulia but neither is any opinion eubulia. This is evident for the same reason stated previously (1145, 1165) about science, for although a man who holds an opinion is not certain, nevertheless he has already limited himself to one viewpoint-something that is not true of a man deliberating.
Deinde cum dicit sed quia qui quidem etc., ostendit quid sit verum genus eubuliae, per hoc, quod ille qui male consiliatur, dicitur peccare in consiliando; qui autem bene consiliatur, dicitur recte consiliari. Et talis est Eubulus; unde manifestum est quod eubulia est quaedam rectitudo. 1222. Then [b, ii], at “But because the man,” he shows what is the real genus of eubulia from the fact that the man who deliberates badly is said to err in deliberating, but the man who deliberates well is said to deliberate rightly. The latter is eubuleos (i.e., correct in deliberation). Hence it is plain that eubulia is a kind of rectitude.
Deinde cum dicit: neque scientiae autem etc., ostendit cuius sit rectitudo. Et primo ostendit cuius non sit rectitudo. Secundo cuius sit, ibi, sed rectitudo quaedam et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod eubulia non est rectitudo, neque scientiae, neque opinionis. 1223. At “although not” [A, 2] he shows to what rectitude is linked. First [2, a] he shows whence it does not arise, and then [2., b] at “But eubulia is etc.,” whence it does arise. On this (first) point he does two things. First [a, i] he proposes what he intends, saying that eubulia is rectitude neither of science nor of opinion.
Secundo ibi, scientiae quidem etc., ostendit propositum. Et primo quantum ad scientiam. Illud enim videtur indigere rectitudine, qua rectificetur, in quo contingit esse peccatum; sed in scientia non contingit esse peccatum, cum sit semper verorum; ergo eubulia non est rectitudo scientiae. 1224. Next [a, ii], at “for rectitude,” he establishes his proposition: first [ii, x] in regard to science. In an area where error is possible, rectitude appears necessary. But error does not apply to science, which always has to do with true and necessary things. Therefore eubulia is not rectitude of science.
Secundo ibi: opinionis autem etc., ostendit propositum quantum ad opinionem. Et hoc duplici ratione. Quarum prima talis est. Opinionis quidem, quia in ea contingit esse peccatum, potest esse aliqua rectitudo. Sed rectitudo eius non dicitur bonitas, sed veritas, sicut et peccatum eius dicitur falsitas. Ergo eubulia, quae a bonitate denominatur, non est rectitudo opinionis. 1225. Then [ii, y], at “while truth” he establishes his proposition in regard to opinion, by two arguments. The first is this [y, aa]. Since error is possible in opinion, rectitude is applicable to it. However, its rectitude is not called goodness but truth, just as its defect is called falsity. Therefore eubulia, which takes its name from goodness, is not rectitude of opinion.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, similiter autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod omne illud de quo habetur opinio, iam est determinatum quantum ad opinantem, licet non sit determinatum quantum ad rei veritatem. Et in hoc eubulia deficit ab opinione, quia non est sine ratione inquirente. Eubulia enim non est enunciatio alicuius rei, sed inquisitio. E contrario autem opinio non est inquisitio, sed quaedam enuntiatio opinati; opinans enim dicit verum esse quod opinatur. Sed ille qui consiliatur vel bene vel male adhuc quaerit aliquid et ratiocinatur, nondum autem enuntiat ita esse vel non esse. Ergo eubulia non est rectitudo opinionis. 1226. He gives the second argument at “Likewise” [y, bb], saying that everything which is a matter of opinion is already determined so far as concerns the one holding it, but not in reality. On this point eubulia, since it is not without the inquiry of reason, differs from opinion. eubulia is not a declaration of something but an inquiry. On the contrary, however, opinion is not an inquiry but a kind of declaration of the man holding it, for a person expressing an opinion states what he imagines to be true. But the man who deliberates, well or badly, seeks something and thinks discursively about the subject; hence he does not yet declare it is or is not so. Therefore eubulia is not rectitude of opinion.
Deinde cum dicit: sed rectitudo quaedam etc., ostendit cuius sit rectitudo eubulia. Et dicit, quod ex quo non est rectitudo scientiae neque opinionis, relinquitur, quod sit quaedam rectitudo consilii, ut ipsum nomen significat. Et inde est, quod ad perfectam notitiam eubuliae oportet inquirere quid sit consilium, et circa quid sit. Et haec supra determinata sunt in tertio; unde non oportuit quod hic resumerentur. 1227. Then [2, b], at “But eubulia” he shows of what subject eubulia is rectitude. He says that, since eubulia is not rectitude of science nor opinion, we conclude that it must be a certain rectitude of deliberation, as the very name (eubulia) indicates. Consequently to have a perfect notion of eubulia we must inquire what deliberation is and about what it is concerned. These questions have been discussed before in the third book (458-482); so there was no need that they be resumed here.
Deinde cum dicit: quia autem rectitudo etc., ostendit qualis rectitudo sit eubulia. Et circa hoc determinat quatuor conditiones eubuliae per ordinem. Dicit ergo primo quod rectitudo multipliciter dicitur. Uno modo proprie, alio modo metaphorice. Proprie quidem dicitur in bonis; secundum similitudinem autem etiam dicitur in malis, ut si dicamus quod aliquis sit rectus fur, sicut dicimus quod est bonus fur. 1228. Next [A, 3], at “Obviously, rectitude,” he shows what kind of rectitude eubulia is. On this point he determines four conditions by turns. He says first 13, a] that rectitude is used in various senses: in one sense properly, in another figuratively. Properly it is used in reference to good things but figuratively it is applied to evil things, just as if we should say that a man is a real burglar, as we do say he is a good burglar.
Manifestum est autem quod non omnis rectitudo consilii est eubulia: non enim est rectitudo consilii in malis, sed in bonis tantum. Incontinens enim et pravus quandoque adipiscitur per suam ratiocinationem illud quod proponit cognoscere, puta cum invenit viam per quam possit peccatum perpetrare. Unde per similitudinem dicitur recte consilians, inquantum scilicet invenit viam efficaciter ducentem in finem, sed tamen assumit pro fine quoddam magnum malum, puta furtum vel adulterium. Sed bene consiliari, quod significat nomen eubuliae, videtur esse quoddam bonum. Unde manifestum est quod talis rectitudo consilii est eubulia, per quam aliquis adipiscitur bonum finem. 1229. Obviously, not every rectitude of deliberation is eubulia, for rectitude of deliberation does not refer to evil things but to good things only. The incontinent and evil man sometimes attains what he sets out to know by his reasoning, for example, when he finds out the way he can commit sin. Hence figuratively he is said to deliberate correctly inasmuch as he discovers a way effectively leading to an evil end. However, he takes some great evil for his end, e.g., theft or adultery. But to deliberate well—the name eubulia means this—seems to be something good. Hence it is evident that this rectitude of deliberation is eubulia by which a man attains a good end.
Secundam conditionem ponit ibi: sed est et hoc et cetera. Ubi considerandum est quod contingit in syllogisticis aliquando concludi veram conclusionem per falsum syllogismum. Et ita etiam in operabilibus contingit quandoque pervenire ad bonum finem per aliquam malam viam. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod contingit aliquando sortiri bonum finem quasi falso syllogismo, ita scilicet quod aliquis consiliando perveniat ad id quod oportet facere, sed non per quod oportet, puta cum aliquis furatur, ut subveniat pauperi, et hoc est ac si in syllogismo aliquis ad veram conclusionem assumeret medium aliquem falsum terminum. 1230. At “But it is possible” [3, b], he explains the second condition, that sometimes in syllogistic arguments a true conclusion is drawn by a false syllogism. So also sometimes in practical matters we arrive at a good end by some evil means. This is what he means by saying that sometimes we determine a good end as it were by a false syllogism; thus a man by deliberating arrives at what he ought to do but not at the means he ought to use, for example, when someone steals to help the poor. It is as if a man in reasoning would take some false middle term to arrive at a true conclusion.
Licet enim in intentione finis sit sicut principium et medius terminus, tamen in via executionis quam inquirit consiliator, finis se habet sicut conclusio, et id quod est ad finem sicut medius terminus. Manifestum est autem quod non dicitur recte syllogizare qui veram conclusionem per falsum medium concluderet: unde consequens est quod non sit vere eubulia, secundum quam aliquis adipiscitur finem quem oportet, non autem per viam per quam oportet. 1231. Although the end in the order of intention is like the principle and the middle term, nevertheless, in the order of execution, which the counsellor seeks, the end takes the place of the conclusion and the means the place of the middle term. Obviously, the man who draws a true conclusion by means of a false middle term is not reasoning correctly. Consequently eubulia is not genuine insofar as a man attains the end he ought but not in the way he ought.
Tertiam condicionem ponit ibi: adhuc est multum tempus et cetera. Et dicit quod quandoque contingit quod aliquis multum tempus ponit in consilio, ita quod forte aliquando elabitur opportunitas exequendi. Contingit etiam quod aliquis nimis velociter et praecipitanter consiliatur. Unde nec ista est vere eubulia, sed talis rectitudo consilii quae attendit id quod est utile ad finem et finem quem oportet et modum et tempus. 1232. At “Besides, it happens” [3, c] he gives the third condition. He says that sometimes a man takes so much time in deliberating that perhaps the opportunity for action occasionally slips by. Likewise, another man may deliberate too hastily. Hence genuine eubulia consists not in this but in that rectitude which aims at what is useful for the proper end, manner and time.
Quartam conditionem ponit ibi: adhuc est simpliciter et cetera. Et dicit quod contingit aliquem esse qui bene consiliatur simpliciter ad finem totius vitae. Contingit etiam aliquem esse qui recte consiliatur ad aliquem finem particularem. Unde eubulia simpliciter erit quae dirigit consilium ad finem communem totius humanae vitae, illa autem quae dirigit ad quemdam finem particularem, non est eubulia simpliciter, sed eubulia quaedam. Quia cum prudentium sit bene consiliari, oportet quod eubulia simpliciter sit rectitudo consilii in ordine ad illum finem, circa quem veram aestimationem habet prudentia simpliciter dicta; et hic est finis communis totius humanae vitae, ut supra dictum est. 1233. At “Again, one person” [3, d] he introduces the fourth condition, saying that one man may deliberate well, without qualification, about the whole end of life. Also it is possible that another may rightly deliberate about some particular end. Hence unqualified eubulia will be that which directs deliberation in relation to the common end of human life. But eubulia of a particular kind will direct deliberation in relation to some special end. Because to deliberate well is characteristic of prudent people, unqualified eubulia must be rectitude of deliberation in respect to that end which so-called absolute prudence truly evaluates. This is the common end of the whole of life, as was noted above (1163).
Ex omnibus ergo quae dicta sunt accipi potest quod eubulia est rectitudo consilii ad finem bonum simpliciter per vias congruas et tempore convenienti. 1234. Therefore, it can be seen from all our discussions that eubulia is rectitude of deliberation in relation to an absolutely good end, by suitable methods and at an opportune time.

LECTURE 9
Synesis (Habit of Right judgment in Practical Individual Cases)
Chapter 10
      B.  He now explains synesis.
            1.   HE COMPARES SYNESIS WITH SCIENCE AND OPINION.
                   a.   He shows that not all science or opinion is synesis. — 1235
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία, καθ' ἃς λέγομεν συνετοὺς καὶ εὐσυνέτους, οὔθ' ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμῃ ἢ δόξῃ πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί Nor is synesis, and asynesia, according to which we are called sensible and foolish, entirely the same as science or opinion, for if this were so all men would be sensible.
                   b.   He shows that no one science is synesis. — 1236
οὔτε τις μία τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν, ἡ γεωμετρία περὶ μεγέθη· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσίς ἐστιν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὁτουοῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις καὶ βουλεύσαιτο. Nor is it any of the particular sciences, for example, medicine which deals with health, or geometry which deals with magnitudes. Nor is synesis concerned with eternal and unchangeable substances, nor with anything made. But it treats those matters about which men may doubt and seek counsel.
            2.   HE COMPARES synesis WITH PRUDENCE.
                   a.   He infers an agreement between them. — 1237
διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν, For this reason synesis is concerned with the same things that prudence is.
                   b.   He shows the difference between them.
                         i.    He shows that synesis is not prudence. — 1238-1240
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ σύνεσις καὶ φρόνησις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν· τί γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον. ταὐτὸ γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συνετοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι. But synesis is not the same as prudence, for prudence gives orders inasmuch as its end is to lay down 10 what is to be done or not to be done. synesis, however, merely forms judgments. In fact judgment (synesis) and good judgment, like people of judgment and people of good judgment, are looked upon as identical.
                         ii.   He shows that it is not the source of prudence. — 1241-1242
ἔστι δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἡ σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται συνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ εὖ τῷ καλῶς τὸ αὐτό καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοὔνομα ἡ σύνεσις, καθ' ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν· λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις. Likewise synesis is not the same as having or acquiring prudence. But just as learning is called syniene when it uses knowledge, so also when it uses practical evaluation to judge things about which prudence treats, or (as someone else says) to judge well, for eu has the meaning of “well.” Hence the name synesis, in accord with which some are called eusyneti (men of good judgment) is derived from the word used in connection with learning. Indeed we often use “learning” in the sense of “understanding.”
      C. He describes a third virtue called gnome. — 1243-1244
Chapter 11
ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν συγγνώμονας καὶ ἔχειν φαμὲν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή. σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστά φαμεν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἔνια συγγνώμην. ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή· ὀρθὴ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. The virtue called gnome according to which we say men are lenient and have just evaluation, is nothing more than a correct judgment of what is equitable. A proof of this is that we say the man of equity in a special way is inclined to leniency and that what is equitable has a measure of pardon in certain matters. Gnome itself judges what is equitable and the judgment is right when it corresponds to the truth.
II.  HE COMPARES THESE VIRTUES WITH ONE ANOTHER AND WITH PRUDENCE.
      a.   He mentions the agreement among these habits. — 1245
εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι· λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· All the preceding habits, it is reasonable to affirm, tend to the same thing. We use the names gnome, synesis, prudence, and understanding in such a way as to imply that the same persons possess gnome and understanding, and on that account are both prudent and sensible. In fact all these habits deal with singulars and particular ultimates,
      b.   He verifies this.
            i.    First by reason.
                   x.   HE SHOWS THAT synesis AND gnome DEAL WITH PARTICULAR ULTIMATES AND SINGULARS. — 1246
καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ εὐγνώμων ἢ συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα. inasmuch as a man of good sense, or someone pronouncing favorable judgment, or passing a lenient sentence judges the actions which the prudent man commands. Indeed every equitable thing has a relation to all human goods in this, that it refers to another. All these have to do with singulars and particular ultimates, which are practicable things. Because of this the prudent person should know them; likewise synesis and gnome are concerned with things to be done, and these are particular ultimates.
                   y.   HE SHOWS THE SAME THING ABOUT UNDERSTANDING. — 1247-1249
καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς. Understanding in both kinds of knowledge is concerned with ultimates because understanding and not reasoning deals with first principles and ultimates. One kind is about unchangeable and first principles in demonstrations, but the other is about a singular and contingent ultimate in practical matters and about a proposition of a different nature. This latter concerns principles of purposeful activity, for the universal is drawn from singulars. Hence it is necessary that man experience these singulars by sense, and this perception is understanding.
            ii.   (He verifies this) by an indication. — 1250-1252
διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν οὐδείς, γνώμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης. Therefore the preceding habits seem to be natural. While a man is not naturally wise, he does have good sense, judgment and understanding by nature. This is indicated by the fact that we think such aptitudes follow man’s years. In fact a particular age of life has understanding and good sense just as if nature caused them.
      c.   He makes an inference from what has been said.
            i.    First. — 1253
[διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων.] On this account understanding is both a principle and an end, for demonstrations proceed from them and are given for their sake.
            ii.   He sets down a second corollary. — 1254-1256
ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἧττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τί ἑκατέρα τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα, εἴρηται. So we must heed the indemonstrable statements and opinions of experienced, old and prudent men no less than demonstrations themselves, since the elderly understand principles by their experience. We have thus far considered the nature of prudence and wisdom, what material each virtue treats and in what part of the soul each exists.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
Est autem et synesis et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de eubulia, hic determinat de synesi. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo comparat synesim scientiae et opinioni. Secundo prudentiae, ibi, propter quod et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod non omnis scientia vel opinio est synesis. Secundo ostendit quod nulla scientia est synesis, ibi, neque aliqua una et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod synesis, secundum quam dicimus aliquos esse synechos, id est sensatos, et contrarium eius quod est asynesia, secundum quam dicimus aliquos esse asynecos, idest insensatos, non est totaliter idem quod scientia vel opinio. Nullus enim est qui non habeat aliquam scientiam vel opinionem. Si ergo omnis scientia vel opinio esset synesis, sequeretur quod omnes homines essent sensati. Quod patet esse falsum. 1235. After the Philosopher has explained eubulia, he now explains synesis [B]. On this subject he does two things. First [B, 1] he compares synesis with science and opinion. Then [B, 2], at “For this reason synesis etc.,” he compares synesis with prudence. On the first point he does two things. First [i, a] he shows that not all science or opinion is synesis. Next [1, b], at “Nor is it etc.,” he shows that no one science is synesis. He says first that synesis (by reason of which we call some men synetos, i.e., sensible) and its contrary, viz., asynesis—by reason of which we call other men asynetos (asinine) or foolish—are not entirely the same as science or opinion. Surely there is no one who does not have some science or opinion. if then all science or opinion was synesis it would follow that all men would be sensible—something obviously false.
Deinde cum dicit: neque aliqua una etc., ostendit quod nulla scientia sit synesis. Et dicit quod synesis non est aliqua scientiarum particularium. Quia si esset medicina, esset de sano et aegro. Si autem esset geometria, esset circa magnitudines. Quaedam autem aliae scientiae sunt de rebus sempiternis et immobilibus, sicut scientiae divinae circa quas non dicitur esse synesis. Neque etiam dicitur esse de his quae fiunt sive a natura, sive ab homine, de quibus sunt scientiae naturales et artificiales: sed est de illis de quibus aliquis potest dubitare et consiliari. Et sic patet quod synesis non est aliqua scientia. 1236. Then [2, b], at “Nor is it, he shows that no one science is synesis, saying that synesis is not any of the particular sciences. The reason is that if it was medicine it would deal with health and sickness; and if it was geometry it would deal with magnitudes . Certainly synesis is not said to be concerned with other particular sciences like the divine sciences, which treat eternal and unchangeable substances; nor is it said to treat the things done by nature or by man which the natural sciences and the arts consider. But it has to do with matters about which a man can doubt and deliberate. So it is evident that synesis is not a particular science.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod etc., comparat synesim prudentiae. Et primo concludit ex praemissis convenientiam utriusque: quia enim synesis est circa consiliabilia, circa quae etiam est prudentia, ut supra ostensum est, sequitur quod synesis sit circa eadem cum prudentia. 1237. Next [B, 2], at “For this reason synesis,” he compares synesis with prudence. First [2, a] he infers an agreement between them from our discussion. Since synesis is concerned with matters worthy of deliberation which prudence also considers, as was noted above (1164), it follows that synesis is concerned with the things treated by prudence.
Secundo ibi: non est autem idem etc., ostendit differentiam utriusque. Et primo ostendit quod synesis non est prudentia. Secundo quod non sit prudentiae generatio, ibi, est autem non habere prudentiam et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quamvis synesis et prudentia sint circa eadem, non tamen sunt omnino idem. 1238. Second [2, b], at “But synesis is not,” he shows the difference between them. First [b, i] he shows that synesis is not prudence, then [1), ii] at “Likewise synesis etc.,” that it is not the source of prudence. He says first that although synesis and prudence have to do with the same things, nevertheless they are not identical.
Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum quod in speculativis, in quibus non est actio, est solum duplex opus rationis: scilicet invenire inquirendo, et de inventis iudicare. Et haec quidem duo opera sunt (etiam) rationis practicae, cuius inquisitio est consilium, quod pertinet ad eubuliam, iudicium autem de consiliatis pertinet ad synesim. Illi enim dicuntur sensati, qui possunt bene iudicare de agendis. Non autem stat hic ratio practica, sed ulterius procedit ad agendum. Et ideo necessarium est tertium opus quasi finale et completivum, scilicet praecipere quod procedatur ad actum: et hoc proprie pertinet ad prudentiam. 1239. For proof of this we must consider that in speculative matters, in which no transient action exists, there is a twofold operation of reason, viz., first to find out by inquiry, and then to judge the information. These two works belong to the practical reason whose inquiry is deliberation pertaining to eubulia, but whose judgment about matters deliberated pertains to synesis. People who can judge well about things to be done are called sensible. However, practical reason does not stop here but proceeds further to do something. Hence there is required a third work, as it were final and perfecting, viz., to command that the thing be done. This properly belongs to prudence.
Unde dicit quod prudentia est praeceptiva, inquantum scilicet est finis ipsius determinare quid oporteat agere vel non agere, sed synesis est solum iudicativa. Et pro eodem accipitur synesis et eusynesia, idest bonus sensus, sicut et idem dicuntur synechi et eusynechi, id est sensati et bene sensati, quorum est bene iudicare. Et sic patet quod prudentia est eminentior quam synesis, sicut et synesis quam eubulia. Inquisitio enim ordinatur ad iudicium sicut ad finem; et iudicium ad praeceptum. 1240. Consequently, he says that prudence is preceptive inasmuch as the work of the end is to determine what must be done. But synesis merely makes a judgment. And synesis and eusynesia are taken for the same thing, viz., sound sense, just as syneti and eusyneti, i.e., people of sense and people of good sense—the work of both is to judge well—are considered to be alike. So it is clear that prudence is more excellent than synesis, just as synesis is more excellent than eubulia, for inquiry is ordered to judgment as to an end, and judgment to command.
Deinde cum dicit: est autem non habere etc., ostendit quod synesis non est generatio prudentiae. Et dicit quod synesis, sicut non est idem quod prudentia, ita non est idem cum hoc quod est habere prudentiam, aut cum hoc quod est sumere, idest acquirere eam. Sed sicut in Graeco discere, quod est quidam usus scientiae, dicitur syniene, sic et syniene dicitur in hoc quod aliquis utitur opinione practica in hoc quod iudicat de his de quibus est prudentia. Quod quidem (multi) ab alio potest dici iudicare bene; eu enim in Graeco idem est ei quod est bene. Unde nomen synesis, secundum quam dicuntur aliqui eusyneci, quasi bene iudicantes vel bene sensati, venit ex ea voce, scilicet syniene quae dicitur circa hoc quod est discere. Multoties enim discere nominamus syniene. 1241. Then [b, ii], at “Likewise synesis,” he shows that synesis is not the source of prudence. He says that as synesis is not the same as prudence so it is not the same as having prudence, or as assuming or acquiring it. But just as learning, which is the use of knowledge, is called syniene in Greek, so also the practical evaluation used by someone to judge things about which prudence treats is called syniene. This can even be called judging well, by another, for eu in Greek means the same as “well.” Hence the name synesis, in accord with which some are called eusyneti (as it were men of good judgment or of good sense), is derived from this word syniene which is used in connection with learning. Indeed we often call learning syniene.
Est ergo sensus quod syniene in Graeco significat aliquem usum alicuius intellectualis habitus, qui quidem usus non solum est discere sed etiam iudicare. Synesis autem dicitur a syniene ratione illius usus qui est iudicare, non ratione illius usus qui est discere. Unde synesis non est idem quod habere vel discere prudentiam, ut quidam putaverunt. 1242. The sense then is that syniene in Greek means a use of some intellectual habit, which use is not only learning but also judging. But synesis is so called from syniene by reason of that use which is judging, not by reason of that use which is learning. Hence synesis is not the same as having or learning prudence, as some have thought.
Deinde cum dicit: vocata autem gnome etc., determinat de tertia virtute quae vocatur gnome. Et ad huius virtutis evidentiam resumendum est quod supra dictum est in V de differentia epiichiae et iustitiae legalis. Iustum enim legale determinatur secundum id quod in pluribus contingit. Sed id quod est epiiches est directivum iusti legalis, ex eo quod necesse est legem deficere in paucioribus. Sicut ergo synesis importat iudicium rectum circa ea quae ut in pluribus contingunt, ita gnomyn importat rectum iudicium circa directionem iusti legalis. Et ideo dicit, quod illa virtus quae vocatur gnomyn, secundum quam aliquos dicimus eugnomonas, idest bene sententiantes, et habere gnomen, idest attingere ad rectam sententiam, nihil est aliud quam rectum iudicium eius, quod est obiectum epiichiae. 1243. At “The virtue called gnome” [C] he describes a third virtue called gnome. To understand this virtue we must draw from a previous discussion (1070-1090) on the distinction between equity and legal justice. What is legally just is determined according to what happens in the majority of cases. But what is equitable is directive of the legally just thing because the law necessarily is deficient in the minority of cases. As synesis signifies a right judgment about the things that happen in the majority of cases, so gnome signifies a right judgment about the direction of what is legally just. Therefore, he says that that virtue called gnome—according to which we say some men are eugnomonas, i.e., pronounce fair judgments and have correct evaluation or arrive at just decisions—is nothing more than a correct judgment of that which is the object of equity.
Et huius signum est quia hominem, qui est epiiches maxime dicimus esse signomonicum, quasi per quandam clementiam contemperantem sententiam. Et id quod est epiikes dicitur habere signomen, idest quamdam contemperantiam veniae. Et ipsa virtus, quae dicitur syngnome, est recte iudicativa eius, quod est epiiches. Et in hoc est recta, quod verum iudicat. 1244. A proof of this is that we say the equitable man is especially (syngnomonicum) inclined to kindness, as it were tempering judgment with a certain clemency. And what is equitable is especially said to have syngnome, i.e., a certain equal measure of pardon. The virtue syngnome rightly judges what is equitable, and is correct when it judges what is true.
Deinde cum dicit: sunt autem omnes etc., comparat praedictas virtutes adinvicem, et ad prudentiam. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit convenientiam inter hos habitus. Secundo probat, ibi: et in eo quidem etc.; tertio infert quaedam correlaria ex dictis, ibi: propter quod et principium et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod omnes praedicti habitus tendunt in idem. Et hoc rationabiliter. Et quod in idem tendant, patet, quia eisdem attribuuntur; nominamus enim gnomyn et synesim et prudentiam, et intellectum, eisdem attribuentes habere gnomin et intellectum, quos dicimus prudentes et synetos. Et quod rationabiliter eisdem attribuantur, patet per hoc quod omnia praedicta, quae vocat potentias, quia sunt actionum principia, sunt circa singularia, quae in operabilibus sunt sicut extrema, sicut supra dictum est de prudentia. 1245. Next [II], at “All the preceding habits,” he compares these virtues with one another and with prudence. On this point he does three things. First [II, a] he mentions the agreement among these habits. Then [II, b], at “inasmuch as a man etc.,” he verifies this. Last [II, c], at “On this account understanding etc.,” he makes an inference from what has been said. He affirms first that all these habits aim at the same thing. And this is reasonable. That they aim at the same thing is evident because they are attributed to the same persons. We use the words gnome, synesis, prudence, and understanding, referring to the same persons whom we call prudent and sensible as having gnome and understanding. That this reference is reasonable is clear from the fact that all the foregoing-called powers because they are principles of action-deal with singulars, which, in the practical order, are particular ultimates, as was stated in the discussion on prudence (1191-1194).
Deinde cum dicit: et in eo quidem etc., probat quod dixerat. Et primo per rationem. Secundo per signum, ibi: propter quod et naturalia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit synesim et gnomen esse circa extrema et singularia, sicut et prudentia. Secundo ostendit idem de intellectu, ibi: et intellectus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod manifestum est synesim et gnomyn esse extremorum singularium, in quantum synechus (et) eugnomen, id est bene sententians, vel signomyn, id est contemperanter sententians, est iudicativus de illis de quibus prudens praecipit. Ea enim quae sunt epiikia, de quibus est gnomyn, possunt communiter se habere ad omnia bona humana, quorum est prudentia, inquantum unumquodque eorum se habet ad alium, quod est de ratione iustitiae; dictum est enim supra, quod epiiches est quoddam iustum; sic bene dictum est, quod gnomi sit de his de quibus est prudentia. Quod autem omnia ista sint circa singularia et extrema patet per hoc quod operabilia sunt singularia et extrema; prudentia autem, synesis et gnomin circa operabilia sunt. Unde patet, quod sunt circa extrema. 1246. Then [II, b], at “inasmuch as,” he verifies what he said: first [II, b, i] by reason, and next [II, b, ii], at “Therefore the preceding etc.,” by an indication. On the first point he does two things. First [i, x] he shows that synesis and gnome deal with particular ultimates and singulars, just as prudence does. Second [i, y], at “Understanding in both kinds etc.,” he shows the same thing about understanding. He says first that obviously synesis and gnome deal with singular ultimates inasmuch as the kindly-disposed man of good sense, i.e., one pronouncing favorable sentences, or the compassionate man, i.e., the one passing sentence with clemency, judges those actions that the prudent man commands. But equitable things, about which gnome treats, in general can be compared to all human goods inasmuch as each of them has a reference to another-a thing pertaining to the nature of justice. Indeed, it has been said above (1078) that what is equitable is a kind of just thing. So then it has been correctly stated that gnome is concerned with the things treated by prudence. However, it is evident that all these have to do with singulars and particular ultimates by reason of the fact that practicable things are singular and particular ultimates. But prudence, synesis, and gnome deal with practicable things and so, obviously, with particular ultimates.
Deinde cum dicit: et intellectus etc., ostendit quod etiam intellectus sit circa extrema. Et dicit, quod intellectus in utraque cognitione, scilicet tam speculativa quam practica, est extremorum, quia primorum terminorum et extremorum, a quibus scilicet ratio procedere incipit, est intellectus et non ratio. Est autem duplex intellectus. Quorum hic quidem est circa immobiles terminos et primos, qui sunt secundum demonstrationes, quae procedunt ab immobilibus et primis terminis, idest a principiis indemonstrabilibus, quae sunt prima cognita et immobilia, quia scilicet eorum cognitio ab homine removeri non potest. Sed intellectus qui est in practicis, est alterius modi extremi, scilicet singularis, et contingentis et alterius propositionis, idest non universalis quae est quasi maior, sed singularis quae est minor in syllogismo operativo. 1247. Second [i, y], at “Understanding in both kinds,” he shows that understanding is concerned with ultimates. He says that understanding in both speculative and practical knowledge has to do with ultimates because understanding and not reasoning deals with first principles and ultimates (from which reasoning starts). But there are two kinds of understanding. One of these is about unchangeable and first principles in demonstrations, for they proceed from the unchangeable and first—that is, indemonstrable—principles which are the first things known and immutable because the knowledge of them cannot be removed from man. But that understanding of practical matters deals with another kind of ultimate: the singular and contingent, and with a different proposition, i.e., not the universal—which is as it were a major—but the particular which is the minor of a syllogism in the practical field.
Quare autem huiusmodi extremi dicatur intellectus, patet per hoc, quod intellectus est principiorum; haec autem singularia, quorum dicimus esse intellectum huiusmodi, principia eius sunt quod est cuius gratia, id est sunt principia ad modum causae finalis. 1248. Why understanding is predicated of an ultimate of this kind is evident from the fact that understanding treats of principles. But the singulars, about which we say understanding is concerned, are principles of what is done for an end, i.e., principles after the manner of a final cause.
Et quod singularia habeant rationem principiorum, patet, quia ex singularibus accipitur universale. Ex hoc enim, quod haec herba fecit huic sanitatem, acceptum est, quod haec species herbae valet ad sanandum. Et quia singularia proprie cognoscuntur per sensum, oportet quod homo horum singularium, quae dicimus esse principia et extrema, habeat sensum non solum exteriorem sed etiam interiorem, cuius supra dixit esse prudentiam, scilicet vim cogitativam sive aestimativam, quae dicitur ratio particularis. Unde hic sensus vocatur intellectus qui est circa singularia. Et hunc philosophus vocat in tertio de anima intellectum passivum, qui est corruptibilis. 1249. It is obvious that singulars have the nature of principles because the universal is drawn from singulars. From the fact that this herb cured this man, we gather that this kind of herb has power to cure. Because singulars are properly known by the senses, it is necessary that man should have experience of these singulars (which we say are principles and ultimates) not just by exterior but by interior sense as well; he said before (1214-1215) that prudence belongs to the sensory power of judging called particular reason. Hence this sense is called understanding whose object is the sensible and singular. In the third book De Anima (Ch. 5, 430 a 25; St. Th. Lect. 10, 745) the Philosopher refers to this as the “passive intellect” which is perishable.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod et naturalia etc., manifestat quod dixerat per signum. Quia enim praedicti habitus sunt circa singularia, oportet quod aliquo modo attingant virtutes sensitivas, quae operantur per organa corporea. Et ideo praedicti habitus videntur esse naturales: non quod totaliter sint a natura, sed quod ex naturali dispositione corporis aliqui sunt prompti ad hos habitus, ita quod per modicam experientiam complentur in eis: quod non accidit circa habitus intellectuales, qui sunt circa naturalia, puta geometriam vel metaphysicam. 1250. Next [II, b, ii], at “Therefore the preceding,” he verifies what he said. Since the foregoing habits concern singulars, they must in some way be in contact with the sensitive faculties which operate by means of bodily organs. Consequently these habits seem to be natural, not as from nature entirely but in the sense that some are inclined to them by a natural physical disposition so as to be perfected in them with a little experience. This does not happen with the intellectual habits, like geometry and metaphysics, which deal with things in nature.
Et hoc est quod subdit quod nullus dicitur sapiens, idest metaphysicus, nec geometer, secundum naturam, non quin aliqui secundum naturam sint magis apti ad hoc quam alii: sed hoc est secundum dispositionem remotam non secundum dispositionem propinquam, secundum quam aliqui dicuntur naturaliter habere gnomyn et synesim et intellectum, quem diximus esse circa singularia. 1251. And he adds this: no one is called a philosopher (i.e., a metaphysician) or a geometrician by nature. Some indeed are naturally more apt for these roles than others but this is due to a remote and not an immediate bent of mind, as some men are said naturally to have good sense and excellent judgment, and that understanding which we speak of regarding singulars.
Et signum huius quod huiusmodi secundum naturam insint aliquibus est quia aestimamus quod consequantur aetates hominum, secundum quas transmutatur natura corporalis. Est enim aliqua aetas, scilicet senilis, quae propter quietationem transmutationum corporalium et animalium habet huiusmodi intellectum et gnomyn, quasi natura sit horum causa. 1252. An indication of such aptitudes is the opinion we have that they accompany age as physical nature is changed. Indeed there is a particular time of life, old age which, by the cessation of bodily and animal changes, has understanding and good sense as if nature was the cause of them.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod et principium etc., infert duo corollaria ex dictis. Quorum primum est, quod intellectus, qui est bene discretivus singularium in practicis, non solum se habet sicut principium, sicut in speculativis, sed etiam sicut finis. In speculativis enim demonstrationes procedunt ex principiis quorum est intellectus; non tamen demonstrationes dantur de eis. Sed in operativis, demonstrationes et procedunt ex his scilicet singularibus, et dantur de his scilicet singularibus. Oportet enim in syllogismo operativo, secundum quem ratio movet ad agendum, esse minorem singularem, et etiam conclusionem quae concludit ipsum operabile, quod est singulare. 1253. Then [II, c], at “On this account understanding,” he infers two corollaries from the discussion. The first of these [c, i] is that understanding, which discriminates well among singulars in practical matters, not only has to do with principles as in the speculative order but is a quasi-end. In speculative matters demonstrations proceed from principles (considered by understanding), but there are no demonstrations for the principles. On the other hand in practical matters demonstrations proceed from principles, viz., singulars and there are demonstrations for these principles. In practical argumentation, according to which reason moves to action, a singular must be the minor and also the conclusion inferring the practicable thing itself which is a singular.
Secundum corollarium ponit ibi: quare oportet et cetera. Quia enim dictum est supra, quod intellectus, qui est principiorum operabilium, consequitur experientiam et aetates et perficitur per prudentiam; inde est, quod oportet attendere his quae opinantur et enuntiant circa operabilia homines experti et senes et prudentes, quamvis non inducant demonstrationes, non minus quasi ipsis demonstrationibus, sed etiam magis. Huiusmodi enim homines, propter hoc quod habent ex experientia visum, idest rectum iudicium de operabilibus, vident principia operabilium. Principia autem sunt certiora conclusionibus demonstrationum. 1254. At “So we must heed” [c, ii] he sets down a second corollary. It has just been said (1252) that understanding, dealing with practicable principles, follows from experience and age, and is perfected by prudence. Hence we must pay attention to the thoughts and decisions of experienced, old, and prudent men on what is to be done. Although such opinions and resolutions do not lead to demonstrations, they are nonetheless heeded even more than if they were demonstrations themselves. Such men understand practical principles because they have an experienced eye, i.e., right judgment in practical matters. And principles are more certain than the conclusions of demonstrations.
Est autem considerandum circa ea quae hic dicta sunt quod sicut pertinet ad intellectum absolutum in universalibus iudicium de primis principiis, ad rationem autem pertinet discursus a principiis in conclusiones, ita etiam circa singularia vis cogitativa hominis vocatur intellectus secundum quod habet absolutum iudicium de singularibus. Unde ad intellectum dicit pertinere prudentiam et synesim et gnomen. Dicitur autem ratio particularis, secundum quod discurrit ab uno in aliud. Et ad hanc pertinet eubulia, quam philosophus his non connumeravit nec dixit eam esse extremorum. 1255. Regarding the statements just made (1254) we must consider that, as in universals unconditioned judgment about first principles belongs to understanding (and deduction from principles to conclusions, to reasoning) so in particulars unconditioned judgment about singulars belongs to the sensory power of judgment called understanding. We say that prudence, synesis, and gnome pertain to understanding. However, this is called particular reason, inasmuch as it concludes from one to another; to it belongs eubulia which the Philosopher did not enumerate among the others. Therefore he said it (particular reason) deals with particular ultimates.
Ultimo autem epilogat, dicens quod dictum est quid sit prudentia, quae est principalis in agibilibus, et sapientia, quae est principalis in speculativis, et circa quae sunt utraque earum, et quod non sint in eadem parte animae rationalis. 1256. Finally he sums up saying that we have discussed the nature of prudence (the principal virtue in practical matters) and wisdom (the principal virtue in speculative matters) and the affairs each of these is concerned with, and that they are not in the same part of the rational soul.

LECTURE 10
Doubts About the Usefulness of Wisdom and Prudence
Chapter 12
I.    HE PROPOSES SOME DOUBTS.
      A.  He raises a doubt about the usefulness of wisdom and prudence.
            1.   HE PROPOSES THE DOUBT. — 1257
διαπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοί εἰσιν. Someone may raise a doubt about the utility of these virtues.
            2.   HE PURSUES THE DOUBT.
                   a.   First in regard to wisdom. — 1258
ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρήσει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων ἄνθρωπος οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως, Wisdom, to be sure, explores none of the ways in which man is made happy, for it does not consider any operation.
                   b.   Then ... about prudence.
                         i.    He brings forward the argument that prudence is not necessary for man. — 1259-1260
ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς; εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησίς ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν, οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἕξεις αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά, ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λέγεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικήν ἐσμεν. Although prudence considers this very thing, why does man need it? Prudence is the virtue concerned with things that are just and honorable and useful to man—the performance of which belongs to the good of man. But we are not more inclined to do things from knowing them (since virtues are operative habits) than we are inclined to fulfill the requirements of health and good condition from knowing them, but from the fact that they are habits. Surely we are not more inclined to activity because we know medicine and gymnastics.
                         ii.   He rules out a particular answer (for two reasons).
                               x.   THE FIRST REASON. — 1261-1262
εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον ῥητέον ἀλλὰ τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος· If we must assume that a man ought to be prudent not for the sake of these (virtuous works) but to become virtuous, prudence will not be at all useful for men who are virtuous.
                               y.   THE SECOND REASON. — 1263
ἔτι δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἱκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ μανθάνομεν ἰατρικήν. Nor will it be necessary for those not having virtue because, in order to be virtuous, it makes no difference whether men themselves have prudence or are induced to it by others who have it. It is enough that we make use of prudence; in regard to health, we do not learn medicine even though we want to be healthy.
      B.  He raises a doubt about the comparison of these two (wisdom and prudence) with one another. — 1264-1265
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὖσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται· ἡ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὴ τούτων λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον. Again, it seems unreasonable that prudence, which is less perfect, should have predominance over wisdom. Prudence indeed has power over singulars and gives orders in regard to them. But we must discuss the questions proposed; up to the present we have merely raised doubts about them.
II.  HE SOLVES THEM (THE DOUBTS).
      A.  He solves the doubt about the utility of wisdom and prudence.
            1.   HE SOLVES THE DOUBT IN REGARD TO WISDOM AND PRUDENCE IN GENERAL... (BY) TWO EXPLANATIONS.
                   a.   The first (explanation). — 1266
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι καθ' αὑτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἱρετὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετάς γ' οὔσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου, καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. We answer first that wisdom and prudence necessarily are objects of choice in themselves; even if neither of them performs any operation, they are virtues perfecting both parts of the soul.
                   b.   The second explanation. — 1267
ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα. Wisdom and prudence do, in fact, perform some operation but not as the medical art produces health; as health brings about healthful activities so does wisdom bring happiness. Since wisdom is a part of virtue as a whole, he who has it acts according to it and becomes happy.
            2.   (HE SOLVES THE DOUBT) IN REGARD TO PRUDENCE IN PARTICULAR.
                   a.   First... that prudence does nothing for virtuous works. — 1268-1269
ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν. Moreover, a work of virtue is perfected in accord with prudence and moral virtue: moral virtue rectifies the end, and prudence the means to the end. But there is no such virtue in the fourth part of the soul, viz., the power of growth because this does not have the option of operating or not operating.
                   b.   Then... that prudence is not necessary in order that a man be virtuous.
                         i.    Prudence cannot exist without moral virtue.
                               x.   ANOTHER OPERATIVE PRINCIPLE IS REQUIRED. — 1270-1271
περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακτικωτέρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὔπω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά καίτοι πράττουσί γε ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν, λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τῶν πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἕνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. Concerning the objection that, by reason of prudence, men will not the more readily perform good and just deeds, we must begin a little further back, resuming the following heading. We do not call certain men just who do just works, for example, those who do the things decreed by the law, either unwillingly or because of ignorance or some other cause, and not because of the works themselves. We do not call such men just, although they do what they ought to do and even what a good man ought to do. So, as it seems, one ought to do particular things in such a manner to be virtuous, for example, he should do them from choice and for the sake of the virtuous works themselves. Virtue indeed makes the right choice, but whatever things are designed by nature to be done do not pertain to virtue but to some other principle.
                               y.   HE SHOWS. WHAT (THE OTHER OPERATIVE PRINCIPLE) IS. — 1272
λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτοῦ. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾖ καλός, ἐπαινετή ἐστιν, ἐὰν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαμὲν εἶναι. But something more must be said in order to understand these matters better. There is a particular quality called shrewdness, which is of such a nature that it enables a man to do the things ordained to a determined end and to attain the end by means of these things. When the intention is good, shrewdness is praiseworthy, but when the intention is evil it is called craftiness. For this reason we call both prudent and crafty people clever.
                               z.   HE SHOWS THAT PRUDENCE MAKES AN ADDITION OF A MORAL VIRTUE TO THAT PRINCIPLE. — 1273-1274
ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δύναμις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἕξις τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὡς εἴρηταί τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὁτιδήποτε ὄν ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν· τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν. Prudence is not this quality but cannot exist without it; the habit in the soul is joined to this insight by moral virtue, as has been pointed out. This is evident because argumentation in the practical order has a principle that such an end is the supreme good, whatever that end may be, in fact anything may be used as an example. What is the supreme good is not apparent except to a virtuous man, for evil corrupts and causes deception in practical principles. Obviously then it is impossible for a man to be prudent who is not virtuous.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
Dubitabit autem utique aliquis et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus intellectualibus, hic movet quasdam dubitationes de utilitate ipsarum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit dubitationes. Secundo solvit eas, ibi: primum quidem igitur dicimus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo movet dubitationem de utilitate sapientiae et prudentiae, ad quas aliae reducuntur sicut ad principaliores. Secundo de comparatione harum duarum ad invicem, ibi: ad haec autem inconveniens et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit dubitationem. Et dicit, quod aliquis potest dubitare ad quid vel quomodo sapientia et prudentia sint utiles. 1257. After the Philosopher has considered the intellectual virtues, he raises some doubts about their utility. On this point he does two things. First [I] he proposes some doubts. Then [II], at “We answer first,” he solves them. On the first point he does two things. First [I, A] he raises a doubt about the usefulness of wisdom and prudence, to which the other virtues are referred as to the principal ones. Second [I, B], at “Again, it seems etc.,” he raises a doubt about the comparison of these two with one another. On the first point he does two things. First [I, A, I] he proposes the doubt saying that a man may be uncertain why or how wisdom and prudence are useful.
Secundo ibi, sapientia quidem enim etc., prosequitur dubitationem. Et primo quantum ad sapientiam, quae videtur ad nihil utilis esse. Quicquid enim est utile in rebus humanis valet ad felicitatem, quae est ultimus finis vitae humanae, ad quam nihil videtur valere sapientia. Non enim videtur speculari aliquid eorum per quae homo fit felix; quod quidem est per operationem virtutis, ut supra in primo habitum est. Sapientia autem nullius generationis, idest operationis est considerativa, cum sit de primis principiis entium. Sic ergo videtur, quod sapientia non sit utilis homini. 1258. Second [I, A, 2], at “Wisdom, to be sure,” he pursues the doubt: first [I, A, 2, a] in regard to wisdom that seems to be useless. Whatever is useful in human affairs contributes something to happiness, the ultimate end of human life, to which wisdom seems to contribute nothing. Wisdom does not appear to explore any of the ways by which man is made happy because this takes place by means of virtuous operation, as was explained in the first book (224-230). But wisdom does not consider any production, i.e., operation, since it treats the first principles of being. So then it seems that wisdom is not useful to man.
Secundo ibi: prudentia autem etc., prosequitur dubitationem quantum ad prudentiam. Et primo inducit in rationem quod prudentia non sit necessaria homini. Secundo excludit quamdam responsionem, ibi, si autem non horum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod prudentia habet (hoc), quod scilicet sit considerativa operationum humanarum ex quibus homo fit felix. Sed non propter hoc videtur quod homo habeat opus ipsa. Est enim prudentia circa ea quae sunt iusta in comparatione ad alios, et pulchra idest honesta, et bona idest utilia homini secundum seipsum, quae quidem operari pertinet ad bonum virum. Non videtur autem aliquis esse operativus eorum quae sunt secundum aliquem habitum ex eo quod scit ipsa, sed ex eo quod habet habitum ad ea. 1259. Then [I, A, 2, b], at “Although prudence considers,” he pursues his doubt about prudence. First [I, A, 2, b, i ] he brings forward the argument that prudence is not necessary for man. Next [I, A, 2, b, ii], at “If we must assume etc.,” he rules out a particular answer. He says first that it is the role of prudence to consider the operations of man by which he may become happy. But on this account it does not seem that man needs it. Prudence is concerned with things just in relation to others and with things noble (or honorable) and good, i.e., useful to man in relation to himself—the performance of which belongs to the good man. But a person does not seem to perform actions that are in accord with some habit from the fact that he knows them but from the fact that he has the habit in relation to them.
Sicut patet in corporalibus, quod per hoc quod homo habet scientiam medicinalem vel exercitativam non est magis operativus eorum quae pertinent ad hominem sanum vel ad bene se habentem, dummodo ea non consistant solum in eo quod est facere, sed in eo quod est esse ab aliquo interiori habitu. Contingit enim quandoque quod aliquis per notitiam artis operatur quaedam opera sani quasi confingens ea et non secundum quod procedunt ab habitu sanitatis, prout scilicet operatur ea homo sanus. Sic enim non magis procedit ab homine ex eo quod scit medicinam, sed ex eo solum quod sit sanus. Cum igitur virtutes sint habitus, opera virtutum secundum quod ab eis procedunt et ducunt ad felicitatem non magis operatur homo ex hoc quod habet eorum notitiam per prudentiam. Et sic prudentia non est boni operativa. 1260. Thus it is clear in regard to the body that someone is not more inclined to put into practice the things pertaining to a healthy or well-conditioned man—provided they are not merely activities—because he has a knowledge of medicine or gymnastics, but because he has an inner habit. It happens sometimes that, from a knowledge of his art, a man performs certain healthful activities, but does them incidentally and not according as they come from a habit of health, which is why a healthy man does them. So this does not proceed from man because he knows medicine but only because he is healthy. Therefore, since virtues are habits, a man is not induced to do the works of the virtues as they proceed from the habits and lead to happiness simply because prudence gives him a knowledge of them. And in this manner prudence is not operative of the good.
Deinde cum dicit: si autem non horum etc., excludit quamdam responsionem. Posset enim aliquis dicere quod, licet homo ex quo est virtuosus non magis sit operativus operum virtutis per hoc quod cognoscit ea secundum prudentiam, est tamen prudentia necessaria ad hoc quod homo fiat virtuosus, sicut ars medicinae est necessaria non ad hoc quod sanus opera sanitatis exequatur, sed ad hoc quod fiat sanus. Et sic ponendum est quod homo debet esse prudens non gratia horum, scilicet operum virtutis, sed gratia eius quod est fieri virtuosum. Hanc autem responsionem excludit duabus rationibus. 1261. Then [I, A, 2, b, ii], at “If we must assume,” he rules out a particular answer. Someone could say: a man in being virtuous is not more ready to perform virtuous acts from the fact that he knows them according to prudence, but he does need prudence to become virtuous, just as a healthy man does not need the art of medicine to perform healthful works but in order that he be made healthy. So we must say that a man ought to be prudent not for the sake of these, viz., virtuous works, but for the sake of becoming virtuous. He excludes this answer for two reasons.
Quarum prima est quia, ex quo homines essent studiosi, id est virtuosi, ad nihil esset eis utilis prudentia, quod manifeste videtur inconveniens. 1262. The first reason [ii, x] is that prudence would not be at all useful when men are already good, i.e., virtuous. This seems quite unreasonable.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. Videtur enim quod secundum responsionem praedictam non solum (habentibus virtutem, sed) etiam non habentibus virtutem non esset necessaria prudentia. Videtur enim quod nihil differat ad hoc quod aliqui fiant virtuosi, utrum ipsi habeant prudentiam vel persuadeantur ab aliis qui habent, quum per hoc sufficienter se habet homo ad hoc quod fiat virtuosus, sicut patet circa sanitatem. Cum enim volumus sani esse, non propter hoc curamus addiscere medicinam, sed sufficit nobis uti consilio medicorum. Ergo, pari ratione, ad hoc quod efficiamur virtuosi, non oportet quod nos ipsi habeamus prudentiam, sed sufficit quod a prudentibus instruamur. 1263. He gives the second reason at “Nor will it” [ii, y]. According to the previous answer it seems that prudence would not be necessary even for those who do not have virtue. In order that men become virtuous it does not seem to make any difference whether they themselves have prudence, or are induced to it by those who have prudence, since in the latter case man is sufficiently disposed to become virtuous, as is clear in regard to health. When we want to regain health, we do not, because of this, take the trouble to learn medicine, but it is enough to follow the advice of doctors. Hence, for a similar reason, it is not necessary to have prudence in order to become virtuous but it is sufficient to be instructed by prudent men.
Deinde cum dicit: ad haec autem etc., movet dubitationem circa comparationem sapientiae et prudentiae. Ostensum est enim supra quod prudentia est deterior, id est inferior in dignitate quam sapientia; et tamen videtur esse principalior, idest magis principativa quia prudentia et operatur et praecipit circa singula. Continetur enim sub prudentia etiam politica: dictum est enim in prooemio libri quod haec praeordinat quas disciplinas debitum est esse in civitatibus et quales unumquemque addiscere et usquequo. Et sic videtur prudentia principari sapientiae, cum praecipere sit opus iudicantis. Et hoc videtur inconveniens quod deterior principetur meliori. 1264. Next [I, B] at “Again, it seems” he raises a doubt about the comparison between prudence and wisdom. It was explained before (1186-1189) that prudence is inferior to wisdom in excellence. At least wisdom seems to be prior, i.e., more pre-eminent than prudence, which operates with and gives orders regarding singulars. Even political science is contained under prudence, for it has been explained in the introduction to this work (26-31) that political science gives orders as to what sciences ought to be pursued in a state, which sciences each man ought to learn, and for what period. So it seems that prudence has authority over wisdom, since to give orders is the function of a judge. But it seems unreasonable that the less perfect should exercise authority over the more excellent.
Subdit autem, continuans se ad sequentia, dicens quod de his quae proposita sunt dicendum est, nunc autem tacta sunt solum per modum dubitationis. 1265. Continuing with what follows he adds a note, saying that he must discuss the proposed questions, which have been treated under the aspect of doubt up to the present.
Deinde cum dicit: primum quidem igitur etc., solvit praemissas dubitationes. Et primo solvit dubitationem de utilitate sapientiae et prudentiae. Secundo de comparatione utriusque, ibi, sed tamen neque principalis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo solvit dubitationem communiter quantum ad sapientiam et prudentiam. Secundo specialiter quantum ad prudentiam, ibi, adhuc opus et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas solutiones. Quarum prima ostendit quod rationes quas inducit non efficaciter concludunt. Non enim sequitur, si per sapientiam et prudentiam nihil operatur homo ad felicitatem, quod propter hoc sint inutiles. Quia etiam si neutra ipsarum haberet aliquam operationem, tamen essent secundum se eligibiles cum sint virtutes perficientes utramque partem animae rationalis, ut ex dictis patet. Unicuique autem est eligibilis sua perfectio. 1266. Then [II], at “We answer first,” he resolves the foregoing doubts. First [II, A] he solves the doubt about the utility of wisdom and prudence. Next [Lect. 11, II, B], at “Nevertheless, neither” (B.1145 a 7), he solves the doubt about the comparison between the two. On the first point he does two things. First [II, A, i] he solves the doubt in regard to wisdom and prudence in general, then [II, A, 2] at “Moreover, a work etc.” in regard to prudence in particular. In reference to the first he puts forward two explanations. The first [II, A, i, a] of these shows that the arguments presented do not prove conclusively. It does not follow that wisdom and prudence are useless because by them nothing is gained in happiness. Even if neither of them had any operation, they would nevertheless be objects of choice in themselves since they are virtues perfecting both parts of the rational soul, as is evident from previous discussions (1255). Anything is an object of choice by reason of its perfection.
Secundo solvit per interemptionem ibi: deinde et cetera. Et dicit quod sapientia et prudentia faciunt quidem aliquid ad felicitatem. Sed exemplum quod inducebatur non erat conveniens. Non enim hoc modo se habet sapientia, vel prudentia ad felicitatem, sicut ars medicinae ad sanitatem, sed magis sicut sanitas ad opera sana; ars enim medicinae facit sanitatem sicut quoddam opus exterius operatum; sed sanitas facit opera sana, quasi quemdam usum habitus sanitatis. Felicitas autem non est opus exterius operatum, sed est operatio procedens ab habitu virtutis. Unde, cum sapientia sit quaedam species virtutis communis, ex hoc ipso quod aliquis habet sapientiam et operatur secundum eam, est felix. Et eadem ratio est de prudentia. Sed specialiter expressit sapientiam, quia in operatione eius consistit potior felicitas, ut infra in X dicetur. 1267. The second explanation, given at “Wisdom and prudence” [II, A, 1, b], destroys the arguments. He says that wisdom and prudence in fact do something for happiness. But the example that he had been using was not suitable. Wisdom or prudence is not compared to happiness in the same way as the medical art to health, but rather as health to healthful activities. The medical art brings about health as a particular external work produced, but health brings about healthful activities by use of the habit of health. However, happiness is not a work externally produced but an operation proceeding from the habit of virtue. Hence, since wisdom is a certain species of virtue as a whole it follows that, from the very fact that a man has wisdom and operates according to it, he is happy. The same reason holds in the case of prudence. But he mentioned wisdom particularly because happiness consists more in its operation, as will be explained later in the tenth book (2111-2125).
Deinde cum dicit: adhuc opus etc., solvit ea quae specialiter ad prudentiam pertinent. Et primo quantum ad hoc quod obiiciebatur, quod prudentia nihil facit ad opera virtutis. Secundo quantum ad hoc quod obiiciebatur, quod prudentia non est necessaria ad hoc quod homo sit virtuosus, ibi, de eo autem quod est et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod adhuc specialiter quantum ad prudentiam fallit quod obiiciebatur, quod per prudentiam non sumus magis operativi operum virtutis. Hoc enim patet esse falsum, quia opus virtutis perficimus secundum utrumque, scilicet secundum prudentiam et secundum moralem virtutem. 1268. Next [II, A, 2], at “Moreover, a work,” he solves the objections pertaining particularly to prudence: first [II, A, 2, a] in reference to the doubt that prudence does nothing for virtuous works; then [II, A, 2, b], at “Concerning the objection,” in reference to the doubt that prudence is not necessary in order that a man be virtuous. He says first—this time as regards prudence in particular—that the objection of prudence not enabling us to perform virtuous works breaks down. This can be false because we perfect the work of virtue according to both, viz., prudence and moral virtue.
Duo enim sunt necessaria in opere virtutis, (scilicet) quorum unum est ut homo habeat rectam intentionem de fine; quod quidem facit virtus moralis, inquantum inclinat appetitum in debitum finem. Aliud autem est quod homo bene se habeat circa ea quae sunt ad finem: et hoc facit prudentia quae est bene consiliativa et iudicativa et praeceptiva eorum quae sunt ad finem. Et sic ad opus virtutis concurrit et prudentia quae est perfectiva rationalis per essentiam, et virtus moralis quae est perfectiva appetitivae quae est rationalis per participationem. Sed quare alterius particulae animae quae est penitus irrationalis, scilicet nutritivae, non sit talis virtus quae concurrat ad operationem humanam, ratio in promptu est, quia in nutritiva potentia non est operari vel non operari, et hoc requiritur ad operationem virtutis humanae, ut ex supradictis patet. 1269. Two things are needed in a work of virtue. One is that a man have a right intention for the end, which moral virtue provides in inclining the appetitive faculty to a proper end. The other is to be well disposed towards the means. This is done by prudence, which gives good advice, judges, and orders the means to the end. In this way, both prudence and moral virtue concur in a virtuous operation: prudence perfecting the part rational by essence, and moral virtue perfecting the appetitive part, rational by participation. But in the other, i.e., nutritive part of the soul-which is altogether devoid of reason-there is no such virtue concurring in human operation. The evident reason for this is that the power of growth does not have the option of operating or not operating. But this characteristic is required for the operation of human virtue, as is evident from previous discussions (305, 308, 382, 496, 502, 503).
Deinde cum dicit: de eo autem quod est nihil etc., solvit id quod obiciebatur quod sine prudentia possit aliquis esse et fieri virtuosus. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod prudentia non possit esse sine virtute morali. Secundo ostendit quod virtus moralis non possit esse sine prudentia, ibi, intendendum utique rursus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quod ad hoc quod aliquis sit virtuosus, requiritur non solum virtus moralis, sed etiam quoddam aliud operativum principium. Secundo ostendit quid sit illud, ibi, dicendum autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit quod prudentia super illud principium addit adiunctionem virtutis moralis, ibi, est autem prudentia et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ad solvendum hoc quod dictum est, quod propter prudentiam non magis homo operabitur bona et iusta ad hoc quod fiat virtuosus, oportet parum superius incipere resumentes quaedam eorum quae dicta sunt. 1270. At “Concerning the objection” [II, A, 2, b] he solves the difficulty which pretended to show that a man could be and could become virtuous without prudence. On this point he does two things. First [II, A, 2, b, i], he shows that prudence cannot exist without moral virtue. Then [Lect. 11; II, A, 2, b, ii], at “We must again etc.” (B.1144 b), he shows that moral virtue cannot exist without prudence. On the first point he does three things. First [II, a, 2, b, ii, x] he shows that for a man to be virtuous, not only moral virtue but also another operative principle is required. Second [II, A, 2, b, ii, y], at “But something more etc.,” he shows what it is. Last [II, A, 2, b, ii, z], at “Prudence is not etc.,” he shows that prudence makes an addition of a moral virtue to that principle. He says first that to answer the assertion (1262-1263) that by reason of prudence a man will not perform good and just actions in order to become virtuous, we must begin a little further back, resuming certain things already discussed (1035-1049).
Et incipiemus hinc, quod, sicut supra dictum est, quidam operantur iusta, et tamen non dicimus esse iustos: sicut cum aliqui operantur ea quae sunt statuta legibus vel inviti, vel propter ignorantiam, aut propter aliquam aliam causam, puta propter lucrum, et non propter amorem ipsorum operum iustitiae: et tales inquam non dicuntur iusti, quamvis operentur ea quae oportet eos facere, et etiam ea quae oportet facere bonum virum. Et ita etiam in singulis virtutibus oportet hominem aliqualiter operari ad hoc quod sit bonus ut sit bonus sive virtuosus, ut scilicet operetur ex electione et quia placeant ei ipsa opera virtutis. Iam autem supradictum est, quod virtus moralis facit electionem rectam, quantum scilicet ad intentionem finis, sed ea quae nata sunt fieri propter finem non pertinent ad virtutem moralem, sed ad quamdam aliam potentiam, idest ad quoddam aliud operativum principium, quod ingeniatur vias ducentes ad fines. Et sic huiusmodi principium est necessarium ad hoc quod homo sit virtuosus. 1271. We will begin from this point that, as has been said (1035-1049), some people perform just deeds, and we nevertheless do not call them just, as when they do deeds decreed by law, either unwillingly or because of ignorance or for some other reason like gain, and not out of love for the very works of justice. Men of this sort, I say, are not called just though they perform the actions they should perform and even actions that a good man should perform. So also in particular virtues a man ought to work in ~some measure in order that he be good or virtuous, just as he works from choice and because the virtuous works themselves are pleasing. It has just been said (1269) that moral virtue makes the right choice in regard to the intention of the end. But the things designed by nature to be done for the end do not pertain to moral virtue but to some other power, i.e., to a certain other operative principle that discovers ways leading to ends. So a principle of this kind is necessary in order that a man be virtuous.
Deinde cum dicit dicendum autem etc., ostendit quid sit istud principium. Et dicit quod de praedictis aliquid est ulterius dicendum ut manifestius sciantur. Est itaque quaedam potentia, idest operativum principium, quam vocant dinoticam, quasi ingeniositatem quamdam sive industriam, quae talis est ut per eam homo possit operari ea quae ordinantur ad intentionem quam homo praesupposuit, sive bonam sive malam, et quod per ea quae operatur possit sortiri, idest consequi, finem. Et si quidem intentio sit bona, huiusmodi ingeniositas est laudabilis, si autem sit prava, vocatur astutia; quae sonat in malum, sicut prudentia sonat in bonum. Et quia dinotica communis est utrique, inde est, quod tam prudentes quam astutos dicimus esse dinos, id est ingeniosos sive industrios. 1272. Then [II, A, 2, b, ii, y], at “But something more, “ he Shows what that principle is. He states that something further must be said about the things discussed above, so that they may be more clearly understood. There is, therefore, a particular power, i.e., an operative principle called shrewdness, as it were a certain ingenuity or skillfulness. This is of such a nature that, by means of it, man can do the things ordered to an end-either good or bad-that he has presupposed, and by means of the things he does he can share or attain the end. When the intention is good, ingenuity of this sort deserves praise, but when the intention is bad, it is called craftiness, which implies evil as prudence implies good. But, because shrewdness is common to each, it follows that we call both prudent and crafty people shrewd, i.e., ingenious or skillful. So then it seems that wisdom is not useful to man.
Deinde cum dicit: est autem prudentia etc., ostendit quid prudentia addat supra praedictum principium. Et dicit, quod prudentia non est omnino idem quod praedicta potentia, scilicet dinotica. Sed tamen non potest esse sine ea; sed in anima, huic visui idest huic cognoscitivo principio scilicet dinoticae, habitus prudentiae non fit sine virtute morali, quae se habet semper ad bonum, ut dictum est et ratio eius est manifesta. Quia sicut syllogismi speculativi habent sua principia, ita syllogismorum operabilium principium est, quod talis finis sit bonum et optimum, qualiscumque finis sit ille propter quem aliquis operatur, et ponatur, exempli gratia, quodcumque, puta temperato optimum et quasi principium est attingere medium in concupiscentiis tactus: sed quod hoc sit optimum non apparet nisi bono, idest virtuoso, qui habet rectam existimationem de fine, cum virtus moralis faciat rectam intentionem finis. 1273. At “Prudence is not” [II, A, 2, b, ii, z] he shows that prudence adds something to this principle, saying that prudence is not identical with this trait of shrewdness, although prudence cannot be without it. But the habit of prudence in the soul is not joined to this insight, i.e., this perceptive principle of shrewdness, without moral virtue which always refers to good, as has been pointed out (712)The reason for this is clear. As argumentation has principles in the speculative field so it has in the practical field, for instance, the principle that such an end is the good and the supreme good, whatever that end be for which a man operates (and anything may be used as an example). Thus for the self-controlled man the supreme good and a quasi-principle is the attainment of moderation in the desires of touch. But the supreme good is not apparent except to the good or virtuous man who has the proper evaluation of the end, since moral virtue rectifies the conception of the end.
Et quod aliis malis non appareat id quod vere est optimum, patet per hoc, quod malitia opposita virtuti pervertit iudicium rationis, et facit mentiri circa fines, qui sunt circa practica principia. Sicut intemperato videtur optimum sequi concupiscentias. Non autem recte potest syllogizari si erretur circa principia. Cum ergo ad prudentem pertineat recte syllogizari de operabilibus, manifestum est, quod impossibile est esse prudentem illum qui non est virtuosus, sicut non posset esse sciens qui erraret circa principia demonstrationis. 1274. That what is really the supreme good does not appear in evil things is evident from the fact that vice, the opposite of virtue, perverts the judgment of the reason and causes deception in practical principles, for example, to follow his desires seems the supreme good to the licentious man. It is not possible to reason correctly if we are in error about principles. Since then it pertains to the prudent man to reason correctly in practical matters, obviously it is impossible for one to be prudent who is not virtuous, just as a man who errs about the principles of demonstration cannot acquire science.

LECTURE 11
Moral Virtue and Prudence
Chapter 13
                   ii.   He shows that moral virtue cannot exist without prudence.
                         x.   HE EXPLAINS HIS PROPOSITION.
                               aa. He proves his proposition initially by reason. — 1275-1280
σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα οὐ ταὐτὸ μέν,ὅμοιον δέοὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τἆλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι. πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ ἄνευ ὄψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει· ἡ δ' ἕξις ὁμοία οὖσα τότ' ἔσται κυρίως ἀρετή. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. We must again turn our attention to virtue. Virtue has a relation to a similar quality-as prudence to shrewdness, not that they are identical but that they have some likeness. In this way natural virtue is related to the principal virtue, for it seems to everyone that each kind of moral practice exists by nature to some extent. Indeed immediately from birth we are just, temperate, and brave and have other qualities. However, we are looking for something different, a good as a principle, so that virtues of this kind may be in us according to another manner of existence. It is a fact that children and dumb animals have natural habits, but these seem detrimental without the direction of reason. Certainly this much seems clear that, as a powerful body moved without the guidance of vision goes astray more powerfully because it lacks that guidance, so in this matter. But if a principle similar (to prudence) operates, then virtue in the proper sense will be present. Hence, as in the discursive faculty there are two kinds of principles, viz., shrewdness and prudence, so in the moral faculty there are two kinds of principles, viz., natural virtue and the principal virtue. The latter cannot be without prudence.
                               bb.        Then by the observations of others.
                                     a’   First by a statement of Socrates.
                                            A.  THE STATEMENT. — 1281
διόπερ τινές φασι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, Therefore, it is said that all virtues are kinds of prudence.
                                            B.  ARISTOTLE SHOWS HOW THEY (THE VIRTUES) FALL SHORT. — 1282
καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. In this, Socrates’ investigation was correct in one respect and wrong in an other. He erroneously held that all virtues are species of prudence, but correctly stated that virtue cannot be without prudence.
                                     b’   Next by a statement of Aristotle’s contemporaries.
                                            A.  HE GIVES THEIR STATEMENT. — 1283
σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετήν, προστιθέασι, τὴν ἕξιν εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἅ ἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. ἐοίκασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαί πως ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. An indication of this is that at the present time all men, in defining virtue, place it in the genus of habit and state to what matters it extends and that it is according to right reason. But right reason is that which is according to prudence. Therefore they all seem to guess in some manner that virtue is the kind of habit that is in accord with prudence.
                                            B.  HE SHOWS HOW THEY MAY BE WRONG. — 1284-1285
δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι. ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν· ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας, ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς. But we must go a little further, for virtue is not only in conformity with reason, but a habit accompanied by reason. But right reason in such matters is prudence. Socrates then was of the opinion that virtues are kinds of reason because he thought they were species of knowledge. But we maintain they are accompanied by reason. Therefore it is obvious from the discussion how it is not possible for a man to be good in the strict sense without prudence, nor to be prudent without moral virtue.
                         y.   HE SOLVES A PARTICULAR INCIDENTAL DOUBT.
                               aa. He raises the doubt. — 1286
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ' ἄν, ᾧ διαλεχθείη τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφυέστατος πρὸς ἁπάσας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὔπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται· In this way we can refute the argument that some use to prove that virtues are separated one from another. We see that the same man is not equally well inclined by nature to all virtues. Wherefore he will be said to acquire the virtue he has known but not any other.
                               bb.        He solves the doubt. — 1287-1288
τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἃς δὲ ἁπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ ὑπαρχούσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. This does happen in regard to the natural virtues but not in regard to those virtues according to which a man is called absolutely good. The reason is that all the virtues are present simultaneously with prudence, a single virtue.
                         z.   HE BRINGS HIS PRINCIPAL PROPOSITION TO A CONCLUSION. — 1289
δῆλον δέ, κἂν εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἣ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἣ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν. Evidently man would need prudence (even though it were not practical) because it is a virtue perfecting a part of the soul; he would need it because there will be no right choice without either prudence or virtue, for the latter disposes the end and the former directs the means to the end.
B.   He solves the doubt raised about the comparison between prudence and wisdom. — 1290-1291
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰατρική· οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνῃ. ἔτι ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει. Nevertheless, neither prudence rules over wisdom nor (an inferior thing) over what is more excellent, just as medicine does not rule health. This is so because medicine does not use health but sees how it may be produced; it gives orders for the sake of health but not to it. Again, it would be like saying that political science rules the gods because it gives orders about everything in the state.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
Intendendum utique rursus et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod prudentia non potest esse sine morali virtute, hic ostendit quod moralis virtus non potest esse sine prudentia. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo ex hoc solvit quamdam dubitationem incidentem, ibi, sed et ratio sic dissolvetur et cetera. Tertio concludit principale intentum, ibi, manifestum autem quamvis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum per rationem. Secundo per dicta aliquorum, ibi, propter quod aiunt omnes et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex quo ostensum est, quod prudentia non potest esse sine virtute morali, rursus intendendum est de virtute morali, utrum scilicet possit esse sine prudentia. Ita enim se habet circa virtutem moralem, sicut dictum de prudentia et dinotica, quod scilicet sicut ista duo non sunt idem penitus, sed tamen habent aliquam similitudinem ad invicem inquantum utraque adinvenit convenientes vias ad finem propositum. Ita etiam videtur se habere circa virtutem naturalem et principalem, idest moralem, quae est perfecta virtus. 1275. After the Philosopher has shown that prudence cannot exist without moral virtue, he now shows that moral virtue cannot exist without prudence [ii]. On this point he does three things. First [ii, x] he explains his proposition. Second [ii, y], at “In this way we can etc.,” he solves a particular incidental doubt. Third [ii, z], at “Evidently man etc.,” he brings his principal proposition to a conclusion. On the first point he does two things. First [x, aa] he proves his proposition initially by reason and then [x, bb] by the observations of others at “Therefore, it is etc.” He says first that, since it has been shown (1273) that prudence cannot be without moral virtue, we must again turn our attention to moral virtue, inquiring whether it can be without prudence. It is the same with moral virtue, as has been said about prudence and shrewdness (1272-1274), that although they are not identical nevertheless they have some likeness one to the other, inasmuch as each discovers means suitable for the proposed end. This seems to be the case with natural and principal virtue, i.e., moral which is the perfect kind.
Et quod sit aliqua virtus naturalis quae praesupponitur morali, patet per hoc quod singuli mores virtutum vel vitiorum videntur aliqualiter existere aliquibus hominibus naturaliter; statim enim quidam homines a sua nativitate videntur esse iusti, vel temperati vel fortes propter naturalem dispositionem, qua inclinantur ad opera virtutum. Quae quidem naturalis dispositio quantum ad tria potest attendi. 1276. That there is a natural virtue, presupposed to moral, is obvious from the fact that individual virtuous or vicious practices seem to exist in some people naturally; immediately from birth certain men seem to be just or temperate or brave because of a natural disposition by which they are inclined to virtuous works. This natural disposition can be considered from three viewpoints.
Primo quidem ex parte rationis, cui naturaliter indita sunt prima principia operabilium humanorum, puta nulli esse nocendum, et similia. Secundo ex parte voluntatis, quae de se naturaliter movetur a bono intellecto, sicut a proprio obiecto. Tertio ex parte appetitus sensitivi, secundum quod ex naturali complexione quidam sunt dispositi ad iram, quidam ad concupiscentias, vel ad alias huiusmodi passiones aut magis aut minus aut mediocriter, in quo consistit virtus moralis. Sed prima duo communia sunt omnibus hominibus, sed hoc tertium est quod differentiam facit in hominibus. 1277. It can be considered first on the part of the reason, since the first principles of human conduct are implanted by nature, for instance, that no one should be injured, and the like; next, on the part of the will, which of itself is naturally moved by the good apprehended as its proper object; last, on the part of the sensitive appetite according as, by natural temperament, some men are inclined to anger, others to concupiscence or passions of a different kind either too much or too little, or with moderation in which moral virtue consists. The first two are common to all men.
Unde secundum hoc dicit hic philosophus quosdam esse naturaliter fortes vel iustos: et tamen requiritur in his qui naturaliter sunt tales aliquid aliud quod sit principaliter bonum, ad hoc quod praedictae virtutes secundum perfectiorem modum in nobis existant, quia praedicti naturales habitus sive inclinationes etiam pueris et bestiis insunt, sicut leo naturaliter est fortis et liberalis, sed tamen huiusmodi habitus naturales videntur esse nocivi nisi adsit discretio intellectus. 1278. Hence, according to this, the Philosopher says that some men are brave and just by nature, although those who are so naturally need something good as a principle, so that these virtues may exist in a more perfect manner; the foregoing natural habits or inclinations exist in children and dumb animals, for example, the lion is brave and noble by nature. Nevertheless natural habits of this kind may be harmful unless the discrimination of reason is present.
Et videtur, quod sicut in motu corporali si corpus fortiter moveatur absque visu dirigente, accidit, quod id quod movetur impingat et fortiter laedatur, ita etiam est et hic; si enim aliquis habeat fortem inclinationem ad opus alicuius virtutis moralis et non adhibeat discretionem, accidet gravis laesio, vel corporis proprii, sicut in eo qui inclinatur ad abstinentiam sine discretione, vel rerum exteriorum, si inclinetur ad liberalitatem: et simile est in aliis virtutibus. Sed si huiusmodi inclinatio coaccipiat in operando intellectum, ut scilicet cum discretione operetur, tunc multum differet secundum excellentiam bonitatis, et habitus, qui erit similis tali operationi cum discretione factae, erit proprie et perfecte virtus, quae est moralis. 1279. Moreover, it seems that, as in physical movement when a body is moved by force without the guidance of vision it happens that the moved object is struck and damaged by the force, so also in this matter. If a man has a strong inclination to the work of some moral virtue and does not use discretion with regard to that work of the moral virtue, grave harm will occur either to his own body (as in one who is inclined to abstinence without discretion) or to external things (in one who is inclined to liberality). The same is true in other virtues. But if such an inclination jointly accepts reason in its operation so that it operates with discretion, then there will be a great difference in the excellence of goodness. Likewise the habit, which will be similar to the operation of this kind done with discretion, will be a virtue in the proper and perfect sense, i.e., a moral virtue.
Sicut igitur in parte animae opinativa sunt duae species principiorum operativorum, scilicet dinoches et prudentia, ita etiam in parte appetitiva, quae pertinet ad mores, sunt duae species, scilicet virtus naturalis et moralis, quae est principalis: et haec non potest fieri sine prudentia, sicut ostensum est. 1280. As then in the discursive part of the soul there are two kinds of principles of operation, viz., shrewdness and prudence, so also in the appetitive part pertaining to moral matters there are two kinds of principles, viz., natural virtue and moral, the principal virtue. The latter cannot come into being without prudence, as has been indicated (1275).
Deinde cum dicit propter quod aiunt etc., manifestat propositum per dicta aliorum. Et primo per dictum Socratis. Secundo per dictum eorum, qui suo tempore erant, ibi, signum autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit dictum Socratis. Et dicit, quod propter praedictam affinitatem virtutis moralis ad prudentiam, Socratici dixerunt omnes virtutes morales esse prudentias. 1281. Then [x, bb], at “Therefore, it is,” he confirms his proposition by the observations of others. He does this first [bb, a’] by a statement of Socrates, and next [bb, b’], at “An indication etc.,” by a statement of Aristotle’s contemporaries. On the first point he does two things. First [a’, a] he gives the statement of Socrates, who held that all moral virtues are species of prudence by reason of the previously mentioned relationship between moral virtue and prudence.
Secundo ibi: et Socrates etc., ostendit in quo deficiebant. Et dicit, quod in hoc dicta Socratis inquisitio quantum ad aliquid erat recta, quantum autem ad aliquid peccabat; in hoc enim quod existimabat omnes virtutes morales esse prudentias, peccabat; cum virtus moralis et prudentia sint in diversis partibus animae. Sed quantum ad hoc bene dicebat, quod virtus moralis non potest esse sine prudentia. 1282. Second [a’, b], at “In this, Socrates’,” Aristotle shows how they (the virtues) fall short, saying that in this statement Socrates’ investigation was correct in one respect but wrong in another. Socrates erroneously held that all moral virtues are kinds of prudence, since moral virtue and prudence are in different parts of the soul but he was correct in saying that moral virtue cannot be without prudence.
Deinde cum dicit: signum autem etc., confirmat idem per dicta modernorum. Et primo ponit dictum eorum. Secundo ostendit in quo deficiant, ibi, oportet autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod signum huius, quod virtus moralis non sit sine prudentia, est, quia etiam inter omnes definientes virtutem, ponentes eam in genere habitus, dicunt ad quae se extendat virtus, et quod hoc sit secundum rationem rectam. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis, quod ratio recta in agibilibus est, quae est secundum prudentiam. Si igitur omnes sic definientes, etsi non distincte determinent, videntur tamen aliqualiter divinare sive coniecturare quod virtus est talis habitus, qui est secundum prudentiam. 1283. Next [bb, b’], at “An indication,” he confirms this by the words of his contemporaries. First [b’, a] he gives their statement. Then [b’, b], at “But we must etc.,” he shows how they may be wrong. He says first that an indication that moral virtue is not without prudence is that all of them in defining virtue anti placing it in the genus of habit state the scope of virtue and say that this is guidance by right reason. But it is clear from previous discussion (1111 ) that right reason in things to be done is right reason under the aegis of prudence. Therefore, when they all define virtue in this way, even though they do not decide it expressly, they seem in some manner to divine or conjecture that virtue is the kind of habit which is according to prudence.
Deinde cum dicit: oportet autem etc., ostendit in quo deficiant sic dicentes. Et dicit quod oportet parum transcendere eorum dictum, aliquid addendo. Non enim solum hoc habet virtus moralis quod sit secundum rationem rectam; quia sic posset aliquis esse virtuosus moraliter sine hoc quod haberet prudentiam, per hoc, quod esset instructus per rationem alterius: sed oportet ulterius dicere quod virtus moralis est habitus cum ratione recta, quae quidem est prudentia. Sic igitur patet, quod Socrates plus dixit quam oporteret dum aestimavit quod omnes virtutes morales essent rationes et non cum ratione, quia dicebat eas esse scientias sive prudentias. 1284. At “But we must” [b’, b] he shows how they may be wrong, when they talk this way, by saying that their statement needs extension. Not only does it pertain to moral virtue to be in accord with right reason—otherwise someone could be morally virtuous without the need of prudence simply by the fact that he had been instructed by another’s mind—but we must add that moral virtue is a habit accompanied by right reason, which of course is prudence. Evidently, therefore, Socrates said too much in expressing the opinion that all moral virtues are forms of reason and not things accompanied by reason, and that they were species of knowledge or prudence.
Alii vero minus dixerunt quam oporteret, ponentes virtutes esse solum secundum rationem, Aristotiles vero medium tenuit, ponens virtutem moralem esse secundum rationem et cum ratione. Sic igitur manifestum est ex dictis, quod non est possibile aliquem hominem esse bonum principaliter, idest secundum virtutem moralem, sine prudentia, neque etiam prudentem sine morali virtute. 1285. Others said too little holding that virtue is only in accord with reason. But Aristotle maintains a middle position by stating that moral virtue is according to reason and accompanied by reason. Obviously then, from the discussions (1275-1283), it is not possible for a man to be good in the principal sense, i.e., according to moral virtue, without prudence, nor even to be prudent without moral virtue.
Deinde cum dicit: sed et ratio etc., solvit ex praemissis quamdam incidentem quaestionem. Et primo movet dubitationem. Secundo solvit, ibi, hoc enim secundum quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod per praemissa potest solvi ratio, quam quidam inducunt disputantes ad hoc, quod virtutes abinvicem separentur, ita scilicet quod una virtus absque altera possit haberi. Videmus enim quod non idem homo est optime natus ad omnes virtutes, sed alius ad liberalitatem, alius ad temperantiam, et sic de aliis; facile autem unusquisque perducitur in id ad quod naturaliter inclinatur. Difficile autem est aliquid assequi contra naturae impulsum; sequetur ergo quod homo qui est naturaliter dispositus ad unam virtutem et non ad aliam, scivit, idest assecutus est hanc virtutem, ad quam naturaliter erat dispositus (et loquitur secundum Socraticos, qui ponebat virtutes esse scientias): hanc autem, scilicet virtutem ad quam non est naturaliter dispositus, nequaquam consequetur. 1286. Then [ii, y], at “In this way we can,” from the previous discussion he solves a particular incidental doubt. First [y, aa] he raises the doubt. Second [y, bb], at “This does happen etc.,” he solves the doubt. He says first that from the premises it is possible to refute the argument that certain philosophers have used contending that virtues are separated from one another, so one virtue can be had without another. We see that the same person is not inclined to all the virtues, but one to liberality, another to temperance, and so on. it is easy for a man to be led to that to which he is naturally inclined, but it is difficult to acquire a thing contrary to a natural impulse. It follows then that a man, who is naturally disposed to one virtue and not to another, has known, i.e., has acquired the one virtue to which he was naturally disposed (he is taking the position of Socrates who held that virtues are kinds of knowledge). But he will never acquire the other virtue to which he is not disposed by nature.
Deinde cum dicit: hoc enim etc., solvit dubitationem praedictam. Et dicit quod hoc quod dictum est verificatur secundum virtutes naturales, non autem secundum virtutes morales, secundum quas aliquis dicitur simpliciter bonus. Et hoc ideo, quia nulla earum potest haberi sine prudentia, nec prudentia sine eis, ut ostensum est, et sic, quando prudentia quae est una virtus inerit, omnes simul inerunt cum ea, quarum nulla erit prudentia non existente. 1287. Next [y, bb], at “This does happen,” his statement is verified in regard to the natural virtues but not in regard to the moral virtues according to which a man is called good without qualification. This is true because none of them can exist without prudence, nor prudence without them, as has been explained (1275-1283). So when there is prudence, which is a single virtue, all the virtues will be simultaneous with it, and none of them will be present if prudence is not there.
Signanter autem dicit uni existenti, quia si essent diversae prudentiae circa materias diversarum virtutum moralium, sicut sunt diversa artificiorum genera, nihil prohiberet unam virtutem moralem esse sine alia, unaquaque earum habente prudentiam sibi correspondentem. Sed hoc non potest esse; quia eadem sunt principia prudentiae ad totam materiam moralem, ut scilicet omnia redigantur ad regulam rationis. Et ideo propter prudentiae unitatem omnes virtutes morales sunt sibi connexae. Potest autem contingere, quod alicui habenti alias morales virtutes, dicatur aliqua virtus deesse propter defectum materiae, sicut pauperi virtuoso deest magnificentia, quia non habet unde faciat magnos sumptus. Ex ipsa tamen prudentia quam habet est taliter constitutus, ut in promptu habeat magnificus fieri, si materia non desit. 1288. He expressly says “a single virtue”—if different species of prudence were concerned with the matter of different moral virtues (as is the case with the different objects in the genus of art), one moral virtue would not be hindered from existing without another, each of them having a prudence corresponding to it. But this is impossible because the same principles of prudence apply to the totality of moral matter so that everything is subjected to the rule of reason. Therefore, all moral virtues are connected one with the other by prudence. However, it can happen that a man, having other moral virtue, may be said to be without one virtue because of the lack of matter, for example, someone good but poor lacks magnificence because he does not have the mean to make great expenditures. Nevertheless, by reason of prudence which he does possess, he is so disposed that he may become munificent when he has matter for the virtue.
Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem etc., concludit principale intentum, epilogans quae dicta sunt. Et dicit, manifestum esse ex praedictis quod, etiam si prudentia non esset operativa, quod homo indigeret ipsa propter hoc quod est virtus perfectiva cuiusdam particulae animae. Et iterum manifestum est quod est operativa, quia electio recta, quae requiritur ad operationem virtutis, non est sine prudentia nec (sine) virtute morali, quia virtus moralis ordinat ad finem, prudentia autem dirigit circa ea quae sunt ad finem. 1289. Then [ii, z], at “Evidently man,” he brings his principal proposition to a conclusion by a summation of the discussions. He says that it is now evident from previous discussions (1266) that, even if prudence were not operative, man would need it because it is a virtue which perfects a particular part of the soul. Again, it is evident that prudence is operative because right choice, necessary for the operation of virtue, does not exist without prudence and moral virtue. The reason is that moral virtue makes the disposition in regard to the end, while prudence directs the means to the end.
Deinde cum dicit: sed tamen etc., solvit dubitationem motam de comparatione prudentiae et sapientiae. Et dicit, quod prudentia non principatur sapientiae, neque id quod est deterius principatur meliori. Et inducit ad hoc duo exempla. Quorum primum est quod ars medicinae praecipit quidem quid debeat fieri ad sanitatem consequendam; non tamen principatur sanitati, quia non utitur ipsa sanitate, quod est proprium artis vel scientiae principantis, ut scilicet utatur ea cui principatur praecipiendo illi. Sed ars medicinae praecipit qualiter fiat sanitas, ita quod praecipit propter sanitatem, sed non sanitati. Et similiter prudentia, etiam politica, non utitur sapientia praecipiens illi qualiter debeat iudicare circa res divinas, sed praecipit propter illam, ordinans scilicet qualiter homines possint ad sapientiam pervenire. Unde sicut sanitas est potior quam ars medicinae, cum sit eius finis, ita sapientia prudentiae praeminet. 1290. Last [II, B], at “Nevertheless, neither prudence” he solves the doubt raised about the comparison between prudence and wisdom, saying that prudence does not have power over wisdom, nor does that which is inferior have power over what is more excellent. He introduces two examples by way of illustration. The first is that the art of medicine indeed commands what ought to be done to obtain health, but it does not have power over health because it does not use health itself-something proper to the art or science of one governing—as a man uses a thing over which he has power by commanding it. But the art of medicine commands how health may be brought about, in such a way as to give orders for the sake of health but not to it. Likewise prudence, or even political science, does not use wisdom by commanding the manner in which it ought to judge about divine things but it does give orders by reason of it, i.e., ordains how men can arrive at wisdom. Hence, as health is more powerful than the art of medicine—since health is the end of medicine—so wisdom is more excellent than prudence.
Secundum exemplum est, quod cum politica praecipiat de omnibus quae sunt in civitate, consequens est, quod praecipiat de his quae pertinent ad cultum divinum, sicut praecipit de his quae pertinent ad studium sapientiae. Simile igitur est propter hoc, prudentiam aut politicam praeferre sapientiae, ac si aliquis praeferret eam Deo: quod manifestum est inconveniens. Et sic terminatur sententia sexti libri. 1291. The second example is this. Since political science gives orders about all things done in the state, it follows that it should give orders about the things pertaining to divine worship just as it commands what belongs to the study of wisdom. This, therefore, is like the argument that prudence or political science is preferred to wisdom in the sense that one should prefer wisdom to God—a thing obviously unreasonable. Thus he concludes the teaching of the sixth book.

LECTURE 1 Right Reason
Chapter 1
I. HE SPEAKS OF WHAT HE PROPOSES.
A. He states that we must discuss right reason. — 1109
ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἱρεῖσθαι, μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν.	But since we previously said that we ought to choose a mean, rejecting excess and defect, and that the mean is determined according to right reason, we may now make a division of right reason.
B. He shows what we must discuss about it.
A’ He shows what can be understood from the things that were said before. — 1110
ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καί τις ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.	In all habits previously considered and in other matters, there is some mark on which the man who possesses right reason keeps his eye, straining and relaxing; and this is the limit of the middle courses that we say are a mean between excess and defect in accord with right reason.
B’ He discloses that this is not sufficient. — 1111
ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἄν τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων.	It is true indeed to say this, but nothing is made clear by it. In all occupations in which science is at work, it is true to say that neither too much nor too little ought to be done or passed over but what is moderate and as reason determines. But a man possessing only this knowledge will not know how to proceed further, for instance, what remedies must be given for the body, if someone suggests that it should be whatever medical art, as possessed by the doctor, prescribes.
C’ He infers what should be added. — 1112
διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ μόνον ἀληθῶς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος.	For this reason, not only must this true statement be made about the habits of the soul but also the nature of right reason and its limits must be determined.
C. He continues with what precedes. — 1113
τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ ἤθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως.	We have, however, already divided the virtues of the soul, stating that some are moral and others intellectual. The moral virtues we have discussed, and the others we will now treat, after first speaking of the soul.
II. HE EXPLAINS HIS PROPOSITION.
A. He explains what is to be discussed about the soul.
A’ He resumes the division of the parts of the soul. — 1114
πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη δύ' εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον·	We said before that there are two parts of the soul: rational and irrational.
B’ He subdivides one member.
1. HE PROPOSES THE DIVISION. — 1115
νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετέον. καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἓν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα·	Now we will speak of the rational part in the same way. Let us suppose two parts of the rational soul: one by which we consider the kind of things whose principles cannot be otherwise; the other by which we consider contingent things.
2. HE EXPLAINS THE MEMBERS OF THE DIVISION.
a. He explains the aforementioned division by this reasoning. — 1116
πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός,	To the objects, which differ in kind, correspond different kinds of parts of the soul,
b. He explains the major proposition. — 1117
εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς.	since indeed the knowledge of the objects exists (in the parts) according to a certain species and reality.
3. HE NAMES THE MEMBERS OF THE DIVISION. — 1118-1123
λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστιν ἕν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.	Let one of these be called scientific but the other estimative, for deliberating and estimating are the same. No one deliberates about things that do not take place any other way. Therefore the estimative element is one part of the rational soul.

LECTURE 2 Function Proper to Each Part of the Soul
Chapter 1
B. He considers the particular intellectual virtues.
A’ He investigates the ways of understanding the intellectual virtues.
1. HE PROPOSES THE COMMON NOTION OF VIRTUE. — 1124-1125
ληπτέον ἄρ' ἑκατέρου τούτων τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου,	We must, then, ascertain what is the most excellent habit of each of these parts, for this is their virtue.
Chapter 2
ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον.	But virtue is directed to the work that is proper.
2. HE INQUIRES WHAT THE GOOD OF THE RATIONAL SOUL IS IN REGARD TO EACH PART.
a. He shows what the principles of human acts are.
i. He proposes three ingredients that are called principles of human acts. — 1126
τρία δή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις.	Three things in the soul seem to have power over action and truth: the senses, intellect, and appetitive faculty.
ii. He excludes one of them. — 1127
τούτων δ' ἡ αἴσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν.	But one of these, viz., the senses is not a principle of any action. This is obvious because dumb animals have senses but do not share in action.
iii. He shows how the remaining two can harmonize.
x. HE SHOWS HOW THEIR ACTIONS ARE PROPORTIONABLE. — 1128
ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγή·	Now, affirmation and negation are in the mind, and corresponding to these in the appetitive faculty are pursuit and flight.
y. HE SHOWS HOW THESE ACTIONS... ARE IN AGREEMENT. — 1129
ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτική, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτική·	Therefore, since moral virtue is a habit of free choice, and choice is the appetitive faculty deliberating, then reason must be true and the appetitive faculty right if choice is to be good; and the same things that reason affirms, the appetitive faculty pursues. Hence this mind and its truth are practical.
b. He seeks what the proper work of reason is.
i. He shows how each part is related to truth. — 1130-1132
τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον· τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ.	However, it is the function of the speculative mind (but not the practical) as it operates in good or faulty fashion, to express truth and falsity. This belongs to every intellect but the good of the practical intellect is truth conformable to a right appetitive faculty.
ii. He shows how each part is related to action.
x. HE EXPLAINS THAT THE MIND IS A PRINCIPLE OF ACTION. — 1133-1134
πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὔτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὔτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις· εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους οὐκ ἔστιν.	Choice, then, is a principle of action, and so of motion but not as a final cause. But, for choice itself the principles are the appetitive faculty and the reason which is terminative. Hence choice does not exist without intellect and mind, nor without moral habit, for good and bad actions cannot exist without the intellect or mind and moral disposition.
y. HE SHOWS OF WHAT MIND HE SPEAKS.
aa. He explains the proposition. — 1135-1136
διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική· αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει· ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρός τι καὶ τινός τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου.	Still, mind itself does not move any thing, but the mind that has a purpose and is practical does so, for it governs even the operation which fashions some product. Indeed every worker produces for the sake of something he is not induced to act for an end in general but for a particular thing made for some use; he does not act merely for the sake of acting. The good action itself is an end but the appetitive faculty is for some particular end.
bb. He infers a corollary. — 1137
διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος.	Therefore, choice is either the appetitive intellect or the intellective faculty of appetition, and man is this kind of principle.
z. HE EXPLAINS ABOUT WHAT KIND OF OBJECTS THE MIND IS A PRINCIPLE OF ACTION. — 1138-1139
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται, ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἅσς' ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα.	What has already taken place is not now an object of choice, e.g., no one now chooses to have captured Ilion. Nor does anyone give advice about something past, but about a future and contingent event. It is not possible that what has taken place did not occur. Therefore Agathon was right, for God lacks only this—to undo things already done.
c. He draws the conclusion he sought to establish. — 1140
ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον.	In any case the work of each of the intellect’s parts is the knowledge of the truth.
3. HE INFERS THE NATURE AND QUALITY OF THE VIRTUES OF EACH PART. — 1141
καθ' ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκάτερον, αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.	These habits according to which each part especially manifests the truth are the virtues of both divisions of the intellect.

LECTURE 3 An Enumeration of the Intellectual Virtues; Every Science Can Be Taught
Chapter 3
I. HE DISCUSSES THE PRINCIPAL INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.
A. He enumerates the intellectual virtues. — 1142-1143
ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι.	Introducing again the subject treated above, let us discuss it further. There are five habits by which the soul expresses the truth by affirming or denying. They are: art, science, prudence, wisdom, and understanding; but not suspicion’ and opinion, which can express falsehood.
B. He discusses each of them.
A’ He discusses ... them.
1. HE DISCUSSES THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES PERFECTING THE INTELLECT REGARDING THE THINGS... DERIVED FROM PRINCIPLES.
a. The science which perfects the intellect in regard to necessary things.
i. Science on the part of the matter. — 1144-1146
ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα, μηδ' ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. ἀίδιον ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀίδια, τὰ δ' ἀίδια ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα.	From this then it can be made clear what science is, if it is proper to science to know with certitude and not follow approximations to the truth. Indeed we all suppose that what we know scientifically cannot be in any other way. But contingent things are not of this kind, for when they pass from observation it is not known whether they exist or not. The object of science then concerns necessity, and therefore is eternal, because everything that is of necessity without qualification is eternal. Eternal things, however, are unproduced and indestructible.
ii. (Science) on the part of the cause. — 1147-1149
ἔτι διδακτὴ ἅπασα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν. ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· ἣ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἣ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός· ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς· ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.	Besides, every science can be taught and every object of science can be learned. But all teaching comes about by reason of previous knowledge, as we have indicated in the Analytics; one kind is by induction, the other by syllogism. Induction then gives us a first principle and a universal assent, but the syllogism proceeds from universals. Therefore, there are principles from which the syllogism proceeds principles not derived from the syllogism, and consequently arising from induction. Science then is a demonstrative habit having all the other requirements determined in the Analytics. When a man knows scientifically, he assents to and understands principles in some way; indeed, if he does not know them more than the conclusion, then he has science only incidentally. In this way, therefore, the question of science has been settled.
b. The habits perfecting the intellect in regard to contingent things.
i. He shows that there are two habits concerned with contingent things. — 1150-1152
τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ πρακτόν· ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις· ὥστε καὶ ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς ἕξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πρᾶξίς ἐστιν.	The contingent is both something to be made and something to be done; and making is one thing and action another. We assent to these things even by proofs outside the science. For this reason the habit that is active under reason’s guidance is different from the habit that is productive through reason. Likewise action and making are not contained under one another, for action is not making, nor is making action.
ii. He defines one of these (habits).
x. FIRST HE DEFINES ART IN ITSELF. aa. He shows what art is. — 1153
Chapter 4
ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἣ οὐ τέχνη, ταὐτὸν ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική.	However, since architecture is a kind of art and also a kind of habit productive through reason, and no art is found that is not a habit of this sort; and again there is no such habit that is not an art, art then will be the same as a habit concerned with making, under the guidance of true reason.
bb. He shows what the subject matter of art is.
a’ He proposes the subject matter of art. — 1154-1155
ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ·	But every art is concerned with realization, an artifact and observation; it considers particularly how contingent things may be made, and indicates that their principle is in the craftsman but not in the thing made.
b’. He shows from what things art differs according to its subject matter.
a. IN RELATION TO DIVINE SCIENCES. — 1156
οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν,	Art, however, does not deal with things that exist necessarily or come into being by necessity;
b. TO NATURAL SCIENCE. — 1157
οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὑτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν.	nor with things that are according to nature, for they have these principles in themselves.
c. (TO) PRUDENCE. — 1158
ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι.	Since making and action differ from one another, art necessarily directs making and not action.
c’ He shows with what it agrees in subject matter. — 1159
καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτά ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.	In some manner art and chance are concerned with the same things, as Agathon remarked: Art highly esteems chance, and chance art.
y. SECOND (HE DEFINES ART) BY COMPARISON WITH ITS OPPOSITE. — 1160
ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τοὐναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.	Art then, as was previously noted, is a kind of habit productive under the guidance of genuine reason On the contrary, however, unskillfulness is a habit productive under the guidance of incorrect reason operating on contingent matter.

LECTURE 4 Prudence
Chapter 5
I. HE SHOWS WHAT PRUDENCE IS.
A. He shows the nature of prudence.
A’ He shows who is prudent.
1. HE DETERMINES THE METHOD OF PROCEDURE. — 1161
περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους.	Let us now investigate prudence in this way, considering who are called prudent.
2. HE SHOWS WHO ARE PRUDENT. — 1162
δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως.	It seems to pertain to the prudent man that he can give good advice about proper goods useful not for one aspect of life—as an example, what are useful for health or bodily strength—but for the benefit of the total life of man.
3. HE MAKES KNOWN WHAT HE SAID, BY A SIGN. — 1163
σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοὺς περί τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μή ἐστι τέχνη. ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός.	A sign of this is that we call men prudent in a particular matter when they can rightly conclude what is useful for a determined good end in things that do not belong to art. Therefore, a man will be absolutely prudent who gives advice about the whole of life.
B’ He shows what prudence is.
1. HE GIVES THE DEFINITION.
a. He shows... the difference between prudence and other habits given above. — 1164-1165
βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πρᾶξαι. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μή ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως.	But no one takes counsel about things that either are incapable of being in any other way or are not within his power. Therefore, let us consider that science comes about by demonstration, and a demonstration is not possible in things whose principles can be in some other way--otherwise all the conclusions could be different; also, that b counsel is not about matters which are necessarily so. Prudence then will be neither a science nor an art. It is not a science because the thing to be done is contingent; it is not an art because the genus of action and making differ.
b. He infers the definition of prudence. — 1166
λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά.	It remains, therefore, that prudence is a genuine habit concerned with action under the guidance of reason, dealing with things good and bad for man.
c. He assigns the reason for a statement he has made. — 1167
τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος.	Indeed the end of making is something other than itself. This is not always true in regard to action, for sometimes a good operation is its own end.
2. HE MAKES... KNOWN (THE DEFINITION OF PRUDENCE) BY SIGNS.
a. The first of these. — 1168
διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς.	For this reason we think Pericles and others like him are prudent, because they can reckon what things are good both for themselves and others. We look upon stewards or dispensers of goods and statesmen or rulers of cities as men of this kind.
b. He presents the second sign.
ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σώζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν. σώζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ' αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν.	Hence we call temperance by the name sophrosyne, as it were, a thing preserving prudence. Prudence does preserve an estimation of the kind mentioned, for while pleasure and pain do not distort or pervert all judgments (for example, that a triangle has or has not three angles equal to two right angles), they do affect those dealing with the practicable. The principles of practicable things are the ends for which they are done. But the principle is not clear to a man corrupted by pleasure or pain, nor does he see the obligation to choose and do everything for the sake of it and on account of it, for vice is corruptive of principle. Consequently, prudence is of necessity a habit concerned with action, under the direction of correct reason, regard-
B. He shows how it (prudence) differs from art.
A’ First... in art, a moral virtue regulating its use is required. — 1172
ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν·	Nevertheless, virtue is required for art but not for prudence.
B’ He presents the second difference. — 1173
καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἧττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή τις ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τέχνη.	Likewise in art a man who makes a deliberate mistake is the more acceptable, but in prudence, as in the virtues, it is the reverse. It is clear, therefore, that prudence is a particular kind of virtue and not an art.
II. HE SHOWS WHAT ITS OBJECT IS. — 1174
δυοῖν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.	But since there are two parts of the reasoning soul, prudence will be a virtue of the second part, viz., the estimative (opinativae), for opinion deals with the contingent as prudence does. Nevertheless, prudence is not a habit connected with reason alone, and a sign of this is that such a habit can be forgotten. But this is not true of prudence.

LECTURE 5 Understanding, the Habit of First Principles; Wisdom
Chapter 6
1. HE DISCUSSES UNDERSTANDING WHICH DEALS WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION. — 1175-1179
ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἳ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξίν ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι λέγω δὲ τρία φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν, λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.	Since science is an evaluation of universal and necessary truths, and since there are principles of demonstrable things and of every science (science is accompanied by demonstrative reason), the principle of the knowable is neither a science nor an art nor prudence. What is knowable is demonstrable, but these, viz., art and prudence, deal with contingent things. Likewise, wisdom does not treat these principles because it is the business of the man of wisdom to furnish demonstrations about some things. If intellectual habits are science, prudence, wisdom, and understanding—by which we have the truth and are never deceived about contingent or necessary things—and none of the three (viz., prudence, science, and wisdom) is concerned with those principles, it remains then that understanding treats them.
2. HE CONSIDERS WISDOM WHICH DEALS WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF BEING.
a. He shows what wisdom is.
i. He shows what wisdom, understood in a special sense, is called. — 1180
Chapter 7
τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν·	We attribute “wisdom” to the most certain arts; accordingly we call Phidias a wise sculptor, and Polycletus a wise statuary. Here then by wisdom we mean nothing more than the excellence of the art.
ii. He shows what wisdom in the unqualified sense is. — 1181
εἶναι δέ τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ τὸν δ' οὔτ' ἂρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὔτ' ἀροτῆρα οὔτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.	But we consider some men wise in an unqualified sense and not just in a particular area or in some other way, as Homer says in his Margites: “The gods made this man neither a miner nor a farmer, nor wise in any other particular way.” It is clear then that wisdom is the most perfect of the modes of knowledge.
b. He infers a corollary from what was said. — 1182-1183
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη,	Therefore, the wise man must not only know the conclusions drawn from the principles but he must declare the truth about the principles. Hence wisdom will be a combination of understanding and science.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
Quia autem scientia de universalibus et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus intellectualibus quae perficiunt intellectum circa ea quae sunt ex principiis, hic determinat de virtutibus intellectualibus perficientibus intellectum circa ipsa principia. Et primo quidem determinat de intellectu, qui est circa principia demonstrationis. Secundo determinat de sapientia quae est circa principia entium, ibi, sapientiam autem in artibus et cetera. Ostendit ergo primo, quod praeter alias virtutes intellectuales, necesse est esse intellectum circa principia demonstrationis. Est enim scientia quaedam existimatio de universalibus et de his quae sunt ex necessitate particularia enim et contingentia non possunt attingere ad certitudinem scientiae, quia non sunt nota nisi secundum quod cadunt sub sensu.	1175. After the Philosopher has treated the intellectual virtues that perfect the intellect in respect to the things derived from principles, he will now consider the intellectual virtues perfecting the intellect in relation to the principles themselves. He does two things. First [i] he discusses understanding which deals with the principles of demonstration. Second [2], at “We attribute wisdom etc.,” he considers wisdom which deals with the principles of being. He shows first that, over and above the other intellectual virtues, there must be understanding concerning the principles of demonstration. Science is a certain evaluation of universals and things existing of necessity, for particulars and contingents cannot attain the certitude of science since they are only known insofar as they fall under the senses.
Est autem tertio considerandum circa scientiam quod eorum quae demonstrantur (et) ipsius scientiae quae est circa demonstrabilia necesse est esse quaedam principia quod ex hoc patet: quod scientia est cum ratione demonstrativa procedente ex principiis in conclusiones. Quia ergo ita se habet circa scientiam, necesse est quod principiorum scientiae neque sit scientia, neque ars, neque prudentia, de quibus iam dictum est.	1176. In regard to the science of the things that are demonstrated, we must consider that there are some principles of the science itself necessarily dealing with demonstrable things. This is clear from the fact that science is founded on demonstrative reason proceeding from principles to conclusions. Since this is the case with science, the principle of the science necessarily is neither a science, nor an art, nor prudence—which we have just discussed (1142-1174).
Quod autem horum non sit scientia, patet: quia id de quo est scientia est demonstrabile, prima autem demonstrationum principia non sunt demonstrabilia, alioquin procederetur in infinitum. Quod autem non sit horum principiorum ars vel prudentia, patet per hoc quod hae duae virtutes sunt circa ea quae contingit aliter se habere, quod non potest dici de principiis demonstrationis. Oportet enim ea esse certiora conclusionibus quae sunt ex necessitate. Ex hoc etiam patet quod horum principiorum non potest esse sapientia, quae est alia virtus intellectualis, de qua post dicetur; quia ad sapientem pertinet quod habeat demonstrationem de aliquibus rebus, idest de primis causis entium; principia autem sunt indemonstrabilia, ut dictum est.	1177. Obviously it is not a science because the subject matter of science is demonstrable. But the first principles of demonstrations are indemonstrable, otherwise we would proceed to infinity. That art and prudence have nothing to do with these principles is evident from the fact that these two virtues deal with contingent things. This cannot be said of the principles of demonstration, for principles must be more certain than necessary conclusions. Likewise it is clear that wisdom, another intellectual virtue which we will discuss subsequently (1180-1181), does not treat these principles. The reason is that it pertains to the wise man to frame a demonstration about some things, viz., the ultimate causes of being. But principles are indemonstrable, as has been said (1148).
Si ergo virtutes intellectuales quibus ita verum dicimus quod eis nunquam subest mendacium, sive circa necessaria quae non contingit aliter se habere, sive circa contingentia, sunt isti habitus, scientia, prudentia (sub qua comprehendit artem quae est etiam circa contingentia), et iterum sapientia et intellectus: cum nullum trium quae sunt prudentia, sapientia et scientia, possit esse circa principia indemonstrabilia, ut ex praedictis patet; relinquitur quod horum principiorum sit intellectus.	1178. If then the intellectual virtues—about which we so truly say that falsehood never underlies them whether concerned with necessary or contingent things—are these habits: science, prudence (under which he includes art which also has to do with what is contingent), and besides, wisdom and understanding, it remains that understanding treats these principles since none of the three, prudence, wisdom, or science, can be concerned with indemonstrable principles, as is clear from the foregoing.
Accipitur autem hic intellectus non pro ipsa potentia intellectiva, sed pro habitu quodam quo homo ex virtute luminis intellectus agentis naturaliter cognoscit principia indemonstrabilia. Et satis congruit nomen. Huiusmodi enim principia statim cognoscuntur cognitis terminis. Cognito enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim scitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. Dicitur autem intellectus ex eo quod intus legit intuendo essentiam rei. Unde et in tertio de anima dicitur, quod obiectum proprium intellectus est quod quid est. Et sic convenienter cognitio principiorum quae statim innotescunt cognito quod quid est circa terminos intellectus nominatur.	1179. Understanding is not taken here for the intellect itself but for a particular habit by which a man, in virtue of the light of the active intellect, naturally knows indemonstrable principles. The name is suitable enough, for principles of this kind are immediately understood from a knowledge of their terms. Once we know what a whole and what a part is, we grasp immediately that every whole is greater than its part. It is called understanding (intellectus) because it reads (legit) within, observing the essence of a thing. Hence his third book De Anima (Ch. 4, 429 b 5-23; St. Th., Lect. 8, 700-719) says that the proper object of the intellect is the essence of a thing. So the knowledge of principles, which immediately become known when the essence of the thing is understood, is suitably called “intellect” or understanding (intellectus).
Deinde cum dicit sapientiam autem etc., determinat de sapientia. Et primo ostendit quid sit sapientia. Secundo infert quoddam correlarium ex dictis, ibi: oportet ergo sapientem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quid dicatur sapientia particulariter sumpta. Et secundo ex hoc quid sit sapientia simpliciter, ibi, esse autem quosdam et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod inter artes nos assignamus nomen sapientiae certissimis artibus, quae scilicet cognoscentes primas causas in genere alicuius artificii dirigunt alias artes quae sunt circa idem genus; sicut architectonica ars dirigit manualiter operantes. Et secundum hunc modum dicimus Phydiam fuisse sapientem latomum, id est lapidum incisorem, et Policlitum sapientem statuificum, idest factorem statuarum: ubi nihil aliud dicimus sapientiam, quam virtutem artis, idest ultimum et perfectissimum in arte, quando scilicet aliquis attingit ad id quod est ultimum et perfectissimum in arte. Hoc enim est virtus uniuscuiusque rei, ut dicitur in I de caelo et mundo.	1180. Next [2], at “We attribute wisdom,” he considers wisdom. First [a] he shows what wisdom is. Then [b], at “Therefore, the wise man etc.,” he infers a corollary from what was said. On the initial point he does two things. First. [i] he shows what wisdom, understood in a special sense, is called. Second [ii], at “But we consider some etc.,” he shows what wisdom in the unqualified sense is. He says first that in the arts we attribute the name wisdom to the most certain ones—those which, knowing the ultimate causes in some category of handicraft, direct other arts concerned with the same category, for example, an architectonic art directs technical workers. In this way we say Phidias was a wise sculptor and Polycletus a wise statuary, i.e., a carver of statues. Here we call wisdom nothing other than the excellence of the art (i.e., its ultimate perfection) by which a man attains what is ultimate and most perfect in the art. In this the excellence of each thing consists, as was pointed out in the first book De Coelo (Ch. 11, 281 a 7-15; St. Th. Lect. 25, 248-249).
Deinde cum dicit: esse autem quosdam etc., ostendit quid sit sapientia simpliciter dicta. Et dicit quod sicut existimamus quosdam esse sapientes in aliquo artificio, ita etiam existimamus quosdam esse sapientes totaliter, idest respectu totius generis entium et non secundum aliquam partem, etiam si non sint sapientes circa aliquod aliud artificium; sicut Homerus dicit de quodam quod dii eum posuerant non fossorem neque aratorem neque aliquod aliud particulare artificium sapientem, sed sapientem simpliciter. Unde manifestum est, quod sicut ille qui est sapiens in aliquo artificio est certissimus in illa arte, ita illa quae est sapientia simpliciter est certissima inter omnes scientias, inquantum scilicet attingit ad prima principia entium, quae secundum se sunt notissima, quamvis aliqua eorum, scilicet immaterialia, sint minus nota quoad nos. Universalissima autem principia sunt etiam quoad nos magis nota, sicut ea quae pertinent ad ens inquantum est ens: quorum cognitio pertinet ad sapientiam simpliciter dictam, ut patet in quarto metaphysicae.	1181. Then [ii], at “But we consider,” he shows what wisdom in the unqualified sense is. He says that, as we consider some men wise in a particular handicraft, so too we consider others completely wise, i.e., with regard to the whole category of beings and not just a part of them, even though they are not wise in a particular handicraft. Thus Homer remarks that the gods did not make a certain man a miner or a farmer, nor make him gifted in any craft but simply made him wise. Hence it is clear that, as the man who is wise in some handicraft is most sure in that art, so that knowledge which is wisdom in an unqualified sense is the most certain of all modes of knowledge inasmuch as it treats first principles of being—in themselves most known, although some of them, the immaterial, are less known in regard to us. But the most universal principles are also more known in regard to us, for example, those belonging to being as being—the knowledge of which pertains to wisdom taken in this sense, as is evident in the fourth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 1, 1003 a 21-22; St. Th. Lect. 1, 529-530).
Deinde cum dicit: oportet ergo etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis. Et dicit quod quia sapientia est certissima, principia autem demonstrationum sunt certiora conclusionibus, oportet quod sapiens non solum sciat ea quae ex principiis demonstrationum concluduntur circa ea de quibus considerat; sed etiam quod verum dicat circa ipsa principia, non quidem quod demonstret ea, sed in quantum ad sapientem pertinet notificare communia, puta totum et partem, aequale et inaequale, et alia huiusmodi, quibus cognitis statim principia demonstrationum innotescunt; unde et ad huiusmodi sapientem pertinet disputare contra negantes principia, ut patet in quarto metaphysicae.	1182. At “Therefore, the wise man” [b] he infers a corollary from this: because wisdom is most certain and the principles of demonstrations more certain than the conclusions, the wise man should not only know the things inferred in the matter that he is considering but he should also declare the truth about first principles themselves not to prove them but to explain common notions, e.g., whole and part, equal and unequal, and suchlike-a function proper to a philosopher. When these common notions are known, the principles of demonstrations are clear. Hence the concern of such a man is to argue against those denying principles, as is evident in the fourth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 3, 1005 a 19-b 8; St. Th. Lect. 5, 588-595).
Sic ergo ulterius concludit, quod sapientia, inquantum dicit verum circa principia, est intellectus; inquantum autem scit ea quae ex principiis concluduntur, est scientia. Distinguitur tamen a scientia communiter sumpta, propter eminentiam quam habet inter alias scientias: est enim virtus quaedam omnium scientiarum.	1183. Finally, he draws a further conclusion that wisdom, in declaring the truth about principles, is understanding; but in knowing the things inferred from the principles, it is science. However, wisdom is distinguished from science, taken in the usual sense, by reason of the eminence which it has among other sciences; it is a kind of perfection of all sciences.

LECTURE 6 Wisdom, the Principal Intellectual Virtue
Chapter 7
I. HE SHOWS WHICH (VIRTUE) IS ABSOLUTELY PRINCIPAL.
A. He shows that wisdom is principal among all...
A’ He proposes what he intends. — 1184
ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων.	As having supremacy it is the science of the most honorable things,
B’ He rejects the opposite error.
1. HE REJECTS THIS ERROR (FOR... TWO REASONS).
a. It is unreasonable... to consider political science or prudence... the best of the sciences. — 1185-1186
ἄτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἴεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν.	for it is unreasonable to consider political science or prudence the best of the sciences if man is not the most excellent thing in the world.
b. He gives the second reason. — 1187-1188
εἰ δὴ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ ταὐτὸν ἀεί, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταὐτὸ πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν, φρόνιμον δὲ ἕτερον· τὰ γὰρ περὶ αὑτὸ ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν φησὶν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψει αὐτά. διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὑτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικήν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὑτοῖς ἐροῦσι σοφίαν, πολλαὶ ἔσονται σοφίαι· οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἁπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζώων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων.	What is healthful and what is good for men and fishes are different, but white and straight are always the same; and everyone would say that in godlike things what is wise is always the same. However, what is prudent may be different, for the man who can properly consider individual things pertaining to himself is called prudent and we entrust such matters to him. For this reason people call prudent all dumb animals who seem to have the ability to care for themselves. It will certainly be evident then that wisdom is not 30 the same as political science. If people call wisdom that science dealing with things useful to themselves, there will be many kinds of wisdom, for there is not one consideration regarding the good of all animals but there is a different consideration for individual animals. Likewise there is not one medicine for all beings.
2. HE DISMISSES A CERTAIN OBJECTION. — 1189
εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν.	That man is the most excellent of all animals makes no difference, because there are other creatures more divine by their nature, for instance, the very evident things that constitute the universe.
C’ He infers the truth. — 1190
ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει.	From what has been said it is obvious that wisdom is both science and understanding about the things most honorable by their nature.
B. He infers a corollary from the premises.
A’ He introduces the corollary. — 1191-1193
διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους δ' οὔ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτούς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.	For this reason people say Anaxagoras and Thales, and others like them, are wise but not prudent: men, seeing them ignorant of what is useful to themselves, assert they know superfluous and wonderful things both difficult and divine, but that this knowledge is useless because they do, not seek human goods.
ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, βουλεύεται δ' οὐδεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ' ὅσων μὴ τέλος τι ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ' ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν.	Prudence has to do with human goods about which we deliberate, for skillful deliberation seems to be the special work of the prudent man. But no one deliberates about things that cannot be in any other way, nor about whatsoever is not ordered to some end -and this a practicable good. Moreover, that man is a good counsellor absolutely speaking who can conjecture, by reasoning what is best for man to do.
B’ He manifests one aspect of it (the corollary). — 1194
οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἑτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια [κοῦφα καὶ] ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική· ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον.	Prudence not only considers universals but must also know singulars, for it is active, and action is concerned with singulars. Hence some men not informed scientifically but expert in different particulars are more effective than other men with scientific knowledge. Certainly, if a doctor knows that light meats are easily digestible and healthful but does not know what meats are light, lie will not make people the flesh well. But if he knows that the flesh of fowls is light and healthful he will be better able to effect a cure. Since prudence is concerned with action, therefore, it must have both kinds (of knowledge) but especially the latter (of particulars).

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
Et quemadmodum caput habens et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de singulis virtutibus intellectualibus, hic ostendit quae sit praecipua inter eas. Et primo ostendit, quae sit praecipua simpliciter. Secundo, quae sit praecipua in genere agibilium humanorum, ibi, erit autem utique quaedam et hic et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod sapientia sit simpliciter praecipua inter omnes. Secundo infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, manifestans per signum quoddam ea quae dicta sunt, ibi, propter quod Anaxagoram et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo excludit errorem contrarium, ibi, inconveniens enim et cetera. Tertio concludit veritatem, ibi, ex dictis utique manifestum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod sapientia non est qualiscumque scientia, sed scientia rerum honorabilissimarum, id est divinarum, ac si ipsa habeat rationem capitis inter omnes scientias. Sicut enim per sensus, qui sunt in capite, diriguntur motus et operationes omnium aliorum membrorum, ita sapientia dirigit omnes alias scientias, dum ab ea omnes aliae sua principia supponunt.	1184. After the Philosopher has defined the individual intellectual virtues, he now explains the principal one among them. First [I] he shows which is absolutely principal. Then [Lect. 7], at “But there will be etc.” (B. 1141 b 22), he shows which is principal in the, genus of the practicable in reference to man. On the first point he does two things. First [A] he shows that wisdom is principal among all without qualification. Next [B], at “For this reason etc.,” he infers a corollary from the premises, clarifying what has been said, by a sign. On the initial point he does three things. First [A, A’] he proposes what he intends. Then [A, B’], at “for it is unreasonable etc.,” he rejects the opposite error. Last [A, C’], at “From what has been said etc.,” he infers the truth. He says first that wisdom is not science of any sort whatever but the science of the most honorable and divine things, inasmuch as it has the essential elements to be head of all sciences. As the senses located in the head direct the movements and operations of all the other members, so wisdom directs all the other sciences since they take their principles from it.
Deinde cum dicit inconveniens enim etc., excludit quorumdam errorem, qui attribuebant principalitatem inter omnes scientias politicae, per quam gubernatur multitudo, vel prudentiae per quam aliquis gubernat seipsum, attendentes ad utilitatem magis, quam ad scientiae dignitatem. Scientiae enim speculativae, ut dicitur in principio metaphysicae non quaeruntur quasi ad aliquid utiles, sed sicut per se honorabiles. Unde circa hoc duo facit. Primo excludit hunc errorem. Secundo removet quamdam obiectionem, ibi, si autem, quoniam optimum et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas rationes.	1185. Then [A, B’], at “for it is unreasonable,” he rejects the error of certain philosophers who, considering usefulness rather than the dignity of science, assign primacy of the sciences to political science by which the multitude is governed, or to prudence by which a man governs himself. As was pointed out in the beginning of the Metaphysics (Bk. 1, Ch. 1, 981 b 13-25; St. Th. Lect. 1, 31-33), the speculative sciences are not sought as useful for some further end but simply as honorable in themselves. Hence he does two things on this point. First [1] he rejects this error. Next [2], at “That man etc.,” he dismisses an objection raised. For the first statement he gives two reasons.
Circa quarum primam dicit, quod inconveniens est si quis politicam vel prudentiam aestimet esse scientiam studiosam, idest optimam inter scientias. Quod quidem esse non posset nisi homo esset optimum eorum quae sunt in mundo. Scientiarum enim una est melior et honorabilior altera ex eo quod est meliorum et honorabiliorum, ut dicitur in primo de anima. Hoc autem est falsum quod homo sit optimum eorum quae sunt in mundo. Ergo neque politica seu prudentia, quae sunt circa res humanas, sunt optimae inter scientias.	1186. Concerning the first of these he says that [a] it is unreasonable for a man to consider political science or prudence the most desirable science, i.e., the best of the sciences. This could not be unless man were the most excellent of all things in the world, for one science is better and more honorable than another because it deals with better and more honorable subjects-as is said in the first book De Anima (Ch. 1, 402 a 1-5; St. Th. Lect. 1, 4-5). But it is false to say that man is the most excellent thing in the world. Consequently, neither political science nor prudence—both dealing with human affairs—are the best among the sciences.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi si utique sanum et cetera. Quae quidem procedit ex hoc, quod quaedam sunt quorum ratio consistit in proportione et habitudine ad aliquid. Et ideo huiusmodi non possunt esse eadem quantum ad omnia; sicut patet quod non idem est sanum et bonum hominibus et piscibus. Quaedam vero dicuntur absolute, sicut album in coloribus et rectum in figuris. Et quia sapientia est de his quae in se et absolute sunt talia (est enim de primis entium), oportet ab omnibus dici quod idem sit quod est sapiens in omnibus, et quod sit eadem sapientia simpliciter respectu omnium. Sed id quod est prudens oportet quod sit alterum apud diversos, propter hoc, quod prudentia dicitur secundum proportionem et habitudinem ad aliquid. Ille enim qui potest bene speculari singula quae pertinent ad seipsum, dicitur esse prudens, et tali conceditur sive attribuitur prudentia. Et inde est, quod per quandam similitudinem homines dicunt quasdam bestias esse prudentes, quaecumque scilicet videntur habere quamdam potentiam provisivam circa propriam vitam, non quidem ex ratione, quod proprie ad prudentiam pertinet. Sic igitur manifestum est quod sapientia, quae est praecipua inter omnes, non est idem quod politica.	1187. At “What is healthful etc.” [b] he gives the second reason. It arises from this, that there are certain things whose prime characteristic consists in a proportion and relation to another. For this reason such things cannot be the same in reference to all objects. Thus it is clear that what is healthful and what is good are not identical for men and fishes. But other things are predicated without limitation, for example, white of colors and straight of figures. Because wisdom is one of the things which are such simply and in themselves (it is numbered among the primary entities), everyone must say that what is wise is the same in all things and that wisdom is the same without qualification in relation to everything. But what is prudent must be a thing that may be different in different subjects, because prudence is predicated according to a proportion and a relation to something. The man who can properly consider each thing pertaining to him is said to be prudent and to such a one we grant or attribute prudence. Hence by a kind of analogy men say that certain dumb animals are prudent, viz., those that seem to be able to care for themselves, not however by means of reason which properly belongs to prudence. So then it is evident that wisdom, which is a particular virtue, is not the same as political science.
Si enim poneremus quod illa scientia, quae est circa utilia qualis est politica, esset sapientia quae est omnium caput, sequeretur quod essent multae sapientiae. Non enim potest esse una aliqua ratio circa ea quae sunt bona omnibus animalibus; sed oportet, quod circa singula animalia sit altera consideratio considerans quid sit bonum unicuique. Et eadem ratio est de medicina, quae non potest esse una omnium. Dictum est enim supra, quod sicut sanum, ita et bonum est alterum hominibus et piscibus. Oportet autem esse solam unam sapientiam, quia ad eam pertinet considerare ea quae sunt communia omnibus entibus. Unde relinquitur, quod politica, quae est gubernativa humanae multitudinis, non potest esse sapientia simpliciter; et multo minus prudentia communiter dicta, quae est gubernativa unius.	1188. If we would hold that a science such as politics, which deals with useful things, was wisdom—the chief of all the sciences—it would follow that there would be many kinds of wisdom. Certainly there cannot be one identical formality in the things which are good for all animals, but a different consideration must be accorded to individual animals, taking into account what is good for each. A similar reason holds for medicine that cannot be the same for all. It was just said (1187) that what is healthful and what is good differ for men and fishes. But there must be only one wisdom because its function is to consider things which are common to all entities. So it remains that political science, which governs a human multitude, cannot be wisdom without qualification; much less can ordinary prudence which governs one man.
Deinde cum dicit: si autem quoniam etc., excludit quamdam obiectionem. Posset enim aliquis dicere, politicam seu prudentiam, cum sit de rebus humanis, esse praecipuam, quia homo est excellentior inter alia animalia. Sed hoc nihil refert ad propositum: quia quaedam alia secundum suam naturam sunt multum diviniora propter sui excellentiam, quam homo. Et ut taceamus de Deo et substantiis separatis quae non subiacent sensibus, etiam ipsa quae manifestissima sunt sensui, ex quibus mundus constat, scilicet caelestia corpora, sunt homine potiora, sive comparemus corpus corpori, sive comparemus substantias moventes animae humanae.	1189. Then [2], at “That man’ “ he answers a certain objection. Someone could say that political science or (practical) prudence, treating as it does of human affairs, is the principal science because man is more excellent than other animals. But this has no relevance to our proposition because certain other things are by their nature more divine than man by reason of their excellence. And—as we may not treat of God and separated substances, for they do not come under the senses—even the objects most evident to the senses and constituting the universe, namely, the heavenly bodies, are better than men. This is so whether we compare body to body, or the moving substances to the human soul.
Deinde cum dicit: ex dictis utique manifestum etc., concludit veritatem intentam, scilicet quod sapientia sit scientia et intellectus, ut prius dictum est, non circa quaecumque, sed circa honorabilissima. Et hoc est ex dictis manifestatum, quia, si aliqua scientia esset honorabilior, hoc praecipue conveniret politicae et prudentiae, quod supra est improbatum.	1190. Next [A, C’], at “From what has been said,” he infers the truth, viz., that wisdom is science and understanding—as was previously pointed out [1183)—not of all possible things but of the most honorable. This is evident from the preceding, because if any science was more honorable it would be especially political science or prudence, and this view has just been rejected (1186-1188).
Deinde cum dicit propter quod Anaxagoram etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex praemissis; per quod manifestantur quaedam quae dicta sunt. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo inducit corollarium. Secundo manifestat quandam partem ipsius, ibi: neque enim prudentia et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod quia prudentia est circa bona humana sapientia autem circa ea quae sunt homine meliora, inde est, quod homines dicunt Anaxagoram, et quemdam alium philosophum qui vocabatur Thales, et alios similes esse quidem sapientes, non autem prudentes, eo quod homines vident eos ignorare ea quae sunt sibi ipsis utilia, et dicunt eos scire quaedam superflua, id est inutilia, et admirabilia, quasi excedentia communem hominum notitiam, et difficilia, quia indigent diligenti inquisitione, et divina propter nobilitatem naturae.	1191. At “For this reason” [B] he infers from the premises a corollary by which some things previously discussed are clarified. On this point he does two things. First [B, A’] he introduces the corollary. Then [B, B’], at “Prudence not only considers etc.,” he manifests one aspect of it. He says first that, because prudence deals with the goods of man, but wisdom with the things that are better than man, accordingly people call Anaxagoras and Thales the philosopher—and others like them—wise but not prudent. This is because men see these philosophers ignorant of things useful to themselves, but admit they know useless truths that are wonderful (is it were exceeding the common knowledge of mortals), difficult (needing careful investigation), and divine by reason of their exalted character.
Ponit autem specialiter exemplum de Thale et Anaxagora, qui specialiter super hoc reprehensi fuerunt. Cum enim Thales exiret domum, ut astra consideraret, incidit in foveam; eoque lugente, dixit ad eum quaedam vetula: tu quidem, o Thales, quae ante pedes nequis videre et quae in caelo sunt putas cognoscere? Anaxagoras etiam, cum nobilis et dives esset, paterna bona suis dereliquit, et speculationi naturalium se dedit, non curans de politicis, unde ut negligens reprehendebatur. Et dicenti sibi: non est tibi curae patria?, Respondit: mihi patria valde curae est, ostenso caelo.	1192. He gives in particular the example of Thales and Anaxagoras because they are especially censured on this point. When Thales was leaving his house to look at the stars he fell into a ditch; while he was bewailing the fact an old woman remarked to him: “You, O Thales, cannot see what is at your feet and you expect to see what is in the heavens?” And Anaxagoras, though noble and wealthy, left his family possessions to his relatives and devoted himself to the investigation of natural phenomena; taking no interest in civic affairs, he was consequently blamed for his negligence. When someone asked him: “Do you not care about your country?” He answered: “I will have great concern for my country after I have explained the heavens.”
Ideo autem homines dicunt eos scire inutilia, quia non inquirunt de bonis humanis, propter quod etiam non dicuntur esse prudentes. Nam prudentia est circa bona humana, de quibus contingit consiliari. Prudentis autem maxime videtur esse opus bene consiliari. Nullus autem consiliatur de necessariis, quae impossibile est aliter se habere, cuiusmodi sunt res divinae de quibus sapientes praedicti considerant. Neque etiam potest esse consilium de quibuscumque rebus non ordinatis ad aliquem finem, qui est operabile bonum, de quibus considerant scientiae speculativae, etiam si sint circa corruptibilia. Ille autem est simpliciter bonus consiliator, et per consequens prudens, qui ratiocinando potest coniicere quid sit optimum homini ad operandum.	1193. Therefore people say they know useless things, since they do not seek human goods; on this account, too, they are not called prudent, for prudence deals with human goods about which we deliberate. Now, to deliberate well seems to be the special work of the prudent man. But no one deliberates about necessary things which cannot possibly be in any other way; and the divine things, which these wise men consider, are necessary. Likewise deliberation is not possible about things in general that are not ordered to some end, i.e., to a practicable good—things that the speculative sciences consider, even when they treat what is corruptible. That man is a good counsellor without qualification, and consequently prudent, who can conjecture by reasoning what is best for man to do.
Deinde cum dicit neque enim prudentia etc., manifestat quiddam quod dixerat, assignans scilicet rationem quare prudentia sit circa operabilia. Prudentia enim non considerat solum universalia, in quibus non est actio; sed oportet quod cognoscat singularia, eo quod est activa, idest principium agendi. Actio autem est circa singularia. Et inde est, quod quidam non habentes scientiam universalium sunt magis activi circa aliqua particularia, quam illi qui habent universalem scientiam, eo quod sunt in aliis particularibus experti. Puta si aliquis medicus sciat quod carnes leves sunt bene digestibiles et sanae, ignoret autem quales carnes sint leves; non poterit facere sanitatem. Sed ille qui scit quod carnes volatilium sunt leves et sanae, magis poterit sanare. Quia igitur prudentia est ratio activa, oportet quod prudens habeat utramque notitiam, scilicet et universalium et particularium; vel, si alteram solum contingat ipsum habere, magis debet habere hanc, scilicet notitiam particularium, quae sunt propinquiora operationi.	1194. Then [B, B’], at “Prudence not only considers,” he makes clear something he had said, assigning the reason why the prudent man is concerned about practicable things. Prudence not only considers universals, in which action does not occur, but must know singulars because it is active, i.e., a principle of doing. But action has to do with singulars. Hence it is that certain people not possessing the knowledge of universals are more effective about some particulars than those who have universal knowledge, from the fact that they are expert in other particulars. Thus if a doctor knows that light meats are easily digestible and healthful but does not know which meats are light, he cannot help people to get well. But the man who knows that the flesh of fowls is light and healthful is better able to effect a cure. Since then prudence is reason concerning an action, the prudent person must have a knowledge of both kinds, viz., universals and particulars. But if it is possible for him to have one kind, he ought rather to have the latter, i.e., the knowledge of particulars that are closer to operation.

LECTURE 7 Prudence, the Principal Virtue in Human Affairs
Chapter 7
II. HE NOW SHOWS WHAT IS PRIMARY IN HUMAN AFFAIRS.
A. He explains his proposition.
1. HE PROPOSES HIS OBJECTIVE. — 1195
εἴη δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική.	But there will be a certain architectonic knowledge even here.
2. HE MAKES KNOWN HIS PROPOSITION.
a. He distinguishes civic prudence from prudence as such. — 1196
Chapter 8
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς.	However, civic prudence and prudence as such are really the same habit although they differ from one another.
b. He defines civic prudence. — 1197-1198
τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν ἣ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἣ δὲ ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτική· αὕτη δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνον λέγουσιν· μόνοι γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι.	One part of the habit dealing with the whole state is as it were architectonic prudence and is denominated legislative; the other part concerned with individual practicables goes by the general name of civic prudence. The latter is operative and deliberative, for a decree has to do with the practicable as a singular ultimate. Hence only those with civic prudence are said to be engaged in civic affairs because they alone are active like manual workers.
c. He defines prudence.
i. He shows what should be called prudence. — 1199-1201
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα· καὶ ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις· ἐκείνων δὲ ἣ μὲν οἰκονομία ἣ δὲ νομοθεσία ἣ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἣ μὲν βουλευτικὴ ἣ δὲ δικαστική.	But that which is concerned with oneself seems to be prudence in a special way. This retains the general name, prudence; but of the others, one is called domestic, another legislative, and a third executive. Each of these is divided into consultative and judicial.
ii. He infers a corollary. — 1202
εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως τὸ αὑτῷ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν·	Therefore, to know what is to one’s advantage is a certain kind of human knowledge differing much from other human knowledge.
3. HE REJECTS AN ERROR.
a. He presents it. — 1203
καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὰ περὶ αὑτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες·	Moreover, that man seems to be prudent who knows and diligently cultivates the things pertaining to himself, but public officials seem to be busy about many affairs.
b. He gives proof for it.
i. First. — 1204
διὸ Εὐριπίδης πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἠριθμημένον στρατοῦ ἴσον μετασχεῖν; τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καί τι πράσσοντας πλέον.	For this reason Euripides says: “How could I be prudent—I who have neglected to take care of myself and now share equally with many others in military service?”
ii. He proposes a reason for this notion. — 1205
ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τούτους φρονίμους εἶναι·	They (public officials) seem to be intent on superfluous things and to do more than is necessary. But men generally seek what is good for themselves and think they must work to secure it. Hence in this opinion only such men are prudent.
c. He excludes the error. — 1206-1207
καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν, ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον.	It may be, though, that the individual’s good cannot be attained without domestic prudence or civic virtue. But still it is not evident how the things pertaining to him are to be disposed, and this must be given attention.
B. He makes known something that he had stated above.
1. HE EXPLAINS HIS PROPOSITION.
a. He offers two reasons.... The first.
i. He gives a confirmation of the proposition. — 1208
σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ' ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν·	In evidence of this it may be noted that youths become geometricians and scientists and are learned in studies of this kind, yet do not seem to become prudent. The reason is that prudence deals with particulars that are known by experience. But a young man does not have experience, which requires a great deal of time.
ii. He brings up a particular question. — 1209-1211
ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἄν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὔ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον;	Here someone may ask why a boy can become a mathematician but not a philosopher or a scientist. The reason is that the truths (belonging to mathematics) are known by abstraction but the principles (of nature) are learned by experience. Then too these things (pertaining to wisdom) are mouthed but not grasped by youths while the nature of mathematics is not obscure to them.
b. He gives the second reason. — 1212
ἔτι ἡ ἁμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον.	Moreover, error in deliberating can happen either regarding a universal or a particular proposition, because a man can err, for example, about all sluggish waters being unhealthy or about this water being sluggish.
2. HE COMPARES PRUDENCE WITH SCIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING.
a. First, with science. — 1213
ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον.	It is plain that prudence is not science because prudence deals with a singular ultimate, as was pointed out, and the practicable is of this nature.
b. Next, with understanding.
i. He shows the agreement. — 1214-1215
ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἣ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ [ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς] ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.	They (science and prudence) have some agreement with understanding. Understanding indeed concerns those principles requiring no proof. But prudence deals with a singular ultimate, an object not of scientific knowledge but of a kind of sense—not that by which we perceive proper sensibles—but the sense whereby in mathematics we perceive the external triangle (to which we conform our reasoning). This, however, is perception rather than prudence although it is another kind of perception.
ii. He shows the difference. — 1216
Chapter 9
τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν.	But inquiry and deliberation differ, for deliberation is a kind of inquiry.

LECTURE 8 Eubulia (Excellence in Deliberating)
Chapter 9
I. HE DEFINES (CERTAIN VIRTUES CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE) INDIVIDUALLY.
A. He investigates the genus of eubulia.
*1. HE EXAMINES THE GENUS OF eubulia, SHOWING THAT IT IS A KIND OF RECTITUDE.*
a. He explains his intention. — 1217
Δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβουλίας τί ἐστι, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δοξα ἢ εὐστοχία, ἢ ἄλλο τι γένος.	Now we must consider the nature of eubulia. Is it science, or opinion, or eustochia (the virtue of conjecturing well in practical matters), or does it belong to some other genus?
b. He carries it out.
*i. He shows where (eubulia) does not belong.*
*x. HE SHOWS THAT eubulia* IS NOT SCIENCE. — 1218**
ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐχ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἡ δ' εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται.	Certainly it is not science, for men do not inquire about things they already know. But eubulia is a kind of counsel that is given to inquiry and discursive thinking.
*y. HE SHOWS THAT IT IS NOT eustochia* (FOR TWO REASONS).**
aa. The first (reason). — 1219
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εὐστοχία· ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἡ εὐστοχία, βουλεύονται δὲ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευθέντα, βουλεύεσθαι δὲ βραδέως.	However, it is not eustochia because eustochia exists without the inquiry of reason and is instantaneous, while eubulia requires much time for those who deliberate. As the proverb goes: Be slow to come to a decision; but when you have decided, act quickly.
bb. The second reason. — 1220
ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια.	Furthermore, quickness of mind and eubulia differ, for the former is a kind of eustochia.
z. HE SHOWS THAT IT IS NOT OPINION. — 1221
οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία.	Nor is eubulia opinion in any sense whatever.
ii. He determines its genus. — 1222
ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἁμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρθότης τις ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν,	But because the man errs who deliberates badly and the man who deliberates well does so rightly, it is evident that eubulia is a kind of rectitude,
2. HE SHOWS TO WHAT RECTITUDE IS LINKED.
a. He shows whence it does not arise.
i. He proposes what he intends. — 1223
οὔτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης·	although not pertaining to either science or opinion,
ii. He establishes his proposition.
x. IN REGARD TO SCIENCE. — 1224
ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία,	for rectitude, like error, is not applicable to science,
y. IN REGARD TO OPINION, BY TWO ARGUMENTS.
aa. The first (argument). — 1225
δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια·	while truth is the rectitude of opinion.
bb. The second argument. — 1226
ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισται ἤδη πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία. διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, ἐάν τε εὖ ἐάν τε καὶ κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται.	Likewise, everything that is a matter of opinion has already been determined. Nevertheless eubulia is not without discursive knowledge, and so differs from opinion; it is not at all a declaration. And opinion is not an inquiry but a sort of declaration already made. However, the man who deliberates, well or badly, inquires and thinks discursively about a subject.
b. (He shows) whence it does arise. — 1227
ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζητητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί.	But eubulia is a certain rectitude of deliberation. Therefore, we must inquire what deliberation is and about what it is concerned.
3. HE SHOWS WHAT KIND OF RECTITUDE HE IS DISCUSSING (BY DETERMINING FOUR CONDITIONS OF EUBULIA).
a. He says first that rectitude is used in various senses. — 1228-1229
ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὃ προτίθεται ἰδεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική.	Obviously, rectitude is taken in various senses because not every rectitude is eubulia. Indeed the incontinent and evil man will acquire by reasoning what he sets out to know. Wherefore one who keeps in view even some great evil will be said to deliberate rightly. But to deliberate well seems to be a good. And this rectitude of deliberation by which someone obtains a good end is eubulia.
b. The second condition. — 1230-1231
ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οὐδ' αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ' ἣν οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι δι' οὗ ἔδει.	But it is possible sometimes to determine this even by a false syllogism, so that we arrive at what we ought to do but not by the means we ought—the middle term being false. Therefore that, by which we attain what we ought but not in the way we ought, is not eubulia in the full sense.
c. The third condition. — 1232
ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν, τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὣς καὶ ὅτε.	Besides, it happens that one man deliberates too slowly but another too quickly. Hence genuine eubulia is found not in these exaggerations but in rectitude, which acts according to what is useful and proper in regard to the end, the manner, and the time.
d. The fourth condition. — 1233-1234
ἔτι ἔστι καὶ ἁπλῶς εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ πρός τι τέλος. ἣ μὲν δὴ ἁπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, τὶς δὲ ἡ πρός τι τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν.	Again, one person may deliberate well in the unqualified sense and another may simply concern himself about a particular end. Therefore eubulia without qualification will be that which directs deliberations in relation to an absolute end; but eubulia in a limited sense, that which directs deliberations in relation to a particular end. If indeed to deliberate well belongs to prudent people, eubulia will be rectitude conducing to that end about which prudence gives the true evaluation.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
Oportet autem assumere et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de prudentia et aliis virtutibus intellectualibus principalibus, hic determinat de quibusdam virtutibus adiunctis prudentiae. Et primo determinat de singulis earum secundum se. Secundo comparat eas adinvicem et ad prudentiam, ibi, sunt omnes habitus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo determinat de eubulia; secundo de synesi, ibi: est autem et synesis etc.; tertio de gnome, ibi, vocata autem gnome et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo inquirit genus eubuliae, ostendens, quod sit quaedam rectitudo. Secundo ostendit cuius sit rectitudo, ibi, neque scientiae autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit qualis rectitudo sit, ibi: quia autem rectitudo et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo (dicit) de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur, ibi, scientia quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod post tractatum de principalibus virtutibus intellectualibus, oportet assumere ad complementum cognitionis praedictarum virtutum de eubulia, quae dicitur bona consiliatio, quid sit: utrum scilicet sit scientia quaedam, vel saltem opinio, vel etiam Eustochia, idest bona coniecturatio, vel in quo alio genere sit.	1217. After the Philosopher has defined prudence and the other principal intellectual virtues, he now investigates certain virtues connected with prudence. First [I] he defines them individually, each in itself. Then [Lect. 9, II], at “All the preceding habits tend etc.” (B.1143 a 25), he compares them with one another and with prudence. On the first point he does three things. First [A] he investigates the genus of eubulia. Next [Lect. 9, B], at “Nor is synesis etc.” (B.1142 b 34), he investigates synesis. Last [Lect. 9, C], at “The virtue called gnome etc.” (B.1143 a 19), he investigates gnome. Regarding the initial point he does three things. First [A, 1] he examines the genus of eubulia, showing that it is a kind of rectitude. Then [A, 2], at “although not etc.,” he shows to what rectitude is linked. Last [A, 3], at “Obviously, rectitude etc.,” he shows what kind of rectitude he is discussing. On the first point he does two things. First [1, a], he explains his intention. Next [1, b], at “Certainly it is not etc.,” he carries it out. He says first that, after the tract on the principal intellectual virtues (1142-1216), he must treat the nature of eubulia (excellent deliberation) in order to have a complete knowledge of these virtues. Is it a kind of science, or at least opinion, or even eustochia—shrewd conjecturing? Or in what other genus is it?
Deinde cum dicit: scientia quidem etc., ostendit quid sit genus eubuliae. Et primo ostendit in quo genere non sit; secundo concludit genus eius, ibi: sed quia qui quidem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quod eubulia non sit scientia; secundo quod non sit Eustochia, ibi, sed tamen neque Eustochia etc.; tertio quod non sit opinio, ibi, neque utique opinio et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod eubulia non est scientia. Quod quidem patet per hoc, quod habentes scientiam iam non quaerunt de illis de quibus sciunt, sed habent certam notitiam de eis. Eubulia autem, cum sit quoddam consilium, est cum quadam inquisitione. Ille enim, qui consiliatur, quaerit et ratiocinatur. Sed scientia habetur in termino inquisitionis; ergo eubulia non est scientia.	1218. Then [1, b], at “Certainly it is not,” he shows what the genus of eubulia is. First [b, i] he shows where it does not belong. Next [b, ii], at “But because the man etc.,” he determines its genus. On the first point he does three things. First [i, x] he shows that eubulia is not science. Then [i, y], at “However, it is not etc.,” he shows that it is not eustochia. Last [i, z], at “Nor is eubulia etc.,” he shows that it is not opinion. He says first that eubulia is not science. This is clear from the fact that men already possessing science do not inquire about those things which they know, but have certain knowledge about them. But eubulia being a kind of deliberation is joined with some sort of inquiry, for the man who deliberates inquires and thinks discursively. But discursive knowledge is attained at the end of an inquiry. Therefore eubulia is not science.
Deinde cum dicit: sed tamen neque Eustochia etc., ostendit, quod eubulia non sit Eustochia, duplici ratione. Quarum prima talis est. Eustochia, idest bona coniecturatio est sine rationis inquisitione et est velox; provenit enim aliquibus ex hoc quod habent promptum iudicium intellectus vel sensitivae partis ad recte existimandum de aliquo, propter subtilitatem spirituum, et bonitatem imaginationis, et puritatem sensitivorum organorum. Cooperatur etiam ad hoc multa experientia. Et haec duo desunt eubuliae. Eubulia enim, ut dictum est, est cum inquisitione rationis, et ex alia parte non est velox, sed magis boni consiliatores consiliantur multo tempore, ut diligenter perquirant omnia quae pertingunt negotium; unde et in proverbio dicunt quod oportet ea quae sunt determinata in consilio velociter exequi, sed consiliari tarde. Unde patet, quod eubulia non est Eustochia.	1219. At “However, is it not” [i, y] he shows that eubulia is not eustochia, for two reasons. The first is this [y, aa]. Eustochia or happy conjecture exists without the inquiry of reason and is instantaneous. It is innate in some men, who, by reason of acuteness of powers, richness of imagination and sensitivity of the external senses, come to a prompt judgment based on intellect or sense whereby they correctly evaluate a situation. Wide experience also develops this. And these two things are lacking in eubulia, which is associated with the inquiry of reason, as was just mentioned (1218). Besides, eubulia is not instantaneous but rather takes time for those who deliberate so they may thoroughly explore everything touching the subject. Hence too the proverb saying that the matters of counsel ought to be carried out quickly but deliberated slowly. So, obviously, eubulia is not eustochia.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi adhuc sollertia et cetera. Quae talis est. Si eubulia esset idem quod Eustochia, oporteret quod quicquid continetur sub Eustochia contineretur sub eubulia. Sed sollertia est quaedam species Eustochiae, est enim bona coniecturatio circa inventionem medii, differt tamen solertia ab eubulia, quia eubulia non est circa finem, qui se habet in operabilibus sicut medium in syllogismis: non enim est consilium de fine, ut dictum est in tertio. Ergo eubulia non est idem quod Eustochia.	1220. At “Furthermore, quickness etc. [y, bb] he gives the second reason. If eubulia was identical with eustochia, then whatever was contained under eubulia would be contained under eustochia. But quickness of mind is a certain kind of eustochia; it is a rapid conjecture about finding a means. However, quickness of mind differs from eubulia since eubulia is not concerned with the end which in practical matters holds the place of the middle term in syllogisms, for counsel is not taken about the end, as was indicated in the third book (473-474). Therefore eubulia is not the same as eustochia.
Deinde cum dicit: neque utique opinio etc., ostendit, quod eubulia non sit opinio: ita scilicet quod non solum non omnis opinio sit eubulia, sed quod neque una, id est nulla, opinio sit eubulia. Et hoc patet eadem ratione quam supra proposuit de scientia. Licet enim opinans non sit certus, tamen iam determinavit se ad unum; quod non contingit consilianti.	1221. Next [i, z], at “Nor is eubulia,” he shows that eubulia is not opinion in such a way that not only is not every opinion eubulia but neither is any opinion eubulia. This is evident for the same reason stated previously (1145, 1165) about science, for although a man who holds an opinion is not certain, nevertheless he has already limited himself to one viewpoint-something that is not true of a man deliberating.
Deinde cum dicit sed quia qui quidem etc., ostendit quid sit verum genus eubuliae, per hoc, quod ille qui male consiliatur, dicitur peccare in consiliando; qui autem bene consiliatur, dicitur recte consiliari. Et talis est Eubulus; unde manifestum est quod eubulia est quaedam rectitudo.	1222. Then [b, ii], at “But because the man,” he shows what is the real genus of eubulia from the fact that the man who deliberates badly is said to err in deliberating, but the man who deliberates well is said to deliberate rightly. The latter is eubuleos (i.e., correct in deliberation). Hence it is plain that eubulia is a kind of rectitude.
Deinde cum dicit: neque scientiae autem etc., ostendit cuius sit rectitudo. Et primo ostendit cuius non sit rectitudo. Secundo cuius sit, ibi, sed rectitudo quaedam et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod eubulia non est rectitudo, neque scientiae, neque opinionis.	1223. At “although not” [A, 2] he shows to what rectitude is linked. First [2, a] he shows whence it does not arise, and then [2., b] at “But eubulia is etc.,” whence it does arise. On this (first) point he does two things. First [a, i] he proposes what he intends, saying that eubulia is rectitude neither of science nor of opinion.
Secundo ibi, scientiae quidem etc., ostendit propositum. Et primo quantum ad scientiam. Illud enim videtur indigere rectitudine, qua rectificetur, in quo contingit esse peccatum; sed in scientia non contingit esse peccatum, cum sit semper verorum; ergo eubulia non est rectitudo scientiae.	1224. Next [a, ii], at “for rectitude,” he establishes his proposition: first [ii, x] in regard to science. In an area where error is possible, rectitude appears necessary. But error does not apply to science, which always has to do with true and necessary things. Therefore eubulia is not rectitude of science.
Secundo ibi: opinionis autem etc., ostendit propositum quantum ad opinionem. Et hoc duplici ratione. Quarum prima talis est. Opinionis quidem, quia in ea contingit esse peccatum, potest esse aliqua rectitudo. Sed rectitudo eius non dicitur bonitas, sed veritas, sicut et peccatum eius dicitur falsitas. Ergo eubulia, quae a bonitate denominatur, non est rectitudo opinionis.	1225. Then [ii, y], at “while truth” he establishes his proposition in regard to opinion, by two arguments. The first is this [y, aa]. Since error is possible in opinion, rectitude is applicable to it. However, its rectitude is not called goodness but truth, just as its defect is called falsity. Therefore eubulia, which takes its name from goodness, is not rectitude of opinion.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, similiter autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod omne illud de quo habetur opinio, iam est determinatum quantum ad opinantem, licet non sit determinatum quantum ad rei veritatem. Et in hoc eubulia deficit ab opinione, quia non est sine ratione inquirente. Eubulia enim non est enunciatio alicuius rei, sed inquisitio. E contrario autem opinio non est inquisitio, sed quaedam enuntiatio opinati; opinans enim dicit verum esse quod opinatur. Sed ille qui consiliatur vel bene vel male adhuc quaerit aliquid et ratiocinatur, nondum autem enuntiat ita esse vel non esse. Ergo eubulia non est rectitudo opinionis.	1226. He gives the second argument at “Likewise” [y, bb], saying that everything which is a matter of opinion is already determined so far as concerns the one holding it, but not in reality. On this point eubulia, since it is not without the inquiry of reason, differs from opinion. eubulia is not a declaration of something but an inquiry. On the contrary, however, opinion is not an inquiry but a kind of declaration of the man holding it, for a person expressing an opinion states what he imagines to be true. But the man who deliberates, well or badly, seeks something and thinks discursively about the subject; hence he does not yet declare it is or is not so. Therefore eubulia is not rectitude of opinion.
Deinde cum dicit: sed rectitudo quaedam etc., ostendit cuius sit rectitudo eubulia. Et dicit, quod ex quo non est rectitudo scientiae neque opinionis, relinquitur, quod sit quaedam rectitudo consilii, ut ipsum nomen significat. Et inde est, quod ad perfectam notitiam eubuliae oportet inquirere quid sit consilium, et circa quid sit. Et haec supra determinata sunt in tertio; unde non oportuit quod hic resumerentur.	1227. Then [2, b], at “But eubulia” he shows of what subject eubulia is rectitude. He says that, since eubulia is not rectitude of science nor opinion, we conclude that it must be a certain rectitude of deliberation, as the very name (eubulia) indicates. Consequently to have a perfect notion of eubulia we must inquire what deliberation is and about what it is concerned. These questions have been discussed before in the third book (458-482); so there was no need that they be resumed here.
Deinde cum dicit: quia autem rectitudo etc., ostendit qualis rectitudo sit eubulia. Et circa hoc determinat quatuor conditiones eubuliae per ordinem. Dicit ergo primo quod rectitudo multipliciter dicitur. Uno modo proprie, alio modo metaphorice. Proprie quidem dicitur in bonis; secundum similitudinem autem etiam dicitur in malis, ut si dicamus quod aliquis sit rectus fur, sicut dicimus quod est bonus fur.	1228. Next [A, 3], at “Obviously, rectitude,” he shows what kind of rectitude eubulia is. On this point he determines four conditions by turns. He says first 13, a] that rectitude is used in various senses: in one sense properly, in another figuratively. Properly it is used in reference to good things but figuratively it is applied to evil things, just as if we should say that a man is a real burglar, as we do say he is a good burglar.
Manifestum est autem quod non omnis rectitudo consilii est eubulia: non enim est rectitudo consilii in malis, sed in bonis tantum. Incontinens enim et pravus quandoque adipiscitur per suam ratiocinationem illud quod proponit cognoscere, puta cum invenit viam per quam possit peccatum perpetrare. Unde per similitudinem dicitur recte consilians, inquantum scilicet invenit viam efficaciter ducentem in finem, sed tamen assumit pro fine quoddam magnum malum, puta furtum vel adulterium. Sed bene consiliari, quod significat nomen eubuliae, videtur esse quoddam bonum. Unde manifestum est quod talis rectitudo consilii est eubulia, per quam aliquis adipiscitur bonum finem.	1229. Obviously, not every rectitude of deliberation is eubulia, for rectitude of deliberation does not refer to evil things but to good things only. The incontinent and evil man sometimes attains what he sets out to know by his reasoning, for example, when he finds out the way he can commit sin. Hence figuratively he is said to deliberate correctly inasmuch as he discovers a way effectively leading to an evil end. However, he takes some great evil for his end, e.g., theft or adultery. But to deliberate well—the name eubulia means this—seems to be something good. Hence it is evident that this rectitude of deliberation is eubulia by which a man attains a good end.
Secundam conditionem ponit ibi: sed est et hoc et cetera. Ubi considerandum est quod contingit in syllogisticis aliquando concludi veram conclusionem per falsum syllogismum. Et ita etiam in operabilibus contingit quandoque pervenire ad bonum finem per aliquam malam viam. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod contingit aliquando sortiri bonum finem quasi falso syllogismo, ita scilicet quod aliquis consiliando perveniat ad id quod oportet facere, sed non per quod oportet, puta cum aliquis furatur, ut subveniat pauperi, et hoc est ac si in syllogismo aliquis ad veram conclusionem assumeret medium aliquem falsum terminum.	1230. At “But it is possible” [3, b], he explains the second condition, that sometimes in syllogistic arguments a true conclusion is drawn by a false syllogism. So also sometimes in practical matters we arrive at a good end by some evil means. This is what he means by saying that sometimes we determine a good end as it were by a false syllogism; thus a man by deliberating arrives at what he ought to do but not at the means he ought to use, for example, when someone steals to help the poor. It is as if a man in reasoning would take some false middle term to arrive at a true conclusion.
Licet enim in intentione finis sit sicut principium et medius terminus, tamen in via executionis quam inquirit consiliator, finis se habet sicut conclusio, et id quod est ad finem sicut medius terminus. Manifestum est autem quod non dicitur recte syllogizare qui veram conclusionem per falsum medium concluderet: unde consequens est quod non sit vere eubulia, secundum quam aliquis adipiscitur finem quem oportet, non autem per viam per quam oportet.	1231. Although the end in the order of intention is like the principle and the middle term, nevertheless, in the order of execution, which the counsellor seeks, the end takes the place of the conclusion and the means the place of the middle term. Obviously, the man who draws a true conclusion by means of a false middle term is not reasoning correctly. Consequently eubulia is not genuine insofar as a man attains the end he ought but not in the way he ought.
Tertiam condicionem ponit ibi: adhuc est multum tempus et cetera. Et dicit quod quandoque contingit quod aliquis multum tempus ponit in consilio, ita quod forte aliquando elabitur opportunitas exequendi. Contingit etiam quod aliquis nimis velociter et praecipitanter consiliatur. Unde nec ista est vere eubulia, sed talis rectitudo consilii quae attendit id quod est utile ad finem et finem quem oportet et modum et tempus.	1232. At “Besides, it happens” [3, c] he gives the third condition. He says that sometimes a man takes so much time in deliberating that perhaps the opportunity for action occasionally slips by. Likewise, another man may deliberate too hastily. Hence genuine eubulia consists not in this but in that rectitude which aims at what is useful for the proper end, manner and time.
Quartam conditionem ponit ibi: adhuc est simpliciter et cetera. Et dicit quod contingit aliquem esse qui bene consiliatur simpliciter ad finem totius vitae. Contingit etiam aliquem esse qui recte consiliatur ad aliquem finem particularem. Unde eubulia simpliciter erit quae dirigit consilium ad finem communem totius humanae vitae, illa autem quae dirigit ad quemdam finem particularem, non est eubulia simpliciter, sed eubulia quaedam. Quia cum prudentium sit bene consiliari, oportet quod eubulia simpliciter sit rectitudo consilii in ordine ad illum finem, circa quem veram aestimationem habet prudentia simpliciter dicta; et hic est finis communis totius humanae vitae, ut supra dictum est.	1233. At “Again, one person” [3, d] he introduces the fourth condition, saying that one man may deliberate well, without qualification, about the whole end of life. Also it is possible that another may rightly deliberate about some particular end. Hence unqualified eubulia will be that which directs deliberation in relation to the common end of human life. But eubulia of a particular kind will direct deliberation in relation to some special end. Because to deliberate well is characteristic of prudent people, unqualified eubulia must be rectitude of deliberation in respect to that end which so-called absolute prudence truly evaluates. This is the common end of the whole of life, as was noted above (1163).
Ex omnibus ergo quae dicta sunt accipi potest quod eubulia est rectitudo consilii ad finem bonum simpliciter per vias congruas et tempore convenienti.	1234. Therefore, it can be seen from all our discussions that eubulia is rectitude of deliberation in relation to an absolutely good end, by suitable methods and at an opportune time.

LECTURE 9 Synesis (Habit of Right judgment in Practical Individual Cases)
Chapter 10
*B. He now explains synesis.*
1. HE COMPARES SYNESIS WITH SCIENCE AND OPINION.
*a. He shows that not all science or opinion is synesis. — 1235*
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία, καθ' ἃς λέγομεν συνετοὺς καὶ εὐσυνέτους, οὔθ' ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμῃ ἢ δόξῃ πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί	Nor is synesis, and asynesia, according to which we are called sensible and foolish, entirely the same as science or opinion, for if this were so all men would be sensible.
*b. He shows that no one science is synesis. — 1236*
οὔτε τις μία τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν, ἡ γεωμετρία περὶ μεγέθη· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσίς ἐστιν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὁτουοῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις καὶ βουλεύσαιτο.	Nor is it any of the particular sciences, for example, medicine which deals with health, or geometry which deals with magnitudes. Nor is synesis concerned with eternal and unchangeable substances, nor with anything made. But it treats those matters about which men may doubt and seek counsel.
*2. HE COMPARES synesis* WITH PRUDENCE.**
a. He infers an agreement between them. — 1237
διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν,	For this reason synesis is concerned with the same things that prudence is.
b. He shows the difference between them.
*i. He shows that synesis* is not prudence. — 1238-1240**
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ σύνεσις καὶ φρόνησις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν· τί γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον. ταὐτὸ γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συνετοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι.	But synesis is not the same as prudence, for prudence gives orders inasmuch as its end is to lay down 10 what is to be done or not to be done. synesis, however, merely forms judgments. In fact judgment (synesis) and good judgment, like people of judgment and people of good judgment, are looked upon as identical.
ii. He shows that it is not the source of prudence. — 1241-1242
ἔστι δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἡ σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται συνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ εὖ τῷ καλῶς τὸ αὐτό καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοὔνομα ἡ σύνεσις, καθ' ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν· λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.	Likewise synesis is not the same as having or acquiring prudence. But just as learning is called syniene when it uses knowledge, so also when it uses practical evaluation to judge things about which prudence treats, or (as someone else says) to judge well, for eu has the meaning of “well.” Hence the name synesis, in accord with which some are called eusyneti (men of good judgment) is derived from the word used in connection with learning. Indeed we often use “learning” in the sense of “understanding.”
C. He describes a third virtue called gnome. — 1243-1244
	Chapter 11
ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν συγγνώμονας καὶ ἔχειν φαμὲν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή. σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστά φαμεν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἔνια συγγνώμην. ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή· ὀρθὴ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.	The virtue called gnome according to which we say men are lenient and have just evaluation, is nothing more than a correct judgment of what is equitable. A proof of this is that we say the man of equity in a special way is inclined to leniency and that what is equitable has a measure of pardon in certain matters. Gnome itself judges what is equitable and the judgment is right when it corresponds to the truth.
II. HE COMPARES THESE VIRTUES WITH ONE ANOTHER AND WITH PRUDENCE.
a. He mentions the agreement among these habits. — 1245
εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι· λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον·	All the preceding habits, it is reasonable to affirm, tend to the same thing. We use the names gnome, synesis, prudence, and understanding in such a way as to imply that the same persons possess gnome and understanding, and on that account are both prudent and sensible. In fact all these habits deal with singulars and particular ultimates,
b. He verifies this.
i. First by reason.
*x. HE SHOWS THAT synesis* AND gnome DEAL WITH PARTICULAR ULTIMATES AND SINGULARS. — 1246**
καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ εὐγνώμων ἢ συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα.	inasmuch as a man of good sense, or someone pronouncing favorable judgment, or passing a lenient sentence judges the actions which the prudent man commands. Indeed every equitable thing has a relation to all human goods in this, that it refers to another. All these have to do with singulars and particular ultimates, which are practicable things. Because of this the prudent person should know them; likewise synesis and gnome are concerned with things to be done, and these are particular ultimates.
y. HE SHOWS THE SAME THING ABOUT UNDERSTANDING. — 1247-1249
καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.	Understanding in both kinds of knowledge is concerned with ultimates because understanding and not reasoning deals with first principles and ultimates. One kind is about unchangeable and first principles in demonstrations, but the other is about a singular and contingent ultimate in practical matters and about a proposition of a different nature. This latter concerns principles of purposeful activity, for the universal is drawn from singulars. Hence it is necessary that man experience these singulars by sense, and this perception is understanding.
ii. (He verifies this) by an indication. — 1250-1252
διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν οὐδείς, γνώμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης.	Therefore the preceding habits seem to be natural. While a man is not naturally wise, he does have good sense, judgment and understanding by nature. This is indicated by the fact that we think such aptitudes follow man’s years. In fact a particular age of life has understanding and good sense just as if nature caused them.
c. He makes an inference from what has been said.
i. First. — 1253
[διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων.]	On this account understanding is both a principle and an end, for demonstrations proceed from them and are given for their sake.
ii. He sets down a second corollary. — 1254-1256
ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἧττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τί ἑκατέρα τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα, εἴρηται.	So we must heed the indemonstrable statements and opinions of experienced, old and prudent men no less than demonstrations themselves, since the elderly understand principles by their experience. We have thus far considered the nature of prudence and wisdom, what material each virtue treats and in what part of the soul each exists.

LECTURE 10 Doubts About the Usefulness of Wisdom and Prudence
Chapter 12
I. HE PROPOSES SOME DOUBTS.
A. He raises a doubt about the usefulness of wisdom and prudence.
1. HE PROPOSES THE DOUBT. — 1257
διαπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοί εἰσιν.	Someone may raise a doubt about the utility of these virtues.
2. HE PURSUES THE DOUBT.
a. First in regard to wisdom. — 1258
ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρήσει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων ἄνθρωπος οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως,	Wisdom, to be sure, explores none of the ways in which man is made happy, for it does not consider any operation.
b. Then ... about prudence.
i. He brings forward the argument that prudence is not necessary for man. — 1259-1260
ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς; εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησίς ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν, οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἕξεις αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά, ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λέγεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικήν ἐσμεν.	Although prudence considers this very thing, why does man need it? Prudence is the virtue concerned with things that are just and honorable and useful to man—the performance of which belongs to the good of man. But we are not more inclined to do things from knowing them (since virtues are operative habits) than we are inclined to fulfill the requirements of health and good condition from knowing them, but from the fact that they are habits. Surely we are not more inclined to activity because we know medicine and gymnastics.
ii. He rules out a particular answer (for two reasons).
x. THE FIRST REASON. — 1261-1262
εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον ῥητέον ἀλλὰ τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος·	If we must assume that a man ought to be prudent not for the sake of these (virtuous works) but to become virtuous, prudence will not be at all useful for men who are virtuous.
y. THE SECOND REASON. — 1263
ἔτι δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἱκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ μανθάνομεν ἰατρικήν.	Nor will it be necessary for those not having virtue because, in order to be virtuous, it makes no difference whether men themselves have prudence or are induced to it by others who have it. It is enough that we make use of prudence; in regard to health, we do not learn medicine even though we want to be healthy.
B. He raises a doubt about the comparison of these two (wisdom and prudence) with one another. — 1264-1265
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὖσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται· ἡ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὴ τούτων λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον.	Again, it seems unreasonable that prudence, which is less perfect, should have predominance over wisdom. Prudence indeed has power over singulars and gives orders in regard to them. But we must discuss the questions proposed; up to the present we have merely raised doubts about them.
II. HE SOLVES THEM (THE DOUBTS).
A. He solves the doubt about the utility of wisdom and prudence.
1. HE SOLVES THE DOUBT IN REGARD TO WISDOM AND PRUDENCE IN GENERAL... (BY) TWO EXPLANATIONS.
a. The first (explanation). — 1266
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι καθ' αὑτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἱρετὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετάς γ' οὔσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου, καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν.	We answer first that wisdom and prudence necessarily are objects of choice in themselves; even if neither of them performs any operation, they are virtues perfecting both parts of the soul.
b. The second explanation. — 1267
ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα.	Wisdom and prudence do, in fact, perform some operation but not as the medical art produces health; as health brings about healthful activities so does wisdom bring happiness. Since wisdom is a part of virtue as a whole, he who has it acts according to it and becomes happy.
2. (HE SOLVES THE DOUBT) IN REGARD TO PRUDENCE IN PARTICULAR.
a. First... that prudence does nothing for virtuous works. — 1268-1269
ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν.	Moreover, a work of virtue is perfected in accord with prudence and moral virtue: moral virtue rectifies the end, and prudence the means to the end. But there is no such virtue in the fourth part of the soul, viz., the power of growth because this does not have the option of operating or not operating.
b. Then... that prudence is not necessary in order that a man be virtuous.
i. Prudence cannot exist without moral virtue.
x. ANOTHER OPERATIVE PRINCIPLE IS REQUIRED. — 1270-1271
περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακτικωτέρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὔπω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά καίτοι πράττουσί γε ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν, λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τῶν πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἕνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως.	Concerning the objection that, by reason of prudence, men will not the more readily perform good and just deeds, we must begin a little further back, resuming the following heading. We do not call certain men just who do just works, for example, those who do the things decreed by the law, either unwillingly or because of ignorance or some other cause, and not because of the works themselves. We do not call such men just, although they do what they ought to do and even what a good man ought to do. So, as it seems, one ought to do particular things in such a manner to be virtuous, for example, he should do them from choice and for the sake of the virtuous works themselves. Virtue indeed makes the right choice, but whatever things are designed by nature to be done do not pertain to virtue but to some other principle.
y. HE SHOWS. WHAT (THE OTHER OPERATIVE PRINCIPLE) IS. — 1272
λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτοῦ. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾖ καλός, ἐπαινετή ἐστιν, ἐὰν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαμὲν εἶναι.	But something more must be said in order to understand these matters better. There is a particular quality called shrewdness, which is of such a nature that it enables a man to do the things ordained to a determined end and to attain the end by means of these things. When the intention is good, shrewdness is praiseworthy, but when the intention is evil it is called craftiness. For this reason we call both prudent and crafty people clever.
z. HE SHOWS THAT PRUDENCE MAKES AN ADDITION OF A MORAL VIRTUE TO THAT PRINCIPLE. — 1273-1274
ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δύναμις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἕξις τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὡς εἴρηταί τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὁτιδήποτε ὄν ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν· τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν.	Prudence is not this quality but cannot exist without it; the habit in the soul is joined to this insight by moral virtue, as has been pointed out. This is evident because argumentation in the practical order has a principle that such an end is the supreme good, whatever that end may be, in fact anything may be used as an example. What is the supreme good is not apparent except to a virtuous man, for evil corrupts and causes deception in practical principles. Obviously then it is impossible for a man to be prudent who is not virtuous.

LECTURE 11 Moral Virtue and Prudence
Chapter 13
ii. He shows that moral virtue cannot exist without prudence.
x. HE EXPLAINS HIS PROPOSITION.
aa. He proves his proposition initially by reason. — 1275-1280
σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα οὐ ταὐτὸ μέν,ὅμοιον δέοὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τἆλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι. πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ ἄνευ ὄψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει· ἡ δ' ἕξις ὁμοία οὖσα τότ' ἔσται κυρίως ἀρετή. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως.	We must again turn our attention to virtue. Virtue has a relation to a similar quality-as prudence to shrewdness, not that they are identical but that they have some likeness. In this way natural virtue is related to the principal virtue, for it seems to everyone that each kind of moral practice exists by nature to some extent. Indeed immediately from birth we are just, temperate, and brave and have other qualities. However, we are looking for something different, a good as a principle, so that virtues of this kind may be in us according to another manner of existence. It is a fact that children and dumb animals have natural habits, but these seem detrimental without the direction of reason. Certainly this much seems clear that, as a powerful body moved without the guidance of vision goes astray more powerfully because it lacks that guidance, so in this matter. But if a principle similar (to prudence) operates, then virtue in the proper sense will be present. Hence, as in the discursive faculty there are two kinds of principles, viz., shrewdness and prudence, so in the moral faculty there are two kinds of principles, viz., natural virtue and the principal virtue. The latter cannot be without prudence.
bb. Then by the observations of others.
a’ First by a statement of Socrates.
A. THE STATEMENT. — 1281
διόπερ τινές φασι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι,	Therefore, it is said that all virtues are kinds of prudence.
B. ARISTOTLE SHOWS HOW THEY (THE VIRTUES) FALL SHORT. — 1282
καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν.	In this, Socrates’ investigation was correct in one respect and wrong in an other. He erroneously held that all virtues are species of prudence, but correctly stated that virtue cannot be without prudence.
b’ Next by a statement of Aristotle’s contemporaries.
A. HE GIVES THEIR STATEMENT. — 1283
σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετήν, προστιθέασι, τὴν ἕξιν εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἅ ἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. ἐοίκασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαί πως ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν.	An indication of this is that at the present time all men, in defining virtue, place it in the genus of habit and state to what matters it extends and that it is according to right reason. But right reason is that which is according to prudence. Therefore they all seem to guess in some manner that virtue is the kind of habit that is in accord with prudence.
B. HE SHOWS HOW THEY MAY BE WRONG. — 1284-1285
δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι. ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν· ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας, ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς.	But we must go a little further, for virtue is not only in conformity with reason, but a habit accompanied by reason. But right reason in such matters is prudence. Socrates then was of the opinion that virtues are kinds of reason because he thought they were species of knowledge. But we maintain they are accompanied by reason. Therefore it is obvious from the discussion how it is not possible for a man to be good in the strict sense without prudence, nor to be prudent without moral virtue.
y. HE SOLVES A PARTICULAR INCIDENTAL DOUBT.
aa. He raises the doubt. — 1286
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ' ἄν, ᾧ διαλεχθείη τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφυέστατος πρὸς ἁπάσας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὔπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται·	In this way we can refute the argument that some use to prove that virtues are separated one from another. We see that the same man is not equally well inclined by nature to all virtues. Wherefore he will be said to acquire the virtue he has known but not any other.
bb. He solves the doubt. — 1287-1288
τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἃς δὲ ἁπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ ὑπαρχούσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν.	This does happen in regard to the natural virtues but not in regard to those virtues according to which a man is called absolutely good. The reason is that all the virtues are present simultaneously with prudence, a single virtue.
z. HE BRINGS HIS PRINCIPAL PROPOSITION TO A CONCLUSION. — 1289
δῆλον δέ, κἂν εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἣ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἣ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν.	Evidently man would need prudence (even though it were not practical) because it is a virtue perfecting a part of the soul; he would need it because there will be no right choice without either prudence or virtue, for the latter disposes the end and the former directs the means to the end.
B. He solves the doubt raised about the comparison between prudence and wisdom. — 1290-1291
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰατρική· οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνῃ. ἔτι ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.	Nevertheless, neither prudence rules over wisdom nor (an inferior thing) over what is more excellent, just as medicine does not rule health. This is so because medicine does not use health but sees how it may be produced; it gives orders for the sake of health but not to it. Again, it would be like saying that political science rules the gods because it gives orders about everything in the state.