QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE ANIMA

by
Thomas Aquinas

translated as
THE SOUL
by
John Patrick Rowan
St. Louis & London: B. Herder Book Co., 1949

Html edition by Joseph Kenny, O.P.

CONTENTS

  1. Et primo enim quaeritur, utrum anima humana possit esse forma et hoc aliquid.
  2. Secundo utrum anima humana sit separata secundum esse a corpore.
  3. Tertio utrum intellectus possibilis, sive anima intellectiva, sit una in omnibus.
  4. Quarto utrum necesse sit ponere intellectum agentem.
  5. Quinto utrum intellectus agens sit unus et separatus.
  6. Sexto utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma.
  7. Septimo utrum Angelus et anima differant specie.
  8. Octavo utrum anima rationalis tali corpori debeat uniri quale est corpus humanum.
  9. Nono utrum anima uniatur materiae corporali.
  10. Decimo utrum anima sit tota in toto corpore, et in qualibet parte eius.
  11. Undecimo utrum in homine anima rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis sit una substantia.
  12. Duodecimo utrum anima sit suae potentiae.
  13. Decimotertio de distinctione potentiarum animae, utrum videlicet distinguantur per obiecta.
  14. Decimoquarto de immortalitate animae humanae, et utrum sit immortalis.
  15. Decimoquinto utrum anima separata a corpore possit intelligere.
  16. Decimosexto utrum anima coniuncta corpori possit intelligere substantias separatas.
  17. Decimoseptimo utrum anima separata possit intelligere substantias separatas.
  18. Decimoctavo utrum anima separata cognoscat omnia naturalia.
  19. Decimonono utrum potentiae sensitivae remaneant in anima separata.
  20. Vicesimo utrum anima separata singularia cognoscat.
  21. Vicesimoprimo utrum anima separata possit pati poenam ab igne corporeo.
  1. Whether the soul can be a form and a particular thing
  2. Whether the human soul, so far as its act of existing is concerned, is separated from the body
  3. Whether there is one possible intellect, or intellective soul, for all men
  4. Whether it is necessary to admit that an agent intellect exists
  5. Whether there is one separately existing agent intellect for all men
  6. Whether the soul is composed of matter and form
  7. Whether the angel and the soul are of different species
  8. Whether the rational soul should be united to a body such as man possesses
  9. Whether the soul is united to corporeal matter through a medium
  10. Whether the soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts
  11. Whether the rational, sentient, and vegetal souls in man are substantially one and the same
  12. Whether the soul is its powers
  13. Whether the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another by their objects
  14. Whether the human soul is incorruptible
  15. Whether the soul, when separated from the body, is capable of understanding
  16. Whether the soul, when united to the body, can understand separate substances
  17. Whether the soul, when separated from the body, can understand separate substances
  18. Whether the soul, when separated from the body, knows all natural things
  19. Whether the sentient powers remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body
  20. Whether the soul, when separated from the body, knows singular things
  21. Whether the soul, when separated from the body, can suffer punishment by corporeal fire
ARTICLE 1
WHETHER THE SOUL CAN BE A FORM AND A PARTICULAR THING

[Summa theol., I, q.75, a.2; q.76, a.1; Contra Gentiles, II, chaps. 56, 57, 59, 68, 69, and 70; De potentia, q.3, a.9 and 11; De spir. creat., a. 2; Comm. in De anima, Bk. II, lect. 4; Bk. III, lect. 7; De unit. intell.]
Et primo quaeritur utrum anima humana possit esse forma et hoc aliquid In the first article we examine this question: Whether the human soul can be a form and a particular thing.
Objections
Et videtur quod non. Si enim anima humana est hoc aliquid, est subsistens et habens per se esse completum. Quod autem advenit alicui post esse completum, advenit ei accidentaliter, ut albedo homini et vestimentum. Corpus igitur unitum animae advenit ei accidentaliter. Si ergo anima est hoc aliquid, non est forma substantialis corporis. 1. It seems that the human soul cannot be a form and a particular thing. For if the human soul is a particular thing, it is a subsisting thing having a complete act of existing (esse) in virtue of its own nature. Now whatever accrues to a thing over and above, its complete [substantial] existence, is an accident of that thing as whiteness and clothing are accidents of man. Therefore, when the body is united to the soul, it is united to it accidentally. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, it is not the substantial form of the body.
Praeterea, si anima est hoc aliquid, oportet quod sit aliquid individuatum; nullum enim universalium est hoc aliquid. Aut igitur individuatur ex aliquo alio, aut ex se. Si ex alio, et est forma corporis, oportet quod individuetur ex corpore (nam formae individuantur ex propria materia); et sic sequitur quod remoto corpore tollitur individuatio animae; et sic anima non poterit esse per se subsistens, nec hoc aliquid. Si autem ex se individuatur, aut est forma simplex, aut est aliquid compositum ex materia et forma. Si est forma simplex sequitur quod anima individuata, ab alia differre non poterit nisi secundum formam. Differentia autem secundum formam facit diversitatem speciei. Sequitur igitur quod animae diversorum hominum sint specie differentes; unde et homines specie differrent si anima est forma corporis, cum unumquodque a propria forma speciem sortiatur. Si autem anima est composita ex materia et forma, impossibile est quod secundum se totam sit forma corporis, nam materia nullius est forma. Relinquitur igitur quod impossibile sit animam simul esse hoc aliquid et formam. 2. Further, if the soul is a particular thing, it must be an individuated thing, for a universal is not a particular thing. Now the soul is individuated either by something other than itself, or by itself. If the soul is individuated by something other than itself, and is the form of the body, it must be individuated by the body (for forms are individuated by their proper matter). And thus it follows that when the body is separated from the soul, the latter loses its individuation. In that case the soul could not subsist of itself nor be a particular thing. On the other hand, if the soul is individuated by itself, it is either a form in its entirety (simplex) or is something composed of matter and form. If it is a form in its entirety, it follows that one individuated soul could differ from another only according to form. But difference in form causes difference in species. Hence it would follow that the souls of different men are specifically diverse; and if the soul is the form of the body, men differ specifically among themselves, because each and every thing derives its species from its proper form. On the other hand, if the soul is composed of matter and form, it would be impossible for the soul as a whole to be the form of the body, for the matter of a thing never has the nature of a form. It follows, then, that the soul cannot be at once both a particular thing and a form.
Praeterea, si anima est hoc aliquid sequitur quod sit individuum quoddam. Omne autem individuum est in aliqua specie et in aliquo genere. Relinquitur igitur quod anima habeat propriam speciem et proprium genus. Impossibile est autem quod aliquid propriam speciem habens recipiat superadditionem alterius ad speciei cuiusdam constitutionem; quia, ut philosophus dicit VIII Metaph., formae vel species rerum sunt sicut numeri; quibus quidquid subtrahitur vel additur, speciem variat. Materia autem et forma uniuntur ad speciei constitutionem. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid, non unietur corpori ut forma materiae. 3. Further, if the soul is a particular thing, it follows that it is an individual. Now every individual belongs to a species and a genus. Consequently the soul will have a proper species and a proper genus. But a thing possessing its own species cannot have anything else super-added to it in order to give it its species, because, as the Philosopher, points out [Metaph., VIII, 3 (1043b 36)], the forms or species of things are like numbers whose species change if a unit is added or subtracted. Matter and form, however, are united in order to constitute a species. Therefore, if the soul is a particular thing, it is not united to the body as a form to matter.
Praeterea, cum Deus res propter sui bonitatem fecerit, quae in diversis rerum gradibus manifestatur, tot gradus entium instituit, quot potuit natura pati. Si igitur anima humana potest per se subsistere, quod oportet dicere, si est hoc aliquid, sequeretur quod anima per se existens sit unus gradus entium. Formae autem non sunt unus gradus entium seorsum sine materiis. Igitur anima, si est hoc aliquid, non erit forma alicuius materiae. 4. Further, since God made things because of His goodness, which is manifested in the different grades of things, He instituted as many grades of beings as nature could admit. Hence, if the human soul can subsist in itself (which must be maintained if it is a particular thing), it would then constitute a distinct grade of being. But forms without matter do not themselves constitute a distinct grade of being. Thus, if the soul is a particular thing, it will not be the form of any matter.
Praeterea, si anima est hoc aliquid, et per se subsistens, oportet quod sit incorruptibilis; cum neque contrarium habeat, neque ex contrariis composita sit. Si autem est incorruptibilis, non potest esse proportionata corpori corruptibili, quale est corpus humanum. Omnis autem forma est proportionata suae materiae. Igitur si anima est hoc aliquid, non erit forma corporis humani. 5. Further, if the soul is a particular thing, subsisting in itself, it must be incorruptible, for neither has it a contrary, nor is it composed of contraries . But if the soul is incorruptible, it cannot be proportioned to a corruptible body such as the human body is. Now every form is proportioned to its matter. So if the soul is a particular thing, it will not be the form of the human body.
Praeterea, nihil subsistens est actus purus nisi Deus. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid, utpote per se subsistens, erit in ea aliqua compositio actus et potentiae; et sic non poterit esse forma, quia potentia non est alicuius actus. Si igitur anima sit hoc aliquid non erit forma. 6. Further, the only subsisting being that is Pure Act, is God. Therefore, if the soul is a particular self-subsisting thing, it will be composed of act and potentiality, and thus will not be a form, because no potentiality is an act. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, it will not be a form.
Praeterea, si anima est hoc aliquid potens per se subsistere, non oportet quod corpori uniatur nisi propter aliquod bonum ipsius. Aut igitur propter aliquod bonum essentiale, aut propter bonum accidentale. Propter bonum essentiale non, quia sine corpore potest subsistere; neque etiam propter bonum accidentale, quod praecipue videtur esse cognitio veritatis quam anima humana per sensus accipit, qui sine organis corporis esse non possunt. Sed animae puerorum antequam nascantur morientium, dicuntur a quibusdam perfectam cognitionem rerum habere, quam tamen constat quod per sensum non acquisierunt. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid, nulla ratio est quare corpori uniatur ut forma. 7. Further, if the soul is a particular thing capable of subsisting in itself, it would need to be united to a body only for a good accruing to the soul, either for an essential good or an accidental one. Not for an essential good, however, because it can subsist without the body. Nor even for an accidental good; for the knowledge of truth which the human soul can acquire through the senses (themselves incapable of existing without bodily organs) is evidently a pre-eminent good of this sort; but some hold that the souls of still-born infants have a perfect knowledge of things, and these certainly never acquired that knowledge through their senses. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, there is no reason why it should be united as a form to the body.
Praeterea, forma et hoc aliquid ex opposito dividuntur; dicit enim philosophus in II de anima, quod substantia dividitur in tria: quorum unum est forma, aliud materia et tertium quod est hoc aliquid. Opposita autem non dicuntur de eodem. Ergo anima humana non potest esse forma et hoc aliquid. 8. Further, a form and a particular thing are distinguished from each other as opposites; for the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 2 (414a 15)], that substance has a threefold division: the first is form, the second, matter, and the third, this particular thing. But opposites are not predicated of one and the same thing. Therefore the human soul cannot be a form and a particular thing.
Praeterea, id quod est hoc aliquid per se subsistit. Formae autem proprium est quod sit in alio, quae videntur esse opposita. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid, non videtur quod sit forma. 9. Further, it belongs to the very essence of a particular thing to subsist of itself. But it is proper to a form to exist in something else. These seem to be contradictory. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, it is apparently not a form.
Sed dicebat quod corrupto corpore anima remanet hoc aliquid et per se subsistens, sed tunc perit in ea ratio formae. —Sed contra, omne quod potest abscedere ab aliquo, manente substantia eius, inest ei accidentaliter. Si igitur anima remanente post corpus, perit in ea ratio formae, sequitur quod ratio formae conveniat ei accidentaliter. Sed non unitur corpori ad constitutionem hominis nisi prout est forma. Ergo unitur corpori accidentaliter, et per consequens homo erit ens per accidens; quod est inconveniens. 10. But it might be said that when the body corrupts, the soul still remains a particular self-subsisting thing, but then loses the nature of a form. On the other hand, whatever can exist apart from a thing and retain the nature of a substance, exists in that thing accidentally. Therefore, if the soul continues to exist after the body corrupts, the soul ceases to have the character of a form; and thus the nature of a form belongs to it only accidentally. But it is only as a form that the soul is united to the body in order to constitute a man. Hence the soul is united to the body accidentally, and thus man will be a being per accidens. This is incongruous.
Praeterea, si anima humana est hoc aliquid et per se existens, oportet quod per se habeat aliquam propriam operationem; quia uniuscuiusque rei per se existentis est aliqua propria operatio. Sed anima humana non habet aliquam propriam operationem; quia ipsum intelligere, quod maxime videtur esse eius proprium, non est animae, sed hominis per animam, ut dicitur in I de anima. Ergo anima humana non est hoc aliquid. 11. Further, if the human soul is a particular self-subsisting thing, it must have an operation of its own, because a thing that exists of itself has its own proper operation. But the human soul does not have its own proper operation, because the act of intellection itself, which seems to be proper above all to the soul, is not an activity of the soul, but that of a man through his soul, as is stated in the De anima [I, 4 (408a 14)]. Therefore the human soul is not a particular thing.
Praeterea, si anima humana est forma corporis, oportet quod habeat aliquam dependentiam ad corpus; forma enim et materia a se invicem dependent. Sed quod dependet ex aliquo, non est hoc aliquid. Si igitur anima est forma corporis, non erit hoc aliquid. 12. Further, if the human soul is the form of the body, it must depend in some way on the body, for form and matter depend on each other. But whatever depends on something else [in this way] is not a particular thing. Therefore, if the soul is the form of the body, it will not be a particular thing.
Praeterea, si anima est forma corporis, oportet quod animae et corporis sit unum esse: nam ex materia et forma fit unum secundum esse. Sed animae et corporis non potest esse unum esse, cum sint diversorum generum; anima enim est in genere substantiae incorporeae, corpus vero in genere substantiae corporeae. Anima igitur non potest esse forma corporis. 13. Further, if the soul is the form of the body, there must be one act of existing (esse) common to the soul and the body; because from the union of matter and form there results a thing having one act of existing. But there cannot be one act of existing common to the soul and the body, since they are generically diverse; for the soul belongs to the genus of incorporeal substance, and the body to that of corporeal substance. Hence the soul cannot be the form of the body.
Praeterea, esse corporis est esse corruptibile, et ex partibus quantitativis resultans; esse autem animae est incorruptibile et simplex. Ergo corporis et animae non est unum esse. 14. Further, the body’s act of existing is a corruptible one resulting from quantitative parts. The soul’s act of existing, on the other hand, is incorruptible and simple. Therefore there is not one act of existing possessed in common by the body and the soul.
Sed dicebat quod corpus humanum ipsum esse corporis habet per animam. —Sed contra, philosophus dicit in II de anima, quod anima est actus corporis physici organici. Hoc igitur quod comparatur ad animam ut materia ad actum, est iam corpus physicum organicum: quod non potest esse nisi per aliquam formam, qua constituatur in genere corporis. Habet igitur corpus humanum suum esse praeter esse animae. 15. But it might be said that the human body itself has the act of existing of a body through the soul. On the contrary, the Philosopher says [Ibid., II, 1 (412b 5)] that the soul is the act of a physical organic body. Therefore that entity which is related to the soul as matter to act, is now a physical organic body; and this body can exist only through a form whereby it is placed in the genus of body. Consequently the human body possesses its own act of existing distinct from that of the soul.
Praeterea, principia essentialia, quae sunt materia et forma, ordinantur ad esse. Sed ad illud quod potest haberi in natura ab uno, non requiruntur duo. Si igitur anima, cum sit hoc aliquid, habet in se proprium esse, non adiungetur ei secundum naturam corpus, nisi ut materia formae. 16. Further, the essential principles of matter and form are ordered to the act of existing (esse). But whatever can be brought about in nature by one principle, does not require two. Therefore, if the soul has in itself its own act of existing because it is a particular thing, then the body by nature is united to the soul only as a matter to a form.
Praeterea, esse comparatur ad substantiam animae ut actus eius, et sic oportet quod sit supremum in anima. Inferius autem non contingit id quod est superius secundum supremum in eo, sed magis secundum infimum; dicit enim Dionysius, quod divina sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum. Corpus igitur, quod est inferius anima, non pertingit ad esse quod est supremum in ipsa. 17. Further, the act of existing is related to the substance of the soul as its act. Hence the act of existing must be supreme in the soul. But an inferior being is not related to a superior one with respect to that which is supreme in the superior, but rather with respect to that which is lowest in it. For Dionysius says [De divinis nominibus, VII, 2] that divine wisdom joins that which is highest (fines) in primary things [i.e., those having less perfection] to that which is lowest (principiis) in secondary ones [i.e., those having greater perfection]. Therefore the body, which is inferior to the soul, does not attain to that act of existing which is supreme in the soul.
Praeterea, quorum est unum esse, et una operatio. Si igitur esse animae humanae coniunctae corpori sit commune corpori; et operatio eius, quae est intelligere, erit communis animae et corpori; quod est impossibile, ut probatur in III de anima. Non est igitur unum esse animae humanae et corporis; unde sequitur quod anima non sit forma corporis et hoc aliquid. 18. Further, things having one and the same act of existing, have one and the same operation. Therefore, if the act of existing of the human soul, when joined to the body, belongs also to the body, the act of understanding, which is the operation of the soul, will belong both to the soul and the body. This is impossible, as is proved in the De anima [, 4 (429a 18)]. Consequently there is not one act of existing for both the human soul and the body. Hence it follows that the soul is not the form of the body and a particular thing.
Sed contra. Unumquodque sortitur speciem per propriam formam. Sed homo est homo in quantum est rationalis. Ergo anima rationalis est propria forma hominis. Est autem hoc aliquid et per se subsistens, cum per se operetur. Non enim est intelligere per organum corporeum, ut probatur in III de anima. Anima igitur humana est hoc aliquid et forma. On the contrary, a thing receives its species through its proper form. But man is man because he is rational. Hence the rational soul is the proper form of man. Moreover the soul is a particular self-subsisting thing because it operates of itself; for its act of understanding is not performed through a bodily organ, as is proved in the De anima [III, 4 (429a 24)]. Consequently the human soul is a particular thing and a form.
Praeterea, ultima perfectio animae humanae consistit in cognitione veritatis, quae est per intellectum. Ad hoc autem quod perficiatur anima in cognitione veritatis, indiget uniri corpori; quia intelligit per phantasmata, quae non sunt sine corpore. Ergo necesse est ut anima corpori uniatur ut forma, et sit hoc aliquid. Further, the highest perfection of the human soul consists in knowledge of truth which is acquired through the intellect. Moreover the soul must be united to the body in order to be ‘perfected in knowledge of truth, because it understands through phantasms which are non-existent without the body. Consequently the soul must be united as a form to the body and must be a particular thing as well.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod hoc aliquid proprie dicitur individuum in genere substantiae. Dicit enim philosophus in praedicamentis, quod primae substantiae indubitanter hoc aliquid significant; secundae vero substantiae, etsi videantur hoc aliquid significare, magis tamen significant quale quid. Individuum autem in genere substantiae non solum habet quod per se possit subsistere, sed quod sit aliquid completum in aliqua specie et genere substantiae; unde philosophus etiam in praedicamentis, manum et pedem et huiusmodi nominat partes substantiarum magis quam substantias primas vel secundas: quia, licet non sint in alio sicut in subiecto (quod proprie substantiae est), non tamen participant complete naturam alicuius speciei; unde non sunt in aliqua specie neque in aliquo genere, nisi per reductionem. I answer: “A particular thing,” properly speaking, designates an individual in the genus of substance. For the Philosopher says, in the Categories [V, 2a 10], that first substances undoubtedly signify particular things; second substances, indeed, although they seem to signify particular things, rather signify the specific essence (quale quid). Furthermore, an individual in the genus of substance is capable not only of subsisting of itself, but is also a complete entity belonging to a definite species and genus of substance. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the Categories [V, 3a 28], also calls a hand and a foot, and things of this sort, parts of substances rather than first or second substances. For although they do not exist in another as a subject (which is characteristic of a substance), they still do not possess completely the nature of a species. Hence they belong to a species or to a genus only by reduction.
Duobus igitur existentibus de ratione eius quod est hoc aliquid; quidam utrumque animae humanae abstulerunt, dicentes animam esse harmoniam, ut Empedocles; aut complexionem, ut Galenus; aut aliquid huiusmodi. Sic enim anima neque per se poterit subsistere, neque erit aliquid completum in aliqua specie vel genere substantiae; sed erit forma tantum similis aliis materialibus formis. Now some men have denied that the human soul possesses these two real characteristics belonging to a particular thing by its very nature, because they said that the soul is a harmony, as Empedocles did, or a combination [of the elements], as Galen did, or something of this kind. For then the soul will neither be able to subsist of itself, nor will it be a complete thing belonging to a species or genus of substance, but will be a form similar only to other material forms.
Sed haec positio stare non potest nec quantum ad animam vegetabilem, cuius operationes oportet habere aliquod principium supergrediens qualitates activas et passivas, quae in nutriendo et in augendo se habent instrumentaliter tantum, ut probatur in II de anima; complexio autem et harmonia qualitates elementares non transcendunt. Similiter autem non potest stare quantum ad animam sensibilem, cuius operationes sunt in recipiendo species sine materia, ut probatur in II de anima; cum tamen qualitates activae et passivae ultra materiam se non extendant, utpote materiae dispositiones existentes. Multo autem minus potest stare quantum ad animam rationalem, cuius operationes sunt intelligere et abstrahere species, non solum a materia, sed ab omnibus conditionibus materialibus individuantibus, quod requiritur ad cognitionem universalis. Sed adhuc aliquid amplius proprie in anima rationali considerari oportet: quia non solum absque materia et conditionibus materiae species intelligibiles recipit, sed nec etiam in eius propria operatione possibile est communicare aliquod organum corporale; ut sic aliquod corporeum sit organum intelligendi, sicut oculus est organum videndi; ut probatur in III de anima. Et sic oportet quod anima intellectiva per se agat, utpote propriam operationem habens absque corporis communione. Et quia unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu, oportet quod anima intellectiva habeat esse per se absolutum non dependens a corpore. Formae enim quae habent esse dependens a materia vel subiecto, non habent per se operationem: non enim calor agit, sed calidum. But this position is untenable as regards the vegetal soul, whose operations necessarily require some principle surpassing the active and passive qualities [of the elements] which play only an instrumental role in nutrition and growth, as is proved in the De anima [II, 4. 415b 28]. Moreover, a combination and a harmony do not transcend the elemental qualities. This position is likewise untenable as regards the sentient soul, whose operations consist in receiving species separated from matter, as is shown in the De anima [II, 12, 424a 16]. For inasmuch as active and passive qualities are dispositions of matter, they do not transcend matter. Again, this position is even less tenable as regards the rational soul, whose operation consists in understanding, and in abstracting species not only from matter, but from all individuating conditions, this being required for the understanding of universals. However, in the case of the rational soul something of special importance must still be considered, because not only does it receive intelligible species without matter and material conditions, but it is also quite impossible for it, in performing its proper operation, to have anything in common with a bodily organ, as though something corporeal might be an organ of understanding, just as the eye is the organ of sight, as is proved in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 24]. Thus the intellective soul, inasmuch as it performs its proper operation without communicating in any way with the body, must act of itself. And because a thing acts so far as it is actual, the intellective soul must have a complete act of existing in itself, depending in no way on the body. For forms whose act of existing depends on matter or on a subject do not operate of themselves. Heat, for instance, does not act, but something hot.
Et propter hoc posteriores philosophi iudicaverunt partem animae intellectivam esse aliquid per se subsistens. Dicit enim philosophus in III de anima, quod intellectus est substantia quaedam et non corrumpitur. Et in idem redit dictum Platonis ponentis animam immortalem et per se subsistentem, ex eo quod movet seipsam. Large enim accepit motum pro omni operatione, ut sic intelligatur quod intellectus movet seipsum, quia a seipso operatur. For this reason the later Greek philosophers came to the conclusion that the intellective part of the soul is a self-subsisting thing. For the Philosopher says, in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 24], that the intellect is a substance, and is not corrupted. The teaching of Plato [Phaedrus, 24] who maintains that the soul is incorruptible and subsists of itself in view of the fact that it moves itself, amounts to the same thing. For he took “motion” in a broad sense to signify every operation; hence he understands that the soul moves itself because it moves itself by itself.
Sed ulterius posuit Plato, quod anima humana non solum per se subsisteret, sed quod etiam haberet in se completam naturam speciei. Ponebat enim totam naturam speciei in anima esse, dicens hominem non esse aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, sed animam corpori advenientem; ut sit comparatio animae ad corpus sicut nautae ad navem, vel sicuti induti ad vestem. —Sed haec opinio stare non potest. Manifestum est enim id quo vivit corpus, animam esse, vivere autem est esse viventium: anima igitur est quo corpus humanum habet esse actu. Huiusmodi autem forma est. Est igitur anima humana corporis forma. Ita si anima esset in corpore sicut nauta in navi, non daret speciem corpori, neque partibus eius; cuius contrarium apparet ex hoc quod recedente anima, singulae partes non retinent pristinum nomen nisi aequivoce. Dicitur enim oculus mortui aequivoce oculus, sicut pictus aut lapideus; et simile est de aliis partibus. Et praeterea, si anima esset in corpore sicut nauta in navi, sequeretur quod unio animae et corporis esset accidentalis. Mors igitur, quae inducit eorum separationem, non esset corruptio substantialis; quod patet esse falsum. Relinquitur igitur quod anima est hoc aliquid, ut per se potens subsistere; non quasi habens in se completam speciem, sed quasi perficiens speciem humanam ut forma corporis; et similiter est forma et hoc aliquid. But elsewhere [Alcibiades, 25-26] Plato maintained that the human soul not only subsisted of itself, but also had the complete nature of a species. For he held that the complete nature of the [human] species is found in the soul, saying that a man is not a composite of soul and body, but a soul joined to a body in such a way that it is related to the body as a pilot is to a ship, or as one clothed to his clothing. However, this position is untenable, because it is obvious that the soul is the reality which gives life to the body. Moreover, vital activity (vivere) is the act of existing (esse) of living things. Consequently the soul is that, which gives the human body its act of existing. Now a form is of this nature. Therefore the human soul is the form of the body. But if the soul were, in the body as a pilot is in, a ship, it would give neither the body nor its parts their specific nature. The contrary of this is seen to be true, because, when the soul leaves the body, the body’s individual parts retain their original names only in an equivocal sense. For the eye of a dead man, like the eye of a portrait or that of a statue, is called an eye equivocally; and similarly for the other parts of the body. Furthermore, if the soul were in the body as a pilot in a ship, it would follow that the union of soul and body would be an accidental one. Then death, which brings about their separation, would not be a substantial corruption; which is clearly false. So it follows that the soul is a particular thing and that it can subsist of itself, not as a thing having a complete species of its own, but as completing the human species by being the form of the body. Hence it likewise follows that it is both a form and a particular thing.
Quod quidem ex ordine formarum naturalium considerari potest. Invenitur enim inter formas inferiorum corporum tanto aliqua altior, quanto superioribus principiis magis assimilatur et appropinquat. Quod quidem ex propriis formarum operationibus, perpendi potest. Formae enim elementorum, quae sunt infimae et materiae propinquissimae, non habent aliquam operationem excedentem qualitates activas et passivas, ut rarum et densum, et aliae huiusmodi, quae videntur esse materiae dispositiones. Super has autem sunt formae mixtorum corporum, quae praeter praedictas operationes, habent aliquam operationem consequentem speciem, quam sortiuntur ex corporibus caelestibus; sicut quod adamas attrahit ferrum, non propter calorem aut frigus aut aliquid huiusmodi, sed ex quadam participatione virtutis caelestis. Super has autem formas sunt iterum animae plantarum, quae habent similitudinem non solum ad ipsa corpora caelestia, sed ad motores corporum caelestium in quantum sunt principia cuiusdam motus, quibusdam seipsa moventibus. Super has autem ulterius sunt animae brutorum, quae similitudinem iam habent ad substantiam moventem caelestia corpora, non solum in operatione qua movent corpora, sed etiam in hoc quod in seipsis cognoscitivae sunt; licet brutorum cognitio sit materialium tantum, et materialiter, unde organis corporalibus indigent. Super has autem ultimo sunt animae humanae, quae similitudinem habent ad superiores substantias etiam in genere cognitionis, quia immaterialia cognoscere possunt intelligendo. In hoc tamen ab eis differunt, quod intellectus animae humanae habent naturam acquirendi cognitionem immaterialem ex cognitione materialium, quae est per sensum. Indeed, this can be shown from the order of natural forms. For we find among the forms of lower bodies that the higher a form is, the more it resembles and approaches higher principles. This can be seen from the proper operation of forms. For the forms of the elements, being lowest [in the order of forms] and nearest to matter, possess no operation surpassing their active and passive qualities, such as rarefaction and condensation, and the like, which appear to be material dispositions. Over and above these forms are those of the mixed bodies and these forms have (in addition to the above mentioned operations) a certain activity, consequent upon their species, which they receive from the celestial bodies. The magnet, for instance, attracts iron not because of its heat or its cold or anything of this sort, but because it shares in the powers of the heavens. Again, surpassing these forms are the souls of plants, which resemble not only the forms of earthly bodies but also the movers of the celestial bodies inasmuch as they are principles of a certain motion, themselves being moved. Still higher are brute beasts’ forms, which now resemble a substance moving a celestial body not only because of the operation whereby they move bodies but also because they are capable of knowledge, although their knowledge is concerned merely with material things and belongs to the material order (for which reason they require bodily organs). Again, over and above these forms, and in the highest place, are human souls, which certainly resemble superior substances with respect to the kind of knowledge they possess, because they are capable of knowing immaterial things by their act of intellection. However, human souls differ from superior substances inasmuch as the human soul’s intellective power, by its very nature, must acquire its immaterial knowledge from the knowledge of material things attained through the senses.
Sic igitur ex operatione animae humanae, modus esse ipsius cognosci potest. In quantum enim habet operationem materialia transcendentem, esse suum est supra corpus elevatum, non dependens ex ipso; in quantum vero immaterialem cognitionem ex materiali est nata acquirere, manifestum est quod complementum suae speciei esse non potest absque corporis unione. Non enim aliquid est completum in specie, nisi habeat ea quae requiruntur ad propriam operationem ipsius speciei. Si igitur anima humana, in quantum unitur corpori ut forma, habet esse elevatum supra corpus non dependens ab eo, manifestum est quod ipsa est in confinio corporalium et separatarum substantiarum constituta. Consequently the human soul’s mode of existing can be known from its operation. For, inasmuch as the human soul has an operation transcending the material order, its act of existing transcends the body and does not depend on the body. Indeed, inasmuch as the soul is naturally capable of acquiring immaterial knowledge from material things, evidently its species can be complete only when it is united to a body. For a thing’s species is complete only if it has the things necessary for the proper operation of its species. Consequently, if the human soul, inasmuch as it is united as a form to the body, has an act of existing which transcends the body and does not depend on it, obviously the soul itself is established on the boundary line dividing corporeal from separate substances.
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet anima habeat esse completum non tamen sequitur quod corpus ei accidentaliter uniatur; tum quia illud idem esse quod est animae communicat corpori, ut sit unum esse totius compositi; tum etiam quia etsi possit per se subsistere, non tamen habet speciem completam, sed corpus advenit ei ad completionem speciei. 1. Although the soul has a complete act of existing of its own, it does not follow that the body is united to it accidentally: first, because the same act of existing that belongs to the soul is conferred on the body by the soul so that there is one act of existing for the whole composite; secondly, because, while the soul can subsist of itself, it does not have a complete species, for the soul needs the body in order to complete its species.
Ad secundum dicendum quod unumquodque secundum idem habet esse et individuationem. Universalia enim non habent esse in rerum natura ut universalia sunt, sed solum secundum quod sunt individuata. Sicut igitur esse animae est a Deo sicut a principio activo, et in corpore sicut in materia, nec tamen esse animae perit pereunte corpore; ita et individuatio animae, etsi aliquam relationem habeat ad corpus, non tamen perit corpore pereunte. 2. The act of existing (esse) and individuation (individuatio) of a thing are always found together. For universals do not exist in reality inasmuch as they are universals, but only inasmuch as they are individuated. Therefore, although the soul receives its act of existing from God as from an active principle, and exists in the body as in matter, nevertheless the soul’s act, of existing does not cease when the body corrupts, nor does the soul’s individuation cease when the body corrupts, even though it has a relationship to the body.
Ad tertium dicendum quod anima humana non est hoc aliquid sicut substantia completam speciem habens; sed sicut pars habentis speciem completam, ut ex dictis patet. Unde ratio non sequitur. 3. The human soul is not a particular thing as though it were a substance having a complete species in itself, but inasmuch as it is part of a thing having a complete species, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore the conclusion in the objection is false.
Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet anima humana per se possit subsistere, non tamen per se habet speciem completam; unde non posset esse quod animae separatae constituerent unum gradum entium. 4. Although the human soul subsists of itself, it does not have a complete species in virtue of its very nature. Consequently souls existing apart from bodies cannot constitute a distinct grade of being.
Ad quintum dicendum quod corpus humanum est materia proportionata animae humanae; comparatur enim ad eam ut potentia ad actum. Nec tamen oportet quod ei adaequetur in virtute essendi: quia anima humana non est forma a materia totaliter comprehensa; quod patet ex hoc quod aliqua eius operatio est supra materiam. Potest tamen aliter dici secundum sententiam fidei, quod corpus humanum a principio aliquo modo incorruptibile constitutum est, et per peccatum necessitatem moriendi incurrit, a qua iterum in resurrectione liberabitur. Unde per accidens est quod ad immortalitatem animae non pertingit. 5. The human body is the matter proportioned to the human soul, for the body is related to the soul as potentiality is to act. However, as regards its capacity for existing the soul need not be on a par with the body, because the human soul is not a form totally embraced by matter. This is evident from the fact that one of the soul’s operations transcends matter. However, another explanation can be given in accordance with the position of faith, namely, that in the beginning the human body was in some way created incorruptible and incurred the necessity of dying through sin, from which necessity it will be freed once again at the resurrection. Hence it is accidental that the body does not share in the incorruptibility of the soul.
Ad sextum dicendum quod anima humana, cum sit subsistens, composita est ex potentia et actu. Nam ipsa substantia animae non est suum esse, sed comparatur ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum. Nec tamen sequitur quod anima non possit esse forma corporis: quia etiam in aliis formis id quod est ut forma et actus in comparatione ad unum, est ut potentia in comparatione ad aliud; sicut diaphanum formaliter advenit aeri, quod tamen est potentia respectu luminis 6. Since the human soul is a subsisting being, it is composed of potentiality and act. For the substance itself of the soul is not its own act of existing, but is related to its act of existing as potentiality is to act. However, it does not follow that the soul cannot be the form of the body, because, even in the case of other forms, whatever is like form and act in relation to one thing is like potentiality in relation to something else; just as transparency is formally present to the atmosphere, which is in potency in relation to light.
Ad septimum dicendum quod anima unitur corpori et propter bonum quod est perfectio substantialis, ut scilicet compleatur species humana; et propter bonum quod est perfectio accidentalis, ut scilicet perficiatur in cognitione intellectiva, quam anima ex sensibus acquirit; hic enim modus intelligendi est naturalis homini. Nec obstat, si animae separatae puerorum et aliorum hominum alio modo intelligendi utuntur, quia hoc magis competit eis ratione separationis quam ratione speciei humanae. 7. The soul is united to the body both for a good which is a substantial perfection, namely, the completion of the human species; and for a good which is an accidental perfection, namely, the perfecting of the soul in intellectual knowledge which it acquires from the senses; for this mode of understanding is natural to man. Nor is this position rendered untenable if the separated souls of infants and those of other men employ a different mode of understanding, for these souls are capable of such intellection rather by reason of being separated from the body than by reason of their human species.
Ad octavum dicendum quod non est de ratione eius quod est hoc aliquid quod sit ex materia et forma compositum, sed solum quod possit per se subsistere. Unde licet compositum sit hoc aliquid, non tamen removetur quin aliis possit competere quod sint hoc aliquid. 8. It is not of the very nature of a particular thing to be composed of matter and form, but only to be capable of subsisting in itself. Consequently, although a composite [of matter and form] is a particular thing, this does not prevent other beings [i.e., those not composed of matter and form] from being particular things.
Ad nonum dicendum quod in alio esse sicut accidens in subiecto, tollit rationem eius quod est hoc aliquid. Esse autem in alio sicut partem (quomodo anima est in homine), non omnino excludit quin id quod est in alio, possit hoc aliquid dici. 9. For a thing to exist in another as an accident in a subject, prevents that thing from having the nature of a particular thing. However, for a thing to exist in another as part of it (and the soul exists in man in this way) does not altogether prevent a thing having such an existence from being called a particular thing.
Ad decimum dicendum quod corrupto corpore non perit ab anima natura secundum quam competit ei ut sit forma; licet non perficiat materiam actu, ut sit forma. 10. When the body is corrupted the soul does not lose the nature which belongs to it as a form, despite the fact that it does not actually perfect matter as a form.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod intelligere est propria operatio animae, si consideretur principium a quo egreditur operatio; non enim egreditur ab anima mediante organo corporali, sicut visio mediante oculo, communicat tamen in ea corpus ex parte obiecti; nam phantasmata, quae sunt obiecta intellectus, sine corporeis organis esse non possunt. 11. Intellection is the operation proper to the soul, if the soul is considered to be the principle from which the operation flows, for this operation is not exercised by the soul through some bodily organ as sight is exercised through the eye. Nevertheless the body shares in this operation on the side of the object, for phantasms, which are the objects of the intellect, cannot exist without bodily organs.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod etiam anima aliquam dependentiam habet ad corpus, in quantum sine corpore non pertingit ad complementum suae speciei; non tamen sic dependet a corpore quin sine corpore esse possit. 12. Although the soul has some dependence on the body inasmuch as the soul’s species is not complete without the body, the soul does not depend on the body in such a way that it cannot exist without the body.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod necesse est, si anima est forma corporis, quod animae et corporis sit unum esse commune, quod est esse compositi. Nec hoc impeditur per hoc quod anima et corpus sint diversorum generum: nam neque anima neque corpus sunt in specie vel genere, nisi per reductionem, sicut partes reducuntur ad speciem vel genus totius. 13. If the soul is the form of the body, the soul and the body must have one common act of existing which is the act of existing of the composite. Nor is this prevented by the fact that the soul and the body belong to two different genera, for the soul and the body belong to the same species or genus only by reduction, just as the parts of a whole are reduced, to the species or genus of the whole.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod illud quod proprie corrumpitur, non est forma neque materia, neque ipsum esse, sed compositum. Dicitur autem esse corporis corruptibile, in quantum corpus per corruptionem deficit ab illo esse quod erat sibi et anima commune, quod remanet in anima subsistente. Et pro tanto etiam dicitur ex partibus consistens esse corporis, quia ex suis partibus corpus constituitur tale ut possit ab anima esse recipere. 14. The thing that is properly corrupted is neither the form nor the matter nor the act of existing itself but the composite. Moreover, the body’s act of existing is said to be corruptible inasmuch as the body by corrupting is deprived of the act of existing which it possessed in common with the soul; which act of existing remains in the subsisting soul. The same thing is to be said also for the parts composing the body, because the body is constituted of its parts in such a way that it can receive its act of existing from the soul.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod in definitionibus formarum aliquando ponitur subiectum ut informe, sicut cum dicitur: motus est actus existentis in potentia. Aliquando autem ponitur subiectum formatum, sicut cum dicitur: motus est actus mobilis, lumen est actus lucidi. Et hoc modo dicitur anima actus corporis organici physici, quia anima facit ipsum esse corpus organicum, sicut lumen facit aliquid esse lucidum. 15. Sometimes in the definitions of forms a subject is considered independently of its form (informe), as when it is said that motion is the act of a being in potentiality. Sometimes, however, the subject is regarded as informed (formatum) as when it is said that motion is the act of a mobile thing, just as light is the act of that which is transparent. Now it is in this way that the soul is said to be the act of a physical organic body, because the soul causes it to be a physical organic body just as light makes something to be lucid.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod principia essentialia alicuius speciei ordinantur non ad esse tantum, sed ad esse huius speciei. Licet igitur anima possit per se esse, non tamen potest in complemento suae speciei esse sine corpore. 16. The essential principles of a species are not related merely to an act of existing, but to the act of existing of this [particular] species. Consequently, although the soul can exist of itself, it cannot be complete in its species without the body.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod licet esse sit formalissimum inter omnia, tamen est etiam maxime communicabile, licet non eodem modo inferioribus et superioribus communicetur. Sic ergo corpus esse animae participat, sed non ita nobiliter sicut anima. 17. While the act of existing is the most formal of all principles, it is also the most communicable, although it is not shared in the same measure both by inferior beings and by superior ones. Hence the body shares in the soul’s act of existing, but not as perfectly as the soul does.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod quamvis esse animae sit quodammodo corporis, non tamen corpus attingit ad esse animae participandum secundum totam suam nobilitatem et virtutem; et ideo est aliqua operatio animae in qua non communicat corpus. 18. Although the soul’s act of existing belongs in a certain measure to the body, the body does not succeed in sharing in the souls’s act of existing to the full extent of its perfection and actuality; and therefore the soul has an operation in which the body does not share.
ARTICLE 2
WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL, SO FAR AS ITS ACT OF EXISTING IS CONCERNED, IS SEPARATED FROM THE BODY

[Summa theol., la, q-75, a-4; Contra Gentiles, 11 1 57; Sent., Bk. III, dist., 5, q. 3, a. 2; dist., 22, q. i, a. i; De ente et essentia, chap. 2; De unit. intell.; Comm. in Metaph., VII, lect. 9]
Secundo quaeritur utrum anima humana sit separata secundum esse a corpore In the second article we examine this question: Whether the human soul, so far as its act of existing is concerned, is separated from the body.
Objections.
Et videtur quod sic. Dicit enim philosophus in III de anima quod sensitivum non sine corpore est; intellectus autem est separatus. Intellectus autem est anima humana. Ergo anima humana est secundum esse a corpore separata. 1. It seems that it is. For the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 4, 429b 4] that no sentient power exists without a body. But the intellect is separate and the intellect is the human soul. Therefore the human soul, so far as its act of existing is concerned, is separated from the body.
Praeterea, anima est actus corporis physici organici, in quantum corpus est organum eius. Si igitur intellectus unitur secundum esse corpori ut forma, oportet quod corpus sit organum eius; quod est impossibile, ut probat philosophus in III de anima. 2. Further, the soul is the act of a physical organic body inasmuch as the body is its organ. Hence, if the intellect, with respect to its very act of existing, is united as a form to the body, the body must be its organ. This is impossible, as the Philosopher proves in the De anima [ibid.].
Praeterea, maior est concretio formae ad materiam quam virtutis ad organum. Sed intellectus propter sui simplicitatem non potest esse concretus corpori sicut virtus organo. Ergo multo minus potest ei uniri sicut forma ad materiam. 3. Further, a form is united to matter more intimately than a power is to an organ. But the intellect cannot be united to the body as a power is to an organ, because the intellect is simple.
Sed dicebat quod intellectus, id est potentia intellectiva, non habet organum; sed ipsa essentia animae intellectivae unitur corpori ut forma. —Sed contra, effectus non est simplicior sua causa. Sed potentia animae est effectus essentiae eius, quia omnes potentiae fluunt ab esse eius. Nulla ergo potentia animae est simplicior esse animae. Si ergo intellectus non potest esse actus corporis, ut probatur in III de anima, neque anima intellectiva poterit uniri corpori ut forma. 4. But it might be said that the intellect, that is, the intellective power, does not have an organ, but that the essence itself of the intellective soul is united as a form to the body. On the other hand, no effect is simpler than its cause. Now a power of the soul is an effect of its essence, because all powers of the soul flow from its essence (esse). Consequently no power of the soul is simpler than its essence. If, then, the intellect cannot be the act of the body, as is proved in the De anima [III. 4, 420a 24; 420b 4] neither can the intellective soul be united as a form to the body.
Praeterea, omnis forma unita materiae individuatur per materiam. Si igitur anima intellectiva unitur corpori ut forma, oportet quod sit individua. Ergo formae receptae in ea sunt formae individuatae. Non ergo anima intellectiva poterit universalia cognoscere; quod patet esse falsum. 5. Further, every form united to matter is individuated by matter. Therefore, if the intellective soul is united to the body as the form of the latter, the soul must be an individuated [form]. Then the forms received in the soul are individuated forms. Consequently the intellective soul will be incapable of knowing universals; which is clearly false.
Praeterea, forma universalis non habet quod sit intellectiva a re quae est extra animam; quia omnes formae quae sunt in rebus extra animam, sunt individuatae. Si igitur formae intellectus sint universales, oportet quod hoc habeant ab anima intellectiva. Non ergo anima intellectiva est forma individuata; et ita non unitur corpori secundum esse. 6. Further, a universal form does not acquire its universality from the thing existing outside the soul, because all forms existing in such things are individuated. Thus, if the forms in the intellect are universal, they must acquire this universality from the intellective soul. Consequently the intellective soul is not an individuated form, and therefore is not united to the body so far as its act of existing is concerned.
Sed dicebat quod formae intelligibiles ex illa parte qua inhaerent animae, sunt individuatae; sed ex illa parte qua sunt rerum similitudines, sunt universales, repraesentantes res secundum naturam communem, et non secundum principia individuantia. —Sed contra, cum forma sit principium operationis, operatio egreditur a forma secundum modum quo inhaeret subiecto. Quanto enim aliquid est calidum, tantum calefacit. Si igitur species rerum quae sunt in anima intellectiva sunt individuatae ex ea parte qua inhaerent animae, cognitio quae sequitur erit individualis tantum, et non universalis. 7. However, it might be said that inasmuch as intelligible forms inhere in the soul they are individuated; but as the likenesses of things they are universals representing things according to their common nature and not according to their individuating principles. On the contrary, since a form is a principle of operation, an operation proceeds from a form in accordance with the manner in which that form inheres in a subject. For instance, the hotter something is, the more it is capable of heating. Therefore, if the species of things in the intellective soul are individuated because they inhere in the soul, then the knowledge which results will be knowledge only of the individual [as such] and will not be universal.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in II de anima, quod sicut trigonum est in tetragono, et tetragonum est in pentagono; ita nutritivum est in sensitivo et sensitivum in intellectivo. Sed trigonum non est in tetragono actu sed potentia tantum; neque etiam tetragonum in pentagono. Ergo nec nutritivum nec sensitivum sunt in actu in intellectiva parte animae. Cum ergo pars intellectiva non uniatur corpori nisi mediante nutritivo et sensitivo, ex quo nutritivum et sensitivum non sunt actu in intellectivo, intellectiva pars animae non erit corpori unita. 8. Further, the Philosopher says in the De anima [II, 3, 414b 27], that just as the triangle is contained in the quadrilateral and the quadrilateral in the pentagon, so also is the nutritive part of the soul contained in the sentient part and the sentient in turn contained in the intellective. However, the triangle is not contained actually in the quadrilateral, but only potentially; nor is the quadrilateral contained actually in the pentagon. Therefore, neither is the nutritive nor sentient part of the soul contained, actually in the intellective. Consequently, since the intellective part of the soul is united to the body only through the intermediary of the nutritive and sentient parts, because the sentient and nutritive parts of the soul are not actually contained in the intellective part, the intellective part of the soul will not be united to the body.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in XVI de animalibus, quod non est simul animal et homo; sed primum animal, et postea homo. Non igitur idem est quo est animal, et quo est homo. Sed animal est per sensitivum, homo vero per intellectivum. Non igitur sensitivum et intellectivum uniuntur in una substantia animae; et sic idem quod prius. 9. Further, the Philosopher says in the De generatione animalium [II, 3, 736b 2] that a man is not at once both an animal and a man, but first is an animal and then a man. Consequently the principle whereby he is an animal and that whereby he is a man are not one and the same. But he is an animal because of his sentient part and a man because of his intellective part. Therefore the sentient and intellective parts are not united in one and the same substance of the soul. Hence the conclusion is the same as the foregoing.
Praeterea, forma est in eodem genere cum materia cui unitur. Sed intellectus non est in genere corporalium. Intellectus igitur non est forma unita corpori sicut materiae. 10. Further, a form belongs to the same genus as the matter to which it is united. But the intellect does not belong to the genus of corporeal things. Therefore the intellect is not a form united to the body as to matter.
Praeterea, ex duabus substantiis existentibus actu non fit aliquid unum. Sed tam corpus quam intellectus est substantia existens actu. Non igitur intellectus potest uniri corpori, ut ex eis fiat aliquid unum. 11. Further, one being does not result from the union of two actually existing substances. But both the body and the intellect [i.e., the intellective soul] are two actually existing substances. Hence the intellect cannot be united to the body so that one being results from their union.
Praeterea, omnis forma unita materiae reducitur in actum per motum et mutationem materiae. Sed anima intellectiva non reducitur in actum de potentia materiae, sed est ab extrinseco, ut philosophus dicit in XVI de animalibus. Ergo non est forma unita materiae. 12. Further, every form united to matter is given actual existence by moving and changing matter. But the intellective soul is not given actual existence [by being educed] from the potentiality of matter, but receives its act of existing from an extrinsic agent, as the Philosopher says in the De generatione animalium [ibid., 736b 27]. Therefore the soul is not a form united to matter.
Praeterea, unumquodque secundum quod est, sic operatur. Sed anima intellectiva habet operationem per se sine corpore, scilicet intelligere. Ergo non est unita corpori secundum esse. 13. Further, a thing operates in accordance with its nature. But the intellective soul has an operation of its own without the body, namely, the act of intellection. Therefore, so far as its act of existing is concerned, the intellective soul is not united to the body.
Praeterea, minimum inconveniens est Deo impossibile. Sed inconveniens est quod anima innocens corpori includatur, quod est quasi carcer. Impossibile est igitur Deo quod animam intellectivam uniat corpori. 14. Further, even the slightest impropriety is impossible for God.” But it is improper for an innocent soul to be united to a body which is like a prison. Therefore it is impossible for God to unite an intellective soul to a body.
Praeterea, nullus artifex sapiens praestat impedimentum suo operato. Sed animae intellectivae est maximum impedimentum corpus ad veritatis cognitionem percipiendam, in qua perfectio eius consistit, secundum illud Sap. IX: corpus, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam. Non igitur Deus animam intellectivam corpori univit. 15. Further, a wise artifex does not place an obstacle in the way of his work. But the body is the greatest obstacle to the intellective soul in acquiring knowledge of truth, in which its perfection consists, according to that text in the Book of Wisdom: “The body which is corrupted, weighs down upon the soul” (Wis. 9:15). Therefore God did not unite the intellective soul to the body.
Praeterea, ea quae sunt unita ad invicem, habent mutuam affinitatem ad invicem. Sed anima intellectiva et corpus habent contrarietatem, quia caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem. Non igitur anima intellectiva unita est corpori. 16. Further, things which are united one to another have an affinity for each other. But the intellective soul and the body are opposed to each other, because “The flesh desires the opposite of the spirit, and the spirit, the opposite of the flesh” (Gal. 5:17). Consequently the intellective soul is not united to the body.
Praeterea, intellectus est in potentia ad omnes formas intelligibiles, nullam earum habens in actu; sicut materia prima est in potentia ad omnes formas sensibiles, et nullam earum habet in actu. Sed hac ratione est prima materia una omnium. Ergo et intellectus est unus omnium; et sic non est unitus corpori, quod ipsum individuat. 17. Further, the intellect is in potency to all intelligible forms having none actually, just as prime matter is in potency to all sensible forms having none actually. But it is for this reason that there is one prime matter for all things. Therefore there is also one intellect for all men. Hence it is not united to a body which would individuate it.
Praeterea, philosophus probat in III de anima quod si intellectus possibilis haberet organum corporale, haberet aliquam naturam determinatam de naturis sensibilibus, et sic non esset receptivus et cognoscitivus omnium formarum sensibilium. Sed magis forma unitur materiae quam virtus organo. Ergo si intellectus uniatur corpori ut forma, habebit aliquam naturam sensibilem determinatam; et sic non erit perceptivus et cognoscitivus omnium formarum sensibilium; quod est impossibile. 18. Further, the Philosopher proves in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 18] that, if the possible intellect had a bodily organ, it would have a certain determinate sensible nature, and thus could not receive and know all sensible forms. But a form is united to matter more intimately than a power is to an organ. Therefore, if the intellect is united as a form to the body, it will have a certain determinate sensible nature, and thus will be incapable of perceiving and knowing all sensible forms. This is impossible.
Praeterea, omnis forma unita materiae, est in materia recepta. Omne autem quod recipitur ab aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis. Ergo omnis forma unita materiae est in ea per modum materiae. Sed modus materiae sensibilis et corporalis non est quod recipiat aliquid per modum intelligibilem. Cum igitur intellectus habeat esse intelligibile, non est forma materiae corporali unita. 19. Further, every form united to matter is received in matter. But whatever is received in a thing exists therein in accordance with the mode of the recipient. Therefore every form united to matter exists in matter according to the mode of matter. But the mode of sensible and corporeal matter is not the one that a thing receives through an intelligible mode. Consequently, since the intellect has an intelligible mode of existing, it is not a form united to corporeal matter.
Praeterea, si anima unitur materiae corporali, oportet quod recipiatur in ea. Sed quidquid recipitur ab eo quod est esse a materia receptum, est in materia receptum. Ergo si anima est unita materiae, quidquid recipitur in anima recipitur in materia. Sed formae intellectus non possunt recipi a materia prima; quinimmo per abstractionem a materia intelligibiles fiunt. Ergo anima quae est unita materiae corporali non est receptiva formarum intelligibilium; et ita intellectus, qui est receptivus formarum intelligibilium, non erit unitus materiae corporali. 20. Further, if the soul is united to corporeal matter, it must be received in it. But whatever is received in a thing that has received its act of existing from matter, is received in matter. Therefore, if the soul is united to matter, then whatever is received in the soul is received in matter. But the forms of the intellect cannot be received in prime matter. On the contrary, they are made intelligible by abstraction from matter. Consequently, a soul which is united to corporeal matter is not capable of receiving intelligible forms, and thus the intellect, which is capable of receiving intelligible forms, will not be united to corporeal matter.
Sed contra. Est quod philosophus dicit in II de anima quod non oportet quaerere si anima et corpus sint unum, sicut neque de cera et figura. Sed figura nullo modo potest esse separata a cera secundum esse. Ergo nec anima est separata a corpore. Sed intellectus est pars animae, ut philosophus dicit in III de anima. Ergo intellectus non est separatus a corpore secundum esse. On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the De anima [II, 1, 412b 6], that it is unnecessary to ask whether the soul and the body are one, just as it is unnecessary to ask whether the wax and its impression are one. But with respect to its act of existing, the impression cannot be separated in any way from the wax. Consequently, with respect to its act of existing, the soul is not separated from the body. But the intellect is a part of the soul, as the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 15]. Therefore the intellect, so far as its act of existing is concerned, is not separated from the body.
Praeterea, nulla forma est separata a materia secundum esse. Sed anima intellectiva est forma corporis. Ergo non est forma separata a materia secundum esse. Further, so far as its act of existing is concerned, no form is separated from matter. But the intellective soul is the form of the body. Therefore, with respect to its act of existing, the soul is not separated from matter.
Respondeo. Ad evidentiam huius quaestionis considerandum est, quod ubicumque invenitur aliquid quandoque in potentia, quandoque in actu, oportet esse aliquod principium per quod res illa sit in potentia: sicut homo quandoque est sentiens actu, et quandoque in potentia; et propter hoc in homine oportet ponere principium sensitivum, quod sit in potentia ad sensibilia: si enim esset semper sentiens actu, formae sensibilium inessent semper actu principio sentiendi. Similiter cum homo inveniatur quandoque intelligens actu, quandoque intelligens in potentia tantum; oportet in homine considerare aliquod intellectivum principium, quod sit in potentia ad intelligibilia. Et hoc principium nominat philosophus in III de anima intellectum possibilem. Hunc igitur intellectum possibilem necesse est esse in potentia ad omnia quae sunt intelligibilia per hominem, et receptivum eorum, et per consequens denudatum ab his: quia omne quod est receptivum aliquorum, et in potentia ad ea, quantum de se est, est denudatum ab eis; sicut pupilla, quae est receptiva omnium colorum, caret omni colore. Homo autem natus est intelligere formas omnium sensibilium rerum. Oportet igitur intellectum possibilem esse denudatum, quantum in se est, ab omnibus sensibilibus formis et naturis; et ita oportet quod non habeat aliquod organum corporeum. Si enim haberet aliquod organum corporeum, determinaretur ad aliquam naturam sensibilem, sicut potentia visiva determinatur ad naturam oculi. Per hanc philosophi demonstrationem excluditur positio philosophorum antiquorum, qui ponebant intellectum non differre a potentiis sensitivis; vel quicumque alii posuerunt principium quo intelligit homo, esse aliquam formam vel virtutem permixtam corpori, sicut aliae formae aut virtutes materiales. I answer: In order to settle this issue we must take into consideration that, whenever a thing is found to be sometimes in potency and sometimes in act, there must be some principle by which it is in potency; just as a man is sometimes actually sensing and sometimes only potentially. Now on account of this it is necessary to maintain that in man there exists a sentient principle which is in potency to sensible things; for if he were always actually sensing, the forms of sensible things would always actually exist in his sentient principle. Similarly, since a man is found sometimes to be actually understanding and sometimes only potentially, it is necessary to maintain that in man there exists an intellective power which is in potency to intelligibles; and the Philosopher, in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 15], calls this principle the possible intellect. Consequently this possible intellect must be in potency to all things intelligible to man; it must be capable of receiving them and therefore must be devoid of them, because anything capable of receiving other things is in potency to them inasmuch as it lacks them; just as the pupil of the eye, which is capable of receiving all colors, lacks every color. Now man is determined by nature to understand the forms of all sensible things. Therefore, by its very nature the possible intellect must be devoid of all sensible forms and natures, and so also must have no bodily organ. For if it had a bodily organ, it would be limited to some sensible nature, just as the power of vision is limited to the nature of the eye. By means of this proof we exclude the position of the ancient philosophers, who held that the intellect did not differ from the sentient powers, as well as the position of those who maintained that the principle by which a man understands is a certain form or power which is united to the body as other material forms or powers are.
Sed hoc quidam fugientes, in contrarium dilabuntur errorem. Existimant enim sic intellectum possibilem esse denudatum ab omni natura sensibili, et impermixtum corpori, quod sit quaedam substantia secundum esse a corpore separata quae sit in potentia ad omnes formas intelligibiles. —Sed haec positio stare non potest. Non enim inquirimus de intellectu possibili nisi secundum quod per eum intelligit homo: sic enim Aristoteles in eius notitiam devenit. Quod patet ex hoc quod dicit in III de anima, incipiens tractare de intellectu possibili: de parte autem animae, qua cognoscit anima et sapit, considerandum est etc.; et iterum: dico autem intellectum possibilem, quo intelligit anima. Si autem intellectus possibilis esset substantia separata, impossibile esset quod eo intelligeret homo: non enim est possibile, si aliqua substantia operatur aliquam operationem, quod illa operatio sit alterius substantiae ab ea diversa. Licet enim duarum substantiarum diversarum una possit alteri esse causa operandi ut principale agens instrumento, tamen actio principalis agentis non est actio instrumenti eadem secundum numerum, cum actio principalis agentis sit in movendo instrumentum; actio vero instrumenti in moveri a principali agente, et movere aliquid alterum. Sic igitur, si intellectus possibilis sit substantia separata secundum esse ab hoc homine sive ab illo homine; impossibile est quod intelligere intellectus possibilis sit huius hominis vel illius. Unde cum ista operatio quae est intelligere, non attribuatur alii principio in homine nisi intellectui possibili; sequitur quod nullus homo aliquid intelligat. Unde idem modus disputandi est contra hanc positionem, et contra negantes principia, ut patet per disputationem Aristotelis contra eos in IV Metaph. But certain other men avoiding this position, fall into the opposite error. For they think that the possible intellect is devoid of every sensible nature and that it is not present in the body, because it is a certain substance which exists in separation from the body and is in potency to all intelligible forms. But this position cannot be maintained, because we acquire our knowledge of the possible intellect only so far as a man understands by it. Indeed, this is the way Aristotle obtains his knowledge of it, as is evident from what he says in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 10] when he begins to discuss the possible intellect: “Concerning that part of the soul by which the soul knows and perceives... it must be considered...”; and in another place he says: “I speak of the possible intellect by which the soul understands.” But if the possible intellect were a separate substance, it would be impossible for a man to understand by means of it; because, if a substance performs an operation, that operation cannot belong to any other substance than the one performing it. For although one of two substances can be the cause of the other’s operation, as the principal agent is the cause of the activity of the instrument, nevertheless the action of the principal agent is not numerically the same as that of the instrument. For the action of the principal agent consists in moving the instrument, whereas that of the instrument consists in being moved by the principal agent and in moving something else. Consequently, if the possible intellect is a substance existing apart from this or that particular man, it is impossible for the possible intellect’s act of intellection to be the act of any particular man. From this it follows that no man understands anything, because the act of intellection is not attributed to any principle in man except the possible intellect. Hence the same manner of arguing is opposed to this position and to those who deny its principles, as is evident from Aristotle’s arguments against them in the Metaphysics [IV, 3, 1005b 25].
Hoc autem inconveniens evitare intendens Averroes, huius positionis sectator, posuit intellectum possibilem, licet secundum esse a corpore separatum, tamen continuari cum homine mediantibus phantasmatibus. Phantasmata enim, ut dicit philosophus in III de anima, se habent ad intellectum possibilem sicut sensibilia ad sensum, et colores ad visum. Sic igitur species intelligibilis habet duplex subiectum: unum in quo est secundum esse intelligibile, et hoc est intellectus possibilis; aliud in quod est secundum esse reale, et hoc subiectum sunt ipsa phantasmata. Est igitur quaedam continuatio intellectus possibilis cum phantasmatibus, in quantum species intelligibilis est quodammodo utrobique; et per hanc continuationem homo intelligit per intellectum possibilem. Now Averroes who is a follower of this position, intending to avoid its incongruity maintained that, although the possible intellect existed apart from the body, it must be united to man through the intermediary of phantasms. For phantasms, as the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 14], are related to the possible intellect as sensible things are to sense, and colors to sight. Thus an intelligible species has two subjects: one in which it exists with an intelligible mode of existing, and this is the possible intellect: another in which it exists with a real mode of existing, and this subject is the phantasms. Therefore [according to Averroes] there is a certain union of the possible intellect with the phantasms inasmuch as an intelligible species exists in a certain manner in each of these subjects; and a man understands through the [supposedly separate] possible intellect as a result of this union with the phantasms.
Sed ista continuatio adhuc non sufficit. Non enim aliquid est cognoscitivum ex hoc quod ei adest species cognoscibilis, sed ex hoc quod ei adest potentia cognoscitiva. Patet autem secundum praedicta, quod homini non aderit nisi sola species intelligibilis; potentia autem intelligendi, quae est intellectus possibilis, est omnino separata. Homo igitur ex continuatione praedicta non habebit quod sit intelligens, sed solum quod intelligatur intellectus, vel species, vel aliquid eius; quod per simile supra inductum manifeste apparet. Sic enim sic se habent phantasmata ad intellectum sicut colores ad visum, non erit secundum praedicta alia continuatio intellectus possibilis ad nos per phantasmata quam quae est visus ad parietem per colores; paries autem non habet per hoc quod colores sunt in eo, quod videat, sed quod videatur tantum. Unde et homo non habebit per hoc quod phantasmata sunt in eo, quod intelligat, sed solum quod intelligatur. However, this union is still not sufficient [to account for man’s knowledge], for a thing is capable of knowing, not because intelligible species are present to it, but because it possesses a cognitive power. Now evidently, from what has been said, intelligible species alone will be present to man, whereas the power of understanding, that is, the possible intellect,. exists in complete separation from him. Therefore it does not follow from the aforesaid union that a man will have what is necessary for understanding, but only that a species or something in that intellect will be understood. This clearly appears to be the case from the simile introduced above. For if phantasms are related to the intellect as colors are to sight, the union of the [supposedly separate] possible intellect with us through our phantasms, will be the same as that of sight with a wall through its colors. Now it does not follow that a wall sees because it has colors, but only that it is seen. Nor, similarly, does it follow that a man will understand because phantasms are present within him, but only that he will be understood.
Et praeterea, phantasma non est subiectum speciei intelligibilis secundum quod est intellectum in actu, sed magis per abstractionem a phantasmatibus fit intellectum in actu. Intellectus autem possibilis non est subiectum speciei intelligibilis, nisi secundum quod est intellecta iam in actu, et abstracta a phantasmatibus. Non igitur aliquid unum est, quod sit in intellectu possibili et phantasmatibus, per quod intellectus possibilis continuetur nobiscum. Furthermore, a phantasm is not the subject of an intelligible species inasmuch as the latter is actually understood. On the contrary, an intelligible species is made to be actually understood by abstraction from phantasms. Moreover, the possible intellect is the subject of an intelligible species only inasmuch as an intelligible species is now actually understood and abstracted from phantasms. Therefore the species existing in the possible intellect, and that existing in the phantasms. through which the [supposedly separate] possible intellect is united to us, are not one and the same.
Et praeterea, si per species intelligibiles non est aliquis intelligens nisi secundum quod sunt intellectae in actu, sequitur quod nos nullo modo simus intelligentes secundum praedictam positionem; non enim aderunt nobis species intelligibiles nisi secundum quod sunt in phantasmatibus, prout sunt intellectae in potentia tantum. Sic ergo apparet ex parte nostra praedictam positionem esse impossibilem. Quod etiam apparet ex natura substantiarum separatarum; quae, cum sint perfectissimae, impossibile est quod in propriis operationibus indigeant aliquibus rebus materialibus aut operationibus earum; aut quod sint in potentia ad alia quae sunt huiusmodi, quia hoc etiam manifestum est de corporibus caelestibus, quae sunt infra substantias praedictas. Unde cum intellectus possibilis sit in potentia ad species rerum sensibilium, et non compleatur eius operatio sine phantasmatibus, quae ex nostra operatione dependent; impossibile et inopinabile est quod intellectus possibilis sit una de substantiis separatis. Furthermore, if anyone understands through intelligible species only when they are actually understood, it follows, according to the aforesaid position, that we are incapable of understanding anything in any way, for then intelligible species would be present to us only inasmuch as they exist in phantasms, and here they are only potentially understood. Consequently it is evident on the side of our human nature that the above-mentioned position is impossible. This is also apparent from the nature of separate substances. Since these are most perfect, it is impossible for them in their own operations to stand in need of the operations of material things; nor need they be in potency to any things of this kind, for not even the celestial bodies, which are below the separate substances, require things of this sort. Hence, since the possible intellect is in potency to the species of sensible things, and since its operation may not be completed without phantasms, which depend on our operations, it is impossible and inconceivable for the possible intellect to be one of the separate substances.
Unde dicendum est quod est quaedam vis, seu potentia animae humanae. Cum enim anima humana sit quaedam forma unita corpori, ita tamen quod non sit a corpore totaliter comprehensa quasi ei immersa, sicut aliae formae materiales, sed excedat capacitatem totius materiae corporalis, quantum ad hoc in quo excedit materiam corporalem, inest ei potentia ad intelligibilia, quod pertinet ad intellectum possibilem; secundum vero quod unitur corpori, habet operationes et vires in quibus communicat ei corpus; sicut sunt vires partis nutritivae et sensitivae. Et sic salvatur natura intellectus possibilis, quam Aristoteles demonstrat, dum intellectus possibilis non est potentia fundata in aliquo organo corporali; et tamen eo intelligit homo formaliter, in quantum fundatur in essentia animae humanae, quae est hominis forma. Consequently, we must say that the possible intellect is a certain faculty or power of the human soul. For although the human soul is a form united to the body, it is not embraced completely by the body as though immersed in it as other material forms are, but transcends the capacity of the whole of corporeal matter. And so far as the soul transcends corporeal matter, the potentiality for intelligibles exists in the soul and this [potentiality] belongs to the possible intellect. Certainly the soul, so far as it is united to the body, has operations and powers in common with the body; such, for example, are the powers of the nutritive and sentient part. Thus the nature of the possible intellect is as Aristotle proves it to be,110 for the possible intellect is not a power rooted in any bodily organ. However, a man understands formally by means of it inasmuch as it is rooted in the essence of the human soul, which is the form of man.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus dicitur separatus, non sensus: quia intellectus remanet corrupto corpore in anima separata, non autem potentiae sensitivae. Vel melius dicendum, quod intellectus pro tanto dicitur separatus, quia non utitur organo corporali in operatione sua, sicut sensus. 1. The intellect is said to be separate but not the senses; because the intellect remains in the separated soul when the body has corrupted, whereas the senses do not. Or a better way of stating it is to say that the intellect is said to be separate because it does not employ a bodily organ in its operation as the senses do.
Ad secundum dicendum quod anima humana est actus corporis organici, eo quod corpus est organum eius. Non tamen oportet quod sit organum eius quantum ad quamlibet eius potentiam et virtutem; cum anima humana excedat proportionem corporis, ut dictum est. 2. The human soul is the act of an organic body because the body is its organ. However, the body need not be the organ of all the soul’s active and passive powers, since the human soul exceeds the capacity of the body, as we have explained.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod organum alicuius potentiae est principium operationis illius potentiae. Unde si intellectus possibilis uniretur alicui organo, operatio eius esset etiam operatio illius organi; et sic non esset possibile quod principium quo intelligimus, esset denudatum ab omni natura sensibili. Principium enim quo intelligimus, esset intellectus possibilis simul cum suo organo; sicut principium quo videmus, scilicet visus, simul est cum pupilla. Sed si anima humana est forma corporis, et intellectus possibilis est quaedam virtus eius, non sequitur quod intellectus possibilis determinetur ad aliquam naturam sensibilem; quia anima humana excedit corporis proportionem, ut dictum est. 3. The organ of a power is the principle of that power’s operation. Hence, if the possible intellect were united to an organ, its operation would also be the operation of that organ, and thus it would be impossible for the principle by which we understand, to lack every sensible nature. For this principle by which we understand would then be the possible intellect together with its organ, just as the principle whereby we see, namely, the power of vision, exists concurrently with the pupil of the eye. However, even though the human soul is the form of the body and the possible intellect is one of the soul’s powers, it. does not follow that the possible intellect is limited to some sensible nature; because the human soul transcends the capacity (proportionem) of the body, as we have explained.
Ad quartum dicendum quod intellectus possibilis consequitur animam humanam in quantum supra materiam corporalem elevatur; unde per hoc quod non est actus alicuius organi, non excedit totaliter essentiam animae, sed est supremum in ipsa. 4. The possible intellect belongs to the human soul inasmuch as the soul is elevated above corporeal matter. Consequently, because the intellect is not the act of an organ, it does so Aristotle proved that the intellect is “separate,” not in the sense of existing apart from man, but as being free from matter in its operation.
Ad quintum dicendum quod anima humana est quaedam forma individuata; et similiter potentia eius quae dicitur intellectus possibilis, et formae intelligibiles in eo receptae. Sed hoc non prohibet eas esse intellectas in actu: ex hoc enim aliquid est intellectum in actu quod est immateriale, non autem ex hoc quod est universale; sed magis universale habet quod sit intelligibile per hoc quod est abstractum a principiis materialibus individuantibus.— Manifestum est autem substantias separatas esse intelligibiles actu, et tamen individua quaedam sunt; sicut Aristoteles dicit in VII Metaph., quod formae separatae, quas Plato ponebat, individua quaedam erant. Unde manifestum est quod si individuatio repugnaret intelligibilitati, eadem difficultas remaneret ponentibus intellectum possibilem substantiam separatam: sic enim et intellectus possibilis individuus esset individuans species in se receptas. Sciendum igitur, quod quamvis species receptae in intellectu possibili sint individuatae ex illa parte qua inhaerent intellectui possibili; tamen in eis, in quantum sunt immateriales, cognoscitur universale quod concipitur per abstractionem a principiis individuantibus. Universalia enim, de quibus sunt scientiae, sunt quae cognoscuntur per species intelligibiles, non ipsae species intelligibiles; de quibus planum est quod non sunt scientiae omnes, sed sola physica et metaphysica. Species enim intelligibilis est quo intellectus intelligit, non id quod intelligit, nisi per reflexionem, in quantum intelligit se intelligere id quod intelligit. 5. The human soul is an individuated form and so also is its power which is called the possible intellect, as well as the intelligible forms which are received in the possible intellect. But this does not prevent these forms from being actually known, for a thing is actually known because it is immaterial, not because it is universal. Indeed, the universal is intelligible because it is abstracted from material individuating conditions. Moreover, it is evident that separate substances are actual intelligibles and yet are certain individual entities; just as Aristotle says in the Metaphysics [VII, 14, 1039a 23], that the separated forms which Plato claimed to exist, were individual things. Therefore if individuation is incompatible with intelligibility it is evident that the same difficulty remains when the intellect is considered to be a separate substance; for then the possible intellect would be individuated as well as the species which are received in it. Consequently we must understand that, although the intelligible species received in the possible intellect are individuated inasmuch as they exist in the possible intellect, still the universal, which is conceived by abstraction from individuating principles, is known in these species inasmuch as they are immaterial. For universals with which the sciences are concerned, are what are known (through intelligible species) and not the intelligible species themselves. Moreover, concerning these intelligible species, not all sciences study them, but only physics and metaphysics. For an intelligible species is that by which the intellect knows, but not that which it knows—except by reflection inasmuch as it knows that by which it knows in order to know itself.
Ad sextum dicendum quod intellectus dat formis intellectis universalitatem, in quantum abstrahit eas a principiis materialibus individuantibus; unde non oportet quod intellectus sit universalis, sed quod sit immaterialis. 6. The intellect gives universality to the forms known inasmuch as it abstracts them from material individuating conditions. Consequently it is not necessary that the intellect be universal, but that it be immaterial.
Ad septimum dicendum quod species operationis consequitur speciem formae, quae est operationis principium; licet inefficacia operationis sequatur formam secundum quod inhaeret subiecto. Ex eo enim quod calor est, calefacit: sed secundum modum quo perficit subiectum magis vel minus, efficacius vel minus efficaciter calefacit. Intelligere autem universalia pertinet ad speciem intellectualis operationis; unde hoc sequitur speciem intellectualem secundum propriam operationem. Sed ex eo quod inhaeret intelligenti perfectius vel minus perfecte, sequitur quod aliquis perfectius vel minus perfecte intelligat. 7. The species of an operation is a natural effect of the species of the form which is the principle of that operation, whereas the ineffectiveness of an operation is a natural effect of the form inasmuch as it inheres in a subject. For a thing heats because it is hot, but it heats more or less effectively according as heat perfects it to a greater or lesser degree. Now to understand universals pertains to the species of intellectual operation. Hence this activity is the natural effect of an intellectual species as its proper operation; but so far as this activity is exercised more or less perfectly by the one understanding, it follows that the one understanding does so in a more or less perfect way.
Ad octavum dicendum quod similitudo philosophi de figuris ad partes animae attenditur quantum ad hoc, quod sicut tetragonum habet quidquid habet trigonum et adhuc amplius et pentagonum quidquid habet tetragonum: ita sensitiva anima habet quidquid habet nutritiva, et intellectiva quidquid habet sensitiva et adhuc amplius. Non ergo per hoc ostenditur quod nutritivum et sensitivum essentialiter differant ab intellectivo; sed magis quod unum illorum includat alterum. 8. The resemblance which the Philosopher observes between geometrical figures and the parts of the soul is to be regarded in this way: that just as a quadrilateral contains the elements of a triangle and additional characteristics; and a pentagon, the elements of a quadrilateral; so also does the sentient soul possess the characteristics of the nutritive, and the intellective possesses the characteristics of the sentient and others as well. Therefore it is not shown in this way that the nutritive and sentient parts of the soul differ essentially from the intellective, but rather that one of these [parts] contains another.
Ad nonum dicendum quod sicut non simul est quod concipitur animal et homo, ita non simul est animal et equus, ut philosophus ibidem dicit. Non igitur haec est ratio dicti, quod aliud principium sit in homine substantialiter anima sensitiva qua est animal, et aliud anima intellectiva qua est homo; cum non possit dici quod in equo sint plura principia diversa, quorum uno sit animal, et alio sit equus. Sed hoc ea ratione dicitur, quia in animali concepto prius apparent operationes imperfectae, et postea apparent magis perfectae; sicut omnis generatio est transmutatio de imperfecto ad perfectum. 9. just as animal and man are not conceived simultaneously, so neither are animal and horse, as the Philosopher points out in the same place. Therefore this statement [of the Philosopher] is not based on the argument that the sentient soul, existing substantially in man, is a principle by which he is an animal, and the intellective soul another principle by which he is a man. For it cannot be said that there are many different principles in a horse, one making it an animal, another, a horse. But this statement [of the Philosopher] is made for this reason, that in the concept of animal the imperfect operations appear first, and then the more perfect; just as every generation is a transition from the imperfect to the perfect.
Ad decimum dicendum quod forma non est in aliquo genere, ut dictum est; unde, cum anima intellectiva sit forma hominis, non est in alio genere quam corpus; sed utrumque est in genere animalis et in specie hominis per reductionem. 10. A form does not belong to a genus, as has been shown (Art. 1). Consequently, since the intellective soul is the form of man, it does not belong to a different genus from that of the body. But each belongs to the genus animal and the species man, by reduction.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod ex duabus substantiis actu existentibus et perfectis in sua specie et natura non fit aliquid unum. Anima autem et corpus non sunt huiusmodi, cum sint partes humanae naturae; unde ex eis nihil prohibet fieri unum. 11. One being does not result from the union of two actually existing substances complete in their species and nature. Now the soul and the body are not substances of this sort, because they are parts of human nature. Therefore nothing prevents them from being united to form one being [substantially].
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod anima humana licet sit forma unita corpori, tamen excedit proportionem totius materiae corporalis et ideo non potest educi in actum de potentia materiae per aliquem motum vel mutationem, sicut aliae formae quae sunt immersae materiae. 12. Although the human soul is a form united to a body, it totally transcends the capacity of the whole of corporeal matter, and therefore cannot derive actual existence from the potentiality of matter as a result of any motion or change, as do other forms which are immersed in matter.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod anima habet operationem in qua non communicat corpus, ex ea parte qua superat omnem corporis proportionem; ex hoc tamen non removetur quin sit aliquo modo corpori unita. 13. The soul, through that part of it whereby it exceeds every capacity of the body, has an operation in which the body does not share. However this does not prevent the soul from being united to the body in some way.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod obiectio illa procedit secundum positionem Origenis, qui posuit animas creatas a principio absque corporibus inter substantias spirituales, et postea eas unitas esse corporibus, quasi carceribus inclusas. Sed hoc non dicebat animas passas innocentes, sed merito praecedentis peccati. Existimabat igitur Origenes quod anima humana haberet in se speciem completam, secundum opinionem Platonis; et quod corpus adveniret ei per accidens. Sed cum hoc sit falsum, ut supra ostensum est, non est in detrimentum animae quod corpori uniatur; sed hoc est ad perfectionem suae naturae. Sed quod corpus sit ei carcer, et eam inficiat, hoc est ex merito praevaricationis primae. 14. This objection agrees with the position of Origen, who maintained that in the beginning souls were created without bodies together with the spiritual substances [i.e., the angels] and afterwards were united to bodies as though shut up in prisons. However, he did not say souls suffered that innocently, but because of a preceding sin. Hence Origen, in accordance with the position of Plato, held that the human soul was a complete species in itself, and that the body was joined to it accidentally. But since this is false, as we have shown above (Art. 1), it is not detrimental to the soul to be united to a body; on the contrary this union makes for the perfection of its nature. However, that the body is the prison of the soul and taints the soul, is merited by the first sin.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod iste modus cognoscendi est naturalis animae, ut percipiat intelligibilem veritatem infra modum quo percipiunt spirituales substantiae superiores, accipiendo scilicet eam ex sensibilibus; sed in hoc etiam patitur impedimentum ex corruptio corporis, quae provenit ex peccato primi parentis. 15. It is natural to the human soul to apprehend intelligible truth in a manner inferior to that proper to superior spiritual substances, namely, by abstraction from sensible things. But in this also the soul suffers an impediment through the corruption of the body which results from the sin of the first parent.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, ostendit affinitatem animae ad corpus. Spiritus enim dicitur pars animae superior, qua homo excedit alia animalia, ut Augustinus dicit super Genesim contra Manichaeos. Caro autem concupiscere dicitur, quia partes animae carni affixae, ea quae sunt delectabilia carni, concupiscunt: quae concupiscentiae spiritui interdum repugnant. 16. The fact that the flesh desires things that are opposed to the spirit, shows the affinity of the soul for the body. For “spirit” signifies the superior part of the soul whereby man surpasses other animals, as Augustine says in the Super Genesi contra Manichaeos [II, 8]. But the flesh is said to desire because the parts of the soul joined to the flesh desire those things, which delight the flesh, and now and again these concupiscences fight against the spirit.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod intellectus possibilis non habet aliquam formam intelligibilem in actu, sed in potentia tantum, sicut materia prima non habet aliquam formam sensibilem actu. Unde non oportet, nec ita ratio ostendit, quod intellectus possibilis sit unus in omnibus; sed quod sit unus respectu omnium formarum intelligibilium, sicut materia prima est una respectu omnium formarum sensibilium. 17. The possible intellect does not possess any intelligible form actually, but only potentially, just as prime matter does not have any sensible form actually. Therefore it is not necessary, nor does the argument prove, that the possible intellect is one and the same for all men. It only shows that their intellect is open with respect to all intelligible forms, just as prime matter is one with respect to all sensible forms.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod si intellectus possibilis haberet aliquod organum corporale, oporteret quod illud organum esset principium simul cum intellectu possibili quo intelligimus, sicut pupilla cum potentia visiva est principium quo videmus. Et ita principium quo intelligimus haberet aliquam naturam determinatam sensibilem; quod patet esse falsum ex demonstratione Aristotelis supra inducta. Hoc autem non sequitur ex hoc quod anima est forma humani corporis, quia intellectus possibilis est quaedam potentia eius, in quantum excedit corporis proportionem. 18. If the possible intellect had a bodily organ, that organ would have to be a principle [of understanding] together with the possible intellect which is the cause of intellection; just as the pupil of the eye together with the power of vision is the principle of vision; and thus the principle by which we understand would have a determinate sensible nature. This is evidently false in view of Aristotle’s demonstration which was given above. However, this does not follow from the fact that the soul is the form of the body, because the possible intellect is a power of the soul so far as it transcends the capacity of the body.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum quod anima, licet uniatur corpori secundum modum corporis, tamen ex ea parte qua excedit corporis capacitatem, naturam intellectualem habet; et sic formae receptae in ea sunt intelligibiles et non materiales. 19. Although the soul is united to the body in accordance with the body’s mode of existing, still the soul has an intellectual nature in virtue of that part whereby it transcends the capacity of the body; and thus the forms received in the soul are intelligible and not material.
Unde patet solutio ad vigesimum. Whence the solution to the twentieth objection is evident.
ARTICLE III
WHETHER THERE IS ONE POSSIBLE INTELLECT, OR INTELLECTIVE SOUL, FOR ALL MEN

[Summa theol., la, q.76, a.2; Contra Gentiles, II, 59, 73, 75; Sent., I, dist., 8, q.5, a.2, ad 6; II, dist., 17, q.2, a.1; De spir. creat., a.9; De unit. intell.; Compend. theol., 58.]
Tertio quaeritur utrum intellectus possibilis, sive anima intellectiva, sit una in omnibus In the third article we examine this question: Whether there is one possible intellect, or intellective soul, for all men.
Objections.
Et videtur quod sic. Perfectio enim est proportionata perfectibili. Sed veritas est perfectio intellectus: nam verum est bonum intellectus, sicut philosophus dicit, VI Ethic. Cum igitur veritas sit una, quam omnes intelligunt, videtur quod intellectus possibilis sit unus in omnibus. 1. It seems that there is. For a perfection is proportioned to what is perfectible. But truth is the perfection of the intellect, for truth is the good of the intellect, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics [VI, 2, 1139b 11]. Therefore, since truth, which. all men understand, is one, it seems that there is one possible intellect for all men.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in libro de quantitate animae: de numero animarum nescio quid tibi respondeam. Si enim dixero unam esse animam, conturbaberis, quod in altero beata est, et in altero misera: nec una res simul beata et misera esse potest. Si unam simul et multas esse dicam, ridebis; nec facile mihi unde tuum risum comprimam suppetit. Si multas tantummodo dixero esse, ipse me ridebo, minusque me mihi displicentem quam tibi proferam. Videtur ergo esse derisibile in pluribus hominibus esse plures animas. 2. Further, Augustine says, in the book De quantitate animae [32] “I know what I will say to you about the number of souls.... For if I say there is one soul, you will be disturbed, because it is happy in one and sad in another, and one and the same thing cannot be happy and sad. If I say one and many at the same time, you will laugh; nor is it easy for me to know how to suppress your laughter. For if I say there are many only, I will laugh at myself, and I will maintain that I am less displeasing to myself than to you.” Therefore the existence of many souls, one for each man, seems to be ridiculous.
Praeterea, omne quod distinguitur ab alio, distinguitur per aliquam naturam determinatam quam habet. Sed intellectus possibilis est in potentia ad omnem formam, nullam habens actu. Ergo intellectus possibilis non habet distingui; ergo nec multiplicari, ut sint multi in diversis. 3. Further, things that differ from each other, differ because of the determinate nature which each possesses. But the possible intellect is in potency to all forms, having none actually. Consequently the possible intellect [in one man] cannot differ [from that in another], and thus there cannot be many possible intellects, one for each man.
Praeterea, intellectus possibilis denudatur ab omni quod intelligitur; quia nihil est eorum quae sunt, ante intelligere, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed, ut in eodem dicitur, ipse est denudatus a seipso; et ita non habet unde possit multiplicari in diversis. 4. Further, the possible intellect totally lacks everything that it knows, because, prior to actual intellection, it possesses none of the things that it is cognizant of, as is said in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 18]. But, as is said in the same book, it completely lacks any nature of its own; and thus it cannot have a multiple existence among different individuals.
Praeterea, in omnibus distinctis et multiplicatis oportet aliquid esse commune: pluribus enim hominibus communis est homo, et pluribus animalibus anima. Sed intellectus possibilis nulli aliquid habet commune, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo intellectus possibilis non potest distingui et multiplicari in diversis. 5. Further, there must be something in common in all things that are distinct and multiple, for man is common to many men, and animal to many animals. But the possible intellect does not have anything in common with other things, as is said in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 23]. Therefore the possible intellect in one man cannot differ from that in another, and thus there cannot be many possible intellects, one for each man.
Praeterea, in his quae sunt separata a materia, ut dicit Rabbi Moyses, non multiplicantur nisi secundum causam et causatum. Sed intellectus hominis unius, aut anima, non est causa intellectus aut animae alterius. Cum ergo intellectus possibilis sit separatus, ut dicitur in III de anima; non erit intellectus possibilis multiplex in diversis. 6. Further, as Rabbi Moses points out, there is multiplicity with respect to cause and thing caused only in things existing in separation from matter. But the intellect or soul of one man is not the cause of the intellect or soul of another. Therefore, since the possible intellect is separate, as is said in the De anima [III, 5, 429a 24], there will not be many possible intellects, one for each man.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur est idem apud omnes. Ergo intellectus possibilis est unus in omnibus hominibus. 7. Further, the Philosopher says, in the De anima [III, 7&8, 431a 1; 431b 21], that the intellect and what is understood are one and the same. But what is understood is one and the same for all men. Therefore there is one possible intellect for all men.
Praeterea, id quod intelligitur est universale, quod est unum in multis. Sed forma intellecta non habet hanc unitatem ex parte rei: non enim est forma hominis in rebus nisi individuata et multiplicata in diversis. Ergo hoc habet ex parte intellectus. Intellectus igitur est unus in omnibus. 8. Further, that which is understood is a universal, which is a one-in-many (unum in multis). But the form understood does not derive this unity from the thing [of which it is the form], for the form man is present in men themselves only as individuated and multiplied among diverse men. Therefore the form derives this unity from the intellect. Consequently there is one [possible] intellect for all men.
Praeterea, philosophus in III de anima dicit, quod anima est locus specierum. Sed locus est communis diversis quae in loco sunt. Non ergo anima multiplicatur secundum diversos homines. 9. Further, the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 26] that the soul is the place (locus) of species. But place is common to different things in place. Therefore there are not many souls, one for each man.
Sed dicebat, quod anima dicitur locus specierum, quia est specierum contentiva. —Sed contra, sicut intellectus est contentivus specierum intelligibilium, ita sensus est contentivus specierum sensibilium. Si igitur intellectus est locus specierum, quia est contentivus earum, pari ratione et sensus erit locus specierum; quod est contra philosophum dicentem in III de anima, quod anima est locus specierum, praeter quod non tota, sed intellectiva tantum. 10. But it must be said that the soul is the place of species because if contains species. On the other hand, just as the intellect contains intelligible species, so does sense contain sensible species. Therefore, if the intellect is the place of species because it contains them, sense, for a similar reason, will also be the place of species. This is contrary to what the Philosopher says, in the De anima [ibid.] that not every soul is the place of species, but only the intellective soul.
Praeterea, nihil operatur nisi ubi est. Sed intellectus possibilis operatur ubique: intelligit enim quae sunt in caelo, et quae sunt in terra, et quae sunt ubique. Ergo intellectus possibilis est ubique et ita est in omnibus unus. 11. Further, a thing operates only in the place in which it is located. But the possible intellect operates everywhere, for it understands things existing in heaven, those existing on earth, and everywhere. Therefore the possible intellect is everywhere, and thus is one for all men.
Praeterea, quod est definitum ad aliquid unum particulare, habet materiam determinatam; quia principium individuationis, materia est. Sed intellectus possibilis non terminatur ad materiam, ut probatur in III de anima. Ergo non definitur ad aliquid particulare, et ita est unus in omnibus. 12. Further, whatever is limited (definitum) to some one particular thing, has a determinate matter, because the principle of individuation is matter. But the possible intellect does .not have a determinate matter, as is proved in the De anima [III, 8, 431b 30]. Therefore it is not found to exist in each particular man, and thus is one for all men.
Sed dicebat quod intellectus possibilis habet materiam in qua est, ad quam terminatur, scilicet corpus humanum. —Sed contra, principia individuantia debent esse de essentia individuati. Sed corpus non est de essentia intellectus possibilis. Ergo non potest individuari per corpus, et per consequens nec multiplicari. 13. But it must be said that the possible intellect has matter in the thing in which it exists, namely, in the human body in which it is confined. On the other hand, the principle of individuation should belong to the individuated essence. But the body is not an essential part of the possible intellect. Therefore the possible intellect cannot be individuated by the body, and consequently cannot have a multiple existence.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in I de caelo quod si essent plures mundi, essent plures caeli primi. Sed si essent plures primi caeli, essent plures primi motores; et sic primi motores essent materiales. Pari igitur ratione si essent plures intellectus possibiles in pluribus hominibus, intellectus possibilis esset materialis; quod est impossibile. 14. Further, the Philosopher says in the De caelo [I, 9, 279a 8] that if there were many worlds, there would be many first heavens. But if there were many first heavens, there would be many first movers; and thus these first movers would be material. Therefore, for a similar reason, if there were many possible intellects, one for each man, the possible intellect would be material; which is impossible.
Praeterea, si intellectus possibiles sint plures in hominibus, oportet quod remaneant multi corruptis corporibus. Sed tunc, cum non possit in eis esse differentia nisi secundum formam, oportebit quod differant secundum speciem. Cum igitur corrupto corpore speciem aliam non obtineant, quia nihil mutatur de specie in speciem, nisi corrumpatur; etiam ante corruptionem corporum secundum speciem differebant: sed homo habet speciem ab anima intellectiva, ergo diversi homines non sunt eiusdem speciei; quod patet esse falsum. 15. Further, if there are many possible intellects, one for each man, they must remain many when their bodies have corrupted. But then, since they can differ only as regards form, they will have to differ specifically. Therefore, since possible intellects do not become specifically different when their bodies have corrupted (because nothing is changed from one species into another unless it is corrupted), possible intellects were specifically different before their bodies corrupted. But man acquires his species from the intellective soul. Therefore diverse men do not possess the same species; which is clearly false.
Praeterea, id quod est separatum a corpore, non potest multiplicari secundum corpora. Sed intellectus possibilis est separatus a corpore, ut probat philosophus in III de anima. Ergo non potest multiplicari vel distingui secundum corpora; non ergo in pluribus hominibus sunt plures. 16. Further, whatever exists in separation from a body cannot be given a multiple existence by bodies. But the possible intellect is separate from the body, as the Philosopher proves in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 79]. Therefore the possible intellect cannot be multiplied nor be individuated by bodies. Consequently there are not many possible intellects, one for each man.
Praeterea, si intellectus possibilis multiplicatur in diversis, oportet quod species intelligibiles multiplicentur in diversis; et ita sequitur quod sint formae individuales. Sed formae individuales non sunt intellectae nisi in potentia; oportet enim quod abstrahatur ab eis universale, quod proprie intelligitur. Formae igitur quae sunt in intellectu possibili, erunt intelligibiles in potentia tantum; et ita intellectus possibilis non poterit intelligi in actu, quod est inconveniens. 17. Further, if a possible intellect exists in each man, intelligible species must exist in each man; and thus it follows that intelligible species are individuated forms. But individuated forms are only potentially intellected, for the universal, which is the proper object of intellection, must be abstracted from such forms. Therefore the forms which are in the possible intellect will only be potentially intelligible, and thus the possible intellect will be unable to be actually understood; which is incongruous.
Praeterea, agens et patiens, movens et motum, habent aliquid commune. Phantasma autem comparatur ad intellectum possibilem qui est in nobis, sicut agens ad patiens, et movens ad motum. Ergo intellectus qui est in nobis, habet aliquid commune cum phantasmatibus. Sed intellectus possibilis nihil habet commune cum phantasmatibus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo intellectus possibilis est alius ab intellectu qui est in nobis; et ita intellectus possibilis non multiplicatur in diversis hominibus. 18. Further, an agent and patient, mover and thing moved, have something in common. Now a phantasm is related to the possible intellect, existing in us, as an agent to a patient, and as a mover to something moved. Therefore the intellect existing in us has something in common with phantasms. But the possible intellect has nothing in common with the latter, as is pointed out in the De anima [III, 4, 429b 22]. Therefore the [supposedly separate] ‘possible intellect differs from the intellect which is present in us, and so is not multiplied among diverse men.
Praeterea, unumquodque, in quantum est unum est. Cuius igitur esse non dependet ab alio, nec unitas eius dependet ab alio. Sed esse intellectus possibilis non dependet a corpore; alias corrumperetur corrupto corpore. Ergo nec unitas intellectus possibilis dependet a corpore, et per consequens nec eius multitudo. Non igitur intellectus possibilis multiplicatur in diversis corporibus. 19. Further, a thing, inasmuch as it exists, is one. Therefore neither its act of existing nor its unity depends on another. But the possible intellect’s act of existing does not depend on the body, otherwise it would be corrupted when the body corrupts. Consequently the unity of the possible intellect does not depend on the body; and so neither does its multiplicity. Therefore the possible intellect is not multiplied among different bodies [in such a way that each man possesses his own].
Praeterea, philosophus dicit VIII Metaph. quod in illis quae sunt formae tantum, idem est res et quod quid erat esse, idest natura speciei. Sed intellectus possibilis, vel anima intellectiva, est forma tantum: si enim componeretur ex materia et forma, non esset forma alterius. Ergo anima intellectiva est ipsa natura suae speciei. Si igitur natura speciei est una in omnibus animalibus intellectivis, non potest esse quod anima intellectiva multiplicetur in diversis. 20. Further, the Philosopher says, in the Metaphysics [VII, 2, 1043b 1] that in those things which are forms alone [i.e., not composed of matter and form], the thing and its quiddity (quod quid erat esse), that is, the nature of its species, are one and the same. But the possible intellect, or intellective soul, is a form alone, for, ‘if it were composed of matter and form, it would not be the form of anything else. Hence the intellective soul is the nature itself of its species. So, if the nature of the species is one and the same in every intellective soul, the intellective soul is incapable of having a multiple existence among diverse individuals [in such a way that each possesses his own].
Praeterea, anima non multiplicatur secundum corpora nisi ex eo quod unitur corpori. Sed intellectus possibilis ex ea parte consequitur animam qua corporis excedit unionem. Intellectus igitur possibilis non multiplicatur in hominibus. 21. Further, the soul has a multiple existence among different bodies only by being united thereto. But the possible intellect belongs to that part of the soul which transcends bodily union. Hence the possible intellect does not have a multiple existence among diverse men [in such a way that each possesses his own intellect].
Praeterea, si anima humana multiplicatur secundum divisionem corporum, et intellectus possibilis per multiplicationem animarum, cum constet quod oporteat species intelligibiles multiplicari si intellectus possibilis multiplicetur, relinquitur quod primum multiplicationis principium erit materia corporalis. Sed quod multiplicatur secundum materiam est individuale et non intelligibile in actu. Species igitur quae sunt in intellectu possibili, non erunt intelligibiles actu; quod est inconveniens. Non igitur anima humana et intellectus possibilis multiplicantur in diversis. 22. Further, if many human souls exist because of the multiplicity of bodies, and many possible intellects because of the multiplicity of souls, and since it is certain that there must be many intelligible species if there are many possible intellects, it follows that the first principle of multiplicity must be corporeal matter. But whatever is made multiple by matter is individual, and is not actually intelligible. Therefore the species which are in the possible intellect will not be actually intelligible objects; which is incongruous. Hence there will not be many human souls and possible intellects, one in each man.
Sed contra. Per intellectum possibilem homo intelligit. Dicitur enim in III de anima quod intellectus possibilis est quo intelligit anima. Si igitur unus sit intellectus possibilis in omnibus, sequitur quod illud quod unus intelligit alius intelligat; quod patet esse falsum. On the contrary, man understands by the possible intellect. For it is said in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 15] that the possible intellect is that by which the soul understands. Consequently, if there is one possible intellect for all men, it follows that one man understands what another does; which is clearly false.
Praeterea, anima intellectiva comparatur ad corpus ut forma ad materiam, et ut motor ad instrumentum. Sed omnis forma requirit determinatam materiam, et omnis motor determinata instrumenta. Impossibile est igitur quod sit una anima intellectiva in diversis hominibus. Further, the intellective soul is related to the body as a form to matter, and as a mover to an instrument. But every form requires a determinate matter, and every mover a determinate instrument. It is impossible, therefore, that there be one intellective soul for all men.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod ista quaestio aliqualiter dependet a superiori. Si enim intellectus possibilis est substantia separata secundum esse a corpore, necessarium est eum esse unum tantum; quae enim secundum esse sunt a corpore separata, nullo modo per multiplicationem corporum multiplicari possunt. Sed tamen unitas intellectus specialem requirit considerationem, quia specialem habet difficultatem. Videtur enim in primo aspectu hoc esse impossibile quod unus intellectus sit omnium hominum. Manifestum est enim quod intellectus possibilis comparatur ad perfectiones scientiarum sicut perfectio prima ad secundam, et per intellectum possibilem sumus in potentia scientes; et hoc cogit ad ponendum intellectum possibilem. Manifestum est autem quod perfectiones scientiarum non sunt eaedem in omnibus, cum quidam inveniantur habere scientias, quibus alii carent. Hoc autem videtur inconveniens et impossibile quod perfectio secunda non sit una in omnibus, perfectione prima existente una in eis. Sicut est impossibile quod unum subiectum primum sit in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem formae; sicut quod superficies sit in potentia, et in actu simul alba. I answer: This question depends in a certain way on the preceding one. For if the possible intellect is a substance having existence separate from the body, it must be unique; because those things which have existence apart from a body can in no way have a multiple existence as a result of a multiplicity of bodies. However, the unicity of the intellect must be given special consideration because it involves a peculiar difficulty. For it is at once apparent that there cannot be one [possible] intellect for all men. It is, indeed, clear that the possible intellect is related to the perfections, which sciences are, as a primary perfection to a secondary one, and that we have scientific knowledge potentially because of a possible intellect. This fact compels us to maintain that a possible intellect exists. Moreover, it is obvious that not all men possess the same scientific knowledge, because some know sciences which others do not. Now it is evidently incongruous and impossible for one and the same primary subject to be in act and in potency with regard to the same form. For example, [it is impossible that] a surface be at the same time potentially and actually white.
Hoc autem inconveniens evadere nituntur quidam ponentes intellectum possibilem unum in omnibus per hoc quod species intelligibiles, in quibus consistit perfectio scientiae, habent duplex subiectum, ut supra dictum est: scilicet ipsa phantasmata, et intellectum possibilem. Et quia ipsa phantasmata non sunt eadem in omnibus ab illa parte, nec species intelligibiles sunt eaedem in omnibus. Ex illa vero parte qua sunt in intellectu possibili, non multiplicantur. Et inde est quod propter diversitatem phantasmatum unus habet scientiam, qua alius caret. Sed hoc patet frivolum esse ex his quae superius dicta sunt. Species enim non sunt intelligibiles actu nisi per hoc quod a phantasmatibus abstrahuntur, et sunt in intellectu possibili. Diversitas igitur phantasmatum non potest esse causa unitatis vel multiplicationis perfectionis, quae est secundum scientiam intelligibilem. Nec habitus scientiarum sunt sicut in subiecto in aliqua parte pertinente ad animam sensitivam, ut dicunt. Now those maintaining that there is one possible intellect for all men try to avoid the absurdity of this position by pointing to the fact that the intelligible species, on which the perfection of science is based, have a twofold subject, as was shown above (Art. 2), namely, the phantasms, themselves, and the possible intellect. And they argue that intelligible species are not the same in all men, because phantasms are not the same in all. In fact, as existing in the possible intellect, intelligible species are not multiple. So it is that one man possesses a science which another lacks, because he has different phantasms. But this is evidently foolish in view of what has previously been said. For species are actually intelligible only by being abstracted from phantasms and by existing in the possible intellect. Therefore diversity of phantasms cannot be the cause of the unity or multiplicity of a perfection having the character of scientific knowledge. Nor do scientific habits exist in some part of the sentient soul as their subject, as these men claim.
Sed adhuc aliquid difficilius sequetur ponentibus intellectum possibilem esse in omnibus unum. Manifestum est enim quod haec operatio, quae est intelligere, egreditur ab intellectu possibili sicut a primo principio, per quod intelligimus; sicut haec operatio sentire egreditur a potentia sensitiva. Et licet supra ostensum sit, quod si intellectus possibilis est secundum esse ab homine separatus, non est possibile quod intelligere, quod est intellectus possibilis, sit operatio huius vel illius hominis; tamen hoc causa inquisitionis dato, sequitur quod hic homo vel ille intelligat per ipsum intelligere intellectus possibilis. Nulla autem operatio potest multiplicari nisi dupliciter: vel ex parte obiectorum, vel ex parte principii operantis. Potest tamen addi et tertium ex parte temporis; sicut cum aliqua operatio recipit interpolationem temporum. Ipsum ergo intelligere, quod est operatio intellectus possibilis, potest quidem multiplicari secundum obiecta, ut aliud sit intelligere hominem, aliud intelligere equum; et etiam secundum tempus, ut aliud sit numero intelligere quod fuit heri, et quod est hodie, si tamen discontinuetur operatio. Non autem potest multiplicari ex parte principii operantis, si intellectus possibilis est unus tantum. Si igitur ipsum intelligere intellectus possibilis est intelligere hominis huius et illius; poterit quidem aliud esse intelligere huius hominis, et intelligere illius, si diversa intelligant; cuius aliqua ratio esse potest diversitas phantasmatum. Sed diversorum hominum simul idem intelligentium, ut ipsi dicunt, similiter poterit multiplicari ipsum intelligere, scilicet ut unus hodie intelligat, et alius cras. Quod etiam potest referri ad diversum usum phantasmatum; sed duorum hominum simul idem intelligentium, necesse est quod sit unum et idem numero ipsum intelligere, quod manifeste est impossibile. Impossibile est igitur quod intellectus possibilis, quo intelligimus formaliter, sit unus in omnibus. But an even greater difficulty faces those who maintain that there is one possible intellect for all men. For it is evident that the act of intellection has its origin in the possible intellect as the first principle whereby we understand, just as the operation of sensing has its origin in a sentient power. Also, while it was shown above (Art. 2) that if the possible intellect exists apart from man, the act of understanding, which belongs to the possible intellect, cannot be the operation of this or that man; nevertheless, from the hypothesis of one possible intellect for all men, it follows that this or that man understands by the possible intellect’s own act of understanding. Yet an operation can be multiplied in only two ways: either on the side of the objects [known], or on that of the principle operating. A third way [of multiplying operation] can also be envisaged from the point of view of time, as, for instance, when an operation involves temporal changes. Hence the act of understanding, which is the operation of the intellect, can be multiplied with respect to objects known, so that it is one thing to know a man, another thing to know a horse. The act of understanding can also be multiplied with respect to time, so that to understand what happened yesterday is one act, and to understand what happens today, another, if, of course, the operation is not continuous. However, the act of understanding cannot be multiplied respecting the principle operating, if there is only one possible intellect. Therefore, if the possible intellect’s own act of understanding is this or that man’s act of understanding, this man’s act of understanding, and that man’s, could be different if they were understanding different things. A reason for this can be found in the diversity of phantasms. The act of understanding by different men understanding the same thing, according to the one possible intellect theory, could be multiplied similarly, so that one understands today and another tomorrow. This can also be attributed to the different use of phantasms. But in the case of two men who understand the same thing at the same time, their act of understanding would have to be numerically one and the same; which is clearly impossible. Therefore it is impossible for the possible intellect, by which we understand formally, to be one and the same for all men.
Si autem per intellectum possibilem intelligeremus sicut per principium activum, quod faceret nos intelligentes per aliquod principium intelligendi in nobis, esset positio magis rationabilis. Nam unum movens movet diversa ad operandum; sed quod aliqua diversa operentur per aliquod unum formaliter, hoc est omnino impossibile. However, it would be more reasonable to hold that we understand by the possible intellect as an active principle existing in us, and causing in us actual understanding. For one mover puts different things into operation; but that different things should act through some one thing formally, is absolutely impossible.
Iterum formae et species rerum naturalium per proprias operationes cognoscuntur. Propria autem operatio hominis in eo quod est homo, est intelligere, et ratione uti; unde oportet quod principium huius operationis, scilicet intellectus, sit illud quo homo speciem sortitur, et non per animam sensitivam, aut per aliam vim eius. Si igitur intellectus possibilis est unus in omnibus, velut quaedam substantia separata; sequitur quod omnes homines sortiantur speciem per unam substantiam separatam; quod est simile positioni idearum, et eamdem difficultatem habens. Moreover, the forms and species of natural things are known through their proper operations; but the proper operation of man, as man, is understanding and reasoning. Hence the principle of this operation, whereby man is made to be specifically what he is, must be the intellect. It cannot be the sensory soul, nor any other power of man. Therefore, if the possible intellect, existing as a separate substance, is one for all men, then all men are made to be specifically what they are by one substance existing apart from them. This position is reminiscent of the doctrine of Ideas, and labors under the same difficulty.
Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod intellectus possibilis non est unus in omnibus, sed multiplicatur in diversis. Et cum sit quaedam vis vel potentia animae humanae, multiplicatur secundum multiplicationem substantiae ipsius animae, cuius multiplicatio sic considerari potest. Si enim aliquid quod sit de ratione alicuius communis materialem multiplicationem recipiat, necesse est quod illud commune multiplicetur secundum numerum, eadem specie remanente: sicut de ratione animalis sunt carnes et ossa; unde distinctio animalium, quae est secundum has vel illas carnes, facit diversitatem in numero, non in specie. Manifestum est autem ex his quae supra; dicta sunt, quod de ratione animae humanae est quod corpori humano sit unibilis, cum non habeat in se speciem completam; sed speciei complementum sit in ipso composito. Unde quod sit unibilis huic aut illi corpori, multiplicat animam secundum numerum non autem secundum speciem; sicut et haec albedo differt ab illa numero per hoc quod est esse huius et illius subiecti. Sed in hoc differt anima humana ab aliis formis, quod esse suum non dependet a corpore, nec hoc esse individuatum eius a corpore dependet; unumquodque enim, in quantum est unum, est in se indivisum, et ab aliis distinctum. Consequently it must be said absolutely that there is not one possible intellect for all men, but that there are many intellects, one for each man. And since the intellect is a certain power or capacity of the human soul, it is multiplied according as the substance of the soul itself is multiplied; which multiplication can be considered in the following way. For if a thing having a certain common character is multiplied materially, it must be multiplied numerically while remaining specifically the same. For instance, flesh and bones belong to the very notion of animal. Hence the distinction between animals, which is based on individual bodily differences, makes them numerically, but not specifically, diverse. Moreover, it is clear from what was said above (Arts. 1 and 1) that the human soul by its very nature is capable of union with the human body, because the human soul is not a complete species in itself, but acquires the completion of its species in the composite itself. Hence the fact that the soul is capable of being united to this or to that body, multiplies the soul numerically, not specifically; just as this whiteness differs numerically from that, because it belongs to this or that subject. But the human soul differs from other forms in this way, that its act of existing does not depend on the body. Nor does this individuated act of existing which it has, depend on the body; for inasmuch as a thing is one, it is undivided in itself and distinct from other things.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad rem. Sic igitur est una veritas quam diversi intelligunt, ex eo quod eorum conceptiones eidem rei adaequantur. 1. Truth is the conformity of the intellect with the thing [known]. Therefore there is one truth which different men understand, inasmuch as their conceptions conform to the same known object.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus se derisibilem profitetur, non si dicat multas animas, sed si dicat multas tantum; ita scilicet quod sint multae et secundum numerum et secundum speciem. 2. Augustine acknowledges that his position is ridiculous, not if he says many souls, but if he says many without qualification, so that souls would be many both numerically and specifically.
Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus possibilis non multiplicatur in diversis secundum differentiam alicuius formae, sed secundum multiplicationem substantiae animae, cuius potentia est. 3. The possible intellect is not multiplied among different individuals because of any formal diversity, but because the substance of the soul, of which the intellect is a power, has a multiple existence.
Ad quartum dicendum quod non est necessarium intellectum communem denudari ab eo quod intelligit, sed solum intellectum in potentia; sicut et omne recipiens denudatur a natura recepti. Unde si aliquis intellectus est qui sit actus tantum (sicut intellectus divinus), se intelligit per seipsum. Sed intellectus possibilis intelligibilis dicitur, sicut et alia intelligibilia, quia per speciem intelligibilem aliorum intelligibilium se intelligit. Ex obiecto enim cognoscit suam operationem, per quam devenit ad cognitionem sui ipsius. 4. It is not necessary for the intellect as such (commune) to completely lack what it understands, but only the intellect in potency; just as every recipient lacks the nature received. Hence, if there exists an intellect which is Act alone (as the divine intellect is), it understands itself through itself. But the, possible intellect is said to be intelligible, just as other intelligible things are, because it understands itself through the intelligible species of other intelligible things. For it knows its operation with respect to an object, and acquires knowledge of itself through this operation.
Ad quintum dicendum quod intellectus possibilis intelligendus est non habere commune cum aliqua naturarum sensibilium, a quibus sua intelligibilia accipit; communicat tamen unus intellectus possibilis cum alio in specie. 5. The possible intellect must be understood to have nothing in common with any of the sensible natures from which it derives its intelligible species. However, one possible intellect is specifically the same as another.
Ad sextum dicendum quod in his quae sunt secundum esse a materia separata, non potest esse distinctio nisi secundum speciem. Diversae autem species in diversis gradibus constitutae sunt; unde et assimilantur numeris, a quibus species diversificatur secundum additionem et subtractionem unitatis. Et ideo secundum positionem quorumdam dicentium, ea quae sunt inferiora in entibus, causari a superioribus, sequitur quod in separatis a materia sit multiplicatio secundum causam et causatum. Sed haec positio secundum fidem non sustinetur. Intellectus ergo possibilis non est substantia separata a materia secundum esse. Unde ratio non est ad propositum. 6. Those things which exist apart from matter can differ from one another only specifically. Moreover, things which are specifically diverse belong to different grades [of being]. Hence they resemble numbers which differ specifically from one another as a result of the addition and subtraction of a unit. Consequently it follows, from the position of those who maintain that inferior beings are caused by superior ones, that in the case of beings existing in separation from matter there is multiplicity so far as cause and thing caused are concerned. But this position may not be held according to faith . Therefore the possible intellect is not a substance existing apart from matter. Hence the reason given does not support the argument.
Ad septimum dicendum quod licet species intelligibilis qua intellectus formaliter intelligit, sit in intellectu possibili istius et illius hominis, ex quo intellectus possibiles sunt plures; id tamen quod intelligitur per huiusmodi species est unum, si consideremus habito respectu ad rem intellectam; quia universale quod intelligitur ab utroque, est idem in omnibus. Et quod per species multiplicatas in diversis, id quod est unum in omnibus possit intelligi, contingit ex immaterialitate specierum, quae repraesentant rem absque materialibus conditionibus individuantibus, ex quibus una natura secundum speciem multiplicatur numero in diversis. 7. The intelligible species through which the intellect understands formally, is present in the possible intellect of this and of that particular man, and for this reason it follows that there are many possible intellects. Nevertheless the quiddity (quod) known through such a species is one, if we consider this quiddity in relation to the thing known; because the universal which is understood by both of these men is the same in all the things [of which it is the universal representation]. Moreover, the fact that what is one-in-all [i.e., the universal] can be understood through species multiplied among diverse individuals, is made possible by the immateriality of these species. For species represent a thing without the material individuating conditions which give the simple specific nature a multiple existence among diverse things.
Ad octavum dicendum quod secundum Platonicos causa huius quod intelligitur unum in multis, non est ex parte intellectus, sed ex parte rei. Cum enim intellectus noster intelligat aliquid unum in multis; nisi aliqua res esset una participata a multis, videretur quod intellectus esset vanus, non habens aliquid respondens sibi in re. Unde coacti sunt ponere ideas, per quarum participationem et res naturales speciem sortiuntur, et intellectus nostri fiunt universalia intelligentes. Sed secundum sententiam Aristotelis hoc est ab intellectu, scilicet quod intelligat unum in multis per abstractionem a principiis individuantibus. Nec tamen intellectus est vanus aut falsus, licet non sit aliquid abstractum in rerum natura. Quia eorum quae sunt simul, unum potest vere intelligi aut nominari, absque hoc quod intelligatur vel nominetur alterum; licet non possit vere intelligi vel dici, quod eorum quae sunt simul, unum sit sine altero. Sic igitur vere potest considerari et dici id quod est in aliquo individuo, de natura speciei, in quo simile est cum aliis, absque eo quod considerentur in eo principia individuantia, secundum quae distinguitur ab omnibus aliis. Sic ergo sua abstractione intellectus facit istam unitatem universalem, non eo quod sit unus in omnibus, sed in quantum est immaterialis. 8. According to the Platonists the reason why something is understood as a one-in-many [i.e., universally], is not to be attributed to the intellect, but to the thing. They argue that, because our intellect knows a thing as a one-in-many, it would apparently be empty of any real content unless there were one real nature shared by many individuals. For in that case the intellect would have in itself nothing corresponding to this one-in-many in reality. Hence the Platonists felt obliged to posit Ideas, by participation in which both natural things are given their specific nature, and our intellects made cognizant of universals. But according to Aristotle, the fact that the intellect understands a one-in-many in abstraction from individuating principles, is to be attributed to the intellect itself. And though nothing abstract exists in reality, the intellect is not void of any real content, nor is it misrepresentative of things as they are; because, of those things which necessarily exist together, one can be truly understood or named without another being understood or named. But it cannot be truly understood or said of things existing in this way, that one exists without the other. Thus whatever exists in an individual which pertains to the nature of its species, and in respect of which it is like other things, can be known and spoken of truly without taking into consideration its individuating principles, which distinguish it from all other individuals [of the same species]. Consequently, by its abstractive power the intellect makes this universal unity itself, not as though it were a unity existing in things themselves, but as an immaterial representation of them.
Ad nonum dicendum quod intellectus est locus specierum, eo quod continet species; unde non sequitur quod intellectus possibilis sit unus omnium hominum, sed unus et communis omnibus speciebus. 9. The intellect is the place of species because it contains them. Hence it does not follow that there is one possible intellect for all men, but that it is one and common to the whole species.
Ad decimum dicendum quod sensus non recipit species absque organo; et ideo non dicitur locus specierum, sicut intellectus. 10. Sense does not receive species without an organ, and therefore sense is not said to be the place of species in the same manner as the intellect is.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod intellectus possibilis potest dici ubique operari, non quia operatio eius sit ubique, sed quia operatio eius est circa ea quae sunt ubique. 11. The possible intellect can be said to operate everywhere, not because it actually does so, but because its intellectual operation comprehends things which exist everywhere.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod intellectus possibilis, licet materiam determinatam non habeat, tamen substantia animae, cuius est potentia, habet materiam determinatam, non ex qua sit, sed in qua sit. 12. Although the possible intellect has no determinate matter, the substance of the soul, of which the intellect is a power, has a determinate matter. However it does not have matter as a constituent part, but as something in which it exists.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod principia individuantia omnium formarum, non sunt de essentia earum, sed hoc solum verum est in compositis. 13. The individuating principles of all forms are not of the very essence of these forms. This is true only in the case of things composed of matter and form.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod primus motor caeli est omnino separatus a materia etiam secundum esse; unde nullo modo potest numero multiplicari: non est autem simile de anima humana. 14. The Prime Mover of the heavens exists in complete separation from matter. Therefore He cannot be multiplied numerically in any way whatever. However, the same thing is not true of the human soul.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod animae separatae non differunt specie, sed numero, ex eo quod sunt tali vel tali corpori unibiles. 15. Souls existing apart from bodies do not differ specifically, but numerically, because they are capable of being united to this or to that particular body.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod licet intellectus possibilis sit separatus a corpore quantum ad operationem; est tamen potentia animae, quae est actus corporis. 16. Although the possible intellect is separated from the body so far, as its operation is concerned, nevertheless it is a power of the soul which is the act of the body.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod aliquid est intellectum in potentia, non ex eo quod est individuale, sed ex eo quod est materiale; unde species intelligibiles, quae immaterialiter recipiuntur in intellectu, etsi sint individuatae, sunt intellectae in actu. Et praeterea idem sequitur apud ponentes intellectum possibilem esse unum; quia si intellectus possibilis est unus sicut quaedam substantia separata, oportet quod sit aliquod individuum; sicut et de ideis Platonis Aristoteles argumentatur. Et eadem ratione species intelligibiles in ipso essent individuatae, et essent etiam diversae in diversis intellectibus separatis, cum omnis intelligentia sit plena formis intelligibilibus. 17. Something is potentially known, not because it is individual, but because it is material. Hence the intelligible species that are received in the intellect immaterially are actually known, even though they are individuated. Furthermore, the same [incongruity set forth in this objection] follows logically from the position of those who maintain that there is one possible intellect for all men. For if there is one possible intellect existing as a separate substance, it must be an individual thing. This is the argument that Aristotle employs against Plato’s Ideas. The intelligible species in the intellect would be individuated for the same reason, and would differ in diverse separate intellects as well, because every intelligence is filled with intelligible forms.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod phantasma movet intellectum prout est factum intelligibile actu, virtute intellectus agentis ad quam comparatur intellectus possibilis sicut potentia ad agens, et ita cum eo communicat. 18. A phantasm moves the intellect so far as the possible intellect is made actually cognizant by the power of the agent intellect to which the possible intellect is related as potency is to act. This is the way in which the intellect has something in common with a phantasm.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum quod, licet esse animae intellectivae non dependeat a corpore, tamen habet habitudinem ad corpus naturaliter, propter perfectionem suae speciei. 19. Although the soul’s act of existing does not depend on the body, nevertheless it is related by its very nature to the body for the completion of its species.
Ad vicesimum dicendum quod, licet anima humana non habeat materiam partem sui, est tamen forma corporis; et ideo quod quid erat esse suum, includit habitudinem ad corpus. 20. Although the human soul does not contain matter as an intrinsic part of itself, it is still the form of the body. Therefore its nature involves relationship with the body.
Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum quod, licet intellectus possibilis elevetur supra corpus, non tamen elevatur supra totam substantiam animae, quae multiplicatur secundum habitudinem ad diversa corpora. 2 1. Although the possible intellect transcends the body, it does not transcend the entire substance of the soul, which has a multiple existence because it inhabits diverse bodies.
Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si corpus sic uniretur animae quasi totam essentiam et virtutem comprehendens; sic enim oporteret quidquid est in anima esse materiale. Sed hoc non est ita, ut supra manifestatum est; unde ratio non sequitur. 22. This argument would be true if the body were united to the soul in such a way as to embrace the whole essence and power of the soul, for then whatever exists in the soul would necessarily be material. But this is not the case as was shown above, and therefore this argument is not legitimate.
ARTICLE 4
WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO ADMIT THAT AN AGENT INTELLECT EXISTS

[Summa theol., I, q. 79, a. 3; q. 54, a.4; Contra Gentiles, II, 77; De spir. creat., a.9; Compend. theol., chap. 83; Comm. in De anima, III, lect. 10.]
Quarto quaeritur utrum necesse sit ponere intellectum agentem In the fourth article we examine this question: Whether it is necessary to admit that an agent intellect exists.
Objections.
Et videtur quod non. Quod enim potest per unum fieri in natura, non fit per plura. Sed homo potest sufficienter intelligere per unum intellectum, scilicet possibilem. Non ergo necessarium est ponere intellectum agentem. Probatio mediae. Potentiae quae radicantur in una essentia animae, compatiuntur sibi invicem; unde ex motu facto in potentia sensitiva relinquitur aliquid in imaginatione; nam phantasia est motus a sensu factus secundum actum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Si ergo intellectus possibilis est in anima nostra, et non est substantia separata, sicut superius dictum est; oportet quod sit in eadem essentia animae cum imaginatione. Ergo motus imaginationis redundat in intellectum possibilem; et ita non est necessarium ponere intellectum agentem, qui faciat phantasmata intelligibilia a phantasmatibus abstracta. 1. It seems unnecessary to admit that an agent intellect exists. For whatever can be accomplished in nature by one thing is not done by many. Now a man can understand quite well by means of one intellect, namely, the possible intellect. Therefore it is unnecessary to admit that an agent intellect exists. The minor proposition is proved thus: powers that are rooted in one and the same essence of the soul influence one another. It is for this reason that an impression is made on the imagination as a result of a change in the [external] sense powers, for the imagination is moved [i.e., actuated or informed] when the external senses are actuated, as is said in the De anima [III, 3, 429a 1]. Therefore, if the possible intellect belongs to our soul, and is not a separate substance, as we have explained above (Art. 2), it must belong to the same essence of the soul as the imagination does. Hence a change in the imagination flows into the possible intellect, and thus it is unnecessary to admit that an agent intellect exists which makes phantasms intelligible by abstracting [species] from the phantasms themselves.
Praeterea, tactus et visus sunt diversae potentiae. Contingit autem in caeco quod ex motu relicto in imaginatione a sensu tactus, commovetur imaginatio ad imaginandum aliquid quod pertinet ad sensum visus; et hoc ideo quia visus et tactus radicantur in una essentia animae. Si igitur intellectus possibilis est quaedam potentia animae, pari ratione ex motu imaginationis resultabit aliquid in intellectum possibilem; et ita non est necessarium ponere intellectum agentem. 2. Further, touch and sight are different powers. Now in the case of one who is [born] blind, it happens that the imagination is moved to imagine something that belongs to the sense of sight from a change produced in the imagination by the sense of touch, and this occurs because sight and touch are rooted in one and the same essence of the soul. Therefore, if the possible intellect is a certain power of the soul, then, for a similar reason, an impression will be produced in the possible intellect from a change in the imagination. Thus it is unnecessary to admit that an agent intellect exists.
Praeterea, intellectus agens ad hoc ponitur, quod intelligibilia in potentia faciat intelligibilia actu. Fiunt autem aliqua intelligibilia actu per hoc quod abstrahuntur a materia et a materialibus conditionibus. Ad hoc ergo ponitur intellectus agens ut species intelligibiles a materia abstrahantur. Sed hoc potest fieri sine intellectu agente; nam intellectus possibilis, cum sit immaterialis, immaterialiter necesse est quod recipiat, cum omne receptum sit in recipiente per modum recipientis. Nulla igitur necessitas est ponendi intellectum agentem. 3. Further, an agent intellect is held to exist in order that the potentially intelligible may be made actually intelligible. Moreover, some things are made actually intelligible by being abstracted from matter and from material conditions. Thus an agent intellect is held to exist in order that intelligible species may be abstracted from matter. However, this can be accomplished without an agent intellect, for, since the possible intellect is immaterial, it must receive things in an immaterial way, because whatever is received is in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore it is unnecessary to admit that an agent intellect exists.
Praeterea, Aristoteles in III de anima, assimilat intellectum agentem lumini. Sed lumen non est necessarium ad videndum, nisi in quantum facit diaphanum esse actu lucidum, est enim color secundum se visibilis, et motivus lucidi secundum actum, ut dicitur in II de anima. Sed intellectus agens non est necessarius ad hoc quod faciat intellectum possibilem aptum ad recipiendum; quia secundum id quod est, est in potentia ad intelligibilia. Ergo non est necessarium ponere intellectum agentem. 4. Further, in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 15],Aristotle compares the agent intellect to light. But light is necessary for sight only inasmuch as it makes the medium (diaphanus) to be actually luminous; for color is visible in virtue of its own nature, and moves the medium which is actually luminous, as is explained in the De anima [II, 7, 418a 26; 418b 27]. However, the agent intellect is not required in order to prepare the possible intellect for the reception of species, because the possible intellect is in potency to intelligible species by its very nature. Therefore it is unnecessary to maintain that an agent intellect exists.
Praeterea, sicut se habet intellectus ad intelligibilia, ita sensus ad sensibilia. Sed sensibilia ad hoc quod moveant sensum, non indigent aliquo agente, licet secundum esse spirituale sint in sensu, qui est susceptivus rerum sensibilium sine materia, ut dicitur in III de anima; et in medio quod recipit spiritualiter species sensibilium: quod patet ex hoc quod in eadem parte medii recipitur species contrariorum, ut albi et nigri. Ergo nec intelligibilia indigent aliquo alio intellectu agente. 5. Further, just as our intellect is related to intelligible things, so are our senses related to sensible things. Now sensible things require no agent [sense] in order that they may move the senses, yet sensible things are present with an immaterial mode of existence, both in the senses, which are receptive of sensible things without matter, as is said in the De anima [III, 8, 431b 25], as well as in the medium [e.g., the air], which receives the species of sensible things in an immaterial way. This is evident from the very fact that the species of contrary qualities, such as white and black, are received in the same part of the medium. Therefore neither do intelligible things require an agent intellect.
Praeterea, ad hoc quod aliquid quod est in potentia reducatur in actum in rebus naturalibus, sufficit id quod est in actu eiusdem generis; sicut ex materia quae est potentia ignis, fit actu ignis per ignem qui est actu. Ad hoc igitur quod intellectus qui in nobis est in potentia fiat in actu, non requiritur nisi intellectus in actu, vel ipsiusmet intelligentis; sicut quando ex cognitione principiorum venimus in cognitionem conclusionum, vel alterius, sicut cum aliquis addiscit a magistro. Non est igitur necessarium ponere intellectum agentem, ut videtur. 6. Further, in order for something in potency to be made actual in the case of natural things, something actual belonging to the same genus is sufficient; for example, in the case of matter, whatever is ablaze potentially is set ablaze actually by fire, which is in act. Therefore, for our intellect, which is in potency, to be actuated, nothing more is required than the intellect in act, either of the knower himself, as when we proceed from a knowledge of principles to a knowledge of conclusions, or of someone else, as when someone learns from a teacher. Consequently it seems unnecessary to maintain that an agent intellect exists.
Praeterea, intellectus agens ad hoc ponitur ut illuminet nostra phantasmata, sicut lux solis illuminat colores. Sed ad nostram illuminationem sufficit divina lux: quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, ut dicitur Ioan. I. Non igitur est necessarium ponere intellectum agentem. 7. Further, an agent intellect is held to exist in order that it may illuminate our phantasms, just as the light of the sun illuminates colors. But the divine light, “which illuminates every man coming into this world” (John 1:9), suffices for our illumination. Consequently it is unnecessary to maintain that an agent intellect exists.
Praeterea, actus intellectus est intelligere. Si igitur est duplex intellectus, scilicet agens et possibilis, erit unius hominis duplex intelligere; quod videtur inconveniens. 8. Further, intellection is the activity of an intellect. Therefore, if there are two intellects, that is, an agent and a possible intellect, the intellection of one and the same man will be twofold. This is incongruous.
Praeterea, species intelligibilis videtur esse perfectio intellectus. Si igitur est duplex intellectus, scilicet possibilis et agens, est duplex intelligere; quod videtur superfluum. 9. Further, it is seen that an intelligible species perfects our intellect. Therefore, if there are two intellects, namely, a possible and an agent intellect, there are two distinct acts of intellection. This seems unnecessary.
Sed contra, est ratio Aristotelis in III de anima; quod cum in omni natura sit agens et id quod est in potentia, oportet haec duo in anima esse, quorum alterum est intellectus agens, alterum intellectus possibilis. On the contrary, in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 10], Aristotle concludes that, since in every nature there is something active and something potential, these two things must be found within the soul itself, and one of these is the agent intellect, the other the possible intellect.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod necesse est ponere intellectum agentem. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod, cum intellectus possibilis sit in potentia ad intelligibilia, necesse est quod intelligibilia moveant intellectum possibilem. Quod autem non est, non potest aliquid movere. Intelligibile autem per intellectum possibilem non est aliquid in rerum natura existens, in quantum intelligibile est; intelligit enim intellectus possibilis noster aliquid quasi unum in multis et de multis. Tale autem non invenitur in rerum natura subsistens, ut Aristoteles probat in VII Metaphys. Oportet igitur, si intellectus possibilis debet moveri ab intelligibili, quod huiusmodi intelligibile per intellectum fiat. Et cum non possit esse id quod est, in potentia ad aliquid factum ipsius, oportet ponere praeter intellectum possibilem intellectum agentem, qui faciat intelligibilia in actu, quae moveant intellectum possibilem. Facit autem ea per abstractionem a materia, et a materialibus conditionibus, quae sunt principia individuationis. Cum enim natura speciei, quantum ad id quod per se ad speciem pertinet, non habeat unde multiplicetur in diversis, sed individuantia principia sint praeter rationem ipsius; poterit intellectus accipere eam praeter omnes conditiones individuantes; et sic accipietur aliquid unum. Et eadem ratione intellectus accipit naturam generis abstrahendo a differentiis specificis, ut unum in multis et de multis speciebus. I answer: We must admit that an agent intellect exists. To make this evident we must observe that, since the possible intellect is in potency to intelligibles, the intelligibles themselves must move [i.e., actuate] the possible intellect. But that which is non-existent cannot move anything. Moreover, the intelligible as such, that which the possible intellect understands, does not exist in reality; “ for our possible intellect understands something as though it were a one-in-many and common to many [i.e., universal]. However, such an entity is not found subsisting in reality, as Aristotle proves in the Metaphysics [VII, 13, 1039a 15]. Therefore, if the possible intellect has to be moved by an intelligible, this intelligible must be produced by an intellective power. And since it is impossible for anything in potency, in a certain respect, to actuate itself, we must admit that an agent intellect exists, in addition to the possible intellect, and that this agent intellect causes the actual intelligibles which actuate the possible intellect. Moreover, it produces these intelligibles by abstracting them from matter and from material conditions which are the principles of individuation. And since the nature as such of the species does not possess these principles by which the nature is given a multiple existence among different things, because individuating principles of this sort are distinct from the nature itself, the intellect will be able to receive this nature apart from all material conditions, and consequently will receive it as a unity [i.e., as a one-in-many]. For the same reason the intellect receives the nature of a genus by abstracting from specific differences, so that it is a one-in-many and common to many species.
Si autem universalia per se subsisterent in rerum natura, sicut Platonici posuerunt, necessitas nulla esset ponere intellectum agentem; quia ipsae res intelligibiles per se intellectum possibilem moverent. Unde videtur Aristoteles hac necessitate inductus ad ponendum intellectum agentem, quia non consensit opinioni Platonis de positione idearum. Sunt tamen et aliqua per se intelligibilia in actu subsistentia in rerum natura, sicut sunt substantiae immateriales; sed tamen ad ea cognoscenda intellectus possibilis pertingere non potest, sed aliqualiter in eorum cognitionem devenit per ea quae abstrahit a rebus materialibus et sensibilibus. However, if universals subsisted in reality in virtue of themselves, as the Platonists maintained, it would not be necessary to admit than an agent intellect exists; because things which are intelligible in virtue of their own nature move the possible intellect. Therefore it appears that Aristotle was led by this necessity to posit an agent intellect, because he did not agree with the opinion of Plato on the question of Ideas. Nevertheless there are some subsistent things in the real order which are actual intelligibles in virtue of themselves; the immaterial substances, for instance, are of this nature (see Art. 7). However, the possible intellect cannot attain a knowledge of these immediately, but acquires its knowledge of them through what it abstracts from material and sensible things (see Art. 16).
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intelligere nostrum non potest compleri per intellectum possibilem tantum. Non enim intellectus possibilis potest intelligere nisi moveatur ab intelligibili; quod, cum non praeexistat in rerum natura, oportet quod fiat per intellectum agentem. Verum est autem quod duae potentiae quae sunt in una substantia animae radicatae, compatiuntur sibi ad invicem; sed ista compassio quantum ad duo potest intelligi; scilicet quantum ad hoc quod una potentia impeditur vel totaliter abstrahitur a suo actu, quando alia potentia intense operatur; sed hoc non est ad propositum. Vel etiam quantum ad hoc quod una potentia ab alia movetur, sicut imaginatio a sensu. Et hoc quidem possibile est, quia formae imaginationis et sensus sunt eiusdem generis; utraeque enim sunt individuales. Et ideo formae quae sunt in sensu, possunt imprimere formas quae sunt in imaginatione movendo imaginationem quasi sibi similes. Formae autem imaginationis, in quantum sunt individuales, non possunt causare formas intelligibiles, cum sint universales. 1. Our act of intellection cannot be accomplished by the possible intellect alone, for the possible intellect can understand only when it is moved by an intelligible, and this intelligible, since it does not already exist in the real order, must be produced by the agent intellect. Moreover, it is true that two powers, which are rooted in one and the same substance of the soul, do influence each other; but this influence can be understood to occur in two ways: first, inasmuch as one power is hindered or totally prevented from performing its operation when another power operates intensely; however, this has no bearing on the problem; secondly, inasmuch as one power is moved by another, as the imagination is moved by the [external] senses. Now this is possible because the forms in the imagination and those in the external senses are generically the same, for all are individual forms. Therefore the forms which are in the external senses can impress those forms which exist in the imagination by moving the imagination, because they are similar to these forms. However, the forms in the imagination, since they represent things as individuals, cannot cause intelligible forms, because these are universal.
Ad secundum dicendum quod ex speciebus receptis in imaginatione a sensu tactus, imaginatio non sufficeret formare formas ad visum pertinentes, nisi praeexisterent formae per visum receptae, in thesauro memoriae vel imaginationis reservatae. Non enim caecus natus colorem imaginari potest per quascumque alias species sensibiles. 2. The species received in the imagination from the sense of touch are not enough to cause the imagination to produce forms belonging to the sense of sight, unless forms previously received by the sense of sight are stored up in the repertory of memory or imagination. For one who is born blind cannot imagine color by any other kind of sensible species whatever.
Ad tertium dicendum quod conditio recipientis non potest transferre speciem receptam de uno genere in aliud; potest tamen, eodem genere manente, variare speciem receptam secundum aliquem modum essendi. Et inde est quod cum species universalis et particularis differant secundum genus, sola cognitio intellectus possibilis non sufficit ad hoc quod species quae sunt in imaginatione particulares, in eo fiant universales; sed requiritur intellectus agens, qui hoc faciat. 3. The condition of the recipient cannot cause a species which has been received, to be transferred from one genus to another; however, it can alter a received species of, the same genus according to some mode of being. Hence, since a universal species and a particular species differ generically, it follows that the cognitive activity of the possible intellect alone is not enough to give the particular species in the imagination the universality which they possess in the intellect, but that an agent intellect is required to do this.
Ad quartum dicendum quod de lumine, ut Commentator dicit in II de anima, est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod lumen necessarium est ad videndum, quantum ad hoc quod dat virtutem coloribus, ut possint movere visum; quasi color non ex seipso sit visibilis, sed per lumen. Sed hoc videtur Aristoteles removere, cum dicit in II de anima, quod color est per se visibilis; quod non esset, si solum ex lumine haberet visibilitatem. Et ideo alii aliter dicunt, et melius, quod lumen necessarium est ad videndum in quantum perficit diaphanum, faciens illud esse lucidum actu; unde philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod color est motivus lucidi secundum actum. Nec obstat quod ab eo qui est in tenebris, videntur ea quae sunt in luce, et non e converso. Hoc enim accidit ex eo quod oportet illuminari diaphanum, quod circumstat rem visibilem, ut recipiat visibilem speciem, quae usque ad hoc visibilis est quousque porrigitur actus luminis illuminantis diaphanum; licet de propinquo perfectius illuminet, et a longinquo magis debilitetur. Comparatio ergo luminis ad intellectum agentem non est quantum ad omnia; cum intellectus agens ad hoc sit necessarius ut faciat intelligibilia in potentia esse intelligibilia actu. Et hoc significavit Aristoteles in III de anima, cum dixit, quod intellectus agens est quasi lumen quoquo modo. 4. There are two opinions concerning light, as the Commentator points out in the De anima [II, 67]. For some said that light is necessary for sight inasmuch as it gives to colors the power of moving the sense of sight, as if color were not visible of itself, but only through light. But this seems to contradict Aristotle, since he points out in the De anima [II, 7, 418a 29]. that color is visible in virtue of itself, and this would not be the case if it were made visible by light alone. For this reason others offer a different and more acceptable explanation, namely, that light is necessary for sight inasmuch as it perfects the medium, making it to be actually luminous. Wherefore the Philosopher says in the De anima [II, 7, 418a 33] that color has the power of moving what is actually luminous. Nor is this position rendered untenable by the fact that someone in the dark sees things which are in the light, but not vice versa. For this occurs because the medium, which surrounds a visible thing, must be illuminated in order that the medium may receive the visible species; and this remains visible as long as the act of light continues to illuminate the medium, although it illuminates it more perfectly the nearer it is, and more weakly the farther it is away. Consequently the comparison between light and the agent intellect does not hold in all respects, because the agent intellect is necessary for this reason, that it may make the potentially intelligible to be actually intelligible. Aristotle pointed this out in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 15] when he said that the agent intellect is like light in some respects.
Ad quintum dicendum quod sensibile, cum sit quoddam particulare, non imprimit nec in sensum nec in medium speciem alterius generis; cum species in medio et in sensu non sit nisi particularis. Intellectus autem possibilis recipit species alterius generis quam sint in imaginatione; cum intellectus possibilis recipiat species universales, et imaginatio non contineat nisi particulares. Et ideo in intelligibilibus indigemus intellectu agente, non autem in sensibilibus alia potentia activa; sed omnes potentiae sensitivae sunt potentiae passivae. 5. Since a sensible is something particular, it does not impress a species of a higher genus, either on the sense or on the medium, because the species existing in the medium and in the sense is a particular and nothing more. The possible intellect, however, receives species of a higher genus than those present in the imagination; because the possible intellect receives universal species, whereas the imagination contains only particular species. Therefore we require an agent intellect in the case of intelligible things, but need no additional agent power in the case of sensible things. Indeed, all the sentient powers are passive powers.
Ad sextum dicendum quod intellectus possibilis factus in actu non sufficit ad causandum scientiam in nobis, nisi praesupposito intellectu agente. Si enim loquamur de intellectu in actu qui est in ipso addiscente, contingit quod intellectus possibilis alicuius sit in potentia quantum ad aliquid, et quantum ad aliquid in actu. Et per quod est in actu potest reduci, etiam quantum ad id quod est in potentia, in actum; sicut per id quod est actu cognoscens principia, fit in actu cognoscens conclusiones, quas prius cognoscebat in potentia. Sed tamen actualem cognitionem principiorum habere non potest intellectus possibilis nisi per intellectum agentem. Cognitio enim principiorum a sensibilibus accipitur ut dicitur in fine libri posteriorum. A sensibilibus autem non possunt intelligibilia accipi nisi per abstractionem intellectus agentis. Et ita patet quod intellectus in actu principiorum non sufficit ad reducendum intellectum possibilem de potentia in actum sine intellectu agente; sed in hac reductione intellectus agens se habet sicut artifex, et principia demonstrationis sicut instrumenta. Si autem loquamur de intellectu in actu docentis, manifestum est quod docens non causat scientiam in addiscente, tamquam interius agens, sed sicut exterius adminiculans; sicut etiam medicus sanat sicut exterius adminiculans, natura autem tamquam interius agens. 6. The possible intellect in act is not sufficient to, cause knowledge in us unless an agent intellect is presupposed. For if we speak of the intellect in act of one who is learning, it so happens that his possible intellect is in potency with respect to some things, and in act with respect to others; and his intellect can be put into act, so far as the things to which it is in potency are concerned, by the things that are already actually known; just as one is made to be actually knowing conclusions,, which were previously known only potentially, by actually knowing principles. However, the possible intellect can be actually knowing principles only through the activity of the agent intellect; for our knowledge of principles is received from sensible things, as is stated at the end of the Posterior Analytics [II, 19, 100a 10]. Moreover, intelligibles can be derived from sensible things only by the abstractive activity of the agent intellect. Thus it is evident that the intellect in act with respect to principles, does not suffice to move the possible intellect from potentiality to act without the agent intellect. Indeed, in this actuating of the possible intellect, the agent intellect acts like an artisan and the principles of demonstration like tools. However, if we speak of the intellect in act of the teacher, it is evident that when the teacher causes knowledge in one who is learning, he does not act as an interior agent, but as an external administrator, just as in the production of health a physician acts as an external administrator, whereas the nature of the patient acts as an interior agent.
Ad septimum dicendum quod, sicut in rebus naturalibus sunt propria principia activa in unoquoque genere, licet Deus sit causa agens prima et communis, ita etiam requiritur proprium lumen intellectuale in homine, quamvis Deus sit prima lux omnes communiter illuminans. 7. Just as real things of any kind require proper active principles, even though God is the first and universal agent, so too does man require a proper intellective light, even though God is the First Light illuminating all men in common.
Ad octavum dicendum quod duorum intellectuum, scilicet possibilis et agentis, sunt duae actiones. Nam actus intellectus possibilis est recipere intelligibilia; actio autem intellectus agentis est abstrahere intelligibilia. Nec tamen sequitur quod sit duplex intelligere in homine; quia ad unum intelligere oportet quod utraque istarum actionum concurrat. 8. There is a proper activity for each one of the two intellects, that is, the possible intellect and the agent intellect. For the activity of the possible intellect consists in receiving intelligibles, whereas that of the agent intellect consists in abstracting them. Nor does it follow that there are two distinct acts of understanding in a man, because it is necessary that the activities of both intellects concur to produce one act of understanding.
Ad nonum dicendum quod species intelligibilis eadem comparatur ad intellectum agentem et possibilem; sed ad intellectum possibilem sicut ad recipientem, ad intellectum autem agentem sicut ad facientem huiusmodi species per abstractionem. 9. The same intelligible species is related to the agent intellect and to the possible intellect. However, it is related to the possible intellect as a recipient, and to the agent intellect as the one producing species of this sort by abstraction.
ARTICLE 5
WHETHER THERE IS ONE SEPARATELY EXISTING AGENT INTELLECT FOR ALL MEN

[Summa theol., I. q.79. a.4, 5; Contra Gentiles, II, 76, 78; Sent., II dist. 17, q.2, a. 1; De spir. creat., a. 10; Comm. in De anima, III, lect. 10; Compend. theol., chap. 86.]
Quinto quaeritur utrum intellectus agens sit unus et separatus In the fifth article we examine this question: Whether there is one separately existing agent intellect for all men.
Objections.
Et videtur quod sic. Quia philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod intellectus agens non quandoque intelligit et quandoque non. Nihil autem est tale in nobis. Ergo intellectus agens est separatus, et per consequens in omnibus unus. 1. It seems that there is. Because the Philosopher says, in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 22], that the agent intellect is not at one time knowing and at another not. But nothing of this nature exists in us. Hence the agent intellect exists apart from men, and therefore is one and the same for all men.
Praeterea, impossibile est quod aliquid sit simul in potentia et in actu respectu eiusdem. Sed intellectus possibilis est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia; intellectus autem agens est in actu respectu eorum, cum sit intelligibilium specierum actus. Impossibile igitur videtur quod in eadem substantia animae radicetur intellectus possibilis et agens; et ita, cum intellectus possibilis sit in essentia animae, ut ex praedictis patet, intellectus agens erit separatus. 2. Further, nothing can be in potency and in act with respect to the same thing simultaneously. Now the possible intellect is in potency with respect to every intelligible species. However, the agent intellect is in act with respect to them, because it is the act [producing] them. Therefore it seems that the possible and agent intellect cannot be rooted in the same substance of the soul. Hence, since the possible intellect is rooted in the essence of the soul, as is evident from the preceding articles (Arts. 1, 2 and 2), the agent intellect will exist apart from the soul.
Sed dicebat, quod intellectus possibilis est in potentia ad intelligibilia, et intellectus agens in actu respectu eorum secundum aliud et aliud esse. Sed contra, intellectus possibilis non est in potentia ad intelligibilia secundum quod habet ea, quia secundum hoc iam est actu per ea. Est igitur in potentia ad species intelligibiles secundum quod sunt in phantasmatibus. Sed respectu specierum, secundum quod sunt in phantasmatibus, intellectus agens est actus; cum faciat ea intelligibilia in actu per abstractionem. Ergo intellectus agens est in potentia ad intelligibilia, secundum illud esse secundum quod comparatur intellectus agens ad ipsa, ut faciens. 3. But it might be said that the possible intellect is in potency to intelligible species, and the agent intellect in act with respect to them according to different modes of existence. —On the other hand, the possible intellect is not in potency to intelligible species when it possesses them, because then it is actuated by them. Hence it is in potency to intelligible species as existing in phantasms. But the agent intellect is related to such species as the act [which produces them], because it makes them actually intelligible by abstraction. Hence the possible intellect is in potency to intelligible species with respect to that mode of existence according to which the agent intellect is related to them as the one producing them.
Praeterea, philosophus in III de anima attribuit quaedam intellectui agenti quae non videntur nisi substantiae separatae convenire; dicens quod hoc solum est perpetuum et incorruptibile et separatum. Est igitur intellectus agens substantia separata, ut videtur. 4. Further, in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 17] the Philosopher attributed to the agent intellect certain properties which seem to belong only to separate substances. For he says that “this [i.e., the intellect] alone is perpetual, incorruptible, and separate.” Therefore its seems that the agent intellect is a separate substance.
Praeterea, intellectus non dependet ex complexione corporali, cum sit absolutus ab organo corporali. Sed facultas intelligendi in nobis variatur secundum complexiones diversas. Non igitur ista facultas nobis competit per istum intellectum qui sit in nobis; et ita videtur quod intellectus agens sit separatus. 5. Further, the intellect does not depend on any bodily disposition, because it is not united to a bodily organ. But our faculty of understanding is affected by different physical dispositions .5 Consequently this [intellective] faculty of ours is not identical with this intellect which is present in us; so it seems that the agent intellect has a separate existence.
Praeterea, ad actionem aliquam non requiritur nisi agens et patiens. Si igitur intellectus possibilis, qui se habet ut patiens in intelligendo est aliquid substantiae nostrae, ut prius monstratum est, et intellectus agens est aliquid animae nostrae; videtur quod in nobis sufficienter habeamus unde intelligere possimus. Nihil ergo aliud est nobis necessarium ad intelligendum; quod tamen patet esse falsum. Indigemus enim sensibus, ex quibus experimenta accipimus ad sciendum, unde qui caret uno sensu, scilicet visu, caret una scientia, scilicet colorum. Indigemus etiam ad intelligendum doctrina, quae fit per magistrum; et ulterius illuminatione quae fit per Deum, secundum quod dicitur Ioan. I: erat lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. 6. Further, in order to have activity, an agent and a patient alone are necessary. Therefore, if the possible intellect, which is the patient in cognition, is a part of our substantial principle, as was previously shown (Art. 3), and the agent intellect is also a part of our soul, it seems that we possess within ourselves everything necessary in order that we may be able to understand. Hence we require nothing more in order to be able to do so. But this is clearly false. For we need the senses through which we acquire the experience necessary for cognition. This is the reason why a man deprived of a sense, for instance, sight, lacks a knowledge of colors. In order to learn we also require instruction, which is given by a teacher. And above all we stand in need of the illumination given by God, for it is said: “It was the true Light that enlightens every man who comes into this world” (John 1:9).
Praeterea, intellectus agens comparatur ad intelligibilia sicut lumen ad visibilia, ut patet in III de anima. Sed una lux separata, scilicet solis, sufficit ad faciendum omnia visibilia actu. Ergo ad faciendum omnia intelligibilia actu sufficit una lux separata; et sic nulla necessitas est ponere intellectum agentem in nobis. 7. Further, the agent intellect is related to intelligible objects as light is to visible objects, as is evident in the De anima [ibid., 430a 14]. But one light existing apart from things, that is, the sun, suffices to make all things actually visible. Consequently one [intellectual] light existing apart from men, suffices to make everything actually intelligible. Hence it is unnecessary to maintain that an agent intellect exists in each one of us.
Praeterea, intellectus agens assimilatur arti, ut patet in III de anima. Sed ars est principium separatum ab artificiatis. Ergo et intellectus agens est principium separatum. 8. Further, the agent intellect is similar to an art, as is clear in the De anima [ibid., 430a 15] But an art is a principle separate from the objects produced by it. Therefore the agent intellect is also a separate principle.
Praeterea, perfectio cuiuslibet naturae est ut similetur suo agenti. Tunc enim generatum perfectum est quando ad similitudinem generantis pertingit; et artificiatum quando consequitur similitudinem formae quae est in artifice. Si igitur intellectus agens est aliquid animae nostrae, ultima perfectio et beatitudo animae nostrae erit in aliquo quod est in ipsa; quod patet esse falsum: sic enim animae seipsa esset fruendum. Non ergo intellectus agens est aliquid in nobis. 9. The perfection of a nature consists in being like its agent, for a thing generated is perfect when it resembles the thing producing it. A thing produced by art is also perfect when it resembles the form in the mind of the artisan. Therefore, if the agent intellect belongs to our soul, the ultimate perfection and happiness of our soul will be found in some part of the soul itself; which is evidently false. For in that case the ultimate happiness of the soul would be the enjoyment of itself. Consequently the agent intellect is not something that exists within ourselves.
Praeterea, agens est honorabilius patiente, ut dicitur in III de anima. Si ergo intellectus possibilis est aliquo modo separatus, intellectus agens erit magis separatus: quod non potest esse, ut videtur, nisi omnino extra substantiam animae ponatur. 10. Further, an agent is nobler than a patient, as is pointed out in the De anima [ibid., 430a 17]. Therefore, if the possible intellect is separated in some measure from the body, the agent intellect will be separated to an even greater degree; and we see that this can be so, only if the agent intellect is held to be completely separated from the substance of the soul.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur in V de anima: quod sicut in omni natura est aliquid, hoc quidem ut materia aliud autem quod est factivum, ita necesse est in anima esse has differentias; ad quorum unum pertinet intellectus possibilis, ad alterum intellectus agens. Uterque ergo intellectus, possibilis scilicet et agens, est aliquid in anima. On the contrary, there is this statement in the De anima [ibid., 430a 10] that since there is something in every nature like matter [i.e., potential] and something which is productive [i.e., active], these two distinct elements must likewise be found within the soul. The possible intellect corresponds to one of these, the agent intellect to the other. Therefore both the possible and agent intellect belong to the soul.
Praeterea, operatio intellectus agentis est abstrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus: quod quidem semper in nobis accidit. Non autem esset ratio quare haec abstractio quandoque fieret et quandoque non fieret, ut videtur, si intellectus agens esset substantia separata. Non est ergo intellectus agens substantia separata. Further, the operation of the agent intellect is to abstract intelligible species from phantasms. Now it is certain that this operation is not continually taking place in us. However, there would be no reason why such abstraction should sometimes occur and sometimes not, as is seen to be the case if the agent intellect were a separate substance. Consequently the agent intellect is not a separate substance.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod intellectum agentem esse unum et separatum plus videtur rationis habere quam si hoc de intellectu possibili ponatur. Est enim intellectus possibilis, secundum quem sumus intelligentes, quandoque quidem in potentia quandoque autem in actu; intellectus autem agens est qui facit nos intelligentes actu. Agens autem invenitur separatus ab his quae reducit in actum; sed id per quod aliquid est in potentia, omnino videtur esse intrinsecum rei. I answer: It is obviously more reasonable to maintain that the agent intellect is unique and separate, than to hold that this is true of the possible intellect. For the possible intellect, in virtue of which we are capable of understanding, is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act. The agent intellect, on the other hand, is that which makes us actually understanding. Now an agent exists in separation from the things which it brings into actuality, but obviously whatever makes a thing potential is wholly within that thing.
Et ideo plures posuerunt intellectum agentem esse substantiam separatam, intellectum autem possibilem esse aliquid animae nostrae. Et hunc intellectum agentem posuerunt esse quamdam substantiam separatam, quam intelligentiam nominant; quae ita se habet ad animas nostras, et ad totam sphaeram activorum et passivorum, sicut se habent substantiae superiores separatae, quas intelligentias dicunt, ad animas caelestium corporum, quae animata ponunt, et ad ipsa caelestia corpora; ut sicut superiora corpora a praedictis substantiis separatis recipiunt motum, animae vero caelestium corporum intelligibilem perfectionem; ita haec omnia inferiora corpora ab intellectu agente separato recipiunt formas et proprios motus, animae vero nostrae recipiunt ab eo intelligibiles perfectiones. Sed quia fides Catholica Deum, et non aliquam substantiam separatam in natura et animabus nostris operantem ponit, ideo quidam Catholici posuerunt, quod intellectus agens sit ipse Deus, qui est lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. For this reason many maintained that the agent intellect is a separate substance, and that the possible intellect is a part of our soul. Furthermore they held that this agent intellect is a specific kind of separate substance, which they call an intelligence. They held that it is related to our souls, and to the entire sphere of active and passive qualities, as superior separate substances (which they also call intelligences) are related to the souls of the celestial bodies (for they considered these to be animated), and to the celestial bodies themselves. Hence they maintained that, as superior bodies receive their motion from these separate substances, and the souls of the heavenly bodies .their intelligible perfections, so also do all the bodies of this inferior sphere receive their forms and movements from the separate agent intellect, while our soul receives its intelligible perfections from it. But because the Catholic Faith maintains that God is the agent operating in our souls and not some separate substance in nature, some Catholics asserted that the agent intellect is God himself, who is “the true Light that enlightens every man who comes into this world” (John 1: 9).
Sed haec positio, si quis diligenter consideret, non videtur esse conveniens. Comparantur enim substantiae superiores ad animas nostras, sicut corpora caelestia ad inferiora corpora. Sicut enim virtutes superiorum corporum sunt quaedam principia activa universalia respectu inferiorum corporum; ita virtus divina, et virtutes aliarum substantiarum secundarum, si qua influentia ex eis fiat in nos, comparantur ad animas nostras sicut principia activa universalia. But this position, if anyone examines it carefully, is seen to be implausible, because the superior substances are related to our souls as celestial bodies are to inferior bodies. For, as the powers of superior bodies are certain universal active principles in relation to inferior bodies, so also are the divine power and the powers of different secondary substances (if the latter do influence us in any way) related to our souls as universal active principles.
Videmus autem quod praeter principia activa universalia, quae sunt caelestium corporum, oportet esse principia activa particularia, quae sunt virtutes inferiorum corporum determinatae ad proprias operationes huius vel illius rei; et hoc praecipue requiritur in animalibus perfectis. Inveniuntur enim quaedam animalia imperfecta, ad quorum productionem sufficit virtus caelestis corporis, sicut patet de animalibus generatis ex putrefactione; sed ad generationem animalium perfectorum praeter virtutem caelestem requiritur etiam virtus particularis, quae est in semine. Cum igitur id quod est perfectissimum in omnibus corporibus inferioribus, sit intellectualis operatio, praeter principia activa universalia, quae sunt virtus Dei illuminantis, vel cuiuscumque alterius substantiae separatae, requiritur in nobis principium activum proprium, per quod efficiamur intelligentes in actu; et hoc est intellectus agens. However, we see that there must exist in addition to the universal active principles of the celestial bodies, certain particular active principles which are powers of inferior bodies, limited to the proper operation of each and every one of them. This is particularly necessary in the case of perfect animals, because certain imperfect animals are found, for whose production the power of a celestial body suffices, as is evident in the case of animals generated from decomposed matter.” However, in the generation of perfect animals a special power is also required in addition to the celestial power, and this power is present in the seed. Therefore, since intellectual operation is the most perfect thing existing in the entire order of inferior bodies, we need in addition to universal active principles (namely, the power of God enlightening us, or the powers of any other separate substance) an active principle existing within us by which we are enabled to understand actually. This power is the agent intellect.
Considerandum etiam est, quod si intellectus agens ponatur aliqua substantia separata praeter Deum, sequitur aliquid fidei nostrae repugnans: ut scilicet ultima perfectio nostra et felicitas sit in coniunctione aliquali animae nostrae, non ad Deum, ut doctrina evangelica tradit dicens: haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te Deum verum; sed in coniunctione ad aliquam aliam substantiam separatam. Manifestum est enim quod ultima beatitudo sive felicitas hominis consistit in sua nobilissima operatione, quae est intelligere; cuius ultimam perfectionem oportet esse per hoc quod intellectus noster suo activo principio coniungitur. Tunc enim unumquodque passivum maxime perfectum est quando pertingit ad proprium activum, quod est ei causa perfectionis. Et ideo ponentes intellectum agentem esse substantiam a materia separatam, dicunt quod ultima felicitas hominis est in hoc quod possit intelligere intellectum agentem. We must also consider this, that, if the agent intellect is held to exist as a separate substance along with God, a consequence repugnant to our faith will follow: namely, that our ultimate perfection and happiness consists not in a certain union of our soul with God, as the Gospel teaches, saying. “This is life eternal, that you may know the true God” (John 17:3), but with some other separate substance. For it is evident that man’s ultimate beatitude or happiness depends upon his noblest operation, intellection, which operation, in order to be fully completed, requires the union of our [possible] intellect with its active principle. For, indeed, anything passive in any way whatever is perfected [i.e., fully actuated] only when joined with the proper active principle which is the cause of its perfection. Therefore those maintaining that the agent intellect is a substance existing apart from matter, say that man’s ultimate happiness consists in being able to know the agent intellect.
Ulterius autem si diligenter consideremus, inveniemus eadem ratione impossibile esse, intellectum agentem substantiam separatam esse, qua ratione et de intellectu possibili hoc supra ostensum est. Sicut enim operatio intellectus possibilis est recipere intelligibilia, ita propria operatio intellectus agentis est abstrahere ea: sic enim ea facit intelligibilia actu. Utramque autem harum operationum experimur in nobis ipsis. Nam et nos intelligibilia recipimus et abstrahimus ea. Oportet autem in unoquoque operante esse aliquod formale principium, quo formaliter operetur: non enim potest aliquid formaliter operari per id quod est secundum esse separatum ab ipso. Sed etsi id quod est separatum, est principium motivum ad operandum, nihilominus oportet esse aliquod intrinsecum quo formaliter operetur, sive illud sit forma, sive qualiscumque impressio. Oportet igitur esse in nobis aliquod principium formale quo recipiamus intelligibilia, et aliud quo abstrahamus ea. Et huiusmodi principia nominantur intellectus possibilis et agens. Uterque igitur eorum est aliquid in nobis. Non autem sufficit ad hoc, quod actio intellectus agentis, quae est abstrahere intelligibilia, conveniat nobis per ipsa phantasmata, quae sunt in nobis illustrata ab ipso intellectu agente. Unumquodque enim artificiatum consequitur actionem artificis: cum tamen intellectus agens comparatur ad phantasmata illustrata sicut ad artificiata. Moreover, if we give the matter further careful consideration, we will find that the agent intellect cannot be a separate substance for the same reason that the possible intellect cannot be, as was shown above (Arts. 1-3). For, as the operation of the possible intellect consists in receiving intelligible [species], so also does the proper operation of the agent intellect consist in abstracting them, for it makes them actually intelligible in this way. Now we experience both of these operations in ourselves, because we receive our intelligible species, and abstract them as well. However, in anything that operates there must be some formal principle whereby it operates formally, because a thing cannot operate formally through something that possesses existence distinct from itself. But, although the motive principle of an activity [i.e., an efficient cause] is separate from the thing which it causes, nevertheless there must be some intrinsic principle whereby a thing operates formally, whether it be a form or some sort of impression. Therefore there must exist within us a formal principle through which we receive intelligible species, and one whereby we abstract them. These principles are called the possible and the agent intellect respectively. Consequently each exists within us. Moreover, [the formal intrinsic existence in us of the agent intellect] is not accounted for simply by the fact that the action of the agent intellect, namely, the abstracting of intelligible species, is carried out through phantasms illumined in us by its action. For every object produced by art is the effect of the action of an artificer, the agent intellect being related to the phantasms illumined by it as an artificer is to the things made by his art.
Non est autem difficile considerare, qualiter in eadem substantia animae utrumque possit inveniri; scilicet intellectus possibilis, qui est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, et intellectus agens, qui facit ea intelligibilia in actu. Non enim est impossibile aliquid esse in potentia respectu alicuius, et in actu respectu eiusdem, secundum diversa. Si ergo consideremus ipsa phantasmata per respectum ad animam humanam, inveniuntur quantum ad aliquid esse in potentia, scilicet in quantum non sunt ab individuantibus conditionibus abstracta, abstrahibilia tamen, quantum vero ad aliquid inveniuntur esse in actu respectu animae, in quantum scilicet sunt similitudines determinatarum rerum. Est ergo in anima nostra invenire potentialitatem respectu phantasmatum, secundum quod sunt repraesentativa determinatarum rerum. Et hoc pertinet ad intellectum possibilem, qui, quantum est de se, est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia; sed determinatur ad hoc vel aliud per species a phantasmatibus abstractas. Est etiam in anima invenire quamdam virtutem activam immaterialem, quae ipsa phantasmata a materialibus conditionibus abstrahit; et hoc pertinet ad intellectum agentem, ut intellectus agens sit quasi quaedam virtus participata ex aliqua substantia superiori, scilicet Deo. Unde philosophus dicit quod intellectus agens est ut habitus quidam et lumen; et in Psal. IV, dicitur: signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine. Et huiusmodi simile quodammodo apparet in animalibus videntibus de nocte, quorum pupillae sunt in potentia ad omnes colores; in quantum nullum colorem habent determinatum in actu, sed per quamdam lucem insitam faciunt quodammodo colores visibiles actu. Now it is not difficult to see how both of these can be present in one and the same substance of the soul: that is, the possible intellect, which is in potency to all intelligible objects, and the agent intellect which makes them actually intelligible; because it is not impossible for a thing to be in potency and in act with respect to one and the same thing in different ways. Therefore, if we consider the phantasms themselves in relation to the human soul, in one respect they are found to be in potency, inasmuch as they are not abstracted from individuating conditions, although capable of being abstracted. In another respect they are found to be in act in relation to the soul, namely, inasmuch as they are [sensible] likenesses of determinate things. Therefore potentiality with respect to phantasms must be found within our soul so far as these phantasms are representative of determinate things. This belongs to the possible intellect which is, by its very nature, in potency to all intelligible objects, but is actuated by this or that object through species abstracted from phantasms. Our soul must also possess some active immaterial power which abstracts the phantasms themselves from material individuating conditions. This belongs to the agent intellect, so that it is, as it were, a power participated from the superior substance, God. Hence the Philosopher says [De Anima, III, 5, 430a 14] that the agent intellect is like a certain habit and light. In the Psalms it is also said: “The light of Thy countenance is signed upon us, O Lord” (Ps. 4:7). Something resembling this in a certain degree is apparent, in animals who see by night. The pupils of their eyes are in potency to every color inasmuch as they have no one determinate color actually, but make colors actually visible in some way by means of a certain innate light.
Quidam vero crediderunt intellectum agentem non esse aliud quam habitum principiorum indemonstrabilium in nobis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia etiam ipsa principia indemonstrabilia cognoscimus abstrahendo a singularibus, ut docet philosophus in I Poster. Unde oportet praeexistere intellectum agentem habitui principiorum sicut causam ipsius; quia vero principia comparantur ad intellectum agentem ut instrumenta quaedam eius, quia per ea, facit alia intelligibilia actu. Indeed, some men thought that the agent intellect does not differ from our habitus of indemonstrable principles. But this cannot be the case, because we certainly know indemonstrable principles by abstracting them from singulars, as the Philosopher teaches in the Posterior Analytics [II, 19, 100b 4]. Consequently the agent intellect must exist prior to the habitus of first indemonstrable principles in order to be the cause of it. Indeed, the principles themselves are related to the agent intellect as certain of its instruments, because the intellect makes things actually intelligible by means of such principles.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi, non aliquando intelligit, aliquando vero non intelligit, non intelligitur de intellectu agente, sed de intellectu in actu. Nam postquam Aristoteles determinavit de intellectu possibili et agente, necessarium fuit ut determinaret de intellectu in actu, cuius primo differentiam ostendit ad intellectum possibilem. Nam intellectus possibilis et res quae intelligitur, non sunt idem; sed intellectus sive scientia in actu est idem rei scitae in actu, sicut et de sensu idem dixerat, quod sensus et sensibile in potentia differunt, sed sensus et sensibile in actu sunt unum et idem. Iterum ostendit ordinem intellectus possibilis ad intellectum in actu: quia in uno et eodem prius est intellectus in potentia quam in actu, non tamen simpliciter; sicut et multoties consuevit hoc dicere de his quae exeunt de potentia in actum. Et postea subdit verbum inductum, in quo ostendit differentiam inter intellectum possibilem et inter intellectum in actu: quia intellectus possibilis quandoque intelligit, et quandoque non; quod non potest dici de intellectu in actu. Et similem differentiam ostendit in III Physic., inter causas in potentia, et causas in actu. 1. The Philosopher’s statement that “the intellect is not at one time knowing and at another not” [De Anima, III, 5, 430a 22] is not understood of the agent intellect, but of the intellect-in-act. For after Aristotle had determined the role of the possible and agent intellect, he had to determine the role of the intellect-in-act. He first distinguishes it in relation to the possible intellect, because the possible intellect and the thing known are not one and the same. However, the intellect or science-in-act is the same as the thing actually known. Aristotle had said the same thing about sense, namely, that sense and what is potentially sensible differ from each other, but that sense and what is actually sensed are one and the same. Secondly, he shows how the possible intellect is related to the intellect-in-act, because in one and the same individual, intellect in potency precedes intellect-in-act. However, it does not precede it absolutely, for he very often uses this manner of speaking concerning things that pass from potentiality to actuality. Then he makes the statement quoted above, in which he shows the difference between the possible intellect and the intellect-in-act, because the possible intellect sometimes understands and sometimes does not, which cannot be said of the intellect-in-act. He points out a similar difference, in the Physics [III, 1, 201a 20] between causes in potency and causes in act.
Ad secundum dicendum quod substantia animae est in potentia et in actu respectu eorumdem phantasmatum, sed non secundum idem, ut supra expositum est. 2. The substance of the soul is in potency and in act with respect to the same phantasms, but not in the same way, as was shown above.
Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus possibilis est in potentia respectu intelligibilium, secundum esse quod habent in phantasmatibus. Et secundum illud idem intellectus agens est actus respectu eorum; tamen alia et alia ratione, ut ostensum est. 3. The possible intellect is in potency with respect to intelligible species, and the agent intellect in act with respect to them, in relation to the existence which such species have in phantasms; but for different reasons, as was shown.
Ad quartum dicendum quod verba illa philosophi, quod hoc solum est separatum et immortale perpetuum, non possunt intelligi de intellectu agente; nam et supra dixerat, quod intellectus possibilis est separatus. Oportet autem quod intelligantur de intellectu in actu secundum contextum superiorum verborum, ut supra dictum est. Intellectus enim in actu comprehendit et intellectum possibilem et intellectum agentem. Et hoc solum animae est separatum et perpetuum et immortale, quod continet intellectum agentem et possibilem; nam ceterae partes animae non sunt sine corpore. 4. Those words of the Philosopher, “This alone is separate, immortal, and perpetual,” cannot be understood to apply to the agent intellect. For Aristotle had also previously stated that the possible intellect is separate. However, they must be understood to apply to the intellect-in-act in view of the context in which they occur, as was shown above (Ans. obj. 1). For intellect-in-act embraces both the possible intellect and the agent intellect. And only that part of the soul which contains the agent and possible intellects is separate, perpetual, and immortal. For the other parts of the soul have no existence without the body.
Ad quintum dicendum quod diversitas complexionum causat facultatem intelligendi vel meliorem vel minus bonam, ratione potentiarum a quibus abstrahit intellectus; quae sunt potentiae utentes organis corporalibus, sicut imaginatio, memoria, et huiusmodi. 5. Diversity of dispositions causes the intellective faculty to understand more or less perfectly by reason of the powers which aid the intellect in abstracting. These are the powers employing corporeal organs, such as imagination, memory, and the like.
Ad sextum dicendum quod licet in anima nostra sit intellectus agens et possibilis, tamen requiritur aliquid extrinsecum ad hoc quod intelligere possimus. Et primo quidem requiruntur phantasmata a sensibilibus accepta, per quae repraesententur intellectui rerum determinatarum similitudines. Nam intellectus agens non est talis actus in quo omnium rerum species determinatae accipi possint ad cognoscendum; sicut nec lumen determinare potest visum ad species determinatas colorum, nisi adsint colores determinantes visum. Ulterius autem, cum posuerimus intellectum agentem esse quamdam virtutem participatam in animabus nostris, velut lumen quoddam, necesse est ponere aliam causam exteriorem a qua illud lumen participetur. Et hanc dicimus Deum, qui interius docet; in quantum huiusmodi lumen animae infundit, et supra huiusmodi lumen naturale addit, pro suo beneplacito, copiosius lumen ad cognoscendum ea ad quae naturalis ratio attingere non potest, sicut est lumen fidei et lumen prophetiae. 6. Although our soul possesses an agent and a possible intellect, nevertheless something extrinsic is required so that we may be able to understand. First of all, indeed, we need phantasms, derived from sensible things, by means of which the likenesses of particular things are presented to the intellect. For the agent intellect is not an act in which the determinate species of all things can be received in order to be known, any more than light can cause sight to apprehend particular kinds of colors, unless those particular kinds of colors are present to sight. Moreover, since we maintained above that the agent intellect is a certain power in which our souls share, as a kind of light, we must maintain that some exterior cause exists from whom such light is participated, and we call this exterior cause, God, who teaches within us inasmuch as He infuses light of this kind into our soul. Because of His munificence He bestows upon us, in addition to this natural light, a richer one in order that we may be, able to know those things which the natural light of reason cannot attain. Such, for instance, is the light of faith and of prophecy.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod colores moventes visum sunt extra animam; sed phantasmata, quae movent intellectum possibilem, sunt nobis intrinseca. Et ideo, licet lux solis exterior sufficiat ad faciendum colores visibiles actu, ad faciendum tamen phantasmata intelligibilia esse actu, requiritur lux interior, quae est lux intellectus agentis. Et praeterea, pars intellectiva animae est perfectior quam sensitiva; unde necessarium est quod magis ei adsint sufficientia principia ad propriam operationem: propter quod et secundum intellectivam partem invenimur et recipere intelligibilia, et abstrahere ea, quasi in nobis existente secundum intellectum virtute activa et passiva; quod circa sensum non accidit. 7. The, colors moving the sense of sight are outside the soul. However, the phantasms which move the possible intellect are within us. Therefore, although the exterior light of the sun is adequate for making colors actually visible, nevertheless in order that phantasms may be made actually intelligible, an interior light is required, and this is the light of the agent intellect. Furthermore, the intellective part of the soul is more perfect than the sensory. Hence it is even more necessary that adequate principles be present to the intellect for the performance of its proper operation. Also, for this reason: it is a matter of experience that by the intellective part of our soul we both receive intelligible species and abstract them, which indicates that there exists in us intellectually not only a passive but also an active power. This is not true in the case of the senses.
Ad octavum dicendum quod licet sit similitudo quaedam intellectus agentis ad artem, non oportet huiusmodi similitudinem quantum ad omnia extendi. 8. Although there is a certain likeness between the agent intellect and an art, the likeness need not hold in all respects.
Ad nonum dicendum quod intellectus agens non sufficit per se ad reducendum intellectum possibilem perfecte in actum, cum non sint in eo determinatae rationes omnium rerum, ut dictum est. Et ideo requiritur ad ultimam perfectionem intellectus possibilis quod uniatur aliqualiter illi agenti in quo sunt rationes omnium rerum, scilicet Deo. 9. The agent intellect is not sufficient of itself to actuate completely the possible intellect, because the determinate natures of all things do not exist in it, as has been explained. Therefore, to acquire complete perfection, the possible intellect needs to be united in a certain way to that Agent in whom the exemplars of all things exist, namely, God.
Ad decimum dicendum quod intellectus agens nobilior est possibili, sicut virtus activa nobilior quam passiva, et magis separatus, secundum quod magis a similitudine materiae recedit; non tamen ita quod sit substantia separata. 10. The agent intellect is nobler than the possible intellect, because an active power is nobler than a passive power. It is also more independent of matter than the possible intellect. inasmuch as it is further removed from any participation in matter. But its independence is not that of a separate substance.
ARTICLE 6
WHETHER THE SOUL IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM

[Summa theol., I, q. 75, a. 5; Contra Gentiles, II, 50; Sent., I dist. 8, q.5, a. 2; II, dist. 17, a. 1, a.2; Quodl., III, q.8, a. 1; IX, q.4, a. 1; De spir. creat., a. 1; a.9, ad 9; De subst. separatis, chap. 7.]
Sexto quaeritur utrum anima composita sit ex materia et forma In the sixth article we examine this question: Whether the soul is composed of matter and form.
Objections.
Et videtur quod sic. Dicit enim Boetius in libro de Trinit.: forma simplex subiectum esse non potest. Sed anima est subiectum, scientiarum scilicet et virtutum. Ergo non est forma simplex; ergo est composita ex materia et forma. 1. It seems that the soul is composed of matter and form. For Boethius says in his book, the De Trinitate: “A simple form cannot be a subject.” But the soul is the subject of sciences and virtues. Therefore the soul is not a form in its entirety (simplex) and, consequently, is composed of matter. and form.
Praeterea, Boetius dicit in libro de Hebdom. Id quod est, participare aliquid potest; ipsum vero esse nihil participat; et pari ratione subiecta participant, non autem formae; sicut album potest aliquid participare praeter albedinem, non autem albedo. Sed anima aliquid participat, ea scilicet quibus informatur anima. Ergo non est forma tantum; est ergo composita ex materia et forma. 2. Further Boethius says in the De hebdomadibus, “Whatever exists, can participate in something else; but the act of existing (esse) itself cannot participate in anything.” For a similar reason, subjects participate in something but forms do not; for example, a white thing can participate in something besides whiteness, but whiteness itself cannot participate in anything. Now the soul participates in something, namely, in those things by which it is informed. Therefore the soul is not a form alone, but is composed of matter and form.
Praeterea, si anima est forma tantum, et est in potentia ad aliquid, maxime videtur quod ipsum esse sit actus eius; non enim ipsa est suum esse. Sed unius simplicis potentiae simplicissimus erit actus. Non ergo poterit esse subiectum alterius nisi ipsius esse. Manifestum est autem quod est aliorum subiectum. Non est ergo substantia simplex, sed composita ex materia et forma. 3. Further, if the soul is a form in its entirety and is in potency to something, it seems that its act of existing (esse) above all is its act, for the soul is not its own act of existing. But act will be the simplest thing belonging to a simple potency. Therefore the soul could not be the subject of anything else than its own act of existing. However, it is evident that it is the subject of other things. Therefore the soul is not a simple substance, but is composed of matter and form.
Praeterea, accidentia formae sunt consequentia totam speciem; accidentia vero materialia, sunt consequentia individuum hoc vel illud; nam forma est principium speciei, materia vero est principium individuationis. Si ergo anima sit forma tantum omnia eius accidentia erunt consequentia totam speciem. Hoc autem patet esse falsum; nam musicum et grammaticum et huiusmodi, non consequuntur totam speciem. Anima ergo non est forma tantum, sed composita ex materia et forma. 4. Further, accidents proceeding from the form belong to the entire species; however, those coming from matter belong to this or to that individual; for the form is the principle of the species, whereas matter is the principle of individuation. Therefore, if the soul is a form alone, all of its accidents will belong to the entire species. This appears to be false, however, because music and grammar and things of this sort do not belong to the entire species. Therefore the soul is not a form alone, but is composed of matter and form.
Praeterea, forma est principium actionis, materia vero principium patiendi. In quocumque ergo est actio et passio, ibi est compositio formae et materiae. Sed in ipsa anima est actio et passio, nam operatio intellectus possibilis est in patiendo; propter quod dicit philosophus, quod intelligere est quoddam pati; operatio autem intellectus agentis est in agendo, facit enim intelligibilia in potentia intelligibilia in actu, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo in anima est compositio formae et materiae. 5. Further, a form is a principle of action, and matter, the principle of passion [i.e., being-acted-upon]. Therefore anything in which there is action and passion is composed of matter and form. But action and passion are found in the soul itself, because the operation of the possible intellect consists in being-acted-upon (patiendo), and for this reason the Philosopher says [De Anima, III, 4, 429b 32] that to understand is to undergo something. The operation of the agent intellect, on the other hand, consists in acting, for it makes the potentially intelligible, actually intelligible, as is said in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 14]. Consequently the soul is composed of form and matter.
Praeterea, in quocumque inveniuntur proprietates materiae, illud oportet esse ex materia compositum. Sed in anima inveniuntur proprietates materiae, scilicet esse in potentia, recipere, subiici, et alia huiusmodi. Ergo anima est composita ex materia et forma. 6. Further, matter must enter into the composition of anything in which the properties of matter are found to exist. But the properties of matter are present in the soul, namely, to be in potency, to receive, to be a subject, and other things of this kind. Therefore the soul is composed of matter and form.
Praeterea, agentium et patientium oportet esse materiam communem, ut patet in I de Gener. Quidquid ergo pati potest ab aliquo materiali, habet in se materiam. Sed anima habet pati ab aliquo materiali, scilicet ab igne Inferni, qui est ignis corporeus, ut Augustinus probat, XXI de Civ. Dei. Ergo anima in se materiam habet. 7. Further, agents and patients must have a common matter,” as is shown in the De generatione et corruptione [I, 7, 324a, 34]. Hence anything that can be acted upon by something material possesses matter. But the soul can be acted upon by something material, namely, by the fire of hell, which is corporeal fire, as Augustine proves in the De civitate Dei [21:10]. Therefore the soul possesses matter.
Praeterea, actio agentis non terminatur ad formam tantum, sed ad compositum ex materia et forma, ut probatur in VII Metaphys. Sed actio agentis, scilicet Dei, terminatur ad animam. Ergo anima est composita ex materia et forma. 8. Further, the action of an agent does not terminate in a form, but in a composite of matter and form, as is shown in the Metaphysics [VIII, 6, 1045b5]. But the action of one agent, namely, God, terminates in the soul. Therefore the soul is composed of matter and form.
Praeterea, illud quod est forma tantum statim est ens et unum; et non indiget aliquo quod faciat ipsum ens et unum, ut dicit philosophus in VIII Metaph. Sed anima indiget aliquo quod faciat ipsam entem et unam, scilicet Deo creante. Ergo anima non est forma tantum. 9. Further, whatever is a form in its entirety, is at once a being and a unity, and does not require anything to make it a being and a unity, as the Philosopher points out in the Metaphysics [VIII, 6, 1045b 5]. The soul, however, requires something which makes it a being and a unity, namely, God, who creates it. Therefore the soul is not a form in its entirety.
Praeterea, agens ad hoc necessarium est ut reducat aliquid de potentia in actum. Sed reduci de potentia in actum competit solum illis in quibus est materia et forma. Si igitur anima non sit composita ex materia et forma non indiget causa agente; quod patet esse falsum. 10. Further, an agent is necessary in order that something may be reduced from potentiality to actuality. But to be brought from potentiality to actuality belongs only to those things in which there is matter and form. Therefore, if the soul is not composed of matter and form, it does not require an efficient cause; which is clearly false.
Praeterea, Alexander dicit in libro de intellectu, quod anima habet intellectum ylealem. Yle autem dicitur prima materia. Ergo in anima est aliquid de prima materia. 11. Further, Alexander says, in the book De intellectu, that the soul has a hyleic intellect. Now “hyle” means prime matter. Therefore the soul contains prime matter as a constituent part.
Praeterea, omne quod est vel est actus purus, vel potentia pura, vel compositum ex potentia et actu. Sed anima non est actus purus, quia hoc solius Dei est; nec est potentia pura, quia sic non differret a prima materia. Ergo est composita ex potentia pura et actu; ergo non est forma tantum, cum forma sit actus. 12. Further, whatever exists, is either pure act, pure potency, or is composed of potency and act. However, the soul is not pure act, because this is characteristic of God alone; nor is the soul pure potentiality, for in that case it would not differ from prime matter. Hence the soul is composed of potency and act, and consequently is not a form in its entirety, because a form is an act.
Praeterea, omne quod individuatur, individuatur ex materia. Sed anima non individuatur ex materia in qua est, scilicet ex corpore; quia perempto corpore cessaret eius individuatio. Ergo individuatur ex materia ex qua. Habet ergo materiam partem sui. 13. Further, whatever is individuated, is individuated by matter. But the soul is not individuated by the matter in which it exists, that is, by the body, because when the body corrupted the individuation of the soul would cease. Therefore the soul is individuated by matter which enters into its constitution, and thus contains matter as an integral part.
Praeterea, agentis et patientis oportet esse aliquid commune, ut patet in I de Gener. Sed anima patitur a sensibilibus, quae sunt materialia; nec est dicere, quod in homine sit alia substantia animae sensibilis et intellectualis. Ergo anima habet aliquid commune cum materialibus; et ita videtur quod in se materiam habeat. 14. Further, an agent and a patient must have something in common, as is shown in the De generatione et corruptione [I, 7, 324a 34]. But the soul is acted upon by sensible things which are material; nor can it be said that the substance of the sentient soul differs from that of the intellective. Consequently the soul has something in common with material things; and thus it seems that it contains matter.
Praeterea, cum anima non sit simplicior quam Angelus, oportet quod sit in genere quasi species, hoc enim Angelo convenit. Sed omne quod est in genere sicut species, videtur esse compositum ex materia et forma; nam genus se habet ut materia, differentia autem ut forma. Ergo anima est composita ex materia et forma. 15. Further, since the soul is not simpler than an angel, it must belong to a genus as a species of that genus, for this is proper to an angel. But whatever belongs to a genus, as one of its species, seems to be composed of matter and form, for a genus has the character of matter, and a specific difference has the character of form. Therefore the soul is composed of matter and form.
Praeterea, forma communis diversificatur in multis per divisionem materiae. Sed intellectualitas est quaedam forma communis non solum animabus, sed etiam Angelis. Ergo oportet quod etiam in Angelis et in animabus sit aliqua materia, per cuius divisionem huiusmodi forma distribuatur in multos. 16. Further, a form common to [several individuals] is multiplied among these individuals as a result of material division. But intellectuality is a form which is common not only to the souls of men, but to the angels as well. Therefore there must be some matter in the angels and in human souls, through whose division a form of this kind is multiplied among many individuals.
Praeterea, omne quod movetur, habet materiam. Sed anima movetur: per hoc enim ostendit Augustinus, quod anima non est divinae naturae, quia est mutationi subiecta. Anima ergo est composita ex materia et forma. 17. Further, whatever is moved contains matter. But the soul is moved, for Augustine shows [De spir. et an., 40], in this way, that the nature of the soul is not divine, because it is subject to change. Therefore the soul is composed of matter and form.
Sed contra, omne compositum ex materia et forma habet formam. Si igitur anima est composita ex materia et forma, anima habet formam. Sed anima est forma. Ergo forma habet formam; quod videtur impossibile, quia sic esset ire in infinitum. On the contrary, everything composed of matter and form, has a form. Therefore, if the soul is composed of matter and form, the soul itself has a form. But the soul is a form. Therefore a form has a form; but this is evidently impossible, because it would result in an infinite regression.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod circa hanc quaestionem diversimode aliqui opinantur. Quidam dicunt quod anima, et omnino omnis substantia praeter Deum, est composita ex materia et forma. Cuius quidem positionis primus auctor invenitur Avicebron auctor libri fontis vitae. Huius autem ratio est, quae etiam in obiiciendo est tacta, quod oportet in quocumque inveniuntur proprietates materiae, inveniri materiam. Unde cum in anima inveniantur proprietates materiae, quae sunt recipere, subiici, esse in potentia, et alia huiusmodi; arbitratur esse necessarium quod in anima sit materia. I answer: There are different opinions about this question. Some say that the soul and, indeed, every substance, with the exception of God, is composed of matter and form. The first to maintain this position is Avicebron, the author of the Fons vitae. The reason for this position, which is also mentioned in one of the objections (Obj. 6), is this: that matter is found wherever the properties of matter exist. Wherefore, since the properties of matter are found in the soul, namely, to receive, to be in potency, and other things of this kind, Avicebron is of the opinion that there must be matter in the soul. But this argument is silly, and the position itself is impossible.
Sed haec ratio frivola est, et positio impossibilis. Debilitas autem huius rationis apparet ex hoc, quod recipere et subiici et alia huiusmodi non secundum eamdem rationem conveniunt animae et materiae primae. Nam materia prima recipit aliquid cum transmutatione et motu. Et quia omnis transmutatio et motus reducitur ad motum localem, sicut ad primum et communiorem, ut probatur in VIII Physic.; relinquitur quod materia in illis tantum invenitur in quibus est potentia ad ubi. Huiusmodi autem sunt solum corporalia, quae loco circumscribuntur. Unde materia non invenitur nisi in rebus corporalibus, secundum quod philosophi de materia sunt locuti; nisi aliquis materiam sumere velit aequivoce. Anima autem non recipit cum motu et transmutatione, immo per separationem a motu et a rebus mobilibus: secundum quod dicitur in III Physic. quod in quiescendo fit anima sciens et prudens. Unde etiam philosophus dicit, III de anima, quod intelligere dicitur pati alio modo quam sit in rebus corporalibus passio. Si quis ergo concludere velit animam esse ex materia compositam per hoc quod recipit vel patitur, manifeste ex aequivocatione decipitur. Sic ergo manifestum est rationem praedictam esse frivolam. Now the weakness of this argument become’s apparent if we consider that to receive, to be a subject, and other things of this sort, are not found in the soul and in prime matter in the same specific way. For prime matter is actuated by means of change and motion, and since every change and motion may be reduced to local motion, as the primary and most universal type of motion, as is proved in the Physics [VIII, 7, 260b 6], it follows that matter is present only in those things in which there is potency to place (ab ubi). Moreover, things of this kind, which are circumscribed by place alone, are corporeal. Hence, in accordance with the way in which the philosophers have spoken about matter, matter is present only in corporeal things; unless, of course, someone wishes to employ matter in an equivocal sense. The soul, however, does not receive something by means of motion and change, but, on the contrary, by being separated from motion and from movable things. Accordingly, it is said in the Physics [VII, 3, 247b 10] that the soul becomes cognitive and possesses prudence when at rest. Wherefore the Philosopher also states, in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 30] that intellection is referred to as a passion, but is a passion of a different nature from that present in corporeal things. Therefore, if anyone wishes to conclude that the soul is composed of matter because it is receptive or is acted upon, he is clearly deceived by an equivocation. Consequently it is evident that the aforesaid argument is foolish.
Quod etiam positio sit impossibilis, multipliciter manifestum esse potest. Primo quidem, quia forma materiae adveniens constituit speciem. Si ergo anima sit ex materia et forma composita, ex ipsa unione formae ad materiam animae, constituetur quaedam species in rerum natura. Quod autem per se habet speciem, non unitur alteri ad speciei constitutionem, nisi alterum ipsorum corrumpatur aliquo modo; sicut elementa uniuntur ad componendam speciem mixti. Non igitur anima uniretur corpori ad constituendam humanam speciem; sed tota species humana consisteret in anima: quod patet esse falsum; quia si corpus non pertineret ad speciem hominis, accidentaliter animae adveniret. Moreover, it can be shown in several ways that this position is impossible. First, for this reason, that when a form accrues to matter, it constitutes a species. Therefore, if the soul is composed of matter and form, a certain species will be established in the natural order, as a result of the union itself of the form and matter of the soul. However, a thing which possesses a specific nature in its own right, is not united to some other thing in order to constitute a species, unless each is corrupted in some manner: just as, for example, the elements are united in order to constitute the species of the mixed bodies. The soul, therefore, is not united to the body in order to constitute the human species, but the complete human species is comprised of the soul alone. This is clearly false, for if the body does not belong to the human species, it is joined to the soul in an accidental way.
Non autem potest dici, quod secundum hoc nec manus est composita ex materia et forma, quia non habet completam speciem, sed est pars speciei; manifestum est enim quod materia manus non seorsum sua forma perficitur; sed una forma est quae simul perficit materiam totius corporis et omnium partium eius; quod non posset dici de anima, si esset ex materia et forma composita. Nam prius oporteret materiam animae ordine naturae perfici per suam formam, et postmodum corpus perfici per animam. Nisi forte quis diceret, quod materia animae esset aliqua pars materiae corporalis; quod est omnino absurdum. Moreover, it cannot be said, according to this, that the hand is not composed of matter and form because it does not have a complete species of its own, but is a part of a species; for it is evident that the matter of the hand is not perfected separately by its own form, but that there is one form which perfects at the same time the matter of the whole body and that of all its parts. This could not be said of the soul if it were composed of matter and form. For in that case the matter of the soul would first have to be perfected in the order of nature by its own form, and the body in turn perfected by the soul; unless, perhaps, someone might care to say that the soul’s matter is some part of corporeal matter, which is utterly absurd.
Item positio prima ostenditur impossibilis ex hoc quod in omni composito ex materia et forma materia se habet ut recipiens esse, non autem ut quo aliquid est; hoc enim proprium est formae. Si ergo anima sit composita ex materia et forma, impossibile est quod anima se tota sit principium formale essendi corpori. Non igitur anima erit forma corporis, sed aliquid animae. Quidquid autem est illud quod est forma huius corporis, est anima. Non igitur illud quod ponebatur compositum ex materia et forma, est anima, sed solum forma eius. The position of Avicebron is also shown to be impossible for this reason, that in everything composed of matter and form, matter occupies the position of that which receives existence, and not that by which something exists; for this is peculiar to the form alone. Therefore, if the soul is composed of matter and form, it is impossible for the entire soul to be the formal principle which gives to the body its act of existing. The whole soul, therefore, will not be the form of the body, but only a part of the soul will be so. The soul, however, is certainly that entity which is the form of the body. Therefore the soul is not that thing which was considered to be a composite of matter and form, but the form of it alone.
Apparet etiam hoc esse impossibile alia ratione. Si enim anima est composita ex materia et forma, et iterum corpus: utrumque eorum habebit per se suam unitatem; et ita necessarium erit ponere aliquid tertium quo uniatur anima corpori. Et hoc quidam sequentes praedictam positionem concedunt. Dicunt enim, animam uniri corpori mediante luce: vegetabile quidem mediante luce caeli siderei; sensibile vero mediante luce caeli crystallini; rationale vero mediante luce caeli Empirei. Quae omnino fabulosa sunt. Oportet enim immediate animam uniri corpori sicut actum potentiae, sicut patet in VIII metaphysicorum. This position [of Avicebron] is seen to be impossible also for another reason. For if the soul is composed of matter and form, and the body as well, each of them will have its unity in virtue of itself, and then it will be necessary to admit that some third entity exists which unites the soul to the body. Indeed, some of the adherents of the aforesaid position do maintain this. For they say that a soul is united to its body by the instrumentality of light; the vegetal soul by the mediating light of the sidereal heaven, the sentient soul by the mediating light of the crystalline heaven, and the rational soul by the mediating light of the empyrean heaven. These explanations are entirely fictitious, because the soul must be united to the body without any intermediary, just as act is to potency, as is shown in the Metaphysics [VIII, 6, 1045b 16].
Unde manifestum fit quod anima non potest esse composita ex materia et forma; non tamen excluditur quin in anima sit actus et potentia; nam potentia et actus non solum in rebus mobilibus, sed etiam in immutabilibus inveniuntur, et sunt communiora, sicut dicit philosophus in VIII Metaph., cum materia non sit in rebus immobilibus. Quomodo autem in anima actus et potentia inveniantur sic considerandum est ex materialibus ad immaterialia procedendo. In substantiis enim ex materia et forma compositis tria invenimus, scilicet materiam et formam et ipsum esse. Cuius quidem principium est forma; nam materia ex hoc quod recipit formam, participat esse. Sic igitur esse consequitur ipsam formam. Nec tamen forma est suum esse, cum sit eius principium. Et licet materia non pertingat ad esse nisi per formam, forma tamen in quantum est forma, non indiget materia ad suum esse, cum ipsam formam consequatur esse; sed indiget materia, cum sit talis forma, quae per se non subsistit. Nihil ergo prohibet esse aliquam formam a materia separatam, quae habeat esse, et esse sit in huiusmodi forma. Ipsa enim essentia formae comparatur ad esse sicut potentia ad proprium actum. It becomes evident, then, that the soul cannot be composed of matter and form. However, act and potency are not excluded from the soul, for potency and act are found not only in immovable things, but in movable things as well; and they are more common here, as the Philosopher points out in the Metaphysics [VIII, 5, 1044b 26], because matter itself may not exist in immovable things. Now the manner in which act and potency are found in the soul must be discovered by proceeding from material things to immaterial ones. For we observe three things in substances composed of matter and form: namely, matter, form, and the act of existing itself, the principle of which is the form; for matter receives an act of existing because it receives a form. Therefore a thing’s act of existing is the natural effect of the form itself of that thing. However, the form is not identical with its own act of existing, because the form is the principle of that act of existing. And although matter receives its act of existing only through some form, yet a form as such does not stand in need of matter in order to exist, because the act of existing is the natural effect of the form itself. However, a form requires matter in order to exist when it is a form of that specific type which does not subsist of itself. Consequently a form having its act of existing in itself is not prevented in any way from existing apart from matter and the act of existing is found in a form of this kind. For the very essence of a form is related to its act of existing as a potency is to its proper act.
Et ita in formis per se subsistentibus invenitur et potentia et actus, in quantum ipsum esse est actus formae subsistentis, quae non est suum esse. Si autem aliqua res sit quae sit suum esse, quod proprium Dei est, non est ibi potentia et actus, sed actus purus. Et hinc est quod Boetius dicit in Lib. de hebdomadibus quod in aliis quae sunt post Deum, differt esse et quod est; vel, sicut quidam dicunt, quod est et quo est. Nam ipsum esse est quo aliquid est, sicut cursus est quo aliquis currit. Cum igitur anima sit quaedam forma per se subsistens, potest esse in ea compositio actus et potentiae, id est esse et quod est, non autem compositio materiae et formae. It is in this way, then, that both potency and act are found in forms which subsist of themselves, inasmuch as the act of existing itself is the act of a subsisting form which is not its own act of existing. Moreover, if there is a thing which is its own act of existing, and this is proper to God alone, it does not contain potency and act, but is pure act. It is for this reason that Boethius says, in his De hebdomadibus, that in the beings which are beneath God in perfection, the act of existing (esse) and quiddity (quod est) are really distinct; or as some say, that which is (quod est) and that by which it is (quo est) differ from each other.” For the act of existing itself of a thing is that by which a thing exists; just as running is that by which someone runs. Consequently, since the soul is a certain form which subsists of itself, it can be composed of act and potency, that is, of an act of existing and an essence, but not of form and matter.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Boetius loquitur ibi de forma quae est omnino simplex, scilicet de divina essentia; in qua cum nihil sit de potentia, sed sit actus purus, omnino subiectum esse non potest. Aliae autem formae simplices, etsi sint subsistentes, ut Angeli et anima, possunt tamen esse subiecta secundum quod habent aliquid de potentia, ex qua competit eis ut aliquid recipere possint. 1. Boethius is speaking here of that form which is absolutely simple, namely, of the divine essence itself, which cannot be a subject in any way whatever because it contains no potency, but is pure act. However, other simple forms such as the angels and the human soul, even though they are subsisting beings, can, nevertheless, be subjects inasmuch as they possess some degree of potentiality which enables them to receive new perfection.
Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsum esse est actus ultimus qui participabilis est ab omnibus, ipsum autem nihil participat; unde si sit aliquid quod sit ipsum esse subsistens, sicut de Deo dicimus, nihil participare dicimus. Non autem est similis ratio de aliis formis subsistentibus, quas necesse est participare ad ipsum ut potentiam ad actum; et ita, cum sint quodammodo in potentia, possunt aliquid aliud participare. 2. The act of existing itself is the highest act in which all things are capable of participating, but the act of existing itself does not participate in anything. Therefore, if there is a being which is itself a subsisting act of existing (ipsum esse subsistens), just as we speak of God, we say that it does not participate in anything. However, this is not true of other subsisting forms which necessarily participate in the act of existing itself, and which are related to it as potency is to act; and thus, since these forms are in potentiality in some measure, they can participate in something else.
Ad tertium dicendum quod forma aliqua non solum comparatur ad ipsum esse ut potentia ad actum, sed etiam nihil prohibet unam formam comparari ad aliam ut potentiam ad actum, sicut diaphanum ad lumen, et humorem ad calorem. Unde si diaphaneitas esset forma separata per se subsistens, non solum esset susceptiva ipsius esse, sed etiam luminis. Et similiter nihil prohibet formas subsistentes, quae sunt Angeli et animae, non solum esse susceptiva ipsius esse, sed etiam aliarum perfectionum. Sed tamen quanto huiusmodi formae subsistentes perfectiores fuerint, tanto paucioribus participant ad sui perfectionem, utpote in essentia suae naturae plus perfectionis habentes. 3. Not only is a form related to its act of existing as potency is to act, but, indeed, nothing prevents one from being related to another as potency is to act; just as the transparent medium is related to light, and light in turn to color. Hence, if transparency were a separate form subsisting in virtue of its own nature, it would be receptive not only of an act of existing, but of light as well. Similarly, nothing prevents subsisting forms like the angels and the soul from receiving not only the act of existing itself, but other perfections as well. However, the more perfect subsisting forms of this kind are, the less do they participate in their perfection, seeing that they have more of that perfection in the very principles of their nature.
Ad quartum dicendum quod licet animae humanae sint formae tantum, sunt tamen formae individuatae in corporibus, et multiplicatae numero secundum multiplicationem corporum; unde nihil prohibet quin aliqua accidentia consequantur eas secundum quod sunt individuatae, quae non consequuntur totam speciem. 4. Although human souls are forms in their entirety, nevertheless they are forms individuated in bodies, and are multiplied numerically because of the multiplication of bodies. Consequently, nothing prevents certain accidents which do not belong to the entire species from belonging to these forms inasmuch as they are individuated.
Ad quintum dicendum quod passio quae est in anima, quae attribuitur intellectui possibili, non est de genere passionum quae attribuuntur materiae; sed aequivoce dicitur passio utrobique, ut patet per philosophum in III de anima; cum passio intellectus possibilis consistat in receptione, secundum quod recepit aliquid immaterialiter. Et similiter actio intellectus agentis, non est eiusdem modi cum actione formarum naturalium. Nam actio intellectus agentis consistit in abstrahendo a materia, actio vero agentium naturalium in imprimendo formas in materia. Unde ex huiusmodi actione et passione quae invenitur in anima non sequitur quod anima sit composita ex materia et forma. 5. The sort of passion which is in the soul, and which is attributed to the possible intellect, does not belong to the same genus as the passions attributed to matter; for in these two cases matter is spoken of equivocally, as is evident from what the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 4, 430a 3] because the passion of the possible intellect consists in a reception inasmuch as it receives something immaterially. In like manner, the action of the agent intellect is not of the same mode as the action of natural forms, for the action of the agent intellect consists in abstracting forms from matter, whereas the action of natural agents consists in impressing forms on matter. Consequently it does not follow, from the kind of action and passion present in the soul, that the soul is composed of matter and form.
Ad sextum dicendum quod recipere et subiici, et alia huiusmodi, alio modo animae conveniunt quam materiae primae; unde non sequitur quod proprietates materiae in anima inveniantur. 6. To receive, to be a subject, and other things of this kind, are proper to the soul in a different way from the way they are to prime matter. Therefore it does not follow that the properties of matter are found in the soul.
Ad septimum dicendum quod licet ignis Inferni, a quo anima patitur, sit materialis et corporalis; non tamen anima patitur ab ipso materialiter, per modum scilicet corporum materialium; sed patitur ab eo afflictionem spiritualem, secundum quod est instrumentum divinae iustitiae iudicantis. 7. Although the fire of hell, by which the soul is acted upon, is material and corporeal, nevertheless the soul is not acted upon by it in a material way, as material bodies themselves are, but undergoes a spiritual affliction by means of it, inasmuch as it is the instrument of the judgment of divine justice.
Ad octavum dicendum quod actio generantis terminatur ad compositum ex materia et forma, quia generans naturale non nisi ex materia generat; actio vero creantis non est ex materia, unde non oportet quod actio creantis terminetur ad compositum ex materia et forma. 8. The action of a generator terminates in something composed of matter and form, because a natural generator only produces something from matter; creative activity, however, does not depend upon matter. Consequently, creative activity does not necessarily have to terminate in a composite of matter and form.
Ad nonum dicendum quod ea quae sunt formae subsistentes, ad hoc quod sint unum et ens, non requirunt causam formalem, quia ipsae sunt formae; habent tamen causam exteriorem agentem, quae dat eis esse. 9. Those things which are subsisting forms, in that each is a unity and a being, do not require a formal cause, because they themselves are forms. However, they do require an external cause which gives them existence.
Ad decimum dicendum quod agens per motum reducit aliquid de potentia in actum; agens autem sine motu non reducit aliquid de potentia in actum, sed facit esse actu quod secundum naturam est in potentia ad esse, et huiusmodi agens est creans. 10. An agent, by its motion, brings something from potentiality to act. However, an agent that acts without any motion does not bring something from potentiality to actuality, but gives actual existence to what by nature is potentially existing. Creating is action of this kind.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod intellectus ylealis, id est materialis, nominatur a quibusdam intellectus possibilis, non quia sit forma materialis, sed quia habet similitudinem cum materia, in quantum est in potentia ad formas intelligibiles, sicut materia ad formas sensibiles. 11. The hyleic intellect, that is, the material intellect, is the name which some men give to the possible intellect, not because it is a material form, but because it bears some likeness to matter inasmuch as it is in potency to intelligible forms, as matter is to sensible forms.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod licet anima non sit actus purus nec potentia pura, non tamen sequitur quod sit composita ex materia et forma, ut ex dictis manifestum est. 12. Although the soul is neither pure act nor pure potency, yet it does not follow that it is composed of matter and form, as was shown above (in the Answer to this Art.).
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod anima non individuatur per materiam ex qua sit, sed secundum habitudinem ad materiam in qua est: quod qualiter possit esse, in quaestionibus praecedentibus manifestum est. 13. The soul is not individuated by any matter of which it is composed, but by reason of its relationship to the matter in which it exists. How this is possible was shown in the preceding questions.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod anima sensitiva non patitur a sensibilibus sed coniunctum; sentire enim, quod est pati quoddam, non est animae tantum sed organi animati. 14. The sensitive soul is not acted upon by sensible things, but the soul conjointly with the body; for sensing, which is to undergo something, does not belong to the soul alone, but to the animated organ.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod anima non est in genere proprie quasi species, sed quasi pars speciei humanae; unde non sequitur quod sit ex materia et forma composita. 15. The soul does not belong properly to a genus as a species thereof, but as a part of the human species. Therefore it does not follow that it is composed of matter and form.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod intelligibilitas non convenit multis, sicut una forma speciei distributa in multos secundum divisionem materiae, cum sit forma spiritualis et immaterialis; sed magis diversificatur secundum diversitatem formarum; sive sint formae differentes specie, sicut homo et Angelus, sive sint differentes numero solo, sicut animae diversorum hominum. 16. Intelligibility does not belong to many beings, as though it were one specific form divided among many because of a division of matter, for it is a spiritual and immaterial form; rather is it diversified because of a diversity of forms, whether the forms be specifically different, like the soul of a man and an angel, or numerically different only, like the souls of different men.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod anima et Angeli dicuntur spiritus mutabiles, prout possunt mutari secundum electionem; quae quidem mutatio est de operatione in operationem: ad quam mutationem non requiritur materia; sed ad mutationes naturales, quae sunt de forma ad formam, vel de loco ad locum. 17. The soul and an angel are called changeable spirits inasmuch as they can be changed by choice; which change, indeed, is from one operation to another. Matter is not required for this kind of change, but only for natural changes, which are changes from one form to another, or from one place to another.
ARTICLE 7
WHETHER THE ANGEL AND THE SOUL ARE OF DIFFERENT SPECIES

[Summa theol., I, q. 75, a. 7; Contra Gentiles, II, 94; Sent., II, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 6.]
Septimo quaeritur utrum Angelus et anima differant specie In the seventh article we examine this question: Whether the angel and the soul are of different species.
Objections.
Et videtur quod non. Quorum enim eadem est operatio propria et naturalis, illa sunt eadem secundum speciem; quia per operationem natura rei cognoscitur. Sed animae et Angeli est eadem operatio propria et naturalis, scilicet intelligere. Ergo anima et Angelus sunt eiusdem speciei. 1. It seems that they are not. For things which possess the same proper and natural operation have the same species, because the nature of a thing is known by its operations. Now the same proper and natural operation of intellection belongs to the soul and to the angel. Consequently the soul and the angel are of the same species.
Sed dicebat quod intelligere animae est cum discursu, intelligere vero Angeli est sine discursu; et sic non est eadem operatio secundum speciem animae et Angeli. —Sed contra, diversarum operationum secundum speciem non est eadem potentia. Sed nos per eamdem potentiam, scilicet per intellectum possibilem, intelligimus quaedam sine discursu, scilicet prima principia; quaedam vero cum discursu, scilicet conclusiones. Ergo intelligere cum discursu et sine discursu non diversificant speciem. 2. But it will be said that the soul’s act of understanding is discursive whereas the angel’s is not. Thus the [proper] operation of the soul and that of the angel are not specifically the same. On the other hand, operations which are specifically diverse are not operations of the same power. But by one and the same power, that is, the possible intellect, we understand certain things without discourse, namely, first principles, and understand certain other things discursively, namely, conclusions. Hence understanding discursively and understanding without discourse do not diversify species.
Praeterea, intelligere cum discursu et sine discursu videntur differre sicut esse in motu et esse in quiete: nam discursus est quidam motus intellectus de uno in aliud. Sed esse in motu et quiete non diversificant speciem; nam motus reducitur ad illud genus in quo est terminus motus ut dicit Commentator in III Physic. Unde et philosophus ibidem dicit quod tot sunt species motus, quot et species entis sunt, scilicet terminantis motum. Ergo nec intelligere cum discursu et sine discursu differunt secundum speciem. 3. Further, to understand discursively and to do so without discourse, are seen to differ as being-in-motion differs from being-at-rest, for discourse is a certain movement of the intellect from one thing to another. But to be in motion and to be at rest do not differ specifically, because a motion belongs to that genus wherein the termination of the motion is found, as the Commentator says in the Physics [III, 1]. Hence the Philosopher also says, in the same work [III, 1, 201a 8], that “there are as many species of motion as there are species of being,” that is, terminations of motion. Consequently, to understand discursively and to do so without discourse do not differ specifically from each other.
Praeterea, sicut Angeli intelligunt res in verbo, ita et animae beatorum. Sed cognitio quae est in verbo est sine discursu; unde Augustinus dicit, XV de Trin. quod in patria non erunt cogitationes volubiles. Non ergo differt anima ab Angelo per intelligere cum discursu et sine discursu. 4. Further, as the angels understand things in the Word, so also do the souls of the blessed. But the knowledge contained in the Word is not discursive. Hence Augustine says, in the De Trinitate,” that there will be no discursive knowledge in heaven. Therefore the soul does not differ from an angel because the former understands discursively, the latter without discourse.
Praeterea, omnes Angeli non conveniunt in specie, ut a multis ponitur; et tamen omnes Angeli intelligunt sine discursu. Non ergo intelligere cum discursu et sine discursu facit diversitatem speciei in substantiis intellectualibus. 5. Further, all angels are not specifically the same as many maintain. But every angel understands without discourse. Therefore to understand discursively and to do so without discourse do not cause specific diversity in the case of intellectual substances.
Sed dicebat quod etiam Angelorum alii perfectius aliis intelligunt. —Sed contra, magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed intelligere perfectius et minus perfecte non differunt nisi per magis et minus. Ergo Angeli non differunt secundum speciem per hoc quod magis perfecte vel minus perfecte intelligunt. 6. But it must be said too that some angels understand more perfectly than others. On the other hand, more and less do not diversify species. But to understand more perfectly and to do so less perfectly, differ only in terms of more and less. Therefore angels do not differ in species because some understand more perfectly, others less perfectly.
Praeterea, omnes animae humanae sunt eiusdem speciei, non tamen omnes aequaliter intelligunt. Non ergo est differentia speciei in substantiis intellectualibus per hoc quod est perfectius aut minus perfecte intelligere. 7. Further, all human souls are of the same species. However, all do not understand equally well. Therefore intellectual substances do not differ specifically from one another because the act of understanding of one is more perfect than that of another.
Praeterea, anima humana dicitur intelligere discurrendo, per hoc quod intelligit causam per effectum et e converso. Sed hoc etiam contingit Angelis: dicitur enim in libro de causis, quod intelligentia intelligit quod est supra se, quia est causatum ab ea; et intelligit quod est sub se, quia est causa eius. Ergo non differt Angelus ab anima per hoc quod est intelligere cum discursu et sine discursu. 8. Further, the human soul is said to understand discursively, in view of the fact that it understands a cause through its effect, and vice versa. But this also occurs in angels, for it is said in the book De causis [VIII], that an intelligence is cognizant of the being that is above it, because it is caused by that being. It also knows the being beneath it because it is the cause of this being. Hence the angel does not differ specifically from the soul because the latter understands discursively and the former without discourse.
Praeterea, quaecumque perficiuntur eisdem perfectionibus videntur esse eadem secundum speciem: nam proprius actus in propria potentia fit. Sed Angelus et anima perficiuntur eisdem perfectionibus, scilicet gratia, gloria et caritate. Ergo sunt eiusdem speciei. 9. Further, things perfected by the same perfections evidently belong to the same species, for a particular actuality perfects a particular potency. But the angel and the soul are perfected by the same perfections, namely, grace, glory, and charity. Therefore they are specifically the same.
Praeterea, quorum est idem finis videtur esse eadem species: nam unumquodque ordinatur ad finem per suam formam, quae est principium speciei. Sed Angeli et animae est idem finis, scilicet beatitudo aeterna; ut patet per id quod dicitur Matth. XX, quod filii resurrectionis erunt sicut Angeli in caelo; et Gregorius dicit quod animae assumuntur ad ordines Angelorum. Ergo Angelus et anima sunt eiusdem speciei. 10. Further, things having the same end are seen to be specifically the same, for a thing is directed to its end by its form, which is the principle of its species. But the end of the angel and that of the soul is the same, namely, eternal beatitude, as is clear from the statement that the children of the resurrection shall be as the angels in heaven (Matt. 22:30). Gregory also says that souls are elevated to the ranks of the angels [In Evang., II, 34]. Therefore the angel and the soul are specifically the same.
Praeterea, si Angelus et anima specie differunt, oportet quod Angelus sit superior anima in ordine naturae; et sic erit medius inter animam et Deum. Sed inter mentem nostram et Deum non est medium, sicut Augustinus dicit. Ergo Angelus et anima non differunt specie. 11. Further, if the angel and the soul differ specifically, the angel must be superior to the soul in the order of nature, and so will be midway between the soul and God. But there is nothing midway between our soul and God, as Augustine says [De Trin., XV, 1]. Consequently the angel and the soul are not specifically diverse.
Praeterea, impressio eiusdem imaginis in diversis non diversificat speciem; imago enim Herculis in auro et in argento sunt eiusdem speciei. Sed tam in anima quam in Angelo est imago Dei. Ergo Angelus et anima non differunt specie. 12. Further, impressions of the same image in different individuals are not thereby made specifically diverse, for the image of Hercules in gold and that in silver are specifically the same. Now the image of God is present in the soul and in the angel as well. Therefore the angel and the soul do not differ specifically.
Praeterea, quorum est eadem definitio, est eadem species. Sed definitio Angeli convenit animae; dicit enim Damascenus, quod Angelus est substantia incorporea, semper mobilis, arbitrio libera, Deo ministrans; gratia, non natura, immobilitatem suscipiens. Haec autem omnia animae humanae conveniunt. Ergo anima et Angelus sunt eiusdem speciei. 13. Further, things having the same definition are specifically the same. But the definition of the angel is the same as that of the soul, for Damascene says [De fide orth., II, 3] that an angel is “an incorporeal substance always moved by free choice, ministering to God by grace, not by nature, and remaining unchanged.” Now this is proper to every human soul. Consequently the soul and the angel are specifically the same.
Praeterea, quaecumque conveniunt in ultima differentia, sunt eadem specie: quia ultima differentia est constitutiva speciei. Sed Angelus et anima conveniunt in ultima differentia: in hoc, scilicet, quod est intellectuale esse; quod oportet esse ultimam differentiam, cum nihil sit nobilius in natura animae vel Angeli: semper enim ultima differentia est completissima. Ergo Angelus et anima non differunt specie. 14. Further, things agreeing in an ultimate difference are specifically the same, because an ultimate difference determines the species. But the angel and the soul share a common ultimate difference, namely, the possession of intellectual being. This must be an ultimate difference, because there is nothing nobler than this in the nature of the soul or in that of the angel, for an ultimate difference is always most complete. Therefore the angel and the soul do not differ specifically.
Praeterea, ea quae non sunt in specie, non possunt specie differre. Sed anima non est in specie, sed magis est pars speciei. Ergo non potest specie differre ab Angelo. 15. Further, things not found in a species, cannot differ specifically. Now the soul is not found in a species, rather is it part of a species. Hence it cannot differ specifically from an angel.
Praeterea, definitio proprie competit speciei. Ea ergo quae non sunt definibilia, non videntur esse in specie. Sed Angelus et anima non sunt definibilia, cum non sint composita ex materia et forma, ut supra ostensum est; in omni enim definitione est aliquid ut materia, et aliquid ut forma, ut patet per philosophum in VII Metaph.: ubi ipse dicit quod si species rerum essent sine materia, ut Plato posuit, non essent definibiles. Ergo Angelus et anima non proprie possunt dici specie differre. 16. Further, the definition coincides expressly with the species. Consequently things not definable apparently do not exist in a species. But the angel and the soul are not definable, because they are not composed of matter and form, as has been shown above (Art. 2). For in every definition there is something like matter and something like form, as is evident from what the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics [VII, 6, 1031b4] where he himself points out that, if the species of things were devoid of matter, as Plato held, they would not be definable. Therefore the angel and the soul cannot properly be said to differ in species.
Praeterea, omnis species constat ex genere et differentia. Genus autem et differentia in diversis fundantur; sicut genus hominis, quod est animal, in natura sensitiva; et differentia eius, quae est rationale, in natura intellectiva. In Angelo autem et anima non sunt aliqua diversa super quae genus et differentia fundari possint; essentia enim eorum est simplex forma, esse autem eorum nec genus nec differentia esse potest. Philosophus enim probat in III Metaph., quod ens nec est genus nec differentia. Ergo Angelus et anima non habent genus et differentiam, et ita non possunt specie differre. 17. Further, every species is comprised of a genus and a [specific] difference. Now genus and difference have their foundation in different things. For instance, the genus of man, which is “animal,” has its foundation in his sensory nature, and his difference, which is “rational,” is rooted in his intellective nature. However, in the angel and the soul there are no diversities on which genus and difference can be based, because their essence is constituted of form alone. Furthermore, their act of existing can be neither a genus nor a difference, for the Philosopher proves in the Metaphysics [III, 3, 998b 20] that the act of existing is neither a genus nor a species. Consequently the angel and the soul have neither a genus nor a specific difference, and so cannot differ specifically.
Praeterea, quaecumque differunt specie, differunt per differentias contrarias. Sed in substantiis immaterialibus non est aliqua contrarietas: quia contrarietas est principium corruptionis. Ergo Angelus et anima non differunt specie. 18. Further things differing specifically, differ through contrary differences. But there is no contrariety in immaterial substances, for contrariety is the principle of corruption. Hence the angel and the soul do not differ specifically.
Praeterea, Angelus et anima praecipue differre videntur per hoc quod Angelus non unitur corpori, anima vero unitur. Sed hoc non potest facere animam differre specie ab Angelo: corpus enim comparatur ad animam ut materia; materia vero non dat speciem formae, sed magis e converso. Nullo igitur modo Angelus et anima differunt specie. 19. Further, the angel and the soul are seen to differ above all because the angel is not united to a body, whereas the soul is. But this cannot make the soul differ specifically from the angel, since the body is related to the soul as matter, and matter does not give species to form, but rather the reverse. Therefore the angel and the soul do not differ specifically in any way whatever.
Sed contra, ea quae non differunt specie, sed numero, non differunt nisi per materiam. Sed Angelus et anima non habent materiam, ut ex superiori quaestione manifestatur. Ergo si Angelus et anima non differunt specie, etiam numero non differunt; quod patet esse falsum. Relinquitur ergo quod differunt specie. On the contrary, things differing not specifically, but numerically, differ only because of matter. But the angel and the soul do not have matter, as is clear from the preceding question. Therefore, if the angel and the soul do not differ specifically, neither do they differ numerically; which is evidently false. Therefore it follows that they differ specifically.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod quidam dicunt animam humanam et Angelos eiusdem esse speciei. Et hoc videtur primo posuisse Origenes: volens enim vitare antiquorum haereticorum errores, qui diversitatem rerum diversis attribuebant principiis, diversitate boni et mali introducentes, posuit omnium rerum diversitatem ex libero arbitrio processisse. Dixit enim, quod Deus fecit omnes creaturas rationales a principio aequales; quarum quaedam Deo adhaerentes, in melius profecerunt secundum modum adhaesionis ad Deum; quaedam vero a Deo per liberum arbitrium recedentes, in deterius ceciderunt secundum quantitatem recessus a Deo. Et sic quaedam earum sunt incorporatae corporibus caelestibus, quaedam vero corporibus humanis, quaedam vero usque ad malignitatem Daemonum perversae sunt: cum tamen ex suae creationis principio essent omnes uniformes. Sed quantum ex eius positione videri potest, Origenes attendit ad singularum creaturarum bonum, praetermissa consideratione totius. Sapiens tamen artifex in dispositione partium non considerat solum bonum huius partis aut illius, sed multo magis bonum totius; unde aedificator non facit omnes partes domus aeque pretiosas, sed magis et minus secundum quod congruit ad bonam dispositionem domus. Et similiter in corpore animalis non omnes partes habent oculi claritatem, quia esset animal imperfectum; sed est diversitas in partibus animalis, ut animal possit esse perfectum. Ita etiam Deus secundum suam sapientiam non omnia produxit aequalia, sic enim imperfectum esset universum, cui multi gradus entium deessent. Simile igitur est quaerere, in operatione Dei, quare unam creaturam fecerit alia meliorem, sicut quaerere, quare artifex in suo artificio partium diversitatem instituerit. I answer: Some say that the human soul and the angels are of the same species, and this seems to have been maintained first by Origen. Wishing to avoid the errors of the ancient heretics, who attributed the diversity of things to different principles by introducing a duality of good and evil, Origen held that the diversity of all things had proceeded from free choice. For he said that God made all rational creatures equally perfect in the beginning: certain of these adhering to God, acquired greater perfection in proportion to the measure of their adherence; others, falling away from God through an act of free choice, descended to positions of lesser importance in proportion to the extent of their fall. Accordingly some were incorporated into the celestial bodies, others were perverted to the point of demonic maliciousness, though all were equally perfect in the beginning. So far as Origen’s position [Peri Archon, I, 7] is concerned, it can be seen that he regarded the good of singular creatures and neglected to consider the good of the whole. Now a wise artificer arranging the parts [of his work], takes into consideration not only the good of the individual parts, but the good of the whole even more. For this reason a builder does not make all parts of a house equally valuable, but gives them greater or lesser importance inasmuch as this is required for the good disposition of the house. Likewise, in an animal’s body, not all parts have the transparency of the eye, because the animal would then be imperfect, but in an animal’s parts there is diversity in order than the animal may be perfect. In the same way, God, in His wisdom, did not make all things in the universe of equal worth, because if He had, the universe, lacking many grades of being, would be imperfect. Consequently to inquire why God, by His activity, made one creature better than another, is the same as asking why an artificer introduced a diversity of parts into his work.
Hac igitur Origenis ratione remota, sunt aliqui eius positionem imitantes, dicentes omnes intellectuales substantias esse unius speciei, propter aliquas rationes quae in obiiciendo sunt tactae. Sed ipsa positio videtur esse impossibilis. Si enim Angelus et anima ex materia et forma non componuntur, sed sunt formae tantum, ut in praecedenti quaestione dictum est; oportet quod omnis differentia qua Angeli ab invicem distinguuntur, vel etiam ab anima, sit differentia formalis. Nisi forte poneretur quod Angeli etiam essent uniti corporibus, sicut et animae; ut ex habitudine ad corpora differentia materialis in eis esse posset, sicut et de animabus dictum est supra. Sed hoc non ponitur communiter; et si hoc poneretur, non proficeret ad hanc positionem; quia manifestum est quod illa corpora specie differrent ab humanis corporibus quibus animae uniuntur; et diversorum corporum secundum speciem, diversas perfectiones secundum speciem oportet esse. Hoc igitur dempto, quod Angeli non sint formae corporum, si non sint compositi ex materia et forma, non remanet Angelorum ab invicem vel ab anima differentia, nisi formalis. Formalis autem differentia speciem variat. Nam forma est quae dat esse rei. Et sic relinquitur quod non solum Angeli ab anima, sed ipsi etiam ab invicem, specie differant. Hence this view of Origen having been shown to be false, there are some who adopt a similar position, claiming that all intellectual substances are specifically the same for the reasons mentioned in the objections. However, this position is seen to be impossible. For if angels and the soul are not composed of matter and form, but are forms alone, as was explained in the preceding question, every difference whereby angels are distinguished from one another, or from the soul as well, must be a formal one; unless perhaps it might be maintained that angels, like souls, were also united to bodies in order that there might be a material difference in them resulting from this relationship with bodies, as we explained above is true of souls. But this view is not commonly held, and even if it were it would not lend any weight to this position, because it is evident that the bodies [which angels would have] would, differ specifically from human bodies to which souls are united. Moreover, there must be different specific perfections for bodies that are specifically diverse. Therefore, this position that angels are forms of bodies having been shown to be false, since they are not composed of matter and form, it follows that angels differ from one another, or from the soul, only by reason of a formal difference. But a formal difference diversifies species, for the form gives a thing its mode of existing. Hence it follows that angels not only differ specifically from the soul, but also from each other.
Si quis autem ponat quod Angeli et anima sint ex materia et forma compositi, adhuc haec opinio stare non potest. Si enim tam in Angelis quam in anima sit materia de se una, sicut omnium corporum inferiorum est materia una, diversificata tantum secundum formam; oportebit etiam quod divisio illius materiae unius et communis sit principium distinctionis Angelorum ab invicem et ab anima. Cum autem de ratione materiae sit quod de se careat omni forma, non poterit intelligi divisio materiae ante receptionem formae, quae secundum materiae divisionem multiplicatur, nisi per dimensiones quantitativas; unde philosophus dicit in I Physic., subtracta quantitate, substantia remanet indivisibilis. Quae autem componuntur ex materia dimensioni subiecta, sunt corpora, et non solum corpori unita. Sic igitur Angelus et anima sunt corpora, quod nullus sanae mentis dixit; praesertim cum probatum sit quod intelligere non potest esse actus corporis ullius. Si vero materia Angelorum et animae non sit una et communis, sed diversorum ordinum; hoc non potest esse nisi secundum ordinem ad formas diversas; sicut ponitur quod corporum caelestium et inferiorum non est una materia communis: et sic talis materiae differentia speciem faciet diversam. However, even if someone claims that angels and souls are composed of matter and form, this position [that souls and angels are specifically the same] cannot be upheld. For if there were one matter common to angels and souls alike (just as there is one matter for inferior bodies, diversified only by form), the division of that one common matter would have to be the principle whereby angels are made distinct from one another, and from the soul. Now since it is of the very nature of matter in itself to be void of all form, the division of matter could not be understood to exist before it received a form (which form is given a multiple existence as a result of the division of matter), unless matter itself were divided by quantitative dimensions. Hence the Philosopher says in the Physics [I, 2, 185b3] that substance remains indivisible when quantity is removed. However, things which are composed of matter determined by dimensions are themselves bodies, not merely things united to a body. According to this argument, therefore, the angel and the soul are bodies. Now no one of sound mind maintained this, particularly because it has been proved that intellection cannot be the act of a body. Certainly, if the matter of the angels and that of the soul is not one and common (just as it is maintained that there is not one common matter for celestial and earthly bodies), but belongs to diverse orders, this can only be because it is ordered to different forms and thus material diversity of this sort causes specific diversity.
Unde impossibile videtur quod Angeli et anima sint eiusdem speciei. Secundum autem quid specie differant, considerandum restat. Oportet autem nos in cognitionem substantiarum intellectualium per considerationem substantiarum materialium pervenire. In substantiis autem materialibus diversi gradus perfectionis naturae diversitatem speciei constituunt; et hoc quidem facile patet, si quis ipsa genera materialium substantiarum consideret. Manifestum est enim quod corpora mixta supergrediuntur ordine perfectionis elementa, plantae autem corpora mineralia, et animalia plantas; et in singulis generibus secundum gradum perfectionis naturalis diversitas specierum invenitur. Nam in elementis terra est infimum, ignis vero nobilissimum. Similiter autem in mineralibus gradatim natura invenitur per diversas species proficere usque ad speciem auri. In plantis etiam usque ad speciem arborum perfectarum, et in animalibus usque ad speciem hominis; cum tamen quaedam animalia sint plantis propinquissima, ut immobilia, quae habent solum tactum. Et similiter plantarum quaedam sunt inanimatis propinquae, ut patet per philosophum in Lib. de vegetabilibus; For this reason it is clearly impossible for the angels and the soul to be specifically the same. However, the way they differ remains to be investigated. We must acquire our knowledge of intellectual substances by considering material substances. Now in material substances different grades of natural perfection constitute different species. Indeed this becomes quite obvious if we reflect upon the genera of material substances. For it is evident that mixed bodies surpass the elements in the order of perfection; plants surpass minerals; animals surpass plants; and in singular genera a diversity of species is found in accordance with the order of natural perfection. For among the elements, earth is lowest, and fire most noble. Likewise in the case of minerals [i.e., mixed bodies], nature is found to ascend by degrees through diverse species up to the species of gold. In plants also, nature ascends progressively up to the species of perfect trees; and in animals up to the species of man. Moreover, certain animals are more like plants, that is the immobile ones which have touch only. Similarly, certain plants are more like inanimate bodies, as is clear from what the Philosopher says in the book De plantis [I, 1, 815b 35].
et propter hoc philosophus dicit in VIII Metaphys., quod species rerum naturalium sunt sicut species numerorum, in quibus unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem. Ita igitur et in substantiis immaterialibus diversus gradus perfectionis naturae facit differentiam speciei; sed quantum ad aliquid differenter se habet in substantiis immaterialibus et materialibus. Ubicumque enim est diversitas graduum, oportet quod gradus considerentur per ordinem ad aliquod unum principium. In substantiis igitur materialibus attenduntur diversi gradus speciem diversificantes in ordine ad primum principium, quod est materia. Et inde est quod primae species sunt imperfectiores, posteriores vero perfectiores et per additionem se habentes ad primas; sicut mixta corpora habent speciem perfectiorem quam sint species elementorum, utpote habentes in se quidquid habent elementa, et adhuc amplius; unde similis est comparatio plantarum ad corpora mineralia, et animalium ad plantas. For this reason the Philosopher, in the Metaphysics [VIII, 3, 1043b 33] says that the species of natural things are like the species of numbers, wherein the addition or subtraction of a unit changes the species. Consequently in immaterial substances also a different grade of natural perfection causes difference in species. But a grade of perfection is in some respect different in the case of immaterial substances from what it is in the case of material substances. For wherever diversity of grades exists, the grades must be considered through their order to some one principle. Therefore in material substances diverse grades acre observed to diversify species in relation to the first principle, matter. For this reason first species [i.e., those nearest to matter] are most imperfect, whereas species farther removed [from matter] are more perfect, and related to the first by the addition [of higher perfections]. For instance, mixed bodies have a more perfect species than the elements have, because they possess in themselves the perfections of the elements and higher perfections as well. Hence the relation of plants to mineral bodies, and that of animals to plants, is similar.
In substantiis vero immaterialibus ordo graduum diversarum specierum attenditur, non quidem secundum comparationem ad materiam, quam non habent, sed secundum comparationem ad primum agens, quod oportet esse perfectissimum. Et ideo prima species in eis est perfectior secunda, utpote similior primo agenti; et secunda diminuitur a perfectione primae et sic deinceps usque ad ultimam earum. Summa autem perfectio primi agentis in hoc consistit, quod in uno simplici habet omnimodam bonitatem et perfectionem. Unde quanto aliqua substantia immaterialis fuerit primo agenti propinquior, tanto in sua natura simplici perfectiorem habet bonitatem suam et minus indiget inhaerentibus formis ad sui completionem. Et hoc quidem gradatim producitur usque ad animam humanam, quae in eis tenet ultimum gradum, sicut materia prima in genere rerum sensibilium; unde in sui natura non habet perfectiones intelligibiles, sed est in potentia ad intelligibilia, sicut materia prima ad formas sensibiles. Unde ad propriam operationem indiget ut fiat in actu formarum intelligibilium, acquirendo eas per sensitivas potentias a rebus exterioribus; et cum operatio sensus sit per organum corporale, ex ipsa conditione suae naturae competit ei quod corpori uniatur, et quod sit pars speciei humanae, non habens in se speciem completam. In the case of immaterial substances the order of diverse grades of species is certainly not considered in relationship to matter, which they do not have, but in relationship to the First Agent [i.e., God], who must be most perfect. Consequently in the case of immaterial substances the first species [i.e., the one nearest to God] is more perfect than the second, inasmuch as the former bears greater likeness to the First Agent. The second species has less perfection than the first, and so on successively down to the last of them. Now the entire perfection of the First Agent consists in this, that He has in one simple nature all His goodness and perfection. Therefore the nearer an immaterial substance is to the First Agent, the more does it have its perfection and goodness in one simple nature, and the less does it require inhering forms for its perfection. This continues progressively down to the human soul which occupies the lowest place [among immaterial substances], just as prime matter holds the lowest place in the genus of sensible things. Hence the soul does not have intelligible forms in its very nature, but is in potency to them, just as matter is to sensible forms. Therefore in order to perform its proper operation, the soul requires to be actuated by intelligible forms by acquiring them from external realities through its sensory powers. And since the operation of a sense is performed through a bodily organ, it is proper to the soul, according to the very condition of its nature, to be united to the body, and to be part of the human species, not having a complete species in itself.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intelligere Angeli et animae non est eiusdem speciei. Manifestum est enim, quod si formae quae sunt principia operationum, differunt specie, necesse est et operationes ipsas specie differre; sicut calefacere et infrigidare differunt secundum differentiam caloris et frigoris. Species autem intelligibiles quibus animae intelligunt sunt a phantasmatibus abstractae; et ita non sunt eiusdem rationis cum speciebus intelligibilibus quibus Angeli intelligunt, quae sunt eis innatae, secundum quod dicitur in libro de causis quod omnis intelligentia est plena formis. Unde et intelligere hominis et Angeli non est eiusdem speciei. Ex hac differentia provenit quod Angelus intelligit sine discursu, anima autem cum discursu; quae necesse habet ex sensibilibus effectibus in virtutes causarum pervenire, et ab accidentibus sensibilibus in essentias rerum, quae non subiacent sensui. 1. The act of understanding of the angel and that of the soul are not specifically the same. For it is evident that if forms, which are principles of operation, differ in species, their operations must differ in species as well. For instance, the act of heating and that of cooling differ from each other because heat and cold differ. Now the intelligible species, through which the soul understands, are abstracted from phantasms, and thus are not of the same nature as the intelligible species through which angels understand, because these are innate in the angels. Accordingly it is said in the book De causis [X] that every intelligence is filled with forms. Therefore the act of understanding of a man and that of an angel are not specifically the same. In view of this difference it follows that the angel understands without any discourse, whereas the human soul understands discursively. It does this of necessity in order to know the powers of causes from their sensible effects, and to understand the essences of things, not perceived by the senses, from their sensible accidents.
Ad secundum dicendum quod anima intellectualis principia et conclusiones intelligit per species a phantasmatibus abstractas; et ideo non est diversum intelligere secundum speciem. 2. Therefore the act of understanding discursively and that of understanding without discourse do not differ specifically from each other.
Ad tertium dicendum quod motus reducitur ad genus et speciem eius ad quod terminatur motus; in quantum eadem forma est quae ante motum est tantum in potentia, in ipso motu medio modo inter actum et potentiam, et in termino motus in actu completo. Sed intelligere Angeli sine discursu, et intelligere animae cum discursu, non est secundum formam eamdem specie; unde non oportet quod sit unitas speciei. 3. A motion is reduced to the genus and species of that particular order in which the motion is terminated, inasmuch as it is the same form that is in potency only before the motion begins, midway between act and potency during the motion itself, in complete act at the termination of the motion. However, an angel’s act of understanding, which takes place without any discourse, is not specifically the same as that of the soul so far as the form is concerned. Consequently it is not necessary that these two ways of understanding be specifically one and the same.
Ad quartum dicendum quod species rei iudicatur secundum operationem competentem ei secundum propriam naturam, non autem secundum operationem quae competit ei secundum participationem alterius naturae. Sicut non iudicatur species ferri secundum adustionem, quae competit ei prout est ignitum; sic enim eadem iudicaretur species ferri et ligni, quod etiam ignitum adurit. Dico autem quod videre in verbo est operatio supra naturam animae et Angeli, utrique conveniens secundum participationem superioris naturae, scilicet divinae, per illustrationem gloriae. Unde non potest concludi quod Angeli et anima sint eiusdem speciei. 4. A thing’s species is declared to be such in virtue of the operation that belongs to it by its own nature, and not in virtue of one that belongs to it because it participates in a higher nature. The species of iron, for instance, is not judged to be such because it is combustible, which belongs to it inasmuch as it is set on fire, for then the species of iron and that of wood, which also may be set on fire, would be considered to be the same. Moreover, I say that the act of intellection in the Word is an operation surpassing the nature of the soul and that of an angel, yet proper to each according as they participate in a superior nature, namely, the divine nature, through the light of glory. Consequently it cannot be concluded that an angel and the soul are specifically the same.
Ad quintum dicendum quod etiam in diversis Angelis non sunt species intelligibiles eiusdem rationis. Nam quanto substantia intellectualis est superior et Deo propinquior, qui omnia per unum, quod est sua essentia, intelligit; tanto formae intelligibiles in ipsa sunt magis elevatae, et virtuosiores ad plura cognoscenda. Unde dicitur in Lib. de causis, quod superiores intelligentiae intelligunt per formas magis universales; et Dionysius dicit, quod superiores Angeli habent scientiam magis universalem. Et ideo intelligere diversorum Angelorum non est eiusdem speciei, licet utrumque sit sine discursu; quia intelligunt per species innatas, non aliunde acceptas. 5. Intelligible species are not of the same nature in different angels; for the more superior an intellectual substance is, and the nearer to God (whom all understand through one thing, His essence), the more elevated are the intelligible forms within that substance, and thus more capable of knowing many things. Wherefore it is said in the book De causis [ibid.] that superior intelligences understand through more universal forms. Dionysius also says [De cael. hier., XII, 2] that superior angels have greater universal knowledge. Therefore the act of understanding of different angels is not specifically the same, although each takes place without discourse, because they understand through innate species and not through species received in some other way.
Ad sextum dicendum quod magis et minus est dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod materia eamdem formam diversimode participat, ut lignum albedinem; et secundum hoc magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Alio modo secundum diversum gradum perfectionis formarum; et hoc diversificat speciem. Diversi enim colores specie sunt secundum quod magis et minus propinque se habent ad lucem; et sic magis et minus in diversis Angelis invenitur. 6. More and less are found in things in two ways. First, according as matter participates in different ways in the same form, as wood participates in whiteness. In this way more and less do not cause things to differ in species. Secondly, according as more and less are found in the different grades of perfection of forms. This causes difference in species. For colors differ in species by being related more or less closely to light. This is the way in which more and less are found in different angels.
Ad septimum dicendum quod licet omnes animae non aequaliter intelligant, tamen omnes intelligunt per species eiusdem rationis, scilicet a phantasmatibus acceptas. Unde et hoc quod inaequaliter intelligunt, convenit ex diversitate virtutum sensitivarum, a quibus species abstrahuntur: quod etiam provenit secundum diversam dispositionem corporum. Et sic patet quod secundum hoc magis et minus non diversificant speciem, cum sequantur materialem diversitatem. 7. Although all souls do not understand equally well, nevertheless all understand through species of the same nature, namely, those derived from phantasms. Hence the fact that men do not understand equally well is a result of the difference in their sensory powers through which species are abstracted. This results in turn from the different disposition of their bodies. Consequently it is evident, according to this, that more and less do not cause difference in species, since they are a consequence of material diversity.
Ad octavum dicendum quod cognoscere aliquid per alterum contingit dupliciter. Uno modo sicut cognoscere unum cognitum per aliud cognitum, ita quod sit distincta cognitio utriusque; sicut homo per principia cognoscit conclusionem, seorsum considerando utrumque. Alio modo sicut cognoscitur aliquid cognitum per speciem qua cognoscitur; ut videmus lapidem per speciem lapidis quae est in oculo. Primo igitur modo cognoscere unum per alterum facit discursum, non autem secundo modo. Sed hoc modo Angeli cognoscunt causam per effectum, et effectum per causam, in quantum ipsa essentia Angeli est similitudo quaedam suae causae, et assimilat sibi suum effectum. 8. To be cognizant of one thing through another occurs in two ways. First, when something known is understood through the knowledge of some other thing in such a way that there is a distinct knowledge of each, as a man knows conclusions from principles by considering both [the principles and the conclusions] separately. Secondly, when something known is understood through the species whereby it is understood, as when we see a stone through the species of the stone, which [species] exists in the eye. Now it is in this way that angels know a cause through an effect and an effect through a cause, inasmuch as the essence itself of the angel bears some likeness to its cause, while the angel in turn causes its effect to be like itself.
Ad nonum dicendum quod perfectiones gratuitae conveniunt animae et Angelo per participationem divinae naturae; unde dicitur II Petri, I,: per quem maxima et pretiosa nobis dona donavit, ut divinae naturae consortes, et cetera. Unde per convenientiam in istis perfectionibus non potest concludi unitas speciei. 9. The perfections of grace befit the soul and the angel by a participation in the divine nature. Hence it is said: “By whom He hath given us most great and precious promises: that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature: flying the corruption of that concupiscence which is the world” (II Pet. 1:4). Therefore it cannot be concluded that the angel and the soul are specifically the same because they have these perfections in common.
Ad decimum dicendum quod ea quorum unus est finis proximus et naturalis, sunt unum secundum speciem. Beatitudo autem aeterna est finis ultimus et supernaturalis. Unde ratio non sequitur. 10. things having one and the same proximate and natural end are one and the same specifically. However, eternal beatitude is an ultimate and supernatural end. Therefore the conclusion stated in the objection does not follow.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod Augustinus non intelligit nihil esse medium inter mentem nostram et Deum secundum gradum dignitatis et naturae, quia una natura non sit alia nobilior; sed quia mens nostra immediate a Deo iustificatur, et in eo beatificatur. Sicut si diceretur quod aliquis miles simplex immediate est sub rege; non quia alii superiores eo sint sub rege, sed quia nullus habet dominium super eum nisi rex. 11. Augustine understands that there is nothing midway between our mind and God so far as the grades of dignity and of nature are concerned, not because one nature is not nobler than another, but because our mind is immediately justified by God and beatified in Him; just as if it might be said, for example, that a simple soldier is immediately under the king, not because there are no others superior to him under the king, but because no one has dominion over him except the king.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod neque anima neque Angelus est perfecta imago Dei, sed solus filius; et ideo non oportet quod sint eiusdem speciei. 12. Neither the soul nor an angel is a perfect image of God, but the Son alone. Consequently it is not necessary that the angel and the soul possess the same species.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod praedicta definitio non convenit animae eodem modo sicut Angelo. Angelus enim est substantia incorporea, quia non est corpus, et quia non est corpori unita; quod de anima dici non potest. 13. The aforesaid definition is not applicable to the soul in the same way as it is to an angel, for an angel is an incorporeal substance, because it is not a body nor is it united to a body. This cannot be said of the soul.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod ponentes animam et Angelum unius speciei esse, in hac ratione maximam vim constituunt sed non necessario concludit. Quia ultima differentia debet esse nobilior non solum quantum ad naturae nobilitatem, sed etiam quantum ad determinationem; quia ultima differentia est quasi actus respectu omnium praecedentium. Sic igitur intellectuale non est nobilissimum in Angelo vel anima, sed intellectuale sic vel illo modo; sicut de sensibili patet. Alias enim omnia bruta animalia essent eiusdem speciei. 14. To maintain that the soul and the angel are specifically the same makes them, for this reason, equal in power. But this does not necessarily follow, for the ultimate difference should be nobler, not only with respect to nobility of nature, but also with respect to the way in which the nature is determined; because the ultimate difference is like an act in relation to all preceding differences. Consequently the angel is nobler than the soul not because it is intellectual, but because it is intellectual in some particular way. This is evident in sensible things, otherwise all brute animals would be of the same species.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod anima est pars speciei et tamen est principium dans speciem; et secundum hoc quaeritur de specie animae. 15. The soul is a part of a species, and is also a principle conferring species. The species of the soul is investigated in this way.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod licet sola species definiatur proprie, non tamen oportet quod omnis species sit definibilis. Species enim immaterialium rerum non cognoscuntur per definitionem vel demonstrationem, sicut cognoscitur aliquid in scientiis speculativis; sed quaedam cognoscuntur per simplicem intuitum ipsarum. Unde nec Angelus proprie potest definiri: non enim scimus de eo quid est; sed potest notificari per quasdam negationes vel notificationes. Anima etiam definitur ut est corporis forma. 16. Although a species alone may be properly defined, yet it is not necessary that every species be definable. For the species of immaterial things are known neither by definition nor by demonstration, as something is known in the speculative sciences, but some of them are known by a simple intuition. Consequently an angel cannot properly be defined, for we do not know what its essence is; but it can be known by certain negations or distinguishing characteristics. Again, the soul is defined inasmuch as it is the form of the body.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod genus et differentia possunt accipi dupliciter. Uno modo secundum considerationem realem, prout considerantur a metaphysico et naturali et sic oportet quod genus et differentia super diversis naturis fundentur; et hoc modo nihil prohibet dicere quod in substantiis spiritualibus non sit genus et differentia, sed sint formae tantum et species simplices. Alio modo secundum considerationem logicam; et sic genus et differentia non oportet quod fundentur super diversas naturas, sed supra unam naturam in qua consideratur aliquid proprium, et aliquid commune. Et sic nihil prohibet genus et differentias ponere in substantiis spiritualibus. 17. Genus and difference can be regarded in two ways. First, from an existential point of view, so far as they are considered by metaphysics and by natural philosophy. Here it is manifest that genus and difference are based on different natures. Thus nothing prevents us from saying that there is no genus and difference in spiritual substances, but that they are forms in their entirety, and simple species. Genus and difference can also be regarded from the logical point of view. In this case it is not necessary that genus and difference be founded on different natures, but on one and the same nature in which something proper and something common may be distinguished. In this way nothing prevents us from distinguishing genus and difference in spiritual substances.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod naturaliter loquendo de genere et differentia, oportet differentias esse contrarias: nam materia, super quam fundatur natura generis, est susceptiva contrariarum formarum. Secundum autem considerationem logicam sufficit qualiscumque oppositio in differentiis; sicut patet in differentiis numerorum, in quibus non est contrarietas; et similiter est in spiritualibus substantiis. 18. Speaking of genus and difference from the point of view of the real order, differences must be contraries. For matter, on which the nature of genus is based, is receptive of contrary forms. However, from the point of view of logic, any opposition whatever in differences is sufficient, as is clear in the differences between numbers in which there is no contrariety. It is similar in the case of spiritual substances.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum quod licet materia non det speciem, tamen ex habitudine materiae ad formam attenditur natura formae. 19. Although matter is not the basis of species, nevertheless the nature of a form is considered according to the relationship of matter to form.
ARTICLE 8
WHETHER THE RATIONAL SOUL SHOULD BE UNITED TO A BODY SUCH AS MAN POSSESSES

[Summa theol., I, q.76, a.5; Contra Gentiles, II, 90; Sent., II, dist. 1, q.2, a.5; De malo, q.5, a.5.]
Octavo quaeritur utrum anima rationalis tali corpori debuerit uniri, quale est corpus humanum In the eighth article we examine this question: Whether the rational soul should be united to a body such as man possesses.
Objections.
Et videtur quod non. Anima enim rationalis est subtilissima formarum corpori unitarum. Terra autem est infima corporum. Non ergo fuit conveniens quod corpori terreno uniretur. 1. It seems that it should not. For the rational soul is the subtlest of all forms united to a body. Now earth is the lowest of all [elemental] bodies. Therefore the soul is not fittingly united to an earthly body.
Sed dicebat, hoc corpus terrenum ex hoc quod reductum est ad aequalitatem complexionis, similitudinem habere cum caelo, quod omnino caret contrariis; et sic nobilitatur, ut ei anima rationalis convenienter possit uniri. —Sed contra, si nobilitas corporis humani in hoc consistit quod corpori caelesti assimiletur, sequitur quod corpus caeleste nobilius sit. Sed anima rationalis nobilior est omni forma, cum capacitate sui intellectus omnia corpora transcendat. Ergo anima rationalis magis deberet corpori caelesti uniri. 2. But in view of the fact that an earthly body is reduced to a harmonious combination [of the elements], it must be said that such a body is similar to a celestial body, which is without contraries altogether, and thus is ennobled in order that a rational soul may be fittingly united to it. On the other hand, if the nobility of the human body consists in its likeness to a celestial body, it follows that a celestial body is nobler. But the rational soul is nobler than all other forms, because it transcends all bodies by its intellectual capacity. Therefore the rational soul should be united rather to a celestial body.
Sed dicebat quod corpus caeleste nobiliori perfectione perficitur quam sit anima rationalis. Sed contra, si perfectio corporis caelestis nobilior est anima rationali, oportet quod sit intelligens: quia quodcumque intelligens quolibet non intelligente nobilius est. Si igitur corpus caeleste aliqua substantia intellectuali perficitur, aut erit motor eius tantum, aut erit forma. Si tantum motor, adhuc remanet quod corpus humanum sit nobiliori modo perfectum quam corpus caeleste: forma enim dat speciem ei cuius est forma, non autem motor. Unde etiam nihil prohibet aliqua quae secundum sui naturam ignobilia sunt, esse instrumenta nobilissimi agentis. Si autem substantia intellectualis est forma corporis caelestis, aut huiusmodi substantia habet intellectum tantum, aut cum intellectu sensum et alias potentias. Si habet sensum et alias potentias, cum huiusmodi potentias necesse sit esse actus organorum quibus indigent ad operandum, sequetur quod corpus caeleste sit corpus organicum; quod ipsius simplicitati et uniformitati et unitati repugnat. Si vero habet intellectum tantum a sensu nihil accipientem, huiusmodi substantia in nullo indigebit unione corporis; quia operatio intellectus non fit per organum corporale. Cum igitur unio corporis et animae non sit propter corpus, sed propter animam, quia materiae sunt propter formam, et non e converso; sequetur quod intellectualis substantia non uniatur corpori caelesti ut forma. 3. But it must be said that a celestial body is perfected by a nobler perfection than the rational soul. On the other hand, if the perfection of a celestial body is nobler than that of a rational soul, it must be intelligent, because any intelligent being is nobler than any non-intelligent being whatever. Therefore, if a celestial body is perfected by an intellectual substance, this substance will be either the mover only of such a body, or will be its form. If it is only a mover, it follows that the human body is perfected in a nobler way than a celestial body is, for a form gives species to the thing of which it is the form, whereas a mover does not. Again, nothing prevents certain things ignoble by nature from being instruments of the noblest agent. However, if an intellectual substance is the form of a celestial body, such a substance has either an intellect alone, or senses and other powers together with an intellect. If it has senses and other powers, it follows that a celestial body is an organic body, because powers of this sort must be the acts of organs, which are required for the operations of such powers. This is opposed to the simplicity, uniformity, and unity of a celestial body. If, indeed, such a substance has an intellect alone and receives nothing from sense, then it does not need to be united to a body, because the operation of an intellect is not performed through a bodily organ. Therefore, since the body is united to the soul not for the sake of the body but for that of the soul (because any matter exists for the sake of form, and not vice versa), it follows that an intellectual substance is not united as a form to a celestial body.
Praeterea, omnis substantia intellectualis creata habet ex sui natura possibilitatem ad peccatum, quia potest averti a summo bono quod est Deus. Si igitur aliae substantiae intellectuales uniantur corporibus caelestibus ut formae, sequitur quod peccare poterunt. Poena autem peccati mors est, id est separatio animae a corpore, et cruciatio peccantium in Inferno. Potuit ergo fieri quod corpora caelestia morerentur per separationem animarum et quod animae in Inferno retruderentur. 4. Further, every created intellectual substance is capable of sinning by reason of its nature, because it can turn away from the Highest Good, which is God. Therefore, if intellectual substances were united [substantially] as forms to celestial bodies, it would follow that they could commit sin. But the punishment for sin is death, that is, the separation of the soul from the body, and the punishment of the sinners in hell. Consequently it could happen that celestial bodies would corrupt by having their souls separated from them, and that these souls would be cast into hell.
Praeterea, omnis intellectualis substantia capax est beatitudinis. Si ergo corpora caelestia sunt animata animabus intellectualibus, huiusmodi animae sunt capaces beatitudinis. Et sic in aeterna beatitudine non solum sunt Angeli et homines, sed etiam quaedam naturae mediae; cum tamen sancti doctores tradant, societatem sanctorum ex hominibus constare et Angelis. 5. Further, every intellectual substance is capable of attaining beatitude. Therefore, if celestial bodies are animated by intellectual souls, such souls are capable of beatitude; and thus not only angels and men, but also certain intermediate natures enjoy eternal beatitude. However, when the holy doctors consider this matter, they say that the society of the blessed is composed of men and angels.
Praeterea, corpus Adae proportionatum fuit animae rationali. Sed corpus nostrum dissimile est illi corpori; illud enim corpus ante peccatum fuit immortale et impassibile, quod nostra corpora non habent. Ergo huiusmodi corpora, qualia nos habemus, non sunt proportionata animae rationali. 6. Further, the body of Adam was proportioned to a rational soul. But our body is unlike his, for his body was immortal and unchangeable before he sinned. Our bodies do not have these characteristics. Therefore bodies such as we possess are not proportioned to a rational soul.
Praeterea, nobilissimo motori debentur instrumenta optime disposita et obedientia ad operationem. Anima autem rationalis est nobilior inter motores inferiores. Ergo debetur sibi corpus maxime obediens ad suas operationes. Huiusmodi autem non est corpus quale nos habemus; quia caro resistit spiritui, et anima propter pugnam concupiscentiarum distrahitur hac atque illac. Non igitur anima rationalis tali corpori debuit uniri. 7. Further, the best disposed instruments, and those which cooperate in operation, belong to the noblest mover. Now the rational soul is nobler than all other inferior movers. Hence the rational soul should have a body that cooperates with it to the fullest extent in carrying out its operations. However, a body such as ours is not of this sort, because the flesh lusts against the spirit (Gal- 5:17), and the soul is drawn here and there as a result of the struggle between concupiscences. Consequently the rational soul should not be united to a body such as we possess.
Praeterea, animae rationali contingit abundantia spirituum in corpore perfectibili; unde cor hominis est calidissimum inter caetera animalia quantum ad virtutem generandi spiritus; quod significat ipsa corporis humani rectitudo, ex virtute caloris et spirituum proveniens. Convenientissimum igitur fuisset quod anima rationalis totaliter spirituali corpori fuisset unita. 8. Further, an abundance of spirits falls to the lot of a rational soul in a perfectible body. Hence in contrast to other animals, the heart of man is the hottest so far as the power of generating spirits is concerned. The human body’s erectness, resulting from the power of heat and spirits, is a sign of this. Therefore it would be most fitting for the rational soul to be united entirely to a spiritual body.
Praeterea, anima est substantia incorruptibilis. Corpora autem nostra sunt corruptibilia. Non ergo convenienter talibus corporibus anima rationalis unitur. 9. Further, the soul is an incorruptible substance. However our bodies are corruptible. Consequently rational souls are not fittingly united to bodies such as we possess.
Praeterea, anima rationalis unitur corpori ad speciem humanam constituendam. Sed melius conservaretur humana species, si corpus cui anima unitur, esset incorruptibile. Non enim esset necessarium quod per generationem species conservaretur, sed in eisdem secundum numerum conservari posset. Ergo anima humana incorruptibilibus corporibus uniri debuit. 10. Further, the rational soul is united to the body in order to constitute the human species. Now the human species would be better preserved if the body to which the rational soul is united, were incorruptible, because then it would not be necessary for the human species to be preserved by generation, for it would be preserved numerically in the same individuals. Hence the human soul should be united to an incorruptible body.
Praeterea, corpus humanum, ut sit nobilissimum inter inferiora corpora, debet esse simillimum corpori caelesti, quod est nobilissimum corporum. Sed corpus caeleste omnino caret contrarietate. Ergo corpus humanum minimum debet habere de contrarietate. Corpora autem nostra non habent minimum de contrarietate; alia enim corpora, ut lapidum et arborum, sunt durabiliora, cum tamen contrarietas sit principium dissolutionis. Non ergo anima rationalis debuit talibus corporibus uniri qualia nos habemus. 11. Further, the human body, being the noblest of inferior bodies, should resemble most a celestial body, which is the noblest of bodies. However, a celestial body lacks contrariety altogether. Therefore the human body ought to have the least contrariety. But our bodies do not have the least contrariety, because other bodies, such as stones and trees, are more enduring, and contrariety is the principle of disintegration. Consequently the rational soul should not be united to bodies such as we have.
Praeterea, anima est forma simplex. Formae autem simplici competit materia simplex. Debuit igitur anima rationalis alicui simplici corpori uniri utpote igni vel aeri, vel alicui huiusmodi. 12. Further, the soul is a simple form. Now a simple matter befits a simple form. Hence the rational soul should be united to some simple body such as fire or gold or something of this kind.
Praeterea anima humana videtur cum principiis communionem habere; unde antiqui philosophi posuerunt animam esse de natura principiorum, ut patet in I de anima. Principia autem corporum sunt elementa. Ergo si anima non sit elementum, neque ex elementis, saltem alicui corpori elementari debuit uniri, ut igni vel aeri, vel alicui aliorum. 13. Further, the human soul seems to have something in common with principles. Hence the ancient philosophers maintained that the soul is composed of principles, as is clear in the De anima [I, 2, 404b 7]. Now the principles of bodies are the elements. Therefore, if the soul is not an element, nor composed of elements, it should at least be united to some elementary body such as fire or gold, or something of this sort.
Praeterea, corpora similium partium minus recedunt a simplicitate quam corpora dissimilium partium. Cum igitur anima sit forma simplex, magis debuit uniri corpori similium partium quam corpori dissimilium. 14. Further, bodies composed of similar parts come closer to being simple than bodies composed of dissimilar parts. Consequently the soul should be united to a body composed of similar parts rather than to one composed of dissimilar parts, because the soul is a form in its entirety (simplex).
Praeterea, anima unitur corpori ut forma et ut motor. Debuit igitur anima rationalis, quae est nobilissima formarum, uniri corpori agillimo ad motum, cuius contrarium videmus; nam corpora avium sunt agiliora ad motum, et similiter corpora multorum animalium quam corpora hominum. 15. Further, the soul is united both as a form and as a mover to the body. Therefore the rational soul, which is the noblest of forms, should be united to a body best adapted for movement. But we see that the contrary of this is true, for the bodies of birds and those of many other animals as well, are better adapted for movement than the human body is.
Praeterea, Plato dicit quod formae dantur a datore secundum merita materiae, quae dicuntur materiae dispositiones. Sed corpus humanum non habet dispositionem respectu tam nobilis formae, ut videtur, cum sit grossum et corruptibile. Non ergo anima debuit tali corpori uniri. 16. Further, Plato says” that forms are conferred by the giver of forms according to the merits of matter, which are called material dispositions. But apparently the human body does not have a disposition in keeping with the nobility of its form, for the body is “gross” and corruptible. Therefore the soul should not be united to such a body.
Praeterea, in anima humana sunt formae intelligibiles maxime particulatae secundum comparationem ad substantias intelligibiles superiores. Sed tales formae competerent operationi corporis caelestis, quod est causa generationis et corruptionis horum particularium. Ergo anima humana debuit uniri corporibus caelestibus. 17. Further, the intelligible forms existing in the human soul, in contrast to those in superior intellectual substances, are in the highest degree representative of particulars. But such forms befit the operation of a celestial body, which is the cause of the generation and corruption of these particulars. Consequently the human soul should be united to a celestial body.
Praeterea, nihil movetur naturaliter dum est in suo ubi, sed solum quando est extra proprium ubi. Caelum autem movetur in suo ubi existens. Ergo non movetur naturaliter. Movetur ergo ad ubi ab anima, et ita habet animam sibi unitam. 18. Further, nothing is moved naturally so long as it occupies its [proper place], but only when it is outside its proper place. However, a heaven is moved while it exists in its [proper] place. Therefore it is not moved naturally. Consequently it is moved with respect to place by a soul, and thus has a soul united to it.
Praeterea, enarrare est actus substantiae intelligentis. Sed caeli enarrant gloriam Dei, ut in Psal. XVIII, dicitur. Ergo caeli sunt intelligentes; et ita habent animam intellectivam. 19. Further, “to proclaim” is an act of an intellectual substance. But “the heavens proclaim the glory of God,” as is said in the Psalms (Ps. 18:5). Hence the heavens are intelligent, and therefore possess an intellective soul.
Praeterea, anima est perfectissima formarum. Debuit ergo uniri perfectiori corpori. Corpus autem humanum videtur esse imperfectissimum; non enim habet arma ad defendendum vel impugnandum, neque operimenta, neque aliquid huiusmodi, quae natura corporibus aliorum animalium tribuit. Non igitur talis anima tali corpori debuit uniri. 20. Further, the soul is the most perfect of forms. Therefore it should be united to a most perfect body. However, the human body seems to be most imperfect, for it neither has arms to defend itself and to fight, nor covering nor anything of this sort which nature has bestowed on the bodies of other animals. Therefore a soul of this kind should not be united to a body such as ours.
Sed contra, est quod dicitur Eccli. XVII: Deus de terra creavit hominem, et secundum imaginem suam fecit illum. Sed opera Dei sunt convenientia; dicitur enim Genes. I,: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Ergo conveniens fuit ut anima rationalis, in qua est Dei imago, corpori terreno uniretur. On the contrary, it is said: “God created man of the earth and made him after His image” (Eccles. 17:1). But the works of God are fitting works, for it is said: “God saw what He had made and that His works were good” (Gen. 1:4). Therefore the rational soul, in which the image of God exists, is fittingly united to an earthly body.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod cum materia sit propter formam, et non e converso, ex parte animae oportet accipere rationem, quale debeat esse corpus cui unitur. Unde in II de anima dicitur quod anima non solum est corporis forma et motor, sed etiam finis. Est autem ex superius disputatis quaestionibus manifestum, quod ideo naturale est animae humanae corpori uniri, quia cum sit infima in ordine intellectualium substantiarum, sicut materia prima est infima in ordine rerum sensibilium; non habet anima humana intelligibiles species sibi naturaliter inditas, quibus in operationem propriam exire possit quae est intelligere, sicut habent superiores substantiae intellectuales, sed est in potentia ad eas, cum sit sicut tabula rasa, in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde oportet quod species intelligibiles a rebus exterioribus accipiat mediantibus potentiis sensitivis, quae sine corporeis organis operationes proprias habere non possunt. Unde et animam humanam necesse est corpori uniri. I answer: Since matter exists for the sake of form and not vice versa, we must discover, on the side of the soul, the reason why the body should be united to it. Hence it is said, in the De anima [II, 4, 415b 10] that the soul is not only the form and mover of the body but also its end. Moreover, it is evident, from the preceding Disputed Questions [De spiritualibus creaturis, 3] that it is natural for the human soul to be united to the body. For, although the soul is lowest in the order of intellectual substances (as primary matter is lowest in the order of sensible things), it does not have intelligible species naturally impressed on it, as superior intellectual substances have, whereby it can perform its proper operation of intellection; but is in potency to them because it is like “ a wax tablet on which nothing is written, as is said in the De anima [III, 4, 429b 32]. For this reason it must receive its intelligible species from external things through its sensory powers, which cannot perform their proper operations without bodily organs. Consequently it is necessary for the human soul to be united to a body.
Si ergo propter hoc anima humana unibilis est corpori, quia indiget accipere species intelligibiles a rebus mediante sensu; necessarium est quod corpus, cui anima rationalis unitur, tale sit ut possit esse aptissimum ad repraesentandum intellectui species sensibiles, ex quibus in intellectu intelligibiles species resultent. Sic ergo oportet corpus cui anima rationalis unitur, esse optime dispositum ad sentiendum. Sed cum plures sint sensus, unus tamen est qui est fundamentum aliorum, scilicet tactus, in quo principaliter tota natura sensitiva consistit. Unde et in II de anima dicitur, quod propter hunc sensum primo animal dicitur. Et inde est quod immobilitato hoc sensu, ut in somno accidit, omnes alii sensus immobilitantur. Et iterum omnes alii sensus non solum solvuntur ab excellentia propriorum sensibilium, sicut visus a rebus multum fulgidis et auditus a maximis sonis; sed etiam ab excellentia sensibilium secundum tactum, ut a forti calore vel frigore. Cum igitur corpus cui anima rationalis unitur debeat esse optime dispositum ad naturam sensitivam, necessarium est ut habeat convenientissimum organum sensus tactus. Propter quod dicitur in II de anima quod hunc sensum habemus certiorem inter omnia animalia; et quod propter bonitatem huius sensus etiam unus homo alio est habilior ad intellectuales operationes. Molles enim carne (qui sunt boni tactus) aptos mente videmus. Therefore, if the human soul is capable of being united to a body, because it needs to receive intelligible species from things through the intermediary of the senses, then the body, to which the rational soul is united, must be one which can most adequately present to the intellect those sensible species from which are derived the intelligible species existing in the intellect. Hence the body to which the rational soul is united must be best disposed for sensory operation. But although there are several sensory powers, still there is one which is the basis of the others, namely, touch, in which every sensible nature is principally rooted. For this reason it is also said in the De anima [II, 2, 413b8] that an animal derives its name from this sense. This is the reason why, when this sense is unmoved, as occurs during sleep, all other senses are unmoved. Again, not only are all the other senses rendered inactive by an excess of their proper sensible [objects] as sight, for instance, is made inoperative by very bright objects, and hearing by too intense sounds, but so also is the sense of touch rendered incapable of performing its proper operation (solvuntur) by an excess of its sensible object, for example, excessive warmth or cold. Therefore, since the body to which the rational soul is united must be best disposed for a sentient nature, it must have the most competent organ of touch. And so it is said in the De anima [II, 9, 421a 20] that among all animals we have this sense to a greater degree, and also that one man is more adept than another in intellectual operations as a result of this sense. For we see that those who have tender flesh (those who are of good touch) are well-endowed mentally.
Cum autem organum cuiuslibet sensus non debeat habere in actu contraria, quorum sensus est perceptivus, sed esse in potentia ad illa, ut possit ea recipere, quia recipiens debet esse denudatum a recepto; aliter necesse est hoc esse in organo tactus, et in organis aliorum sensuum. Organum enim visus, scilicet pupilla, caret omnino albo et nigro, et universaliter omni genere coloris; et similiter est in auditu et in olfactu. Hoc autem in tactu accidere non potest. Nam tactus est cognoscitivus eorum ex quibus necesse est componi corpus animalis, scilicet caloris et frigoris, humidi et sicci; unde impossibile est quod organum tactus omnino sit denudatum a genere sui sensibilis, sed oportet quod sit reductum ad medium, sic enim est in potentia ad contraria. Corpus ergo cui anima rationalis unitur, cum debeat esse convenientissimum ad sensum tactus, oportet quod sit maxime reductum ad medium per aequalitatem complexionis. Now since the organ of any sense must not possess actually any of the contraries of which a sense is perceptive, but must be in potency to them in order that it may be able to receive them (because the recipient must be deprived of the thing received), the case must be otherwise for the organ of touch than it is for the organs of the other senses. For the organ of sight, that is, the pupil of the eye, is deprived completely of white and of black, and of every kind of color whatever. It is similar in the case of hearing and smell. But this cannot occur in the case of the sense of touch, for touch is capable of experiencing those qualities which the animal body must be composed of, namely, hot and cold, wet and dry. For this reason it is impossible for the organ of touch to be deprived completely of its sensible objects; rather must it be reduced to a mean, because in this way it is in potency to contraries. Therefore, since the body to which the rational soul is united must be best disposed for the sense of touch, it must be brought in the fullest measure to an intermediate state by the harmonious combination [of its constituent elements and their qualities].
In quo apparet quod tota operatio inferioris naturae terminatur ad homines sicut ad perfectissimum. Videmus enim operationem naturae procedere gradatim a simplicibus elementis commiscendo ea, quousque perveniatur ad perfectissimum commixtionis modum, qui est in corpore humano. Hanc igitur oportet esse dispositionem corporis cui anima rationalis unitur, ut scilicet sit temperatissimae complexionis. In this way it is evident that the total operation of an inferior nature reaches its highest peak in man as a most perfect being. For we see that the operation of nature ascends progressively from the simple elements, by blending them, until it reaches the most perfect mode of combination, which is the human body. Consequently this disposition of the human body, to which the rational soul is united, must exist in order that the body may possess the most tempered combination.
Si quis autem considerare velit etiam particulares humani corporis dispositiones, ad hoc inveniet ordinatas, ut homo sit optimi sensus. Unde, quia ad bonam habitudinem potentiarum sensitivarum interiorum, puta imaginationis et memoriae, et cogitativae virtutis, necessaria est bona dispositio cerebri. Ideo factus est homo habens maius cerebrum inter omnia animalia, secundum proportionem suae quantitatis; et ut liberior sit eius operatio habet caput sursum positum; quia solus homo est animal rectum, alia vero animalia curva incedunt. Et ad hanc rectitudinem habendam et conservandam necessaria fuit abundantia caloris in corde, per quam multi spiritus generentur; ut per caloris abundantiam et spirituum, corpus possit in directum sustineri. Cuius signum est quod in senio incurvatur homo, cum calor naturalis debilitatur. Moreover, if anyone also wishes to examine the particular dispositions of the human body, he will find them ordered to this end, that man may have the best sense. Therefore man, in proportion to his size, has a larger brain than any other animal, because a good disposition of the brain is necessary for the good condition of the internal sentient powers, namely, the imagination, the memory, and the cogitative power. And in order that his operation may be freer, he has his head placed on high. For man is the only erect animal, the others, indeed, are bent over. Furthermore, in order to have this erectness and to preserve it, there must exist in the heart an abundance of heat (by which many spirits are generated) so that the body may be maintained erect by this copious amount of heat and spirits. The fact that a man stoops over when he is old is a sign of this, because his natural heat is diminished.
Et per istum modum ratio dispositionis humani corporis est assignanda quantum ad singula quae sunt homini propria. Sed tamen considerandum est quod in his quae sunt ex materia, sunt quaedam dispositiones in ipsa materia, propter quas talis materia eligitur ad hanc formam; et sunt aliquae quae consequuntur ex necessitate materiae, et non ex electione agentis. Sicut ad faciendam serram artifex eligit duritiem in ferro, ut sit serra utilis ad secandum; sed quod acies ferri hebetari possit et fieri rubiginosa, hoc accidit ex necessitate materiae. Magis enim artifex eligeret materiam ad quam hoc non consequeretur, si posset inveniri; sed quia inveniri non potest, propter huiusmodi defectus consequentes, non praetermittit ex huiusmodi materia convenienti facere opus. Sic igitur et in corpore humano contingit: quod enim taliter sit commixtum et secundum partes dispositum ut sit convenientissimum ad operationes sensitivas, est electum in hac materia a factore hominis; sed quod hoc corpus sit corruptibile, fatigabile et huiusmodi defectus habeat, consequitur ex necessitate materiae. Necesse est enim corpus sic mixtum ex contrariis subiacere talibus defectibus. Nec potest obviari per hoc quod Deus potuit aliter facere: quia in institutione naturae non quaeritur quid Deus facere potuit, sed quid rerum natura patitur ut fiat, secundum Augustinum super Genes. ad Litter. In the light of what is stated above, the nature of a disposition of the human body must be determined in relation to the particular [dispositions] proper to man. However, we must take into consideration that in those things which are constituted of matter, some dispositions exist in the matter itself, and that on account of these a definite matter is chosen for a definite form. There are also some dispositions which proceed from the necessary character of matter, and not from the choice of the agent. For instance, when an artisan chooses hardness in iron to make a saw in order that it may be useful for sawing. But the fact that sharpness can be given to iron, and that it can rust, results from the necessary character of matter. For the artisan would rather choose a matter in which defects are not present, if it could be found. But because it cannot be found, the artisan does not neglect to work with the available matter of this kind simply because of the defects intrinsic to such matter. This also occurs in the human body, for, likewise, whatever is combined and disposed according to parts in order that such a body may be best fitted for sentient operations, is selected in this matter by the Maker of man. But that this body is corruptible, that it may become fatigued, and have defects of this kind, follows from the necessary character of this matter. For the body, as a mixture of contraries, must be subject to such defects. Nor can any objection be raised in view of the fact that God could make it otherwise, because we do not investigate what God could make in the establishment of nature, but what the nature of things undergoes as made, as Augustine says in the Super Genesim ad litteram [II, 1].
Sciendum tamen est, quod in remedium horum defectuum Deus homini in sua institutione contulit auxilium iustitiae originalis, per quam corpus esset omnino subditum animae, quamdiu anima Deo subderetur; ita quod nec mors nec aliqua passio vel defectus homini accideret, nisi prius anima separaretur a Deo. Sed per peccatum anima recedente a Deo, homo privatus est hoc beneficio; et subiacet defectibus secundum quod natura materiae requirit. Moreover, it must be recognized that when God remedied these defects in man at his creation, He employed the help of original justice whereby the body was made subject completely to the soul and the soul to God, so that neither death nor passion nor any defect could affect man unless the soul were first separated from God. But when the soul turned away from God through sin, man was deprived of this gift, and is subject to the defects which are intrinsic to the nature of matter.
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet anima sit subtilissima formarum in quantum est intelligens — quia tamen, cum sit infima in genere formarum intelligibilium, indiget corpori uniri, quod fit mediante complexione, ad hoc quod per sensus species intelligibiles possit acquirere — necessarium fuit quod corpus cui unitur haberet plus in quantitate de gravibus elementis, scilicet terra et aqua. Cum enim ignis sit efficacissimae virtutis in agendo, nisi secundum quantitatem inferiora elementa excederent, non posset fieri commixtio et maxime reducta ad medium; ignis enim alia elementa consumeret. Unde in II de Generat., philosophus dicit, quod in corporibus mixtis materialiter abundat plus terra et aqua. 1. The soul, being intellectual, is the subtlest of forms, but it is lowest in the order of intellectual forms, and must be united to a body in order to acquire intelligible species through the senses. This union is effected through a combination of the elements. The body, to which the soul is united, had to contain a greater quantity of the heavy elements, namely, of earth and water [than the light elements, fire and air]. For fire is the most active of all the elements. If the lower elements [earth and water] were not present in greater quantity, the aforesaid combination could not be brought about nor above all be reduced to a mean, because fire would consume the other elements. For this reason the Philosopher, in the De generatione et corruptione [II, 8, 334b 31], states that earth and water are more abundant [than air and fire] in mixed bodies.
Ad secundum dicendum quod anima rationalis unitur corpori tali, non quia est simile caelo, sed quia est aequalis commixtionis; sed ad hoc sequitur aliqua similitudo ad caelum per elongationem a contrariis. Sed tamen, secundum opinionem Avicennae, unitur tali corpori proprie propter similitudinem caeli: ipse enim voluit inferiora a superioribus causari, ut scilicet corpora inferiora causarentur a corporibus caelestibus; et cum pervenirent ad similitudinem corporum caelestium per aequalitatem complexionis, sortirentur formam similem corpori caelesti, quod ponitur esse animatum. 2. The rational soul is united to this kind of body, not because it is like a celestial body, but because it is composed of a harmonious combination [of the elements]. But it follows that it bears some likeness to a celestial body, in this way, by being relatively independent of contraries. However, according to the opinion of Avicenna, the soul is united to such a body particularly because of its likeness to a celestial body. For he desired that inferior things be caused by the superior beings, in order that inferior bodies might be caused by the celestial bodies. And [he maintained] that these inferior bodies possess a form similar to that of a celestial body (which is considered to be animated), since such inferior bodies bear some likeness to celestial bodies because of their harmonious combination.
Ad tertium dicendum quod de animatione corporum caelestium est diversa opinio et apud philosophos et apud fidei doctores. Nam apud philosophos Anaxagoras posuit intellectum agentem esse omnino immixtum et separatum, et corpora caelestia esse inanimata; unde etiam damnatus ad mortem dicitur esse propter hoc quod dixit solem esse quasi lapidem ignitum, ut Augustinus narrat in libro de Civit. Dei. Alii vero philosophi posuerunt corpora caelestia esse animata. Quorum quidam dixerunt Deum esse animam caeli, quod fuit ratio idololatriae, ut scilicet caelo et corporibus caelestibus cultus divinus attribueretur. Alii vero, ut Plato et Aristoteles, licet ponerent corpora caelestia esse animata, ponebant tamen Deum esse aliquid superius ab anima caeli omnino separatum. Apud doctores etiam fidei Origenes et sequaces ipsius posuerunt corpora caelestia esse animata. Quidam vero posuerunt ea inanimata, ut Damascenus ponit: quae etiam positio apud modernos theologos est communior: quod Augustinus relinquit sub dubio, II super Genes. ad litteram, et in libro Enchir. Hoc igitur pro firmo tenentes quod corpora caelestia ab aliquo intellectu moventur, saltem separato, propter argumenta utramque partem sustinentes, dicamus aliquam substantiam intellectualem esse perfectionem corporis caelestis ut formam, quae quidem habet solam potentiam intellectivam, non autem sensitivam ut ex verbis Aristotelis accipi potest in II de anima, et in XI Metaph. Quamvis Avicenna ponat quod anima caeli cum intellectu etiam habeat imaginationem. Si autem habet intellectum tantum, unitur tamen corpori ut forma, non propter operationem intellectualem, sed propter executionem virtutis activae, secundum quam potest adipisci divinam similitudinem in causando per motum caeli. 3. There is a diversity of opinion, both among philosophers and among the doctors of the faith, concerning the animation of the celestial bodies. For among the philosophers, Anaxagoras maintained that the agent intellect was altogether simple (immixtum) and existed apart from things, and that the celestial bodies were inanimate. Hence it is said that he was even condemned to death because he claimed that the sun was a fiery stone, as Augustine relates in the work De civitate Dei [18:41]. Other philosophers, indeed, maintained that the celestial bodies are animated. Some of these stated that God is the soul of the heavens, which was idolatrous inasmuch as it attributed divine worship to the heavens and the heavenly bodies. Others, indeed, such as Plato and Aristotle, who, although they claimed that the celestial bodies are animated, nevertheless maintained that God is a supreme being, quite distinct from the soul of the heavens. Among the doctors of the faith as well, Origen [Peri Archon, II, 7]and his followers held that such bodies are inanimate, as Damascene did [De fide ortho., II, 6]. This is also the more common position among modern theologians. That Augustine remained in doubt [on the question, is shown in] the Super Genesim ad litteram [II, 18] and in the work Enchiridion [58]. Therefore, holding this for a fact, that the celestial bodies are moved by an intellect which is separate, we say (maintaining both positions on account of the arguments supporting both sides) that an intellectual substance, as a form, is the perfection of the celestial body, and that it has an intellective power alone but no sensory power, as can be seen from the words of Aristotle in the De anima [II, 1, 413a6] and in the Metaphysics [XI, 2, 1060a 10], even though Avicenna maintains that the soul of the heavens has an imagination in addition to its intellect. However, if it has an intellect only, it is still united as a form to the body, not for the sake of intellectual operation, but for the sake of executing its active power according to which it can attain a certain likeness to divine causality by moving the, heavens.
Ad quartum dicendum quod licet secundum naturam suam omnes substantiae intellectuales creatae possint peccare, tamen ex electione divina et praedestinatione per auxilium gratiae plures conservatae sunt ne peccarent: inter quas posset aliquis ponere animas corporum caelestium; et praecipue si Daemones qui peccaverunt fuerunt inferioris ordinis, secundum Damascenum. 4. Although all created intellectual substances by nature are capable of committing sin, still many are preserved from so doing by divine choice and predestination through the aid of grace. One can maintain that the souls of the celestial bodies are among this number, particularly if the demons who sinned were of an inferior order, as Damascene held [De fide orth., II, 4].
Ad quintum dicendum quod si corpora caelestia sunt animata, animae eorum pertinent ad societatem Angelorum. Dicit enim Augustinus in Enchir.: nec illud quidem certum habeo, utrum ad eamdem societatem, scilicet Angelorum, pertineat sol et luna, et cuncta sidera; quamvis nonnullis lucida esse corpora, non tamen sensitiva vel intellectiva, videantur. 5. If the celestial bodies are animated, their souls belong to the society of the angels. For Augustine says in the Enchiridion [58]: “I do not hold for certain that the sun and moon, and the other stars belong to the same society,” namely, that of the angels, “for although some are luminous bodies, still they do not appear to be sentient or intellective.”
Ad sextum dicendum quod corpus Adae fuit proportionatum humanae animae, ut dictum est, non solum secundum quod requirit natura, sed secundum quod contulit gratia; qua quidem gratia privamur, natura manente eadem. 6. The body of Adam was made proportionate to a human soul, as was explained, not only with respect to what nature requires, but also with respect to what grace conferred. Now, we are deprived of this grace, but our nature remains the same.
Ad septimum dicendum quod pugna quae est in homine ex contrariis concupiscentiis, etiam ex necessitate materiae provenit; necesse enim fuit, si homo haberet sensum, quod sentiret delectabilia, et quod eum sequeretur concupiscentia delectabilium, quae plerumque repugnat rationi. Sed contra hoc etiam homini fuit datum remedium per gratiam in statu innocentiae, ut scilicet inferiores vires in nullo contra rationem moverentur; sed hoc homo perdidit per peccatum. 7. The struggle which occurs in man as a result of contrary concupiscences, also results from the necessary character of matter. For, given the fact that man has sense, it is necessary that he sense delectable objects, and that he pursue his concupiscence for such objects, which is generally opposed to reason. But in the state of innocence, man was also given a remedy against this through grace so that the inferior powers were not moved in any way contrary to reason. However, man lost this through sin.
Ad octavum dicendum quod spiritus, licet sint vehicula virtutum, non tamen possunt esse organa sensuum; et ideo non potuit corpus hominis ex solis spiritibus constare. 8. Although spirits are the vehicles of powers, they still cannot be organs of the senses. Therefore the human body could not be composed of spirits alone.
Ad nonum dicendum quod corruptibilitas est ex defectibus qui consequuntur corpus humanum ex necessitate materiae; et maxime post peccatum, quod subtraxit auxilium gratiae. 9. Corruptibility is a result of the defects which belong intrinsically to the human body from the necessary character of matter. This is particularly true after man sinned, because sin removes the assistance of grace.
Ad decimum dicendum quod quid melius sit, requirendum est in his quae sunt propter finem, non autem in his quae ex necessitate materiae proveniunt. Melius enim esset quod corpus animalis esset incorruptibile, si hoc secundum naturam pateretur talis materia qualem forma animalis requirit. 10. Whatever is better must necessarily exist in those things which exist for an end, but not in those things which are a result of the necessary character of matter. For it would be better if an animal body were incorruptible, and if this were permitted by nature, an animal form would require such a matter.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod ea quae sunt maxime propinqua elementis et plus habent de contrarietate, ut lapides et metalla, magis durabilia sunt, quia minor est in eis harmonia, unde non ita de facili solvuntur; eorum enim quae subtiliter proportionantur facile solvitur harmonia. Nihilominus tamen in animalibus causa longitudinis vitae est ut humidum non sit facile desiccabile vel congelabile et calidum non sit facile extinguibile: quia vita in calido et humido consistit. Hoc autem in homine invenitur secundum aliquam mensuram, quam requirit complexio reducta ad medium. Unde quaedam sunt homine durabiliora, et quaedam minus durabilia; et secundum hoc quidam homines durabiliores sunt aliis. 11. Those things which are most akin in nature to the elements, and possess greater contrariety, such as stones and metals, are more enduring, because in them the elements are less subtly proportioned (harmonia), and thus they are not easily disintegrated. For the blending of the elements in those things which are subtly proportioned, is easily destroyed. Notwithstanding, the cause of longevity in animals is attributed to the fact that the moisture which they contain is not easily dried up or made inactive, nor is their heat easily extinguished, because heat and moisture are indispensable for life. Moreover, this is found in man to the extent that it is necessary for a combination [of the elements] reduced to a mean. Hence in men some combinations are more enduring, others less so, and as a result of this some men live longer than others.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod corpus hominis non potuit esse corpus simplex, nec corpus caeleste potuit esse propter passibilitatem organi sensus, et praecipue tactus; neque corpus simplex elementare: quia in elemento sunt contraria in actu. Corpus autem humanum oportet esse reductum ad medium. 12. The human body could not be a simple body, nor could it be a celestial body, because of the determinable character of a sense organ, particularly that of touch. Nor could it be a simple elementary body, because actual contraries exist in an element, whereas the human body must be reduced to a mean.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod antiqui naturales existimaverunt quod oporteret animam, quae cognoscit omnia, similem esse actu omnibus. Et ideo ponebant eam esse de natura elementi, quod ponebant principium ex quo omnia constare dicebant, ut sic anima esset similis omnibus, ut omnia cognosceret. Aristoteles autem postmodum ostendit quod anima cognoscit omnia in quantum est similis omnibus in potentia, non in actu. Unde oportet corpus cui unitur, non esse in extremo, sed in medio, ut sic sit in potentia ad contraria. 13. The nature philosophers of antiquity thought that the soul, which knows all things, must actually be like all things. And therefore they maintained that the soul possessed the nature of an element, which they held was the principle from which all things are said to be constituted, so that in this way the soul knew all things inasmuch as it was like all things. However, Aristotle later showed that the soul knows all things inasmuch as it is like all things potentially, not actually. Consequently the body to which it is united must be composed not of extremes but of a mean, so that it may thus be in potency to contraries.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod quamvis anima sit simplex in essentia, est tamen in virtute multiplex, et tanto magis quanto fuerit perfectior. Et ideo requirit corpus organicum quod sit dissimilium partium. 14. Although a soul is simple in essence, yet it has many powers. And the more numerous its powers, the more perfect will it be. For this reason it requires an organic body constituted of dissimilar parts.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod anima non unitur corpori propter motum localem; sed magis motus localis hominis, sicut et aliorum animalium, ordinatur ad conservationem corporis uniti animae. Sed anima unitur corpori propter intelligere, quod est propria et principalis eius operatio; et ideo requirit quod corpus unitum animae rationali sit optime dispositum ad serviendum animae in his quae sunt necessaria ad intelligendum, et quod de agilitate et de aliis huiusmodi habeat quantum talis dispositio patitur. 15. The soul is not united to the body for the sake of local motion; rather is the local motion of man, like that of other animals, directed to conserving the body which is united to the soul. But the soul is united to the body for the sake of intellection, which is its proper and principal operation. For this reason the body, being united to the rational soul, must be best disposed to serve the soul with respect to the things necessary for intellection. It is also necessary that the body possess agility and other things of this kind, so far as such a disposition permits this.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod Plato ponebat formas rerum per se subsistentes, et quod participatio formarum a materiis est propter materias ut perficiantur, non autem propter formas, quae per se subsistunt; et ideo sequebatur quod formae darentur materiis secundum merita earum. Sed secundum sententiam Aristotelis, formae naturales non per se subsistunt; unde unio formae ad materiam non est propter materiam, sed propter formam. Non igitur quia materia est sic disposita talis forma sibi datur; sed ut forma sit talis oportuit materiam sic disponi. Et sic supra dictum est quod corpus hominis dispositum est secundum quod competit tali formae. 16. Plato maintained that the form of things subsisted of themselves, and that the participation of forms by material things is for the sake of material things inasmuch as they are thereby perfected, and not for the sake of the forms themselves, which subsist of themselves. From this it follows that forms are given to material things so far as they merit them. Now according to the view of Aristotle, natural forms do not subsist of themselves. Hence a form is united to matter not for the sake of matter, but for the sake of form. Therefore a certain form is given to matter not because matter is so disposed, but because a certain form requires matter to be so disposed. For this reason it was said above that the human body is disposed in a manner befitting such a form as the human soul.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod corpus caeleste, licet sit causa particularium quae generantur et corrumpuntur, est tamen eorum causa ut agens commune; propter quod sub eo requirunt determinata agentia ad determinatas species. Unde motor corporis caelestis non oportet quod habeat formas particulares sed universales, sive sit anima sive motor separatus. Avicenna tamen posuit, quod oportebat animam caeli habere imaginationem, per quam particularia comprehenderet. Cum enim sit causa motus caeli, secundum quem revolvitur caelum in hoc ubi et in illo, oportet animam caeli, quae est causa motus, cognoscere hic et nunc; et ita oportet quod habeat aliquam potentiam sensitivam. Sed hoc non est necessarium. Primo quidem, quia motus caelestis est semper uniformis et non recipit impedimentum; et ideo universalis conceptio sufficit ad causandum talem motum. Particularis enim conceptio requiritur in motibus animalium propter irregularitatem motus, et impedimenta quae possunt provenire. Deinde, quia etiam substantiae intellectuales superiores possunt particularia cognoscere sine potentia sensitiva, sicut alibi ostensum est. 17. Although a celestial body is the cause of the particular things which are generated and corrupted, nevertheless it causes them as a common agent. For this reason determinate agents of a particular species are required beneath it. Hence it is not necessary for the mover of a celestial body, whether it be a soul or a separate mover, to have particular forms, but only universal ones. Now Avicenna maintained that the soul of a celestial body had to have an imagination through which it could apprehend particulars. For the soul of a heaven, being the cause of its motion, must know the here and the now, and therefore must have some sensory power, because it is the cause of the celestial motion whereby a heaven revolves in this or that [particular] place. But this is not necessary. First, indeed, because celestial motion is always uniform and is not hindered, and therefore a universal conception is sufficient to cause such movement. For a knowledge of the particular is required in the case of animal movements on account of the irregularity of such movement, and because obstacles can hinder such movement. Secondly, because superior intellectual substances can apprehend particulars without a sensory power, as was shown elsewhere.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod motus caeli est naturalis propter principium passivum sive receptivum motus, quia tali corpori competit naturaliter talis motus; sed principium activum huius motus est aliqua substantia intellectualis. Quod autem dicitur quod nullum corpus in suo ubi existens movetur naturaliter, intelligitur de corpore mobili motu recto, quod mutat locum secundum totum non solum ratione sed etiam subiecto. Corpus autem quod circulariter movetur totum quidem non mutat locum subiecto, sed ratione tantum; unde nunquam est extra suum ubi. 18. The movement of a heaven is natural on account of a passive principle or of movement received, because such movement belongs naturally to such a body. But the active principle of this movement is a certain intellectual substance. Now the statement that no body is moved naturally when it is in its proper place, is understood of a body moved by rectilinear movement, and this body changes place with respect to the whole of itself not only from the point of view of reason, but also from that of the subject itself. But a body which is moved circularly does not change place with respect to the whole of itself [from the point of view of the subject] but only from that of reason. Hence it never is outside its [proper] place.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum quod probatio illa frivola est, licet Rabbi Moyses eam ponat. Quod si enarrare proprie accipitur cum dicitur: caeli enarrant gloriam Dei; oportet quod caelum non solum habeat intellectum, sed etiam linguam. Dicuntur ergo caeli enarrare gloriam Dei, si ad litteram exponatur, in quantum ex eis manifestatur hominibus gloria Dei; per quem modum etiam creaturae insensibiles Deum laudare dicuntur. 19. This argument is foolish despite the fact that Rabbi Moses proposes it. Because, if “to proclaim” is taken in its proper sense, when it is said that “the heavens proclaim the glory of God,” the heavens would require not only an intellect but also a ton(rue. Therefore the heavens are said to proclaim the glory of God, if taken in a literal sense, inasmuch as through them the glory of God is made manifest to men. In this way, also, insensible creatures are said to praise God.
Ad vicesimum dicendum quod alia animalia habent aestimativam naturalem determinatam ad aliqua certa, et ideo sufficienter potuit eis provideri a natura aliquibus certis auxiliis; non autem homini, qui propter rationem est infinitarum conceptionum. Et ideo loco omnium auxiliorum quae alia animalia naturaliter habent, habet homo intellectum, qui est species specierum, et manus quae sunt organum organorum, per quas potest sibi praeparare omnia necessaria. 20. Other animals have a natural estimative power directed to definite activities, and therefore nature could provide them sufficiently with certain definite aids. But not so in the case of man who is capable of an unlimited number of conceptions because of his reason. And therefore, in place of all the aids which other animals possess by nature, man has an intellect, which is a mirror of all forms, and hands, which are the organs of organs, whereby he can provide for himself whatever he requires.
ARTICLE 9
WHETHER THE SOUL IS UNITED TO CORPOREAL MATTER THROUGH A MEDIUM

[Summa theol., I, q. 76, a. 6; a. 7; Contra Gentiles, II, 71; Sent., II, dist. 1, q.2, a.4, ad 3; Quodl., XII, q.6, a.9; De spir. creat., a.3; Comm. in Metaph., VIII, lect 5.]
Nono quaeritur utrum anima uniatur materiale corporali per medium In the ninth article we examine this question: Whether the soul is united to corporeal matter through a medium.
Objections.
Et videtur quod sic. Quia in libro de spiritu et anima dicitur quod anima habet vires quibus miscetur corpori. Sed vires animae sunt aliud quam eius essentia. Ergo anima unitur corpori per aliquod medium. 1. It seems that the soul is united to the body in this way, because it is stated in the work De spiritu et anima, [X] that the soul has powers (vires) by which it is united to the body. But the powers of the soul are distinct from the soul’s essence. Therefore the soul is united to the body through some medium.
Sed dicebat quod anima unitur corpori mediantibus potentiis, in quantum est motor, sed non in quantum est forma. —Sed contra, anima est forma corporis in quantum est actus; motor autem est in quantum est principium operationis. Principium vero operationis est in quantum est actus, quia unumquodque agit secundum quod actu est. Ergo secundum idem anima est forma corporis et motor. Non ergo est distinguendum de anima secundum quod est motor corporis vel forma. 2. But it must be said that the soul is united through the medium of its powers to the body as the mover of the latter and not as its form. On the other hand, the soul is the form of the body inasmuch as it is an act, but is a mover inasmuch as it is a principle of operation. And certainly a thing is a principle of operation inasmuch as it is an act, because a thing acts inasmuch as it is actual. Hence the soul is the form and mover of the body in the same respect. Consequently no distinction is to be drawn between the soul as the mover of the body and as its form.
Praeterea, anima ut est motor corporis non unitur corpori per accidens, quia sic ex anima et corpore non fieret unum per se. Ergo unitur ei per se. Sed quod unitur alicui per seipsum, unitur ei sine medio. Non ergo anima, in quantum est motor, unitur corpori per medium. 3. Further, inasmuch as the soul is the mover of the body, it is not united to the body accidentally, because then a being that is substantially one (unum per se) would not result from the union of soul and body. Therefore the soul is united to the body substantially. But whatever is united to a thing substantially, is united to it without a medium. Consequently the soul is not united as a mover to the body through a medium.
Praeterea, anima unitur corpori ut motor, in quantum est principium operationis. Sed operationes animae non sunt animae tantum, sed compositi, ut dicitur in I de anima; et sic inter animam et corpus non cadit aliquod medium quantum ad operationes. Non ergo anima unitur corpori per medium in quantum est motor. 4. Further, the soul is united as a mover to the body inasmuch as it is the body’s principle of operation. However, the soul’s operations do not belong to the soul alone, but to the composite, as is pointed out in the De anima [I, 4, 408b 11] and thus there is no medium between the soul and the body so far as the soul’s operations are concerned. Hence the soul, inasmuch as it is the mover of the body, is not united to the body through a medium.
Praeterea, videtur quod etiam uniatur ei per medium, in quantum est forma. Forma enim non unitur cuilibet materiae, sed propriae. Fit autem materia propria huius formae vel illius per dispositiones proprias, quae sunt propria accidentia rei; sicut calidum et siccum sunt propria accidentia ignis. Ergo forma unitur materiae mediantibus propriis accidentibus. Sed propria accidentia animatorum sunt potentiae animae. Ergo anima unitur corpori ut forma mediantibus potentiis. 5. Further, it seems that the soul, as a form, is united to the body through a medium. For a form is not united to any kind of matter but to one befitting it (propria). Now the matter of any particular form is prepared to receive that form through proper dispositions which are proper accidents of a thing, just as hot and dry are proper accidents of fire. Therefore, a form is united to its matter through the medium of proper accidents. But the proper accidents of living things are the powers of their soul. Therefore, as a form, the soul is united through the medium of its powers to the body.
Praeterea, animal est movens seipsum. Movens autem seipsum dividitur in duas partes, quarum una est movens et alia est mota, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Pars autem movens est anima. Sed pars mota non potest esse materia sola: quia quod est in potentia tantum non movetur, ut dicitur in V Physic. Et ideo corpora gravia et levia, licet habeant in seipsis motum, non tamen movent seipsa; quia dividuntur solum in materiam et formam, quae non potest esse mota. Relinquitur ergo quod animal dividatur in animam, et aliquam partem quae sit composita ex materia et forma; et sic sequitur quod anima uniatur materiae corporali mediante aliqua forma. 6. Further an animal is a thing that moves itself. But a thing that moves itself is divided into two parts, one of which is a mover, the other a thing moved, as is proved in the Physics [VIII, 4, 254b 15]. Now the part causing movement is a soul; however, the moved part cannot be matter alone, because whatever is in potency only is not moved, as is said in the Physics [V, 1, 225a 20]. Hence although heavy and light bodies have movement in themselves, they do not move themselves because they are divided only into matter and into form, which cannot be moved. It follows, then, that an animal is divided into a soul and into some part which is composed of matter and form. Consequently the soul is united to corporeal matter by means of some form.
Praeterea, in definitione cuiuslibet formae ponitur propria materia eius. Sed in definitione animae, in quantum est forma, ponitur corpus physicum organicum potentia vitam habens, ut patet in II de anima. Ergo anima unitur huiusmodi corpori ut propriae materiae. Sed hoc non potest esse nisi per aliquam formam; scilicet quod sit aliquod corpus physicum organicum potentia vitam habens. Ergo anima unitur materiae mediante aliqua forma primo materiam perficiente. 7. Further, the proper matter of any form is given in the definition of that form. Now “a physical organic body potentially having life” is given in the definition of the soul inasmuch as it is the form of the body, as is evident in the De anima [II, 1, 412a 28]. Consequently the soul is united to such a body as its proper matter. But “a physical organic body potentially having life” can exist as such only because of some form. Therefore the soul is united to its matter through some form which first perfects its matter.
Praeterea, Genes. II, dicitur: formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae. Spiraculum autem vitae est anima. Ergo aliqua forma praecedit in materia unionem animae; et sic anima mediante alia forma unitur materiae corporali. 8. Further, it is said: “God made man from the slime of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life” (Gen. 2:7)Now the breath of life is the soul. Hence some form exists in matter prior to its union with the body, and thus the soul is united to corporeal matter through the medium of some other form.
Praeterea, secundum hoc formae uniuntur materiae quod materia est in potentia ad eas. Sed materia per prius est in potentia ad formas elementorum quam ad alias formas. Ergo anima et aliae formae non uniuntur materiae nisi mediantibus formis elementorum. 9. Further, forms are united to matter so far as matter is in potency to them. But matter is first in potency to the forms of the elements rather than to other forms. Consequently the soul and other forms are united to matter only through the intermediary forms of the elements.
Praeterea, corpus humanum et cuiuslibet animalis est corpus mixtum. Sed in mixto oportet quod remaneant formae elementorum per essentiam; alias esset corruptio elementorum et non mixtio. Ergo anima unitur materiae mediantibus aliis formis. 10. Further, the body of a man and that of an animal are mixed bodies. But the forms of the elements must remain essentially in a mixed body, otherwise there would be a corruption of the elements and not a mixture. Therefore the soul is united to matter through the medium of other forms.
Praeterea, anima intellectualis est forma in quantum est intellectualis. Sed intelligere est mediantibus aliis potentiis. Ergo anima unitur corpori ut forma mediantibus aliis potentiis. 11. Further, the intellective soul as such is a form. But its act of understanding is accomplished with the aid of its other powers. Therefore the soul, inasmuch as it is a form, is united to the body through the medium of these other powers.
Praeterea, anima non unitur cuilibet corpori, sed corpori sibi proportionato. Oportet ergo proportionem esse inter animam et corpus, et sic mediante proportione anima unitur corpori. 12. Further, the soul is not united to any sort of body, but to one proportioned to it. Therefore there must be a proportion between the soul and the body; and thus the soul is united to the body by means of a proportion.
Praeterea, unumquodque operatur in remotiora per id quod est maxime proximum. Sed vires animae diffunduntur in totum corpus per cor. Ergo cor est vicinius quam ceterae partes corporis; et ita mediante corde unietur corpori. 13. Further, a thing operates in something remote through that which is closest to itself. But the powers of the soul are diffused throughout the whole body by the heart. Therefore the heart is nearer to the soul than the other parts of the body, and thus the soul is united to the body by means of the heart.
Praeterea, in partibus corporis est invenire diversitatem, et ordinem ad invicem. Sed anima est simplex secundum suam essentiam. Cum ergo forma sit proportionata materiae perfectibili, videtur quod anima uniatur primo uni parti corporis, et, ea mediante, aliis. 14. Further, a diversity of parts mutually related are present in the body. However, the soul is simple so far as its essence is concerned. Therefore, since a form is proportioned to the matter that is capable of being perfected by it, it seems that the soul is united first to one part of the body, and then to the other parts of the body through the intermediary of this [first] part.
Praeterea, anima est superior corpore. Sed inferiores vires animae ligant superiores corporis; non enim intellectus indiget corpore nisi propter imaginationem et sensum, a quibus accipit. Ergo e contrario corpus unitur animae per ea quae sunt suprema et simpliciora, sicut per spiritum et humorem. 15. Further, the soul is superior to the body. But the inferior powers of the soul are united to the superior parts of the body, for the intellect requires the body only because of the imagination and the external senses from which it receives species. Therefore, conversely, the soul is united to the body through those things which are highest and simplest, as through spirits and humors.
Praeterea, illud quo subtracto solvitur unio aliquorum unitorum, videtur esse medium inter ea. Sed subtracto spiritu, et calido naturali extincto, et humido radicali exsiccato, solvitur unio animae et corporis. Ergo praedicta sunt medium inter animam et corpus. 16. Further, that which when taken away destroys the unity among things united to one another, is seen to be a medium between them. But the union of soul and body is dissolved when the spirits have been removed, the natural heat extinguished, and the basic moisture exhausted. Therefore these things are media between the soul and the body.
Praeterea, sicut anima naturaliter unitur corpori, ita haec anima unitur huic corpori. Sed hoc corpus est per hoc quod est sub aliquibus dimensionibus terminatis. Ergo anima unitur corpori mediantibus dimensionibus terminatis. 17. Further, as a soul is naturally united to a body, so is this soul united to this body. But this body is this [particular] body through the fact that it possesses certain terminated dimensions. Therefore the soul is united to the body by the medium of terminated dimensions..
Praeterea, distantia non coniunguntur nisi per medium. Sed anima et corpus humanum videntur esse maxime distantia, cum unum eorum sit incorporeum et simplex, aliud corporeum et maxime compositum. Ergo anima non unitur corpori nisi per medium. 18. Further, things which differ from one another are united only through a medium. But the soul and the human body are seen to differ from each other to the greatest degree, because one of them is incorporeal and simple, the other corporeal and particularly complex. Therefore the soul is united to the body only through a medium.
Praeterea, anima humana est similis in natura intellectuali substantiis separatis, quae movent caelestia corpora. Sed eadem videtur esse habitudo motorum et mobilium. Ergo videtur quod corpus humanum, quod est motum ab anima, habeat aliquid in se de natura caelestis corporis, quo mediante anima sibi uniatur. 19. Further, the human soul is similar in intellectual nature to the separate substances which move the celestial bodies. Now these are seen to be related to one another as movers and things capable of being moved. Consequently it seems that the human body, which is moved by the soul, has within itself something of the nature of a celestial body, and that the soul is united to the body by means of this.
Sed contra, est quod dicit philosophus in VIII Metaph., quod forma unitur materiae immediate. Anima autem unitur corpori ut forma. Ergo unitur sibi immediate. On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics [VIII, 6, 1045b 16] that a form is united to its matter directly. Now the soul is united as a form to the body. Therefore it is united to the body directly.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod inter omnia, esse est illud quod immediatius et intimius convenit rebus, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis; unde oportet, cum materia habeat esse actu per formam, quod forma dans esse materiae, ante omnia intelligatur advenire materiae, et immediatius ceteris sibi inesse. Est autem hoc proprium formae substantialis quod det materiae esse simpliciter; ipsa enim est per quam res est hoc ipsum quod est. Non autem per formas accidentales habet esse simpliciter, sed esse secundum quid: puta esse magnum, vel coloratum, vel aliquid tale. Si qua ergo forma est quae non det materiae esse simpliciter, sed adveniat materiae iam existenti in actu per aliquam formam, non erit forma substantialis. Ex quo patet quod inter formam substantialem et materiam non potest cadere aliqua forma substantialis media, sicut quidam voluerunt, ponentes quod secundum ordinem generum, quorum unum sub altero ordinatur, est ordo diversarum formarum in materia; utpote si dicamus, quod materia secundum unam formam habet quod sit substantia in actu, et secundum aliam quod sit corpus, et iterum secundum aliam quod sit animatum corpus, et sic deinceps. I answer: Among all [principles] the act of existing (esse) is that which most immediately and intimately belongs to things, as is pointed out in the book De causis [IV]. Hence the form which gives matter its act of existing, must be understood to come to matter prior to anything else, and to be present in it more immediately than anything else, because matter receives its act of existing from a form. Moreover, it is proper to a substantial form to give matter its act of existing pure and simple (esse simpliciter), because it is through its form that a thing is the very thing that it is. For a thing is not given an act of existing pure and simple through accidental forms, but only a relative one (esse secundum quid), such as to be large or colored, and so on. Therefore, if there is a form which does not give to matter its act of existing pure and simple, but comes to matter already possessing an act of existing through some form, such a form will not be a substantial one. From this it is obvious that an intermediary substantial form cannot intervene between a substantial form and matter, as some wished to maintain. For these men held that there exists in matter an order of diverse forms, one of which is arranged under another in accordance with the order of genera; as if one were to say, for instance, that matter is given the act of existing of a substance through one form; the act of existing of a body through another; the act of existing of a living body through still another; and so on.
Sed hac positione facta, sola prima forma, quae faceret esse substantiam actu, esset substantialis, aliae vero omnes accidentales; quia forma substantialis est quae facit hoc aliquid, ut iam dictum est. Oportet igitur dicere, quod eadem numero forma sit per quam res habet quod sit substantia, et quod sit in ultima specie specialissima, et in omnibus intermediis generibus. Relinquitur ergo dicendum quod cum formae rerum naturalium sint sicut numeri, in quibus est diversitas speciei addita vel subtracta unitate, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys.; oportet intelligere diversitatem formarum naturalium, secundum quas constituitur materia in diversis speciebus, ex hoc quod una addit perfectionem super aliam, ut puta quod una forma constituit in esse corporali tantum (hunc enim oportet esse infimum gradum formarum animalium, eo quod materia non est in potentia nisi ad formas corporales. Quae enim incorporea sunt, immaterialia sunt, ut in praecedentibus ostensum est). Alia autem perfectior forma constituit materiam in esse corporali, et ulterius dat ei esse vitale. But if this position is adopted, only the first form which gives a thing its act of existing as a substance, would be a substantial one. The other forms, indeed, would all be accidental ones, because it is a thing’s substantial form that makes it be a substance (hoc aliquid), as we have already shown (Art. 1). Therefore it is necessary to say that a thing has substantiality, exists in the ultimate species, under which there are no other species (specialissima), and in all intermediate genera, through one and the same form. Now the forms of natural things are like numbers, whose species change when a unit is added or subtracted, as is pointed out in the Metaphysics.” It follows, therefore, that the diversity of natural forms, in accordance with which matter is constituted in diverse species, is to be understood as resulting from this fact, that one adds a perfection over and above another. For example, one form gives matter corporeal existence only. (This must be below the grade of animal forms, because matter is in potency only to corporeal forms. For those things which are incorporeal are immaterial, as was shown in the preceding question.) A second more perfect form gives matter vital existence in addition to corporeal existence. Another, still higher, form confers on it sensory existence in addition to vital and corporeal existence; and so on successively.
Et ulterius alia forma dat ei et esse corporale et esse vitale, et super hoc addit ei esse sensitivum; et sic est in aliis. Oportet ergo intelligere quod forma perfectior secundum quod simul cum materia compositum constituit in perfectione inferioris gradus, intelligatur ut materiale respectu ulterioris perfectionis, et sic ulterius procedendo. Utpote materia prima, secundum quod iam constituta est in esse corporeo, est materia respectu ulterioris perfectionis, quae est vita; et exinde est quod corpus est genus corporis viventis; et animatum, sive vivens, est differentia. Nam genus sumitur a materia et differentia a forma; et sic quodammodo una et eadem forma, secundum quod constituit materiam in actu inferioris gradus, est media inter materiam et seipsam, secundum quod constituit eam in actu superioris gradus. Materia autem prout intelligitur constituta in esse substantiali secundum perfectionem inferioris gradus, per consequens intelligi potest ut accidentibus subiecta. Nam substantia secundum illum inferiorem gradum perfectionis necesse est quod habeat quaedam accidentia propria quae necesse est ei inesse. Sicut ex hoc quod materia constituitur in esse corporeo per formas, statim consequitur ut sint in ea dimensiones, per quas intelligitur materia divisibilis per diversas partes, ut sic secundum diversas sui partes possit esse susceptiva diversarum formarum. Et ulterius ex quo materia intelligitur constituta in esse quodam substantiali, intelligi potest ut susceptiva accidentium quibus disponitur ad ulteriorem perfectionem, secundum quam materia fit propria ad ulteriorem perfectionem suscipiendam. Huiusmodi autem dispositiones praeintelliguntur formae ut inductae ab agente in materiam, licet sint quaedam accidentia impropria formae, quae non nisi ex ipsa forma causentur in materia. Unde non praeintelliguntur in materia formae quasi dispositiones, sed magis forma praeintelligitur eis, sicut causa effectibus. Therefore a more perfect form, constituting with matter a composite being in the perfection of an inferior grade, must be considered as matter with respect to a higher perfection; and so on up the scale. For instance, prime matter, so far as it now exists in a corporeal mode, is matter with respect to the higher perfection of life. (And so body is the genus of living body, and animated or living is the specific difference. For genus is derived from matter, and difference from form.) Thus, in a certain way, one and the same form actualizing matter in a lower grade of perfection, is midway between matter and that same form actualizing matter in a superior grade. But matter, so far as it is understood to have substantial existence as a perfection of an inferior grade, can, therefore, be regarded as the subject of accidents. For a substance in that inferior grade of perfection must have a proper accident which necessarily inheres in it. Likewise, from the fact that matter has corporeal existence through forms, it immediately follows that there are dimensions in matter whereby it is understood to be divisible into different parts, so that it can receive different forms corresponding to its different parts. Furthermore, from the fact that matter is known to have a certain substantial mode of existing, matter can be understood to receive accidents by which it is disposed to a higher perfection’ so far as it is fittingly disposed to receive that higher perfection. Moreover dispositions of this kind are understood to exist in matter prior to the form, inasmuch as they are given existence in matter by an agent, although there are some improper accidents of the form that are caused in the matter only by the form itself. Hence such accidents are not understood to exist as dispositions in matter prior to the form; rather is the form understood to be prior to the proper accidents as a cause is to its effects.
Sic igitur cum anima sit forma substantialis, quia constituit hominem in determinata specie substantiae, non est aliqua alia forma substantialis media inter animam et materiam primam; sed homo ab ipsa anima rationali perficitur secundum diversos gradus perfectionum, ut sit scilicet corpus, et animatum corpus, et animal rationale. Sed oportet quod materia secundum quod intelligitur ut recipiens ab ipsa anima rationali perfectiones inferioris gradus, puta quod sit corpus et animatum corpus et animal, intelligatur, simul cum dispositionibus convenientibus, quod sit materia propria ad animam rationalem, secundum quod dat ultimam perfectionem. Sic igitur anima, secundum quod est forma dans esse, non habet aliquid aliud medium inter se et materiam primam. Sed quia eadem forma quae dat esse materiae est etiam operationis principium, eo quod unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu; necesse est quod anima, sicut et quaelibet alia forma, sit etiam operationis principium. Consequently, since the soul is a substantial form, because it places man in a determinate species of substance, no other substantial form intervenes between the soul and prime matter. But man is perfected in different grades of perfection by the rational soul itself, so that he is a body, a living body, and a rational animal. However, matter (being understood to receive from the rational soul itself, perfections of an inferior grade, for instance, that of being a body, a living body, and an animal) must also be understood to have, at the same time, appropriate dispositions so that it may be a matter befitting a human soul, inasmuch as the soul gives the body its ultimate perfection. So, therefore, the soul inasmuch as it is the form which gives the act of existing absolutely, does not have any intermediary between itself and prime matter. But because the same form which gives matter its act of existing, is also a principle of operation (for a thing acts so far as it is in act), then the soul like any other form must be a principle of operation.
Sed considerandum est quod secundum gradum formarum in perfectione essendi est etiam gradus earum in virtute operandi, cum operatio sit existentis in actu. Et ideo quanto aliqua forma est maioris perfectionis in dando esse, tanto etiam est maioris virtutis in operando. Unde formae perfectiores habent plures operationes et magis diversas quam formae minus perfectae. Et inde est quod ad diversitatem operationum in rebus minus perfectis sufficit diversitas accidentium. In rebus autem magis perfectis requiritur ulterius diversitas partium; et tanto magis, quanto forma fuerit perfectior. Videmus enim quod igni conveniunt diversae operationes secundum diversa accidentia; sicut ferri sursum secundum levitatem, calefacere secundum calorem, et sic de aliis. Sed tamen quaelibet harum operationum competit igni secundum quamlibet partem eius. In corporibus vero animatis quae habent nobiliores formas, diversis operationibus deputantur diversae partes; sicut in plantis alia est operatio radicis, alia rami et stipitis. Et quanto corpora animata fuerint perfectiora, tanto propter maiorem perfectionem necesse est inveniri maiorem diversitatem in partibus. Unde cum anima rationalis sit perfectissima formarum naturalium, in homine invenitur maxima distinctio partium propter diversas operationes; et anima singulis earum dat esse substantiale, secundum illum modum qui competit operationi ipsorum. Cuius signum est, quod remota anima, non remanet neque caro neque oculus nisi aequivoce. Sed cum oporteat ordinem instrumentorum esse secundum ordinem operationum, diversarum autem operationum quae sunt ab anima, una naturaliter praecedit alteram, necessarium est quod una pars corporis moveatur per aliam ad suam operationem. Sic ergo inter animam secundum quod est motor et principium operationum et totum corpus, cadit aliquid medium; quia mediante aliqua prima parte primo mota movet alias partes ad suas operationes, sicut mediante corde movet alia membra ad vitales operationes: sed secundum quod dat esse corpori, immediate dat esse substantiale et specificum omnibus partibus corporis. Et hoc est quod a multis dicitur quod anima unitur corpori ut forma sine medio, ut motor autem per medium. But it must be considered that a gradation of forms in the order of operation corresponds to the gradation of forms in the order of existence, for an operation is an act of an agent in act. Therefore the greater perfection a form possesses with respect to conferring the act of existing, so much the greater is its power of operating. Hence more perfect forms have a greater number of operations and more diverse ones than less perfect forms. And so it is that a diversity of accidents suffices for a diversity of operations in the case of less perfect things. But in the case of more perfect things a diversity of parts is required as well; and the greater the diversity of parts, the more perfect the form will be. For we see that diverse operations are proper to fire because its accidents differ, for example, to rise upward in virtue of its lightness; to heat in virtue of its heat; and so on. However’ any one of these operations belongs to any part of fire. But in animate bodies which have nobler forms, different operations are allotted to different parts, for instance, in plants there is one operation performed by the roots, another by the trunk, and still another by the branches. And the more perfect that living bodies are, so much the more diverse must their parts be in view of their greater perfection. Therefore, since the rational soul is the most perfect of natural forms, there is found in man the greatest diversity of parts because of his different operations. Furthermore the one soul performing these operations confers substantial existence in a manner befitting the operations of the parts themselves. An indication of this fact is that, when the soul ceases to animate the body, neither flesh nor eye remains except in an equivocal sense. But since there must be an order of instruments in keeping with the order of operations, and since there is a natural precedence among the different operations which flow from the soul, one part of the body must be moved to perform its operations by another part. Thus a medium intervenes between the whole body and the soul as the mover and principle of its operations. For after a certain primary mediating part of the body has been moved, that part moves the other parts to perform their operations. So it is that the soul, by means of the heart, moves the other members of the body to perform their vital operations. But since the soul gives to the body its act of existing, it immediately gives to all parts of the body their substantial and specific mode of existing. And this is what many assert, namely, that as a form the soul is united to the body without an intermediary, but that as a mover it is united to the body through an intermediary.
Et haec opinio procedit secundum sententiam Aristotelis qui ponit animam esse formam substantialem corporis. Sed quidam ponentes secundum opinionem Platonis animam uniri corpori sicut unam substantiam, alii, necesse habuerunt ponere media quibus anima uniretur corpori; quia diversae substantiae et distantes non colligantur, nisi sit aliquid quod uniat eas. Et sic posuerunt quidam spiritum et humorem esse medium inter animam et corpus, et quidam lucem, et quidam potentias animae, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Sed nullum istorum est necessarium, si anima est forma corporis; quia unumquodque secundum quod est ens, est unum. Unde cum forma secundum seipsam det esse materiae, secundum seipsam unitur materiae primae, et non per aliud aliquod ligamentum. Moreover, this view is in keeping with the position of Aristotle, who maintains that the soul is the substantial form of the body. However, some who, following Plato’s theory, hold that the soul is united to the body as one substance is to another, had to posit media through which the soul is united to the body. For diverse and disparate substances are unified only if something exists to unite them. For this reason some held that there is a certain spirit and humor existing as a medium between soul and body; other posited light; still others, the powers of the soul, or something else of this sort. But none of these [entities] are necessary if the soul is the form of the body, because anything whatever, inasmuch as it is a being, is one. Hence a form is united to prime matter by virtue of itself and not by any other bond, because a form, by its very nature, gives to matter its act of existing.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vires animae sunt qualitates eius quibus operatur; et ideo cadunt media inter animam et corpus, secundum quod anima movet corpus, non autem secundum quod dat ei esse. Tamen sciendum, quod liber qui inscribitur de spiritu et anima non est Augustini, et quod auctor illius opinatus est quod anima sit suae potentiae. Unde totaliter cessat obiectio. 1. The powers of the soul are the qualities by which it operates. Therefore they serve as intermediaries between the soul and the body inasmuch as the soul moves the body, but not inasmuch as it gives to the body its act of existing. Moreover, it must be understood that the work which is called De spiritu et anima is not a work of Augustine, and that its author is of the opinion that the soul is its powers. Hence the objection fails completely.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet anima sit forma in quantum est actus, et similiter in quantum est motor, et ita secundum idem sit forma et motor; tamen alius est effectus eius secundum quod est forma, et alius secundum quod est motor; et propter hoc locum habet distinctio. 2. Although the soul is a form inasmuch as it is an act, and similarly is a mover inasmuch as it is an act, and thus is a form and a mover in one and the same respect, nevertheless the effect which it produces as a form differs from that which it produces as a mover. The distinction is made for this reason.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ex motore et mobili non fit unum per se in quantum huiusmodi; sed ex hoc motore qui est anima et ex hoc mobili quod est corpus, fit unum per se, in quantum anima est forma corporis. 3. One being pure and simple (unum per se) does not result from the union of a mover and a thing moved inasmuch as they are mover and moved, but from [the union of] this mover which is the soul, inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, and this mobile thing which is the body.
Ad quartum dicendum quod, quantum ad illam operationem animae quae est compositi, non cadit aliquod medium inter animam et quamlibet partem corporis; sed est una pars corporis per quam primo exercet anima illam operationem quae cadit media inter animam secundum quod est principium illius operationis, et omnes alias partes corporis, quae participant illam operationem. 4. Nothing intervenes between the soul and any part of the body with respect to any operation of the soul which is an operation of the composite. However, there is one part of the body through which the soul first exercises its operation, which [part] falls midway between the soul, so far as it is the principle of that operation, and all the other parts of the body which share in that operation.
Ad quintum dicendum quod dispositiones accidentales quae faciunt materiam propriam ad aliquam formam, non sunt mediae totaliter inter formam et materiam; sed inter formam secundum quod dat ultimam perfectionem, et materiam secundum quod iam est perfecta perfectione inferioris gradus. Materia enim secundum seipsam est prima respectu infimi gradus perfectionis, quia secundum seipsam est in potentia ad esse substantiale corporeum. Nec ad hoc requirit aliquam dispositionem; sed hac perfectione praesupposita in materia requiruntur dispositiones ad ulteriorem perfectionem. Tamen sciendum est quod potentiae animae sunt accidentia propria animae, quae non sunt sine ea. Unde non habent rationem dispositionis ad animam secundum quod sunt eius potentiae, nisi secundum quod potentiae inferioris partis animae dicuntur dispositiones ad superiorem partem; sicut potentia animae vegetabilis ad animam sensibilem, secundum quod ex praemissis intelligi potest. 5. The accidental dispositions which dispose matter properly for [receiving] some form are not media absolutely between form and matter, but between form inasmuch as it bestows the highest perfection, and matter inasmuch as it is already perfected by some perfection of an inferior order. For matter by its very nature is first with respect to the lowest grade of perfection, because matter of itself is in potency to substantial corporeal existence. Moreover, it does not require to be disposed in this way. But matter, having this perfection already in existence, requires dispositions to a higher perfection. Moreover it must be recognized that the powers of the soul are its proper accidents and do not exist without the soul. Therefore, inasmuch as they are its powers, they do not have the nature of a disposition in relation to the soul except so far as the powers of the inferior part of the soul are called dispositions in relation to the powers of the superior part, just as the powers of the vegetal soul are dispositions in relation to the sentient soul, as can be seen from the preceding argument.
Ad sextum dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod anima vel animal dividatur in duas partes, quarum una est sicut corpus mobile, et alia sicut motor. Quod quidem verum est. Sed oportet intelligere quod anima movet corpus per apprehensionem et appetitum. Apprehensio autem et appetitus in homine duplex est. Una quidem quae est animae tantum, non per organum corporale, quae est partis intellectivae. Alia quae est coniuncti, et est partis sensitivae. Illa autem quae est partis intellectivae non movet corpus nisi mediante ea quae est partis sensitivae; quia, cum motus sit circa aliquod singulare, apprehensio universalis quae est intellectus, non movet nisi mediante particulari, quae est sensus. Sic igitur homo vel animal cum dividitur in partem moventem et partem motam, non est haec divisio in solam animam et solum corpus; sed in unam partem corporis animati, et animam. Nam illa pars animati corporis cuius operatio est apprehendere et appetere, movet totum corpus. Sed si supponatur quod pars intellectiva immediate moveat, ita quod pars movens in homine sit anima tantum; adhuc remanebit responsio, secundum praehabita. Nam anima humana erit movens secundum id quod est supremum in ipsa, scilicet per partem intellectivam; motum autem erit non materia prima tantum, sed materia prima secundum quod est constituta in esse corporali et vitali, non per aliam formam nisi per eamdem animam. Unde non erit necessarium ponere formam substantialem mediam inter animam et materiam primam. Sed quia in animali est quidam motus qui non est per apprehensionem et appetitum, sicut motus cordis, et etiam motus augmenti et decrementi, et motus alimenti diffusi per totum corpus, quod etiam est commune plantis; quantum ad huiusmodi motus dicendum est quod (cum anima animali non solum det id quod est proprium sibi, sed etiam id quod est inferiorum formarum, ut ex dictis patet), sicut inferiores formae sunt principia naturalis motus in corporibus naturalibus, ita etiam anima in corpore animalis. Unde philosophus dicit in II de anima, quod anima est naturalis corporis; et propter hoc operationes animae distinguuntur in animales et naturales. Ut illae dicantur animales quae sunt ab anima secundum id quod est proprium sibi; naturales autem quae sunt ab anima secundum quod facit effectum inferiorum formarum naturalium. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum, quod sicut ignis per formam suam naturalem habet naturalem motum quo tendit sursum; ita aliqua pars corporis animati in qua primo invenitur motus qui non est per apprehensionem, habet hunc motum naturaliter per animam. Sicut enim ignis naturaliter movetur sursum ita sanguis naturaliter movetur ad loca propria et determinata. Et similiter cor naturaliter movetur motu sibi proprio: licet ad hoc etiam cooperetur resolutio spirituum facta ex sanguine, quibus cor dilatatur et constringitur, ut Aristoteles dicit ubi agit de respiratione et inspiratione. Sic ergo prima pars in qua talis motus invenitur, non est movens seipsam, sed movetur naturaliter, sicut ignis; sed ista pars movet aliam. Et sic totum animal est movens seipsum, cum una pars eius sit movens, et alia sit mota. 6. This argument concludes that the soul or the animal is divided into two parts, one of which is like a mobile thing, the other like a mover. This, indeed, is true, but we must understand that the soul moves the body through knowledge and appetite. Now knowledge and appetite in man are of two kinds. First, that which belongs to the soul alone and which does not depend on a bodily organ. This belongs to the intellective part of the soul. Secondly, that which belongs to the composite. This belongs to the sentient part of the soul. Now whatever belongs to the intellective part moves the body only by means of that which belongs to the sentient part. For when a movement has to do with some particular thing, the universal apprehension which belongs to the intellect causes movement only by means of something particular belonging to sense. Hence when we divide a man or an animal into a part that causes movement and one that is moved, we do not divide them into a soul and a body exclusively, but into a soul and an animated body. For that part of the animated body whose operation it is to apprehend and to desire, moves the whole body. But if it be supposed that the intellective part moves [the body] directly, so that the, part causing movement in man is the soul alone, then the answer will be in accordance with the preceding explanation (i.e., the one given in the Answer). For the human soul will be a mover in virtue of what is supreme i n itself, namely, its intellective part. Moreover, the moved part will not be prime matter alone, but prime matter inasmuch as it is given a corporeal and vital act of existing (esse). Nor will it be moved by any other form than the soul. Hence it will not be necessary to maintain that a substantial form acts as an intermediary between the soul and prime matter. However, there is a certain movement in the animal which is not the result of apprehension and desire, that is, the movement of the heart, the movement also of growth and decay, and the movement of nutrition which is diffused throughout the whole body, and which the animal has in common with plants. Now with respect to this kind of movement, we must maintain that, as inferior forms are the principles of movement in natural bodies, so also is the soul the principle of movement in animal bodies. For the animal soul not only bestows what is proper to its nature as such, but also gives those perfections which belong to a lower order of forms, as is evident from what has been said. Hence the Philosopher says, in the De anima [II, 2, 414a 18] that the soul is the nature of this specific type of body. For this reason the operations of the soul are divided into animal operations and natural operations. That is to say, those operations which proceed from the soul in keeping with its proper nature, are called animal operations, whereas those which come from the soul inasmuch as it produces the effect of inferior natural forms, are called natural operations. According to this, therefore, it must be said that, as fire through its natural form has a natural movement whereby it tends upwards, so also does any part of an animated body in which there is found movement not resulting from apprehension, have this movement naturally through its soul. For as fire tends upward by nature, so also is the blood moved naturally to its proper and determinate place. Similarly, the heart is moved naturally by its proper movement, although the dissolution of spirits, made from the blood, by which the heart is expanded and contracted, cooperates in this activity, as Aristotle points out in the place where he treats of exhalation and inhalation. Consequently the first part of the body in which such movement is found is not a self-mover, but is moved naturally, just as fire is. However, this part moves another part, and thus the whole animal is a self-mover, because one part of it is a mover, and another is moved.
Ad septimum dicendum quod corpus physicum organicum comparatur ad animam sicut materia ad formam. Non quod sit tale per aliquam aliam formam, sed quia hoc ipsum habet per animam, ut supra ostensum est. 7. A physical organic body is related to the soul as matter to form, not that it is such a body as a result of some other form, but because it has this nature through . the soul, as was shown above.
Et similiter dicendum ad octavum. Nam quod in Genesi dicitur, formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae, non praecedit tempore hoc quod sequitur: et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae; sed ordine naturae tantum. 8. The eighth argument must be answered similarly. For the statement in Genesis: “God formed man out of the slime of the earth,” is not prior in time to the following: “And breathed into his face the breath of life”; but is prior in the order of nature only.
Ad nonum dicendum quod materia secundum ordinem est in potentia ad formas; non quod recipiat diversas formas substantiales ordinatim, sed quia id quod est proprium superioris formae non recipitur nisi mediante eo quod est proprium inferioris formae, sicut expositum est. Et per hunc modum intelligitur quod mediantibus formis elementaribus recipiat alias formas. 9. Matter is in potency to forms with respect to a certain order, not that it receives different substantial forms in a certain order, but because it receives whatever is proper to a superior form only through the medium of what is proper to an inferior form, as was shown. In this way matter is understood to receive other forms by way of the forms of the elements.
Ad decimum dicendum quod formae elementares non actu sunt in mixto secundum essentiam, licet hoc Avicenna posuerit: non enim possent esse in una parte materiae; si autem essent in diversis partibus, non esset mixtio secundum totum, quae est vera mixtio, sed esset mixtio minima, quae est mixtio ad sensum. Dicere etiam quod formae elementorum recipiant magis et minus, ut Averroes dicit, ridiculum est; cum sint formae substantiales, quae magis et minus recipere non possunt. Nec aliquid est medium inter substantiam et accidens, ut ipse fingit. Nec dicendum est quod totaliter corrumpantur; sed quod maneant virtute, ut Aristoteles dicit. Et hoc est in quantum manent accidentia propria elementorum secundum aliquem modum, in quibus manet virtus elementorum. 10. The forms of the elements do not exist according to their very essence in a mixed body, although Avicenna maintained this, for they cannot exist in one and the same part of matter. However, if they were to exist in different parts of matter, there would not be a mixture with respect to the whole, as is the case in a true mixture, but there would be a mixture of the most insignificant kind, that is to say, one which appears to be a mixture to the senses. Again, to say that the forms of the elements may receive more and less, as Averroes does, is ridiculous, because there are substantial forms which cannot receive more and less. Nor is there a medium between a substance and an accident as he imagined. Moreover it must be said that the forms of the elements are not corrupted completely, but that they remain virtually, as Aristotle says. And they are virtually present inasmuch as the proper accidents of the elements, in which the power of the elements is found, remain in some measure.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod licet anima sit forma corporis secundum essentiam animae intellectualis, non tamen secundum operationem intellectualem. 11. The intellective soul is the form of the body according to its very essence, but not according to its intellectual operation.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod proportio quae est inter animam et corpus est in ipsis proportionatis; unde non oportet quod sit aliqua res media inter animam et corpus. 12. The proportion that exists between the soul and the body is in the things proportioned. Consequently it does not necessarily have to be an intermediary between soul and body.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod cor est primum instrumentum per quod anima movet ceteras partes corporis; et ideo eo mediante anima unitur reliquis partibus corporis ut motor, licet ut forma uniatur unicuique parti corporis per se et immediate. 13. The heart is the first instrument through which the soul moves the other parts of the body. Therefore, as a mover, the soul is united to the other parts of the body through the medium of the heart. However, as a form, the soul is united to every part of the body essentially and directly.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod licet anima sit forma simplex secundum essentiam, est tamen multiplex virtute secundum quod est principium diversarum operationum. Et quia forma perficit materiam, non solum quantum ad esse sed etiam ad operandum, ideo oportet quod licet anima sit una forma, partes corporis diversimode perficiantur ab ipsa, et unaquaeque secundum quod competit eius operationi. Et secundum hoc etiam oportet esse ordinem in partibus secundum ordinem operationum, ut dictum est; sed iste ordo est secundum operationem corporis ad animam, ut est motor. 14. Although the soul is a form in its entirety so far as its essence is concerned, yet it is many by its powers inasmuch as it is the principle of different operations. Furthermore, because a form perfects a matter not only with respect to its act of existing, but also with respect to its operation, it is necessary that the parts of the body be perfected in different ways by the soul, even though it is a form in its entirety, and that each part be perfected in a way befitting its operation. For this reason there must be an order among the parts of the body in accordance with the order among operations, as was explained. However, this order exists inasmuch as the operation of the body belongs to the soul as the mover of the body.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod inferiores vires animae possunt intelligi ligare superiores vires corporis quantum ad operationem; prout scilicet superiores vires indigent operationibus inferiorum, quae exercentur per corpus. Et eodem modo corpus per superiores sui partes coniungitur animae secundum operationem et motum. 15. The inferior powers of the soul, so far as their operations are concerned, can be understood to unite the superior powers to the body inasmuch as the superior powers stand in need of the operations of the inferior powers which are exercised through the body. Similarly the body, so far as operation and movement are concerned, is joined through its superior parts to the soul.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod forma sicut non advenit materiae nisi sit facta propria per debitas dispositiones, ita cessantibus propriis dispositionibus forma in materia remanere non potest; et hoc modo unio animae ad corpus solvitur remoto calore et humiditate naturali, et aliis huiusmodi, in quantum his disponitur corpus ad susceptionem animae. Unde huiusmodi cadunt media inter animam et corpus ut dispositiones. Quod quomodo sit, dictum est supra. 16. A form accrues to matter only when matter is properly disposed by fitting dispositions, and thus a form cannot remain in matter when the proper dispositions cease to exist. In this way, when the heat, natural humidity, and the like, are removed from the body, the union of soul and body is destroyed, because the body is disposed to receive the soul by means of these things. Hence things of this kind intervene as dispositions between the soul and the body. The explanation of this was given above.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod dimensiones non possunt intelligi in materia nisi secundum quod materia intelligitur constituta per formam substantialem in esse substantiali corporeo: quod quidem non fit per aliam formam in homine quam per animam, ut dictum est. Unde huiusmodi dimensiones non praeintelliguntur ante animam in materia totaliter, sed quantum ad ultimos gradus perfectionis, ut supra expositum est. 17. Dimensions can be considered to exist in matter only so far as matter is given substantial corporeal existence through a substantial form. In man this kind of existence is not bestowed by any other form than the soul, as has been explained. Consequently these dimensions are not understood actually to precede the existence of the soul in matter absolutely, but relative to the highest grades of perfection, as was explained above.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod anima et corpus non sunt distantia sicut res diversorum generum vel specierum, cum neuter eorum sit in genere vel specie, ut in superioribus quaestionibus habitum est, sed solum compositum ex eis. Sed anima est forma corporis per seipsam dans ei esse; unde per se et immediate ei unitur. 18. The soul and the body do not differ from each other as things of different genera and species do, because neither of them exists in a genus or a species, but only the composite of which they are parts, as we have shown in the preceding questions. However, the soul by its very essence is the form of the body giving it its act of existing. Hence it is united to the body essentially and directly.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum quod corpus humanum habet aliquam communicationem cum corpore caelesti; non quod aliquid corporis caelestis, ut lux, interveniat medium inter animam et corpus; sed secundum quod est constitutum in quadam aequalitate complexionis remotae a contrarietate, ut in superioribus expositum est. 19. The human body has something in common with a celestial body; not inasmuch as something characteristic of a celestial body, such as light, intervenes as a medium between the soul and the body, but inasmuch as the human body is given a certain tempered combination lacking contrariety, as was shown in preceding questions.
ARTICLE 10
WHETHER THE SOUL EXISTS IN THE WHOLE BODY AND IN EACH OF ITS PARTS

[Summa theol., I, q.76, a.8; Contra Gentiles, II, 72; Sent., I. dist., 8, q.5, a.3; De spir. creat., a.4.]
Decimo quaeritur utrum anima sit in toto corpore et qualibet parte eius In the tenth article we examine this question: Whether the soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts.
Objections.
Et videtur quod non. Anima enim est in corpore sicut perfectio in perfectibili. Sed perfectibile ab anima est corpus organicum: est enim anima actus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis, ut dicitur in II de anima. Ergo anima non est nisi in corpore organico. Sed non quaelibet pars corporis est organicum corpus. Ergo anima non est in qualibet parte corporis. 1. It seems that the soul does not. For the soul exists in the body as a perfection in something perfectible. But the thing capable of being perfected by the soul is an organic body, because the soul is “the actuality of a physical organic body having life potentially,” as is stated in the De anima [II, 1, 412a 28]. Therefore the soul exists only in an organic body. But each part of the body is not an organic body. Therefore the soul does not exist in each part of the body.
Praeterea, forma est proportionata materiae. Sed anima prout est forma corporis, est quaedam essentia simplex. Ergo non respondet ei materia multiplex. Sed diversae partes corporis vel hominis vel animalis sunt sicut materia multiplex, cum habeant magnam diversitatem ad invicem. Non ergo anima est forma cuiuslibet partis corporis; et ita non est anima in qualibet parte corporis. 2. Further, a form is proportioned to a matter. But the soul as the form of the body is a certain simple essence. Therefore a complex matter is not proportioned to the soul. But the diverse parts of the body, either of a man or of an animal, are certainly complex matter, because these parts differ greatly from one another. Therefore the soul is not the form of each part of the body, and so does not exist in each part of the body.
Praeterea, extra totum nihil est sumere. Si igitur anima est tota in qualibet parte corporis, extra illam partem nihil est de anima. Ergo impossibile est quod sit tota in qualibet parte corporis. 3. Further, no part of a whole exists in separation from the whole. Therefore, if the whole soul exists in one part of the body, no part of the soul can exist outside that part of the body. Therefore it is impossible for the soul to exist in each part of the body.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in Lib. de causa motus animalium: aestimandum est constare animal quemadmodum civitatem bene legibus rectam. In civitate enim quando semel stabilitus fuerit ordo, nihil opus est separato monarcha; quoniam non oportet esse per singula eorum quae fiunt; sed per se quilibet facit quod auctoritate ipsius ordinatum est, et fit hoc post hoc propter consuetudinem. In animalibus autem idem hoc propter naturam fit, et quia natum est unumquodque sic constitutum facere proprium opus, ut non opus sit in unoquoque esse animam, sed in quodam principio corporis existente, alia quidem vivere eo quod apta nata sunt, facere autem proprium opus propter naturam. Non ergo anima est in qualibet parte corporis, sed in una tantum. 4. Further, the Philosopher says in the work De causa motus animalium [X, 703a 30] “The animal must be considered as similar to a state which is well governed by laws. For when order is once established in it, there is no further need of a separate monarch to preside over each particular work. But each individual performs the task to which he is directed by the authority of the ruler, and these things are done continually in a customary manner. In animals, however, the same order results from their nature, and each part performs the proper work for which it has been constituted by nature. Hence there is not a soul for each part, but one single principle of the body exists, and the different parts of the body live because they are connected to one another. Moreover, they perform the proper operation allotted to them by nature.” Therefore the soul does not exist in each part of the body, but only in one part.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in VIII Physic. quod motor caeli oportet quod sit in centro, vel in aliquo signo circumferentiae; quia haec duo sunt principia in motu circulari. Et ostendit quod non potest esse in centro, sed in circumferentia; quia quanto aliqua sunt propinquiora circumferentiae et remotiora a centro, tanto sunt velocioris motus. Ergo a simili, oportet quod motus animae sit in illa parte animalis in qua praecipue apparet motus. Haec autem est eorum cor. Ergo anima est tantum in corde. 5. Further, the Philosopher says, in the Physics [VIII, 10, 267b 6] that the mover of the heavens must occupy either the center or some sign of the circumference, since these two things are the principles of circular motion. Now he proves that it cannot occupy the center but must exist at the circumference, for the nearer things are to the circumference and the farther away from the center, the swifter is their motion. Therefore, similarly the movement of the soul must exist in that part of the animal in which movement is most apparent. Now this part is the heart. Therefore the soul exists only in the heart.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in Lib. de iuventute et Senect. quod plantae habent principium nutritivum in medio superioris et inferioris. Sed sicut superius et inferius est in plantis, ita in animalibus est superius et inferius, dexterum et sinistrum, ante et retro. Ergo oportet principium vitae, quod est anima, esse in animali in medio harum particularum. Hoc autem est cor. Ergo anima est tantum in corde. 6. Further, the Philosopher says in the book De iuventute et senectute [II, 468a 20] that plants have a nutritive principle midway between their upper and lower parts. But upper and lower are found not only in plants, but in animals as well, and these also have a right and left side, a front and a back. Therefore the principle of life, namely, the soul, exists in an animal in the midst of its particular parts. But this [position is occupied by] the heart. Therefore the soul exists only in the heart.
Praeterea, omnis forma quae est in aliquo toto et qualibet parte eius, denominat totum et quamlibet partem, sicut patet de forma ignis; nam ignis quaelibet pars, ignis est. Non autem quaelibet pars animalis animal est. Non ergo anima est in qualibet parte corporis. 7. Further, every form existing in a whole and in each of its parts, is predicated of the whole and of each of its parts, as is evident in the case of fire, for each part of fire is fire. However, each part of an animal is not an animal. Therefore the soul does not exist in each part of the body.
Praeterea, intelligere ad aliquam partem animae pertinet. Sed intelligere non est in aliqua parte corporis. Non ergo tota anima est in qualibet parte corporis. 8. Further, the act of intellection belongs to a part of the soul. But this act is not present in any part of the body. Therefore the whole soul does not exist in each part of the body.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in II de anima quod sicut anima se habet ad corpus, ita pars animae ad partem corporis. Si ergo anima est in toto corpore non erit in qualibet parte corporis tota, sed pars eius. 9. Further, the Philosopher says in the De anima [II, 1, 412b 25] that as the soul is related to the body, so also is a part of the soul related to a part of the body. Therefore, if the soul exists in the whole body, the whole soul will not exist in each part of the body, but a part of the soul only will exist in a part of the body.
Sed dicebat quod philosophus loquitur de anima et partibus eius in quantum est motor, non in quantum est forma. —Sed contra, philosophus dicit ibidem, quod si oculus esset animal, visus esset anima eius. Sed anima est forma animalis. Ergo pars animae est in corpore ut forma, et non ut motor tantum. 10. But it has been said that the Philosopher is speaking of the soul and of its parts inasmuch as it is a mover and not a form. On the other hand, the Philosopher says in another place, that if the eye were an animal, sight would be its soul. But the soul is the form of an animal. Hence, in the body, part of the soul has the character of a form, so that the soul is not merely a mover.
Praeterea, anima est principium vitae in animali. Si ergo anima esset in qualibet parte corporis, pars corporis immediate acciperet vitam ab anima; et ita una pars non dependeret ab alia in vivendo. Quod patet esse falsum; nam aliae partes in vivendo dependent a corde. 11. Further, the soul is the principle of life in an animal. Therefore, if the soul were in each part of the body, each part would receive life directly from the soul. Then one part would not depend on another for life, which is clearly false, for the other parts of the body depend on the heart for life.
Praeterea, anima movetur per accidens ad motum corporis in quo est; et similiter quiescit per accidens quiescente corpore in quo est. Contingit autem, quiescente una parte corporis, aliam moveri. Si ergo anima est in qualibet parte corporis, oportet quod anima simul moveatur et quiescat; quod videtur impossibile. 12. Further, the soul is moved accidentally by the movement of the body in which it exists. Similarly it is at rest accidentally when the body in which it exists is at rest. However, it happens that when one part of a body is at rest, another is moved. Therefore, if the soul exists in each part of the body, the soul must be moved and at rest simultaneously; which is evidently impossible.
Praeterea, omnes potentiae animae radicantur in essentia animae. Si igitur essentia animae sit in qualibet parte corporis, oportet quod quaelibet potentia animae sit in qualibet parte corporis. Quod patet esse falsum; nam auditus non est in oculo, sed in aure tantum, et sic de aliis. 13. Further, all powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul. Therefore, if the essence of the soul exists in each part of the body, each power of the soul must exist in each part of the body. This is obviously false, for the sense of hearing does not exist in the eye but in the ear alone; and similarly for the other powers.
Praeterea, omne quod est in altero, est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Si igitur anima est in corpore, oportet quod sit in eo per modum corporis. Sed modus corporis est ut ubi est una pars non sit alia. Ergo ubi est una pars animae non est alia; et ita non est tota in qualibet parte corporis. 14. Further, whatever exists in another exists there according to the mode of the thing in which it exists. Therefore, if the soul exists in the body, it must exist there in a manner proper to the body. But it is proper to a body that no part of it may exist where another part exists. Therefore, where one part of the soul exists, another does not exist; and thus the whole soul does not exist in each part of the body.
Praeterea, quaedam animalia imperfecta, quae dicuntur anulosa, decisa vivunt, propter hoc quod anima remanet in qualibet parte corporis post decisionem. Sed homo et alia animalia perfecta non vivunt decisa. Non igitur in eis anima est in qualibet parte corporis. 15. Further, certain imperfect animals, called ring-worms, continue to live after they have been dissected, because a soul exists in each part of the body after its dissection. But man and the other perfect animals do not live after they have been dissected. Consequently in them the soul does not exist in each part of the body.
Praeterea, sicut homo et animal est quoddam totum ex diversis partibus consistens, ita et domus. Sed forma domus non est in qualibet parte domus, sed in tota. Ergo et anima, quae est forma animalis, non est tota in qualibet parte corporis, sed in toto. 16. Further, as a man and an animal are certain wholes composed of different parts, so also is a house. But the form of a house does not exist in each of its parts but in the whole [house]. Therefore the whole soul, which is the form of the animal, does not exist in each part of the animal but in the whole [animal].
Praeterea, anima dat esse corpori in quantum est forma eius. Est autem forma eius secundum suam essentiam, quae simplex est. Ergo per suam essentiam simplicem dat esse corpori. Sed ab uno non est naturaliter nisi unum. Si igitur sit in qualibet parte corporis sicut forma, sequetur quod cuilibet parti corporis det esse uniforme. 17. Further, the soul as a form gives to the body its act of existing (esse). However, the soul is the form of the body through its essence, which is simple. Therefore the simple essence of the soul gives to the body its act of existing. But only one thing comes naturally from something that is one. Therefore, if the soul as a form were in each part of the body, it would follow that it would give existence uniformly to each part of the body.
Praeterea, magis intime unitur forma materiae quam locatum loco. Sed unum locatum non potest esse in diversis locis simul, etiam si sit substantia spiritualis; non enim conceditur a magistris quod Angelus sit in diversis locis simul. Ergo nec anima potest esse in diversis partibus corporis. 18. Further, a form is united to matter more intimately than a thing in place is united to its place. But a thing existing in one place cannot exist in different places simultaneously, especially if it is a spiritual substance. For the teachers [of theology] do not admit that an angel exists in different places simultaneously. Therefore the soul cannot exist in different parts of the body.
Sed contra. Est quod Augustinus dicit in VI de Trin., quod anima est tota in toto corpore, et tota in qualibet parte eius. On the contrary, Augustine says in the De Trinitate [VI, 5] that the whole soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts.
Praeterea, anima non dat esse corpori nisi secundum quod unitur ei. Sed anima dat esse toti corpori et cuilibet parti eius. Ergo anima est in toto corpore et in qualibet parte eius. Further, the soul gives to the body its act of existing, only by being united to the body. But the soul confers the act of existing on the whole body and on each of its parts. Therefore the whole soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts.
Praeterea, anima non operatur nisi ubi est. Sed operationes animae apparent in qualibet parte corporis. Ergo anima est in qualibet parte corporis. Further, the soul operates only where it exists. But the operations of the soul are seen to exist in each part of the body. Therefore the soul exists in each part of the body.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod veritas huius quaestionis ex praecedenti dependet. Ostensum est enim quod anima, secundum quod est forma corporis, non unitur toti corpori mediante aliqua parte eius, sed toti corpori immediate. Est enim forma et totius corporis, et cuiuslibet partis eius. Et hoc necesse est dicere. Cum enim corpus hominis, aut cuiuslibet alterius animalis, sit quoddam totum naturale, dicetur unum ex eo quod unam formam habeat qua perficitur non solum secundum aggregationem aut compositionem, ut accidit in domo, et in aliis huiusmodi. Unde oportet quod quaelibet pars hominis et animalis recipiat esse et speciem ab anima sicut a propria forma. Unde philosophus dicit quod recedente anima, neque oculus neque caro neque aliqua pars remanet nisi aequivoce. Non est autem possibile quod aliquid recipiat esse et speciem ab aliquo separato sicut a forma; hoc enim simile esset Platonicorum positioni, qui posuerunt huiusmodi sensibilia recipere esse et speciem per participationem formarum separatarum. Sed oportet quod forma sit aliquid eius cui dat esse; nam forma et materia sunt principia intrinsecus constituentia essentiam rei. I answer: The true solution to this question depends on the preceding one. For it was shown that the soul as the form of the body is not united to the whole body through the medium of any of its parts, but is united directly to the whole body, because it is the form of the body as a whole and of each of its parts. And this must be maintained, for, since the body of a man or that of any other animal is a certain natural whole, it will be said to be one because it has one form whereby it is perfected, and not simply because it is an aggregate or a composition, as occurs in the case of a house and other things of this kind. Hence each part of a man and that of an animal must receive its act of existing and species from the soul as its proper form. Therefore the Philosopher says [De anima, II, 1, 412b 20] that when the soul leaves the body, neither the eye nor the flesh nor any part remains except in an equivocal sense. Moreover, it is impossible for a thing to receive its act of existing and species, as it does from a form, from a principle existing in separation from it, because this would he similar to the position of the Platonists, who maintained that such sensible things receive their act of existing and species by participating in forms which exist apart from things themselves. But a form must be an intrinsic principle of the thing whose act of existing it is responsible for, because form and matter are the intrinsic principles constituting the essence of a [corporeal] thing.
Unde oportet quod si anima dat esse et speciem, ut forma, cuilibet parti corporis, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, sit in qualibet parte corporis; nam et ea ratione dicitur anima esse in toto, quia est forma totius. Unde, si est forma cuiuslibet partis, oportet quod sit in qualibet parte; et non in toto tantum, nec in una parte tantum. Et haec definitio animae convenit; est enim anima actus corporis organici. Corpus autem organicum est constitutum ex diversis organis. Si ergo anima esset in una parte tantum ut forma, non esset actus corporis organici; sed actus unius organi tantum, puta cordis, aut alicuius alterius, et reliquae partes essent perfectae per alias formas. Et sic totum non esset unum quid naturaliter, sed compositione tantum. Relinquitur ergo quod anima sit in toto corpore et in qualibet parte eius. Hence, according to the teaching of Aristotle, if the soul as a form gives to each part of the body its act of existing and species, it must be present as a form in each part of the body. And for this reason the soul is said to exist in the whole body because it is the form of the whole. Therefore, if it is the form of each part [of the body], it must exist in each part and not in the whole alone, nor in one part alone. Moreover, this definition of the soul is an appropriate one, for the soul is the act of an organic body. However, an organic body is composed of different organs. Hence, if the soul as a form existed in one part of the body only, it would not be the act of an organic body, but that of one organ alone, for instance, the heart or some other part; and the remaining parts would be perfected by different forms. And thus the whole would not be one thing by nature but merely by composition. Hence it follows that the soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts.
Sed quia etiam quaeritur an sit tota in toto et in qualibet parte eius, considerandum est qualiter hoc dicitur. Potest autem attribui totalitas alicui formae tripliciter, secundum quod tribus modis convenit aliquid habere partes. Uno enim modo aliquid habet partes secundum divisionem quantitatis, prout scilicet dividitur numerus aut magnitudo. Uni autem formae non competit totalitas numeri nec magnitudinis, nisi forte per accidens, puta in formis quae per accidens dividuntur divisione continui, sicut albedo per divisionem superficiei. Alio modo dicitur aliquid totum per comparationem ad partes essentiales speciei; sicut materia et forma dicuntur partes compositi; genus et differentia partes quodammodo speciei. Et hic modus totalitatis attribuitur etiam essentiis simplicibus ratione suae perfectionis; eo quod sicut composita habent perfectam speciem ex coniunctione principiorum essentialium, ita substantiae et formae simplices habent perfectam speciem per seipsas. Tertio modo dicitur totum per comparationem ad partes virtutis, seu potestatis; quae quidem partes accipiuntur secundum divisionem operationum. But since it is also asked whether the whole soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts, we must consider how this is to be explained. For totality can be attributed to a form in a threefold manner, according to the three ways in which it is proper for a thing to have parts. For a thing has parts, in one way, resulting from quantitative division, that is, according as a number or a magnitude is divided. However, totality of number or that of magnitude does not apply to a form, except perhaps in an accidental way; for instance, in the case of forms which are divided accidentally by the division of a continuum, as whiteness is divided as a result of dividing a surface. A thing is said to be a totality in another way in relation to the essential parts of its species, as matter and form are said to be parts of a composite, and genus and difference, in a certain respect, parts of a species. This kind of totality is also attributed to simple essences by reason of their perfection, in this way, that as composites have a perfect species from the union of their essential principles, so also do substances and simple forms which have a perfect species in virtue of themselves. A thing is said to be a totality in a third way in relation to its active and passive powers, inasmuch as these are considered to be parts of it which are distinguished from one another because their operations differ.
Si qua igitur forma accipiatur quae dividitur per continui divisionem, et quaeratur de ea utrum sit in qualibet parte corporis tota, utpote utrum albedo sit in parte superficiei tota: si accipiatur per comparationem ad partes quantitativas (quae quidem totalitas pertinet ad albedinem per accidens), non est tota in qualibet parte, sed tota in toto, et pars in parte. Si autem quaeratur de totalitate quae pertinet ad speciem, sic tota est in qualibet parte; nam aeque intensa est albedo in aliqua parte sicut in toto. Sed verum est quod adhuc secundum virtutem non est tota in qualibet parte. Non enim potest tantum in disgregando albedo quae est in parte superficiei, sicut albedo quae est in tota superficie; sicut neque tantum potest calor qui est in parvo igne ad calefaciendum, sicut calor qui est in magno igne. Therefore, if we take a form which is divided as a result of dividing a continuum, and inquire whether the whole form is in each part of the body (for example, whether whiteness exists in its entirety in a part of the surface), and if the form is considered in relation to quantitative parts (which totality, indeed, pertains to whiteness accidentally), then the whole form does not exist in each part [of the body], but the whole form exists in the whole [body], and a part of the form in a part of the whole. However, if it is a question of totality so far as the species is concerned, then the whole [form] exists in each part [of the body]; for whiteness is as equally intense in any part [of the surface] as it is in the whole. But so far as its power is concerned, it is true that the whole form does not exist in each part [of the body], for the whiteness existing in a part of the surface cannot disperse as much light as the whiteness existing in the whole surface; just as the heat in a small fire alone, cannot cause warmth like the heat in a large fire.
Supposito autem ad praesens quod sit una tantum anima in corpore hominis (de hoc enim postea quaeretur), dicendum quod non dividitur divisione quantitatis quae est numerus. Planum est etiam quod non dividitur divisione continui; praecipue anima animalium perfectorum, quae decisa non vivunt. Secus enim esset forte de animabus animalium anulosorum, in quibus est una anima in actu, et plures in potentia, ut philosophus docet. Relinquitur igitur quod in anima hominis et cuiuslibet animalis perfecti, non potest accipi totalitas nisi secundum perfectionem speciei, et secundum potentiam seu virtutem. Dicimus ergo quod, cum perfectio speciei pertineat ad animam secundum suam essentiam, anima autem secundum suam essentiam est forma corporis et prout est forma corporis est in qualibet parte corporis, ut ostensum est, relinquitur quod anima tota sit in qualibet parte corporis secundum totalitatem perfectionis speciei. Now if we suppose, for the present, that there is only one soul in the human body (we will explain this later), we must maintain that it is not divided by dividing that species of quantity which is numerical in nature. It is also obvious that the soul is not divided by dividing a continuum. This is particularly true of the souls of perfect animals which do not live when dissected. However, it would perhaps be different in the case of the souls of ring-worms, in which there is one soul actually and many potentially, as the Philosopher teaches [De anima, II, 2, 413b 13]. Therefore, in the case of the soul of man and that of any perfect animal, it follows that totality can be considered only so far as the soul’s species and its passive or active power are concerned. Hence we say that the soul by its very essence is the form of the body, and that it exists as such in each part of the body, as has been shown, because the perfection of the species comes from the soul in virtue of its very essence. Consequently the whole soul exists in each part of the body according to the whole of its specific perfection.
Si autem accipiatur totalitas quantum ad virtutem et potestatem, sic non est tota in qualibet parte corporis, nec etiam tota in toto, si loquamur de anima hominis. Ostensum est enim ex superioribus quaestionibus quod anima humana, quia excedit corporis capacitatem, remanet ei virtus ad operandum operationes quasdam sine communicatione corporis, sicut intelligere et velle. Unde intellectus et voluntas non sunt actus alicuius organi corporalis. Sed quantum ad alias operationes quas exercet per organa corporalia, tota virtus et potestas eius est in toto corpore; non autem in qualibet parte corporis, quia diversae partes corporis sunt proportionatae ad diversas operationes animae. Unde, secundum illam potentiam, tantum est in aliqua parte quae respicit operationem quae per illam partem corporis exercetur. However, if totality is taken so far as the soul’s active and passive powers are concerned, then the whole soul does not exist in each part of the body. Nor, if we speak of the soul of man, does the whole soul [according to the totality of its powers] exist in the whole body. For it was shown in the preceding articles (Arts. 1, 2 and 5) that the human soul possesses the power of performing certain operations without communicating in any way with the body, that is, the acts of understanding and willing, as it exceeds the capacity of the body. Hence the intellect and the will are not the acts of any bodily organ. However, with respect to those operations which the soul exercises through bodily organs, the soul’s active and passive powers as a whole exist in the whole body, although not in each part of the body, because different parts of the body are proportioned to different operations of the soul. Consequently, with respect to any one power, the soul exists only in that part of the body which takes care of the operations exercised by that particular part.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cum materia sit propter formam, forma autem ordinetur ad propriam operationem, oportet quod talis sit materia uniuscuiusque formae ut competat operationi illius formae; sicuti materiam serrae oportet esse ferream, quod competit ad opus serrae propter suam duritiem. Cum ergo anima propter suae virtutis perfectionem possit in diversas operationes, necessarium est quod materia eius sit corpus constitutum ex partibus congruentibus ad diversas operationes animae quae dicuntur organa. Et propter hoc totum corpus, cui respondet principaliter anima ut forma, est organum; partes autem sunt propter totum. Unde animae non respondet pars corporis sicut proprium et principale perfectibile, sed secundum quod habet ordinem ad totum. Unde non oportet quod quaelibet pars animalis sit corpus organicum, licet anima sit forma eius. 1. Since matter exists for the sake of form, and since a form is directed to a proper operation, the matter to which a form is united must be one that is suitable for the proper operations of that form, just as the matter of a saw must be iron, which is suitable for sawing due to its hardness. Hence, since the soul can exercise different operations because of the perfect power which it has, its matter must be a body composed of different parts (which parts are called organs) suitable for the different operations of the soul. And for this reason the whole body, to which the soul is related principally as a form, is the organ of the soul. However, parts exist for the sake of the whole. Hence it is only by being intrinsically related to the body as a whole, that a part of the body is related to the soul as that which is properly and principally capable of being perfected by the soul. Consequently it is not necessary for each part of an animal to be an organic body, even though the soul is the form of each of the animal’s parts.
Ad secundum dicendum quod cum materia sit propter formam, hoc modo forma dat esse et speciem materiae, secundum quod congruit suae operationi. Et quia corpus perfectibile ab anima, ad hoc quod congruat diversis operationibus animae, requirit diversitatem in partibus; ideo, licet sit una et simplex secundum suam essentiam, diversimode partes corporis perficit. 2. Since matter exists for the sake of form, form gives an act of existing and species to matter inasmuch as matter is disposed for the operations of the form. And therefore the soul, even though it is one and simple in its essence, perfects the parts of the body in different ways, because the body, which is capable of being perfected by the soul, requires diversity in its parts in order that it may be disposed for the different operations of the soul.
Ad tertium dicendum quod cum anima sit in una parte corporis eo modo quo dictum est, nihil animae est extra animam quae est in hac parte corporis. Non tamen sequitur quod animae nihil sit extra hanc partem corporis; sed quod nihil sit extra totum corpus, quod principaliter perficit. 3. Since the soul exists in a part of the body in the manner just described, no part of the soul is found outside the soul which is in this part of the body. However, it does not follow that no part of the soul exists outside this part of the body, but rather than no part of the soul exists outside the whole body which the soul perfects as a principle.
Ad quartum dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de anima quantum ad potentiam motivam, principium enim motus corporis est in aliqua parte corporis, scilicet in corde; et per illam partem movet totum corpus. Et hoc patet per exemplum quod ponit de rectore. 4. In this passage the Philosopher is speaking about the motive power of the soul. For the body’s principle of motion exists in one part, namely, in the heart, and moves the whole body through this part. This is clear from the example which he gives of the ruler.
Ad quintum dicendum quod motor caeli non circumscribitur loco secundum suam substantiam; sed philosophus intendit ostendere ubi sit quantum ad principium movendi. Et hoc modo, quantum ad principium motus, anima est in corde. 5. The mover of the heavens, so far as its substance is concerned, is not confined to some particular place [as bodies are].
Ad sextum dicendum quod etiam in plantis anima dicitur esse in medio eius quod est sursum et deorsum, in quantum est principium quarumdam operationum. Et similiter est in animalibus. 6. The soul in plants, inasmuch as it is the principle of certain operations, is also said to exist in the midst of their upper and lower parts. The soul exists in animals in the same way.
Ad septimum dicendum quod ideo non quaelibet pars animalis est animal, sicut quaelibet pars ignis est ignis, quia omnes operationes ignis salvantur in qualibet parte ignis; non autem omnes operationes animalis salvantur in qualibet parte eius maxime in animalibus perfectis. 7. Therefore each part of an animal is not an animal as each part of fire is fire, because every operation of fire is found in each part of fire. However, all the operations of an animal are not found in each of its parts. This is particularly true of perfect animals.
Ad octavum dicendum quod ratio illa concludit animam non esse totam in qualibet parte corporis secundum suam virtutem; quod dictum est esse verum. 8. The conclusion of this argument is that the whole soul, so far as its power is concerned, does not exist in each part of the body. This was shown to be true.
Ad nonum dicendum quod partes animae accipiuntur a philosopho non quantum ad essentiam animae, sed quantum ad eius potestatem. Et ideo dicit quod, sicut anima est in toto corpore, ita pars animae in parte corporis; quia sicut totum corpus organicum se habet ut deserviat operationibus animae quae per corpus exercentur, ita se habet unum organum ad unam determinatam operationem. 9. The Philosopher does not distinguish parts in the soul with respect to its essence, but with respect to its powers. Hence he says that, as the soul exists in the whole body, so also does a part of the soul exist in a part of the body. For as the whole organic body is so constituted that it may serve the operations of the soul which are exercised through it, so also is one organ disposed to one particular operation.
Ad decimum dicendum quod potentia animae radicatur in essentia; et ideo ubicumque est aliqua potentia animae, ibi est essentia animae. Quod ergo dicit philosophus quod si oculus animalis esset animal visus esset anima eius, non intelligitur de potentia animae sine eius essentia; sicut et totius corporis dicitur anima sensibilis esse forma per essentiam suam, non per potentiam sensitivam. 10. A power of the soul is rooted in its essence. Therefore, wherever a power of the soul exists, there also does the essence of the soul exist. Hence the Philosopher’s statement that, if the eye of an animal were itself an animal, sight would be its soul, is not to be understood of a power of the soul without its essence; just as the sentient soul is said to be the form of the whole body through its essence, not through its sensory power.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod cum anima operetur in alias partes corporis per aliquam unam potentiam — corpus autem disponatur ad hoc quod sit proportionatum esse animae per actionem animae, quae est causa efficiens corporis, ut Aristoteles dicit in II de anima — necesse est quod dispositio aliarum partium, secundum quam sunt perfectibiles ab anima, dependeat ab una prima parte, videlicet a corde. Et pro tanto vita aliarum partium dependet a corde, quia postquam desinit esse in aliqua parte debita dispositio, anima non unitur ei ut forma. Non autem propter hoc removetur quin anima sit immediate forma cuiuslibet partis corporis. 11. Since the soul operates in different parts of the body through one particular power (moreover the body is disposed in this way that it is proportioned to the soul’s act of existing through the action of the soul itself which is the efficient cause of the body, as Aristotle says in the De anima [II, 4, 415b 9]) it is necessary that the disposition of the different parts of the body, inasmuch as they are capable of being perfected by the soul, depend on one first part of the body, namely, on the heart. For this reason the life of the other parts depends upon the heart, because, after the necessary dispositions cease to exist, the soul is not united as a form to the body. However, this does not prevent the soul from being the form of each part of the body directly.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod anima non movetur neque quiescit, moto seu quiescente corpore, nisi per accidens. Non autem inconveniens est si aliquid movetur et quiescit simul per accidens; sicut non est inconveniens quod aliquid moveatur per accidens contrariis motibus, ut puta si quis in navi deferretur contra cursum navis. 12. The soul is moved or at rest only in an accidental way when the body is moved or at rest. Moreover, it is not incongruous for a thing to be moved and at rest accidentally at one and the same time, just as it is not implausible for a thing to be moved accidentally by contrary movements, as for instance, when someone on a ship walks in the direction opposite to that of the course of the ship.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod, licet omnes potentiae radicentur in essentia animae, tamen quaelibet pars corporis recipit animam secundum suum modum; et ideo in diversis partibus est secundum diversas potentias. Neque oportet quod in unaquaque sit secundum omnes. 13. Although all powers of the soul are rooted in its essence, yet each part of the body is informed by the soul in the manner befitting each. Therefore different powers of the soul exist in different parts of the body. But it is not necessary that all of the soul’s powers exist in each part of the body.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod cum dicitur, unumquodque esse in alio secundum modum eius in quo est, intelligitur quantum ad capacitatis ipsius modum, non quantum ad naturam eius. Non enim oportet ut id quod est in aliquo habeat naturam et proprietatem eius in quo est; sed quod recipiatur in eo secundum capacitatem ipsius. Manifestum est enim quod aqua non habet naturam amphorae; unde nec oportet quod anima habeat istam naturam corporis, ut ubi est una pars eius, ibi sit alia. 14. When it is said that one thing exists in another in accordance with the mode of the thing in which it exists, this is understood of the mode of its capacity, not of its nature. For it is not necessary that whatever exists in something else have the nature and Properties of that thing in which it exists, but that it be received in that thing according to the thing’s capacity; because it is obvious that water does not have the nature of the vessel [in which it exists]. Hence it is not necessary for the soul to possess this characteristic of a body, namely, that wherever one part exists, another may not exist.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod animalia anulosa decisa vivunt, non solum quia anima est in qualibet parte corporis; sed quia anima eorum, cum sit imperfecta et paucarum actionum, requirit paucam diversitatem in partibus, quae etiam invenitur in parte decisa a vivente. Unde, cum retineat dispositionem per quam totum corpus est perfectibile ab anima, remanet in eo anima. Secus autem est in animalibus perfectis. 15. Ring-worms continue to live after they have been dissected, not only because their soul exists in each part of the body, but because their soul, being imperfect and performing a minimum of operations, requires the least diversity of parts. This is also found in any part segregated from a living thing of this sort. Hence a soul remains in each part because each part retains that disposition whereby the whole body is made capable of being perfected by a soul. However, the soul exists differently in perfect animals.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod forma domus, sicut et aliae formae artificiales, est forma accidentalis: unde non dat esse et speciem toti et cuilibet parti; neque totum est unum simpliciter, sed unum aggregatione. Anima autem est forma substantialis corporis, dans esse et speciem toti et partibus; et totum ex partibus constitutum est unum simpliciter; unde non est simile. 16. The form of a house, like other artificial forms, is an accidental one. Hence it does not give to the whole house and to each of its parts their act of existing and species. Indeed, a whole [of this sort] is not a substantial unity, but is a one by aggregation. However, the soul is the substantial form of the body, giving to the whole body and to each of its parts their act of existing and species. Furthermore, the whole constituted of these parts is a substantial unity. Hence there is no similarity.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod anima, quamvis sit una et simplex in essentia, habet tamen virtutem ad diversas operationes. Et quia naturaliter dat esse et speciem suo perfectibili in quantum est forma corporis secundum essentiam; ea autem quae sunt naturaliter, sunt propter finem; oportet quod anima constituat in corpore diversitatem partium, prout congruit diversis operationibus. Et verum est quod propter huiusmodi diversitatem, cuius ratio est ex fine, et non ex forma tantum in constitutione viventium magis apparet quod natura operetur propter finem quam in aliis rebus naturalibus, in quibus una forma uniformiter perficit suum perfectibile. 17. Although the soul is one and simple in essence, yet it is capable of performing different operations. And because the soul by nature gives to its perfectible its act of existing and species, inasmuch as it is the form of the body by its very essence (moreover, those things existing naturally, exist for an end), the soul must establish a diversity of parts in the body inasmuch as this is required for its different operations. It is also true in the light of such diversity (which is to be attributed to the end, and not to the form alone) that it is more apparent that nature acts for an end in the constitution of living things than it is in the case of other natural things in which one form perfects, in a uniform way, the thing capable of being perfected by it.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod simplicitas animae et Angeli non est existimanda ad modum simplicitatis puncti, quod habet determinatum situm in continuo; et ideo quod simplex est, non potest esse simul in diversis partibus continui. Sed Angelus et anima dicuntur simplicia per hoc quod omnino carent quantitate; et ideo non applicantur ad continuum nisi per contactum virtutis. Unde totum illud quod virtute Angeli contingitur, respondet Angelo, qui non unitur ut forma, ut locus unus; et animae, quae unitur ut forma, ut perfectibile unum. Et sicut Angelus est in qualibet parte sui loci totus, ita et anima in qualibet parte sui perfectibilis, tota. 18. The simplicity of the soul and that of an angel must not be thought of in terms of the simplicity of the point, which has a definite position in a continuum, and, therefore, because it is simple cannot exist in different parts of the continuum at one and the same time. But the angel and the soul are said to be simple because they lack quantity altogether, and thus are related to a continuum only by contact of power. Hence that whole, which it contacted by an angel’s power, is present to the angel (which is not united to it as a form) as a single place; and it is present to the soul (which is united to it as a form) as a single perfectible thing. And just as the whole angel exists in each part of the place it is present in [by contact of power], so also does the whole soul exist in each part of the thing perfectible by it.
ARTICLE 11
WHETHER THE RATIONAL, SENTIENT, AND VEGETAL SOULS IN MAN ARE SUBSTANTIALLY ONE AND THE SAME

[Summa theol., I, q. 76, a. 3; Contra Gentiles, II, 58; De Potentia, q. 3, a. 9, ad 9; Quodl. XI, q. 5, a. 1; De spir. creat., a. 3; Compend. theol., chaps. 90-92.]
Undecimo quaeritur utrum in homine anima rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis sit una substantia In the eleventh article we examine this question: Whether the rational, sentient, and vegetal souls in man are substantially one and the same.
Objections.
Et videtur quod non. Ubicumque enim est actus animae, ibi est et anima. Sed in embryone actus animae vegetabilis praecedit actum animae sensibilis, et actus animae sensibilis actum animae rationalis. Ergo in concepto primum est anima vegetabilis, quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam rationalis; et ita non sunt idem secundum substantiam. 1. It seems that they are not substantially one and the same. For wherever an act of a soul exists, there also does a soul exist. Now in the embryo the act of a vegetal soul precedes that of a sentient soul, and the act of a sentient soul precedes that of a rational soul. Therefore in pregnancy the vegetal soul is prior to the sentient, and the sentient is prior to the rational. Consequently they are not substantially one and the same.
Sed dicebat quod actus animae vegetabilis et sensibilis non est in embryone ab anima quae sit in embryone, sed a virtute in eo existente ab anima parentis. —Sed contra, nullum agens finitum agit sua virtute nisi secundum determinatam distantiam, ut patet in motu proiectionis. Proiiciens enim usque ad locum determinatum proiicit secundum modum suae virtutis. Sed in embryone apparent motus et operationes animae, quantumcumque parens distet, cuius tamen virtus finita est. Non igitur operationes animae sunt in embryone per virtutem animae parentis. 2. But it has been said that the act of a vegetal soul and that of a sentient soul which are present in the embryo, do not belong to a soul existing in the embryo, but to a power of the parent’s soul existing therein. On the other hand, a finite agent acts by its power only with respect to a limited distance, as is evident in the motion of throwing. For a thrower casts an object to a definite place according to the power which he possesses. But the movements and operations of a soul appear in the embryo no matter how distant the [male] parent may be, although his power is finite. Therefore the operations of a soul do not exist in the embryo as a result of a power of the parent’s soul.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in libro de Generat. animalium, quod embryo prius est animal quam homo. Sed animal non est nisi quod habet animam sensibilem, homo autem est per animam rationalem. Ergo ipsa anima sensibilis est prius in embryone quam anima rationalis; et non solum virtus eius. 3. Further, the Philosopher states, in the work De generatione animalium [II, 3, 736a 35], that the embryo is an animal before it is a man. But an animal is such because of its sentient soul, and a man is a man because of his rational soul. Therefore a sentient soul, and not merely a power of such a soul, exists in the embryo prior to a rational soul.
Praeterea, vivere et sentire sunt operationes quae non possunt esse nisi a principio intrinseco: sunt enim actus animae. Ergo cum embryo vivat et sentiat antequam habeat animam rationalem, vivere et sentire non erunt ex anima exteriori parentis, sed ab anima intus existente. 4. Further, living and sensing are operations which can issue only from an intrinsic principle, because they are acts of a soul. Hence, since the embryo lives and senses before it has a rational soul, the acts of living and sensing in the embryo will not come from the soul of the external parent, but from a soul existing within the embryo itself.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in II de anima, quod anima est causa corporis viventis non solum sicut forma, sed sicut efficiens et finis. Sed non esset efficiens causa corporis nisi adesset corpori quando formatur. Formatur autem ante infusionem animae rationalis. Ergo ante infusionem animae rationalis est in embryone anima, et non solum animae virtus. 5. Further, the philosopher says in the De anima [II, 4, 415b 9] that the soul is not only the formal cause of the body, but its efficient and final cause as well. But it would not be the efficient cause of the body unless it were present to the body when it is formed. However, the body is formed before the rational soul is infused. Therefore there is a soul and not merely a power of a soul in the embryo preceding the infusion of the rational soul.
Sed dicebat quod formatio corporis fit ab anima, non quae est in embryone, sed ab anima parentis. —Sed contra, corpora viventia secundum motus proprios movent seipsa. Sed generatio corporis viventis est quidam motus eius proprius, cum eius principium proprium sit potentia generativa. Ergo secundum istum modum res viva movet seipsam. Sed movens seipsum componitur ex movente et moto, ut probatur in VIII Phys. Ergo principium generationis, quod format corpus vivum, est anima quae est in embryone. 6. But it has been said that the formation of the body is brought about, not by a soul existing in the embryo, but by the soul of the parent. On the other hand, living bodies move themselves by their own movements. But the generation of a living body is a certain movement of its own, because the generative power is one of its principles. Therefore with respect to this activity, a living thing moves itself. But a thing .that moves itself is composed of a part that causes movement and one that is moved, as is proved in the Physics [VIII, 4, 254b 30]. Hence the principle of generation, which forms the living body, is a soul existing in the embryo.
Praeterea, manifestum est quod embryo augetur. Augmentum autem est motus secundum locum, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Cum ergo animal secundum locum moveat seipsum, movebit etiam seipsum secundum augmentum; et ita oportet quod in embryone sit principium talis motus, et non habeat hunc motum ab anima extrinseca. 7. Further, it is obvious that the embryo increases in size. Now increase is a species of local motion, as is stated in the Physics [IV, 6, 213b 19]. Therefore, since the animal moves itself locally, it will also move itself augmentatively. Hence this movement must come from a principle existing in the embryo and not from an extrinsic soul.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in libro de Generat. animalium, quod non potest dici quod in embryone non sit anima; sed primo est ibi anima cibativa, postea sensitiva. 8. Further, the Philosopher says, in the book De generatione animalium [II, 3, 736a 35] that it cannot be said that no soul exists in the embryo, but that first a vegetative soul exists there and then a sentient soul.
Sed dicebat quod hoc dicit philosophus non quod sit ibi anima in actu, sed in potentia. Sed contra, nihil agit nisi in quantum est actu. Sed in embryone sunt actiones animae. Ergo est ibi anima in actu; et ita relinquitur quod non sit tantum una substantia. 9. But it has been argued that the Philosopher does not mean that a soul exists in the embryo actually, but only potentially. On the other hand, a thing acts only so far as it is in act. But there are activities of a soul in the embryo. Therefore a soul actually exists there, and thus it follows that [the souls in the embryo] are not substantially one and the same.
Praeterea, impossibile est quod idem sit ab extrinseco et intrinseco. Sed anima rationalis est in homine ab extrinseco, vegetabilis autem et sensibilis ab intrinseco, id est a principio quod est in semine, ut patet per philosophum in libro de Generat. animalium. Ergo non est idem in homine secundum substantiam anima vegetabilis, sensibilis et rationalis. 10. Further, it is impossible for one and the same thing to be caused both by an intrinsic principle and by an extrinsic one. But the rational soul in man is caused by an extrinsic principle. The vegetal and sentient souls, however, are caused by an intrinsic principle contained in the semen, as is clear from what the Philosopher says in the book De generatione animalium [II, 3, 736b, 21]. Therefore in man the vegetal, sentient, and rational souls are not substantially one and the same.
Praeterea, impossibile est ut quod est substantia in uno sit accidens in alio; unde dicit philosophus in VIII Metaph. quod calor non est forma substantialis ignis, cum sit accidens in aliis. Sed anima sensibilis est substantia in brutis animalibus. Non est ergo potentia tantum in homine, cum potentiae sint quaedam proprietates et accidentia animae. 11. Further, it is impossible for a substantial principle of one thing to be an accident of another. Consequently the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics,” that heat is not the substantial form of fire, because heat is an accident of other things. But the sentient soul is a substantial principle in brute animals. Therefore it is not merely a power in man, because powers are certain properties and accidents of a soul.
Praeterea, homo est nobilius animal quam bruta animalia. Sed animal dicitur propter animam sensibilem. Ergo anima sensibilis est nobilior in homine quam in brutis animalibus. Sed in brutis animalibus est quaedam substantia, et non tantum potentia animae. Ergo multo magis in homine est quaedam substantia per se. 12. Further, man is a nobler animal than the brute. Now an animal is said to be such because it possesses a sentient soul. Therefore the sentient soul in man is nobler than that in brute animals. But it is a certain substantial entity in brute animals, and not merely a power of their soul. Consequently in man the sentient soul is a substance in virtue of its very nature to an even greater degree.
Praeterea, impossibile est quod idem secundum substantiam sit corruptibile et incorruptibile. Sed anima rationalis est incorruptibilis; animae vero sensibiles et vegetabiles sunt corruptibiles. Ergo impossibile est quod anima rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis sint idem secundum substantiam. 13. Further, it is impossible for the substance of one and the same being to be both corruptible and incorruptible. Now the rational soul is incorruptible. Sentient and vegetal souls, however, are corruptible. Therefore it is impossible for the rational, sentient, and vegetal souls to be substantially one and the same.
Sed dicebat quod anima sensibilis in homine est incorruptibilis. —Sed contra, corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt secundum genus, ut dicit philosophus in X Metaphys. Sed anima sensibilis in brutis est corruptibilis. Si igitur in homine anima sensibilis est incorruptibilis, non erit eiusdem generis anima sensibilis in homine et in equo. Et ita, cum animal dicatur per animam sensibilem, homo et equus non essent in uno genere animalis; quod patet esse falsum. 14. But it has been said that the sentient soul in man is incorruptible. On the other hand, the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically, as the Philosopher states in the Metaphysics [X, 10, 1058b 26]. Now the sentient soul in brutes is corruptible. Therefore, if the sentient soul in man is incorruptible, the sentient soul in man and that in a horse will not be generically the same. Hence, since an animal is said to be such because of its sentient soul, a man and a horse would not exist in one and the same genus; which is obviously false.
Praeterea, impossibile est quod idem secundum substantiam sit rationale et irrationale, quia contradictio non verificatur de eodem. Sed anima sensibilis et vegetabilis sunt irrationales. Ergo non possunt idem esse in substantia cum anima rationali. 15. Further, it is impossible for the substance of the same being to be both rational and irrational, because a contradiction is not true of one and the same being. But sentient and vegetal souls are irrational. Therefore they cannot be substantially the same as the rational soul.
Praeterea, corpus est proportionatum animae. Sed in corpore sunt diversa principia operationum animae, quae vocantur membra principalia. Ergo non est tantum una anima, sed plures. 16. Further, the body is proportioned to the soul. But in a body there are diverse principles of operation of the soul which are called principal members. Therefore in man there is not one soul alone but many souls.
Praeterea, potentiae animae naturaliter ab essentia animae fluunt. Ab uno autem naturaliter non procedit nisi unum. Si ergo anima est una tantum in homine, non procederent ab ea vires quaedam affixae organis et quaedam non affixae. 17. Further, the powers of a soul flow naturally from its essence. However, only one thing proceeds naturally from one thing. Therefore, if there were only one soul in man, there would not come from this soul certain powers that operate through organs, and others that do not.
Praeterea, genus sumitur a materia, differentia vero a forma. Sed genus hominis est animal, differentia vero rationalis. Cum ergo animal dicatur ab anima sensibili, videtur quod non solum corpus, sed etiam anima sensibilis comparetur ad animam rationalem per modum materiae. Ergo non sunt idem in substantia anima rationalis et anima sensibilis. 18. Further, genus is taken from matter, difference from form. But the genus of man is “animal,” his difference, “rational.” Therefore, since an animal is said to be such because of its sentient soul, it appears that not only the body but also the sentient soul is related as matter to the rational soul. Therefore the rational and sentient souls are not substantially one and the same.
Praeterea, homo et equus conveniunt in animali. Animal autem dicitur per animam sensibilem. Ergo conveniunt in anima sensibili. Sed anima sensibilis in equo non est rationalis. Ergo nec in homine. 19. Further, a man and a horse share animality in common. Moreover, an animal is said to be such because of its sentient soul. Therefore their sentient souls are the same. But the sentient soul in a horse is not rational. Therefore it is not rational in man.
Praeterea, si anima rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis sint idem secundum substantiam in homine, oportet quod in quacumque parte est una earum, sit et alia. Hoc autem est falsum. Nam in ossibus est anima vegetabilis, quia nutriuntur et augentur; non autem anima sensibilis, quia sine sensu sunt. Ergo non sunt idem secundum substantiam. 20. Further, if in man the rational, sentient, and vegetal souls are substantially one and the same, then in every part of the body in which one of them exists, another must exist. But this is false. For the vegetal soul is in the bones, because they are nourished and increased in size. However, the sentient soul does not exist there, because the bones lack sense. Therefore these souls are not substantially one and the same.
Sed contra, est quod dicitur in Lib. de Eccles. dogmatibus: neque duas animas in uno homine esse dicimus, sicut Iacobus et alii Syrorum scribunt; unam animalem qua animetur corpus, et aliam rationalem quae rationi ministret; sed dicimus unam eamdemque animam in homine, quae corpus sua societate vivificet, et semetipsam sua ratione disponat. On the contrary, it is pointed out in the work De ecclesiae dogmatibus [XV, of Gennadius of Marseilles] “We do not say that there are two souls in man as Jacobus and other Syrians write: an animal soul by which the body is animated..., and a rational soul which exercises reasoning; but in man we speak of one and the same soul which gives life to the body by being united to it, and which disposes itself by its reason.”
Respondeo. Dicendum quod circa hanc quaestionem sunt diversae opiniones, non solum modernorum, sed etiam antiquorum. Plato enim posuit diversas animas esse in corpore. Et hoc quidem consequens erat suis principiis. Posuit enim Plato quod anima unitur corpori ut motor, et non ut forma; dicens animam esse in corpore sicut est nauta in navi: ubi autem apparent diversae actiones secundum genus, oportet ponere diversos motores; sicut in navi alius est qui gubernat, et alius qui remigat. Nec eorum diversitas repugnat unitati navis: quia sicut actiones ordinatae sunt, ita et motores qui sunt in navi, ordinati sunt, unus sub alio. Et similiter non videtur repugnare unitati hominis vel animalis, si sint plures animae in uno corpore, ut motores ordinati sub invicem secundum ordinem operationum animae. I answer: There are different opinions about this question, not only among the moderns, but also among the ancients. For Plato maintained [Timaeus 32, Phaedrus 34] that there are different souls in the body and, indeed, this followed from his principles; because he maintained that the soul is united as a mover and not as a form to the body, saying that the soul exists in the body as a sailor in a ship. Moreover he maintained that it is necessary to posit different movers wherever there are generically different operations. For instance, in a ship there is one who steers, and another who rows. [Hence Plato argued in this way]: the fact that these movers hold different positions does not destroy the unity existing in the ship, because just as the actions of these movers are subordinated to one another, so also are the movers themselves. In like manner it does not seem to be inconsistent with the unity of a man or that of an animal, if in one body there exist many souls subordinated to one another as movers in accordance with the subordination of operations.
Sed secundum hoc cum ex motore et mobili non fiat unum simpliciter et per se, homo non esset unum simpliciter et per se, neque animal; neque esset generatio aut corruptio simpliciter, cum corpus accipit animam vel amittit. Unde oportet dicere, quod anima unitur corpori non solum ut motor, sed ut forma; ut etiam ex superioribus manifestum est. However, according to this position, neither a man nor an animal would have its unity absolutely and in virtue of its very nature, because a being that has unity absolutely and in its own right, does not result from the conjunction of a mover and something movable. Nor, on Plato’s hypothesis, would generation and corruption strictly speaking exist when a body receives a soul or loses it. Consequently it must be said that the soul is united to the body not only as a mover but as a form. This is also evident from the preceding arguments (Arts. 8 and 9).
Sed etiam hoc posito, adhuc secundum Platonis principia consequens est quod sint plures animae in homine et in animali. Posuerunt enim Platonici universalia esse formas separatas, quae de sensibilibus praedicantur in quantum participata sunt ab eis: utpote Socrates dicitur animal in quantum participat ideam animalis, et homo in quantum participat ideam hominis. Et secundum hoc relinquitur quod alia sit forma secundum essentiam, secundum quam Socrates dicitur esse animal, et alia secundum quam dicitur esse homo. Unde ad hoc sequitur quod anima sensibilis et rationalis secundum substantiam differant. Sed hoc non potest stare: quia ex diversis actu existentibus non fit aliquid unum per se. Quia si de aliquo subiecto praedicentur aliqua secundum diversas formas per se, unum illorum praedicatur de altero per accidens. Sicut de Socrate dicitur album secundum albedinem, et musicum secundum musicam; unde musicum de albo secundum accidens praedicatur. Si igitur Socrates dicatur homo et animal secundum aliam et aliam formam, sequeretur quod haec praedicatio homo est animal, sit per accidens; et quod homo non sit vere id quod est animal. Contingit tamen secundum diversas formas fieri praedicationem per se, quando habent ordinem ad invicem; ut si dicatur quod habens superficiem est coloratum. Nam color est in substantia mediante superficie. Sed hic modus praedicandi per se non est quia praedicatum ponatur in definitione subiecti; sed magis e converso. Superficies enim ponitur in definitione coloris sicut numerus in definitione paris. Si ergo hoc modo esset praedicatio per se hominis et animalis, cum anima sensibilis quasi materialiter ordinetur ad rationalem, si diversae sint, sequetur quod animal non praedicabitur per se de homine, sed magis e contrario. But even if this position is adopted, it still follows from Plato’s principles that there are several souls in man and in the animal. For the Platonists maintained that universals are separate forms [i.e., existing apart from things] which are predicated of sensible things inasmuch as sensible things participate in them. For example, Socrates is called an animal inasmuch as he participates in the Idea, “animal,” and a man inasmuch as he participates in the Idea, “man.” The consequence of this is that there is one form essentially in virtue of which Socrates is said to be an animal, and another in virtue of which he is said to be a man. Whence it follows in turn that the sentient and rational soul differ substantially. But this cannot be maintained, for a being having unity in its own right cannot be constituted of diverse things having actual existence [in their own right]; because if terms are predicated of some subject by reason of diverse forms having existence of themselves, one is predicated of another accidentally. For instance, it is said of Socrates that he is white according to whiteness, and musical according to music. Therefore musical is predicated of white accidentally. Hence, if Socrates is said to be a man and an animal according to different forms, it would follow that this predication, man is an animal, is an accidental one, and that man is not really what an animal is. However, it happens that an essential predication is made through different forms when they are intrinsically related to one another, as when it is said that a thing having surface is colored. For color exists in a substance through the medium of its surface. But this mode of essential predication occurs, not because the thing predicated is placed in the definition of the subject, but rather the reverse. For surface is placed in the definition of color just as number is placed in the definition of the equal. Therefore, if animal were predicated of man through this mode of essential predication, when the sentient soul is related as matter to the rational soul, assuming they are diverse, it would follow that animal is not predicated essentially of man but rather the reverse.
Sequitur etiam aliud inconveniens. Ex pluribus enim actu existentibus non fit unum simpliciter, nisi sit aliquid uniens et aliquo modo ligans ea ad invicem. Sic ergo, si secundum diversas formas Socrates esset animal et rationale, indigerent haec duo, ad hoc quod unirentur simpliciter, aliquo quod faceret ea unum. Unde, cum hoc non sit assignare, remanebit quod homo non erit unum nisi aggregatione; sicut acervus, qui est secundum quid unum et simpliciter multa. Et ita etiam non erit homo ens simpliciter, quia unumquodque in tantum est ens, in quantum est unum. An additional difficulty follows. For a being having unity absolutely cannot be constituted of diverse things having actual existence [in their own right], unless there is something uniting them and binding them to one another in some manner. Therefore, if Socrates were an animal and rational according to different forms, these two forms would need a unitary principle to make them substantially one. Therefore, since, on Plato’s hypothesis, no such unitary principle is to be found, it will follow that the unity of a man will be a unity of aggregation alone, like that of a heap of things which is relatively one and absolutely many. So neither will man be a being absolutely, because so far as a thing is a being to that extent it is one.
Iterum aliud inconveniens sequitur. Cum enim genus sit substantiale praedicatum, oportet quod forma secundum quam individuum substantiae recipit praedicationem generis, sit forma substantialis. Et ita oportet quod anima sensibilis, secundum quam Socrates dicitur animal, sit forma substantialis in eo; et sic necesse est quod det esse simpliciter corpori, et faciat ipsum hoc aliquid. Anima ergo rationalis, si est alia secundum substantiam, non facit hoc aliquid nec esse simpliciter, sed solum esse secundum quid; cum adveniat rei iam subsistenti. Unde non erit forma substantialis, sed accidentalis; et sic non dabit speciem Socrati, cum etiam species sit praedicatum substantiale. Still another incongruity follows. For the form in accordance with which an individual substance receives a generic predication, must be a substantial one, because a genus is a substantial predicate. And thus the sentient soul in virtue of which Socrates is said to be an animal, must be his substantial form, and so must give to the body its act of existing in the absolute sense (per se), and make it to be this particular thing (hoc aliquid). Therefore, if the rational soul differs substantially from the sentient, it does not make the body to be this particular thing, nor does it give to the body an act of existing in the absolute sense, but only relatively. For in that case a rational form will accrue to a thing already actually subsisting. Consequently it will not be a substantial form but an accidental one, and thus will not make Socrates to be specifically what he is, for a species also is a substantial predicate.
Relinquitur ergo quod in homine sit tantum una anima secundum substantiam, quae est rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis. Et hoc consequens est ei, quod in praecedentibus ostendimus de ordine formarum substantialium: scilicet quod nulla forma substantialis unitur materiae mediante alia forma substantiali; sed forma perfectior dat materiae quidquid dabat forma inferior, et adhuc amplius. Unde anima rationalis dat corpori humano quidquid dat anima sensibilis brutis, vegetabilis plantis, et ulterius aliquid; et propter hoc ipsa est in homine et vegetabilis et sensibilis et rationalis. It follows, therefore, that a man’s soul, which is rational, sentient, and vegetal, is substantially one only. This is a consequence of the argument given in a preceding article (Art. 9) concerning the order of substantial forms, namely, that no substantial form is united to matter through the medium of another, but that a more perfect form gives to matter whatever an inferior form does, and something over and above. Hence the rational soul gives to the human body everything that the sentient soul gives to the brute and the vegetal soul gives to the plant, and something over and above. For this reason the soul in man is both vegetal, sentient, and rational.
Huic etiam attestatur, quod, cum operatio unius potentiae fuerit intensa, impeditur alterius operatio, et e contra fit redundantia ab una potentia in aliam: quod non esset, nisi omnes potentiae in una essentia animae radicarentur. The following example also attests to this, namely, that when the operation of one power is intense, that of another is impeded; and contrariwise, there is an overflowing of one power into another, which would occur only if all the powers were rooted in one and the same essence of the soul.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod supposito quod sit tantum una substantia animae in corpore humano, diversimode ad hoc argumentum respondetur a diversis. Quidam enim dicunt quod in embryone ante animam rationalem non est anima, sed quaedam virtus procedens ab anima parentis, et ab huiusmodi virtute sunt operationes quae in embryone apparent: quae dicitur virtus formativa. Sed hoc non est omnino verum: quia in embryone apparet non solum formatio corporis, quae potest attribui praedictae virtuti; sed etiam aliae operationes, quae non possunt attribui nisi animae, ut augeri, sentire, et huiusmodi. Posset tamen hoc sustineri, si praedictum principium activum in embryone pro tanto diceretur virtus animae, non anima, quia nondum est anima perfecta, sicut nec embryo est animal perfectum. Sed tunc eadem remanebit difficultas. Dicunt enim aliqui quod, licet primo in embryone sit anima vegetabilis quam sensibilis et sensibilis quam rationalis, non tamen est alia et alia. Sed primo quidem reducitur semen in actum animae vegetabilis per principium activum, quod est in semine. Quae quidem anima in processu temporis magis ad ulteriorem producitur perfectionem per processum generationis, et ipsamet fit anima sensibilis; quae quidem ulterius producitur in maiorem perfectionem a principio extrinseco, et fit anima rationalis. Sed secundum hanc positionem sequetur quod ipsa substantia animae rationalis sit a principio activo quod est in semine, sed alia perfectio adveniat ibi ultimo a principio extrinseco. Et ita sequeretur quod anima rationalis secundum suam substantiam sit corruptibilis: non enim potest esse incorruptibile quod a virtute quae est in semine causatur. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod generatio animalis non est tantum una generatio simplex; sed succedunt sibi invicem multae generationes et corruptiones. Sicut dicitur quod primo habet formam seminis, et secundo formam sanguinis, et sic deinceps quousque perficiatur generatio. Et ideo cum corruptio et generatio non sint sine abiectione et additione formae, oportet quod forma imperfecta quae prius inerat abiiciatur et perfectior inducatur; et hoc quousque conceptum habeat formam perfectam. Et ideo dicitur quod anima vegetabilis prius est in semine; sed illa abiicitur in processu generationis, et succedit alia, quae non solum est vegetabilis, sed etiam sensibilis. Ad istam iterum additur alia quae simul est vegetabilis, sensibilis et rationalis. 1. Having premised that the soul existing in the human body is substantially one only, this argument is answered in different ways by diverse men. For some claim that no soul exists in the embryo prior to the rational soul, but a certain power deriving from the soul of the parent. They maintain that the operations perceived in the embryo are caused by this power, which is called a formative one. But this is not altogether true, because there appears in the embryo not only the forming of the body (which can be attributed to the aforesaid power) but other operations as well; and these cannot be attributed to anything but a soul, such as growth, sensation, and the like. Nevertheless this position could be held if the aforesaid active principle in the embryo were called a power of a soul temporarily, and not a soul, because it is not yet a perfect one, just as the embryo is not a perfect animal. But then the same difficulty will remain. For some say that the vegetal soul exists in the embryo before the sentient soul, and the sentient before the rational, but not concomitantly. Indeed, they maintain that the semen gives rise to an actual vegetal soul as a result of an active principle existing in the semen. This soul in the course of time is brought to a higher degree of perfection by the process of generation and itself becomes a sentient soul, which in turn is brought to a still higher degree of perfection by an extrinsic principle, and becomes the rational soul. Now according to this position it follows that the substance itself of the rational soul comes from an active principle existing in the semen, but that an additional perfection accrues to it finally from an extrinsic principle. And thus it would follow that the very substance of the rational soul is corruptible. For that cannot be incorruptible which is caused by a power existing in the semen. Therefore our explanation must be different, namely, that the generation of an animal is not one simple generation alone, but that many generations and corruptions follow one another. For it is said that first the animal has the form of semen, then the form of blood, and so on successively until generation is completed. And therefore since corruption and generation do not take place without the loss of one form and the acquisition of another, the imperfect form which first exists within the embryo must be discarded and a more perfect one assumed. This continues until the thing conceived has acquired its perfect form. Consequently it is said that the vegetal soul first exists in the semen, but that it is lost in the process of generation, and that another soul succeeds it which is not only vegetal, but also sentient. Then another soul is added to this which is at once vegetal, sentient, and rational.
Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus quae est in semine a patre, est virtus permanens ab intrinseco, non influens ab extrinseco, sicut virtus moventis quae est in proiectis: et ideo quantumcumque pater distet secundum locum, virtus quae est in semine, operatur. Non enim virtus activa quae est in semine potest esse a matre, licet hoc quidam dicant, quod femina non est principium activum, sed passivum. Tamen quantum ad aliquid est simile: sicut enim virtus proiicientis, quae est finita, movet motu locali usque ad determinatam distantiam loci, ita virtus generantis movet motu generationis usque ad determinatam formam. 2. The power existing in the semen which is derived from the father is a permanent intrinsic power, not one coming from an extrinsic principle, just as the power of the mover which exists in the thing thrown is intrinsic. Hence the power which is in the semen operates no matter how far away the father may be. For the active power which is in the semen cannot be caused by the mother (although some indeed maintain this), because the woman is not an active principle but a passive one. Nevertheless there is some similarity here, because, just as the thrower’s power, which is finite, moves an object to a definite place some distance away by local motion, so does the power of one generating move a thing to a determinate form by the movement of generation.
Ad tertium dicendum quod illa virtus habet rationem animae, ut dictum est; et ideo ab ea embryo potest dici animal. 3. That power has the nature of a soul as has been explained. Therefore the embryo can be called an animal because of it.
Et similiter dicendum ad quartum, quintum, sextum, septimum et octavum. 4-8. The fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth objections are answered in the same way.
Ad nonum dicendum quod sicut anima est in embryone in actu, sed imperfecte, ita operatur secundum operationes imperfectas. 9. Inasmuch as the soul exists actually, but imperfectly, in the embryo, to that extent does it perform imperfect operations.
Ad decimum dicendum quod, licet anima sensibilis in brutis sit ab intrinseco, tamen in homine substantia animae, quae est simul vegetabilis, sensibilis et rationalis, est ab extrinseco, ut iam dictum est. 10. Although the sentient soul in the brute comes from an intrinsic principle, nevertheless in man the substance of the soul, which is at once vegetal, sentient, and rational, comes from an extrinsic principle, as has just been shown.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod anima sensibilis non est accidens in homine, sed substantia, cum sit idem in substantia cum anima rationali; sed potentia sensitiva est accidens in homine, sicut et in aliis animalibus. 11. The sentient soul does not exist in man accidentally, but substantially, because it is substantially the same as the rational soul. However, a sentient power is an accident in man just as it is in other animals.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod anima sensibilis est nobilior in homine quam in aliis animalibus: quia in homine non tantum sensibilis est, sed etiam rationalis. 12. The sentient soul in man is nobler than that in other animals, because in man it is not only sentient but also rational.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod anima sensibilis in homine secundum substantiam est incorruptibilis, cum eius substantia sit substantia animae rationalis; licet forte potentiae sensitivae, quae sunt actus corporis, non remaneant post corpus, ut quibusdam videtur. 13. As regards its very substance the sentient soul in man is incorruptible, because its substance is the substance of the rational soul, although perhaps the sentient powers, which are acts of the body, do not remain in existence after the body has corrupted, as some maintain.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod si anima sensibilis quae est in brutis, et anima sensibilis quae est in homine, collocarentur secundum se in genere vel specie, non essent unius generis; nisi forte logice loquendo secundum aliquam intentionem communem. Sed id quod est in genere et specie proprie, est compositum, quod utrobique est corruptibile. 14. If the sentient soul existing in brutes and that existing in man could of themselves be placed in a genus and a species, they would belong to one genus only logically speaking, according to some common intention. But the thing that exists expressly in a genus and a species is the composite of body and soul, and this composite is corrupted both in the case of man and in that of the animal.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod anima sensibilis in homine non est anima irrationalis, sed est anima sensibilis et rationalis simul. Sed verum est quod potentiae animae sensitivae, quaedam quidem sunt irrationales secundum se, sed participant rationem secundum quod obediunt rationi; potentiae autem animae vegetabilis sunt penitus irrationabiles, quia non obediunt rationi, ut patet per philosophum in I Ethic. 15. The sentient soul in man is not a non-rational soul but is at once a sentient and rational soul. However, it is true that the soul’s sentient powers as such are, indeed, non-rational, but participate in reason inasmuch as they obey reason. Moreover, the powers of the vegetal soul are wholly non-rational, because they do not obey reason, as is clear from what the Philosopher says in the Ethics [I, 13, 1102b 30].
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod, licet sint plura principalia membra in corpore, in quibus manifestantur principia quarumdam operationum animae, tamen omnia dependent a corde sicut a primo principio corporali. 16. Although in the body there are several principal members in which the principles of certain operations of a soul are manifested, nevertheless all depend upon the heart as the first bodily principle.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod ab anima humana in quantum unitur corpori effluunt vires affixae organis; in quantum vero excedit sua virtute corporis capacitatem, effluunt ab ea vires non affixae organis. 17. Powers operating through organs spring from the human soul inasmuch as it is united to the body. But powers not operating through organs spring from the soul inasmuch as it exceeds by its power the capacity of the body.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod sicut ex superioribus quaestionibus patet, ab una et eadem forma materia recipit diversos gradus perfectionis; et secundum quod materia perficitur inferiori gradu perfectionis, remanet adhuc materialis dispositio ad ulterioris perfectionis gradum. Et sic secundum quod corpus perficitur in esse sensibili ab anima humana, remanet adhuc ut materiale respectu ulterius perfectionis. Et secundum hoc, animal quod est genus, sumitur a materia; et rationale, quod est differentia, sumitur a forma. 18. As is clear from the preceding questions, matter receives different grades of perfection from one and the same form. And so far as matter is perfected by an inferior grade of perfection, the material disposition for a higher grade of perfection still remains. Thus so far as the body is perfected in sensible being by the human soul, the body retains to that extent the nature of matter with respect to a higher perfection. And according to this, animal, which is a genus, is derived from matter, and “rational,” which is a difference, is derived from form.,
Ad decimumnonum dicendum quod sicut animal, in quantum animal, neque est rationale neque irrationale: sed ipsum animal rationale est homo, animal vero irrationale est animal brutum; ita anima sensibilis, in quantum huiusmodi, neque rationalis neque irrationalis est; sed ipsa anima sensibilis in homine est rationalis, in brutis vero irrationalis. 19. As an animal as such is neither rational nor non-rational (but rational animal is man, and non-rational animal is brute animal), so is the sentient soul as such neither rational nor non-rational, but is rational in man and non-rational in’the brute.
Ad vicesimum dicendum quod, licet una sit anima sensibilis et vegetabilis, non tamen oportet quod in quocumque apparet operatio unius, appareat operatio alterius, propter diversam partium dispositionem. Ex quo etiam contingit quod nec omnes operationes animae sensibilis exercentur per unam partem; sed visus per oculum, auditus per aures, et sic de aliis. 20. Although the sentient and vegetal soul is one soul, still it is not necessary that the operation of one appear wherever the operation of the other appears, because of the diverse dispositions of parts. For this reason it also happens that all of the sentient soul’s operations are not exercised through one part; but sight is exercised through the eye, hearing through the ear, and so on for the rest.
ARTICLE 12
WHETHER THE SOUL IS ITS POWERS

[Summa theol., I, q.77, a. 1; q.54, a. 3; Sent., I, dist. 3. q.4, a. 2; Quodl. X, q. 3, a. 1; De spir. creat., a. 1]
Duodecimo quaeritur utrum anima sit suae potentiae In the twelfth article we examine this question: Whether the soul is its powers.
Objections.
Et videtur quod sic. Dicitur enim in libro de spiritu et anima: anima habet sua naturalia, et illa omnia est: potentiae namque atque vires eius idem sunt quod ipsa. Habet accidentia, et illa non sunt suae vires, et suae virtutes non sunt; non est enim sua prudentia, sua temperantia, sua iustitia, sua fortitudo. Ex hoc expresse videtur haberi quod anima sit suae potentiae. 1. It seems that the soul is its powers. For it is said in the work De spiritu et anima [XIII] “The soul has its own natural powers, and is all of these, for its active and passive powers are the same as itself. It has accidents, and these are not its powers, nor are its virtues itself; for it is not its own prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude.” According to this it seems to be clearly maintained that the soul is its powers.
Praeterea, in eodem libro, dicitur: anima secundum sui operis officium variis nuncupatur nominibus: dicitur namque anima dum vegetat, sensus dum sentit, animus dum sapit, mens dum intelligit, ratio dum discernit, memoria dum recordatur, voluntas dum vult. Ista tamen non differunt in substantia, quemadmodum in nominibus: quoniam ista sunt anima. Ex hoc etiam idem habetur quod prius. 2. Further, it is stated in the same work: “The soul is designated by different names in accordance with the way in which it operates. For it is called soul when it vegetates, sense when it senses, spirit when it knows, mind when it understands, reason when it discerns, memory when it remembers, and will when it wills. However, these do not differ substantially but only in name, because all of these are the soul itself.” According to this the same thing would be maintained as is stated above.
Praeterea, Bernardus dicit: tria quaedam intueor in anima: memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem; et haec tria esse ipsam animam. Sed eadem ratio est etiam de aliis potentiis animae. Ergo anima est suae potentiae. 3. Further, Bernard says [Liber meditationum, I]: “I distinguish three powers in the soul: memory, understanding, and will; and these three are the soul itself.” But the same thing is also true of the other powers of the soul. Hence the soul is its powers.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in VI de Trinit., quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una vita, una essentia. Sed nonnisi essentia animae. Ergo potentiae animae sunt idem quod eius essentia. 4. Further, Augustine says in the De Trinitate [X, 11] that memory, understanding, and will, are one life, one essence. Now the essence of the soul is nothing if not one. Therefore the powers of the soul are the same as its essence.
Praeterea, nullum accidens excedit suum subiectum. Sed memoria intelligentia et voluntas, excedunt animam: non enim sui solum anima meminit, neque se solum intelligit et vult, sed etiam alia. Ergo haec tria non sunt accidentia animae: sunt igitur idem quod essentia animae, et eadem ratione aliae potentiae. 5. Further, no accident goes beyond its subject. Now memory, understanding, and will, go beyond the soul; for the soul not only remembers itself, and understands and wills itself, but other things as well. Therefore these three powers are not accidents of the soul. Hence they are the same as its essence, and so also are its other powers for the same reason.
Praeterea, secundum haec tria attenditur imago Trinitatis in anima. Sed anima est ad imaginem Trinitatis secundum seipsam, et non solum secundum eius accidentia. Ergo praedictae potentiae non sunt accidentia animae: sunt igitur de essentia eius. 6. Further, an image of the Trinity is found in the soul with respect to these three powers. But an image of the Trinity is present in the soul so far as the soul itself is concerned, and not merely so far as its accidents are concerned. Therefore the aforementioned powers are not accidents of the soul and, consequently, belong to its essence.
Praeterea, accidens est quod potest adesse et abesse praeter subiecti corruptionem. Sed potentiae animae non possunt abesse. Ergo non sunt accidentia animae; et sic idem quod prius. 7. Further, an accident is something that can be present or absent without its subject being corrupted. But the powers of the soul cannot be withdrawn from the soul. Therefore they are not accidents of it. Thus the conclusion here is the same as the foregoing.
Praeterea, nullum accidens est principium substantialis differentiae; quia differentia complet definitionem rei, quae significat quid est res. Sed potentiae animae sunt principia differentiarum substantialium; sensibile enim dicitur secundum sensum, rationale secundum rationem. Ergo potentiae non sunt accidentia animae, sed sunt ipsa anima, quae est forma corporis; nam forma est principium substantialis differentiae. 8. Further, no accident is a principle of substantial difference, because a difference completes a thing’s definition, which definition signifies what a thing is. Now powers of a soul are principles of substantial differences, for a thing is said to be sensible in virtue of sense, and to be rational in virtue of reason. Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents of it, but are the soul itself, which is the form of the body; for the form is the principle of substantial difference.
Praeterea, forma substantialis est virtuosior quam accidentalis. Sed accidentalis a seipsa agit, et non per aliam potentiam mediam. Ergo et substantialis. Cum igitur anima sit forma substantialis, potentiae quibus agit non sunt aliud quam ipsa. 9. Further, a substantial form is more efficacious than an accidental one. But an accidental form acts by itself and not by some intermediary power. Therefore, so also does a substantial form. Consequently, since the soul is a substantial form, its powers, whereby it operates, do not differ from itself.
Praeterea, idem est principium essendi et operandi. Sed anima secundum seipsam est principium essendi, quia secundum suam essentiam est forma. Ergo sua essentia est principium operandi. Sed potentia nihil est aliud quam principium operandi. Essentia igitur animae est eius potentia. 10. Further, the principle which gives a thing its act of existing, and that responsible for its operations, are one and the same. Now the soul in itself is the principle that gives a living thing its act of existing, because it is a form according to its very essence. Therefore its essence is a principle of operation. But a power is nothing more than a principle of operation. Consequently the essence of the soul is identical with its powers.
Praeterea, substantia animae, in quantum est in potentia ad intelligibilia, est intellectus possibilis; in quantum autem est actu, est agens. Sed esse actu et esse in potentia non significant aliud quam ipsam rem quae est in potentia et in actu. Ergo anima est intellectus agens et possibilis; et eadem ratione est suae potentiae. 11. Further, the substance of the soul, inasmuch as it is in potency to intelligibles, is the possible intellect. However, inasmuch as the soul is in act with respect to intelligibles, its substance is the agent intellect. But to be in act and to be in potency refer only to the thing itself which is in potency and in act. Therefore the soul is the agent intellect and the possible intellect, and is its other powers for the same reason.
Praeterea, sicut materia prima est in potentia ad formas sensibiles, ita anima intellectiva est in potentia ad formas intelligibiles. Sed materia prima est sua potentia. Ergo anima intellectiva est sua potentia. 12. Further, just as prime matter is in potency to sensible forms so also is the intellective soul in potency to intelligible forms. But prime matter is its own potency. Therefore the intellective soul is its own powers.
Praeterea, philosophus in libro Ethic. dicit quod homo est intellectus. Sed hoc non est nisi ratione animae rationalis. Ergo anima est intellectus, et eadem ratione est etiam suae potentiae. 13. Further, the Philosopher says, in the Ethics [IX, 4, 1166a 16], that man is an intellect. But he is an intellect only by reason of his rational soul. Therefore the soul is the intellect, and, for the same reason, it is also its other powers.
Praeterea, philosophus in II de anima dicit quod anima est actus primus, sicut scientia. Sed scientia est immediatum principium actus secundi, qui est considerare. Ergo anima est immediatum principium operationum suarum. Sed immediatum principium operationis dicitur potentia. Ergo anima est suae potentiae. 14. Further, the Philosopher says, in the De anima [II, 1, 412a 20], that the soul is a first act, just as any science is. Now a science is the immediate principle of that second act which is cogitation itself. Therefore the soul is the immediate principle of its own operations. But the immediate principle of an operation is called a power. Consequently the soul is its powers.
Praeterea, omnes partes sunt consubstantiales toti, quia totum consistit ex partibus. Sed potentiae animae sunt partes eius, ut patet in II de anima. Ergo sunt substantiales animae, et non sunt accidentia. 15. Further, all parts of a whole are consubstantial with the whole, because a whole is composed of its parts. Now the powers of the soul are its parts, as is shown in the De anima [II, 1, 413a 3]. Therefore they are substantial parts of the soul and not accidents of it.
Praeterea, forma simplex non potest esse subiectum. Sed anima est forma simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subiectum accidentium. Potentiae ergo quae sunt in anima, non sunt eius accidentia. 16. Further, whatever is a form alone (simplex) cannot be a subject.” But the, soul is a form alone, as we have shown above (Art. 6). Therefore it cannot be a subject of accidents. Consequently the powers which are present in the soul are not accidents of it.
Praeterea, si potentiae sunt accidentia animae, oportet quod ab essentia eius fluant; accidentia enim propria causantur ex principiis subiecti. Sed essentia animae, cum sit simplex, non potest esse causa tantae diversitatis accidentium, quantum apparet in potentiis animae. Potentiae igitur animae non sunt eius accidentia. Relinquitur ergo quod ipsa anima sit suae potentiae. 17. Further, if the powers are accidents of the soul, they must flow from its essence; for proper accidents are caused by the principles of a subject. But the essence of the soul, so far as it reveals itself in its powers, cannot be the cause of so great a diversity of accidents, because it is simple. Therefore the powers of the soul are not its accidents. Consequently it is to be concluded that the soul is its powers.
Sed contra. Sicut se habet essentia ad esse, ita posse ad agere. Ergo permutatim, sicut se habent esse et agere ad invicem, ita se habent potentia et essentia. Sed in solo Deo idem est esse et agere. Ergo in solo Deo idem est potentia et essentia. Anima ergo non est suae potentiae. On the contrary, essence is related to the act of existing (esse) as power (posse) is to action (agere). Therefore just as to be and to act are proportionally related to each other, so also are power and essence. Now to exist and to act are one and the same in God alone. Therefore power and essence are one and the same in God alone. Consequently the soul is not its powers
Praeterea, nulla qualitas est substantia. Sed potentia naturalis est quaedam species qualitatis, ut patet in praedicamentis. Ergo potentiae naturales animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae. Further, no quality is a substance. But a natural power is a particular species of quality, as is revealed in the Categories [VIII, 9a 13]. Consequently the natural powers of the soul are not the essence itself of the soul.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod circa hanc quaestionem sunt diversae opiniones. Quidam enim dicunt, quod anima est suae potentiae; alii vero hoc negant dicentes, potentias animae esse quasdam proprietates ipsius. Et ut harum opinionum diversitas cognoscatur, sciendum quod potentia nihil aliud est quam principium operationis alicuius, sive sit actio sive passio. Non quidem principium quod est subiectum agens aut patiens, sed id quo agens agit aut patiens patitur; sicut ars aedificativa est potentia in aedificatore qui per eam aedificat, et calor in igne qui calore calefacit, et siccum est potentia in lignis, quia secundum hoc sunt combustibilia. Ponentes igitur quod anima sit suae potentiae, hoc intelligunt quod ipsa essentia animae sit principium immediatum omnium operationum animae; dicentes quod homo per essentiam animae intelligit, sentit et alia huiusmodi operatur, et secundum diversitatem operationum diversis nominibus nominatur: sensus quidem in quantum est principium sentiendi, intellectus autem in quantum est intelligendi principium, et sic de aliis. Utpote si calorem ignis nominaremus potentiam liquefactivam, calefactivam et desiccativam, quia haec omnia operatur. I answer: There are different opinions about this question For some say that the soul is its powers, and others deny this, holding that the powers of the soul are certain properties of it. In order to see wherein these opinions differ we must understand that a power is nothing but a thing’s principle of operation, whether it be an action or a passion [i.e., the undergoing of an action]. Indeed, a principle is not the subject acting or undergoing an action, but that by which an agent acts or a patient undergoes an action; just as the art of building is a power in the builder who builds by means of that power; and as heat is a power of fire, which heats by means of its heat; and as dryness is a power in pieces of wood, because they are combustible in virtue of this dryness. Consequently those who maintain that the soul is its powers, think that the essence itself of the soul is the immediate principle of all its operations. They say that a man understands, senses, and acts, and other things of this sort, by the essence of the soul, and that the soul is referred to by different names inasmuch as its operations differ. It is called sense inasmuch as it is the principle of sensation, intellect inasmuch as it is the principle of intellection and so on for the other powers; just as if, for example, we were to call the heat of fire its liquifying power, its heating power, and its drying power, because it does all of these.
Sed haec opinio stare non potest. Primo quidem, quia unumquodque agit secundum quod actu est, illud scilicet quod agit; ignis enim calefacit non in quantum actu est lucidum, sed in quantum est actu calidum: et exinde est quod omne agens agit sibi simile. Unde oportet quod ex eo quod agitur, consideretur principium quo agitur; oportet enim utrumque esse conforme. Unde in II Physic. dicitur quod forma et generans sunt idem specie. Cum ergo id quod agit non pertinet ad esse substantiale rei, impossibile est quod principium quo agit sit aliquid de essentia rei; et hoc manifeste apparet in agentibus naturalibus. Quia enim agens naturale in generatione agit transmutando materiam ad formam, quod quidem fit secundum quod materia primo disponitur ad formam, et tandem consequitur formam, secundum quod generatio est terminus alterationis; necesse est quod ex parte agentis id quod immediate agit sit forma accidentalis correspondens dispositioni materiae. Sed oportet ut forma accidentalis agat in virtute formae substantialis, quasi instrumentum eius; alias non induceret agendo formam substantialem. Et propter hoc in elementis non apparent aliqua principia actionum, nisi qualitates activae et passivae, quae tamen agunt in virtute formarum substantialium. Et propter hoc earum actio non solum terminatur ad dispositiones accidentales, sed etiam ad formas substantiales. Nam et in artificialibus actio instrumenti terminatur ad formam intentam ab artifice. Si vero est aliquod agens quod directe et immediate sua actione producat substantiam (sicut nos dicimus de Deo, qui creando producit rerum substantias, et sicut Avicenna dicit de intelligentia agente, a qua secundum ipsum fluunt formae substantiales in istis inferioribus), huiusmodi agens agit per suam essentiam; et sic non erit in eo aliud potentia activa et eius essentia. Now this opinion cannot be maintained. First, indeed, because anything whatever that acts, acts according as it is in act. For fire heats not inasmuch as it is actually bright, but inasmuch as it is actually hot. It is for this reason that every agent produces an effect similar to itself. Wherefore the principle by which an agent acts must be known from its effects (quod agitur), for both must conform. Hence it is said in the Physics [II, 7, 198a 25] that the form and the thing generating are specifically the same.” Therefore when an effect does not result from the substantial mode of existing of the one acting, it is impossible that the principle by which such an effect is brought about, belong in any way to the essence itself of the thing acting. This is quite evident in natural agents. For since a natural agent in generating acts by changing matter with respect to some form (which change occurs inasmuch as matter is first disposed to receive the form, and then acquires it according as generation is the terminus of alteration), the principle which acts immediately on the side of the agent must be an accidental form corresponding to the disposition of the matter. Now an accidental form must act in virtue of a substantial form, and as an instrument of the latter, otherwise it would not induce a substantial form by its activity. For this reason no principles of action appear in the elements except their active and passive qualities,” which still act in virtue of their substantial forms; and on account of this their action is terminated not only in accidental dispositions, but in substantial forms as well. For in things made by art the action of an instrument is terminated in the form intended by the artisan. Indeed, if there is an agent that produces a substance directly and immediately by its action (just as we speak of God who produces the substances of things by creating them, and as Avicenna speaks of the Agent Intellect, which, by virtue of its own power, infuses substantial forms into these inferior things), then an agent of this sort acts through its own essence, and thus its active power will not differ from its own essence.
De potentia vero passiva manifestum est quod potentia passiva quae est ad actum substantialem, est in genere substantiae; et quae est ad actum accidentalem, est in genere accidentis per reductionem, sicut principium, et non sicut species completa. Quia unumquodque genus dividitur per potentiam et actum. Unde potentia homo est in genere substantiae, et potentia album est in genere qualitatis. Manifestum est autem quod potentiae animae, sive sint activae sive passivae, non dicuntur directe per respectum ad aliquid substantiale, sed ad aliquid accidentale. Et similiter esse intelligens vel sentiens actu non est esse substantiale, sed accidentale, ad quod ordinatur intellectus et sensus; et similiter esse magnum vel parvum, ad quod ordinatur vis augmentativa. Generativa vero potentia et nutritiva ordinantur quidem ad substantiam producendam vel conservandam, sed per transmutationem materiae; unde talis actio, sicut et aliorum agentium naturalium, fit a substantia mediante principio accidentali. Manifestum est ergo quod ipsa essentia animae non est principium immediatum suarum operationum, sed operatur mediantibus principiis accidentalibus; unde potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae, sed proprietates eius. Concerning passive power, it is clear that a passive power which is ordered to substantial act, belongs to the genus of substance, whereas one that is ordered to accidental act, belongs to the genus of accident by reduction as a principle and not as a complete species, because every genus is divided by potency and act. Accordingly a potential man belongs to the genus of substance, and potentially white belongs to the genus of quality. Now it is evident that the powers of the soul, whether active or passive, are spoken of directly with respect to something substantial, but not with respect to something accidental. Similarly, to be understanding or sensing actually, is not a substantial mode of existing, but an accidental one to which the intellect and sense are directed. It is similar with respect to being large or small, to which the augmentative power is ordered. Indeed, the generative and nutritive powers are directed to the production or conservation of a substance, but by changing matter. Wherefore an action of this kind, like that of other natural agents, is performed by a substance through the medium of an accidental principle. Hence it is evident that the essence of the soul is not the immediate principle of its operations, but that it operates through accidental principles. Consequently the powers of the soul are not the essence itself of the soul but are properties of it.
Deinde hoc apparet ex ipsa diversitate actionum animae, quae sunt genere diversae, et non possunt reduci ad unum principium immediatum; cum quaedam earum sint actiones et quaedam passiones, et aliis huiusmodi differentiis differant, quae oportet attribui diversis principiis. Et ita, cum essentia animae sit unum principium, non potest esse immediatum principium omnium suarum actionum; sed oportet quod habeat plures et diversas potentias correspondentes diversitati suarum actionum. Potentia enim ad actum dicitur correlative, unde secundum diversitatem actionum oportet esse diversitatem potentiarum. Et inde est quod philosophus in VI Ethic. dicit quod scientificum animae, quod est necessariorum, et ratiocinativum quod est contingentium, sunt diversae potentiae; quia necessarium et contingens genere differunt. This is also evident from the very diversity of the soul’s actions, which differ generically and cannot be attributed to one immediate principle; because some are actions and some are passions, and are distinguished by other differences of this sort which must be attributed to different principles. Consequently, since the essence of the soul is one principle, it cannot be the immediate principle of all its actions, but must have many different powers corresponding to its different actions; for a power is said to be reciprocally related to its act. Hence there must be a diversity of powers in accordance with the diversity of operations. For this reason the Philosopher says, in the Ethics [VI, 1, 1139a 5] that the scientific power of the soul, which is concerned with necessary things, and the ratiocinative power, which is concerned with contingent things, are different powers, because the necessary and the contingent differ generically.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod liber iste de spiritu et anima non est Augustini, sed dicitur cuiusdam Cisterciensis fuisse; nec est multum curandum de his quae in eo dicuntur. Si tamen sustineatur, potest dici quod anima est suae potentiae, vel suae vires, quia sunt naturales proprietates eius. Unde in eodem libro dicitur quod omnes potentiae sunt una anima, proprietate quidem diversae, sed potentia una. Et est similis modus dicendi, sicut si diceretur quod calidum, lucidum et leve sunt unus ignis. 1. This book De spiritu et anima was not written by Augustine but is said to have been written by a certain Cistercian monk. Nor is there much to be said for the things which are set forth therein. If it is taken in an orthodox manner, however, it can be said that the soul is its powers or faculties, because they are its natural properties. Wherefore it is said in the same book that all powers are one soul, differing in property it is true, but one power. It would be a similar way of speaking if we were to say that heat, clarity, and brightness are one with fire.
Et similiter dicendum ad secundum, tertium et quartum. 2-4. The second, third, and fourth arguments are to be answered in the same way.
Ad quintum dicendum quod accidens non excedit subiectum in essendo, excedit tamen in agendo. Calor enim ignis exteriora calefacit; et secundum hoc potentiae animae excedunt ipsam, in quantum anima intelligit et diligit non solum se, sed etiam alia. Augustinus autem inducit hanc rationem comparans notitiam et amorem ad mentem, non ut ad cognoscentem et ad amantem, sed ut ad cognitum et amatum. Si enim secundum hanc habitudinem compararet ad ipsam ut accidentia ad subiectum, sequeretur quod anima non cognosceret et amaret nisi se. Unde fortassis secundum hunc intellectum dixit quod sunt una vita, una essentia; quia notitia in actu est quodammodo cognitum, et amor in actu est quodammodo ipsum amatum. 5. So far as its act of existing is concerned an accident does not go beyond its subject, but in so far as its operation is concerned it does; for the heat of fire heats something external to fire. It is in this way that the powers of the soul go beyond the soul itself, inasmuch as the soul understands and seeks not only itself but other things as well. Moreover, Augustine introduces this notion when he relates knowledge and love to the mind, not as the thing knowing and loving, but as that known and loved. For if he were to relate them to the soul itself in this way, as an accident to a subject, it would follow that the soul would know and love only itself. Perhaps it is in accordance with this meaning that he said, they are one life, one essence; because actual knowledge is the thing known in a certain respect, and actual love, the thing loved.
Ad sextum dicendum quod imago Trinitatis in anima attenditur non secundum potentiam tantum, sed etiam secundum essentiam. Sic enim repraesentatur una essentia in tribus personis, licet deficienter. Si autem anima esset suae potentiae, non esset distinctio potentiarum ab invicem nisi solis nominibus: et sic non repraesentaretur convenienter distinctio personarum quae est in divinis. 6. An image of the Trinity is found in the soul not only with respect to the soul’s powers, but also with respect to its essence; for the one essence of the three persons is represented in the soul, although in a very imperfect way. Moreover, if the soul were its powers, its powers would differ from each other in name only. Consequently the distinction between the Persons which is found in God, is not adequately represented [in the soul].
Ad septimum dicendum quod tria sunt genera accidentium: quaedam enim causantur ex principiis speciei, et dicuntur propria sicut risibile homini; quaedam vero causantur ex principiis individui. Et hoc dicitur quia, vel habent causam permanentem in subiecto, et haec sunt accidentia inseparabilia, sicut masculinum et femininum et alia huiusmodi; quaedam vero habent causam non permanentem in subiecto, et haec sunt accidentia separabilia, ut sedere et ambulare. Est autem commune omni accidenti quod non sit de essentia rei, et ita non cadit in definitione rei. Unde de re intelligimus quod quid est, absque hoc quod intelligamus aliquid accidentium eius. Sed species non potest intelligi sine accidentibus quae consequuntur principium speciei. Potest tamen intelligi sine accidentibus individui etiam inseparabilibus; sine separabilibus vero esse potest non solum species, sed et individuum. Potentiae vero animae sunt accidentia sicut proprietates. Unde licet sine illis intelligatur quid est anima, non autem animam sine eis esse est possibile neque intelligibile. 7. There are three genera of accidents: some are caused by the principles of the species, and are called proper accidents, for example, risibility in man; others are caused by the principles of the individual, and this class is spoken of [in two ways]: first, those that have a permanent cause in their subject, for example, masculine and feminine, and other things of this kind, and these are called inseparable accidents; secondly, those that do not have a permanent cause in their subject, such as to sit and to walk, and these are called separable accidents. Now no accident of any kind ever constitutes part of the essence of a thing, and thus an accident is never found in a thing’s definition. Hence we understand the essence (quod quid est) of a thing without thinking of any of its accidents. However, the species cannot be understood without the accidents which result from the principles of the species [i.e., the proper accidents], although the species can be understood without the accidents of the individual, even the inseparable accidents. Indeed, there can be not only a species but also an individual without the separable accidents. Now the powers of the soul are accidents in the sense of properties. Therefore, although the essence of the soul is understood without them, still the existence of the soul is neither possible nor intelligible without them.
Ad octavum dicendum quod sensibile et rationale secundum quod sunt differentiae essentiales, non sumuntur a sensu et intellectu, sed ab anima sensitiva et intellectiva. 8. Inasmuch as sensible and rational are essential differences, they are not derived from sense and intellect, but from the sentient and intellective soul.
Ad nonum dicendum quod quare forma substantialis non sit immediatum principium actionis in agentibus inferioribus, ostensum est. 9. For this reason the substantial form is not the immediate principle of action in inferior agents, as we have shown.
Ad decimum dicendum quod anima est principium operandi, sed primum, non proximum. Operantur enim potentiae virtute animae, sicut et qualitates elementorum, in virtute formarum substantialium. 10. The soul is the principle of operation; however, it is the first principle, not a proximate one, for powers operate by virtue of the soul itself, just as the qualities of the elements operate by virtue of their substantial forms.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod ipsa anima est in potentia ad ipsas formas intelligibiles. Sed ista potentia non est essentia animae, sicut nec potentia ad statuam quae est in aere est essentia aeris; esse enim actu et potentia non sunt de essentia rei, quoniam actus non est essentialis. 11. The soul itself is in potency to the intelligible forms themselves, but this potency is not the essence of the soul; just as the potency to be a statue, which is in the copper, is not the essence of copper. For actual and potential existence do not belong to the essence of a thing, because act is not of the essence.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod materia prima est in potentia ad actum substantialem, qui est forma; et ideo ipsa potentia est ipsa essentia eius. 12. Prime matter is in potency to substantial act which is form; and therefore potency is the very essence of prime matter.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod homo dicitur intellectus esse, quia intellectus dicitur id quod est potius in homine, sicut civitas dicitur esse rector civitatis; non tamen hoc dictum est eo quod essentia animae sit ipsa potentia intellectus. 13. Man is said to be an intellect because the intellect is said to be the highest thing in man; just as the state is said to be the governor of the state. However, this does not mean that the essence of the soul is the intellective power itself.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod similitudo inter animam et scientiam attenditur secundum quod utraque est actus primus, non autem quantum ad omnia. Unde non oportet quod anima sit immediatum principium operationum, sicut scientia. 14. The soul is seen to be similar to a science inasmuch as each is a first act, but such similarity does not exist in every respect. Consequently the soul is not necessarily the immediate principle of its operations, just as a science is.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod potentiae animae non sunt partes essentiales animae quasi constituentes essentiam eius; sed partes potentiales, quia virtus animae distinguitur per huiusmodi potentias. 15. The powers of the soul are not essential parts of it as though constituting its essence, but are potential parts, because a virtue of the soul is distinguished by powers of this kind.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod forma simplex quae non est subsistens, vel si subsistit, quae est actus purus, non potest esse subiectum accidentis. Anima autem est forma subsistens et non est actus purus, loquendo de anima humana; et ideo potest esse subiectum potentiarum quarumdam, scilicet intellectus et voluntatis. Potentiae autem sensitivae et nutritivae partis sunt in composito sicut in subiecto; quia cuius est actus eius est potentia, ut patet per philosophum in libro de Somn. et vigilia. 16. Whatever is a form in its entirety and is not a subsisting thing, or if it is a subsisting thing that is pure act, cannot be the subject of an accident. Now the soul is a subsisting form and is not pure act, that is, if we speak of the human soul. Therefore it can be the subject of certain powers, such as the intellect and the will. Moreover, the powers of the sentient and nutritive parts are in the composite as a subject; because whatever has an act, has a power, as is shown by the Philosopher in the work De somno et vigilia [I, 458b 34].
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod, licet anima sit una in essentia, tamen est in ea potentia et actus, et habet diversam habitudinem ad res. Diversimode etiam comparatur ad corpus; et propter hoc ab una essentia animae possunt procedere diversae potentiae. 159 17. Although the soul is one in essence, yet it contains potency and act and is diversely related to things. It is also related in a different way to the body; and for this reason different powers can proceed from one and the same essence of the soul.
ARTICLE 13
WHETHER THE POWERS OF THE SOUL ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM ONE ANOTHER BY THEIR OBJECTS

[Summa theol., I, q. 77, a. 3; Comm. in De anima, II, lect. 6. For a detailed treatment of the various powers of man, see Summa theol., I, q.78 to 82.]
Decimotertio quaeritur de distinctione potentiarum animae, utrum videlicet distinguantur per obiecta The distinction between the powers of the soul is examined in the thirteenth article, that is: Whether the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another by their objects.
Objections.
Et videtur quod non. Quia contraria sunt quae maxime distant. Sed contrarietas obiectorum non diversificat potentias; eadem enim potentia albi et nigri est visus. Ergo nulla differentia obiectorum diversificat potentias. 1. It seems that the powers of the soul are not distinguished in this way. For the things which differ most from one another are contraries. But a contrariety of objects does not diversify powers, because the same power of vision apprehends both white and black. Therefore a difference [i.e., a specific diversity] of objects does not diversify powers.
Praeterea, magis differunt quae differunt secundum substantiam, quam quae differunt secundum accidens. Sed homo et lapis differunt secundum substantiam, sonus autem et coloratum differunt secundum accidens. Cum igitur homo et lapis ad eamdem potentiam pertineant, multo magis sonus et coloratum; et ita nulla differentia obiectorum facit differre potentias. 2. Further, things which differ substantially differ more than those which differ accidentally. Now a man and a stone differ substantially, whereas a sound and something colored differ accidentally. Therefore, since a man and a stone are apprehended by the same power, so much the more so are a sound and something colored. Hence a diversity of objects is not the cause of the diversity of powers.
Praeterea, si differentia obiectorum esset causa diversitatis potentiarum, oporteret quod unitas obiecti esset causa identitatis in potentiis. Videmus autem quod idem obiectum ad diversas potentias se habet: idem enim est quod intelligitur et desideratur; bonum enim intelligibile est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo differentia obiectorum non est causa diversitatis potentiarum. 3. Further, if a difference of objects were the cause of the diversity of powers, one and the same object would necessarily cause powers to be identical. Now we see that one and the same object is apprehended by different powers. For the same object is known and desired, because an intelligible good is the object of the will. Consequently a diversity of objects is not the cause of the diversity of powers.
Praeterea, ubi est eadem causa est idem effectus. Si ergo obiecta diversa diversificarent potentias aliquas, oporteret quod diversitatem facerent ubique in potentiis. Hoc autem non videmus: nam quaedam obiecta diversa comparantur quidem ad diversas potentias, sicut sonus et color ad auditum et visum; et iterum ad unam potentiam, scilicet ad imaginationem et intellectum. Relinquitur ergo quod differentia obiectorum non sit causa diversitatis potentiarum. 4. Further, wherever the cause is the same, the effect is also the same. Therefore, if different objects diversified some powers, they would necessarily have to cause a diversity of powers in every case. However, we do not observe this. For sometimes different objects are certainly related to different powers, as sound and color are related to hearing and to vision respectively; and, at other times, these same objects are related to one and the same power, namely, to the imagination and to the intellect. Hence it follows that a diversity of objects is not the cause of the diversity of powers.
Praeterea, habitus sunt perfectiones potentiarum, perfectibilia enim distinguuntur per perfectiones proprias. Ergo potentiae distinguuntur secundum habitus et non secundum obiecta. 5. Further, habits (habitus) are perfections of powers. Moreover, perfectible things are distinguished from one another by their proper perfections. Consequently powers are distinguished by their habits and not by their objects.
Praeterea, omne quod est in aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis. Sed potentiae animae sunt in organis corporeis. Sunt enim actus organorum. Ergo distinguuntur secundum organa corporis, et non secundum obiecta. 6. Further, whatever exists in a thing exists in it according to the mode of the recipient. But the powers of the soul exist in the organs of the body, for they are the acts of these organs. Therefore the powers of the soul are distinguished by the organs of the body and not by their objects.
Praeterea, potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae, sed proprietates eius. Proprietates autem rei sunt ab essentia eius. Ab uno autem non est nisi unum immediate. Ergo una sola potentia animae est prima fluens ab essentia animae, et mediante ea fluunt aliae secundum aliquem ordinem. Ergo potentiae animae differunt secundum originem, et non secundum obiecta. 7. Further, the powers of the soul are not the essence itself of the soul, but are properties of it. Now the properties of a thing spring from its essence. However, only one thing comes directly from a single thing. Therefore, first of all one single power of the soul comes from its essence, and then the other powers proceed therefrom in a certain order through the medium of this [first] power. Hence the powers of the soul differ according to origin and not according to objects.
Praeterea, si potentiae animae sunt diversae, oportet quod una earum oriatur ab alia; quia non possunt omnes oriri ab essentia animae immediate, cum sit una et simplex. Sed impossibile videtur quod una potentia animae oriatur ex alia; tum quia omnes potentiae animae sunt simul, tum etiam quia accidens oritur a subiecto. Unum autem accidens non potest esse subiectum alterius. Non ergo possunt esse diversae potentiae animae per diversitatem obiectorum. 8. Further, if the powers of the soul are diverse, one of them must come from another, for all of them do not come directly from the essence of the soul, because it is one and simple. But it is seen to be impossible for one power of the soul to come from another. First, because all powers of the soul exist simultaneously. Secondly, because accidents have their existence in a subject, and one accident cannot be the subject of another. Therefore the diversity among the soul’s powers cannot be a result of the diversity among objects.
Praeterea, quanto aliqua substantia est altior, tanto eius virtus est maior et per consequens minus multiplicata: quia omnis virtus unita plus est infinita quam multiplicata, ut dicitur in libro de causis. Anima autem inter omnia inferiora est sublimior. Ergo virtus eius est magis una, et tamen ad plura se habens. Non ergo multiplicatur secundum differentiam obiectorum. 9. Further, the higher a substance is, the greater is its power and, as a result, less diversified (multiplicata), because every simple power is unlimited more than it is multiplied, as is said in the book De causis [27]. Now the soul is the most perfect of all inferior beings. Therefore its power is more unified than theirs, and still extends to many things. Consequently its power is not multiplied because of the diversity among objects.
Praeterea, si diversitas potentiarum animae est secundum differentiam obiectorum, oportet etiam quod ordo potentiarum sit secundum ordinem obiectorum. Hoc autem non videtur: nam intellectus, cuius obiectum est quod quid est et substantia, est posterior sensu, cuius obiecta sunt accidentia, ut color et sonus. Tactus autem est prior visu, cum tamen visibile sit prius et communius tangibili. Ergo nec diversitas potentiarum est solum secundum differentiam obiectorum. 10. Further, if the diversity among the soul’s powers depends on the diversity among objects, the order among the soul’s powers must also depend on the order among these objects. However, this is seen not to be the case, for the intellect, whose object is the quiddity (quod quid est) and substance, is subsequent to the senses, whose objects are accidents such as color and sound. Furthermore, touch is prior to sight, while the visible is prior to and more common than the tangible. Consequently there is not a diversity of powers merely because there is a difference of objects.
Praeterea, omne appetibile est sensibile vel intelligibile. Intelligibile autem est perfectio intellectus, et sensibile perfectio sensus. Cum igitur unumquodque appetat naturaliter suam perfectionem, sequitur quod intellectus et sensus appetant naturaliter omne appetibile. Non igitur oportet ponere potentiam appetitivam praeter sensitivam. 11. Further, every appetible object is either sensible or intelligible. Now the intelligible is the perfection of the intellect, and the sensible is the perfection of sense. Therefore, since any being naturally desires its perfection, it follows that intellect and sense naturally desire every appetible object. Hence it is unnecessary to admit the existence of any appetitive power other than the sentient.
Praeterea, appetitus non est nisi voluntas irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Sed voluntas est in intellectu, irascibilis et concupiscibilis in sensu, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo potentia appetitiva non est ponenda praeter sensitivam et intellectivam. 12. Further, no appetite exists except the will and the irascible and concupiscible appetite. But the will belongs to the intellective order, and the concupiscible and irascible appetites belong to the order of sense, as is pointed out in the De anima [III, 9, 432b 5]. Therefore no appetitive power must be held to exist in addition to the sentient and intellective.
Praeterea, philosophus probat in III de anima, quod principia motus localis in animalibus sunt sensus sive imaginatio, et intellectus et appetitus. Sed potentia in animalibus nihil aliud est quam principium motus. Ergo potentia motiva non est praeter cognoscitivam et appetitivam. 13. Further, the Philosopher proves in the De anima [III, 10, 433a 9] that the principles of local motion in an animal are sense or imagination, intellect and appetite. But a power in animals is nothing else than a principle of movement. Therefore there is no motive power except the cognitive and appetitive powers.
Praeterea, potentiae animae ordinantur ad aliquid altius quam est natura; alias in omnibus corporibus naturalibus essent vires animae. Sed potentiae quae attribuuntur animae vegetabili non videntur ordinari ad aliquid altius quam natura. Ordinantur enim ad conservationem speciei per generationem, et conservationem individui per nutrimentum, et perfectam quantitatem per augmentum; quae omnia operatur natura etiam in rebus naturalibus. Non igitur ad huiusmodi ordinandae sunt potentiae animae. 14. Further, the powers of the soul are directed to something higher than nature, otherwise there would be powers (vires) of the soul in all natural things. But the powers which are assigned to the vegetal soul do not appear to be directed to anything higher than nature. For the vegetal soul is directed to the conservation of the species through generation; to the preservation of the individual through nutrition; and to the [development] of the individual’s proper size through augmentation. Now in natural things, nature too performs all of these activities. Consequently the powers of the soul must not be directed to such activities.
Praeterea, quanto aliqua virtus est altior, tanto, una existens, ad plura se extendit. Sed virtus animae est supra virtutem naturae. Cum igitur natura eadem virtute producat in esse corpus naturale, et det ei debitam quantitatem, et conservet ipsum in esse; videtur hoc fortius quod anima una virtute operetur. Non igitur sunt diversae potentiae generativa, nutritiva et augmentativa. 15. Further, the higher a power, the greater is its unity and the more numerous are the things to which it extends. But a power of the soul is higher than a power of nature. Therefore, since nature by one and the same power gives existence to a natural body, bestows on it its proper size, and preserves it in existence, it seems a fortiori that the soul does these things through one power. Therefore the generative, nutritive, and augmentative powers are not diverse powers.
Praeterea, sensus est cognoscitivus accidentium. Sed aliqua alia accidentia magis ad invicem differunt quam sonus et color et huiusmodi; quae sunt non solum in eodem genere qualitatis, sed etiam in eadem specie, quae est tertia. Si igitur potentiae distinguuntur secundum differentiam obiectorum non deberent potentiae animae distingui penes huiusmodi accidentia, sed magis penes alia quae magis distant. 16. Further, sense is cognizant of accidents. But certain other accidents differ from one another to a greater degree than do sound and color and the like, which exist not only in the same genus of quality, but also in the same species, namely, the third [kind of quality]. Therefore, if powers are distinguished according to the difference of objects, the powers of the soul should not be distinguished by accidents of this kind, but rather by others which differ from each other to a greater degree.
Praeterea, cuiuslibet generis est una contrarietas prima. Si igitur penes diversa genera qualitatum possibilium diversificantur potentiae sensitivae, videtur quod ubicumque sunt diversae contrarietates sint diversae potentiae sensitivae. Sed hoc alicubi invenitur: visus enim est albi et nigri, auditus gravis et acuti; alicubi vero non: tactus enim est calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci, mollis et duri, et huiusmodi. Ergo potentiae non distinguuntur penes obiecta. 17. Further, there is one first contrary in any genus. Therefore, if the sentient powers are diversified because of the different genera of possible qualities, it seems that there are diverse sentient powers wherever there are diverse contraries. Now in some cases this does occur, for sight apprehends both white and black, and hearing apprehends both low and high notes; but in other cases it does not, for touch apprehends both hot and cold, wet and dry, soft and hard, and so on. Consequently powers are not distinguished from one another by’ their objects.
Praeterea, memoria non videtur esse alia potentia a sensu; est enim passio primi sensitivi, secundum philosophum. Obiecta tamen eorum differunt, quia obiectum sensus est praesens, obiectum vero memoriae praeteritum. Ergo potentiae non distinguuntur penes obiecta. 18. Further, memory does not appear to be a power distinct from sense. For, according to the Philosopher, memory is a passion of a first sense. However, their objects differ, because the object of sense exists in the present, and the object of memory, in the past. Hence powers are not distinguished from one another by their objects.
Praeterea, omnia quae cognoscuntur per sensum, cognoscuntur etiam per intellectum, et alia plura. Si igitur potentiae sensitivae distinguuntur secundum pluralitatem obiectorum, oportet etiam quod intellectus distinguatur secundum diversas potentias, sicut et sensus; quod patet esse falsum. 19. Further, all things known by the senses are also known by the. intellect, which is cognizant of many other things as well. Therefore, if the sentient powers are distinguished from one another by reason of a plurality of objects, the intellect must also be distinguished into different powers, just as sense is. This is evidently false.
Praeterea, intellectus possibilis et agens sunt diversae potentiae, ut supra ostensum est. Sed idem est obiectum utriusque. Non igitur potentiae distinguuntur secundum differentiam obiectorum. 20. Further, the possible and agent intellect are different powers, as has been shown above (Arts. 3-5). But the object of both is the same. Therefore powers are not distinguished from one another because of a difference of objects.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur in II de anima, quod potentiae distinguuntur per actus, et actus per obiecta. On the contrary, it is said in the De anima [II, 4, 415a 14] that powers are distinguished by acts, and acts by objects.
Praeterea, perfectibilia distinguuntur penes perfectiones. Sed obiecta sunt perfectiones potentiarum. Ergo potentiae distinguuntur penes obiecta. Further, perfectible things are distinguished from one another by their perfections. But the objects of powers are the perfections of powers. Therefore powers are distinguished by their objects.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod potentia secundum id quod est, dicitur ad actum; unde oportet quod per actum definiatur potentia, et secundum diversitatem actuum diversificentur potentiae. Actus autem ex obiectis speciem habent: nam si sint actus passivarum potentiarum, obiecta sunt activa; si autem sunt activarum potentiarum, obiecta sunt ut fines. Secundum autem utrumque horum considerantur species operationis; nam calefacere et infrigidare distinguuntur quidem secundum quod huius principium est calor, illius autem frigus; et iterum in similes fines terminantur. Nam agens ad hoc agit ut similitudinem suam in aliis inducat. Relinquitur ergo quod secundum distinctionem obiectorum attenditur distinctio potentiarum animae. I answer: A power as such is spoken of in relation to an act. Hence a power must be defined by its act, and powers in turn distinguished ‘from one another inasmuch as their acts are different. Now acts derive their species from their objects, because, if they are acts of passive powers, their objects are active. However, if they are the acts of active powers, their objects are as ends. Now the species of an operation must be considered in both of these ways. For the act of heating and that of making cold are distinguished from one another, because the principle of the former is heat, and that of the latter, cold. Besides, both are terminated in similar ends. For an agent acts in order that it may cause something similar to itself to exist in another. It follows, therefore, that the distinction between the powers of the soul is based on a difference [i.e., a specific diversity] of objects.
Oportet tamen attendere distinctionem obiectorum secundum quod obiecta sunt differentiae actionum animae, et non secundum aliud; quia in nullo genere species diversificatur nisi differentiis quae per se dividunt genus. Non enim albo et nigro distinguuntur species animalis, sed rationali et irrationali. Oportet autem in actionibus animae tres gradus considerare. Actio enim animae transcendit actionem naturae in rebus inanimatis operantis; sed hoc contingit quantum ad duo: scilicet quantum ad modum agendi, et quantum ad id quod agitur. Oportet autem quod quantum ad modum agendi omnis actio animae transcendat operationem vel actionem naturae inanimati; quia, cum actio animae sit actio vitae, vivum autem est quod seipsum movet ad operandum, oportet quod omnis operatio animae sit secundum aliquod intrinsecum agens. Sed quantum ad id quod agitur, non omnis actio transcendit actionem naturae inanimati. Oportet enim quod fit esse naturale, et quae ad ipsum requiruntur: sic in corporibus inanimatis, sicut in corporibus animatis. Sed in corporibus inanimatis fit ab agente extrinseco, in corporibus vero animatis ab agente intrinseco; et huiusmodi sunt actiones ad quas ordinantur potentiae animae vegetabilis. Nam ad hoc quod individuum producatur in esse, ordinatur potentia generativa; ad hoc autem quod quantitatem debitam consequatur, ordinatur vis augmentativa; ad hoc autem quod conservetur in esse, ordinatur vis nutritiva. Haec autem consequuntur corpora inanimata ab agente naturali extrinseco tantum; et propter hoc praedictae vires animae dicuntur naturales. Now it is necessary to consider the difference between objects in this way and in this way alone, namely, that objects specifically differentiate the actions of the soul. For a species is differentiated in any genus only by the [specific] differences which essentially divide the genus. The species of “animal,” for instance, are not distinguished by white and by black, but by rational and non-rational. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider three grades in the actions of a soul. For the action of a soul transcends that of the nature operating in inanimate things. But this occurs in two ways. First, with respect to the manner of acting; secondly, with respect to what is produced by the action. Now with respect to the manner of acting, every action of a soul must transcend the operation or action of an inanimate nature. For every operation of a soul must proceed from some intrinsic agent, because an action of a soul is a vital action (moreover, every living thing is one that moves itself to operation). However, so far as the effect produced is concerned, not every action of a soul transcends an action of the nature of an inanimate thing. For the effect produced, that is, a natural mode of existing (esse naturale), and the things necessary for it, must be present in the case of inanimate bodies just as they are in the case of animate ones. But in the case of inanimate bodies, the effect is brought about by an extrinsic agent, whereas in the case of animate bodies, it is caused by an intrinsic agent. The actions to which the powers of a vegetal soul are directed, are of this sort. For the generative power is directed to giving existence to the individual thing; the augmentative power, to giving the thing its proper size; and the nutritive power, to preserving the thing in existence. But in inanimate things these effects are brought about only by an extrinsic agent. For this reason the aforementioned powers of a soul are said to be natural.
Sunt autem aliae altiores actiones animae, quae transcendunt actiones formarum naturalium, etiam quantum ad id quod agitur, in quantum scilicet in anima sunt nata esse omnia secundum esse immateriale. Est enim anima quodammodo omnia secundum quod est sentiens et intelligens. Oportet autem esse diversum gradum huiusmodi esse immaterialis. Unus enim gradus est secundum quod in anima sunt res sine propriis materiis, sed tamen secundum singularitatem et conditiones individuales, quae consequuntur materiam. Et iste est gradus sensus, qui est susceptivus specierum individualium sine materia, sed tamen in organo corporali. Altior autem et perfectissimus immaterialitatis gradus est intellectus, qui recipit species omnino a materia et conditionibus materiae abstractas, et absque organo corporali. Sicut autem per formam naturalem res habet inclinationem ad aliquid, et habet motum aut actionem ad consequendum id ad quod inclinatur; ita ad formam etiam sensibilem vel intelligibilem sequitur inclinatio ad rem sive per sensum sive per intellectum comprehensam; quae quidem pertinet ad potentiam appetitivam. Et iterum oportet consequenter esse motum aliquem per quem perveniatur ad rem desideratam; et hoc pertinet ad potentiam motivam. However, there are other higher actions of a soul which transcend the actions of natural forms, and also the effects produced by them, seeing that all things are disposed by nature to exist in the soul with an immaterial existence. For the human soul, in a certain respect, is all things by sensing and understanding. Moreover, there must be different grades of such immaterial existence. For there is one grade inasmuch as things exist in the soul without their proper matter, but with the singularity and individuating conditions which are the result of matter. This is the grade of sense, which is receptive of individual species without matter, yet receives them in a bodily organ. Now the intellect which receives species completely abstracted from matter and material conditions, and without [the aid of] a bodily organ, constitutes a higher and more perfect grade of immateriality. Furthermore, just as a thing has a natural inclination toward something, and has movement and action in order to pursue that toward which it is inclined through its natural form, so also does the inclination toward a thing apprehended by sense or by intellect, follow upon the apprehension of a sensible or intelligible form. This inclination belongs to the appetitive power. And again, as a consequence of this, there must be some movement by which the thing [having sense or intellect] attains the thing desired. This pertains to the motive power.
Ad perfectam autem sensus cognitionem, quae sufficiat animali, quinque requiruntur. Primo, quod sensus recipiat speciem a sensibilibus: et hoc pertinet ad sensum proprium. Secundo, quod de sensibilibus perceptis diiudicet, et ea ad invicem discernat: quod oportet fieri per potentiam ad quam omnia sensibilia perveniunt, quae dicitur sensus communis. Tertium est quod species sensibilium receptae conserventur. Indiget autem animal apprehensione sensibilium non solum ad eorum praesentiam, sed etiam postquam abierint: et hoc necessarium est reduci in aliquam potentiam. Nam et in rebus corporalibus aliud principium est recipiendi, et aliud conservandi, nam quae sunt bene receptibilia sunt interdum male conservativa. Huiusmodi autem potentia dicitur imaginatio sive phantasia. Quarto autem, requiruntur intentiones aliquae quas sensus non apprehendit, sicut nocivum et utile et alia huiusmodi. Et ad haec quidem cognoscenda pervenit homo inquirendo et conferendo; alia vero animalia quodam naturali instinctu, sicut ovis naturaliter fugit lupum tamquam nocivum. Unde ad hoc in aliis animalibus ordinatur aestimativa naturalis; in homine autem vis cogitativa, quae est collativa intentionum particularium: unde et ratio particularis dicitur, et intellectus passivus. Quinto autem, requiritur quod ea quae prius fuerunt apprehensa per sensus et interius conservata, iterum ad actualem considerationem revocentur. Et hoc quidem pertinet ad rememorativam virtutem: quae in aliis quidem animalibus absque inquisitione suam operationem habet, in hominibus autem cum inquisitione et studio; unde in hominibus non solum est memoria, sed reminiscentia. Necesse autem fuit ad hoc potentiam ab aliis distinctam ordinari, quia actus aliarum potentiarum sensitivarum est secundum motus a rebus ad animam, actus autem memorativae potentiae est e contrario secundum motum ab anima ad res. Diversi autem motus diversa principia motiva requirunt: principia autem motiva potentiae dicuntur. Moreover, five things are required for the perfect sense knowledge which an animal should have. First, that sense receive species from sensible things and this pertains to the proper sense. Secondly, that the animal make some judgment about the sensible qualities received, and distinguish them one from another, and this must be done by a power to which all sensible qualities are related. This power is called the common sense (sensus communis). Thirdly, that the species of sensible things which have been received be retained. Now an animal needs to apprehend sensible things not only when they are present, but also after they have disappeared. And it is necessary that this also be attributed. to some power. For in corporeal things there is one principle that receives, and another that retains, because things which are good recipients are sometimes poor retainers. This power is called imagination or “phantasy” (phantasia). In the fourth place, the animal must know certain intentions which sense [i.e., the external sense] does not apprehend, such as the harmful, the useful, and so on. Man, indeed, acquires a knowledge of these by investigation and by inference, but other animals, by a certain natural instinct. For example, the sheep flees naturally from the wolf as something harmful. Hence in animals other than man a natural estimative power is directed to this end, but in man there is a cogitative power which collates particular intentions. This is why it is called both particular reason and passive intellect. In the fifth place, it is necessary that those things which were, first apprehended by sense and conserved interiorly, be recalled again to actual consideration. This belongs to a memorative power, which operates without any investigation in the case of some animals, but with investigation and study in the case of men. Therefore in men there is not only memory but also reminiscence.”’ Moreover it was necessary that a power distinct from the others be directed to this end, because the activity of the other sentient powers entails a movement from things to the soul, whereas the activity of the memorative power entails an opposite movement from the soul to things. But diverse movements require diverse motive principles, and motive principles are called powers.
Quia vero sensus proprius, qui est primus in ordine sensitivarum potentiarum, immediate a sensibilibus immutatur, necesse fuit quod secundum diversitatem immutationum sensibilium in diversas potentias distingueretur. Cum enim sensus sit susceptivus specierum sensibilium sine materia, necesse est gradum et ordinem immutationum quibus immutantur sensus a sensibilibus, accipere per comparationem ad immateriales immutationes. Sunt igitur quaedam sensibilia quorum species, licet immaterialiter in sensu recipiantur, tamen etiam materialem immutationem faciunt in animalibus sentientibus. Huiusmodi autem sunt qualitates quae sunt principia transmutationum etiam in rebus materialibus: sicut calidum, frigidum, humidum et siccum et alia huiusmodi. Quia igitur huiusmodi sensibilia immutant nos etiam materialiter agendo, materialis autem immutatio fit per contactum, necesse est quod huiusmodi sensibilia contingendo sentiantur. Propter quod potentia sensitiva comprehendens ea vocatur tactus. Sunt autem quaedam sensibilia quae quidem non materialiter immutant, sed tamen eorum immutatio habet materialem immutationem annexam; quod contingit dupliciter. Uno modo sic quod materialis immutatio annexa sit tam ex parte sensibilis quam ex parte sentientis; et hoc pertinet ad gustum. Licet enim sapor non immutet organum sensus faciendo ipsum saporosum, tamen haec immutatio non est sine aliquali transmutatione tam saporosi quam etiam organi gustus, et praecipue secundum humectationem. Alio modo sic quod transmutatio materialis annexa sit solum ex parte sensibilis. Huiusmodi autem transmutatio vel est secundum resolutionem et alterationem quamdam sensibilis, sicut accidit in sensu odoratus; vel solum secundum loci mutationem, sicut accidit in auditu. Unde auditus et odoratus, quia sunt sine mutatione materiali sentientis, licet adsit materialis mutatio ex parte sensibilis, non tangendo, sed per medium extrinsecum sentiunt. Gustus autem solum in tangendo sentit, quia requiritur immutatio materialis ex parte sentientis. Sunt autem alia sensibilia quae immutant sensum absque materiali immutatione annexa, sicut lux et color, quorum est visus. Unde visus est altior inter omnes sensus et universalior; quia sensibilia ab eo percepta sunt communia corporibus corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus. Now because the proper sense, which is first in the order of sentient powers, is changed immediately by sensible objects, it was necessary for it to be divided into different powers in accordance with the diversity of sensible modifications. For the grade and order of modifications by which the senses are altered by sensible qualities, must be considered in relation to immaterial modifications, because sense is receptive of sensible species without matter. Hence there are some sensible objects whose species, although they are received immaterially in the senses, still cause a material modification in sentient animals. Now qualities which are also principles of change in material things are of this sort, for instance, hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like. Hence, because sensible qualities of this kind also modify us by acting upon us, and because material modification is made by contact, it was necessary that such sensible qualities be sensed by making contact with them. This is the reason why the sensory power experiencing such qualities is called touch. However, there are some sensible qualities which do not, indeed, change us materially, although their mutation has a material change connected with it. This occurs in two ways. First, in this way, that the material change affects the sensible quality as well as the one sensing. This pertains to taste. For, although the taste of a thing does not change the sense organ by making it the tasted thing itself, nevertheless this modification does not occur without some change taking place in the thing tasted as well as in the organ of taste, and particularly as a result of moisture. Secondly, in this way, that the material change affects the sensible quality alone. Now change of this sort is caused either by a dissipation and alteration of the sensible object, as occurs, for instance, in the sense of smell, or by a local change only, as occurs in the case of hearing. So it is that hearing and smell sense not by contact with an object, but through an extrinsic medium, because they occur without a material change on the side of the one sensing, although material change does take place in the sensible object. However, taste alone senses by contact, because it requires a material modification in the one sensing. Furthermore, there are other sensibilia which modify a sense without a material change being involved, such as light and color, and the sense which apprehends these is sight. Hence sight is the noblest of all the senses and extends to more objects than the other senses do (universalia), because the sensible qualities perceived by it are common both to corruptible and incorruptible bodies.
Similiter autem vis appetitiva, quae consequitur apprehensionem sensus, necesse est quod in duo dividatur. Quia aliquid est appetibile vel ea ratione quod est delectabile sensui et conveniens, et ad hoc est vis concupiscibilis; vel ea ratione quod per hoc habetur potestas fruendi delectabilibus secundum sensum. Quod quandoque contingit cum aliquo tristabili secundum sensum, sicut cum animal pugnando adipiscitur quamdam potestatem fruendi proprio delectabili, repellendo impedientia; et ad hoc ordinatur vis irascibilis. Similarly the appetitive power, which follows the apprehension of the senses, must be divided twofoldly. For a thing is appetible either because it is delightful and suitable to the senses, and the concupiscible power is directed to this; or because the capacity of enjoying things delightful to the senses is made possible through it, which sometimes occurs together with something that is displeasing to sense. For instance, when an animal by fighting makes possible the enjoyment of something properly delightful by driving away anything that hinders this. The irascible power is directed to this end.
Vis autem motiva, cum ad motum ordinetur, non diversificatur nisi secundum diversitatem motuum; qui vel competunt diversis animalibus, quorum quaedam sunt reptibilia, quaedam volatilia, quaedam gressibilia, quaedam alio modo mobilia; vel etiam secundum diversas partes eiusdem animalis, nam singulae partes habent quosdam proprios motus. Moreover, since the motive power is directed to local movement, it is diversified only with respect to different [local] movements. These movements may differ for different animals, since some of them are able to crawl, some to fly, some to walk, and some to move in other ways; or they may differ for different parts of one and the same animal, because the particular parts of the body have their own movements.
Gradus autem intellectualium potentiarum similiter distinguuntur in cognoscitivas et appetitivas. Motiva autem communis est et sensui et intellectui; nam idem corpus eodem motu movetur ab utroque. Cognitio autem intellectus requirit duas potentias: scilicet intellectum agentem et possibilem, ut ex superioribus patet. Again, the grades of intellectual powers are similarly distinguished into cognitive and appetitive. Moreover, movement is common to sense and to the intellect, for the same body is moved by each of these powers through one and the same movement. Again intellectual cognition requires two powers, namely, the agent intellect and the possible intellect, as is clear from the previous articles.
Sic igitur manifestum est quod sunt tres gradus potentiarum animae: scilicet secundum animam vegetabilem, sensitivam et rationalem. Sunt autem quinque genera potentiarum: scilicet nutritivum, sensitivum, intellectivum, appetitivum et motivum secundum locum; et horum quodlibet continet sub se potentias plures, ut dictum est. Consequently it is obvious that there are three grades of powers in the soul, namely, the vegetal, sentient, and rational. Moreover, there are five genera of powers, i.e., the nutritive, sentient, intellective, appetitive, and locomotive, and each of these contains many powers under itself, as has been pointed out.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod contraria maxime differunt, sed in eodem genere. Diversitas autem obiectorum secundum genus convenit diversitati potentiarum, quia et genus quodammodo in potentia est. Et ideo contraria referuntur ad eamdem potentiam. 1. Contraries are the things which differ most from each other, but within the same genus. Moreover, generically different objects befit diverse powers [or potencies], because a genus is also potential in a certain respect. Therefore contraries are related to one and the same power [or potency].
Ad secundum dicendum quod licet sonus et color sint diversa accidentia, tamen per se differunt quantum ad immutationem sensus, ut dictum est; non autem homo et lapis, quia eis eodem modo immutatur sensus. Et ideo homo et lapis differunt per accidens in quantum sentiuntur; licet differant per se in quantum sunt substantiae. Nihil enim prohibet differentiam aliquam esse per se comparatam ad unum genus, comparatam vero ad aliud esse per accidens; sicut album et nigrum per se differunt in genere coloris, non autem in genere substantiae. 2. Although sound and color differ as accidents, yet they differ essentially (per se) so far as the alteration which they produce in sense is concerned, as has been explained. However a man and a stone do not, because sense is modified in the same way by them. Therefore a man and a stone differ accidentally so far as they are sensed, although they differ substantially as substances. For nothing prevents a difference from being related substantially to one genus, and accidentally to another, as white and black differ essentially in the genus of color, but not in that of substance.
tertium dicendum quod eadem res comparatur ad diversas potentias animae non secundum eamdem rationem obiecti, sed secundum aliam et aliam. 3. The same thing is not related to different powers of the soul, according to the same formal object (ratione objecti), but according to different objects.
Ad quartum dicendum quod quanto aliqua potentia est altior, tanto ad plura se extendit; unde habet communiorem rationem obiecti. Et inde est quod quaedam conveniunt in ratione obiecti superioris potentiae, quae distinguuntur in ratione obiecti quantum ad potentias inferiores. 4. The higher a power, the more numerous are the things to which it extends. Hence the formal object of such a power has greater scope. This is why certain things that convene in the formal object of a superior power, are separated from each other in the formal object of inferior powers.
Ad quintum dicendum quod habitus non sunt perfectiones potentiarum, propter quas sunt potentiae; sed sicut quibus aliqualiter se habent ad ea propter quae sunt, id est ad obiecta. Unde potentiae non distinguuntur penes habitus, sed penes obiecta; sicut nec artificialia, penes obiecta, sed penes fines. 5. Habits are not perfections of powers as though powers existed for the sake of habits, but habits exist for the sake of powers in order that powers may better attain their objects. For this reason powers are not distinguished by habits, but by objects, just as things made by art are not distinguished by objects but by ends.
Ad sextum dicendum quod potentiae non sunt propter organa, sed magis e converso; unde magis distinguuntur organa penes obiecta quam e converso. 6. Powers do not exist for the sake of organs but vice versa. Consequently organs are distinguished from one another by objects rather than the reverse.
Ad septimum dicendum quod anima habet aliquem praecipuum finem, sicut anima humana bonum intelligibile. Habet autem et alios fines ordinatos ad hunc ultimum finem, sicut quod sensibile ordinatur ad intelligibile. Et quia anima ordinatur ad sua obiecta per potentias, sequitur quod etiam potentia sensitiva sit in homine propter intellectivam, et sic de aliis. Sic igitur secundum rationem finis oritur una potentia animae ex alia per comparationem ad obiecta. Unde potentias animae distingui per potentias et obiecta non est contrarium. 7. A soul has some particular end, just as the human soul has an intelligible good as its end. Besides, it also has other ends ordered to this ultimate end, just as the sensible is ordered to the intelligible. And because the soul is directed to its object through its powers, it also follows that in man the sentient power exists for the sake of the intellective; and so on. Thus, with respect to the notion of end, one power arises from another because of the relationship of their objects. Hence the distinction between the powers of the soul from the point of view of origin and that of objects, involves no opposition.
Ad octavum dicendum quod licet accidens non possit esse per se subiectum accidentis, tamen subiectum subiicitur uni accidenti mediante alio; sicut corpus colori mediante superficie. Et sic unum accidens oritur ex subiecto mediante alio, et una potentia ab essentia animae mediante alia. 8. Although an accident by its very nature cannot be the subject of another accident, nevertheless a subject is determined by one accident through the intermediary of another, just as a body is subject to color through the medium of its surface. Thus one accident proceeds from its subject through the medium of another accident, and one power of the soul proceeds from its essence through the medium of another power.
Ad nonum dicendum quod anima una virtute in plura potest quam res naturalis; sicut visus apprehendit omnia visibilia. Sed anima propter sui nobilitatem habet multo plures operationes quam res inanimata; unde oportet quod habeat plures potentias. 9. The soul by one power can bring itself to bear on more objects than a natural thing can, just as sight apprehends all visible objects. But the soul, by reason of its nobility, performs many more operations than inanimate things do, and therefore must have several powers.
Ad decimum dicendum quod ordo potentiarum animae est secundum ordinem obiectorum. Sed utrobique potest attendi ordo vel secundum perfectionem, et sic intellectus est prior sensu; vel secundum generationis viam, et sic est sensus prior intellectu: quia in generationis via prius inducitur accidentalis dispositio quam forma substantialis. 10. The order among the soul’s powers is according to the order among their objects. But order can be observed in both, either in relation to perfection, and in this case the intellect is prior to sense; or in relation to the process of generation, and in this case sense is prior to the intellect. For in the process of generation an accidental disposition is induced prior to the substantial form.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod intellectus quidem naturaliter appetit intelligibile ut est intelligibile; appetit enim naturaliter intellectus intelligere, et sensus sentire. Sed quia res sensibilis vel intelligibilis non solum appetitur ad sentiendum et ad intelligendum sed etiam ad aliquid aliud, ideo praeter sensum et intellectum necesse est esse appetitivam potentiam. 11. The intellect naturally desires the intelligible as such. For the intellect by nature desires to know, and sense desires to sense. But there must be an appetitive power in addition to sense and intellect, because the sensible or intelligible object is desired not merely in order that it may be sensed and understood, but also for some other end. Therefore there must be an appetitive power in addition to sense and intellect.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod voluntas est in ratione in quantum sequitur apprehensionem rationis; operatio vero voluntatis pertinet ad eumdem gradum operationis potentiarum animae, sed non ad idem genus. Et similiter est dicendum de irascibili et concupiscibili respectu sensus. 12. The will exists in the intellective order inasmuch as it follows the apprehension of the intellect. Indeed, the will belongs to the same grade of operation, namely, operations of the soul, but not to the same genus. The same thing must be said for the irascible and concupiscible appetite in relation to sense.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod intellectus et appetitus movent sicut imperantes motum; sed oportet esse potentiam motivam quae motum exequatur, secundum quam scilicet membra sequuntur imperium appetitus, et intellectus vel sensus. 13. The intellect and appetite cause movement inasmuch as they command movement. But there must exist a motive power which executes movement according as the members of the body follow the command of appetite, intellect, or sense.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod potentiae animae vegetabilis dicuntur vires naturales, quia non operantur nisi quod natura facit in corporibus; sed dicuntur vires animae, quia altiori modo hoc faciunt, ut supra dictum est. 14. The powers of the vegetal soul are called natural powers because they operate only as nature does in bodies. But they are called powers of a soul because such powers do the things that nature does, in a more superior way, as was previously shown.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod res naturalis inanimata simul recipit speciem et debitam quantitatem; quod non est possibile in rebus viventibus, quas oportet in principio generationis esse modicae quantitatis, quia generantur ex semine. Et ideo oportet quod praeter vim generativam in eis sit vis augmentativa, quae perducat ad debitam quantitatem. Hoc autem fieri oportet per hoc quod aliquid convertatur in substantiam augmentandi, et sic additur ei. Haec autem conversio fit per calorem, quia etiam convertit id quod extrinsecum apponitur, et resolvit etiam quod inest. Unde ad conservationem individui, ut continuo restauretur deperditum, et addatur quod deest ad perfectionem quantitatis et quod necessarium est ad generationem seminis, necessaria fuit vis nutritiva, quae deservit et augmentativae et generativae; et propter hoc individuum conservat. 15. A real inanimate being receives its species and proper size at the same time. This is not possible in living things which require the least possible size at the beginning of generation, because they are generated from semen. Therefore in addition to the generative power which these things possess, there must exist also an augmentative power which produces their proper size. Moreover, this must occur in view of the fact that something is changed within a substance by augmentation and is added to that substance. Furthermore, this change is brought about by heat, which transforms both what is taken in from without, and also what exists within the thing itself. Hence a nutritive power is necessary for the conservation of the individual in order that whatever is lost may be continually restored; that whatever is lacking for the completion of its size may be added; and that whatever is necessary for the generation of semen may be produced. This nutritive power serves both the augmentative and the generative power, and thereby preserves the individual in existence.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod sonus et calor et huiusmodi differunt secundum diversum modum immutationis sensus, non autem sensibilia diversorum generum. Et ideo penes ea non diversificantur potentiae sensitivae. 16. Sound and color and things of this sort differ according to the different way in which they modify sense. However, they are not sensibilia of different genera. Therefore the sensory powers are not differentiated by them.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod quia contrarietates quarum est tactus cognoscitivus non reducuntur in aliquod unum genus, sicut diversae contrarietates quae possunt considerari circa visibilia reducuntur in unum genus coloris, ideo philosophus determinat in II de anima, quod tactus non est unus sensus, sed plures. Sed tamen omnes conveniunt in hoc quod non per medium extrinsecum sentiunt; et omnes dicuntur tactus, ut sit unus sensus genere divisum in plures species. Posset tamen dici quod esset simpliciter unus sensus, quia omnes contrarietates, quarum tactus est cognoscitivus, cognoscuntur per se. Cognoscunt enim se invicem, et reducuntur in unum genus, sed est innominatum; nam et genus proximum calidi et frigidi innominatum est. 17. In the De anima [II, 6, 418a 14] the Philosopher concludes that touch is not one sense but many, because the contraries which touch experiences are not brought together under one and the same genus, as the different contraries which can be considered in visible things are brought together under one and the same genus of color. Nevertheless all are alike in this respect, that they do not sense through an external medium; and all are called touch, so that there is one sense generically, divided into several species. However, it could be said that there is one sense pure and simple (simpliciter), because all the contraries of which touch is cognitive are known of themselves (per se); for they are known alternately and brought together under one genus, although this is unnamed, since the proximate genus both of heat and of cold is unnamed.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod, cum potentiae animae sint proprietates quaedam, per hoc quod dicitur memoria esse passio primi sensitivi, non excluditur quin memoria sit alia potentia a sensu; sed ostenditur ordo eius ad sensum. 18. Since the powers of the soul are properties of it, memory is not prevented from being a power distinct from a first sense because memory is said to be a passion of a first sense. This statement shows the way in which memory is related to sense.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum quod sensus recipit species sensibilium in organis corporalibus, et est cognoscitivus particularium; intellectus autem recipit species rerum absque organo corporali, et est cognoscitivus universalium. Et ideo aliqua diversitas obiectorum requirit diversitatem potentiarum in parte sensitiva, quae non requirit diversitatem potentiarum in parte intellectiva. Recipere enim et retinere in rebus materialibus non est secundum idem; sed in immaterialibus secundum idem est. Et similiter secundum diversos modos immutationis oportet diversificari sensum, non autem intellectum. 19. Sense receives the species of sensible things in the organs of the body and perceives singulars. However, the intellect receives o the species of things without a bodily organ and is cognizant of universals. Hence a diversity of objects requires a diversity of powers in the sentient part, which does not require a diversity of powers in the intellective part. For in material things reception and retention are not one and the same, whereas in immaterial things these activities are one and the same. It is also necessary to distinguish the senses from, one another with respect to the different modes of change involved. But this is unnecessary in the case of the intellect.
Ad vicesimum dicendum quod idem obiectum, scilicet intelligibile in actu, comparatur ad intellectum agentem ut factum ab eo; ad intellectum vero possibilem ut movens ipsum. Et sic patet quod non secundum eamdem rationem idem comparatur ad intellectum agentem et possibilem. 20. The same object, namely, the intelligible species in act, is related to the agent intellect as that which is produced by this intellect; and to the possible intellect as that which moves the possible intellect. Thus it is obvious that the same thing is not related in the same respect both to the agent intellect and to the possible intellect.
ARTICLE 14
WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL IS INCORRUPTIBLE

[Summa theol., I, q.75, a.6; Contra Gentiles, II, 79, 80, 81; Quodl., X, q.3, a.1; Sent., II, dist. 19, a. 1; IV, dist. 50, q. 1, a. 1; Compend. theol., chap. 84.]
Decimoquarto quaeritur de immortalitate animae humanae The incorruptibility of the human soul is examined in the fourteenth article.
Objections.
Et videtur quod sit corruptibilis. Dicitur enim Eccl. III: unus est interitus hominis et iumentorum, et aequa utriusque conditio. Sed iumenta cum intereunt, interit eorum anima. Ergo cum homo interierit anima eius corrumpitur. 1. It seems that the soul is corruptible, for we read: “The death of man and the beast is one and the condition of them both is equal” (Eccles. 3: 19). Now when beasts die their soul perishes with them. Consequently when a man dies, his soul perishes along with his body.
Praeterea, corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt secundum genus, ut dicitur X Metaphys. Sed anima humana et anima iumentorum non differunt secundum genus; quia nec homo a iumentis genere differt. Ergo anima hominis et anima iumentorum non differunt secundum corruptibile et incorruptibile. Sed anima iumentorum est corruptibilis. Ergo anima humana non est incorruptibilis. 2. Further, it is said that the corruptible and the incorruptible are generically diverse. But the human soul and the soul of beasts are not generically diverse, because man belongs to the same genus [animal] as the beast. With respect to corruptibility and incorruptibility, therefore, the soul of man and that of the beasts do not differ. But the soul of the beast is corruptible. Therefore the human soul is not incorruptible.
Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod Angelus est gratia, non natura, immortalitatem suscipiens. Sed Angelus non est inferior anima. Ergo anima non est naturaliter immortalis. 3. Further, Damascene says [De fide orth. II, 3], that an angel is endowed with incorruptibility, not by virtue of its own nature but by the gift of grace. The angel, however, is not a soul inferior to the human. Consequently the soul is not incorruptible by its very nature.
Praeterea, philosophus probat in VIII Phys., quod primum movens est infinitae virtutis, quia movet tempore infinito. Si igitur anima habet virtutem Durandi tempore infinito, sequitur quod virtus eius sit infinita. Sed virtus infinita non est in essentia finita. Ergo sequitur quod essentia animae sit infinita, si sit incorruptibilis. Hoc autem est impossibile, quia sola essentia divina est infinita. Ergo anima humana non est incorruptibilis. 4. Further, the Philosopher proves in the Physics [VIII, 10, 267b 19] that the Prime Mover has infinite power because He moves in infinite time. Hence, if the soul has the power of remaining in existence for an infinite length of time, it follows that this power is itself infinite. But the essence of an infinite power is not finite. Therefore, if the soul is incorruptible, its essence is infinite. But this is impossible, for the divine essence alone is infinite. Consequently the human soul is not incorruptible.
Sed dicebat, quod anima est incorruptibilis non per essentiam propriam, sed per virtutem divinam. &8212;Sed contra, illud quod non competit alicui per essentiam propriam, non est ei essentiale. Sed corruptibile et incorruptibile essentialiter praedicatur de quibuscumque dicuntur, ut dicit philosophus in X Metaph. Ergo si anima est incorruptibilis, oportet quod sit incorruptibilis per essentiam suam. 5. It may be objected that the soul is incorruptible, not by virtue of its own essence but by virtue of the power of God. On the other hand, whatever does not belong to a thing by virtue of its own essence is not essential to it; and, as the Philosopher points out in the Metaphysics [X, 10, 1058b 36–1059a 9] corruptible and incorruptible are predicated essentially of everything whatever. Hence, if the soul is incorruptible, it must necessarily be incorruptible in virtue of its own essence.
Praeterea, omne quod est, aut est corruptibile aut incorruptibile. Si igitur anima humana secundum suam naturam non est incorruptibilis, sequitur quod secundum suam naturam sit corruptibilis. 6. Further, everything that exists is either corruptible or incorruptible. Hence, if the human soul is not incorruptible by virtue of its very nature, it follows that it is corruptible by virtue of its very nature.
Praeterea, omne incorruptibile habet virtutem quod sit semper. Si igitur anima humana sit incorruptibilis, sequitur quod habet virtutem quod sit semper. Ergo non habet esse post non esse; quod est contra fidem. 7. Further, every incorruptible thing has the power of existing forever. Thus, if the human soul is incorruptible, it has the power of existing forever. In that case the human soul did not come into existence but always existed. This is contrary to faith.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit quod sicut Deus est vita animae, ita anima est vita corporis. Sed mors est privatio vitae. Ergo per mortem anima privatur et tollitur. 8. Further, Augustine says [De civitate Dei, XIX, 26], that as God is the life of the soul, so the soul is the life of the body. But death is the privation of life. Therefore by death the soul is deprived of life and is destroyed.
Praeterea, forma non habet esse nisi in eo in quo est. Si igitur anima est forma corporis, non potest esse nisi in corpore; ergo perit perempto corpore. 9. Further, a form has actual existence only in the thing in which it exists. Thus, if the soul is the form of the body, it can exist only in a body. Hence it ceases to exist when the body corrupts.
Sed dicebat quod hoc est verum de anima secundum quod est forma, non secundum suam essentiam. &8212;Sed contra anima non est forma corporis per accidens; alioquin, cum anima constituat hominem secundum quod est forma corporis, sequeretur quod homo esset ens per accidens. Quidquid autem competit alicui non per accidens, convenit ei secundum suam essentiam. Ergo est forma secundum suam essentiam. Si ergo secundum quod est forma est corruptibilis, et secundum suam essentiam erit corruptibilis. 10. The objection may be raised that, although this argument truly applies to the soul as a form, it does not hold so far as the essence of the soul is concerned. On the contrary, the soul is not the form of the body in an accidental way, otherwise, since the soul is constitutive of man inasmuch as it is the form of the body, it would follow that man would be a being per accidens. But whatever does not belong to a thing accidentally, belongs to it by its very essence. Consequently the soul is a form according to its very essence. Hence, if the soul is corruptible inasmuch as it is a form, it will likewise be corruptible according to its very essence.
Praeterea, quaecumque conveniunt ad unum esse, ita se habent quod corrupto uno corrumpitur aliud. Sed anima et corpus conveniunt ad unum esse, scilicet ad esse hominis. Ergo corrupto corpore corrumpitur anima. 11. Further, things having one and the same act of existing (esse) in common are so intimately related to each other that, if one of them is corrupted, the other or others are thereby corrupted also. But the soul and the body have one and the same act of existing in common, namely, the act of existing of a man. Therefore, when the body is corrupted, the soul is also corrupted.
Praeterea, anima sensibilis et anima rationalis sunt unum secundum substantiam in homine. Sed anima sensibilis est corruptibilis. Ergo et rationalis. 12. Further, in man the sentient soul and the rational soul are substantially one and the same. But the sentient soul is corruptible. Therefore the rational soul is also corruptible.
Praeterea, forma debet esse materiae proportionata. Sed anima humana est in corpore ut forma in materia. Cum igitur corpus sit corruptibile, et anima erit corruptibilis. 13. Further, a form ought to be proportioned to a matter. But the human soul exists in the body as a form in matter. Therefore, since the body is corruptible, so too is the soul.
Praeterea, si anima potest a corpore separari, oportet quod sit aliqua operatio eius sine corpore, eo quod nulla substantia est otiosa. Sed nulla operatio potest esse animae sine corpore, neque etiam intelligere, de quo magis videtur; quia non est intelligere sine phantasmate, ut philosophus dicit: phantasma autem non est sine corpore. Ergo anima non potest separari a corpore, sed corrumpitur corrupto corpore. 14. Further, if the soul can exist in separation from the body, then the soul must be able to perform some operation without ‘the body, for no substance is functionless. Now without the body the soul can do nothing; it cannot even perform an act of knowledge. This is evident from the fact that intellection is impossible without a phantasm, as the Philosopher points out [De anima, III, 7, 431a 14], and there are no phantasms without the body. Consequently the soul cannot exist in separation from the body but ceases to exist when the body corrupts.
Praeterea, si anima humana sit incorruptibilis, hoc non erit nisi quia est intelligens. Sed videtur quod intelligere non sibi conveniat; quia id quod est supremum inferioris naturae imitatur aliqualiter actionem naturae superioris, sed ad eam non pervenit. Sicut simia imitatur aliqualiter operationem hominis, non tamen ad eam pertingit. Et similiter videtur quod cum homo sit supremum in ordine materialium rerum, imitetur aliqualiter actionem substantiarum separatarum intellectualium quae est intelligere, sed ad eam non perveniat. Nulla igitur necessitas videtur ponendi animam hominis esse immortalem. 15. Further, the argument that the human soul is incorruptible could be based only on the assumption that it is intellective. But it seems that the soul is not intellective. For the highest part of a being of an inferior nature in some way strives to imitate the action of the being superior to it. Thus the ape in some way imitates the action of a man, and yet does not attain to the human level. Similarly, in view of the fact that man occupies the highest rank in the order of material things, it seems that he in some fashion imitates the action of the separate intellectual substances, namely, the act of intellection, and yet does not really attain to it. Hence there does not seem to be any necessary reason for holding that the human soul is immortal.
Praeterea, ad operationem propriam speciei pertingunt vel omnia vel plurima eorum quae sunt in specie. Sed paucissimi homines perveniunt ad hoc quod sint intelligentes. Ergo intelligere non est propria operatio animae humanae; et ita non oportet animam humanam esse incorruptibilem eo quod sit intellectualis. 16. Further, either all or at least most of the members of any given species participate in the type of activity proper to that species. But actually very few men succeed in being intelligent. Intellectual operation, therefore, is not the type of operation proper to the human soul. Consequently the human soul need not be incorruptible simply because it is intellectual.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in I Phys., quod omne finitum consumitur, semper ablato quodam. Sed bonum naturale animae est finitum bonum. Cum ergo per aliquod peccatum minuatur bonum naturale animae humanae, videtur quod tandem totaliter tollatur; et sic anima humana quandoque corrumpitur. 17. Further, the Philosopher points out in the Physics [I, 4, 187b 25] that every finite thing comes to an end, since something is always being taken away from it. But the natural good of the soul is a finite good. Therefore, since the natural good of the soul is .diminished through sin, it seems that in the end this good will be totally removed; and hence that the human soul will at some time cease to exist.
Praeterea, ad debilitatem corporis anima debilitatur, ut patet in eius operationibus. Ergo et ad corruptionem corporis anima corrumpitur. 18. Further, it is evident from our observation of the soul’s operations, that when the body grows weak the soul grows weak also. Therefore, when the body corrupts, the soul also corrupts.
Praeterea, omne quod est ex nihilo est vertibile in nihil. Sed anima humana ex nihilo creata est. Ergo vertibilis est in nihil. Et sic sequitur quod anima sit corruptibilis. 19. Further, everything that is created can also be annihilated. Now the human soul has been created; therefore it can be annihilated; and thus it follows that the soul is corruptible.
Praeterea, manente causa manet effectus. Sed anima est causa vitae corporis. Si ergo anima semper manet, videtur quod corpus semper vivat; quod patet esse falsum. 20. Further, so long as a cause continues to operate, its effect continues to exist. Now the soul is the cause of life in the body. Therefore, if the soul always continues to exist, it seems that the body should go on living forever. This is clearly false.
Praeterea, omne quod est per se subsistens est hoc aliquid in genere vel specie collocatum. Sed anima humana, ut videtur, non est hoc aliquid nec collocatur in specie vel genere tanquam individuum vel species, cum sit forma; esse enim in genere vel specie convenit composito, non materiae neque formae, nisi per reductionem. Ergo anima humana non est per se subsistens; et ita, corrupto corpore, remanere non potest. 21. Further, everything that subsists of itself is a particular thing (hoc aliquid) belonging to some species or genus. Now since the human soul is a form, it appears that it is not a particular thing, and that it does not belong to a species or to a genus as an individual member of the former or as a species of the latter. For to exist in a genus or in a species belongs to a composite [of matter and form], and not to matter or to form taken separately, except by reduction. Therefore the human soul is not a self-subsisting entity, and thus cannot continue to exist once the body has corrupted.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur Sapient. cap. II: Deus fecit hominem inexterminabilem, et ad imaginem suae similitudinis fecit illum. Ex quo potest accipi quod homo est inexterminabilis, id est incorruptibilis, secundum quod est ad imaginem Dei. Est autem ad imaginem Dei secundum animam, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Trinit. Ergo anima humana est incorruptibilis. On the contrary, it is written: “God made man inexterminable, and in the image of His own likeness He made him” (Wis. 2:23); from which it may be inferred that man is inexterminable, that is, incorruptible, inasmuch as he is made in the image of God. But as Augustine says in the book De Trinitate [X, 12] it is with respect to man’s soul that he is made in the image of God. Therefore the human soul is incorruptible.
Praeterea, omne quod corrumpitur habet contraria, vel est ex contrariis compositum. Sed anima humana est omnino absque contrarietate; quia illa etiam quae sunt contraria in se, in anima non sunt contraria. Rationes enim contrariorum in anima contrariae non sunt. Ergo anima humana est incorruptibilis. Further, everything that is corrupted has contraries, or is made up of contraries. But the human soul is completely devoid of contrariety, for even those things which are themselves contraries are not contraries in the soul, because the concepts of contraries existing in the soul are not themselves actual contraries. Hence the human soul is incorruptible.
Praeterea, corpora caelestia dicuntur esse incorruptibilia, quia non habent materiam qualem generabilia et corruptibilia. Sed anima humana omnino est immaterialis; quod patet ex hoc quod rerum species immaterialiter recipit. Ergo anima est incorruptibilis. Further, the celestial bodies are said to be incorruptible because they do not have matter of the sort found in generable and corruptible things. But the human soul is absolutely immaterial. This is evident from the fact that it receives the species of things immaterially. Hence the soul is incorruptible.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit quod intellectus separatur sicut perpetuum a corruptibili. Intellectus autem est pars animae, ut ipse dicit. Ergo anima humana est incorruptibilis. Further, the Philosopher says [De Anima, II, 2, 413b 24-29] that the intellect differs [from other powers] as the eternal differs from the perishable. But the intellect is a part of the soul, as he himself points out. Therefore the human soul is incorruptible.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod necesse est omnino animam humanam incorruptibilem esse. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod id quod per se consequitur ad aliquid, non potest removeri ab eo. Sicut ab homine non removetur quod sit animal, neque a numero quod sit par vel impar. Manifestum est autem quod esse per se consequitur formam: unumquodque enim habet esse secundum propriam formam; unde esse a forma nullo modo separari potest. Corrumpuntur igitur composita ex materia et forma per hoc quod amittunt formam ad quam consequitur esse. Ipsa autem forma per se corrumpi non potest, sed per accidens corrupto composito corrumpitur, in quantum deficit esse compositi quod est per formam; si forma sit talis quae non sit habens esse, sed sit solum quo compositum est. I answer: It must necessarily be granted that the human soul is incorruptible. In proof of this we must take into consideration the fact that whatever belongs to a thing in virtue of its very nature (per se), cannot be taken away from it; for example, animality cannot be taken away from man, nor can the even and odd be taken away from number. Moreover it is evident that the act of existing in itself is a result of a form, for everything has its act of existing from its proper form; wherefore its act of existing can in no way be separated from its form. Therefore things composed of matter and form are corrupted by losing the form that gives them their act of existing. Moreover a form itself cannot be corrupted in itself (per se), but is corrupted accidentally as a result of the disintegration of the composite, inasmuch as the composite, which exists in virtue of its form, ceases to exist as a composite. This indeed, is the case if the form is one that does not have an act of existing in itself, but is merely that by which a composite exists.
Si ergo sit aliqua forma quae sit habens esse, necesse est illam formam incorruptibilem esse. Non enim separatur esse ab aliquo habente esse, nisi per hoc quod separatur forma ab eo; unde si id quod habet esse, sit ipsa forma, impossibile est quod esse separetur ab eo. Manifestum est autem quod principium quo homo intelligit est forma habens esse in se, et non solum sicut quo aliquid est. Intelligere enim, ut philosophus probat in III de anima, non est actus expletus per organum corporale. Non enim posset inveniri aliquod organum corporale quod esset receptivum omnium naturarum sensibilium; praesertim quia recipiens debet esse denudatum a natura recepti, sicut pupilla caret colore. Omne autem organum corporale habet naturam aliquam sensibilem. Intellectus vero quo intelligimus est cognoscitivus omnium sensibilium naturarum; unde impossibile est quod eius operatio, quae est intelligere, exerceatur per aliquod organum corporale. Unde apparet quod intellectus habet operationem per se, in qua non communicat corpus. Unumquodque autem operatur secundum quod est: quae enim per se habent esse, per se operantur. Quae vero per se non habent esse, non habent per se operationem; non enim calor per se calefacit, sed calidum. Sic igitur patet quod principium intellectivum quo homo intelligit, habet esse elevatum supra corpus, non dependens a corpore. Now if there is a form having an act of existing in itself, then that form must be incorruptible. For a thing having an act of existing (esse) does not cease to exist unless its form is separated from it. Hence if the thing having an act of existing is itself a form, it is impossible for its act of existing to be separated from it. Now it is evident that the principle by which a man understands is a form having its act of existing in itself and is not merely that by which something exists. For, as the Philosopher proves in the De anima [III, 4, 429b 3], intellection is not an act executed by any bodily organ. The main reason why there is no bodily organ capable of receiving the sensible forms of all natural things, is that the recipient must itself be deprived of the nature of the thing received; just as the pupil of the eye does not possess the color that it sees. Now every bodily organ possesses a sensible nature. But the intellect, by which we understand, is capable of apprehending all sensible natures. Therefore its operation, namely, understanding, cannot be carried out by a bodily organ. Thus it is clear that the intellect has an operation of its own in which the body does not share. Now a thing operates in accordance with its nature (quod est), for things that exist of themselves have an operation of their own, whereas things that do not exist of themselves have no operation of their own. For example, heat in itself does not produce warmth, but something hot. Consequently it is evident that the intellective principle, by which man understands, has it own mode of existing superior to that of the body and not dependent upon it.
Manifestum est etiam quod huiusmodi intellectivum principium non est aliquid ex materia et forma compositum, quia species omnino recipiuntur in ipso immaterialiter. Quod declaratur ex hoc quod intellectus est universalium, quae considerantur in abstractione a materia et a materialibus conditionibus. Relinquitur ergo quod principium intellectivum quo homo intelligit, sit forma habens esse; unde necesse est quod sit incorruptibilis. Et hoc est quod etiam philosophus dicit quod intellectus est quoddam divinum et perpetuum. Ostensum est autem in praecedentibus quaestionibus quod principium intellectivum quo homo intelligit, non est aliqua substantia separata; sed est aliquid formaliter inhaerens homini, quod est anima, vel pars animae. Unde relinquitur ex praedictis quod anima humana sit incorruptibilis. It is also evident that an intellective principle of this sort is not a thing composed of matter and form, because the species of things are received in it in an absolutely immaterial way, as is shown by the fact that the intellect knows universals, which are considered in abstraction from matter and from material conditions. The sole conclusion to be drawn from all this, then, is that the intellective principle, by which man understands, is a form having its act of existing in itself. Therefore this principle must be incorruptible. This indeed agrees with the Philosopher’s dictum [De anima, III, 5, 430a 22] that the intellect is something divine and everlasting. Now it was shown in preceding articles (Articles 2 and 5), that the intellective principle, by which man understands, is not a substance existing apart from man but is something formally inhering in him which is either the soul or a part of the soul. Thus, from the foregoing considerations we conclude that the human soul is incorruptible.
Omnes enim qui posuerunt animam humanam corrumpi, interemerunt aliquid praemissorum. Quidam enim animam ponentes esse corpus, posuerunt eam non esse formam, sed aliquid ex materia et forma compositum. Alii vero ponentes intellectum non differre a sensu, posuerunt per consequens quod non habet operationem nisi per organum corporale, et sic non habet esse elevatum supra corpus; unde non est forma habens esse. Alii vero posuerunt intellectum, quo homo intelligit, esse substantiam separatam. Quae omnia in superioribus ostensa sunt esse falsa. Unde relinquitur animam humanam esse incorruptibilem. Now all those who held that the human soul is corruptible missed’some of the points we have already made. Some of these people, holding that the soul is a body, declared that it is not a form in its entirety, but a thing composed of matter and form. Others held that the intellect does not differ from the senses, and so they declared that the intellect does not operate except through a bodily organ; that it does not have a higher mode of existence than that of the body, and, therefore, that it is not a form having an act of existing in its own right. Still others held that the intellect, by which man understands, is a separate substance. But the falsity of all these opinions has been demonstrated in preceding articles. It therefore remains that the human soul is incorruptible.
Signum autem huius ex duobus accipi potest. Primo quidem, ex parte intellectus: quia ea etiam quae sunt in seipsis corruptibilia, secundum quod intellectu percipiuntur, incorruptibilia sunt. Est enim intellectus apprehensivus rerum in universali, secundum quem modum non accidit eis corruptio. Secundo, ex naturali appetitu qui in nulla re frustrari potest. Videmus enim hominibus appetitum esse perpetuitatis. Et hoc rationabiliter: quia cum ipsum esse secundum se sit appetibile, oportet quod ab intelligente qui apprehendit esse simpliciter, et non hic et nunc, appetatur esse simpliciter, et secundum omne tempus. Unde videtur quod iste appetitus non sit inanis; sed quod homo secundum animam intellectivam sit incorruptibilis. Two additional arguments can be considered as an indication of this: First, respecting the intellect itself, because we see that even those things which are corruptible in themselves are incorruptible so far as they are perceived by the intellect. For the intellect apprehends things in and through universal concepts, and things existing in this [universalized conceptual] mode are not subject to corruption. Secondly, the natural appetite also provides an argument for the incorruptibility of the soul. Natural appetite [desire springing from the nature of man] cannot be frustrated. Now we observe in men the desire for perpetual existence. This desire is grounded in reason. For to exist (esse) being desirable in itself, an intelligent being who apprehends existence in the absolute sense, and not merely the here and now, must desire existence in the absolute sense and for all time. Hence it is clear that this desire is not vain, but that man, in virtue of his intellective soul, is incorruptible.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Salomon in libro Sap. loquitur, quasi concionator, nunc ex persona sapientum, nunc ex persona stultorum; verbum autem inductum loquitur ex persona stultorum. Vel potest dici quod unus dicitur interitus hominis et iumentorum, quantum ad corruptionem compositi, quae utrobique est per separationem animae a corpore; licet post separationem anima humana remaneat, non autem anima iumentorum. 1. In the Book of Ecclesiastes (3:19) Solomon speaks as a popular orator, at one time representing the wisdom of the wise, at another, the stupidity of fools. The text quoted is an example of the latter. Or it may be said that the death of man and that of the beast is one and the same so far as the dissolution of the composite is concerned, since, for the one as for the other, this dissolution is brought about by the separation of the soul from the body. But there is this difference: after that separation occurs, the human soul remains in existence, whereas the soul of the brute does not.
Ad secundum dicendum quod si anima humana et anima iumentorum per se collocarentur in genere, sequeretur quod diversorum generum essent secundum naturalem generis considerationem. Sic enim corruptibile et incorruptibile necesse est genere differre, licet in aliqua ratione communi possent convenire. Ex quo et in uno genere possunt esse secundum logicam considerationem. Nunc autem anima non est in genere sicut species, sed sicut pars speciei. Utrumque autem compositum corruptibile est: tam illud cuius pars est anima humana, quam illud cuius pars est anima iumentorum; et propter hoc nihil prohibet ea esse unius generis. 2. Even if the human soul and the soul of brutes were brought under the same [logical] genus, nevertheless they would still exist in different natural genera; for the corruptible and the incorruptible are, of necessity, generically different in reality, although they can be ranged under one common concept; that is, from the standpoint of logic they can be considered under the same generic notion. Moreover, the soul does not exist in a genus as a species thereof, but as a part of a species. Yet both the composites in question are corruptible: the composite of which the human soul is a part, as well as the composite of which the soul of brutes is a part. Hence there is no reason why both types of soul may not belong to one and the same [logical] genus.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, vera immortalitas est vera immutabilitas. Immutabilitatem autem quae est secundum electionem, ne scilicet de bono in malum mutari possint, tam anima quam Angelus habent per gratiam. 3. As Augustine says, true immortality and true immutability are the same. Moreover it is through grace that both the soul and the angel possess that immutability which results from free choice and which prevents them from changing from good to evil.
Ad quartum dicendum quod esse comparatur ad formam sicut per se consequens ipsam, non autem sicut effectus ad virtutem agentis, ut puta motus ad virtutem moventis. Licet ergo quod aliquid possit movere infinito tempore, demonstraret infinitatem virtutis moventis; tamen quod aliquid possit esse tempore infinito, non demonstrat infinitatem formae per quam aliquid est. Sicut nec hoc quod dualitas semper est par, ostendit infinitatem ipsius. Magis autem hoc quod aliquid est tempore infinito, demonstrat virtutem infinitam eius quod est causa essendi. 4. The act of existing (esse) is related to a form as something consequent upon the form in virtue of its very nature, and not as an effect to its efficient cause, in the manner in which motion, for example, is related to the power of the thing that produces it. Consequently, although the fact that a thing can move in infinite time may prove that its movement is infinite, nevertheless the fact that a thing can exist in infinite time does not prove that the form whereby it exists is infinite; any more than the fact that a given quantity is always equal proves that it is infinite. On the contrary, the fact that a thing exists in infinite time proves the infinite power of that which is the cause of its being.
Ad quintum dicendum quod corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt essentialia praedicata, quia consequuntur essentiam sicut principium formale vel materiale, non autem sicut principium activum; sed principium activum perpetuitatis aliquorum est extrinsecus. 5. Corruptible and incorruptible are essential predicates because they belong to the essence of a thing as a formal or material Principle and not as an active principle. However, the active principle of the perpetual act of existing enjoyed by some things is external to them.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad sextum. 6. The answer to the sixth objection is clear from what was said above.
Ad septimum dicendum quod anima habet virtutem ut sit semper, sed illam virtutem non semper habuit; et ideo non oportet quod semper fuerit, sed quod in futurum nunquam deficiat. 7. The soul has the power of existing forever, but it did not always [i.e., before it existed] have that power. Hence the soul need not always have existed, but it must never cease to exist in the future.
Ad octavum dicendum quod anima dicitur forma corporis in quantum est causa vitae, sicut forma est principium essendi: vivere enim viventibus est esse, ut dicit philosophus in II de anima. 8. The soul is called the form of the body inasmuch as it is the cause of life, just as the form is the principle of a thing’s act of existing; because for living things, to live (vivere) is to exist (esse), as the Philosopher says in the De anima [II, 4, 415b 8].
Ad nonum dicendum quod anima est talis forma, quae habet esse non dependens ab eo cuius est forma; quod operatio ipsius ostendit, ut dictum est. 9. The soul is a form of such a kind that its act of existing does not depend on the subject of which it is the form. Its proper operation proves this, as was shown above (Arts. 8-9).
Ad decimum dicendum, quod, licet anima per suam essentiam sit forma, tamen aliquid potest ei competere in quantum est talis forma, scilicet forma subsistens, quod non competit ei in quantum est forma. Sicut intelligere non convenit homini in quantum est animal, licet homo sit animal secundum suam essentiam. 10. Although the soul is a form by its very essence, nevertheless inasmuch as it is a form of a particular kind, that is, a subsisting form, it can have a certain character which does not belong to it simply as a form; just as the act of understanding does not belong to man inasmuch as he is an animal, although he is an animal by his very essence.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod, licet anima et corpus conveniant ad unum esse hominis, tamen illud esse est corpori ab anima; ita quod anima humana esse suum in quo subsistit corpori communicat, ut ex praemissis quaestionibus ostensum est; et ideo remoto corpore adhuc remanet anima. 11. Although the soul and the body of man have one and the same act of existing in common, nevertheless that act of existing is communicated to the body by the soul. Thus the human soul communicates to the body that very act of existing by which the soul itself subsists. This has been shown in preceding articles. Hence the soul continues to exist when the body has corrupted.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod anima sensibilis in brutis corruptibilis est; sed in homine, cum sit eadem in substantia cum anima rationali, incorruptibilis est. 12. The sentient soul in brute animals is corruptible, but since in man the sentient soul is identical in substance with the rational soul, it is incorruptible.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod corpus humanum est materia animae humanae proportionata quantum ad operationes eius; sed corruptio et alii defectus accidunt ex necessitate materiae, ut supra ostensum est. Vel potest dici quod corruptio advenit corpori ex peccato, non ex prima institutione naturae. 13. The human body is the matter belonging to the human soul and proportioned to the soul’s operations. But, as was shown above (Art. 8), bodily disintegration and other defects occur by reason of the very nature of matter. Or we may reply that the death of the body is the result of [original] sin, and not an original determination of nature.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod hoc quod dicit philosophus, quod non est intelligere sine phantasmate, intelligitur quantum ad statum praesentis vitae, in quo homo intelligit per animam; alius autem modus erit intelligendi animae separatae. 14. The Philosopher’s statement that understanding cannot take place without a phantasm, applies to the state of the present life in which man understands by his soul. However, the separated soul will understand in a different way. (See below, Arts. 17 ff.).
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod licet anima humana non pertingat ad illum modum intelligendi quo substantiae superiores intelligunt, pervenit tamen ad intelligendum aliquo modo, qui sufficit ad incorruptibilitatem eius ostendendam. 15. Although the human soul does not attain to that mode of understanding which superior substances possess, nevertheless it does attain to understanding in a certain way [i.e., in a way proper to itself], and this suffices to show its incorruptibility.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod, licet pauci perveniant ad perfecte intelligendum, tamen ad aliqualiter intelligendum omnes perveniunt. Manifestum est enim quod prima demonstrationis principia sunt communes animi conceptiones, quae intellectu percipiuntur. 16. Although few people arrive at perfect understanding, yet all people achieve some kind or degree of understanding. The first principles of demonstration are obviously common conceptions of the soul which are perceived by the intellect.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod peccatum gratiam totaliter tollit, nihil autem removet de rei essentia. Removet tamen aliquid de inclinatione sive habilitate ad gratiam; et in quantum quodlibet peccatum de contraria dispositione inducit, dicitur aliquid de bono naturae adimere, quod est habilitas ad gratiam. Nunquam tamen totum bonum naturae tollitur; quia semper remanet potentia sub contrariis dispositionibus, licet magis ac magis elongata ab actu. 17. Sin takes away grace totally, but it does not take anything away from the essence of a thing. However, sin does take away something of the inclination toward or aptitude for grace; and inasmuch as every sin stems from a contrary disposition, sin is said to take away some part of that good of nature which is aptitude for grace. But sin never destroys completely the good of nature; because, under contrary dispositions, the potentiality for good always remains, though by sin that potentiality is further and further removed from actualization.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod anima non debilitatur debilitato corpore, nec etiam sensitiva; ut patet per id quod philosophus dicit in I de anima, quod si senex accipiat oculum iuvenis, videbit utique sicut et iuvenis. Ex quo manifestum est quod debilitas actionis non accidit propter debilitatem animae, sed organi. 18. The soul does not grow feeble when the body grows feeble, not even the sentient soul. For, as the Philosopher observes in the De anima [I, 4, 408b 20], if an old man acquired the eye of a youth, he would see as well as the youth does. From this it is clear that functional debility does not result from a debility of the soul but from that of a bodily organ.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum quod id quod est ex nihilo vertibile est in nihil, nisi manu gubernantis conservetur. Sed ex hoc non dicitur aliquid corruptibile, sed ex eo quod habet in se aliquod principium corruptionis. Et sic corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt praedicata essentialia. 19. Whatever receives existence “from nothing” [i.e., is created] can be reduced to nothing [i.e., annihilated], unless it is conserved in being by a guiding hand. Yet it is not for this reason that a thing is said to be corruptible, but because some principle of corruption exists in the thing itself. So it is clear that corruptible and incorruptible are essential predicates.
Ad vicesimum dicendum quod, licet anima quae est causa vitae sit incorruptibilis, tamen corpus, quod recipit vitam ab anima, est subiectum transmutationis. Et per hoc recedit a dispositione per quam est aptum ad recipiendum vitam; et sic incidit corruptio hominis. 20. Although the soul, which is the cause of life, is incorruptible, nevertheless the body, which receives life from the soul, is subject to change; and because of this the body loses that disposition by which it prepared to receive life; and in this way the corruption of man is brought about.
Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum quod anima, licet per se possit esse, non tamen per se habet speciem, cum sit pars speciei. 21. Although the soul can exist of itself, yet it does not itself possess a species, for it is part of a species.
ARTICLE 15
WHETHER THE SOUL, WHEN SEPARATED FROM THE BODY, IS CAPABLE OF UNDERSTANDING

[Summa theol., I, q. 89, a. 1: II-II, q. 67, a.2; Contra Gentiles, II, 81; De verit., q. 19, a. 1; Quodl., III, q. 9, a. 1; Sent., III, dist. 31, q. 2, a. 4; IV, dist. 50, q. 1, a. 1.]
Decimoquinto quaeritur utrum anima separata a corpore possit intelligere In the fifteenth article we examine this question: Whether the soul, when separated from the body, is capable of understanding.
Objections.
Et videtur quod non. Nulla enim operatio coniuncti manet in anima separata. Sed intelligere est operatio coniuncti: dicit enim philosophus in I de anima, quod dicere animam intelligere simile est ac si dicat eam quis texere vel aedificare. Ergo intelligere non manet in anima a corpore separata. 1. It seems that the soul, when separated from the body, is incapable of understanding. For no operation proper to the human composite remains in the soul when it exists apart from the body. Now understanding is an operation of the composite; for the Philosopher says in the De anima [I, 4, 408b, 11] that to say that the soul understands is like saying that it weaves or builds. Therefore the act of understanding does not remain in the soul when it exists in separation from the body.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod nequaquam est intelligere sine phantasmate. Sed phantasmata, cum sint in organis sentiendi, non possunt esse in anima separata. Ergo anima separata non intelligit. 2. Further, the Philosopher states in the De anima [III, 7, 431a 14] that understanding in no way takes place without a phantasm. Now since phantasms exist in the sense organs, they cannot exist in the separated soul. Hence the soul does not understand when it is separated from the body.
Sed dicebat quod philosophus loquitur de anima secundum quod est unita corpori, non de anima separata. &8212;Sed contra, anima separata non potest intelligere nisi per potentiam intellectivam. Sed, sicut dicit philosophus in I de anima, intelligere vel est phantasia, vel non est sine phantasia. Phantasia autem non est sine corpore. Ergo nec intelligere. Anima ergo separata non intelligit. 3. But we must say that the Philosopher is speaking of the soul inasmuch as it is united to the body, and not of the separated soul. On the other hand, the separated soul can understand only by means of its intellective faculty. Now understanding is either [a form] of imagination or is impossible without imagination, as the Philosopher says in the De anima [I, 1, 403a 8]. But the imagination does not exist without the body. Therefore neither is there any understanding without the body. Consequently the soul does not understand when it, is separated from the body.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod ita se habet intellectus ad phantasmata, sicut visus ad colores. Sed visus non potest videre sine coloribus. Ergo nec intellectus intelligit sine phantasmatibus; ergo neque sine corpore. 4. Further, the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 7, 431a 16] that the intellect is related to phantasms as sight is to colors. But sight cannot see without colors. Therefore the intellect does not understand without the body.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in I de anima quod intelligere corrumpitur interius quodam corrupto, scilicet vel corde, vel calore naturali; quod quidem corrumpitur, anima a corpore separata. Ergo anima a corpore separata intelligere non potest. 5. Further, the Philosopher says in the De anima [I, 4, 408b 18] that understanding is corrupted when certain things within [the body] are corrupted; for example, the heart or the natural heat of the body. However, this is what occurs after the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is incapable of understanding when it is separated from the body.
Sed dicebat quod anima a corpore separata intelligit quidem, non autem isto modo quo nunc intelligit a phantasmatibus abstrahendo. &8212;Sed contra, forma unitur materiae non propter materiam, sed propter formam; nam forma est finis et perfectio materiae. Unitur autem forma materiae propter complementum suae operationis; unde talem materiam forma requirit per quam operatio formae compleri possit, sicut forma serrae requirit materiam ferream ad perficiendum opus secandi. Anima autem est forma corporis. Unitur ergo tali corpori ad complementum suae operationis. Propria autem eius operatio est intelligere. Ergo si potest sine corpore intelligere, frustra corpori unitur. 6. But it may be argued that the soul does understand when it is separated from the body, although not by abstracting from phantasms as it does in the present life. On the other hand, a form is not united to matter for the sake of the matter but for the sake of the form; for the form is the end and the perfection of the matter. Now a form is united to matter for the sake of fulfilling its own proper operation. Hence a form requires that specific type of matter by which its operation can be carried to completion, just as the form of a saw requires ferrous matter in order to accomplish the work of cutting. Now the soul is the form of the body. Consequently the soul is united to that specific type of body which is adapted to carrying out the soul’s proper operation. Now the soul’s proper operation consists in understanding. Therefore, if the soul can understand without the body, then the soul is united to the body in vain.
Praeterea, si anima separata intelligere potest, nobilius intelligit sine corpore quam corpori unita. Nobiliori enim modo intelligunt quae phantasmatibus non indigent ad intelligendum, scilicet substantiae separatae, quam nos qui per phantasmata intelligimus. Bonum autem animae est in intelligendo; nam perfectio cuiuslibet substantiae est propria operatio eius. Ergo si anima sine corpore intelligere potest praeter phantasmata, nocivum esset ei corpori uniri; et sic non esset ei naturale. 7. Further, if the separated soul is capable of understanding, it understands in a more excellent manner when apart from the body than when united to it. For beings which have no need of phantasms in order to understand, do so in a more excellent way than we, who understand through the medium of phantasms. Now the good of the soul lies in its act of understanding; for the perfection of every substance consists in its own proper operation. Therefore, if the soul is capable of understanding without the aid of phantasms, when separated from the body, then it would be harmful to the soul to be united to a body, and hence would not be natural to it.
Praeterea, potentiae diversificantur penes obiecta. Sed animae intellectivae obiecta sunt phantasmata, ut dicitur in III de anima. Si igitur sine phantasmatibus intelligit separata a corpore, oportet quod habeat alias potentias; quod est impossibile, cum potentiae sint naturales animae, et inseparabiliter ei inhaereant. 8. Further, powers are diversified by their objects. But the objects of the intellective soul are phantasms, as the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 7, 431a 14]. Therefore, if the intellective soul when separated from the body understands without phantasms, it must have powers other than those which it possesses when united to the body. But that is impossible, since the soul’s powers are natural to it and inhere in it inseparably.
Praeterea, si anima separata intelligit, oportet quod per aliquam potentiam intelligat. Potentiae autem intellectivae in anima non sunt nisi duae, scilicet intellectus agens et possibilis. Per neutrum autem horum potest anima separata intelligere, ut videtur; nam operatio utriusque intellectus respicit phantasmata. Intellectus enim agens facit phantasmata esse intelligibilia actu, intellectus autem possibilis recipit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus abstractas. Videtur ergo quod nullo modo anima separata intelligere possit. 9. Further, if the separated soul understands, it must understand by means of some power. Now there are only two intellective powers in the soul: the agent intellect and the possible intellect. But it seems that the separated soul cannot understand by means of either of these powers. For the operation of each of them bears on phantasms: the agent intellect renders phantasms actually intelligible, whereas the possible intellect receives the intelligible species abstracted from phantasms. Consequently it seems that the separated soul is incapable of understanding in any way.
Praeterea, unius rei una est propria operatio, sicut et unius perfectibilis una est perfectio. Si ergo operatio animae sit intelligere accipiendo a phantasmatibus, videtur quod non possit esse eius operatio, scilicet intelligere, praeter phantasmata; et ita, separata a corpore, non intelliget. 10. Further, there is but one proper operation for one thing, just as there is only one perfection for one perfectible thing. Therefore, if the operation of the soul consists in understanding by receiving [intelligible species] from phantasms, it seems that understanding without phantasms cannot be the operation of the soul, and hence that it does not understand when separated from the body.
Praeterea, si anima separata intelligit, oportet quod aliquo intelligat; quia intelligere est per similitudinem rei intellectae in intelligente. Non potest autem dici quod anima separata intelligat per suam essentiam, hoc enim solius Dei est. Unius enim essentia, quia infinita est, omnem in se perfectionem praehabens, similitudo est omnium rerum. Similiter etiam neque per essentiam rei intellectae; quia sic intelligeret solum illa quae per essentiam suam sunt in anima. Neque etiam per aliquas species, ut videtur, intelligere potest. Non per species innatas, sive concreatas: hoc enim videtur redire in opinionem Platonis, qui posuit omnes scientias esse nobis naturaliter inditas. 11. Further, if the separated soul understands, it must understand by means of something, because understanding takes place when the likeness of the thing understood exists in the one understanding. It cannot be said, however, that the separated soul understands by its own essence. This is true only of God; for His essence, being infinite, possesses in itself from eternity every perfection, and thus is the likeness of all things. Nor can it be said that the separated soul understands through the essence of the thing understood, because in that case it would understand only those things which are in the soul in virtue of its essence alone. Moreover it seems that the separated soul cannot understand through any species whether innate or concreated, for this would apparently be a reversion to Plato’s theory that we are naturally endowed with all knowledge [Phaedo 18, Euthydemus 20, 22].
Praeterea, huiusmodi species frustra viderentur esse animae innatae, cum per eas intelligere non possit dum est in corpore. Species autem intelligibiles ad nihil aliud ordinari videntur nisi ut per eas intelligatur. 12. Further, species of this sort seem to be needlessly implanted in the soul because, so long as it remains in the body, the soul cannot understand through them. However, intelligible species seem to have no other purpose than this, that the soul may understand through them.
Sed dicebat quod anima, quantum est de se, potest intelligere per species innatas; sed impeditur a corpore, ne per eas intelligere possit. &8212;Sed contra, quanto aliquid est perfectius in sua natura, tanto perfectius est in operando. Sed anima unita corpori est perfectior in sua natura quam cum est a corpore separata; sicut quaelibet pars in suo toto existens perfectior est. Si igitur anima separata a corpore per species innatas intelligere potest, multo magis corpori unita potest intelligere per easdem. 13. Now it may be argued that, considered in itself, the soul is able to understand through innate species but that, as a matter of fact, it is hindered by the body from understanding through them. On the contrary, the more perfect a thing is in its nature, the more perfect it is in its operation. Now the soul is more perfect in its nature when united to the body than when it is separated from the body, just as every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that whole than when separated from, it. Therefore, if the soul existing in separation from the body is able to understand through innate species, it is even more capable of understanding through them when united to the body.
Praeterea, nihil naturalium alicuius rei totaliter impeditur per id quod ad naturam pertinet. Ad naturam autem animae pertinet ut corpori uniatur, cum sit corporis forma. Ergo si species intelligibiles sunt naturaliter inditae animae, non impedietur per unionem corporis quin per eas intelligere possit; cuius contrarium experimur. 14. Further, none of the natural properties of a thing are totally impeded by anything which pertains to the nature itself. Now it pertains to the very nature of the soul to be united to the body, because the soul is the form of the body. Hence, if intelligible species are naturally implanted in the soul, the soul would not be prevented from understanding through them because of its union with the body. But experience shows that the contrary is true.
Praeterea, neque etiam potest dici, ut videtur, quod anima separata intelligat per species prius acquisitas in corpore. Multae enim animae humanae remanebunt a corporibus separatae quae nullas species intelligibiles acquisierunt; sicut patet de animabus puerorum, et maxime eorum qui in maternis uteris defuncti sunt. Si igitur animae separatae non possent intelligere nisi per species prius acquisitas, sequeretur quod non omnes animae separatae intelligerent. 15. Further, though it seems to be the case, it cannot be said that the separated soul understands through species acquired previously, when united to the body. For many human souls will remain separated from their bodies and will never acquire any intelligible species of things, as is evident in the case of the souls of children, and especially of infants who are stillborn. Therefore, if separated souls can understand only through species previously acquired, it would follow that not all separated souls would have understanding.
Praeterea, si anima separata non intelligeret nisi per species prius acquisitas, sequi videtur quod non intelligat nisi ea quae prius intellexit dum fuit corpori unita. Hoc autem non videtur verum; intelligit enim multa de poenis et de praemiis, quae nunc non intelligit. Non ergo anima separata intelliget tantum per species prius acquisitas. 16. Further, if the separated soul understands only through species previously acquired, it seems to follow that it could understand only those things which it understood in this life while united to the body. This seems untrue, however, for the separated soul knows many things concerning punishments and rewards which it does not know in this life. Hence the separated soul does not understand solely through species acquired before its separation from the body.
Praeterea, intellectus efficitur in actu per speciem intelligibilem in eo existentem. Sed intellectus actu existens actu intelligit. Ergo intellectus in actu intelligit omnia illa quorum species intelligibiles sunt actu in ipso. Videtur igitur quod species intelligibiles non conserventur in intellectu postquam desinit actu intelligere, et ita non remanent in anima post separationem, ut per eas intelligere possit. 17. Further, the intellect is rendered intelligent in act by the intelligible species existing in it. But the intellect existing in act is understanding in act. Therefore the intellect in act understands all those things whose intelligible species actually exist in it. Hence it seems that intelligible species are not retained in the intellect after it ceases to actually understand, and thus that those species through which it is capable of understanding do not remain in the soul after its separation from the body.
Praeterea, habitus acquisiti actus similes reddunt illis actibus ex quibus acquiruntur, ut patet per philosophum in II Ethic.; aedificando enim fit homo aedificator, et iterum aedificator factus potest aedificare. Sed species intelligibiles acquiruntur intellectui per hoc quod convertitur ad phantasmata. Ergo nunquam per eas potest intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Separata igitur a corpore, per species acquisitas intelligere non potest, ut videtur. 18. Further, acquired habits give rise to acts similar to those acts by which the habits were acquired, as is evident from the Philosopher’s observation in the Ethics [II, 1, 1103a 30]. For by building a man becomes a builder, and the man who thus becomes a builder can in turn engage in building. But the intellect acquires intelligible species by turning to phantasms. Hence it can understand through phantasms only by turning to them. Therefore when the soul is separated from the body it cannot understand through acquired species as seems to be the case.
Praeterea, neque etiam dici posset, quod intelligat per species influxas ab aliqua superiori substantia. Quia unumquodque receptivum habet proprium agens a quo natum est recipere. Intellectus autem humanus natus est recipere a sensibus. Non igitur recipit a substantiis superioribus. 19. Further, it cannot be said that the intellect understands through species infused by some higher substance. For every receptive entity has its own proper agent by which it is naturally disposed to receive that which it receives. Now the human intellect is naturally disposed to receive [its species] from the senses.
Praeterea, ad ea quae nata sunt causari per agentia inferiora, non sufficit sola actio superioris agentis. Sicut animalia quae sunt nata generari ex semine, non inveniuntur generata ex actione solis tantum. Sed anima humana nata est recipere species a sensibilibus. Non ergo sufficit, ad hoc quod acquirat species intelligibiles, solum influxus substantiarum superiorum. 20. Further, in the case of those things which are naturally disposed to be caused by inferior agents, the action of a superior agent alone does not suffice to cause them; thus animals which are disposed by nature to be generated from seed, are not found to be generated by the action of the sun alone. Now the human soul by its very nature is disposed to receive species from sensible things. The influx of higher substances, therefore, does not alone suffice to account for its reception of intelligible species.
Praeterea, agens debet esse proportionatum patienti, et influens recipienti. Sed intelligentia substantiarum superiorum non est proportionata intellectui humano, cum habeat scientiam magis universalem, et incomprehensibilem nobis. Non igitur anima separata per species influxas a substantiis superioribus intelligere potest, ut videtur; et sic non relinquitur aliquis modus quo intelligere possit. 2 1. Further, an agent should be proportioned to a patient, and an inflowing power to a recipient. But the intelligence of a superior substance is not proportioned to the human intellect, since the former has knowledge which is more universal than ours and which is incomprehensible to us. Therefore the separated soul cannot understand through species infused by superior substances as seems to be the case. Consequently there is no way in which the separated soul can understand anything.
Sed contra. Intelligere est maxima et propria operatio animae. Si igitur intelligere non convenit animae sine corpore, nulla alia operatio ipsius conveniet ei. Sed si non conveniet ei aliqua operatio sine corpore, impossibile est animam separatam esse. Ponimus autem animam separatam. Ergo necesse est ponere eam intelligere. On the contrary, understanding is the highest and proper operation of the soul. Hence if intellection does not belong to the soul without the body, none of its other operations belong to it either. But if some operation does not belong to the soul without the body, then it is impossible for the soul to exist apart from the body. We maintain, however, that the soul does exist when separated from the body. Hence it is necessary to hold that it understands.
Praeterea, illi qui resuscitati leguntur in Scripturis, eamdem notitiam postea habuerunt quam prius. Ergo notitia eorum quae homo in hoc mundo scit, non tollitur post mortem. Potest ergo anima per species prius acquisitas intelligere. Further, those whom Scripture records as having been brought back to life, possessed the same knowledge after this event that they had possessed before. Therefore the knowledge of those things which a man possesses in this life is not taken away from him after death. Consequently the separated soul can understand through species acquired before death.
Praeterea, similitudo inferiorum invenitur in superioribus; unde et mathematici futura praenuntiant, considerantes similitudines eorum quae hic aguntur, in caelestibus corporibus. Sed anima est superior in natura omnibus corporalibus rebus. Ergo omnium corporalium similitudo est in anima, et per modum intelligibilem, cum ipsa sit substantia intellectiva. Videtur ergo quod per suam naturam omnia corporalia intelligere possit, etiam cum fuerit separata. Further, the likeness of inferior beings is found in superior ones. Thus mathematicians 11 foretell the future by studying in the celestial bodies the likeness of things which are done here on earth. Now the soul is superior in nature to all corporeal things. Therefore the likeness of all corporeal things exists in the soul, and in an intelligible mode, because the soul is itself an intellective substance. Therefore, it is seen that the soul by its very nature is capable of understanding all corporeal things, even when it will exist in separation from the body.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod huic quaestioni dubitationem affert hoc quod anima nostra secundum praesentem statum ad intelligendum sensibilibus indigere invenitur; unde secundum huiusmodi diversam indigentiae rationem diversimode oportet de veritate huius quaestionis existimare. Posuerunt enim quidam, scilicet Platonici, quod sensus sunt animae necessarii ad intelligendum, non per se, quasi ex sensibus in nobis causetur scientia, sed per accidens; in quantum scilicet per sensus quodammodo excitatur anima nostra ad rememorandum quae prius novit, et quorum scientiam naturaliter inditam habet. Et sciendum est, ad huiusmodi intelligentiam, quod Plato posuit species rerum separatas subsistentes et actu intelligibiles, et nominavit eas ideas; per quarum participationem, et quodammodo influxum, posuit animam nostram scientem et intelligentem esse. Et antequam anima corpori uniretur, ista scientia libere poterat uti; sed ex unione ad corpus in tantum erat praegravata, et quodammodo absorpta, quod eorum quae prius sciverat, et quorum scientiam connaturalem habebat, oblita videbatur. Sed excitabatur quodammodo per sensus, ut in seipsam rediret, et reminisceretur eorum quae prius intellexit, et quorum scientiam innatam habuit. Sicut etiam nobis interdum accidit quod ex inspectione aliquorum sensibilium, manifeste reminiscimur aliquorum, quorum obliti videbamur. I answer: The fact that our soul in its present condition needs sensible things in order to understand, is the cause of the difficulty encountered in solving the problem raised in this article. Therefore, to solve this problem, we must consider the various explanations for this need [of sensible things] that have been proposed. For some men (namely, the Platonists [Phaedo 10, 18, Meno], as Aristotle points out [Metaph., I, 6, 987b 4]) have maintained that, in order for the soul to understand it does not need the senses essentially (per se), as though knowledge were caused in us by the senses, but only accidentally inasmuch as our soul is stirred by the senses to recollect things which it knew in a previous existence, and of which it possesses a knowledge naturally endowed. To account for this mode of understanding Plato held that the species of things subsisted apart from them, and were actually intelligible entities. He called them “Ideas” and maintained that our soul knows and understands by participating in them, and by some kind of infusion. Moreover, according to Plato, the soul, prior to its union with the body, was able to use this knowledge freely, but as a result of that union it was so weighed down by the body, and somehow smothered by it, that it seemed to have forgotten the things it had previously known. and of which it had possessed connatural knowledge. They also maintained that the soul was in some way stimulated by the senses so that it turned back upon itself and recollected those things which it previously knew and of which it had innate knowledge; just as it sometimes happens that our sense experiences are the occasion for our recollecting vividly certain things which we seemed to have forgotten.
Haec autem eius positio de scientia et sensibilibus, conformis est positioni eius circa generationem rerum naturalium. Nam formas rerum naturalium per quas unumquodque individuum in specie collocatur, ponebat provenire ex participatione idearum praedictarum; ita quod agentia inferiora non sunt nisi disponentia materiam ad participationem specierum separatarum. This position of Plato on knowledge and on sense-objects conforms with his position on the generation of natural things. For he held that the forms of natural things, through which each individual is placed in its proper species, result from a participation in the “Ideas” aforementioned, so that the sole function of inferior agents is to dispose matter for participation in the separated species.
Et si quidem haec opinio teneatur, haec quaestio facilis et absoluta est. Nam secundum hoc, anima non indiget sensibilibus ad intelligendum secundum suam naturam, sed per accidens; quod quidem tollitur cum anima fuerit a corpore separata. Tunc enim cessante aggravatione corporis, excitante non indigebit; sed ipsa per seipsam erit quasi vigil et expedita ad omnia intelligenda. Now if this theory be adopted, the whole problem with which we are dealing becomes simple and easy. For according to this view the soul does not by its essence (per se) require sensible things in order to understand; it requires them only accidentally (per accidens), and this accidental need ceases to exist as soon as the soul is separated from the body. For the body having ceased to weigh upon the soul, the soul will then have no need of the stimulus of sense. Existing by itself the soul will be, as it were, lightly clad and on the alert for all knowledge.
Sed secundum hanc opinionem non videtur quod possit assignari rationabilis causa propter quam anima corpori uniatur. Non enim est hoc propter animam: cum anima, corpori non unita, perfecte propriam operationem habere possit, et ex unione ad corpus eius operatio propria impeditur. Similiter etiam non potest dari quod propter corpus: non enim anima est propter corpus, sed corpus magis propter animam, cum anima sit nobilior corpore. Unde et inconveniens videtur quod anima ad nobilitandum corpus sustineat in sua operatione detrimentum. Videtur etiam sequi ex hac opinione quod unio animae ad corpus non sit naturalis: nam quod est naturale alicui non impedit eius propriam operationem. Si igitur unio corporis impedit intelligentiam animae, non erit naturale animae corpori uniri, sed contra naturam. Et ita homo qui constituitur ex unione animae ad corpus, non erit aliquod naturale; quod videtur absurdum. Now according to this theory, it appears that no explanation can be offered as to why the soul is united to the body. For [according to the Platonic view under consideration] this union is not for the sake of the soul, because when the soul is not united to the body it can still exercise perfectly its own proper operation, whereas its proper operation is impeded by its union with the body. Similarly, according to this view, it cannot be argued that the union of soul and body exists for the sake of the body; for the soul does not exist for the sake of the body, but rather the body for the soul, because the soul is nobler than the body. Then, too, it seems incongruous that the soul should suffer a loss in its own operation for the sake of ennobling the body. It also seems to follow from this view that the union of the soul with the body is not natural, for whatever is natural to a thing does not impede the operation proper to that thing. Hence, if union with a body impeded the soul’s understanding, it would not be natural but contrary to the nature of the soul to be united to a body; and in that case man, who is constituted of a soul united to a body, would not be a natural being; which seems absurd.
Similiter in experimento patet quod scientia in nobis non provenit ex participatione specierum separatarum, sed a sensibilibus accipitur; quia quibus deest unus sensus, deest scientia sensibilium quae illo sensu apprehenduntur; sicut caecus natus non potest habere scientiam de coloribus. Likewise; experience shows that our knowledge is not the result of participation in separated species, but is acquired from sensible things, because those who lack one sense lack knowledge of the sensible things apprehended by that sense; just as a person born blind cannot have a knowledge of colors.
Alia autem positio est quod sensus prosunt animae humanae ad intelligendum, non per accidens, sicut praedicta opinio ponit, sed per se: non quidem ut a sensibilibus accipiamus scientiam, sed quia sensus disponit animam ad acquirendum scientiam aliunde. Et haec est opinio Avicennae. Ponit enim quod est quaedam substantia separata, quam vocat intellectum vel intelligentiam agentem, et quod ab ea effluunt species intelligibiles in intellectu nostro, per quas intelligimus. Et quod per operationem sensitivae partis, scilicet imaginationem et alia huiusmodi, praeparatur intellectus noster ut convertat se ad intelligentiam agentem, et recipiat influentiam specierum intelligibilium ab ipsa. Et hoc etiam consonat ei quod ipse opinatur circa generationes rerum naturalium. Ponit enim quod omnes formae substantiales effluunt ab intelligentia agente, et quod agentia naturalia disponunt solum materiam ad recipiendum formas ab intelligentia agente. Now there is another theory according to which the senses are not accidentally serviceable to the human soul in performing its function of understanding (as the theory just dealt with supposes), but essentially; not in order that we may acquire knowledge from sense-objects, but because the senses dispose the soul for acquiring knowledge from some other source. This is the opinion of Avicenna. For Avicenna maintains that there is a certain separate substance which he calls the intellect or “the Agent Intelligence; that the intelligible species through which we understand flow into our intellect from this Agent Intellect, and that by the operation of the sentient part, the imagination and other things of this sort, our intellect is prepared for orientating itself toward the Agent Intellect and for receiving the influx of intelligible species from it. This theory agrees with Avicenna’s view on the generation of natural things; for he maintains that all substantial forms flow from the Agent Intellect, and that natural agents only dispose the matter for receiving forms from the Agent Intellect.
Secundum hanc etiam opinionem videtur quaestio haec parum difficultatis habere. Si enim sensus non sunt necessarii ad intelligendum nisi secundum quod disponunt ad recipiendum species ab intelligentia agente, per hoc quod anima nostra convertatur ad ipsam; quando iam erit a corpore separata, per seipsam convertetur ad intelligentiam agentem, et recipiet species intelligibiles ab ea. Nec sensus erunt ei necessarii ad intelligendum: sicut navis, quae est necessaria ad transfretandum, cum aliquis iam transfretaverit, ei necessaria non est. According to this position, as in the preceding, this question seems to involve little or no difficulty. For if the senses are necessary for understanding only inasmuch as they dispose the soul to receive species from the Agent Intellect, because our soul is thus orientated toward the latter, then when the soul is separated from the body it will be orientated toward the Agent Intellect by itself alone, and will receive intelligible species from that Intellect. Thus the soul will have no need of the senses in order to understand; just as the ship in which a person has crossed the sea is no longer needed by him after the completion of the voyage.
Sed ex hac opinione videtur sequi quod homo statim acquirat omnem scientiam, tam eorum quae sensu percepit, quam aliorum. Si enim intelligimus per species effluentes in nos ab intelligentia agente, et ad huiusmodi influentiae receptionem non requiritur nisi conversio animae nostrae ad intelligentiam praedictam; quandocumque fuerit ad eam conversa, poterit recipere quarumcumque specierum intelligibilium influxum. Non enim potest dici quod convertatur quantum ad unum, et non quantum ad aliud. Et ita caecus natus imaginando sonos poterit accipere scientiam colorum, vel quorumcumque aliorum sensibilium. Quod patet esse falsum. Now it seems to follow from this view, that a man immediately acquires all knowledge, both of things which he perceives by his senses and of other things. For if we understand through species which flow into our minds from an Agent Intellect, and if all that is required for the reception of this infusion is the orientating of our soul toward this Intellect, then whenever the soul is so orientated it will be able to receive the infusion of any and every sort of intelligible species; because in that case it cannot be said that the soul is orientated toward the Agent Intellect with respect to one species and not with respect to another; and thus a person born blind will, by imagining sounds, be able to acquire a knowledge of colors, or of any other sensible object; which is manifestly false.
Manifestum est etiam quod potentiae sensitivae sunt nobis necessariae ad intelligendum non solum in acquisitione scientiae, sed etiam in utendo scientia iam acquisita. Non enim possumus considerare etiam ea quorum scientiam habemus, nisi convertendo nos ad phantasmata; licet ipse contrarium dicat. Inde enim est quod, laesis organis potentiarum sensitivarum per quas conservantur et apprehenduntur phantasmata, impeditur usus animae in considerando etiam ea quorum scientiam habet. Manifestum est etiam quod in revelationibus quae nobis divinitus fiunt per influxum substantiarum superiorum, indigemus aliquibus phantasmatibus; unde dicit Dionysius I cap. Cael. Hierar. quod impossibile est nobis aliter lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum velatum. Quod quidem non esset, si phantasmata non essent nobis necessaria nisi ad convertendum nos ad substantias superiores. It is also evident that we have need to the sentient powers for understanding, not only in the acquisition of knowledge but also in the utilization of knowledge already acquired. For we cannot even reflect upon the things we know without turning to phantasms, although Avicenna himself is of a contrary opinion. It is for this reason that, even in reflecting upon things which it knows, the soul is impeded in its operation by injuries to the organs of the sentient powers whereby the phantasms are retained and apprehended. It is evident also that we have need of certain phantasms in things divinely revealed to us through the influence of superior substances. Thus Dionysius says [De cael. hier., I, 2]: “The divine light cannot shine upon us unless it is screened round about by many sacred veils.” Now this would not be so if we needed phantasms only to orientate us toward superior substances.
Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod potentiae sensitivae sunt necessariae animae ad intelligendum, non per accidens tamquam excitantes, ut Plato posuit; neque disponentes tantum, sicut posuit Avicenna; sed ut repraesentantes animae intellectivae proprium obiectum, ut dicit philosophus in III de anima: intellectivae animae phantasmata sunt sicut sensibilia sensui. Sed sicut colores non sunt visibiles actu nisi per lumen, ita phantasmata non sunt intelligibilia actu nisi per intellectum agentem. Et hoc consonat ei quod ponimus circa generationem rerum naturalium. Sicut enim ponimus quod agentia superiora mediantibus agentibus naturalibus causant formas naturales; ita ponimus quod intellectus agens per phantasmata ab eo facta intelligibilia actu, causat scientiam in intellectu possibili nostro. Nec refert ad propositum, utrum intellectus agens sit substantia separata, ut quidam ponunt; vel sit lumen, quod anima nostra participat ad similitudinem substantiarum superiorum. Consequently a different explanation must be given for the need which the soul has of sensory powers in order to understand. For they are not accidental in the manner of stimuli, as Plato held, nor, are they merely dispositive, as Avicenna claimed, but re-present to the intellective soul its proper object, as Aristotle says in the De anima [III, 7, 431a 14]: “Phantasms are to the intellect what sensible things are to sense.” Now just as colors are made actually visible by light, so phantasms are made actually intelligible only by the agent intellect. This agrees with what we hold about the generation of natural things. For as we maintain that superior agents produce natural forms by means of natural agents, so we maintain that the agent intellect produces knowledge in our possible intellect through phantasms rendered actually intelligible by the agent intellect. The question whether the agent intellect is a separate substance, as some held, or a light in which our soul participates in the manner of superior substances, has no bearing on this last point.
Sed secundum hoc iam difficilius est videre quomodo anima separata intelligere possit. Non enim erunt phantasmata, quae indigent ad sui apprehensionem et conservationem organis corporeis; quibus sublatis, ut videtur, non potest intelligere anima. Sicut nec coloribus sublatis, potest visus videre. Ad hanc igitur difficultatem tollendam considerandum est, quod anima, cum sit infima in ordine intellectivarum substantiarum, infimo et debilissimo modo participat intellectuale lumen, sive intellectualem naturam. Nam in primo intelligente, scilicet Deo, natura intellectualis est adeo potens quod per unam formam intelligibilem, scilicet essentiam suam, omnia intelligit; inferiores vero substantiae intellectuales per species multas. Et quanto unaquaeque earum est altior, tanto habet pauciores formas, et virtutem magis potentem ad intelligendum omnia per formas paucas. Si autem substantia intellectualis inferior haberet formas ita universales sicut superior, cum non adsit ei tanta virtus in intelligendo, remaneret eius scientia incompleta; quia tantum in universali res cognosceret, et non posset deducere cognitionem suam ex illis paucis ad singula. Anima ergo humana, quae est infima, si acciperet formas in abstractione et universalitate conformes substantiis separatis, cum habeat minimam virtutem in intelligendo, imperfectissimam cognitionem haberet, utpote cognoscens res in quadam universalitate et confusione. Et ideo ad hoc quod eius cognitio perficiatur, et distinguatur per singula, oportet quod a singulis rebus scientiam colligat veritatis; lumine tamen intellectus agentis ad hoc necessario existente, ut altiori modo recipiantur in anima quam sint in materia. Ad perfectionem igitur intellectualis operationis necessarium fuit animam corpori uniri. Now according to this latter theory it seems even more difficult to see how the separated soul can understand. For [on that hypothesis] there will be no phantasms requiring corporeal organs for their apprehension and retention. Yet if these be removed, it is seen that the soul cannot understand; just as the faculty of sight cannot function in the absence of colors. Now in order to solve this problem the fact must be borne in mind that the soul, being lowest in the order of intellectual substances, participates in intellectual light or in intellectual nature, in the lowest and weakest measure. For in the first intelligence, namely, God, intellectual nature is so powerful that He understands all things through one intelligible form, namely, His own essence. Inferior intellectual substances, on the other hand, understand through many species; and the higher each of these substances is, the fewer forms it possesses, and the more potent is its faculty of understanding all things through those few forms. However, even if an inferior intellectual substance possessed forms equally as universal as those of a superior substance, its knowledge would still remain incomplete, since it does not have so great a power of understanding, because that inferior intellectual substance would only know things universally; and, from the few universal forms it apprehends, it could not bring its knowledge to bear on singulars. Therefore, if the human soul, which is lowest in the order of intellectual substances and hence possesses the least intellectual power of them all, received forms abstractly and universally, as separate substances do, then it would have a most imperfect kind of knowledge: that of knowing things in the universal and indistinctly. Hence, in order that the soul’s knowledge may be perfect in its kind and bear directly upon singulars, the soul must acquire a knowledge of truth from singular things. However, the light of the agent intellect is necessary in order that those things may be received in the soul and may exist there in a higher mode than that in which they exist materially. Hence it was necessary that the soul be united to a body for the perfection of its intellectual operation.
Nec tamen dubium est quin per motus corporeos et occupationem sensuum anima impediatur a receptione influxus substantiarum separatarum; unde dormientibus et alienatis a sensibus quaedam revelationes fiunt quae non accidunt sensu utentibus. Quando ergo anima erit a corpore totaliter separata, plenius percipere poterit influentiam a superioribus substantiis, quantum ad hoc quod per huiusmodi influxum intelligere poterit absque phantasmate, quod modo non potest. Sed tamen huiusmodi influxus non causabit scientiam ita perfectam et ita determinatam ad singula, sicut est scientia quam hic accipimus per sensus; nisi in illis animabus, quae supra dictum naturalem influxum habebunt alium supernaturalem ad omnia plenissime cognoscenda, et ad ipsum Deum videndum. Habebunt etiam animae separatae determinatam cognitionem eorum quae prius hic sciverunt, quorum species intelligibiles conservantur in eis. It is undoubtedly true, however, that bodily movements and the activity of the senses prevent the soul from receiving infused knowledge from separate substances. It is for this reason that certain things are revealed to persons during sleep, and to those who have [momentarily] lost their senses. Therefore, when the soul shall be separated completely from the body, it will be able to receive infused knowledge from superior substances more fully, because, thanks to such knowledge, it will be able to understand without a phantasm, which otherwise it cannot do. Nevertheless an influx of this sort will not produce knowledge as perfect and as directly related to singulars as the knowledge which we acquire here below through the senses, though a much more perfect knowledge will be had in addition to this natural influx by those souls that will enjoy the influx of a supernatural light by which they will know all things most fully and will see God Himself. Moreover, separated souls will have a determinate knowledge of those [singular] things which they had previously known here below, and whose intelligible species they retain in themselves.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa verba Aristoteles dicit non secundum propriam sententiam, sed secundum opinionem illorum qui dicebant quod intelligere est moveri; ut patet ex his quae praemisit ibi. 1. Those words do not represent Aristotle’s own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to be moved, as the context of his statement shows.
Ad secundum dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de operatione intellectuali animae, secundum quod est corpori unita; sic enim non est sine phantasmate, ut dictum est. 2. The Philosopher is speaking of the intellectual operation of the soul so far as the soul is united to the body; for in that state the soul does not understand without a phantasm, as has been explained.
Ad tertium dicendum quod secundum statum praesentem, quo anima corpori unitur, non participat a substantiis superioribus species intelligibiles, sed solum lumen intellectuale; et ideo indiget phantasmatibus ut obiectis a quibus species intelligibiles accipiat. Sed post separationem amplius participabit etiam intelligibiles species; unde non indigebit exterioribus obiectis. 3. In its present state of union with the body, the soul does not participate in intelligible species flowing from superior substances, but only in intellectual light. Consequently the soul is in need of phantasms as objects from which it may receive intelligible species. But after its separation from the body, the soul will indeed participate more fully in intelligible species, and therefore will have no need of external objects.
Et similiter dicendum est ad quartum. 4. This also answers the fourth objection.
Ad quintum dicendum quod philosophus loquitur secundum opinionem quorumdam, qui posuerunt intellectum habere organum corporale sicut et sensum; ut patet per ea quae ante praemittuntur. Hoc enim posito, penitus anima separata intelligere non posset. Vel potest dici quod loquitur de intelligere secundum modum intelligendi quo nunc intelligimus. 5. It is clear from what has been said before that Aristotle refers in this place to the opinion of certain philosophers who held that the intellect has a bodily organ just as a sense faculty does. Now if this were maintained, the separated soul would be entirely incapable of understanding anything. Or we may reply that Aristotle is speaking of that mode of understanding which we possess here and now.
Ad sextum dicendum quod anima unitur corpori per suam operationem, quae est intelligere, non quia sine corpore quoquomodo intelligere non posset, sed quia naturali ordine sine corpore perfecte non intelligeret, ut expositum est. 6. The soul is united to the body in virtue of the soul’s operation, which is understanding, not because it could in no way understand without the body, but because in the natural order it could not understand perfectly without the body, as has been shown.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad septimum. 7. Thus, the answer to the seventh objection is evident.
Ad octavum dicendum quod phantasmata non sunt obiecta intellectus nisi secundum quod fiunt intelligibilia actu per lumen intellectus agentis. Unde quaecumque species intelligibiles actu recipiantur in intellectu et undecumque, non habebunt aliam rationem obiecti formalem, penes quam obiecta potentias diversificant. 8. Phantasms are objects of the intellect only so far as they are rendered actually intelligible by the light of the agent intellect. Consequently all actually intelligible species which are received in the intellect, whencesoever they may come, will have no other formal object; and it is by their formal objects that the powers of the soul are differentiated.
Ad nonum dicendum quod operatio intellectus agentis et possibilis respicit phantasmata secundum quod est anima corpori unita; sed cum erit anima a corpore separata, per intellectum possibilem recipiet species effluentes a substantiis superioribus, et per intellectum agentem habebit virtutem ad intelligendum. 9. The operation of the agent intellect and that of the possible intellect bear on phantasms so long as the soul remains united to the body; but when the soul will be separated from the body, it will receive, through its possible intellect, the species that flow into it from superior substances, and it will have the power of understanding through its agent intellect.
Ad decimum dicendum quod operatio propria animae est intelligere intelligibilia actu. Nec per hoc diversificatur species intellectualis operationis, quod intelligibilia actu sunt accepta a phantasmatibus vel aliunde. 10. The proper operation of the soul is to understand things that are actually intelligible. Moreover, intellectual operation is not diversified specifically because actual intelligibles are received from phantasms or elsewhere.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod anima separata non intelligit res per essentiam suam, neque per essentiam rerum intellectarum, sed per species influxas a substantiis superioribus in ipsa separatione; non a principio cum esse incepit, ut Platonici posuerunt. 11. The separated soul does not understand things through its own essence, nor through the essences of the things understood, but through species flowing into it from superior substances; nor does it, as the Platonists claimed, understand things from the very beginning of its existence.
Per hoc etiam patet solutio ad duodecimum. 12. Thus the reply to the twelfth objection is evident.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod anima, cum est corpori unita, si haberet species innatas, per eas posset intelligere, sicut intelligit per acquisitas. Sed licet sit perfectior in natura sua, tamen propter motus suos corporeos et occupationes sensibiles retinetur ut non possit ita libere coniungi substantiis superioribus ad recipiendum influxum earum, sicut post separationem. 13. If the soul, when united to the body, possessed innate species, it would be able to understand through them, just as it understands through acquired species. Now although it is more perfect in its nature [when united to the body], nevertheless on account of bodily movements and sense activities, the soul is held in check, so that it cannot be united to superior substances in order to receive infused knowledge from them, as it does when it is separated from the body.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod non est naturale animae ut per species influxas intelligat cum est corpori unita, sed solum postquam est separata, ut dictum est. 14. To understand through infused species is not natural to the soul when united to the body, but only after it has left the body, as we have pointed out.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod animae separatae poterunt etiam intelligere per species prius acquisitas in corpore; sed tamen non solum per eas, sed etiam per influxas, ut dictum est. 15. Separated souls will indeed be able to understand through species acquired previously while they existed in the body, but not through them alone. They will also understand through infused species, as we have explained.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad decimumsextum. 16. Thus the reply to objection sixteen is evident.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod species intelligibiles quandoque sunt in intellectu possibili in potentia tantum; et tunc homo est intelligens in potentia, et indiget aliquo reducente in actum vel per doctrinam vel per inventionem. Quandoque autem sunt in eo in actu perfecto, et tunc intelligit actu. Quandoque autem sunt in eo medio modo inter potentiam et actum, scilicet in habitu; et tunc potest intelligere actu quando voluerit. Et per hunc modum species intelligibiles acquisitae sunt in intellectu possibili quando actu non intelligit. 17. Intelligible species sometimes exist in the possible intellect only potentially; and when that is the case man knows only potentially, and thus needs to be made actually knowing either by teaching or by discovery. Sometimes, however, intelligible species exist in the possible intellect in a completely actual way, and when that is the case, it knows actually. Sometimes, however, they exist in it in a mode midway between potency and act, that is to say, as a habit; and when that is the case the intellect can understand actually whenever it wishes. Moreover’ thanks to this mode of existing, acquired intelligible species exist in the possible intellect even when it is not performing acts of understanding.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, operatio intellectualis non differt specie, sive intelligibile actu, quod est obiectum intellectus, accipiatur a phantasmatibus sive undecumque. Operatio enim potentiae recipit distinctionem et speciem secundum obiectum quantum ad formalem rationem ipsius, non secundum id quod est materiale in ipso. Et ideo si per species intelligibiles conservatas in intellectu, prius autem acceptas a phantasmatibus, anima separata intelligat non convertendo se ad phantasmata, non erunt dissimiles specie operationi quae ex speciebus acquisitis causatur, et per quam species acquiruntur. 18. As has already been pointed out, an intellectual operation’ whose actually understood object is received from phantasms, does not differ specifically from an intellectual operation whose object is derived from some other source. For the operation of a power is distinguished and specified by the formal nature of the object, not by its matter. Hence, if the separated soul understands through intelligible species which are retained in the intellect, and which were previously acquired from phantasms, and not by actually turning itself to phantasms, then the operation which results from the species so acquired, and the operation by which those species are acquired, will not be specifically different.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum quod intellectus possibilis non est natus recipere a phantasmatibus nihil secundum quod phantasmata fiunt actu per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est quaedam participatio luminis substantiarum superiorum. Et ideo non removetur quin a substantiis superioribus recipere possit. 19. The possible intellect is disposed by nature to receive [species] from phantasms only so far as the phantasms are actualized by the light of the agent intellect, which is a kind of participation of the light of superior substances. Consequently the intellect is not prevented from being able to receive [species] from superior substances.
Ad vicesimum dicendum quod scientia in anima nata est causari a phantasmatibus secundum statum quo est corpori unita, secundum quem statum non potest causari a superioribus agentibus tantum. Poterit autem hoc esse, cum anima fuerit a corpore separata. 20. In its present state of union with the body, the soul, is disposed by nature to acquire knowledge from phantasms, and in this state its knowledge cannot be caused by superior agents alone. But this will be possible when the soul is separated from the body.
Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum quod ex hoc quod scientia substantiarum separatarum non est proportionata animae nostrae, non sequitur quod nullam intelligentiam ex earum influxu capere possit; sed solum quod non possit capere perfectam et distinctam, ut dictum est. 21. From the fact that the knowledge of separate substances is not proportioned to our soul, it does not follow that our soul is incapable of grasping any knowledge from the influx of those substances, but only that it cannot grasp a perfect and distinct knowledge, as has been explained.
ARTICLE 16
WHETHER THE SOUL, WHEN UNITED TO THE BODY, CAN UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES

[Summa theol., I, q. 88, a. 1; Contra Gentiles, II, 60; III, 42, 43, 44, 46; De verit., q. 10, a. 11; q. 18, a. 5, ad 7& 8; De Trin., q. 6, lect. 3; Comm. in Metaph., II, lect. 1.]
Decimosexto quaeritur utrum anima coniuncta corpori possit intelligere substantias separatas In the sixteenth article we examine this question: Whether the soul, when united to the body, can understand separate substances.
Objections.
Et videtur quod sic. Nulla enim forma impeditur a fine suo per materiam cui naturaliter unitur. Finis enim animae intellectivae videtur esse intelligere substantias separatas, quae sunt maxime intelligibiles. Uniuscuiusque enim rei finis est ut perveniat ad perfectum in sua operatione. Non ergo anima humana impeditur ab intelligendo substantias separatas per hoc quod unitur tali corpori, quod est propria eius materia. 1. It seems that the soul, when united to the body, can understand separate substances. For no form is prevented from attaining its end by the, matter to which it is naturally united. Now the end of the intellective soul seems to consist in knowing separate substances, which are in the highest degree intelligible; for the end of each and every thing is to attain perfection in its operation. Therefore the human soul is not prevented from understanding separate substances by being united to the body, which is the soul’s own proper matter.
Praeterea, finis hominis est felicitas. Ultima autem felicitas, secundum philosophum in X Ethic., consistit in operatione altissimae potentiae, scilicet intellectus, respectu nobilissimi obiecti, quod non videtur esse nisi substantia separata. Ergo ultimus finis hominis est intelligere substantias separatas. Inconveniens autem est, si homo totaliter deficiat a fine suo: sic enim vanum esset. Cognoscere ergo potest homo substantias separatas. Sed de ratione hominis est quod anima corpori sit unita. Ergo anima unita corpori intelligere potest substantias separatas. 2. Further, the end of man is happiness. Now according to the Philosopher, in the Ethics [X, 7, 1177a 11; 8, 1178b 10], ultimate happiness consists in the operation of man’s highest power, namely, the intellect, and is related to the noblest object, which seems to be none other than a separate substance. Hence man’s last end consists in understanding separate substances. Now it would be incongruous if man failed completely to attain his end; for in that case his life would be meaningless. Therefore man can know separate substances. But it belongs to man’s very essence to possess a soul that is united to a body. Therefore the soul, when it is united to the body, can understand separate substances.
Praeterea, omnis generatio pervenit ad aliquem terminum: nihil enim in infinitum movetur. Est autem quaedam intellectus generatio, secundum quod de potentia in actum reducitur; prout scilicet fit actu sciens. Hoc ergo non procedit in infinitum, sed pervenit quandoque ad aliquem terminum, ut scilicet totaliter sit factus in actu. Quod esse non potest nisi omnia intelligibilia intelligat, inter quae praecipue sunt substantiae separatae. Ergo intellectus humanus ad hoc pervenire potest quod intelligat substantias separatas. 3. Further, every generative process reaches a terminus, for no process goes on to infinity. Now there is a certain intellectual generation whereby the intellect is brought from potency to act, that is to say, is made actually knowing. Therefore this process does not go on to infinity but at some time will reach a terminus, that is, it will be completely actualized. But this end can be attained only when the intellect understands all intelligible things, especially separate substances. Therefore the human intellect is capable of attaining a knowledge of separate substances.
Praeterea, difficilius videtur facere separata ea quae non sunt separata et intelligere ea, quam intelligere ea quae secundum se sunt separata. Sed intellectus noster etiam corpori unitus facit separata ea quae non sunt secundum se separata, dum abstrahit species intelligibiles a rebus materialibus, per quas res materiales intelligit. Ergo multo fortius poterit intelligere substantias separatas. 4. Further, it seems to be more difficult to separate from matter things which do not exist in separation therefrom, and to apprehend those things, than to apprehend things which exist in themselves apart from matter. But even when united to the body, our intellect separates from matter things which do not in themselves exist apart from matter, inasmuch as it abstracts the intelligible species by which it apprehends material things. Therefore our intellect will be even more capable of apprehending separate substances.
Praeterea, excellentia sensibilia pro tanto minus sentiuntur quia corrumpunt harmoniam organi. Si autem esset aliquod organum sensus quod non corrumperetur ab excellenti sensibili, quanto sensibile esset excellentius, tanto magis sentiret ipsum. Intellectus autem nullo modo corrumpitur ab intelligibili, sed magis perficitur. Ergo ea quae sunt magis intelligibilia magis intelligit. Sed substantiae separatae, quae sunt secundum se actu intelligibiles utpote immateriales, sunt magis intelligibiles quam substantiae materiales, quae non sunt intelligibiles nisi in potentia. Ergo, cum anima intellectiva unita corpori intelligat substantias materiales, multo magis intelligere potest substantias separatas. 5. Further, sense objects that are excessively intense (excellentia sensibilia) are sensed to a lesser degree than others, because they destroy the harmony of a sense organ. However, if there were a sense organ which was not affected adversely by the intensity of its sensible object, then the more intense the sensible object, the more fully would the sense organ experience that object. Now the intellect is not corrupted in any way by an intelligible object, rather is it perfected by it. Hence the more intelligible things are, the better the intellect knows them. But separate substances which are actually intelligible in themselves, because they are immaterial, are more intelligible than material substances, which are intelligible only potentially. Therefore, since the intellective soul when it is united to the body apprehends material substances, it is even more capable of apprehending separate substances.
Praeterea, anima intellectiva etiam unita corpori abstrahit quidditatem a rebus habentibus quidditatem. Et cum non sit in infinitum abire, necesse est quod perveniat abstrahendo ad aliquam quidditatem quae non sit res habens quidditatem, sed quidditas tantum. Cum ergo substantiae separatae nihil aliud sint quam quaedam quidditates per se existentes, videtur quod anima intellectiva unita corpori intelligere possit substantias separatas. 6. Further, even when the intellective soul is united to the body it abstracts the quiddity from things having a quiddity; and, since it cannot regress to infinity, it must in this abstractive process eventually attain to a quiddity that is not a thing having a quiddity, but is a quiddity only. Therefore, since separate substances are nothing but certain quiddities existing of themselves, it seems that the intellective soul, when united to the body, is capable of apprehending separate substances.
Praeterea, innatum est nobis per effectus causas cognoscere. Oportet autem aliquos effectus substantiarum separatarum in rebus sensibilibus et materialibus esse, cum omnia corporalia a Deo per Angelos administrentur; ut patet per Augustinum in III de Trin. Potest igitur anima unita corpori, per sensibilia substantias separatas intelligere. 7. Further, it is natural for us to acquire a knowledge of causes from their effects. However, some of the effects caused by separate substances must be found in sensible and material things; for, as Augustine shows in the De Trinitate [III, 4], all corporeal things are governed by God through the agency of the angels. Therefore the soul, when united to the body, can apprehend separate substances through sensible objects.
Praeterea, anima unita corpori intelligit seipsam; mens enim intelligit se et amat se, ut dicit Augustinus in IX de Trin. Sed ipsa est de natura substantiarum separatarum intellectualium. Ergo unita corpori potest intelligere substantias separatas. 8. Further, the soul understands itself when it is united to the body; for, as Augustine says in the De Trinitate [IX, 3], the mind understands itself and loves itself. But the mind itself possesses the nature of a separate intellectual substance. Therefore the soul, when united to the body, can apprehend separate substances.
Praeterea, nihil est frustra in rebus. Frustra autem videtur esse intelligibile, si a nullo intellectu intelligatur. Ergo substantias separatas, cum sint intelligibiles, intellectus noster intelligere potest. 9. Further, in things nothing exists without a purpose. But to be an intelligible seems to be purposeless if the intelligible is not apprehended by any intellect. Therefore, since separate substances are intelligibles, our intellect can apprehend them.
Praeterea, sicut se habet visus ad visibilia, ita intellectus ad intelligibilia. Sed visus noster potest cognoscere omnia visibilia, etiam incorruptibilia, quamvis ipse sit corruptibilis. Ergo intellectus noster, etiam dato quod esset corruptibilis, posset intelligere substantias separatas incorruptibiles, cum sint per se intelligibiles. 10. Further, as sight is to visible things, so intelligence is to intelligible things. But our sense of sight can perceive all visible things, even those that are incorruptible, although it is itself corruptible. Therefore, on the assumption that our intellect is corruptible, it would be capable of apprehending incorruptible separate substances because they are intelligibles in themselves.
Sed contra, nihil sine phantasmate intelligit anima, ut dicit philosophus in III de anima. Sed per phantasmata non possunt intelligi substantiae separatae. Ergo anima unita corpori non potest intelligere substantias separatas. On the contrary, the soul does not apprehend anything without a phantasm, as the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 7]. Therefore the soul, when united to the body, cannot apprehend separate substances.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod hanc quaestionem Aristoteles promisit se determinaturum in III de anima, licet non inveniatur determinata ab ipso in libris eius qui ad nos pervenerunt. Unde sectatoribus eius fuit occasio diversimode procedendi ad huiusmodi quaestionis solutionem. I answer: Aristotle set out to solve the problem, posed in this article, in the De anima [ibid., 431b 19], but the solution is not found in those writings of his which have come down to us. This explains why Aristotle’s followers have proceeded to offer various solutions for this problem.
Quidam enim posuerunt quod anima nostra etiam corpori unita potest pervenire ad hoc quod intelligat substantias separatas; et hoc ponunt esse ultimam felicitatem humanam. Sed in modo intelligendi est apud eos diversitas. Quidam enim posuerunt quod anima nostra potest pertingere ad intelligendum substantias separatas, non quidem eodem modo quo pervenimus ad intelligendum alia intelligibilia, de quibus instruimur in scientiis speculativis per definitiones et demonstrationes, sed per continuationem intellectus agentis nobiscum. Ponunt enim intellectum agentem esse quamdam substantiam separatam, quae naturaliter substantias separatas intelligit. Unde cum iste intellectus agens fuerit unitus nobis sic ut per eum intelligamus, sicut nunc intelligimus per habitus scientiarum, sequeretur quod intelligamus substantias separatas. For some have maintained that our soul, even when united to the body, is capable of knowing separate substances, and that man’s ultimate happiness actually consists in knowing such substances. However, [these theorists] entertain different opinions as to the way in which we understand such substances. For some have maintained that our soul cannot acquire an understanding of separate substances in the way in which we -acquire an understanding of those other intelligible objects which we learn about in the speculative sciences. The latter type of knowledge is acquired through definitions and demonstrations, whereas a knowledge of separate substances, these theorists maintained, can be acquired only as a result, of the Agent Intellect itself being united to us. For they supposed that the Agent Intellect was a separate substance which by its own nature understands separate substances. Hence, when this Agent Intellect shall be united to us, enabling us thereby to understand through Itself (as we now understand through intellectual habits of scientific knowledge), we shall, consequently, apprehend separate substances.
Modum autem quo iste intellectus agens possit sic continuari nobis, ut per eum intelligamus, talem assignant. Manifestum est enim ex philosopho in II de anima quod quando nos dicimur aut esse aut operari aliquid duobus, unum eorum est quasi forma, et aliud sicut materia. Sicut dicimur sanari sanitate et corpore; unde sanitas comparatur ad corpus sicut forma ad materiam. Manifestum est etiam nos intelligere per intellectum agentem, et per intelligibilia speculata; venimus enim in cognitionem conclusionum per principia naturaliter nota, et per intellectum agentem. Necesse est igitur quod intellectus agens comparetur ad intelligibilia speculata sicut principale agens ad instrumentum, et sicut ut forma ad materiam, vel actus ad potentiam; semper enim quod est perfectius duorum, est quasi actus alterius. Quidquid autem recipit in se id quod est quasi materia, recipit illud etiam quod est quasi forma. Sicut corpus recipiens superficiem, recipit etiam colorem, qui est forma quaedam superficiei; et pupilla recipiens colorem, recipit etiam lumen, quod est actus coloris, eo enim est visibilis actu. Sic igitur intellectus possibilis in quantum recipit intelligibilia speculata, in tantum recipit de intellectu agente. Quando igitur intellectus possibilis receperit omnia speculata, tunc totaliter recipiet in se intellectum agentem; et sic intellectus agens fiet quasi forma intellectus possibilis, et per consequens unum nobis. Unde sicut nunc intelligimus per intellectum possibilem, tunc intelligemus per intellectum agentem, non solum omnia naturalia sed etiam substantias separatas. Moreover, they explain the manner in which this Agent Intellect can be united to us so that we may understand. For it is evident, [they argue], from what the Philosopher says in the De anima [II, 2, 414a 4] that whenever we are said to be so-and-so or to do so-and-so, two things are involved, one having the role of form, the other the role of matter; just as we are said to be made healthy by health and with respect to the body, so that health is related to the body as a form to matter. It is clear also [they say] that we understand by the Agent Intellect and through intelligible objects-known (speculata); for we arrive at a knowledge of conclusion through principles known naturally, and through the Agent Intellect. Therefore the Agent Intellect must be related to intelligible objects-known as a principal agent is to an instrument, and as a form is to matter, or as act is to potency. For of two things, the more perfect always has the character of an act with respect to the other. Moreover, whatever receives in itself that which has the character of a form, also receives that which has the character of matter; just as a body having a surface is also receptive of color, which is a kind of form possessed by that surface. Likewise, the pupil of the eye which receives color, also receives light, which is the act of color; for by light color is made actually visible. Consequently, in the same way, so far as the possible intellect receives intelligible objects-known, to that extent does it receive from the Agent Intellect. Hence, when the possible intellect receives all objects-known, then at that time it will receive the Agent Intellect unto itself completely; and thus the Agent Intellect will assume the character of a form in the possible intellect, and consequently will become one with us. Hence, as we at present understand through the possible intellect, so shall we then understand through the Agent Intellect; and we shall understand not only all natural things but separate substances as well.
Sed in hoc est quaedam diversitas inter quosdam sectantium hanc opinionem. Quidam enim ponentes intellectum possibilem esse corruptibilem, dicunt quod nullo modo intellectus possibilis potest intelligere intellectum agentem, neque substantias separatas. Nos autem in statu illius continuationis intellectus agentis nobiscum, intelligimus ipsum intellectum agentem et alias substantias separatas per ipsum intellectum agentem, in quantum unietur nobis ut forma. Alii vero, ponentes intellectum possibilem esse incorruptibilem, dicunt quod intellectus possibilis potest intelligere intellectum agentem, et alias substantias separatas. On this point, however, there are differences of opinion among those who subscribe to the theory stated above. For some, holding that the possible intellect is corruptible, assert that the possible intellect is in no way able to know either the Agent Intellect or the separate substances; but that as long as we remain in a state of union with the Agent Intellect, we shall know the Agent Intellect and other separate substances as well through the Agent Intellect itself, inasmuch as it will be united to us as a form. But others, holding that the possible intellect is incorruptible, assert that the possible intellect is able to know the Agent Intellect as well as other separate substances.
Haec autem positio impossibilis est et vana, et contra intentionem Aristotelis. Impossibilis quidem, quia duo impossibilia ponit: scilicet quod intellectus agens sit quaedam substantia separata a nobis secundum esse; et quod nos per intellectum agentem intelligimus sicut per formam. In tantum enim aliquo operamur ut forma, in quantum illo adipiscimur aliquod esse actu. Sicut calidum calore calefacit, in quantum est calidum actu; nihil enim agit nisi secundum quod est actu. Oportet ergo id quod aliquid agit aut operatur formaliter, uniri ei secundum esse. Unde impossibile est quod duarum substantiarum separatarum secundum esse una formaliter operetur per aliam. Et sic impossibile est, si intellectus agens est quaedam substantia separata a nobis secundum esse, quod ea formaliter intelligamus. Posset autem esse ut ea intelligeremus active, sicut dicimur videre sole illuminante. Now it is impossible to maintain this position. It is gratuitous, and it is contrary to the meaning of Aristotle’s doctrine.”’ It is impossible to maintain this position because it premises two contradictory affirmations (duo impossibilia): namely, that the Agent Intellect is a separate substance existing apart from us, and that we understand through the Agent Intellect as through a form. Now so far as we carry out an operation by means of something having the character of a form, to that extent do we cause something to exist actually, just as a hot thing heats by its heat inasmuch as it is actually hot. For a thing acts only so far as it is in act. Hence that by which a thing acts or operates formally, must be united to that thing with respect to its very act of existing. Hence in the case of two substances existing in separation from one another, it is impossible for one of them to operate formally through the other. Thus, if the Agent Intellect is a separate substance existing apart from us, we cannot understand by it formally, although we may be able to understand by it actively, as we are said to see by the light of the sun.
Vana est etiam praedicta positio, quia rationes ad ipsam inductae non de necessitate concludunt. Et hoc patet in duobus. Primo quidem, quia si intellectus agens est substantia separata ut ponunt, comparatio intellectus agentis ad intelligibilia speculata non erit sicut luminis ad colores, sed sicut solis illuminantis. Unde intellectus possibilis per hoc quod recipit intelligibilia speculata, non coniungitur substantiae eius, sed alicui effectui ipsius. Sicut oculus, per hoc quod recipit colores, non unitur substantiae solis, sed lumini eius. Secundo, quia dato quod per hoc quod recipit intelligibilia speculata coniungatur intellectus possibilis ipsi substantiae intellectus agentis aliquo modo, non tamen sequitur quod recipiendo omnia intelligibilia speculata, quae abstrahuntur a phantasmatibus et acquiruntur per principia demonstrationum, perfecte coniungantur substantiae intellectus agentis. Nisi hoc esset probatum quod omnia huiusmodi intelligibilia speculata adaequarent virtutem et substantiam intellectus agentis; quod patet esse falsum: quia intellectus agens est altioris gradus in entibus, si est substantia separata, quam omnia quae fiunt intelligibilia per ipsum in rebus naturalibus. The aforesaid position is likewise gratuitous (vana), because the arguments advanced for it are not conclusive with necessity. Two considerations make this point clear. First, indeed, because if, as the advocates of this view maintain, the Agent Intellect is a separate substance, then this intellect will not be related to intelligible objects-known as light is to colors, but as the sun shining is to colors. Hence, simply because the possible intellect receives intelligible objects-known, that intellect is not thereby brought into substantial union with the Agent Intellect, but is united only to an effect of it; just as the eye by receiving colors is not united to the substance of the sun, but only to the sun’s light. Secondly, because (supposing we grant that the possible intellect, being receptive of intelligible objects-known, is in some way united substantially to the Agent Intellect), even though the possible intellect receives all intelligible objects-known, the latter being abstracted from phantasms and known demonstratively through the principles of demonstration, it would not follow that the possible intellect had thus been perfectly united with the Agent Intellect. This could be the case only if it were proved that all those intelligible objects together were equivalent in power and in substance to the power and substance of the Agent Intellect itself. This is obviously untrue, for if the Agent Intellect is a separate substance, it is by that fact alone of a higher order of being than all those objects in the natural order which are rendered intelligible by it.
Mirum est etiam quod ipsimet non intellexerunt defectum suae rationis. Quamvis enim ponerent quod per unum vel duo intelligibilia speculata unirentur nobiscum, non tamen sequitur secundum eos quod propter hoc intelligamus omnia alia intelligibilia speculata. Manifestum est autem quod multo plus excedunt substantiae intelligibiles separatae omnia praedicta, quae dicuntur intelligibilia speculata, quam omnia ea simul accepta excedunt unum vel duo, vel quolibet ex eis. Quia omnia ista sunt unius generis, et eodem modo intelligibilia; substantiae autem separatae sunt altioris generis, et altiori modo intelliguntur. Unde etiam si continuetur intellectus agens nobiscum secundum quod est forma et agens istorum intelligibilium, non sequitur propter hoc quod continuetur nobiscum secundum quod intelligit substantias separatas. It is also remarkable that these people did not see the evident error in their reasoning. For, although they maintained that all intelligible objects-known were united by one or two of these objects, still it does not follow for this reason, according to them, that we shall know all the other intelligible objects-known. Now it is evident that separate intelligible substances surpass all those objects which they call intelligible objects-known to a far greater degree than all of the latter taken together exceed one or two or any number of themselves; for these objects are all of one genus and have the same mode of intelligibility, whereas separate substances are of a higher order, and have a higher mode of intelligibility. Hence if the Agent Intellect is brought into union with us as a form, and as the agent of those intelligibles, it does not for this reason follow that it is united to us as a knower of separate substances.
Manifestum est etiam quod haec positio est contra intentionem Aristotelis, qui dicit in I Ethic. quod felicitas est quoddam bonum commune, quod potest accidere omnibus non orbatis ad virtutem. Intelligere autem omnia quae dicuntur ab eis intelligibilia speculata, vel est impossibile alicui homini, vel adeo rarum quod nulli unquam homini hoc accidit in statu huius vitae, nisi Christo qui fuit Deus et homo. Unde impossibile est quod hoc requiratur ad felicitatem humanam. Ultima autem humana felicitas consistit in intelligendo nobilissima intelligibilia, ut dicit philosophus in X Ethic. Non igitur ad intelligendum substantias separatas quae sunt nobilissima intelligibilia, secundum quod in hoc consistit felicitas humana, requiritur quod aliquis intelligat intelligibilia speculata omnia. Alio etiam modo apparet quod praedicta positio est contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicitur enim in I Ethic. quod felicitas consistit in operatione quae est secundum perfectam virtutem. Et ideo, ut appareat in quo determinate consistit felicitas, necesse habuit determinare de omnibus virtutibus, ut ipsemet dicit in fine I Ethic., quarum quaedam ponuntur ab ipso morales, ut fortitudo, temperantia, et huiusmodi; quaedam autem intellectuales, quae sunt quinque secundum ipsum, sapientia, intellectus, scientia, prudentia, et ars. Inter quas praecipuam ponit sapientiam, in cuius operatione dicit consistere ultimam felicitatem, ut in textu apparet. Sapientia autem est ipsa philosophia prima, ut patet in I Metaphys. Unde relinquitur quod ultima felicitas humana, quae potest haberi in hac vita, secundum intentionem Aristotelis, est cognitio de substantiis separatis, qualis potest haberi per principia philosophiae, et non per modum continuationis quam aliqui somniaverunt. It is likewise clear that this whole position is contrary to the meaning of the doctrine of Aristotle, who says in the Ethics [I, 9, 1099b 18] that happiness is a common good which all who are not deprived of virtue may possess. But to understand all those things which these theorists call intelligible objects-known is impossible for any man, or at least is so rare that in this life no man ever did in fact attain such understanding, except Christ Himself, who was both God and man. Hence it is impossible that such knowledge should be required for human happiness. Now the ultimate happiness of man consists in knowing the noblest intelligible objects, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics [X, 7, 1177a 20]. Thus it is not necessary for a man to know all intelligible objects-known in order to know those substances which are the noblest intelligibles, and in the knowledge of which human happiness consists. in another way this whole position is evidently contrary to the meaning of Aristotle’s doctrine. For it is said in Ethics [I, 13, 1102a 5] that happiness consists in acting in accordance with perfect virtue. So in order to show clearly and precisely what happiness actually consists in, Aristotle found it necessary, as he says near the end of the Ethics [I, 11-2a 5], to determine the nature of all the virtues. He maintains that some of these are moral virtues, such as fortitude, temperance, and the like; however, others are intellectual virtues, which he held to be five in number: wisdom, understanding, science, prudence, and art. He says that the chief of these is wisdom, and that ultimate happiness consists in the exercise of wisdom, as appears in his text. Moreover, it is clear from his Metaphysics [I, 2, 982b 7], that wisdom is First Philosophy itself. Hence it follows, according to Aristotle, that the ultimate human happiness which can be had in this life, consists in such knowledge of separate substances as can be acquired through the principles of philosophy, and not through any union [with an Agent Intellect] such as some have vainly imagined.
Unde fuit alia opinio, quod anima humana per principia philosophiae devenire potest ad intelligendum ipsas substantias separatas. Ad quod quidem ostendendum sic procedebat. Manifestum est enim quod anima humana potest abstrahere a rebus materialibus quidditates earum, et intelligere eas; hoc enim contingit quoties intelligimus de aliqua re materiali quid est. Si igitur illa quidditas abstracta non est quidditas pura, sed etiam res habens quidditatem, iterum intellectus noster potest abstrahere illam. Et, cum non possit procedere in infinitum, devenietur ad hoc quod intelligat aliquam simplicem quidditatem et per eius considerationem intellectus noster intelliget substantias separatas, quod nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam simplices quidditates. Wherefore there is another theory according to which the human soul can attain to an understanding of separate substances through the principles of philosophy. The upholders of this theory proceeded to demonstrate their position as follows. It is evident [they point out], that the human soul can abstract quiddities from material things and can apprehend them; for this is precisely what happens whenever we grasp what (quid est) a material thing is. Now if that abstracted quiddity is not a pure quiddity but is itself a thing having a quiddity, then even so the intellect must eventually succeed in grasping the simple quiddity itself alone, because it is impossible to go on to infinity in the process of abstraction. And by contemplating simply quiddities, our intellect is, in fact, understanding separate substances because the latter are themselves nothing else than simple quiddities.
Sed haec ratio omnino est insufficiens. Primo quidem, quia quidditates rerum materialium sunt alterius generis a quidditatibus separatis, et habent alium modum essendi. Unde per hoc quod intellectus noster intelligit quidditates rerum materialium, non sequitur quod intelligat quidditates separatas. Item diversae quidditates intellectae differunt specie; et inde est quod etiam qui intelligit quidditatem unius rei materialis, non intelligit quidditatem alterius. Non enim qui intelligit quid est lapis intelligit quid est animal. Unde, dato quod quidditates separatae essent eiusdem rationis cum quidditatibus materialibus, non sequeretur quod qui intelligit has quidditates rerum materialium, intelligeret substantias separatas; nisi forte secundum opinionem Platonis, qui posuit substantias separatas esse species horum sensibilium. However, this argument is entirely inadequate: first of all because the quiddities of material things are of a different order from separate quiddities and have a different mode of existing; so it does not follow that our intellect understands separate quiddities simply because it grasps the quiddities of material things. In the second place, the diverse quiddities apprehended by the intellect, themselves differ specifically, so that a person who apprehends the quiddity of one material thing does not thereby apprehend the quiddity of another; for example, to understand what “stone” is, is not to understand what “animal” is. Thus, even if we granted that separate quiddities are of the same formal character (ratio) as material quiddities, it would follow that one who understands the latter likewise understands the former, unless one happened to subscribe to Plato’s view that separate substances are the species of these sensible things.
Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod anima intellectiva humana ex unione ad corpus habet aspectum inclinatum ad phantasmata; unde non informatur ad intelligendum aliquid nisi per species a phantasmatibus acceptas. Et huic consonat dictum Dionysii in cap. I Cael. Hierar. Dicit enim quod impossibile est nobis lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum. In tantum igitur anima, dum est unita corpori, potest ad cognitionem substantiarum separatarum ascendere, in quantum potest per species a phantasmatibus acceptas manuduci. Hoc autem non est ut intelligatur de eis quid sint, cum illae substantiae excedant omnem proportionem horum intelligibilium, sed possumus hoc modo de substantiis separatis aliquo modo cognoscere quia sunt. Sicut per effectus deficientes devenimus in causas excellentes, ut cognoscamus de eis tantum quia sunt; et dum cognoscimus quia sunt causae excellentes, scimus de eis quia non sunt tales quales sunt earum effectus. Et hoc est scire de eis magis quid non sunt quam quid sunt. Et secundum hoc est aliqualiter verum quod, in quantum intelligimus quidditates quas abstrahimus a rebus materialibus, intellectus noster convertendo se ad illas quidditates potest intelligere substantias separatas, ut intelligat eas esse immateriales, sicut ipsae quidditates sunt a materia abstractae. Et sic per considerationem intellectus nostri deducimur in cognitionem substantiarum separatarum intelligibilium. Nec enim est mirum, si substantias separatas non possumus in hac vita cognoscere intelligendo quid sunt, sed quid non sunt; quia etiam quidditatem et naturam corporum caelestium non aliter cognoscere possumus. Et sic etiam Aristoteles notificat ea in I de caelo et mundo; scilicet ostendens quod non sunt gravia neque levia, neque generabilia neque corruptibilia, neque contrarietatem habentia. Consequently, in opposition to this doctrine, we must maintain that the intellectual soul of man, by being united to the body, has its vision turned toward phantasms, and is informed (informare) in its intellection only through species acquired from phantasms. This agrees with the statement of Dionysius in Book I of the De caelestia hierarchia [I, 2] for he says: “The divine light can shine upon us only when screened round about by many sacred veils.” Hence the soul, while united to the body, is capable of attaining a knowledge of separate substances only so far as it can be led thereto through species derived from phantasms. But in this way the soul will not attain quidditative knowledge of those substances, because their order of intelligibility transcends completely that of the intelligible species of material things abstracted from phantasms. However, we can in this way attain some [non-quidditative] knowledge of those separate substances, we can know that they exist (quia sunt); just as from lowly and deficient effects we proceed to lofty causes, but only to the extent that we know they exist. And while we know that these superior causes exist, at the same time we know that they are not of the same nature as their effects, and this knowledge consists in knowing what they are not, rather than what they are. Consequently it is true to say that, inasmuch as we grasp the quiddities which we abstract from material things, our intellect can, by turning to those quiddities, apprehend separate substances, so that it knows them to be immaterial, just as are the quiddities themselves which are abstracted from matter. Thus, thanks to the reflective power of our intellect, we are brought to a knowledge of intelligible separate substances. Nor is there cause for wonder if in this life we are incapable of knowing separate substances in their very essence, but can know only what they are not. For it is only in this way that we can know even the quiddity and nature of the celestial bodies. Thus in the De caelo et mundo [I, 10, 259b 5] Aristotle shows that the celestial bodies are neither heavy nor light, generable nor corruptible, nor subject to contrariety.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod finis ad quem se extendit naturalis possibilitas animae humanae, est ut cognoscat substantias separatas secundum modum praedictum; et ab hoc non impeditur per hoc quod corpori unitur. Et similiter etiam in tali cognitione substantiae separatae ultima est felicitas hominis ad quam per naturalia pervenire potest. 1. The end to which the natural power (possibilitas) of the human soul is directed is to know separate substances in the manner explained above [in the body of this article], and the soul is not prevented from attaining this end because of its union with the body. Nor does the ultimate happiness of man, so far as it can be attained by his natural powers (per naturalia), consists in such knowledge.
Unde patet solutio ad secundum. 2. Thus the answer to the second objection is evident.
Ad tertium dicendum quod cum intellectus possibilis continue reducatur de potentia in actum per hoc quod magis ac magis intelligit, finis tamen huiusmodi reductionis sive generationis erit in intelligendo supremum intelligibile, quod est divina essentia. Sed ad hoc non potest pervenire per naturalia, sed per gratiam tantum. 3. Although the possible intellect is continually being brought from potency to act by understanding more and more, nevertheless this reduction or generation will find its term in understanding the supremely intelligible object, namely, the divine essence. But the intellect cannot attain to this understanding by its natural powers, but only by grace.
Ad quartum dicendum quod difficilius est facere separata et intelligere, quam intelligere quae separata sunt, si de eisdem agatur; sed si de aliis non est necessarium. Quia maior potest esse difficultas in intelligendo tantum aliqua separata, quam in abstrahendo et in intelligendo alia. 4. It is more difficult to separate and to understand things [which are not separate] than it is to understand things which are separate, if it is a question of the same things. But in the case of different things, this is not necessarily so; for more difficulty may be experienced merely in understanding one separate thing than in abstracting and understanding others.
Ad quintum dicendum quod sensus respectu excellentium sensibilium duplicem defectum patitur: unum quidem, quia non potest ipsum comprehendere propter hoc quod excedit proportionem sensus; alium autem quia post excellentia sensibilia non percipit minora sensibilia, propter hoc quia corrumpitur organum sensus. Licet igitur intellectus non habeat organum quod possit corrumpi ab intelligibili excellenti, tamen aliquod excellens intelligibile potest excedere facultatem intellectus nostri in intelligendo. Et tale intellegibile est substantia separata, quae excedit facultatem intellectus nostri, qui secundum quod est unitus corpori, est natus perfici per species a phantasmatibus abstractas. Si tamen intellectus noster intelligeret substantias separatas, non intelligeret minus alia, sed magis. 5. With respect to sense objects of excessive intensity, a sensory power is subject to a twofold deficiency: one, in that such objects exceed the grasp of sense since they are out of proportion to its powers; another, in that, after the impact of such objects on the sense, the sense is incapable of perceiving sense-objects which are not as intense, because the sense organ has already been made inoperative (corrumpitur). Therefore, although the intellect does not have an organ which can be made inoperative by an intelligible object of great intensity, yet something supremely intelligible can exceed the intellective power of our intelligence. Such an object is a separate substance, which exceeds the ‘power of our intelligence, for our intelligence, inasmuch as it is united to the body, is naturally disposed to be actuated and perfected by species abstracted from phantasms. Nevertheless, if our intelligence did apprehend separate substances, it would have not less but greater understanding of other things.
Ad sextum dicendum quod quidditates abstractae a rebus materialibus non sufficiunt ut per eas possimus cognoscere de substantiis separatis quid sunt, ut ostensum est. 6. As was shown, the quiddities abstracted from material things do not suffice as means through which we can acquire quidditative knowledge of separate substances.
Et similiter dicendum ad septimum. Nam effectus deficientes, ut supra dictum est, non sufficiunt ut per eos cognoscatur de causa quid est. 7. The same answer applies to the seventh objection; for, as we have said above, effects that do not adequately reflect their causes do not suffice as means through which their causes can be known quidditatively.
Ad octavum dicendum quod intellectus possibilis noster intelligit seipsum non directe apprehendendo essentiam suam, sed per speciem a phantasmatibus acceptam. Unde philosophus dicit in III de anima quod intellectus possibilis est intelligibilis sicut et alia. Et hoc ideo est, quia nihil est intelligibile secundum quod est in potentia, sed secundum quod est actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaph. Unde, cum intellectus possibilis sit in potentia tantum in esse intelligibili, non potest intelligi nisi per formam suam per quam fit actu, quae est species a phantasmatibus abstracta; sicut et quaelibet alia res intelligitur per formam suam. Et hoc est commune in omnibus potentiis animae, quod actus cognoscuntur per obiecta, et potentiae per actus, et anima per suas potentias. Sic igitur et anima intellectiva per suum intelligere cognoscitur. Species autem a phantasmatibus accepta non est forma substantiae separatae ut per eam cognosci possit, sicut per eam aliqualiter cognoscitur intellectus possibilis. 8. Our possible intellect does not know itself directly by apprehending its own essence, but through a species abstracted from phantasms. For this reason the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 4, 429b 9] that the possible intellect is itself intelligible like other things. The reason for this is that nothing is intelligible so far as it is in potency, but only so far as it is in act, as is said in the Metaphysics [IX, 9, 1051a 30]. Hence, since the possible intellect is only in potency with respect to intelligible being, it can be known only through the form by which it is actuated, namely, by a species abstracted from phantasms; just as everything else is known through the form which it has. That acts are known through objects, powers through acts, and the soul through its powers, is indeed common to all the powers of the soul. So likewise the intellective soul is known through its own act of understanding. However, a species abstracted from phantasms is not the form of a separate substance through which that substance can be known, in the same way as the possible intellect is understood through that form.
Ad nonum dicendum quod ratio illa omnino inefficax est, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia intelligibilia non sunt propter intellectus intelligentes ipsa; sed magis intelligibilia sunt fines et perfectiones intellectuum. Unde non sequitur quod si esset aliqua substantia intelligibilis non intellecta ab aliquo alio intellectu, quod propter hoc esset frustra; nam frustra dicitur de eo quod est ad finem ad quem non pertingit. Secundo, quia si substantiae separatae non intelligantur ab intellectu nostro secundum quod est corpori unitus, intelliguntur tamen a substantiis separatis. 9. This argument is entirely ineffective for two reasons: first, because intelligibles do not exist in order that intellects may know them; they rather exist as the ends and perfections of intellects. Consequently, if an intelligible substance existed which was not actually known by any intellect other than itself, this substance would not for that reason exist in vain. For the expression in vain (frustra) is said of that which concerns the end that a thing fails to reach. Secondly, the argument of this objection is ineffective because, even if separate substances are not apprehended by our intellect while united to the body, yet they are apprehended by separate substances.
Ad decimum dicendum quod species quarum est visus receptivus, possunt esse similitudines quorumcumque corporum, sive corruptibilium, sive incorruptibilium. Sed species a phantasmatibus abstractae, quarum est receptivus intellectus possibilis, non sunt similitudines substantiarum separatarum; et ideo non est simile. 10. The species of which the power of sight is receptive can be the likenesses of any sort of body, whether corruptible or incorruptible. But species abstracted from phantasms, of which the possible intellect is receptive, are not likenesses of separate substances. Hence there is no ground for a comparison between these two cases.
ARTICLE 17
WHETHER THE SOUL, WHEN SEPARATED FROM THE BODY, CAN UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES

[Summa theol., I, q. 89, a. 2; Contra Gentiles, III, 45; Quodl. III, q. 9, a. 1.]
Decimoseptimo quaeritur utrum anima separata intelligat substantias separatas In the seventeenth article we examine this question: Whether the soul, when separated from the body, can understand separate substances.
Objections.
Et videtur quod non. Perfectioris enim substantiae est perfectior operatio. Sed anima unita corpori est perfectior quam separata, ut videtur: quia quaelibet pars perfectior est unita toti quam separata. Si igitur anima unita corpori non potest intelligere substantias separatas, videtur quod nec a corpore separata. 1. It seems that the separated soul cannot understand separate substances. For a more perfect operation is characteristic of a more perfect substance. Now the soul is more perfect when united to the body than when existing apart from it. This is evident, because every part of a whole is more perfect when united to the whole than when separated from it. Therefore, if the soul is unable to understand separate substances when it is actually joined to the body, it seems that the soul cannot understand these substances when it exists apart from the body.
Praeterea, anima nostra aut potest cognoscere substantias separatas per naturam, aut per gratiam tantum. Si per naturam, cum naturale sit animae quod corpori uniatur, non impediretur per unionem ad corpus quin substantias separatas cognosceret. Si autem per gratiam, cum non omnes animae separatae habeant gratiam, sequitur quod ad minus non omnes animae separatae cognoscant substantias separatas. 2. Further, our soul can know separate substances either by its nature or by grace alone. If it knows them by its own nature, then, since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, the soul is not prevented from knowing separate substances by being united to the body. However, if the soul knows them by grace alone, it follows that at least not all separated souls know separate substances, for not all souls existing apart from bodies possess grace.
Praeterea, anima unita est corpori, ut perficiatur in eo scientiis et virtutibus. Maxima autem perfectio animae consistit in cognitione substantiarum separatarum. Si igitur ex hoc solo quod separatur, cognosceret substantias separatas, frustra anima corpori uniretur. 3. Further, the soul is united to the body in order that the soul may be perfected therein by the sciences and the virtues. However, the greatest perfection of the soul consists in knowing separate substances. Therefore, if the soul understands separate substances in virtue of its separation alone, then the, soul is united to the body unnecessarily.
Praeterea, si anima separata cognoscit substantiam separatam, oportet quod cognoscat eam vel per essentiam eius vel per speciem ipsius. Sed non per essentiam substantiae separatae, quia essentia substantiae separatae non est unum cum anima separata. Similiter nec per speciem eius; quia a substantiis separatis, cum sint simplices, non potest fieri abstractio speciei. Ergo anima separata nullo modo cognoscit substantias separatas. 4. Further, if the soul, when separated from the body, knows a separate substance, it must know such a substance either through that substance’s essence, or through a species of it. But the soul does not know a separate substance through its essence, because the essence of a separate substance is not the same as that of a separated soul. Similarly, the soul cannot know a separate substance through a species of such a substance, for no species can be abstracted by the soul from separate substances, because they, are simple. Consequently, when the soul exists apart from the body, it can in no way know separate substances.
Praeterea, si anima separata cognoscit substantiam separatam, aut cognoscit eam sensu, aut intellectu. Manifestum est autem quod non cognoscit eam sensu, quia substantiae separatae non sunt sensibiles. Similiter etiam nec per intellectum, quia intellectus non est singularium; substantiae autem separatae sunt quaedam substantiae singulares. Ergo anima separata nullo modo cognoscit substantiam separatam. 5. Further, if the soul, existing in separation from the body, knows a separate substance, the soul apprehends that substance either by its senses or by its intellect. Now it is obvious that the soul does not apprehend a separate substance by its senses, because separate substances are not sensible things. Neither are separate substances apprehended by the soul’s intellect, because its intellect does not know singulars, and separate substances are singular substances. Therefore the soul, existing apart from the body, can in no way understand separate substances.
Praeterea, intellectus possibilis animae nostrae plus distat ab Angelo quam imaginatio nostra ab intellectu possibili; quia imaginatio et intellectus possibilis radicantur in eadem substantia animae. Sed imaginatio nullo modo potest intelligere intellectum possibilem. Ergo intellectus possibilis noster nullo modo potest apprehendere substantiam separatam. 6. Further, our possible intellect differs from an angel to a greater degree than our imagination does from our possible intellect, because our imagination and possible intellect are rooted in one and the same substance of the soul. Now our imagination can in no way understand our possible intellect. Consequently our possible intellect can in no way apprehend a separate substance.
Praeterea, sicut se habet voluntas ad bonum, ita intellectus ad verum. Sed voluntas quarumdam animarum separatarum, scilicet damnatarum, non potest ordinari ad bonum. Ergo et intellectus earum nullo modo potest ordinari ad verum; quod potissime intellectus consequitur in cognitione substantiae separatae. Ergo non omnis anima separata potest cognoscere substantiam separatam. 7. Further, as our will is ordered to good, so is our intellect ordered to truth. But the will of some separated souls, namely, those of the damned, cannot be ordered to good. Therefore neither can their intellect in any way be ordered to truth which the intellect itself pursues above all else in its knowledge of a separate substance. Therefore not every separated soul can know a separate substance.
Praeterea, felicitas ultima secundum philosophos ponitur in intelligendo substantias separatas, ut dictum est. Si autem animae damnatorum intelligunt substantias separatas, quas non possumus hic intelligere, videtur quod damnati sint propinquiores felicitati quam nos; quod est inconveniens. 8. Further, as we have pointed out already, ultimate happiness, according to the philosophers, is thought to consist in the knowledge of separate substances. Now if the souls of the damned understand separate substances, which we here on earth cannot understand, it seems that the damned are nearer to happiness than we are. This is incongruous.
Praeterea, una intelligentia intelligit aliam per modum suae substantiae, ut dicitur in libro de causis. Sed anima separata non potest cognoscere suam substantiam, ut videtur; quia intellectus possibilis non cognoscit seipsum, nisi per speciem a phantasmatibus abstractam vel acceptam, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo anima separata non potest cognoscere separatas substantias. 9. Further, one intelligence knows another through knowing its own essence, as is pointed out in the work De causis [VIII]. Now apparently the separated soul cannot know its own essence, because the possible intellect can know itself only through species abstracted from phantasms, as is stated in the De anima [III, 8, 432a 6]. Consequently the separated soul cannot know separate substances.
Praeterea, duplex est modus cognoscendi. Unus modus secundum quem a posterioribus devenimus in priora; et sic quae sunt magis nota simpliciter, cognoscuntur a nobis per ea quae sunt minus nota simpliciter. Alio modo a prioribus in posteriora devenimus; et sic quae sunt magis nota simpliciter, prius cognoscuntur a nobis. In animabus autem separatis non potest esse primus modus cognoscendi. Ille enim modus competit nobis secundum quod cognitionem a sensu accipimus. Ergo anima separata intelligit modo secundo, scilicet deveniendo a prioribus in posteriora. Et sic quae sunt magis nota simpliciter, sunt per prius ei nota. Sed maxime notum est essentia divina. Si igitur anima separata naturaliter cognoscit substantias separatas, videtur quod ex solis naturalibus possit videre essentiam divinam, quae est vita aeterna; et hoc est contra apostolum, qui dicit Rom. VI: gratia Dei vita aeterna. 10. Further, there are two ways of acquiring knowledge: first, by proceeding from what is subsequent to what is prior, and thus things which are better known absolutely (simpliciter) are known by us through those things which are less known absolutely. Secondly, by proceeding from what is prior to what is subsequent, and thus things which are better known absolutely are known first by us. Now the first manner of knowing cannot be found in souls existing apart from bodies for that manner of knowing is proper to us so far as we derive our knowledge from the senses. Consequently the separated soul understands in the second manner, namely, by proceeding from what is prior to what is subsequent; and then those things which are better known absolutely are known first by the soul. But that which is best known is the divine essence. Therefore, if the separated soul knows separate substances by its nature, it seems that it can grasp the divine essence, which is life eternal, through natural things alone. This is contrary to the Apostle, who says: “The grace of God is life eternal” (Rom. 4:23).
Praeterea inferior substantia separata intelligit aliam, secundum quod impressio superioris est in inferiori. Sed impressio substantiae separatae est in anima separata multum deficienter a substantia separata. Ergo non potest eam intelligere. 11. Further, a separate substance of an inferior order understands another separate substance of a higher order by reason of the fact that an impression of the superior substance is present in the inferior one. But the impression of a separate substance is present in the separated soul in a much more imperfect way than it is in the separate substance itself. Therefore the separated soul cannot understand a separate substance.
Sed contra, simile a simili cognoscitur. Sed anima separata est substantia separata. Ergo potest intelligere substantias separatas. On the contrary, like things are known by like. Now the separated soul is a separate substance. Consequently it can understand separate substances.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod secundum ea quae fides tenet, convenienter videtur dicendum quod animae separatae cognoscant substantias separatas. Substantiae enim separatae dicuntur Angeli et Daemones, in quorum societatem deputantur animae hominum separatae, bonorum vel malorum. Non videtur autem probabile quod animae damnatorum Daemones ignorent, quorum societati deputantur, et qui animabus terribiles esse dicuntur. Multo autem minus probabile videtur quod animae bonorum ignorent Angelos, quorum societate laetantur. I answer: In view of the things held by faith, it is seen that we must truly maintain that separated souls know separate substances. For the separate substances, to whose society the separated souls of men both good and bad are allotted, are called angels and demons. Now it does not seem credible that the souls of the damned do not know the demons whose society they share, and who are said to terrify the souls. Again, it seems even less likely that the souls of the good do not know the angels whose society they enjoy.
Hoc autem quod animae separatae substantias separatas ubicumque cognoscant, rationabiliter accidit. Manifestum est enim quod anima humana corpori unita aspectum habet ex unione corporis ad inferiora directum; unde non perficitur nisi per ea quae ab inferioribus accipit, scilicet per species a phantasmatibus abstractas. Unde neque in cognitionem sui ipsius neque in cognitionem aliorum potest devenire, nisi in quantum ex praedictis speciebus manuducitur, ut supra dictum est. Moreover, the fact that souls existing apart from bodies know separate substances wherever they may be, is in accord with reason. For it is clear that the human soul, when joined to the body, has a direct knowledge of inferior things because of its union with the body. Wherefore the soul is perfected only by what it receives from inferior things, namely, by species abstracted from phantasms. Consequently the soul can acquire a knowledge of itself, and of other things, only inasmuch as it is led thereto through the aforementioned species, as was explained above (Art. 16).
Sed quando iam anima erit a corpore separata, aspectus eius non ordinabitur ad aliqua inferiora, ut ab eis accipiat; sed erit absolutus, potens a superioribus substantiis influentiam recipere sine inspectione phantasmatum, quae tunc omnino non erunt, et per huiusmodi influentiam reducetur in actum. Et sic seipsam cognoscet directe suam essentiam intuendo, et non a posteriori, sicut nunc accidit. Sua autem essentia pertinet ad genus substantiarum separatarum intellectualium, et eumdem modum subsistendi habet, licet sit infima in hoc genere; omnes enim sunt formae subsistentes. Sicut igitur una aliquarum aliarum substantiarum separatarum cognoscit aliam intuendo substantiam suam, in quantum in ea est aliqua similitudo alterius substantiae cognoscendae, per hoc quod recipit influentiam ab ipsa vel ab aliqua altiori substantia, quae est communis causa utriusque; ita etiam anima separata intuendo directe essentiam suam cognoscet substantias separatas secundum influentiam receptam ab eis vel a superiori causa, scilicet Deo. However, when the soul really will be separated from the body, its vision will not be directed toward inferior beings in order, to receive species therefrom, rather will it be independent and capable of receiving infused species from superior substances without turning to phantasms which will then be wholly non-existent. The soul will be actuated by infused species of this kind and thus will know itself directly by understanding its own essence, and not in an a posteriori fashion as it does in its present state. Moreover, by its essence the soul belongs to the genus of separate intellectual substances, although it is the lowest in this genus, and possesses the same mode of subsisting; for every separate substance is a subsisting form. Therefore, just as one separate substance knows another by immediately understanding (intuendo) its own essence, inasmuch as there is in its own essence some likeness of the other substance which it knows (either because it receives infused species from that substance, or from a superior one that is the common cause of both of them), so also does the separated soul, by immediately understanding its own essence, know separate substances by reason of the infused species received from them, or from the highest cause, namely, God.
Non tamen ita perfecte cognoscet substantias separatas naturali cognitione, sicut ipsae cognoscunt se invicem; eo quod anima est infima inter eas, et infimo modo recipit intelligibilis luminis emanationem. However, the soul does not by its natural knowledge understand separate substances as perfectly as they understand themselves, because the soul is the most inferior of all intelligences, and receives the emanation of intelligible light in the least degree.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima unita corpori est quodammodo perfectior quam separata, scilicet quantum ad naturam speciei. Sed quantum ad actum intelligibilem habet aliquam perfectionem a corpore separata, quam habere non potest dum est corpori unita. Nec hoc est inconveniens: quia operatio intellectualis competit animae secundum quod supergreditur corporis proportionem; intellectus enim non est actus alicuius organi corporalis. 1. When the soul is united to the body, it is in a certain respect more perfect than when it is separated from the body.” However, with respect to its act of understanding, the soul has a certain perfection, when separated from the body, which it cannot have while united to the body. Nor is this incongruous, because intellectual operation is proper to the soul inasmuch as it surpasses the capacity (proportionem) of the body, for the intellect is not the act of any bodily organ.
Ad secundum dicendum quod loquimur de cognitione animae separatae quae sibi per naturam competit; nam loquendo de cognitione quae sibi dabitur per gratiam, aequabitur Angelis in cognoscendo. Haec autem cognitio, ut cognoscat praedicto modo substantias separatas, est sibi naturalis, non simpliciter, sed in quantum est separata. Unde in quantum est unita, non competit sibi. 2. We are speaking here of that knowledge of the separated souls which belongs to them by their nature; for when we speak of the knowledge which ‘ is given to them by grace, they are equal to the angels in knowing. Moreover, this knowledge whereby the soul knows separate substances in the aforesaid way [i.e., through an influx from separated substances], is not natural to the soul absolutely, but inasmuch as it is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is not capable of this knowledge inasmuch as it is united to the body.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ultima perfectio cognitionis naturalis animae humanae haec est, ut intelligat substantias separatas. Sed perfectius ad hanc cognitionem habendam pervenire potest per hoc quod in corpore est, quia ad hoc disponitur per studium, et maxime per meritum. Unde non frustra corpori unitur. 3. The highest perfection of the human soul’s knowledge consists in understanding separate substances. But it can obtain possession of this knowledge more perfectly by being united to the body, because it is disposed to this end by study and particularly by merit. Consequently it is not united to the body unnecessarily.
Ad quartum dicendum quod anima separata non cognoscit substantiam separatam per essentiam eius, sed ipsius speciem et similitudinem. Sciendum tamen est quod non semper species per quam aliquid cognoscitur est abstracta a re, quae per ipsam cognoscitur; sed tunc solum quando cognoscens accipit speciem a re. Et tunc haec species accepta est simplicior et immaterialior in cognoscente quam in re quae cognoscitur. Si autem fuerit e contrario, scilicet quod res cognita immaterialior sit et simplicior quam cognoscens, tunc species rei cognitae in cognoscente non dicitur abstracta, sed impressa et influxa. Et sic est in proposito. 4. When the soul is separated from the body, it does not know a separate substance through the essence of such a substance, but through a species and likeness of it. Moreover it must be observed that a species through which something is known is not always abstracted from the thing that is known through that species, but only when the knower receives the species from the thing itself. When this is the case the species is received in a simpler and more immaterial way in the knower than it is in the thing that is known through it. Indeed, if the opposite were true, namely, that the thing known is more immaterial and simpler than the knower, then the species of the thing known in the knower is not said to be abstracted, but to be impressed and infused. This is the way it is considered in this argument.
Ad quintum dicendum quod singulare non repugnat cognitioni intellectus nostri, nisi in quantum individuatur per hanc materiam. Species enim intellectus nostri oportet esse a materia abstractas. Si vero fuerint aliqua singularia in quibus natura speciei non individuetur per materiam, sed unumquodque eorum sit quaedam natura speciei immaterialiter subsistens, unumquodque eorum per se intelligibile erit. Et huiusmodi singularia sunt substantiae separatae. 5. To know a singular is incompatible with our intellectual cognition only inasmuch as the singular is individuated by this matter; for our intelligible species must be abstracted from matter. Indeed, if any singulars exist in which the nature of the species is not individuated by matter, but each is a certain nature whose species subsists immaterially, each of them will be intelligible in virtue of its own nature. Separate substances are singulars of this specific type.
Ad sextum dicendum quod imaginatio et intellectus possibilis humanus magis conveniunt subiecto, quam intellectus possibilis humanus et intellectus angelicus; qui tamen plus conveniunt specie et ratione, cum utrumque eorum pertineat ad esse intelligibile. Actio enim consequitur formam secundum naturam suae speciei, et non ex parte subiecti. Unde quantum ad convenientiam in actione magis attendenda est convenientia duarum formarum eiusdem speciei in diversis substantiis, quam formarum differentium specie in eodem subiecto. 6. An imagination and a human possible intellect are more appropriate to the human subject than a human possible intellect and an angelic intellect. However, these are more in keeping with the species and nature (ratio), because both of these belong to a thing having an intellective mode of existing. Moreover, an action is the natural effect of the form according to the nature of its species, and not of the subject itself. Therefore, so far as conformity of action is concerned, more attention must be paid to the conformity of two forms that are specifically the same existing in different substances, than to the conformity of specifically different forms existing in the same subject.
Ad septimum dicendum quod damnati sunt deordinati ab ultimo fine; unde voluntas eorum non est in bonum, secundum hunc ordinem. Tendit tamen in aliquod bonum, quia etiam Daemones, ut dicit Dionysius, bonum et optimum concupiscunt, vivere, esse, et intelligere; sed hoc bonum non ordinant in summum bonum, et ideo voluntas eorum perversa est. Unde et nihil prohibet quin animae damnatorum multa vera intelligant; sed non illud primum verum, scilicet Deum, cuius visione efficiantur beati. 7. The damned are diverted from their ultimate end, and for this reason their wills do not tend to a good in keeping with this order [to the ultimate end]. Moreover, their wills do tend toward some good, because even the demons, as Dionysius says [De div. nom., IV, 23], desire what is good and best, to live, to exist, and to understand; but this good is not ordered to the highest good, and hence their wills are perverse. Therefore nothing prevents the souls of the damned from understanding many truths, but they do not understand the First Truth, namely, God, the vision of whom causes happiness.
Ad octavum dicendum quod felicitas ultima hominis non consistit in cognitione alicuius creaturae, sed solum in cognitione Dei. Unde dicit Augustinus in libro confessionum: beatus est qui te novit, etiam si illa nesciat, scilicet creaturas; infelix autem, si illa sciat, te autem ignoret. Qui autem te et illa novit, non propter illa beatior, sed propter te solum beatus. Licet ergo damnati aliqua sciant quae nos nescimus, sunt tamen a vera beatitudine remotiores quam nos, qui ad eam possumus pervenire, illi autem non possunt. 8. The ultimate happiness of man does not consist in knowing any created thing, but in knowing God alone; wherefore Augustine says, in his Confessions: “Happy is he who knows you, though he does not know not these,” namely, creatures; “but unhappy is he who knows these and does not know you. And whoever knows both you and them, is not the happier for them but for you only” [V, 4]. Therefore, although the damned know some of the things that we know, nevertheless they are much farther away from true happiness than we are, for we can attain it whereas they are unable to do so.
Ad nonum dicendum quod anima humana alio modo cognoscet seipsam cum fuerit separata; et alio modo nunc, ut dictum est. 9. The human soul will know itself in one way when it will be separated from the body, and in another way when it is united to the body, as we have explained above (Art. 15).
Ad decimum dicendum quod animae separatae licet competat ille modus cognoscendi quo ea quae sunt notiora simpliciter magis cognoscit, non tamen sequitur quod vel anima separata vel quaecumque alia substantia separata creata, per sua naturalia et per suam essentiam possit intueri Deum. Sicut enim substantiae separatae alterius modi esse habent quam substantiae materiales, ita Deus alterius modi esse habet quam omnes substantiae separatae. In rebus enim materialibus tria est considerare, quorum nullum est aliud: scilicet individuum, naturam speciei et esse. Non enim possumus dicere quod hic homo sit sua humanitas, quia humanitas consistit tantum in speciei principiis; sed hic homo supra principia speciei addit principia individuantia, secundum quod natura speciei in hac materia recipitur et individuatur. Similiter etiam nec humanitas est ipsum esse hominis. In substantiis autem separatis, quia immateriales sunt, natura speciei non recipitur in aliqua materia individuante, sed est ipsa natura per se subsistens. Unde non est in eis aliud habens quidditatem, et aliud quidditas ipsa. Sed tamen aliud est in eis esse, et aliud quidditas. Deus autem est ipsum suum esse subsistens. Unde, sicut cognoscendo quidditates materiales non possumus cognoscere substantias separatas, ita nec substantiae separatae per cognitionem suae substantiae possunt cognoscere divinam essentiam. 10. Although that mode of knowing by which the soul knows better the things which are better known in themselves, is proper to the separated soul, nevertheless it does not follow that the separated soul, or any other created separate substance, through its own nature and essence, can understand God; for just as separate substances possess a more excellent mode of existing -than material substances do, so does God possess a more excellent mode of existing than all separate substances. For in material beings three things have to be taken into consideration, no one of which is the same as the others; namely, the individual, the specific nature, and the act of existing (esse). For we cannot say that this man is his humanity, because humanity is comprised only of the principles of the species; but this man adds individuating principles over and above the principles of the species inasmuch as the nature of the species is received and individuated in this matter. Likewise humanity is not a man’s act of existing. However, in separate substances the nature of the species is not received in any individuating matter, because separate substances are immaterial, but the nature of the species is the nature itself subsisting in virtue of itself. Consequently in them the thing having a quiddity and the quiddity itself are one and the same, although their act of existing and quiddity differ from each other.” Only God is His own subsisting act of existing. Therefore, as we cannot know separate substances by knowing material quiddities, neither can separate substances know the divine essence by knowing their own substance.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod per hoc quod impressiones substantiarum separatarum in anima separata deficienter recipiuntur, non sequitur quod nullo modo eas cognoscere possint, sed quod imperfecte eas cognoscant. 11. It does not follow, because the impressions of separate substances are received in the separated soul in an imperfect way, that separated souls cannot know separate substances, but only that they know them imperfectly.
ARTICLE 18
WHETHER THE SOUL, WHEN SEPARATED FROM THE BODY, KNOWS ALL NATURAL THINGS

[Summa theol., I, q.89, a.3; Contra Gentiles, II, 101; De verit., q. 8, a. 4.]
Decimoctavo quaeritur utrum anima separata cognoscat omnia naturalia In the eighteenth article we examine this question: Whether the soul, when separated from the body, knows all natural things.
Objections.
Et videtur quod non. Quia sicut dicit Augustinus, Daemones multa cognoscunt per experientiam longi temporis; quam quidem non habet anima, mox cum fuerit separata. Cum igitur Daemon sit perspicacioris intellectus quam anima, quia data naturalia in eis manent clara et lucida, ut Dionysius dicit; videtur quod anima separata non cognoscat omnia naturalia. 1. It seems that the soul does not understand all natural things when it exists apart from the body. For, as Augustine says [De divinat. daemon., III], the demons know many things through experience over a long time, experience which the soul does not possess as soon as it is separated from the body. Therefore, since the demon possesses a more penetrating intelligence than the soul, because the natural gifts of the demons remain clear and lucid, as Dionysius says [De div. nom., IV, 23], it seems that the soul does not know all natural things when it exists in separation from the body.
Praeterea, animae, cum sunt unitae corporibus, non cognoscunt omnia naturalia. Si igitur separatae a corporibus omnia naturalia cognoscunt, videtur quod post separationem huiusmodi scientiam acquirant. Sed aliquae animae aliquorum naturalium in hac vita scientiam acquisierunt. Ergo illorum eorumdem post separationem habebunt duplicem scientiam; unam acquisitam hic et aliam ibi. Quod videtur impossibile, quia duae formae eiusdem speciei non sunt in eodem subiecto. 2. Further, the souls of men, when united to their bodies, do not know all natural things. Therefore, if souls existing in separation from bodies know all natural things, it seems that they acquire this knowledge after their separation from the body. But some souls acquire a knowledge of some natural things in this life. Consequently after separation from their bodies, these souls will possess a twofold knowledge of the same things: one acquired in this life, another, when they exist apart from the body. This seems impossible, for two forms of the same species do not exist in the same subject.
Praeterea, nulla virtus finita potest super infinita. Sed virtus animae separatae est finita, quia et essentia eius finita est. Ergo non potest super infinita. Sed naturalia intellecta sunt infinita; nam species numerorum et figurarum et proportionum infinitae sunt. Ergo anima separata non cognoscit omnia naturalia. 3. Further, no finite power (virtus) can extend to infinite things. Now the power of the separated soul is finite, because its essence is finite. Therefore it cannot extend to infinite things. But natural things known by the soul are infinite, for example, the various kinds of numbers, figures, and proportions. Therefore the separated soul does not know all natural things.
Praeterea, omnis cognitio est per assimilationem cognoscentis et cogniti. Sed impossibile videtur esse quod anima separata, cum sit immaterialis, assimiletur naturalibus, cum sint materialia. Ergo impossibile videtur quod anima naturalia cognoscat. 4. Further, every cognition is brought about by the one knowing becoming like the thing known. Now it seems impossible for the separated soul to become like natural things, because they are material, whereas it is itself immaterial. Consequently it does not seem possible that the soul can know all natural things.
Praeterea, intellectus possibilis se habet in ordine intelligibilium sicut materia prima in ordine sensibilium. Sed materia prima secundum unum ordinem non est receptiva nisi unius formae. Ergo cum intellectus possibilis separatus non habeat nisi unum ordinem, cum non trahatur ad diversa per sensus, videtur quod non possit recipere nisi unam formam intelligibilem; et ita non potest cognoscere omnia naturalia, sed unum tantum. 5. Further, the possible intellect stands in the same relation to intelligible things as prime matter does to sensible things. But prime matter receives only one form at a time. Therefore, since the possible intellect, when it exists apart from the body, has only one order [of objects], because in that state it is not attracted to different things by the senses, it seems that the possible intellect is capable of receiving only one intelligible form, and thus of knowing only one natural thing instead of all natural things.
Praeterea, ea quae sunt diversarum specierum, non possunt esse uni et eidem similia secundum speciem. Cognitio autem fit per assimilationem speciei. Ergo una anima separata non potest cognoscere omnia naturalia, cum sint specie diversa. 6. Further, things belonging to different species cannot be like one and the same thing so far as species is concerned. But cognition is brought about by one thing becoming like another so far as species is concerned. Therefore one separated soul cannot know all natural things, since they are specifically diverse.
Praeterea, si animae separatae cognoscunt omnia naturalia, oportet quod habeant in se formas quae sunt similitudines rerum naturalium. Aut igitur quantum ad genera et species tantum; et sic non cognoscent individua, et per consequens nec omnia naturalia, quia individua maxime videntur esse in natura. Vel etiam quantum ad individua; et sic, cum individua sint infinita, sequitur quod in anima separata sint similitudines infinitae. Quod videtur impossibile. Non igitur anima separata cognoscit omnia naturalia. 7. Further, if separated souls know all natural things, they must have in themselves forms which are the likenesses of natural things. Now knowledge of this kind extends either to genera and species alone [or to individuals as well]. In the first case, separated souls will not know individuals, and hence will fail to know all natural things, since individuals above all are seen to exist in reality. In the second case, since individuals are infinite in number, it would follow that an infinite number of likenesses exists in the separated soul. This seems impossible. Therefore the separated soul does not know all natural things.
Sed dicebat, quod in anima separata sunt tantum similitudines generum et specierum; sed applicando eas ad singularia potest singularia cognoscere. &8212;Sed contra, intellectus universalem cognitionem, quam habet penes se, non potest applicare nisi ad particularia quae iam novit. Si enim scio quod omnis mula est sterilis, non possum applicare nisi ad hanc mulam quam cognosco. Cognitio enim particularis praecedit naturalem applicationem universalis ad particulare. Non enim applicatio huiusmodi potest esse causa cognitionis particularium. Et sic particularia animae separatae remanebunt ignota. 8. It has been said, however, that only the likenesses of genera and species exist in the separated soul, and that by applying these to singulars it is enabled to apprehend singulars. On the contrary, the intellect can apply the universal knowledge which it has in its possession, only to the particulars which it now knows. For if I know that every [female] mule is sterile, I can apply this knowledge only to this particular mule which I know. Now knowledge of the particular precedes the natural application of the universal to the particular; for an application of this sort cannot be the cause of our knowledge of particulars. Consequently particulars will remain unknown to the soul when it is separated from the body.
Praeterea, ubicumque est cognitio ibi est aliquis ordo cognoscentis ad cognitum. Sed animae damnatorum non habent aliquem ordinem; dicitur enim Iob X, quod ibi, scilicet in Inferno, nullus ordo, sed sempiternus horror inhabitat. Ergo ad minus animae damnatorum non cognoscent naturalia. 9. Further, wherever knowledge exists, there is found a certain order of the knower to the thing known. Now the souls of the damned do not have any order; for it is said that “there,” i.e., in hell, “no order dwells, but eternal horror” (Job 15:22). Therefore the souls of the damned, at least, do not know natural things.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in libro de cura pro mortuis gerenda quod animae mortuorum ea quae hic fiunt, omnino scire non possunt. Naturalia autem sunt quae hic fiunt. Ergo animae mortuorum non habent cognitionem naturalium. 10. Further, Augustine says [De cura pro mort., 13] that the souls of the dead can have absolutely no knowledge of things that come to pass here below. But natural things are things that come to pass here below. Therefore the souls of the dead have no knowledge of natural things.
Praeterea, omne quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum per id quod est in actu. Manifestum est autem quod anima humana quamdiu est corpori unita, est in potentia respectu vel omnium, vel plurimorum quae naturaliter sciri possunt; non enim omnia scit actu. Ergo si post separationem scit omnia naturalia, oportet quod per aliquid reducatur in actum. Hoc autem non videtur esse nisi intellectus agens, quo est omnia facere. Sed per intellectum agentem non potest reduci in actum omnium intelligibilium, quae non intellexit. Comparat enim philosophus in III de anima intellectum agentem lumini, phantasmata vero coloribus. Lumen autem non sufficit ad faciendum visum in actu omnium visibilium, nisi et colores adsint. Ergo nec intellectus agens poterit facere intellectum possibilem actu respectu omnium intelligibilium, cum phantasmata adesse non possint animae separatae, cum sint in organis corporeis. 11. Further, everything that exists potentially is actualized by that which exists actually. However, it is evident that, so long as it remains united to the body, the human soul is in potency with respect either to all things, or at least to most of the things which can be known naturally, for the intellect does not know all things actually. Therefore if, after its separation from the body, the soul knows all natural things, it must be actuated by something. Now this is apparently none other than the agent intellect, “by which all things are made,” as is said in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 15]. But the agent intellect cannot actualize the soul with respect to all those intelligibles which it did not apprehend. Thus the Philosopher, in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 15; 7, 431a 14], compares the agent intellect to light, and phantasms to colors. Now light does not suffice to make all visible things actually visible unless colors be present also. Therefore neither will the agent intellect be able to actuate the possible intellect with respect to all intelligibles, for, since phantasms reside in bodily organs, they cannot be present to the separated soul.
Sed dicebat quod non reducitur in actum omnium naturaliter scibilium per intellectum agentem, sed per aliquam superiorem substantiam. &8212;Sed contra quandocumque aliquid reducitur in actum per agens extraneum quod non est sui generis, talis reductio non est naturalis. Sicut si aliquod sanabile sanetur per artem vel per virtutem divinam, erit sanatio artificialis et miraculosa; non autem naturalis, nisi quando sanatio fit per principium intrinsecum. Proprium autem agens et connaturale respectu intellectus possibilis humani, est intellectus agens. Si igitur intellectus possibilis reducatur in actum per aliquod superius agens et non per intellectum agentem, non erit cognitio naturalis de qua nunc loquimur. Et sic non aderit omnibus animabus separatis, cum in solis naturalibus omnes animae separatae conveniant. 12. But it has been said that, so far as all naturally knowable things are concerned, the soul is not actuated by an agent intellect, but by some higher substance. On the other hand, whenever a thing is actuated by an external agent differing generically from itself, such actuation is not natural. Thus if something curable is cured by art or by divine power, the cure will be either artificial [i.e., a work of medical art] or miraculous; however, a cure will be natural only when it is effected through an intrinsic principle. Now the proper and connatural agent so far as the possible intellect of man is concerned, is the agent intellect. Therefore, if the possible intellect is not actuated by an agent intellect but by some higher agent, then the natural knowledge, of which we have been speaking, Will not exist. Hence no such knowledge will be had by all separated souls in common, because it is only with respect to natural things that all separated souls are united.
Praeterea, si anima separata reducatur in actum omnium naturaliter intelligibilium, aut hoc erit a Deo, aut ab Angelo. Non autem ab Angelo, ut videtur; quia Angelus non est causa naturae ipsius animae. Unde nec naturalis animae cognitio videtur esse per actionem Angeli. Similiter etiam inconveniens videtur quod animae damnatorum a Deo recipiant tantam perfectionem post mortem ut cognoscant omnia naturalia. Nullo igitur modo videtur quod animae separatae omnia naturalia cognoscant. 13. Further, if the separated soul is actuated with respect to all naturally intelligible objects, the actualizing agent must either be God or an angel. Now apparently it cannot be an angel, because an angel is not the cause of the nature itself of the soul; hence the natural knowledge of the soul does not seem to be attributable to the action of an angel. Likewise it would appear incongruous if the souls of the damned received from God, after death, such great perfection that they were cognizant of all natural things. Therefore it seems that separated souls do not in any way know all natural things.
Praeterea, ultima perfectio uniuscuiusque existentis in potentia est ut reducatur in actum, quantum ad omnia secundum quod est in potentia. Sed intellectus possibilis humanus non est in potentia naturali nisi omnium intelligibilium naturalium, id est quae naturali cognitione intelligi possunt. Si ergo anima separata intelligit omnia naturalia, videtur quod omnis substantia separata ex sola separatione habeat ultimam suam perfectionem, quae est felicitas. Frustra igitur sunt alia adminicula ad felicitatem consequendam adhibita, si sola separatio a corpore, hoc animae praestare potest; quod videtur inconveniens. 14. Further, the ultimate perfection of everything existing in potency lies in this, that it be actualized with respect to all those things to which it is in potency. But man’s possible intellect is in a state of natural potency only with respect to all natural intelligible objects, that is to say, all those things which it is capable of knowing by natural cognition. Therefore, if the separated soul apprehends all natural things, then apparently every separate substance, simply because of the separate existence which it enjoys, truly possesses its own ultimate perfection, namely, happiness. Therefore, if mere separation from the body suffices to confer this perfection upon the soul, then the other helps employed in the effort to attain happiness exist to no purpose. This seems incongruous.
Praeterea, ad scientiam sequitur delectatio. Si igitur animae omnes separatae cognoscunt omnia naturalia, videtur quod animae damnatorum maximo gaudio perfruantur; quod videtur inconveniens. 15. Further, delight follows upon knowledge. Therefore, if all separated souls know all natural things, it seems that the souls of the damned enjoy that knowledge thoroughly, taking the greatest delight therein. This seems incongruous.
Praeterea, super illud Is., LXIII: Abraham nescivit nos, dicit Glossa: nesciunt mortui, etiam sancti, quid agunt vivi, etiam eorum filii. Sed ea quae inter vivos hic aguntur, sunt naturalia. Ergo animae separatae non cognoscunt omnia naturalia. 16. Further, the Gloss on the text in Isaiah (63: 16), “Abraham did not know us,” reads: “The dead, even the saints, are ignorant of what the living do; they know not even what their own children do.” But the things that are done among the living are natural things. Therefore separated souls do not know all natural things.
Sed contra. Arguments against the conclusions of these objections:
Anima separata intelligit substantias separatas. Sed in substantiis separatis sunt species omnium naturalium. Ergo anima separata cognoscit omnia naturalia. 1. The separated soul apprehends separate substances. But the species of all natural things are found in separate substances. Therefore the separated soul does know all natural things.
Sed dicebat quod non est necessarium quod qui videt substantiam separatam, videat omnes species in intellectu eius existentes. &8212;Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit: quid est quod non videant qui videntem omnia vident? Videntes igitur Deum vident omnia ea quae Deus videt. Ergo eadem ratione et videntes Angelos vident ea quae Angeli vident. 2. It may be said, however, that he who sees a separate substance need not see all the species existing in its intellect. On the contrary, there is Gregory’s saying: “What is there that they, who see Him who sees all things, may not themselves see?” [Dial., IV, 33; XII, 13]. Thus they who see God see all the things that God sees. For the same reason, therefore, those who see the angels see those things that the angels see.
Praeterea, anima separata cognoscit substantiam separatam, in quantum est intelligibilis; non enim videt eam visu corporeo. Sed sicut est intelligibilis substantia separata, ita et species in intellectu eius existens. Ergo anima separata non solum intelligit substantiam separatam, sed etiam species intelligibiles in ipsa existentes. 3. Further, the separated soul knows a separate substance so far as the latter is intelligible; for it does not see that substance by corporeal vision. But as the separate substance is intelligible, so also is a species existing in the intellect of that substance. Therefore the separated soul apprehends not only a separate substance but the intelligible species existing in it as well.
Praeterea, intellectum in actu est forma intelligentis, et est unum cum intelligente. Si igitur anima separata intelligit substantiam separatam intelligentem omnia naturalia, videtur quod ipsa omnia naturalia intelligat. 4. Further, the object actually known is the form of the knower and is one with him. Therefore, if the separated soul apprehends a separate substance, and if the latter is actually cognizant of all natural things, then apparently the separated soul would itself be cognizant of all natural things.
Praeterea, quicumque intelligit maiora intelligibilia, intelligit etiam minora, ut dicitur in III de anima. Si igitur anima separata intelligit substantias separatas quae sunt maxime intelligibilia, ut supra dictum est, videtur sequi quod intelligat omnia alia intelligibilia. 5. Further, as is said in the De anima [III, 4, 429b 1-5] he who understands greater intelligible objects, also understands lesser ones. Therefore, if the separated soul apprehends separate substances which are in the highest degree intelligible, as we have said above (see Art. 5), then it seems to follow that it apprehends all other intelligible objects.
Praeterea, si aliquid est in potentia ad multa, reducitur in actum quantum ad omnia illa ab activo, quod est actu omnia illa. Sicut materia quae est in potentia calida et sicca, ab igne fit actu calida et sicca. Sed intellectus possibilis animae separatae est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia. Activum autem a quo recipit influentiam, scilicet substantia separata, est in actu respectu omnium illorum. Ergo vel reducet animam de potentia in actum quantum ad omnia intelligibilia, vel quantum ad nullum. Sed manifestum est quod non quantum ad nullum, quia animae separatae aliqua intelligunt quae etiam hic non intellexerunt. Ergo quantum ad omnia. Sic igitur anima separata intelligit omnia naturalia. 6. Further, if something is in potency with respect to many things, it is actuated with respect to all of them by an active principle which is all of them actually; just as a matter which is potentially hot and dry, is made actually hot and dry by fire. Now the separated soul’s possible intellect is in potency to all intelligibles. However the active principle from which it receives an influx (influentiam), namely, a separate substance, is in act with respect to all of these intelligible objects. Consequently the separate substance brings the soul from potentiality to act either with respect to all intelligible objects or to none. But obviously not with respect to none, for separated souls apprehend certain things of which they were not cognizant here below. Therefore it actuates them with respect to all intelligible objects. Consequently the separated soul apprehends* all natural things.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit in V capite de Divin. Nomin. quod superiora in entibus sunt exemplaria inferiorum. Substantiae autem separatae sunt supra res naturales. Ergo sunt exemplaria rerum naturalium. Et ita animae separatae per inspectionem substantiarum separatarum, videtur quod cognoscant omnia naturalia. 7. Further, Dionysius says [De div. nom., 5] that superior beings are the exemplars of inferior ones. Now separate substances are superior to natural things; hence they are the exemplars of natural things. Therefore it would seem that separated souls know all natural things in virtue of the intellectual vision that they have of separate substances.
Praeterea, animae separatae cognoscunt res per formas influxas. Sed formae influxae dicuntur esse formae ordinis universi. Ergo animae separatae cognoscunt totum ordinem universi; et sic cognoscunt omnia naturalia. 8. Further, separated souls know things through infused forms. But infused forms are said to be forms of the order of the universe. Therefore separated souls know the entire order of the universe, and thus know all natural things.
Praeterea, quidquid est in inferiori natura, totum est in superiori. Sed anima separata est superior rebus naturalibus. Ergo omnia naturalia sunt quodammodo in anima. Sed anima cognoscit seipsam. Ergo cognoscit omnia naturalia. 9. Further, whatever exists in an inferior nature, exists in its entirety in a superior nature. Now the separated soul is superior to natural things. Hence all natural things in a certain respect exist in the soul. But the soul knows itself. Consequently it knows all natural things.
Praeterea, quod narratur Luc. XVI de Lazaro et divite, non est parabola, sed res gesta, ut Gregorius dicit; quod patet per hoc, quod persona per nomen proprium exprimitur. Ibi etiam dicitur, quod dives in Inferno positus Abraham cognovit, quem ante non cognoverat. Ergo, pari ratione, animae separatae, etiam damnatorum, cognoscunt aliqua quae hic non cognoverunt. Et sic videtur quod cognoscant omnia naturalia. 10. Further, as Gregory says [In Evang. hom. 40], the story of Lazarus and the rich man (Luke 16) is not a mere parable; it clearly related something that actually took place, because the person involved (Lazarus) is explicitly identified by name. Now it is recorded that the rich man in hell knows Abraham, whom he had not known before. Therefore separated souls, even those of the damned, likewise know things which they did not know in this life, and so it seems that they know all natural things.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod anima separata secundum quid intelligit omnia naturalia, sed non simpliciter. I answer: The separated soul knows all natural things in a certain respect (secundum quid), but does not know them in an absolute sense (simpliciter).
Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod, talis est ordo rerum ad invicem, ut quaecumque inveniuntur in inferiori natura, inveniantur excellentius in superiori. Sicut ea quae sunt in istis generabilibus et corruptibilibus sunt nobiliori modo in corporibus caelestibus, sicut in causis universalibus. Calidum enim et frigidum, et alia huiusmodi, sunt in istis inferioribus velut quaedam qualitates particulares et formae; sed in corporibus caelestibus sunt velut quaedam universales virtutes, a quibus derivantur in haec inferiora. Similiter etiam et quaecumque sunt in natura corporali, sunt eminentius in natura intellectuali. Formae enim rerum corporalium in ipsis rebus corporalibus sunt materialiter et particulariter; in ipsis vero substantiis intellectualibus sunt immaterialiter et universaliter. Unde et in Lib. de causis dicitur, quod omnis intelligentia est plena formis. Ulterius autem quaecumque sunt in tota creatura, eminentius sunt in ipso Deo. In creaturis enim sunt formae rerum et naturae multipliciter et divisim, sed in Deo simpliciter et unite. In proof of this the fact should be borne in mind that the order among things is such that whatever exists in an inferior nature exists in a higher mode in a superior nature. Thus whatever is found in things susceptible of generation and corruption [terrestrial bodies], exists in a higher mode in celestial bodies as in their universal causes. For example, hot and cold, and other things of this sort, exist in inferior bodies as particular qualities and forms, but exist in celestial bodies as universal powers by which such qualities and forms are conveyed to those inferior bodies. In like manner, whatever exists in a corporeal nature, exists in a higher mode in an intellectual nature. Thus the forms of corporeal things exist materially and particularly in those corporeal things, whereas they exist immaterially and universally in intellectual substances. Wherefore it is said in the book De causis [X] that every intelligence is full of forms. Furthermore, everything that exists in the creature exists in a higher mode in God Himself. For the natures and forms of things exist in creatures in many diverse modes, but in God they exist unitedly, in a simple and undivided way.
Et istud esse rerum tripliciter exprimitur. Primo enim dixit Deus: fiat firmamentum; per quod intelligitur esse rerum in verbo Dei. Secundo dicitur: et fecit Deus firmamentum; per quod intelligitur esse firmamenti in intelligentia angelica. Tertio dicitur: et factum est ita; per quod intelligitur esse firmamenti in propria natura, ut Augustinus exponit; et similiter in aliis. Sicut enim a Deo profluxerunt res, ut in propria natura subsisterent, ita ex divina sapientia profluxerunt formae rerum in substantias intellectuales, quibus res intelligerent. Unde considerandum est quod, eo modo quo aliquid est de perfectione naturae, eo modo ad perfectionem intelligibilem pertinet. Singularia namque non sunt de perfectione naturae propter se, sed propter aliud: scilicet ut in eis salventur species quas natura intendit. Natura enim intendit generare hominem non hunc hominem; nam in quantum homo non potest esse, nisi sit hic homo. Et idem est quod philosophus dicit in libro de animalibus quod in assignandis causis accidentium speciei oportet nos reducere in causam finalem, accidentia vero individui in causam efficientem vel materialem. Quasi solum id quod est in specie, sit de intentione naturae. Unde et cognoscere species rerum pertinet ad perfectionem intelligibilem; non autem cognitio individuorum, nisi forte per accidens. This existence of things is expressed in three ways (Gen. 1:6 ff.): First, God said: “Let there be a firmament,” by which is understood the existence of things in the Word of God. Secondly, it is said: “And God made the firmament,” by which is understood the existence of the firmament in the angelic intelligence. Thirdly, it is said: “And it was made thus,” by which is understood the existence of the firmament in its proper nature, as Augustine explains. The same applies to the other creations of God. For just as things flowed from God that they might subsist in their proper nature, so from the divine wisdom the forms of things flowed into intellectual substances so that those things might be understood. Hence it must be borne in mind that the mode in which a thing exists in the order of natural perfection is the mode proper to it in the order of intelligible perfection. Now in the order of natural perfection singulars do not exist on their own account but for the sake of something else, namely, that in them the species to which they belong may be preserved. This indeed is what nature intends. For nature intends to generate man, not this man. Or rather, it generates this man only because the species cannot exist unless the individual man exists. Thus the Philosopher, in his work the De generatione animalium [V, 1, 778b 10], states that in assigning the causes of the accidents of a species we must go back to the final cause. But the accidents of the individual, he says, must be reduced to the efficient or material cause, thus suggesting that only what pertains to the species as such falls under the intention of nature. Thus knowledge of the species of things pertains to intellectual perfection, but not the knowledge of individuals, except perhaps accidentally.
Haec igitur perfectio intelligibilis quamvis omnibus substantiis intellectualibus adsit, non tamen eodem modo. Nam in superioribus sunt formae intelligibiles rerum magis unitae et magis universales; in inferioribus autem magis multiplicantur et sunt minus universales, secundum quod magis recedunt ab uno primo simplici, et appropinquant ad particularitatem rerum. Sed tamen quia in superioribus est potentior vis intellectiva, superiores substantiae in paucis formis universalibus obtinent perfectionem intelligibilem, ut cognoscant naturas rerum usque ad ultimas species. Si autem in substantiis inferioribus essent formae adeo universales sicut sunt in superioribus, cum hoc quod habent inferiorem virtutem intellectivam, non consequerentur ex huiusmodi formis ultimam perfectionem intelligibilem, ut cognoscerent res usque ad indivisibiles species; sed remaneret earum cognitio in quadam universalitate et confusione, quod est cognitionis imperfectae. Manifestum est enim quod, quanto intellectus fuerit efficacior, tanto magis ex paucis potest multa colligere; cuius signum est quod rudibus et tardioribus oportet singulatim exponere, et exempla particularia inducere ad singula. Consequently, although this intellectual perfection is found in all intellectual substances, it does not exist in each of them to the same degree. For the intelligible forms of things exist in a more united and more universal mode in superior intellectual substances than they do in inferior [intellectual substances] where they are multiplied to a greater extent and are less universal according as they are further and further removed from the first simple Being [God], and come closer and closer to the particularity of things. But thanks to their greater intellective power, superior substances perfect their intelligence through a few forms, so that they know the natures of things down to their ultimate species. Now even if forms as universal as those existing in superior intellectual substances were possessed by inferior substances, the latter would not thereby attain that ultimate intellectual perfection which consists in knowing things down to their individual species, because inferior intellectual substances have an inferior intellective power. Hence their knowledge of things will remain more or less universal and indistinct; and generality and indistinctness are the marks of imperfect knowledge. For it is evident that the more active the intellect, the greater is its ability to acquire much from little. An indication of this is that things must be explained one by one to uncultivated people and to slow learners, and particular examples introduced for each single thing.
Manifestum est autem quod anima humana est infima inter omnes intellectuales substantias; unde eius capacitas naturalis est ad recipiendum formas rerum conformiter rebus materialibus. Et ideo anima humana unita est corpori ut ex rebus materialibus species intelligibiles possit recipere secundum intellectum possibilem. Nec est ei maior virtus naturalis ad intelligendum, quam ut secundum huiusmodi formas sic determinatas in cognitione intelligibili perficiatur. Unde et lumen intelligibile quod participat, quod dicitur intellectus agens, hanc operationem habet, ut in huiusmodi species intelligibiles faciat actu. Quoniam igitur anima est unita corpori, ex ipsa unione corporis habet aspectum ad inferiora, a quibus accipit species intelligibiles proportionatas suae intellectivae virtuti, et sic in scientia perficitur. Sed, cum fuerit a corpore separata, habet aspectum ad superiora tantum, a quibus recipit influentiam specierum intelligibilium universalium. Et, licet minus universaliter recipiantur in ipsa quam sint in substantiis superioribus, tamen non est sibi tanta efficacia virtutis intellectivae, ut per huiusmodi genus specierum intelligibilium possit perfectam cognitionem consequi, intelligendo specialiter et determinate unumquodque; sed in quadam universitate et confusione, sicut cognoscuntur res in principiis universalibus. Hanc autem cognitionem acquirunt animae separatae subito per modum influentiae, et non successive per modum instructionis, ut Origenes dicit. Now the human soul is obviously the lowest among all intellectual substances. Consequently it is capable by nature of receiving the forms of things in the material order. Thus the human soul is united to a body in order that the soul may receive intelligible species from material things through its possible intellect. Nor is its natural intellective power greater than that required for perfecting its knowledge through such forms. Hence the intelligible light in which the human soul participates and which is called the agent intellect, has as its function to actualize intelligible species of the type referred to. Therefore, since the soul is united to the body, the soul’s vision is turned toward inferior things; from these it abstracts intelligible species proportioned to its intellective power, and it is in this way that the soul is perfected in knowledge. But when the soul is separated from the body, its vision is directed toward higher things alone, and from these it receives an influx of universal intelligible species. And although the species thus received have ; less universal mode of existence in the separated soul than they enjoy in those higher substances, nevertheless the intellective power of the soul is not so efficacious that it can acquire a perfect knowledge of those intelligibles through this kind of species. That is to say, it cannot apprehend each one of them individually and determinately, but can know them only generally and indistinctly in the manner in which things are known through universal principles. Moreover, separated souls acquire this knowledge all at once by an influx, and not successively by instruction, as Origen says [Peri Archon, I, 6].
Sic dicendum est igitur, quod animae separatae naturali cognitione in universali cognoscunt omnia naturalia, non autem specialiter unumquodque. De cognitione autem quam habent animae sanctorum per gratiam, alia ratio est; nam secundum illam Angelis adaequantur, prout vident omnia in verbo. Ergo respondendum est ad obiectiones. Consequently, we must say that separated souls know all natural things in a universal way by natural knowledge, but do not know each of them individually. This is not the case, however, with respect to the knowledge that the souls of the saints possess through grace. For as regards that knowledge the saints are made equal to the angels inasmuch as they, like the angels, see all things in the Word. The answers to the objections are now in order.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, Daemones tripliciter res cognoscunt. Quaedam per revelationem bonorum Angelorum: quae scilicet sunt supra cognitionem naturalem eorum, sicut mysteria Christi et Ecclesiae, et alia huiusmodi; quaedam vero cognoscunt acumine proprii intellectus; scilicet ea quae sunt naturaliter scibilia; quaedam vero per experientiam longi temporis: scilicet eventus futurorum contingentium in singularibus, quae non per se pertinent ad cognitionem intelligibilem, ut dictum est. Unde de eis ad praesens non agitur. 1. According to Augustine [De dviniat. daemon., 3], the demons know things in three ways: First, some demons know things that transcend their natural knowledge through the revelation of the good angels, such as the mystery of Christ and the Church and others of this kind; secondly, some demons know things that are naturally knowable by the native acumen of their own intelligence; thirdly, some demons know the issue of future contingent events in individual cases through experience over a long time. Now as we have pointed out, knowledge of singulars does not pertain essentially to intellectual cognition as such. Consequently the objection is irrelevant, because here there is no question of such knowledge.
Ad secundum dicendum quod in illis qui scientiam aliquorum naturalium scibilium in hac vita acquisierunt, erit determinata cognitio in speciali eorum quae hic acquisierunt, aliorum vero universalis et confusa. Unde non inutile erit eis scientiam acquisivisse. Nec est inconveniens quod utraque scientia eorumdem scibilium adsit eidem, cum non sint ambae unius rationis. 2. In those souls which have acquired the science of certain natural things knowable in this life, there will exist a knowledge of those things which bears directly on the individual. Their knowledge of other things, however, will be universal and indistinct, so that they will not have acquired knowledge uselessly in this life. Nor is there any incongruity in their possessing both types of knowledge with respect to the same objects, since those knowledges are formally diverse.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa non pertinet ad propositum, eo quod non ponimus quod anima separata cognoscat omnia naturalia in speciali. Unde non repugnat eius cognitioni infinitas specierum quae est in numeris, figuris et proportionibus. Quia tamen eodem modo posset concludere haec ratio contra cognitionem angelicam, dicendum est, quod species figurarum et numerorum et huiusmodi, non sunt infinitae in actu, sed in potentia tantum. Nec est etiam inconveniens quod virtus substantiae intellectualis finitae ad huiusmodi infinita extendat se; quia virtus intellectiva est quodammodo infinita, in quantum non est terminata per materiam. Unde et universale cognoscere potest, quod quodammodo est infinitum, in quantum de sui ratione, potentia continet infinita. 3. That argument is beside the point. For we do not allege that the separated soul knows all natural things in their individuality. Hence the infinity of species that is found in numbers, figures, and proportions, is not out of proportion to the soul’s cognitive power. But since that same argument would likewise apply to angelic knowledge, it must be said that the species of figures and numbers and things of this sort are not infinite actually but only potentially. Nor is it improper that the power of a finite intellectual substance should extend to infinites of this kind. For an intellective power in a certain respect is itself infinite inasmuch as it is not limited by matter. This is why it can know the universal, which is also infinite in a certain respect inasmuch as it belongs to the universal by nature to contain infinites potentially.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod formae rerum materialium sunt in substantiis immaterialibus immaterialiter. Et sic est assimilatio inter utrumque quantum ad rationes formarum, non quantum ad modum essendi. 4. The forms of material things exist in immaterial substances immaterially. Thus immaterial things become like material ones so far as the intelligible nature of the latter’s forms is concerned, not so far as their mode of existing is concerned.
Ad quintum dicendum quod materia prima non se habet ad formas nisi dupliciter: vel in potentia pura, vel in actu puro. Eo quod formae naturales, statim ut sunt in materia, habent operationes suas, nisi sit aliquod impedimentum. Quod ideo est, quia forma naturalis non se habet nisi ad unum; unde statim quod forma ignis est in materia, facit eum moveri sursum. Sed intellectus possibilis se habet ad species intelligibiles tripliciter: quandoque enim se habet in potentia pura, sicut ante addiscere; quandoque autem in actu puro, sicut cum actu considerat; quandoque autem medio modo inter potentiam et actum, sicut cum est scientia in habitu et non in actu. Comparatur igitur forma intellecta ad intellectum possibilem sicut forma naturalis ad materiam primam, prout est intellecta in actu, non prout est habitualiter. Et inde est quod, sicut materia prima simul et semel non informatur nisi una forma, ita intellectus possibilis non intelligit nisi unum intelligibile; potest tamen scire multa habitualiter. 5. Prime matter is related to forms in a twofold manner only, because with respect to them it is either in pure potency or in complete act. For natural forms have their own operations as soon as they exist in matter, unless there be some impediment, because a natural form is directed to one thing only. Thus, as soon as the form fire exists in matter, it causes the matter to move upward. However, the possible intellect is related to intelligible species in a threefold manner: sometimes, as before learning, it is in pure potency; sometimes, as when actually reflecting upon something, it is in complete act; sometimes, as when possessing a habitus of science but not actually exercising it, it is in a state midway between potency and act. Therefore an apprehended form so far as it is apprehended actually, but not so far as it exists in the possible intellect “habitually,” is related to the possible intellect as a natural form is to prime matter. Hence, as prime matter is informed with but one form at a time, so the possible intellect apprehends but one intelligible object at a time. Nevertheless it can know many things habitually in virtue of its habit of knowledge.
Ad sextum dicendum quod substantiae cognoscenti potest aliquid assimilari dupliciter. Aut secundum suum esse naturale; et sic non assimilantur diversa secundum speciem, cum ipsa sit unius speciei. Aut secundum esse intelligibile; et sic secundum quod habet diversas species intelligibiles, sic possunt ei assimilari diversa secundum speciem, cum tamen ipsa sit unius speciei. 6. There can be a likeness between a thing and a knowing substance in two ways: either according to the thing’s real mode of existing, and in this way no likeness exists between things specifically diverse and a knowing substance, since the latter belongs to one species only: or according to the thing’s intelligible mode of existing, and in this way there can be a likeness between things specifically diverse and the soul, inasmuch as the knowing substance possesses diverse intelligible species, even though the soul itself belongs only to one species.
Ad septimum dicendum quod animae separatae non solum cognoscunt species, sed individua; non tamen omnia, sed aliqua. Et ideo non oportet quod sint in ea species infinitae. 7. Separated souls know not only the species but also individuals, although not all individuals but only some. Consequently it is not necessary that an infinite number of species exist in the separated soul.
Ad octavum dicendum quod applicatio universalis cognitionis ad singularia non est causa cognitionis singularium, sed consequens ad ipsam. Quomodo autem anima separata singularia cognoscat, infra quaeretur. 8. The application of universal knowledge to singulars is not the cause of the knowledge of singulars, but is a natural result of a knowledge of singulars. The problem of how the separated soul knows singulars will be treated later (Art. 20) .
Ad nonum dicendum quod cum bonum consistat in modo, specie et ordine, secundum Augustinum in libro de natura boni, in tantum invenitur in re aliqua de ordine, in quantum invenitur ibi de bono. In damnatis autem non est bonum gratiae, sed naturae; unde non est ibi ordo gratiae, sed naturae, qui sufficit ad huiusmodi cognitionem. 9. Since, according to Augustine in his work De natura boni [3], the good consists in mode, species, and order; so far as order is found in a thing, to that extent good is found there. Now the good of grace does not exist in the damned but only the good of nature. Hence in them there exists not the order of grace but the order of nature, and the latter suffices for knowledge of natural things.
Ad decimum dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de singularibus quae hic fiunt, de quibus dictum est quod non pertinent ad cognitionem intelligibilem. 10. Augustine is speaking of singulars which come to pass here below. The knowledge of such things, we have said, does not pertain to intellectual cognition.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod intellectus possibilis non potest reduci in actum cognitionis omnium naturalium per lumen solum intellectus agentis, sed per aliquam superiorem substantiam, cui actu adest cognitio omnium naturalium. Et si quis recte consideret, intellectus agens, secundum ea quae philosophus de ipso tradit non est activum respectu intellectus possibilis directe: sed magis respectu phantasmatum, quae facit intelligibilia actu, per quae intellectus possibilis reducitur in actum quando aspectus eius inclinatur ad inferiora ex unione corporis. Et eadem ratione quando aspectus eius est ad superiora post separationem a corpore, fit in actu per species actu intelligibiles quae sunt in substantiis superioribus, quasi per agens proprium. Et sic talis cognitio est naturalis. 11. The possible intellect cannot be rendered actually cognizant of all natural things by the light of the agent intellect alone, but only by some superior substance which is actually cognizant of all natural things. And if one considers rightly, he will see that, according to the Philosopher’s own treatment of the matter, the agent intellect is not active directly with respect to the possible intellect, but rather with respect to phantasms which the agent intellect makes actually intelligible. And it is by the phantasms thus actualized that the possible intellect is actualized when, as a result of its union with the body, its vision is turned to inferior things. And for the same reason, when, after its separation from the body, the possible intellect turns toward superior things, it is actualized, as by its own proper agent, by the actually intelligible species which exist in superior substances. And such knowledge, therefore, is natural.
Unde patet solutio ad duodecimum. 12. Hence the reply to the twelfth objection is evident.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod huiusmodi perfectionem recipiunt animae separatae a Deo mediantibus Angelis. Licet enim substantia animae creetur a Deo immediate, tamen perfectiones intelligibiles proveniunt a Deo mediantibus Angelis, non solum naturales, sed etiam quae ad mysteria gratiarum pertinent, ut patet per Dionysium cap. IV Cael. hierarchiae. 13. Separated souls receive this sort of perfection from God through the mediation of the angels. For, although the substance of the soul is created by God immediately, nevertheless intelligible perfections come from God through the mediation of the angels; and not only natural perfections but also those which pertain to the mysteries of grace, as Dionysius shows [De cael. hier., IV, 2].
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod anima separata, habens universalem cognitionem scibilium naturalium, non est perfecte reducta in actum; quia cognoscere aliquid in universali, est cognoscere imperfecte et in potentia. Unde non attingit ad felicitatem etiam naturalem. Unde non sequitur quod alia auxilia, quibus pervenitur ad felicitatem, sint superflua. 14. The separated soul, having universal knowledge of natural intelligible objects, is not perfectly actualized. For to know a thing universally is to know it imperfectly and potentially. By such knowledge, therefore, the separated soul does not attain even natural happiness. Consequently it does not follow that the other helps for the attainment of happiness are superfluous.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod damnati de hoc ipso bono cognitionis quod habent, tristantur, in quantum cognoscunt se destitutos esse summo bono, ad quod per alia bona ordinabantur. 15. The good of knowledge which the damned possess is itself a cause of sorrow to them, inasmuch as they know that they are deprived of the highest good to which they are directed through other goods.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur de particularibus, quae non pertinent ad perfectionem intelligibilem, ut dictum est. 16. That Gloss refers to particulars which, as was said, do not pertain to intellectual perfection.
Answers to the arguments against the conclusions of the objections.
Ad primum vero in contrarium dicendum quod anima separata non perfecte comprehendit substantiam separatam; et ideo non oportet quod cognoscat omnia quae in ipsa sunt per similitudinem. 1. The separated soul does not perfectly comprehend a separate substance. Hence it is not necessary that the separated soul know all the things which are present by their likeness in such a substance.
Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Gregorii veritatem habet quantum ad cognitionem obiecti intelligibilis, quod est Deus; quod, quantum est de se, repraesentat omnia intelligibilia. Non tamen necesse est quod quicumque videt Deum, sciat omnia quae ipse scit; nisi comprehendat ipsum, sicut ipse seipsum comprehendit. 2. Gregory’s statement is true as regards knowledge of that intelligible object which is God: an object which in itself represents all intelligible objects. However, it is not necessary that he who sees God should know all the things that God knows, unless that person should know himself as God knows Himself.
Ad tertium dicendum quod species quae sunt in intellectu Angeli, sunt intelligibiles intellectui eius cuius sunt formae, non tamen intellectui animae separatae. 3. The species existing in the angel’s intellect are intelligible to the intellect of the one of whom they are the forms, but not to the intellect of the separated soul.
Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet intellectum sit forma substantiae intelligentis, non tamen oportet quod anima separata intelligens substantiam separatam, intelligat intellectum eius; quia non comprehendit ipsam. 4. Although the intellect is the form of an intellectual substance, it is not necessary that the separated soul, apprehending the separate substance, should apprehend the intellect of that substance, because the separated soul does not comprehend the latter.
Ad quintum dicendum quod, licet anima separata aliquo modo cognoscat substantias separatas, non tamen oportet quod alia omnia cognoscat perfecte; quia nec ipsas substantias separatas perfecte cognoscit. 5. Although the separated soul does in some way know separated substances, it is not necessary that it know all other things perfectly. For it does not know perfectly the separate substances themselves.
Ad sextum dicendum quod anima separata reducitur a superiore substantia in actum omnium intelligibilium naturalium, non perfecte sed universaliter, ut dictum est. 6. The separated soul is actualized with respect to all natural intelligible objects by a superior substance. However, it is not actualized perfectly but universally, as we have pointed out.
Ad septimum dicendum quod, licet substantiae separatae sint quodammodo exemplaria omnium rerum naturalium, non tamen sequitur quod, eis cognitis, omnia cognoscantur; nisi perfecte comprehenderentur ipsae substantiae separatae. 7. Although separate substances are in some way the exemplars of all natural things, it does not follow that all these are known when these natural things are known, unless the separate substances themselves are comprehended perfectly.
Ad octavum dicendum quod anima separata cognoscit per formas influxas, quae tamen non sunt formae ordinis universi in speciali sicut in substantiis superioribus, sed in generali tantum, ut dictum est. 8. The separated soul knows through infused forms. But these are not forms of the order of the universe in an individual mode, such as superior substances possess, but only in a general mode, as was said.
Ad nonum dicendum quod res naturales sunt quodammodo in substantiis separatis et in anima: sed in substantiis separatis in actu, in anima vero in potentia ad omnes formas naturales intelligendas. 9. Natural things exist in a certain respect in separate substances and in the soul. However the forms of natural things exist actually in the separate substances, whereas they exist only potentially in the soul inasmuch as they are knowable.
10. The soul of Abraham was a separate substance. Consequently the soul of the rich man was able to know the soul of Abraham, just as it could know other separate substances.
Ad decimum dicendum quod anima Abraham erat substantia separata; unde et anima divitis poterat eam cognoscere, sicut et alias substantias separatas. 27 That is, the separate substance exists in a higher order of being and so cannot be totally included within the scope of the intellectual power of the separated soul.
ARTICLE 19
WHETHER THE SENTIENT POWERS REMAIN ,IN THE SOUL WHEN IT EXISTS APART FROM THE BODY

[Summa theol., I, q. 77, a.8; Contra Gentiles, II, 81; Sent., IV, dist. 44, q. 3, a. 3, q. 1 and 2; dist. 50, q. 1, a. 1; Quodl. X, q. 4, a. 2; De virt. card., a. 4, ad 13.]
Decimonono quaeritur utrum potentiae sensitivae remaneant in anima separata In the nineteenth article we examine this question: Whether the sentient powers remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body.
Objections.
Et videtur quod sic. Quia potentiae animae vel essentialiter insunt ei, vel sunt proprietates naturales eius. Sed nec essentialia possunt separari a re, dum ipsa res manet, neque proprietates naturales eius. Ergo in anima separata manent potentiae sensitivae. 1. It seems this is the case, because the powers of the soul are either essential parts of it or natural properties of it. But the essential parts of a thing cannot be separated from a thing so long as the thing itself remains in existence, and neither can its natural properties be separated from it. Therefore the sentient powers remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body.
Sed dicebat quod remanent in ea ut in radice. &8212;Sed contra, esse in aliquo ut in radice est esse in eo ut in potentia; quod est esse in aliquo virtute et non actu. Essentialia autem rei et proprietates naturales eius oportet quod sint in re actu, et non virtute tantum. Ergo potentiae sensitivae non remanent in anima separata solum ut in radice. 2. But it might be said that the sentient powers remain in the [separated]. soul as in their root. On the other hand, for a thing to exist in something else as in its root, is for it to exist in that thing potentially, that is, virtually and not actually. Now the essential constituents of a thing and its natural properties must exist in it actually and not just virtually. Therefore the sentient powers do not remain in the separated soul merely as in their root.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in libro de spiritu et anima, quod anima, recedens a corpore trahit secum sensum et imaginationem, concupiscibilem et irascibilem, quae sunt in parte sensitiva. Ergo potentiae sensitivae remanent in anima separata. 3. Further, Augustine says in the book De spiritu et anima [15] that when the soul leaves the body it takes with it sense and imagination, and the concupiscible and irascible appetites which belong to the sentient part. Therefore the sentient powers remain in the soul when it exists in separation from the body.
Praeterea, totum non est integrum cui desunt aliquae partes eius. Sed potentiae sensitivae sunt partes animae. Si igitur non essent in anima separata, anima separata non esset integra. 4. Further, a whole from which any of the parts are missing is not a complete one. But the sentient powers are parts of the soul. Hence, if they did not exist in the separated soul, the separated soul would not be a complete whole.
Praeterea, sicut est homo per rationem et intellectum, ita est animal per sensum; nam rationale est differentia hominis constitutiva, et sensibile est differentia constitutiva animalis. Si ergo non est idem sensus non erit idem animal. Sed si potentiae sensitivae non remanent in anima separata, non erit idem sensus in homine resurgente qui modo est; quia, quod in nihilum cedit, non potest resumi idem numero. Ergo homo resurgens non erit idem animal, et sic neque idem homo; quod est contra id quod dicitur Iob XIX: quem visurus sum ego ipse, et oculi mei conspecturi sunt. 5. Further, as a man is such because of his reason and intellect, so also is an animal such because of its sense, for “rational” is the constitutive difference of “man,” “sensible” the constitutive difference of “animal.” Therefore, if sense is not one and the same, it will not be one and the same animal. Now if the sentient powers do not remain in the separated soul, the same sense will not be present in man when he arises from the dead as is present in him now, because whatever lapses into nothingness cannot be brought back into existence as numerically the same thing. Therefore when a man rises from the dead he will not be the same animal. This is contrary to what is said: “Whom I myself shall see, and my eyes shall behold, and not another” (Job 19: 27).
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litter., quod poenae quas in Inferno animae patiuntur, sunt similes visis dormientium, id est secundum similitudines corporalium rerum. Sed huiusmodi visa dormientium sunt secundum imaginationem, quae pertinet ad partem sensitivam. Ergo potentiae sensitivae sunt in anima separata. 6. Further, Augustine says in Super Genesim ad litteram [XII, 32] that the punishments which souls suffer in hell are similar to the dreams of people asleep, that is to say, according to the [sensible] likenesses of corporeal things. But such dreams of people asleep result from the imagination, which belongs to the sentient part of the soul. Therefore the sentient powers exist in the separated soul.
Praeterea, manifestum est quod gaudium est in concupiscibili, et ira in irascibili. Sed in animabus separatis bonorum est gaudium, et in animabus malorum est dolor et ira; est enim ibi fletus et stridor dentium. Ergo, cum concupiscibilis et irascibilis sint in parte sensitiva, ut philosophus dicit in III de anima, videtur quod potentiae sensitivae sint in anima separata. 7. Further, it is evident that joy belongs to the concupiscible appetite, and anger to the irascible appetite. Now there is joy in the separated souls of good men, and sorrow and anger in the souls of evil men, for in hell “there is weeping and gnashing of teeth” (Matt. 8:12). Consequently, since the concupiscible and irascible appetites belong to the sentient part of the soul, as the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 9, 432b 5], it seems that the sentient powers remain in the soul when it is separated from the body.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit quod malum Daemonis est furor irrationalis, concupiscentia amens, et phantasia proterva. Sed haec pertinent ad potentias sensitivas. Ergo potentiae sensitivae sunt in Daemonibus; multo ergo magis in anima separata. 8. Further, Dionysius says [De div. nom., IV, 23], that the wickedness of the demons is irrational fury, love of concupiscence, and a wanton imagination. But these belong to the sentient powers. Consequently there are sentient powers in the demon and, therefore, even more so in the soul when it is separated from the body.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit super Gen. ad Litt. quod anima quaedam sentit sine corpore, scilicet gaudium et tristitiam. Sed quod convenit animae sine corpore, est in anima separata. Ergo sensus est in anima separata. 9. Further, Augustine says in Super Genesim ad litteram [XII, 32] that the soul senses certain things without the body, namely, joy and sadness. But whatever belongs to the soul itself without the body, exists in the separated soul. Therefore sense exists in the separated soul.
Praeterea, in libro de causis dicitur quod in omni anima sunt res sensibiles. Sed res sensibiles per hoc sentiuntur, quia sunt in anima. Ergo anima separata sentit res sensibiles; et ita est in ea sensus. 10. Further, it is said in the book De causis [14] that sensible things exist in every soul. But sensible things are sensed because they are present in the soul. Consequently the separated soul senses sensible things, and thus sense exists in it.
Praeterea, Gregorius dicit quod id quod dominus narrat Lucae XVI de divite epulone, non est parabola, sed gesta. Dicitur autem ibi, quod dives in Inferno positus, nec dubium quin secundum animam separatam, vidit Lazarum, et audivit Abraham sibi loquentem. Ergo anima separata vidit et audivit; et sic est in ea sensus. 11. Further, Gregory says [In Evang. hom. 40] that what our Lord relates about the wealthy reveler (Luke 16) is not a parable but a fact. Moreover, it is said there that when the rich man had gone to hell (no doubt so far as he was a separated soul), he saw Lazarus and heard Abraham speaking to him. Therefore the separated soul sees and hears, and thus sense exists in the separated soul.
Praeterea, eorum quae sunt idem secundum esse vel secundum substantiam, unum non potest esse sine altero. Sed anima sensibilis et rationalis in homine sunt idem secundum esse et secundum substantiam. Ergo non potest esse quin sensus remaneat in anima rationali separata. 12. Further, things that are the same so far as their act of existing and substance are concerned, cannot exist without each other. Now in man the sentient and rational soul are the same so far as their act of existing and substance are concerned. Hence it is impossible that sense should cease to remain in the rational soul when it exists in separation from the body.
Praeterea, quod cedit in nihil non resumitur idem numero. Sed si potentiae sensitivae non manent in anima separata, oportet quod cedant in nihilum. Ergo in resurrectione non erunt eaedem numero. Et sic, cum potentiae sensitivae sint actus organorum, neque organa erunt eadem numero, neque totus homo erit idem numero; quod est inconveniens. 13. Further, when that which ceases to exist, is brought back into existence again, it is not numerically the same thing as it was when it first existed. But if the sentient powers do not remain in the separated soul, they must cease to exist. Consequently they will not be numerically the same at the resurrection; and thus, since the sentient powers are the acts of bodily organs, neither will the organs be numerically the same, nor will the whole man be numerically the same. This is incongruous.
Praeterea, praemium et poena respondet merito et demerito. Sed meritum et demeritum hominis consistit, ut plurimum, in actibus sensitivarum potentiarum, dum vel passiones sequimur vel eas refrenamus. Ergo iustitia videtur exigere quod actus sensitivarum potentiarum sint in animabus separatis, quae praemiantur vel puniuntur. 14. Further, rewards and punishments are in conformity with a man’s merit or lack of merit. Now what a man merits or fails to merit is to a great extent the result of the activities of his sentient powers, for we either give in to our passions or curb them. Therefore justice seems to demand that the acts of the sentient powers exist in separated souls which are either rewarded or punished.
Praeterea, potentia nihil est aliud quam principium actionis vel passionis. Anima autem est principium operationum sensitivarum. Ergo potentiae sensitivae sunt in anima sicut in subiecto. Et ita non potest esse quin remaneant in anima separata; cum accidentia contrarietate carentia non corrumpantur nisi per corruptionem subiecti. 15. Further, a power is nothing more than a principle of action or passion [i.e., being-acted-upon]. Now the soul is the principle of sentient operations. Therefore the sentient powers exist in the soul as their subject. Hence it is impossible that they should cease to exist in the separated soul, for accidents lacking contraries are corrupted only by the corruption of their subject.
Praeterea, memoria est in parte sensitiva secundum philosophum. Sed memoria est in anima separata; quod patet per hoc quod dicitur diviti epuloni per Abraham, Luc. cap. XVI: recordare quia recepisti bona in vita tua. Ergo potentiae sensitivae sunt in anima separata. 16. Further, according to the Philosopher [De mem. et rem., I, 450a 10], memory exists in the sentient part [of the soul]. Now memory is present in the soul when it exists apart from the body, as is apparent from what is said to the rich reveler by Abraham: “Remember that you have received good things in your lifetime” (Luke 16:25)Consequently the sentient powers exist in the separated soul.
Praeterea, virtutes et vitia remanent in animabus separatis. Sed quaedam virtutes et vitia sunt in parte sensitiva: dicit enim philosophus in III Ethic., quod temperantia et fortitudo sunt irrationabilium partium. Ergo potentiae sensitivae manent in anima separata. 17. Further, virtues and vices remain in souls when they exist apart from the body. But some virtues and vices exist in the sentient part of the soul, for the Philosopher says in the Ethics [III, 9, 1117b 22] that temperance and fortitude belong to the irrational part of the soul. Therefore the sentient powers remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body.
Praeterea, de mortuis qui resuscitati dicuntur, legitur in plerisque historiis sanctorum, quod quaedam imaginabilia se vidisse recitaverunt: puta domos, campos, flumina, et huiusmodi. Ergo animae separatae imaginatione utuntur, quae est in parte sensitiva. 18. Further, it is related of the dead who are brought back to life, as we read in many histories of the saints, that they said they saw certain imaginable objects, for example, houses, camps, rivers, and things of this kind. Therefore when souls exist apart from their bodies, they use imagination, which belongs to the sentient part [of the soul].
Praeterea, sensus iuvat cognitionem intellectivam; nam cui deficit unus sensus deficit una scientia. Sed cognitio intellectiva perfectior erit in anima separata quam in anima coniuncta corpori. Ergo magis aderit ei sensus. 19. Further, the senses assist in intellectual knowledge, for, if anyone is deprived of one sense, he is deprived of one kind of knowledge. Now intellectual knowledge will be more perfect when the soul is separated from the body than when it is joined thereto. Therefore sense will be required to an even greater extent by the intellect [of the separated soul].
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in I de anima quod, si senex accipiat oculum iuvenis, videbit utique sicut et iuvenis. Ex quo videtur quod debilitatis organis non debilitantur potentiae sensitivae. Ergo nec destructis, destruuntur. Et sic videtur quod potentiae sensitivae remanent in anima separata. 20. Further, the Philosopher says in the De anima [I, 4, 408b 20] that if an old man were to receive the eye of a youth, he would see just as well as a youth. From this it appears that, although the organs are weakened, the sensory powers are not weakened. Therefore neither are they destroyed when their organs cease to exist. Consequently it seems that the sentient powers remain in the separated soul.
Sed contra. Est quod philosophus dicit in III de anima, de intellectu loquens, quod hoc solum separatur sicut perpetuum a corruptibili. Ergo potentiae sensitivae non remanent in anima separata. On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the De anima [II, 2, 413b 25] when he speaks of the intellect, that “this alone is separate as the perpetual is separate from the corruptible.” Consequently the sentient powers do not remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in XVI libro de animalibus, quod quarum potentiarum operationes non sunt sine corpore, neque ipsae potentiae sunt sine corpore. Sed operationes potentiarum sensitivarum non sunt sine corpore: exercentur enim per organa corporalia. Ergo potentiae sensitivae non sunt sine corpore. Further, the Philosopher says in the De generatione animalium [II, 3, 736b 21] that “The operations of some powers do not exist without the body, nor do these powers themselves exist without the body.” But the operations of the sentient powers do not exist without the body, for they are performed through bodily organs. Therefore the sentient powers do not exist in the soul without the body.
Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod nulla res destituitur propria operatione. Si ergo potentiae sensitivae remanerent in anima separata haberent proprias operationes; quod est impossibile. Further, Damascene says [De fide orth., II, 23] that nothing is bereft of its proper operation. Hence, if the sentient powers remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body, they have their proper operations. This is impossible.
Praeterea, frustra est potentia quae non reducitur ad actum. Nihil autem est frustra in operationibus Dei. Ergo potentiae sensitivae non manent in anima separata, in qua non possunt reduci ad actum. Further, a power which is not exercised is purposeless. Now in the activities of God nothing is done without a purpose. Therefore the sentient powers do not remain in the separated soul, for they cannot be exercised.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod potentiae animae non sunt de essentia animae, sed sunt proprietates naturales quae fluunt ab essentia eius, ut ex prioribus quaestionibus haberi potest. Accidens autem dupliciter corrumpitur: uno modo a suo contrario, sicut frigidum corrumpitur a calido; alio modo per corruptionem sui subiecti. Non enim accidens remanere potest corrupto subiecto. Quaecumque igitur accidentia seu formae contrarium non habent, non destruuntur nisi per destructionem subiecti. Manifestum est autem quod potentiis animae nihil est contrarium; et ideo, si corrumpantur, non corrumpuntur nisi per corruptionem sui subiecti. I answer: the powers of the soul do not belong to the essence of the soul but are natural properties which flow from its essence, as can be learned from the preceding questions. Now an accident is corrupted in two ways. First, by its contrary, as cold is corrupted by heat. Secondly, by the corruption of its subject, for an accident cannot remain when its subject is corrupted. Consequently what does not have a contrary accident or form, is destroyed only by the destruction of the subject itself. Now it is evident that there is nothing contrary to the powers of the soul. And therefore if they are corrupted, they are corrupted only by the corruption of their subject.
Ad investigandum igitur utrum potentiae sensitivae corrumpantur corrupto corpore vel remaneant in anima separata, principium investigationis oportet accipere, ut consideremus quid sit subiectum potentiarum praedictarum. Manifestum est autem quod subiectum potentiae oportet esse id quod secundum potentiam dicitur potens: nam omne accidens suum subiectum denominat. Idem autem est quod potest agere vel pati, et quod est agens vel patiens; unde oportet ut illud sit subiectum potentiae quod est subiectum actionis vel passionis, cuius potentia est principium. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de somno et vigilia quod cuius est potentia eius est actio. Circa operationes autem sensuum diversa fuit opinio. Plato enim posuit quod anima sensitiva per se haberet propriam operationem: posuit enim quod anima, etiam sensitiva, est movens seipsam et quod non movet corpus nisi prout est a se mota. Sic igitur in sentiendo est duplex operatio: una qua anima movet seipsam, alia qua movet corpus. Unde Platonici definiunt quod sensus est motus animae per corpus. Unde et propter hoc quidam huiusmodi positionis sectatores distinguunt duplices operationes partis sensitivae: quasdam scilicet interiores, quibus anima sentit, secundum quod seipsam movet; quasdam exteriores, secundum quod movet corpus. Dicunt etiam quod sunt duplices potentiae sensitivae. Quaedam quae sunt in ipsa anima principium interiorum actuum; et istae manent in anima separata, corpore destructo cum suis actibus. Quaedam vero sunt principia exteriorum actuum; quae sunt in anima simul et corpore, et pereunte corpore, pereunt. Consequently, in order to discover whether the sentient powers are corrupted when the body is corrupted, or whether they remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body, we must accept the principle of this investigation so that we may learn what the subject of the aforementioned power is. Now it is evident that the subject of a power must be that which is capable of doing something in virtue of its power, for every accident designates its subject. Furthermore, an agent or a patient is nothing more than a thing which can act or undergo some change (pati). Hence, whatever is the subject of an action or undergoes a change, must be the subject of a power, the power itself being a principle. And this is what the Philosopher says in the book De somno et vigilia [I, 454a 7], namely, that an action belongs to the thing to which the power belongs. Now there has been a diversity of opinion about the operations of the senses. For Plato held that the sentient soul has a proper operation in virtue of its own nature, for he maintained that the sentient soul is a self-mover, and that it moves the body only inasmuch as it is moved by itself. Thus there is a twofold operation in sensing: one by which the soul moves itself, and another by which it moves the body. Wherefore the Platonists defined sense as the movement of the soul through the body. For this reason, certain followers of this position distinguish two operations in the sentient part of the soul, namely, certain interior operations by which the soul senses inasmuch as it moves itself, and certain external operations inasmuch as it moves the body. They also stated that there are two kinds of sentient powers: some which are principles of acts within the soul itself, and which remain together with their activities in the separated soul when the body is corrupted; others, which are principles of external acts, and these are present in the soul and the body simultaneously, and cease to exist when the body corrupts.
Sed haec positio stare non potest. Manifestum est enim quod unumquodque secundum hoc operatur secundum quod est ens; unde quae per se habent esse, per se operantur, sicut individua substantiarum. Formae autem quae per se non possunt esse, sed dicuntur entia in quantum eis aliquid est, non habent per se operationem, sed dicuntur operari in quantum per eas subiecta operantur. Sicut enim calor non est id quod est, sed est id quo aliquid est calidum; ita non calefacit, sed est id quo calidum calefacit. Si igitur anima sensitiva haberet per se operationem, sequeretur quod haberet per se subsistentiam, et sic non corrumperetur corrupto corpore. Unde etiam brutorum animae essent immortales; quod est impossibile. Et tamen Plato hoc dicitur concessisse. But this position cannot be held, for it is evident that anything whatever operates so far as it is a being. Therefore those things which exist of themselves, operate of themselves as individual substances. On the other hand, forms which cannot exist of themselves, but are called beings inasmuch as something exists by them, do not operate of themselves but are said to act inasmuch as their subjects act through them. For just as heat itself is not a thing having existence (id quod est), but is that by which something is hot, so heat itself does not heat anything, but is that by which a hot thing heats something. Therefore, if the sentient soul could operate of itself [i.e., without the body], it would follow that it would subsist of itself, and thus would not be corrupted when the body is corrupted; but then the souls of brute animals would also be immortal. This is impossible, yet Plato is said to have conceded this [Phaedo 21].
Manifestum est igitur quod nulla operatio partis sensitivae potest esse animae tantum ut operetur; sed est compositi per animam, sicut calefactio est calidi per calorem. Compositum igitur est videns et audiens, et omnia sentiens, sed per animam; unde etiam compositum est potens videre et audire et sentire, sed per animam. Manifestum est ergo quod potentiae partis sensitivae sunt in composito sicut in subiecto; sed sunt ab anima sicut a principio. Destructo igitur corpore, destruuntur potentiae sensitivae, sed remanent in anima sicut in principio. Et hoc est quod alia opinio dicit, quod potentiae sensitivae manent in anima separata solum sicut in radice. It is evident then that no operation of the sentient part can belong to the soul alone in such a way that it can be exercised by the soul alone; but such operations belong to the composite because of the soul, just as the act of heating belongs to the hot thing on account of its heat. Hence the composite sees, hears, and senses all things, but [it does this] through its soul. Consequently the composite is capable of seeing, hearing, and sensing, but [it performs these] because of its soul. Hence it is clear that the powers of the sentient part exist in the composite as their subject, but come from the soul as their principle. Therefore, when the body is corrupted the sentient powers cease to exist, although they remain in the soul as in their principle. This is what the other position maintains, namely, that the sentient powers remain in the separated soul as in their root.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod potentiae sensitivae non sunt de essentia animae, sed sunt proprietates naturales: compositi quidem ut subiecti, animae vero ut principii. 1. The sentient powers do not belong to the essence of the soul, but, in fact, are natural properties of the composite as their subject and of the soul as their principle.
Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi potentiae dicuntur in anima separata remanere ut in radice, non quia sint actu in ipsa, sed quia anima separata est talis virtutis, ut si uniatur corpori iterum potest causare has potentias in corpore; sicut et vitam. 2. Powers of this kind are said to remain in the soul as in their root, when it exists apart from the body, not because they are actually present in the soul, but because the separated soul’s virtually such that, if it is united to a body, it can again cause these powers in the body, and life as well.
Ad tertium dicendum quod illam auctoritatem non oportet nos recipere, cum liber iste falsum habeat auctorem in titulo: non enim est Augustini, sed cuiusdam alterius. Posset tamen illa auctoritas exponi, ut dicatur quod anima trahit secum huiusmodi potentias non actu, sed virtute. 3. We do not have to accept this authority because this false book has authority in name only. For it was not written by Augustine but by some other person.’s Moreover, that authority can be openly exposed inasmuch as it says that the soul draws with it powers of this kind not actually but virtually.
Ad quartum dicendum quod potentiae animae non sunt partes essentiales, vel integrales, sed potentiales; ita tamen quod quaedam earum insunt animae secundum se, quaedam vero composito. 4. The powers of the soul are neither essential parts nor integral parts but potential parts. However, some of these belong to the soul in virtue of itself, and others belong to the composite.
Ad quintum dicendum quod sensus dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo ipsa anima sensitiva, quae est huiusmodi potentiarum principium; et sic per sensum animal est animal sicut per propriam formam. Hoc enim modo a sensu sensibile sumitur, prout est differentia constitutiva animalis. Alio modo dicitur sensus ipsa potentia sensitiva, quae, cum sit proprietas naturalis ut dictum est, non est constitutiva speciei, sed consequens speciem. Hoc igitur modo sensus non manet in anima separata, sed sensus primo modo dictus manet. Nam in homine eadem est essentia animae sensibilis et rationalis. Unde nihil prohibet hominem resurgentem esse idem animal numero. Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit idem numero, sufficit quod principia essentialia sint eadem numero; non autem requiritur quod proprietates et accidentia sint eadem numero. 5. Sense is spoken of in two ways. In one way as the sentient soul itself which is the principle of powers of this kind, and in this way the animal is an animal by sense as by its proper form. For in this way “sensible” is taken from sense inasmuch as it is the constitutive difference of “animal.” Sense is spoken of in another way as the sentient power itself, which, since it is a natural property, as has been pointed out, is not a constitutive part of the species, but is the natural effect of the species. Therefore sense does not remain in the separated soul in the latter way, but sense does remain in the first way spoken Of, for in man the essence of the rational soul and that of the sentient soul is one and the same. Consequently nothing prevents a man who rises from the dead from being the same man numerically, for, in order that something be numerically the same, it is enough that the essential principles remain numerically the same. However, it is not necessary that the properties and accidents be numerically the same.
Ad sextum dicendum quod Augustinus videtur hoc retractasse in libro Retractationum. Dicit enim II super Genes. ad Litt., quod poenae Inferni secundum imaginariam visionem sunt, et quod locus Inferni non est corporeus, sed imaginarius. Unde coactus fuit reddere rationem, si Infernus non est locus corporeus, quare Inferi dicuntur esse sub terra. Et hoc ipsemet reprehendit dicens: de Inferis magis mihi videtur docere debuisse quod sub terris sint, quam rationem reddere cur sub terris esse credantur sive dicantur, quasi non ita sit. Hoc autem retractato quod de loco Inferni dixerat, videntur omnia alia retractari quae ad hoc pertinent. 6. Augustine seems to have revoked this in his Retractiones [II, 24]. For he says in Super Genesim ad litteram [II, 32] that the punishments of hell exist by reason of imaginary vision, and that this place hell is not corporeal but imaginary. Whereupon this view was withdrawn to conform with the reason that if hell is not a corporeal place, why is it said that hell is underground. And he reproves himself for this, saying: “Concerning the damned, it seems to me that it should be taught that they are under the earth rather than question why they are believed to be or are said to be under the earth, as if this were not so.” However, what he said about the place of hell has been retracted, and all other things which pertain to this seem to be retracted.
Ad septimum dicendum quod in anima separata non est gaudium neque ira, secundum quod sunt actus irascibilis et concupiscibilis, quae sunt in sensitiva parte; sed secundum quod his designatur motus voluntatis, quae est in parte intellectiva. 7. In separated souls there is neither joy nor sorrow so far as these are acts of the irascible and concupiscible appetites which belong to the sentient part of the soul, but so far as the movement of the will, which is in the intellective part, is signified by these.
Ad octavum dicendum quod quia malum hominis est secundum tria scilicet phantasiam protervam, quae scilicet est principium errandi, concupiscentiam amentem et irrationalem furorem, propter hoc Dionysius malum Daemonis sub similitudine humani mali describit. Non ut intelligatur in Daemonibus esse phantasia, aut irascibilis, aut concupiscibilis, quae sunt in parte sensitiva; sed aliqua his proportionata, secundum quod competit naturae intellectivae. 8. Because human evil is a result of one of three things, namely, a wanton imagination which is the principle of error, a love of concupiscence, and irrational anger, Dionysius describes the evil of the demons in likeness to human evil; not that it is to be understood that there is imagination in the demons, or irascible and concupiscible appetites which are in the sentient part of the soul, but that in them there is something proportionate to these as becomes their intellective nature.
Ad nonum dicendum quod per verba illa Augustini non intelligitur quod anima aliqua sentiat absque organo corporali; sed quod aliqua sentiat absque ipsis corporibus sensibilibus, utpote metum et tristitiam; aliqua vero per ipsa corpora, utpote calidum et frigidum. 9. We must not understand by these words of Augustine that the soul senses something without a bodily organ, but that it senses something without sensible bodies themselves, for instance, fear and sorrow. Again it senses other things through the body itself, for example, heat and cold.
Ad decimum dicendum quod omne quod est in aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis. Unde res sensibiles sunt in anima separata non per modum sensibilem, sed per modum intelligibilem. 10. Whatever exists in another, exists in that thing according to the mode of the recipient. Consequently sensible things do not exist in the separated soul according to a sensible mode but according to an intelligible one.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod nihil prohibet in descriptione rerum gestarum aliqua metaphorice dici. Licet enim quod dicitur in Evangelio de Lazaro et divite sit res gesta, tamen metaphorice dicitur quod Lazarus vidit et audivit, sicut et metaphorice dicitur quod linguam habuit. 11. Nothing prevents us from speaking of certain facts metaphorically, for, although the story related in the Gospel about Lazarus and the rich man is a fact, still it is said metaphorically that Lazarus saw and heard, just as it is also said metaphorically that he had a tongue.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod substantia animae sensibilis in homine manet post mortem; non tamen manent potentiae sensitivae. 12. The substance of the sentient soul remains in man after death. However, the sentient powers do not.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod sicut sensus, prout nominat potentiam, non est forma totius corporis, sed anima sensitiva, sensus autem est proprietas compositi; ita etiam potentia visiva non est actus oculi, sed anima secundum quod est principium talis potentiae. Quasi ita dicatur quod anima visiva est actus oculi, sicut anima sensitiva est actus corporis; potentia autem visiva est proprietas consequens. Unde non oportet quod sit alius oculus resurgentis, licet alia sit potentia sensitiva. 13. just as sense, inasmuch as it is called a power, is not the form of the whole body but the sentient soul itself (moreover, sense is a property of the composite), so neither is the power of vision the act of the eye, but that of the soul itself as the principle of such a power; just as it may be said that the visive soul is the act of the eye as the sentient soul is the act of the body. Moreover the power of vision is a property consequent on this. Therefore it is not necessary that there be a different eye for the resurrected individual, although there is a different sentient power.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod praemium non respondet merito sicut praemiando, sed sicut ei pro quo aliquid praemiatur. Unde non oportet quod omnes actus resumantur in remuneratione quibus aliquis meruit, sed sufficit quod sint in divina recordatione. Alias oporteret iterum sanctos occidi; quod est absurdum. 14. Reward does not correspond to merit as rewarding, but as that on account of which some reward is given. Consequently it is not necessary that all the acts by which some one merits reward, should be brought back into existence again when the reward is actually given. It is sufficient that they exist in the divine memory. Otherwise it would be necessary for the saints to die a second time, which is absurd.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod anima est principium sentiendi, non sicut sentiens, sed sicut id quo sentiens sentit. Unde potentiae sensitivae non sunt in anima sicut in subiecto, sed sunt ab anima sicut a principio. 15. The soul is a principle of sensing, not as a thing that senses, but as that by which a sensing thing senses. Consequently the sentient powers do not exist in the soul as a subject, but come from the soul as a principle.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod anima separata recordatur per memoriam, non quae est in parte sensitiva, sed quae est in parte intellectiva; prout Augustinus ponit eam partem imaginis. 16. The separated soul does not remember through the memory which belongs to its sentient part, but through that which belongs to its intellective part, inasmuch as Augustine considers this to be part of the image [of God in us].
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod virtutes et vitia, quae sunt irrationabilium partium, non manent in anima separata nisi in suis principiis; omnium enim virtutum semina sunt in voluntate et ratione. 17. The virtues and vices which belong to the irrational part of the soul remain in the soul only in principle, for the seeds of all the virtues are found in the will and the reason.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, anima separata a corpore non eumdem modum habet cognoscendi sicut cum est in corpore. Eorum ergo quae apprehendit anima separata secundum modum sibi proprium absque phantasmatibus, remanet cognitio in ea postquam ad pristinum statum redit, corpori iterato coniuncta, secundum modum tunc sibi convenientem, scilicet cum conversione ad phantasmata. Et ideo quae intelligibiliter viderunt, imaginabiliter narrant. 18. The soul does not understand in the same manner when it exists apart from the body as it does when it exists in the body, as is evident from the preceding articles (Arts. XVII and XVIII). Therefore, concerning those things which the separated soul apprehends in the manner proper to it without phantasms, this knowledge remains in the soul after it returns to its former state. Having been joined to the body again, the soul now understands in a manner befitting it, that is, by turning to phantasms. And for this reason things grasped intelligibly are narrated imaginatively.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum quod intellectus indiget auxilio sensus secundum statum imperfectae cognitionis, prout scilicet accipit a phantasmatibus; non autem secundum perfectiorem cognitionis modum, qui competit animae separatae. Sicut homo indiget lacte in pueritia, non tamen in perfecta aetate. 19. The intellect requires the aid of the senses because of the imperfect kind of knowledge which it has, that is, inasmuch as it receives [species] from phantasms. But this is not true with respect to the more perfect mode of knowledge possessed by the separated soul; just as a man requires milk in infancy but not when fully grown.
Ad vicesimum dicendum quod potentiae sensitivae non debilitantur secundum se debilitatis organis, sed solum per accidens; unde et per accidens corrumpuntur corruptis organis. 20. The sentient powers are not weakened absolutely because their organs are weakened, but only accidentally. Consequently they are corrupted accidentally when their organs are corrupted.
ARTICLE 20
WHETHER THE SOUL, WHEN SEPARATED FROM THE BODY, KNOWS SINGULAR THINGS

[Summa theol., I, q.89, a.4; Contra Gentiles, II, 100; Sent., IV. dist. 50, q. 1, a. 3; De ver., q. 19, a. 2.]
Vicesimo quaeritur utrum anima separata singularia cognoscat In the twentieth article we examine this question: Whether the soul, when separated from the body, knows singular things.
Objections.
Et videtur quod non. Quia de potentiis animae in anima separata remanet solus intellectus. Sed obiectum intellectus est universale et non singulare; scientia enim est universalium, sensus autem singularium, ut dicitur in I de anima. Ergo anima separata non cognoscit singularia, sed tantum universalia. 1. It seems that the separated soul does not know singular things, because of all the soul’s powers, only the intellect remains in the soul when it exists apart from the body. Now the object of the intellect is the universal and not the singular, for science has to do with the universal, whereas the senses are directed to singulars, as is stated in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 10]. Therefore the separated soul does not know singulars but only universals.
Praeterea, si anima separata cognoscit singularia aut per formas prius acquisitas, cum esset in corpore; aut per formas influxas. Sed non per formas prius acquisitas. Nam formarum quas anima per sensus acquirit dum est in corpore, quaedam sunt intentiones individuales, quae conservantur in potentiis partis sensitivae; et sic remanere non possunt in anima separata, cum huiusmodi potentiae non maneant in ea, ut ostensum est. Quaedam autem intentiones sunt universales, quae sunt in intellectu, unde hae solae manere possunt. Sed per intentiones universales non possunt cognosci singularia. Ergo anima separata non potest cognoscere singularia per species quas acquisivit in corpore. Similiter autem neque per species influxas; quia huiusmodi species aequaliter se habent ad omnia singularia. Unde sequeretur quod anima separata omnia singularia cognosceret; quod non videtur esse verum. 2. Further, if the separated soul knows singulars, it does so either through the forms which it acquired previously while it existed in the body, or through infused forms. Now it does not know singulars through forms acquired previously, for some of the forms which the soul acquired through the senses while it existed in the body, are individual intentions, which are conserved in the sentient part [of the soul]; but these cannot remain in the soul when it is separated from the body, because powers of this kind do not remain in the soul, as has been shown (Art. 19). Some intentions, however, that is, those which are in the intellect, are universal; therefore these alone can remain in the separated soul. But singulars cannot be known through universal intentions. Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars through the species acquired while it existed in the body. Similarly, it cannot know singulars through infused forms, because such forms represent all singulars equally. Therefore it would follow that the separated soul knows all singulars. This does not appear to be the case.
Praeterea, cognitio animae separatae impeditur per loci distantiam. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de cura pro mortuis gerenda, quod animae mortuorum ibi sunt ubi ea quae hic fiunt, omnino scire non possunt. Cognitionem autem quae fit per species influxas, non impedit loci distantia. Ergo anima non cognoscit singularia per species influxas. 3. Further, the separated soul is prevented from knowing a thing that is located in a different place from itself. For Augustine says in the book De cura pro mortuis agenda [13] that the souls of the dead are in a place where they cannot know in any way whatever the things that occur here. But knowledge that is caused through infused species is not prevented because of a difference of place. Therefore the soul does not know singulars through infused species.
Praeterea, species influxae aequaliter se habent ad praesentia et futura: non enim influxus intelligibilium specierum est sub tempore. Si igitur anima separata cognoscit singularia per species influxas, videtur quod non solum cognoscat praesentia vel praeterita, sed etiam futura; quod esse non potest, ut videtur. Cum cognoscere futura sit solius Dei, prout dicitur Is., X: annuntiate quae ventura sunt in fine, et dicam quod dii estis vos. 4. Further, infused species are related equally both to the present and to the future, for the infusion of intelligible species is not affected by time. Therefore, if the separated soul knows singulars through infused species-, it seems that it does not know the present or the past, but only the future. However, it appears that this cannot be the case, because knowledge of the future belongs to God alone; for it is said: “Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods” (Isa. 41:23).
Praeterea, singularia sunt infinita. Species autem influxae non sunt infinitae. Non ergo anima separata per species influxas potest singularia cognoscere. 5. Further, singular things are infinite. Infused species, however, are not infinite. Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars through infused species.
Praeterea, id quod est indistinctum non potest esse principium distinctae cognitionis. Cognitio autem singularium est distincta. Cum igitur formae influxae sint indistinctae, utpote universales existentes; videtur quod per species influxas anima separata, singularia cognoscere non possit. 6. Further, whatever is indistinct cannot be a principle of a distinct knowledge. But the knowledge of singulars is distinct. Therefore, since infused species are indistinct inasmuch as they are universal, it seems that the separated soul cannot know singular things through infused species.
Praeterea, omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis. Sed anima separata est immaterialis. Ergo formae influxae recipiuntur in ea immaterialiter. Sed quod est immateriale non potest esse principium cognitionis singularium, quae sunt individuata per materiam. Ergo anima separata per formas influxas non potest cognoscere singularia. 7. Further, whatever is received in a thing is received according to the mode of the recipient. Now the separated soul is immaterial. Therefore infused forms are received in it immaterially. But what is immaterial cannot be the principle of a knowledge of singular things which are individuated by matter. Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars through infused forms.
Sed dicebat quod per formas influxas possunt cognosci singularia, licet sint immateriales: quia sunt similitudines rationum idealium, quibus Deus et universalia et singularia cognoscit. &8212;Sed contra, Deus per rationes ideales cognoscit singularia, in quantum sunt factrices materiae, quae est principium individuationis. Sed formae influxae animae separatae non sunt materiae factrices, quia non sunt creatrices: hoc enim solius Dei est. Ergo anima separata per formas influxas non potest cognoscere singularia. 8. But it may be said that singular things can be known by infused forms, even though they are immaterial, because singulars are likenesses of the ideal exemplars by which God knows both universals and singulars. On the contrary, God knows singulars through the ideal exemplars inasmuch as they are productive of matter, which is the principle of individuation. But the forms infused in the separated soul are not productive of matter, because they do not create, for creation belongs to God alone. Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars through infused forms.
Praeterea, similitudo creaturae ad Deum non potest esse per univocationem, sed solum per analogiam. Sed cognitio quae fit per similitudinem analogiae, est imperfectissima; sicut si aliquid cognosceretur per alterum, in quantum convenit cum illo in ente. Si ergo anima separata cognoscit singularia per species influxas, in quantum sunt similes rationibus idealibus; videtur quod imperfectissime singularia cognoscat. 9. Further, the likeness which any creature bears to God cannot be a univocal likeness, but only an analogous one. Now a knowledge that is acquired because of some analogous similarity [between things] is the most imperfect sort of knowledge; for example, if one thing is known through something else inasmuch as it conforms with it in being. Therefore, if the separated soul knows singulars through infused species, inasmuch as they are like the ideal exemplars, it seems that it knows singulars in a most imperfect manner.
Praeterea, dictum est in praecedentibus, quod anima separata non cognoscit naturalia per formas influxas nisi in quadam confusione, et in universali. Hoc autem non est cognoscere. Ergo anima separata non cognoscit singularia per species influxas. 10. Further, it was shown in a preceding article (Art. 18), that the separated soul knows natural things through infused forms only indistinctly and in the universal. Now this is not to know them. Therefore the separated soul does not know singulars through infused species.
Praeterea, species illae influxae per quas anima separata singularia ponitur cognoscere, non causantur a Deo immediate: quia, secundum Dionysium, lex divinitatis est infima per media reducere. Nec iterum causantur per Angelum: quia Angelus huiusmodi species causare non potest neque creando, cum nullius rei sit creator; neque transmutando, quia oportet esse aliquod medium differens. Ergo videtur quod anima separata non habeat species influxas, per quas singularia cognoscat. 11. Further, those infused species through which the separated soul admittedly knows singular things, are not caused immediately by God; because, according to Dionysius, the divine law (lex divinitatis) is to change the lowest thing through an intermediary. On the other hand, neither are infused species caused by an angel; because an angel cannot cause species of this kind, either by creating them, since it never creates anything; or by changing something, because this requires a communicating medium. Therefore it seems that the separated soul does not possess infused species through which it may know singulars.
Praeterea, si anima separata cognoscit singularia per species influxas, hoc non potest esse nisi dupliciter. Vel applicando species ad singularia, vel convertendo se ad ipsas species. Si applicando ad singularia, constat quod huiusmodi applicatio non fit accipiendo aliquid a singularibus; cum non habeat potentias sensitivas quae natae sunt a singularibus accipere. Relinquitur ergo quod haec applicatio fit ponendo aliquid circa singularia; et sic non cognoscet ipsa singularia, sed hoc tantum quod circa singularia ponit. Si autem per species dictas cognoscit singularia convertendo se ad ipsas, sequetur quod non cognoscet singularia nisi secundum quod sunt in ipsis speciebus. Sed in speciebus praedictis non sunt singularia nisi universaliter. Ergo anima separata non cognoscit singularia nisi in universali. 12. Further, if the separated soul knows singular things through infused species, this can occur only in one of two ways: either by applying species to singulars, or by turning itself toward the species themselves. If the soul knows singulars by applying species to singulars, it follows that such an application, is not made by deriving something from singular things themselves, because the separated soul does not have sentient powers naturally disposed to receive [species] from singulars. Therefore it remains that this application is made by premising something about singulars; and thus the soul will not know singulars themselves, but only what it premises about them. However, if the separated soul knows singulars through the aforesaid species by turning itself toward them, it follows that it will know singulars only so far as they exist in the species themselves. But singulars exist only universally in the aforesaid species. Therefore the separated soul knows singulars only in the universal.
Praeterea, nullum finitum super infinita potest. Sed singularia sunt infinita. Cum igitur virtus animae separatae sit finita, videtur quod anima separata non cognoscat singularia. 13. further, nothing finite can be superior to infinite things. But singulars are infinite. Therefore, since the power of the separated soul is finite, it seems that the separated soul does not know singulars.
Praeterea, anima separata non potest cognoscere aliquid nisi visione intellectuali. Sed Augustinus, XII super Genesim ad Litt., dicit quod visione intellectuali non cognoscuntur neque corpora neque similitudines. Cum igitur singularia sint corpora, videtur quod ab anima separata cognosci non possunt. 14. Further, the separated soul can know a thing only by intellectual vision. Now Augustine says in the De Genesi ad litteram [XII, 24] that separated souls by their intellectual vision know neither bodies nor the likenesses of bodies. Therefore, since singular things are bodies, it seems that they cannot be known by the separated soul.
Praeterea, ubi est eadem natura, et idem est modus operandi. Sed anima separata est eiusdem naturae cum anima coniuncta corpori. Cum ergo anima coniuncta corpori non possit cognoscere singularia per intellectum, videtur quod nec anima separata. 15. Further, wherever the nature is the same, the mode of operation is also the same. Now a separated soul possesses the same nature as a soul that is joined to a body. Therefore, since the soul by its intellect cannot know singulars when it is joined to the body, it seems that it cannot know singulars when it exists apart from the body.
Praeterea, potentiae distinguuntur per obiecta. Sed propter quod unumquodque, illud magis. Ergo obiecta sunt magis distincta quam potentiae. Sed sensus nunquam fiet intellectus. Ergo singulare, quod est sensibile, nunquam fiet intelligibile. 16. Further, powers are distinguished by their objects. But the cause [in this case, the object] possesses that which it produces [viz., distinction] in a higher degree. Therefore the diversity among objects is greater than that found among powers. But a sense never becomes an intellect. Hence the singular, which is the object of sense, never becomes an object of the intellect.
Praeterea, potentia cognoscitiva superioris ordinis minus multiplicatur respectu eorumdem cognoscibilium quam potentia inferioris ordinis. Sensus enim communis est cognoscitivus omnium quae per quinque exteriores sensus apprehenduntur. Et similiter Angelus una potentia cognoscitiva, scilicet intellectu, cognoscit universalia et singularia, quae homo sensu et intellectu apprehendit. Sed nunquam potentia inferioris ordinis potest apprehendere id quod est alterius potentiae quae ab ea distinguitur, sicut visus nunquam potest apprehendere obiectum auditus. Ergo intellectus hominis nunquam potest apprehendere singulare, quod est obiectum sensus, licet intellectus Angeli cognoscat utrumque et apprehendat. 17. Further, a cognitive power of a superior order is less complex (multiplicatur), with respect to the same cognizable object, than a power of an inferior order; for the common sense knows all things apprehended by the five external senses; and likewise an angel, by one cognitive power, namely, by its intellect, knows both the universals and singulars which a man apprehends by his senses and his intellect. Now no power of an inferior order can apprehend the object of another power which differs [specifically] from itself, just as sight can never apprehend the object of hearing. Therefore a man’s intellect can never apprehend a singular which is the object of sense, although an angel’s intellect knows and apprehends both.
Praeterea, in libro de causis dicitur quod intelligentia cognoscit res in quantum est causa eis, vel in quantum regit eas. Sed anima separata neque causat singularia, neque regit singularia. Ergo non cognoscit ea. 18. Further, it is said in the work De causis [23] that an intelligence knows things inasmuch as it causes them or directs them. But the separated soul can neither cause singulars nor direct them. Therefore it does not know singulars.
Sed contra. Arguments against the conclusions of these objections.
Formare propositiones non est nisi intellectus. Sed anima, etiam coniuncta corpori, format propositionem cuius subiectum est singulare, praedicatum universale; ut cum dico: Socrates est homo. Quod non possum facere nisi cognoscerem singulare et comparationem eius ad universale. Ergo etiam anima separata per intellectum cognoscit singularia. 1. On the contrary, to form propositions belongs to the intellect alone. Now the soul, when still joined to the body, forms propositions, the subject of which is a singular, and the predicate of which is a universal; for example, when I say: Socrates is a man; but I cannot do this unless I know the singular and its relationship to the universal. Therefore the separated soul really knows singulars by its intellect.
Praeterea, anima est inferior secundum naturam omnibus Angelis. Sed Angeli inferioris hierarchiae recipiunt illuminationes singularium effectuum; et in hoc distinguuntur ab Angelis mediae hierarchiae, qui recipiunt illuminationes secundum rationes universales effectuum; et ab Angelis supremae, qui recipiunt illuminationes secundum rationes universales existentes in causa. Cum igitur tanto sit magis particularis cognitio, quanto substantia cognoscens est inferioris ordinis; videtur quod anima separata multo fortius singularia cognoscat. 2. Further, the soul is inferior in nature to every angel. Now the angels of a lower hierarchy receive illuminations about singular effects. In this way they are distinguished from the angels of an intermediary hierarchy, who receive illuminations according to the universal likenesses (rationes) of these effects. They are also distinguished from the angels of a supreme hierarchy, who receive their illuminations according to the universal likenesses existing in their cause [i.e., God]. Therefore, since the more particular in nature a knowledge is, the lower is, the order of existence of the substance possessing such knowledge, it seems that the soul knows singulars in a much more desirable way when it exists apart from the body.
Praeterea, quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest superior. Sed sensus potest cognoscere singularia, qui est inferior intellectu. Ergo anima separata secundum intellectum potest singularia cognoscere. 3. Further, whatever an inferior power can do, a superior power can do. Now sense, which is inferior to the intellect, can know singulars. Therefore the separated soul can know singulars by its intellect.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod necesse est dicere, quod anima separata quaedam singularia cognoscat, non tamen omnia. Cognoscit autem singularia quaedam, quorum prius cognitionem accepit dum corpori esset unita; aliter enim non recordaretur eorum quae gessit in vita, et sic periret ab anima separata conscientiae vermis. Cognoscit etiam quaedam singularia quorum cognitionem accepit post separationem a corpore; aliter enim non affligeretur ab igne Inferni, et ab aliis corporalibus poenis quae in Inferno esse dicuntur. Quod autem non omnia singularia cognoscat anima separata secundum naturalem cognitionem, ex hoc manifestum est quod animae mortuorum nesciunt ea quae hic aguntur, ut Augustinus dicit. I answer: We must say that, when the soul exists apart from the body it knows some singulars, but not all of them. Now it knows some of the singulars of which it first acquired knowledge while united to the body, otherwise it would not remember the things which it did in this life-, and thus remorse of conscience would vanish from the separated soul. It knows also those singulars of which it acquires knowledge after being separated from the body, otherwise it would not be punished by the fire of hell and by the other corporeal punishments which are said to exist in hell. However, that the separated soul does not know all singulars by its natural knowledge, is shown by the fact that the souls of the dead are not aware of things that occur here, as Augustine says [De cura pro mort., 13].
Habet igitur haec quaestio duas difficultates: unam communem et aliam propriam. Communis quidem difficultas est ex hoc quod intellectus noster non videtur esse cognoscitivus singularium, sed universalium tantum. Unde cum Deo et Angelis et animae separatae non competat aliqua cognoscitiva potentia nisi solus intellectus, difficile videtur quod eis singularium cognitio adsit. Unde quidam in tantum erraverunt, ut Deo et Angelis cognitionem singularium subtraherent; quod est omnino impossibile. Nam hoc posito, providentia divina excluderetur a rebus, et iudicium Dei de humanis actibus tolleretur. Auferrentur etiam et ministeria Angelorum, quos de salute hominum credimus esse sollicitos, secundum illud apostoli: omnes sunt administratorii spiritus in ministerium missi propter eos qui hereditatem capiunt salutis. Therefore this inquiry involves two difficulties: one common [to intellectual nature as such] and one proper [to human nature]. The difficulty common to intellectual nature as such arises from the fact that our intellect does not seem to be capable of knowing singulars, but only universals. Therefore, since intelligence. is the only cognitive power proper to God, to the angels, and to the separated soul, it appears difficult to see how they can possess a knowledge of singulars. For this reason some men made the mistake of denying any knowledge of singulars to God and the angels; but this is altogether impossible. For if this position were adopted, divine providence would be excluded from things, the judgment of God concerning human acts would disappear, and the ministering of the angels would also be removed, for we believe that the angels are solicitous of the safety of man, as the Apostle says: “Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them, who shall receive the inheritance of salvation?” (Heb. 1:14)
Et ideo alii dixerunt Deum quidem et Angelos, necnon et animas separatas, singularia cognoscere per cognitionem universalium causarum totius ordinis universali. Nihil enim est in rebus singularibus quod ex illis universalibus causis non derivetur. Et ponunt exemplum: sicut si aliquis cognosceret totum ordinem caeli et stellarum, et mensuram et motus eorum, sciret per intellectum omnes futuras eclypses, et quantae, et quibus in locis, et quibus temporibus futurae essent. Sed hoc non sufficit ad veram singularium cognitionem. Manifestum est enim quod quantumcumque adunentur aliqua universalia, nunquam ex eis perficitur singulare. Sicut si dicam hominem album, musicum et quaecumque huiusmodi addidero, nunquam erit singulare. Possibile est enim omnia haec adunata pluribus convenire. Unde qui cognoscit omnes causas in universali, nunquam propter hoc proprie cognoscet aliquem singularem effectum. Nec ille qui cognoscit totum ordinem caeli, cognoscit hanc eclypsim ut est hic. Etsi enim cognoscat eclypsim futuram esse in tali situ solis et lunae, et in tali hora, et quaecumque huiusmodi in eclypsibus observantur; tamen talem eclypsim possibile est pluries evenire. For this reason some said that God, the angels, and separated souls as well, know the whole order of the universe through a knowledge of universal causes; for there is nothing in singular things that is not derived from these universal causes. They offer the example that, if anyone should know the whole order of the stars and the heavens, and their measure and movement, he would know, by means of his intellect, all future eclipses, both their number, in what places they would occur, and at what time they would take place in the future. But this is insufficient for a true knowledge of singulars. For it is clear that, no matter how closely universals may be united, a complete singular never results from their union: just as if I say man, white, musical, and will have added whatever others are possible, a singular will never result from them; since it is possible for all these universals, which are joined together, to belong to many men. Therefore anyone who knows all causes universally, never knows expressly any singular effect as a result of such knowledge. Nor does one who knows the whole order of the heavens know this eclipse inasmuch as it is this [i.e., as a singular], for although he knows that a future eclipse will occur at such a position of the sun and moon, at such an hour, and whatever else is to be observed in eclipses of this kind, yet it is possible for an eclipse of this specific kind to occur frequently.
Et ideo alii, ut veram cognitionem singularium Angelis et animabus adscriberent, dixerunt quod huiusmodi cognitionem ab ipsis singularibus accipiunt. Sed hoc est omnino inconveniens. Cum enim maxima sit distantia inter intelligibile et esse materiale et sensibile, non statim forma rei materialis ab intellectu accipitur, sed per multa media ad eum deducitur. Puta, forma alicuius sensibilis prius fit in medio, ubi est spiritualior quam in re sensibili, et postmodum in organo sensus; et exinde derivatur ad phantasiam, et ad alias inferiores vires; et ulterius tandem perducitur ad intellectum. Haec autem media nec etiam fingere possibile est competere Angelis, aut animae separatae. Therefore others, that they might ascribe a true knowledge of singulars to the angels, maintained that knowledge of this sort is derived from singulars themselves. But this is quite incongruous; for, since the greatest difference exists between an intelligible mode of existing and a material and sensible mode of existing, the form of a material thing is not received immediately by the intellect, but is carried to it through a number of intermediaries; for example, the form of a sensible thing first exists in a medium wherein it is more spirituals than in the sensible thing itself; next it exists in a sense organ; and from there is drawn into the imagination and the other inferior [sense] powers; and finally it is carried to the intellect. Now it is inconceivable that such media should play any role either in the knowledge of an angel or in that of a separated soul.
Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod formae rerum, per quas intellectus cognoscit, dupliciter se habent ad res: quaedam enim sunt factivae rerum, quaedam autem a rebus acceptae. Et illae quidem quae sunt rerum factivae, in tantum ducunt in cognitionem rei, in quantum eius factivae existunt; unde artifex qui artificiato tradit formam vel dispositionem materiae, per formam artis cognoscit artificiatum quantum ad illud quod in eo causat. Et quia nulla ars hominis causat materiam, sed accipit eam iam praeexistentem, quae est individuationis principium; ideo artifex per formam, puta aedificator, cognoscit domum in universali, non autem hanc domum ut est haec, nisi in quantum eius notitiam accipit per sensum. Therefore it must be said, on the contrary, that the forms of things through which the intellect knows, are related to things in a twofold manner: for some forms are productive of things, while others are derived from them; and forms which are productive of things lead to a knowledge of a thing inasmuch as they are productive of it. Thus the artisan who gives *the form to the thing made, or gives some disposition to matter, knows the thing made by the form of his art as regards that which he causes in the thing. And because no human art causes matter, which is the principle of individuation, but receives matter already in existence, therefore the artisan, for example, a builder, knows the house in a universal way by its form, but he does not know this house as this house, except so far as he acquires knowledge of it through the senses.
Deus autem per intellectum suum non solum producit formam ex qua sumitur ratio universalis, sed etiam materiam quae est individuationis principium; unde per suam artem cognoscit et universalia et singularia. Sicut enim a divina arte effluunt res materiales ut subsistant in propriis naturis, ita ab eadem arte effluunt in substantias intellectuales separatas similitudines rerum intelligibiles, quibus res cognoscant secundum quod producuntur a Deo. Et ideo substantiae separatae cognoscunt non solum universalia, sed etiam singularia; in quantum species intelligibiles in eas a divina arte emanantes sunt similitudines rerum et secundum formam et secundum materiam. Now God, by His intellect, not only produces the form from which the universal notion (ratio) is derived, but also produces matter which is the principle of individuation. Consequently He knows by His art, both universals and singulars; for, as material things flow from the divine art, with the result that they subsist with their proper natures, so also by the same art do the likenesses of intelligible things flow into the separate intellectual substances, and these substances know the things produced by God, through these likenesses. Therefore the separate substances know not only universals, but singulars as well, inasmuch as the intelligible species which are infused in them by the divine art are the likenesses of things as regards both their form and their matter.
Nec est inconveniens, formam quae est factiva rei, quamvis sit immaterialis, esse similitudinem rei et quantum ad formam et quantum ad materiam. Quia semper in aliquo altiori est aliquid uniformius quam sit in inferiori natura. Unde licet in natura sensibili sit aliud forma et materia; tamen id quod est altius et causa utriusque, unum existens se habet ad utramque. Propter quod superiores substantiae immaterialiter materialia cognoscunt, et uniformiter divisa, ut Dionysius dicit. Formae autem intelligibiles a rebus acceptae per quamdam abstractionem a rebus accipiuntur; unde non ducunt in cognitionem rei quantum ad id a quo fit abstractio, sed quantum ad id quod abstrahitur tantum. Et sic cum formae receptae in intellectu nostro a rebus sint abstractae a materia et ab omnibus conditionibus materiae, non ducunt in cognitionem singularium, sed universalium tantum. Haec est igitur ratio quare substantiae separatae possunt per intellectum singularia cognoscere, cum tamen intellectus noster cognoscat universalia tantum. Nor is it improper for a form which is productive of a thing, even though the form itself is immaterial, to be the likeness of a thing as regards both its form and its matter, because a thing always exists more simply in a superior nature than it does in an inferior one. Therefore, although form and matter are diverse in the sensible nature, nevertheless that which is higher and the cause of both, is related to both as one existing thing; and for this reason superior substances know material things immaterially, and diverse things unitedly, as Dionysius says.’ However, intelligible forms that are derived from things are acquired by abstraction. Hence they do not give rise to knowledge of the thing as such, but only to a knowledge of what is abstracted from the thing. Therefore, since the forms in our intellect, which are derived from things, are abstracted from matter and from all material conditions, they do not lead to a knowledge of singulars, but to a knowledge of universals alone. This, therefore, is the reason why separate substances can know singulars by their intellect, whereas, on the other hand, our intellect knows only universals.
Sed circa singularium cognitionem aliter se habet intellectus angelicus, et aliter animae separatae. Diximus enim in superioribus quod efficacia virtutis intellectivae quae est in Angelis, est proportionata universalitati formarum intelligibilium in eis existentium. Et ideo per huiusmodi formas universales cognoscunt omnia ad quae se extendunt. Unde, sicut cognoscunt omnes species rerum naturalium sub generibus existentes, ita cognoscunt omnia singularia rerum naturalium quae sub speciebus continentur. Efficacia autem virtutis intellectivae animae separatae non est proportionata universalitati formarum influxarum, sed magis est proportionata formis a rebus acceptis; propter quod naturale est animae corpori uniri. Et ideo supra dictum est quod anima separata non cognoscit omnia naturalia, etiam secundum species, determinate et complete, sed in quadam universalitate et confusione. Unde nec species influxae sufficiunt in eis ad cognitionem singularium, ut sic possint cognoscere omnia singularia, sicut Angeli cognoscunt. Now an angelic intellect and a separated soul are differently situated so far as the knowledge of singulars is concerned. For we explained in a previous article (Art. 18) that the efficacy of the angels’ intellective power is proportioned to the universality of the intelligible forms which they possess; and therefore they know through universal forms of this kind all the things to which these forms extend. Therefore, just as they know all the species of natural things existing under their genera, so they know all the singular natural things contained under their species. However, the efficacy of the separated soul’s intellective power is not proportioned to the universality of infused forms, but, on the contrary, is proportioned to forms abstracted from things. For this reason it is natural for the soul to be united to a body. Therefore it was said above that the separated soul does not know all natural things determinately and completely, even with regard to their species, but that it can know them in a certain general and indeterminate manner. Consequently the infused species [which separated souls possess] are not sufficient for a knowledge of singulars to the point of enabling those souls to know all singulars as the angels do.
Sed tamen huiusmodi species influxae determinantur in ipsa anima ad cognitionem aliquorum singularium, ad quae anima habet aliquem ordinem specialem vel inclinationem: sicut ad ea quae patitur, vel ad ea ad quae afficitur, vel quorum aliquae impressiones et vestigia in ea remanent. Omne enim receptum determinatur in recipiente secundum modum recipientis. Et sic patet quod anima separata cognoscit singularia; non tamen omnia, sed quaedam. Nevertheless these infused species in the soul are limited to a knowledge of those singulars to which the soul is specifically ordered or inclined, for example, those things which act upon it, either things afflicting it, or things which leave impressions and traces upon it. For whatever is received is limited [or determined] in the recipient in accordance with the condition of the recipient’s mode of being. Hence it is evident that the separated soul knows singulars; not all singulars, however, but only some of them.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus noster nunc cognoscit per species a rebus acceptas, quae sunt abstractae a materia et omnibus materiae conditionibus; et ideo non potest cognoscere singularia, quorum principium est materia, sed universalia tantum. Sed intellectus animae separatae habet formas influxas, per quas potest singularia cognoscere ratione iam dicta. 1. In this life our intellect knows through species derived from things, which species are abstracted from matter and from all material conditions; and therefore it cannot know singulars~ the principle of which is matter, but only universals. However, the separated soul’s intellect has infused forms through which it can know singulars, for the reason just given.
Ad secundum dicendum quod anima separata non cognoscit singularia per species prius acquisitas dum erat corpori unita, sed per species influxas; non tamen sequitur quod cognoscat omnia singularia, ut ostensum est. 2. When the soul exists apart from the body, it does not know singulars by the species which it previously acquired while united to the body, but by infused forms. However, it does not follow that it knows all singulars, as has been shown.
Ad tertium dicendum quod animae separatae non impediuntur a cognoscendis quae sunt hic, propter loci distantiam. Sed quia non est in eis tanta efficacia intellectivae virtutis, ut per species influxas omnia singularia cognoscere possint. 3. Separated souls are prevented from knowing things that occur here, not because they exist in a different place, but because they do not possess a sufficiently efficacious intellectual power whereby they can know all singulars through infused species.
Ad quartum dicendum quod nec etiam Angeli omnia futura contingentia cognoscunt. Per species enim influxas singularia cognoscunt, in quantum participant speciem. Unde futura quae nondum participant speciem in quantum futura sunt, ab eis non cognoscuntur, sed solum in quantum sunt praesentia in suis causis. 4. The angels do not know all future contingent things, for they know singulars through infused species inasmuch as they participate in these species. Hence future things, in whose species the angels do not yet participate, are not known by the angels inasmuch as they are future, but are known only inasmuch as they are present in their causes [i.e., as possibles].
Ad quintum dicendum quod Angeli qui cognoscunt omnia singularia naturalia, non habent tot species intelligibiles quot sunt singularia ab eis cognita; sed per unam speciem cognoscunt multa, ut in superioribus ostensum est. Animae vero separatae non cognoscunt omnia singularia. Unde quantum ad eas ratio non concludit. 5. The angels who know all singular natural things do not have as many intelligible species as there are singulars known through these species; but they know many things through one species, as we have shown above. Separated souls do not know all singulars. Consequently this objection does not apply so far as they are concerned.
Ad sextum dicendum quod si species essent a rebus acceptae, non possent esse propria ratio singularium a quibus abstrahuntur. Sed species influxae, cum sint similitudines idealium formarum quae sunt in mente divina, possunt distincte repraesentare singularia; maxime illa ad quae anima habet aliquam determinationem ex natura sua. 6. If [infused] species were derived from things, they could not be the proper [intellectual] likenesses of the singulars from which they are abstracted; but the infused species, since they are the likenesses of the ideal forms which are in the divine mind, can distinctly represent singulars, especially those which the soul is somehow determined to know by its nature.
Ad septimum dicendum quod species influxa quamvis sit immaterialis et distincta, est tamen similitudo rei et quantum ad formam et quantum ad materiam, in qua est distinctionis et individuationis principium ut expositum est. 7. Although an infused species is immaterial and distinct, yet it is the likeness of a thing as regards its form as well as its matter, which matter is the principle of distinction and individuation, as we have shown.
Ad octavum dicendum quod quamvis formae intelligibiles non sint creatrices rerum, sunt tamen similes formis creatricibus, non quidem in virtute creandi, sed in virtute repraesentandi res creatas. Aliquis enim artifex potest tradere artem aliquid faciendi alicui, cui tamen non adest virtus ut perficiat illud. 8. Although intelligible forms are not creative of things, nevertheless they are similar to creative forms, not indeed because they create, but because they represent created things. For an artisan by his art can communicate something to the thing which he makes, although the virtue [of the artisan) which perfects the thing, is not itself present to that thing.
Ad nonum dicendum quod quia formae influxae non sunt similes rationibus idealibus in mente divina existentibus nisi secundum analogiam, ideo per huiusmodi formas illae rationes ideales non perfecte cognosci possunt. Non tamen sequitur quod per eas imperfecte cognoscantur res quarum sunt rationes ideales. Huiusmodi enim res non sunt excellentiores formis influxis, sed e converso; unde per formas influxas perfecte comprehendi possunt. 9. Because infused forms are only analogously similar to the ideal exemplars existing in the divine mind, it follows that these ideal exemplars cannot be known perfectly through forms of this kind. However, it does not follow that the things of which these are the ideal exemplars, are known imperfectly by the infused forms; for things of this sort are not more excellent than infused forms, but rather the reverse. Consequently they can be understood perfectly through infused forms.
Ad decimum dicendum quod formae influxae determinantur ad cognitionem quorumdam singularium in anima separata ex ipsius animae dispositione, ut dictum est. 10. The infused forms in the separated soul are limited to a knowledge of certain singular things because of the soul’s own disposition, as we have shown.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod species influxae causantur in anima separata a Deo mediantibus Angelis. Nec obstat quod quaedam animae separatae sunt superiores quibusdam Angelis. Non enim nunc loquimur de cognitione gloriae, secundum quam anima potest esse Angelis vel similis, vel aequalis, vel etiam superior; sed loquimur de cognitione naturali, in qua anima deficit ab Angelo. Causantur autem huiusmodi formae in anima separata per Angelum, non per modum creationis; sed sicut id quod est in actu, reducit aliquid sui generis de potentia in actum. Et, cum huiusmodi actio non sit situalis, non oportet hic quaerere medium deferens situale; sed idem hic operatur ordo naturae quod in corporalibus ordo situs. 11. Infused species are caused in the separated soul by God through the intervention of the angels. Nor does this prevent some of the separated souls from being superior to some of the angels. For we are not speaking now of the knowledge of glory, in accordance with which the soul can be either similar, or equal, or even superior to an angel, but we are speaking of that natural knowledge [of the soul] wherein the soul is inferior to an angel. Moreover, forms of this kind are caused in the separated soul by an angel, not in a creative manner, but as something actual brings something in its genus from potentiality to actuality. And because such action is not spatial, it is unnecessary here to examine a conveying spatial medium. But the order of nature operates here in the same was as the order of place (situs) does in corporeal things.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod anima separata per species influxas cognoscit singularia, in quantum sunt similitudines singularium per modum iam dictum. Applicatio autem et conversio, de quibus in obiectione fit mentio, magis huiusmodi cognitionem concomitantur quam eam causent. 12. The separated soul knows singulars through infused species inasmuch as they are the likenesses of singulars in the manner just described. Moreover, application and conversion, mention of which is made in the objection, accompany knowledge of this kind rather than cause it.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod singularia non sunt infinita in actu, sed in potentia. Nec intellectus Angeli aut animae separatae prohibentur cognoscere infinita singularia unum post unum, cum et sensus hoc possit; et intellectus noster hoc modo cognoscit infinitas species numerorum. Sic enim infinitum non est in cognitione nisi successive, et secundum actum coniunctum potentiae; sicut etiam ponitur esse infinitum in rebus materialibus. 13. Singulars are not actually infinite but potentially infinite. Nor is the intellect of an angel or that of a separated soul prevented from knowing an infinite number of singulars one after another, because sense can also do this. And our intellect, in this way, knows infinite species of numbers, for the infinite exists in knowledge only successively, and according as act is allied with potency, as the infinite in material things is also considered to be.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod Augustinus non intendit dicere quod corpora et similitudines corporum non cognoscantur intellectu; sed quod intellectus non movetur in sua visione a corporibus, sicut sensus; nec a similitudinibus corporum, sicut imaginatio; sed ab intelligibili veritate. 14. Augustine did not intend to say that bodies and the likenesses of bodies are not known by the intellect, but that the intellect is not moved in its vision by bodies in the same way as the senses are, nor by the likenesses of bodies as the imagination is, but by intelligible truth.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod, licet anima separata sit eiusdem naturae cum anima coniuncta corporis, tamen propter separationem a corpore habet aspectum liberum ad substantias superiores, ut possit per eas recipere influxum intelligibilium formarum, per quas singularia cognoscat; quod non potest dum est corpori unita, ut in superioribus ostensum est. 15. Although a separated soul is of the same nature as a soul which is joined to a body, nevertheless, because of its separation from the body, the soul has the character proper to superior substances, so that it can receive from them the infused intelligible forms through which it knows singulars; which it cannot do while it is united to a body, as we have shown above (Art. 17).
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod singulare secundum quod est sensibile, scilicet secundum corporalem immutationem, nunquam fit intelligibile; sed secundum quod forma immaterialis intelligibilis ipsum repraesentare potest, ut ostensum est. 16. The singular inasmuch as it is sensible, that is, so far as it is subject to corporeal change, never becomes intelligible; but it becomes intelligible so far as an immaterial form can represent it, as has been shown.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod anima separata per suum intellectum recipit species intelligibiles per modum superioris substantiae, in qua una virtute cognoscitur quod homo duabus virtutibus, scilicet sensu et intellectu, cognoscit. Et ideo anima separata utrumque cognoscere potest. 17. The separated soul receives intelligible species by means of its intellect, after the manner of a superior substance which knows by one power what man knows by two, namely, by his sense and his intellect. And thus the separated soul can know both.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod anima separata quamvis non regat res vel causet eas, tamen habet formas similes causanti et regenti: non enim causans et regens cognoscit quod regitur et causatur nisi in quantum eius similitudinem habet. 18. Although the separated soul does not direct or cause those things, nevertheless it possesses forms similar to those which do cause and direct; for a being that causes and directs, knows what it directs and causes only inasmuch as it possesses the likeness of that thing.
Ad ea vero quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, etiam respondere oportet, quia falsum concludunt. We must also answer those arguments which are raised as contrary objections, because they are false.
Ad primum quorum dicendum est quod anima coniuncta corpori per intellectum cognoscit singulare, non quidem directe, sed per quamdam reflexionem; in quantum scilicet ex hoc quod apprehendit suum intelligibile, revertitur ad considerandum suum actum et speciem intelligibilem quae est principium suae operationis, et eius speciei originem. Et sic venit in considerationem phantasmatum et singularium, quorum sunt phantasmata. Sed haec reflexio compleri non potest nisi per adiunctionem virtutis cogitativae et imaginativae, quae non sunt in anima separata. Unde per modum istum anima separata singularia non cognoscit. 1. When the soul is joined to the body, it does not know singulars by its intellect directly, but by a certain reflection; that is, inasmuch as it apprehends its intelligible, it turns back to consider its act, the intelligible species (which is the principle of its operation) and the origin of its species; and in this way it proceeds to consider phantasms, and the singulars of which they are the phantasms. But this reflection can be completed only with the cooperation of the cogitative power (ratio particularis) and the imagination, which are not present in the separated soul. Hence the intellect does not know singulars in this way.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Angeli inferioris hierarchiae illuminantur de rationibus singularium effectuum, non per species singulares, sed per rationes universales, ex quibus cognoscere singularia possunt propter efficaciam virtutis intellectivae, in qua excedunt animam separatam. Et, licet rationes ab eis perceptae sint universales simpliciter, tamen dicuntur particulares per comparationem ad rationes universaliores, quas Angeli superiores recipiunt. 2. The angels of an inferior hierarchy receive illumination regarding the natures of singular, effects, not through singular species, but through universal likenesses by which they can know singulars by reason of the efficacy of their intellectual power, wherein they surpass the separated soul; and although the likenesses perceived by them are universals absolutely, yet they are said to be particular in comparison to the more universal species, which superior angels receive.
Ad tertium dicendum quod id quod potest virtus inferior, potest et superior; non tamen eodem modo, sed excellentiori. Unde easdem res quas sensus percipit materialiter et singulariter, intellectus immaterialiter et universaliter cognoscit. 3. Whatever an inferior power can do, a superior power can also do; not in the same way, however, but in a more excellent manner. Consequently those things which the senses perceive materially and singularly, the intellect knows immaterially and universally.
ARTICLE 21
WHETHER THE SOUL, WHEN SEPARATED FROM THE BODY, CAN SUFFER PUNISHMENT BY CORPOREAL FIRE

[De veritate, q.26, a.1; Quodl. II, q.7, a. 1; III, q. 9, a. 21]
Vicesimoprimo quaeritur utrum anima separata possit pati poenam ab igne corporeo In the twenty-first article we examine this question: Whether the soul, when separated from the body, can suffer punishment by corporeal fire.
Objections.
Et videtur quod non. Nihil enim patitur nisi secundum quod est in potentia. Sed anima separata non est in potentia nisi secundum intellectum; quia potentiae sensitivae in ea non manent, ut ostensum est. Ergo anima separata non potest pati ab igne corporeo nisi secundum intellectum, intelligendo scilicet ipsum. Hoc autem non est poenale, sed magis delectabile. Ergo anima non potest pati ab igne corporeo poenam. 1. It seems that the separated soul cannot suffer punishment by corporeal fire. For a thing suffers (patitur) [i.e., is acted upon or undergoes a change] only so far as it is in potency. But when the soul exists in separation from the body it is in potency only so far as the intellect is concerned, because the sentient powers do not exist in the soul, as we have shown above (Art. 19). Consequently the separated soul can be acted upon by corporeal fire with respect to the intellect alone, namely, by understanding this fire. Now this is not punitive, but is, in fact, delightful. Therefore the separated soul cannot suffer punishment by corporeal fire.
Praeterea, agens et patiens communicant in materia, ut dicitur in I de generatione. Sed anima, cum sit immaterialis, non communicat in materia cum igne corporeo. Ergo anima separata non potest pati ab igne corporeo. 2. Further, an agent and a patient have the same matter, as is stated in the De generatione et corruptione [I, 7, 324a 324a 34]. But since the soul is immaterial it does not have any matter in common with corporeal fire. Therefore, when the soul exists in separation from the body, it cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire.
Praeterea, quod non tangit non agit. Sed ignis corporeus non potest tangere animam neque secundum ultima quantitatis, cum anima sit incorporea; neque etiam tactu virtutis, cum virtus corporis non possit imprimere in substantiam incorpoream, sed magis e converso. Nullo igitur modo anima separata potest pati ab igne corporeo. 3. Further, whatever does not make contact with a thing does not act upon that thing. Now corporeal fire cannot make contact with the soul, either by the elemental [contact] of quantity, because the soul is incorporeal, or by contact of power, because the power of a body cannot make an impression upon an incorporeal substance, but rather the reverse. Therefore the separated soul cannot be acted upon in any way whatever by corporeal fire.
Praeterea, dupliciter dicitur aliquid pati: vel sicut subiectum, ut lignum patitur ab igne; vel sicut contrarium, ut calidum a frigido. Sed anima non potest pati ab igne corporeo sicut subiectum passionis, quia oporteret quod forma ignis fieret in anima. Et sic sequeretur quod anima calefieret et igniretur; quod est impossibile. Similiter non potest dici quod anima patiatur ab igne corporeo sicut contrarium a contrario; tum quia animae nihil est contrarium, tum quia sequeretur quod anima ab igne corporeo destrueretur; quod est impossibile. Anima igitur non potest pati ab igne corporeo. 4. Further, a thing is said to be acted upon in two ways: either as an object, as when wood is acted upon by fire, or as a contrary, as when something hot is acted upon by something cold. Now the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire as the subject of a passion, because in that case the form fire would have to arise in the soul, and, as a consequence, the soul would be made hot and would burn, which is impossible. In like manner, we cannot say that the soul is acted upon by corporeal fire as one contrary is acted upon by another: first, because the soul has no contrary, and secondly, because it would follow that the soul would be destroyed by corporeal fire; which is impossible. Therefore the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire.
Praeterea, inter agens et patiens oportet esse proportionem aliquam. Sed inter animam et ignem corporeum non videtur esse aliqua proportio, cum sint diversorum generum. Ergo anima non potest pati ab igne corporeo. 5. Further, there must be some proportion between an agent and a patient. Now there does not seem to be any proportion between the soul and corporeal fire, because they belong to different genera. Therefore the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire.
Praeterea, omne quod patitur movetur. Anima autem non movetur, cum non sit corpus. Ergo anima non potest pati. 6. Further, whatever is acted upon is moved [i.e., passes from potency to act]. Now the soul is not moved, because it is not a body. Therefore the soul cannot be acted upon by fire.
Praeterea, anima est dignior quam corpus quintae essentiae. Sed corpus quintae essentiae est omnino impassibile. Ergo multo magis anima. 7. Further, the soul is nobler than a body composed of the fifth essence. But a body composed of the fifth essence is altogether unchangeable. Consequently the soul is even more unchangeable.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Genes. ad litteram, quod agens est nobilior patiente. Sed ignis corporeus non est nobilior anima. Ergo ignis non potest agere in animam. 8. Further, Augustine says in the De Genesi ad litteram [XII, 16] that an agent is nobler than a patient. But corporeal fire is not nobler than the soul. Therefore corporeal fire cannot act upon the soul.
Sed dicebat, quod ignis non agit in animam virtute propria et naturali, sed in quantum est instrumentum divinae iustitiae. &8212;Sed contra, sapientis artificis est uti convenientibus instrumentis ad finem suum. Sed ignis corporeus non videtur esse conveniens instrumentum ad puniendum animam, cum hoc non conveniat ei ratione suae formae, per quam instrumentum adaptatur ad effectum, ut dolabra ad dolandum, et serra ad secandum. Non enim sapienter ageret artifex, si uteretur serra ad dolandum et dolabra ad secandum. Ergo multo minus Deus, qui est sapientissimus, utitur igne corporeo ut instrumento ad puniendum animam. 9. But it was said that fire does not act upon the soul in virtue of what is proper and natural to fire, but inasmuch as it is the instrument of divine justice. On the contrary, it is characteristic of a wise builder to use suitable instruments for the end which he intends. Now corporeal fire does not seem to be an adequate instrument for punishing the soul, because this is not proper to fire by reason of its form; and it is by its form that an instrument is adapted to its effect, as an axe for chopping and a saw for cutting, for a builder will not act with greater wisdom if he should use a saw for chopping and an axe for cutting. Therefore even less will God, who is most wise, use corporeal fire as an instrument for punishing the soul.
Praeterea, Deus, cum sit auctor naturae, nihil contra naturam facit, ut dicit quaedam Glossa super illud Rom. XI: contra naturam insertus es. Sed contra naturam est ut corporeum in incorporeum agat. Ergo hoc Deus non facit. 10. Further, since God is the Author of nature, He does nothing contrary to nature, as it says in a certain Gloss on the text: “It is implanted contrary to nature” (Rom. 11:24). But it is contrary to nature for the corporeal to act upon the incorporeal. Therefore God does not permit this.
Praeterea, Deus non potest facere quod contradictoria sint simul vera. Hoc autem sequeretur, si subtraheretur alicui quod est de essentia eius. Puta, si homo non esset rationalis, sequeretur quod esset simul homo et non homo. Ergo Deus non potest facere quod aliqua res careat eo quod est ei essentiale. Sed esse impassibile est essentiale animae; convenit enim ei in quantum est immaterialis. Ergo Deus non potest facere quod anima patiatur ab igne corporeo. 11. Further, God cannot cause contradictories to be true simultaneously. Now this would occur if He were to withdraw from a thing a constitutive part of its essence; for example, if a man were not rational, it would follow that he would be a man and not be a man at the same time. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to be deprived of any of its essential parts. Now to be unchangeable is essential to the soul, for this is proper to it by reason of its immateriality. Consequently God cannot cause the soul to be acted upon by corporeal fire.
Praeterea, unaquaeque res habet potentiam agendi secundum suam naturam. Non ergo potest res aliqua accipere potentiam agendi quae sibi non competit sed magis alteri rei, nisi a propria natura immutetur in aliam naturam. Sicut aqua non calefacit, nisi fuerit ab igne transmutata. Sed habere potentiam agendi in res spirituales, non competit naturae ignis corporei, ut ostensum est. Si ergo a Deo hoc habet ut instrumentum divinae iustitiae, quod in animam separatam agere possit; videtur quod iam non sit ignis corporeus, sed alterius naturae. 12. Further, everything possesses the power of acting in accordance with its nature. Therefore a thing cannot receive a power of acting which is not proper to itself but to something else instead, unless its proper nature is changed into some other nature; water, for example, will not heat unless it is changed [i.e., made hot] by fire. Now it is not proper to fire by nature to have the power of acting upon immaterial things, as we have already shown. Therefore, if God gives fire, as the instrument of divine justice, the power of acting upon the separated soul, it now seems that it is not corporeal fire, but fire of a different nature.
Praeterea, id quod fit virtute divina, habet propriam et veram rationem rei in natura existentis. Cum enim divina virtute aliquis caecus illuminatur, recipit visum secundum veram et propriam rationem naturalem visus. Si anima igitur virtute divina patiatur ab igne prout est instrumentum divinae iustitiae, sequitur quod anima vere patiatur secundum propriam rationem passionis. Pati autem dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, secundum quod pati dicitur recipere tantum; sicut intellectus patitur ab intelligibili, et sensus a sensibili. Alio modo, per hoc quod abiicitur aliquid a substantia patientis; sicut cum lignum patitur ab igne. Si igitur anima separata patiatur ab igne corporeo divina virtute, prout ratio passionis consistit in receptione tantum, cum receptum sit in recipiente secundum modum eius, sequitur quod anima separata recipiat ab igne corporeo immaterialiter et incorporaliter secundum modum suum. Talis autem receptio non est animae punitiva, sed perfectiva. Ergo hoc non erit ad poenam animae. Similiter etiam nec potest pati anima ab igne corporeo prout passio abiicit a substantia; quia sic substantia animae corrumperetur. Ergo non potest esse quod anima patiatur ab igne corporeo, etiam prout est instrumentum divinae iustitiae. 13. Further, what is done by the divine power is in accord with the proper and true specific nature of a thing existing in reality. For when by divine power a blind man is given the power of vision, he receives sight according to the true and proper natural notion of sight. Therefore, if the soul is acted upon by fire, as the instrument of divine justice, by virtue of the divine power itself, it follows that the soul really is acted upon in the true sense of “passion.” Now passion [i.e., being acted upon] is used in two ways. First, to signify merely the reception of something [by a patient], as when the intellect is acted upon by an intelligible, and a sense by a sensible. Secondly, to signify the loss of something on the side of the substance of the thing being acted upon, as when wood is acted upon by fire. Therefore, if the separated soul is acted upon by corporeal fire, in virtue of the divine power, inasmuch as the nature of passion consists merely in receiving something, it follows that the separated soul is receptive of corporeal fire in an immaterial and incorporeal way in keeping with the soul’s own mode; because whatever is received in something is received according to the mode of the recipient. However, a reception of this sort does not punish the soul, but perfects it. Consequently this will not be a punishment for the soul. Similarly the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire so far as passion consists in the loss of something on the side of the substance being acted upon, because then the substance of the soul would be corrupted. Therefore the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire as the instrument of divine justice.
Praeterea, nullum instrumentum agit instrumentaliter, nisi exercendo operationem propriam. Sicut serra agit instrumentaliter ad perfectionem arcae secando. Sed ignis non potest agere in animam actione propria naturali; non enim potest calefacere animam. Ergo non potest agere in animam ut instrumentum divinae iustitiae. 14. Further, an instrument acts as an instrument only by exercising its proper operation, just as a saw, by cutting, acts instrumentally in the production of a chest. Now fire by its proper natural operation cannot act upon the soul, because it cannot make the soul hot. Consequently fire as the instrument of divine justice cannot act upon the soul.
Sed dicebat, quod ignis aliqua actione propria agit in animam, in quantum scilicet detinet eam ut sibi alligatam. &8212;Sed contra, si anima alligatur igni et ab eo detinetur, oportet quod ei aliquo modo uniatur. Non autem unitur ut forma, quia sic anima vivificaret ignem; nec unitur ei ut motor, quia sic magis pateretur ignis ab anima quam e converso. Non est autem alius modus quo substantia incorporea corpori uniri possit. Ergo anima separata non potest alligari ab igne corporeo, nec ab eo detineri. 15. But it has been said that fire acts upon the soul by a proper action inasmuch as it confines the soul in such a way as to imprison the latter. On the other hand, if the soul is imprisoned by fire and detained by it, the soul must be united to fire in some way. However, the soul is not united as a form to fire, because then the soul would give life to fire. Nor is the soul united as a mover to fire, because then fire would be acted upon by the soul, and not vice versa. Now there is no other way in which an incorporeal substance can be united to a body, so it follows that the separated soul cannot be detained by fire, nor be imprisoned by it.
Praeterea, id quod est alligatum alicui, non potest ab eo separari. Sed spiritus damnati separantur aliquando ab igne corporeo infernali. Nam Daemones dicuntur esse in hoc aere caliginoso; animae etiam damnatorum interdum aliquibus apparuerunt. Non ergo patitur anima ab igne corporeo ut ei alligata. 16. Further, whatever is fettered by something cannot be separated from it. But the spirits of the damned are sometimes separated from the corporeal fire of hell, for the demons are said to be in this misty atmosphere, and the souls of the damned have occasionally appeared to certain individuals here, as well. Therefore the soul is not acted upon by corporeal fire, as though imprisoned by it.
Praeterea, id quod alligatur alicui et detinetur ab eo, impeditur per ipsum a propria operatione. Sed propria operatio animae est intelligere, a qua impediri non potest per alligationem ad aliquid corporeum; quia intelligibilia sua in se habet, ut in III de anima dicitur. Unde non oportet ut ea extra se quaerat. Ergo anima separata non punitur per alligationem ad ignem corporeum. 17. Further, whatever is fettered to something and detained by it, is thereby prevented from performing its proper operation. Now the proper operation of the soul is intellection; but the soul cannot be prevented from exercising this activity by being bound to something corporeal, because the soul contains its intelligibles within itself, as is said in the De anima [III, 4, 429b 55]. Consequently it is not necessary for the soul to seek these things outside itself. Therefore the separated soul is not punished by being fettered to corporeal fire.
Praeterea, sicut ignis per modum istum potest detinere animam; ita et alia corporea, vel etiam magis, in quantum sunt grossiora et graviora. Si ergo anima non puniretur nisi per detentionem et alligationem, eius poena non deberet soli igni attribui, sed magis aliis corporibus. 18. Further, just as fire can detain the soul in this way, so also can other bodies, or to an even greater extent inasmuch as they are larger and heavier. Therefore, if the soul is punished only by being detained and fettered, its punishment should be attributed not only to fire, but even more so to other bodies.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Genes. ad litteram, quod substantiam Inferorum non est credendum esse corporalem, sed spiritualem. Damascenus etiam dicit, quod ignis Inferni non est materialis. Ergo videtur quod anima non patiatur ab igne corporeo. 19. Further, Augustine says in the De Genesi ad litteram [XII, 32] that the substance of hell is not believed to be corporeal, but spiritual. Damascene also says that the fire of hell is not corporeal. Therefore it seems that the soul is not acted upon by corporeal fire.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Gregorius in moralibus, delinquens servus ad hoc punitur a domino ut corrigatur. Sed illi qui sunt damnati in Inferno, incorrigibiles sunt. Ergo non debent puniri per ignem corporeum infernalem. 20. Further, Gregory says in the De moralibus [XXXIV, 19] that the delinquent servant is punished by his master in order that he may be corrected. But the damned in hell are incorrigible. Therefore they should not be punished by the corporeal fire of hell.
Praeterea, poenae per contrarium fiunt. Sed anima peccavit subdendo se corporalibus rebus per affectum. Ergo non debet per aliqua corporalia puniri, sed magis per separationem a corporalibus. 21. Further, punishments are inflicted by means of contraries. Now the soul sinned by subjecting itself to corporeal things, under the influence of passion. Therefore it should not be punished by being united to corporeal things, but rather by being separated from corporeal things.
Praeterea, sicut ex divina iustitia redduntur poenae peccatoribus, ita et praemia iustis. Sed iustis non redduntur praemia corporalia, sed spiritualia tantum. Unde si qua praemia corporalia iustis reddenda in Scriptura traduntur, intelliguntur metaphorice; sicut dicitur Luc. XXII: ut edatis et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo. Ergo et peccatoribus non infliguntur poenae corporales, sed spirituales tantum; et ea quae de poenis corporalibus in Scripturis dicuntur, erunt metaphorice intelligenda. Et sic anima non patitur ab igne corporeo. 22. Further, just as punishments are allotted to sinners by divine justice, so also are rewards to the just. Now corporeal rewards are not given to the just, but spiritual rewards only. Consequently, if in Scripture any rewards of a corporeal nature are said to be given to the just, they are to be understood metaphorically; for example, it is said: “That you may eat and drink at My table, in My kingdom” (Luke 22:30). Therefore corporeal punishments are not inflicted on sinners, but spiritual punishments only; and whatever is related in the Scriptures about corporeal punishments, is to be understood metaphorically. Consequently the soul is not acted upon by corporeal fire.
Sed contra, idem ignis est quo punientur corpora et animae damnatorum et Daemones; ut patet per illud Matth. XXV: ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum, qui paratus est Diabolo et Angelis eius. Sed corpora damnatorum necessarium est quod puniantur igne corporeo. Pari ergo ratione animae separatae igne corporeo puniuntur. On the contrary, the fire by which the demons and the bodies and souls of the damned are punished, is the same, as is evident from this text: “Depart from Me ye cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels” (Matt. 25:41). But the bodies of the damned must be punished by corporeal fire. So likewise their separated souls must be punished by corporeal fire.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod circa passionem animae ab igne, multipliciter aliqui locuti sunt. I answer: Men have spoken in many ways about the suffering (passio) of the soul by fire.
Quidam enim dixerunt quod anima non patietur poenam ab aliquo igne corporeo, sed spiritualis eius afflictio metaphorice in Scripturis ignis nomine designatur. Et haec fuit opinio Origenis. Sed hoc pro tanto non videtur sufficiens, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, XXI de Civit. Dei, oportet intelligi ignem esse corporeum quo cruciabuntur corpora damnatorum, quo etiam igne et Daemones et animae cruciantur, secundum sententiam de eo inductam. For some said that the soul did not suffer punishment by corporeal fire, but by a spiritual affliction which is referred to metaphorically in the Scriptures by the name of fire. This was the opinion of Origen [Peri Archon, II, 11]. But, such as it is, it does not seem satisfactory, because as Augustine says in the De civitate Dei [XXI, 10] we must understand that the fire by which the bodies of the damned are tormented, is corporeal; as is also the fire by which both the demons and the souls are tormented, inasmuch as this conclusion is inferred from it.
Et ideo aliis visum fuit quod ignis ille corporeus est; sed non ab eo immediate anima patitur poenam, sed ab eius similitudine secundum imaginariam visionem. Sicut accidit dormientibus, quod ex visione aliquorum terribilium quae se perpeti vident, veraciter affliguntur; licet ea a quibus affliguntur, non sint vera corpora, sed similitudines corporum. Sed haec positio stare non potest; quia in superioribus est ostensum, quod potentiae sensitivae partis, inter quas est vis imaginativa, non manent in anima separata. Wherefore it seemed to others that, although this fire is corporeal, nevertheless the soul does not suffer punishment by it directly, but by its likeness in the imagination; just as happens to people asleep who are truly tormented by the appearance of certain terrible things which they see themselves suffer, although the things by which they are tormented are not real bodies, but merely the likeness of bodies. But this position cannot be maintained, because we have shown above (Art. 19, ans. obj. 6) that the powers of the sentient part of the soul, of which one is the imaginative power itself, do not remain in the soul when it is separated from the body.
Et ideo oportet dicere quod ab ipso corporali igne patitur anima separata. Sed quomodo patiatur, videtur difficile assignare. Therefore it must be said that the separated soul is acted upon by corporeal fire itself. However, it seems difficult to determine in what way it is acted upon by fire.
Quidam enim dixerunt quod anima separata patitur ignem hoc ipso quod videt. Quod tangit Gregorius in Dial. dicens: ignem eo ipso patitur anima, quo videt. Sed cum videre sit perfectio videntis, omnis visio est delectabilis in quantum huiusmodi. Unde nihil in quantum est visum, est afflictivum, sed inquantum apprehenditur ut nocivum. For some said that the separated soul suffers by the very fire which it sees. Gregory mentions this in his Dialogues [IV, 29] for he says: “The soul suffers by fire in the very things which it sees.” However, since the act of seeing is a perfection of the one seeing, every vision is delightful inasmuch as it is of this sort. Hence nothing is painful inasmuch as it is seen, but inasmuch as it is apprehended as harmful.
Et ideo alii dixerunt quod anima videns illum ignem, et apprehendens ut nocivum sibi, ex hoc affligitur. Quod tangit Gregorius, XIV Dial. dicens, quod quia anima cremari se conspicit, crematur. Sed tunc considerandum restat, utrum ignis secundum rei veritatem sit nocivus animae, vel non. Et si quidem non sit animae nocivus secundum rei veritatem, sequetur quod decipietur in sua aestimatione, qua apprehendit ipsum ut nocivum. Et hoc videtur inopinabile; praecipue quantum ad Daemones, qui acumine intellectus vigent in rerum naturis cognoscendis. Wherefore others said that when the soul sees this fire and understands that fire is harmful to it, it is tormented by this fact. Gregory mentions this is his Dialogues [ibid.], for he says that the soul is consumed by fire, because it sees itself being consumed by fire. But then we still have to discover whether fire by its very nature is harmful to the soul or not. Indeed, if it is not by its very nature harmful to the soul, then it follows that the soul is deceived in that judgment wherein it apprehends fire as harmful. This seems unlikely, particularly so far as the demons are concerned, because they possess an extensive knowledge of the natural order by reason of their intellectual acumen.
Oportet ergo dicere quod secundum rei veritatem ille ignis corporeus animae sit nocivus. Unde Gregorius, IV Dialog., concludit dicens: colligere ex dictis evangelicis possumus, quod incendium anima non solum videndo, sed experiendo patiatur. Ad investigandum ergo quomodo ignis corporeus animae vel Daemoni nocivus esse possit, considerandum est quod nocumentum alicui non infertur secundum quod recipit id quo perficitur, sed secundum quod a suo contrario impeditur. Unde passio animae per ignem non est secundum receptionem tantum, sicut patitur intellectus ab intelligibili et sensus a sensibili, sed secundum quod aliquid patitur ab altero per viam contrarietatis et obstaculi. Therefore it must be said that corporeal fire in virtue of its true nature is harmful to the soul. Hence Gregory concludes by saying: “We can gather from the aforesaid Gospels that the soul suffers not only by seeing fire but by experiencing it.” Therefore to discover how corporeal fire can be harmful to the soul or to a demon, we must bear in mind that harm does not befall a thing inasmuch as it receives something by which it is perfected, but inasmuch as it is hindered by its contrary. Hence the suffering of the soul by fire does not consist simply in its receiving something as the intellect suffers by an intelligible and sense by a sensible, but in this, that one thing is acted upon by another by way of contrariety and as an obstacle.
Hoc autem contingit dupliciter. Impeditur enim aliquid uno modo a suo contrario quantum ad esse suum quod habet ex aliqua forma inhaerente; et sic patitur aliquid a suo contrario per alterationem et corruptionem, sicut lignum ab igne comburitur. Aliquid autem impeditur ab aliquo obstante vel contrariante quantum ad suam inclinationem. Sicut naturalis inclinatio lapidis est ut feratur deorsum; impeditur autem ab aliquo obstante et vim inferente, ut per violentiam quiescat, vel per violentiam moveatur. Now this happens in two ways. For sometimes a thing is hindered in one way by its contrary as regards its very act of existing which it receives from some inhering form; and in this way something is acted upon by its contrary through alteration and corruption, as wood, for example, is consumed by fire. Secondly, a thing is hindered by an obstacle or a contrary with respect to its inclination, just as the natural inclination of a stone is to tend downward, but it is hindered in this by some obstacle and opposing power so that it is brought to rest or is moved contrary to its nature.
Neuter autem modus passionis poenalis est in re cognitione carente. Nam ubi non potest esse dolor et tristitia, non competit ratio afflictionis et poenae. Sed in habente cognitionem, ab utroque modo passionis consequitur afflictio et poena; sed diversimode. Nam passio quae est secundum alterationem a contrario, infert afflictionem et poenam secundum sensibilem dolorem; sicut cum sensibile excellens corrumpit harmoniam sensus. Et ideo excellentiae sensibilium, et maxime tangibilium, dolorem sensibilem inferunt; contemperationes autem eorum delectant propter convenientiam ad sensum. Sed secunda passio non infert poenam secundum dolorem sensibilem, sed secundum tristitiam quae oritur in homine vel in animali ex hoc quod aliquid interiori aliqua vi apprehenditur ut repugnans voluntati, vel cuicumque appetitui. Unde ea quae sunt contraria voluntati et appetitui affligunt, et magis interdum quam ea quae sunt dolorosa secundum sensum; praeeligeret enim aliquis verberari, et graviter secundum sensum affligi, quam vituperia sustinere, vel aliqua huiusmodi quae voluntati repugnant. However, neither of these ways of suffering punishment exists in a thing that lacks knowledge. For where sorrow and sadness cannot exist, the nature of affliction and punishment is not found. However, in a being which possesses knowledge, torment and punishment are the natural effects of both kinds of suffering, although in different ways. For the suffering [or being-acted-upon] which is the effect of change by a contrary, results in ‘affliction and punishment by sensible pain, as when a sensible object of the greatest intensity corrupts the harmony of a sense. Therefore when sensibilia are of too great intensity, particularly those of touch, they inflict sensible pain; but when moderate they cause delight, because then they are proportioned to sense. However, the second kind of suffering (foes not inflict punishment by sensible pain, but by that sadness which arises in a man or in an animal because something is apprehended by an interior power as being repugnant to the will or to some appetite. Hence things which are opposed to the will and to the appetite inflict punishment, and sometimes even more than those which are painful to sense. For some choose beforehand to be whipped and to undergo severe physical punishment rather than be scolded or the like, which is repugnant to the will.
Secundum igitur primum modum passionis anima non potest pati poenam ab igne corporeo; non enim possibile est quod ab eo alteretur et corrumpatur. Et ideo non eo modo ab igne affligitur ut ex eo dolorem sensibilem patiatur. Potest autem pati anima ab igne corporeo, secundo modo passionis, in quantum per huiusmodi ignem impeditur a sua inclinatione, vel voluntate. Quod sic patet. Anima enim, et quaelibet incorporalis substantia, quantum est de sui natura, non est obligata alicui loco; sed transcendit totum ordinem corporalium. Quod ergo alligetur alicui, et determinetur ad aliquem locum per quamdam necessitatem, est contra eius naturam et contrarium appetitui naturali. Et hoc dico, nisi in quantum coniungitur corpori, cuius est forma naturalis, in quo aliquam perfectionem consequitur. Consequently the soul cannot suffer punishment by corporeal fire according to the first kind of suffering [i.e., being acted-upon], because it is impossible for the soul to be altered and corrupted by suffering of this specific kind. Hence the soul is not afflicted by fire in this way, namely, that it suffers sensible pain thereby. However, the soul can suffer by corporeal fire according to the second kind of suffering, inasmuch as it is hindered from its inclination or volition by fire of this kind. This is evident. For the soul and any incorporeal substance, inasmuch as this belongs to it by nature, is not physically confined in any place, but transcends the whole corporeal order. Consequently it is contrary to its nature and to its natural appetite for it to be fettered to anything and be confined in a place by some necessity; and I maintain that this is the case except inasmuch as the soul is united to the body whose natural form it is, and in which there follows some perfection.
Quod autem aliqua spiritualis substantia alicui corpori obligetur, non est ex virtute corporis potentis substantiam incorpoream detinere; sed ex virtute alicuius superioris substantiae alligantis spiritualem substantiam tali corpori. Sicut etiam per artes magicas, permissione divina, virtute superiorum Daemonum aliqui spiritus rebus aliquibus alligantur, vel anulis, vel imaginibus, vel huiusmodi rebus. Et per hunc modum animae et Daemones alligantur, virtute divina, in sui poenam, corporeo igni. Unde Augustinus dicit, XXI de Civit. Dei: cur non dicamus, quamvis miris modis, etiam spiritus incorporeos poena corporalis ignis affligi, si spiritus hominum, etiam ipsi profecto incorporei, et nunc possunt includi corporalibus membris, et tunc poterunt corporum suorum vinculis insolubiliter alligari? Adhaerebunt ergo spiritus, licet incorporei, corporalibus ignibus cruciandi; accipientes ex ignibus poenam, non dantes ignibus vitam. Moreover, the binding of a spiritual substance to a body is not brought about by any power which a body has for detaining an incorporeal substance; but is the result of the power of some superior substance which unites a spiritual substance to such a body; just as by the magic arts, and with divine permission, some spirits are bound to certain things by the power of superior demons, either by signs or imaginary visions or other things of this kind. It is in this way, through the divine power, that the souls and the demons are confined in their punishment by corporeal fire. Wherefore Augustine says in the De civitate Dei [XXI, 10]: “If men’s souls, having been created incorporeal, are now in this life incarnate in bodily members, and shall one day be bound thereto forever, then why cannot we truly say, though you may marvel at it, that even incorporeal spirits may be afflicted by corporeal fire? Therefore these spirits, even though incorporeal, shall dwell in tormenting corporeal fires... and, instead of giving life to these fires, they shall receive punishment from them.”
Et sic verum est quod ignis ille, in quantum virtute divina detinet animam alligatam, agit in animam ut instrumentum divinae iustitiae. Et in quantum anima apprehendit illum ignem ut sibi nocivum, interiori tristitia affligitur; quae quidem maxima est cum considerat se infimis rebus subdi, quae nata fuit Deo per fruitionem uniri. Maxima ergo afflictio damnatorum erit ex eo quod a Deo separabuntur; secunda vero ex hoc quod rebus corporalibus subdentur, et infimo et abiectissimo loco. Thus it is true that this fire, inasmuch as it detains the fettered soul, as a result of the divine power, acts upon the soul as the instrument of divine justice; and inasmuch as the soul apprehends that this fire is harmful to it, it is afflicted by interior sadness. Indeed, this sadness is greatest because the soul, which was born to be united to God through possession, meditates on the fact that it occupies a place below the lowest things in existence. Therefore the greatest affliction of the damned will be caused by the fact that they are separated from God; secondly, by the fact that they are situated below corporeal things, and in the lowest and meanest place.
Answers to objections.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad septem quae primo obiiciuntur. Non enim dicimus quod anima patiatur ab igne corporeo vel recipiendo tantum, vel secundum alterationem a contrario, prout praedictae obiectiones procedunt. 1-7. As a result of this the solution to the first seven objections is evident. For we do not say that the soul is acted upon by corporeal fire in the manner of reception only or according to change by a contrary, as the preceding objections maintain.
Ad octavum dicendum quod instrumentum non agit virtute sua, sed virtute principalis agentis. Et ideo, cum ignis agat in animam ut instrumentum divinae iustitiae, non est attendenda dignitas ignis, sed divinae iustitiae. 8. An instrument does not act by its own power but by that of the principal agent. Therefore, when fire as the instrument of divine justice acts upon the soul, the dignity of fire is not considered, but that of divine justice.
Ad nonum dicendum quod corpora sunt convenientia instrumenta ad puniendum damnatos. Conveniens enim est ut qui suo superiori, scilicet Deo, subdi noluerunt, rebus inferioribus subdantur per poenam. 9. Bodies are appropriate instruments for punishing the damned, because it is proper for those who are unwilling to be subject to their superior, that is, to God, to be made subject to inferior things as a punishment.
Ad decimum dicendum quod Deus, etsi non faciat contra naturam, operatur tamen supra naturam, dum facit quod natura non potest. 10. Although God does not act contrary to nature, yet He acts in a way superior to that of nature when He does what nature cannot do.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod esse impassibile a re corporali per modum alterationis, animae competit secundum rationem suae essentiae. Hoc autem modo non patitur divina virtute, sed sicut dictum est. 11. To be incapable of being changed by a corporeal thing after the manner of an alteration, is proper to the soul by reason of its very essence. However, the soul does not suffer in this way through the divine power, but as we have explained above (the body of this article).
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod ignis non habet potentiam agendi in animam ut virtute propria agat, sicut ea quae naturaliter agunt; sed instrumentaliter tantum; et ideo non sequitur quod mutetur a sua natura. 12. Fire does not possess the power of acting upon the soul inasmuch as it acts in virtue of its proper power, as those things do which act naturally; it acts only in an instrumental way. Therefore it does not follow that its nature is changed.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod neutro illorum modorum anima ab igne corporeo patitur, sed sicut dictum est. 13. The soul is not acted upon by corporeal fire in any of these ways, but as we have explained.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod ignis corporeus etsi non calefaciat animam, habet tamen aliam operationem vel habitudinem ad animam, quam corpora nata sunt habere ad spiritus; ut scilicet eis aliqualiter uniantur. 14. Although corporeal fire does not make the soul hot, nevertheless it has another operation or relationship to the soul; which relationship bodies are naturally disposed to have toward spirits in order that bodies may be united to them in some way.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod anima non unitur igni punienti ut forma, quia non dat ei vitam, ut Augustinus dicit; sed unitur ei eo modo quo spiritus uniuntur locis corporeis per contactum virtutis, quamvis etiam non sint ipsorum motores. 15. The soul is not united as a form to the fire which punishes it, because the soul does not give life to fire, as Augustine says; “I but it is united to fire in the way in which spirits are united to corporeal places by contact of power, although they are not the movers of these.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, anima affligitur ab igne corporeo, in quantum apprehendit eum ut sibi nocivum per modum alligationis et detentionis. Haec autem apprehensio affligere potest etiam cum non est actu alligata, ex hoc solum quod apprehendit se alligationi deputatam. Et per hoc dicuntur Daemones secum ferre Gehennam quocumque vadunt. 16. The soul is afflicted by corporeal fire inasmuch as the soul apprehends that fire is harmful to it as binding and confining it, as we have already pointed out. Moreover, this apprehension can torment the soul even when it is not actually confined by fire, simply because it sees that it is capable of being so confined; and for this reason the demons are said to bring’hell-fire with them wherever they go.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod licet anima ex huiusmodi alligatione non impediatur ab intellectuali operatione, impeditur tamen a quadam naturali libertate, qua est absoluta ab omni obligatione ad locum corporalem. 17. Although the soul is not prevented from performing its intellectual operation by being detained in this way; yet it is deprived of a certain natural liberty whereby it is wholly freed from being physically confined to a corporeal place.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod poena Gehennae non solum est animarum, sed etiam corporum; propter hoc ponitur ignis maxime poena gehennalis, quia ignis est maxime corporum afflictivus. Nihilominus tamen et alia erunt afflictiva, secundum illud Psalm. X: ignis, sulphur, et spiritus procellarum, pars calicis eorum. Competit etiam amori inordinato, qui est peccandi principium; ut sicut caelum Empyreum respondet igni caritatis, ita ignis Inferni respondeat inordinatae cupiditati. 18. The punishment of hell-fire (gehenna) belongs not only to the soul but also to the body. For this reason this fire above all is said to be the punishment of hell, because fire is particularly capable of tormenting bodies. However, there will also be other torments, according to this: “Fire and brimstone and the storms of winds shall be the portion of their cup” (Ps. 10:7). It is also appropriate to that inordinate love which is the principle of sin, so that as the empyrean heaven rewards the fire of charity, so does the fire of hell reward inordinate desire.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum quod Augustinus hoc dicit non determinando, sed inquirendo. Vel si hoc opinando dixit, expresse postmodum hoc revocat in XXI de Civit. Dei. Vel potest dici, quod substantia Inferorum dicitur esse spiritualis quantum ad proximum affligens, quod est ignis apprehensus ut nocivus per modum detentionis et alligationis. 19. Augustine says this not by way of an answer but by way of an inquiry, or if he stated this as an opinion, he expressly revoked it afterward in the De civitate Dei [XXI, 2]. Or we can say that the substance of hell is said to be spiritual as to the proximate effect produced, namely, that fire is apprehended as harmful inasmuch as it confines and binds the soul.
Ad vicesimum dicendum quod Gregorius hoc introducit per modum obiectionis quorumdam, qui credebant omnes poenas quae a Deo infliguntur esse purgatorias, et nullam esse perpetuam; quod quidem falsum est. Inferuntur enim a Deo quaedam poenae vel in hac vita, vel post hanc vitam, ad emendationem vel purgationem; quaedam vero ad ultimam damnationem. Nec tales poenae a Deo infliguntur eo quod ipse delectetur in poenis; sed eo quod delectatur in iustitia, secundum quam peccantibus poena debetur. Sic etiam apud homines quaedam poenae infliguntur ad correctionem eius qui punitur, sicut cum pater flagellat filium; quaedam autem ad finalem condemnationem, sicut cum iudex suspendit latronem. 20. Gregory introduces this as an objection against certain people who believed that all punishments inflicted by God belong to purgatory and are not perpetual; which indeed is false. For some punishments are inflicted by God, either in this life or after this life, for correction and purgation; others, indeed, for ultimate damnation. Nor are such punishments inflicted by God because He delights in punishment, but because He delights in justice inasmuch as punishment is due to sinners. This is the way it is among men, because some punishments are inflicted for the correction of the one who is punished, as when a father chastises his son, whereas others are inflicted as a final condemnation, as when a judge hangs a bandit.
Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum quod poenae sunt per contrarium quantum ad intentionem peccantis: nam peccans intendit propriae satisfacere voluntati. Poena etiam est contraria voluntati ipsius; in quantum ex sapientia divina procedit, ut illud in quo quaerit aliquis suam voluntatem implere, in contrarium ei vertatur. Et sic dicitur in libro Sap. XI: per quae peccat quis, per haec et torquetur. Unde quia anima peccat corporalibus inhaerendo, ad divinam sapientiam pertinet ut per corporalia puniatur. 21. Punishments take place by means of contraries so far as the intention of the sinner is concerned, for the sinner intends properly to satisfy his will. Punishment is also contrary to the will itself inasmuch as punishment results from the divine wisdom, so that that wherein someone seeks to satisfy his will is turned into its contrary, as is said in the Book of Wisdom: “That by which a man sins, by the same also is he tormented” (Wis. 11:17). Wherefore, because the soul sins by adhering to corporeal things, it is consistent with the divine wisdom that it be punished by corporeal things.
Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum quod anima praemiatur per hoc quod fruitur eo quod est supra se; punitur autem per hoc quod subditur his quae sunt infra ipsam. Et ideo praemia animarum non sunt convenienter intelligenda nisi spiritualiter; poenae autem intelliguntur corporaliter. 22. The soul is rewarded by enjoying things which are superior to it, but is punished by being subjected to things which are inferior to it. Therefore the rewards of the soul are fittingly understood only when regarded spiritually; punishments, however, are understood to be corporeal.