ARTICLE I
This question treats of the mind, which contains the image of the Trinity,
and in the first article we ask:
Is the mind, as containing within itself the image of the Trinity, the essence of the soul
or one of its powers?
[ARTICLE I Sent., 3, 4, 2; S.T., I, 54, 3; 79, 1; 93, 7; Q.D. de spir. creat., 11; Q.D. de
anima, 12.]
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| Quaestio est de mente in qua est imago Trinitatis.
Et primo quaeritur utrum mens, prout in ea ponitur imago Trinitatis, sit essentia animae, vel aliqua potentia eius
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod sit ipsa essentia animae.
| It seems that it is the essence of the soul, for
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| Quia Augustinus dicit, IX de Trinitate, quod mens et spiritus non relative dicuntur, sed essentiam demonstrant: nonnisi essentiam animae. Ergo mens est ipsa animae essentia.
| 1. Augustine says: “The terms mind and spirit are not taken relatively, but denote the essence, and nothing but the essence of the soul. Therefore, the mind is the essence of the soul.
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| Praeterea, diversa genera potentiarum animae non uniuntur nisi in essentia. Sed appetitivum et intellectivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum animae: ponuntur enim, in fine I de anima, quinque genera communissima potentiarum animae: scilicet vegetativum, sensitivum, appetitivum, motivum secundum locum, et intellectivum. Cum ergo mens comprehendat in se intellectivum et appetitivum, quia in mente ponitur ab Augustino intelligentia et voluntas, videtur quod non sit mens aliqua potentia, sed ipsa essentia animae.
| 2. Different classes of powers of the soul are found only in its essence. But the appetitive and intellective are different classes of powers of the soul. For The Soul gives five most general classes of powers of the soul: vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellective. But the mind includes within it appetitive and intellective powers, for Augustine puts understanding and will in the mind. It seems, then, that the mind is not a power, but the very essence of the soul.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus, XI de civitate Dei, dicit, quod nos sumus, ad imaginem Dei, inquantum sumus, novimus nos esse, et amamus utrumque; in IX vero de Trinit. assignat imaginem Dei in nobis secundum mentem, notitiam et amorem. Cum ergo amare sit actus amoris, et nosse sit actus notitiae, videtur quod esse sit actus mentis. Sed esse est actus essentiae. Ergo mens est ipsa essentia animae.
| 3. Augustine says: “We are in the image of God by the fact that we exist, that we know that we exist, and that we love this knowledge and this existence.” He also bases the attribution of the likeness of God in us upon knowledge, mind, and love. Since, then, loving is the act of love, and knowing is the act of knowledge, it seems that existence is the act of the mind. But existence is the act of essence. Therefore, the mind is the very essence of the soul.
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| Praeterea, eadem ratione invenitur mens in Angelo et in nobis. Sed ipsa essentia Angeli est mens eius. Unde Dionysius frequenter Angelos nominat divinas vel intellectuales mentes. Ergo etiam et mens nostra est ipsa essentia animae.
| 4. Mind has the same nature in angels and in us. But the very essence of an angel is its mind. For this reason Dionysius frequently calls angels divine or intellectual minds. Therefore, our mind, also, is the very essence of our soul.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in X de Trinitate, quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens, una essentia, una vita. Ergo, sicut vita ad essentiam pertinet, ita et mens.
| 5. Augustine says: “Memory, understanding, and will are one mind, one essence, one life.” Therefore, as life belongs to the essence of the soul, so does mind.
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| Praeterea, accidens non potest esse principium substantialis distinctionis. Sed homo substantialiter distinguitur a brutis in hoc quod habet mentem. Ergo mens non est aliquod accidens. Sed potentia animae est proprietas eius, secundum Avicennam: et sic est de genere accidentis. Ergo mens non est potentia, sed est ipsa essentia animae.
| 6. An accident cannot be the source of a substantial distinction. But, by his possession of mind, man is substantially distinguished from brute animals. So, mind is not an accident. But a power of the soul is a property of the soul, according to Avicenna and so it belongs to the class of accident. Therefore, mind is not a power, but the very essence of the soul.
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| Praeterea, ab una potentia non egrediuntur diversi actus secundum speciem. Sed a mente egrediuntur diversi actus secundum speciem, scilicet memorari, intelligere et velle, ut patet per Augustinum. Ergo mens non est aliqua potentia animae, sed ipsa essentia eius.
| 7. Acts specifically different do not come from one power. But, as is clear from Augustine, acts specifically different—namely: remembering, understanding, and willing—come from the mind. Therefore, mind is not a power of the soul, but its very essence.
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| Praeterea, una potentia non est subiectum alterius potentiae. Sed mens est imaginis subiectum, quae consistit in tribus potentiis. Ergo mens non est potentia, sed ipsa essentia animae.
| 8. One power is not the subject of another power. But mind is the subject of the image of the Trinity, which is constituted by the three powers. Therefore, mind is not a power, but the essence of the soul.
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| Praeterea, nulla potentia comprehendit in se plures potentias. Sed mens comprehendit intelligentiam et voluntatem. Ergo non est potentia, sed essentia.
| 9. No power contains in itself other powers. But the mind includes understanding and will. Therefore, it is not a power, but the essence.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Anima non habet alias partes nisi suas potentias. Sed mens est quaedam pars animae superior, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Trin. Ergo mens est potentia animae.
| 1. Powers of the soul are its only parts. But mind is the higher part of the soul, as Augustine says. Therefore, mind is a power of the soul.
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| Praeterea essentia animae communis est omnibus potentiis, quia omnes in ea radicantur. Sed mens non est communis omnibus potentiis, quia dividitur contra sensum. Ergo mens non est ipsa essentia animae.
| 2. The essence of the soul is common to all the powers, because all are rooted in it. But mind is not common to all the powers, because it is distinguished from sense. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul.
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| Praeterea, in essentia animae non est accipere supremum et infimum. Sed in mente est supremum et infimum; dividit enim Augustinus, mentem in superiorem et inferiorem rationem. Ergo mens est potentia animae, non essentia.
| 3. We cannot speak of highest and lowest in the essence of the soul. But there are highest and lowest in mind. For Augustine divides mind into higher and lower reason. Therefore, mind is a power of the soul and not its essence.
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| Praeterea, essentia animae est principium vivendi. Sed mens non est principium vivendi, sed intelligendi. Ergo mens non est ipsa essentia animae, sed potentia eius.
| 4. The essence of the soul is the principle of life. But mind is not the principle of life, but of understanding. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul, but one of its powers.
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| Praeterea, subiectum non praedicatur de accidente. Sed mens praedicatur de memoria, intelligentia, et voluntate, quae sunt in essentia animae sicut in subiecto. Ergo mens non est essentia animae.
| 5. A subject is not predicated of an accident. But mind is predicated of memory, understanding, and will, which are in the soul as in a subject. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul.
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| Praeterea, secundum Augustinum in libro II de Trinitate, anima non est ad imaginem secundum se totam, sed secundum aliquid sui. Est autem ad imaginem secundum mentem. Ergo mens non nominat totam animam, sed aliquid animae.
| 6. According to Augustine, the relation of the soul to the image does not arise from the whole soul, but only from part of it, namely, the mind. Therefore, the mind does not denote the whole soul, but a part of it.
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| Praeterea, nomen mentis ex eo quod meminit sumptum esse videtur. Sed memoria designat aliquam potentiam animae. Ergo et mens, et non essentiam.
| 7. The name mind (mens) seems to have been attributed [to the soul] from the fact that it remembers (memini). But memory refers to a power of the soul. Therefore, mind also denotes a power and not the essence.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod nomen mentis a mensurando est sumptum. Res autem uniuscuiusque generis mensuratur per id quod est minimum, et principium primum in suo genere, ut patet in X Metaphys.; et ideo nomen mentis hoc modo dicitur in anima, sicut et nomen intellectus. Solum enim intellectus accipit cognitionem de rebus quasi mensurando eas ad sua principia. Intellectus autem, cum dicatur per respectum ad actum, potentiam animae designat: virtus enim, sive potentia, est medium inter essentiam et operationem, ut patet per Dionysium, cap. XI Caelest. Hierarch.
| The term mind (mens) is taken from the verb measure (mensurare). For a thing of any genus is measured by that which is least and first in its genus, as is clear from the Metaphysics. So, the word mind is applied to the soul in the same way as understanding is. For understanding knows about things only by measuring them, as it were, according to its own principles. But, since it signifies reference to act, understanding designates a faculty of the soul. But a power or faculty lies between essence and activity, as Dionysius says.
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| Quia vero rerum essentiae sunt nobis ignotae, virtutes autem earum innotescunt nobis per actus, utimur frequenter nominibus virtutum vel potentiarum ad essentias significandas. Sed quia nihil notificatur nisi ex hoc quod est sibi proprium, oportet quod, cum aliqua essentia designatur per suam potentiam, quod designetur per potentiam sibi propriam. In potentiis autem hoc communiter invenitur, quod illud quod potest in plus, potest in minus, sed non convertitur; sicut qui potest ferre mille libras, potest ferre centum, ut dicitur in I caeli et mundi. Et ideo, si aliqua res per suam potentiam debeat designari, oportet quod designetur per ultimum potentiae suae.
| Since, however, the essences of things are not known to us, and their powers reveal themselves to us through their acts, we often use the names of the faculties and powers to denote the essences. But, since knowledge of a thing comes only from that which is proper to it, when an essence takes its name from one of its powers, it must be named according to a power proper to it. It is commonly true of powers that that which can do more can do less, but not conversely. So, a man who can carry a thousand pounds can carry a hundred, as is said in Heaven and Earth. Hence, if a thing is to be classified by its power, it must be classified according to the utmost of its power.
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| Anima autem quae est in plantis, non habet nisi infimum gradum inter potentias animae; unde ab ea denominatur, cum dicitur nutritiva vel vegetabilis. Anima autem bruti pertingit ad altiorem gradum, scilicet qui est sensus; unde ipsa anima vocatur sensitiva, vel quandoque etiam sensus. Sed anima humana pertingit ad altissimum gradum inter potentias animae, et ex hoc denominatur; unde dicitur intellectiva, et quandoque etiam intellectus, et similiter mens, inquantum scilicet ex ipsa nata est effluere talis potentia, quia est sibi proprium prae aliis animabus.
| Now, among souls, the soul in plants has only the lowest level of power, and so is classified according to this when it is called nutritive or vegetative. The soul of a brute animal, however, reaches a higher level, that of sense, and so its soul is called sensitive, or, sometimes, even simply sense. But the human soul reaches the highest level which there is among powers of soul and takes its name from this, being called intellective or, sometimes, also understanding and mind, inasmuch as from the intellective soul such power naturally arises, as is proper to the human soul above other souls.
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| Patet ergo, quod mens in anima nostra dicit illud quod est altissimum in virtute ipsius. Unde, cum secundum id quod est altissimum in nobis divina imago inveniatur in nobis, imago non pertinebit ad essentiam animae nisi secundum mentem, prout nominat altissimam potentiam eius. Et sic mens, prout in ea est imago, nominat potentiam animae, et non essentiam; vel si nominat essentiam, hoc non est nisi inquantum ab ea fluit talis potentia.
| It is clear, then, that in us mind designates the highest power of our soul. And since the image of God is in us according to that which is highest in us, that image will belong to the essence of the soul only in so far as mind is its highest power. Thus, mind, as containing the image of God, designates a power of the soul and not its essence. Or, if we take mind to mean essence, it means it only inasmuch as such a power flows from the essence.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod mens non dicitur significare essentiam secundum quod essentia contra potentiam dividitur; sed secundum quod essentia absoluta dividitur contra id quod relative dicitur. Et sic mens dividitur contra notitiam sui, inquantum per notitiam mens ad seipsam refertur; ipsa vero mens dicitur absolute. Vel potest dici, quod mens accipitur ab Augustino secundum quod significat essentiam animae, simul cum tali potentia.
| 1. Mind is not taken to mean essence, as essence is contrasted with power, but as absolute essence is distinguished from that which is relatively so called. Thus, mind is distinguished from knowledge of itself in this, that through knowledge mind is referred to itself, but mind itself is an absolute term. Or we can say that mind is taken by Augustine to mean the essence of the soul along with this power.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod genera potentiarum animae distinguuntur dupliciter: uno modo ex parte obiecti; alio modo ex parte subiecti, sive ex parte modi agendi, quod in idem redit. Si igitur distinguantur ex parte obiecti, sic inveniuntur quinque potentiarum animae genera supra enumerata. Si autem distinguantur ex parte subiecti vel modi agendi, sic sunt tria genera potentiarum animae: scilicet vegetativum, sensitivum et intellectivum. Operatio enim animae tripliciter se potest habere ad materiam.
| 2. There are two ways of classifying powers of the soul: first, according to their objects; and second, according to their subjects, or, what comes to the same thing, according to their manner of acting. If we classify them according to their objects, we have the five classes of powers of the soul mentioned above. However, if we classify them according to their subjects or manner of acting, there are three classes of powers of the soul: vegetative, sensitive, and intellective. For the activity of the soul can be related to matter in three ways.
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| Uno modo ita quod per modum materialis actionis exerceatur; et talium actionum principium est potentia nutritiva, cuius actus exercentur qualitatibus activis et passivis, sicut et aliae actiones materiales. Alio modo ita quod operatio animae non pertingat ad ipsam materiam, sed solum ad materiae conditiones, sicut est in actibus potentiae sensitivae: in sensu enim recipitur species sine materia, sed tamen cum materiae conditionibus. Tertio modo ita quod operatio animae excedat et materiam et materiae conditiones; et sic est pars animae intellectiva.
| In the first of these, the relation is such that the activity is performed as a natural activity. The source of this kind of activity is the nutritive power, and the exercise of the acts of this power takes place through active and passive qualities, just as other material activity does. In the second way, the relation is such that the activity of the soul does not reach matter itself, but only the conditions of matter, as in the activity of the sensitive power. For, in sense, the species is received without matter, but with the conditions of matter. In the third way, the relation is such that the activity of the soul is beyond both matter and the conditions of matter. The intellective part of the soul acts in this way.
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| Secundum igitur has diversas potentiarum animae partitiones contingit aliquas duas potentias animae ad invicem comparatas in idem vel diversum genus reduci. Si enim appetitus sensibilis et intellectualis, qui est voluntas, consideretur secundum ordinem ad obiectum, sic reducuntur in unum genus, quia utriusque obiectum est bonum. Si vero consideretur quantum ad modum agendi, sic reducuntur in diversa genera; quia appetitus inferior reducetur in genus sensitivi, appetitus vero superior in genus intellectivi.
| According to these different divisions of powers of the soul, two powers of the soul can belong to the same or different classes when compared with each other. For, if sensible appetite and intellectual appetite, which is will, are considered with reference to their object, both belong to the same class, because the good is the object of both. But, if we view them with reference to their manner of acting, they belong to different classes, for we classify the lower appetite as sensitive, and the higher as intellective.
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| Sicut enim sensus non apprehendit suum obiectum sub conditionibus materialibus, prout scilicet est hic et nunc; sic et appetitus sensibilis in suum obiectum fertur, in bonum scilicet particulare. Appetitus vero superior in suum obiectum tendit per modum quo intellectus apprehendit; et sic quantum ad modum agendi voluntas ad genus intellectivi reducitur.
| For, just as the sense grasps its object under the material conditions it has here and now, so, too, the sense appetite tends toward its object in the same way, and thus to a particular good. But the higher appetite is directed to its object after the manner in which the understanding perceives. So, with reference to manner of acting, will belongs to the intellective class.
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| Modus autem actionis provenit ex dispositione agentis: quia quanto fuerit perfectius agens, tanto est eius actio perfectior. Et ideo, si considerentur huiusmodi potentiae secundum quod egrediuntur ab essentia animae, quae est quasi subiectum earum, voluntas invenitur in eadem coordinatione cum intellectu; non autem appetitus inferior, qui in irascibilem et concupiscibilem dividitur. Et ideo mens potest comprehendere voluntatem et intellectum, absque hoc quod sit essentia animae; inquantum, scilicet, nominat quoddam genus potentiarum animae, ut sub mente intelligantur comprehendi omnes illae potentiae quae in suis actibus omnino a materia et conditionibus materiae recedunt.
| The manner of acting follows the state of the agent, for, as the agent is more perfect, so its activity is more perfect. Therefore, if we consider powers of this kind as they issue from the essence of the soul, which is, as it were, their subject, we find that will is on an equal footing with understanding, whereas the lower appetite, which is divided into the concupiscible and irascible, is not. Therefore, mind can include both understanding and will without thereby being the essence of the soul. Thus, mind denotes a certain class of powers of the soul, the group in which we include all the powers which withdraw entirely from matter and the conditions of matter in their activity.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod ab Augustino et aliis sanctis imago Trinitatis in homine multipliciter assignatur: nec oportet ut una illarum assignationum alteri correspondeat; sicut patet quod Augustinus assignat imaginem Trinitatis secundum mentem, notitiam et amorem; et ulterius secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Et quamvis voluntas et amor sibi invicem correspondeant, et notitia et intelligentia, non tamen oportet quod mens correspondeat memoriae; cum mens omnia tria contineat quae in alia assignatione dicuntur. Similiter etiam assignatio Augustini quam obiectio tangit, est alia a duabus praemissis. Unde non oportet quod, si amare amori correspondeat, et nosse notitiae, quod esse respondeat menti sicut proprius actus eius, inquantum est mens.
| 3. According to Augustine and other saints, the image of the Trinity is attributed to man under diverse formulae, and there is no need that the members of one formula correspond to those of another. This is clearly the case when Augustine makes the image of the Trinity follow mind, cognition, and love, and also memory, understanding, and will. Now, although will and love are parallel, as are understanding and cognition, it is not necessary that mind parallel memory, for mind includes all three which are given in the other way of attributing this likeness. Similarly, the attribution of Augustine referred to in the objection differs from the two we have Just mentioned. So, there is no need for existence to relate as proper act to mind, in so far as it is mind, although loving so relates to love and knowing so relates to knowledge.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod Angeli dicuntur mentes, non quia ipsa mens sive intellectus Angeli, sit eius essentia, prout mens et intellectus potentiam nominant; sed quia nihil aliud habent de potentiis animae nisi hoc quod sub mente comprehenditur: unde totaliter sunt mens. Animae vero nostrae adiunguntur aliae potentiae quae sub mente non comprehenduntur, ex eo quod est actus corporis: scilicet sensitivae et nutritivae potentiae; unde non ita potest dici anima esse mens sicut et Angelus.
| 4. Angels are called minds not because the mind or understanding of an angel, in so far as it designates a power, is its essence, but because they have no other powers of the soul except those which are included in the mind, and, so, are completely mind. Our soul, however, since it is the act of the body, has other powers which are not included in the mind, namely, sensitive and nutritive powers. So, soul cannot be called mind as an angel can.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod vivere addit supra esse, et intelligere supra vivere. Ad hoc autem quod in aliquo imago Dei inveniatur, oportet quod ad ultimum genus perfectionis perveniat quo creatura tendere potest; unde si habeat esse tantum, sicut lapides, vel esse et vivere, sicut plantae et bruta, non salvatur in hoc ratio imaginis; sed oportet ad perfectam imaginis rationem, ut creatura sit, vivat et intelligat. In hoc enim perfectissime secundum genus conformatur essentialibus attributis.
| 5. Living adds something to existing, and understanding something to living. But, for something to have the image of God in it, it must reach the highest kind of perfection to which a creature can aspire. So, if a thing has existence only, as stones, or existence and life, as plants and beasts, these are not enough to preserve the character of image. To have the complete character of image the creature must exist, live, and understand. For in this it has most perfectly the generic likeness to the essential attributes.
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| Et ideo, quia in assignatione imaginis mens locum divinae essentiae tenet, haec vero tria, quae sunt memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, tenent locum trium personarum; ideo Augustinus menti adscribit illa quae requiruntur ad imaginem in creatura, cum dicit, quod memoria et intelligentia et voluntas sunt una vita, una mens, una essentia. Nec tamen oportet quod ex hoc ipso in anima dicatur mens et vita quo et essentia; quia non est idem in nobis esse, vivere et intelligere, sicut et in Deo; dicuntur tamen haec tria una essentia, inquantum ab una essentia mentis procedunt; una vita inquantum ad unum genus vitae pertinent; una mens, inquantum sub una mente comprehenduntur ut partes sub toto, sicut visus et auditus comprehenduntur sub parte animae sensitiva.
| Therefore, since in applying the image mind takes the place of the divine essence, and memory, intellect, and will take the place of the three Persons, Augustine attributes to mind those things which are needed for the image in creatures when he says: “Memory, understanding, and will are one life, one mind, and one essence.” Still, it is not necessary to conclude from this that in the soul mind and life mean the same as essence, for to be, to live, and to understand are not the same thing in us as they are in God. Nevertheless, these three are called one essence since they flow from the one essence of the mind, one life because they belong to one kind of life, and one mind because they are included in one mind as parts in the whole, just as sight and hearing are included in the sensitive part of the soul.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod secundum philosophum in VIII Metaph., quia substantiales rerum differentiae sunt nobis ignotae, loco earum interdum definientes accidentalibus utuntur, secundum quod ipsa accidentia designant vel notificant essentiam, ut proprii effectus notificant causam: unde sensibile, secundum quod est differentia constitutiva animalis, non sumitur a sensu prout nominat potentiam, sed prout nominat ipsam animae essentiam, a qua talis potentia fluit. Et similiter est de rationali, vel de eo quod est habens mentem.
| 6. Since, according to the Philosopher, we do not know the substantial differences of things, those who make definitions sometimes use accidental differences because they indicate or afford knowledge of the essence as the proper effects afford knowledge of a cause. Therefore, when sensible is given as the constitutive difference of animal, it is not derived from the sense power, but the essence of the soul from which that power comes. The same is true of rational, or of that which has mind.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod sicut pars animae sensitiva non intelligitur esse una quaedam potentia praeter omnes particulares potentias quae sub ipsa comprehenduntur, sed est quasi quoddam totum potentiale comprehendens omnes illas potentias quasi partes; ita etiam mens non est una quaedam potentia praeter memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem; sed est quoddam totum potentiale comprehendens haec tria; sicut etiam videmus quod sub potentia faciendi domum comprehenditur potentia dolandi lapides et erigendi parietes; et sic de aliis.
| 7. Just as we do not understand that the sensitive part of the soul is a single power over and above the particular powers contained in it, but, rather, a kind of potential whole, including all those powers as parts, so, too, mind is not a single power over and above memory, understanding, and will, but a kind of potential whole including these three. In the same way, we see that the power of house building embraces those of cutting the stones and building the wall. The same holds true for the other powers.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod mens non comparatur ad intelligentiam et voluntatem sicut subiectum, sed magis sicut totum ad partes, prout mens potentiam ipsam nominat. Si vero sumatur mens pro essentia animae, secundum quod ab ea nata est progredi talis potentia; sic nominabit subiectum potentiarum.
| 8. Mind, when taken for the power itself, is not related to understanding and will as subject, but as whole to parts. But, if it is taken for the essence of the soul, in so far as such a power naturally flows from it, mind does denote the subject of the powers.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod una potentia particularis non comprehendit sub se plures; sed nihil prohibet sub una generali potentia comprehendi plures ut partes, sicut sub una parte corporis plures partes organicae comprehenduntur, ut digiti sub manu.
| 9. A single particular power does not contain many powers, but there is nothing to prevent a general power from embracing many powers as parts, just as one part of the body includes many organic parts, as the hand includes the fingers.
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ARTICLE III
In the third article we ask:
Is memory distinguished from understanding as one power from another?
[ARTICLE I Sent., 3, 4, 1; S.T., II, 74; S.T., I, 79, 7; 93, 7, ad 3.]
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| Tertio quaeritur utrum memoria distinguatur ab intelligentia sicut potentia a potentia
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it is not, for
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| Diversarum enim potentiarum sunt diversi actus. Sed intellectus possibilis et memoriae, prout in mente ponitur, est idem actus, qui est species retinere; hoc enim Augustinus memoriae, philosophus autem intellectui possibili attribuit. Ergo memoria non distinguitur ab intelligentia sicut potentia a potentia.
| 1. Different acts belong to different powers. But the possible intellect and memory, as part of the mind, are said to have the same act, to preserve the species. For Augustine assigns this function to memory and the Philosopher assigns it to the possible intellect. Therefore, memory is not distinguished from understanding as one power from another.
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| Praeterea, accipere aliquid non concernendo aliquam temporis differentiam, est proprium intellectus, qui abstrahit ab hic et nunc. Sed memoria non concernit aliquam differentiam temporis, quia, secundum Augustinum, XIV de Trinit., memoria est communiter praeteritorum, praesentium, et futurorum. Ergo memoria ab intellectu non distinguitur.
| 2. To receive something without paying attention to any difference of time belongs properly to understanding, which abstracts from the here and now. But memory pays no attention to difference of time, for, according to Augustine, memory deals indifferently with things present, past, and future. Therefore, memory is not distinguished from understanding.
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| Praeterea, intelligentia accipitur dupliciter secundum Augustinum, XIV de Trinit. Uno modo prout dicimur intelligere illud quod actu cogitamus; alio modo prout dicimur intelligere illud quod non actu consideramus. Sed intelligentia, secundum quam id tantum dicimur intelligere quod actu cogitamus, est intelligere in actu; quod non est potentia, sed operatio alicuius potentiae; et sic non distinguitur a memoria sicut potentia a potentia. Secundum vero quod intelligimus ea quae non actu cogitamus, nullo modo a memoria distinguitur, sed ad memoriam pertinet; quod patet per Augustinum, XIV de Trinitate, ubi sic dicit: si nos referamus ad interiorem mentis memoriam, qua sui meminit, et interiorem intelligentiam, qua se intelligit et interiorem voluntatem, qua se diligit; ubi haec tria simul semper sunt, sive cogitarentur, sive non cogitarentur; videtur quidem imago Trinitatis ad solam memoriam pertinere. Ergo intelligentia nullo modo distinguitur a memoria sicut potentia a potentia.
| 3. According to Augustine, intelligence can be taken in two ways. According to the first, we are said to understand that which we actually think. According to the second, we are said to understand that which we do not actually consider. But intelligence, in the meaning of understanding only that which we actually think, is understanding in act. This is not a power, but the activity of a power; hence, it is not distinguished from memory as a power from a power. But, in so far as we understand those things which we do not actually consider, understanding is not in any way distinguished from memory, but belongs to it. This is clear from Augustine: “If we look to the inner memory of the mind by which it remembers itself, to the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and to the inner will by which it loves itself, where these three are always together, whether they are thought about or not, we will see that the image of the Trinity belongs only to the memory.” Therefore, understanding is in no way distinguished from memory as a power from a power.
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| Si dicatur, quod intelligentia est quaedam potentia secundum quam anima est potens actu cogitare, et sic etiam intelligentia, qua non dicimur intelligere nisi cogitantes, distinguitur a memoria sicut potentia a potentia. Contra: eiusdem potentiae est habitum habere, et uti habitu. Sed intelligere non cogitando, est intelligere in habitu; intelligere autem cogitando, est uti habitu. Ergo ad eamdem potentiam pertinet intelligere non cogitando, et intelligere cogitando: et sic per hoc non diversificatur intelligentia a memoria sicut potentia a potentia.
| 4. Someone may say that intelligence is a power through which the soul is able actually to think, and so, also, that the intelligence through which we are said to understand only when we are thinking is distinguished from memory as one power from another.—On the contrary, it belongs to the same power to have a habit and to use that habit. But to understand when not thinking is to understand habitually, whereas to understand when thinking is to use the habit. Therefore, to understand when not thinking and to understand when thinking belong to the same power. And so, for this reason, understanding does not differ from memory as one power from another.
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| Praeterea in intellectiva parte animae non invenitur aliqua potentia nisi cognitiva et motiva vel affectiva. Sed voluntas est affectiva vel motiva; intelligentia autem est cognitiva. Ergo memoria non est alia potentia ab intelligentia.
| 5. In the intellective part of the soul there are only the cognoscitive and motive, or affective, powers. But the will is the affective or motive; understanding, the cognoscitive. Therefore, memory is not a different power from understanding.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., quod secundum hoc anima est ad imaginem Dei quod uti ratione atque intellectu ad intelligendum Deum et conspiciendum potest. Sed potest anima conspicere secundum potentiam. Ergo imago in anima attenditur secundum potentias. Sed imago in anima attenditur secundum quod haec tria in ea inveniuntur, memoria, intelligentia, et voluntas. Ergo haec tria sunt tres potentiae distinctae.
| 1. Augustine says that “the soul partakes of the image of God in this, that it can use reason and understanding to know and see God.” But the soul can see through its powers. Therefore, the image in the soul is considered according to its powers. But the image in the soul is considered according to the presence of memory, understanding, and will in the soul. Therefore, these three are three distinct powers.
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| Praeterea, si ista tria non sunt tres potentiae, oportet aliquod eorum esse actum sive operationem. Sed actus non semper est in anima; non enim semper actu intelligit vel vult. Ergo ista tria non semper erunt in anima; et sic non semper erit anima ad imaginem Dei, quod est contra Augustinum.
| 2. If these are not three powers, there must be one of them which is act or activity. But act is not always in the soul, for one does not always actually understand or will. Therefore, these three will not always be in the soul, and consequently the soul will not always be in the image of God, contrary to Augustine.
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| Praeterea, inter haec tria invenitur aequalitas, per quam aequalitas divinarum personarum repraesentatur. Sed inter actum et habitum vel potentiam non invenitur aequalitas; quia ad plura se extendit potentia quam habitus, et habitus quam actus; quia unius potentiae sunt plures habitus, et ab uno habitu plures actus eliciuntur. Ergo non potest esse quod aliquod eorum sit habitus, et aliud actus.
| 3. There is a certain equality among these three which portrays the equality of the divine Persons. But there is no equality among act, habit, and power, because power embraces more than habit and habit more than act. For many habits belong to one power, and many acts can come from one habit. Therefore, one of these cannot be habit and another act.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod imago Trinitatis in anima potest assignari dupliciter: uno modo secundum perfectam imitationem Trinitatis; alio modo secundum imperfectam.
| We must say that the image of the Trinity in the soul can be predicated in two ways: one in which there is perfect imitation of the Trinity, the other in which the imitation is imperfect.
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| Anima quidem perfecte Trinitatem imitatur secundum quod meminit, intelligit actu, et vult actu. Quod ideo est, quia in illa Trinitate increata, media in Trinitate persona est verbum. Verbum autem esse non potest sine actuali cognitione. Unde secundum hunc modum perfectae imitationis assignat Augustinus imaginem in his tribus: memoria, intelligentia et voluntate; prout memoria importat habitualem notitiam, intelligentia vero actualem cogitationem ex illa notitia prodeuntem, voluntas vero actualem voluntatis motum ex cogitatione procedentem. Et hoc expresse patet ex hoc quod dicit in XIV de Trinit., sic dicens: quia ibi, scilicet in mente, verbum esse sine cogitatione non potest (cogitamus enim omne quod dicimus illo interiori verbo, quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam); in tribus potius illis imago ista cognoscitur memoria scilicet, intelligentia, voluntate. Hanc autem nunc dico intelligentiam, qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem, quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit.
| For the mind perfectly imitates the Trinity in this, that it actually remembers, actually understands, and actually wills. This is so because in the uncreated Trinity the middle Person is the Word. Now, there can be a word only with actual cognition. Hence, it is according to this kind of perfect imitation that Augustine puts the image in memory, understanding, and will. In it, memory refers to habitual knowledge, understanding to actual cognition which proceeds from the habitual knowledge of memory, and will to the actual movement of the will which proceeds from thought. This appears expressly from what he says in The Trinity: “Since the word cannot be there,” in the mind, “without thought; for everything which we speak we think with that internal word which belongs to the language of no people, the image is found especially in those three: memory, intelligence, and will. Intelligence I now call that by which we understand when thinking; I call that will which joins this offspring [thought] with its parent [intelligence].”
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| Imago vero secundum imperfectam imitationem est, quando assignatur secundum habitus et potentias; et sic assignat Trinitatis imaginem in anima, IX de Trinitate, quantum ad haec tria, mens, notitia et amor; ut mens nominet potentiam, notitia vero et amor habitus in ea existentes. Et sicut posuit notitiam, ita ponere potuisset intelligentiam habitualem: utrumque enim habitualiter accipi potest, ut patet ex hoc quod dicit in libro XIV de Trinitate: numquid recte possumus dicere: iste musicus novit quidem musicam; sed nunc eam non intelligit, quia eam non cogitat; intelligit vero nunc geometriam, hanc enim nunc cogitat? Absurda est quantum apparet, ista sententia. Et sic secundum hanc assignationem haec duo, quae sunt notitia, et amor, habitualiter accepta, ad memoriam tantum pertinent, ut patet per auctoritatem eiusdem in obiiciendo inductam.
| We have the image in which there is imperfect imitation when we designate it according to habits and powers. It is thus that Augustine bases the image of the Trinity in the soul upon mind, knowledge, and love. Here, mind means the power; knowledge and love, the habits existing in it. In place of knowledge he could have said habitual intelligence, for both can be taken in the sense of habit. This is clear from The Trinity, where he says: “Can we correctly say that the musician knows music, but he does not now understand it because he is not now thinking about it, or that he now understands geometry because he is now thinking about it? This opinion is obviously absurd.” So, in this sense, knowledge and love, taken as habitual, belong only to memory, as is clear from the authoritative citation from Augustine in the objections.”
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| Sed quia actus sunt in potentiis radicaliter sicut effectus in causis; ideo etiam perfecta imitatio, quae est secundum memoriam, intelligentiam actualem et voluntatem actualem, potest originaliter inveniri in potentiis, secundum quas anima potest meminisse, intelligere actualiter et velle, ut per verba Augustini inducta patet. Et sic imago attendetur secundum potentias; non tamen hoc modo quod memoria possit esse, in mente, alia potentia praeter intelligentiam: quod sic patet.
| But, since acts have radical existence in powers, as effects in their causes, even perfect imitation according to memory, understanding in act, and will in act can in the first instance be found in the powers through which the soul can remember, actually understand and will, as the citation from Augustine shows. Thus, the image will be based upon the powers, though not in the sense that in the mind memory could be some power besides the understanding. This is clear from what follows.
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| Potentiae enim non diversificantur ex diversitate obiectorum nisi diversitas obiectorum sit ex his quae per se accidunt obiectis, secundum quod sunt talium potentiarum obiecta; unde calidum et frigidum, quae colorato accidunt, inquantum huiusmodi, non diversificant potentiam visivam: eiusdem enim visivae potentiae est videre coloratum calidum et frigidum, dulce et amarum. Quamvis autem mens sive intellectus aliquo modo cognoscere possit praeteritum, tamen, cum indifferenter se habeat ad cognoscenda praesentia, praeterita et futura; differentia praesentis et praeteriti est accidentalis intelligibili inquantum huiusmodi. Unde, quamvis in mente aliquo modo possit esse memoria, non tamen potest esse ut potentia quaedam per se distincta ab aliis, per modum quo philosophi de distinctione potentiarum loquuntur; sed hoc modo solummodo inveniri potest memoria in parte animae sensitiva, quae fertur ad praesens inquantum est praesens; unde, si debeat ferri in praeteritum, requiritur aliqua altior virtus quam ipse sensus.
| Diversity of objects is the source of differentiation of powers only when the diversity comes from those things which of themselves belong to the objects, in so far as they are objects of such powers. Thus, hot and cold in something colored do not, as such, differentiate the power of sight. For the same power of sight can see what is colored, whether hot or cold, sweet or bitter. Now, although mind or understanding can in a certain way know what is past, still, since it relates indifferently to knowledge of present, past, and future, the difference of past and present is accidental to what is intelligible, in so far as it is intelligible. For this reason, although memory can be in the mind in a certain way, it cannot be there as a power distinct of itself from other powers in the way in which philosophers speak of the distinction of powers. In this way, memory can be found only in the sensitive part, which is referred to the present as present. For this reason, a higher power than that of sense is needed if it is to relate to the past.
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| Nihilominus tamen, etsi memoria non sit potentia distincta ab intelligentia, prout intelligentia sumitur pro potentia, tamen invenitur Trinitas in anima etiam considerando ipsas potentias, secundum quod una potentia, quae est intellectus, habet habitudinem ad diversa, scilicet ad tenendum notitiam alicuius habitualiter et ad considerandum illud actualiter, sicut etiam Augustinus, distinguit rationem inferiorem a superiori secundum habitudinem ad diversa.
| Nevertheless, although memory is not a power distinct from intelligence, taken as a power, the Trinity is still in the soul if we consider those powers in so far as the one power of understanding has an orientation to different things, namely, habitually to keep the knowledge of something, and actually to consider it. It is in this way that Augustine distinguishes lower from higher reason, according to an orientation to different things.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod quamvis memoria, prout est in mente, non sit alia potentia ab intellectu possibili distincta; tamen inter intellectum possibilem et memoriam invenitur distinctio secundum habitudinem ad diversa, ut ex dictis patet.
Ad primum vero in contrarium dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de imagine inventa in anima, non secundum perfectam imitationem, quae est quando actu imitatur Trinitatem intelligendo eam.
| 1. Although memory as belonging to the mind is not a power distinct from the possible intellect, there is a distinction between memory and possible intellect according to orientation to different things, as we have said.
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| Et similiter dicendum est ad quatuor sequentia.
| 2. The same answer can be given to the four following difficulties.
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| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
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| Ad primum vero in contrarium dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de imagine inventa in anima, non secundum perfectam imitationem, quae est quando actu imitatur Trinitatem intelligendo eam.
| l. In the passage cited, Augustine is not talking about the image which is in the soul according to perfect imitation. This is present when the soul actually imitates the Trinity by understanding It.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod semper est in anima imago Trinitatis aliquo modo, sed non secundum perfectam imitationem.
| 2. In the soul there is always an image of the Trinity in some way, but not always according to perfect imitation.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod inter potentiam et actum et habitum potest esse aequalitas secundum quod comparantur ad unum obiectum; et sic imago Trinitatis invenitur in anima secundum quod fertur in Deum. Et tamen, etiam communiter loquendo de potentia, habitu et actu, invenitur in eis aequalitas, non quidem secundum proprietatem naturae, quia alterius modi habet esse operatio, habitus et potentia; sed secundum comparationem ad actum, secundum quam consideratur horum trium quantitas: nec oportet quod accipiatur unus actus tantum numero, aut unus habitus, sed habitus et actus in genere.
| 3. Between power, act, and habit there can be equality inasmuch as they are referred to one object. Thus, the image of the Trinity is in the soul inasmuch as it is directed to God. Still, even in the ordinary way of speaking about power, habit, and act, there is an equality among them. However, this equality does not follow the distinctive character of the nature, because activity, habit, and power have the act of existence in different ways. But it does follow the relation to act according to which we consider the quantity of these three. It is not necessary to consider only one act numerically, or one habit, but habit and act in general.
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ARTICLE IV
In the fourth article we ask:
Does the mind know material things?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 84, 1.]
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| Quarto quaeritur utrum mens cognoscat res materiales
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it does not, for
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| Mens enim non cognoscit aliquid nisi intellectuali cognitione. Sed, ut habetur in Glossa, II Cor., XII, 2, illa est intellectualis visio quae eas res continet quae non habent imagines sui similes, quae non sunt quod ipsae. Cum igitur res materiales non possint esse in anima per seipsas, sed solum per imagines sui similes, quae non sunt quod ipsae, videtur quod mens materialia non cognoscat.
| 1. The mind knows things only by intellectual cognition. But, according to the Gloss: “Intellectual sight is that which embraces those things which have no likenesses which are not identical with themselves.” Since, then, material things cannot exist in the soul of themselves, but only through representations similar to them, yet really different from them, it seems that the mind does not know material things.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram dicit: mente intelliguntur quae nec corpora sunt nec similitudines corporum. Sed res materiales sunt corpora, et similitudines corporum habent. Ergo mente non cognoscuntur.
| 2. Augustine says: “Through the mind we know things which are neither bodies nor likenesses of bodies.” But material things are bodies and have bodily likenesses. Therefore, they are not known by the mind.
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| Praeterea, mens, sive intellectus, habet cognoscere quidditates rerum, quia obiectum intellectus est quod quid est, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed quidditas rerum materialium non est ipsa corporeitas; alias oporteret, omnia quae quidditatem habent, corporea esse. Ergo materialia mens non cognoscit.
| 3. The mind, or intellect, is capable of knowing the quiddity of things because the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said in The Soul. But the quiddity of material things is not corporeity; otherwise, it would be necessary for all things which have quiddities to be corporeal. Therefore, the mind does not know material things.
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| Praeterea, cognitio mentis consequitur formam, quae est principium cognoscendi. Sed formae intelligibiles quae sunt in mente, sunt omnino immateriales. Ergo per eas mens non potest res materiales cognoscere.
| 4. Mental cognition follows upon form which is the principle of knowing. But the intelligible forms in the mind are altogether immaterial. So, through them, the mind is not able to know material things.
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| Praeterea, omnis cognitio est per assimilationem. Sed non potest esse assimilatio inter mentem et materialia, quia similitudinem facit unitas qualitatis; qualitates autem rerum materialium sunt corporalia accidentia, quae in mente esse non possunt. Ergo mens non potest materialia cognoscere.
| 5. All cognition takes place through assimilation. But there is no assimilation possible between the mind and material things, because likeness depends on sameness of quality. However, the qualities of material things are bodily accidents which cannot exist in the mind. Therefore, the mind cannot know material things.
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| Praeterea, mens nihil cognoscit nisi abstrahendo a materia et a conditionibus materiae. Sed res materiales, quae sunt res naturales, non possunt, etiam secundum intellectum, a materia separari, quia in eorum definitionibus cadit materia. Ergo materialia per mentem cognosci non possunt.
| 6. The mind knows nothing except by abstracting from matter and the conditions of matter. But material things, as physical beings, cannot be separated from matter even in the mind, because matter is part of their definition. Therefore, the mind cannot know material things.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Ea quae ad scientiam naturalem pertinent, mente cognoscuntur. Sed scientia naturalis de rebus materialibus est. Ergo mens res materiales cognoscit.
| 1. Objects of natural science are known by the mind. But natural science is concerned with material things. Therefore, the mind knows material things.
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| Praeterea, unusquisque bene iudicat quae cognoscit, et horum est optimus iudex ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, XII super Genesim ad litteram, per mentem ista inferiora iudicantur. Ergo haec inferiora materialia per mentem intelliguntur.
| 2. Each person is a good judge—in fact, as Aristotle says, the best judge—of those things of which he has knowledge. But, as Augustine notes, it is by the mind that these less perfect beings are judged. Therefore, these less perfect beings, which are material, are understood by the mind.
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| Praeterea, per sensum non cognoscimus nisi materialia. Sed cognitio mentis a sensu oritur. Ergo et mens materiales res cognoscit.
| 3. Through sense we know only material beings. But mental cognition is derived from sense. Therefore, the mind also knows material things.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod omnis cognitio est secundum aliquam formam, quae est in cognoscente principium cognitionis. Forma autem huiusmodi dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo secundum esse quod habet in cognoscente; alio modo secundum respectum quem habet ad rem cuius est similitudo. Secundum quidem primum respectum facit cognoscentem actu cognoscere; sed secundum respectum secundum determinat cognitionem ad aliquod cognoscibile determinatum. Et ideo modus cognoscendi rem aliquam, est secundum conditionem cognoscentis, in quo forma recipitur secundum modum eius. Non autem oportet quod res cognita sit secundum modum cognoscentis, vel secundum illum modum quo forma, quae est cognoscendi principium, esse habet in cognoscente; unde nihil prohibet, per formas quae in mente immaterialiter existunt, res materiales cognosci.
| All cognition follows some form which is the principle of cognition in the knower. Such a form can be considered under two aspects: either with relation to the being it has in the knower, or in the reference it has to the thing it represents. Under the first aspect, it causes the knower actually to know. Under the second, it limits the cognition to some definite knowable object. Therefore, the manner of knowing a thing conforms to the state of the knower, which receives the form in its own way. It is not necessary that the thing known exist in the manner of the knower or in the manner in which the form which is the principle of knowing exists in the knower. From this it follows that nothing prevents us from knowing material things through forms which exist immaterially in our minds.
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| Hoc autem differenter contingit in mente humana, quae formas accipit a rebus, et in divina vel angelica, quae a rebus non accipiunt. In mente enim accipiente scientiam a rebus, formae existunt per quamdam actionem rerum in animam; omnis autem actio est per formam; unde formae quae sunt in mente nostra, primo et principaliter respiciunt res extra animam existentes quantum ad formas earum. Quarum est duplex modus: quaedam enim sunt quae nullam sibi materiam determinant, ut linea, superficies, et huiusmodi; quaedam autem determinant sibi specialem materiam, sicut omnes formae naturales.
| There is a difference on this point between the human mind, which derives forms from things, and the divine or angelic minds, which do not draw their cognition from things. In the mind which depends on things for knowledge, the forms exist because of a certain action of things on the soul. But, since all action is through form, the forms in our minds first and mainly refer to things which exist outside our soul according to their forms. These forms are of two kinds. Some forms involve no determined matter, as line, surface, and so forth. Others do involve a special matter, as all natural forms.
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| Ex cognitione ergo formarum quae nullam sibi materiam determinant, non relinquitur aliqua cognitio de materia; sed ex cognitione formarum quae determinant sibi materiam, cognoscitur etiam ipsa materia aliquo modo, scilicet secundum habitudinem quam habet ad formam; et propter hoc dicit philosophus in I Physic., quod materia prima est scibilis secundum analogiam. Et sic per similitudinem formae ipsa res materialis cognoscitur, sicut aliquis ex hoc ipso quod cognoscit simitatem, cognosceret nasum simum. Sed formae rerum in mente divina existentes sunt, ex quibus fluit esse rerum,
| Therefore, knowledge of forms implying no matter does not give knowledge of matter, but the knowledge of natural forms gives some knowledge of matter, in so far as it is correlative to form. For this reason, the Philosopher says that first matter is knowable through analogy, and that the material thing itself is known through the likeness of its form, just as, by the very fact of knowing snubness, snub nose is known. But in the divine mind there are forms of things from which the existence of things flows.
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| quod est communiter formae et materiae; unde et formae illae respiciunt materiam et formam immediate, non unum per alterum et similiter formae intellectus angelici, quae sunt similes formis mentis divinae, quamvis non sint causae rerum. Et sic mens nostra de rebus materialibus immaterialem cognitionem habet; mens vero divina et angelica materialia immaterialius, et tamen perfectius, cognoscit.
| And this existence is common to form and matter. So, those forms are directly related to matter and form without the mediation of one to the other. So, too, angelic intellect has forms similar to the forms of the divine mind, although in angels the forms are not the causes of things. Therefore, our mind has immaterial knowledge of material things, whereas the divine and angelic minds have knowledge of the same material things in a way at once more immaterial and yet more perfect.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod auctoritas illa dupliciter potest exponi. Uno modo ut referatur ad visionem intellectualem quantum ad omnia quae sub ipsa comprehenduntur; et sic dicitur intellectualis visio illarum tantum rerum quae non habent imagines sui similes, quae non sint quod ipsae; non ut hoc intelligatur de imaginibus quibus res intellectuali visione videntur, quae sunt quasi medium cognoscendi; sed quia ipsa cognita per intellectualem visionem sunt res ipsae, et non rerum imagines. Quod in visione corporali, scilicet sensitiva, et spirituali, scilicet imaginativa, non accidit. Obiecta enim imaginationis et sensus sunt quaedam accidentia, ex quibus quaedam rei figura vel imago, constituitur; sed obiectum intellectus est ipsa rei essentia; quamvis essentiam rei cognoscat per eius similitudinem, sicut per medium cognoscendi, non sicut per obiectum in quod primo feratur eius visio.
| 1. The text cited in the first objection can be explained in two ways. In the first place, it can be taken to refer to intellectual sight with reference to all that is included in its scope. Taken in this way, intellectual sight is taken to refer only to those things which have no likenesses which are not identical with themselves. This is not to be understood of the likenesses by which we see things in intellectual sight, for these are a kind of means of knowing. What is known by intellectual sight is the things themselves, not their representations. This differs from bodily (sensitive) vision and spiritual (imaginative) vision. For the objects of imagination and sense are certain accidents from which the shape or image of a thing is made up. But the object of the intellect is the very essence of the thing, although the intellect knows the essence of the thing through its likeness, as through a cognoscitive medium, and not through an object which is known first.
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| Vel dicendum, quod hoc, quod in auctoritate dicitur, pertinet ad visionem intellectualem secundum quod excedit imaginativam et sensitivam; sic enim Augustinus, ex cuius verbis Glossa sumitur, intendit assignare differentiam trium visionum, attribuens superiori visioni illud in quo inferiorem excedit; sicut dicit, quod spiritualis visio est cum absentia cogitamus per similitudines quasdam, et tamen spiritualis sive imaginaria visio etiam est de his quae praesentialiter videntur; sed in hoc quod etiam absentia videt imaginatio, sensum transcendit; et ideo ponitur hoc quasi proprium eius. Similiter etiam intellectualis visio in hoc transcendit imaginationem et sensum, quod ad illa se extendit quae per essentiam suam sunt intelligibilia; et ideo hoc ei attribuit Augustinus quasi eius proprium, quamvis etiam cognoscere possit materialia, quae per suas similitudines cognoscibilia sunt. Unde dicit Augustinus, XII super Genesim ad litteram, quod per mentem et ista inferiora diiudicantur, et ea cernuntur quae neque sunt corpora, neque ullas gerunt formas similes corporum.
| A second explanation would be that the text cited refers to intellectual sight in so far as it surpasses the imaginative and sensitive powers. Following this line of thought, Augustine, from whose words the comment in the Gloss is taken, wishes to differentiate three types of sight, designating the higher by that in which it surpasses the lower. Thus it is said that spiritual sight takes place when through certain likenesses we know things which are absent. Spiritual (imaginative) sight can nevertheless relate to things seen as present. But imagination outstrips sense, inasmuch as it can also see things absent. Hence, this is attributed to it as a sort of property. Similarly, intellectual sight surpasses imagination and sense because it can reach things that are essentially intelligible through their essence. So, Augustine makes this a sort of property of intellectual vision, although it can also know material things which are knowable by means of their likenesses. For this reason Augustine says: “Through the mind judgment is passed even upon those lower types of being, and those things which are not bodies and do not have forms of a bodily kind are known.”
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| Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum.
| 2. The answer to the second difficulty is clear from the first response.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod si corporeitas sumatur a corpore prout est in genere quantitatis, sic corporeitas non est rei naturalis quidditas, sed eius accidens, scilicet trina dimensio. Si vero sumatur a corpore prout est in genere substantiae, sic corporeitas nominat rei naturalis essentiam. Nec tamen sequetur quod omnis quidditas sit corporeitas, nisi diceretur, quod quidditati, inquantum est quidditas, conveniret esse corporeitatem.
| 3 If corporeity is taken of body in so far as it is in the category of quantity, it is not the quiddity of a physical thing, but an accident of it; namely, triple dimension. But, if it is taken of body in so far as it is in the category of substance, then corporeity designates the essence of a physical thing. Nevertheless, it will not follow from this that every quiddity is corporeity, unless one would say that quiddity, by its very nature as quiddity, has the same meaning as corporeity.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis in mente non sint nisi immateriales formae, possunt tamen esse similitudines materialium rerum. Non enim oportet quod eiusmodi esse habeat similitudo et id cuius est similitudo, sed solum quod in ratione conveniant; sicut forma hominis in statua aurea, quale esse habet forma hominis in carne et ossibus.
| 4. Although in the mind there are only immaterial forms, these can be likenesses of material things. For it is not necessary that the likeness and that of which it is the likeness have the same manner of existing, but only that they agree in intelligible character, just as the form of man in a golden statue need not have the same kind of existence as the form of man in bones and flesh.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis qualitates corporales non possint esse in mente, possunt tamen (in) ea esse similitudines corporearum qualitatum, et secundum has mens rebus corporeis assimilatur.
| 5. Although bodily qualities cannot exist in the mind, their representations can, and through these the mind is made like bodily things.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod intellectus cognoscit abstrahendo a materia particulari et conditionibus eius, sicut ab his carnibus et his ossibus; non tamen oportet quod abstrahat a materia universali; unde potest considerare formam naturalem in carnibus et ossibus, licet non in his.
| 6. Intellect knows by abstracting from particular matter and its conditions, as from this flesh and these bones. It does not have to abstract from common matter. Hence, it can study the physical form in flesh and bones, although not in this flesh and these bones.
|
ARTICLE V
In the fifth article we ask:
Can our mind know material things in their singularity?
[ARTICLE De ver., 2, 5-6; I Sent., 36, 1, 1; II Sent., 3, 3, 3, ad 1; IV Sent., 50,1, 3; Quodl., VII, 1, 3; XII, 8, 11; S.T., I, 63 & 65; S.T., I, 14, 11, ad 1; 86, 1; Q.D. de anima, 20; III de anima, 8, nn. 705-719; De princ. individ., nn. 3-4.]
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| Quinto quaeritur utrum mens nostra possit cognoscere materialia in singulari
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that it can, for
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| Quia sicut singulare habet esse propter materiam, ita et res dicuntur naturales quae in sui definitione materiam habent. Sed mens quamvis sit immaterialis, potest cognoscere res naturales. Ergo eadem ratione potest cognoscere res singulares.
| 1. Since the singular has existence through matter, things are called physical which have matter in their definition. But the mind, even though it is immaterial, can know physical things. For the same reason it can know singular things.
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| Praeterea, nullus iudicat recte et disponit de aliquibus nisi ea cognoscat. Sed sapiens per mentem iudicat et disponit recte de singularibus, sicut de familia sua et de rebus suis. Ergo mente singularia cognoscimus.
| 2. No one can correctly decide about things and use them properly unless he knows them. But the wise man through his mind decides correctly about singular things and uses them properly; for example, his family and his possessions. Therefore, we know singular things with our mind.
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| Praeterea, nullus cognoscit compositionem nisi cognoscat compositionis extrema. Sed hanc compositionem: Socrates est homo, format mens; non enim posset eam formare aliqua sensitiva potentia, quae hominem in universali non apprehendit. Ergo mens singularia cognoscit.
| 3. No one knows a composition unless he knows the components. But the mind makes this conjunction: “Socrates is man.” No sense would be able to do so, since it does not perceive man in general. Therefore, the mind knows singular things.
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| Praeterea, nullus potest imperare actum aliquem nisi cognoscat obiectum illius actus. Sed mens, sive ratio, imperat actum concupiscibilis et irascibilis, ut patet in I Ethic. Cum ergo, illarum obiecta sint singularia, mens singularia cognoscet.
| 4. No one can command any act without knowing the object of that act. But the mind, or reason, commands acts of the concupiscible power and the irascible power, as is clear in the Ethics. Therefore, since the objects of these are singular things, the mind can know singular things.
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| Praeterea, quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest et superior, secundum Boetium. Sed potentiae sensitivae, quae sunt inferiores mente, singularia cognoscunt. Ergo multo amplius mens singularia cognoscere potest.
| 5. According to Boethius, a higher power can do anything the lower power can. But the sensitive powers, which are lower than the mind, know singulars. Therefore, the mind can know singulars much more fully.
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| Praeterea, quanto aliqua mens est altior, tanto habet universaliorem cognitionem, ut patet per Dionysium, cap. XII Cael. Hierarch. Sed mens Angeli est altior quam mens hominis, et tamen Angelus cognoscit singularia. Ergo multo amplius mens humana.
| 6. The higher a mind is, the more general is its knowledge, as is clear from Dionysius. But the angelic mind, though higher than the human mind, knows singulars. So, the human mind knows them much more fully.
|
| Sed contra:
| To the Contrary
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| universale est dum intelligitur, singulare dum sentitur, ut dicit Boetius.
| We understand the universal, but sense the singular, as Boethius says.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod, sicut ex dictis patet, mens humana et angelica diversimode materialia cognoscit. Cognitio enim mentis humanae fertur ad res materiales primo secundum formam, et secundario ad materiam prout habet habitudinem ad formam. Sicut autem omnis forma, quantum est de se, est universalis, ita habitudo ad formam non facit cognoscere materiam nisi cognitione universali. Sic autem considerata materia non est individuationis principium, sed secundum quod consideratur materia in singulari, quae est materia signata sub determinatis dimensionibus existens: ex hac enim forma individuatur. Unde philosophus dicit in VII Metaph., quod hominis partes sunt forma et materia ut universaliter, Socratis vero forma haec et haec materia.
| As is clear from what has been said, human and angelic minds know material things in different ways. For the cognition of the human mind is directed, first, to material things according to their form, and, second, to matter in so far as it is correlative to form. However, just as every form is of itself universal, so correlation to form makes us know matter only by universal knowledge. Matter thus considered is not the principle of individuation. Designated matter, existing under definite dimensions and considered as singular, is, rather, that principle because form receives its individuation from such matter. For this reason, the Philosopher says: “The parts of man are matter and form taken generally, whereas the parts of Socrates are this form and this matter.”
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| Unde patet quod mens nostra directe singulare cognoscere non potest; sed directe cognoscitur a nobis singulare per virtutes sensitivas, quae recipiunt formas a rebus in organo corporali: et sic recipiunt eas sub determinatis dimensionibus, et secundum quod ducunt in cognitionem materiae singularis. Sicut enim forma universalis ducit in cognitionem materiae universalis, ita forma individualis ducit in cognitionem materiae signatae, quae est individuationis principium.
| From this it is clear that our mind is not able directly to know singulars, for we know singulars directly through our sensitive powers which receive forms from things into a bodily organ. In this way, our senses receive them under determined dimensions and as a source of knowledge of the material singular. For, just as a universal form leads to the knowledge of matter in general, so an individual form leads to the knowledge of designated matter which is the principle of individuation.
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| Sed tamen mens per accidens singularibus se immiscet, inquantum continuatur viribus sensitivis, quae circa particularia versantur. Quae quidem continuatio est dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum motus sensitivae partis terminatur ad mentem, sicut accidit in motu qui est a rebus ad animam. Et sic mens singulare cognoscit per quamdam reflexionem, prout scilicet mens cognoscendo obiectum suum, quod est aliqua natura universalis, redit in cognitionem sui actus, et ulterius in speciem quae est sui actus principium, et ulterius in phantasma a quo species est abstracta; et sic aliquam cognitionem de singulari accipit.
| Nevertheless, the mind has contact with singulars by reason of something else in so far as it has continuity with the sensitive powers which have particulars for their object. This conjunction comes about in two ways. First, the movement of the sensitive part terminates in the mind, as happens in the movement that goes from things to the soul. Thus, the mind knows singulars through a certain kind of reflection, as when the mind, in knowing its object, which is some universal nature, returns to knowledge of its own act, then to the species which is the principle of its act, and, finally, to the phantasm from which it has abstracted the species. In this way, it attains to some knowledge about singulars.
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| Alio modo secundum quod motus qui est ab anima ad res, incipit a mente, et procedit in partem sensitivam, prout mens regit inferiores vires. Et sic singularibus se immiscet mediante ratione particulari, quae est potentia quaedam sensitivae partis componens et dividens intentiones individuales quae alio nomine dicitur cogitativa, et habet determinatum organum in corpore, scilicet mediam cellulam capitis. Universalem enim sententiam quam mens habet de operabilibus, non est possibile applicari ad particularem actum nisi per aliquam potentiam mediam apprehendentem singulare, ut sic fiat quidam syllogismus, cuius maior sit universalis, quae est sententia mentis; minor autem singularis, quae est apprehensio particularis rationis; conclusio vero electio singularis operis, ut patet per id quod habetur III de anima.
| In the other way, this conjunction is found in the movement from the soul to things, which begins from the mind and moves forward to the sensitive part in the mind’s control over the lower powers. Here, the mind has contact with singulars through the mediation of particular reason, a power of the sensitive part, which joins and divides individual intentional likenesses, which is also known as the cogitative power, and which has a definite bodily organ, a cell in the center of the head. The mind’s universal judgment about things to be done cannot be applied to a particular act except through the mediation of some intermediate power which perceives the singular. In this way, there is framed a kind of syllogism whose major premise is universal, the decision of the mind, and whose minor premise is singular, a perception of the particular reason. The conclusion is the choice of the singular work, as is clear in The Soul.
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| Mens vero Angeli, quia cognoscit res materiales per formas quae respiciunt immediate materiam sicut et formam, non solum cognoscit materiam in universali directa inspectione, sed etiam in singulari; et similiter etiam mens divina.
| The angelic mind, since it knows material things through forms that immediately refer to matter as well as to form, knows by direct vision not only matter in general, but also matter as singular. So, also, does the divine mind.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cognitio qua cognoscitur materia secundum analogiam quam habet ad formam, sufficit ad cognitionem rei naturalis, non autem ad cognitionem singularis, ut ex dictis patet.
| 1. The operation by which we know matter through the analogy which it has to form is sufficient for knowledge of physical reality, but not for knowledge of the singular thing, as is clear from what has been said.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod dispositio sapientis de singularibus non fit per mentem nisi mediante vi cogitativa, cuius est intentiones particulares cognoscere, ut ex dictis patet.
| 2. The wise man arranges singulars; by the mind only through the mediation of the cogitative power whose function it is to know particular intentions, as is clear from what has been said.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod secundum hoc intellectus potest ex universali et singulari propositionem componere, quod singulare per reflexionem quamdam cognoscit, ut dictum est.
| 3. The intellect makes a proposition of a singular and a universal term since it knows the singular through a certain reflection, as was said.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod intellectus sive ratio cognoscit in universali finem ad quem ordinat actum concupiscibilis et actum irascibilis imperando eos. Hanc autem cognitionem universalem mediante vi cogitativa ad singularia applicat, ut dictum est.
| 4. The intellect or reason knows universally the end to which it directs the act of the concupiscible power and the act of the irascible power when it commands them. It applies this universal knowledge to singulars through the mediation of the cogitative power, as has been said.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod illud quod potest virtus inferior, potest etiam superior, non tamen semper eodem modo, sed quandoque alio altiori. Et sic intellectus cognoscere potest ea quae cognoscit sensus, altiori tamen modo quam sensus: sensus enim cognoscit ea quantum ad dispositiones materiales et accidentia exteriora, sed intellectus penetrat ad intimam naturam speciei, quae est in ipsis individuis.
| 5. The higher power can do what the lower power can, but not always in the same way. Sometimes it acts in a higher way. Thus, intellect can know what sense knows, but in a way that is superior. For sense knows these things according to their material dispositions and external accidents, but intellect penetrates to the intimate nature of the species which is in these individuals.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod cognitio mentis angelicae est universalior quam cognitio mentis humanae, quia ad plura se extendit paucioribus mediis utens: est tamen efficacior ad singularia cognoscenda quam mens humana, ut ex dictis patet.
| 6. Cognition of the angelic mind is more universal than cognition of the human mind, because, by the use of fewer media, it reaches more things. Nevertheless, it is more effective than the human mind for knowing singulars, as is clear from what has been said.
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ARTICLE VI
In the sixth article we ask:
Does the human mind receive knowledge from sensible things?
[ARTICLE De ver., 19, 1; Quodl., VIII, 2, 3; S.T., I, 84, 6; Q.D. de anima, 15; Comp. Theol., cc. 81-82.]
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| Sexto quaeritur utrum mens humana cognitionem accipiat a sensibilibus
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it does not, for
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| Eorum enim quae non communicant in materia, non potest esse actio et passio, ut per Boetium in Lib. de duabus naturis patet et per philosophum in libro de generatione. Sed mens nostra non communicat in materia cum rebus sensibilibus. Ergo non possunt sensibilia agere in mentem nostram, ut ex eis menti nostrae aliqua cognitio imprimatur.
| 1. Action and passion cannot take place between things unless both are material, as is clear from Boethius, and also from the Philosopher. But our mind does not share in matter with sensible things. Therefore, sensible things cannot act on our mind to imprint knowledge on it.
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| Praeterea, obiectum intellectus est quid, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed quidditas rei nullo sensu percipitur. Ergo cognitio mentis a sensu non accipitur.
| 2. What a thing is, is the object of intellect, as is said in The Soul. But the quiddity of a thing is not perceived by any sense. Therefore, mental cognition is not received from sense.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, X confessionum, loquens de cognitione intelligibilium, quomodo a nobis acquiratur: ibi, inquit, erant, scilicet intelligibilia in mente nostra; et antequam ea didicissem, sed in memoria non erant. Ergo videtur quod intelligibiles species non sint in mente a sensibus acceptae.
| 3. When speaking of the way in which we acquire cognition of intelligible things, Augustine says: “They were there” that is, intelligibles in our mind, “before I learned them, but they were not in my memory. Therefore, it seems that intelligible species are not received in the mind from the senses.
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| Praeterea, sicut Augustinus probat in X de Trinitate, anima non potest amare nisi cognita. Sed aliquis antequam aliquam scientiam addiscat, amat eam; quod patet ex hoc quod multo studio eam quaerit. Ergo antequam addiscat illam scientiam, habet eam in notitia sua; ergo videtur quod non accipiat mens cognitionem a rebus sensibilibus.
| 4. Augustine proves that the soul can love only what it knows. But one loves a science before he learns it, as is clear from the eagerness with which he seeks this knowledge. Therefore, before he learns such a science, he has some acquaintance with it. So, it seems that the mind does not receive knowledge from sensible things.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Genesim ad litteram: corporis imaginem non corpus in spiritu, sed ipse spiritus in seipso facit celeritate mirabili, quae ineffabiliter longe est a corporis tarditate. Ergo videtur quod mens non accipiat species intelligibiles a sensibus, sed ipsa eas in se formet.
| 5. Augustine says: “The body does not make the image of the body in the spirit. Rather, the spirit itself with a wonderful swiftness which is ineffably far from the slowness of the body makes in itself the image of the body.” Therefore, it seems that the mind does not receive intelligible species from sensible things but constructs them in itself.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII de Trinitate, quod mens nostra de rebus corporalibus iudicat secundum rationes incorporales et sempiternas. Sed rationes a sensu acceptae non sunt huiusmodi; ergo videtur quod mens humana non accipiat cognitionem a sensibilibus.
| 6. Augustine says that our mind judges about bodily things through non-bodily and eternal principles. But principles received from the senses are not of this kind. Therefore, it seems that the human mind does not receive knowledge from sensible things.
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| Praeterea, si mens cognitionem a sensibilibus accipiat, hoc non potest esse nisi inquantum species quae a sensibilibus accipitur, intellectum possibilem movet. Sed talis species non potest movere intellectum possibilem. Non enim movet ipsum in phantasia adhuc existens, quia ibi existens nondum est actu intelligibilis, sed potentia tantum; intellectus autem non movetur nisi ab intelligibili actu, sicut nec visus nisi a visibili in actu; similiter nec movet intellectum possibilem existens in intellectu agente, qui nullius speciei est receptivus, alias non differret ab intellectu possibili; similiter nec existens in ipso possibili intellectu, quia forma iam inhaerens subiecto subiectum non movet, sed in ipso quodammodo quiescit; nec etiam per se existens, cum species intelligibiles non sint substantiae, sed de genere accidentium, ut dicit Avicenna in sua metaphysica. Ergo nullo modo esse potest ut mens nostra a sensibilibus accipiat scientiam.
| 7. If the mind receives knowledge from sensible things, it must do so because the species received from sensible things set the possible intellect in motion. But such species cannot influence the possible intellect. For, when they are in the imagination, they are not intelligible actually, but only potentially, and so cannot set the possible intellect in motion. The intellect, however, is moved only by something actually intelligible, just as the power of sight is moved only by something actually visible. Similarly, something existing in the agent intellect cannot move the possible intellect, because the agent intellect does not receive species. If it did, it would not differ from the possible intellect. Again, these representations do not actuate the possible intellect by existing in it, for a form already adhering in a subject does not set the subject in motion, but is, as it were, at rest in it. Finally, they do not cause movement in the possible intellect by existing of themselves, for intelligible species are not substances, but belong to the class of accidents, as Avicenna says. Therefore, in no way can our mind receive knowledge from sensible things.
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| Praeterea, agens est nobilius patiente, ut patet per Augustinum, XII super Genesim ad litteram, et per philosophum in III de anima. Sed recipiens se habet ad illud a quo recipit quasi patiens ad agens. Cum ergo mens sit multo nobilior sensibilibus et sensibus ipsis, non poterit ab eis cognitionem accipere.
| 8. The agent is more noble than the patient, as is clear from Augustine and from the Philosopher. But the receiver is related to that which it receives, as a patient is related to the agent. Since, therefore, the mind is much more noble than sensible things and the senses themselves, it cannot receive knowledge from them.
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| Praeterea, philosophus dicit in VII Phys., quod anima in quiescendo fit sciens et prudens. Sed anima non posset accipere scientiam a sensibilibus, nisi moveretur aliquo modo ab eis. Ergo anima non accipit scientiam a sensibilibus.
| 9. The Philosopher says” that the soul comes to acquire knowledge and prudence by coming to rest. But the soul cannot receive knowledge from sensible things unless it be somehow set in motion by them. Therefore, the soul does not receive knowledge from sensible things.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Sicut dicit philosophus, et experimento probatur, cui deficit unus sensus, deest una scientia, sicut caecis deest scientia de coloribus. Hoc autem non esset, si anima aliunde acciperet scientiam quam per sensus. Ergo a sensibilibus per sensus cognitionem accipit.
| 1. As the Philosopher says, and as experience proves, one who lacks a sense is deprived of one kind of knowledge, as the blind have no knowledge of colors. This would not happen if the soul received knowledge from a source other than the senses. Therefore, the soul receives knowledge from sensible objects through the senses.
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| Praeterea, omnis nostra cognitio originaliter consistit in notitia primorum principiorum indemonstrabilium. Horum autem cognitio in nobis a sensu oritur, ut patet in fine Poster. Ergo scientia nostra a sensu oritur.
| 2. At first, all our cognition consists in the knowledge of first undeducible principles. But the cognition of these arises in us from sense, as is clear from the Posterior Analytics. Therefore, all our knowledge arises from sense.
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| Praeterea, natura nihil facit frustra, nec deficit in necessariis. Frustra autem dati essent sensus animae, nisi per eos cognitionem de rebus acciperet. Ergo mens nostra a sensibilibus cognitionem accipit.
| 3. Nature does nothing to no purpose and does not fail in necessary matters. But senses would have been given to the soul to no purpose unless the soul received cognition from things through them. Therefore, our mind receives knowledge from sensible things.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem multiplex fuit antiquorum opinio.
| The views of the ancients on this question are manifold. Some held that our knowledge derived completely from an external cause separated from matter. There are two explanations of this position.
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| Quidam enim posuerunt ortum scientiae nostrae totaliter a causa exteriori esse, quae est a materia separata: quae in duas sectas dividitur. Quidam enim, ut Platonici, posuerunt formas rerum sensibilium esse a materia separatas, et sic esse intelligibiles actu, et per earum participationem a materia sensibili effici individua in natura; earum vero participatione humanas mentes scientiam habere. Et sic ponebant formas praedictas esse principium generationis et scientiae, ut philosophus narrat in I Metaph. Sed haec positio a philosopho sufficienter reprobata est; qui ostendit quod non est ponere formas sensibilium rerum nisi in materia sensibili, cum etiam nec sine materia sensibili in universali formae naturales intelligi possint, sicut nec simus sine naso.
| Some, as the Platonists, held that the forms of sensible thing existed apart from matter and so were actually intelligible. According to them, real individuals come about through the participation by sensible matter in these forms, and the human mind has knowledge by sharing in them. Thus, these forms are the principle of generation and knowledge, as the Philosopher says. But the Philosopher has adequately confuted this position by showing that sensible forms must exist in sensible matter, and that sensible matter in general is necessary for the understanding of physical forms, just as there is no snub without nose.
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| Et ideo alii non ponentes formas sensibilium separatas, sed intelligentias tantum, quas nos Angelos dicimus, posuerunt originem nostrae scientiae totaliter ab huiusmodi substantiis separatis esse. Unde Avicenna voluit, quod sicut formae sensibiles non acquiruntur in materia sensibili nisi ex influentia intelligentiae agentis, ita nec formae intelligibiles humanis mentibus imprimuntur nisi ex intelligentia agente, quae non est pars animae, sed substantia separata, ut ipse ponit. Indiget tamen anima sensibus quasi excitantibus et disponentibus ad scientiam; sicut agentia inferiora praeparant materiam ad suscipiendum formam ab intelligentia agente.
| For this reason, others, bypassing separated forms of sensible things, demanded only intelligences, which we call angels, and made separated substances of this sort the sole source of our knowledge. Accordingly, Avicenna holds that just as sensible forms are not received into sensible matter except through the influence of the agent intelligence, so, too, intelligible forms are not imprinted on human minds except by the agent intelligence, which for him is not a part of the soul, but a separated substance. However, the soul needs the senses to prepare the way and stimulate it to knowledge, just as the lower agents prepare matter to receive form from the agent intelligence.
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| Sed ista etiam opinio non videtur rationabilis: quia secundum hoc non esset necessaria dependentia inter cognitionem mentis humanae et virtutes sensitivas; cuius contrarium manifeste apparet: tum ex hoc quod deficiente sensu deficit scientia de suis sensibilibus, tum etiam ex hoc quod mens nostra non potest actu considerare etiam ea quae habitualiter scit, nisi formando aliqua phantasmata; unde etiam laeso organo phantasiae impeditur consideratio. Et praeterea praedicta positio tollit proxima rerum principia, si omnia inferiora ex substantia separata immediate formas consequuntur tam intelligibiles quam sensibiles.
| But this opinion does not seem reasonable, because, according to it, there is no necessary interdependence of the human mind and the sensitive powers. The opposite seems quite clear both from the fact that, when a given sense is missing, we have no knowledge of its sensible objects, and from the fact that our mind cannot actually consider even those things which it knows habitually unless it forms some phantasms. Thus, an injury to the organ of imagination hinders consideration. Furthermore, the explanation just given does away with the proximate principles of things, inasmuch as all lower things would derive their intelligible and sensible forms immediately from a separated substance.
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| Alia opinio fuit ponentium nostrae scientiae originem totaliter a causa interiori esse: quae etiam in duas sectas dividitur. Quidam enim posuerunt humanas animas in seipsis continere omnium rerum notitiam; sed per coniunctionem ad corpus praedictam notitiam obtenebrari. Et ideo dicebant nos indigere sensibus et studio, ut impedimenta scientiae tollerentur; dicentes, addiscere, nihil aliud esse quam reminisci; sicut etiam manifeste apparet quod ex his quae audimus vel videmus, reminiscimur ea quae prius sciebamus. Sed haec positio non videtur etiam rationabilis. Si enim coniunctio animae ad corpus sit naturalis, non potest esse quod per eam totaliter naturalis scientia impediretur: et ita, si haec opinio vera esset, non pateremur omnimodam ignorantiam eorum quorum sensum non habemus. Esset autem opinio consona illi positioni quae ponit animas ante corpora fuisse creatas, et postmodum corporibus unitas; quia tunc compositio corporis et animae non esset naturalis, sed accidentaliter proveniens ipsi animae. Quae quidem opinio et secundum fidem et secundum philosophorum sententias reprobanda iudicatur.
| A second explanation has been given by those who make an inferior cause the complete source of our knowledge. There are also two explanations; of this position. Some held that human souls had within themselves knowledge of all things, but that this cognition was darkened by union with the body. Therefore, they said that we need assiduous use of the senses to remove the hindrance to knowledge. Learning, they said, is nothing but remembering, as is abundantly clear from the way in which those things which we have seen and heard make us remember what we formerly knew. But this position does not seem reasonable. For, if the union of soul and body is natural, it cannot wholly hinder natural knowledge. And if this opinion be true, we would not be subject to the complete ignorance of those objects which demand a sense faculty of which one is deprived. This opinion would fit in with the theory that holds that souls were created before bodies and later united to them. Then, the conjunction d body and soul would not be natural, but only an accidental accretion to the soul. This opinion must be rejected on the score both of faith and philosophic tenets.
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| Alii vero dixerunt, quod anima sibi ipsi est scientiae causa: non enim a sensibilibus scientiam accipit quasi per actionem sensibilium aliquo modo similitudines rerum ad animam perveniant; sed ipsa anima ad praesentiam sensibilium in se similitudines sensibilium format. Sed haec etiam positio non videtur totaliter rationabilis. Nullum enim agens, nisi secundum quod est actu, agit; unde si anima in se format omnium rerum similitudines, oportet quod ipsa in se actu habeat illas similitudines rerum; et sic redibit in praedictam opinionem, quae ponit omnium rerum scientiam animae humanae naturaliter insitam esse.
| Other proponents of this second opinion said that the soul is the cause of its own knowledge. For it does not receive knowledge from sensible things as if likenesses of things somehow reached the soul because of the activity of sensible things, but the soul itself, in the presence of sensible things, constructs in itself the likenesses of sensible things. But this statement does not seem altogether reasonable. For no agent acts except in so far as it is in act. Thus, if the soul formed the likenesses of all things in itself, it would be necessary for the soul to have those likenesses of things actually within itself. This would be a return to the previous opinion which held that the knowledge of all things is naturally present in the human soul.
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| Et ideo prae omnibus praedictis positionibus rationabilior est sententia philosophi, qui ponit scientiam mentis nostrae partim ab intrinseco et partim ab extrinseco esse; non solum a rebus a materia separatis, sed etiam ab ipsis sensibilibus. Cum enim mens nostra comparatur ad res sensibiles quae sunt extra animam, invenitur se habere ad eas in duplici habitudine. Uno modo ut actus ad potentiam: inquantum, scilicet, res quae sunt extra animam sunt intelligibiles in potentia. Ipsa vero mens est intelligibilis in actu; et secundum hoc ponitur in anima intellectus agens, qui faciat intelligibilia in potentia esse intelligibilia in actu. Alio modo ut potentia ad actum: prout scilicet in mente nostra formae rerum determinatae, sunt in potentia tantum, quae in rebus extra animam sunt in actu; et secundum hoc ponitur in anima nostra intellectus possibilis, cuius est recipere formas a rebus sensibilibus abstractas, factas intelligibiles in actu per lumen intellectus agentis. Quod quidem lumen intellectus agentis in anima procedit, sicut a prima origine, a substantiis separatis et praecipue a Deo.
| Therefore, the opinion of the Philosopher is more reasonable than any of the foregoing positions. He attributes the knowledge of our mind partly to intrinsic, partly to extrinsic, influence. Not only things separated from matter, but also sensible things themselves, play their part. For, when our mind is considered in relation to sensible things outside the soul, it is found to be related to them in a twofold manner. In one way, it is related as act to potency, to the extent that things outside the mind are only potentially intelligible. The mind itself, however, is intelligible in act, and it is on this basis that the agent intellect, which makes potentially intelligible things actually intelligible, is held to be included in the soul. In another way, it is related to things as potency to act, inasmuch as determined forms of things are only potentially in our mind, but actually in things outside the soul. In this respect our soul includes the possible intellect, whose function it is to receive forms abstracted from sensible things and made actually intelligible through the light of the agent intellect. This light of the agent intellect comes to the soul from the separated substances and especially from God as from its first source.
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| Et secundum hoc, verum est quod scientiam mens nostra a sensibilibus accipit; nihilominus tamen ipsa anima in se similitudines rerum format, inquantum per lumen intellectus agentis efficiuntur formae a sensibilibus abstractae intelligibiles actu, ut in intellectu possibili recipi possint. Et sic etiam in lumine intellectus agentis nobis est quodammodo originaliter omnis scientia originaliter indita, mediantibus universalibus conceptionibus, quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur, per quas sicut per universalia principia iudicamus de aliis, et ea praecognoscimus in ipsis. Ut secundum hoc etiam illa opinio veritatem habeat quae ponit, nos ea quae addiscimus, ante in notitia habuisse.
| Accordingly, it is true that our mind receives knowledge from sensible things; nevertheless, the soul itself forms in itself likenesses of things, inasmuch as through the light of the agent intellect the forms abstracted from sensible things are made actually intelligible so that they may be received in the possible intellect. And in this way all knowledge is in a certain sense implanted in us from the beginning (since we have the light of the agent intellect) through the medium of universal conceptions which are immediately known by the light of the agent intellect. These serve as universal principles through which we judge about other things, and in which we foreknow these others. In this respect, that opinion is true which holds that we previously had in our knowledge those things which we learn.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod formae sensibiles, vel a sensibilibus abstractae, non possunt agere in mentem nostram, nisi quatenus per lumen intellectus agentis immateriales redduntur, et sic efficiuntur quodammodo homogeneae intellectui possibili in quem agunt.
| 1. Sensible forms, those, namely, which are abstracted from sensible things, cannot act on our mind unless they are rendered immaterial through the light of the agent intellect, and thus in some way are made homogeneous with the possible intellect on which they must act.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod circa idem virtus superior et inferior operantur, non similiter, sed superior sublimius; unde et per formam quae a rebus recipitur, sensus non ita efficaciter rem cognoscit sicut intellectus: sed sensus per eam manuducitur in cognitionem exteriorum accidentium; intellectus vero pervenit ad nudam quidditatem rei, secernendo eam ab omnibus materialibus dispositionibus unde non pro tanto dicitur cognitio mentis a sensu originem habere, quod omne illud quod mens cognoscit, sensus apprehendat; sed quia ex his quae sensus apprehendit, mens in aliqua ulteriora manuducitur, sicut etiam sensibilia intellecta manuducunt in intelligibilia divinorum.
| 2. A higher and lower power do not operate in the same way even in respect to the same thing, but the higher power acts more nobly. Thus, when sense knows a thing through a form received from things, it does not know it so effectively as the intellect. Sense is led through it to a knowledge of the external accidents; the intellect reaches to the bare quiddity of the thing, distinguishing it from all material dispositions. Thus, when the mental knowing is said to take its origin from sense, this does not mean that sense apprehends all that the mind knows, but that, from those things which sense apprehends, the mind is led on to something more, just as the intellectual knowledge of sensible things leads to knowledge of divine things.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod verbum Augustini est referendum ad praecognitionem qua particularia in principiis universalibus praecognoscuntur; sic enim verum est quod ea quae addiscimus, prius in anima nostra erant.
| 3. The statement from Augustine refers to that precognition by which we know particulars in universal principles. In this sense it is true that what we learn is already in our soul.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod aliquis antequam aliquam scientiam acquirat, amare eam potest, inquantum eam cognoscit quadam cognitione universali, cognoscendo utilitatem illius scientiae, vel visu, vel quocumque alio modo.
| 4. One can love scientific knowledge before he acquires it in so far as he has some general acquaintance with it by sight, or by knowing its usefulness, or in some other way.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod secundum hoc intelligenda est anima seipsam formare, quod per actionem intellectus agentis formae intelligibiles factae intellectum possibilem formant, ut dictum est; et secundum quod etiam vis imaginativa potest formare diversorum sensibilium formas; quod praecipue apparet dum imaginamur ea quae nunquam sensu percepimus.
| 5. The soul is to be understood to fashion itself in this sense, that the forms which arise from the activity of the agent intellect determine the possible intellect, as has been said. And in this sense, too, the imaginative power can fashion the forms of different sensible objects, as especially appears when we imagine things which we have never perceived by sense.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod prima principia quorum cognitio est nobis innata, sunt quaedam similitudines increatae veritatis; unde secundum quod per ea de aliis iudicamus, dicimur iudicare de rebus per rationes incommutabiles, vel per veritatem increatam. Hoc tamen quod Augustinus ibi dicit, referendum est ad rationem superiorem, quae aeternis contemplandis inhaeret; quae quidem, quamvis sit dignitate prior, est tamen eius operatio tempore posterior, quia invisibilia per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur, Rom. I, 20.
| 6. The first principles of which we have innate cognition are certain likenesses of uncreated truth. When we judge about other things through these likenesses, we are said to judge about things through unchangeable principles or through uncreated truth. Nevertheless, we should refer this statement of Augustine to higher reason, which confines itself to the contemplation of eternal truths. Although this higher reason is first in dignity, its operation is subsequent in time: “For the invisible things of him [God]... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Romans 1:20).
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod in receptione qua intellectus possibilis species rerum accipit a phantasmatibus, se habent phantasmata ut agens instrumentale vel secundarium; intellectus vero agens ut agens principale et primum. Et ideo effectus actionis relinquitur in intellectu possibili secundum conditionem utriusque, et non secundum conditionem alterius tantum; et ideo intellectus possibilis recipit formas ut intelligibiles actu, ex virtute intellectus agentis, sed ut similitudines determinatarum rerum ex cognitione phantasmatum. Et sic formae intelligibiles in actu non sunt per se existentes neque in phantasia neque in intellectu agente, sed solum in intellectu possibili.
| 7. In the reception through which the possible intellect receives species from phantasms, the phantasms act as instrumental and secondary agents. The agent intellect acts as the principal and first agent. Therefore, the effect of the action is received in the possible intellect according to the condition of both, and not according to the condition of either one alone. Therefore, the possible intellect receives forms whose actual intelligibility is due to the power of the agent intellect, but whose determinate likeness to things is due to cognition of the phantasms. These actually intelligible forms do not, of themselves, exist either in the imagination or the agent intellect, but only in the possible intellect.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod, quamvis intellectus possibilis sit simpliciter nobilior quam phantasma; tamen secundum quid nihil prohibet phantasma nobilius esse, inquantum scilicet phantasma est actu similitudo talis rei; quod intellectui possibili non convenit nisi in potentia. Et sic, quodammodo potest agere in intellectum possibilem virtute luminis intellectus agentis, sicut et color potest agere in visum virtute luminis corporalis.
| 8. Although the possible intellect is simply more noble than the phantasm, nothing prevents the phantasm from being more noble n a certain respect, namely, that it is actually the likeness of such a thing, whereas this likeness belongs to the possible intellect only potentially. Thus, in a certain sense, we can say that the phantasm acts on the possible intellect in virtue of the light of the agent intellect, just as color can act on sight in virtue of bodily light.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod quies in qua perficitur scientia, excludit motum materialium passionum; non autem motum et passionem communiter accepta, secundum quod quodlibet recipere pati dicitur et moveri; sic enim philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod intelligere quoddam pati est.
| 9. The rest in which knowledge is achieved eliminates the movement of material passions. It does not eliminate movement and passion in a general sense, inasmuch as all receiving is called passion and movement. In accord with this, the Philosopher says in The Soul: “Intellection is a kind of passion.”
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ARTICLE VII
In the seventh article we ask:
Is the image of the trinity in the mind as it knows material things or only as it knows eternal things?
[ARTICLE I Sent., 3, 4, 4; S.T., I, 93, 8]
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| Septimo quaeritur utrum in mente sit imago Trinitatis secundum quod materialia cognoscit, non solum secundum quod cognoscit aeterna
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non solum secundum quod cognoscit aeterna.
| It seems that it is not only as the mind knows eternal things, for
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| Quia, ut dicit Augustinus, libro XII de Trinitate, cum quaerimus Trinitatem in anima, in tota quaerimus, non separantes actionem rationalem in temporalibus a contemplatione aeternorum. Sed mens non est ad imaginem nisi secundum quod in ea Trinitas invenitur. Ergo mens est ad imaginem non solum secundum quod inhaeret aeternis contemplandis, sed etiam secundum quod inhaeret temporalibus agendis.
| 1. As Augustine says: “When we look for the Trinity in our soul, we look for It in the whole soul without separating the activity of reason concerning temporal things from the contemplation of things eternal.” But mind has the character of image only as it has the Trinity in it. Therefore, the mind has the character of image not only in so far as it applies itself to the contemplation of eternal things, but also in so far as it engages in activity concerning temporal things.
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| Praeterea, imago Trinitatis consideratur in anima inquantum in ea repraesentatur aequalitas personarum, et earum origo. Sed magis aequalitas personarum repraesentatur in mente secundum quod cognoscit temporalia, quam secundum quod cognoscit aeterna; cum aeterna in infinitum excedant mentem, mens autem non in infinitum temporalia excedit. Origo etiam personarum repraesentatur in cognitione temporalium, sicut et in cognitione aeternorum, quia utrobique ex mente procedit notitia, et ex notitia procedit amor. Ergo imago Trinitatis non solum est in mente secundum quod cognoscit aeterna, sed etiam secundum quod cognoscit temporalia.
| 2. We consider the image of the Trinity in the soul in so far as the equality and origin of the persons are represented there. But the equality of the persons is better represented in the mind as knowing things of time than as knowing eternal things, since the latter are infinitely above the mind, whereas the mind is not infinitely above things of time. The origin of the persons, too, is displayed in cognition of things of time as well as in cognition of things eternal, for in both instances knowledge proceeds from the mind and love proceeds from knowledge. Therefore, it has the character of image of the Trinity not only in so far as it knows eternal things, but also in so far as it knows temporal things.
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| Praeterea, similitudo est in potentia diligendi; sed imago in potentia cognoscendi, ut habetur in II sententiarum, XVI distinct. Sed mens nostra per prius cognoscit materialia quam aeterna, cum ex materialibus in aeterna perveniat; et etiam perfectius, cum materialia comprehendat, non autem aeterna. Ergo imago magis est in mente secundum quod comparatur ad temporalia quam secundum quod comparatur ad aeterna.
| 3. Likeness is in the power of loving, but the image is in the power of knowing, as is said in the Sentences. But our mind knows material things before it knows things eternal, since it goes from material things to eternal things. It also knows material things more perfectly, since it has a comprehensive grasp of temporal things, but not of things eternal. Therefore, the image is in the mind more according to temporal things than according to eternal things.
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| Praeterea, imago Trinitatis invenitur in anima quodammodo secundum potentias, ut supra, dictum est. Sed potentiae indifferenter se habent ad omnia obiecta ad quae potentiae determinantur. Ergo imago Dei invenitur in mente respectu quorumlibet obiectorum.
| 4. The image of the Trinity in the soul somehow follows its powers, as has been said above. But the powers are related indifferently to all the objects to which they are directed. Therefore, the image of God is in the mind with reference to any of its objects.
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| Praeterea, perfectius videtur illud quod in seipso videtur, quam quod videtur in sui similitudine. Sed anima videt seipsam in se, Deum autem non nisi in similitudine, in statu viae. Ergo perfectius cognoscit seipsam quam Deum. Et ita magis est attendenda imago Trinitatis in anima secundum quod anima cognoscit seipsam, quam secundum quod cognoscit Deum; cum in nobis secundum id imago Trinitatis inveniatur quod perfectissimum in natura nostra habemus, ut Augustinus dicit.
| 5. Something seen in itself is seen more perfectly than something seen in its likeness. But the soul sees itself in itself; whereas in this life it sees God only in a likeness. Therefore, it knows itself more perfectly than it knows God. So, we should look for the image of the Trinity in the soul rather as it knows itself than as it knows God, since the image of the Trinity is in us according to that which is most perfect in our nature, as Augustine says.
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| Praeterea, secundum hoc personarum aequalitas in mente nostra repraesentatur quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas tota, invicem se capiunt, ut patet per Augustinum, X de Trinitate. Sed ista mutua comprehensio non ostenderet earum aequalitatem, nisi quantum ad omnia obiecta se comprehenderent. Ergo ratione omnium obiectorum imago Trinitatis invenitur in potentiis mentis.
| 6. The equality of the persons is represented in our mind in this, that memory, understanding, and the whole will each grasp the others, as is clear from Augustine. But this mutual comprehension shows forth the equality only in so far as they grasp themselves with reference to all objects. Therefore, the image of the Trinity is in the powers of the mind by reason of all their objects.
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| Praeterea, sicut imago est in potentia cognoscendi, ita caritas in potentia diligendi. Sed caritas non solum respicit Deum, sed etiam proximum; unde et duplex ponitur actus caritatis, scilicet dilectio Dei et proximi. Ergo et imago non solum est in mente secundum quod cognoscit Deum, sed etiam secundum quod cognoscit creaturas.
| 7. As the image is in the power of knowing, so charity is in the power of loving. But charity looks not only to God, but also to the neighbor. Thus, there is a double act of charity: love of God and love of the neighbor. Therefore, the image, also, is in the mind not only as it knows God, but also as it knows creatures.
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| Praeterea, potentiae mentis in quibus consistit imago, aliquibus habitibus perficiuntur, secundum quos imago deformata dicitur reformari et perfici. Sed potentiae mentis non indigent habitibus secundum quod comparantur ad aeterna, sed solum secundum quod comparantur ad temporalia, quia habitus ad hoc sunt ut secundum eos potentiae regulentur; in aeternis autem error non potest accidere, ut ibi regula opus sit, sed solum in temporalibus. Ergo imago magis consistit in mente secundum quod cognoscit temporalia quam secundum quod cognoscit aeterna.
| 8. The powers of the mind in which the image resides are made perfect by certain habits, according to which the deformed image is said to be re-formed and made perfect. But the powers of the mind do not need habits inasmuch as they are related to things eternal, but only to things temporal. For we have habits in order that powers may be regulated according to them. But there can be no error in things eternal to need regulation, but only in temporal things. Therefore, the image is more in the mind as it knows temporal things than as it knows eternal things.
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| Praeterea, Trinitas increata repraesentatur in imagine mentis nostrae, praecipue quantum ad consubstantialitatem et coaequalitatem. Sed haec duo inveniuntur etiam in potentia sensitiva, quia sensibile et sensus in actu efficiuntur unum, et species sensibilis non recipitur in sensu nisi secundum suam capacitatem. Ergo etiam in potentia sensitiva imago Trinitatis invenitur: multo igitur magis in mente, secundum quod temporalia cognoscit.
| 9. The uncreated Trinity is represented in the image of the mind especially according to consubstantiality and equality. But these two are also found in the sensitive power, because the sensible thing and sense are made actually one, and the sensible species is received in the senses only according to their capacity. Therefore, the image of the Trinity is in the sensitive power, and so, a fortiori, it is in the mind as it knows temporal things.
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| Praeterea, metaphoricae locutiones secundum aliquas similitudines attenduntur, quia, secundum philosophum, omnes transferentes secundum aliquam similitudinem transferunt. Sed a quibusdam creaturis sensibilibus magis fit transumptio in divina per metaphoricas locutiones, quam etiam ab ipsa mente; sicut patet de radio solari, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. IV de divinis nominibus. Ergo creaturae sensibiles aliquae magis possunt dici ad imaginem quam etiam ipsa mens. Et ita non videtur aliquid impedire quin mens, secundum quod temporalia cognoscit, ad imaginem sit.
| 10. Metaphorical expressions are accepted according to certain likenesses, for, according to the Philosopher, every term used figuratively is applied according to some likeness. But the application to God through metaphor is taken rather from certain sensible creatures than from the mind itself. This is evidently what Dionysius does when speaking of the rays of the sun. Therefore, some sensible creatures can be said to have the character of image more than the mind. And so, there seems to be nothing to prevent the mind, as knowing temporal things, from having the character of image.
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| Praeterea, Boetius dicit in libro de Trinitate, quod formae quae sunt in materia, sunt imagines illarum rerum quae sunt sine materia. Formae autem in materia existentes sunt formae sensibiles. Ergo formae sensibiles sunt imagines ipsius Dei; et ita mens, secundum quod ea cognoscit, videtur ad imaginem Dei esse.
| 11. Boethius says that forms which exist in matter are images of those things which exist without matter. But forms existing in matter are sensible forms. Therefore, sensible forms are images of God Himself. Thus, the mind, as knowing them, seems to have the character of image of God.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod Augustinus dicit in XV de Trinitate, quod Trinitas quae in inferiori scientia invenitur, licet ad interiorem hominem iam pertineat, nondum tamen imago Dei appellanda est vel putanda. Inferior autem scientia est, secundum quod mens temporalia contemplatur; sic enim a sapientia aeternorum distinguitur. Ergo imago Trinitatis non attenditur in mente secundum quod temporalia cognoscit.
| 1. Augustine says: “The trinity which is found in a lower science should not be called or be thought to be the image of God, although it doe’s belong to the inner man.” But a lower science is that according to which the mind considers temporal things, and is thus distinguished from wisdom, which refers to eternal things. Therefore, the image of the Trinity is not to be found in the mind according to its knowledge of temporal things.
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| Praeterea, partes imaginis secundum ordinem debent tribus personis respondere. Sed ordo personarum non invenitur in mente secundum quod temporalia cognoscit. In cognitione enim temporalium intelligentia non procedit ex memoria, ut verbum a patre; sed magis memoria ab intelligentia, quia ea quae prius intelleximus, memoramur. Ergo imago non consistit in mente secundum quod temporalia cognoscit.
| 2. The parts of the image, considered according to their order, should correspond to the three persons. But the order of the persons does not appear in the mind as it knows temporal things. For, in knowing temporal things, understanding does not proceed from memory, as the Word from the Father, but memory rather proceeds from understanding, for we remember those things which we have previously understood. Therefore, the image is not in the mind as it knows things of time.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII de Trinitate: facta ista distributione mentis, quae scilicet dividitur in contemplationem aeternorum, et actionem temporalium, in eo solo quod ad contemplationem pertinet aeternorum, non solum Trinitas, sed etiam imago Dei; in hoc autem quod derivatum est in actione temporalium, etiamsi Trinitas possit, non tamen imago Dei potest inveniri; et sic idem quod prius.
| 3. Augustine, having given that division of the mind (into contemplation of things eternal and activity concerning temporal things), says: “Not only the Trinity, but also the image of God, exists only in that part which is concerned with contemplation of eternal things. Even if we could find a trinity in that which is derived from activity about things of time, we still would not find the image of God there.” Thus, we conclude as before.
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| Praeterea, imago Trinitatis semper existit in anima, non autem cognitio rerum temporalium, cum per acquisitionem habeatur. Ergo imago Trinitatis non invenitur in anima secundum quod temporalia cognoscit.
| 4. The image of the Trinity always exists in the soul, but knowledge of temporal things does not, since it is acquired. Therefore, the image of the Trinity is not in the soul as it knows temporal things.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod rationem imaginis similitudo perficit. Non tamen quaelibet similitudo ad rationem imaginis sufficiens invenitur; sed expressissima similitudo, per quam aliquid repraesentatur secundum rationem suae speciei; et ideo in corporalibus imagines rerum attenduntur magis secundum figuras, quae sunt specierum propria signa, quam secundum colores et alia accidentia. Invenitur autem in anima nostra aliqua similitudo Trinitatis increatae secundum quamlibet sui cognitionem, non solum mentis, sed etiam sensus, ut patet per Augustinum XI de Trinit.: sed in illa tantum cognitione mentis imago Dei reperitur, secundum quam in mente nostra expressior Dei similitudo invenitur.
| Likeness brings the character of image to completion. However, for the character of image not every likeness is sufficient, but the fullest likeness, through which something is represented according to its specific nature. For this reason, in bodies we look for the image more in their shapes, which are the proper marks of species, than in colors and other accidents. There is a likeness of the uncreated Trinity in our soul according to any knowledge which it has of itself, not only of the mind, but also of sense, as Augustine clearly shows.” But we find the image of God only in that knowledge according to which there arises in the mind the fuller likeness of God.
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| Ut igitur cognitionem mentis secundum obiecta distinguamus, triplex cognitio in mente nostra invenitur. Cognitio, scilicet, qua mens cognoscit Deum, et qua cognoscit seipsam, et qua cognoscit temporalia. In illa igitur cognitione qua mens temporalia cognoscit, non invenitur expressa similitudo Trinitatis increatae neque secundum conformationem, quia res materiales magis sunt Deo dissimiles quam ipsa mens, unde per hoc quod mens earum scientia informatur, non efficitur Deo maxime conformis; similiter etiam neque secundum analogiam, eo quod res temporalis, quae sui notitiam parit in anima, vel intelligentiam actualem, non est eiusdem substantiae cum ipsa mente, sed extraneum a natura eius; et sic non potest per hoc increatae Trinitatis consubstantialitas repraesentari.
| Therefore, if we distinguish the knowledge of the mind according to objects, we find in our mind a threefold knowledge. There is the knowledge by which the mind knows God, by which it knows itself, and by which it knows temporal things. In the knowledge by which the mind knows temporal things there is no expressed likeness of the uncreated Trinity, either according to adaptation or according to analogy. It is not according to the first, because material things are more unlike God than is the mind itself. Thus, the mind does not become fully conformed to God for being informed by knowledge of these material things. Nor yet is it according to analogy, for a temporal thing, which begets knowledge, or even actual understanding of itself in the soul, is not of the same substance as the mind, but something extraneous to its nature. Thus, the consubstantiality of the uncreated Trinity cannot be represented through it.
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| Sed in cognitione qua mens nostra cognoscit seipsam, est repraesentatio Trinitatis increatae secundum analogiam, inquantum hoc modo mens cognoscens seipsam verbum sui gignit, et ex utroque procedit amor. Sicut pater seipsum dicens, verbum suum genuit ab aeterno, et ex utroque spiritus sanctus procedit. Sed in cognitione illa qua mens ipsum Deum cognoscit mens ipsa Deo conformatur, sicut omne cognoscens, inquantum huiusmodi, assimilatur cognito.
| But in the knowledge by which our mind knows itself there is a representation of the uncreated Trinity according to analogy. It lies in this, that the mind, knowing itself in this way, begets a word expressing itself, and love proceeds from both of these, just as the Father, uttering Himself, has begotten the Word from eternity, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both. But in that cognition by which the mind knows God the mind itself becomes conformed to God, just as every knower, as such, is assimilated to that which is known.
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| Maior est autem similitudo quae est per conformitatem, ut visus ad colorem, quam quae est per analogiam, ut visus ad intellectum, qui similiter ad sua obiecta comparatur. Unde expressior similitudo Trinitatis est in mente secundum quod cognoscit Deum, quam secundum quod cognoscit seipsam. Et ideo proprie imago Trinitatis in mente est secundum quod cognoscit Deum primo et principaliter: sed quodam modo et secundario etiam secundum quod cognoscit seipsam et praecipue prout seipsam considerat ut est imago Dei; ut sic eius consideratio non sistat in se, sed procedat usque ad Deum. In consideratione vero rerum temporalium non invenitur imago, sed similitudo quaedam Trinitatis, quae magis potest ad vestigium pertinere, sicut et similitudo quam Augustinus assignat in potentiis sensitivis.
| But there is a greater likeness through conformity, as of sight to color, than through analogy, as of sight to understanding, which is related to its objects in a way similar to that of sight. Consequently, the likeness of the Trinity is clearer in mind, as knowing God, than as knowing itself. Therefore, properly speaking, the image of the Trinity is in the mind primarily and mainly, in so far as the mind knows God, and it is there in a certain manner and secondarily, in so far as the mind knows itself, especially when it considers itself in so far as it is the image of God. As a result, its consideration does not stop with itself, but goes on to God. There is no image in the consideration of temporal things, but a kind of likeness of the Trinity, which can partake more of the character of vestige. Such is the likeness which Augustine attributes to the sensitive powers.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod Trinitas quidem aliqua invenitur in mente, secundum quod se extendit ad actionem temporalium; sed tamen illa Trinitas non dicitur imago increatae Trinitatis, ut patet per ea quae ibidem Augustinus subiungit.
| 1. There is indeed a trinity in the mind, as it applies itself to activity concerned with temporal things. But this trinity is not called the image of the uncreated Trinity, as is clear from what Augustine adds to that passage.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod aequalitas divinarum personarum magis repraesentatur in cognitione aeternorum quam temporalium. Non enim est attendenda aequalitas inter obiectum et potentiam, sed inter unam potentiam et aliam. Quamvis autem maior sit inaequalitas inter mentem nostram et Deum, quam inter mentem nostram et rem temporalem; tamen inter memoriam quam mens nostra habet de Deo, et actualem intelligentiam eius et amorem, maior invenitur aequalitas quam inter memoriam quam habet de rebus temporalibus, et earum intelligentiam et amorem. Ipse enim Deus per seipsum cognoscibilis est et diligibilis, et ita tantum a mente uniuscuiusque intelligitur et amatur, quantum menti praesens est; cuius praesentia in mente ipsius memoria in mente est et sic memoriae, quae de ipso habetur, intelligentia et huic voluntas sive amor adaequatur.
| 2. The equality of the divine persons is better represented in the knowledge of eternal than of temporal things. For we should not look for equality between object and power, but between one power and another. Moreover, although there is greater inequality between our mind and God than between our mind and a temporal thing, yet between the memory which our mind has of God and actual understanding and love of God there is greater equality than between the memory it has of temporal things and the understanding and love of them. For God is knowable and lovable of Himself and is understood and loved by the mind of each to the degree in which He is present to the mind. His presence in the mind is memory of Him in the mind; thus, intelligence is proportioned to the memory of Him, and will or love is proportioned to this intelligence.
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| Res autem materiales non sunt secundum se intelligibiles et diligibiles. Et ideo respectu earum talis aequalitas in mente non invenitur, nec etiam idem ordo originis cum ex hoc nostrae memoriae praesentes sint, quod a nobis intellectae fuerunt; et sic memoria ex intelligentia oritur potius quam e converso; cuius contrarium in mente creata accidit respectu ipsius Dei, ex cuius praesentia mens intellectuale participat lumen, ut intelligere possit.
| However, physical things as such are not intelligible or lovable and so there is not this equality in the mind with reference to them. Neither is there the same order of origin, since these are present to our memory because we have understood them, and so memory arises from understanding rather than conversely. The opposite of this takes place in the created mind with reference to God from whose presence the mind participates in intellectual light so that it can understand.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis cognitio quam de rebus materialibus habemus, sit prior tempore illa notitia quam habemus de Deo, tamen haec est prior dignitate. Nec obstat quod materialia a nobis perfectius cognoscuntur quam Deus; quia minima cognitio quae de Deo haberi potest, superat omnem cognitionem quae de creatura habetur. Nobilitas enim scientiae ex nobilitate sciti dependet, ut patet in principio I de anima; unde et in XI de animalibus philosophus praeponit modicam scientiam quam habemus de rebus caelestibus omni scientiae quam de rebus inferioribus habemus.
| 3. Although the knowledge which we have of physical things is prior in time to that which we have of God, the latter is prior in dignity. And the fact that we know physical reality better than we know God offers no difficulty, because the least knowledge which can be had about God surpasses all knowledge about creatures. The nobility of knowledge depends on the nobility of the thing known, as is clear from The Soul. For this reason, the Philosopher puts the little knowledge which we have of heavenly things before all the knowledge which we have about things here below.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis potentiae se extendant ad omnia sua obiecta, tamen earum virtus pensatur ex ultimo in quod possunt, ut patet in I caeli et mundi. Et ideo id quod ad maximam perfectionem potentiarum mentis pertinet, scilicet esse ad imaginem Dei, attribuitur eis respectu nobilissimi obiecti, quod Deus est.
| 4. Although powers extend to all their objects, their capacity is measured by the highest thing which they can reach, as appears in Heaven and Earth. Therefore, that which belongs to the highest perfection of the powers of the mind, namely, to be in the image of God, is attributed to them with reference to the most noble object, which is God.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis mens perfectius seipsam cognoscat quam Deum, tamen cognitio quam habet de Deo, est nobilior, et per eam magis Deo conformatur, ut dictum est; et ideo secundum ipsam magis est ad Dei imaginem.
| 5. Although the mind knows itself more perfectly than it knows God, the knowledge which it has of God is more noble, and through it the mind becomes more conformed to God, as has been said. Therefore, it is rather according to this that the mind is in the image of God.
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| Ad sextum dicendum quod quamvis aequalitas ad imaginem pertineat, quae in mente nostra invenitur, non tamen oportet quod respectu omnium imago attendatur; respectu quorum aliqua aequalitas invenitur in ipsa, eo quod plura alia ad imaginem requiruntur; unde ratio non sequitur.
| 6. Although the equality belongs to the image which is in our mind, it is not necessary to consider the image with respect to everything, with reference to which some equality is found in it, since many other things are needed for an image. Hence, the argument does not follow.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis caritas, quae imaginem perficit, respiciat proximum, non tamen sicut principale obiectum, cum eius principale obiectum sit solus Deus; in proximo enim nihil diligit caritas nisi Deum.
| 7. Although charity, which brings the image to completion, looks to the neighbor, it does not do so as to its principal object, since only God is its principal object. For charity loves nothing in one’s neighbor except God.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod potentiae imaginis aliquibus habitibus perficiuntur etiam secundum quod comparantur in Deum, sicut fide, spe et caritate, sapientia, et aliis huiusmodi. Quamvis enim in ipsis aeternis error non inveniatur ex parte ipsorum, potest tamen accidere error nostro intellectui in cognitione eorum; difficultas enim in eis cognoscendis accidit non ex eis, sed ex parte nostra, ut dicitur II Metaphysic.
| 8. The powers of the image, even in so far as they are related to God, are made perfect through certain habits, as faith, hope, charity, wisdom, and others like these. For, although in these eternal things there is no error on their part, there still can be error on the part of our understanding in its knowledge of these. The difficulty in knowing them comes not from them, but from us, as is said in the Metaphysics.”
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod inter sensibile et sensum non invenitur consubstantialitas, eo quod ipsum sensibile est extraneum a sensus essentia; nec etiam invenitur aequalitas, cum quandoque non semper tantum videatur visibile, quantum visibile est.
| 9. There is no identity of substance between sense and the sensible thing, because the sensible thing is outside the essence of the senses. Nor is there equality, for sometimes the visible thing is not always seen to the full extent of its visibility.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod creaturae aliquae irrationales possunt quadam similitudine magis Deo assimilari quam etiam rationales, quantum ad causandi efficaciam: sicut patet de radio solari, quo omnia in inferioribus causantur et renovantur; et ex hoc convenit cum divina bonitate, quae omnia causat, ut dicit Dionysius. Tamen secundum proprietates sibi inhaerentes magis creatura rationalis Deo est similis quam quaecumque irrationalis.
| 10. With reference to the effectiveness of their causality, certain irrational creatures can in some way become more like God than even rational creatures. This appears in the sun’s rays, by which everything in lower bodies is caused and renewed. In this way, it is like the divine goodness which causes all things, as Dionysius says. Still, according to properties inhering in it, the rational creature is more like God than any irrational creature.
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| Hoc tamen quod a creaturis irrationalibus frequentius metaphoricae locutiones transferuntur in Deum, contingit ex ratione dissimilitudinis; quia, ut Dionysius dicit, cap. II caelestis hierarchiae, ea quae sunt in vilioribus creaturis, ideo frequentius transferuntur in divina, ut omnis errandi tollatur occasio. Translatio enim a creaturis nobilioribus facta aestimationem posset inducere, quod ea quae metaphorice dicerentur essent secundum proprietatem intelligenda; quod opinari nullus potest de ipsis vilioribus creaturis.
| That metaphorical expressions are more frequently taken from irrational creatures and applied to God is due to their dissimilarity. This is done because, as Dionysius says, what belongs to less noble creatures is more frequently transferred to God to remove all occasion for error. For the transfer made from noble creatures could bring about the belief that those things which are applied metaphorically were to be understood properly. No one can think this about less noble things.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod Boetius formae materiales ponit esse imagines non Dei, sed formarum immaterialium, id est rationum idealium in mente divina existentium, a quibus secundum perfectam similitudinem oriuntur.
| 11. Boethius makes material forms images, not of God, but of immaterial forms, that is, of the ideal natures existing in the divine mind, from which material forms arise with a perfect likeness.
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ARTICLE VIII
In the eighth article we ask:
Does the mind know itself through its essence or through some species?
[ARTICLE De ver., 8, 6; S.T., II, 75; III, 46; S.T., I, 14, 2, ad 3; 87, 1; Q.D. de anima, 16, ad 8; II De anima, 6, nn. 304-308; III de anima, 9, nn. 721, 724-726.]
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| Octavo quaeritur utrum mens seipsam per essentiam cognoscat, aut per aliquam speciem
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod per aliquam speciem.
| It seems that it knows itself through some species, for
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| Quia, ut philosophus dicit in III de anima, intellectus noster nihil intelligit sine phantasmate. Sed ipsius essentiae animae non potest accipi aliquod phantasma. Ergo oportet quod per aliquam aliam speciem a phantasmatibus abstractam mens nostra seipsam intelligat.
| 1. As the Philosopher says: “Our intellect understands nothing without a phantasm.” But it cannot receive a phantasm of the very essence of the soul. Therefore, our mind must understand itself through some other species abstracted from phantasms.
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| Praeterea, ea quae per sui essentiam videntur, certissime cognoscuntur sine errore. Sed de mente humana multi erraverunt: cum quidam dicerent eam esse aerem quidam ignem, et multa alia de ea inepta sentirent. Ergo mens non videt se per essentiam suam.
| 2. Those things which are seen through their essence are most certainly apprehended without error. But many err about the human mind, for some say it is air, others fire, and hold many other foolish opinions about it. Therefore, the mind does not see itself through its essence.
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| Sed dicebat, quod mens per essentiam suam videt se esse; errare tamen potest in inquirendo quid sit. —Sed contra, scire aliquid per essentiam suam, est scire de eo quid est, cum essentia rei sit idem quod quidditas eius. Si igitur anima videret se ipsam per essentiam quilibet sine errore sciret de anima sua quid est; quod manifeste patet falsum esse.
| 3 It was said that through its essence the mind sees that it exists, but can err in the investigation of its nature.—On the contrary, to know something through its essence is to know what it is, for the essence of a thing is the same as its quiddity. Therefore, if the soul saw itself through its essence, everyone would unerringly know the essence of his soul, which is obviously false.
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| Praeterea, anima nostra est forma coniuncta materiae. Sed omnis huiusmodi forma cognoscitur per abstractionem speciei a materia, et materialibus conditionibus. Ergo anima cognoscitur per aliquam speciem abstractam.
| 4 Our soul is a form joined to matter. But every form of this kind is known through abstraction of the species from matter and from material conditions. Therefore, the soul is known through an abstracted species.
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| Praeterea, intelligere non est actus animae tantum, sed actus coniuncti, ut dicitur in I de anima. Sed omnis talis actus est communis animae et corpori. Ergo oportet quod in intelligendo semper sit aliquid ex parte corporis. Sed hoc non esset, si mens seipsam per essentiam suam videret, sine aliqua specie a corporeis sensibus abstracta. Ergo, mens non videt se ipsam per essentiam.
| 5. Understanding is not an act of the soul alone, but of the composite, as is said in The Soul. But every such act is common to soul and body. Therefore, there must always be something from the body in understanding. But this would not be if the mind saw itself through its essence without any species abstracted from the bodily senses. Therefore, the mind does not see itself through its essence.
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| Praeterea, philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod intellectus intelligit se sicut et alia. Sed alia intelligit non per essentiam suam, sed per aliquas species. Ergo nec se ipsam mens intelligit per suam essentiam.
| 6. The Philosopher says that the intellect understands itself just as it understands other things. But it does not understand other things through its essence, but through species. Therefore, it does not understand itself through its essence.
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| Praeterea, potentiae cognoscuntur per actus, et actus per obiecta. Sed essentia animae non potest cognosci nisi potentiis eius cognitis; cum virtus rei cognoscere faciat rem ipsam. Ergo oportet quod essentiam suam per actus suos et per species obiectorum suorum cognoscat.
| 7. Powers are known through their acts, and acts through their objects. But the essence of the soul can be known only when its powers are known, for what a thing can do manifests the nature of the thing. Therefore, it has to know its essence through its acts and through the species of its objects.
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| Praeterea, sicut se habet sensus ad sensibile, ita intellectus ad intelligibile. Sed inter sensus et sensibile requiritur quaedam distantia, ex quo provenit quod oculus seipsum videre non possit. Ergo et in intellectuali cognitione requiritur quaedam distantia, ut nunquam se per essentiam suam intelligere possit.
| 8. As sense is related to what is sensible, so understanding is related to what is intelligible. But there has to be some distance between sense and the sensible. For this reason, the eye cannot see itself. Therefore, there also has to be some distance in intellectual vision, with the result that mind can never understand itself through its essence.
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| Praeterea, secundum philosophum in I Poster., non est circulo demonstrare: quia sequeretur quod aliquid per seipsum notum fieret; et sic sequeretur quod aliquid esset prius et notius seipso; quod est impossibile. Sed si mens seipsam per essentiam suam videt, erit idem quod cognoscitur et per quod cognoscitur. Ergo sequitur idem inconveniens, ut aliquid sit prius et notius seipso.
| 9. According to the Philosopher, in a demonstration we should not proceed in a circle, because it would follow that a thing would become known through itself. Thus, it would follow that it would exist before itself and be better known than itself, which is impossible. But, if the mind sees itself through its essence, that which is known and that through which it is known will be the same. Therefore, the same untenable conclusion would follow, for something would exist before itself and be better known than itself.
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| Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de divinis nominibus, quod anima circulo quodam cognoscit existentium veritatem. Circularis autem motus est ab eodem in idem. Ergo videtur quod anima, a seipsa egrediens intelligendo per res exteriores, ad sui ipsius cognitionem redeat; et sic non intelliget se per essentiam suam.
| 10. Dionysius says that the soul knows the truth of existing things in a sort of circle. However, a circular movement is from the same thing to the same thing. Therefore, it seems that the soul goes out from itself in its understanding, and through things outside returns to knowledge of itself. Thus, it does not understand itself through its essence.
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| Praeterea, manente causa, manet eius effectus. Si igitur mens se per essentiam suam videret, propter hoc quod essentia sua sibi est praesens: cum semper ei sit praesens, semper ipsam videret. Ergo, cum impossibile sit simul plura intelligere, nunquam aliud intelligeret.
| 11. While the cause remains, the effect remains. Therefore, if the mind saw itself through its essence because its essence is present to it, it would always see it, for it is always present to it. Therefore, since it is impossible to understand many things at once, the mind would never understand anything else.
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| Praeterea, posteriora sunt magis composita prioribus. Sed intelligere est posterius quam esse. Ergo in intelligentia animae invenitur maior compositio quam in eius esse. Sed in anima non est idem quod est et quo est. Ergo nec in ea est idem quod intelligitur et quo intelligitur; et sic mens non se videt per suam essentiam.
| 12. Things that follow have more composition than those which come earlier. But understanding follows existing. Therefore, there is more composition in the understanding of the soul than in its existence. But, in the soul, that which exists is not the same as that by which it exists. Therefore, that in the soul by which it understands will not be the same as that which is understood. Thus, the mind does not see itself through its essence.
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| Praeterea, non potest idem esse forma et formatum respectu eiusdem. Sed intellectus, cum sit quaedam potentia animae, est quasi quaedam forma essentiae eius. Ergo non potest esse quod essentia animae sit forma intellectus; sed id quo aliquid intelligitur est forma intellectus; ergo mens non videt se ipsam per essentiam suam.
| 13. The same thing under the same aspect cannot be form and that which is informed. But, since the understanding is a power of the soul, it is a kind of form of its essence. Therefore, the essence of the soul cannot be the form of the understanding. Therefore, the mind does not see itself through its essence.
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| Praeterea, anima est quaedam substantia per se subsistens. Formae autem intelligibiles non sunt per se subsistentes; alias scientia quae ex huiusmodi formis intelligibilibus consistit, non esset de genere accidentis. Ergo essentia animae non potest esse ut forma intelligibilis, qua mens seipsam videat.
| 14. The soul is a subsistent substance. However, intelligible forms are not of themselves subsistent. Otherwise, knowledge, which is made up of these intelligible forms, would not be classified as an accident. Therefore, the essence of the soul cannot have the character of intelligible form by which the mind sees itself.
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| Praeterea, cum actus et motus penes terminos distinguantur, intelligibilia quae sunt unius speciei, eodem modo secundum speciem intelliguntur. Sed anima Petri est unius speciei cum anima Pauli. Ergo anima Petri eodem modo intelligit seipsam sicut intelligit animam Pauli. Sed animam Pauli non intelligit per eius essentiam, cum ab ea sit absens. Ergo nec se intelligit per essentiam suam.
| 15. Since acts and movements are distinguished in their terms, intelligible things which belong to the same species are understood according to their species in the same way. But the soul of Peter belongs to the same species as that of Paul. Therefore, the soul of Peter understands itself just as it understands Paul’s soul. But it does not understand Paul’s soul through its essence, for it is not present to it. Therefore, it does not understand itself through its essence.
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| Praeterea, forma est simplicior eo quod per formam informatur. Sed mens non est simplicior seipsa. Ergo non informatur se ipsa; cum igitur informetur eo per quod cognoscit, non cognoscet seipsam per seipsam.
| 16. Form is simpler than that which is informed through the form. But the mind is not simpler than itself. Therefore, it is not informed by itself. Consequently, since it is informed by that through which it knows, it will not know itself through itself.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Trinitate: mens seipsam per seipsam novit quoniam est incorporea: nam si non seipsam novit, non seipsam amat.
| 1. Augustine says: “Mind knows itself through itself because it is incorporeal. For, if it does not know itself, it does not love itself.”
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| Praeterea, II Cor., XII, 2, super illud, scio hominem, etc., dicit Glossa: hac visione, quae dicitur intellectualis, ea cernuntur quae non sunt corpora nec ullas gerunt formas similes corporum; velut ipsa mens, et omnis animae affectio. Sed ut in eadem Glossa dicitur: intellectualis visio eas res continet quae non habent imagines sui similes, quae non sunt quod ipsae. Ergo mens non cognoscit seipsam per aliquid quod non sit idem quod ipsa.
| 2. The Gloss on the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2) reads: “By that sight which is called intellectual, those things are known which are not bodies and do not have any forms like bodies, as mind itself and every disposition of the soul.” The same Gloss adds: “Intellectual sight contains those things which have no likenesses not identical with themselves.” Therefore, the mind does not know itself through something not identical with it.
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| Praeterea, sicut dicitur in III de anima, in his quae sunt separata a materia, idem est quod intelligitur et quo intelligitur. Sed mens est res quaedam immaterialis. Ergo per essentiam suam intelligitur.
| 3. In The Soul we read: “In things separated from matter, that which understands and that by which it is understood are the same.” But the mind is an immaterial thing. Therefore, it is understood through its essence.
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| Praeterea, omne quod est praesens intellectui ut intelligibile, ab intellectu intelligitur. Sed ipsa essentia animae est praesens intellectui per modum intelligibilis; est enim ei praesens per suam veritatem. Veritas autem est ratio intelligendi sicut bonitas ratio diligendi; ergo mens per essentiam suam se intelligit.
| 4. Everything which, as intelligible, is present to the understanding is understood by the understanding. But the essence of the soul is present to understanding in an intelligible manner, for it is present to it through its truth. Truth, however, is the reason for understanding, as goodness is the reason for loving. Therefore, the mind understands itself through its essence.
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| Praeterea, species per quam aliquid intelligitur, est simplicior eo quod per eam intelligitur. Sed anima non habet aliquam speciem se simpliciorem, quae ab ea abstrahi possit. Ergo anima non intelligit se per aliquam speciem, sed per essentiam suam.
| 5. The species through which something is understood is simpler than that which we understand through it. But the soul does not have any species simpler than itself to be abstracted from it. Therefore, the soul does not understand itself through a species, but through its essence.
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| Praeterea, omnis scientia est per assimilationem scientis ad scitum. Sed nihil aliud est animae similius quam sua essentia. Ergo per nihil aliud se intelligit quam per essentiam suam.
| 6. All knowledge takes place through an assimilation of the knower to the thing known. But there is nothing else more like the soul than its essence. Therefore, it understands itself through nothing else but its essence.
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| Praeterea, illud quod est causa cognoscibilitatis aliis, non cognoscitur per aliquid aliud quam per seipsum. Sed anima est aliis rebus materialibus causa cognoscibilitatis: sunt enim intelligibilia inquantum nos ea intelligibilia facimus, ut Commentator dicit in II Metaph. Ergo anima per seipsam solum intelligitur.
| 7. That which is a cause by which other things are made knowable is not known through anything other than itself. But the soul is a cause which makes other physical things knowable, for they are intelligible inasmuch as we make them intelligible, as the Commentator says. Therefore, the soul is understood only through itself.
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| Praeterea, scientia de anima est certissima, secundum philosophum in I de anima. Sed magis certum non cognoscitur per minus certum. Ergo de anima non habetur scientia per aliud a seipsa.
| 8. According to the Philosopher, knowledge about the soul is most certain. But that which is more certain is not known through that which is less certain. Therefore, we do not have knowledge of the soul through something other than itself.
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| Praeterea, omnis species per quam anima nostra intelligit, est a sensibilibus abstracta. Sed nullum sensibile est a quo anima possit suam quidditatem abstrahere. Ergo anima non cognoscit seipsam per aliquam similitudinem.
| 9. Every species through which our soul understands is abstracted from sensible things. But there is no sensible thing from which the soul can abstract its own quiddity. Therefore, the soul does not know itself through any likeness.
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| Praeterea, sicut lux corporalis facit omnia esse visibilia in actu, ita anima per suam lucem facit omnia materialia esse intelligibilia actu, ut patet in III de anima. Sed lux corporalis per seipsam videtur, non per aliquam similitudinem sui. Ergo et anima per suam essentiam intelligitur, non per aliquam similitudinem.
| 10. As physical light makes all things actually visible, so the soul through its light makes all material things actually intelligible, as is clear from The Soul. But physical light is seen through itself and not through any likeness of itself. Therefore, the soul, too, is understood through its essence and not through any likeness.
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| Praeterea, sicut philosophus dicit in III de anima, intellectus agens non aliquando quidem intelligit, aliquando autem non, sed semper intelligit. Sed non intelligit semper nisi seipsum: nec hoc etiam posset, si per speciem a sensibus abstractam se intelligeret, quia sic ante abstractionem non se intelligeret. Ergo mens nostra intelligit se per suam essentiam.
| 11. As the Philosopher says, the agent intellect “does not at one time understand and at another not understand, but always understands.” But it is only itself which it understands at all times. This would not be possible if it understood itself through a species abstracted from the senses, for thus it would not understand itself before the abstraction. Therefore, our mind understands itself through its essence.
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| REPLY
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| Responsio. Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur utrum aliquid per essentiam suam cognoscatur, quaestio ista dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo ut hoc quod dicitur, per essentiam, referatur ad ipsam rem cognitam, ut illud intelligatur per essentiam cognosci cuius essentia cognoscitur; illud autem non, cuius essentia non cognoscitur, sed accidentia quaedam eius. Alio modo ut referatur ad id quo aliquid cognoscitur; ut sic intelligatur aliquid per suam essentiam cognosci, quia ipsa essentia est quo cognoscitur. Et hoc modo ad praesens quaeritur, utrum anima per suam essentiam intelligat se.
| When we ask if something is known through its essence, we can understand the question in two ways. In the first, “through its essence” is taken to refer to the thing known, so that we understand that a thing is known through its essence when its essence is known, and that it is not known through its essence when not its essence but only certain of its accidents are known. In the second way, it is taken to refer to that by which something is known, so that we thus understand that something is known through its essence because the essence itself is that by which it is known. It is in this sense that we ask here if the soul understands itself through its essence.
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| Ad cuius quaestionis evidentiam sciendum est, quod de anima duplex cognitio haberi potest ab unoquoque, ut Augustinus dicit in IX de Trinit. Una quidem, qua cuiusque anima se tantum cognoscit quantum ad id quod est ei proprium; alia qua cognoscitur anima quantum ad id quod est omnibus animabus commune. Illa igitur cognitio quae communiter de omni anima habetur, est qua cognoscitur animae natura; cognitio vero quam quis habet de anima quantum ad id quod est sibi proprium, est cognitio de anima secundum quod esse habet in tali individuo. Unde per hanc cognitionem cognoscitur an est anima, sicut cum aliquis percipit se habere animam; per aliam vero cognitionem scitur quid est anima, et quae sunt per se accidentia eius.
| For a clear understanding of this question we should observe that each person can have a twofold knowledge of the soul, as Augustine says. One of these is the knowledge by which the soul of each man knows itself only with reference to that which is proper to it. The other is that by which the soul is known with reference to that which is common to all souls. This latter, which concerns all souls without distinction, is that by which the nature of the soul is known. However, the knowledge which each has of his soul, in so far as it is proper to himself, is the knowledge of the soul as it exists in this individual. Thus, it is through this knowledge that one knows whether the soul exists, as when someone perceives that he has a soul. Through the other type of knowledge, however, one knows what the soul is and what its proper accidents are.
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| Quantum igitur ad primam cognitionem pertinet, distinguendum est, quia cognoscere aliquid est habitu et actu. Quantum igitur ad actualem cognitionem, qua aliquis se in actu considerat animam habere, sic dico, quod anima cognoscitur per actus suos. In hoc enim aliquis percipit se animam habere, et vivere, et esse, quod percipit se sentire et intelligere, et alia huiusmodi vitae opera exercere; unde dicit philosophus in IX Ethicorum: sentimus autem quoniam sentimus; et intelligimus quoniam intelligimus; et quia hoc sentimus, intelligimus quoniam sumus. Nullus autem percipit se intelligere nisi ex hoc quod aliquid intelligit: quia prius est intelligere aliquid quam intelligere se intelligere; et ideo anima pervenit ad actualiter percipiendum se esse, per illud quod intelligit, vel sentit.
| With reference to the first type of cognition we must make a distinction, because one can know something habitually or actually. Concerning the actual cognition by which one actually considers that he has a soul, I say that the soul is known through its acts. For one perceives that he has a soul, that he lives, and that he exists, because he perceives that he senses, understands, and carries on other vital activities of this sort. For this reason, the Philosopher says: “We sense that we sense, and we understand that we understand, and because we sense this, we understand that we exist.” But one perceives that he understands only from the fact that he understands something. For to understand something is prior to understanding that one understands. Therefore, through that which it understands or senses the soul arrives at actual perception of the fact that it exists.
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| Sed quantum ad habitualem cognitionem, sic dico, quod anima per essentiam suam se videt, id est ex hoc ipso quod essentia sua est sibi praesens est potens exire in actum cognitionis sui ipsius; sicut aliquis ex hoc quod habet habitum alicuius scientiae, ex ipsa praesentia habitus, est potens percipere illa quae subsunt illi habitui. Ad hoc autem quod percipiat anima se esse, et quid in seipsa agatur attendat, non requiritur aliquis habitus; sed ad hoc sufficit sola essentia animae, quae menti est praesens: ex ea enim actus progrediuntur, in quibus actualiter ipsa percipitur.
| Concerning habitual knowledge I say this, that the soul sees itself through its essence, that is, the soul has the power to enter upon actual cognition of itself from the very fact that its essence is present to it. This is like the case of one who, because he has the habit of some knowledge, can by reason of the presence of the habit perceive those things which fall under that habit. But no habit is required for the soul’s perception of its existence and its advertence to the activity within it. The essence alone of the soul, which is present to the mind, is enough for this, for the acts in which it is actually perceived proceed from it.
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| Sed si loquamur de cognitione animae, cum mens humana speciali aut generali cognitione definitur, sic iterum distinguendum videtur. Ad cognitionem enim duo concurrere oportet: scilicet apprehensionem, et iudicium de re apprehensa: et ideo cognitio, qua natura animae cognoscitur, potest considerari et quantum ad apprehensionem, et quantum ad iudicium.
| But, if we speak of the knowledge of the soul when the human mind is limited to specific or generic knowledge, we must make another distinction. For the concurrence of two elements, apprehension and judgment about the thing apprehended, is necessary for knowledge. Therefore, the knowledge by which the nature of the soul is known can be considered with reference to apprehension and with reference to judgment.
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| Si igitur consideretur quantum ad apprehensionem, sic dico, quod natura animae a nobis cognoscitur per species quas a sensibus abstrahimus. Anima enim nostra in genere intellectualium tenet ultimum locum, sicut materia prima in genere sensibilium, ut patet per Commentatorem in III de anima. Sicut enim materia prima est in potentia ad omnes formas sensibiles, ita et intellectus possibilis noster ad omnes formas intelligibiles; unde in ordine intelligibilium est sicut potentia pura, ut materia in ordine sensibilium. Et ideo, sicut materia non est sensibilis nisi per formam supervenientem, ita intellectus possibilis non est intelligibilis nisi per speciem superinductam.
| If, then, we consider this knowledge with reference to apprehension, I say that we know the nature of the soul through species which we abstract from the senses. For our soul holds the last place among intellectual things, just as first matter does among sensible things, as the Commentator shows. For, as first matter is in potency to all sensible forms, so our possible intellect is in potency to all intelligible forms. Thus, it is, in fact, pure potency in the order of intelligible things, as matter is in the order of sensible reality. Therefore, as matter is sensible only through some added form, so the possible intellect is intelligible only through a species which is brought into it.
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| Unde mens nostra non potest se intelligere ita quod seipsam immediate apprehendat; sed ex hoc quod apprehendit alia, devenit in suam cognitionem; sicut et natura materiae primae cognoscitur ex hoc ipso quod est talium formarum receptiva. Quod patet intuendo modum quo philosophi naturam animae investigaverunt.
| Hence, our mind cannot so understand itself that it immediately apprehends itself. Rather, it comes to a knowledge of itself through apprehension of other things, just as the nature of first matter is known from its receptivity for forms of a certain kind. This becomes apparent when we look at the manner in which philosophers have investigated the nature of the soul.
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| Ex hoc enim quod anima humana universales rerum naturas cognoscit, percipit quod species qua intelligimus, est immaterialis; alias esset individuata, et sic non duceret in cognitionem universalis. Ex hoc autem quod species intelligibilis est immaterialis, perceperunt quod intellectus est res quaedam non dependens a materia; et ex hoc ad alias proprietates cognoscendas intellectivae animae processerunt. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod intellectus est intelligibilis, sicut alia intelligibilia: quod exponens Commentator dicit quod intellectus intelligit per intentionem in eo, sicut alia intelligibilia: quae quidem intentio nihil aliud est quam species intelligibilis. Sed haec intentio est in intellectu ut intelligibilis actu; in aliis autem rebus non, sed ut intelligibilis in potentia.
| For, from the fact that the human soul knows the universal natures of things, they have perceived that the species by which we understand is immaterial. Otherwise, it would be individuated and so would not lead to knowledge of the universal. From the immateriality of the species by which we understand, philosophers have understood that the intellect is a thing independent of matter. And from this they have proceeded to a knowledge of the other properties of the intellective soul. Thus, the Philosopher says: “The intellect is intelligible just as the other intelligible things are.” The Commentator also affirms this in his explanation: “Intellect is understood through an intention in it, just as other intelligible things.” This intention is nothing but the intelligible species. But this intention is in the intellect as actually intelligible. In other things, however, it is not actually but only potentially intelligible.
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| Si vero consideretur cognitio quam de natura animae habemus quantum ad iudicium quo sententiamus ita esse, ut deductione praedicta apprehenderamus; sic notitia animae habetur inquantum intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte quantum possumus definimus, non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat, ut Augustinus dicit Lib. IX de Trinitate: hanc autem inviolabilem veritatem (intuemur) in sui similitudine, quae est menti nostrae impressa inquantum aliqua naturaliter cognoscimus ut per se nota, ad quae omnia alia examinamus, secundum ea de omnibus iudicantes.
| But, if we consider the knowledge which we have of the nature of the soul in the judgment by which we decide that it exists in such a way, as we had apprehended from the deduction mentioned above, we have knowledge of the soul inasmuch as “we contemplate inviolable truth. This is the truth from which we define to the best of our power not the kind of mind each man has, but the kind of mind it ought to be according to eternal norms,” as Augustine says. We see this inviolable truth in its likeness which is impressed on our mind to the extent that we naturally know some things as self-evident. We examine all other things with reference to these, judging of them according to these.
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| Sic ergo patet quod mens nostra cognoscit seipsam quodammodo per essentiam suam, ut Augustinus dicit: quodam vero modo per intentionem, sive per speciem, ut philosophus et Commentator dicunt; quodam vero intuendo inviolabilem veritatem, ut item Augustinus dicit. Unde et sic ad utrasque rationes respondendum est.
| Thus it is clear that our mind knows itself in some way through its essence, as Augustine says, and in some way through an intention or species, as the Philosopher and the Commentator say; and, moreover, in some way in the contemplation of inviolable truth, as Augustine says. In this way, then, one must answer both sets of reasons.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod intellectus noster nihil actu potest intelligere antequam a phantasmatibus abstrahat; nec etiam potest habere habitualem notitiam aliorum a se, quae scilicet in ipso non sunt, ante abstractionem praedictam, eo quod species aliorum intelligibilium non sunt ei innatae. Sed essentia sua sibi innata est, ut non eam necesse habeat a phantasmatibus acquirere; sicut nec materiae essentia acquiritur ab agente naturali, sed solum eius forma, quae ita comparatur ad materiam naturalem sicut forma intelligibilis ad materiam sensibilem, ut Commentator dicit in III de anima. Et ideo mens antequam a phantasmatibus abstrahat, sui notitiam habitualem habet, qua possit percipere se esse.
| 1. Our understanding can actually understand nothing before it abstracts from phantasms. Nor can it have habitual knowledge of things other than itself, which are not within it, before the abstraction just mentioned, because species of other intelligible things are not innate in it. However, its essence is innate in it, so that it does not have to obtain it from phantasms, just as it is not the essence of matter which is received from the natural agent, but only its form, which is related to physical matter as intelligible form is related to sensible matter, as the Commentator says. Therefore, before the mind abstracts from phantasms, it has habitual knowledge of itself, by which it can perceive that it exists.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod nullus unquam erravit in hoc quod non perciperet se vivere, quod pertinet ad cognitionem qua aliquis singulariter cognoscit quid in anima sua agatur; secundum quam cognitionem dictum est, quod anima per essentiam suam cognoscitur in habitu. Sed error apud multos accidit circa cognitionem naturae ipsius animae in specie; et quantum ad hoc, haec pars obiectionum verum concludit.
| 2. No one has ever made the mistake of not perceiving that he was alive, a fact which belongs to the knowledge by which one knows in its singularity what goes on in his soul. It is according to this knowledge that the soul is said to be habitually known through its essence. Many, however, do fall into error regarding knowledge of the specific nature of the soul, and on this point the conclusion of the objection is true.
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| Et per hoc patet responsio ad tertium.
| 3. From this the answer to the third difficulty is clear.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis anima materiae coniungatur ut forma eius, non tamen materiae subditur ut materialis reddatur; ac per hoc non sit intelligibilis in actu, sed in potentia tantum per abstractionem a materia.
| 4. Although the soul is joined to matter as its form, it is not so dominated by matter that it becomes material, and thus not actually intelligible, but only potentially intelligible by abstraction from matter.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod obiectio illa procedit de notitia actuali, secundum quam anima non percipit se esse nisi percipiendo actum suum et obiectum, ut dictum est.
| 5. The objection holds for actual knowledge, according to which the soul perceives its existence only by perceiving its act and object, as has been said.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod illud verbum philosophi est intelligendum, secundum quod intellectus intelligit de se quid est, et non secundum quod habitualiter habet notitiam de se an sit.
| 6. The citation from the Philosopher should be taken as referring to the intellect’s understanding of what it is and not to the habitual knowledge which it has of the fact that it exists.
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| Et similiter dicendum ad septimum.
| 7. The seventh difficulty must be answered in like manner.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod operatio sensitiva perficitur per actionem sensibilis in sensum, quae est actio situalis, et ideo requirit determinatam distantiam; sed operatio intellectus non determinatur ad aliquem situm; et ideo non est simile.
| 8. Sensitive activity is brought to completion through the action of the sensible thing on the sense. This is action which is connected with position and therefore needs a definite distance. Intellectual activity is not limited to any position. Therefore, in this way they are not alike.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod dupliciter dicitur aliquid alio cognosci. Uno modo sicut ex cuius cognitione deveniatur in cognitionem ipsius, et sic dicuntur conclusiones principiis cognosci; et hoc modo non potest aliquid cognosci seipso. Alio modo dicitur aliquid alio cognosci sicut in quo cognoscitur, et sic non oportet ut id quo cognoscitur, alia cognitione cognoscatur quam id quod eo cognoscitur. Unde sic nihil prohibet quod aliquid cognoscatur seipso, sicut Deus seipso seipsum cognoscit; et sic etiam anima quodam (modo) seipsam per essentiam suam cognoscit.
| 9. There are two ways in which we can say a thing is known by means of something else. In the first, from knowledge of another thing one arrives at knowledge of the thing in question. In this way conclusions are said to be known from principles. A thing cannot be known by means of itself in this way. In the second way, a thing is said to b~ known by means of something else in the sense that it is known in that something. In this case, an act of cognition distinct from that in which the thing is known is not required in order that the medium in which the thing is known might itself be known. So, there is nothing to prevent something from being known by means of itself in this way, as God knows Himself by means of Himself. Thus, in some way the soul, too, knows itself through its essence.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod circulus quidam in cognitione animae attenditur, secundum quod ratiocinando inquirit existentium veritatem; unde hoc dicit Dionysius ut ostendat in quo animae cognitio deficiat a cognitione Angeli. Haec autem circulatio attenditur in hoc quod ratio ex principiis secundum viam inveniendi in conclusiones pervenit, et conclusiones inventas in principia resolvendo examinat secundum viam iudicandi. Et secundum hoc non est ad propositum.
| 10. We do find a circle in the knowledge of the soul, in so far as it seeks the truth of existing things by reasoning. Hence, Dionysius says this in order to show how the knowledge of the soul falls short of the knowledge of an angel. The circularity is observed in this, that reason reaches conclusions from principles by way of discovery, and by way of judgment examines the conclusions which have been found, analyzing them back to the principles. Therefore, this difficulty is not to the point.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod sicut non oportet ut semper intelligatur in actu, cuius notitia habitualiter habetur per aliquas species in intellectu existentes; ita etiam non oportet quod semper intelligatur actualiter ipsa mens, cuius cognitio inest nobis habitualiter, ex hoc quod ipsa eius essentia intellectui nostro est praesens.
| 11. just as it is not necessary always actually to understand that of which we have habitual knowledge through species existing in the understanding, so, too, it is not necessary always actually to understand the mind, knowledge of which is habitually in us because its essence is present to our understanding.
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| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod quo intelligitur et quod intelligitur, non hoc modo se habent ad invicem sicut quo est et quod est. Esse enim est actus entis; sed intelligere non est actus eius quod intelligitur, sed intelligentis; unde quo intelligitur comparatur ad intelligentem sicut quo est ad quod est. Et ideo, sicut in anima est aliud quo est et quod est, ita aliud est quo intelligit, idest potentia intellectiva, quae est principium actus intelligendi, a sua essentia. Non autem ex hoc oportet quod species qua intelligitur, sit aliud ab eo quod intelligitur.
| 12. “That by which a thing is understood” and “that which is understood” are not related to each other as “that by which a thing is” and “that which is.” For existence is the act of a being, but understanding is not the act of that which is understood but of that which understands. Hence, “that by which a thing is understood” is related to that which understands as “that which is to that by which it is.” And, therefore, just as in the soul “that which is,” is different from “that by which it is,” so that by which it understands, that is to say, the intellective power, which is the source of the act of understanding, is different from its essence. However, it does not necessarily follow from this that the species by which a thing is understood must be different from that which is understood.
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| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod intellectiva potentia est forma ipsius animae quantum ad actum essendi, eo quod habet esse in anima, sicut proprietas in subiecto; sed quantum ad actum intelligendi nihil prohibet esse e converso.
| 13. The intellective power is a form of the soul with reference to its act of existing, for it has existence in the soul as a property in a subject. But there is nothing to prevent the opposite of this from being true with reference to the act of understanding.
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| Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod notitia qua anima seipsam novit, non est in genere accidentis quantum ad id quo habitualiter cognoscitur, sed solum quantum ad actum cognitionis qui est accidens quoddam; unde etiam Augustinus dicit quod notitia substantialiter inest menti, in IX de Trinitate, secundum quod mens novit se ipsam.
| 14. The knowledge by which the soul knows itself is not classified as an accident in so far as it is the source of habitual knowledge, but only as an act of cognition which is an accident. Thus, Augustine also says that knowledge is in the mind substantially in so far as the mind knows itself.
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| Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod illa obiectio procedit de notitia animae prout cognoscitur quantum ad naturam speciei, in qua omnes animae communicant.
| 15. The objection holds for the knowledge of the soul by which it is known according to the nature of the species in which all souls share.
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| Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod cum mens intelligit seipsam, ipsa mens non est forma mentis, quia nihil est forma sui ipsius; sed se habet per modum formae, inquantum ad se sua actio terminatur qua seipsam cognoscit. Unde non oportet quod sit seipsa simplicior; nisi forte secundum modum intelligendi, inquantum id quod intelligitur, accipitur ut simplicius ipso intellectu intelligente, sicut accipitur ut perfectio eius.
| 16. When the mind understands itself, the mind is not itself the form of the mind, because nothing is its own form. But it does follow the manner of form, inasmuch as the action by which it knows itself terminates at itself. Hence, it is not necessary for it to be simpler than itself, unless, perhaps, according to the manner of understanding, in so far as that which is understood is taken as simpler than the intellect itself which understands, and is thus considered as a perfection of the intellect.
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| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
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| Ad primum autem in contrarium dicendum, quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum quod mens seipsam per seipsam cognoscit, quod ex ipsa mente est ei unde possit in actum prodire, quo se actualiter cognoscat percipiendo se esse; sicut etiam ex specie habitualiter in mente retenta inest menti ut possit actualiter rem illam considerare. Sed qualis est natura ipsius mentis, mens non potest percipere nisi ex consideratione obiecti sui, ut dictum est.
| 1. We must understand these words of Augustine to mean that the mind knows itself through itself, since from itself the mind has the power to enter upon the act by which it actually knows itself, by perceiving that it exists. Similarly, from the species habitually retained in the mind, there results in the mind the power actually to consider the thing. But the mind can perceive what its own nature is only from the consideration of its object, as has been said.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum Glossae quod dicit, quod intellectualis visio eas res continet, etc., magis est referendum ad obiectum cognitionis quam ad id quo intelligitur; et hoc patet considerando ea quae de aliis visionibus dicuntur. Dicitur enim in Glossa eadem, quod per visionem corporalem videntur corpora, per visionem vero spiritualem (id est imaginariam) similitudines corporum; per intellectualem autem ea quae neque sunt corpora neque similitudines corporum. Si enim hoc referretur ad id quo intelligitur, tunc quantum ad hoc nulla esset differentia inter visionem corporalem et spiritualem sive imaginariam, quia etiam corporalis visio fit per similitudinem corporis; non enim lapis est in oculo, sed similitudo lapidis.
| 2. The words of the Gloss which read: “Intellectual sight contains those things...” are to be referred to the object of knowledge rather than to that by which it is understood. This is clear from a consideration of what is said about other kinds of sight. For the same Gloss reads: “Through bodily sight bodies are seen; through spiritual sight (that is, sight of imagination) likenesses of bodies are seen; through intellectual sight those things which are neither bodies nor likenesses of bodies are seen.” If this were referred to that by which we understand, there would be no difference between bodily sight and spiritual sight (that of imagination), because even bodily sight takes place through the likeness of a body. For the stone is not in the eye, but a likeness of the stone.
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| Sed in hoc est dictarum visionum differentia, quod visio corporalis terminatur ad ipsum corpus, imaginaria vero terminatur ad imaginem corporis sicut ad obiectum; et sic etiam, cum dicitur, quod visio intellectualis eas res continet quae non habent sui similitudines, quae non sunt quod ipsae, non intelligitur quod visio intellectualis non fiat per aliquas species quae non sunt idem quod res intellectae; sed quod visio intellectualis non terminatur ad aliquam rei similitudinem, sed ad ipsam essentiam rei. Sicut enim visione corporali aliquis intuetur ipsum corpus, non ita quod inspiciat aliquam corporis similitudinem, quamvis per aliquam similitudinem corporis inspiciat: ita in visione intellectuali aliquis inspicit ipsam essentiam rei sine hoc quod inspiciat aliquam similitudinem illius rei, quamvis quandoque per aliquam similitudinem illam essentiam inspiciat; quod etiam experimento patet. Cum enim intelligimus animam, non confingimus nobis aliquod animae simulacrum quod intueamur, sicut in visione imaginaria accidebat; sed ipsam essentiam animae consideramus. Non tamen ex hoc excluditur quin ista visio sit per aliquam speciem.
| But between the kinds of sight mentioned there is this difference, that bodily sight terminates at the body itself, whereas the sight of imagination terminates at the image of the body, as at its object. So, also, when it is said that intellectual sight embraces things which have no likenesses not identical with themselves, this does not mean that spiritual sight does not take place through species which are not the same as the things understood, but that intellectual sight does not terminate at the likeness of a thing but at the very essence of the thing. For, as by bodily sight one sees a body itself without seeing a likeness of the body, although he sees through a likeness of the body, so in intellectual sight one sees the very essence of a thing without seeing the similitude of the thing, although sometimes he sees that essence through some likeness, as is clear from experience. For, when we understand the soul, we do not construct a likeness of the soul and look at it, as happens in imagination. Rather, we study the essence of the soul itself. Nevertheless, this does not deny that this sight takes place through a species.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod verbum philosophi intelligendum est de intellectu qui est omnino a materia separatus, ut Commentator ibidem exponit, sicut sunt intellectus Angelorum; non autem de intellectu humano: alias sequeretur quod scientia speculativa esset idem quod res scita; quod est impossibile, ut Commentator etiam ibidem deducit.
| 3. What the Philosopher says should be understood of an intellect which is altogether separated from matter, as the intellects of angels. And this is the way in which the Commentator explains the passage. However, it should not be applied to the human intellect; otherwise, it would follow that speculative science would be the same as the thing known. But this is impossible, as the Commentator also concludes.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod anima est sibi ipsi praesens ut intelligibilis, idest ut intelligi possit; non autem ut per seipsam intelligatur, sed ex obiecto suo, ut dictum est.
| 4. The soul is present to itself as intelligible, in the sense that it can be understood, but not in the sense that it is understood through itself, but from its object, as has been said.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod anima non cognoscitur per aliam speciem abstractam a se, sed per speciem obiecti sui, quae etiam fit forma eius secundum quod est intelligens actu; unde ratio non sequitur.
| 5. The soul is not known through a species abstracted from it, but through the species of its object, which becomes its form in so far as it actually understands. Hence, the reason does not follow.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis anima nostra sit sibi ipsi simillima, non tamen potest esse principium cognoscendi seipsam ut species intelligibilis, sicut nec materia prima; eo quod hoc modo se habet intellectus noster in ordine intelligibilium sicut materia prima in ordine sensibilium, ut Commentator dicit in III de anima.
| 6. Although our soul is most like itself, it cannot be the principle of knowing itself in the manner of an intelligible species, just as first matter cannot. The reason for this is that our understanding occupies a position in the order of intelligible things similar to that of first matter in the order of sensible things, as the Commentator says.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod anima est causa cognoscibilitatis aliis non sicut medium cognoscendi, sed inquantum per actum animae intelligibiles efficiuntur res materiales.
| 7. The soul is the cause why other things are knowable not in so far as it is a means of knowing, but in so far as physical things are made intelligible through the activity of the soul.
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| Ad octavum dicendum quod secundum hoc scientia de anima est certissima, quod unusquisque in seipso experitur se animam habere, et actus animae sibi inesse; sed cognoscere quid sit anima, difficillimum est; unde philosophus ibidem subiungit, quod omnino difficillimorum est accipere aliquam fidem de ipsa.
| 8. Knowledge about the soul is most certain in this, that each one experiences within himself that he has a soul and that acts of the soul are within him. But it is very difficult to know what the soul is. Hence, the Philosopher adds: “It is extremely difficult to get any assurance about it.”
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod anima non cognoscitur per speciem a sensibilibus abstractam, quasi intelligatur species illa esse animae similitudo; sed quia considerando naturam speciei, quae a sensibilibus abstrahitur, invenitur natura animae in qua huiusmodi species recipitur, sicut ex forma cognoscitur materia.
| 9. The soul is not known through a species abstracted from sensible beings, as though that species were understood to be a likeness of the soul. Rather, from a study of the nature of the species abstracted from sensible things we discover the nature of the soul in which such a species is received, just as matter is known from form.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod lux corporalis non videtur per se ipsam, nisi quatenus fit ratio visibilitatis visibilium, et forma quaedam dans esse eis visibile actu. Ipsa vero lux quae est in sole, non videtur a nobis nisi per eius similitudinem in visu nostro existentem. Sicut enim species lapidis non est in oculo, sed similitudo eius, ita non potest esse quod forma lucis quae est in sole, ipsa eadem sit in oculo. Et similiter etiam lumen intellectus agentis per seipsum a nobis intelligitur, inquantum est ratio specierum intelligibilium, faciens eas intelligibiles actu.
| 10. Physical light is seen through itself only in so far as it is the reason for the visibility of visible things and a kind of form making them actually visible. Now, we see the light which exists in the sun only through its likeness which exists in our sight. For as the specific nature of stone is not in the eye, but its likeness, so the form of light which is in the sun cannot be the same form that is in the eye. Similarly, we understand the light of the agent intellect, in so far as it is the reason for the intelligible species, making them actually intelligible.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod verbum illud philosophi potest dupliciter exponi, secundum duas opiniones de intellectu agente. Quidam enim posuerunt intellectum agentem esse substantiam separatam, unam de aliis intelligentiis; et secundum hoc semper actu intelligit, sicut aliae intelligentiae.
| 11. What the Philosopher says can be explained in two ways, according to the two opinions about the agent intellect. For some have held that the agent intellect is a separated substance, one of a number of intelligences. According to this it always actually understands, as the other intelligences do.
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| Quidam vero ponunt intellectum agentem esse potentiam animae; et secundum hoc dicitur, quod intellectus agens non quandoque intelligit et quandoque non, quia causa quandoque intelligendi et quandoque non, non est ex parte eius, sed ex parte intellectus possibilis. In omni enim actu quo homo intelligit, concurrit operatio intellectus agentis et intellectus possibilis. Intellectus autem agens non recipit aliquid ab extrinseco, sed solum intellectus possibilis. Unde quantum ad id quod requiritur ad nostram considerationem ex parte intellectus agentis, non deest quin semper intelligamus; sed quantum ad id quod requiritur ex parte intellectus possibilis, qui non completur nisi per species intelligibiles a sensibus abstractas.
| Others, hold that the agent intellect is a power of the soul. According to this it is said that the agent intellect is not a power which sometimes understands and sometimes does not, because the cause of understanding at some times and not at others does not come from it, but from the possible intellect. For, in every act by which man understands, the action of the agent intellect and that of the possible intellect concur. Moreover, the agent intellect does not receive anything from outside. Only the possible intellect does so. Hence, with reference to the requirements for our thought, there is nothing on the part of the agent intellect to keep us from always understanding, but there is on the part of the possible intellect, for it is brought to completion only through intelligible species abstracted from the senses.
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ARTICLE IX
In the ninth article we ask:
Is it through their essence or through some likeness that our mind knows habits which exist in the soul?
[ARTICLE III Sent., 23, 1, 2; Quodl., VIII, 2, 4; S.T., I, 87, 2.]
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| Nono quaeritur utrum mens nostra cognoscat habitus in anima existentes per essentiam suam, vel per aliquam similitudinem
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod per essentiam suam.
| it seems that it knows them through their essence, for
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| Quia II Cor., XII, 2, super illud, scio hominem, etc., dicit Glossa: dilectio non aliter videtur praesens in specie per quam est, et aliter absens in aliqua imagine sui simili; sed quantum mente cerni potest, ab alio minus, ab alio magis ipsa cernitur. Ergo dilectio, per essentiam suam, non per aliquam sui similitudinem, a mente cernitur; et eadem ratione quilibet alius habitus.
| 1. The Gloss on this passage, “I know a man...” in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2) reads: “We do not see love in one way in the species through which it exists when it is present, and in another way in some image similar to it when it is not present. But it is perceived in so far as it can be discerned by the mind, more by one, less by another.” Therefore, love is perceived by the mind through its essence and not through some likeness of it. This is true of every other habit for the same reason.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in X de Trinitate: quid enim tam cognitioni adest quam id quod menti adest? Sed habitus animae per sui essentiam menti adsunt. Ergo per suam essentiam cognoscuntur a mente.
| 2. Augustine says: “What is as present to knowledge as that which is present to the mind? But habits of the soul are present to the mind through their essence. Therefore, they are known by the mind through their essence.
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| Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, illud magis. Sed habitus mentis sunt causa quare alia cognoscantur quae habitibus subsunt. Ergo ipsi habitus per essentiam suam maxime cognoscuntur a mente.
| 3. The cause of the perfection of a thing has that perfection in an even higher degree. But habits of the mind are the cause whereby other things which fall under the habits are known. Therefore, habits are known by the mind especially through their essence.
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| Praeterea, omne quod cognoscitur a mente per sui similitudinem, prius fuit in sensu quam fiat in mente. Sed habitus mentis nunquam fit in sensu. Ergo a mente non cognoscuntur per aliquam similitudinem.
| 4. Everything which the mind knows through its likeness arises in sense before it arises in the mind. But a habit of the mind never arises in sense. Therefore, these habits are not known by the mind through a likeness.
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| Praeterea, quanto aliquid est propinquius menti, tanto a mente magis cognoscitur. Sed habitus est propinquior potentiae intellectivae mentis quam actus, et actus quam obiectum. Ergo mens magis cognoscit habitum quam actum vel obiectum; et ita habitum cognoscit per essentiam suam, et non per actus vel obiecta.
| 5. The closer a thing is to the mind, the more it is known by the mind. But habit is closer to the intellective power of the mind than act, and act is closer than object. Therefore, the mind knows habit more than act or object. So, it knows habit through its essence and not through acts or objects.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Genesim ad litteram, quod eodem genere visionis cognoscitur mens et ars. Sed mens cognoscitur per essentiam suam a mente. Ergo et ars per essentiam suam cognoscitur, et similiter alii habitus mentis.
| 6. Augustine says that the mind and art are known by the same kind of sight. But the mind is known through its essence by the mind. Therefore, art, also, is known through its essence, and so are the other habits of the mind.
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| Praeterea, sicut se habet bonum ad affectum, sic verum habet se ad intellectum. Sed bonum non est in affectu per aliquam sui similitudinem. Ergo nec verum cognoscitur ab intellectu per aliquam sui similitudinem; ergo quidquid intellectus cognoscit, cognoscit per essentiam, et non per similitudinem.
| 7. The true is related to understanding as the good is related to affection. But the good is not in affection through some likeness of itself. Therefore, neither is the true known by understanding through some likeness. Therefore, whatever understanding knows it knows through essence and not through a likeness.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit XIII de Trinitate: non sic videtur fides in corde in quo est ab eo cuius est, sicut scilicet anima alterius hominis ex motibus corporis videtur; sed eam tenet certissima scientia, clamatque conscientia. Ergo secundum hoc scientia mentis tenet fidem, secundum quod conscientia clamat. Sed conscientia clamat fidem secundum quod praesentialiter inest ei. Ergo et secundum hoc scitur fides a mente, quod per essentiam suam praesentialiter menti inest.
| 8. Augustine says: “Faith is not seen by its possessor in the heart in which it is,” as the soul of another man is seen from movements of the body; “rather, certain knowledge clings to it, and consciousness proclaims it.” Therefore, according to this, knowledge of the mind clings to faith in so far as consciousness proclaims it. But consciousness proclaims faith in so far as it is present in it. Therefore, faith is known by the mind in so far as it is present in the mind through its essence.
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| Praeterea, forma est maxime proportionalis ei cuius est forma. Sed habitus in mente existentes sunt quaedam formae mentis. Ergo sunt menti maxime proportionales; ergo mens nostra eos immediate cognoscit per essentiam.
| 9. Form is most exactly proportionate to that of which it is the form. But habits exist in the mind as forms of the mind. Therefore, they are most exactly proportionate to the mind. Consequently, our mind knows them immediately through their essence.
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| Praeterea, intellectus cognoscit speciem intelligibilem quae in ipso est; non autem cognoscit eam per aliam speciem, sed per essentiam suam, quia sic esset abire in infinitum. Hoc autem non est nisi quia species ipsae intellectum informant. Cum igitur similiter intellectus per habitus informetur, videtur quod eos per essentiam mens cognoscat.
| 10. Understanding knows the intelligible species which is in it, not through another species, but through its essence. Otherwise, there would be an infinite series. But this is so only because these species inform the understanding. Since understanding is informed in a similar way through habits, it seems that the mind knows them through their essence.
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| Praeterea, habitus a mente non cognoscuntur nisi visione intellectuali. Sed visio intellectualis est eorum quae per suam essentiam videntur. Igitur habitus videntur a mente per suam essentiam.
| 11. The mind knows habits only by intellectual vision. But intellectual vision concerns those things which are seen through their essence. Therefore, habits are seen by the mind through their essence.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod Augustinus dicit X confessionum: ecce in memoriae meae campis et antris et cavernis innumerabilibus atque innumerabiliter plenis, innumerabilium generibus rerum, sive per imagines, sicut omnium corporum, sive per praesentiam, sicut artium, sive per nescio quas notiones, sicut affectionum animi, quas et cum animus non patitur, memoria tenet. Ex quo videtur quod affectiones animi cognoscantur non per sui essentiam sed per aliquas sui notiones; et eadem ratione habitus virtutum, qui circa huiusmodi affectiones consistunt.
| l. Augustine says: “Behold in the fields and caves and numberless caverns of my memory, full beyond reckoning, there are innumerable sorts of things, [present] either through images, as those of all bodies, or through actual presence, as that of the arts, or through I know not what notions, as those of affections of the mind which memory retains even when the mind is not acted upon.” From this it seems that affections of the mind are not known through their essence, but through some notions of them; and for the same reason neither are habits of the virtues, which group themselves around affections of this kind.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit XI de civitate Dei: habemus alium sensum interioris hominis, sensu isto, scilicet corporali, praestantiorem, quo iusta et iniusta sentimus; iusta per intelligibilem speciem, iniusta per eius privationem. Iusta autem et iniusta appellat habitus virtutum et vitiorum. Ergo habitus animae per speciem, et non per suam essentiam, cognoscuntur.
| 2. Augustine says: “We have another sense of the interior man which surpasses that sense,” the bodily, “and through which we perceive just and unjust things, the former through an intelligible species, the latter through its privation.” But he calls just and unjust things the habits of virtues and vices. Therefore, habits of virtues are known through a species and not through their essence.
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| Praeterea, nihil cognoscitur ab intellectu per essentiam nisi quod praesentialiter est in intellectu. Habitus autem virtutum non sunt praesentialiter in intellectu, sed in affectu. Ergo non cognoscuntur per sui essentiam ab intellectu.
| 3. Understanding knows through its essence only that which is present in the understanding. But habits of virtues are not present in the understanding, but in the affective part. Therefore, they are not known through their essence by the understanding.
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| Praeterea, visio intellectualis est praestantior quam corporalis. Ergo est cum maiori discretione. Sed in visione corporali species qua aliquid videtur, semper est aliud a re quae per ipsam videtur. Ergo et habitus qui per intellectualem visionem videntur, non videntur a mente per essentiam, sed per aliquas species alias.
| 4. Intellectual vision is superior to bodily sight. Therefore, it entails greater distinction. But in bodily sight the species through which something is seen is always different from the thing seen through it. Therefore, habits, which are seen through intellectual vision, are not seen by the mind through their essence, but through some other species.
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| Praeterea, nihil appetitur nisi quod cognoscitur, ut Augustinus probat in Lib. de Trinit. Sed habitus animae appetuntur ab aliquibus qui ipsos non habent. Ergo habitus illi cognoscuntur ab eis. Non autem per sui essentiam cum eos non habeant. Ergo per sui speciem.
| 5. We desire only what we know, as Augustine proves.. But some people who do not have habits of the soul desire them. Therefore, they know those habits, but not through their essence since they do not have them. Therefore, they know them through a species of them.
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| Praeterea, Hugo de sancto Victore, distinguit in homine triplicem oculum, scilicet oculum rationis, oculum intelligentiae et oculum carnis. Oculus intelligentiae est quo Deus inspicitur; et hunc dicit erutum post peccatum. Oculus carnis est quo ista corporalia videntur; et hic post peccatum integer mansit. Oculus rationis est quo intelligibilia creata cognoscuntur; et hic post peccatum factus est lippus, quia in parte, non totaliter, intelligibilia cognoscimus. Sed omne quod videtur tantum in parte, non cognoscitur per essentiam. Ergo cum habitus mentis sint intelligibiles, videtur quod mens non videat eos per essentiam.
| 6. Hugh of St. Victor says that eye can have three meanings in man. There can be the eye of reason, the eye of intelligence, and the eye of flesh. We see God with the eye of intelligence which, Hugh says, was plucked out after the fall. We see physical things with the eye of flesh, which has remained intact after the fall. We know intelligible created things with the eye of reason, which has become blear since the fall, for we know intelligible things only partially and not entirely. But everything that is seen only partially is not known through its essence. Therefore, since habits of the mind are intelligible, it seems that the mind does not see them through their essence.
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| Praeterea, multo praesentior est Deus per essentiam suam menti quam habitus, cum ipse sit cuilibet rei intimus. Sed praesentia Dei in mente non facit quod mens nostra Deum per essentiam videat. Ergo nec habitus per essentiam videntur a mente, quamvis sint in ea praesentes.
| 7. God is much more present to the mind through His essence than habits are, for He is innermost in everything. But God’s presence in the mind does not make our mind see God through His essence. Therefore, habits, too, are not seen by the mind through their essence, although they are present in it.
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| Praeterea, intellectus qui est potentia intelligens, ad hoc quod actu intelligat, requiritur quod per aliquid reducatur in actum: et id est quo intellectus intelligit actu. Sed habitus essentia, inquantum praesens menti est, non reducit intellectum de potentia in actum, quia sic oporteret quod quamdiu habitus sunt praesentes in anima actu intelligerentur. Ergo habituum essentia non est id quo habitus intelliguntur.
| 8. Intellect, which potentially understands, needs something to reduce it to act, if it is actually to understand. And it is by reason of this that intellect does actually understand. But the essence of a habit, in so far as it is present to the mind, does not reduce intellect from potency to act, for, if it did, things would necessarily be understood as long as they were present in the soul. Therefore, that by which habits are understood is not their essence.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod sicut animae, ita et habitus est duplex cognitio: una qua quis cognoscit an habitus sibi insit; alia qua cognoscitur quid sit habitus. Hae tamen duae cognitiones circa habitus aliter ordinantur quam circa animam. Cognitio enim qua quis novit se habere aliquem habitum, praesupponit notitiam qua cognoscat quid est habitus ille: non enim possum scire me habere castitatem, nisi sciam quid est castitas. Sed ex parte animae non est sic. Multi enim sciunt se animam habere qui nesciunt quid est anima.
| Knowledge of habits, as that of the soul, is twofold. One knowledge is that by which one knows whether he has a habit. The other is that by which one knows what a habit is. Nevertheless, these two types of knowledge relate to habits in a way different from that in which they relate to the soul. For the knowledge by which one knows he has a habit presupposes the knowledge by which he knows what that habit is. For I cannot know that I have chastity unless I know what chastity is. This is not the case with the soul. For many know that they have a soul without knowing what the soul is.
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| Cuius diversitatis haec est ratio, quia tam habitus quam animam non percipimus in nobis esse, nisi percipiendo actus quorum anima et habitus sunt principia. Habitus autem per essentiam suam est principium talis actus, unde si cognoscitur habitus prout est principium talis actus, cognoscitur de eo quid est; ut si sciam quod castitas est per quam quis se cohibet ab illicitis delectationibus in venereis existentibus, scio de castitate quid est. Sed anima non est principium actuum per essentiam suam, sed per suas vires; unde perceptis actibus animae, percipitur inesse principium talium actuum, utpote motus et sensus; non tamen ex hoc natura animae scitur.
| The reason for such diversity is this, that we perceive that habits as well as the soul exist in us only by perceiving acts of which the soul and habits are the principles. And by its essence a habit is the principle of a certain kind of act. Thus, if we know a habit as the principle of such an act, we know what it is. Accordingly, I know what chastity is if I know it is that through which one refrains from illicit thoughts in matters of sex. But the soul is a principle of acts not through its essence, but through its powers. Thus, from a perception of the acts of the soul we perceive that the principle of such acts, for example, of movement and of sense, is in the soul. Nevertheless, we do not know the nature of the soul from this.
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| Loquendo igitur de habitibus prout de eis scimus quid sunt, duo in eorum cognitione oportet attendere; scilicet apprehensionem et iudicium. Secundum apprehensionem quidem eorum notitia oportet quod obiectis et actibus capiatur; nec ipsi possunt per essentiam suam apprehendi. Cuius ratio est, quia cuiuslibet potentiae animae virtus est determinata ad obiectum suum; unde et eius actio primo et principaliter in obiectum tendit. In ea vero quibus in obiectum dirigitur, non potest nisi per quamdam reditionem, sicut videmus, quod visus primo dirigitur in colorem; sed in actum visionis suae non dirigitur nisi per quamdam reditionem, dum videndo colorem videt se videre. Sed ista reditio incomplete quidem est in sensu, complete autem in intellectu, qui reditione completa redit ad sciendum essentiam suam.
| Accordingly, in so far as we know that habits exist, there are, then, two things which we have to keep in mind when we speak of them: the apprehension of the habit and the judgment we form about it. For apprehension we must get knowledge of the habits from objects and acts. The habits themselves cannot be grasped through their essence, because the power of any faculty of the soul is limited to its object. For this reason its activity is directed first of all and principally to its object. It extends only through a kind of return to those things by which it is directed to its object. Thus, we see that sight is first directed to color, but is directed to the act of seeing only through a kind of return, when, in seeing color, it sees that it sees. But this return is incomplete in sense and complete in understanding which goes back to know its essence by a complete return.
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| Intellectus autem noster in statu viae hoc modo comparatur ad phantasmata sicut visus ad colores, ut dicitur in III de anima: non quidem ut cognoscat ipsa phantasmata ut visus cognoscit colores, sed ut cognoscat ea quorum sunt phantasmata. Unde actio intellectus nostri primo tendit in ea quae per phantasmata apprehenduntur, et deinde redit ad actum suum cognoscendum; et ulterius in species et habitus et potentias et essentiam ipsius mentis. Non enim comparantur ad intellectum ut obiecta prima, sed ut ea quibus in obiectum feratur.
| As is said in The Soul, “in this life our understanding is related to phantasms as sight is related to colors, not, however, so that it knows phantasms as sight knows colors, but that it knows the things which the phantasms represent. Thus, the activity of our understanding is directed, first, to the things which are grasped through phantasms, then returns to know its act, and then goes further to the species, habits, powers, and the essence of the mind itself. For these are not related to understanding as primary objects, but as those things by which understanding attains its object.
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| Iudicium autem de unoquoque habetur secundum id quod est mensura illius. Cuiuslibet autem habitus mensura quaedam est id ad quod habitus ordinatur: quod quidem ad nostram cognitionem se habet tripliciter. Quandoque enim est a sensu acceptum, vel visu vel auditu; sicut cum videmus utilitatem grammaticae vel medicinae, aut eam ab aliis audimus, et ex hac utilitate scimus quid est grammatica vel medicina. Quandoque vero est naturali cognitioni inditum; quod maxime patet in habitibus virtutum, quarum fines naturalis ratio dictat. Quandoque vero est divinitus infusum, sicut patet in fide et spe, et aliis huiusmodi habitibus infusis. Et quia etiam naturalis cognitio in nobis ex illustratione divina oritur, in utroque veritas increata consulitur. Unde iudicium in quo completur cognitio de natura habitus, vel est secundum id quod sensu accipimus, vel secundum quod increatam consulimus veritatem.
| Moreover, we have judgment about each one of these according to that which is its measure. And the measure of any habit is that to which the habit is ordained. This object has a triple relation to our knowledge. For, sometimes, it is obtained from sense, either from sight or hearing, as when we see the usefulness of grammar or medicine, or we hear it from others, and from this usefulness we know what grammar or medicine is. Sometimes it is inherent in natural knowledge, as is abundantly clear in the habits of virtues, whose ends natural reason proposes. Sometimes it is divinely infused, as appears in faith, hope, and other infused habits of this kind. In both of these latter, uncreated truth is taken into account, because even natural knowledge arises in us from divine enlightenment. Hence, the judgment in which knowledge about the nature of a habit is brought to completion takes place either according to that which we receive by sense or according to a comparison with uncreated truth.
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| In cognitione vero qua cognoscimus an habitus nobis insint, duo sunt consideranda; scilicet habitualis cognitio, et actualis. Actualiter quidem percipimus habitus nos habere, ex actibus habituum quos in nobis sentimus; unde etiam philosophus dicit in II Ethicorum, quod signum oportet accipere habituum fientem in opere delectationem.
| There are two things to be considered in the knowledge by which we know whether habits are present in us: habitual knowledge and actual knowledge. From the acts of the habits which we experience within us we actually perceive that we have the habits. For this reason, the Philosopher says” that we should take pleasure attendant on a work as a sign of habits.
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| Sed quantum ad habitualem cognitionem, habitus mentis per seipsos cognosci dicuntur. Illud enim facit habitualiter cognosci aliquid, ex quo aliquis efficitur potens progredi in actum cognitionis eius rei quae habitualiter cognosci dicitur. Ex hoc autem ipso quod habitus per essentiam suam sunt in mente, mens potest progredi ad actualiter percipiendum habitus in se esse, inquantum per habitus quos habet, potest prodire in actus, in quibus habitus actualiter percipiuntur.
| But, with reference to habitual knowledge, habits of the mind are said to be known through themselves. For the cause of habitual knowledge is that by which someone is rendered capable of entering into the act of knowing the thing which is said to be known habitually. From the very fact that habits are in the mind through their essence, the mind can enter upon actual perception of the existence of the habits within it, in so far as through the habits which it has it can enter upon acts in which the habits are actually perceived.
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| Sed quantum ad hoc differentia est inter habitus cognitivae partis et affectivae. Habitus enim cognitivae partis est principium et ipsius actus quo percipitur habitus, et etiam cognitionis qua percipitur, quia ipsa actualis cognitio ex habitu cognitivo procedit: sed habitus affectivae partis est quidem principium illius actus ex quo potest habitus percipi, non tamen cognitionis qua percipitur.
| But, in this, habits of the cognitive and affective parts differ. For a habit of the cognitive part is the source both of the very act by which the habit is received and also of the knowledge by which it is perceived. For the actual knowledge proceeds from the cognitive habit, whereas a habit of the affective part is the source of that act from which the habit can be perceived but not of the knowledge by which it is perceived.
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| Et sic patet quod habitus cognitivae, ex hoc quod per essentiam suam in mente existit, est proximum principium suae cognitionis; habitus autem affectivae partis est principium quasi remotum, in quantum non est causa cognitionis, sed eius unde cognitio accipitur; et ideo Augustinus dixit in X confessionum, quod artes cognoscuntur per sui praesentiam, sed affectiones animae per quasdam notiones.
| Thus, it is clear that a habit of the cognitive part is the proximate source of knowledge of it because it is present in the mind through its essence. However, a habit of the affective part is, as it were, a remote source, for such a habit does not have within it the cause of knowledge but of that from which knowledge is received. Therefore, Augustine says that arts are known through their presence, but affections of the soul are known through certain conceptions.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod verbum illud Glossae est referendum ad obiectum cognitionis, et non ad medium cognoscendi; quia, scilicet, cum dilectionem cognoscimus, ipsam dilectionis essentiam consideramus, non aliquam eius similitudinem, ut in imaginaria visione accidit.
| 1. What is said in the Gloss should be taken as referring to the object of knowledge and not to the means of knowing. For, when we know love, we consider the very essence of love and not some likeness of it, as happens in imagination.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod pro tanto dicitur quod mens nihil melius novit eo quod in ipsa est, quia eorum quae sunt extra ipsam non est necesse quod in se habeat aliquid unde in eorum notitiam devenire possit. Sed in eorum quae in ipsa sunt actualem cognitionem devenire potest ex his quae penes se habet, quamvis etiam per aliqua alia cognoscantur.
| 2. The mind knows nothing better than that which is within it, for this reason, that it does not have within itself something of the things outside of it in order to proceed from this to knowledge of those things. But the mind can issue into actual cognition of those things which are within it from the things which are present to it internally, even though these are known through some other things.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod habitus non est causa cognoscendi alia sicut quo cognito alia cognoscantur, prout principia sunt causa cognoscendi conclusiones; sed quia ex habitu perficitur anima ad aliquid cognoscendum. Et sic non est causa cognitorum quasi univoca, prout unum cognitum est causa cognitionis alterius cogniti; sed quasi causa aequivoca, quae eamdem nominationem non recipit; sicut albedo facit album, quamvis ipsa non sit alba, sed est quo aliquid est album. Similiter etiam habitus, inquantum huiusmodi, non est causa cognitionis ut quod est cognitum, sed ut quo aliquid est cognitum; et ideo non oportet quod sit magis cognitum quam ea quae per habitum cognoscuntur.
| 3. Habit is not the cause of knowing other things as something which is the source of knowledge of other things, once it is known itself, as principles are the cause of knowing conclusions. Rather, from a habit the soul acquires a perfection ordered to knowledge of something. Thus, it is not a univocal cause of the things known, as when one thing which is known is the cause of the knowledge of something else which is known, but an equivocal cause, which does not receive the same name. For example, it is like whiteness which makes a thing white although it itself is not white, but that by which something is white. In like manner, a habit, as such, is not the cause of knowledge, as that which is known, but as that by which something is known. Therefore, it is not necessary that it be better known than those things which are known through the habit.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod habitus non cognoscitur ab anima per aliquam eius speciem a sensu abstractam, sed per species eorum quae per habitum cognoscuntur; in hoc ipso quod alia cognoscuntur, et habitus cognoscitur ut principium cognitionis eorum.
| 4. A habit is not known by the soul through a species of it abstracted from sense, but through the species of those things which are known through the habit. And habits are known as the source of knowledge in the cognition of these other things.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis habitus sit propinquior potentiae quam actus, tamen actus est propinquior obiecto, quod habet rationem cogniti; potentia vero habet rationem principii cognoscendi: et ideo actus per prius cognoscitur quam habitus; sed habitus est magis cognitionis principium.
| 5. Although habit is closer to power than act is, act is closer to the object which constitutes that which is known. Power, however, constitutes the source of knowing. Therefore, act is known before habit, but habit is more a source of knowing.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod ars est habitus intellectivae partis, et quantum ad habitualem notitiam percipitur eodem modo ab habente sicut et mens, scilicet per sui praesentiam.
| 6. Art is a habit of the intellective part and, as far as habitual knowledge goes, it is perceived by one who has it just as the mind is perceived, that is, through its presence.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod motus vel operatio cognitivae partis, perficitur in ipsa mente: et ideo oportet ad hoc quod aliquid cognoscatur, esse aliquam similitudinem eius in mente; maxime si per essentiam suam non coniungatur menti ut cognitionis obiectum. Sed motus vel operatio affectivae partis incipit ab anima, et terminatur ad res; et ideo non requiritur in affectu aliqua similitudo rei qua informetur, sicut in intellectu.
| 7. Movement or activity of the cognitive part realizes its perfection within the mind itself, and, therefore, for a thing to be known, there must be some likeness in the mind. This is especially true if, as an object of knowledge, it is not joined to the mind through its essence. But movement or activity of the affective part begins from the soul and terminates at things. Therefore, a likeness of the thing by which it is informed is not required in the affection as it is in the understanding.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod fides est habitus intellectivae partis, unde ex hoc ipso quod menti inest, inclinat mentem ad actum intellectus, in quo ipsa fides videtur; secus autem est de aliis habitibus qui sunt in parte affectiva.
| 8. Faith is a habit of the intellective part; hence, from the very fact that it is in the mind, it bends the mind to an act of understanding, in which faith itself is seen. However, this is not the case with other habits, which are in the affective part.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod habitus mentis sunt ei maxime proportionales, sicut forma proportionatur ad subiectum, et perfectio ad perfectibile; non autem sicut obiectum ad potentiam.
| 9. Habits of the mind have the greatest proportion to it, as form has a proportion to subject, and perfection to perfectible. However, the proportion is not that of object to power.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod intellectus cognoscit speciem intelligibilem non per essentiam suam, neque per aliquam speciem speciei, sed cognoscendo obiectum cuius est species, per quamdam reflexionem, ut dictum est.
| 10. Understanding does not know the intelligible species through its essence or through any species of the species, but, in knowing the object of which it is the species, it knows the species through a kind of reflection, as has been said.
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| Ad undecimum patet responsio ex his quae in praecedenti quaestione sunt dicta.
| 11. The answer to this can be found above.
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| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
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| Ad primum vero in contrarium dicendum, quod in auctoritate illa Augustinus distinguit triplicem modum cognoscendi. Quorum unus est eorum quae sunt extra animam, de quibus cognitionem habere non possumus ex his quae in nobis sunt; sed oportet, ad ea cognoscenda, ut eorum imagines vel similitudines in nobis fiant.
| 1. In the passage cited, Augustine distinguishes three ways of knowing. One of these concerns things which are outside the soul, and about which we cannot have knowledge from the things which are within us. To know these things outside, images or likenesses of them must be formed within us.
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| Alius est eorum quae sunt in parte intellectiva; quae quidem per sui praesentiam dicit cognosci, quia ex eis est ut in actum intelligendi exeamus, in quo actu ea quae sunt intelligendi principia, cognoscuntur: et ideo dicit, quod artes per sui praesentiam cognoscuntur.
| A second way deals with those things which are in the intellective part. He says that these are known by reason of their presence, because it is from them that we enter upon the act of knowing. And in this act those things which are the principles of understanding are known. Therefore, he says that arts are known by reason of their presence.
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| Tertius modus est eorum quae pertinent ad partem affectivam, quorum ratio cognoscendi non est in intellectu, sed in affectu: et ideo non per sui praesentiam, quae in affectu, sed per eius notitiam vel rationem, quae est in intellectu cognoscuntur, sicut per immediatum principium; quamvis etiam habitus affectivae partis per sui praesentiam sint quoddam remotum principium cognitionis inquantum eliciunt actus in quibus eos intellectus cognoscit; ut sic etiam possit dici quod quodammodo, per sui praesentiam cognoscuntur.
| The third way refers to those things which belong to the affective part, and the reason for knowing these is not in the understanding, but in the affections. Therefore, they are known as through an immediate principle, not by their presence, which is in the affections, but through the knowledge or definition of it which is in the understanding. Yet, by their presence, habits of the affective part are also a remote principle of knowledge in so far as they elicit acts in which understanding knows them. As a result, we can in a sense also say that they are known by reason of their presence.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod species illa per quam iustitia cognoscitur, nihil est aliud quam ratio ipsa iustitiae, per cuius privationem iniustitia cognoscitur. Haec autem species vel ratio non est aliquid a iustitia abstractum, sed id quod est complementum esse ipsius ut specifica differentia.
| 2. That species through which justice is known is not something other than the very notion of justice through the privation of which injustice is known. Moreover, this species or notion is not something abstracted from justice, but it is that which, as a specific difference, is the ultimate perfection of its being.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod intelligere, proprie loquendo, non est intellectus, sed animae per intellectum; sicut nec calefacere est caloris, sed ignis per calorem. Nec istae duae partes, scilicet intellectus et affectus, sunt cogitandae in anima ut situaliter distinctae, sicut visus et auditus, qui sunt actus organorum; et ideo illud quod est in affectu, est etiam praesens animae intelligenti. Unde anima per intellectum non solum redit ad cognoscendum actum intellectus, sed etiam actum affectus; sicut etiam per affectum redit ad appetendum et diligendum non solum actum affectus, sed etiam actum intellectus.
| 3. Understanding, properly speaking, is not an activity of the intellect, but of the soul through the intellect, just as to make warm is not an activity of heat, but of fire through heat. Nor again are those two parts, understanding and affection, to be thought of as distinguished according to position, as sight and hearing, which are acts of organs. Therefore, that which is in affection is also present to the understanding soul. For this reason, through understanding, the soul returns to know not only the act of the understanding but also the act of the affections. In a similar way, through the affections it returns to seek and desire not only the act of the affections but also the act of the understanding.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod discretio quae pertinet ad perfectionem cognitionis, non est discretio qua distinguuntur quod intelligitur et quo intelligitur, quia sic divina cognitio qua se cognoscit, esset imperfectissima; sed est discretio qua id quod cognoscitur, distinguitur ab omnibus aliis.
| 4. The distinctness (discretio) which has a bearing on the perfection of knowledge is not the state of being distinct (discretio) by which that which is understood is distinct from that by which it is understood, for, thus, the divine cognition by which God knows Himself would be most imperfect. Rather, it is the discernment (discretio) by which that which is known is [seen as] distinct from everything else.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod a non habentibus habitus mentis cognoscuntur, non quidem illa cognitione qua percipiuntur sibi inesse, sed qua cognoscuntur quid sunt, vel qua percipiuntur aliis inesse; quod non est per praesentiam, sed alio modo, ut dictum est.
| 5. Those who do not have habits of the mind do not know these habits by that knowledge in which one perceives that they exist in himself, but by that in which one knows what they are, or perceives that they exist in others. This is not through presence, but in another way, as has been said.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod oculus rationis pro tanto dicitur lippus esse respectu intelligibilium creatorum, quia nihil intelligit actu nisi accipiendo a sensibilibus, quibus intelligibilia sunt excellentiora; et ideo deficiens invenitur ad intelligibilia cognoscenda. Tamen ea quae sunt in ratione, nihil prohibet quin immediate inclinent per essentiam suam ad actus in quibus intelliguntur, ut dictum est.
| 6. The eye of reason is said to be blear in relation to created intelligible things in so far as it actually understands nothing without getting something from sensible things, to which intelligible things are superior. Therefore, it does not have all that is needed to know intelligible things. Nevertheless, nothing prevents those things which are in reason from immediately tending through their essence toward acts in which they are understood, as has been said.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis Deus sit magis praesens nostrae menti quam habitus, tamen ex obiectis quae naturaliter cognoscimus non ita perfecte essentiam divinam videre possumus sicut essentiam habituum; quia habitus sunt proportionati ipsis obiectis et actibus, et sunt proxima eorum principia; quod de Deo dici non potest.
| 7. Although God is more present to our mind than habits are, still, from objects which we naturally know, we cannot see the divine essence as perfectly as we see the essence of habits, for habits have a proportion to the objects and acts and are their proximate principles. We cannot say this about God.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod quamvis praesentia habitus in mente non faciat eam actualiter cognoscentem ipsum habitum, facit tamen eam actu perfectam per habitum quo actus eliciatur, unde habitus cognoscatur.
| 8. Although the presence of a habit in the mind does not make the mind actually know that habit, it does cause the mind to be actually perfected through the habit by which the act is elicited. And the habit is known from this.
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ARTICLE X
In the tenth article we ask:
Can one know that he has charity?
[ARTICLE I Sent., I7,2,4; III Sent., 23, 1, 2, ad i; IV Sent., 9, 1, 3, sol. 2; 21, 2, 2, ad 2; 2 Cor., c. 12, lect. 2; c. 13, lect. 2; S.T., I-II, 112, 5.]
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| Decimo quaeritur utrum aliquis possit scire se habere caritatem
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that he can, for
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| Quod enim per essentiam videtur, certissime percipitur. Sed caritas per essentiam videtur ab habente eam, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo caritas percipitur a caritatem habente.
| 1. What is seen through its essence is perceived with greatest certainty. But, as Augustine says, charity is seen through its essence by him who has it. Therefore, charity is perceived by him who possesses it.
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| Praeterea, caritas in actibus suis praecipue delectationem causat. Sed habitus virtutum moralium percipiuntur per delectationes quas in actibus virtutum causant, ut patet per philosophum in II Ethic. Ergo et caritas percipitur ab habente ipsam.
| 2. Charity causes pleasure principally in its acts. But habits of the moral virtues are perceived through the pleasures which they cause in acts of the virtues, as is clear from what the Philosopher says. Therefore, charity is perceived by one who has it.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, VIII de Trinitate: magis quis novit dilectionem qua diligit quam fratrem quem diligit. Sed fratrem quem quis diligit, certissime novit esse. Ergo et dilectionem qua diligit certissime novit quis sibi inesse.
| 3. Augustine says: “One knows the love by which he loves better than the brother whom he loves.” But he knows with greatest certainty that the brother whom he loves exists. Therefore, he also knows with greatest certainty that the love with which he loves exists within him.
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| Praeterea, vehementior est inclinatio caritatis quam cuiuslibet alterius virtutis. Sed alias virtutes aliquis scit sibi inesse certitudinaliter ex hoc quod inclinatur in actus ipsarum: habenti enim habitum iustitiae difficile est agere iniusta, facere vero iusta facile, ut dicitur in V Ethic., et hanc facilitatem quilibet in se ipso percipere potest. Ergo et caritatem se habere quilibet percipere potest.
| 4. The attraction of charity is stronger than that of any other virtue. But one is certain that he has other virtues in himself because he has an inclination to their acts. For it is hard for one who has the habit of justice to do what is unjust, but easy to do what is just, as is said in the Ethics. And anyone can perceive this facility within him. Therefore, he can also perceive that he has charity.
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| Praeterea, philosophus dicit in II Poster., quod impossibile est nos habere nobilissimos habitus, et nos lateant. Sed caritas est nobilissimus habitus. Ergo inconveniens est dicere, quod habens caritatem nesciat se habere eam.
| 5. The Philosopher says that it is impossible for us to have the most noble habits and for them to be hidden from us. But charity is the most noble habit. Therefore, it would be inconsistent to say that one who has charity does not know that he has it.
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| Praeterea, gratia est lux spiritualis. Sed ab his qui luce perfunduntur, certissime hoc ipsum percipitur. Ergo ab habentibus gratiam certissime scitur quod gratiam habent; et similiter est de caritate sine qua gratia non habetur.
| 6. Grace is spiritual light. But this light is perceived with greatest certainty by those who are bathed in it. Therefore, those who have grace perceive with greatest certainty that they have it. The same should be said for charity, without which one does not have grace.
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| Praeterea, unctio docet de omnibus necessariis ad salutem. Sed habere caritatem est necessarium ad salutem. Ergo habens caritatem scit se habere.
| 7. The unction [of God] teaches all that is necessary for salvation. But to have charity is necessary for salvation. Therefore, one who has charity knows that he has it.
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| Praeterea, secundum Augustinum in libro de Trinitate, nullus potest ignotum diligere. Sed aliquis diligit in se caritatem. Ergo aliquis cognoscit caritatem esse in se.
| 8. According to Augustine,” no one can love something which he does not know. But one loves the charity within him. Therefore, he knows that charity exists in him.
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| Praeterea, philosophus dicit in II Ethic., quod virtus est certior omni arte. Sed aliquis habens artem, scit se habere eam. Ergo et quando habet virtutem; et sic quando habet caritatem, quae est maxima virtutum.
| 9. The Philosopher says: “Virtue is more certain than any art.” But one who has an art knows that he has it. So, also, when one has a virtue, and, thus, when one has charity, which is the greatest of the virtues, he knows that he has it.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod dicitur Eccles. IX, 1: nemo scit utrum dignus odio vel amore sit. Sed ille qui habet caritatem, est dignus amore divino; Prov., VIII, 17: ego diligentes me diligo. Ergo, et cetera.
| 1. Ecclesiastes (9:1) reads: “Yet man knows not whether he be worthy of love or hatred.” But he who has charity is worthy of divine love according to Proverbs (8:17): “I love them that love me.” Therefore, no one knows that he has charity.
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| Praeterea, nullus scire potest certitudinaliter quando Deus veniat ad habitandum in eo; Iob, IX, 11: si venerit ad me, non videbo eum. Sed per caritatem Deus inhabitat hominem: I Ioan., c. IV, 16: qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Ergo, nullus potest certitudinaliter scire se caritatem habere.
| 21. No one can know with certainty when God comes to dwell in him. Job (9:11) says: “If he come to me, I shall not see him.” But God dwells in man through charity, for the first Epistle of St. John (4:16) says: “He that abides in charity, abides in God and God in him.” Therefore, nor one can know with certainty that he has charity.
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| REPLY
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| Responsio. Dicendum, quod aliquis habens caritatem potest ex aliquibus probabilibus signis coniicere se caritatem habere; utpote cum se ad spiritualia opera paratum videt, et mala efficaciter detestari, et per alia huiusmodi quae caritas in homine facit. Sed certitudinaliter nullus potest scire se caritatem habere nisi ei divinitus reveletur.
| One who has charity can surmise that he has charity from probable signs, as when he sees that he is ready to undertake spiritual works, and that he effectively hates evil, as also through other things of this sort which charity effects in a man. But one cannot know with certainty that he has charity unless it be revealed to him by God.
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| Cuius ratio est, quia, sicut ex praedicta quaestione apparet, cognitio qua quis cognoscit se aliquem habitum habere, praesupponit cognitionem qua cognoscit de habitu illo quid est. Quid est autem aliquis habitus, sciri non potest nisi de eo sumatur iudicium per id ad quod habitus ille ordinatur, quod est habitus illius mensura.
| The reason for this, as is clear from what has been said earlier, is that the knowledge by which one knows that he has a habit presupposes the knowledge by which he knows what the habit is. What a habit is, however, cannot be known unless one bases his judgment about it upon that to which that habit is ordained, which is the measure of that habit.
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| Hoc autem ad quod caritas ordinatur, est incomprehensibile, quia eius immediatum obiectum et finis est Deus, summa bonitas, cui caritas nos coniungit; unde non potest aliquis scire, ex actu dilectionis quem in seipso percipit, an ad hoc pertingat ut Deo hoc modo uniat sicut ad caritatis rationem requiritur.
| But that to which charity is ordained cannot be comprehended, because its immediate object and end is God, the highest good, to whom charity unites us. Hence, one cannot know from the act of love which he perceives within him whether he has reached the stage where he is united to God in the way which is needed for the nature of charity.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod caritas per essentiam videtur, inquantum ipsa per essentiam suam est principium actus dilectionis, in quo utrumque cognoscitur; et sic est etiam per essentiam suam et suae cognitionis principium, licet remotum. Non tamen oportet quod certitudinaliter percipiatur, quia actus ille dilectionis quem in nobis percipimus secundum id quod de eo est perceptibile, non est sufficiens signum caritatis, propter similitudinem dilectionis naturalis ad gratuitam.
| 1. Charity is seen through its essence, in so far as through its essence it is the source of the act of love, in which both are known. Thus, through its essence, also, it is a source of its knowledge, although a remote source. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that it be perceived with certainty, for the act of love which we perceive in ourselves, in so far as it is perceptible, is not an adequate indication of charity because of the similarity between natural love and infused love.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod delectatio illa quae in actu relinquitur ex caritate, potest etiam ex aliquo habitu acquisito causari; et ideo non est sufficiens signum ad caritatem demonstrandam, quia ex communibus signis non percipitur aliquid per certitudinem.
| 2. The pleasure which remains in an act by reason of charity can also be caused by some acquired habit. Therefore, it is not a sufficient indication to show that charity is present because we do not perceive a thing with certainty from common marks.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis mens certissime cognoscat dilectionem qua diligit fratrem, inquantum est dilectio, tamen non certissime novit eam esse caritatem.
| 3. Although the mind knows most certainly the love with which it loves a brother, in so far as it is love, it does not know as certainly that it is charity.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis inclinatio qua caritas inclinat ad agendum, sit quoddam principium apprehendendi caritatem, non tamen sufficit ad perfectam perceptionem caritatis. Nullus enim potest percipere se aliquem habitum habere, nisi sciat perfecte illud ad quod habitus ordinatur, per quod de habitu iudicatur; et hoc in caritate sciri non potest.
| 4. Although the inclination with which charity tends to action is a source of perceiving charity, it is not enough for perfect perception of charity. For no one can perceive that he has a given habit unless he knows perfectly that to which the habit is ordained, for it is through this that he judges about the habit. In charity this cannot be known.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod philosophus loquitur de habitibus intellectivae partis, qui, si sint perfecti, non possunt latere habentes, eo quod de perfectione eorum est certitudo; unde quilibet sciens scit se scire, cum scire sit causam rei cognoscere, et quoniam illius est causa, et quoniam impossibile est aliter se habere; et similiter aliquis habens habitum intellectus principiorum, scit se habitum illum habere. Sed caritatis perfectio non consistit in certitudine cognitionis, sed in vehementia affectionis; et ideo non est simile.
| 5. The Philosopher is speaking of habits of the intellective part, which, if they are perfect, cannot be concealed from those who have them, because certainty belongs to their perfection. Hence, anyone who knows, knows that he knows, since to know is to perceive the cause of a thing, that it is the cause of it, and that it cannot be otherwise. Similarly, one who has the habit of the understanding of principles knows that he has that habit. But the perfection of charity does not consist in certitude of knowledge but in strength of affection. Therefore, the case is not the same.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod in his quae metaphorice dicuntur, non oportet accipere similitudinem quantum ad omnia. Unde nec gratia luci comparatur quantum ad hoc quod ita se spirituali visui ingerat manifeste sicut lux corporea visui corporali; sed quantum ad hoc quod gratia est principium spiritualis vitae, sicut lux caelestium corporum est quodam modo initium corporalis vitae in his inferioribus, ut dicit Dionysius; et etiam quantum ad aliquas alias similitudines.
| 6. When we are speaking metaphorically, we should not apply the likeness to every detail. Thus, grace is not compared to light in so far as it plainly pours itself out on spiritual vision as physical light does on bodily vision. Rather, the comparison lies in this, that grace is the source of spiritual life as light of the heavenly bodies is a source of bodily life in things here below, as Dionysius says. This holds also for other likenesses.
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| Ad septimum dicendum quod se habere caritatem potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo in vi orationis; alio modo in vi nominis. In vi quidem orationis, sicut cum dicitur: verum esse aliquem caritatem habere. In vi autem nominis, cum de hoc dicto: caritatem habere; vel quod per hoc dictum significatur, aliquid dicimus.
| 7. “To have charity” can be understood in two ways. In one it has the force of a statement; in the other, the force of a term. It has the force of a statement, for instance, when one says: “It is true that someone has charity.” It is used with the force of a term when we predicate something about the phrase “to have charity” or about its meaning.
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| Cum autem ad affectum non pertineat componere et dividere, sed solummodo in ipsas res ferri, cuius conditiones sunt bonum et malum; cum dicitur: ego diligo: vel: volo me habere caritatem; hoc quod dico: me habere caritatem; sumitur in vi cuiusdam nominis, ac si diceretur: volo hoc quod est me habere caritatem. Et hoc nihil prohibet esse mihi cognitum. Scio enim quid est me habere caritatem, etiam si eam non habeo; unde et non habens caritatem, appetit se caritatem habere. Non tamen sequitur quod aliquis sciat se caritatem habere, secundum quod hoc in vi orationis sumitur, id est, quod habeat caritatem.
| However, it does not belong to the affections to join or divide, but only to be drawn to things themselves, for good and evil are its conditions. Therefore, when one says: “I love,” or “I want to have charity,” the phrase “to have charity” is taken in the sense of a term, as though I said: “This is what I want, to have charity.” Now, nothing prevents us from knowing this. For I know what it is to have charity, even if I do not have it. Thus, even one who does not have charity desires to have charity. Nevertheless, it does not follow that one knows that he has charity, taking this with the force of a statement, affirming that he does have charity.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod quamvis habere caritatem sit necessarium ad salutem, non tamen scire se habere caritatem; immo magis expedit nescire communiter, quia per hoc magis sollicitudo et humilitas conservatur. Quod autem dicitur unctio docet de omnibus necessariis ad salutem, intelligitur de omnibus quorum cognitio necessaria est ad salutem.
| 8. Although it is necessary to have charity to be saved, it is not necessary to know that one has charity. In fact, it is generally more advantageous not to know, because thus solicitude and humility are preserved. The saying, “The unction of God teaches all that is needed for salvation,” should be understood as referring to all that has to be known for salvation.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod virtus dicitur esse certior omni arte, certitudine inclinationis ad unum, non autem certitudine cognitionis. Virtus enim, ut dicit Tullius, inclinat ad unum per modum cuiusdam naturae; natura autem certius et directius pertingit ad unum finem quam ars; et per hunc etiam modum dicitur quod virtus est certior arte, non quod certius aliquis percipiat se habere virtutem, quam artem.
| 9. Virtue is more certain than any art with the certainty of tendency to one thing, but not with the certainty of knowledge. For virtue, as Cicero says,” tends to one thing in the manner of a nature. But nature reaches a single end more surely and more directly than art does. It is in this sense, too, that virtue is said to be more certain than art, and not in the sense that one perceives virtue in himself more surely than art.
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ARTICLE XI
In the eleventh article we ask:
Can the mind in this life see God through his essence?
[ARTICLE III Sent., 27, 3, 1; 35, 2, 2., sol. 2; IV Sent., 49, 2, 7; Quodl., I, 1; C.G., III, 47; 2 Cor., c. 12, lect. I; S.T., I, 12, 11; II-II, 180, 5; 175, 4-5; In loan., c. 1, lect. 11.]
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| Undecimo quaeritur utrum mens in statu viae possit videre Deum per essentiam
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that it can, for
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| Quia Num. XII, 8, dicit dominus de Moyse: ore ad os loquor ei et palam et non per aenigmata videt Deum. Sed hoc est videre Deum per essentiam, videre scilicet absque aenigmate; ergo cum Moyses adhuc viator esset, videtur quod aliquis in statu viae possit Deum per essentiam videre.
| 1. In Numbers (12:8) it is said of Moses: “For I speak to him mouth to mouth: and plainly and not by riddles doth he see the Lord.”, But to see God without riddles is to see Him through His essence. Therefore, since Moses was still a wayfarer, it seems that someone in this life can see God through His essence.
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| Praeterea, Exod. XXXIII, 20 super illud: non videbit me homo et vivet, dicit Glossa Gregorii, quod quibusdam in hac carne viventibus sed inaestimabili virtute crescentibus, contemplationis acumine potest aeterni Dei claritas videri. Claritas autem Dei est eius essentia, ut in eadem Glossa dicitur. Ergo aliquis in hac mortali vivens carne potest Deum per essentiam videre.
| 2. Gregory’s gloss on Exodus (33:20), “For man shall not see me and live,” says: “The glory of God everlasting can be seen with the keenness of contemplation by some living in this flesh but growing in priceless virtue.” But the glory of God is His essence, as is said in the same gloss. Therefore, one living in this mortal flesh can see God through His essence.
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| Praeterea, Christus habuit intellectum eiusdem naturae sicut nos habemus. Sed status viae non impediebat intellectum eius quin Deum per essentiam videret. Ergo et nos in statu viae Deum per essentiam videre possumus.
| 3. Christ’s understanding was of the same nature as ours. But the conditions of this life did not prevent His understanding from seeing God through His essence. Therefore, we, too, can see God in this life through His essence.
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| Praeterea, Deus, in statu viae, intellectuali visione cognoscitur; unde Rom. c. I, 20: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur. Sed intellectualis visio est per quam res in seipsis videntur, ut Augustinus dicit, Lib. XII super Genesim ad Litt. Ergo mens nostra in statu viae Deum per essentiam videre potest.
| 4. In this life God is known by means of intellectual sight. Hence, Romans (1:20) says: “For the invisible things of him... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” But the sight of understanding is that through which things are seen in themselves, as Augustine says. Therefore, our mind can see God in this life through His essence.
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| Praeterea, philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod anima nostra quodammodo est omnia, quia sensus est omnia sensibilia, et intellectus omnia intelligibilia. Sed maxime intelligibile est divina essentia. Ergo intellectus noster etiam secundum statum viae, secundum quem philosophus loquitur, Deum per essentiam videre potest; sicut et sensus noster potest omnia sensibilia sentire.
| 5. The Philosopher says: “Our soul in a certain sense is all things,” because sense is all sensible things and understanding is all intelligible things. But the divine essence is most intelligible. Therefore, our understanding even according to the conditions of this life, about which the Philosopher is speaking, can see God through His essence, just as our sense can perceive all sensible things.
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| Praeterea, sicut in Deo est immensa bonitas, ita et immensa veritas. Sed divina bonitas quamvis sit immensa, potest a nobis in statu viae immediate diligi. Ergo veritas essentiae eius potest immediate videri in statu viae.
| 6. As there is boundless goodness in God, so, too, there is boundless truth. But the divine goodness, even though it is boundless, can be loved in itself by us in this life. Therefore, the truth of His essence can be seen in itself in this life.
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| Praeterea, intellectus noster ad hoc factus est ut Deum videat. Si ergo in statu viae videre non potest, hoc non est nisi propter aliquod velamen: quod quidem est duplex, culpae et creaturae. Culpae quidem velamen in statu innocentiae non erat; et nunc etiam a sanctis removetur: II Corinth. III, vers. 18: nos autem revelata facie gloriam domini speculantes, etc.; creaturae vero velamen divinae essentiae visionem, ut videtur, impedire non potest, quia Deus est interior menti nostrae quam aliqua creatura. Ergo in statu viae mens nostra Deum per essentiam videt.
| 7. Our understanding has been made to see God. If it cannot see God in this life, this is only because of some veil. This is twofold, a veil of guilt and of creaturehood. The veil of guilt did not exist in the state of innocence, and even now is taken away from the saints. The second Epistle to the Corinthians (3:18) says: “But we all beholding the glory of the Lord with open face...” Now, the veil of creaturehood, as it seems, cannot keep us from seeing the divine essence, because God is deeper within our mind than any creature. Therefore, in this life our mind sees God through His essence.
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| Praeterea, omne quod est in altero, est in eo per modum recipientis. Sed Deus per essentiam suam est in mente nostra. Cum igitur modus mentis nostrae sit intelligibilitas ipsa, videtur quod essentia divina sit in mente nostra ut intelligibilis: et ita mens nostra Deum per essentiam intelligit in statu viae.
| 8. Everything that is in another is there according to the mode of the one receiving. But God is in our mind through His essence. Since, therefore, intelligibility itself is the mode of our mind, it seems that the divine essence is in our mind as intelligible. So, our mind understands God through His essence in this life.
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| Praeterea, Cassiodorus dicit: claritatem illam inaccessibilem sanitas mentis humanae intelligit. Sed mens nostra sanatur per gratiam. Ergo ab habente gratiam in statu viae videri potest essentia divina, quae est inaccessibilis claritas.
| 9. Cassiodorus says: “The soundness of the human mind understands that unapproachable glory.” But our mind is made sound through grace. Therefore, the divine essence, which is unapproachable glory, can be seen in this life by one who has grace.
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| Praeterea, sicut ens quod de omnibus praedicatur, est primum in communitate, ita ens a quo omnia causantur, est primum in causalitate, scilicet Deus. Sed ens quod est primum in communitate, est prima conceptio nostri intellectus etiam in statu viae. Ergo et ens quod est primum in causalitate, statim per essentiam suam in statu viae cognoscere possumus.
| 10. As the being which is predicated of all things stands first in universality, so the being by which all things are caused, that is to say, God, stands first in causality. But the being which is first in universality is the first concept of our understanding even in this life. Therefore, in this life we can immediately know through His essence the being which is first in causality.
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| Praeterea, ad visionem requiritur videns, et visum, et intentio. Sed haec tria in mente nostra inveniuntur respectu divinae essentiae: ipsa enim mens nostra est naturaliter divinae essentiae visiva, utpote ad hoc facta; essentia etiam divina adest principaliter menti nostrae; intentio etiam non deficit, quia quandocumque mens nostra ad creaturam convertitur, convertitur etiam ad Deum, cum in creatura sit Dei similitudo. Ergo mens nostra in statu viae Deum per essentiam videre potest.
| 11. For sight there must be one who sees, something seen, and an intention. But we have these three in our mind with reference to the divine essence. For our mind itself is naturally capable of seeing the divine essence, since it was made for this. And the divine essence is present in our mind. Nor is an intention lacking, for, whenever our mind turns to a creature, it also turns to God, since in the creature there is a likeness of God. Therefore, our mind can see God through His essence in this life.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII confessionum: si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicis, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico. Ubi, quaeso, id videmus? Nec ego utique in te, nec tu in me: sed ambo in ipsa, quae supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili veritate. Sed incommutabilis veritas est divina essentia, in qua non potest aliquid videri, nisi ipsa videatur. Ergo in statu viae essentiam divinam videmus et in ea omne verum inspicimus.
| 12. Augustine says: “If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we see this? Surely, I do not see it in you, nor you in me, but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our minds.”, But the unchangeable truth is the divine essence, in which nothing can be seen unless it itself is seen. Therefore, we see the divine essence in this life, and we see all truth in it.
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| Praeterea, veritas inquantum huiusmodi, est cognoscibilis. Ergo summa veritas summe cognoscibilis. Haec autem est divina essentia. Ergo etiam in statu viae divinam essentiam cognoscere possumus quasi summe cognoscibilem.
| 13. Truth, as such, is knowable, Therefore, the highest truth is most knowable. But this is the divine essence. Therefore, even in the conditions of this life we can know the divine essence as most knowable.
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| Praeterea, Genes. cap. XXXII, 30, dicitur: vidi dominum facie ad faciem. Facies Dei est forma, in qua filius non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo, sicut ex quadam Glossa habetur. Sed forma illa est divina essentia. Ergo Iacob, in statu viae Deum per essentiam vidit.
| 14. Genesis (32:30) says: “I have seen the Lord face to face.”“ And, as the Gloss comments: “The face of God is the form in which the Son did not consider it robbery to be equal to God.” But the form is the divine essence. Therefore, Jacob saw God through His essence in this life.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| I Timoth. ultimo: lucem habitat inaccessibilem, quem nullus hominum vidit sed nec videre potest.
| 1. In the first Epistle to Timothy (6:16) we read: “Who inhabits light inaccessible, whom no man has seen nor can see.”
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| Praeterea, Exod., XXXIII, 20: non videbit me homo et vivet. Glossa Gregorii. In hac carne viventibus videri potuit Deus per circumscriptas imagines, et videri non potuit per incircumscriptum lumen aeternitatis. Hoc autem lumen est divina essentia. Ergo nullus in hac carne vivens potest Deum per essentiam videre.
| 2. Exodus (33:20), “For a man will not see me and live,” the gloss of Gregory says: “God could be seen by those living in this flesh through limited images; He could not be seen through the unlimited light of eternity.” But this light is the divine essence. Therefore, no one living in this life can see God through His essence.
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| Praeterea, Bernardus dicit quod, licet in statu viae Deus possit totus diligi, non tamen potest totus intelligi; sed si per essentiam videretur, totus intelligeretur; ergo per essentiam suam in statu viae non videtur.
| 3. Bernard says that, although God can be entirely loved in this life, He cannot be entirely understood. But, if He were seen through His essence, He would be entirely understood. Therefore, He is not seen through His essence in this life.
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| Praeterea, intellectus noster intelligit cum continuo et tempore, ut philosophus dicit in III de anima. Sed divina essentia excedit omne continuum et tempus. Ergo intellectus noster in statu viae Deum per essentiam videre non potest.
| 4. As the Philosopher says, our intellect understands in space and time. But the divine essence transcends all space and time. Therefore, our intellect cannot see God through His essence in this life.
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| Praeterea, plus distat essentia divina a dono eius quam actus primus ab actu secundo. Sed quandoque ex hoc quod aliquis videt Deum per donum intellectus aut sapientiae in contemplatione, anima separatur a corpore quantum ad operationes sensus, quae sunt actus secundi. Ergo si videat Deum per essentiam, oportet quod separetur a corpore, etiam prout est actus primus eius. Sed hoc non est quamdiu homo in statu viae existit. Ergo nullus in statu viae potest Deum per essentiam videre.
| 5. The divine essence is farther away from the gift of it than first act from second act. But, sometimes, when one sees God in contemplation through the gift of understanding or wisdom, the soul is separated from the body with reference to sense activities, which are second acts. Therefore, if the soul would see God through His essence, it must be separated from the body, even in so far as it is the first act of the body. But this does not happen as long as man is in this life. Therefore, in this life no one can see God through His essence.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod aliqua actio potest alicui convenire dupliciter. Uno modo sic quod illius operationis principium sit in operante, sicut in omnibus actionibus naturalibus videmus. Alio modo sic quod principium operationis illius vel motus, sit a principio extrinseco; sicut est in motibus violentis, et sicut est in operibus miraculosis, quae non fiunt nisi virtute divina, ut illuminatio caeci, resuscitatio mortui et huiusmodi.
| An action can belong to someone in two ways. In one way it is such that the principle of that action is in the doer, as we see in all natural actions. In the other way it is such that the principle of that activity or movement is from an extrinsic principle, as happens in forcibly imposed movements, and also in miraculous works, such as giving sight to the blind, resuscitation of the dead, and things of this sort which take place only through divine power.
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| Menti igitur nostrae in statu viae convenire non potest visio Dei per essentiam secundum primum modum. Mens enim nostra naturali cognitione phantasmata respicit quasi obiecta, a quibus species intelligibiles accipit, ut dicitur in III de anima; unde omne quod intelligit secundum statum viae, intelligit per huiusmodi species a phantasmatibus abstractas. Nulla autem huiusmodi species sufficiens est ad repraesentandam divinam essentiam, vel etiam cuiuscumque alterius essentiae separatae; cum quidditates rerum sensibilium, quarum similitudines sunt intelligibiles species a phantasmatibus abstractae, sint alterius rationis ab essentiis substantiarum immaterialium etiam creatarum, et multo amplius ab essentia divina.
| In this life, the vision of God through His essence cannot belong to our mind in the first way. For, in natural knowledge, our mind looks to phantasms as objects from which it receives intelligible species, as is said in The Soul. Hence, everything it understands in the present life, it understands through species of this sort abstracted from phantasms. But no species of this sort is sufficient to represent the divine essence or that of any other separated essence. For the quiddities of sensible things, of which intelligible species abstracted from phantasms are likenesses, are essentially different from the essences of even created immaterial substances, and much more from the divine essence.
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| Unde mens nostra naturali cognitione, quam in statu viae experimur, nec Deum nec Angelos per essentiam videre potest. Angeli tamen per essentiam videri possunt per aliquas species intelligibiles ab eorum essentia differentes: non autem essentia divina, quae omne genus excedit, et est extra omne genus; ut sic nulla creata species inveniri possit sufficiens ad eam repraesentandam.
| Hence, by means of the natural knowledge, which we experience in this life, our mind cannot see either God or angels through their essence. Nevertheless, angels can be seen through their essence by means of intelligible species different from their essence, but the divine essence cannot, for it transcends every genus and is outside every genus. As a result, it is impossible to find any created species which is adequate to represent it.
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| Unde oportet, si Deus per essentiam videri debeat, quod per nullam speciem creatam videatur: sed ipsa eius essentia fiat intelligibilis forma intellectus eum videntis, quod fieri non potest nisi ad hoc intellectus creatus per lumen gloriae disponatur. Et sic in videndo Deum per essentiam, per dispositionem infusi luminis pertingit mens ad terminum viae, qui est gloria; et sic non est in via.
| Thus, if God is to be seen through His essence, He must be seen through no created species, but His very essence must become the intelligible form of the understanding which sees Him. This cannot take place unless the created intellect is disposed for it through the light of glory. And in thus seeing God through His essence by reason of the disposition of infused light, the mind reaches the end of its course, which is glory, and so is not in this life.
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| Sicut autem divinae omnipotentiae subiecta sunt corpora, ita et mentes. Unde, sicut potest aliqua corpora perducere ad effectus quorum dispositio in praedictis corporibus non invenitur, sicut Petrum fecit super aquas ambulare sine hoc quod ei dotem agilitatis tribueret; ita potest mentem ad hoc perducere ut divinae essentiae uniatur in statu viae, modo illo quo unitur sibi in patria, sine hoc quod a lumine gloriae perfundatur.
| Moreover, just as bodies are subject to the divine omnipotence, so, too, are minds. Hence, just as it can cause some bodies to produce effects, the dispositions for which they do not have within themselves, as it made Peter walk on water without giving him the gift of agility, so it can bring it about that the mind be united to the divine essence in the present life in the way in which it is united to it in heaven without being bathed in the light of glory.
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| Cum autem hoc contingit, oportet quod mens ab illo modo cognitionis desistat quo a phantasmatibus abstrahit; sicut etiam corpus corruptibile, cum ei miraculose datur agilitatis actus, non est simul in actu gravitatis. Et ideo illi quibus hoc modo Deum videre per essentiam datur, omnino ab actibus sensuum abstrahuntur, ut tota anima colligatur ad divinam essentiam intuendam. Unde et rapi dicuntur, quasi vi superioris naturae abstracti ab eo quod secundum naturam eis competebat.
| When, however, this takes place, the mind must leave off that mode of knowing in which it abstracts from phantasms in the same way that a corruptible body is not actually heavy at the same time that it is miraculously given that act of agility. Therefore, those to whom it is given to see God through His essence in this way are withdrawn completely from activity of the senses, so that the whole soul is concentrated on seeing the divine essence. Hence, they are said to be in a state of rapture, as if by virtue of a higher power they were separated from that which naturally belongs to them.
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| Sic igitur, secundum communem cursum, nullus in statu viae Deum per essentiam videt. Et si aliquibus hoc miraculose concedatur, ut Deum per essentiam videant, nondum anima a carne mortali totaliter separata: non tamen sunt totaliter in statu viae, ex quo actibus sensuum carent, quibus in statu mortalis viae utimur.
| Therefore, in the ordinary course of events, no one sees God through His essence in this life. And if it is miraculously granted to some to see God through His essence before the soul is completely separated from mortal flesh, such are, nevertheless, not altogether in this life, for they are without the activity of the senses, which we use in the state of mortal existence.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod secundum Augustinum, XII super Genes. ad Litt. et ad Paulinam de videndo Deum, ex verbis illis Moyses ostenditur Deum per essentiam vidisse in quodam raptu, sicut et de Paulo dicitur II Corinth., XII, 2: ut in hoc Iudaeorum legifer, et doctor gentium aequarentur.
| 1. According to Augustine,” from those words Moses is shown to have seen God through His essence in a rapture, as we are told of Paul in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2), in order that the lawgiver of the Jews and the teacher of the Gentiles might be equal in this respect.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod Gregorius loquitur de illis qui acumine contemplationis ad hoc crescunt ut divinam essentiam in raptu videant; unde subiungit: qui sapientiam quae Deus est, videt, huic vitae funditus moritur.
| 2. Gregory is speaking about men who grow in keenness of contemplation to the point that they see the divine essence in rapture. Hence, he adds: “He who sees the wisdom which is God entirely dies to this life.”
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod in Christo hoc fuit singulare ut esset simul viator et comprehensor. Quod ei competebat ex hoc quod erat Deus et homo: unde in eius potestate erant omnia quae ad humanam naturam spectabant, ut unaquaeque vis animae et corporis afficeretur secundum quod ipse disponebat. Unde nec dolor corporis contemplationem mentis impediebat, nec fruitio mentis dolorem corporis minuebat: et sic intellectus eius, luce gloriae illustratus, Deum per essentiam videbat, ut tamen ad inferiores partes gloria non derivaretur. Et sic simul erat viator et comprehensor; quod de aliis dici non potest in quibus ex superioribus viribus de necessitate redundat aliquid in inferiores; et a passionibus vehementibus inferiorum virium superiores trahuntur.
| 3. It was unique in Christ that at the same time He was a wayfarer and a possessor [of the beatific vision]. This belonged to Him because He was God and man. As a result, everything which related to human nature was under His control, so that each power of soul and body was affected in the way in which He determined. Hence, bodily pain did not hinder contemplation of the mind, nor did delight of the mind lessen bodily pain. Thus, His understanding, which was illumined by the light of glory, saw God through His essence in such a way that the glory did not affect the lower parts. In this way He was at once a wayfarer and a possessor of the beatific vision. This cannot be said of others, in whom there is some necessary diffusion from the higher powers to the lower, and in whom the higher powers are drawn down by the strong passions of the lower powers.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod intellectuali visione in statu viae Deus cognoscitur, non ut sciatur de Deo quid est, sed solum quid non est. Et quantum ad hoc eius essentiam cognoscimus, eam super omnia collocatam intelligentes, quamvis talis cognitio per aliquas similitudines fiat. Verbum autem Augustini referendum est ad id quod cognoscitur, non ad id quo cognoscitur, ut ex superioribus quaestionibus patet.
| 4. In this life God is known by means of intellectual sight, yet not with the result that we know what He is, but only what He is not. To this extent we know His essence, understanding that it stands above everything. Such cognition, however, takes place through certain likenesses. The statement from Augustine should be taken as referring to that which is known and not to that by which it is known, as is clear from what has been said.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod intellectus noster etiam in statu viae divinam essentiam aliquo modo cognoscere potest, non ut sciat de ea quid est, sed solum quid non est.
| 5. Even in this life our understanding can in a certain manner know the divine essence, not that it knows what it is, but only what it is not.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod nos possumus Deum diligere immediate, nullo alio praedilecto, quamvis quandoque ex aliorum visibilium amore in invisibilia rapiamur; non autem possumus in statu viae Deum immediate cognoscere, nullo alio praecognito. Cuius ratio est, quia, cum affectus ad intellectum sequatur, ubi terminatur operatio intellectus, incipit operatio affectus. Intellectus autem ex effectibus in causas procedens, tandem pervenit in ipsius Dei cognitionem aliqualem, cognoscendo de eo quid non est; et sic affectus fertur in id quod ei per intellectum offertur, sine hoc quod necesse habeat redire per omnia media per quae intellectus transivit.
| 6. We can love God directly without having loved anything else first, although sometimes we are drawn to invisible things through love of other things which can be seen. In this life, however, we cannot know God directly without first knowing something else. The reason for this is that the activity of affection begins where the activity of understanding ends, since affection follows understanding. But the understanding, going from effects to causes, finally arrives at some sort of knowledge of God, by knowing what He is not. Hence, affection is directed to that which is presented to it through the understanding, without having to go back through all the intermediate things through which the understanding passed.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod intellectus noster quamvis sit factus ad videndum Deum, non tamen ut naturali sua virtute Deum videre possit, sed per lumen gloriae sibi infusum. Et ideo omni velamine remoto nondum oportet quod intellectus Deum per essentiam videat, si lumine gloriae non illustretur. Ipsa enim carentia gloriae erit ei divinae visionis impedimentum.
| 7. Although our understanding has been made to see God, it cannot see God by its own natural power, but through the light of glory infused into it. Therefore, even though every veil is taken away, it is still not necessary to see God through His essence if the soul is not enlightened with the light of glory. For this lack of glory will be an obstacle to seeing God.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod mens nostra cum intelligibilitate, quam habet ut proprium quoddam, et cum aliis communiter habet esse: unde, quamvis in ea sit Deus, non oportet quod semper sit in ea ut forma intelligibilis; sed ut dans esse, sicut est in aliis creaturis. Quamvis autem creaturis omnibus communiter det esse, tamen cuilibet creaturae dat proprium modum essendi; et sic etiam quantum ad hoc quod in omnibus est per essentiam, praesentiam, potentiam, invenitur esse diversimode in diversis, et in unoquoque secundum proprium eius modum.
| 8. Along with intelligibility, which it has as a property, our mind also has existence in common with other things. Hence, although God is in it, it is not necessary that He be there always as an intelligible form, but as giving existence, just as He is in other creatures. Moreover, although He gives existence to all creatures alike, He gives each creature its own mode of existence. Furthermore, in the sense that He is in all of them through essence, presence, and power, He is seen to exist differently in different things, and in each one according to its own mode.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod duplex est sanitas mentis: una qua sanatur a culpa per gratiam fidei, et haec sanitas facit videre illam inaccessibilem claritatem per speculum et in aenigmate. Alia est ab omni culpa et poena et miseria: quae erit per gloriam; et haec sanitas faciet videri Deum facie ad faciem. Quae duae visiones distinguuntur I Corinth., XIII, 12: videmus nunc per speculum etc. usque faciem.
| 9. Soundness of mind is twofold. There is one by which the mind is healed from sin through the grace of faith. This soundness makes the mind see that unapproachable glory in a mirror and obscurely. The other, which will come through glory, is a remedy for all sin, punishment, and distress. This soundness makes the mind see God face to face. These two kinds of sight are distinguished in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:12): “We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face.”
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod ens quod est primum per communitatem, cum sit idem per essentiam cuilibet rei, nullius proportionem excedit; et ideo in cognitione cuiuslibet rei ipsum cognoscitur. Sed ens quod primum est causalitate, excedit improportionaliter omnes alias res: unde per nullius alterius cognitionem sufficienter cognosci potest. Et ideo in statu viae, in quo per species a rebus abstractas intelligimus, cognoscimus ens commune sufficienter, non autem ens increatum.
| 10. The being which is most extensive in universality does not exceed the proportion of anything, since it is essentially identified with everything. Therefore, it is perceived in the knowledge of anything whatsoever. But the being which is first in causality exceeds all other things and has no proportion to them. Hence, it cannot be known adequately through knowledge of any other thing. Therefore, in this life, in which we understand through species abstracted from things, we have adequate knowledge of being in general, but not of uncreated being.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod quamvis divina essentia sit praesens intellectui nostro, non tamen est ei coniuncta ut forma intelligibilis, quam intelligere possit quamdiu lumine gloriae non perficitur. Ipsa enim mens non habet facultatem videndi Deum per essentiam antequam praedicto lumine illustretur. Et sic deficit et videntis facultas, et visi praesentia. Intentio etiam non semper adest; quamvis enim in creatura inveniatur aliqualis creatoris similitudo, non tamen quandocumque ad creaturam convertimur, convertimur ad eam prout est similitudo creatoris. Unde non oportet quod semper intentio nostra feratur ad Deum.
| 11. Although the divine essence is present to our understanding, still, as long as our understanding is not made perfect by the light of glory, it is not joined to it as an intelligible form which it can understand. For the mind itself does not have the faculty of seeing God through His essence before it is illumined with the aforesaid light. Thus, the faculty of seeing and the presence of what is seen are lacking. Again, the intention is not always present, for, although some likeness of the Creator is found in creatures, still, whenever we look at a creature, we do not consider it as a likeness of the Creator. Hence, it is not necessary that our intention always reach God.
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| Ad decimumsecundum dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Glossa super illud Psal. XI, 1: diminutae sunt veritates etc., ab una increata veritate multae veritates in humanis mentibus imprimuntur, sicut ab una facie multae similitudines resultant in speculis diversis, vel uno fracto. Secundum hoc ergo nos in veritate increata aliquid videre dicimur, secundum quod per eius similitudinem in nostra mente resultantem de aliquo iudicamus, ut cum per principia per se nota iudicamus de conclusionibus. Unde non oportet quod ipsa increata veritas a nobis per essentiam videatur.
| 12. As the Gloss on Psalms (11:2)says: “Truths are decayed.... Many truths are imprinted on human minds,” by the one uncreated truth, “just as from one face many faces appear in different mirrors,” or in one broken mirror. According to this, we are said to see something in uncreated truth when we judge about something through the likeness of uncreated truth reflected in our mind, as when we judge of conclusions through self-evident principles. Hence, it is not necessary that we see uncreated truth through its essence.
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| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod summa veritas, quantum est in se, est maxime cognoscibilis; sed ex parte nostra contingit quod nobis est minus cognoscibilis, sicut patet per philosophum, in II Metaphys.
| 13. The highest truth, in so far as it exists in itself, is most knowable. But in our regard it happens to be less knowable to us, as is clear from the Philosopher.”
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| Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod auctoritas illa dupliciter exponitur in Glossa. Uno modo ut intelligatur de visione imaginaria; unde dicit interlinearis: vidi dominum facie ad faciem: non quod Deus videri possit, sed formam vidit in qua Deus locutus est ei. Alio modo exponit Glossa Gregorii de visione intellectuali, qua sancti in contemplatione divinam veritatem intuentur; non quidem sciendo de ea quid est, sed magis quid non est; unde dicit ibidem Gregorius: veritatem sentiendo videt; quia quanta est ipsa veritas, non videt, cui tanto se longe aestimat, quanto appropinquat; quia nisi illam utcumque conspiceret, non eam conspicere se non posse sentiret. Et post pauca subiungit: haec ipsa per contemplationem facta, non solida et permanens visio, sed quasi quaedam visionis imitatio, Dei facies dicitur. Quia enim per faciem quemlibet agnoscimus, cognitionem Dei faciem vocamus.
| 14. This citation is explained in two ways in the Gloss. In one way it is taken to refer to the sight of imagination. Thus, the interlinear Gloss says: “I have seen the Lord face to face. This does not mean that God can be seen, but that he saw the form in which God spoke to him.” It is explained differently in Gregory’s gloss, as referring to intellectual sight, by which saints have seen divine truth in contemplation, not, indeed, knowing what it is, but what it is not. Hence, Gregory says: “He saw by perceiving the truth, for he does not see how great the truth itself is, since the closer he approaches to it, the farther he thinks he is from it. For, unless he saw the truth in some way, he would not perceive that he was not able to see it.” And he adds: “This sight, which comes through contemplation, is not firm and permanent, but, as a kind of imitation of sight, is called the face of God. For, since we recognize a person by his face, we call knowledge of God the face of God.
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ARTICLE XII
In the twelfth article we ask:
Is God’s existence self-evident to the human mind, just as first principles of demonstration, which cannot be thought not to exist?
[ARTICLE I Sent., 3, 1, 2; In Boet. de Trinit., I, 3, ad 6; S.T., I, 10-11; III, 38; Q.D. de pot., 7, 2, ad 11; S.T., I, 1, 1; In Psalm., 8.]
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| Duodecimo quaeritur utrum Deum esse sit per se notum menti humanae, sicut prima principia demonstrationis quae non potest cogitare non esse
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that it is, for
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| Illa enim sunt nobis per se nota, quorum cognitio naturaliter est nobis indita. Sed cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter omnibus est inserta, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.
| 1. Those things which it is given us to know naturally are self-evident. But “knowledge of God’s existence is naturally given to everybody,” as Damascene says. Therefore, it is self-evident that God exists.
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| Praeterea, Deus est id quo maius cogitari non potest, ut Anselmus dicit. Sed illud quod non potest cogitari non esse, est maius illo quod potest cogitari non esse. Ergo Deus non potest cogitari non esse.
| 2. “God is that than which nothing greater can be thought,” as Anselm says. But that which cannot be thought not to exist is greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Therefore, God cannot be thought not to exist.
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| Praeterea, Deus est ipsa veritas. Sed nullus potest cogitare veritatem non esse, quia si ponitur non esse, sequitur eam esse: si enim veritas non est, verum est veritatem non esse. Ergo non potest cogitari Deum non esse.
| 3. God is truth itself. But no one can think that truth does not exist, because, if it is declared not to exist, it follows that it exists. For, if truth does not exist, it is true that truth does not exist. Therefore, no one can think that God does not exist.
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| Praeterea, Deus est ipsum esse suum. Sed non potest cogitari quin idem de se praedicetur, ut quod homo non sit homo. Ergo non potest cogitari Deum non esse.
| 4. God is His own existence. But it is impossible to think that a thing is not predicated of itself, for example, that man is not man. Therefore, it is impossible to think that God does not exist.
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| Praeterea, omnia desiderant summum bonum, ut Boetius dicit. Summum autem bonum, solus Deus est. Ergo omnia desiderant Deum. Sed non potest desiderari quod non cognoscitur. Ergo communis omnium conceptio est Deum esse; ergo non potest cogitari non esse.
| 5. All things desire the highest good, as Boethius says. But only God is the highest good. Therefore, all things desire God. But what is not known cannot be desired. Therefore, that God exists is a notion common to all. Therefore, He cannot be thought not to exist.
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| Praeterea, veritas prima praecellit omnem veritatem creatam. Sed aliqua veritas creata est adeo evidens quod non potest cogitari non esse, sicut veritas huius propositionis quod affirmatio et negatio non sunt simul vera. Ergo multo minus potest cogitari veritatem increatam non esse, quae Deus est.
| 6. First truth surpasses all created truth. But some created truth is so evident that it is impossible to think that it does not exist, as for instance, the truth of the proposition that affirmation and denial cannot both be true at the same time. Therefore, much less can it be thought that uncreated truth, which is God, does not exist.
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| Praeterea, verius esse habet Deus quam anima humana. Sed anima non potest se cogitare non esse. Ergo multo minus potest cogitare Deum non esse.
| 7. God has existence more truly than the human soul has. But the soul cannot think that it does not exist. Therefore, much less can it think that God does not exist.
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| Praeterea, omne quod est, prius fuit verum esse futurum. Sed veritas est. Ergo prius fuit verum eam futuram. Non autem nisi veritate. Ergo non potest cogitari quin semper veritas fuerit. Deus autem est veritas. Ergo non potest cogitari Deum non esse vel non semper fuisse.
| 8. Before anything existed it was true that it would exist. But truth exists. Therefore, before it existed it was true that it would exist. But this is true only because of truth. Therefore, it is impossible to think that truth did not always exist. But God is truth. Therefore, it cannot be thought that God does not exist or has not always existed.
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| Sed dicebat, quod in processu huius argumenti est fallacia, secundum quid et simpliciter; quia veritatem futuram esse antequam esset, non dicit aliquid verum simpliciter, sed tantum secundum quid; et sic non potest concludi simpliciter veritatem esse.- Sed contra, omne verum secundum quid reducitur ad aliquod verum simpliciter, sicut omne imperfectum ad aliquod perfectum. Si ergo veritatem futuram esse, erat verum secundum quid, oportebat aliquid esse verum simpliciter; et sic simpliciter erat verum, dicere veritatem esse.
| 9. It was said that there is a fallacy in this argument, with an equivocation on “simply” and “in some respect.” For that truth would exist before it did exist does not state a truth simply, but only in some respect. Thus, we cannot conclude that truth exists simply.—On the contrary, there is the fact that everything which is true in some respect is reduced to something which is true simply, just as every imperfect thing is reduced to something perfect. Therefore, if the fact that truth would exist was true in some respect, something had to be true simply. Thus, it was simply true to say that truth existed.
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| Praeterea, nomen Dei proprium est qui est, ut patet Exod. III, 14. Sed non potest cogitari ens non esse. Ergo nec cogitari potest Deum non esse.
| 10. God’s proper name is He Who Is, as is clear from Exodus (3:14). But it is impossible to think that being is not. Therefore, it is also impossible to think that God is not.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod dicitur in Psalm. XIII, 1: dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est Deus.
| 1. The Psalmist says (Ps. 13:1) “The fool has said in his heart, ‘There is no God.’”
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| Sed dicebat, quod Deum esse, in habitu mentis est per se notum, sed actu potest cogitari non esse.- Sed contra, de his quae naturali habitu cognoscuntur, non potest contrarium aestimari secundum interiorem rationem, sicut sunt prima principia demonstrationis. Si ergo contrarium huius quod est Deum esse, potest aestimari in actu, Deum esse, non erit per se notum in habitu.
| 2. It was said that the fact that God exists is self-evident habitually to the mind, but it is possible actually to think that He does not exist. On the contrary, in our inner reason we cannot hold the opposite about those things which we know by a natural habit, such as first principles of demonstration. If, therefore, the contrary of the proposition, God exists, could actually be held, that God does exist would not be habitually self-evident.
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| Praeterea, illa quae sunt per se nota, cognoscuntur sine aliqua deductione a causatis in causas; statim enim cognitis terminis cognoscuntur, ut dicitur I posteriorum. Sed Deum esse non cognoscimus nisi inspiciendo effectum eius; Rom., I, 20: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt etc.; ergo Deum esse, non est per se notum.
| 3. Those things which are self-evident are known without passing from things which are caused to their causes. For they are known as soon as the terms are known, as is said in the Posterior Analytics. But we know God only by looking at what He has made, according to Romans (1:20): “For the invisible things of him.... by the things that are made...” Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.
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| Praeterea, non potest de aliquo sciri ipsum esse, nisi quid ipsum sit cognoscatur. Sed de Deo in praesenti statu scire non possumus quid est. Ergo eum esse non est nobis notum; nedum sit per se notum.
| 4. We cannot know the existence of a thing without knowing what it is. But in this life we cannot know what God is. Therefore, that He exists is not evident to us, much less self-evident.
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| Praeterea, Deum esse est articulus fidei. Sed articulus est quod fides suggerit, et ratio contradicit. Ea autem quibus ratio contradicit, non sunt per se nota. Ergo Deum esse non est per se notum.
| 5. That God exists is an article of faith. But an article of faith is something that faith supplies and reason contradicts. But things which reason contradicts are not self-evident. Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.
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| Praeterea, nihil est homini certius sua fide, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed de his quae sunt fidei, dubitatio potest nobis oriri, ergo et de quibuslibet aliis; et sic cogitari potest Deum non esse.
| 6. There is nothing more certain for a man than his faith, as Augustine says. But doubt can arise in us about matters of faith and, so, about anything else. Thus, it can be thought that God does not exist.
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| Praeterea, cognitio Dei ad sapientiam pertinet. Sed non omnes habent sapientiam. Ergo non omnibus notum est Deum esse, ergo non est per se notum.
| 7. Knowledge of God belongs to wisdom. But not everybody has wisdom. Therefore, it is not evident to everybody that God exists. Therefore, it is not self-evident.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Trinitate, quod summum bonum nonnisi purgatissimis mentibus cernitur. Sed non omnes habent purgatissimas mentes. Ergo non omnes cognoscunt summum bonum, scilicet Deum esse.
| 8. Augustine says: “The highest good is discerned only by the most purified minds.”But not everybody has a most purified mind. Therefore, all do not know the highest good, namely, that God exists.
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| Praeterea, inter quaecumque distinguit ratio, unum eorum potest sine altero cogitari; sicut etiam cogitare possumus Deum, sine hoc quod cogitemus eum esse bonum, ut patet per Boetium in libro de Hebdom. Sed in Deo differt essentia et esse ratione. Ergo potest cogitari eius essentia sine hoc quod cogitetur esse, et sic ut prius.
| 9. It is possible to think of one of the things between which reason distinguishes without the other. Thus, we can think that God exists without thinking that He is good, as is clear from Boethius. But, in God, existence and essence differ in reason. Therefore, we can think of His essence without thinking of His existence. We conclude as before.
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| Praeterea, Deo idem est esse Deum quod esse iustum. Sed quidam opinantur Deum non esse iustum, qui dicunt Deo placere mala. Ergo aliqui possunt opinari Deum non esse, et sic Deum esse non est per se notum.
| 10. It is the same thing for God to be God and to be just. But some are of the opinion that God is not just and say that evil pleases God. Therefore, some can think that God does not exist. Thus, that God exists is not self-evident.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem invenitur triplex opinio. Quidam enim, ut Rabbi Moyses narrat, dixerunt quod Deum esse non est per se notum, nec etiam per demonstrationem scitum, sed est tantum a fide susceptum; et ad hoc dicendum induxit eos debilitas rationum quas multi inducunt ad probandum Deum esse.
| There are three opinions on this question. Some have said, as Rabbi Moses relates, that the fact that God exists is not self-evident, nor reached through demonstration, but only accepted on faith. The weakness of the reasons which many advance to prove that God exists prompted them to assert this.
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| Alii vero dixerunt, ut Avicenna, quod Deum esse, non est per se notum, est tamen per demonstrationem scitum. Alii vero, ut Anselmus, opinantur quod Deum esse sit per se notum, in tantum quod nullus possit cogitare interius Deum non esse; quamvis hoc possit exterius proferre, et verba quibus profert interius cogitare.
| Others, as Avicenna,” say that the fact that God exists is not self-evident, but is known through demonstration. Still others, as Anselm,” are of the opinion that the fact that God exists is self-evident to this extent, that no one in his inner thoughts can think that God does not exist, although exteriorly he can express it and interiorly think the words with which he expresses it.
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| Prima quidem opinio manifeste falsa apparet. Invenitur enim hoc quod est Deum esse, demonstrationibus irrefragabilibus etiam a philosophis probatum; quamvis etiam a nonnullis ad hoc ostendendum aliquae rationes frivolae inducantur.
| The first opinion is obviously false. For we find that the existence of God has been proved by the philosophers with unimpeachable proofs, although trivial reasons have also been brought forth by some to show this.
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| Duarum vero opinionum sequentium utraque secundum aliquid vera est. Est enim dupliciter aliquid per se notum; scilicet secundum se, et quoad nos. Deum igitur esse, secundum se est per se notum; non autem quoad nos; et ideo nobis necessarium est, ad hoc cognoscendum, demonstrationes habere ex effectibus sumptas. Et hoc quidem sic apparet.
| Each of the two following opinions has some truth. For something is immediately evident in two ways: in itself and to us. That God exists, therefore, is immediately evident in itself, but not to us. Therefore, to know this it is necessary in our case to have demonstrations proceeding from effects. This is clear from what follows.
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| Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit per se notum secundum se, nihil aliud requiritur nisi ut praedicatum sit de ratione subiecti; tunc enim subiectum cogitari non potest sine hoc quod praedicatum ei inesse appareat. Ad hoc autem quod sit per se notum nobis, oportet quod nobis sit cognita ratio subiecti in qua includitur praedicatum. Et inde est quod quaedam per se nota sunt omnibus; quando scilicet propositiones huiusmodi habent talia subiecta quorum ratio omnibus nota est, ut, omne totum maius est sua parte; quilibet enim scit quid est totum et quid est pars. Quaedam vero sunt per se nota sapientibus tantum, qui rationes terminorum cognoscunt, vulgo eas ignorante.
| For a thing to be Immediately evident in itself, all that is needed is that the predicate pertain to the nature of the subject., For then the subject cannot be considered without it appearing that the predicate is contained in it. But for something to be immediately evident with reference to us, we have to know the meaning of the subject in which the predicate is included. Hence it is that some things are immediately evident to everybody, as, for instance, when propositions of this sort have subjects which are such that their meaning is evident to everybody, as every whole is greater than its part. For anyone knows what a whole is and what a part is. Some things, however, are immediately evident only to those with trained minds, who know the meaning of the terms, whereas ordinary people do not know them.
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| Et secundum hoc Boetius in Lib. de hebdomadibus dicit, quod duplex est modus communium conceptionum. Una est communis omnibus, ut, si ab aequalibus aequalia demas, et cetera. Alia quae est doctiorum tantum, ut puta incorporalia in loco non esse, quae non vulgus, sed docti comprobant; quia scilicet vulgi consideratio imaginationem transcendere non potest, ut ad rationem rei incorporalis pertingat.
| It is in this sense that Boethius says: “There are two types of common notions. One is common to everybody, for example, if you take equal parts from things that are equal... The other is found only in the more educated, for example, that non-bodily things are not in a place. Ordinary people cannot see the truth of this, but the educated can.” For the thought of ordinary people is unable to go beyond imagination to reach the nature of incorporeal things.
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| Hoc autem quod est esse, in nullius creaturae ratione includitur; cuiuslibet enim creaturae esse est aliud ab eius quidditate: unde non potest dici de aliqua creatura quod eam esse sit per se notum etiam secundum se. Sed in Deo esse ipsius includitur in suae quidditatis ratione, quia in eo est idem quod est et esse, ut Boetius dicit, et idem an est et quid est, ut dicit Avicenna; et ideo secundum se est per se notum.
| Now, existence is not included perfectly in the essential nature of any creature, for the act of existence of every creature is something other than its quiddity. Hence, it cannot be said of any creature that its existence is immediately evident even in itself. But, in God, His existence is included in the nature of His quiddity, for in God essence and existence are the same, as Boethius says. And that He is and what He is are the same, as Avicenna says. Therefore, it is immediately evident in itself.
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| Sed quia quidditas Dei non est nobis nota, ideo quoad nos Deum esse non est nobis notum, sed indiget demonstratione. Sed in patria, ubi essentiam eius videbimus, multo erit nobis amplius per se notum Deum esse, quam nunc sit per se notum quod affirmatio et negatio non sunt simul vera. Quia igitur utraque pars quaestionis quantum ad aliquid vera est, ad utrasque rationes respondere oportet.
| But, since the essence of God is not evident to us, the fact of God’s existence is not evident to us, but has to be demonstrated. In heaven, however, where we shall see His essence, the fact of God’s existence will be immediately evident to us much more fully than the fact that affirmation and denial cannot both be true at the same time is immediately evident to us now. Since, therefore, each part of the question is true to some extent, we must answer both sides.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod cognitio existendi Deum dicitur omnibus naturaliter insita, quia omnibus naturaliter est insitum aliquid unde potest pervenire ad cognoscendum Deum esse.
| 1. Knowledge of God’s existence is said naturally to be implanted in everybody, because in everyone there is naturally implanted something from which he can arrive at knowledge of the fact of God’s existence.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si esset ex parte ipsius, quod non est per se notum; nunc autem quod potest cogitari non esse, est ex parte nostra, qui sumus deficientes ad cognoscendum ea quae sunt in se notissima. Unde hoc quod Deus potest cogitari non esse, non impedit quin etiam sit id quo maius cogitari non possit.
| 2. The reasoning would follow if God were not self-evident because of something connected with Himself. The possibility, however, of thinking that He does not exist is now due to something in us, who are incapable of knowing those things which are most evident in themselves. Hence, the fact that God can be thought of as not existing does not prevent Him from being that than which nothing greater can be thought.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod veritas supra ens fundatur; unde, sicut ens esse in communi est per se notum, ita et etiam veritatem esse. Non est autem per se notum nobis, esse aliquod primum ens quod sit causa omnis entis, quousque hoc vel fides accipiat, vel demonstratio probet; unde nec est per se notum omnem veritatem ab aliqua prima veritate esse. Unde non sequitur quod Deum esse sit per se notum.
| 3. Truth is based on being. Hence, as it is self-evident that being exists in general, so it is also self-evident that truth exists. However, that there is a first being which is the cause of every being is not immediately evident to us until it is accepted on faith or proved by a demonstration. Consequently, neither is it self-evident that the truth of all things derives from some first truth. Hence, it does not follow that God’s existence is self-evident.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si hoc esset nobis per se notum, quod ipsa deitas sit esse Dei; quod quidem nunc nobis per se notum non est, cum Deum per essentiam non videamus; sed indigemus, ad hoc tenendum, vel demonstratione vel fide.
| 4. If it were immediately evident to us that the divine nature is God’s existence, the argument would follow. However, at present it is not immediately evident to us, since we do not see God through His essence, but need a demonstration or faith to hold this truth.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod summum bonum desideratur dupliciter: uno modo in sui essentia: et sic non omnia desiderant summum bonum; alio modo in sui similitudine: et sic omnia summum bonum desiderant, quia nihil est desiderabile nisi in quantum in eo aliqua similitudo summi boni invenitur. Unde ex hoc non potest haberi quod, Deum esse, qui est summum bonum per essentiam, sit per se notum.
| 5. The highest good is desired in two ways. In one, it is desired in its essence, a way in which not everything desires highest good. In the other way, it is desired in its likeness, in which manner all things desire the highest good, for nothing is desirable except in so far as some likeness of the highest good is seen in it. Hence, we cannot conclude from this that God’s existence, which is essentially the highest good, is self-evident.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis veritas increata excedat omnem veritatem creatam, nihil tamen prohibet veritatem creatam, esse nobis magis notam quam increatam: ea enim quae sunt minus nota in se sunt magis, nota quoad nos, secundum philosophum.
| 6. Although uncreated truth surpasses every created truth, nothing prevents created truth from being more evident to us than uncreated truth. For those things which are less evident in themselves are more evident to us, according to the Philosopher.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod cogitari aliquid non esse, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo ut haec duo simul in apprehensione cadant; et sic nihil prohibet quod aliquis cogitet se non esse, sicut cogitat se quandoque non fuisse. Sic autem non potest simul in apprehensione cadere aliquid esse totum et minus parte, quia unum eorum excludit alterum.
| 7. To think that something does not exist can be taken in two ways. In one, it is taken to mean that these two things are grasped at the same time. In this sense, there is nothing to prevent one from thinking that he does not exist, just as he thinks that at one time he did not exist. However, in this sense, we cannot at the same time conceive that something is a whole and that it is less than a part of itself, for one of these excludes the other.
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| Alio modo ita quod huic apprehensioni assensus adhibeatur; et sic nullus potest cogitare se non esse cum assensu: in hoc enim quod cogitat aliquid, percipit se esse.
| In the other way, it is taken to mean that assent is given to what is thus conceived. In this sense, no one can assent to the thought that he does not exist. For, in thinking something, he perceives that he exists.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod id quod nunc est, verum fuisse prius esse futurum, non oportet, nisi supposito quod aliquid tunc fuerit quando hoc dicitur fuisse futurum. Si vero ponamus, per impossibile, aliquando nihil fuisse, tunc, tali positione facta, nihil erit verum nisi materialiter tantum: materia enim veritatis non solum est esse, sed etiam non esse, quia de ente et non ente contingit verum dicere. Et sic non sequitur quod tunc veritas fuerit nisi materialiter et sic secundum quid.
| 8. Before present things existed, it had to be true that they would exist only on the supposition that something existed at the time when it was said that this would exist. But, if we lay down the impossible condition that at one time nothing existed, then, on the basis of such an hypothesis, nothing is true except only materially. For not only existence but also nonexistence is the subject matter of truth, for we can speak truth about being or non-being. Thus it follows that there will be truth at that time only materially and so in some respect.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod id quod est verum secundum quid, reduci ad veritatem vel verum simpliciter, necessarium est supposito veritatem esse, non autem aliter.
| 9. It is necessary to reduce that which is true in some respect to that which is true or truth simply if it is presupposed that truth exists, but not otherwise.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod quamvis nomen Dei sit qui est, non tamen hoc est per se notum nobis; unde ratio non sequitur.
| 10. Although the name of God is He Who Is, this is not immediately evident to us. Hence, the argument does not follow.
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| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
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| Ad primum autem in contrarium dicendum, quod Anselmus in Prosl., ita exponit, quod insipiens intelligatur dixisse in corde, non est Deus, inquantum haec verba cogitavit; non quod hoc interiori ratione cogitare potuerit.
| 11. According to Anselm, that the fool said in his heart: “There is no God,” means that he thought these words, and not that lie could think this in his inner reason.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod eodem modo quantum ad habitum et actum Deum esse est per se notum, et non per se notum.
| 2. That God exists is self-evident and not self-evident in the same way with reference to habit and to act.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc est ex defectu cognitionis nostrae, quod Deum esse cognoscere non possumus nisi ex effectibus; unde per hoc non excluditur quin secundum se sit per se notum.
| 3. That we can know God only from what He has made is due to the inadequacy of our knowledge. Hence, this does not keep Him from being immediately evident in Himself.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod ad hoc quod cognoscatur aliquid esse, non oportet quod sciatur de eo quid sit per definitionem, sed quid significetur per nomen.
| 4. To know that a thing exists, it is not necessary to know what it is by definition, but only what is meant by the name.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod Deum esse non est articulus fidei, sed praecedens articulum; nisi cum hoc quod est Deum esse aliquid aliud cointelligatur; utpote quod habet unitatem essentiae cum Trinitate personarum, et alia huiusmodi.
| 5. That God exists is not an article of faith but the preamble to an article of faith, unless we understand something else along with God’s existence, for example, that He has unity of essence with trinity of Persons, and other things such as this.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod illa quae sunt fidei, certissime cognoscuntur, secundum quod certitudo importat firmitatem adhaesionis: nulli enim credens firmius inhaeret quam his quae per fidem tenet. Non autem cognoscuntur certissime, secundum quod certitudo importat quietationem intellectus in re cognita: quod enim credens assentiat his quae credit, non provenit ex hoc quod eius intellectus sit terminatus ad illa credibilia virtute aliquorum principiorum, sed ex voluntate, quae inclinat intellectum ad hoc quod illis creditis assentiat. Et inde est quod de his quae sunt fidei, potest motus dubitationis insurgere in credente.
| 6. Matters of faith are known with greatest certainty in so far as certainty means firmness of adherence. For the believer clings to nothing more firmly than those things which he holds by faith. But they are not known with greatest certainty in so far as certainty implies repose of understanding in the thing known. For the believer’s assent to what he believes does not come from the fact that his understanding concludes to the things believed by virtue of any principles, but from the will, which influences the understanding to assent to what is believed. Hence it is that in matters of faith, movements of doubt can arise in one who believes.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod sapientia non consistit in hoc solum quod cognoscatur Deum esse, sed in hoc quod accedimus ad cognoscendum de eo quid est; quod quidem in statu viae cognoscere non possumus, nisi quantum de eo cognoscimus quid non est. Qui enim scit aliquid prout est ab omnibus aliis distinctum, appropinquat cognitioni qua cognoscitur quid est; et de hac etiam cognitione intelligitur auctoritas Augustini consequenter inducta.
| 7. Wisdom consists not only in knowing that God exists, but in attaining to a knowledge of what He is. But in this life we can know this only in so far as we know what He is not. For one who knows something in so far as it differs from all other things approaches the knowledge by which one knows what it is. It is to this knowledge, too, that the citation from Augustine which follows is taken to refer.
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| Unde patet responsio ad octavum.
| 8. The answer to the eighth difficulty is clear from the seventh response.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod ea quae sunt ratione distincta, non semper possunt cogitari ab invicem separata esse, quamvis separatim cogitari possint. Quamvis enim cogitari possit Deus sine hoc quod eius bonitas cogitetur, tamen non potest cogitari quod sit Deus, et non sit bonus; unde licet in Deo quod est et esse ratione distinguantur, tamen non sequitur propter hoc quod possit cogitari non esse.
| 9. Those things which have been distinguished by reason cannot always be thought of as separated from each other, although they can be considered separately. For, although it is possible to think of God without considering His goodness, it is impossible to think that God exists and is not good. Hence, although in God that which exists and existence are distinguished in reason, it does not follow that it is possible to think that He does not exist.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod Deus non solum cognoscitur in effectu iustitiae, sed in aliis etiam suis effectibus; unde, dato quod ab aliquo non cognoscatur ut iustus, non sequitur quod nullo modo cognoscatur. Nec potest esse quod nullus eius effectus cognoscatur, cum eius effectus sit ens commune, quod incognitum esse non potest.
| 10. God is known not only in the works which proceed from His justice, but also in His other works. Hence, granted that someone does not know Him as just, it does not follow that he does not know Him at all. Nor is it possible for anyone to know none of His works, since being in general, which cannot be unknown, is His work.
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ARTICLE XIII
In the thirteenth article we ask:
Can the trinity of persons in God be known by natural reason?
ARTICLE I Sent., 3, 1, 4; In Boet. De Trinit., I, 4; S.T., I, 32, 1; Ad Rom., c. 1, lect. 6.]
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| Tertiodecimo quaeritur utrum per naturalem rationem possit cognosci Trinitas personarum
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that it can, for
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| Per id quod dicitur Rom. I, 20: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt etc., Glossa autem invisibilia refert ad personam patris; sempiternam virtutem ad personam filii, divinitatem ad personam spiritus sancti. Ergo per naturalem rationem ex creaturis possumus in Trinitatis cognitionem devenire.
| 1. The Gloss explains the passage, “The invisible things of God... by the things that are made...” (Romans 1:13), in this way: “Invisible things refer to the person of the Father; eternal power to the person of the Son; divinity to the person of the Holy Spirit.” Therefore, by natural reason we can arrive at a knowledge of the Trinity from creatures.
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| Praeterea, naturali cognitione cognoscitur quod in Deo est perfectissima potentia, et quod in eo est totius potentiae origo. Ergo oportet ei primam potentiam attribuere. Prima autem potentia est potentia generativa. Ergo secundum rationem naturalem scire possumus quod in Deo sit generativa potentia. Sed posita generativa potentia in divinis, de necessitate sequitur distinctio personarum. Ergo naturali ratione distinctionem personarum cognoscere possumus.
| 2. We know with natural knowledge that the most perfect power and the source of all power are in God. Therefore, we must attribute the first power to Him. But the first power is generative power. Therefore, according to natural reason we can know that there is generative power in God. But, once generative power is postulated in God, the distinction of persons necessarily follows. Therefore, by natural knowledge we can know the distinction of persons.
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| Quod autem potentia generativa sit prima potentia, sic probabat. Secundum ordinem operationum est ordo potentiarum. Sed inter omnes operationes prima est intelligere; quia agens per intellectum probatur esse primum, et in eo intelligere, secundum modum intelligendi, est prius quam velle et agere. Ergo potentia intellectiva est prima potentiarum. Sed potentia intellectiva est potentia generativa, quia omnis intelligens gignit notitiam suam in seipso. Ergo potentia generativa est prima potentiarum.
| That generative power is the first power was proved in this way: The order of powers follows the order of operations. But the first operation of all is to understand, for there is proof that an intellectual agent exists first, and in such an agent there is understanding, according to the manner of understanding, before willing or doing. Therefore, intellective power is the first of the powers. But intellective power is generative power, since every understanding begets its likeness in itself. Therefore, generative power is the first of the powers.
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| Praeterea, omne aequivocum reducitur ad univocum, sicut omnis multitudo ad unitatem. Sed processio creaturarum a Deo est processio aequivoca, cum creaturae non communicent cum Deo in nomine et ratione. Ergo oportet ponere per naturalem rationem praeexistere in Deo processionem univocam, secundum quam Deus a Deo procedat: qua posita, sequitur personarum distinctio in divinis.
| 3. Every equivocal is reduced to the univocal as every multitude is reduced to unity. But the procession of creatures from God is an equivocal procession, since creatures do not have the same name and definition as God. Therefore, according to natural reason we must assert that there pre-exists in God a univocal procession according to which God proceeds from God. Given this, there follows the distinction of the persons in God.
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| Praeterea, quaedam Glossa super Apocal. dicit, quod nulla secta fuit quae circa personam patris erraverit. Sed maximus esset error circa personam patris, quod poneretur filium non habere. Ergo etiam secta philosophorum, qui naturali ratione Deum cognoverunt, posuit patrem et filium in divinis.
| 4. One of the glosses says that there has been no sect which has erred about the person of the Father. But it would be a very serious error about the person of the Father to say that he did not have a Son. Therefore, even the schools of philosophers who came to know God by natural reason have held Father and Son in God.
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| Praeterea, sicut dicit Boetius in sua arithmetica, omnem inaequalitatem praecedit aequalitas. Sed inter creatorem et creaturam est inaequalitas. Ergo ante hanc inaequalitatem oportet aliquam aequalitatem ponere in Deo. Sed non potest ibi esse aequalitas nisi sit ibi distinctio: quia nihil est sibi ipsi aequale, sicut nec simile, ut Hilarius dicit. Ergo oportet ponere distinctionem personarum in divinis secundum naturalem rationem.
| 5. As Boethius says, equality precedes every inequality. But there is inequality between Creator and creature. Therefore, we must say that there was some equality in God before this inequality. But there cannot be equality in Him unless there is distinction, for nothing is equal to itself, just as nothing is like itself, as Hilary says. Therefore, according to natural reason, we must assign distinction of persons to God.
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| Item, naturalis ratio ad hoc pervenit quod in Deo sit summa iucunditas. Sed nullius boni sine socio est iocunda possessio, ut Boetius dicit. Ergo naturali ratione sciri potest quod in Deo sunt personae distinctae ex quorum consortio est in eis iocunda possessio bonitatis.
| 6. Natural reason comes to the conclusion that there is the greatest joy in God. But “there is not the greatest enjoyment of any good without a companion,” as Boethius says., Therefore, by natural reason we can know that there are distinct persons in God, and that by reason of their companionship there is joyful possession of goodness.
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| Praeterea, naturalis ratio in creatorem pervenit ex similitudine creaturae. Sed in creatura invenitur similitudo creatoris non solum quantum ad essentialia attributa, sed etiam quantum ad propria personarum. Ergo, naturali ratione possumus in personarum propria devenire.
| 7. Natural reason reaches the Creator from the likeness in the creature. But the likeness of the Creator is seen in the creature with reference not only to the essential attributes but also to the properties of the persons. Therefore, by natural reason we can arrive at the properties of the persons.
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| Praeterea, philosophi non habuerunt cognitionem de Deo nisi per naturalem rationem. Sed aliqui philosophi pervenerunt ad cognitionem Trinitatis; unde dicitur in I caeli et mundi: et per hunc quidem numerum, scilicet ternarium, adhibuimus nosipsos magnificare creatorem, ergo et cetera.
| 8. Philosophers have had knowledge of God only from natural reason. But some philosophers have attained to knowledge of the Trinity. Thus, it is said in Heaven and Earth: “Through this number,” three, “we have applied ourselves to admiration of the grandeur of the creator.” Therefore.
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| Praeterea Augustinus narrat in X de civitate Dei, quod Porphyrius philosophus posuit Deum patrem, et filium ab eo genitum; in libro etiam confessionum, dicit, quod in quibusdam libris Platonis invenit hoc quod scriptum est in principio Evangelii Ioannis: in principio erat verbum, etc. usque verbum caro factum est exclusive; in quibus verbis manifeste ostenditur distinctio personarum. Ergo naturali ratione potest quis pervenire in cognitionem Trinitatis.
| 9. Augustine relates that the philosopher Porphyry taught that there was God the Father and the Son begotten by Him. Augustine also says that he found in certain books of Plato the prologue of St. John’s Gospel, from “In the beginning was the Word” down to, but not including, “The Word was made flesh.” The distinction of the persons is clearly shown in these words. Therefore, by natural reason one can reach knowledge of the Trinity.
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| Praeterea, naturali ratione etiam philosophi concessissent, quod Deus potest aliquid dicere. Sed ad dicere in divinis sequitur verbi emissio, et personarum distinctio. Ergo Trinitas personarum ratione naturali cognosci potest.
| 10. From natural reason, philosophers would have also conceded that God can say something. But to say something in God implies the utterance of the Word and the distinction of persons. Therefore, the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod dicitur Hebr. XI, v. 1: fides est substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non apparentium. Ea vero quae naturali ratione cognoscuntur, sunt apparentia. Ergo cum Trinitas personarum ad articulos fidei pertineat, videtur quod naturali ratione cognosci non possit.
| 1. Hebrews (11:1) says: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not.” But those things which are known by natural reason are things that appear. Therefore, since the Trinity belongs to the articles of faith, it seems that it cannot be known by natural reason.
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| Praeterea Gregorius dicit: fides non habet meritum, cui humana ratio praebet experimentum. Sed in fide Trinitatis praecipue meritum consistit. Ergo, hoc non potest cognosci naturali ratione.
| 2. Furthermore, Gregory says: “Belief does not have merit when human reason offers evidence for it.” But it is in belief especially in the Trinity in which the merit of our faith consists. Therefore, it cannot be known by natural reason.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod Trinitas personarum dupliciter cognoscitur. Uno modo quantum ad propria, quibus personae distinguuntur: et his cognitis, vere Trinitas cognoscitur in divinis. Alio modo per essentialia, quae personis appropriantur, sicut potentia patri, sapientia filio, bonitas spiritui sancto; sed per talia Trinitas perfecte cognosci non potest, quia etiam Trinitate remota per intellectum, ista remanent in divinis; sed Trinitate supposita, huiusmodi attributa propter aliquam similitudinem ad propria personarum appropriantur personis. Haec autem personis appropriata naturali ratione cognosci possunt; propria vero personarum nequaquam.
| The trinity of persons is known in two ways. In the first, it is known according to the properties by which the persons are distinguished. When these are known, the Trinity in God is really known. The second way is through essential notes which are appropriated to the persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Spirit. But it is impossible to know the Trinity perfectly through notes like these, for, even if in our minds we prescinded from the Trinity, those things would remain in God. But, once the Trinity is presupposed, attributes of this type are appropriated to the persons because of a certain likeness to properties of the persons. With natural knowledge it is possible to know the things which are thus appropriated to the persons, but it is not at all possible to know the properties of the persons.
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| Cuius ratio est, quia ab agente non potest aliqua actio progredi ad quam se eius instrumenta extendere non possunt; sicut ars fabrilis non potest aedificare, quia ad hunc effectum non se extendunt fabrilia instrumenta. Prima autem principia demonstrationis, ut Commentator dicit, in III de anima, sunt in nobis quasi instrumenta intellectus agentis, cuius lumine in nobis viget ratio naturalis. Unde ad nullius cognitionem nostra naturalis ratio potest pertingere ad quod se prima principia non extendant.
| The reason for this is that it is impossible for an action outside the range of the instruments of an agent to proceed from that agent. Thus, it is impossible to build with the art of the blacksmith, for this effect is outside the range of the instruments of the smith. Moreover, as the the Commentator says,” in us first principles are, as it were, instruments of the agent intellect, and in virtue of its light, natural reason thrives in us.. Hence, our natural reason cannot attain to knowledge of any of those things which are outside the range of first principles.
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| Primorum autem principiorum cognitio a sensibilibus ortum sumit, ut patet per philosophum, II posteriorum. Ex sensibilibus autem non potest perveniri ad cognoscendum propria personarum, sicut ex effectibus devenitur in causas; quia omne id quod rationem causalitatis in divinis habet, ad essentiam pertinet, cum Deus per essentiam suam sit causa rerum. Propria autem personarum sunt relationes, quibus personae non ad creaturas, sed ad invicem referuntur. Unde naturali ratione in propria personarum devenire non possumus.
| But knowledge of first principles arises from sensible objects, as is clear from the Philosopher. But we cannot proceed from sensible things to knowledge of the properties of the persons in the way one reaches causes from effects. For everything that has the nature of cause in God pertains to His essence, since through His essence He is the cause of things. However, the properties of the persons are relations, through which the persons arc related not to creatures, but to each other. Hence, we cannot attain to the properties of the persons by natural knowledge.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod expositio illa Glossae sumitur secundum appropriata personis, non secundum propria personarum.
| 1. That explanation of the Gloss is taken as referring to the things which are appropriated to the persons, not to the properties.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod potentiam intellectivam esse primam potentiarum, satis naturali ratione constare potest; non autem hanc intellectivam potentiam esse potentiam generativam. Cum enim in Deo sit idem intelligens, intelligere et intellectum, naturalis ratio non cogit ponere quod Deus, intelligendo, aliquid gignat a se distinctum.
| 2. It can be made sufficiently clear from natural reason that intellective power is the first of the powers, but it cannot be shown that this intellective power is generative power. For, since in God the one who understands, the act of understanding, and what is understood is the same thing, natural reason does not force us to say that God, in understanding, begets something distinct from Himself.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnis multitudo praesupponit aliquam unitatem, et aequivocatio omnis univocationem; non tamen omnis aequivoca generatio praesupponit generationem univocam; sed magis est e converso, sequendo rationem naturalem. Causae enim aequivocae sunt per se causae speciei: unde in totam speciem causalitatem habent; causae vero univocae non sunt causae speciei per se, sed in hoc vel illo:
| 3. Every multiplicity supposes some unity and every equivocation supposes univocity, but every equivocal generation does not presuppose univocal generation. Rather, if we follow natural reason, the opposite is true, for equivocal causes are essential causes of a species. Hence, they exert causality on the whole species. But univocal causes are not essential causes of a species, but only in this or that individual.
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| unde nulla causa univoca habet causalitatem respectu totius speciei, alias aliquid esset causa sui ipsius, quod esse non potest; et ideo ratio non sequitur.
| Consequently, a univocal cause does not exert causality with reference to the whole species. Otherwise, it would be its own cause, which is impossible. Therefore, the argument does not follow.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod Glossa illa intelligitur de sectis haereticorum qui ex Ecclesia prodierunt; unde in eis non includuntur sectae gentilium.
| 4. That Gloss should be taken of heretical sects which have sprung up in the Church. Accordingly, the sects of the gentiles are not included among them.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod etiam non supposita personarum distinctione, possumus ponere aequalitatem in divinis, secundum quod eius bonitatem sapientiae suae aequalem dicimus. Vel dicendum quod in aequalitate duo considerantur: scilicet aequalitatis causa, et aequalitatis supposita. Causa aequalitatis est unitas, aliarum vero proportionum aliquis numerus. Unde hoc modo ex parte ista, aequalitas inaequalitatem praecedit, sicut unitas numerum. Sed supposita aequalitatis sunt multa; et haec non praesupponuntur ad supposita inaequalitatis; alias oporteret ante omnem unitatem dualitatem praecedere, quia in dualitate primo invenitur aequalitas, inter unitatem vero et dualitatem est inaequalitas.
| 5. Even without supposing the distinction of persons, we can affirm equality in God, in so far as we say that His goodness is equal to His wisdom. Another answer can be based on a consideration of the two elements of equality, the cause of the equality and its terms. Unity is the cause of equality, but some number is the cause of other proportions. Hence, according to this consideration, equality precedes inequality, as unity precedes number. But the terms of equality are many. And these are not assumed to be prior to the terms of inequality. Otherwise, duality would have to precede every unity, for equality is first found in duality, but between unity and duality there is inequality.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod verbum Boetii est intelligendum de illis quae non habent in se perfectam bonitatem, sed unum indiget adminiculo alterius, unde iucunditas non perficitur sine socio. Sed ipse Deus in se habet plenitudinem bonitatis; unde ad eius iucunditatem plenam non oportet ponere consortium.
| 6. What Boethius says should be understood of those things which do not have within them perfect goodness, but one needs the support of the other. For this reason, enjoyment is not complete without a companion. But God has within Himself the fullness of joy. Hence, there is no need to posit companionship for the fullness of His enjoyment.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis in creaturis inveniantur aliqua similia personarum quantum ad propria, non tamen ex illis similitudinibus potest concludi ita esse in divinis; quia ea quae in creaturis inveniuntur distincta, in creatore inveniuntur sine distinctione.
| 7. Although some aspects of creatures are like the properties of the persons, we cannot conclude from these likenesses that they are found in God in the same way. For the things which are distinguished in creatures are in the Creator without distinction.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod Aristoteles non intellexit ponere numerum ternarium in Deo; sed ostendere perfectionem ternarii numeri ex hoc quod antiqui in sacrificiis et orationibus numerum ternarium observabant.
| 8. Aristotle did not intend to put the number three in God, but he wanted to show the perfection of the number three from the fact that the ancients made use of it in sacrifices and prayers.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod verba illorum philosophorum intelliguntur quantum ad appropriata personarum, et non quantum ad propria.
| 9. We should take the words of those philosophers as referring to things appropriated to the persons, not to properties.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod philosophus ratione naturali nunquam concederet Deum dicere secundum quod dicere importat distinctionem personarum; sed solum secundum quod essentialiter dicitur.
| 10. From natural reason, philosophers have never thought that God speaks in so far as speaking implies distinction of persons, but only in so far as it is applied essentially to God.
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