| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| | Post haec autem de amicitia et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus et continentia, quae est quiddam imperfectum in genere virtutis, hic consequenter determinat de amicitia, quae supra virtutem fundatur, sicut quidam virtutis effectus. Et primo prooemialiter dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo incipit de amicitia tractare, ibi, forte autem utique et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod ad moralem pertinet de amicitia tractare. Secundo ostendit quae sint circa amicitiam tractanda, ibi, dubitantur autem de ipsa et cetera. Circa primum inducit sex rationes ad ostendendum, quod de amicitia sit considerandum. Dicit ergo primo, quod post praedicta considerandum est de amicitia pertranseunter, ut scilicet consideremus circa eam ea quae pertinent ad considerationem moralis philosophi, praetermissis his quae pertinent ad considerationem naturalis philosophi. Et prima ratio quare de amicitia sit tractandum, est, quia consideratio virtutis pertinet ad moralem philosophum; amicitia autem est quaedam virtus, inquantum scilicet est habitus electivus, ut infra dicetur: et reducitur ad genus iustitiae, inquantum exhibet proportionale, ut infra dicetur, vel saltem est cum virtute, inquantum scilicet virtus est causa verae amicitiae.
| 1538. After the Philosopher has determined the moral and intellectual virtues and continence, which is something imperfect in the genus of virtue, he now turns his attention to friendship which is founded upon virtue as an effect of it. First he explains by way of introduction what he intends to do. Then [Lect. 2], at “Perhaps these questions etc.” (B. 1155 b 17), he begins to treat friendship. He develops the first point in two ways. First [1] he shows that it pertains to ethics to treat friendship. Next [2], at “On this subject etc.,” he shows what matters are to be treated in the question of friendship. In regard to the first item he offers six reasons to explain what we must consider about friendship. He states first what has to be treated, after the previous discussions, in examining the subject of friendship, viz., we must consider the things pertaining to the study of moral philosophy, omitting what belongs to the field of the cosmologist. The first reason [1, a] why we must investigate friendship is that the consideration of virtue is the concern of moral philosophy. Friendship is a kind of virtue inasmuch as it is a habit of free choice—this will be explained later (1559, 1602-1604, 1645, 1831). Also it is reduced to the genus of justice as offering something proportional (a point that will also be discussed later), or at least it accompanies virtue insofar as virtue is the cause of true friendship,
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc maxime et cetera. Moralis enim philosophia habet considerationem circa omnia quae sunt necessaria vitae humanae, inter quae maxime necessarium est amicitia: intantum, quod nullus bene dispositus eligeret vivere cum hoc, quod haberet omnia alia exteriora bona sine amicis. Illis enim, qui maxime possident exteriora bona, scilicet divitibus et principibus et potentatibus, maxime videntur esse necessarii amici. Primo quidem ad usum horum bonorum. Nulla enim est utilitas bonorum fortunae, si ex his aliquis nulli benefaciat. Beneficium autem maxime et laudabilissime fit ad amicos. Secundo ad conservationem talium bonorum, quae non possunt conservari sine amicis. Quia bona fortuna quanto est maior, tanto est minus secura, quia habet plures insidiatores. Nec solum in bona fortuna sunt utiles amici, sed etiam in contraria.
| 1539. He gives the second reason [1, b] at “Besides, friendship.” Moral philosophy considers all things that are required for human living; and among these friendship is especially necessary, to such an extent that no one in his right mind would choose to live in the possession of great external goods without friends. Indeed friends seem most necessary for the wealthy, the rulers, and the powerful, who have abundant external goods. First, for the enjoyment of these goods; there is no advantage to be derived from goods of fortune if no one can be benefited by them, but a benefit is especially and most laudably done for friends. Second, for the preservation of such goods that cannot be retained without friends. The greater the goods of fortune, the less secure they are because many people secretly covet them. Nor are friends useful only in good fortune but also in adversity.
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| Quia in paupertate homines existimant amicos esse singulare refugium. Sic ergo in omni fortuna amici sunt necessarii. Sunt etiam necessarii in omni aetate. Quia iuvenibus sunt necessarii ad hoc quod per amicos cohibeantur a peccato. Sunt enim secundum seipsos proni ad concupiscentias delectationum, ut in septimo dictum est. Senioribus autem sunt utiles amici ad serviendum propter defectus corporales. Et quia deficiunt in suis actionibus propter debilitatem, sunt eis amici necessarii ad adiutorium. Illis autem qui sunt in summo, idest in perfecta aetate, sunt utiles ad bonas actiones exequendas. Quando enim duo conveniunt sunt potentiores. Et in opere intellectualis speculationis, dum unus videt quod alius videre non potest; et ad opus exterioris actionis, in quo manifeste unus alii auxiliatur. Et sic patet quod de amicitia considerandum est, sicut de re omnibus necessaria.
| 1540. Therefore, in poverty people look upon friends as the one refuge. So then in any situation friends are needed. Likewise friendship is necessary for young men that the help of friends may restrain them from sin, for they themselves are inclined to desires for pleasures, as has been already remarked in the seventh book (1531). On the other hand, friends are useful to the old for assistance in their bodily infirmities; because they are faltering in their movements from weakness, friends are needed to assist them. But even to those who are at their peak, in the very prime of life, friends are useful for the performance of good actions. When two work together, they are more effective. This is true both in rational investigation where one sees ‘what the other cannot see, and external activity in which one is especially a help to the other. Thus it is evident that we must investigate friendship as a state necessary for all.
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| Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, naturaque inesse videtur et cetera. Et dicit, quod etiam amicitia inest secundum naturam generanti ad genitum. Et hoc non solum in hominibus, sed etiam in volatilibus, quae manifeste longo tempore studium adhibent ad educationem prolis. Et idem etiam est in aliis animalibus. Est etiam naturalis amicitia inter eos, qui sunt unius gentis adinvicem, inquantum communicant in moribus et convictu. Et maxime est naturalis amicitia illa, quae est omnium hominum adinvicem, propter similitudinem naturae speciei. Et ideo laudamus philanthropos, idest amatores hominum, quasi implentes id quod est homini naturale, ut manifeste apparet in erroribus viarum. Revocat enim quilibet alium etiam ignotum et extraneum ab errore, quasi omnis homo sit naturaliter familiaris et amicus omni homini. Ea autem, quae sunt naturaliter bona, sunt consideranda a morali. Et sic debet de amicitia considerare.
| 1541. He presents his third reason [1, c] at “By nature the parent.” By nature a parent feels friendship for its child. This is true not only of mankind but even of birds who obviously spend a long time training their young. And the same goes for other animals. There is also a natural friendship between people of the same race who have common customs and social life. There is above all that natural friendship of all men for one another by reason of their likeness in specific nature. For this reason we praise philanthropists or friends of mankind as, fulfilling what is natural to man. This: is evident when a man loses his way; for everyone stops even an unknown stranger from taking the wrong road, as if every man is naturally a familiar and a friend of every other man. But those things which are naturally good must be treated by the moralist. Therefore he ought to treat friendship.
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| Quartam rationem ponit ibi, videtur autem et civitates et cetera. Et dicit, quod per amicitiam videntur conservari civitates. Unde legislatores magis student ad amicitiam conservandam inter cives, quam etiam ad iustitiam, quam quandoque intermittunt, puta in poenis inferendis, ne dissensio oriatur. Et hoc patet per hoc, quod concordia assimilatur amicitiae. Quam quidem, scilicet concordiam, legislatores maxime appetunt, contentionem autem civium maxime expellunt, quasi inimicam salutis civitatis. Et quia tota moralis philosophia videtur ordinari ad bonum civile, ut in principio dictum est, pertinet ad moralem considerare de amicitia.
| 1542. At “States, it seems” [1, d] he offers the fourth reason, pointing out that states seem to be preserved by friendship. Hence legislators have greater zeal for maintaining friendship among citizens than even justice itself which is sometimes omitted, for example, in the infliction of punishment, lest dissension be stirred up. This is clear from the fact that concord and friendship are similar. Certainly lawmakers especially want this harmony and eliminate from the citizenry as much as possible contention inimical to the security of the state. Because the whole of ethics seems to be ordered to the good of the state, as was said at the beginning (25), it pertains to ethics to treat friendship.
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| Quintam rationem ponit ibi, et amicis quidem et cetera. Et dicit quod, si aliqui sint amici, in nullo indigerent iustitia proprie dicta, quia haberent omnia quasi communia, cum amicus sit alter ipse; non est autem iustitia ad seipsum. Sed si sint iusti, nihilominus indigent amicitia adinvicem. Et illud quod est maxime iustum videtur esse conservativum et reparativum amicitiae. Multo ergo magis ad moralem pertinet considerare de amicitia quam de iustitia.
| 1543. He states the fifth reason [1, e] at “If people,” saying that if men are friends there should be no need of justice in the strict sense because they should have all things in common; a friend is another self and there is no justice to oneself. But if men are just they nevertheless need friendship for one another. Likewise perfect justice seems to preserve and restore friendship. Therefore it pertains to ethics to treat friendship much more than justice.
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| Sextam rationem ponit ibi, non solum autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod non solum de amicitia considerandum est quia est quiddam necessarium humanae vitae, sed etiam quia est quiddam bonum, idest laudabile et honestum. Laudamus enim philophilos, idest amatores amicorum, et philophilia, id est amicitia multorum, videtur esse aliquid boni, in tantum quod quidam existimant eosdem esse viros bonos et amicos.
| 1544 . He gives the sixth reason [1, f] at “But friendship” explaining that we must treat friendship not only because it is something necessary for human living but also because it is something good, i.e., laudable and honorable. We praise philophiloi, i.e., those who love their friends; and poliphilia (a multiplicity of friendships) seems to be so good that people identify good men and friends.
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| Deinde cum dicit: dubitantur autem etc., ostendit, quae sint de amicitia consideranda. Et primo praemittit quamdam dubitationem, quae circa amicitiam apparet. Secundo ostendit quales dubitationes sint circa amicitiam determinandae, ibi: naturalia quidem igitur etc.; tertio excludit quorundam errorem, ibi, unam quidem enim et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit diversas opiniones quorumdam in rebus humanis circa amicitiam. Secundo in rebus naturalibus, ibi, et de his ipsis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod de amicitia non pauca dubitantur. Et primo hoc manifestatur ex diversis opinionibus. Quidam enim volunt, quod amicitia sit quaedam similitudo, et quod similes sunt sibiinvicem amici. Et ad hoc inducunt proverbium quod dicitur quod simile vadit ad suum simile et coloyus ad coloyum (sunt autem quaedam aves gregales sicut sturni) et inducunt etiam quaecumque similia proverbia. Alii vero e contrario dicunt quod omnes figuli contrariantur sibiinvicem, inquantum scilicet unus impedit lucrum alterius. Est autem veritas quaestionis, quod simile per se loquendo est amabile. Habetur autem odio per accidens, in quantum scilicet est impeditivum proprii boni.
| 1545. Then [2], at “On this subject,” he shows what should be considered on friendship. First [2, a] he presents an obvious doubt about friendship. Next [2, b], at “Certainly questions etc.,” he shows the kind of doubts to be resolved about friendship. Last [2, c], at “In fact some etc.,” he rejects an error of certain philosophers. He considers the first point in a twofold manner. First [a, i] he states conflicting opinions of some thinkers on friendship in human affairs; second [a, ii], at “Likewise some etc.,” on friendship in things of nature. He says first that not a few things regarding friendship are uncertain. This is obvious, primarily from the diversity of opinions. Some contend that friendship is a kind of likeness and that like people are friends of one another. In favor of this they quote proverbs: “Like seeks like,” “Birds of a feather flock together.” Certain birds like starlings do flock together. There are other proverbs of this type. But others, on the contrary, hold that all potters are enemies of each other, since one hinders another’s gain. But the truth of the matter is that, essentially speaking, like is lovable; it is, however, hateful incidentally, precisely as an impediment to one’s own good.
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| Deinde cum dicit et de his ipsis etc., ponit circa idem contrarias opiniones in rebus naturalibus: et dicit quod de hac eadem quaestione quidam inquirunt superius, idest altius et magis naturaliter, sicut Euripides qui dixit quod terra desiccata desiderat pluviam quasi amans sibi contrarium, et quod caelum venerabile propter sui dignitatem quando est impletum pluvia desiderat cadere in terram, idest quod pluviam in terram emittat, quod est contrarium eius altitudini et plenitudini. Heraclitus etiam dixit quod contrarium confert suo contrario, sicut homini supercalefacto conferunt frigida, inquantum ex differentibus et contrariis fit optima harmonia, idest contemperantia. Dixit etiam contrarium esse conferens inquantum omnia sunt facta secundum litem, per quam elementa prius confusa sunt distincta. Sed e contrario his dixerunt quidam alii, et praecipue Empedocles. Qui dixit quod simile appetit sibi simile.
| 1546. At “Likewise some” [a, ii] he states conflicting opinions about the same subject in things of nature. He says that on this very question some seek loftier, i.e., deeper reasons, more in the manner of cosmologists. Thus Euripides maintained that the parched earth desires rain as if loving its contrary; and that when heaven, worthy of honor on account of its excellence, is filled with rain its longs to fall on the earth, i.e., to send down rain to earth, which is the contrary of its loftiness and fullness. Likewise Heraclitus held that contrary contributes to contrary, as cold things to a man suffering from excessive heat, insofar as the most excellent harmony or equilibrium is produced from different and contrary things. But he said that the contrary does this inasmuch as all things had their origin from strife by means of which the elements, mingled in the beginning, are separated. But others like Empedocles were of an opposite opinion: that like desires like.
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| Solvitur autem haec dubitatio eodem modo per hoc quod simile, per se loquendo, est desiderabile et amabile naturaliter, per accidens autem desideratur contrarium, in quantum est conferens et medicinale, sicut (supra) de delectationibus corporalibus supra dixit.
| 1547. Our difficulty is answered: essentially speaking, like is desirable naturally; but incidentally like desires the contrary, inasmuch as it is helpful and medicinal. Cf. his previous discussion on bodily pleasures (1525-1517).
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| Deinde cum dicit: naturalia quidem igitur etc., ostendit quae dubitationes sint determinandae circa amicitiam. Et dicit quod naturales quaestiones sunt relinquendae, quia non sunt propriae praesentis intentionis, sed quaecumque sunt humana, utpote pertinentia ad mores et passiones humanas, de his intendamus, sicut utrum possit esse amicitia in omnibus hominibus, vel non possit esse in malis. Et utrum sit una species amicitiae vel plures.
| 1548. Next [2, b], at “Certainly questions,” he shows the kinds of doubts to be resolved about friendship, saying that cosmological questions must be omitted as irrelevant to our present purpose. Attention should be directed to human affairs as connected with morals and man’s passions; for instance, whether all men are capable of friendship, or whether evil men are incapable of it, and whether there is one kind or many kinds of friendship.
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| Deinde cum dicit: unam quidem etc., excludit quorundam errorem qui aestimabant quod esset una sola species amicitiae, propter hoc quod omnes species amicitiae sunt comparabiles secundum magis et minus. Puta cum dicimus quod maior est amicitia honesti quam utilis. Sed ipse dicit quod non crediderunt sufficienti signo; quia etiam ea quae differunt specie recipiunt magis et minus, inquantum scilicet conveniunt in genere; puta si dicamus quod album est coloratius nigro; vel secundum analogiam, puta si dicamus quod actus est melior potentia et substantia accidente.
| 1549. Then [2, c], at “In fact some,” he rejects an error of some philosophers who thought there was only one kind of friendship because all species of friendship are to be compared according to more and less. Thus we say that honorable friendship is greater than useful friendship. But Aristotle says that they have not accepted the adequate explanation that even those things that differ specifically receive more and less inasmuch as they agree generically. For example, we may say that white has more color than black, or by analogy that act is more excellent than potency, and substance than accident.
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| Ultimo autem dicit quod de praedictis quae pertinent ad res humanas circa amicitiam dicendum est superius, id est a prioribus incipiendo.
| 1550- In conclusion he says that the things just treated pertaining to human activities in regard to friendship were discussed previously in a general way.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| | Forte autem utique de his et cetera. Postquam philosophus prooemialiter ostendit quod oportet de amicitia determinare et quae sunt de ea determinanda, hic incipit de amicitia tractare. Et primo ostendit quid sit amicitia. Secundo distinguit species eius, ibi, differunt autem haec ad invicem etc.; tertio determinat quasdam amicitiae proprietates in IX libro, ibi: in omnibus autem dissimilium specierum et cetera.
| 1551. After the Philosopher has shown in the introduction that it is necessary to clarify friendship and what things are to be determined about it, now he begins to treat friendship. First [A] he explains what friendship is. Then [Lect. 3], at “Since these objects etc.” (1156 a 5), he distinguishes its kinds. Last [Lect. 1, Bk IX], at “In all friendships etc.” (1163 b 32), he states the properties belonging to the different kinds of friendship. He treats
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| Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat quatuor partes definitionis amicitiae. Secundo concludit amicitiae diffinitionem, ibi: oportet igitur et cetera. Primo autem investigat particulam quae est ex parte obiecti. Circa quod tria facit. Primo determinat obiectum amicitiae. Secundo movet dubitationem, ibi, utrum igitur et cetera. Tertio solvit, ibi: videtur autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod de praedictis quaestionibus forte fiet aliquid manifestum si cognoscamus quid sit amabile quod est obiectum amationis a qua dicitur amicitia.
| The first point from two aspects. First [A, 1] he investigates the four parts of the definition of friendship. Next [A, 2], at “Therefore it is necessary etc., he concludes with the definition of friendship. First [1, a] he investigates the portion dealing with the object. In regard to this he does three things. First [a, i] he determines the object of friendship. Second [a, ii], at “Do men then love etc.,” he raises a doubt. Third [a, iii], at “it seems though etc.,” he gives the answer. He says first that these questions will perhaps be somewhat clarified if we understand the nature of the thing that is lovable, the object of love from which friendship (or love) receives its name.
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| Non enim quodcumque indifferenter amatur, quia malum in quantum huiusmodi non amatur, sed, sicut videtur visibile, ita amatur amabile, quod quidem est vel per se bonum, scilicet honestum, vel delectabile vel utile. Hoc autem tertium, scilicet utile, videtur esse id per quod pervenitur ad bonum honestum vel delectabile, unde bonum honestum et delectabile sunt propter se amabilia ut fines, utile autem est amabile propter alterum, sicut id quod est ad finem. Bonum autem et delectabile si communiter sumerentur, non distinguerentur subiecto abinvicem, sed solum ratione. Nam bonum dicitur aliquid secundum quod est in se perfectum et appetibile. Delectabile autem secundum quod in eo quiescit appetitus. Sic autem non sumuntur hic, sed verum bonum hominis hic dicitur quod ei convenit secundum rationem, delectabile autem quod est sibi conveniens secundum sensum.
| 1552. Not everything is loved indiscriminately because evil as such is not loved, but man loves what is lovable, and this is either good in itself, i.e., honorable, or it is a pleasurable or useful good. The last or useful good seems to be a means of attaining the honorable and pleasurable goods which are lovable on account of themselves as ends. On the other hand, useful good is lovable on account of another, as a means to an end. But the good and the pleasurable taken in general are not distinguished from one another in substance but only in concept. Something is described as good precisely insofar as it is intrinsically perfect and desirable; and pleasurable inasmuch as the appetite rests in it. However that is not the meaning here: the question here is of man’s genuine good, which belongs to reason; and the pleasurable is taken here as that which appeals to the senses.
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| Deinde cum dicit: utrum igitur etc., movet circa hoc dubitationem, utrum scilicet homines ament id quod est bonum simpliciter vel id quod est bonum ipsis. Haec enim quandoque abinvicem dissonant. Sicut philosophari est bonum simpliciter, non tamen est bonum indigenti necessariis. Et eadem dubitatio est circa ipsum delectabile. Nam aliquid est delectabile simpliciter sicut dulce, quod non est delectabile huic, scilicet habenti gustum infectum.
| 1553. Then [a, ii], at “Do men then love, he raises a. doubt on this point: do men love what is the absolute good, or what is good relative to themselves? These sometimes do differ from each other. For instance, to philosophize in itself is good but not in the case of the pauper. The same doubt presents itself in the case of the pleasurable good itself; for an object pleasurable in itself (e.g., a sweet) is not pleasant to one with a sour taste.
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| Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem etc., solvit praedictam quaestionem. Et primo ponit solutionem. Et dicit quod unusquisque videtur amare id quod est sibi bonum, quia quaelibet potentia fertur in obiectum sibi proportionatum: sicut visus uniuscuiusque videt id quod est sibi visibile. Et sicut simpliciter amabile est id quod est simpliciter bonum, ita unicuique amabile est id quod est sibi bonum.
| 1554. At “It seems though” [a, iii] he answers the foregoing question. First [iii, x] he states his solution, saying everyone seems to love what is good for him because every faculty tends to the object proportionate to itself. Thus everyone’s vision sees what is visible to it. As the totally lovable is the totally good, so the lovable for each man is that which is good for him.
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| Secundo ibi: amat autem etc., obiicit in contrarium. Et dicit quod unusquisque homo amat non illud quod est sibi bonum, sed illud quod apparet sibi bonum. Appetitus enim non fertur in aliquid nisi prout est apprehensum, unde videtur falsum esse quod unicuique sit amabile id quod est sibi bonum.
| 1555. Second [iii, y], at “However, everyone,” he argues for the contrary, saying that every man loves not what is really good for him but what seems good for him; for desire tends to an object only as apprehended. Consequently it seems false that what is lovable is what is good for him.
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| Tertio ibi: differt autem etc., solvit dicens, quod hoc nihil differt ad propositum. Quia cum amatur aliquid apparens bonum amatur ut sibi bonum. Unde etiam poterit dici quod amabile est apparens bonum.
| 1556. Third [iii, z], at “But this makes,” he gives the answer that this makes no difference to our proposition; for, when some apparent good is loved it is loved as a good for oneself. Hence it can also be said that what is lovable is what appears good.
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| Secunda particula pertinet ad qualitatem amationis, quam ponit ibi, tribus autem entibus et cetera. Et dicit quod, cum tria sint propter quae homines amant, scilicet bonum, delectabile et utile, in illa amatione qua dicitur amare inanimata, puta vinum aut aurum, non dicitur esse amicitia. Et hoc ostendit dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia in tali amatione non potest esse redamatio quae requiritur ad amicitiam. Non enim vinum amat hominem, sicut homo amat vinum. Secundo, quia non sic amamus inanimata ut insit nobis voluntas boni illorum. Ridiculum enim esset dicere quod aliquis vellet vino bonum: sed hoc bonum quod est vinum homo vult sibi. Unde per hoc quod homo amat vinum, non est benivolus vino, sed sibiipsi.
| 1557. The second portion which he gives at “While there are” [i, b], relates to the quality of love. He says that while there are three reasons why men love, viz., the good, the pleasurable, and the useful, friendship does not consist in that love which a man is said to have for inanimate things, like wine or gold. He shows this in two ways. First, because in a love of this kind there cannot be the mutual return that is necessary for friendship, for wine does not love man as man loves wine. Second, because we do not love inanimate things in such a way that we will their good. It would be absurd to say that we willed good to wine; but the good which is wine a man wills for himself. Therefore, in loving wine man obviously does not have benevolence towards the wine but towards himself.
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| Et si aliquis dicat quod homo vult vino bonum, quia vult quod conservetur, considerandum est quod homo vult salvari vinum, ut ipse habeat illud et ita non vult salutem vini in quantum est bonum vini, sed in quantum est bonum suiipsius. Et hoc est contra rationem amicitiae. Dicitur enim quod oportet amico velle bonum gratia illius et non propter bonum amantis.
| 1558. If someone says that a man wishes good to the wine because he wishes that it be preserved, we should consider that a man wants the wine to remain unspoiled so he can have it. In this way he does not desire the preservation of the wine for the good of the wine but for his own good. And this is contrary to the notion of friendship, for we say that the good of a friend must be willed for his sake and not for the sake of the one loving.
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| Tertia particula pertinet ad vicissitudinem amandi, quam ponit ibi: volentes autem et cetera. Et dicit quod si aliqui velint bona alicui illius gratia, dicimus eos benevolos; sed non dicimus eos amicos, si non idem fiat ab illo, ut scilicet amatus velit bonum amanti eius gratia. Quia amicitiam dicimus esse benevolentiam in contrapassis, ut scilicet amans ametur. Habet enim quamdam commutationem amoris secundum formam commutativae iustitiae.
| 1559. The third portion [i, c], which he presents at “But those wishing,” refers to change in the one loved. He explains that when people wish good to someone for his sake we call them benevolent but not friends if the wish is not reciprocated so that the loved one wishes good to, and for the sake of, the one loving. The reason is that we say friendship is benevolence with corresponding requital inasmuch as the one loving is loved in return, for friendship has a kind of exchange of love after the manner of commutative justice.
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| Quarta particula sumitur secundum conditionem mutui amoris, et hanc ponit ibi: vel apponendum et cetera. Et dicit quod adhuc apponendum est ad complendam rationem amicitiae, quod sit benevolentia mutua non latens: multi enim sunt benevoli aliquibus, quos nunquam viderunt, inquantum ex auditis existimant eos esse epiiches, idest virtuosos, vel utiles sibi. Et potest esse quod idem patiatur aliquis illorum ad eum qui sic est benivolens. Huiusmodi ergo homines videntur esse benevoli adinvicem, sed non possunt dici amici, cum lateat eos qualiter se habent ad invicem.
| 1560. The fourth portion [r, d] is taken from the condition for mutual love; and it is stated at “Likewise we must.” He says that to complete the notion of friendship we must add that it is a mutual benevolence which is recognized. Many men are benevolent towards those they have never seen, for, from reports, they judge these people are just, i.e., virtuous, or useful to themselves. Likewise it is possible that one of them should have the same feeling towards him who is benevolent in this way. Consequently men of this kind seem to be benevolent towards one another but cannot be friends while they are unaware of one another’s feelings.
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| Deinde cum dicit: oportet igitur etc., concludit ex praemissis definitionem amicitiae. Et dicit, quod oportet ad rationem amicitiae, quod per eam aliqui sibi bene velint adinvicem, et quod hoc non lateat eos, et quod hoc sit propter unum aliquod praedictorum, scilicet propter bonum vel delectabile vel utile.
| 1561. Then [A, 2], at “Therefore it is necessary,” he concludes with the definition of friendship derived from the premises. He says that it is necessary to the notion of friendship that men wish good to one another, that this fact be recognized by them, and that it be for the sake of one of the things previously mentioned, namely, the good, the pleasurable, or the useful.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| | Differunt autem haec et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quid est amicitia, hic distinguit species eius. Et primo distinguit species amicitiae. Secundo ostendit, in quibus amicitiae speciebus fiant accusationes seu conquestiones, ibi: trinis itaque existentibus, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit species amicitiae, quae in aequalitate personarum salvatur. Secundo distinguit species amicitiae, quae est inter inaequales personas, ibi: altera est autem amicitiae species et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit amicitiae species. Secundo ostendit eas in aequalitate existere, ibi: sunt autem igitur dictae amicitiae et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo distinguit amicitiae species. Secundo determinat de eis per comparationem ad actum, ibi, quemadmodum autem in virtutibus et cetera. Tertio per comparationem ad subiectum, ibi, in severis autem et senibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit specierum distinctionem. Secundo determinat de singulis speciebus, ibi, qui quidem igitur et cetera.
| 1562. After the Philosopher has shown the nature of friendship, he now distinguishes the kinds of friendship. On this point he does two things. First he makes his distinction. Then [Lect. 13], at “There are three etc.” (B.1162 a 34), he shows which kinds of friendship give rise to complaints or grumblings. He treats his first point from two aspects. First he distinguishes the kinds of friendship which exist between persons of equal rank. Next [Lect. 7], at “There is another etc.” (B. 1158 b 11), he distinguishes the kinds of friendship that exist between persons of unequal rank. On the first point he does two things. First he distinguishes the kinds of friendship. Second [Lect. 6], at “Consequently, the friendships etc.” (B 1158 b), he shows, that these consist in equality. He -discusses the first point from three aspects. First [I] he distinguishes the kinds of friendship. Then [Lect. 5; II], at “Just as in the case etc.” (B.1157 b 5), he treats them in relation to their acts. Last [Lect. 6; III], at “But friendship etc.” (B. 1158 a 3), he treats them in relation to their subjects. On the first point [I, A] he gives the distinction of the kinds. Next [I, B], at “Therefore of those etc.,” he treats the particular kinds.
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| Dicit ergo primo, quod cum sint tria amabilia, sicut dictum est: scilicet bonum simpliciter, delectabile et utile: haec differunt specie abinvicem, non quidem sicut tres species ex aequo dividentes aliquod genus, sed secundum prius et posterius se habent. Et quia secundum differentiam obiectorum diversificantur actus, consequens est, quod amationes secundum haec tria differant specie: ut scilicet alia sit species amationis qua amatur aliquid propter bonum, et alia qua amatur aliquid propter delectabile, et alia qua propter utile. Et quia amicitiae actus est amatio, consequens est, quod etiam sint tres species amicitiae, aequales numero amabilibus. Quarum una est amicitia propter honestum, quod est bonum simpliciter; alia propter delectabile; et tertia, propter utile.
| 1563. He says first that there are three kinds of lovable objects, is indicated (1552, 1557), namely, the good as such, the pleasurable, and the useful; these do not differ in kind as three equal species of a genus but are classified by priority and posteriority. Since acts are diversified according to the difference of objects, the types of love will differ in kind according to these three: thus there is one type of love by which a thing is loved for the good, another for the pleasurable, and a third for the useful. Likewise, because love is an act of friendship, there will be three kinds of friendship equal to the three objects of love. One is friendship for the honorable good or the good as such, another for the pleasurable, and a third for the useful.
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| In singulis enim horum salvatur ratio amicitiae supraposita, quia secundum unumquodque horum trium potest esse redamatio non latens. Et secundum haec tria possunt sibi bona velle adinvicem secundum quod amant. Puta si amant se propter virtutem, volunt sibi invicem bonum virtutis. Si autem propter utile, volunt sibiinvicem bona utilia. Et si propter delectationem, delectabilia.
| 1564. In each of these the definition of friendship just given is fulfilled, because in each of the three a recognized return of love by someone is possible. Likewise in these three, people can will good to one another according to their love. For example, if men love for the sake of virtue, they wish one another the virtuous good; but if for a good based on utility, they wish one another useful goods; if for a good based on pleasure they wish pleasurable goods.
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| Deinde cum dicit: qui quidem igitur etc., determinat de praedictis amicitiae speciebus, quae quidem non aequaliter sub amicitia continentur, sed secundum prius et posterius. Sic ergo tria facit. Primo determinat de amicitia utilis et de ea quae est delectabilis, quae per posterius rationem amicitiae participant. Secundo determinat de amicitia honesti, quod est bonum simpliciter, cui primo et per se competit ratio amicitiae, ibi, perfecta autem est bonorum et cetera. Tertio comparat alias amicitias ad istam, ibi, quae autem propter delectabile et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quales sint amicitiae species imperfectae; secundo ostendit quibus competunt, ibi, maxime autem in senibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit amicitias utilis et delectabilis esse amicitias per accidens. Secundo ostendit, quod sunt facile dissolubiles, ibi: facile solubiles utique et cetera.
| 1565. Next [l, B], at “Therefore of those,” he treats the kinds of friendship just mentioned which are contained under friendship not according to equality but according to priority and posteriority. So he does three things. First [B, i] he treats friendship based on utility and that based on pleasure which share the nature of friendship by posteriority. Then [B, 2], at “Perfect friendship, however etc.,” he treats friendship based on the honorable, i.e., good by itself to which the notion of friendship primarily and essentially pertains. Last [B, 3; Lect. 4], at “But that etc.” (B. 1157), he compares the other kinds of friendship with this kind. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First [i, a] he shows just what the different kinds of imperfect friendship are; then [i, b], at “This friendship,” to whom they belong. On the first point he does two things. First [a, i] he shows that useful and pleasurable friendships are friendships in an incidental sense. Second [a, ii], at “Since men etc.,” he shows that they are easily dissolved.
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| Dicit ergo primo, quod illi qui amant se adinvicem propter utilitatem, unus non amat alterum propter seipsum, sed secundum quod ab altero accipit sibi aliquod bonum. Et simile est in his qui se amant propter delectationem. Non enim unus amat alium propter hoc quod est taliter dispositus, puta, quod est eutrapelus, idest virtuose se habens circa ludos; sed solum inquantum est sibi delectabilis. Et sic patet, quod tam illi qui amant propter utile, amant propter bonum quod eis provenit, quam etiam illi qui amant propter delectationem, amant propter delectabile quod percipiunt. Et ita non amant amicum secundum quod ipse in se est, sed secundum quod accidit ei, scilicet secundum quod est utilis vel delectabilis. Unde patet quod huiusmodi amicitiae non sunt per se amicitiae, sed per accidens, quia non amatur homo secundum id quod ipse est, sed secundum quod aliquid exhibet, scilicet utilitatem vel delectationem.
| 1566. He says first that of those who love one another for the sake of utility, one does not love the other for the sake of the other but inasmuch as he receives from the other some good for himself. The same is true of those who love each other on account of pleasantness, for the one does not love the other precisely as witty or virtuous in merriment but merely as pleasant to himself. So it is obvious that those who love for the sake of utility love for the good they get, and those who love for the sake of pleasantness love for the pleasure they enjoy. Thus they do not love their friend for what he is in himself but for what is incidental to him, his utility or pleasantness. Therefore, friendships of this sort plainly are not friendships essentially but incidentally, because a person is not loved for what he is but for utility or pleasure.
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| Deinde cum dicit: facile solubiles etc., ostendit huiusmodi amicitias facile esse dissolubiles. Sunt enim propter aliquid, quod accidit hominibus qui amantur, in quo homines non permanent semper sibi similes; sicut non semper idem homo est delectabilis vel utilis. Quando igitur illi qui amabantur desinunt esse delectabiles vel utiles, amici eorum quiescunt ab amando. Et hoc maxime manifestum est in amicitia utilis. Non enim semper est idem utile homini, sed aliud et aliud secundum diversa tempora et loca. Sicut in aegritudine est utilis medicus, in navigando nauta, et sic de aliis. Quia ergo amicitia non habebatur ad ipsum hominem secundum se, sed ad utilitatem quae ab ipso erat, consequens est, quod dissoluta amicitiae causa, etiam amicitia dissolvatur. Et simile contingit circa amicitiam delectationis.
| 1567. Then [a, ii], at “Since men,” he shows that friendships of this kind are easily dissolved. They are for the sake of something that is incidental to the persons loved and in this men do not always remain the same. The same man, for instance, is not always pleasant or useful. Therefore, when those who are loved cease to be pleasant or useful, their friends stop loving them. This is very obvious in friendship based on utility, for the same thing is not always useful to a man. it is one thing now, and then another in different times and places. So a doctor is useful for sickness, a sailor for navigation and so on. Since then friendship was cultivated not for the man himself but for the utility he afforded, when the cause of the friendship vanishes the friendship too is consequently dissolved.
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| Deinde cum dicit: maxime autem in senibus etc., ostendit quibus huiusmodi amicitiae competant. Et primo ostendit quibus competat amicitia utilis. Secundo quibus competat amicitia delectabilis, ibi, iuvenum autem amicitia et cetera. Ponit autem primo tria genera hominum quibus competit amicitia utilis. Et primo dicit, quod maxime talis amicitia videtur fieri in senibus, qui non quaerunt delectabile propter debilitatem caloris et sensuum, sed quaerunt utile, inquantum scilicet indigent ut subveniatur naturae iam deficienti.
| 1568. At “This friendship” [1, b] he shows to whom these friendships may be attributed. First [1, b, i] he shows to whom useful friendships belong; then [1, b, ii], at “Young men seem etc.,” to whom pleasurable friendship. He notes three classes of men who avail themselves of useful friendship. First [i, x] he says that this friendship seems to exist especially among old men who are not looking for what is pleasurable for the delight of body and sensitive nature, but rather what is useful for help needed for their natural deficiency.
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| Secundo ibi: et eorum qui in adolescentia etc., dicit quod haec amicitia competit etiam adolescentibus et iuvenibus qui quaerunt utile. Et hi quidem non omnino sunt tales ut se mutuo ament, neque etiam convivunt adinvicem, quia quandoque non sunt sibiinvicem delectabiles, nec unus indiget societate alterius nisi solum propter utilitatem. Intantum enim mutua societas est eis delectabilis, inquantum per hoc habent aliquam spem boni, ad quod sit eis utilis talis societas.
| 1569. Second [i, y], at “It is also,” he says that is the kind of friendship pursued by adolescents and youths who seek what is useful. They seem quite incapable of possessing mutual love or even of remaining constant companions because sometimes they are not agreeable to one another; neither does one need the companionship of another except for utility. Their association with one another is pleasurable to them inasmuch as it holds some hope of good for which this association is useful.
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| Tertio ibi, in has autem dicit, quod ad amicitias quae sunt propter utilitatem quidam reducunt etiam amicitiam peregrinorum, qui seinvicem amare videntur propter utilitatem quam unus ab alio habet in sua peregrinatione.
| 1570. Third [i, z], at “To the same,” he says that to friendships based on utility some reduce even the friendship of fellow travelers who seem to love one another for the advantage that one derives from another on his journey.
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| Deinde cum dicit: iuvenum autem etc., ostendit quibus competat amicitia delectabilis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quibus competat huiusmodi amicitia: et dicit, quod amicitia quae est propter delectationem maxime videtur esse iuvenum. Quia vivunt secundum quod feruntur a passionibus, nondum roborato in eis iudicio rationis, quo passiones ordinentur. Et quia passiones omnes terminantur ad delectationem et tristitiam, ut in secundo habitum est; consequens est, quod ipsi maxime persequuntur id quod est eis delectabile secundum praesens tempus. Passiones enim pertinent ad partem sensitivam, quae maxime respicit praesens. Amare autem aliquid propter hoc quod est factivum delectationis in futurum, iam accedit ad rationem utilis.
| 1571. Next [1, b, ii], at “Young men seem,” he shows to whom pleasurable friendship may be attributed. On this point he does two things. First [ii, x] he explains to whom this friendship may be assigned, saying that friendship based on pleasure belongs most of all to youths. This is so because they live according to the impulses of passion since they have not been strengthened in rational judgment by which the passions are regulated. Because all passions terminate at pleasure and pain, as we stated in the second book (296, 441), youths principally seek what is pleasurable at the present moment. The passions belong to the sensitive part of man which is chiefly concerned with the present. But to love a present thing because it is productive of future pleasure coincides with the notion of the useful.
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| Secundo ibi: aetate autem etc., ostendit horum amicitias esse facile mutabiles dupliciter. Primo quidem ex parte delectabilium, quia scilicet transeunte aetate fiunt eis alia delectabilia. Non enim eadem sunt in quibus delectantur pueri, adolescentes et iuvenes et ideo tales de facili fiunt amici, et de facili cessant, quia simul transmutato delectabili transit amicitia. Iuvenilis autem delectationis est velox transmutatio, eo quod tota eius natura in quadam transmutatione consistit.
| 1572. Then [ii, y], at “As they grow older,” he shows that these friendships readily change in two ways: first [y, aa], on the part of the pleasurable objects, because other things become pleasing to them with the passing of time. It is not in the same thing that children, adolescents, and youths alike find pleasure; and so they easily make friends and easily forsake them because with the change of pleasure comes a change of friendship. But youthful pleasure is characteristically swift to change since the nature of youth consists wholly in a state of change.
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| Secundo ibi: et amativi autem etc., ostendit idem ex parte amantium. Et dicit, quod iuvenes sunt amativi, idest prompti et vehementes in amore, quia scilicet amant non ex electione, sed secundum passionem, et inquantum concupiscunt delectationem. Et ideo vehementer et intense amant. Et quia passio facile transit sicut et facile advenit, inde est quod tales sicut de facili amare incipiunt, ita cito quiescunt ab amando, et multoties eadem die amicitiam ineunt et dissolvunt. Sed quamdiu amicitia durat, volunt tales per totum diem sibiinvicem commanere et convivere sibiipsis, inquantum sunt sibi mutuo delectabiles. Isto enim modo disponitur in eis amicitia.
| 1573. At “Moreover, young people” [y, bb] he shows the same thing on the part of those who love. He says that young people are volatile, i.e., quick and vehement in their love because they love not from rational choice but from passion and inasmuch as they are very desirous of pleasure. Therefore they love passionately and intensely. Since passion vanishes as quickly as it appears, such persons as easily fall in love as they cease to love; many times they even fall in and out of love the same day. But as long as the friendship endures these people want to remain together all day long and live in the other’s presence inasmuch as they enjoy the company of each other. This is the way their friendship works.
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| Deinde cum dicit: perfecta autem est etc., determinat de amicitia principali quae est propter bonum virtutis. Et primo proponit huiusmodi amicitiam esse perfectam. Et dicit quod tertia amicitia, quae est bonorum et sibi invicem similium secundum virtutem, est perfecta amicitia.
| 1574. Next [B, 2], at “Perfect friendship, however,” he treats the principal kind of friendship which is for the good of virtue. First [2, a] he points out that this friendship is perfect. He says that the friendship between good men and those alike in virtue is perfect friendship.
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| Secundo ibi: isti enim bona etc., probat quod dixerat, ostendendo conditiones huius amicitiae. Et primo ostendit quod huiusmodi amicitia est per se et non per accidens. Secundo ostendit quod nihil ei deest, ibi: et est uterque simpliciter bonus et cetera. Tertio quod est rara, ibi, raras autem verisimile et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit praedictam amicitiam esse per se et non per accidens. Illi enim qui sunt sibi similes in virtute, volunt sibiinvicem bona, inquantum sunt boni. Sunt autem boni secundum seipsos. Nam virtus est quaedam perfectio faciens hominem bonum et opus ipsius. Ergo patet quod tales volunt sibi bona secundum seipsos. Unde eorum amicitia est per se.
| 1575. Then [2, b], at “for those who,” he proves his statement by~ explaining the qualities of this friendship. First [2, b, i] he shows that this is friendship essentially and not incidentally. Second [2, b, ii], at “Likewise each,” he shows that it lacks nothing. Third [2, b, iii], at “Very likely etc.,” he shows that it is rare. He handles the first point in a threefold manner. First [2, b, i, x] he shows that the friendship just referred to is friendship essentially and not incidentally. Those who are alike in virtue wish one another good inasmuch as they are virtuous. But they are good in themselves, for virtue is a kind of perfection making man good and his work good. It is clear then that such men wish good to one’ another in themselves. Therefore they have friendship essentially.
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| Secundo ibi, volentes autem bona etc., ex hoc concludit quod talis amicitia sit maxima. Semper enim illud quod est per se est potius eo quod est per accidens. Cum igitur haec amicitia sit per se, aliae autem per accidens, consequens est quod virtuosi qui volunt bona amicis propter eos et non propter aliquid quod sibi ex eis proveniat, sunt maxime amici.
| 1576. Second [2, b, i, y], at “But people who,” he concludes from this that friendship of this type is the best friendship; that which is essential is always better than that which is incidental. Since this is friendship essentially and the others incidentally, the virtuous who wish good to friends for their sake and not for the sake of something that may come from them are the highest type of friends.
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| Tertio ibi, permanet igitur etc., concludit ulterius quod, ex quo tales amant seipsos propter hoc quod boni sunt, consequens est quod eorum amicitia permaneat quousque sunt boni secundum virtutem. Virtus autem est habitus permanens et non de facili transiens, ut patet ex his quae in secundo dicta sunt. Ergo talis amicitia est diuturna.
| 1577. Third [2, b, i, z], at “Therefore friendship,” he infers further: from the fact that men of this kind love one another by reason of their goodness, their friendship consequently remains as long as they are good in virtue. But virtue is a permanent habit and does not change easily, as is clear from discussions in the second book (305). Therefore this friendship is lasting.
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| Deinde cum dicit: et est uterque simpliciter etc., ostendit quod huic amicitiae nihil deest quod pertinet ad rationem perfecti, ut patet in tertio physicorum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quod haec amicitia comprehendit in se ea quae sunt in aliis amicitiis. Et dicit quod in ista amicitia uterque amicus est bonus non solum simpliciter, scilicet secundum seipsum, sed etiam per comparationem ad suum amicum, quia illi qui sunt virtuosi sunt et simpliciter boni et utiles sibi invicem. Et similiter sunt simpliciter delectabiles et etiam ad invicem; et hoc ideo quia unicuique sunt delectabiles propriae actiones, et tales, idest actiones similes propriis. Actiones autem virtuosorum sunt quidem quae unius, propriae sibi, et quae alterius, similes propriis. Non enim contrariantur sibi operationes quae sunt secundum virtutem, sed omnes sunt secundum rationem rectam. Sic ergo manifestum est quod amicitia virtuosorum non solum habet bonum simpliciter, sed etiam delectationem et utilitatem.
| 1578. At “Likewise each” [2, b, ii] he shows that this friendship lacks nothing that belongs to the notion of what is perfect, as is evident in the third book of the Physics (Ch. 6, 207 a 10; St. Th. Lect. 11, 385). On the first point he does three things. First [2, b, ii, x] he shows that this friendship comprehends those things that are found in other kinds of friendship. He explains that each friend is good not only simply or in himself but also in relation to his friend, because those who are virtuous are also good without qualification and useful to one another and completely pleasing. This is so because each man takes pleasure in his own actions and in actions similar to his own. Likewise the actions of virtuous men are those belonging to one man as proper to him and to another as similar to these; for operations that are according to virtue are not contrary to each other but all are according to right reason. So then it is obvious that the friendship of virtuous men comprehends not only good in an unqualified sense but also pleasure and utility.
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| Secundo ibi: talis autem amicitia etc., concludit iterum quod talis amicitia rationabiliter est diu permansiva et non facile transiens, quia in ea coniunguntur omnia quaecumque requiruntur ad amicos. Omnis enim amicitia est propter bonum vel propter delectationem: et hoc vel simpliciter, puta quia id quod amatur est simpliciter bonum et delectabile, vel quia est bonum et delectabile amanti: et hoc est esse bonum et delectabile non simpliciter et proprie, sed secundum quamdam similitudinem ad id quod est vere et proprie bonum et delectabile. In hac autem amicitia omnia praedicta existunt non per accidens, sed per se. Illi enim qui sunt similes secundum hanc amicitiam virtutis, et reliqua bona habent; quia quod est simpliciter bonum est etiam delectabile. Et sic, quia huiusmodi amicitia habet omnia quae ad amicitiam requiruntur, non de facili dissolvitur. Illud enim praetermitti consuevit in quo defectus aliquis invenitur.
| 1579. Then [2, b, ii, y], at “It is reasonable,” he concludes further that it is reasonable for such friendship to be long lasting and not readily transient, because it contains absolutely everything necessary for friends. Every friendship is for the sake of good or pleasure: either in itself (for example, when what is loved is in itself good and pleasurable) or in relation to the one loving which is to be good and pleasurable not in itself and properly but according to a kind of likeness to what is really and properly good and pleasurable. in fact all the preceding things are found in this friendship not incidentally but essentially; and those who are alike according to this friendship have the remaining goods too, because what is simply good is also pleasing. Since this friendship has all the requisites of friendship, it is not easily broken up, for a defective thing is usually set aside.
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| Tertio ibi: maxime itaque etc., concludit iterum hanc amicitiam esse maximam, quia scilicet illa in quibus coniunguntur omnes rationes amandi, sunt maxime amabilia. Et talia sunt bona honesta, quia et sunt bona simpliciter et sunt delectabilia et utilia, unde per consequens oportet quod etiam amare in his maxime accidat, et amicitia horum sit maxima.
| 1580. His third conclusion [2, b, ii, z], at “These things then,” observes that this friendship is the noblest kind because the state in which all the reasons for loving are united is most lovable. Objects of this kind are honorable goods because they are good without qualification and at the same time pleasurable and useful. Hence love in these cases should be most complete, and such friendship the noblest.
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| Deinde cum dicit: raras autem etc., ostendit praedictam amicitiam esse raram, quod est signum perfectionis, nam perfecta in quolibet genere rarius inveniuntur. Circa hoc autem tria facit. Primo ostendit propositum duabus rationibus. Quarum prima est, quia haec amicitia est virtuosorum. Pauci autem sunt tales propter difficultatem attingendi medium, ut dictum est in secundo. Unde verisimile est quod tales amicitiae sint rarae.
| 1581. Next [2, b, iii], at “Very likely,” he shows that this friendship is rare-an indication of its perfection, for perfection in any class is rather unusual. On this point he does three things. First [iii, x] he explains his intention. Then [iii, y], at “However, those who etc.,” he excludes an objection. Last [iii, z], at “A friendship of this kind then etc.,” he gives a summary. He explains his intention by two reasons. The first [x, aa] is that this friendship exists between virtuous men. But such men are scarce because of the difficulty of attaining the mean, as was pointed out in the second book (370). Consequently it is very likely that such friendships are rare.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. Quia scilicet amicitia talium indiget longo tempore et mutua assuetudine ut se invicem possint cognoscere et virtuosos et amicos, quia secundum quod dicitur in proverbio, non contingit quod aliqui seinvicem cognoscant antequam simul comedant mensuram salis. Non oportet autem quod unus acceptet alium ad hoc quod sit eius amicus antequam unus appareat alteri amandus et credatur ita esse; et hoc raro contingit. Unde tales amicitiae sunt rarae.
| 1582. Then [x, bb], at “Besides, time,” be gives the second reason. Friendship between men of this kind requires a long time and mutual association so that they can decide among themselves who are virtuous and their friends. This is so because, according to the proverb, people do not come to know one another before they eat a peck of salt together. But one man ought not to take another as his friend until he appears to the other worthy of being loved and is believed to be so. This rarely occurs. Consequently such friendships are uncommon.
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| Secundo ibi: qui autem cito etc., excludit obiectionem de illis qui videntur cito fieri amici. Et dicit quod illi qui cito sibiinvicem exhibent opera amicitiae, manifestant quod volunt esse amici, non tamen adhuc sunt, quousque sciant quod sint amabiles invicem. Et sic patet quod cito fit in homine voluntas amicitiae, sed non ita est de ipsa amicitia.
| 1583. Next [iii, y], at “However, those who,” he excludes an objection concerning those who seem to become friends at once. He says that people who quickly offer the services of friendship show that they want to be friends; nevertheless they are not yet friends until they know that they are lovable to one another. Thus it is clear that a man quickly acquires a wish for friendship but not friendship itself.
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| Tertio ibi: haec quidem igitur etc., epilogando concludit quod praedicta amicitia est perfecta, et secundum tempus quia est diuturna, et secundum reliqua quae dicta sunt. Et perficitur secundum omnia quae sunt in aliis amicitiis et similis sit uterque amicorum ab altero; quod requiritur ad amicitiam, propter hoc scilicet quod sunt similes in virtute.
| 1584. Last [iii, z], at “A friendship of this kind,” he concludes with a summary that this friendship is perfect both in regard to duration because it is lasting, and in regard to the other conditions. It contains everything found in the other kinds of friendship; and friends perform like services for each other—a thing that is necessary for friendship because friends are alike in virtue.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| | Quae autem propter delectabile et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de tribus amicitiae speciebus, hic comparat eas adinvicem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit in quo aliae amicitiae sint similes perfectae. Secundo in quo ab ea differant, ibi, propter delectationem quidem igitur etc.; tertio epilogat quae dicta sunt, ibi, species autem amicitiae et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit similitudinem aliarum amicitiarum ad perfectam quantum ad causam amandi. Et dicit quod illa amicitia quae est propter delectabile habet similitudinem perfectae amicitiae inquantum virtuosi sunt sibiinvicem delectabiles. Et similiter amicitia quae est propter utile, est similis perfectae amicitiae, inquantum virtuosi sunt sibiinvicem utiles.
| 1585. After the Philosopher has treated the three kinds of friendship, he now [B, 3] compares them. On this point he does three things. First [3, a] he shows in what respect the other kinds of friendship are like perfect friendship. Then [3, b], at “Therefore, for the sake etc.,” he shows how they differ. Last [3, c], at “There are then etc.,” he summarizes what has been discussed. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [a, i] he shows the likeness of the other kinds of friendship with perfect friendship in regard to the reason for loving. He explains that friendship for pleasure has a likeness to perfect friendship to the extent that virtuous men are pleasing to one another. Similarly, utilitarian friendship is like perfect friendship in this that virtuous men are useful to one another.
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| Secundo ibi, maxime autem etc., ostendit similitudinem quantum ad permanentiam amicitiae. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quomodo etiam amicitiae utilis et delectabilis sint permansivae; secundo quae earum sit permanentior, ibi, qui autem propter utile et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit duos modos quibus praedictae duae amicitiae sunt permanentes, et in hoc habent similitudinem perfectae amicitiae; secundo ponit modum in quo deficiunt a permanentia, ibi: qui autem non delectabile et cetera. Primo ergo ponit primum modum permanentiae; dicens, quod etiam in his qui sunt amici propter utile et delectabile, maxime sunt amicitiae permanentes, cum idem et aequale sibiinvicem rependant, puta delectationem pro delectatione. Et quia secundum diversa delectabilia sunt diversae delectationes specie et quantitate differentes, oportet quod ad permanentiam amicitiae non solum rependatur delectatio, sed etiam ab eodem delectabili, sicut accidit in eutrapelis quorum unus delectatur in ludo alterius. Non autem oportet sic esse, sicut accidit inter duas personas se amantes amore venereo, quia quandoque tales non delectantur in eisdem.
| 1586. Second [a, ii], at “But here again,” he shows the likeness in regard to the duration of friendship. On this point he does two things. First [ii, x] he shows how useful and pleasurable friendships endure. Next [ii, y], at “Likewise, people who etc.,” he shows which of these is more enduring. He discusses the first point from a double aspect. First [x, aa] he proposes two reasons why these two kinds of friendship are lasting; and in this they resemble perfect friendship. Then [x, bb], at “Where people etc.,” he states the reasons why they lack permanency. Initially [aa, a] he says that friendships even among those who are friends for utility and pleasure endure for the most part, since such persons make the same and an equal return to one another, for example, pleasure for pleasure. Because there is a variety of pleasures differing in kind and number according to the variety of pleasurable objects, the durability of friendship requires not only a return of pleasure but a return by the same kind of pleasurable object; this occurs among the witty, when one delights in the banter of the other. But this does not necessarily happen among persons who love one another sexually, since sometimes they do not take pleasure in the same things.
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| Sed amator delectatur in hoc quod videt personam amatam quae delectatur in hoc quod recipit servitium ab amatore; quibus cessantibus, quandoque cessat amicitia, dum scilicet ab una parte cessat visio et ex alia parte cessat servitium.
| 1587. But the lover takes pleasure in seeing the beauty of the beloved; and the beloved in receiving favors from the lover. On the termination of these circumstances, pleasurable friendship sometimes breaks up when the attractiveness of the one and the favor of the other cease.
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| Secundum modum permanentiae ponit ibi: multi autem rursus et cetera. Et dicit, quod etiam in amicitia utilis et delectabilis, multi permanent in amicitia si unus diligat mores alterius sicut luxuriosus diligit mores alterius luxuriosi, vel unus cupidus lucri mores alterius, non quod tales mores sint secundum se diligibiles sicut mores virtuosi, sed sunt diligibiles ex consuetudine, in quantum scilicet ambo sunt similis consuetudinis. Similitudo autem est per se causa amicitiae, nisi per accidens impediat privatum bonum, ut supra dictum est; unde, cum mores etiam mali ex consuetudine acquisiti sint permanentes, sequitur quod talis amicitia sit permansiva.
| 1588. At “Again, many persons etc.” [aa, b’] he gives tile second reason for durability. . fie explains that even in friendship based on utility and pleasure many remain friends when one loves the ways of the other, like one lustful person loves the ways of another, or one miser loves the ways of another; not that such ways are attractive of themselves but by reason of habit inasmuch as both persons have like habits. But likeness is essentially a cause of friendship unless it incidentally hinders the good of the individual, as we stated previously (1566). Since evil habits acquired from custom are enduring, such a friendship is lasting.
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| Deinde cum dicit: qui autem non delectabile etc. ponit modum, quo amicitia deficit in permanendo. Et dicit, quod illi, qui in amabilibus non recompensant delectabile pro delectabili sed utile pro delectabili, sunt minus amici propter minorem similitudinem, unde et minus permanent in amicitia.
| 1589. Then [x, bb], at “Where people,” he states the reason why friendship is deficient in durability. He says that people who do not make a return of one pleasurable object for another but of a useful object for a pleasurable one are less friends because of slighter likeness to one another. Hence their friendship is less enduring.
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| Deinde cum dicit: qui autem propter utile etc., comparat permanentiam utriusque amicitiae. Et dicit, quod illi qui sunt amici propter utile simul separantur ab amicitia cessante utilitate, quia non erant adinvicem amici sui ipsorum, sed utilitatis. Delectatio autem magis provenit ab ipso amico secundum seipsum, quam utilitas, quae est quandoque secundum aliquam rem exteriorem.
| 1590. Next [ii, y], at “Likewise, People who,” he compares the durability of the two kinds of friendship. He says that men who are friends by reason of utility break up their friendship when utility ceases, because they were friends, not of one another, but of the utility they seek. But pleasure comes more from the beloved in himself, than does utility which sometimes is in an external object.
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| Deinde cum dicit: propter delectationem quidem etc., ponit duas differentias duarum amicitiarum ad perfectam. Primo ergo concludit ex praemissis, quod propter delectationem et utilitatem possunt sibiinvicem fieri amici homines cuiuscumque condicionis, scilicet et mali malis et boni malis et etiam illi qui nec sunt virtuosi nec vitiosi, et ad utroslibet et adinvicem. Sed secundum perfectam amicitiam, qua homines propter seipsos amantur, non possunt fieri amici nisi boni. Quia in malis non invenitur aliquid, unde possint seinvicem amare aut in se delectari, nisi propter aliquam utilitatem.
| 1591. At “Therefore, for the sake” [3, b] he states two differences by which the two kinds of friendship deviate from perfect friendship. First [b, i] he infers from the discussions that for the sake of pleasure and utility any type of men can become friends with one another, for example, the good with the good, the bad with the bad, and even those who are neither virtuous nor vicious with both (i.e., the good and the bad), and with each other. But only good men make friends in that perfect friendship by which men are loved for their own sakes; evil men do not provide anything except utility by reason of which they can love one another or find mutual pleasure.
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| Secundam differentiam ponit ibi, et sola autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod sola amicitia bonorum, quae est perfecta, est de se intransmutabilis. Transmutatur enim amicitia maxime per hoc, quod unus amicorum invenit in alio id quod amicitiae contrariatur. Sed hoc non potest contingere in amicitia bonorum; quia homo non de facili credit alicui malum de illo quem multo tempore probavit, et nunquam invenit eum aliquid iniustum facientem, et in quo invenit omnia quaecumque reputantur digna ad veram amicitiam. Unde talis amicitia non dissolvitur, tum quia est per se et non per accidens; tum quia est perfecta omnia in se continens quae ad amicitiam requiruntur, quae rationes supra sunt positae, tum etiam quia non compatitur impedimentum amicitiae, quod nunc pro ratione inducitur.
| 1592. He gives the second difference at “Only the friendship” [b, ii], saying that only friendship between virtuous men, which is the perfect kind, is of itself unchangeable. Friendship is destroyed especially when one friend finds in the other something opposed to their friendship. But this is impossible in friendship between the virtuous. A man does not readily believe some evil about one whom he has often proved and never found doing any wrong and in whom he has discovered whatever is considered worthy of true friendship. Consequently, such a friendship does not break up because it is friendship essentially and not incidentally, and because it is perfect containing in itself everything requisite for friendship—the reasons have been given before (1578-1582); and also because it does not admit as an obstacle to friendship what is now offered as a reason.
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| Sed in aliis amicitiis, nihil prohibet quod unus credat malum de alio, et quod unus iniustum faciat alii. Unde non essent secundum has amicitias dicendi aliqui amici. Sed quia homines consueverunt tales vocare amicos tam illos qui propter utile amant (sicut dicitur esse amicitia inter civitates, propter utilitatem compugnationis contra inimicos), quam etiam eos qui diligunt se invicem propter delectationem, sicut patet de pueris; ideo oportet, quod etiam nos sequendo consuetudinem communiter loquentium, tales nominemus amicos.
| 1593. But in other kinds of friendship nothing hinders one from believing evil of another and acting unjustly to another. Therefore, some would not be termed friends according to these types of friendship. But people have usually designated as friends of this kind both those who love for the sake of utility (friendship is said to exist among states because of the advantage of mutually fighting against their common enemies) and those who love one another for the sake of pleasure, as is evident among children. So we should follow the customary way of speaking and call such men friends.
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| Deinde cum dicit: species autem amicitiae etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt de speciebus amicitiae. Et dicit, quod plures sunt amicitiae species. Et primo quidem et principaliter est amicitia bonorum, secundum quod sunt boni. Reliquae autem amicitiae dicuntur secundum similitudinem huius; in tantum enim dicuntur secundum illas amicitias aliqui amici, inquantum est ibi aliqua similitudo verae amicitiae. Manifestum est enim quod delectabile videtur esse quoddam bonum amatoribus delectationum. Et ita huius amicitia habet aliquam similitudinem eius quae est propter simpliciter bonum; et eadem ratio est de amicitia utilis
| 1594. Last [3, c], at “There are then,” he summarizes what has been said about the kinds of friendship, stating that there are many kinds of friendship. That between good men, as good, being friendship in the primary and proper sense, while the remaining kinds are called friendship from a likeness to this. Some men are called friends according to these types of friendship to the extent that there is present a likeness to true friendship. It is clear that what is pleasurable seems to be a kind of good to those who love pleasures. So this friendship has a likeness to that which is an unqualified good; and the same argument prevails in the case of useful friendship.
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| Non tamen hae duae amicitiae semper coniunguntur, ut scilicet sint iidem amici propter utile et delectabile; quia ea quae sunt secundum accidens non coniunguntur universaliter, sicut musicum et album, quae per accidens coniunguntur in sorte, non in omnibus coniunguntur; praedictae autem amicitiae sunt per accidens, sicut supra dictum est: unde non semper coniunguntur. Sic igitur, cum in praedictas species amicitia dividatur, mali possunt sibiinvicem esse amici propter delectationem vel utilitatem, in quantum scilicet sunt sibi invicem similes in altero horum, sed boni sunt (amici propter se ipsos, in quantum scilicet sunt amici secundum quod boni sunt). Unde soli boni sunt simpliciter amici. Alii autem sunt amici secundum similitudinem, inquantum scilicet assimilantur bonis.
| 1595. However, these two kinds of friendship are not so combined that friends for utility and friends for pleasure are identical, for things that are incidental are not united in all cases, for instance, what is musical and white. The kinds of friendship just treated are friendships incidentally, as we have pointed out (1566), hence they are not always combined. If then, according to the division of friendship into the foregoing species, the evil can be friends among themselves, to that extent they are like one another in one or other of these aspects. But only the good are friends essentially; others are friends by way of resemblance, to the extent that they resemble the good.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| | Quemadmodum autem in virtutibus et cetera. Postquam philosophus distinxit species amicitiae, hic determinat de eis per comparationem ad actum proprium amicitiae. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo distinguit amicitiam per habitum et actum. Secundo probat quod supposuerat, ibi, assimilatur autem amatio et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo distinguit amicitiam per habitum et actum; secundo ostendit quomodo quidam privantur amicitia propter defectum actus, ibi: si autem diuturna etc.; tertio ostendit amicitiam bonorum esse maximam ex ratione ipsius actus amicitiae, ibi, maxime quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod sicut est in aliis virtutibus, quod quidam dicuntur boni, idest virtuosi secundum habitum, puta fortes vel liberales, etiam quando actum virtutis non exercent, quidam vero dicuntur virtuosi secundum hoc quod actu exercent operationem virtutis: ita etiam est et in amicitia quod quidam dicuntur actu amici inquantum convivunt cum delectatione adinvicem et sibiinvicem bene faciunt, quae duo videntur pertinere ad actum amicitiae: quidam vero non operantur actu opera amicitiae, sed tamen sic sunt dispositi secundum habitum ut inclinentur ad operandum huiusmodi opera, sicut patet de amicis quando dormiunt, vel quando abinvicem loco separantur. Non enim ipsa amicitia simpliciter dissolvitur per distantiam locorum, sed sola amicitiae operatio. Et sic patet, quod amicitia remanet habitu etiam operatione cessante.
| 1596. After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of friendship, he now [II] treats them in relation to the proper act of friendship. On this point he does two things. First [II, A] he distinguishes friendship by reason of habit and act. Second [II, B], at “Affection resembles etc.,” he proves what he had assumed. He discusses the first point from three aspects. First [A, 1] he distinguishes the kinds of friendship by way of habit and act. Then [A, 2], at “However, if etc.,” he shows that some lose friendship by lack of friendly acts. Last [A, 3], at “Friendship then etc.,” he shows that friendship especially between virtuous men arises from the nature of the very act of friendship. He says first that, as in other virtues some men are called good or virtuous by reason of habit (for example, the brave or the generous) even when they are not performing the act of virtue, but others are called virtuous for actually performing a virtuous action; so too in friendship some are friends actually inasmuch as they live together pleasantly and do good for one another—two things that seem to belong to the act of friendship. But others are not actually performing the works of friendship, although they are so disposed by habit that they are inclined to perform such works—this is obvious of friends who are asleep or locally separated from one another. Indeed, separation does not sever friendship itself but only friendship’s activity. Thus it is evident that the habit of friendship remains even when its expression ceases.
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| Deinde cum dicit: si autem diuturna etc., ostendit, quomodo in quibusdam deficit amicitia propter defectum actus. Et primo ostendit propositum. Secundo probat quod supposuerat, ibi, nihil enim sic est et cetera. Ostendit autem propositum circa tria genera hominum. Primo quidem circa eos, qui diu abinvicem separantur. Unde dicit, quod si absentia amicorum abinvicem sit diuturna, videtur facere oblivionem amicitiae praecedentis. Sicut et alii habitus per dissuetudinem operandi debilitantur et tandem destruuntur; oportet enim quod sicut habitus per consuetudinem operum acquiruntur ita etiam per idem conserventur, nam unumquodque conservatur per suam causam. Et ideo dictum est in proverbio, quod multae amicitiae dissolvuntur per hoc, quod unus alium non appellat, id est non colloquitur et convivit alteri.
| 1597. Then [A, 2], at “However, if the absence,” he shows how in some cases friendship ceases from a lack of friendly acts. First [2, a] he explains his proposition. Second [2, b], at “Nothing is so etc.,” he proves what he had assumed. He explains his proposition in regard to three classes of men. First [a, i], about those who are separated from one another for a long time. He says that if the absence of friends from one another is prolonged, it seems to cause forgetfulness of a previous friendship. In this way other habits are also weakened and finally disappear from lack of use. As habits are acquired by practice, they must be preserved by practice, for everything is preserved by its cause. For that reason it has become proverbial that many friendships are destroyed through a man’s neglect to call upon his friend, to converse and associate with him.
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| Secundo ibi: non videntur autem etc., ostendit idem circa senes et severos. Et dicit, quod neque etiam senes, neque severi, idest homines austeri in verbis et convictu, videntur esse amativi, idest apti ad amicitiam, propter hoc scilicet quod non sunt apti ad amicitiae actum, qui est convivere. Parum enim invenitur in eis de delectatione. Et ideo non possunt de facili convivere aliis, quia nullus potest per diem, id est per aliquod longum tempus, morari cum homine qui contristat vel qui etiam non delectat. Maxime enim videtur secundum naturam hominibus et aliis animalibus, quod fugiant tristitiam et appetant delectationem, quae nihil aliud esse videtur, quam quies appetitus in bono desiderato.
| 1598. Second [a, ii], at “Neither old men,” he shows the same thing about the old and the morose. He says that neither the old nor the morose, i.e., people severe in word and social intercourse, seem to be friendly or disposed for friendship because they are not inclined to the activity of friendship, namely, association. Very little that is pleasant is found in them. For this reason they are not easy to live with, for no one can spend his days (i.e., a long time) with a man who is gloomy or with one who is unpleasant. Men and other animals find it natural to avoid pain and seek pleasure which appears to be simply repose of the appetite in a desired good.
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| Tertio ibi: qui autem recipiunt etc., ostendit idem circa tertium genus hominum, qui scilicet recipiunt se adinvicem in hoc scilicet, quod unus acceptat mores et conversationem alterius, et tamen propter aliquam causam nunquam convivunt adinvicem. Et dicit, quod tales magis sunt similes benevolis quam amicis, quia amicitia convictum per aliquod tempus requirit.
| 1599. Third [a, iii], at “But those who,” he shows the same thing about a third class of men, viz., those who are acceptable to one another in this, that one approves the ways and conduct of the other although for some reason the two never live together. Such persons, he says, are more like well-wishers than friends because friendship requires living together for some time.
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| Deinde cum dicit nihil enim etc., probat quod supposuerat, scilicet quod convivere requiratur ad amicitiam, sicut proprius actus eius. Et dicit quod nihil sic est proprium amicorum sicut convivere. Posuit enim duo supra ad actum amicitiae pertinere: scilicet convivere et tribuere invicem bona, quod est utilitatem afferre amico: quam quidem utilitatem non omnes in amicis quaerunt, sed soli indigentes; sed commorari simul per diem, idest per aliquod longum tempus cum amicis appetunt etiam beati, idest homines in bonis abundantes, quibus non convenit quod sint solitarii. Nec possunt homines simul ad invicem conversari, si non sint sibi mutuo delectabiles et non gaudeant in eisdem; quae duo inveniuntur in amicitia eorum, qui sunt simul nutriti. Sic ergo patet quod praecipuus actus amicitiae est convivere amico.
| 1600. Next [2, b], at “Nothing is so, “ he proves what he had assumed, namely, that living together is required for friendship as its proper act. He says nothing is so characteristic of friends as living together. Previously (1595) he stated that two works belong to the act of friendship: living together and bestowing favors on one another—this is to bring a friend some benefit, a thing that not all but only the needy seek from friends. Even happy people, i.e., those with abundance (who do not like to be alone) desire to spend their days (i.e., a long time) with friends. Nor can men associate with one another if they are not mutually pleasant and do not rejoice in the same things—two qualities found in the friendship of those who are brought up together. So then it is evident that the principal act of friendship is to live with one’s friends.
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| Deinde cum dicit: maxime quidem igitur etc., concludit ex praemissis quod sit maxima amicitia illa quae est bonorum, sicut iam pluries dictum est. Hoc enim videtur esse amabile et eligibile secundum se et simpliciter, quod est simpliciter bonum vel delectabile. Sed unicuique est amabile et eligibile, quod est tale, (id est) bonum vel delectabile, quantum ad ipsum. Sed unus virtuosus est amabilis et eligibilis alteri propter ambo haec, quia scilicet uterque est bonus et delectabilis simpliciter, et uterque est bonus et delectabilis alteri. Unde maxime possunt virtuosi delectabiliter adinvicem convivere.
| 1601. At “Friendship then” [A, 3] he concludes from the premises that friendship between virtuous., men is friendship in the best sense, as we have frequently noted (1574-1579, 1592). That seems to be lovable and absolutely worthy of choice in itself which is wholly good and pleasurable. But something of this nature, i.e., good or pleasurable in itself is lovable and worthy of choice for everyone. But one virtuous man is lovable to another and worthy of choice for these two reasons: each is good and pleasant without qualification, and each is good and pleasant to the other. Consequently, virtuous men especially can live pleasantly with one another.
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| Deinde cum dicit assimilatur autem etc., probat quod supposuerat, scilicet quod amicitia non solum dicatur secundum actum, sed etiam secundum habitum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod amatio videtur importare passionem. Sed amicitia videtur importare habitum, et esse similis aliis habitibus.
| 1602. Then [II, B], at “Affection resembles,” he proves what he had previously assumed: that friendship may be predicated not only according to act but also according to habit. On this point he does three things. First [B, 1] he states his proposal, saying that affection seems to indicate passion. But friendship seems to indicate habit and to be like other habits.
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| Secundo ibi: amatio enim etc., probat propositum duabus rationibus. Quarum prima est quia amatio simplex potest etiam ad inanimata esse, sicut dicimus amare vinum vel aurum. Sed redamare, quod pertinet ad rationem amicitiae, ut supra dictum est, est cum electione; non enim est nisi rationabilium adinvicem. Quod autem fit ex electione, non fit ex passione sed magis ab habitu. Ergo amicitia est habitus.
| 1603. Second [B, 2], at “Affection, however,” he proves his proposition by two reasons. The first [2, a] is that one-sided love can be bestowed even on lifeless objects, as we are said to love wine or gold. But mutual love—which belongs to the notion of friendship, as we have indicated (1557)—is accompanied by deliberate choice, for this is found only among rational beings. But what is done by choice is not done from passion but rather from habit. Therefore friendship is a habit.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi: et bona volunt et cetera. Et dicit quod homines secundum amicitiam volunt bona amicis propter ipsos amicos; nam si eis vellent bona propter seipsos, hoc magis esset diligere se quam alios. Amare autem alios eorum gratia, non est secundum passionem; quia passio, cum pertineat ad appetitum sensitivum, non excedit proprium bonum amantis. Unde relinquitur quod hoc sit secundum habitum et sic amicitia est habitus.
| 1604. He gives the second reason at “Men wish” [2, b], saying that by friendship men wish good to friends for their friends’ sake. If men wished good for their own sake they would love themselves rather than others. But to love others for their sake is not from passion because passion, since it belongs to the sensitive’ appetite, does not go beyond the particular good of the one loving. Consequently, it remains that this is from habit; and so friendship is a habit.
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| Tertio ibi: et amantes amicum etc., respondet cuidam tacitae obiectioni. Dictum est enim supra, quod unicuique est amabile, quod est ei bonum. Contra quod videtur esse quod homo amet amicum illius gratia. Sed ipse respondet, quod illi qui amant amicum, amant id quod est bonum sibiipsis. Nam, quando ille qui est bonus in se est factus amicus alicui, fit etiam bonum amico suo. Et sic uterque, dum amat amicum, amat quod sibi bonum est et uterque retribuit aequale suo amico, et quantum ad voluntatem inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum, et quantum ad speciem voluntatis inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum non sui, sed illius gratia; quia amicitia quaedam aequalitas est, inquantum scilicet requirit mutuam amationem. Et hoc videtur addere super modum virtutis; nam in qualibet virtute sufficit actus virtuosi. Sed in amicitia non sufficit actus unius, sed oportet quod concurrant actus duorum mutuo se amantium; et ideo philosophus supra non dixit absolute quod esset virtus, sed addidit: vel cum virtute, quia videtur aliquid addere supra rationem virtutis.
| 1605. Third [B, 3], at “Likewise, those who love,” he answers an implied objection. It has just been said (1601) that what is good to anyone is lovable to him. It seems contrary to this, that a man loves his friend for the friend’s sake. But he answers that those who love a friend love what is good to themselves. When a person, who is a good in himself ‘ becomes a friend to someone, he also becomes a good to his friend. So each, in loving his friend, loves what is good for himself; and each makes an equal return to his friend both in the fact of willing —as he wishes good to his friend—and in the kind of willing. He wishes good to his friend not for his own but for the friend’s sake. The reason is that friendship is a kind of equality precisely as it requires mutual love. This seems to be an addition above the mode of virtue, for in any virtue the act of the virtuous man is enough. But in friendship the act of one is not sufficient but the acts of two mutually loving one another must concur. For that reason the Philosopher did not state absolutely that it is a virtue but added “or at least accompanies virtue,” because it seems to add something above the notion of virtue.
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| Haec autem quae nunc dicta sunt de amicitia, maxime videntur inveniri in amicitia bonorum.
| 1606. The observations that have been made about friendship seem to be especially applicable to friendship between virtuous men.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| | In severis autem et senibus et cetera. Postquam philosophus distinxit diversas amicitiae species, hic determinat de huiusmodi amicitiis per comparationem ad subiectum, quod sunt ipsi amici. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim agit de aptitudine et ineptitudine quorumdam ad amicitiam. Secundo agit de multitudine amicorum, ibi: multis autem esse etc.; tertio de distinctione eorum, ibi: qui autem in potestatibus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod in hominibus severis et senibus tanto minus fit amicitia quanto magis sunt discoli, quia scilicet de se ipsis praesumentes sensum suum sequuntur. Et ideo cum aliis concordare non possunt; minus etiam gaudent colloquiis aliorum; tum quia sibiipsis intendunt; tum propter suspicionem quam de aliis habent. Ista autem maxime videntur esse amicitiae opera et causativa ipsius; scilicet concordia et colloquium amicorum.
| 1607. After the Philosopher has distinguished the different kinds of friendship, he now [III] discusses these friendships in relation to their subject, that is, to friends themselves. This aspect he treats from three angles. First [III, A] he treats the aptitude and ineptitude of some persons for friendship; then [III, B], at “It is not possible etc.,” the number of friends; last [III, C], at “Men in power etc.,” the differentiation of friends. He says first that the more peevish they are, the fewer friendships morose and elderly people form because, presuming on themselves, they follow their own way, For that reason they cannot agree with others: they have little taste for conversation with others both because they are intent on themselves and because they are suspicious of others. But concord and conversation with friends seem especially to be the works of friendship and its cause.
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| Et inde est, quod iuvenes, qui multum in colloquiis gaudent et de facili aliis assentiunt, cito fiunt amici. Quod non contingit de senibus. Non enim possunt fieri amici illis, de quorum convictu et colloquio non gaudent. Et eadem ratio est de severis, qui scilicet sunt litigiosi, et mordaces eorum quae ab aliis aguntur. Tales autem, scilicet senes et severi, possunt esse benevoli, inquantum aliis bona volunt in affectu, et etiam in effectu subveniunt in necessitatibus; non tamen fiunt vere amici, propter hoc quod non convivunt, neque gaudent in societate amicorum, quae maxime videntur esse amicitiae opera.
| 1608. Consequently youths, who find much pleasure in conversation and readily agree with others, quickly make friends. This does not happen with old people, for they cannot become friends of those whose company and conversation they do not enjoy. The same reason holds for morose persons who are quarrelsome and critical of what others do. But such people, i.e., the elderly and the severe, can be benevolent inasmuch as they affectively wish good to others and even effectively assist them in their needs. However they do not really become friends because they do not live with nor take pleasure in the company of their friends-activities that seem to be the special works of friendship.
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| Deinde cum dicit: multis autem esse amicum etc., agit de multitudine amicorum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim ostendit, quod secundum perfectam amicitiam, quae est bonorum, non contingit habere multos amicos. Secundo ostendit quod hoc contingit in aliis duabus amicitiis, quae scilicet sunt propter utile et delectabile, ibi, propter utile autem et cetera. Tertio comparat utrosque amicos ad invicem, ibi: horum autem magis et cetera. Ostendit ergo primo, quod secundum perfectam amicitiam, quae est propter bonum virtutis, non contingit aliquem esse multis amicum, tribus rationibus. Quarum prima est, quia cum talis amicitia sit perfecta et maxima, habet similitudinem cuiusdam superabundantiae in amando, si scilicet consideretur quantitas amoris; sed si consideretur ratio amandi, non potest ibi esse superabundantia, non enim contingit virtutem et virtuosum ab alio virtuoso, qui ratione ordinat suos affectus, nimis amari. Superabundans autem amor, non est natus fieri ad multos, sed ad unum tantum; sicut patet in amore venereo, secundum quem non contingit quod unus homo simul multas mulieres superabundanter amet. Ergo perfecta amicitia bonorum non potest haberi ad multos.
| 1609. Then [III, B], at “It is not possible,” he treats the number of friends. He explains this point in a threefold manner. First [ B, 1 ] he shows that it is not possible to be a friend to many people by the perfect friendship that exists between virtuous persons. Second [B, 2], at “In friendships etc.,” he shows that this happens in two other kinds of friendship: those for utility and pleasure. Third [B, 3], at “Friendship between etc.,” he compares the two kinds of friends with one another. He shows first, by three reasons, that it is not possible for a person to be a friend of many people by perfect friendship built on the good of virtue. The first [1, a] is that, since this friendship is perfect and best, it has a likeness to excess in loving-if the extent of love be considered. But if we consider the notion of loving there cannot be an excess. It is not possible for virtue and a virtuous person to be loved excessively by another virtuous person who regulates his affections by reason. Superabundant love is not designed by nature for many but for one only. This is evident in sexual love according to which one man cannot at the same time love many women in an excessive manner. Therefore, the perfect friendship of the virtuous cannot extend to many persons.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi: multos autem et cetera. Quae talis est. Secundum perfectam amicitiam amici valde invicem sibi placent. Sed non est facile, quod simul eidem multi valde placeant. Quia non multi inveniuntur, in quibus non inveniatur aliquid quod displiceat homini aliqualiter affecto, propter multos defectus hominum et contrarietates eorum adinvicem. Ex quo fit, ut dum unus multum placet, alius multum placere non possit. Forte etiam non esset bonum et expediens, ut uni homini multi valde placerent; quia dum multis conviveret, non posset sibiipsi intendere. Non ergo secundum perfectam amicitiam sunt multi amici.
| 1610. He gives the second reason [I, b] at “Then too it is difficult.” It is this. In perfect friendship friends are exceedingly pleasing to one another. But it is not easy for many to be exceedingly pleasing at the same time to the same individual, because few are to be found who do not have something displeasing to a person affected in some way by man’s many defects and conflicting dispositions. Thus it happens that, while one is very pleasing, another may not be. Perhaps it is fortunate and desirable that many cannot be exceedingly pleasing to one man who, while associating with many, would not be able to care for himself. Therefore, one cannot be a friend to many by perfect friendship.
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| Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, oportet autem et cetera. Quae talis est. In amicitia perfecta oportet ex assuetudine experientiam accipere de amico. Hoc autem est valde difficile; et sic non potest in multis contingere. Non ergo secundum perfectam amicitiam sunt plures amici.
| 1611. He gives the third reason [i, c] at “Besides, friendship etc.” It is this. In perfect friendship we must become acquainted with a friend by habitual association. But this is very hard and cannot happen with many people. Therefore, one does not have many friends by perfect friendship.
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| Deinde cum dicit: propter utile autem etc., ostendit, quod in aliis duabus amicitiis, quae scilicet sunt propter utile et delectabile, contingit, quod homo habeat multos amicos, quibus placeat: et hoc propter duo. Primo quidem, quia multi inveniuntur tales, qui possunt esse utiles et delectabiles. Secundo, quia non requiritur experientia longi temporis; sed sufficit ad tales amicitias ut etiam in pauco tempore sibi invicem subministrent delectationem vel etiam aliquam utilitatem.
| 1612. Next [B, 2], at “In friendships,” he shows that in the other two kinds of friendship, which are based on utility and pleasure, it is possible for a man to have many friends who are pleasing to him; and this for two reasons. First, because many can be useful and pleasant. Second, because a long period of trial is not required, it suffices that for a short time people provide one another with pleasure, for example, or even some utility.
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| Deinde cum dicit: horum autem etc., comparat amicos duarum amicitiarum adinvicem. Et primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod inter amicos praedictos, qui possunt esse multi, magis videtur esse amicitia (amicitia) eorum qui propter delectabile sunt amici. Si tamen idem fiat ab ambobus, ut scilicet uterque alteri exhibeat delectationem. Sic enim in eisdem adinvicem gaudent, quod est proprium amicitiae. Est enim signum quod sit eorum una (anima) qui in eisdem gaudent. Sed hoc non contingit quando ex una parte exhibetur delectabile et ex alia parte utile. Sunt autem tales amicitiae iuvenum, qui scilicet utrimque propter delectabile se amant.
| 1613. Then [B, 3], at “Friendship between such,” he compares the two kinds of friends. First [3, a] he states his proposition: with those just mentioned, among whom one can have many friends, friendship for pleasure’s sake seems to be more like true friendship; on condition, though that the same thing is done by both, namely, each affords pleasure to the other, for in this way they rejoice in the same things—a characteristic of friendship. In fact, this is an indication that there is one pleasure for those who delight in the same things. But the case is different when pleasure is occasioned on the part of one and utility on the part of the other. However, such are the friendships among youths that on either side they love each other for the sake of pleasure.
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| Secundo ibi: magis enim in his etc., probat propositum duabus rationibus. Quarum prima est quia in amicitia delectabilis amici magis se liberaliter amant quam in amicitia utilis, in qua requiritur recompensatio lucri et sic huiusmodi amicitia videtur esse quasi negotiatio quaedam. Et ita amicitia quae est propter delectabile est potior, utpote similior perfectae amicitiae, quae est maxime liberalis, inquantum secundum ipsam propter se amici amantur.
| 1614. Second [3, b], at “Their friendship,” he proves his proposition by two reasons. The first [b, ii] is that in pleasurable friendship friends love one another more generously than in useful friendship in which a profitable return is sought—this friendship seems to be a kind of business affair. Hence friendship for the sake of pleasure is more powerful, as more resembling perfect friendship, which is most generous inasmuch as by it friends are loved for their own sakes.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi: et beati autem et cetera. Quae talis est. Homines beati, id est bonis abundantes, non indigent utilibus amicis, quia beati sunt sibi sufficientes: indigent autem amicis delectabilibus, quia oportet quod aliquibus convivant; quod non potest fieri sine delectatione. Sustinent enim homines aliquid triste per modicum tempus, sed continue nullus posset aliquid cum tristitia sustinere, neque etiam ipsum bonum honestum si esset ei triste. Et inde est quod homines qui non delectantur in operibus virtutis non possunt in eis perseverare. Sic ergo patet quod amicitia delectabilis potior est quam amicitia utilis, utpote pluribus et melioribus necessaria.
| 1615. He gives the second reason [b, ii] at “But fortunate people.” It is this. Fortunate men, i.e., the rich, have no need of useful friends since they are sufficient unto themselves, but they do have need of pleasant friends, for they must live with others; and this is impossible without pleasantness. People can bear unpleasantness for a time. But no man can continuously endure something unpleasant; he could not even stand good itself if it were displeasing. Consequently men who do not find pleasure in virtuous activities cannot persevere in them, So then it is evident that pleasurable friendship is more effectual than useful friendship, as being necessary to a great number and to more generous people.
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| Tertio ibi: propter quod amicos etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis. Quia enim etiam bonum honestum, si sit triste, non potest aliquis continue sustinere, inde etiam est quod amicos propter virtutem oportet esse delectabiles invicem. Oportet etiam insuper, quod sicut sunt boni in se, ita etiam sint boni sibi invicem, sic enim habebunt quaecumque requiruntur in amicitia.
| 1616. Third [3, c], at “For this reason,” he infers a corollary from the discussions. Since even an honorable good would be intolerable if it were distasteful, it follows that friends for virtue’s sake must be pleasant to one another. They must be not only good in themselves, but also good to one another. Thus they will have the requisites for friendship.
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| Deinde cum dicit: qui autem in potestatibus etc., agit de divisione amicorum et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit: scilicet quod homines qui sunt in potestatibus constituti utuntur divisis amicis, ita scilicet quod alii amicorum sunt eis utiles et alii delectabiles. Non autem contingit de facili quod iidem homines sint eis amici utroque modo.
| 1617. Next [III, C], at “Men in power,” he treats the distinction of friends. On this point he does three things. First [C, 1] he states his proposition, that men situated in positions of power are accustomed to different kinds of friends in such a way that some are useful to them and others pleasant. It is not usual for the same men to be their friends in both ways.
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| Secundo ibi: neque enim delectabiles etc., probat propositum; quia scilicet huiusmodi potentes non quaerunt delectabiles secundum virtutem. Haec enim delectatio habet utilitatem annexam. Neque etiam quaerunt utiles ad bona honesta; quae quidem utilitas habet delectationem adiunctam. Sed ad delectationem appetunt quosdam eutrapelos, idest lusivos, puta histriones. Causa vero utilitatis appetunt amicos quosdam dimos, idest industrios ad exequendum quodcumque praeceperint, sive sit bonum sive malum. Ista autem duo non fiunt in eodem, scilicet industria et iocularitas, quia homines industrii non dant se iocis, sed seriis; unde patet quod potentes habent amicos divisos.
| 1618. Second [C, 2], at “Nor do the powerful,” he proves his proposition from the fact that these powerful men do not seek the pleasures of virtue—this type of pleasure has utility connected with it. Nor do they seek friends useful in the attainment of honorable good—this utility has a pleasure attached to it. For amusement they seek witty or entertaining people, like comedians. But for utility they desire other friends (dinos) i.e., shrewd in executing whatever is commanded, either good or bad. These two qualities, viz., shrewdness and jocularity, are not found in the same person because skillful people are not given to jesting but to serious matters. Hence it is evident that the powerful have different kinds of friends.
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| Tertio ibi: delectabilis autem etc., respondet cuidam obiectioni. Posset enim aliquis dicere quod potentibus sunt amici iidem et delectabiles et utiles, quia, sicut supra dictum est, studiosus, idest virtuosus, est simul et delectabilis et utilis. Sed ipse respondet quod virtuosus non fit amicus homini superexcellenti in potentia vel divitiis, nisi etiam virtuosus superexcellatur a potentiori etiam in virtute. Sed si hoc non contingat, ille potentior qui est superexcessus in virtute, non adaequat secundum analogum, id est non recompensat virtuoso secundum proportionem; ut scilicet, sicut virtuosus defert ei ut potentiori, ita ipse deferat virtuoso ut meliori.
| 1619. Third [C, 3], at “It has been said, though,” he answers an objection. Someone can object that friends of the powerful are at the same time pleasant and useful because, as was explained previously (1585), a good or virtuous person is at the same time pleasant and useful. But Aristotle answers that the virtuous man does not become a friend of one eminent in power or riches unless the virtuous person is surpassed in virtue by the powerful. If this is not the case, the more powerful one who is surpassed in virtue does not make himself proportionately equal, i.e., does not give proportionate compensation to the virtuous man; that is to say, as the virtuous person defers to him as the more powerful so he should defer to the virtuous man as the better.
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| Plerumque enim homines, quantum excellunt in potentia et divitiis, tantum aestimant se meliores. Non autem consueverunt inveniri tales potentes, qui etiam in virtute excedant, aut virtuoso deferant tamquam melioribus.
| 1620. Usually, to the extent that men excel in power and riches they think themselves better; and we are not accustomed to find men in power who also excel in virtue or defer to the virtuous as the better.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sunt autem etc., ostendit quod praedictae amicitiae species in aequalitate consistunt. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum; concludens ex praemissis, quod praedictae amicitiae in aequalitate consistunt. Et quia de amicitia quae est propter bonum hoc est manifestum, probat propositum in amicitia utilis et delectabilis, quia scilicet vel eadem volunt et faciunt sibiinvicem, scilicet recompensantes delectationem delectationi aut utilitatem utilitati; vel commutant alterum pro altero, scilicet utilitatem pro delectatione aut e converso.
| 1621. Then [III, D], at “Consequently, the friendships,” he shows that the kinds of friendship discussed consist in equality. He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [D, 1] he explains his proposition, concluding from the premises that the kinds of friendship just treated consist in equality. Since this is obvious about friendship for the sake of virtue, he proves the proposition in regard to friendship based on utility and pleasure: either men wish and do the same things for one another, i.e., return pleasure for pleasure or utility for utility, or they exchange one for the other, i.e., utility for pleasure or vice versa.
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| Secundo ibi: quoniam autem etc., ostendit quomodo duae species se habeant ad rationem amicitiae: et dicit manifestum esse ex praedictis quod sunt minus amicitiae et minus permanent quam perfecta amicitia quae est bonorum, secundum cuius similitudinem et dissimilitudinem videntur esse amicitiae et non esse. Inquantum enim habent similitudinem ad perfectam amicitiam, videntur esse amicitiae, prout scilicet una earum habet delectabile et alia utile. Perfecta autem amicitia habet et utrumque.
| 1622. Next [D, 2], at “We have explained,” he shows how the two kinds compare with the definition of friendship. He says that from the discussions obviously the kinds of friendship which are less proper are less lasting than the perfect friendship of the virtuous, according to whose likeness or unlikeness friendships seem to be or not to be denominated. Inasmuch as they resemble perfect friendship they seem to be friendship according as one of them has pleasure and another utility. Perfect friendship has both.
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| Sed quantum ad alia sunt dissimiles, prout scilicet perfecta amicitia est immutabilis et permansiva, aliae autem velociter transmutantur. Differunt etiam in multis aliis, ut ex praedictis patet. Et propter hanc dissimilitudinem non videntur esse verae amicitiae.
| 1623. But in respect to other qualities they are dissimilar according as perfect friendship is unchanging and lasting. The remaining kinds, however, quickly change; they also differ in many other particulars, as is evident from the previous discussions (1594-1595). On account of this dissimilarity they do not seem to be species of true friendship.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| | Altera autem est amicitiae species et cetera. Postquam philosophus distinxit amicitiae species quae in aequalitate consistunt, hic distinguit species amicitiae quae est inter inaequales personas. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo determinat ea quae in communi pertinent ad talium amicitiarum distinctionem. Secundo determinat de distinctione harum amicitiarum secundum speciales earum rationes, ibi, videtur autem quemadmodum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo agit de amicitiis superexcedentis ad superexcessum; sicut patris ad filium, viri ad uxorem et huiusmodi; secundo agit de amicitiis quae videntur esse inter contrarios, puta inter pauperem et divitem, et huiusmodi, ibi, ex contrariis autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo distinguit huiusmodi amicitiae genus a praecedentibus amicitiis. Secundo distinguit huiusmodi amicitias abinvicem, ibi, differunt autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit quomodo huiusmodi amicitiae conservantur, ibi: eadem quidem utique et cetera.
| 1624. After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of friendship that consist in equality, he now distinguishes the kinds of friendship that exist between unequal persons. He treats two aspects of this subject. First he determines the things pertaining in general to the distinction of such friendships. Then [Lect. 9], at “As we noted at the outset etc.” (B. 1159 b 25), he treats the distinction of these friendships according to their particular natures. On the first point he does two things. First [I] he discusses the friendships of a superior for a subordinate, as father for son, husband for wife. Second [Lect. 8; II], at “Between opposites, however etc.” (B. 1159 b 12), he discusses friendships existing between opposites, like a poor man and a rich man, and so on. He treats the first point in a threefold manner. First [I, A] he distinguishes the classification of this friendship from the previous kinds of friendships. Then [I, B], at “These friendships, though etc.,” he distinguishes friendships of this type from one another. Last [I, C], at “Certainly the same benefits etc.,” he shows how these friendships are preserved.
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| Dicit ergo primo, quod praeter praedictas amicitias quas diximus in aequalitate consistere, eo quod sunt similium secundum virtutem vel utilitatem vel delectationem; est quaedam alia species amicitiae, quae est secundum superabundantiam, inquantum scilicet una persona excedit aliam, sicut amicitia quae est patris ad filium, et universaliter senioris ad iuniorem et viri ad uxorem et universaliter omnis eius qui habet imperium super aliquem, ad eum super quem habet imperium.
| 1625. He says first that besides the foregoing friendships, which we said (1562-1595) consist in equality from the fact that they belong to persons having likeness in virtue or utility or pleasure, there is another kind of friendship that consists in inequality (inasmuch as one person excels another), as the friendship of a father with a son, or—in general—of an older with a younger person, or of a husband with a wife, or for the most part of a superior with a subordinate.
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| Deinde cum dicit: differunt autem etc., ostendit differentiam harum amicitiarum ad invicem. Et primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit quod huiusmodi amicitiae differunt specie abinvicem. Et assignat duas differentias. Unam quidem secundum diversas relationes superabundantiae. Alia est enim amicitiae species patris ad filios et alia imperantis ad subditos quibus imperat. Alia vero differentia est secundum diversam relationem excedentis et excessi. Non enim eadem est amicitia patris ad filium et filii ad patrem neque etiam eadem est viri ad uxorem et uxoris ad virum.
| 1626. Then [I, B], at “These friendships, though,” he differentiates these friendships from one another. First [B, 1] he states his proposal, saying that friendships of this type differ in kind. He assigns two differences, one according to various relations of inequality: the friendship of a father for a son is one kind, and of a ruler for his subject is another. Another difference is according to the contrasting relation of the superior and subordinate; for the friendship of a father for a son is not the same as the friendship of a son for a father, nor is the friendship of a husband for a wife the same as the friendship of a wife for a husband.
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| Secundo ibi: altera enim etc. ostendit propositum duabus rationibus. Quarum prima est, quia cum amicitia dicatur secundum habitum et secundum actum, necesse est quod cuilibet amico insit aliqua habitualis virtus ad exequendum ea quae sunt amicitiae, et etiam ipsum opus amicitiae. Manifestum est autem in singulis praedictorum quod non est idem opus, puta patris ad filium et viri ad uxorem aut etiam filii ad patrem; et per consequens non est eadem virtus. Ergo etiam sunt diversae amicitiae.
| 1627, Second [B, 2], at “Indeed the virtue,” he explains his proposal by two reasons. The first [2, a] is that, since friendship may be predicated according to habit and act, every friend necessarily should have an habitual disposition to do the things pertaining to friendship as well as the function itself of friendship. But it is clear in the case of the persons just mentioned that the function is not the same, for example of a father toward a son and of a husband toward a wife or even of a son toward a father; and consequently there is not the same virtue. Therefore, they are also different kinds of friendship.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi: altera autem et cetera. Quae talis est. In praedictis amicitiis inveniuntur diversae rationes propter quas amant. Alia enim ratione pater amat filium, et filius patrem, et vir uxorem. Sed secundum diversas rationes amandi sunt diversae amationes, et per consequens diversae amicitiae.
| 1628. He gives the second reason [2, b] at “Different, too, are.” It is this. In these friendships there are different motives why people love. It is for a different reason that a father loves a son and a son loves a father, and a husband loves a wife. But according to the different reasons for loving there are different kinds of love and so different kinds of friendship.
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| Deinde cum dicit: eadem quidem etc., ostendit quomodo praedictae amicitiae conservantur. Et primo ostendit quod conservantur per hoc quod invicem sibi exhibent quae oportet secundum amare et amari. Secundo ostendit quomodo amare et amari se habeant ad amicitiam, ibi, multi autem videntur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quomodo praedictae amicitiae conservantur per hoc quod sibiinvicem exhibent quae oportet. Secundo ostendit quod ista considerantur secundum analogiam, ibi, analogon autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit quomodo hoc diversimode competat iustitiae et amicitiae, ibi, non similiter autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod in his amicitiis non fiunt eadem ab utraque parte amicorum: neque etiam oportet eadem requirere quae quis facit. Sicut filius non debet requirere a patre reverentiam, quam ei exibet, sicut in praedictis amicitiis pro delectatione requirebatur delectatio, et pro utilitate utilitas, sed quando filii exhibent parentibus quae oportet exhibere principiis suae generationis, et parentes exhibent filiis quae oportet exhibere a se genitis, tunc talium amicitia erit permansiva et epiiches, id est virtuosa.
| 1629. Next [I, C], at “Certainly the same benefits,” he shows how these friendships are preserved. First [C, 1] he explains that they are preserved by the parties mutually offering what. they should in regard to loving and being loved. Then [Lect. 8; C, 2], at “Because of a desire for honor etc.” (B. 1159 a 13), he explains how loving and being loved are related to friendship. He discusses the first point in a threefold manner. First [1, a] he shows how these friendships are preserved because the parties mutually offer what is proper. Next [1, b], at “In all friendships etc.,” he shows that these reciprocations are considered according to proportionality. Last [1, c], at “Equality, however etc.,” he explains how this applies to justice and friendship in a different manner. He says first that in these friendships the same benefits are not bestowed by each friend, and it is unnecessary to expect in return the same benefits that one bestows. For example, a son ought not to ask of his father the reverence that the son shows the father, as in the previous friendships pleasure was offered for pleasure and utility for utility. But when children show their parents what is due those who have generated them, and when parents show their children what is due their offspring, there will exist between them a lasting and just or virtuous friendship.
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| Deinde cum dicit: analogon autem etc., ostendit qualiter exhibeatur, quod oportet in his amicitiis. Et dicit, quod in omnibus amicitiis quae sunt secundum superabundantiam unius personae ad aliam, oportet fieri amationem secundum proportionem, ut scilicet melior plus ametur quam amet: et similis ratio est de utiliori et delectabiliori, vel qualitercumque aliter excellentiori: cum enim uterque ametur secundum dignitatem, tunc fiet quaedam aequalitas, scilicet proportionis, quae videtur ad amicitiam pertinere.
| 1630. Next [I, b], at “In all friendships,” he shows how what is proper is offered in these friendships. He says that in all friendships involving inequality of one person to the other, love is given proportionately, so that the superior party is loved more than he loves; the same is true concerning the person who is more useful, more pleasant, or more excellent in any way whatsoever. For when each person is loved by reason of the worth he manifests, an equality of proportion that apparently pertains to friendship will ensue.
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| Deinde cum dicit: non similiter autem etc., ostendit, quomodo hoc diversimode conveniat iustitiae et amicitiae. Et primo ponit differentiam. Secundo manifestat per signum, ibi, manifestum autem et cetera. Tertio solvit quamdam dubitationem, ibi, et unde dubitatur etc. Dicit ergo primo, quod aequalitas et proportio, quae secundum dignitatem attenditur, non similiter se habet in iustitia et amicitia. Nam sicut supra in quinto dictum est circa iustitiam, oportet quod primo attendatur vel aestimetur dignitas secundum proportionem; et tunc fiet commutatio secundum aequalitatem. Sed in amicitia oportet e converso, quod primo attendatur aliqua aequalitas inter personas mutuo se amantes, et secundo exhibeatur utrique quod est secundum dignitatem.
| 1631. Then [1, c], at “Equality, however,” he shows how this is applicable to justice and friendship in a different manner. First [c, i] he gives the difference. Second [c, ii], at “This is clearly etc.,” he makes it clear by an indication. Last [c, iii], at “From this a doubt etc., he solves a doubt. He says first that equality and proportion, which are considered in the light of one’s excellence, are not found in the same way in justice and friendship. For, as we have noted in the fifth book (935) concerning justice, excellence first must be accounted or judged according to proportion, and then an exchange will be made according to equality. But in friendship, on the contrary, an equality between the persons loving one another first must be taken into consideration and then what is in conformity with excellence must be offered to each.
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| Et huius diversitatis ratio est, quia amicitia est quaedam unio sive societas amicorum, quae non potest esse inter multum distantes, sed oportet quod ad aequalitatem accedant. Unde ad amicitiam pertinet aequalitate iam constituta ea aliqualiter uti; sed ad iustitiam pertinet inaequalia ad aequalitatem reducere. Aequalitate autem existente cessat iustitiae opus. Et ideo aequalitas est ultimum in iustitia, sed primum in amicitia.
| 1632. The reason for this difference is that friendship is a kind of union or association of friends that cannot exist between widely separated persons; but they must approach equality. Hence it pertains to friendship to use an equality already uniformly established, but it pertains to justice to reduce unequal things to an equality. When equality exists the work of justice is done. For that reason equality is the goal of justice and the starting point of friendship.
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| Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem etc., manifestat quod dixerat per signum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit signum. Et dicit, quod hoc quod dictum est, scilicet quod aequalitas requiratur primo in amicitia: manifestum est per hoc, quod si sit multa distantia, vel virtutis vel malitiae vel cuiuscumque alterius, non remanent homines amici neque etiam dignum reputatur quod aliqui habeant amicitiam cum his qui multum a se distant.
| 1633. At “This is clearly” [c, ii] he clarifies his statement by an indication. He discusses this point in a threefold way. First [ii, x] he states the indication . He says that the declaration (1631 1632) of the prime necessity of equality in friendship is obvious from the fact that, if there is a great difference in virtue or vice or any other thing, men do not remain friends; nor is it considered suitable for people to maintain friendship with those who differ considerably from themselves.
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| Secundo ibi: manifestissimum autem etc., ponit triplex exemplum. Primum quidem de diis, qui plurimum superexcellunt homines in omnibus bonis. Unde non habent amicitiam cum hominibus, ut scilicet conversentur et convivant cum eis; vocat autem deos more gentilium substantias separatas. Secundum autem exemplum ponit de regibus, quorum amicitia non se reputant dignos illi qui multum ab eis deficiunt. Tertium exemplum ponit de optimis et sapientissimis viris, quibus non fiunt amici illi qui sunt omnino indigni.
| 1634. Second [ii, y], at “This is evident,” he gives three examples. First, of beings who greatly surpass men in all good things. Hence they do not maintain friendship with men so as to converse and live with them. These separated substances Aristotle calls gods, according to pagan custom. The second example is of kings whose friendship people in humbler walks of life are not likely to have. He takes the third example from the best and wisest of men, with whom individuals of little worth do not become friends.
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| Tertio ibi: certa quidem etc., respondet tacitae quaestioni. Posset enim aliquis quaerere in quanta distantia possit amicitia salvari, et in quanta non. Sed ipse respondet, quod in talibus non potest dari certa determinatio. Sed hoc in generali sufficit scire, quod multis ablatis ab uno quae insunt alii, adhuc remanet amicitia. Et si multum distent, puta sicut homines a Deo, non adhuc remanet talis amicitia, de qua loquimur.
| 1635. Third [ii, z], at “In such matters,” he answers an implied question. Someone might ask what barriers can friendship overcome and what barriers can it not overcome. Aristotle answers that in such matters an exact determination is not possible. But it suffices to know in general that many qualities can be absent from one that are present in the other and the friendship still remains. If the persons are far apart, like men from God, then the friendship we are discussing does not survive.
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| Deinde cum dicit: unde et dubitatur etc., solvit quamdam dubitationem incidentem. Et primo movet eam. Et dicit, quod ex praedictis dubitatur utrum amici velint suis amicis maxima bona, puta esse deos, vel reges, aut virtuosissimos. Et videtur quod non; quia iam non remanebunt eis amici, et ita perdent ipsi magna bona, scilicet ipsos amicos.
| 1636, Then [c, iii], at “From this a doubt,” he solves an incidental doubt. First [iii, x] he raises it. He says that from the discussions a doubt arises whether men can wish their friends the greatest goods, for example, that they be gods or kings or most virtuous. It seems not, because then they will no longer have their friends, and in this way they themselves will lose great benefits, viz., their friends.
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| Secundo ibi: si itaque etc., solvit praedictam dubitationem, dupliciter. Primo quidem quia, cum dictum est supra quod amicus vult bona amico eius gratia, oportet supponere, quod habitis illis bonis, ille ipse remaneat qualiscumque est; vult enim maxima bona amicus amico tamquam existenti homini, non tamquam translato ad deos.
| 1637. Next [iii, y], at “If it was,” he solves this doubt in two ways. First [y, aa], when it was explained before (1604) that a man wishes good things to a friend for his sake, we must suppose that the friend himself remains much the same, whatever that may be, after the possession of these goods. A person wishes the most excellent goods to a friend as he is a man, not as he is changed into a god.
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| Secundam solutionem ponit ibi: forte autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod amicus vult bona amico, non magis quam omnibus aliis. Quia unusquisque vult maxime sibi ipsi bona, unde non oportet quod velit amico illa bona, per quae ipse perdet amicum, quod est magnum bonum.
| 1638. He gives the second solution at “but perhaps.” He asserts that a man wishes good to his friend, but not more than to all others, because everyone wishes good to himself most of all. Hence it is not reasonable that a man should wish a friend those goods by which he will lose that friend who is a great good.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| | Multi autem videntur et cetera. Postquam philosophus posuit quod amicitia inaequalium personarum salvatur secundum hoc, quod est amare et amari proportionaliter, hic ostendit qualiter amari et amare se habeant ad amicitiam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod amare magis est proprium amicitiae quam amari: secundo ostendit, quod per hoc quod est amare secundum dignitatem sive proportionaliter amicitia conservatur, ibi, magis autem amicitia et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quare aliqui magis volunt amari, quam amare. Secundo comparat id quod est amari, ei quod est honorari, ibi, non propter seipsum autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit, quod amare magis proprium est amicitiae, quam amari, ibi, videtur autem in amare magis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod multi videntur magis velle amari, quam amare. Et hoc, quia sunt amatores honoris. Pertinet enim ad excellentiores, quibus debetur honor, quod magis amentur quam ament.
| 1639. After the Philosopher has determined that friendship between unequal persons is maintained by a proportionality of loving and being loved, he now [C, 2] shows how loving and being loved pertain to friendship. On this point he does two things. First [2, a] he shows that loving is more characteristic of friendship than being loved. Then [2, b], at “Since friendship etc.,” he shows that friendship is preserved by loving according to excellence or proportionately. He treats the first point from three aspects. First [a, i] he shows why some people wish rather to be loved than to love. Second [a, ii], at “And yet men etc.,” he compares being loved with being honored. Third [a, iii], at “Friendship, however etc.,” he shows that loving is more proper to friendship than being loved. He discusses the first point in a threefold manner. First [i, x] he states his proposition saying that the majority seem to wish rather to be loved than to love; and this because they are lovers of honor. It befits the more worthy, to whom honor is due, rather to be loved than to love.
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| Secundo ibi, propter quod amatores etc., probat quod dixerat per signum. Ex hoc enim quod multi volunt magis amari quam ament, procedit quod multi sunt amatores adulationis, qui scilicet delectantur in hoc, quod aliquis eis adulatur. Adulator enim, vel in rei veritate est amicus superexcessus, quia minorum est adulari, vel adulando aliquis fingit se talem et quod magis amat quam ametur.
| 1640. Next [i, y], at “For this reason,” he confirms his statement. From the fact that many people wish to be loved rather than to love, it follows that they are fond of flattery; they take pleasure in someone fawning upon them. The flatterer is either really a friend of humbler status, since it is characteristic of the lowly to indulge in flattery; or by flattering pretends to be a friend and to love more than he is loved.
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| Tertio ibi: amari autem etc., exponit quiddam quod dixerat quod scilicet propter amorem honoris contingat, quod homo velit magis amari quam amet. Et dicit, quod amari videtur esse propinquum ei quod est honorari, quod desideratur a multis. Honor enim est quoddam signum bonitatis eius qui honoratur: amatur autem unumquodque quia est bonum vel apparens bonum.
| 1641. Third [i, z], at “Being loved,” he explains his statement (1639) that it is because of honor that men wish rather to be loved than to love. He states that being loved seems to be closely connected with being honored which many desire. Honor indeed is a mark of goodness in him who is honored; and anything that is good or apparently good is loved.
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| Deinde cum dicit: non propter se ipsum autem etc., comparat id quod est amari ei quod est honorari. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit, quare aliqui volunt honorari. Et dicit, quod homines videntur desiderare honorem non propter ipsum honorem, sed per accidens. A duobus enim generibus hominum maxime quaerunt homines honorari.
| 1642. Then [a, ii], at “And yet men” he compares being loved with being honored. On this point he does three things. First [a, ii, x] he shows why people wish to be honored, saying that men apparently desire honor not for itself but incidentally. They seek to be honored especially by men of two classes.
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| Multi enim gaudent si honorentur a potentibus, non propter ipsum honorem, sed propter spem quam inde concipiunt. Existimant enim ab his a quibus honorantur se adepturos aliquid quo indigent. Et ita gaudent de honore quasi de quodam signo bonae passionis, idest bonae affectionis honorantium ad eos. Alii autem sunt, qui appetunt honorari ab epiikibus, id est a virtuosis, et scientibus, quia per hoc appetunt firmare propriam opinionem de sua bonitate. Et ita per se gaudent de eo, quod sunt boni; quasi hoc credentes iudicio proborum, qui hoc ipso quod eos honorant, videntur dicere eos esse bonos.
| 1643. Many are glad to be honored by the powerful, not for the honor itself but by reason of the hope they derive from it. They expect to obtain something they need from those who honor them. So they delight in the honor as a mark of the good disposition or kindly affection of the persons honoring them. But there are others who want to be honored by just men, that is, by the virtuous and wise because in this way they seek to confirm a personal opinion about their own goodness. Thus they really rejoice in the fact that they are virtuous, as it were, accepting this for the judgment of good men who by the very act of honoring them seem to say they are good.
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| Secundo ibi: in amari autem etc., dicit quod homines gaudent de hoc quod amantur, etiam secundum seipsum: quia hoc ipsum, quod est habere amicos, videtur esse praecipuum inter exteriora bona.
| 1644. Second [a, ii, y], at “People however,” he teaches that men delight in the fact itself of being loved, since the very possession of friends seems to be the principal external sign of honor.
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| Tertio ibi: propter quod videbitur etc., concludit propositum. Quia enim id quod est per se potius est eo quod est per accidens, sequitur ex praemissis, quod amari sit melius eo quod est honorari, inquantum amicitia est secundum se eligibilis.
| 1645. Third [a, ii, z], at “Therefore, being loved,” he draws a conclusion. Since what is essential is more excellent than what is incidental, it follows from the premises (1642-1644) that being loved is better than being honored inasmuch as friendship is in itself desirable.
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| Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem etc., ostendit in quo consistat magis amicitiae virtus, utrum in amare vel in amari. Et dicit quod magis consistat in amare. Amicitia enim dicitur per modum cuiusdam habitus, ut supra ostensum est; habitus autem determinantur ad operationes. Amare autem est bene operari; amari autem potius est quasi bene pati; unde magis est proprium amicitiae amare, quam amari.
| 1646. At “Friendship, however” [a, iii] he shows in what the excellence of friendship consists: in loving or being loved. He says it consists rather in loving, for friendship is predicated by way of habit, as has been explained (1596, 1602, 1627). But a habit terminates at activity; and loving is certainly an activity, while being loved is rather passivity. Hence loving is more proper to friendship than being loved.
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| Et hoc manifestat per quoddam signum. Matres enim, quarum est vehemens amicitia ad filios, delectantur magis in hoc quod ament filios quam quod amentur ab eis; quaedam enim matres dant filios suos aliis ad nutriendum; et scientes eos esse filios, amant eos, non tamen multum quaerunt quod ab eis reamentur, si hoc fieri non potest, sed videtur eis sufficere si videant quod bene agant et bene se habeant; et ita ipsae amant filios, quamvis ipsi non possint attribuere matri convenientem amorem propter ignorantiam, qua scilicet ignorant eas esse matres.
| 1647. He makes this clear by an example. Mothers who have a strong affection for their children take more pleasure in loving them than in being loved by them. Some mothers give their children to others to rear; knowing the children to be theirs they love them, nevertheless they do not strive much for a return of love, since this is not possible. But it seems enough for the mothers to see that their children do well and are in good health. Thus they love their little ones although the little ones cannot make a suitable return of love because of ignorance, since the children do not know them to be their mothers.
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| Deinde cum dicit: magis autem etc., ostendit quomodo per hoc quod est amare secundum dignitatem, sive proportionaliter, amicitia conservetur. Et primo ostendit quomodo amicitia sit permansiva secundum hoc quod est amare proportionaliter. Secundo comparat quantum ad praedicta diversas amicitiae species, ibi, et maxime quidem eorum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod cum amicitia magis consistat in amare quam in amari, amici laudantur ex hoc quod amant, non ex eo quod amantur. Haec enim est laus amantium.
| 1648. Next [2, b], at “Since friendship,” he shows how friendship is maintained by loving according to excellence or proportionately. First [b, i] he shows how friendship is lasting because of the proportion that love achieves. Then [b, ii], at “This likeness is found etc.,” he compares the different kinds of friendship relative to what has been said before. He says first that, since friendship consists rather in loving than in being loved, friends are praised because they love and not because they are loved; in fact this is the compliment we pay lovers.
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| Et quia unusquisque laudatur secundum propriam virtutem, consequens est quod amicorum virtus attendatur secundum hoc quod est amare. Et ideo in quibuscumque hoc contingit quod ament amicos secundum proportionem dignitatis eorum, tales permanent amici, et eorum amicitia est perseverans. Sic enim dum se invicem amant secundum suam dignitatem, etiam illi qui sunt inaequalis conditionis poterunt esse amici, quia per hoc aequabuntur; dum unus eorum quo magis deficit in bonitate, aut in quacumque excellentia, eo plus amat: et ita abundantia amoris recompensat defectum conditionis. Et sic per quamdam aequalitatem et similitudinem, quae proprie pertinet ad amicitiam, fiunt et perseverant amici.
| 1649. Because everyone is praised for his own virtue, the virtue of a lover should be judged according to his love. For this reason persons who love their friends in proportion to their worth remain friends and their friendship is lasting. Thus, when people love one another according to their worth, even those who are of unequal condition can be friends because they are made equal in this way—provided that the one who is more lacking in goodness or some other excellence loves that much more. In this way the abundance of love makes up for the inadequacy of condition. So by a kind of equality and likeness, which properly belong to friendship, people become and remain friends.
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| Deinde cum dicit: et maxime quidem etc., comparat diversas amicitiae species secundum praedicta. Et primo ostendit quae amicitia sit maxime permansiva. Et dicit quod similitudo, quae est amicitiae factiva et conservativa, maxime videtur esse inter virtuosos. Ipsi enim et permanent similes in seipsis, quia non de facili mutantur ab uno in aliud, et permanent etiam in amicitia adinvicem. Et hoc ideo, quia unus eorum non indiget quod alius pro eo faciat aliquid pravum; quod esset contra facientis virtutem, et neuter eorum servit alteri de aliquo pravo, sed, si potest dici quod inter virtuosos sit aliquid pravum, magis unus eorum prohibet alterum prave operari. Ad bonos enim pertinet quod neque ipsi peccent, neque sustineant quod amici eorum peccata exhibeant.
| 1650. Then [b, ii], at “This likeness,” he compares the different kinds of friendship in reference to his previous statements. First [b, ii, x] he shows which friendship is most enduring. He says that the likeness, which causes and preserves friendship, seems to be found especially among virtuous men; for they remain like-minded both in themselves—they do not easily change from one thing to another—and in friendship with one another. This is so because the one has no need for the other to do anything evil for him, which would be contrary to the virtue of the agent. In this way neither of them serves the other in any evil. But if any evil may possibly occur among the virtuous, one rather prevents the other from doing wrong; for it is characteristic of virtuous men that they neither sin themselves nor allow their friends to commit sins.
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| Secundo ibi: mali autem etc., ostendit quae amicitia sit minime permansiva. Et dicit quod homines mali non habent aliquid firmum et stabile in seipsis. Quia enim malitia, cui insistunt, est secundum seipsam odibilis, oportet quod per diversa eorum affectus varietur, dum nihil inveniunt in quo voluntas eorum quiescere possit, et ita neque sibi ipsis diu permanent similes, sed volunt contraria eorum quae prius voluerunt: et sic ad paucum tempus fiunt amici, quamdiu scilicet gaudent malitia in qua concordent.
| 1651. Second [b, ii, y], at “Evil men, however,” he shows which friendship is least enduring, stating that evil men do not have any steadfastness or stability about them. The reason is that wickedness, to which they adhere, is in itself hateful and so their affection varies when they find nothing in which the will can repose; in this way they do not long remain like-minded. But they desire things contrary to what they previously wanted. Thus they are friends for a short time, as long as they enjoy the evil in which they agree.
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| Tertio ibi: utiles autem etc., ostendit quae amicitiae circa hoc medio modo se habeant. Et dicit quod amici utiles et delectabiles sibiinvicem magis permanent in amicitia quam mali. Utilitas enim et delectatio in se habent, unde amentur. Unde tantum durat talium amicitia, quamdiu mutuo sibi tribuunt delectationes vel utilitates. Secus autem est de his qui sunt amici propter malitiam, quae secundum se nihil amabilitatis habet.
| 1652. Third [b, ii, z], at “But friends for utility” he shows which friendships hold a middle place in this matter. He says that friends for utility and pleasure remain longer together in friendship than do friends in evil. Utility and pleasure are such that they may be loved. Hence friendships of this kind last as long as pleasure and utility are mutually provided. But it is otherwise with those who are friends for the sake of evil which has no lovableness in itself.
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| Deinde cum dicit: ex contrariis autem etc., determinat de amicitia contrariorum adinvicem. Et primo ostendit in qua specie amicitiae hoc contingat quod videatur esse amicitia inter contraria. Secundo ostendit quomodo contrarium appetat suum contrarium, ibi, forte autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quod huiusmodi contrarietas amicorum maxime videtur esse in amicitia utilis. Et dicit quod amicitia quae est ex contrariis, puta quod pauper amet divitem et indoctus scientem, maxime videtur esse propter utilitatem, in quantum scilicet unus amicorum appetens ab alio id quo ipse indiget redonat ei aliquid aliud; sicut pauper appetit consequi divitias a divite pro quibus impendit ei obsequium.
| 1653. Next [II], at “Between opposites, however,” he discusses friendship between persons of disparate condition. First [II, A] he shows under what species of friendship we may place friendship between opposites. Then [II, B], at “Perhaps one opposite etc.,” he explains how contrary may seek contrary. On the first point he does three things. First [A, 1] he shows that this friendship between persons of disparate condition seems to be for the sake of utility, inasmuch as one friend seeks from the other what he himself needs, and gives something in return to the other. Thus a poor man desires to obtain money from the rich man in return for service.
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| Secundo ibi: hic autem utique etc., ostendit quomodo hoc etiam possit pertinere ad amicitiam delectabilis. Et dicit quod ad hunc modum amicitiae potest etiam aliquis attrahere amorem venereum, quo amator amat amatum; est enim ibi quandoque contrarietas, sicut inter pulchrum et turpe. In amicitia autem quae est propter virtutem, nullo modo habet locum contrarietas, quia in tali amicitia est maxima similitudo, ut supra dictum est.
| 1654. Next [A, 2], at “To this type” he shows how this may be characteristic also of pleasurable friendship. He states that to this type of friendship we may reduce sexual love by which the lover loves the beloved; for sometimes there is the disparity of beauty and ugliness. On the other hand, in friendship based on virtue, there is no disparate condition because the greatest likeness is found in it, as was noted previously (1580).
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| Tertio ibi, propter quod videntur etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis. Et dicit quod, quia inter amatorem et amatum est quandoque contrarietas, sicut inter turpe et pulchrum, inde est quod quandoque videntur deridendi amatores qui reputant se dignos ut tantum amentur quantum ament; quod quidem dignum est, si aequaliter sint amabiles. Sed si nihil habeant tale, quo scilicet sint digni tantum amari, ridiculum est si hoc quaerunt.
| 1655. Third [A, 3], at “For this reason,” he infers a corollary from the discussion. He says that since sometimes a contrary condition exists in the lover and the beloved, for example, ugliness and beauty, it follows that sometimes lovers are derided who think they are worthy of being loved as much as they love. This is fitting when they are equally worthy of love. But if they have nothing of such a nature that they are worthy to be so loved it is ridiculous for them to ask it.
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| Deinde cum dicit: forte autem etc., ostendit quomodo contrarium appetat suum contrarium. Et dicit quod hoc non est secundum se, sed secundum accidens. Per se enim appetitur medium, quod est bonum subiecto quod afficitur per unum contrarium in excessu. Puta, si corpus alicuius hominis sit valde siccum, non est ei bonum et appetibile fieri humidum per se loquendo, sed venire ad medium, quod accidit superveniente humido. Et eadem ratio est de calido et aliis huiusmodi contrariis. Et quia haec magis pertinent ad physicam considerationem, ideo dicit hic ea esse praetermittenda.
| 1656. At “Terhaps one opposite” [II, B] he shows how contrary seeks its contrary. He says that this is not true from the nature of the thing (secundum se) but incidentally, for what is essentially (per se) sought is the mean which is the good of the subject induced to excess by one of contraries. For example, if a man’s body is comfortably dry, perspiration is not good and desirable absolutely (per se) speaking, but as a means to a middle state attained by the moisture. The same reason holds for what is hot and contraries of this kind. Because these matters belong more to the study of physics, he says they will be passed over.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| | Videtur autem, quemadmodum in principiis et cetera. Postquam philosophus in communi tetigit diversas species amicitiarum quae sunt inaequalium personarum, hic distinguit huiusmodi species secundum proprias rationes earum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod huiusmodi amicitiarum species consequuntur politicas communicationes. Secundo distinguit amicitiarum species secundum distinctiones politicarum, ibi, politicae autem sunt tres species et cetera. Circa primum ponit talem rationem. Omnis amicitia in communicatione quadam consistit; omnis autem communicatio reducitur ad politicam. Ergo omnes amicitiae species secundum politicas communicationes sunt accipiendae. Circa hoc ergo tria facit: primo probat primum; secundo secundum, ibi, communicationes autem omnes et cetera. Tertio infert conclusionem, ibi: omnes itaque communicationes et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod amicitia omnis in communicatione consistit. Secundo ostendit quod amicitia secundum diversitatem communicationis diversificatur, ibi, sunt autem fratribus et cetera. Primum ostendit tripliciter.
| 1657. After the Philosopher has treated the different kinds of friendships existing between unequal persons, he now distinguishes them according to their proper formalities. He handles this in two ways. First he shows that these kinds of friendships are distinguished in much the same way as civic associations. Then [Lect. 10; I], at “There are three kinds etc.” (B.1160 a 30), he distinguishes the kinds of friendships according to the distinctions of civic units. Concerning the first point he gives this argument. [A] Every friendship consists in association. [B] Every association is reduced to civic association. Therefore all friendships must be understood according to civic associations (communicationes). He treats this argument under three aspects. First he proves the first statement [A]; second, at “All associations are etc..” he proves the second statement [B]; third, at “all these associations etc.,” he draws a conclusion [C]. He does two things in regard to the first point. First [A, 1] he shows that every friendship consists in association. Next [A, 2], at “Brothers and comrades etc.,” he shows that friendship is differentiated according to the diversity of association.
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| Primo, quidem per rationem, quae talis est. Sicut supra dictum est, circa eadem est iustitia et amicitia. Sed iustitia consistit in communicatione. Quaelibet est enim iustitia ad alterum, ut in V dictum est. Ergo et amicitia in communicatione consistit.
| 1658. First [1, a], by the following argument. As was previously explained (1632) justice and friendship deal with the same things. But justice consists in association’ for every kind of justice has a relation to another, as we stated in the fifth book (885, 886, 906, 909, 934). Therefore friendship too consists in association.
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| Secundo ibi, appellant igitur etc., ostendit idem ex usu loquendi. Homines enim consueverunt appellare amicos eos, qui secundum aliquam communicationem sibi communicant; puta connavigatores qui communicant in navigando, et commilitones qui communicant in militia. Et eadem ratio est in aliis communicationibus, quia tantum videtur esse amicitia inter aliquos quantum sibi communicant. Et secundum hoc est etiam inter eos iustitia.
| 1659. Second [I, b], at “Consequently, fellow voyagers,” he shows the same thing by customary speech. Men are accustomed to call friends those who share in any common undertaking: for example, fellow voyagers who take part in seafaring; fellow soldiers who share in military service. The same is true in other kinds of association, because friendship seems to exist among people to the extent that they share with one another; and because, in accordance with this, justice also exists among them.
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| Tertio ibi: et proverbium etc., probat idem per commune proverbium. Vulgo enim dicitur in proverbio quod ea quae sunt amicorum sunt communia, et hoc recte dicitur, quia amicitia in communicatione consistit.
| 1660. Third [i, c], at “Correctly then” he proves his contention by a current proverb. it is generally said that friends’ goods are common goods. Therefore friendship consists in sharing in common (communicatio).
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| Deinde cum dicit: sunt autem fratribus etc., ostendit quod secundum diversas communicationes differunt amicitiae. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit diversitatem amicitiarum secundum diversitatem communicationis. Videmus enim quod fratribus et personis ita coniunctis sunt omnia communia, puta domus, mensa et alia huiusmodi. Aliis autem amicis sunt quaedam discreta. Et quibusdam plura et quibusdam pauciora. Et secundum hoc etiam amicitiarum quaedam sunt maiores, scilicet inter illos qui habent plura communia, quaedam vero minores, scilicet inter illos qui in paucioribus communicant. Et ex hoc manifeste apparet quod, si nulla esset communicatio non posset esse amicitia.
| 1661. At “Brothers and comrades” [A, 2] he shows that friendships differ according to different modes of association. He discusses this point under three aspects. First [2, a] he explains the diversity of friendships according to the diversity of association. We see that brothers and similar relatives have all things in common, like home, table, and so on. But other friends have particular things as their own; some have more, some less. In accordance with this some friendships are greater, for example, among those who have many things in common; and others are less, as among those who have few things in common. From this it is very evident that if there were no communication there could be no friendship.
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| Secundo ibi, differunt autem etc., ostendit quod etiam iustitia diversificatur secundum diversas communicationes. Non enim idem est iustum in qualibet communicatione, sed differens: sicut patet quod non idem est iustum inter patres et filios et inter fratres adinvicem. Et similiter aliud est iustum inter etairos, idest coaetaneos et connutritos, et inter cives, quia alia sibi mutuo tamquam debita exhibent. Et eadem ratio est in aliis amicitiis. Et sic patet, quod altera iusta sunt inter singulos praedictorum.
| 1662. Second [2, b], at “Similarly the notions,” he shows that justice is differentiated according to different types of association. The same kind of right is not found in every association, but a different kind. Thus it is obvious that the same right does not exist between father and sons, as between brother and brother. Likewise there is a different justice between etairos, i.e., people of the same age and rearing than between citizens, because they bestow different things on one another as mutually due. The same pattern holds in other kinds of friendship. So it is clear that different types of justice exist between the individuals just mentioned.
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| Tertio ibi: et augmentationem etc., ostendit, quomodo iustitia diversificatur secundum differentiam amicitiae. Et dicit, quod iustitia et iniustitia accipiunt augmentum ex hoc, quod sunt ad magis amicos. Quia scilicet magis amico bene facere quidem est iustius, nocere autem iniustius; sicut quod aliquis privet pecuniis per furtum aut rapinam hominem sibi familiarem et connutritum est durius et iniustius quam si privaret civem, et similiter si subtrahat auxilium fratri quam si subtraheret extraneo; et si percutiat patrem, quam si percutiat quemcumque alium.
| 1663. Third [3, b], at “Moreover, acts of injustice,” he shows how justice is differentiated according to the diversity of friendship. He says justice and injustice increase in proportion as they are done to closer friends. The reason is that it is just in a greater degree to do good to a closer friend, and unjust in a greater degree to injure him. So it is more offensive and unjust to rob or steal money from a familiar acquaintance or a comrade than from a fellow citizen; likewise, to withhold help from a brother than a stranger; to strike one’s father than to strike someone else.
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| Quod autem simul augetur amicitia et iustum, procedit ex hoc, quod in eisdem existunt, et utrumque pertinet ad quamdam aequalitatem communicationis. Et per hoc signum confirmatur quod supra dictum est.
| 1664. That justice and friendship are extended at the same time arises from this, that they exist in the same persons and both pertain equally to some communication. This is confirmation of what was stated previously (1661).
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| Deinde cum dicit communicationes autem omnes etc., ostendit, quod omnes communicationes ad politicam communicationem reducuntur. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod omnes communicationes similitudinem habent cum communicatione politica. Secundo ostendit, quod omnes aliae continentur sub politica, ibi, aliae quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod omnes communicationes habent aliquam similitudinem cum partibus politicae communicationis. Videmus enim, quod omnes communicantes conveniunt in aliquo utili; ad hoc scilicet quod acquirant aliquid eorum, quae sunt necessaria vitae. Et hoc etiam videtur habere politica communicatio: quia propter utilitatem communem videntur cives, et a principio simul convenisse, et in hoc etiam perseverare. Quod patet ex duobus.
| 1665. Then [B], at “All associations” he shows that all associations are reduced to civic association. He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [B, 1] he shows that all association has a likeness to civic association. Second [B, 2], at “Other associations then etc.,” he shows that all other associations are contained under civic association. He says first that every association has some likeness to the parts of civic association. We see that all associations agree in something useful, in the fact that they acquire something necessary for living. And civic association also appears to have this because fellow citizens seem both to have come together in the beginning and to have remained together for their common interest. This is evident for two reasons.
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| Primo quidem, quia legislatores ad hoc maxime tendere videntur, ut procurent utilitatem communem; secundo quia homines hoc dicunt esse iustum in civitate quod communiter civibus confert.
| 1666. First, because legislators seem to aim at this most of all, to obtain the general welfare. Second, because men call that just in a state which benefits the citizens generally.
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| Deinde cum dicit: aliae quidem igitur etc., ostendit, quod aliae communicationes sub politica continentur. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit, quomodo quaedam aliarum communicationum ordinantur ad aliquam particularem utilitatem. Et dicit, quod communicationes aliae praeter politicam intendunt aliquod particulare conferens: puta connavigantes intendunt acquirere pecuniam si sint mercatores, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi sicut civitatem aliquam si sint bellatores; commilitones autem intendunt acquirere illud propter quod est bellum, sive hoc sit pecunia sive sola victoria, sive dominium alicuius civitatis; et similiter etiam illi, qui sunt unius tribus vel unius plebis, ad aliquod particulare commodum conveniunt.
| 1667. Next [B, 2], at “Other associations,” he shows that other associations are contained under civic association. On this point he does three things. First [2, a] he shows how some of the other associations are directed to a particular interest. He says that associations other than the civic intend some private gain. For example, fellow voyagers intend to acquire money or something of the sort if they are merchants. If they are soldiers they agree in the objective of the war, whether this be riches, victory alone, or capture of a city. In this way, too, those who belong to one tribe or one people agree on some private gain.
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| Secundo ibi, quaedam autem etc., ostendit, quod etiam communicationes, quae videntur fieri propter delectationem, fiunt propter aliquid utile. Et dicit quod quaedam communicationes videntur fieri propter delectationem, sicut conchoreantium, idest eorum qui simul cantant in choro vel chorea; et aeranistarum, idest eorum qui utuntur sonis aereorum instrumentorum, puta tubis vel cymbalis. Huiusmodi autem communicationes consueverunt fieri causa sacrificii, ut ibi delectabiliter homines detineantur, et causa connubii, id est nuptiarum, ut vir et uxor magis se ament, cum in tanta iocunditate conveniant.
| 1668. Second [2, b], at “Still other associations,” he shows that even associations that are apparently formed for pleasure are really for some utility. He says still other associations seemingly exist for pleasure, e.g., choruses or those who sing together in a choir or a dance, and bands or those who play brass instruments like trumpets and cymbals. Associations of this kind were accustomed to be established for the sake of the religious cult so that men may be more pleasantly detained there, and on account of a wedding or nuptials that the groom and bride may have greater pleasure since they share in such great rejoicing.
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| Tertio ibi: omnes autem etc., ostendit ex praemissis quod omnes praedictae communicationes sub politica continentur. Et dicit, quod omnes consueverunt esse sub politica, inquantum scilicet consuetum est, quod omnes per politicam ordinantur. Et huius rationem assignat; quia aliae communicationes, sicut dictum est, ordinantur ad aliquam particularem utilitatem. Politica autem non intendit aliquod particulare et praesens commodum, sed intendit ad id quod est utile per totam vitam. Et hoc specialiter ostendit circa communicationes delectantium; et maxime in sacrificiis, de quibus minus videtur.
| 1669. Third [2, c], at “But all these,” he shows from the premises that all the other previous associations are contained under civic association. He says that all were usually placed under civic association inasmuch as customarily all are directed by it. He gives the explanation because, as previously observed (1667), other associations are ordered to some private advantage. Civic association, however, does not aim at a private and present gain but at what is useful all during life. He shows this especially in regard to associations of persons providing entertainment; and most of all in sacrifices where it seems less evident.
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| Et dicit, quod illi qui faciunt sacrificia in huiusmodi congregationibus, intendunt honorem tribuere Deo, et sibi ipsis acquirere requiem cum aliqua delectatione, quod ordinatur ad utilitatem vitae. Unde et apud antiquos post collectionem fructuum, scilicet in autumno, fiebant sacrificia et congregationes hominum, puta ad solvendum primitias. Hoc enim erat tempus aptum ad hoc quod homines vacarent; tum ut requiescerent a praecedentibus laboribus, tum quia suppetebat eis copia victualium. Et sic patet, quod omnia ista subduntur ordinationi politicae, quasi pertinentia ad utilitatem vitae.
| 1670. Aristotle says that people who offer sacrifice in gatherings of this kind intend to render honor to God and to acquire for themselves repose and a little pleasure, which is ordered to the good of living. Wherefore the ancients, also, gathered together after the harvest in the autumn to offer sacrifices, that is, to pay first-fruits. This was a suitable time for men to have leisure both that they might rest from their recent labors and because abundant food was available. So obviously all these things are subjected to the ordering of the state as they pertain to the benefit of living.
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| Deinde cum dicit: omnes itaque communicationes etc., inducit conclusionem intentam; videlicet, quod omnes communicationes continentur sub politica, sicut quaedam partes eius; inquantum aliae ordinantur ad quaedam particularia commoda, politica autem ad communem utilitatem. Et quia amicitiae consequenter se habent ad tales communicationes, consequens est etiam, quod amicitiarum distinctio secundum politicam attendatur.
| 1671. At “All these associations” [C] he leads up to the conclusion intended, viz., that all associations are contained under civic association, as parts of it; to this extent others are directed to particular interests but civic association to the common welfare. Now since friendships are formed in relation to associations of this kind, it follows that the distinction of friendships should be observed according to the distinction of civic association.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| | Politicae autem sunt species tres et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod amicitiae species reducuntur ad politicam communicationem, hic distinguit eas secundum distinctionem politicae communicationis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo distinguit amicitiarum species, secundum distinctionem politicae communicationis. Secundo subdividit huiusmodi amicitiae species, ibi: in communicatione quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit politicas communicationes adinvicem. Secundo distinguit, secundum eas, amicitiarum species, ibi, secundum unamquamque autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit species communicationis politicae. Secundo ad earum similitudinem assignat species communicationis oeconomicae, ibi, similitudines autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo assignat species politicarum. Secundo comparat eas adinvicem, ibi, harum autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit, quomodo corrumpantur, ibi, transgressio autem regni et cetera.
| 1672. After the Philosopher has explained that the species of friendship are reducible to civic or political association, he now distinguishes them according to the divisions of political association. On this point he does two things. First he distinguishes the species of friendship according to the divisions of political association or states. Then [Lect. 12], at “All friendship then etc.” (B.1161 b 11), he subdivides these kinds of friendship. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [I] he distinguishes the kinds of states one from another; second [Lect. 11; II], at “Each form of etc.” (B.1161 a 10), according to these he distinguishes the kinds of friendship. He discusses the first point under two aspects. First [I, A] he distinguishes the kinds of states; second [I, B], at “Likenesses of these etc.,” he points out the kinds of domestic association that resembles them. He handles the first point in a threefold manner. First [A, 1] he indicates the forms of government; second [A, 2], at “Of these, however etc.,” he compares them; third [A, 3], at “The perversion of kingdom etc.,” he shows how they are corrupted.
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| Dicit ergo primo, quod tres sunt species politicae communicationis, et totidem sunt corruptiones sive transgressiones earum. Rectae quidem politicae sunt tres: scilicet regnum quod est principatus unius; et aristocratia, quae est potestas optimorum eo quod huiusmodi civilitas per virtuosos gubernatur. Videtur autem conveniens, quod sit quaedam alia species, licet quidam eam non ponant ut patet in IV politicae, quae convenienter nominatur timocratia a pretiis (timos enim pretium dicitur), quia videlicet in hac politia pretia dantur pauperibus, et damna inferuntur divitibus, si non conveniant ad publicas congregationes, ut patet in quarto politicae. Quidam autem consueverunt eam vocare communi nomine politicam, eo quod est communis et divitibus et pauperibus, ut patet in quarto politicae.
| 1673. He says first that there are three forms of polity and just as many corruptions or violations. The three good forms are kingdom or the rule of one; aristocracy or the government by the best, in this that a society is governed by virtuous men. It seems fitting that there be another kind too, although some authors do not recognize it, as is evident in the fourth book of the Politics (Ch. 8, 1293 b 22-1294 a 29; St. Th. Lect. 7, 604-613). This is aptly called timocracy from timos—timos means reward—because under this form of government rewards are bestowed on the poor when they serve in a judicial capacity and penalties are imposed on the rich when they do not, as is clear from the fourth book of the Politics (Ch. 9, 1294 a 30-1294 b 41; St. Th. Lect. 8, 614-620). Some are accustomed to call it by the common name polity from the fact that it is common to rich and poor, as appears in the fourth book of the i (Ch. 3-4, 1289 b 27-1290 b 20; St. Th. Lect. 2, 544-556).
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| Deinde cum dicit: harum autem etc., comparat huiusmodi politias ad invicem. Et dicit, quod inter eas optima est regnum, in quo unus optimus principatur: pessima autem, id est minus bona, est timocratia, in qua plures mediocres principantur; media autem est aristocratia, in qua pauci optimi principantur, quorum tamen non est tanta potestas ad bene agendum sicut unius optimi habentis plenitudinem potestatis.
| 1674. Then [A, 2], at “Of these, however,” he compares these forms of government. He says that the best among these is kingdom in which the best qualified man rules. The worst, i.e., the least good, is timocracy in which many mediocre men govern. In the middle is aristocracy in which a few very good men rule; however, their power of doing good is not so great as in the best form where one ruler has the fullness of power.
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| Deinde cum dicit transgressio autem etc., agit de corruptione sive transgressione praedictarum politicarum. Et primo de corruptione regni. Secundo de corruptione aristocratiae, ibi, ex aristocratia autem et cetera. Tertio de corruptione timocratiae, ibi: ex timocratia autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo quidem proponit quod intendit. Et dicit quod transgressio sive corruptio regni vocatur tyrannus. Et hoc manifestat, primo quidem per hoc quod genere conveniunt. Ambo enim sunt monarchiae, idest principatus unius: sicut enim in regno principatur unus, ita et in tyrannide.
| 1675. At “The perversion of kingdom” [A, 3] he treats of the corruptions or perversions of these political systems. First [A, 3, a] about the corruptions of kingdom; second [A, 3, b], at “But aristocracy degenerates etc.,” about the corruption of aristocracy; third [A, 3, c], at “And timocracy deteriorates etc.,” about the corruption of timocracy. He explains the first point under two headings. First he states his intent, saying that perversion or corruption of kingdom is called tyranny. He makes this clear first by the fact that they agree in kind, for both are forms of monarchy, i.e.. rule by one. Just as one man governs in a kingdom so also in a tyranny.
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| Secundo assignat differentiam eorum adinvicem. Et dicit quod plurimum differunt. Et ex hoc apparet quod sunt contraria. Contraria enim sunt quae plurimum differunt et in eodem genere. Hanc autem differentiam manifestat, dicens quod tyrannus intendit in suo regimine quod est utile sibiipsi, rex autem intendit id quod est utile subditorum.
| 1676. Then he indicates the difference between them, saying that they are vastly different. It seems that they are contraries since contraries are things that differ greatly and are in the same genus. He manifests this difference by saying that a tyrant in his government aims at what is, useful to himself, but a king strives’ for what is beneficial to his subjects.
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| Et hoc probat quia non potest vere dici rex qui non est per se sufficiens ad regendum, ut scilicet sit superexcellens in omnibus bonis, et animae et corporis, et exteriorum rerum, ut sit dignus et potens ad principandum. Cum autem talis sit, non indiget aliquo, et ideo non intendet ad utilitatem suam, quod est indigentium, sed ad hoc quod bene faciat subditis, quod est superabundantium. Ille enim qui non est talis, scilicet superexcellens in omnibus bonis, magis potest dici clerotes, quasi sorte assumptus ad principandum, quam rex. Sed tyrannus se habet per contrarium ad regem, quia quaerit bonum sibi. Unde patet quod ipsa corruptio est pessima. Pessimum enim est contrarium optimo. Transgreditur autem aliquis ex regno, quod est optimum, sicut dictum est, in tyrannidem, quae nihil est aliud quam pravitas monarchiae, id est principatus unius, et rex quando fit malus dicitur tyrannus. Unde patet quod tyrannus est pessima.
| 1677. He proves this by the fact that a ruler cannot truly be called a king who is not of himself adequate to rule, that is, excelling in all goods both of soul and body and external things, so he is worthy and able to govern. But when he is so endowed he needs nothing, so will not work for his own interest, which the poor characteristically do, but rather for the benefit of his subjects—as the affluent do. A man not excelling in all goods can better be called clerotos, as if chosen by lot to rule, than king. But a tyrant is the very contrary of a king because he seeks his own profit. So obviously this corruption is the worst, for the worst is contrary to the best. But a ruler deviates from a kingship that is best, as we have noted (1676), to a tyranny that is nothing else than a perversion of monarchy or one-man rule; and when a king becomes wicked he is called a tyrant. Hence it is evident that tyranny is the worst perversion.
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| Deinde cum dicit: ex aristocratia autem etc., agit de corruptione aristocratiae. Et dicit quod ex aristocratia fit transgressio in oligarchiam, quae est principatus paucorum. Et hoc propter malitiam eorum qui principantur; qui bona civitatis non distribuunt secundum dignitatem, sed omnia bona civitatis vel plurima eorum usurpant sibiipsis, et semper principatus eisdem conferunt, hoc plurimum intendentes, ut ditentur ipsi et amici eorum. Et ex hoc contingit quod loco maxime virtuosorum qui praesunt aristocratiae, principantur pauci et mali.
| 1678. Next [A, 3, b], at “But aristocracy,” he treats of the perversion of aristocracy, saying that an aristocracy degenerates into an oligarchy which is the government of a few. This happens by the wickedness of the rulers not distributing the goods of the state according to merit but usurping all or the greater part of them for themselves; and always keeping the same people in office, aiming especially at enriching themselves and their friends. By reason of this a few evil men come into power in place of very good men who rule in an aristocracy.
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| Deinde cum dicit: ex timocratia autem etc., agit de corruptione timocratiae. Et dicit quod corrumpitur in democratiam quae est potestas populi. Ambae enim hae politicae sunt conterminales, idest vicinae. Assimilantur enim in duobus. Primo quidem, quia etiam timocratia quae est potestas pretiorum, est principatus multitudinis, sicut et democratia. Secundo quia in utraque politica omnes qui sunt in honoribus constituti, sunt aequales. Differunt autem quia in timocratia intenditur commune bonum divitum et pauperum. In democratia autem intenditur solum bonum pauperum. Unde minima perversitas est democratiae. Parum enim recedit a timocratia quae est rectae politicae species.
| 1679. At “And timocracy deteriorates” [A, 3, c] he treats of the perversion of timocracy, saying it deteriorates into democracy, which is rule of the populace. In fact these two are coterminous or bordering upon one another, for they are alike in two ways. First, because timocracy or government of rewards is likewise the rule of the masses, just as democracy is. Second, in both forms of government all who occupy places of honor are equal. On the other hand they differ because in a timocracy the common good of the rich and the poor is intended, but in a democracy the good of the poor alone is aimed at. Hence the perversion inherent in democracy is the least, for it departs very little from timocracy which is a kind of good government.
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| Concludit igitur quod politicae maxime sic transmutantur invicem et ita de facili corrumpuntur, sicut praedictum est.
| 1680. He concludes then that these forms of government change very much from one to another, and so are easily perverted, as has been pointed out (1675-1679).
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| Deinde cum dicit similitudines autem etc., distinguit secundum praedictorum similitudinem communicationes yconomicas. Et primo ostendit quid in his respondeat regno et tyrannidi. Secundo quid aristocratiae et oligarchiae, ibi, viri autem et uxoris et cetera. Tertio quid timocratiae et democratiae, ibi, timocraticus autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit quod similitudo et exemplum praedictarum politicarum, potest accipi in rebus domesticis.
| 1681. Then [I, B], at “Likenesses of these very forms’ “ he distinguishes between states and households according to resemblances to these forms (of rule). First [B, 1] he shows what among them corresponds to a kingdom and a tyranny; second [B, 2], at “But the authority etc.,” what corresponds to aristocracy and oligarchy; third [B, 3], at “Among brothers etc.,” what corresponds to timocracy and democracy. He discusses the first point under three aspects. First [i, a] he states his intent, saying that a model and example of these forms of government can be found in domestic affairs.
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| Secundo ibi: patris quidem enim etc., ostendit quid in huiusmodi respondeat regno. Et eius opposito. Et primo quid respondeat regno. Et dicit quod communicatio quae est inter patrem et filios habet similitudinem regni; quia pater habet curam filiorum, sicut rex subditorum. Et inde est quod Homerus Iovem, propter regiam potestatem, appellavit patrem. Principatus enim patris in domo est quasi quoddam regnum.
| 1682. Next [i, b], at “Certainly the association etc.” he shows which domestic relation corresponds to a kingdom. He states that association between a father and his sons resembles a kingship because a father has care of his sons, as a king of his subjects. Hence Homer calls Jove “father” because of his royal power. Indeed the rule of a father in his home is a kind of kingship.
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| Secundo ibi: in Persis autem etc., ostendit quid respondeat in domibus tyrannidi: et ponit duos modos. Quorum unus est secundum quod apud Persas patres se habent ad filios; qui utuntur filiis quasi servis. Secundus autem modus est quo domini se habent ad servos; quia domini utuntur servis intendendo ad suipsorum utilitatem. Hi autem duo modi differunt, nam unus videtur esse rectus, quo scilicet domini utuntur servis ad suam utilitatem, alius autem est perversus, quo scilicet Persae utuntur filiis quasi servis. Oportet enim quod diversis aliquis diversimode principetur. Unde perversum est quod aliquis principetur similiter liberis et servis.
| 1683. Third [i, c], at “With the Persians,” he shows what corresponds to household tyranny. He distinguishes two kinds. The first is the way Persian fathers look upon sons; for they treat their sons as slaves. The second is the way masters manage slaves; masters intend their own profit in the use of slaves. However, these two procedures differ, for the one in which masters employ slaves for their usefulness seems to be right. But the other in which fathers use their sons as slaves seems to be wrong. The reason is that completely different persons should be governed in different ways. Consequently, it is wrong for a man to govern children and slaves in the same manner.
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| Deinde cum dicit: viri autem et uxoris etc., ostendit quid in domibus respondeat aristocratiae et eius opposito. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quid respondeat aristocratiae. Et dicit quod principatus quo vir et uxor dominantur in domo, est aristocraticus; quia vir habet dominium et curam circa ea quae pertinent ad virum secundum suam dignitatem, et dimittit uxori illa quae pertinent ad eam.
| 1684. At “But the authority” [B, 2] he shows what in households corresponds to aristocracy and its opposite. He treats his point in a twofold manner. First [2, a] he shows what corresponds to aristocracy. He says that the authority by which a husband and a wife govern a household is aristocratic because the husband has dominion and charge over the affairs that pertain to him according to his dignity and he hands over to the wife those matters that pertain to her.
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| Secundo ibi, omnium autem etc., ponit duos modos respondentes oligarchiae. Quorum unus est, quando vir vult omnia disponere et nullius rei dominium relinquit uxori. Hoc enim non est secundum dignitatem nec secundum quod melius est. Alius autem modus est, quando uxores totaliter principantur eo quod ipsae sunt haeredes, et tunc principatus non fit secundum virtutem sed propter divitias et potentiam, sicut accidit in oligarchiis.
| 1685. Second [2, b], at “On the other hand,” he states two procedures corresponding to oligarchy. One occurs when the husband wants to arrange everything and leaves the wife in charge of nothing. This does not accord with his dignity nor with what is best. The other procedure exists when wives have complete authority because they are heiresses, and then their authority does not arise from their excellence but from their riches and power, as in an oligarchy.
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| Deinde cum dicit timocraticus autem etc., ostendit quid respondeat timocratiae et eius opposito. Et primo quid respondeat timocratiae. Et dicit, quod principatus quo fratres dominantur in domo videtur esse timocraticus, eo quod fratres sunt aequales, nisi inquantum differunt secundum aetatem; in qua si multum differant, non videtur fraterna amicitia, sed quasi paterna.
| 1686. Third [B, 3], at “Among brothers” he shows what corresponds to timocracy and its opposite. First [B, 3, a], what corresponds to timocracy. He says that the authority wielded by brothers in a household seems to be timocratic because brothers are equal except for difference in their ages; if their ages are far apart, their friendship seems to be in a way paternal and not fraternal.
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| Secundo ibi, democratia autem etc., ostendit quid respondeat democratiae. Et dicit, quod quaedam similitudo democratiae est in habitationibus quae non habent dominium, sicut cum socii morantur in hospitio. Ibi enim omnes sunt aequales; et si aliquis principetur, habet debilem principatum, sicut qui praeficitur ad expensas faciendas; et unusquisque sociorum habet potestatem in domo, sicut in democratiis quilibet de populo habet potestatem, quasi ex aequali et principes parum possunt.
| 1687. Then [B, 3, b], at “Democracy, however,” he shows what corresponds to democracy. He states that a resemblance to democracy exists in groups living together who have no director—companions staying at an inn, for instance. There all are on the same footing; if anyone has authority it is weak, for example, the one in charge of paying expenses. Each member has power in the dwelling, as in a democracy each individual has quasi-equal power and the directors can do little.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| | Secundum unamquamque autem et cetera. Postquam philosophus distinxit diversas species politicae et oeconomicae communicationis, hic distinguit amicitiarum species secundum praedicta. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit quod secundum unamquamque urbanitatem id est politicae ordinem, videtur esse quaedam amicitiae species accipienda, eo quod in unaquaque politia invenitur aliquid iustum. Amicitia autem et iustitia quodammodo circa idem sunt, ut supra dictum est.
| 1688. After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of political and domestic association, he now [II] distinguishes the corresponding kinds of friendships. He discusses this point in a twofold manner. First [II, A] he states his intent. He says each form of government and political order apparently involves a kind of friendship from the fact that in every polity a kind of justice is found. But friendship and justice are in some way concerned with the same matters, as we have indicated (1658, 1664).
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| Secundo ibi: regi quidem etc., manifestat propositum. Et primo quidem quantum ad politias rectas. Secundo quantum ad politias perversas, ibi, in transgressionibus autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit qualiter sit amicitia secundum regnum. Secundo qualiter secundum aristocratiam, ibi, sed et viri ad uxorem et cetera. Tertio qualiter secundum timocratiam, ibi: quod autem fratrum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter sit amicitia inter regem et subditos. Secundo comparat amicitiam paternam amicitiae regali, ibi, talis autem et paterna et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod inter regem et subditos est amicitia superabundantiae secundum rationem beneficii, sicut est beneficentis ad beneficiatum.
| 1689. Second [II, B], at “The friendship,” he explains his statement: first [B, 1] in regard to good forms of government; next [B, 2], at “On the other hand etc.,” in regard to evil systems. He treats the first point under three headings. First [i, a] he shows how friendship can exist on the basis of kingdom; then [i, b], at “But the friendship etc.,” on the basis of aristocracy; last [i, c], at “Friendship between brothers etc.,” on the basis of timocracy. On the first point he does two things. First [a, i] he shows how friendship may exist between a king and his subjects. Second [a, ii], at “Such too is etc.,” he compares a father’s friendship with a king’s. He says first that by reason of benefit a superabundant friendship exists between a king and his subjects, as between a benefactor and a beneficiary.
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| Pertinet enim ad regem ut benefaciat subditis; si enim sit bonus, habet curam subditorum ut bene operentur: intendit enim subditos facere virtuosos. Unde et nominatur ex hoc quod dirigit subditos, sicut pastor oves. Propter quod Homerus regem Agamenonem nominavit pastorem populorum.
| It is proper to a king to confer benefits on his subjects, for if he is a good ruler he takes care that they perform good deeds, and strives to make his subjects virtuous. Hence, inasmuch as he leads his subjects as a shepherd his flock, he is even given the title. Thus Homer called King Agamemnon shepherd of his people.
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| Deinde cum dicit: talis autem et paterna etc., comparat paternam amicitiam regali. Et circa hoc quatuor facit. Primo comparat amicitiam paternam regali. Et dicit quod amicitia paterna est talis, scilicet similis regali.
| 1690. Then [a, ii], at “Such too is,” he compares paternal with regal friendship. He considers four aspects of this point. First [ii, w] he compares a father’s friendship with a king’s, saying that the friendship of a father is like that of a king.
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| Secundo ibi: differt autem etc., ostendit differentiam utriusque amicitiae. Et dicit, quod praedictae duae amicitiae differunt secundum magnitudinem beneficiorum. Quamvis enim beneficium regis simpliciter sit maximum inquantum respicit totam multitudinem, tamen per comparationem ad unam personam, beneficium patris est maius. Est enim pater filio causa trium maximorum bonorum: primo enim generando est sibi causa essendi, quod reputatur esse maximum. Secundo educando est sibi causa nutrimenti; tertio instruendo est sibi causa disciplinae. Haec autem tria non solum attribuuntur patribus respectu filiorum, sed etiam progenitoribus, idest avis et proavis, respectu nepotum et pronepotum.
| 1691. Second [ii, x], at “These friendships, though ‘ “ he shows the difference between the two friendships, noting that they differ in greatness of benefits. Although the benefaction of a king absolutely speaking is greatest insofar as it extends to all the people, nevertheless the benefaction of a father is greater in relation to one person. A father is the cause of the son’s three greatest goods. First, by generation he is the cause of the son’s existence (considered the greatest good); second, by upbringing, of his rearing; third, of his instruction. These three goods are attributed not only to fathers in regard to their sons but also to the ancestors, viz., the grandfathers and the great-grand fathers in regard to their grandsons and great-grandsons.
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| Tertio ibi: et natura enim etc., probat, quod dixerat, scilicet quod talis sit amicitia paterna sicut et regalis. Naturaliter enim pater principatur filiis et progenitores nepotibus sicut et rex subditis. Unde et filii sunt in potestate patris, et nepotes in potestate avi, sicut et subditi in potestate regis.
| 1692. Third [ii, y], at “Likewise, by nature,” he proves his statement that the friendship of a father is like a king’s. By nature a father is the ruler of his son and an ancestor of his descendants, just as a king is a ruler of his subjects. Consequently, sons are under the dominion of their father,—and grandsons, of their grandfather, just as subjects are under the dominion of their king.
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| Quarto ibi: in superexcessu autem etc., ostendit in quo conveniant omnes huiusmodi amicitiae. Et ponit duo. Quorum unum est, quod omnes huiusmodi amicitiae consistunt in quodam superexcessu unius ad alterum; et quia in rege et subditis hoc est manifestum, manifestat hoc circa patres et filios. Quia enim pater est superexcedens, inde est, quod parentes honorantur a filiis. Honor enim superexcellenti debetur, ut in primo habitum est; et idem dicendum est circa progenitores. Aliud autem est quod in huiusmodi amicitiis non est idem iustum ex utraque parte ut scilicet rex idem faciat subdito quod subditus regi, vel pater filio quod filius patri; sed attenditur utrimque iustum secundum dignitatem, ut scilicet uterque faciat alteri quod dignum est: quia sic etiam amicitia inter eos consideratur, ut unus alterum amet secundum quod dignum est.
| 1693. Fourth [ii, z], at “Friendships of this type,” he shows the basis of agreement for all such friendships. He states two common features: one, that they all consist in a kind of excellence of one person over the other. Since this is obvious in the case of a king and his subjects, he manifests it concerning fathers and sons. Because the father greatly excels, parents are honored by their sons; for honor is due to one who excels-as we pointed out in the first book (214).and the same must be said of ancestors. The other feature is that in friendships of this nature the same thing is not just on the part of each. The king, therefore, must not do the same for his subject as the subject must do for his king, nor the father the same for his son as the son for his father. But what is just must be judged for both parties according to worth so that each does for the other what is proper, because in this way friendship between them entails one loving the other in a fitting manner.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sed et viri etc., ostendit qualiter sit amicitia secundum aristocratiam. Et dicit, quod amicitia quae est inter virum et uxorem, est talis sicut ea quae est in aristocratia, in qua praeficiuntur aliqui secundum virtutem et propter eam amantur. Et quia illi qui praeficiuntur sunt meliores, ideo attribuitur eis plus de bono, inquantum scilicet aliis praeferuntur et unicuique tamen attribuitur id quod ei convenit. Virtuosi enim in principatu constituti non subtrahunt subditis bonum, quod eis congruit. Et per hunc etiam modum conservatur iustitia secundum aristocratiam: et ita est etiam in amicitia viri et uxoris. Vir enim, quia melior est praeficitur uxori, tamen vir non praeripit ea quae sunt uxoris.
| 1694. Next [1, b], at “But the friendship,” he shows that there is a friendship corresponding to aristocracy. He says that friendship between husband and wife is similar to that found in an aristocracy in which a few are entrusted with authority by reason of excellence, on account of which they are loved. Since those in authority are better qualified, more good is attributed to them inasmuch as they are esteemed above others; and nevertheless what is proper to each is assigned to him. Indeed virtuous men constituted in power do not take from their subjects the good that belongs to them. By this procedure justice is preserved in accordance with aristocracy; and the same is true in a friendship between a husband and wife. The husband, being more worthy, is placed over the wife; however, the husband does not direct the affairs belonging to the wife.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quod autem fratrum etc., ostendit qualiter amicitia accipiatur secundum timocratiam. Et dicit, quod amicitia quae est inter fratres assimulatur etairikae, id est amicitiae coaetaneorum. Fratres enim sunt aequales et coaetanei. Et tales videntur esse unius disciplinae, et unius moris ut plurimum, eo quod mores sequuntur consuetudinem vitae, ut in secundo habitum est. Et ex hoc patet, quod tali amicitiae assimilatur amicitia quae est secundum timocratiam, in qua cives, qui praeficiuntur, sunt aequales et epiiches, idest virtuosi. Unde iustum est, quod in parte principentur, ita scilicet quod unus non habeat totum principatum sed particularem, ita quod in principatu aequentur; et sic etiam est amicitia inter eos. Et hoc etiam manifeste observatur in amicitia fratrum et coaetaneorum sive connutritorum.
| 1695. At “Friendship between brothers” [1, c] he shows how friendship is understood in accordance with timocracy. He states that friendship between brothers is similar to etairiciae, i.e., friendship between persons of the same age, for brothers are equal and alike in age. Persons of this kind have the same training and habits for the most part because habits follow the way of living, as was indicated in the second book (248, 315). From this there appears an obvious likeness between such a friendship and friendship corresponding to timocracy in which citizens, who are in control, are equal and fair or virtuous. Hence it is just that they rule in turn so that one does not have all the power but a part of it, which makes them equal in power. So too is the friendship among them. This is also clearly observed in friendship among those who are brothers and of a like age or upbringing.
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| Deinde cum dicit: in transgressionibus autem etc., ostendit qualiter sit amicitia, secundum politias corruptas. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit, quod in huiusmodi politiis est parum de amicitia. Secundo ostendit in qua earum sit minimum de amicitia, ibi: et minime in pessima etc.; tertio in qua earum sit plurimum, ibi, quae autem in democratiis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod in transgressionibus, idest in politiis corruptis, sicut parum est de iustitia, ita etiam parum est de amicitia, quae est quodam modo circa idem iustitiae.
| 1696. Then [B, 2], at “On the other hand,” he shows how there is friendship corresponding to corrupt forms of government. He discusses this point under three aspects. First [2, a] he shows that in such systems there is very little friendship; second [2, b], at “It is minimal etc.,” he shows in which of these the least friendship exists; third [2, c], at “In democracies, however etc.,” he shows in which of these most friendship exists. He says first that, as there is little justice in perversions, i.e., corrupt forms of rule, so also there is little friendship, for this in some way concerns the same thing as justice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: et minime in pessima etc., ostendit in qua corruptarum politiarum sit minimum de amicitia. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, in quibus enim nihil et cetera. Tertio ostendit qualiter debeat intelligi quod dictum est, ibi, secundum quod quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum in corruptis politiis sit parum de amicitia, consequens est, quod minimum sit de amicitia in pessima politiarum corruptarum, scilicet in tyrannide, in qua aut nihil aut valde parum est de amicitia.
| 1697. Next [2, b], at “It is minimal;’ he shows in which corrupt political system friendship is minimal. On this point he does three things. First.[b, i] he states his proposition; second [b, ii], at “In those regimes etc.,” he proves it; third [b, iii], at “Consequently, there can be etc.,” he shows how the statement should be understood. He says first that, since there is little friendship in corrupt regimes, it follows that there is the least friendship in the worst regimes, viz., in tyrannies in which no friendship or very little exists.
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| Deinde cum dicit in quibus enim etc., probat propositum. Quia enim amicitia in communicatione consistit, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum est, quod si inter imperantem et imperatum nihil sit commune, puta cum imperans suum proprium bonum intendit; neque amicitia inter eos esse poterit, sicut neque iustitia est inter eos, inquantum scilicet imperans usurpat sibi totum bonum, quod debetur imperato. Hoc autem accidit in tyrannide, quia tyrannus non intendit bonum commune, sed proprium, et sic ita se habet ad subditos sicut artifex ad instrumentum, et anima ad corpus, et dominus ad servum. Utitur enim tyrannus subditis ut servis.
| 1698. Second [b, ii], at “In those regimes,” he proves his proposition. Friendship consists in sharing in common, as we have explained (1655-1660, 1661). Obviously then if nothing is shared between ruler and ruled-as when the ruler aims at his own good—no friendship can exist between them; nor can there be any justice between them inasmuch as the ruler usurps for himself all the good due to the subject. But this happens under tyranny because the tyrant does not strive for the common good but for his own. Thus he acts with his subjects -like a workman with a tool, a soul with the body, or a master with a slave, for the tyrant uses his subjects as slaves.
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| Haec enim tria, quae dicta sunt, iuvantur ab his quae utuntur eis inquantum moventur ab eis, scilicet servus a domino, corpus ab anima, instrumentum ab artifice. Non tamen est amicitia utentium ad ea quibus utuntur; quia et si in aliquo prosunt eis, non intendunt per hoc bonum eorum nisi secundum quod refertur ad proprium bonum. Et hoc praecipue manifestum est de artifice in comparatione ad instrumenta inanimata, ad quae non est amicitia neque iustitia, quia non communicant in operatione humanae vitae. Et similiter non est amicitia ad equum vel bovem, quamvis sint animata. Et ita etiam non est amicitia domini ad servum inquantum est servus, quia non habent aliquid commune sed totum bonum servi est domini, sicut totum bonum instrumenti est artificis. Servus enim est quasi instrumentum animatum, sicut et e converso instrumentum est quasi servus inanimatus.
| 1699. These three objects just mentioned are benefitted by the persons who use them, to the extent that the objects are moved, i.e., the slave by the master, the body by the soul, the tool by the workman. However, those who use things do not have friendship toward them. Even if they somehow benefit the things, they intend by this the good of the things only as it is related to their own good. This is particularly obvious of an artisan in relation to lifeless instruments which are not objects of friendship or justice because they do not share in the activity of human life. Indeed horses and cattle are not objects of friendship though they do have life. So, too, a master does not have friendship with a slave because they share nothing, but all the good of the slave is the master’s as all the good of a tool is the artisan’s. In fact a slave is, as it were, a living tool and conversely a tool is, as it were, a lifeless slave.
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| Deinde cum dicit secundum quod quidem igitur etc., ostendit qualiter sit intelligendum quod dictum est. Et dicit, quod secundum praemissa non est amicitia domini ad servum inquantum est servus, est tamen amicitia ad ipsum inquantum est homo. Potest enim esse aliqua iustitia cuiuslibet hominis ad omnem hominem, in quantum possunt communicare in aliqua lege et in aliqua compositione, idest in aliquo pacto vel promisso, et per hunc etiam modum potest esse amicitia domini ad servum inquantum est homo. Et sic patet, quod in tyrannide, in qua principes utuntur subditis ut servis, parum est de amicitia et iustitia.
| 1700. Third [b, iii], at “Consequently, there can be,” he shows how his statement (1699) is to be taken. He says that according to the premises there is no friendship of a master for a slave qua slave, although there is friendship for him precisely as man. A friendship can exist between any two men inasmuch as they can share some thing according to law or arrangement, i.e., agreement or promise. In this way a master can have friendship with a slave as a human being. Thus it is obvious that under tyranny, in which rulers use subjects as slaves, there is little friendship or justice.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quae autem in democratiis etc., ostendit in qua corruptarum politiarum sit plurimum de amicitia. Et dicit, quod in democratia: quia in hac politia illi qui principantur in multis intendunt ad commune bonum, inquantum volunt aequari populares insignibus, intendentes principaliter ad bonum popularium. Oligarchia autem medio modo se habet: quia neque intendit ad bonum multitudinis sicut democratia, neque ad bonum unius tantum sicut tyrannis, sed ad bonum paucorum.
| 1701. Then [2, c], at “In democracies, however,” he shows in which corrupt political system friendship is most fully realized. He says that this occurs in democracy. In this system the rulers strive in many ways for the general welfare inasmuch as they want the common man to be equal to the talented man, and they aim principally at the good of the people. On the other hand an oligarchy takes a middle course since it neither works for the good of the many like a democracy nor for the benefit of one like a tyranny but for the good of a few.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| | In communicatione quidem igitur et cetera. Postquam philosophus distinxit species amicitiae, secundum species politicae et oeconomicae communicationis, hic subdividit praedictas amicitiarum species. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit commune principium dividendi amicitias; secundo specialiter agit de quibusdam amicitiis, ibi, sed et cognata videtur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit commune principium distinguendi amicitias: concludens ex praemissis, quod sicut supra dictum est, omnis amicitia in communicatione consistit.
| 1702. After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of friendship according to the species of political and domestic association, he now subdivides the kinds of friendships. On this point he does two things. First [I] he states a general principle for dividing and subdividing friendships. Then [II], at “Friendships between relatives, however etc.,” he gives special treatment to some particular kinds of friendships. He discusses the first point under three aspects. First [I, A] he proposes a general principle for distinguishing the kinds of friendship, concluding from the premises that all friendship consists in common participation (communicatio), as has been pointed out (1698).
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| Secundo ibi: dividet autem utique etc., distinguit secundum communicationem species amicitiae, de quibus minus videtur. Et dicit, quod secundum diversitatem communicationis potest aliquis distinguere abinvicem et ab aliis amicitiam cognatam, idest quae est inter consanguineos, et ethairicam, id est quae est inter connutritos. Cognati enim communicant in origine, etairi autem in nutritione.
| 1703. Second [I, B], at “One may,” he distinguishes, by reason of common participation, the kinds of friendship that seem to have less in common. He says that, according to the diversity of common participation, friendship can be distinguished in itself and from others into consanguineous (or that between blood relatives) and companionate (or that between comrades). Blood relatives have a common origin, and comrades a common upbringing.
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| Tertio ibi: politicae autem etc., distinguit secundum hoc amicitias, de quibus magis videtur. Et dicit quod amicitiae politicae, idest quae sunt inter concives, et quae sunt contribulium, idest inter homines eiusdem tribus, et quae sunt connavigantium, idest inter eos qui simul navigant, et quaecumque aliae tales, puta commilitantium vel constudentium, magis habent similitudinem communicationis quam cognata et etayrica; in his enim amicitiis manifeste confiteri oportet, quod ratio amicitiae sit communicatio. Inter quas et potest ordinari amicitia quae est inter eos qui simul peregrinantur. Sed in amicitia cognata et ethayrica non est aliquid praesens et permanens id in quo communicatur, unde magis latet.
| 1704. Third [I, C], at “But civic friendships,” according to this he distinguishes friendships that seem to have more in common. He states that civic friendships (i.e., those among fellow tribesmen, fellow voyagers or men sailing together) and all others of this kind (for example, between fellow soldiers or fellow students) have more evident signs of association than the friendships of blood relatives or comrades; for in the former we must clearly acknowledge that association is the cause of friendship. (Friendship between fellow travelers can be placed in this category.) But the friendship of blood relatives or comrades does not have any present and permanent mode of communicating, and so is less obvious.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sed et cognata etc., determinat specialiter de quibusdam amicitiis. Et primo de amicitia cognata. Secundo de amicitia quae est inter virum et uxorem ibi, viro autem et uxori et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit cognatam amicitiam. Secundo proprietates partium singularium assignat, ibi, est autem ad parentes quidem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo agit de amicitia patris ad filium. Secundo de amicitia fratrum adinvicem, ibi, fratres autem adinvicem et cetera. Tertio de amicitia aliorum consanguineorum, ibi: nepotes autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit, quomodo se habeat paterna amicitia ad alias consanguineorum amicitias. Et dicit quod cum amicitia cognatorum videatur esse multifaria, idest in multas species divisa propter diversos consanguinitatis gradus, omnes tamen huiusmodi amicitiae dependent ex paterna sicut ex principio, ut ex sequentibus patebit.
| 1705. Then [II], at “Friendships between relatives, however,” he treats in particular some kinds of friendship: first [II, A], friendship between relatives; second [II, B], at “Between man and wife etc.,” friendship existing between husband and wife. On the first point he does two things. First [A, 1] he distinguishes the kinds of friendship between blood relatives. Next [A, 2], at “Children have friendship etc.,” he points out the characteristics of each division. He discusses the first point under three headings. First [A, 1, a] he treats a father’s friendship for his son; second [A, 1, b], at “Brothers, though etc.,” the friendship of brothers for one another; third [A,1, c], at “Nephews, however etc.,” the friendship of other blood relations. He handles the first point in a threefold manner. First [A, 1, a, i] he proposes in what way paternal friendship is related to other friendships between blood relatives. He says that friendship between blood relatives seems to have great variety, i.e., to be divided into many species by reason of the different grades of consanguinity; nevertheless, all such friendships depend on paternal friendship as a starting point. This will be clear from what follows.
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| Secundo ibi, parentes quidem enim etc., assignat rationem huius amicitiae. Et dicit, quod parentes diligunt filios eo quod sunt aliquid ipsorum. Ex semine enim parentum filii procreantur. Unde filius est quodammodo pars patris ab eo separata. Unde haec amicitia propinquissima est dilectioni qua quis amat seipsum, a qua omnis amicitia derivatur, ut in nono dicetur. Unde rationabiliter paterna amicitia ponitur esse principium. Filii autem diligunt parentes, inquantum habent esse ab eis, sicut si pars separata diligeret totum a quo separatur.
| 1706. Second [A, 1, a, ii], at “Parents indeed,” he gives the reason for this friendship. He says that parents love their children as part of themselves; they are generated from the seed of their parents. Hence the son is a separated part of the father, so to speak. Consequently this friendship is nearest to the love of a man for himself, from which all friendship is derived, as will be indicated in the ninth book (1797). With reason then paternal friendship is considered to be the starting point. But children love their parents as the source of their existence, much like a separated part would love the whole from which it is separated.
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| Tertio ibi: magis autem sciunt etc., comparat amicitiam paternam ad filialem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo praefert amicitiam paternam filiali. Secundo praefert amicitiam maternam paternae, ibi, ex his autem manifestum et cetera. Tertio manifestat quiddam quod dixerat, ibi: parentes quidem enim et cetera. Circa primum ponit tres rationes. Quarum prima talis est. Tanto aliquem rationabile est magis amare quanto magis cognoscit dilectionis causam. Sicut autem dictum est, causa quare parentes amant filios est, quia sunt aliquid ipsorum. Causa autem quare filii diligunt est, quia sunt a parentibus. Magis autem possunt scire patres qui sint ex eis nati, quam filii ex quibus parentibus sint orti. Parentibus enim nota fuit generatio, non autem filiis, qui nondum erant. Unde rationabile est quod parentes magis ament filios quam e converso.
| 1707. Third [A, 1, a, iii], at “Now parents are,” he compares a father’s friendship with a son’s. He discusses this point in a three-fold fashion. First [iii, x] he ranks paternal friendship above filial; next [iii, y], at “From these observations etc.,” maternal above paternal; last [iii, z], at “Undoubtedly parents etc.,” he clarifies his statement. He gives three reasons for the initial assertion. The first is this [x, aa]. The more a man knows the causes for love, the more reasonable it is that he love more. It has been noted (1076) that parents love their children as part of themselves. But children love their parents as the authors of their existence. Now fathers can know their offspring better than their children can know they are their children, for the parents know the generative action (which produced the child) but the children do not since they were not yet born. Hence it is reasonable for parents to love their children more than children their parents.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi: et magis quo approximatur et cetera. Quae talis est. Ratio dilectionis in omni amicitia cognata est propinquitas unius ad alterum. Sed ille a quo, scilicet generans, propinquior est genito quam factum facienti, id est quam genitum generanti. Genitum enim, sicut dictum est, est quasi quaedam pars generantis separata. Unde videtur comparari ad generantem, sicut partes separabiles ad totum, puta dens vel capillus vel si quid est aliud huiusmodi; huiusmodi autem partes quae separantur a toto magnam propinquitatem habent ad totum, quia totum in se continet ipsas, non autem e converso et ideo ad partes vel nihil videtur attinere totum, vel minus quam e converso. Pars enim, etsi sit aliquid totius, non tamen est idem ipsi toti, sicut tota pars concluditur in toto. Unde rationabile est quod parentes magis diligant filios quam e converso.
| 1708. He assigns the second reason [x, bb] at “Moreover, the procreator.” It is this. The basis for love in every friendship of blood relatives is the relationship of one person to another. But the principal or begetter is nearer to the begotten than the thing made to the maker or the begotten to the begetter. The offspring is—as it were—a separated part of the procreator, as we have indicated (1706, 1707). Hence it seems to be compared to the procreator as a separable part to the whole, for example, a tooth or a hair or the like. But such parts, which are. separated from the whole, have an affinity to the whole because the whole includes them in itself, and not the opposite. For that reason the whole seems not to belong to the parts at all or to belong to them less than if the converse were the case; for even if a part pertains to the whole, nevertheless it is not identical with the whole itself, as all the parts are included in it. Consequently, it is reasonable that parents love their children more than children their parents.
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| Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, sed cum multitudine et cetera. Manifestum est enim quod amicitia per diuturnitatem temporis confirmatur. Manifestum est autem quod in maiori multitudine temporis parentes diligunt filios quam e converso; parentes enim diligunt filios statim natos. Sed filii diligunt parentes processu temporis quando accipiunt intellectum, idest intellectus usum, vel ad minus sensum ad discernendum parentes ab aliis. Nam a principio omnes viros appellant patres et feminas matres, ut dicitur in primo physicorum. Unde rationabile est quod parentes plus diligant filios quam e converso.
| 1709. He gives the third reason [x, cc] at “But length of time etc.” Obviously friendship is strengthened with the passage of time. But it is evident that parents love their children for a greater length of time than do children their parents. Indeed parents love their children as soon as they are born. But children love their parents only after some time has elapsed and they attain intelligence or the use of reason, or at least the capacity to distinguish their parents from others. For, in the beginning, children call all men fathers and all women mothers, as mentioned in the first book of the Physics (Ch. 1, 184 b 12; St. Th. Lect. 1, II). It is reasonable then for parents to love their children more than children love their parents.
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| Deinde cum dicit: ex his autem etc., comparat maternam dilectionem paternae. Et dicit quod ex praedictis rationibus potest esse manifestum quare matres magis ament filios, quam etiam patres. Et hoc quidem manifestum est quantum ad primam rationem. Magis enim possunt scire matres qui sint eorum filii quam patres. Similiter etiam quantum ad tertiam; prius enim tempore matres ex convictu concipiunt amoris affectum ad filios quam patres. Sed quantum ad secundam rationem partim quidem sic, partim autem aliter se habet. Nam pater dat filio principaliorem partem scilicet formam, mater vero materiam, ut dicitur in libro de generatione animalium.
| 1710. Then [iii, y], at “From these observations,” he compares a mother’s love with a father’s. He says that it can be clearly shown from the previous considerations why mothers love their children more than fathers do. The first reason he gives does not need proof because mothers know better than fathers who their children are. Likewise in regard to time, for mothers before fathers conceive the affection of love for their children because they are more constantly in their company. But the second reason is applicable in one part but not in the other. For the father disposes the son’s principal part, the form; and the mother disposes the matter, as is noted in the treatise De Generatione Animalium (Bk. II, Ch. 1, 731 b 13 sq.).
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| Deinde cum dicit: parentes quidem enim etc., manifestat id quod dixerat in secunda ratione, quod scilicet filii magis sint proximi parentibus quam e converso. Hoc enim contingit, quia parentes diligunt filios, quasi seipsos. Filii enim qui ex parentibus generantur sunt quasi ipsi parentes, alteri ab eis existentes in hoc solum quod ab eis separantur, sed filii diligunt parentes non quasi aliquid ipsorum existentes, sed inquantum sunt ab eis nati.
| 1711. Next [iii, z], at “Undoubtedly parents love,” he clarifies what he stated in the second reason, that children are closer to their parents than the converse. This is so because parents love their children as themselves. Children generated by their parents are as it were the parents themselves, differing from them only in the fact of their distinct existence. On the other hand, children love their parents not as though they were part of their parents but as begotten by them.
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| Deinde cum dicit: fratres autem etc., determinat de amicitia fraterna. Et primo ponit rationem huius amicitiae. Secundo ostendit per quid huiusmodi amicitia confirmetur, ibi, magnum autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod fratres se amant adinvicem ex eo quod ab eisdem nascuntur. Quae enim uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibiinvicem sunt quodammodo eadem. Unde, cum filii sint quodammodo idem parentibus, sicut dictum est, identitas filiorum ad illa, idest ad parentes, facit ipsos filios quodammodo esse idem. Et inde est quod fratres dicimus esse idem secundum sanguinem et secundum radicem et secundum alia huiusmodi. Et quamvis sanguis parentum (qui est radix communis) sit idem simpliciter, remanet tamen aliqualiter ista identitas etiam in filiis, qui dividuntur a parentibus et abinvicem.
| 1712. At “Brothers, though” [A, 1, b] he explains fraternal friendship. First [A, 1, b, i] he gives the basis of this friendship. Then [A, 1, b, ii], at “Similarity in upbringing etc.,” he shows the means of strengthening this friendship. He remarks first that brothers love one another because they are begotten by the same parents. Things that are identical with one and the same thing are identical in some fashion with one another. Since then children are identical in some way with their parents, as has been observed (1711), the children’s identity with the parents makes the children identical in some way. Consequently we say that brothers are the same by blood, by stock, and so on. Although the parents’ blood (the common origin) is entirely the same, this identity also endures in some measure even in the children who are separated from their parents and from one another.
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| Deinde cum dicit: magnum autem etc., ostendit per quid huiusmodi amicitia confirmetur. Et dicit quod multum confert ad fraternam amicitiam quod fratres sint connutriti et propinqui secundum aetatem, quia naturaliter coaetanei seinvicem diligunt. Et homines etairi, idest simul nutriti, consueverunt esse unius moris, quod est causa mutuae dilectionis. Et inde est quod amicitia fraterna similis est etayricae, id est connutritivae.
| 1713. Then [A, 1, b, ii], at “Similarity in upbringing,” he explains how this friendship is strengthened. He observes that fraternal friendship is fostered greatly by the fact that brothers are reared together and are nearly the same age, since it is natural for people alike in years to love one another. Likewise, companions or persons of common upbringing usually have an identical manner of life which is a cause of mutual love. Consequently, fraternal friendship resembles friendship between comrades or persons brought up together.
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| Deinde cum dicit: nepotes autem etc., determinat de amicitia aliorum consanguineorum. Et dicit quod nepotes et alii consanguinei appropinquant sibiinvicem propinquitate generis et amicitiae, inquantum sunt ex his, idest inquantum procedunt ex fratribus qui sunt filii eorumdem parentum. Ex hoc enim dicuntur consanguinei quod ab eisdem procedunt. Dicuntur autem huiusmodi magis vel minus propinqui, inquantum sunt propinquiores vel remotiores a praeduce, id est a prima radice consanguinitatis. Primum enim oportet accipere mensuram in omnibus.
| 1714. At “Nephews, however” [i, c] he defines the friendship of other blood relatives. He states that nephews and other kindred are connected with one ‘ another by relationship of generation and friendship to the extent that they derive their origin from brothers, sons of the same parents. In fact they are called blood relatives because they are descended from these very persons. Such people are said to be more or less related inasmuch as they are nearer or farther removed from their procreator, i.e., original ancestor, for the first must be the measure of all.
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| Deinde cum dicit: est autem ad parentes etc., ponit proprietates praedictarum amicitiarum. Et primo paternae. Secundo fraternae, ibi, sunt autem et in fraterna et cetera. Tertio eius quae est inter alios consanguineos, ibi, analogum autem et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas proprietates. Quarum prima est quod filii habent amicitiam ad parentes, sicut ad quoddam bonum superexcellens, quia ipsi sunt maxime benefactores, inquantum ipsi sunt filiis causa essendi et nutriendi et disciplinae; et talis est etiam amicitia hominis ad Deum.
| 1715. Next [A, 2], at “Children have friendship,” he indicates the characteristics of these friendships: first [2, a], of paternal friendship; second [2, bi, at “Friendship among brothers etc.,” of fraternal friendship; third [2, c], at “In the case etc.,” of friendship between other blood relatives. To the first friendship he assigns two characteristics. The first [2, a, i] is that children have friendship for their parents as to a kind of superior good. The reason is that parents are special benefactors-the cause of their children’s existence, upbringing, and training. Man’s friendship for God is also of this nature.
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| Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: habet autem et cetera. Et dicit quod amicitia quae est inter filios et parentes habet etiam delectationem et utilitatem, tanto magis quam amicitia extraneorum quanto magis communem vitam gerunt. Ex quo provenit quod sunt sibiinvicem maxime utiles et delectabiles.
| 1716. Then [2, a, ii], at “Such friendships,” he states the second characteristic. Friendship between children and parents has pleasure and utility in a greater degree than outside friendship in proportion as they live a life more in common. Because of this they become especially useful and pleasant to one another.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sunt autem etc., ponit proprietatem fraternae amicitiae. Et dicit quod in fraterna amicitia inveniuntur eadem quae inveniuntur in amicitia etayrica, id est connutritorum. Et si fratres sint epiiches, idest virtuosi et totaliter sibi similes in moribus, tanto magis ex connutritione est inter eos amicitia quanto sibiinvicem sunt proximiores. Et hoc quidem secundum tria. Primo quidem secundum diuturnitatem temporis, quia statim nati seinvicem dilexerunt. Secundo vero secundum perfectiorem similitudinem. Magis enim videntur esse unius moris fratres qui sunt ex eisdem geniti, et sic videntur habere eamdem naturalem dispositionem et sunt simul nutriti et similiter disciplinati a parentibus. Tertio secundum experientiam amicitiae, quia secundum multum tempus unus probavit alium, et ideo horum amicitia est maxima et firmissima.
| 1717. At “Friendship among brothers” [2, b] he gives the characteristic of fraternal friendship. He observes that the same features are found in friendship of brothers as in the friendship of comrades or persons living together. And if brothers are just or virtuous and entirely alike in their habits, then friendship is greater from this common upbringing inasmuch as they are closer to one another. This is due to three considerations. First, to length of time, since they love each other almost as soon as they are born. Second, to a more perfect likeness. Brothers born of the same parents seem more alike in their ways and hence appear to have the same natural disposition; they have been reared together and trained in a similar fashion by their parents. Third, this is due to the proof of friendship since they have put each other to the test; and for that reason their friendship is highest and firmest.
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| Deinde cum dicit: analogum autem etc., ponit proprietatem amicitiae quae est inter alios consanguineos. Et dicit, quod ea quae pertinent ad amicitiam consanguineorum aliorum oportet accipere secundum proportionem amicitiae fraternae, quia alii consanguinei derivantur a fratribus, ut supra dictum est.
| 1718. Next [2, c], at “In the case,” he assigns the third characteristic of friendship between other kinsmen. He says that matters pertaining to friendship between other kindred should be understood in proportion to, fraternal friendship since other blood relatives are descended from brothers, as indicated above (1714).
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| Deinde cum dicit: viro autem et uxori etc., determinat de amicitia viri et uxoris. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo assignat rationes huius amicitiae. Secundo ostendit per quid huiusmodi amicitia confirmetur, ibi, coniunctio autem et cetera. Tertio respondet cuidam quaestioni, ibi, qualiter autem convivendum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit proprias rationes huius amicitiae. Secundo ostendit quomodo haec amicitia se habeat ad communes rationes amicitiae, ibi: propter haec autem etc. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit propriam rationem huius amicitiae quae communiter competit tam hominibus quam aliis animalibus. Secundo ponit rationem quae proprie se habet ad homines, ibi, aliis quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod inter virum et uxorem videtur esse quaedam amicitia naturalis. Et hoc probat per locum a minori: homo enim est animal naturaliter politicum; et multo magis est in natura hominis quod sit animal coniugale. Et hoc probat duabus rationibus.
| 1719. Then [II, B], at “Between man and wife,” he treats friendship between husband and wife. He discusses this point under three headings. First [B, 1] he assigns the reason for this friendship. Second [B, 2], at “Children seem to be etc.,” he points out the means that can strengthen this friendship. Third [B, 3], at “To ask how man and wife etc.,” he answers a question. On the first point he does two things. First [B, 1, a] he offers the proper reason for this friendship. Then [B, 1, b], at “Therefore, this etc.,” he shows how this friendship shares the general reasons for friendship. He treats the first point from two aspects. First [B, 1, a, i] he assigns the particular reason for the friendship that is common both to man and other animals. Next [B, 1, a, ii], at “Only to this extent etc.,” he gives another reason restricted to men. He remarks first that a natural friendship seems to exist between man and wife. He proves this by recourse to a higher principle; for man is by nature a political animal, and it is more natural for him to be a “conjugal” (conjugale) animal. Aristotle presents two arguments.
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| Quarum prima est quia ea quae sunt priora et necessariora magis videntur ad naturam pertinere: societas autem domestica, ad quam pertinet coniunctio viri et uxoris, est prior quam societas civilis sicut pars est prior toto. Est etiam magis necessaria, quia societas domestica ordinatur ad actus necessarios vitae, scilicet generationem et nutritionem. Unde patet quod homo naturalius est animal coniugale quam politicum. Secunda ratio est, quia procreatio filiorum, ad quam ordinatur coniunctio viri et uxoris, est communis aliis animalibus, et ita sequitur naturam generis. Et sic patet, quod homo magis est secundum naturam animal coniugale quam politicum.
| 1720. The first is that antecedent and necessary things seem to belong to nature more completely. But domestic society, to which the union of man and wife pertains, is antecedent to civil society; for the part is antecedent to the whole. Domestic society is also more necessary because it is ordered to acts necessary for life, viz., generation and nourishment. Obviously then man is inclined by nature more to conjugal than political society. The second reason is that generation of offspring, to which the union of man and wife is ordered, is common to other animals and therefore follows the nature of the genus. So it is clear that man is by nature more a conjugal than a political animal.
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| Deinde cum dicit: aliis quidem igitur etc., assignat propriam rationem amicitiae coniugalis quae convenit tantum hominibus; concludens ex praemissis, quod in aliis animalibus est communicatio inter marem et feminam in tantum sicut dictum est, idest solum ad procreationem filiorum; sed in hominibus mas et femina cohabitant non solum causa procreationis filiorum, sed etiam propter ea quae sunt necessaria ad humanam vitam. Statim enim apparet quod opera humana quae sunt necessaria ad vitam sunt distincta inter marem et feminam; ita quod quaedam conveniunt viro, puta ea quae sunt exterius agenda, et quaedam uxori, sicut nere et alia quae sunt domi agenda. Sic igitur sibiinvicem sufficiunt, dum uterque propria opera redigit in commune.
| 1721. Then [B, 1, a, ii], at “Only to this extent,” he indicates the proper reason for conjugal friendship which belongs to man alone. He concludes from the premises that pairing of male and female among other animals exists exclusively for generation of offspring, as has been noted (1720). But union of male and female among men occurs not only for the procreation of children but also for the functions needed in human living. These functions—it is immediately apparent—are so divided between man and woman that some are proper to the husband, like external works; and others to the wife, like sewing and other domestic occupations. Thus mutual needs are provided for, when each contributes his own services for the common good.
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| Unde patet quod amicitia coniugalis in hominibus non solum est naturalis sicut in aliis animalibus, utpote ordinata ad opus naturae quod est generatio, sed etiam est oeconomica utpote ordinata ad sufficientiam vitae domesticae.
| 1722. Obviously then conjugal friendship among men not only is natural as among other animals—where it is directed to the work of nature, viz., generation—but also domestic as directed to a sufficiency for family life.
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| Deinde cum dicit propter haec autem etc., ostendit qualiter haec amicitia se habeat ad communes amicitiae rationes. Et dicit, quod ex praedictis apparet quod amicitia coniugalis habet utilitatem, inquantum scilicet per eam fit sufficientia vitae domesticae. Habet etiam delectationem in actu generationis, sicut et in ceteris animalibus. Et si vir et uxor sint epiiches, idest virtuosi, poterit eorum amicitia esse propter virtutem. Est enim aliqua virtus propria utriusque, scilicet viri et uxoris, propter quam amicitia redditur iucunda utrique. Et sic patet quod huiusmodi amicitia potest esse et propter virtutem et propter utile et propter delectabile.
| 1723. At “Therefore, this” [B, 1, b] he shows how this friendship shares the common reasons for friendship. He observes that from previous statements conjugal friendship obviously has utility inasmuch as it furnishes a sufficiency for family life. Likewise it provides pleasure in the generative act, as is the case with other animals. But when the husband and wife are virtuous, their friendship can be based on virtue. In fact there is a virtue proper to both husband and wife that renders their friendship delightful to each other. Clearly then friendship of this kind can be based on virtue, utility, and pleasure.
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| Deinde cum dicit coniunctio autem etc., ostendit per quid firmetur huiusmodi amicitia. Et dicit, quod causa stabilis et firmae coniunctionis videntur esse filii. Et inde est quod steriles, qui scilicet carent prole, citius ab invicem separantur. Fiebat enim apud antiquos separatio matrimonii sterilitatis causa. Et huius ratio est quia filii sunt commune bonum amborum, scilicet viri et uxoris, quorum coniunctio est propter prolem. Illud autem quod est commune continet et conservat amicitiam quae, ut supra dictum est, in communicatione consistit.
| 1724. Next [B, 2], at “Children seem,” he indicates a means of making this friendship strong. He remarks that children seem to be a cause of a stable and lasting union. Hence, sterile couples who fail to have children are separated more readily. In fact, divorce was granted in former times because of sterility. And the reason for this is that children are a common good of both husband and wife whose union exists for the sake of children. But what is common continues and preserves friendship which also consists in sharing (communicatio), as has been pointed out (1702).
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| Deinde cum dicit: qualiter autem etc., respondet cuidam quaestioni: scilicet qualiter debeant convivere vir et uxor. Sed ipse respondet, quod quaerere hoc nihil est aliud quam quaerere qualiter se habeat id quod iustum est inter virum et uxorem. Sic enim debent adinvicem convivere, ut uterque servet alteri quod iustum est. Quod quidem diversificatur secundum diversos. Non enim idem iustum videtur esse observandum ad amicum et extraneum et connutritum et discipulum; et ideo huiusmodi consideratio pertinet ad oeconomicam, seu politicam.
| 1725. At “To ask how man and wife” [B, 3] he answers an inquiry, viz., how a man and wife ought to live together. He himself replies that to ask this is the same as to inquire how justice exists between man and wife; for they ought to live together in such a way that each fulfills what is just to the other. This will be different for different persons, for the same justice must not be observed toward friend, stranger, comrade and disciple. Therefore, a study of this kind belongs to domestic ethics or political science.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| | Trinis itaque existentibus et cetera. Postquam philosophus distinxit amicitiae species, hic ostendit qualiter in eis fiant accusationes seu conquestiones. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit, quid oporteat in amicitiis observari ad querimonias vitandas. Secundo ostendit in quibus amicitiis fiunt querimoniae, ibi, fiunt autem accusationes et cetera. Tertio ostendit quae sit ratio querimoniae, ibi, videtur autem quemadmodum iustum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod sunt tres species amicitiae, sicut supra dictum est, scilicet propter virtutem, propter delectabile et propter utile. Et secundum unamquamque earum possunt amici se habere vel secundum aequalitatem vel secundum superexcellentiam. Et hoc manifestat per singulas species.
| 1726. After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of friendships, he now shows how complaints or grumblings arise in friendships. He does this under three headings. First [i] he indicates what must be done to avoid quarrels in friendships. Second [II], at “It is to be expected etc.,” he points out the friendships in which quarrels occur. Third [III], at “As justice is of two kinds etc.,” he explains the cause of quarreling. He says first there are three kinds of friendship: for virtue, for pleasure, and for utility; and in any one of these, men can be friends on terms of equality or of merit. He takes up each kind on this very point.
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| In amicitia enim quae est secundum virtutem possunt amici fieri et illi qui sunt aequaliter boni, et etiam melior peiori. Et similiter in amicitia delectabilis possunt esse aequaliter delectabiles, vel in hoc secundum excellentiam et defectum se habere. Et iterum in amicitia quae est propter utile possunt secundum utilitates adaequari, et etiam differre secundum magis et minus. Si igitur sint aequales amici secundum quamcumque speciem amicitiae, oportet quod adaequentur et quantum ad hoc quod est amare, ut scilicet aequaliter uterque ab altero diligatur, et quantum ad reliqua, sicut sunt obsequia amicorum. Si autem fuerint inaequales, oportet quod utrique eorum assignetur aliquid secundum proportionem excessus et defectus.
| 1727. A friendship for virtue may exist between equally virtuous men or between a more virtuous and a less virtuous man; a friendship for pleasure, between equally pleasant men or between a more pleasant and a less pleasant man; a friendship for utility may provide advantages in equal measure or in a greater and less measure. If then friends would be equal in any kind of friendship, they must be equated both in respect to loving —so that each loves the other equally&8212; and in respect to the other requirements such as the courtesies of friends. But if they were unequal each must bestow something in proportion to his superiority or inferiority.
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| Deinde cum dicit: fiunt autem accusationes etc., ostendit in quibus amicitiis fiant querelae. Et primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, qui quidem enim et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, rationabiliter contingere quod accusationes et querelae, prout scilicet unus amicus accusat alterum vel conqueritur de altero, fiunt vel in sola amicitia quae est propter utile, vel maxime in ea.
| 1728. Then [II], at “It is to be expected,” he points out the friendships in which quarrels occur. First [II, A] he proposes his intention. Next [II, B], at “But friends by reason of etc..” he explains it. He observes first that it is reasonable for complaints and quarrels-according as one friend accuses another or complains about him-to take place either solely or especially in friendship for utility.
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| Deinde cum dicit: qui quidem enim etc., manifestat propositum. Et primo ostendit quod in amicitia quae est propter virtutem non fit accusatio vel querela. Secundo, quod nec etiam multum fit in amicitia quae est propter delectabile, ibi, non omnino autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit quod maxime fit accusatio et querela in amicitia quae est propter utile, ibi, quae autem propter utile et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod illi qui sunt amici propter virtutem, prompti sunt ad hoc quod sibiinvicem benefaciant. Haec enim est propria operatio et virtutis et amicitiae, scilicet bene operari ad amicum. Et cum ita sit quod uterque ad hoc intendat, ut obsequatur amico, non potest contingere quod exinde proveniant accusationes et pugnae.
| 1729. At “But friends by reason of” [II, B] he explains his intention. First [B, 1] he shows that complaint or quarreling does not occur in friendship for virtue. Then [B, 2], at “Nor do complaints etc.,” he points out too that it does not happen often in friendship for pleasure. Last [B, 3], at “Disputes, however etc.,” he shows that complaining and quarreling take place frequently in utilitarian friendship. He remarks first that virtuous friends are prompt to help one another, because doing good for a friend is the proper function of virtue and friendship. And when each strives to serve his friend, complaints and contentions cannot possibly arise.
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| Nullus enim vult contristare eum qui se amat et sibi benefacit, sed, si sit gratus, ille qui recipit beneficium studet ad retribuendum per aliud beneficium. Et si detur quod unus eorum sit superexcellens, quamvis non tantum recipiat quantum impendit, tamen si sortitur illud quod appetit, non accusabit amicum suum. Hoc autem quod ab utroque appetitur est bonum, idest conveniens et honestum; et hoc est illud quod non excedit facultatem amici.
| 1730. Indeed no one wants to cause sorrow to a person who loves him and acts well towards him; but if the recipient of a benefit is grateful he will be anxious to give another benefit in return. Although the person who is supposedly more excellent may not receive as much as he gave, nevertheless—if allotted what he desires—he will not complain of this friend. What both desire is the good, i.e., the proper and honorable, and this will be the thing that does not exceed the friend’s means.
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| Deinde cum dicit: non omnino autem etc., ostendit qualiter se habeat circa amicitiam delectabilis. Et dicit quod neque etiam in amicitiis quae sunt propter delectationem passim fiunt accusationes et querelae, etsi aliquando contingant fieri. Si enim in mutua societate gaudent, uterque habet quod quaerit, scilicet delectationem. Et ideo nullus est locus querelae. Si autem unus ab altero delectationem non recipiat, ridiculum est quod ille alter eorum accuset illum qui delectationem non exhibet, cum in sua potestate habeat cum illo non morari.
| 1731. Next [B, 2], at “Nor do complaints,” he explains how it is with friendship for pleasure. He says that complaints and quarrels, though possible at times, do not arise very often in friendships based on pleasure; for if friends enjoy one another’s company each has what he desires, viz., pleasure. For that reason there is no place for a quarrel. But if one person does not find another pleasant it is ridiculous to complain of him not being pleasant, since the one has it in his power not to stay in the other’s company.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quae autem propter utile etc., ostendit qualiter se habeat in amicitia utilis. Et dicit quod illa amicitia quae est propter utile, maxime patitur accusationes et querelas. Illi enim qui utuntur se invicem ad utilitatem, semper pluri indigent quam eis detur, et existimant quod minus recipiant quam eis conveniat. Et ideo conqueruntur quod non tanta recipiant quantis indigent; praesertim cum sint tantorum digni. E contrario autem benefactores dicunt, quod non possunt ad tanta danda sufficere quantis indigent illi qui ab eis bene patiuntur.
| 1732. At “Disputes, however,” [B, 3] he indicates the case of friendship for utility, observing that this friendship suffers especially from complaints and quarrels. For those who use one another for advantage always want more than is given them and think they receive less than their due. Consequently, they complain of not receiving as much as they need, especially when they are deserving of so much. But, on the other hand, their benefactors say they haven’t enough to give what the beneficiaries want.
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| Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem, quemadmodum etc., assignat rationem, quare contingit querela in amicitia utilis. Et primo quantum ad aequales. Secundo quantum ad inaequales, ibi, differunt autem, et in his et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo assignat rationem. Secundo movet dubitationem, ibi, dubitationem autem habet et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo assignat rationem querelarum, quae sunt in amicitia utilis. Secundo docet huiusmodi querelas vitare, ibi, potenti autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit rationem. Secundo exponit quod dixerat, ibi, est autem legalis quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod duplex est iustum. Unum quidem, quod non est scriptum sed rationi inditum, quod supra nominavit iustum naturale. Aliud autem est iustum secundum legem scriptam, quod supra in quinto nominavit iustum legale.
| 1733. Then [III], at “As justice is of two kinds,” he gives the reason for quarreling in friendship for utility: first [III, A] in respect to equals; next [Lect. 14; III, B], at “Disagreements happen etc.,” in respect to unequals (B.1163 a 24). He handles the first point in a twofold manner. First [A, 1] he assigns the cause. Then [A, 2], at “It is uncertain, though etc.,” he brings out a difficulty. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First [1, a] he proposes the cause of quarrels in friendship based on utility. Second [1, b], at “But when a person etc.,” he tells how to avoid such quarrels. He treats the first point under two headings. First [a, i] he states the cause. Then [a, ii], at “Now legal utility etc.,” he explains his statement. He affirms first that justice is of two kinds. One is unwritten but implanted in reason and is called natural justice by him on a previous occasion (1081) ‘ The other is written in the law and is called legal justice in the fifth book (1081).
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| Et similiter est duplex utilitas, quam oportet in amicitiis consequi. Quarum una est moralis, quando scilicet unus exhibet utilitatem alteri secundum quod pertinet ad bonos mores. Et haec utilitas respondet iusto non scripto. Alia autem est utilitas legalis, prout scilicet unus exhibet utilitatem alteri, secundum quod est lege statutum. Maxime igitur fiunt accusationes in amicitia utilis quando non secundum idem fit commutatio utilitatis; puta cum unus exhibet utilitatem secundum exigentiam legis, alter vero requirit eam secundum convenientiam bonorum morum. Et sic fit dissolutio amicitiae.
| 1734. Likewise, utility properly acquired in friendships is of two kinds. One is moral, according as a person provides another with help (utilitatem) in conformity with moral practice. The other is legal utility, according as a person provides another with help in conformity with a statute of law. Now complaints arise in useful friendships especially when an exchange of utility is not made according to the same standard. One bestows help according to the requirements of law, but the other demands it according to moral practice. And in this way friendship is broken up.
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| Deinde cum dicit: est autem legalis etc., manifestat quod dixerat. Et primo quantum ad utilitatem legalem. Secundo quantum ad moralem, ibi, moralis autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod legalis utilitas consistit in dictis, idest in conventionibus, quae fiunt ex condicto utriusque. Et haec est duplex. Quaedam enim est omnino foralis, id est per modum emptionis et venditionis, quae scilicet est ex manu in manum, scilicet cum aliquis statim accipit quod ei promittitur pro obsequio impenso. Alia autem est liberalior, quae habet temporis dilationem, sed tamen determinatum est quid pro quo debeat dari. Et sic non est dubium, sed manifestum, quid sit debitum, est tamen hic quaedam amicabilis dilatio eius quod debetur. Et ideo apud quosdam talium, non oportet per aliquem iudicem iustitiam exhibere, sed fidelitatem servant in commutationibus et aestimatur quod propter hoc sint diligendi.
| 1735. Next [a, ii], at “Now legal utility,” he clarifies his statement: first [ii, x] in regard to legal utility; then [ii, y], at “Moral utility, however etc.,” in regard to moral utility. He notes first that legal utility is expressed in definite words or pacts entered into by agreement of both parties. This is twofold. One is entirely formal—after the manner of buying and selling done from hand to hand—e.g., when someone immediately takes what is promised him for service rendered. The other is more liberal allowing a period of delay, although the quid pro quo must necessarily be determined. Thus the debt is clear and unambiguous, but the postponement of it is a kind of friendly gesture. For this reason some do not require a judicial exercise of justice but honor their word in business dealings; and it is thought they should be loved for this.
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| Deinde cum dicit: moralis autem etc., exponit quae sit moralis utilitas. Et dicit, quod moralis utilitas non consistit in dictis, id est in conventionibus quae fiunt ex condicto sed sicut consuevit aliquid gratis dari amico, ita unus dat cuicumque alii sine pacto foris expresso; sed tamen quantum ad intentionem ille qui dat dignum reputat, ut reportet aliquid aequale, vel etiam maius, ac si non esset gratis dans, sed accommodans. Si autem non hoc modo fiat commutatio, ut scilicet ille qui accepit restituat et solvat aequale aut maius, ille qui dedit accusabit recipientem et conqueretur de eo.
| 1736. At “Moral utility, however” [ii, y] he explains what moral utility is. He says it is not expressed in definite words or compacts made by agreement, but without any contract externally declared a person gives to someone else what is usually given gratis to a friend. However, the man who makes a worthy gift intends and expects in return something equal or even better, as if he were not making a gift but a loan. But when an exchange does not take place in such a way that the recipient restores and pays equal or more, the giver will accuse the recipient and complain of him.
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| Consequenter autem assignat praedictorum causam. Et dicit, quod hoc quod dictum est, scilicet quod ille qui gratis dat retributionem quaerit, ideo accidit quia omnes vel plures volunt, idest approbant honesta, sed tamen in suis actibus eligunt ea quae sibi sunt utilia; quod autem aliquis benefaciat alteri non ea intentione, ut contra patiatur restitutionem beneficii, est honestum. Et ideo, ut homines sint aliis accepti, volunt videri hoc modo benefacere. Sed quod aliquis beneficia recipiat est utile et ideo homines (hoc) eligunt, quantumcumque aliud praetendant.
| 1737. After that he assigns the cause of these actions. He remarks that what he just said, viz., the person who gives gratis seeks a return, happens because all, or most people, wish or approve what is noble but actually choose what serves their interests. But that a man confer a benefit on another without intending a benefit in return is noble. Consequently, men want to appear to confer benefits in this way in order to be acceptable to others. But it is profitable to receive benefits. Therefore, whatever else they may pretend, men choose what is profitable.
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| Deinde cum dicit: potenti autem etc., ostendit quomodo huiusmodi querimonia sit vitanda. Et dicit, quod ille qui recipit beneficium, si potest, debet retribuere secundum dignitatem eorum quae recepit, et hoc propria sponte, quia non debet aliquis facere amicum involuntarium, ut scilicet velit gratis accipere ab eo qui noluit gratis dare. Sed in hoc peccavit a principio ille qui beneficium accepit quod hoc passus est ab eo a quo non oportuit; non enim recepit beneficium a vero amico, neque ab homine qui beneficium contulit propter ipsum cui datum est, sed propter utilitatem inde speratam. Ille igitur qui beneficium recepit debet solvere danti, sicut fit in dictis, idest in conventionibus quae fiunt ex condicto. Et si potest reddere aequivalens ei quod recepit, debet confiteri, scilicet protestando, se totum restituisse. Si vero non possit reddere, neque etiam ille qui dedit beneficium dignum reputat ut sit ab eo exigendum.
| 1738. Then [x, b], at “But when a person,” he shows how quarreling of this kind is to be avoided. He says the recipient of a benefit, when he can, should make a return worthy of the gifts he has received; and he should do this of his own accord because a man should not make someone a friend against his will, in the sense of being willing to accept gratis from a person who is unwilling to give gratis. But the man who accepts a benefit made a mistake in this at the outset in accepting a favor of a person from whom he should not have taken it. For he does not receive a benefit from a real friend nor from one who bestowed it for the sake of him to whom it was given but for an expected advantage. Hence the recipient of a benefit ought to repay the giver on fixed terms or compacts made by agreement. And if he can return to the giver the equal of what he received, he ought to insist on making complete repayment. But if he is unable to repay, neither he who bestowed nor he who accepted the benefit thinks it proper to demand this.
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| Est ergo hoc observandum, quod tali benefactori, qui retributionem intendit, sit retribuendum, si recipiens possit. Sed a principio, quando homo beneficium recipit, debet attendere a quo recipiat; utrum scilicet ab amico gratis dante, vel ab eo qui retributionem quaerit, et similiter debet homo attendere in qua re beneficium recipiat, utrum scilicet possit recompensare vel non, ut sic sustineat se beneficiari vel non.
| 1739. We should remark then that, when possible the recipient ought to make repayment to the kind of benefactor who is intent on repayment. But when a man accepts a benefit he ought to consider at the beginning the person from whom he is receiving it, whether from a friend freely giving or from one who seeks repayment. Likewise he ought to consider under what conditions he is accepting the benefit, whether he could make a return or not, so that he may accept or decline the benefit.
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| Deinde cum dicit dubitationem autem habet etc., movet dubitationem circa praedicta. Et primo proponit dubitationem. Et dicit, quod dubitatio est utrum retributionem faciendam oporteat mensurare secundum utilitatem eius qui recepit beneficium vel secundum operationem eius qui dedit beneficium.
| 1740. Next [A, 2], at “It is uncertain, though” he raises a difficulty on the matters discussed. First [2, a] he proposes the difficulty, stating it is doubtful whether the recommended repayment ought to be measured by the utility conferred on the recipient of the benefit or by the action of the bestower of the benefit.
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| Secundo ibi: patientes quidem enim etc., assignat rationem dubitationis. Illi enim, qui recipiunt beneficia intendentes attenuare suscepta beneficia, dicunt se talia recepisse a beneficis quae parva erant illis ad dandum et quae illi poterant de facili ab aliis recipere. E converso autem benefactores volentes magnificare sua beneficia, dicunt se contulisse maxima eorum quae habebant, et qualia non poterant ab aliis recipere et quod ea contulerunt in periculis et in magnis necessitatibus.
| 1741. Second [2, b], at “For people who receive etc.,” he gives the reason for the difficulty. Recipients of benefits in attempting to belittle the favors obtained say they received what was only a trifle for their benefactors, such as they themselves were able to get from others. On the contrary, though, benefactors wanting to extol their benefits maintain that they gave the best they had, which were such as could not be gotten from others, and that they gave these in times of danger and great need.
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| Tertio ibi: igitur propter utile etc., solvit dubitationem. Et dicit quod, si amicitia sit propter utile, mensura retributionis debet accipi secundum utilitatem quam percepit ille qui passus est beneficium. Iste enim est, qui indiguit beneficio. Et sufficit ei quod tentet reddere aequalem retributionem; tantum ergo fuit adiutorium benefactoris quantum recipiens fuit adiutus, et ideo tantum debet reddere quantum accepit de adiutorio. Et si plus faciat, melius est. In amicitiis autem quae sunt secundum virtutem, non sunt quidem accusationes, sicut supra dictum est.
| 1742. Third [2, c], at “Therefore, in useful friendship etc.,” he solves the difficulty by saying that repayment ought to be measured by the utility accruing to the recipient’s benefit. He is the one who needed the benefit and it is sufficient for him to attempt an equal return. Indeed the help of the benefactor was only as much as the receiver obtains from it; and if it effects more it is better. In friendships of virtue, however, complaints do not arise, as has been indicated (1729-1730).
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| Est tamen in eis facienda recompensatio. Et hic electio vel voluntas conferentis beneficium habet similitudinem mensurae. Quia mensura uniuscuiusque generis est id quod est principale in genere illo. Principalitas autem virtutis et moris consistit in electione. Et ideo in amicitia quae est secundum virtutem, debet fieri recompensatio secundum voluntatem eius qui beneficium contulit, etiam si parvum aut nullum auxilium ex hoc est aliquis consequutus.
| 1743. Nevertheless a return must be made in them; and here the intention or will in the giver of the benefit has a likeness to a measure, because a measure in any genus is the principal element in that genus. But the excellence of virtue and moral practice lies in intention. For that reason, in friendship based on virtue a return ought to be made according to the will of the person who bestowed the benefit even if someone obtained little or no help from it.
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| COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
| | Differunt autem et in his et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit qualiter fiant accusationes in amicitia utilis, quae est secundum aequalitatem, hic ostendit, quomodo fiant accusationes in amicitiis quae sunt secundum superexcellentiam. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit controversiam quae in talibus amicitiis fieri consuevit. Secundo assignat controversiae rationem, ibi, existimat enim melior etc.; tertio determinat veritatem, ibi, videtur autem uterque et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod etiam in amicitiis, quae sunt secundum superexcellentiam, est quaedam differentia et discordia inter amicos, dum uterque, scilicet et maior et minor, dignum reputat quod ipse plus habeat. Et si hoc non fiat, dissolvitur propter hoc amicitia.
| 1744. After the Philosopher has shown the manner in which complaints arise in useful friendship between equals, he now shows how complaints occur in friendships between unequals [III, B]. He discusses this point under three headings. First [B, 1] he states the disagreement usually happening in these friendships. Next [B, 2], for “For the better person etc.,” he gives the reason for disagreement. Last [B, 3], at “Both seem etc.,” he defines the truth. He remarks first that some difference and discord among friends exist also in friendships between unequals when each, the superior and the inferior, thinks it right that he should have more. If he does not get it the friendship is broken up for this reason.
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| Deinde cum dicit existimat enim etc., assignat rationem praedictae discordiae. Et primo ponit rationem quae movet maiores. Secundo rationem quam inducunt minores, ibi, indigens autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quantum ad amicitiam quae est secundum virtutem, ille qui est melior existimat conveniens esse sibi quod plus habeat. Si enim bono debetur bonum, conveniens est quod meliori plus de bono attribuatur. Et similiter in amicitia quae est secundum utile, ille qui est utilior aestimat quod ipse debeat plus habere.
| 1745. Next [ B, 2 ], at “For the better person,” he offers the reason for this disagreement. First [2, a] he states the reason motivating the superior parties; then [2, b], at “But the needy etc.,” the reason influencing the inferior parties. He observes first that in friendship for virtue the better person thinks it reasonable for him to receive the greater benefit; for if good is due to the good man then more good is due to the better one. Likewise, in friendship for utility the more useful person thinks he should receive the greater benefit.
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| Non enim oportet, sicut dicunt, quod ille qui est inutilis aequalia recipiat ei qui utilior est. Esset enim quaedam ministratio, idest servitus, et non amicitia, si commoda quae ex amicitia proveniunt non distribuerentur secundum dignitatem operum, ut scilicet ille qui melius operatur plus habeat. Existimatur enim, quod sicut in mercationibus ex communi pecunia plura recipiunt illi qui plus posuerunt, ita etiam debeat fieri in amicitia quod qui plura apposuit ad amicitiam plura recipiat.
| 1746. It is not fitting, they contend, that he who is less useful should receive the equal of the more useful partner; for this would be a kind of public benefaction or service and not friendship, if the advantages arising from friendship were not distributed according to the value of works so that the man who does better work would have more. In fact they think that, as in business enterprises, the bigger investors receive larger returns from the general fund, so also in friendship the person who contributes more to friendship should receive more.
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| Deinde cum dicit: indigens autem etc., ponit rationem quam inducunt inferiores. E converso enim loquuntur indigens in amicitia utilis et deterior in amicitia virtutis. Dicunt enim, quod ad amicum excellentem in bono pertinet quod ipse sufficienter provideat amicis indigentibus. Nulla enim videretur esse utilitas, quod aliquis inferior esset amicus alicui virtuoso vel potenti, si nihil ab eo recipere debeat.
| 1747. Then [2, b], at. “But the needy” he gives the reasons influencing the inferior parties. The needy in useful friendship and the less worthy in virtuous friendship argue to the contrary; they maintain that it is the role of a friend excelling in good to provide adequately for friends in need. In fact there would not seem to be any advantage for an inferior person to have a virtuous or powerful friend if nothing ought to be received from him.
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| Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem etc., determinat veritatem. Et primo proponit veritatem. Secundo manifestat eam, ibi: virtutis quidem enim etc.; tertio infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, ibi, propter quod et utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod uterque, scilicet et superior et inferior, recte videtur aestimare id quod dignum est, quia utrique oportet aliquid plus dare, non tamen de eodem; sed ei qui superexcellit debet plus dari de honore, ei autem qui indiget debet plus dari de lucro.
| 1748. At “Both seem” [B, 3] he defines the truth. First [3, a] he proposes the truth; then [3, b], at “Honor certainly etc.,” he explains it; last [3, c], at “Therefore, a son etc.,” he deduces a corollary from the discussion. He says first that each, the superior and inferior, seems to estimate correctly what is just, because something more—not of the same thing though—ought to be given to each: to the superior, greater honor, but to the needy, greater gain.
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| Deinde cum dicit: virtutis quidem enim etc., manifestat quod dictum est. Et primo per rationem. Secundo per exemplum, ibi, sic autem habere et cetera. Tertio probat quiddam quod dixerat, ibi: possibile enim et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ideo superexcellenti debet dari plus de honore, quia honor est propria retributio pro operibus virtutis et pro beneficiis praestitis, in quibus excedunt maiores. Sed per lucrum praestatur auxilium contra indigentiam, quam patiuntur inferiores.
| 1 1749. Next [3, b], at “Honor certainly,” he clarifies his statement (1748): first [b, i] by argument; and second [b, ii], at “It seems to happen etc.,” by illustration; third [b, iii], at “Friendship indeed etc.,” he proves an assertion previously made. He notes first that more honor ought to be given to the superior person because honor is a suitable compensation for acts of virtue and kindness—in which worthy people excel. On the other hand, gain provides assistance against need which inferior persons feel.
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| Deinde cum dicit: sic autem habere hoc etc., manifestat idem per exemplum. Sic enim videmus accidere in urbanitatibus, id est in dispositionibus civitatum; non enim in civitatibus honoratur ille qui nullum bonum tribuit communitati, sed ei qui aliquod beneficium communitati contulit, datur commune bonum, quod est honor. Non enim de facili contingit, quod aliquis a communitate simul et divitias et honores recipiat. Non enim aliquis sustineret quod haberet minus quantum ad omnia; scilicet et quantum ad divitias et quantum ad honores. Sed ei qui diminutus est in pecuniis propter expensas quas in servitium communitatis fecit, tribuunt civitates honorem, ei vero, qui propter sua servitia expectat dona, tribuunt pecunias.
| 1750. At “It seems to happen” [b, ii] he manifests the same point by an example. We see it happen this way in civil affairs, for the man who does not contribute any good to the community is not honored. But he who bestows some benefit on the community is given a common good, honor. It is not easily possible for someone to get riches and honors from the community simultaneously. Indeed no one could bear to have the smaller share of everything, honor and riches alike. But the person who loses money by the expenses incurred in serving the community is given honor by the state, and the person who expects gifts for his service is given riches.
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| Dictum est enim supra, quod illud quod est secundum dignitatem observatum et exhibitum facit aequalitatem proportionalem in amicitiis et sic amicitias conservat. Sicut igitur civitates quibusdam exhibent honores, quibusdam pecuniam secundum eorum dignitatem, sic faciendum est quando sunt amici inaequales: ut scilicet ei qui suo beneficio in pecuniarum exhibitione utilis fuit, vel qui opera virtuosa peregit, reddatur honor, ita quod retributio fiat, etsi non de aequivalenti, tamen de eo quod fieri potest.
| 1751. It was pointed out previously (1693) that the observance and recognition of excellence creates a proportionate equality among friends, and thus preserves friendship. As states confer honors on some and wealth on others according to their excellence, so we must handle unequal friends. We should render honor to one who performs a useful service by bestowing riches or who does virtuous acts; we should do this in such a way that compensation is made—perhaps not in the equivalent but in that service which is possible.
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| Deinde cum dicit possibile enim etc., probat quod sufficiat reddere quod contingit; quia amicitia requirit id quod est possibile amico, non autem semper id quod esset dignum, quia quandoque non esset possibile. Non enim potest in omnibus beneficiis retribui condignus honor, sicut patet in honoribus qui exhibentur Deo et parentibus, quibus nullus potest aliquando retribuere condignum. Si tamen aliquis famuletur Deo et parentibus secundum suam potentiam, videtur esse epiiches, idest virtuosus.
| 1752. Then [b, iii], at “Friendship indeed,” he proves that it is sufficient to return what is feasible. The reason is that friendship asks of a friend what is possible but not always what is equal in value, since this would be absolutely impossible at times. Surely not all benefits can be repaid in adequate honor, as is obvious in honors rendered to God and parents who can never be worthily recompensed. However, if a man serves God and parents according to his ability, he seems to be just or virtuous.
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| Deinde cum dicit propter quod et utique etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis. Et primo concludit ex dictis, quod non licet filio abnegare patrem, sed patri licet quandoque abnegare filium.
| 1753. At “Therefore, a son” [3, c] he deduces a corollary from the discussion. First [c, i] he concludes that it is not lawful for a son to disown his father but it is lawful sometimes for a father to disown his son.
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| Secundo ibi: debentem enim etc., manifestat, quod dictum est, duabus rationibus. Quarum prima est quia filius, cum sit constitutus debitor patri propter suscepta beneficia, debet ei retribuere, nec potest aliquid dignum facere beneficiis receptis. Unde semper remanet debitor. Et ideo non licet ei abnegare patrem. Sed illi quibus debetur aliquid, habent potestatem dimittendi eos qui sibi debent. Et ita pater habet potestatem dimittendi filium.
| 1754. Second [c, ii], at “For a debt etc.,” he clarifies his conclusion by two reasons. The first is [ii, x] that the son being indebted to the father for the benefits received ought to repay. But he is unable to make a repayment that the benefits deserve. Therefore he will always remain in debt. For this reason he is not at liberty to disown his father. But creditors have the power to dismiss their debtors, so a father has the power of dismissing his son.
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| Secundam rationem ponit ibi simul autem forte et cetera. Et dicit, quod nullus filius videtur recedere a patre abnegando ipsum, nisi forte per excellentem malitiam, quia, praeter amicitiam naturalem quae est inter filium et patrem, humanum est, quod aliquis non expellat eum qui sibi auxiliatus est. Et ita iniquissimum est, quod filius expellat patrem. Sed si filius sit malus, pater debet fugere eum vel ad minus non dare magnam operam ad providendum ei sufficienter, quia per hoc in malitia cresceret. Multi enim sunt qui volunt bene pati ab aliis, sed fugiunt benefacere ac si hoc esset inutile.
| 1755. He states the second reason at “At the same time no one” [ii, y], observing that no son seems to forsake his father and disown him except out of excessive wickedness. Because of the natural friendship between father and son, it is human that no one should thrust out a person who has supported him. Thus it would be most wicked for a son to expel his father. But if a son is bad the father ought to put him out, or at least not work hard to provide adequately for him, since the son would thereby increase in wickedness. For the majority are willing to accept benefits but avoid assisting others as something unprofitable.
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| Ultimo autem epilogando concludit quod de his, quae ad species amicitiae pertinent in tantum dictum est. Et sic terminatur sententia octavi libri.
| 1756. He concludes by way of summary that he has discussed those questions pertaining only to the kinds of friendship. Thus he finishes the teaching of the eighth book.
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