ARTICLE I
This question concerns prophecy,
and in the first article we ask:
Is prophecy a habit or an act?
[ARTICLE Quodl., XII, 17, 26; C.G., III, 154; 1 Cor., c. 14, lect. 6; Q.D. de pot., 6, 4;
S.T., I-II, 68, 3, ad 3; II-II, 171, 2; 176, 2, ad 3.]
|
| Quaestio est de prophetia. Et primo quaeritur utrum sit habitus, vel actus
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod non sit habitus.
| It seems that it is not a habit, for
|
| Quia ut dicit Commentator in III de anima, habitus est quo quis quando vult operatur. Sed propheta non potest prophetia uti cum voluerit, sicut patet IV regum, III, 15, de Eliseo, qui regi quaerenti, responsum dare non potuit nisi vocato psalte, ut sic super eum manus domini fieret. Ergo prophetia non est habitus.
| 1. As the Commentator says, a habit is that by which one performs an activity when he wants to. But the prophet cannot make use of prophecy when he wants to, as is clear of Eliseus in the fourth Book of Kings (3:14, 15), who, on being questioned by the king, could not give him an answer without calling the minstrel, so that the hand of the Lord might come upon him. Therefore, prophecy is not a habit.
|
| Praeterea, quicumque habet aliquem habitum cognitivum, potest ea quae subsunt illi habitui, considerare sine hoc quod ab alio accipiat; qui enim ad hoc quod consideret, indiget instruente, nondum habet habitum. Sed propheta non potest inspicere prophetabilia nisi sigillatim ei revelentur: unde IV regum cap. IV, 27, dixit Eliseus de muliere cuius filius erat defunctus: anima eius in amaritudine est; et dominus celavit a me, et non indicavit mihi. Ergo prophetia non est habitus cognoscitivus; nec alius esse potest, cum ad cognitionem prophetia pertineat.
| 2. Whoever has a cognitive habit can consider the subject matter of that habit without receiving anything from another. For one who needs an instructor for this does not yet have the habit. But a prophet cannot examine the subject matter of prophecy unless each event is revealed to him. Hence, in the fourth Book of Kings (4:27) Eliseus said of the woman whose son was dead: “Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord has hid it from me, and has not told me.” Therefore, prophecy is not a cognitive habit. Nor can it be a different habit, for prophecy belongs to cognition.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod ad hoc habitu aliquo propheta indiget, ut ea quae sibi divinitus indicantur, cognoscere possit.- Sed contra, divina locutio est efficacior quam humana. Sed ad hoc quod aliquis ex humana locutione intelligat aliquid esse futurum, nullo habitu indiget. Ergo videtur quod multo minus ad percipiendam revelationem qua Deus prophetae loquitur.
| 3. It was said that the prophet needs a habit to be able to know those things which are divinely shown him.—On the contrary, divine speech is more efficacious than human speech. But no habit is needed for one to understand from human speech that something will take place. Therefore, there seems much less need of a habit to perceive the revelation by which God speaks to the prophet.
|
| Praeterea, habitus sufficit ad omnia cognoscenda quae subsunt habitui. Sed per donum prophetiae aliquis non instruitur de omnibus prophetabilibus; ut enim dicit Gregorius in I homilia super Ezech. et exemplis probat, aliquando spiritus prophetiae ex praesenti tangit animum prophetantis, et ex futuro nequaquam tangit; aliquando ex futuro tangit, et ex praesenti non tangit. Ergo donum prophetiae non est habitus.
| 4. A habit suffices for the knowledge of the whole subject matter of that habit. But by the gift of prophecy one is not taught everything that can be prophesied. For, as Gregory says and proves by examples: “Sometimes the spirit of prophecy inspires the mind of the one prophesying for present events and not at all for the future, and sometimes touches it for the future and not for the present.” Therefore, the gift of prophecy is not a habit.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod dono prophetiae non subsunt omnia prophetabilia, sed illud tantum ad cuius revelationem datur.- Sed contra, influentia aliqua coarctari non potest nisi vel ex parte influentis, vel ex parte recipientis. Sed influentia prophetici doni non recipit coarctationem, quo minus ad omnia prophetabilia se extendat, ex parte recipientis: quia intellectus humanus est capax cognitionis omnium prophetabilium; nec ex parte influentis, cuius est largitas infinita. Ergo donum prophetiae ad omnia prophetabilia se extendit.
| 5. It was said that the subject matter of the gift of prophecy is not everything which can be prophesied but only that for the revelation of which the gift is given.—On the contrary, an inpouring can be limited only by that which gives it or by that which receives it. But the one receiving the inpouring of the gift of prophecy imposes no limitation to prevent it from extending to everything which can be prophesied, for the human intellect is capable of knowing all that can be prophesied. Nor is it limited by the one who gives it, for His liberality is infinite. Therefore, the gift of prophecy extends to everything which can be prophesied.
|
| Praeterea, ex parte affectivae se ita habet, quod per unum gratiae influxum ab omni culpa anima liberatur. Ergo et ex parte intellectus ita erit quod ex influentia unius prophetici luminis, ab omni ignorantia prophetabilium anima purgabitur.
| 6. The affective part of the soul is so constituted that the one influx of grace frees the soul from all guilt. Therefore, the intellective part, also, is such that the influx of the one light of prophecy will cleanse the soul from all ignorance of things that can be prophesied.
|
| Praeterea, habitus gratuitus est perfectior quam acquisitus. Sed habitus acquisitus se extendit ad plures actus. Ergo et prophetia, si sit habitus gratuitus, non se extendet ad unum tantum prophetabile, sed ad omnia.
| 7. A freely given habit is more perfect than an acquired habit. But an acquired habit extends to many acts. Therefore, if prophecy is a freely given habit, it, too, will extend not to only one of the things which can be prophesied, but to all of them.
|
| Praeterea, si de singulis conclusionibus singuli habitus habeantur, illi habitus non uniantur in unius totalis scientiae habitu, nisi conclusiones illae connexionem habeant secundum quod ex eisdem principiis deducuntur. Sed huiusmodi futura contingentia, et alia de quibus est prophetia, non habent aliquam connexionem ad invicem, sicut habent conclusiones unius scientiae. Ergo sequitur quod si donum prophetiae ad unum tantum prophetatum se extendit, in uno propheta tot sunt prophetiae habitus quot prophetabilia cognoscit, si prophetia sit habitus.
| 8. If we had one habit for each conclusion, those habits would not be joined together in the habit of one complete science, unless the conclusions had some connection in so far as they are deduced from the same principles. But future contingents of this sort and other things which prophecy concerns, do not have any interconnection, as the conclusions of a single science have. Therefore, it follows that, if prophecy is a habit, and if the gift of prophecy extends to only one of the things prophesied, there will be in one prophet as many habits of prophecy as there are things which he knows can be prophesied.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod habitus prophetiae semel infusus, ad omnia prophetabilia se extendit; requiritur tamen nova revelatio quantum ad specierum aliquarum ostensionem.- Sed contra, habitus prophetiae infusus debet esse perfectior quam habitus scientiae acquisitae; et lumen propheticum quam lumen naturale intellectus agentis. Sed ex virtute luminis intellectus agentis, et habitu scientiae, adiuncto etiam ministerio imaginativae virtutis, possumus formare tot species quot sunt nobis necessariae ut exeamus in actualem considerationem eorum ad quae habitus se extendit. Ergo multo fortius hoc potest propheta, si habitum aliquem habet, sine hoc quod ei aliquae species de novo ostendantur.
| 9. It was said that the habit of prophecy, once infused, extends to all that can be prophesied, but still a new revelation is needed to disclose certain species.—On the contrary, the infused habit of prophecy ought to be more perfect than the habit of an acquired science, and the prophetic light ought to be more perfect than the natural light of the agent intellect. But with the power of the light of the agent intellect and with the habit of a science, plus the added assistance of the power of imagination, we can form as many species as we need for the actual consideration of those things to which the habit extends. Therefore, if a prophet has a habit, he can do this much more readily without a new disclosure of any species.
|
| Praeterea, sicut habetur in Glossa in principio Psalterii, prophetia est divina inspiratio, rerum eventus immobili veritate denuntians. Inspiratio vero non nominat habitum, sed actum. Ergo prophetia non est habitus.
| 10. As the Gloss reads: “Prophecy is a divine inspiration, which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth. But inspiration does not signify a habit, but an act. Therefore, prophecy is not a habit.
|
| Praeterea, videre est quoddam pati, secundum philosophum. Ergo et visio passio. Sed prophetia est visio quaedam; I Reg. IX, 9: qui nunc dicitur propheta, olim dicebatur videns. Ergo prophetia non est habitus, sed magis passio.
| 11. According to the Philosopher seeing is a kind of passivity. Therefore, sight is a passive operation. But prophecy is a kind of sight, for, according to the first Book of Kings (9:9): “He that is now called a prophet, in times past was called a seer.” Therefore, prophecy is not a habit, but rather a passive operation.
|
| Praeterea, secundum philosophum habitus est qualitas difficile mobilis. Prophetia vero facile movetur, quia non semper prophetae immanet, sed ad tempus: unde Amos VII, 14, super illud, non sum propheta, dicit Glossa: spiritus non semper administrat prophetiam prophetis, sed ad tempus; et tunc recte dicuntur prophetae cum illuminantur. Gregorius etiam super Ezech. in I homilia dicit, quod aliquando prophetiae spiritus prophetis deest, nec semper eorum mentibus praesto est, quatenus, cum hunc non habent, se agnoscant ex dono habere cum habent. Ergo prophetia non est habitus.
| 12. According to the Philosopher, a habit is “a quality which is hard to change.” But prophecy is easily changed, since it does not remain in the prophet at all times but only now and then. As the Gloss on Amos (7:4), “ am not a prophet,” says: “The spirit does not give prophecy to the prophets at all times, but only now and then. And when they are enlightened, they are rightly called prophets.” Gregory also says: “Sometimes the spirit of prophecy fails prophets and it is not always at the service of their minds, for, when they do not have it, they know that it is a gift when they do have it.” Therefore, prophecy is not a habit.
|
| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
|
| Secundum philosophum in III Ethic., tria sunt in anima: potentia, habitus et passio. Sed prophetia non est potentia, quia sic omnes essent prophetae, cum potentiae animae omnibus sint communes; similiter nec est passio, quia passio est tantum in parte animae sensitiva, ut dicitur in VII Lib. physicorum. Ergo prophetia est habitus.
| 1. According to the Philosopher, there are three things in the soul: powers, habits, and passive operations. But prophecy is not a power, for, then, everyone would be a prophet, since the powers of the soul are common to all. Similarly, it is not a passive operation, for they exist only in the sensitive part of the soul, as is said in the Physics. Therefore, it is a habit.
|
| Praeterea, omne quod cognoscitur, aliquo habitu cognoscitur. Sed propheta ea quae denuntiat, cognoscit: non autem habitu naturali vel acquisito. Ergo aliquo habitu infuso, quem dicimus prophetiam.
| 21. Everything which is known is known through some habit. But the prophet knows the things which he declares; he does not know them, however, by reason of a natural or an acquired habit. Therefore he knows them by some infused habit, which we call prophecy.
|
| Praeterea, si prophetia non sit habitus, hoc non erit nisi quia propheta non potest sine nova acceptione omnia alia prophetabilia inspicere. Sed hoc non impedit quin sit habitus: quia etiam habens habitum communem principiorum, non potest considerare particulares conclusiones alicuius scientiae, nisi superaddatur aliquis habitus particularis scientiae. Ergo et nihil prohibet prophetiam esse habitum quemdam universalem, et tamen ad singula prophetabilia cognoscenda requiri novam revelationem.
| 3. If prophecy is not a habit, this is so only because the prophet can. not see everything else which can be prophesied, unless he receives a new inspiration. But this does not prevent it from being a habit, for one who has a habit of common principles cannot consider the particular conclusions of some particular science unless he receives in addition some habit of the particular science. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent prophecy from being a common habit, which still demands a new revelation for the knowledge of the individual things to be prophesied.
|
| Praeterea, fides habitus quidam est omnium credibilium; nec habens tamen habitum fidei, statim novit distincte omnia credibilia, sed indiget instructione ad hoc quod articulos distincte cognoscat. Ergo etsi prophetia sit habitus, adhuc requiretur divina revelatio, quasi quaedam allocutio, ut propheta distincte prophetabilia cognoscat.
| 4. Faith is the habit of everything which must be believed, yet one who has the habit of faith does not immediately have distinct knowledge of each matter of belief, but needs instruction to know the articles of faith distinctly. Therefore, although prophecy is a habit, there still is need of divine revelation, as a kind of speech, for the prophet to know distinctly what is to be prophesied.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Glossa in principio Psalterii, prophetia visio dicitur, et propheta videns, ut patet I Reg. IX, 9, ut supra dictum est. Non tamen quaelibet visio prophetia dici potest, sed visio eorum quae sunt procul a communi cognitione; ut sic dicatur esse propheta non solum procul fans, id est annuntians, sed etiam procul videns, a phanos, quod est apparitio.
| As is said in the Gloss: Prophecy is called sight, and the prophet is called seer.” This is clear from the first Book of Kings (9:9), as was mentioned earlier.” Still, not every sight can be called prophecy, but only the sight of those things which are far beyond our ordinary knowledge. As a result, the prophet is said to be not only one who speaks from afar (procul fans), that is, one who announces, but also one who sees from afar (procul videns), from the Greek phanos, which is an appearing.
|
| Cum autem omne quod manifestatur, sub lumine quodam manifestetur, ut etiam haberi potest ab apostolo, Ephes. V, 13, oportet ut ea quae manifestantur homini supra cognitionem communem, quodam altiori lumine manifestentur, quod lumen propheticum dicitur, ex cuius receptione aliquis propheta constituitur.
| However, since everything which is revealed is revealed under some light, as can be seen in Ephesians (5:13), those things which are revealed to man beyond the ordinary course of knowledge must be made manifest by a higher light. This is called the prophetic light and by receiving it one is made a prophet.
|
| Sciendum est autem, quod aliquid recipitur in aliquo dupliciter: uno modo ut forma in subiecto consistens; alio modo per modum passionis; sicut pallor in eo qui naturaliter vel ex aliquo forti accidente hunc colorem habet, est ut quaedam qualitas; in eo vero qui subito ex aliquo timore pallescit, est ut quaedam passio. Similiter etiam et lumen corporale est quidem in stellis ut stellarum qualitas, utpote quaedam forma in eis permanens; in aere vero est ut quaedam passio, quia lumen non retinet, sed recipit tantum per appositionem corporis lucidi.
| However, we must bear in mind that a thing can be received in someone in two ways. In one, it is received as a form which remains in the subject; in the other, it is received after the manner of a transient impression. Thus, pallor exists as a quality in one who has this color naturally or from some serious accident, but exists as a transient impression in one who suddenly turns white from some fear. Similarly, physical light is in the stars as a quality of the stars, since it is a form remaining in them. But it is in air as a transient impression, since air does not retain light, but only receives it by being placed in the path of a shining body.
|
| In intellectu igitur humano lumen quoddam est quasi qualitas vel forma permanens, scilicet lumen essentiale intellectus agentis, ex quo anima nostra intellectualis dicitur. Sic autem lumen propheticum in propheta esse non potest. Quicumque enim aliqua cognoscit intellectuali lumine, quod est ei effectum quasi connaturale ut forma in eo consistens, oportet quod de eis fixam cognitionem habeat. Quod esse non potest, nisi ea inspiciat in principio in quo possunt cognosci: quamdiu enim non fit resolutio cognitorum in sua principia, cognitio non firmatur in uno, sed apprehendit ea quae cognoscit secundum probabilitatem quamdam utpote ab aliis dicta: unde necesse habet de singulis acceptionem ab aliis habere. Sicut si aliquis nesciret geometriae conclusiones ex principiis deducere, habitum geometriae non haberet; sed quaecumque de conclusionibus geometriae sciret, apprehenderet quasi credens docenti, et sic indigeret ut de singulis instrueretur: non enim posset ex quibusdam in alia pervenire firmiter, non facta resolutione in prima principia.
| Accordingly, in human understanding there is a light which is a quality or permanent form, namely, the essential light of the agent intellect, by reason of which our soul is called intellectual. But the prophetic light in the prophet cannot be this. For whoever knows certain objects by means of intellectual light, which has become a property in him, existing there as a form, must have stable knowledge of those things. And this cannot be unless he sees them in a principle in which they can be known. For, as long as the things known are not reduced to their principles, the knowledge is not established as certain, but is apprehended by him as having some probability, inasmuch as it has been spoken by others. Hence, for each thing he must receive word from others. Thus, if someone did not know how to deduce the conclusions of geometry from the principles, he would not have the habit of geometry, but would apprehend whatever he knew of the conclusions of geometry as one who believes his teacher. Hence, he would have to be instructed on each point, for he would not be able securely to proceed from some points to others without making a resolution to first principles.
|
| Principium autem in quo possunt cognosci futura contingentia, et alia quae cognitionem naturalem excedunt, de quibus est prophetia, est ipse Deus. Unde cum prophetae Dei essentiam non videant, non possunt ea quae prophetice vident, cognoscere aliquo lumine quod sit quasi quaedam forma habitualis eis inhaerens: sed oportet quod de singulis sigillatim instruantur. Unde oportet quod lumen propheticum non sit habitus, sed magis sit in anima prophetae per modum cuiusdam passionis ut lumen solis in aere. Unde, sicut lumen non remanet in aere nisi apud irradiationem solis, ita nec lumen praedictum remanet in mente prophetae nisi quando actualiter divinitus inspiratur.
| Now, God Himself is the principle in which we can know future contingents and other things which exceed natural knowledge and with which prophecy deals. Hence, since the prophets do not see God’s essence, they cannot know the things which they see prophetically by a light which is a kind of habitual form inhering in them, but they have to be taught each thing individually. Thus it is that the prophetic light must not be a habit, but must exist in the soul of the prophet in the manner of a transient impression, as the light of the sun exists in the air. And, as the light remains in the air only when the sun is shining, so the previously mentioned light remains in the mind of the prophet only when it is actually being divinely inspired.
|
| Et inde est quod sancti de prophetia loquentes, de ea per modum passionis loquuntur, dicentes eam esse inspirationem vel tactum quemdam, quo spiritus sanctus dicitur tangere cor prophetae: et aliis huiusmodi verbis, de prophetia loquuntur. Et sic patet quod quantum ad lumen propheticum, prophetia non potest esse habitus.
| And thus it is that the saints, when they talk about prophecy, speak of it as a transient impression and call it an inspiration or a kind of touch by which the Holy Spirit is said to touch the heart of the prophet. They also speak of prophecy with other words of this kind. And thus it is clear that, as far as the prophetic light is concerned, prophecy cannot be a habit.
|
| Sed sciendum, quod sicut est in rebus corporalibus, quod aliquid post passionem, etiam passione abeunte, efficitur habilius ad patiendum, sicut aqua calefacta prius, facilius postmodum post infrigidationem calefiet, et homo post frequentes tristitias facilius ad tristitiam provocatur; ita etiam quando mens aliqua divina inspiratione tangitur, etiam illa inspiratione abeunte remanet habilior ad iterato recipiendum, sicut post devotam orationem remanet mens devotior; unde propter hoc, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de orando Deum: ne mens quae curis et negotiis tepescere coeperat, omnino refrigescat, et penitus extinguatur, nisi crebrius inflammetur, certis horis ad negotium orandi mentem revocamus.
| But we must remember that in bodily things, after something has undergone a transient impression, even after the impression has left, it is rendered more apt to undergo the impression, as water, once warmed, is warmed more easily afterwards when it has become cold, and a man, after he has been sad many times, is saddened more easily. Hence, the mind, when it has been under the influence of a divine inspiration, even after that inspiration has gone, remains more fit to receive it again, just as the mind remains more devout after devout prayer. It is for this reason that Augustine says: “Lest the mind which begins to grow lukewarm from cares and occupations become altogether cold and its fire die out completely, unless it is frequently enkindled, at set hours we call our mind back to the business of prayer.”
|
| Unde et mens prophetae postquam fuerit semel vel pluries divinitus inspirata, etiam actuali inspiratione cessante remanet habilior ut iterum inspiretur. Et haec habilitas potest habitus prophetiae dici; sicut etiam Avicenna dicit, VI de naturalibus, quod habitus scientiarum in nobis nihil aliud sunt quam habilitates quaedam animae nostrae ad hoc quod recipiat illustrationem intelligentiae agentis, et species intelligibiles ab ea in se effluentes. Sed tamen non proprie potest dici habitus, sed magis habilitas vel dispositio quaedam, a qua aliquis nominatur propheta, etiam quando actu non inspiratur. Tamen ne fiat vis in vocabulo habitus, sustinentes utramque partem, utrisque rationibus respondeamus.
| Hence, the mind of the prophet, after it has received a divine inspiration one or more times, remains more apt to receive the inspiration again, even after the actual inspiration has ceased. And this aptitude can be called the habit of prophecy, just as Avicenna says that in us habits of science are nothing but certain aptitudes of our soul ordained for the reception of the illumination of the agent intelligence and the intelligible species flowing forth from it into our soul. However, it cannot properly be called habit, but an aptitude or disposition by reason of which one is called a prophet even when he is not actually being inspired. Nevertheless, lest an argument be built on the strength of the word, habit, we will uphold both sides and answer both sets of reasons.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
|
| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod definitio illa inducitur de habitu proprie accepto: et sic habilitas praedicta prophetandi, habitus dici non potest; per quem tamen modum potest dici habitus secundum opinionem Avicennae etiam habilitas animae nostrae ad recipiendum ab intelligentia agente, quia illa receptio est naturalis secundum eius opinionem. Unde in eo, qui habet habilitatem, habet in potestate recipere cum vult, quia influentia naturalis non deest materiae dispositae. Sed influentia prophetiae dependet ex sola divina voluntate; unde, quantacumque sit habilitas in mente prophetae, non est in eius potestate ut prophetia utatur.
| 1. The definition given fits habit in the strict sense, and in this sense the previously mentioned aptitude of prophesying cannot be called a habit. Nevertheless, taken in this way, the aptitude of our soul to receive something from the agent intelligence can also be called a habit, according to Avicenna, for in his opinion that reception is natural. Thus, according to him, one who has an aptitude has the power to receive when he so wishes, for a natural influx does not fail when the matter is disposed. But the influx of prophecy depends on the divine will alone; hence, it is not in the power of a prophet to use prophecy, no matter how great an aptitude he has for it in his mind.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod si lumen propheticum inesset menti ut habitus quidam scientiae de rebus prophetatis, non indigeret propheta ad quaelibet prophetabilia cognoscenda, nova revelatione; indiget autem, quia illud lumen non est habitus. Sed habilitas ipsa ad lumen percipiendum, similitudinem habitus habet, sine quo lumine prophetabilia cognosci non possunt.
| 2. If prophetic light existed in the mind as a habit of knowledge about things to be prophesied, a prophet would not need new revelation to know anything that can be prophesied. But he does need new revelation, because that light is not a habit. The aptitude itself to perceive the light is like a habit and without this light things to be prophesied cannot be known.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod post perceptionem divinae locutionis, qua prophetam alloquitur interius, quae nihil aliud est quam mentis illustratio; non requiritur aliquis habitus quo interius audita percipiantur; sed ad hanc locutionem percipiendam tanto magis videtur habilitas aliqua operari, quanto ista locutio est excellentior, et eius perceptio vires naturales excedit.
| 3. Beyond the perception of the divine speech by which God talks interiorly to the prophet, and which is nothing but the enlightening of his mind, no habit is needed to perceive interiorly what has been said. But an aptitude seems to have a greater effect toward the perception of this speech, the more noble the speech is and the more its perception surpasses the natural powers.
|
| Ad quartum patet solutio ex dictis.
| 4. The solution to the fourth difficulty is clear from what has been said.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod lumen propheticum semel infusum non facit cognitionem de omnibus prophetabilibus, sed solum de illis propter quorum cognitionem datur. Haec autem arctatio non provenit ex impotentia largientis, sed ex ordine sapientiae ipsius, qui dividit singulis prout vult.
| 5. The prophetic light, once infused, does not give knowledge of all that can be prophesied, but only of those things for the knowledge of which it is given. This limitation does not come from lack of power in the giver, but from the ordination of His wisdom, which distributes to each as He wishes.
|
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod omnia peccata mortalia habent in hoc convenientiam quamdam, quod per eorum quodlibet homo separatur a Deo; unde gratia, quae hominem Deo coniungit, ab omni peccato mortali liberat; non autem ab omni veniali, quia venialia a Deo non separant. Res autem prophetabiles non habent ad invicem connexionem nisi in ipso ordine divinae sapientiae; unde ab his qui divinam sapientiam totaliter non intuentur, potest unum sine alio videri.
| 6. All mortal sins have this in common, that through any one of them man is separated from God. Hence, grace, which joins man to God, frees him from every mortal sin, but not from every venial sin, for venial sins do not separate him from God. But things which can be prophesied have a connection among themselves only in the order of God’s wisdom. Hence, one can be seen without another by those who do not see divine wisdom completely.
|
| Ad septimum dicendum, quod habitus infusus est perfectior quam acquisitus secundum genus suum, scilicet ratione originis, et ratione eius propter quod datur, quod est alius eo ad quod ordinatur habitus acquisitus. Sed quantum ad modum habendi vel perficiendi, nihil prohibet habitum acquisitum perfectiorem esse; sicut patet quod per habitum fidei infusum non ita perfecte videmus credibilia sicut per habitum scientiae acquisitum conclusiones scientiarum. Et similiter lumen propheticum quamvis sit infusum, non tamen ita perfecte in nobis existit sicut habitus acquisiti; quod etiam dignitati infusorum habituum attestatur, quia ex eorum altitudine contingit ut humana infirmitas eos plene possidere non possit.
| 7. An infused habit is more perfect than an acquired habit according to its genus, namely, by reason of its origin and by reason of the object which it is given to attain, which is higher than that to which an acquired habit is ordained. But nothing prevents an acquired habit from being more perfect in the manner in which it is possessed or perfected. Thus, it is clear that through the infused habit of faith we do not see the matters to be believed as perfectly as we see the conclusions of the sciences through the acquired habit of a science. Similarly, although the prophetic light is infused, still it does not exist as perfectly in us as the acquired habits. This also attests to the dignity of infused habits, for, since they are so excellent, human weakness cannot fully possess them.
|
| Ad octavum dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet si lumen quo perfunditur mens prophetae, esset habitus; non autem si ponimus habilitatem ad percipiendum lumen praedictum esse habitum, vel quasi habitum; cum ex eodem possit esse aliquis habilis ut illuminetur de quocumque.
| 8. The reasoning would conclude correctly if the light with which the mind of the prophet is flooded were a habit, but not if we hold that this habit or quasi habit is an aptitude for perceiving the aforesaid light, since this one thing could render a man apt to be enlightened about anything.
|
| Ad nonum dicendum, quod qualiter formatio specierum de novo requiratur ad propheticam revelationem, infra dicetur.
| 9. We will treat later of the way in which the species have to be formed anew for prophetic revelation.
|
| Ad decimum dicendum, quod, licet inspiratio habitum non nominet, tamen ex hoc non potest probari quod prophetia non sit habitus; consuetum est enim quod habitus per actus definiantur.
| 10. Although inspiration does not signify a habit, it cannot be proved from this that prophecy is not a habit. For it is customary to define habits through their acts.
|
| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod videre, secundum philosophum dupliciter dicitur: scilicet habitu, et actu; unde et visio actum et habitum nominare potest.
| 11. According to the Philosopher, to see can be taken in two ways: actually and habitually. Hence, sight can mean the act or the habit.
|
| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod lumen propheticum non est qualitas difficile mobilis, sed aliquid transiens; et secundum hoc loquuntur auctoritates inductae. Sed habilitas illa quae remanet ad illustrationem denuo percipiendam, non est facile mobilis; immo diu permanet, nisi in propheta fiat magna transmutatio, per quam talis habilitas tollatur.
| 12. Prophetic light is not a quality which is hard to change, but something transient. It is in this sense that the authoritative citations mentioned speak. But that aptitude which remains for perceiving the illumination again is not easily changed; in fact, it remains a long time unless there is a great change in the prophet, through which such an aptitude is taken away.
|
|
| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
|
| Ad primum vero eorum, quae sunt in contrarium, dicendum quod quia actus totaliter ab habitu oritur, ideo in illa philosophi divisione actus ad habitum reducitur, vel etiam ad passionem, eo quod passio actus quidam animae est, ut irasci et concupiscere.
| 1. Since acts arise completely from habits, they are therefore reduced to habit in that division of the Philosopher. Or they are also reduced to passive operations, since passive operations are acts of the soul, as to be angry or to desire.
|
| Prophetia autem quantum ad ipsam visionem prophetae est actus quidam mentis; quantum vero ad lumen, quod raptim, et quasi pertranseunter, decipitur, est similis passioni, prout in intellectiva parte receptio passio dicitur: quia intelligere etiam quoddam pati est, ut dicitur III de anima.
| But prophecy, in so far as it refers to the sight of the prophet, is an act of the mind; in so far as it refers to the light, which is received suddenly and in a passing manner, it is like a passive operation, inasmuch as a reception in the intellective part is called a passive operation, for to understand is a kind of passivity, as is said in The Soul.
|
| Vel potest dici, quod illa divisio philosophi, si membra divisionis proprie accipiantur, non sufficienter comprehendunt omnia quae in anima sunt; sed ea tantum quae ad materiam pertinent moralem, de qua philosophus intendit, sicut etiam patet per exempla, quibus ibidem philosophus se exponit.
| Or it can be said that, if the members of the division are taken strictly, that division of the Philosopher does not adequately comprehend everything which is in the soul, but only that which relates to moral matters, about which the Philosopher is thinking, as is clear from the examples with which he there explains himself.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod non omne quod cognoscitur, sub aliquo habitu cognoscitur, sed solum illud de quo perfecta cognitio habetur; sunt enim actus imperfecti in nobis qui ex habitu non procedunt.
| 2. Not everything which is known is known by some habit, but only that of which we have perfect knowledge. For there are in us imperfect acts, which do not come from habits.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod in scientiis demonstrativis sunt quaedam communia, in quibus particulares conclusiones quasi in quibusdam seminibus virtualiter continentur; unde ille qui habet habitum illorum communium, non se habet ad particulares conclusiones nisi in potentia remota, quae indiget motore ut in actum pertingat. Sed in rebus prophetabilibus non est talis ordo, ut quaedam ex aliis primis deducantur, ut sic qui habet primorum habitum, habeat sub quadam confusione habitus secundorum; unde ratio non sequitur.
| 3. In the demonstrative sciences there are certain general things in which particular conclusions are contained virtually, as it were in embryo. Hence, one who has the habit of those general things is only in remote potency to the particular conclusions, and this potency needs a mover to reduce it to act. But in things to be prophesied there is no such connection requiring that some knowledge be deduced from other prior knowledge in such a way that one possessing the knowledge involved in the prior habits would possess in a confused way the knowledge involved in the subsequent habits. Hence, the argument does not follow.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod intellectus alio modo perficitur prophetia et fide. Prophetia enim perficit intellectum secundum se; unde oportet ut ea, ad quae propheta est perfectus dono prophetiae, possit distincte inspicere. Sed fides perficit intellectum in ordine ad affectum: actus enim fidei est intellectus imperati a voluntate; unde per fidem intellectus nihil aliud habet nisi ut sit paratus ad assentiendum his quae Deus credi mandat. Et hinc est quod fides assimilatur auditui; sed prophetia visioni. Et sic non oportet quod habens habitum fidei distincte cognoscat omnia credibilia, sicut oporteret de habente habitum prophetiae quod omnia prophetabilia distincte agnosceret.
| 4. Our understanding is perfected in different ways by prophecy and by faith. For prophecy perfects understanding in itself, and thus it is necessary that the prophet be able to see distinctly those things for which he has the gift of prophecy. But faith perfects our understanding in the affective order, for the act of faith is an act of the understanding commanded by the will. Hence, through faith the understanding is only prepared to assent to those things which God orders to be believed. It is for this reason that faith is likened to hearing, but prophecy to sight. And thus it is not necessary for one who has the habit of faith to know all the matters of belief distinctly, as one who has the habit of prophecy must know distinctly all that is to be prophesied.
|
Q. 12: Prophecy
ARTICLE II
In the second article we ask:
Does prophecy deal with conclusions which can be known scientifically?
[ARTICLE C.G., III, 154; In Isaiam, I; S.T., II-II, 171, 3; In Psalm. 50; Ad Rom., c. 12, lect. 2.]
|
| Secundo quaeritur utrum prophetia sit de conclusionibus scibilibus
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it does not, for
|
| Quia prophetia est inspiratio, rerum eventus immobili veritate denuntians. Eventus autem rerum dicuntur futura contingentia, cuiusmodi non sunt conclusiones scientiae demonstrativae. Ergo de talibus non potest esse prophetia.
| 1. Prophecy is “the inspiration which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth.” But the outcomes of things are called future contingents, and the conclusions of the demonstrative sciences do not concern matters of this sort. Therefore, there cannot be prophecy about such things.
|
| Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit quod prophetia est signum divinae praescientiae. Praescientia autem de futuris est. Cum igitur futura, praecipue contingentia, de quibus maxime videtur esse prophetia, non possint esse conclusiones alicuius scientiae, videtur quod non possit de scibilibus conclusionibus esse prophetia.
| 2. Jerome says that prophecy is “a sign of divine foreknowledge.” But foreknowledge refers to the future. Since, therefore, futures, especially future contingents, which prophecy seems mainly to deal with, cannot be the conclusions of any science, it seems that prophecy cannot deal with conclusions scientifically knowable.
|
| Praeterea, natura non abundat superfluis, nec deficit in necessariis; et multo minus Deus, cuius actio est ordinatissima. Sed homo ad sciendum conclusiones scientiarum demonstrativarum, habet aliam viam quam per prophetiam, scilicet per principia per se nota. Ergo videtur quod superfluum esset, si huiusmodi per prophetiam cognoscerentur.
| 3. Nature does not provide superfluities nor fail in necessary matters. Much less does God, whose activity is most wisely disposed. But to know the conclusions of the demonstrative sciences man has another way than prophecy, namely, through self-evident principles. Therefore, if things of this sort were known through prophecy, it would seem to be superfluous.
|
| Praeterea, diversus modus generationis est indicium diversitatis speciei; unde mures generati ex semine, non sunt eiusdem speciei cum illis qui ex putrefactione generantur, ut dicit Commentator VIII Phys. Sed homines naturaliter conclusiones scientiarum demonstrativarum ex principiis per se notis accipiunt. Si igitur sunt aliqui homines qui alio modo scientias demonstrativas accipiant, utpote per prophetiam, erunt alterius speciei, et aequivoce homines dicuntur; quod videtur absurdum.
| 4. A different manner of generation is an indication of diversity of species. Thus, as the Commentator says, mice begotten from seed cannot be of the same species as mice begotten from decaying matter. But men naturally reach conclusions of the demonstrative sciences from self-evident principles. Therefore, if there are some men who receive knowledge of the demonstrative sciences in another way, as through prophecy, they will be of another species and will be called men equivocally, which seems absurd.
|
| Praeterea, scientiae demonstrativae sunt de his quae se habent indifferenter ad omne tempus. Sed prophetia non similiter se habet ad omne tempus; immo quandoque spiritus prophetarum tangit cor prophetae de praesenti et non de futuro, quandoque e contrario, ut Gregorius dicit super Ezech. Ergo prophetia non est de illis de quibus est scientia.
| 5. The demonstrative sciences deal with those things which relate indifferently to every time. But prophecy does not have a similar relation to every time, in fact, “sometimes the spirit of the prophets stirs the heart of a prophet for the present and not for the future, and sometimes just the opposite,” as Gregory says. Therefore, prophecy does not deal with those things about which there is scientific knowledge.
|
| Praeterea, ad ea quae per prophetiam sciuntur, non eodem modo se habet mens prophetae, et cuiuscumque alterius. Sed in omnibus quae sciuntur per demonstrationem, idem est iudicium prophetae, et cuiuscumque alterius scientis illud; et neuter alteri praefertur, ut dicit Rabbi Moyses. Ergo de his quae per demonstrationem sciuntur, non est prophetia.
| 6. The mind of the prophet and the mind of anyone else do not relate in the same way to those things which are known through prophecy. But in things which are known through demonstration the judgment of the prophet and of anyone else who knows it is the same, and neither is preferred to the other, as Rabbi Moses says. Therefore, prophecy does not deal with those things which are known through demonstration.
|
| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
|
| Prophetis non credimus nisi quatenus spiritu prophetiae inspirantur. Sed illis quae sunt scripta in libris prophetarum, oportet nos fidem adhibere, etiam si pertineant ad conclusiones scientiarum, utpote quod dicitur: qui firmavit terram super aquas, vel si qua sunt alia huiusmodi. Ergo prophetiae spiritus inspirat prophetas etiam de conclusionibus scientiarum.
| 1. We believe the prophets only in so far as they are inspired by the spirit of prophecy. But we have to give belief to those things written in the books of the prophets even though they treat of conclusions of scientific knowledge, as in Psalms (135:6): “Who established the earth above the waters,” and whatever else there is of this sort. Therefore, the spirit of prophecy inspires the prophets even about conclusions of the sciences.
|
| Praeterea, sicut se habet gratia signorum ad operandum ea quae sunt supra virtutem naturae, ita se habet donum prophetiae ad cognoscendum ea quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt. Sed per gratiam signorum non solum fiunt ea quae natura facere non potest, ut puta illuminare caecos et suscitare mortuos, sed etiam quae natura facere potest, ut curare febrientes. Ergo per donum prophetiae non solum cognoscuntur ea ad quae naturalis cognitio non potest attingere, sed etiam ea ad quae naturalis cognitio attingere potest, cuiusmodi sunt conclusiones scientiarum; et sic videtur quod de eis possit esse prophetia.
| 2. As the grace of miracles relates to the performance of deeds which are beyond the power of nature, so the gift of prophecy relates to the knowledge of things which surpass natural knowledge. But through the grace of miracles there take place not only things which nature cannot do, as to give sight to the blind and to raise the dead, but also things which nature can do, as to cure those with fevers. Therefore, through the gift of prophecy one can know not only those things to which natural knowledge does not extend, but also things to which natural knowledge does extend, and conclusions of the sciences are among these latter. Thus, it seems that prophecy can treat of them.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod in omnibus quae sunt propter finem, materia determinatur secundum exigentiam finis, ut patet in II Phys. Donum autem prophetiae datur ad utilitatem Ecclesiae, ut patet I ad Cor., XII, 7: unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem, et subiungit multa inter quae connumerat prophetiam; unde omnia illa quorum cognitio potest esse utilis ad salutem est materia prophetiae, sive sint praeterita, sive praesentia sive futura, sive etiam aeterna, sive necessaria, sive contingentia. Illa vero quae ad salutem pertinere non possunt, sunt extranea a materia prophetiae; unde Augustinus dicit, II super Genesim ad litteram, quod quamvis auctores nostri sciverint cuius figurae sit caelum; tamen per eos dicere noluit nisi quod prodest saluti; et Ioannis cap. XVI, vers. 13 dicitur: cum venerit ille spiritus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem; Glossa saluti necessariam.
| In all things which exist for the sake of an end the matter is determined according to the exigency of the end, as is clear in the Physics. But the gift of prophecy is given for the use of the Church, as is clear in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:7): “And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit.” The letter adds many examples among which prophecy is numbered. Therefore, all those things the knowledge of which can be useful for salvation are the matter of prophecy, whether they are past, or future, or even eternal, or necessary, or contingent. But those things which cannot pertain to salvation are outside the matter of prophecy. Hence, Augustine says: “Although our authors knew what shape heaven is, [the spirit] wants to speak through them only that which is useful for salvation. And to the Gospel of St. John (16:13), “But when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will teach you all truth,” the Gloss adds: “necessary for salvation.”
|
| Dico autem necessaria ad salutem, sive sint necessaria ad instructionem fidei, sive ad informationem morum. Multa autem quae sunt in scientiis demonstrata, ad hoc possunt esse utilia; utpote intellectum esse incorruptibilem, et ea quae in creaturis considerata in admirationem divinae sapientiae et potestatis inducunt. Unde et de his in sacra Scriptura invenimus fieri mentionem.
| Moreover, I say necessary for salvation, whether they are necessary for instruction in the faith or for the formation of morals. But many things which are proved in the sciences can be useful for this, as, for instance, that our understanding is incorruptible, and also those things which when considered in creatures lead to admiration of the divine wisdom and power. Hence, we find that mention of these is made in Holy Scripture.
|
| Sciendum tamen, quod cum prophetia sit cognitio eorum quae sunt procul, non eodem modo se habet ad omnia praedicta. Quaedam enim sunt procul a nostra notitia ex parte ipsorum, quaedam vero ex parte nostra.
| However, we should bear in mind that, since prophecy is knowledge of things which are far away, it does not have the same relation to all the things we have mentioned. For some things are far from our knowledge because of the things themselves and some are such because of something in us.
|
| Ex parte quidem ipsorum sunt procul futura contingentia, quae per hoc non cognoscibilia sunt, quod ab esse deficiunt, cum nec in se sint, nec in causis suis determinentur. Sed ex parte nostra sunt procul illa, in quorum cognitione accidit difficultas propter nostrum defectum, non propter ea, cum sint maxime cognoscibilia et perfectissima entia, sicut res intelligibiles, et praecipue aeternae.
| Future contingents are beyond us because of the things themselves, for they are unknown because they lack existence, since they neither exist in themselves nor are determined in their causes. But the things beyond us because of something in us are those which we have difficulty knowing because of our own inadequacy and not because of the things themselves, since they are the most knowable and the most perfect beings, such as things which are intelligible by nature, and especially things which are eternal.
|
| Quod autem competit alicui secundum se, verius competit ei quam quod competit sibi ratione alterius; unde et futura contingentia verius sunt procul a cognitione quam quaecumque alia, et ideo praecipue videntur ad prophetiam pertinere, in tantum quod quasi praecipua prophetiae materia in definitione prophetiae ponantur, in hoc quod dicitur: prophetia est divina inspiratio, rerum eventus etc.; ex quo etiam nomen prophetiae videtur esse acceptum; unde dicit Gregorius super Ezech., quod cum ideo prophetia dicta sit quod futura praedicat; quando de praeterito vel praesenti loquitur, rationem sui nominis amittit.
| Now, what belongs to a thing in itself belongs to it more truly than that which belongs to it by reason of something else. Hence, since future contingents are more truly beyond our knowledge than anything else, they seem, therefore, to belong especially to prophecy. And they pertain to it so much that, in the definition of prophecy, they are given as the special matter of prophecy. Thus: “Prophecy is a divine inspiration which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth.” And even the name of prophecy seems to be taken from this. Thus, Gregory says: “Prophecy is so called because it predicts the future. When it speaks of the present or the past, it loses the character of its name.”
|
| Eorum vero quae sunt procul ex parte nostra, est etiam consideranda quaedam distinctio. Quaedam enim sunt procul utpote omnem cognitionem humanam excedentia, ut Deum esse trinum et unum, et alia huiusmodi: et talia non sunt conclusiones scientiarum.
| Now, among those things which are beyond us because of something in us there is likewise a difference which we must consider some things are beyond us because they surpass all human knowledge, as that God is three and one, and other such things. These are not conclusions of the sciences.
|
| Quaedam vero sunt procul utpote excedentia cognitionem alicuius hominis, non cognitionem humanam simpliciter; utpote quae a doctis per demonstrationem sciuntur, sed indocti naturali cognitione ad ea non pertingunt, sed quandoque elevantur ad ea revelatione divina: et huiusmodi non sunt prophetabilia simpliciter, sed respectu huius. Et sic possunt subesse prophetiae conclusiones demonstratae in scientiis.
| Some things, however, are beyond us because they surpass the knowledge of some men, but not human knowledge simply. In this class there are those things which the educated know through demonstration, but which the uneducated do not grasp with natural knowledge, although they are sometimes elevated to them by divine revelation. These things do not belong to prophecy simply, but with reference to men of this type. Thus, conclusions which are demonstrated in the sciences can belong to prophecy.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
|
| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod eventus rerum ponuntur in definitione prophetiae quasi materia maxime propria prophetiae, non autem ita quod sint tota prophetiae materia.
| 1. The outcomes of things are put in the definition of prophecy as the most proper matter of prophecy, but not as the whole matter of prophecy.
|
| Et similiter dicendum ad secundum, quod ratione principalis suae materiae prophetia signum praescientiae dicitur.
| 2. Similarly, prophecy is called a sign of foreknowledge by reason of its principal matter.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis conclusiones scientiarum possint sciri alio modo quam per prophetiam, non tamen est superfluum ut lumine prophetiae ostendantur, quia firmius adhaeremus prophetarum dictis per fidem quam demonstrationibus scientiarum; et in hoc etiam Dei gratia commendatur, et ipsius perfecta scientia ostenditur.
| 3. Although conclusions of the sciences can be known in another way than through prophecy, it is not superfluous for them to be shown by prophetic light, for through faith we cling more firmly to what the prophets say than we do to the demonstrations of the sciences. And in this, too, the grace of God is praised and His perfect knowledge is shown forth.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod causae naturales habent determinatos effectus, cum earum virtutes sint finitae et limitatae ad unum; et ideo quae a diversis causis naturalibus producuntur in esse, secundum diversum generationis modum oportet esse specie diversa. Sed virtus divina, cum sit infinita, potest producere eosdem effectus in specie sine operatione naturae quos natura producit; unde non sequitur quod, si ea quae naturaliter cognosci possunt, divinitus revelentur, illi qui diversimode cognitionem accipiunt, specie differant.
| 4. Natural causes have determinate effects, since their powers are finite and limited to one type of effect. Therefore, it is necessary that those things which are brought into being by different natural causes according to different ways of generation be specifically different. But, since the divine power is infinite, it can without the work of nature produce effects specifically the same as those which nature produces. Hence, if those things which can be known naturally are divinely revealed, it does not follow that those who receive knowledge in a different way are specifically different.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod licet prophetia interdum sit de his quae diversis temporibus distinguuntur, interdum tamen est de illis quae per omne tempus sunt vera.
| 5. Although prophecy sometimes concerns things which are separated as belonging to different divisions of time, it sometimes concerns those things which are true for all times.
|
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod Rabbi Moyses non intelligit quin de his quae per demonstrationem sciuntur, possit fieri revelatio prophetae; sed quia ex quo per demonstrationem sciuntur, non differt an de eis habeatur prophetia, vel non.
| 6. Rabbi Moses does not mean that a revelation could not be made to a prophet of those things which are known through demonstration, but that, as soon as they are known by a demonstration, it makes no difference whether there is prophecy about them or not.
|
Q. 12: Prophecy
ARTICLE III
In the third article we ask:
Is prophecy natural?
[ARTICLE S.T., III, 154; S.T., I, 86, 4; II-II, 172, 1.]
|
| Tertio quaeritur utrum prophetia sit naturalis
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that it is, for
|
| Potior enim est cognitio vigilantis quam dormientis. Sed dormientibus naturaliter contingit ut futura praevideant, sicut patet in divinationibus somniorum. Ergo multo fortius in vigilando aliqui naturaliter possunt futura praevidere. Hoc autem est prophetae officium. Ergo aliquis naturaliter potest esse propheta.
| 1. The cognition of one who is awake is preferable to that of one who is sleeping. But it is natural for people who are asleep to foresee the future, as is clear in the divinations of dreams. Therefore, with much greater reason some can see the future naturally while awake. But this is the office of the prophet. Therefore, one can naturally be a prophet.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod vigilantis cognitio est potior quantum ad iudicium, sed dormientis quantum ad receptionem.- Sed contra, secundum hoc vis cognoscitiva potest de re aliqua iudicare, quod speciem eius recipit. Iudicium ergo receptionem sequitur; ergo ubi est potior receptio, est etiam perfectius iudicium; et sic, si dormiens est potior in recipiendo, debet esse potior in iudicando.
| 2. But it was said that the cognition of one who is awake is better for judgment, but the cognition of one who is asleep is better for reception.—On the contrary, the cognoscitive power can judge of something in so far as it receives its species. Therefore, judgment follows reception and, where the reception is better, the judgment is also more perfect. Thus, if one who is asleep is better in receiving, he ought also to be better in judging.
|
| Praeterea, intellectus non ligatur somno nisi per accidens, inquantum dependet a sensu. Sed iudicium intellectus non dependet a sensu, cum intellectus operatio secundum hoc a sensibus tantum dependeat quod a sensibus accipit; iudicium autem est post acceptionem. Ergo intellectus iudicium non est ligatum in somno; et sic videtur distinctio posita nulla esse.
| 3. Our understanding is hampered in sleep only from without, namely in so far as it depends on sense. But the judgment of our understanding does not depend on sense, since the operation of our understanding depends on sense in so far as it receives from sense. But judgment follows reception. Therefore, the judgment of our understanding is not hampered in sleep. Hence, the distinction given seems to be of no importance.
|
| Praeterea, illud quod convenit alicui ex hoc ipso quod ab alio separatur, convenit ei secundum suam naturam; sicut ex hoc ipso quod ferrum a rubigine separatur, accidit ei claritas, unde claritas est ei naturalis. Sed ex hoc ipso quod anima a sensibus corporis abstrahitur, competit ei futura praevidere, ut Augustinus ostendit, XII super Genesim ad litteram, multis exemplis. Ergo videtur quod praevidere futura, sit ipsi animae humanae naturale; et sic idem quod prius.
| 4. What belongs to something because it is kept free from something else belongs to it by reason of its nature, just as brightness, which is natural to iron, comes to it because the iron is kept free from rust. But, as Augustine shows by many examples, it belongs to the soul to see the future in so far as it is cut off from the senses of the body. Therefore, it seems natural for the human soul to foresee the future. Thus, we conclude as before.
|
| Praeterea, Gregorius in IV dialogorum, dicit, quod ipsa aliquando animarum vis subtilitate sua aliquid praevidet: aliquando autem exiturae de corpore animae per revelationem ventura cognoscunt. Sed illa quae anima potest inspicere ex sua subtilitate, naturaliter inspicit. Ergo anima naturaliter futura cognoscere potest, et sic naturaliter habere prophetiam, quae praecipue in futurorum visione consistit.
| 5. Gregory says: “Sometimes the very power of souls foresees something by its subtlety, for sometimes souls about to leave the body know through revelation things to come.” But the things which the soul can see because of its subtlety it sees naturally. Therefore, the soul can naturally know future things, and so naturally have prophecy, which consists especially in foreknowledge of the future.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod futura quae anima naturali cognitione praevidet, sunt illa quae habent causas determinatas in natura; sed prophetia est etiam de aliis futuris.- Sed contra, ea quae dependent ex libero arbitrio, non habent causas determinatas in natura. Sed ea quae anima ex sua subtilitate praevidet, omnino ex libero arbitrio dependent; sicut patet per exemplum Gregorii, quod ibi ponit de quodam, qui cum infirmaretur, et esset dispositum de eius sepultura in quadam Ecclesia, morti appropinquans surrexit, et se induens praedixit se velle ire per viam Appiam ad Ecclesiam s. Sixti. Cumque post modicum defunctus esset; quia longum erat iter ad Ecclesiam ubi sepeliri debebat, repente orto consilio exeuntes cum eius funere per viam Appiam, nescientes quae ille dixerat, in Ecclesia s. Sixti eum posuerunt: quod tamen, ut Gregorius subiungit, praedicere non potuit, nisi quia id quod futurum erat eius corpori, ipsa vis animae ac subtilitas praevidebat. Ergo illa etiam futura quae ex naturalibus causis non dependent, possunt naturaliter ab homine praevideri; et sic idem quod prius.
| 6. It was said that the futures which the soul foresees by natural knowledge are those which have fixed causes in nature, but that prophecy deals with other futures.—On the contrary, those things which depend on free will do not have fixed causes in nature. But those things which the soul foresees from its subtlety depend altogether on free will, as is clear from the example of Gregory, who tells of a man who, when he was sick and his burial in a certain church had been arranged for, arose as he neared death, dressed, and predicted that he wanted to go by the Appian Way to the Church of St. Sixtus. When he died a short while later, as his funeral procession was going out along the Appian Way, they suddenly decided to bury him in the Church of St. Sixtus, since it was a long way to the church where they were supposed to bury him. And they did this without knowing what he had said. As Gregory adds, he would not have been able to predict this if the power and subtlety of his soul had not foreseen what would happen to his body. Therefore, man can naturally foresee those futures which arc independent of non-free causes. The same conclusion follows as before.
|
| Praeterea, ex causis naturalibus non potest accipi significatio super ea quae naturaliter non fiunt. Sed astrologi accipiunt ex motibus corporum caelestium significationes super prophetia. Ergo prophetia est naturalis.
| 7. From natural causes we cannot perceive the meaning of those things which do not take place naturally. But astrologers perceive the meanings of prophecies from the movements of the heavenly bodies. Therefore, prophecy is natural.
|
| Praeterea, philosophi in scientia naturali non determinaverunt nisi de his quae naturaliter possunt accidere. Determinavit autem Avicenna, in VI de naturalibus, de prophetia. Ergo prophetia est naturalis.
| 8. In natural science the philosophers discuss only those things which can happen naturally. But Avicenna discusses prophecy. Therefore, prophecy is natural.
|
| Praeterea, ad prophetiam non requiruntur nisi tria; scilicet claritas intelligentiae, et perfectio virtutis imaginativae, et potestas animae, ut ei materia exterior obediat, ut Avicenna ponit in VI de naturalibus. Sed haec tria possunt accidere naturaliter. Ergo naturaliter potest aliquis propheta esse.
| 9. For prophecy, as Avicenna says, only three things are needed: clearness of intelligence, perfection of the imaginative power, and power of soul so that external matter obeys it. But these three things can be had naturally. Therefore, one can naturally be a prophet.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod naturaliter potest intellectus et imaginatio perfici ad praecognoscendum futura naturalia; sed de his non est prophetia.- Sed contra, ea quae dependent ex causis inferioribus, dicuntur esse naturalia. Sed Isaias praevidit et praedixit Ezechiam fore moriturum, Isa. XXXVIII, 1; et hoc secundum rationes inferiores, ut per Glossam ibidem habetur. Ergo etiam praecognitio naturalium futurorum est prophetia.
| 10. But it was said that our understanding and imagination can naturally be brought to the point where they have foreknowledge of natural future events, but that prophecy does not deal with these. On the contrary, those things which depend on lower causes are said to be natural. But Isaiah (38:1) foretold that Ezechias would die, and lie did this on the basis of [the expected outcome of ] the order of created causes, as the Gloss on that passage states. Therefore, prophecy is the foreknowledge of natural future events.
|
| Praeterea, divina providentia rebus in esse productis tribuit ut in se habeant ea sine quibus conservari non possunt; sicut in humano corpore posuit membra quibus sumitur et decoquitur cibus, sine quo mortalis vita non conservatur. Sed humanum genus non potest sine societate conservari: unus enim homo non sufficit sibi in necessariis ad vitam, unde homo naturaliter est animal politicum, ut dicitur VIII Ethic. Societas autem conservari non potest sine iustitia; iustitiae vero regula est prophetia. Ergo naturae humanae est inditum ut ad prophetiam naturaliter homo pervenire possit.
| 11. To the things which are brought into existence divine providence grants the possession of those things without which they could not be preserved in existence, as in the human body it put members with which food can be taken and digested, without which mortal life would not be maintained. But the human race cannot be maintained without society, for one man is not sufficient unto himself in the necessities of life. Hence, man is “naturally a political animal,” as is said in the Ethics. But society cannot be maintained without justice, and prophecy is the rule of justice. Therefore, human nature is endowed with the ability naturally to arrive at prophecy.
|
| Praeterea, in quolibet genere naturaliter invenitur illud quod est perfectissimum in genere illo. Sed perfectissimum in genere hominum est propheta, qui secundum id quod est in homine potius, scilicet intellectum, alios transcendit. Ergo naturaliter potest homo ad prophetiam pervenire.
| 12. In any class there is that which is most perfect in that class. But among men the most perfect is the prophet, who transcends the others in that which is higher in man, his intellect. Therefore, man can naturally arrive at prophecy.
|
| Praeterea, plus distant proprietates Dei a proprietatibus creaturarum quam proprietates rerum futurarum a rebus praesentibus. Sed naturali cognitione homo per proprietates creaturarum in cognitionem Dei pervenire potest: ut patet Rom. cap. I, 20: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt etc.; ergo et naturaliter ex his quae sunt, potest homo in cognitionem futurorum pervenire; et sic naturaliter potest esse propheta.
| 13. The properties of God are farther from the properties of creatures than the properties of future things are from present things. But man can reach the knowledge of God by natural knowledge through the properties of creatures, according to Romans (1:20): “For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world,...” Therefore, from the things which now exist man can arrive at the knowledge of future things. Thus, he can be a prophet naturally.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod quamvis Deus magis distet in essendo, tamen futura magis distant in cognoscendo.- Sed contra, eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi. Ergo illud quod est magis distans secundum esse, est etiam magis distans secundum cognitionem.
| 14. It was said that future things are more remote in knowledge although God is more remote in being.—On the contrary, the principles of being and of knowing are the same. Therefore, that which is more remote in being is more remote in knowledge.
|
| Praeterea, Augustinus in Lib. de libero Arbitr., distinguit tria genera bonorum; scilicet parvum, magnum et medium. Sed prophetia non computatur inter parva bona, quia huiusmodi sunt bona corporalia; nec iterum inter bona maxima, quia huiusmodi sunt quibus recte vivitur, et quibus nullus abuti potest: quae prophetiae competere non videntur. Ergo restat quod prophetia ad media bona pertineat, quae sunt bona naturalia animae; et sic videtur quod sit naturalis.
| 15. Augustine distinguishes three kinds of goods: “insignificant, important, and ordinary.” But prophecy is not numbered among the insignificant goods, for the goods of this sort are bodily goods. Nor is it classed among the most important goods, for these are those by which we live rightly and which no one can abuse. And this does not seem to fit prophecy. Therefore, it remains that prophecy belongs to the ordinary goods, which are the natural goods of the soul. Thus, prophecy seems to be natural.
|
| Praeterea, Boetius dicit in Lib. de duabus naturis quod uno modo natura dicitur omne illud quod potest agere vel pati. Sed ad hoc quod aliquis sit propheta, requiritur quaedam spiritualis passio, scilicet receptio luminis prophetici, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod prophetia sit naturalis.
| 16. Boethius says that in one sense all that “can act or be acted upon” is called nature. But for someone to be a prophet he must undergo some spiritual change, which consists in the reception of the prophetic light, as was said above. Therefore, it seems that prophecy is natural.
|
| Praeterea, si agenti naturale est agere, et patienti naturale est pati, oportet quod passio sit naturalis. Sed ipsi Deo naturale est quod perfectionem prophetiae hominibus infundat; quia ipse secundum suam naturam bonus est, et bono naturalis est sui communicatio. Similiter etiam humanae menti naturale est quod a Deo recipiat, cum eius natura non consistat nisi ex his quae a Deo recipit. Ergo prophetiae susceptio est naturalis.
| 17. If to act is natural for the agent and to receive is natural for that which is acted upon, the act of receiving must be natural. But it is natural for God to infuse the perfection of prophecy into men. For by His very nature He is good, and it is natural for the good to communicate itself. Likewise, it is natural for the human mind to receive things from God, since its nature is made up only of those things which it receives from God. Therefore, the reception of prophecy is natural.
|
| Praeterea, cuilibet potentiae naturali passivae respondet aliqua naturalis activa potentia. Sed in anima humana est naturalis potentia ad recipiendum lumen prophetiae. Ergo etiam est aliqua naturalis potentia activa, per quam aliquis in actum prophetiae adducitur; et ita videtur quod prophetia sit naturalis.
| 18. There is a natural active potency corresponding to every natural passive potency. But in the human soul there is a natural potency for the reception of the light of prophecy. Therefore, there is also some natural active potency through which one is brought to the act of prophecy. Therefore, it seems that prophecy is natural.
|
| Praeterea, homo naturaliter est perfectioris cognitionis quam alia animalia. Sed quaedam alia animalia naturaliter sunt praescia eorum futurorum maxime quae ad eos pertinent; sicut patet de formicis, quae praesciunt pluvias futuras; et pisces etiam quidam praenuntiant tempestates futuras. Ergo etiam et homo naturaliter debet esse praescius eorum quae ad ipsum pertinent; et sic videtur quod homo naturaliter possit esse propheta.
| 19. Naturally, man has more perfect knowledge than other animals. But some animals are naturally prescient of those future things which especially concern them. This is clear of ants, who have foreknowledge of future rains, and of some fishes, which foretell future storms. Therefore, man, also, ought to be naturally prescient of those things which concern him. Thus, it seems that man naturally can be a prophet.
|
| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
|
| Est quod dicitur II Petri, cap. I, 21: non voluntate humana allata est aliquando prophetia; sed spiritu sancto inspirati, locuti sunt sancti Dei homines.
| 1. In the second Epistle of St. Peter (1:21) is said: “For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time: but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit.”
|
| Praeterea, illud quod dependet ex causa extrinseca, non videtur esse naturale. Sed prophetia dependet ex causa extrinseca, quia scilicet prophetae in speculo aeternitatis legunt. Ergo videtur quod prophetia non sit naturalis.
| 2. That which depends on an external cause does not seem to be natural. But prophecy depends on an external cause, for the prophets read in the mirror of eternity. Therefore, it seems that prophecy is not natural.
|
| Praeterea, illa quae insunt nobis naturaliter, sunt in potestate nostra. Sed in potestate prophetae non erat habere spiritum praedicendi futura, ut patet per Glossam II Petri, I, 19: super illud: habemus firmiorem propheticum sermonem, et cetera. Ergo prophetia non est naturalis.
| 3. Those things which are in us naturally are within our power. “But it was not in the power of a prophet to possess the spirit of predicting the future,” as is clear from the Gloss on the second Epistle of St. Peter (1:19): “We have the more firm prophetical word.” Therefore, prophecy is not natural.
|
| Praeterea, ea quae sunt naturalia, sunt ut in pluribus. Sed prophetia est in valde paucis. Ergo non est naturalis.
| 4. Things which are natural happen as the more common occurrence. But prophecy exists in very few men. Therefore, it is not natural.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur naturale dupliciter. Uno modo, quia eius principium activum est natura; sicut naturale est igni ferri sursum. Alio modo quando quia natura est principium dispositionum ipsius non quarumlibet, sed earum quae sunt necessitas ad talem perfectionem; sicut dicitur quod infusio animae rationalis est naturalis inquantum per operationem naturae corpus efficitur dispositum dispositione quae est necessitas ad animae susceptionem.
| A thing is called natural in two ways. In one it is so called because its active principle is natural, as it is natural for fire to be borne aloft. It is so called in another way when nature is the source not of any of its dispositions whatever, but of those which are a necessity for such a perfection. In this way, the infusion of the rational soul is called natural, inasmuch as through the activity of nature the body is given a disposition which is a necessity for the reception of the soul.
|
| Fuit igitur quorumdam opinio, quod prophetia esset naturalis primo modo: quia dicebant animam habere in se ipsa quamdam vim divinationis, ut Augustinus narrat, XII super Genes. ad litteram. Sed hoc ipse ibidem improbat, quia si hoc esset, tunc in potestate sua haberet anima quandocumque vellet futura praecognoscere; quod manifeste apparet esse falsum.
| Some, then, were of the opinion that prophecy is natural in the first sense, for they said: “The soul had in itself a power of divination,” as Augustine relates. But in the same place he rejects that, for, if that were so, then the soul would be able to have foreknowledge of the future whenever it so wished. And this is clearly false.
|
| Et praeterea hoc apparet esse falsum, quia natura mentis humanae nullius cognitionis naturaliter potest esse principium, in quae non possit pervenire per principia per se nota, quae sunt prima instrumenta intellectus agentis; ex quibus principiis in cognitionem futurorum contingentium perveniri non potest, nisi forte per inspectionem aliquorum signorum naturalium; sicut medicus praecognoscit sanitatem vel mortem futuram, et astrologus tempestatem vel serenitatem. Talis autem futurorum praecognitio non dicitur esse divinationis vel prophetiae, sed magis artis.
| Furthermore, the falsity of this is manifest because the nature of the human mind cannot naturally be the source of any knowledge to which it cannot arrive by means of self-evident principles, which are the prime instruments of the agent intellect. It cannot arrive at a knowledge of future contingents from these principles, except, perhaps, by studying some natural signs, as the doctor foresees that health or death will come, or a meteorologist foresees the storm or fair weather. But such knowledge of future things is not ascribed to divination or prophecy, but to technical knowledge.
|
| Unde alii dixerunt, quod prophetia est naturalis secundo modo; quia scilicet natura ad talem dispositionem potest hominem perducere, quod erit in necessitate ad recipiendam per actionem alicuius superioris causae praescientiam futurorum. Quae quidem opinio est vera de quadam prophetia, non autem de illa quae inter dona spiritus sancti ab apostolo computatur.
| Hence, some. have said that prophecy is natural in the second sense. For nature can bring man to such a state that he will have to receive foreknowledge of futures through the action of some higher cause. Indeed, this opinion is true of a certain type of prophecy, but not, however, of that type which the Apostle numbers among the gifts of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 12:10).
|
| Unde ad earum distinctionem habendam, sciendum est, quod futura contingentia in duobus praeexistunt antequam sint: scilicet in praescientia divina, et in causis creatis, quarum virtute futura illa educuntur in esse. In his autem duobus futura praeexistunt diversimode quantum ad duo.
| And so, to see the difference between these types we should keep in mind that, before they exist, future contingents pre-exist in two ways, that is, they are contained in the divine foreknowledge and in the created causes, by whose power they will be brought into existence. In these two the futures pre-exist in a doubly different manner.
|
| Primo quantum ad hoc quod omnia quae praeexistunt in causis creatis, praeexistunt etiam in divina praescientia, sed non e converso, cum quorumdam futurorum rationes Deus in se retinuerit, rebus creatis eas non infundendo, sicut eorum quae miraculose fiunt sola divina virtute, ut Augustinus dicit super Genes. ad litteram.
| The first difference is this, that all that pre-exists in created causes pre-exists in the divine foreknowledge, but not conversely. For God holds within Himself the principles which will determine some future things without infusing them into created things. An example of this is the principles which will determine those things which happen miraculously by the divine power alone, as Augustine says.
|
| Secundo quantum ad hoc quod futura in causis creatis quaedam praeexistunt mobiliter eo quod virtus causae quae est ordinata ad talem effectum inducendum, potest aliquo eventu impediri. Sed in divina praescientia omnia futura sunt immobiliter, quia futura subduntur divinae praescientiae non solum secundum ordinem causarum suarum ad ipsa, sed etiam secundum exitum ordinis vel eventuum.
| The second is this, that some things pre-exist in created causes changeably, since the power of the cause which is directed to bringing about such an effect can be hindered by some event. But all future things are in the divine foreknowledge unchangeably, for futures are objects of the divine foreknowledge not only as regards the order of their causes to those futures, but also as nards the outcome of that order or the event.
|
| Praecognitio igitur futurorum potest causari in mente humana dupliciter. Uno modo ex hoc quod futura praeexistunt in mente divina; et haec prophetia donum spiritus sancti ponitur, et haec non est naturalis. Illa enim quae fiunt divinitus sine causis naturalibus mediis, non dicuntur esse naturalia, sed miraculosa. Huiusmodi autem futurorum revelatio fit absque mediis causis naturalibus; cum non hoc modo revelentur prout rationes futurorum sunt in causis creatis, sed prout sunt in mente divina, a qua derivantur in mentem prophetae.
| Accordingly, there are two ways in which foreknowledge of the future can be caused in the human mind. One is derived from the preexistence of futures in the divine mind. It is this prophecy that is called a gift of the Holy Spirit, and it is not natural. For those things which are executed by the divine power without natural intermediary causes are not said to be natural, but miraculous. Now the revelation of futures of this sort takes place without intermediary natural causes, for they are not revealed in so far as the principles which determine future things exist in created causes, but in so far as they exist in the divine mind, from which they flow into the mind of the prophet.
|
| Alio modo ex virtute causarum creatarum, prout scilicet in virtutem imaginativam humanam possunt aliqui motus fieri ex virtute caelestium corporum, in quibus praeexistunt quaedam signa futurorum quorumdam, et secundum quod intellectus humanus ex illuminatione intellectuum separatorum, utpote inferior, natus est instrui, et ad aliqua cognoscenda elevari; et haec prophetia modo praedicto potest dici naturalis.
| In the second way it is derived from the power of created causes, in so far as certain movements can be impressed on the human imaginative power, for instance, by the power of the heavenly bodies, in which there pre-exist some signs of certain future events. And, in so far as it is natural for the human understanding, as inferior, to receive instruction from the illumination of the separated intellects, and to be raised up to the knowledge of other things, prophecy can be called natural in the sense which was mentioned.
|
| Differt autem haec prophetia naturalis ab ea de qua nunc loquimur, in tribus. Primo in hoc quod futurorum praevisionem habet immediate a Deo illa de qua nunc loquimur, quamvis Angelus possit esse minister, prout agit in virtute divini luminis; naturalis vero est ex propria actione causarum secundarum. Secundo in hoc quod prophetia naturalis non se extendit nisi ad illa futura quae habent causas determinatas in natura; sed prophetia de qua loquimur, indifferenter se habet ad omnia. Tertio in hoc quod naturalis prophetia non infallibiliter praevidet, sed sicut praedicuntur illa quae sunt vera ut in maiori parte; prophetia vero quae est spiritus sancti donum, infallibiliter praevidet; unde dicitur esse divinae praescientiae signum, quia secundum illam infallibilitatem praevidet secundum quam futura sunt a Deo praescita.
| But this natural prophecy differs in three ways from that about which we are now speaking. It differs, first, in this, that the prophecy of which we speak gets its foreknowledge of future things immediately from God, although an angel can be an intermediary, inasmuch as he acts in virtue of the divine light. But natural prophecy is due to the proper activity of second causes. Second, it differs in this that natural prophecy extends only to those future things which have determinate causes in nature, but the prophecy of which we speak relates indifferently to all things. Third, they differ in this, that natural prophecy does not foresee infallibly, but predicts those things which are true for the most part, whereas the prophecy which is a gift of the Holy Spirit foresees the future infallibly. Hence, it is called a sign of the divine foreknowledge, since it foresees with that infallibility with which future things are foreseen by God.
|
| Et haec triplex differentia in definitione Cassiodori notari potest. Prima in hoc quod dicit divina; secunda in hoc quod dicit generaliter, rerum eventus; tertia in hoc quod dicit, immobili veritate denuntians.
| This threefold difference can be noted in the definition of Cassiodorus. The first difference is in the word “divine”; the second is in the general phrase, “outcomes of things”; and the third in the words, “which announces with immutable truth.”
|
| Sed quantum ad hoc quod prophetia est de rebus necessariis ut de scibilibus, manet duplex differentia: scilicet prima et secunda; quia per prophetiam naturalem non accipit homo immediate a Deo cognitionem illorum scibilium, sed mediantibus causis secundis, et per operationem causarum secundarum in virtute naturali sua agentium. Nec iterum talis cognitio ad omnia necessaria se extendit, sed solum ad illa quae possunt esse nota per prima principia; quia ultra illa virtus luminis intellectus agentis non se extendit, nec naturaliter in alia elevatur, sicut prophetia divina elevatur in quaedam quae sunt supra naturalem cognitionem, utpote Deum esse trinum et unum, et alia huiusmodi.
| But two of the differences, the first and second, remain in prophecy in so far as it deals with things which are necessary, as those which can be known with scientific knowledge. For by natural prophecy man does not receive immediately from God the knowledge of the things which are known scientifically, but gets it through the mediation of second causes, and through the activity of second causes acting with their natural power. Nor, again, does such knowledge extend to things which are necessary, but only to those which can be known through first principles. For the power of the light of the agent intellect does not extend any farther and is not naturally elevated to other things as divine prophecy is raised to certain things which are beyond natural knowledge, such as that God is three and one and other things of this sort.
|
| Sed tertia differentia removetur in hac materia, quia utraque prophetia ita immobiliter et certissime facit scire huiusmodi scibilia necessaria, sicut si scirentur per principia demonstrationis. Per prophetiam enim utramque, elevatur mens hominis, ut quodammodo conformiter substantiis separatis intelligat, quae sicut principia, ita et conclusiones simplici intuitu, sine deductione unius ex altero, certissime vident.
| In this matter the third difference has no place, for both kinds of prophecy give the prophet knowledge of necessary conclusions of this kind as unchangeably and certainly as if they were known through the principles of demonstration. Furthermore, the mind of man is elevated by both prophecies so that it understands in a way similar to the separated substances, who understand the principles and the conclusions with the utmost certainty in a simple intuition without deducing one from the other.
|
| Utraque etiam prophetia differt a somnio et visione, ut somnium dicamus apparitionem quae fit homini in dormiendo, visionem vero quae fit in vigilando, tamen homine a sensibus abstracto; quia tam in somnio quam in visione simplici, anima detinetur phantasmatibus visis, vel totaliter vel in parte, ut scilicet inhaereat eis tamquam veris rebus, vel totaliter vel in parte. Sed in utraque prophetia etsi aliqua phantasmata videantur in somnio vel visione, tamen anima prophetae illis phantasmatibus non detinetur; sed cognoscit per lumen propheticum ea quae videt non esse res, sed similitudines aliquid significantes; et earum significationem cognoscit, quia intelligentia opus est in visione, ut dicitur Danielis, X, 1.
| Again, both prophecies differ from dreams and visions, in so far as we call a dream an apparition which comes to a man who is asleep and a vision one which comes to a man who is awake but carried out of his senses, because in both the dream and the simple vision the soul is fettered completely or partially by phantasms which are seen in such a way that the soul completely or partially clings to them as to things which are true. But, although in both prophecies some phantasms may be seen in sleep or in a vision, the soul of the prophet is not under the control of those phantasms, but knows through the prophetic light that the objects which it sees are not things, but likenesses of them with some meaning. And it knows their meaning for, as is said in Daniel (10:1): “There is need of understanding in a vision.”
|
| Et sic patet quod prophetia naturalis media est inter somnium et prophetiam divinam; unde et somnium dicitur esse pars vel casus prophetiae naturalis; sicut et prophetia naturalis est quaedam deficiens similitudo prophetiae divinae.
| Thus it is clear that natural prophecy is midway between dreams and divine prophecy. Hence it is that a dream is said to be a part of or an instance of natural prophecy, as also, that natural prophecy is an imperfect likeness of divine prophecy.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
|
| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in cognitione duo est considerare: scilicet receptionem, et iudicium de receptis. Quantum igitur ad iudicium de receptis, potior est vigilantis cognitio quam dormientis; quia iudicium vigilantis est liberum, sed dormientis ligatum, ut dicitur in Lib. de somno et vigilia. Sed quantum ad receptionem, cognitio dormientis est potior, quia quiescentibus sensibus ab exterioribus motibus interiores impressiones magis percipiuntur, sive sint ex substantiis separatis, sive ex caelestibus corporibus. Unde sic potest intelligi quod dicitur Num. XXIII, 4, de Balaam: qui cadit, scilicet dormiendo, et sic aperiuntur oculi eius.
| 1. There are two things to be considered in knowledge: reception and judgment about that which is received. Accordingly, in the matter of judgment the cognition of one who is awake is preferable to that of one who is asleep, for the judgment of one who is awake is free, whereas the judgment of one who is asleep is fettered, as is said in Sleeping and Wakefulness. But the cognition of one who is asleep is preferable for reception, because internal impressions from external movements can be received better when the senses are at rest. This is so whether they come from the separated substances or from the heavenly bodies. Thus we can understand in this sense that which is said of Balaam in Numbers (24:16): “who falling,” that is, sleeping, “has his eyes opened.”
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod iudicium non dependet tantum a receptione speciei, sed ex hoc quod ea de quibus iudicatur, examinantur ad aliquod principium cognitionis, sicut de conclusionibus iudicamus eas in principia resolvendo.
| 2. Judgment does not depend only on the reception of the species, but also on the examination of the matter to be judged with reference to some principle of knowledge, just as we judge about conclusions by analyzing them back to principles.
|
| In somno igitur ligatis exterioribus sensibus, interiores vires quasi quietatae ab exteriorum sensuum tumultibus magis percipere possunt interiores impressiones factas in intellectu vel in imaginatione ex illustratione divina vel angelica, vel ex virtute caelestium corporum, aut etiam quorumcumque; sicut tenui phlegmate decurrente ad linguam videtur dormienti quod dulcia comedat. Sed quia primum principium nostrae cognitionis est sensus, oportet ad sensum quodammodo resolvere omnia de quibus iudicamus; unde philosophus dicit in III caeli et mundi, quod complementum artis et naturae est res sensibilis visibilis, ex qua debemus de aliis iudicare; et similiter dicit in VI Ethicorum, quod sensus est extremi sicut intellectus principiorum; extrema appellans illa in quae fit resolutio iudicantis. Quia igitur in somno ligati sunt sensus, non potest esse perfectum iudicium quin quantum ad aliquid homo decipiatur intendens rerum similitudinibus tamquam rebus ipsis; quamvis quandoque dormiens cognoscat de aliquibus quod non sunt res, sed similitudines rerum.
| Therefore, when the exterior senses are bound in sleep, the interior powers are, as it were, free from the bustle of the external senses and can better perceive the internal impressions made on the understanding or the imagination by a divine or angelic light, or by the power of the heavenly bodies, or by anything else, just as it seems to one who is asleep that he is eating something sweet when thin phlegm flows across his tongue. But, since the senses are the first source of our knowledge, we must in some way reduce to sense everything about which we judge. Hence, the Philosopher says” that the sensible visible thing is that at which the work of art and nature terminates, and from which we should judge of other things. Similarly, he says that the senses deal with that which is outermost as the understanding deals with principles. He calls outermost those things which are the term of the resolution of one who judges. Since, then, in sleep the senses are fettered, there cannot be perfect judgment so that a man is deceived in some respect, viewing the likenesses of things as though they were the things themselves. However, it sometimes does happen that one who is asleep knows that some of these are not things, but the likenesses of things.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod iudicium intellectus non dependet a sensu hoc modo, quod actus iste intellectus per organum sensibile exerceatur; indiget autem sicut extremo et ultimo, ad quod resolutio fiat.
| 3. The judgment of our understanding does not depend on sense in such a way that the act of understanding takes place by means of a sensible organ. However, it does need the senses as that which is last and outermost to terminate its analysis.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt quod anima rationalis in se ipsa habet vim quamdam divinationis, ut Augustinus dicit, XII super Genesim ad litteram. Sed hoc ipse ibidem improbat; quia si hoc esset, in promptu esset ei cum vellet futura praecognoscere: quod patet esse falsum. Non igitur propter hoc, a sensibus abstracta, interdum futura praevidet, quia hoc ei secundum naturalem virtutem competat; sed quia per huiusmodi abstractionem efficitur habilior ad percipiendum impressiones illarum causarum ex quibus potest fieri aliqua praecognitio futurorum.
| 4. Some have held that the rational soul “has within itself some power of divination,” as Augustine says. But he himself rejects this in that same place, for, if this were so, the soul would be prepared to foresee futures when it so desired. And this is obviously false. For the soul at times sees the future when it is carried out of its senses, not because this belongs to it by reason of its natural power, but because it is thus rendered more fit to perceive the impressions of those causes which can give some foreknowledge of the future.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod in verbis Gregorii est accipienda subtilitas animae, quam ponit causam praecognitionis futurorum, pro ipsa habilitate animae ad recipiendum a substantiis superioribus non solum secundum ordinem gratiae, prout sanctis ab Angelis quaedam revelantur, sed etiam secundum ordinem naturae, prout inferiores intellectus secundum ordinem naturae nati sunt perfici a superioribus; et prout corpora humana subduntur impressionibus corporum caelestium, in quibus est praeparatio ad aliquos futuros eventus, quos anima sua subtilitate praevidet per aliquas similitudines ex impressione caelestium corporum in imaginatione relictas.
| 5. Subtlety of soul, which Gregory says is a cause of foreknowledge of futures, should be taken to mean that aptitude of the soul to receive something from the separated substances, not only in the order of grace, in so far as things are revealed to holy people by angels, but also in the order of nature, in so far as lower intellects in the order of nature are naturally fitted to receive perfection from the higher intellects, and in so far as human bodies are subject to the impressions of the heavenly bodies, in which there is a provision for some future events. The soul by its subtlety foresees these events through certain likenesses left in the imagination by the impression of the heavenly bodies.
|
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis liberum arbitrium naturalibus causis non subdatur, tamen ad ea quae libero aguntur arbitrio, naturales causae interdum facilitatem vel impedimentum praestant; sicut potuit in proposito vel pluvia vel nimius aestus taedium facere his qui portabant funus, ne ad locum destinatum deferrent, quorum praecognitio fieri poterat per corpora caelestia.
| 6. Although free choice is not subject to natural causes, natural causes sometimes do facilitate or hinder the things which are done by free choice, as in the case mentioned rain or excessive heat could engender weariness in those who were carrying the bier, so that they would not carry it to the assigned place. And we could get foreknowledge of these happenings by means of the heavenly bodies.
|
| Ad septimum dicendum, quod cum corpora humana corporibus caelestibus subdantur, ex motibus caelestium corporum potest accipi significatio super dispositione qualibet corporis humani. Cum igitur aliqua complexio vel dispositio humani corporis sit quasi necessitas ad naturalem prophetiam, non est inconveniens, si ex caelestibus corporibus significatio super naturali prophetia accipitur: non autem super prophetia quae est spiritus sancti donum.
| 7. Since human bodies are under the influence of the heavenly bodies, from the movements of the heavenly bodies we can perceive some indication of any disposition of the human body. Since, therefore, a certain constitution or disposition of the human body is a kind of prerequisite for natural prophecy, it is not inappropriate that an indication of natural prophecy be received from the heavenly bodies. But no indication of the prophecy which is a gift of the Holy Spirit is thus received.
|
| Ad octavum dicendum, quod illi philosophi naturales qui de prophetia determinaverunt, non potuerunt tractare de prophetia de qua nunc loquimur, sed solum de naturali.
| 8. Those philosophers who have treated of prophecy were not able to treat of the prophecy about which we are now speaking, but only of natural prophecy.
|
| Ad nonum dicendum, quod illorum trium unum non potest naturaliter animae competere, ut scilicet sit tantae virtutis, quod ei materia exterior subdatur; cum etiam nec ipsis Angelis ad nutum deserviat materia corporalis, ut Augustinus dicit. Et sic in hoc non est sustinendum dictum Avicennae, vel cuiuslibet alterius philosophi. Ex aliis vero duobus quae tangit obiectio, secundum quod naturaliter homini proveniunt, causatur prophetia naturalis, non illa de qua loquimur.
| 9. One of those three things cannot naturally belong to the soul, namely, that it have such power that external matter would be under its control, since, as Augustine says: “The matter in bodies is not subject to the arbitrary will even of the angels themselves.” Thus, on this point, what Avicenna or any other philosopher says cannot be held. The other two things which the objection deals with, in so far as they arise naturally in man, can cause natural prophecy, but not the prophecy of which we are talking.
|
| Ad decimum dicendum, quod quamvis per prophetiam naturalem non possint revelari nisi ea quae naturalibus causis subduntur, tamen per prophetiam divinam possunt non solum alia, sed etiam ista cognosci.
| 10. Although only those things which fall under the influence of natural causes can be revealed through natural prophecy, nevertheless, not only other things but those, too, can be known through divine prophecy.
|
| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod societas hominum secundum quod ordinatur ad finem vitae aeternae, non potest conservari nisi per iustitiam fidei, cuius principium est prophetia; unde dicitur Proverb. XXVII, 18: cum defecerit prophetia, dissipabitur populus. Sed cum hic finis sit supernaturalis, et iustitia ad hunc finem ordinata, et prophetia, quae est eius principium, erit supernaturalis. Iustitia vero per quam gubernatur societas humana in ordine ad bonum civile, sufficienter potest haberi per principia iuris naturalis homini indita; et sic non oportet prophetiam esse naturalem.
| 11. The society of men, in so far as it is ordained to eternal life as its end, can be preserved only through the justice of faith, of which prophecy is the source. Hence, Proverbs (29:18) says: “When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad.” But, since this end is supernatural, the justice, which is ordained to this end, and the prophecy, which is its source, will both be supernatural. But the justice through which human society is ruled in its ordination to the civil good can be had adequately through natural principles implanted in man. Hence, it is not necessary for prophecy to be natural.
|
| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod hoc est ex nobilitate hominis, quod in genere humano possit inveniri tam digna perfectio quae ex nulla causa produci possit nisi supernaturali. Talis autem perfectionis creaturae irrationales capaces non sunt. Et ideo non oportet ut id quod est perfectissimum in genere hominum, virtute naturae acquiratur; sed id tantum quod est perfectissimum secundum statum naturae, non autem quod est perfectissimum secundum statum gratiae.
| 12. By reason of the nobility of man there can be found in the human race a perfection so becoming that it could be produced only by a supernatural cause. But irrational creatures are not capable of such perfection. Therefore, it is not necessary that that which is most perfect in the human race should be obtained by the power of nature. This is necessary only for that which is most perfect according to the order of nature, not for that which is most perfect according to the order of grace.
|
| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod res aliqua dupliciter potest cognosci: scilicet an est, et quid est. Quia vero proprietates creaturarum, ex quibus cognitionem accipimus, maxime distant a proprietatibus divinis, inde est quod de Deo cognoscere non possumus quid est; sed ex hoc ipso quod creaturae dependent a Deo, ex creaturis inspectis cognoscere possumus, Deum esse. Sed quia praesentia a futuris non dependent, proprietates autem habent similes, idcirco ex rebus praesentibus non possumus scire an aliqua futura sint. Possumus autem scire, si futura, quid vel qualia sint.
| 13. A thing can be known in two ways: with reference to its existence, and to its quiddity. But, since the properties of creatures from which we get our knowledge are extremely remote from the properties of God, thence it is that we cannot have quidditative knowledge of God. However, since creatures depend on God, by looking at creatures we can know that God exists. But, since the things which now exist do not depend on future things, but do have similar properties, we cannot therefore know from present things whether certain future things will follow from them. However, we can know what their nature and properties will be if they should exist.
|
| Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod Deus magis distat a creaturis quam una creatura ab alia quantum ad modum essendi; non tamen quantum ad habitudinem quae est inter principium essendi et id quod habet esse ex tali principio. Et ideo per creaturas cognoscimus Deum esse, sed non quid est. E contrario autem est de cognitione futurorum contingentium per praesentia vel praeterita.
| 14. God is more remote from creatures than one creature is from another in His manner of existing, but not in the relation which exists between the principle of existing and that which has existence from such a principle. Therefore, by means of creatures we can know that God exists, but we cannot know His quiddity. It is just the opposite with the knowledge of future contingents by means of present or past things.
|
| Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod prophetia reducitur ad maxima bona, cum sit quoddam donum gratuitum. Quamvis enim ea non recte vivatur ut immediato principio meritoriae operationis, tamen tota prophetia ad rectitudinem vitae ordinatur. Nec iterum prophetia aliquis abutitur, ita quod abusus ipse sit prophetiae actus, sicut aliquis abutitur potentia naturali. Qui enim prophetia utitur ad quaerendum lucrum, vel favorem hominum, habet quidem actum prophetiae bonum, qui est cognoscere occulta et denuntiare; sed abusus huius boni est actus cupiditatis, vel alterius vitii. Abutitur tamen aliquis prophetia etsi non ut principio actus, tamen ut obiecto; sicut etiam et virtutibus abutuntur qui de eis superbiunt, quamvis virtutes inter maxima bona computentur.
| 15. Prophecy is classified among the greatest goods, since it is a free gift. For, although it does not act as an immediate principle of meritorious action to make one live properly, the whole of prophecy is directed to the virtuous life. Nor, again, does one misuse prophecy in such a way that the misuse itself is an act of prophecy, as when someone misuses a natural power. For one who uses prophecy to seek gain or the favor of men has, indeed, a good act of prophecy, which is to know hidden things and to announce them, but the abuse of this good is an act of cupidity or some other vice. Nevertheless, although one does not misuse prophecy as a principle of action, he does misuse it as an object. In a similar way, those who are proud of their virtues misuse them, although the virtues are counted among the greatest goods.
|
| Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod non dicimus aliquid esse naturale a natura quolibet modo accepta, sed secundum tertiam acceptionem, quam Boetius, ibidem, ponit: prout scilicet natura est principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est, per se, et non secundum accidens; alias oporteret dicere, omnes actiones et passiones et proprietates esse naturales.
| 16. We do not say that something is natural if it comes from nature taken in any sense, but taken in the third meaning which Boethius gives it there, namely, inasmuch as nature is “the principle of motion” and rest in the thing in which it is, and the essential, not the accidental, principle. Otherwise it would be necessary to say that all activities, receptions, and properties are natural.
|
| Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod communicare bonitatem suam est Deo naturale, id est naturae eius conveniens, non quod ex necessitate naturae communicet, cum talis communicatio voluntate divina fiat secundum ordinem sapientiae, quae sua dona omnibus distribuit ordinate. Creaturae etiam naturale est quod a Deo recipiat bonitatem, non quamlibet, sed eam quae suae naturae debetur: sicut homini debetur esse rationale, non lapidi aut asino. Unde si aliqua perfectio divinitus recipiatur in homine, non oportet quod sit homini naturalis, quando debitum naturae humanae excedit.
| 17. To communicate His goodness is natural for God in the sense that it is in harmony with His nature and not in the sense that He communicates it because of some necessity of His nature. For such communication is made by the divine will in keeping with the order of wisdom which distributes Hi’s goods to all in an orderly way. It is also natural for a creature to receive from God not any goodness, but that which belongs to its nature, as to be rational belongs to man but not to a stone or an ass. Hence, if some perfection is received in man by reason of divine power, it is not necessary for it to be natural to man when it exceeds what is due to human nature.
|
| Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod in anima humana est potentia passiva ad recipiendum lumen propheticum, non naturalis, sed tantum potentia obedientiae, sicut est in natura corporali ad ea quae mirabiliter fiunt; unde non oportet quod tali passivae respondeat potentia activa naturalis.
| 18. In human nature there is a passive potency for the reception of prophetic light, which is not natural but only obediential, like the potency which is in physical nature for those things which happen miraculously. Hence, it is not necessary to have a natural active potency corresponding to such a passive potency.
|
| Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod animalia bruta non possunt esse praescia futurorum quae ad ea pertinent nisi illorum quae ex motu caeli dependent: ex cuius impressione movetur eorum imaginatio ad aliquid agendum, quod competit significationi futurorum. Et magis talis impressio in brutis habet locum quam in hominibus, quia bruta, ut Damascenus dicit, magis aguntur quam agant; unde impressiones caelestium corporum sequuntur totaliter; non autem homo, qui est liberae voluntatis. Nec ex hoc debet dici brutum praescium futuri, quamvis ex eius actu alicuius futuri significatio accipi possit; quia non agit ad significationem futuri, quasi rationem sui operis cognoscens, sed magis a naturae instinctu ductum.
| 19. Brute animals can be prescient only of those future events concerning them which depend on the movement of the heavens. And by the impressions of the heavens their imagination is stirred to do something which is an appropriate sign of the future. This kind of imprint has more place in brutes than in men because, as Damascene says, brutes “are more acted upon than acting.”Hence, they follow the impressions of the heavenly bodies completely. Man, however, who has free will, does not act in this way. Nor should a brute be called prescient of the future on this account, although a sign of some future event can be drawn from its activity. For it does not act to give any sign of the future, as though it knew the reason for its activity; rather, it is led on by a natural instinct.
|
Q. 12: Prophecy
ARTICLE IV
In the fourth article we ask:
Is some natural disposition needed for prophecy?
[ARTICLE S.T., II-II, 172, 3.]
|
| Quarto quaeritur utrum ad prophetiam habendam requiratur dispositio naturalis
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that it is, for
|
| Omnis enim perfectio quae non recipitur in aliquo nisi secundum dispositionem recipientis, requirit aliquam determinatam dispositionem in recipiente. Sed prophetia est talis perfectio, ut patet Amos, I, 2 super illud: dominus de Sion rugiet, ubi dicit Glossa Hier.: naturale est, inquit, ut omnes qui volunt rem rei comparare, ex eis rebus sumant comparationes quas sunt experti, et in quibus sunt nutriti; verbi gratia, nautae suos inimicos ventis, damnum naufragio; sic pastores timorem suum rugitui leonis assimilant, inimicos dicunt leones, ursos vel lupos: et sic iste, qui fuit pastor pecorum, timorem Dei rugitui leonis assimilat. Ergo prophetia aliquam determinatam dispositionem praeexigit in natura humana.
| 1. Every perfection which in its reception must conform to the disposition of the receiver requires some definite disposition in the receiver. But prophecy is such a perfection, as is clear from Amos (1:2), “The Lord will roar from Sion,” on which the Gloss says: “It is natural, he says, for all who want to compare one thing to another to use comparisons taken from those things which they have experienced and among which they have been brought up. For example, sailors compare their enemies to storms, and loss to shipwreck. And shepherds liken their fear to the roaring of a lion, and call their enemies lions, bears, and wolves. Thus, the prophet, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to the roaring of a lion.” Therefore, prophecy requires some definite disposition in human nature.
|
| Praeterea, ad prophetiam requiritur bonitas imaginationis, cum etiam per visionem imaginariam frequenter prophetia fiat. Sed ad bonitatem imaginativae virtutis requiritur bona dispositio et complexio organi. Ergo ad prophetiam praeexigitur dispositio naturalis.
| 2. Perfection of the imagination is needed for prophecy, since prophecy operates through the sight of imagination. But to have perfection of the power of imagination its organ must be in good condition and properly disposed. Therefore, a natural disposition is needed for prophecy.
|
| Praeterea, impedimentum naturale est fortius quam id quod accidentaliter supervenit. Sed aliquae passiones accidentaliter supervenientes impediunt prophetiam; unde dicit Hieron. super Matth.: tempore illo quo coniugales actus geruntur, praesentia spiritus sancti non dabitur, etiam si propheta esse videatur qui officio generationis obsequitur. Nec hoc est propter culpam, quia actus matrimonialis culpa caret, sed propter concupiscentiae passionem annexam. Ergo multo fortius indispositio naturalis complexionis impedit aliquem ne possit fieri propheta.
| 3. A natural hindrance is stronger than one which comes from without. But some passions which are aroused from without interfere with prophecy. Thus, Jerome says: “At that time when the marital act is performed the presence of the Holy Spirit will not be given, even though the one who fulfills the duty of procreation seems to be a prophet.” Nor is this due to guilt, for there is no guilt in the marital act, but to the passion of the concupiscence connected with it. Therefore, an indisposition of the natural constitution is a much greater hindrance, tending to make it impossible for one to become a prophet.
|
| Praeterea, natura ordinatur ad gratiam, sicut gratia ad gloriam. Sed gloria praeexigit gratiae perfectionem in eo qui debet ad gloriam pervenire. Ergo et prophetia, et alia dona gratuita, praeexigunt naturalem dispositionem.
| 4. Nature has an ordination to grace as grace has to glory. But the perfection of grace in one who would arrive at glory is a prerequisite for glory. Therefore, a natural disposition is prerequisite for prophecy and the other free gifts.
|
| Praeterea, speculatio prophetiae est altior quam scientiae acquisitae. Sed speculatio scientiae acquisitae impeditur per indispositionem naturalis complexionis: cum quidam sint ita indispositi ex naturali complexione, quod vix aut nunquam ad scientias acquirendas pertingere possint. Ergo multo fortius indispositio naturalis complexionis speculationem prophetiae impedit.
| 5. The contemplation in prophecy is higher than that in acquired scientific knowledge. But the contemplation in acquired scientific knowledge is hindered if the natural constitution lacks the proper disposition, for some are so unfit by reason of their natural constitution that they can hardly, if ever, progress far enough to acquire scientific knowledge. Therefore, if the natural constitution lacks the proper disposition, it is a much greater hindrance to the contemplation in prophecy.
|
| Praeterea, quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt; ut dicitur Rom. XIII, 1. Sed donum prophetiae est a Deo. Ergo ordinate ab eo distribuitur. Sed non esset ordinata distributio, si daretur ei qui non est ad eam habendam dispositus. Ergo prophetia praeexigit naturalem dispositionem.
| 6. As is said in Romans (13:1): “The things which are from God have order in them.” But the gift of prophecy is from God. Therefore, He dispenses it in an orderly manner. But there would be no orderly distribution if it were given to someone who had not the proper disposition to possess it. Therefore, prophecy requires a natural disposition.
|
| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
|
| Illud quod dependet ex solo arbitrio dantis, non praeexigit aliquam dispositionem in recipiente. Sed prophetia est huiusmodi, ut patet per hoc quod I Cor. XII, 11, enumerata prophetia et aliis spiritus sancti donis, subiungitur: haec autem omnia operatur unus atque idem spiritus dividens singulis prout vult; et Ioann., III, 8, dicitur: spiritus ubi vult spirat.
| 11. That which depends solely on the free choice of the giver does not require any disposition in the receiver. But prophecy is such a gift, as is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:11), which, after it has listed prophecy and other gifts of the Holy Spirit, adds: “But all these things one and the same Spirit works, dividing to everyone as he will.” And the Gospel of St. John (3:8) says: “The Spirit breathes where he will.” Therefore, a natural disposition is not needed to have prophecy.
|
| Praeterea, I Corinth., I, 27-28, dicit apostolus: quae infirma sunt mundi, elegit Deus, ut confundat fortia et contemptibilia et ea quae non sunt, ut ea quae sunt, destrueret. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non praeexigunt de necessitate aliquam dispositionem in subiecto.
| 2. The Apostle says in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (1:27-28): “The weak things of the world has God chosen, that he may confound the strong. And the base things of the world and things that are not, that he might bring to naught things that are.” Therefore, no disposition in the subject is a necessary prerequisite for the gifts of the Holy Spirit.
|
| Praeterea, Gregorius dicit in homilia Pentecostes: implet spiritus sanctus citharaedum puerum, et Psalmistam facit; implet pastorem Armentarium sycomoros vellicantem, et prophetam facit. Ergo donum prophetiae non praeexigit aliquam dispositionem vel statum in eo cui datur; sed ex sola divina voluntate dependet eius collatio.
| 31. Gregory says: “The Holy Spirit fills the boy harpist and makes him a prophet; He fills the shepherd who is railing at the sycamore trees and makes him a prophet.”Therefore, the gift of prophecy does not require any disposition in him to whom it is given, but its bestowal depends on the divine will alone.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod in prophetia duo est considerare: scilicet ipsum prophetiae donum, et huius doni iam percepti usum.
| There are two things to be considered in prophecy: the gift of prophecy itself, and the use of such a gift once received.
|
| Ipsum igitur prophetiae donum supra facultatem hominis existens, a Deo datur, non virtute alicuius causae creatae; quamvis prophetia naturalis ex virtute alicuius creaturae perficiatur in nobis, ut dictum est.
| The gift itself of prophecy, which exists beyond the capacity of man, is given by God and not through the power of some created cause, although natural prophecy is produced in us by the power of some created cause, as has been said earlier.
|
| Hoc autem differt inter operationem divinam et operationem creaturae: quod quia Deus sua operatione non solum formam, sed et materiam producit; non praeexigat eius operatio, sicut nec materiam, ita nec dispositionem materialem ad effectum perficiendum. Nec tamen formam sine materia aut sine dispositione facit, sed simul potest materiam et formam condere unica operatione; vel etiam materiam quantumcumque indispositam ad debitam dispositionem reducere, quae competat perfectioni quam inducit: sicut patet in suscitatione mortui. Corpus enim mortuum est omnino indispositum ad animam recipiendam, et tamen unico divino opere corpus et animam, et dispositionem ad animam recipit. Sed ad operationem creaturae praeexigitur et materia, et debita materiae dispositio; non enim potest virtus creata ex quolibet quodlibet facere.
| But between the operation of a creature and that of God there is this difference, that, to bring about an effect, God’s activity does not need matter or any material disposition, for by His activity He produces not only the form but also the matter. However, He does not make the form without matter or without a disposition, but He can make matter and form together in one operation, or He can transform the matter, however unfit, to the proper disposition which is needed for the perfection which He gives. This is clear in resuscitation of a dead man, for the dead body is altogether unfit to receive the soul. Yet by the one divine action the body receives the soul and the disposition for the soul. But matter and the disposition of the matter are required for the activity of a creature, for a created power cannot make whatever it wishes from anything.
|
| Patet ergo quod prophetia naturalis praeexigit dispositionem debitam naturalis complexionis; sed prophetia quae est spiritus sancti donum, non praeexigit eam. Exigit tamen quia simul cum dono prophetiae datur etiam prophetae dispositio naturalis quae sit ad prophetiam conveniens.
| It is clear, then, that natural prophecy requires the proper disposition of the natural constitution, but the prophecy which is the gift of the Holy Spirit does not need this. However, it does require that the natural disposition which is suitable for prophecy be given with the gift of prophecy.
|
| Usus autem prophetiae cuiuslibet est in potestate prophetae; et secundum hoc dicitur I Cor. XIV, 32 quod spiritus prophetarum prophetis subiecti sunt; et ideo ab usu prophetiae aliquis seipsum impedire potest, et ad debitum prophetiae usum de necessitate dispositio debita requiritur, cum prophetiae usus ex virtute creata prophetae procedat. Unde et determinatam dispositionem praeexigat.
| But the use of any prophecy is within the power of the prophet. It is in keeping with this that the first Epistle to the Corinthians (14:3 2) says: “And the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets.” Therefore, one can prevent himself from using prophecy. And the proper disposition is a necessary requirement for the proper use of prophecy, since the use of prophecy proceeds from the created power of the prophet. Hence, a definite disposition is also required.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
|
| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod quaedam dispositiones sunt indifferentes ad prophetiam; et hae divina operatione non mutantur in propheta; et secundum earum convenientiam prophetia procedit. Indifferens enim est ad prophetiam, quibuscumque similitudinibus res prophetata figuretur. Dispositiones vero contrariae, divina virtute auferuntur a propheta, et dispositiones necessariae conferuntur.
| 1. Certain dispositions are unconnected with prophecy, and these are not changed in the prophet by the divine activity, but prophecy proceeds in harmony with these dispositions. For it is indifferent to prophecy, whether the thing prophesied be represented under one likeness rather than another. However, God takes away from the prophet the dispositions which oppose prophecy and gives, him the dispositions which are necessary.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad prophetiam requiritur bonitas imaginationis, non autem de necessitate praeexigitur; quia ipse Deus, qui donum prophetiae infundit, potens est complexionem organi imaginativae virtutis in melius reformare, sicut et oculos lippos, ut clare videre possint.
| 2. Perfection of the imagination is needed for prophecy, but it is not necessarily needed beforehand. For God Himself, who infuses the gift of prophecy, can improve the constitution of the organ of the imaginative power, as He can make blear eyes see clearly.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod huiusmodi passiones vehementes ad se trahunt totaliter rationis attentionem, et per consequens eam avertunt a spiritualium inspectione; et ideo vehementibus passionibus vel irae vel tristitiae, aut delectationis, usus prophetiae impeditur etiam in eo qui prophetiae donum percepit; et sic etiam naturalis indispositio complexionis impediret, nisi divina virtute quodammodo curaretur.
| 3 Strong passions of this sort draw the attention of reason completely to themselves and, consequently, withdraw it from the study of spiritual things. Therefore, strong passions of anger or sorrow or pleasure hinder the use of prophecy in one who has received the gift of prophecy. Thus, the unfitness of the natural constitution would be a hindrance, unless it were somehow remedied by the divine power.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod similitudo proposita quantum ad hoc verificatur, quod, sicut gratia superadditur naturae, ita gloria gratiae. Non tamen est similitudo quantum ad omnia, quia gratia meretur gloriam, non autem natura meretur gratiam. Et ideo praeexigitur meritum gratiae ad gloriam habendam, non autem dispositio naturae ad gratiam obtinendam.
| 4. The application of the proposed likeness is limited to this, that as grace is added to nature, so glory is added to grace. But there is no likeness in all respects, for grace merits glory, but nature does not merit grace. Therefore, the merit of grace is prerequisite for glory, but the disposition of nature is not prerequisite for the reception of grace.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod scientia acquisita causatur ex nobis quodammodo. Non est autem in nostra potestate complexionem organorum animae meliorare, sicut est in potestate divina, qui donum prophetiae infundit; et ideo non est simile.
| 5. In some sense, acquired scientific knowledge is caused by us. But it is not in our power to improve the constitution of the organs of the soul, as it is within the divine power, which infuses the gift of prophecy. So, they are not alike.
|
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod donum prophetiae a Deo ordinatissime dividitur; et hoc etiam ad huius distributionis ordinationem pertinet, ut aliquando conferatur illis qui videntur ad hoc maxime indispositi, ut sic divinae virtuti tribuatur, et non glorietur omnis caro coram illo, ut dicitur I Cor. I, 29.
| 6. The gift of prophecy is dispensed by God in a most orderly way. The orderly distribution of this gift also entails conferring it at times on those who seem least disposed for it, so that it will thus be attributed to the divine power and, as the first Epistle to the Corinthians (1:29) says: “That no flesh should glory in his sight.”
|
Q. 12: Prophecy
ARTICLE V
In the fifth article we ask:
Is moral goodness required for prophecy?
[ARTICLE S.T., II-II, 17., 4; In Ioan., c. 11, lect. 7.]
|
| Quinto quaeritur utrum ad prophetiam requiratur bonitas morum
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that it is, for
|
| Quia Sapient. VII, 27, dicitur: per nationes in animas sanctas se transfert, amicos Dei et prophetas constituit. Sed amici Dei non sunt nisi illi in quibus bonitas morum viget; Ioann. XIV, 23: si quis diligit me, sermones meos servabit. Ergo et ille qui non est bonorum morum, propheta non constituitur.
| 1. In Wisdom (7:27) we read: “Through prophecies [she] conveys herself into holy souls, she makes the friends of God and prophets.” But only those who have moral goodness are the friends of God. As the Gospel of St. John (14:2 3) says: “If anyone love me, he will keep my word.” Therefore, one who does not have moral goodness is not appointed a prophet.
|
| Praeterea, prophetia donum spiritus sancti est. Sed spiritus sanctus non inhabitat aliquem peccatorem; ut patet per id Sap. cap. I, 5: spiritus sanctus disciplinae effugiet fictum. Ergo prophetiae donum non potest esse in aliquo peccatore.
| 2. Prophecy is a gift of the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit does not dwell in a sinner. As Wisdom (1:5) says: “For the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful.” Therefore, the gift of prophecy cannot exist in a sinner.
|
| Praeterea, illud quo quis male uti non potest, esse non potest in aliquo peccatore. Sed prophetia nullus male uti potest. Cum enim actus prophetiae sit a spiritu sancto, si aliquis prophetia male uteretur, esset idem actus a peccato, et a spiritu sancto: quod esse non potest. Ergo prophetia non potest esse in aliquo peccatore.
| 3. That which one cannot put to an evil use cannot exist in a sinner. But no one can put prophecy to an evil use for, since the act of Prophecy is from the Holy Spirit, if someone put it to an evil use, sin and the Holy Spirit would be causes of the same act. And this cannot be. Therefore, prophecy cannot exist in a sinner.
|
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit in libro de somno et vigilia, quod si divinatio somniorum est a Deo, inconveniens est eam immittere quibuslibet, et non optimis viris. Sed constat prophetiae donum esse tantum a Deo. Ergo inconveniens est dicere, quod detur nisi optimis viris.
| 4. The Philosopher says: “If prophecy through dreams comes from God, it is unfitting for Him to give it to any but the best men.” But it is clear that the gift of prophecy is from God alone. Therefore, it is unfitting to say that it is given to any but the best men.
|
| Praeterea, sicut dicit Plato, optimi est optima adducere. Sed prophetia convenientius est in homine bono quam in malo. Ergo cum Deus sit optimus, nunquam malis donum prophetiae dabit.
| 5. Plato says that it belongs to that which is best to produce what is best. But prophecy is more suitable in a good man than in a bad one. Therefore, since God is best, He will never give the gift of prophecy to evil men.
|
| Praeterea, in operatione naturae similitudo divinae operationis invenitur; unde et Dionysius IV cap. de Divin. Nomin. divinam bonitatem radio solari comparat propter similitudinem effectus. Sed operatione naturali magis dispositis aliquae perfectiones magis dantur; sicut a sole corpora magis pervia magis illustrantur. Cum igitur ad recipiendum donum prophetiae magis sit dispositus bonus quam malus, videtur quod multo amplius bonis quam malis dari debeat. Sed non omnibus bonis datur. Ergo nulli malo debet dari.
| 6. We find a likeness of the divine activity in the activity of nature. Hence, Dionysius compares the divine goodness to the light of the sun, because of the similarity of their effects. But natural activity gives more perfections to the things which are more disposed, as the more permeable bodies receive more light from the sun. Therefore, since the good man is more disposed to receive the gift of prophecy than the evil man, it seems that it should be given much more to good men than to evil men. But it is not given to all good men. Therefore, it should not be given to any evil man.
|
| Praeterea, gratia ad hoc datur quod natura elevetur. Sed natura magis debet elevari in bonis quam in malis. Ergo gratia prophetiae magis debet dari bonis quam malis, et sic idem quod prius.
| 7. Grace is given to elevate nature. But nature should be elevated more in good men than in evil men. Therefore, the grace of prophecy should be given to good men rather than to evil men. We conclude as before.
|
| Sed contra
| To the Contrary
|
| est quod Balaam propheta fuisse dicitur qui tamen malus fuit.
| 1. Balaam is said to have been a prophet, yet he was evil.
|
| Praeterea, Matth., VII, 22, ex persona damnatorum dicitur: domine, nonne in nomine tuo prophetavimus et virtutes etc.; ergo prophetia potest esse in hominibus malis.
| 2. In the Gospel of St. Matthew (7:22), this statement is put in the mouth of the damned: “Lord, have not we prophesied in your name...?” Therefore, prophecy can exist in evil men.
|
| Praeterea, quicumque non habet caritatem, est malus. Sed prophetia potest esse in aliquo non habente caritatem, ut patet I ad Cor. c. XIII, 2: si habuero omnem scientiam et noverim mysteria omnia, caritatem autem non habuero et cetera. Ergo prophetia potest esse in aliquo peccatore.
| 3. Whoever does not have charity is evil. But prophecy can exist in one who does not have charity, as is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:2)which says: “And if I should have knowledge and should know all mysteries... and have not charity... Therefore, prophecy can exist in a sinner.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod bonitas hominis in caritate consistit, per quam homo Deo unitur. Quaecumque ergo sine caritate esse possunt, communiter inveniri possunt in bonis et malis. In hoc enim praecipue divina bonitas commendatur, quod tam bonis quam malis utitur ad suum propositum implendum; et ideo utrisque, tam bonis quam malis, illa dona largitur quae ad caritatem, necessariam dependentiam non habent.
| Man’s goodness consists in charity, through which he is united to God. Therefore, whatever can exist without charity, can be found indifferently in good men and in evil men. For the divine goodness is held in high esteem chiefly for this, that it uses both good and evil men to implement its designs. Therefore, it gives to both good and evil those gifts which do not have a necessary dependence on charity.
|
| Prophetia autem non habet aliquam necessariam colligantiam cum caritate, propter duo. Primo, quia prophetia est in intellectu, caritas autem in affectu. Intellectus autem est prior affectu; et sic prophetia et aliae intellectus perfectiones non dependent a caritate. Et hac ratione fides et prophetia et scientia et omnia huiusmodi in bonis et malis esse possunt.
| Now, prophecy does not have any necessary connection with charity for two reasons. First, because prophecy is in the understanding and charity is in the affections. But the understanding has priority over the affections, and, thus, prophecy and the other perfections of the understanding do not depend on charity. And for this reason faith, prophecy, knowledge, and everything else of this sort can exist in good men and in evil men.
|
| Secundo, quia prophetia datur alicui ad utilitatem Ecclesiae, et non propter seipsum. Contingit autem aliquem utiliter quantum ad aliquid Ecclesiae deservire qui in se ipso bonus non est, quasi Deo per caritatem coniunctus; unde prophetia et operatio miraculorum et ecclesiastica ministeria et omnia huiusmodi, quae ad utilitatem Ecclesiae conferuntur, inveniuntur quandoque sine caritate, quae sola homines bonos facit.
| The second reason is that prophecy is given to a person for the profit of the Church and not for himself. But it does happen that someone who is not good in himself and united to God by charity can be of profit to the Church in some fashion. Thus, prophecy, the working of miracles, ecclesiastical ministries, and all the other things of this sort, which contribute to the benefit of the Church, are sometimes found apart from charity, which alone makes men good.
|
| Sciendum tamen est, quod inter peccata quibus caritas amittitur, quaedam sunt quae usum prophetiae impediunt, quaedam quae non. Quia enim carnalia peccata mentem a spiritualitate omnino retrahunt; ex hoc ipso quod aliquis carnalibus peccatis est subditus, ineptus ad prophetiam redditur, ad cuius revelationem summa spiritualitas mentis requiritur. Peccata vero spiritualia spiritualitatem mentis non ita impediunt. Et ideo contingit esse aliquem prophetam spiritualibus vitiis subditum, non autem carnalibus; vel etiam immensis saeculi sollicitudinibus, quibus mens a sua spiritualitate retrahatur.
| However, we must bear in mind that some of the sins by which charity is lost hinder the use of prophecy, and some do not. For, since sins of the flesh draw the mind entirely away from things spiritual, by the very fact that one is given to sins of the flesh he is rendered unfit for prophecy. For the mind must have supreme competence in things spiritual to have the revelation of prophecy. But spiritual sins do not to the same extent interfere with the mind’s competence in spiritual things. Therefore, it happens that one who is a slave to spiritual sins, but not to those of the flesh, or even to the endless cares of this life, which withdraw the mind from its spiritual competence, can be a prophet.
|
| Et ideo dicit Rabbi Moyses, quod hoc est signum quod aliquis sit falsus propheta, quando voluptatibus et sollicitudinibus saeculi detinetur. Et hoc consonat ei quod habetur Matth. VII, 15: attendite a falsis prophetis; et infra: a fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos; quod de manifestis oportet intelligi, ut ibidem dicit Glossa, quae maxime sunt peccata carnalia; spiritualia enim vitia interius latent.
| And, therefore, Rabbi Moses says that entanglement in the pleasures and cares of this world is a sign that one is a false prophet. And this agrees with what we read in the Gospel of St. Matthew (7:15): “Beware of false prophets,” and a little later (7:16): “By their fruits you shall know them.” The Gloss on this passage reads that this must be understood of those sins “which are in plain sight,” and the foremost of these are the sins of the flesh, for spiritual sins lie hidden within.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
|
| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sapientia se transfert in animam dupliciter. Uno modo ut ipsamet Dei sapientia animam inhabitet; et sic hominem sanctum facit et Dei amicum. Alio modo solum quantum ad effectum; et sic non oportet quod sanctum faciat vel Dei amicum; et sic transfert se in mentem malorum quos prophetas constituit.
| 1. Wisdom enters the soul in two ways. In one way, it so enters that the very wisdom of God dwells in the soul. This makes the man holy and a friend of God. In the other way, it enters only in its effects. In this way it does not have to make the man holy or a friend of God. It is in this second way that it enters the minds of the evil men whom it makes prophets.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis prophetia sit spiritus sancti donum, non tamen cum dono prophetiae spiritus sanctus datur, sed solummodo cum dono caritatis; unde ratio non sequitur.
| 2. Although prophecy is a gift of the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit is not given with the gift of prophecy, but only with the gift of charity. Hence, the reasoning does not follow.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod prophetia non contingit male uti, ita quod ipse prophetiae actus, inquantum a prophetia egreditur, sit malus. Cum enim aliquis prophetiae actum ad aliquod malum ordinat, tunc quidem ipse prophetiae actus bonus est, et a spiritu sancto, sed ordinatio illius actus in finem indebitum non est a spiritu sancto, sed a perversa hominis voluntate.
| 3. There is never an evil use of prophecy in the sense that the act itself of prophecy, in so far as it comes from prophecy, is evil. For, when someone directs the act of prophecy toward some evil end, the act itself of prophecy is good and comes from the Holy Spirit, but the direction of that act toward an improper end does not come from the Holy Spirit, but from the perverse will of man.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod intentio philosophi est dicere, quod ea quae divinitus dantur, dependent ex voluntate datoris, quae non potest esse irrationabilis; unde, si praescientia futurorum quae est in somniis, a Deo immitteretur, appareret in ista immissione aliqua discretio. Nunc autem non apparet, cum in quibuslibet talis divinatio fiat, quod ostendit divinationem somniorum esse a natura. In dono autem prophetiae invenimus discretionem, quia non omnibus datur, etiam qui sic vel sic dispositi sint; sed illis solis quos divina voluntas elegerit: qui tamen simpliciter non sint boni vel optimi quantum ad seipsos; sunt tamen boni quantum ad hoc quod per eos prophetae officium exerceatur, secundum quod competere iudicat sapientia divina.
| 4. The Philosopher intends to say that those things which are given by God depend on the will of the giver, and this will cannot be unreasonable. Hence, if the foreknowledge of the future which takes place in dreams were from God, some discrimination would appear in its infusion. But there is no discrimination there, since such divination takes place in anybody, and this shows that divination of dreams comes from nature. But we find discrimination in the gift of prophecy, for it is not given to everybody, even though they have this or that disposition, but only to those whom the divine will chooses. Nevertheless, these are not apt subjects or the best subjects simply in themselves. They are, however, apt subjects in so far as they perform the function of the prophet to the extent which the divine wisdom judges to be fitting.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod in hoc Deus optimus ostenditur, quod non solum bonis sed etiam malis novit bene uti; unde nihil summae bonitati derogatur, si per malos prophetas bonum prophetae officium administrari facit.
| 5. That God is best appears in this, that He knows how to make good use not only of good men, but also of evil men. Hence, if he makes evil prophets perform the good functions of prophecy, this in no wise detracts from His supreme goodness.
|
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod non quicumque est bonus est magis aptus ad prophetiam habendam quam quilibet peccator; cum aliqui caritate carentes habeant mentes aptas ad spiritualia percipienda, utpote a terrenis et carnalibus vacantes, et naturali intellectus praediti claritate; quibusdam e contrario caritatem habentibus terrenis negotiis implicitis, et carnali dantibus operam generationi, nec intellectum habentibus naturaliter perspicacem. Et ideo quandoque propter has et similes conditiones datur prophetiae donum aliquibus malis, quod denegatur aliquibus bonis.
| 6. Not every good man is more fit to become a prophet than every sinner. For some who lack charity have minds more fit to perceive spiritual things, since they are free from carnal affections and worldly cares and are gifted with a natural clarity of understanding. And, on the other hand, some who have charity are occupied with worldly business, are busy begetting children, and do not have a naturally acute understanding. Therefore, because of these and similar conditions, the gift of prophecy sometimes is given to some evil men and denied to some good men.
|
| Ad septimum dicendum, quod per gratiam prophetiae elevatur natura hominis non ad gloriam habendam directe, sed ad utilitatem aliorum; in bonis autem est natura magis elevata per gratiam gratum facientem ad gloriam obtinendam; unde ratio non sequitur.
| 7. Through the grace of prophecy man’s nature receives an elevation ordained not directly to the participation of glory, but to the utility of others. However, in good men, nature rather receives an elevation ordained to the obtaining of glory from the grace which makes its recipient pleasing to God. Hence, the reasoning does not follow.
|
Q. 12: Prophecy
ARTICLE VI
In the sixth article we ask:
Do the prophets see in the mirror of eternity?
[ARTICLE In Isaiam, cc. 1, 6; S.T., II-II, 173, 1.]
|
| Sexto quaeritur utrum prophetae videant in speculo aeternitatis
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that they do, for
|
| Quia Isa. XXXVIII, 1, super illud: dispone domui tuae etc., dicit Glossa: prophetae in libro ipso praescientiae Dei, ubi omnia scripta sunt, legunt. Sed liber praescientiae Dei nihil aliud esse videtur quam aeternitatis speculum, in quo ab aeterno omnes formae rerum resplendent. Ergo prophetae vident in speculo aeternitatis.
| 1. The Gloss on Isaiah (38:1), “Take order with your house,” says: “Prophets read in the book of the foreknowledge of God, in which all things are written.” But the book of the foreknowledge of God seems to be nothing else but the mirror of eternity, in which all the forms of things shine forth from eternity. Therefore, the prophets see in the mirror of eternity.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod prophetae dicuntur in libro praescientiae legere, aut in speculo aeternitatis videre, non materialiter quasi ipsum speculum aut librum videant, sed causaliter, quia ex libro illo vel speculo prophetiae cognitio derivatur.- Sed contra per hoc quod propheta dicuntur videre in speculo aeternitatis, aut legere in libro divinae praescientiae, attribuitur quaedam privilegiata cognitio ipsis prophetis. Sed in hoc quod dicitur aliqua cognitio derivari a speculo aeterno, vel a libro divinae praescientiae, non designatur aliquod cognitionis privilegium, cum omnis humana cognitio inde derivetur, ut patet per Dionysium, VII cap. de Divin. Nomin. Ergo non dicuntur prophetae videre in speculo aeternitatis quasi ex ipso videntes, sed quasi in ipso viso alia intuentes.
| 2. But it was said that the prophets are not said to read in the book of foreknowledge or see in the mirror of eternity in a material sense, as if they saw the mirror or the book itself, but in a causal sense, for their knowledge of prophecy is derived from that book or mirror. On the contrary, the prophets are said to see in the mirror of eternity or in the book of foreknowledge in this sense, that a kind of privileged knowledge is attributed to these prophets. But no privilege of knowledge is signified by saying that some knowledge is derived from the eternal mirror or from the book of divine foreknowledge, since all human knowledge is derived from that source, as Dionysius clearly shows. Therefore, the prophets are not said to see in the mirror of eternity in the sense that they derive knowledge from it, but in the sense that when they see the mirror itself, they see other things in it.
|
| Praeterea, nihil potest videri nisi ubi est. Sed futura contingentia non sunt secundum immobilem veritatem, prout a prophetis videntur, nisi in ipsa praescientia divina. Ergo prophetae in ipsa solum praescientia Dei vident; et sic idem quod prius.
| 3. Nothing can be seen except where it is. But future contingent things, according to the unchangeable truth with which they are seen by the prophets, exist only in the divine foreknowledge. Therefore, the prophets see them only in the foreknowledge of God. Thus, we reach the same conclusions as before.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod futura contingentia sunt quidem primordialiter in divina praescientia; sed exinde derivantur per quasdam species ad mentem humanam, ubi a propheta videntur.- Sed contra, quidquid recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis, et non per modum suum. Sed mens prophetae mutabilis est. Ergo in ea non possunt futura contingentia immobiliter recipi.
| 4 It was said that future contingent things are indeed in God as their source, but flow thence through certain species to the human mind, where they are seen by the prophet.—On the contrary, whatever is received in a thing exists there according to the manner of that which receives it and not according to its own manner. But the mind of the prophet is changeable. Therefore, future contingent things cannot be received in it in their unchanging truth.
|
| Praeterea, illud quod est proprium divinae cognitioni, non potest nisi in eo cognosci. Sed futura cognoscere est proprium Dei, ut patet Isa., XLI, 23: annuntiate quae ventura sunt (...) et dicemus quia dii estis vos. Ergo non possunt a prophetis futura contingentia videri nisi in ipso Deo.
| 5. That which is proper to the divine knowledge can be known only in God. But to know futures is proper to God, as is clear from Isaiah (41:23): “Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall say that ye are gods.” Therefore, future contingent things can be seen by the prophets only in God.
|
| Praeterea, Avicenna dicit, quod quandoque tantum elevatur mens hominis, quod coniungitur saeculo praescientiarum. Sed maxima elevatio mentis humanae est in cognitione prophetiae. Ergo videtur quod coniungatur saeculo praescientiae, ita quod futura in ipsa praescientia Dei videantur.
| 6. Avicenna says that sometimes the mind of man is elevated so high that it is united to the world of foreknowledge. But the human mind has its highest elevation in the knowledge of prophecy. Therefore, it seems that it is so united to the world of foreknowledge that future things are seen in the very foreknowledge of God.
|
| Praeterea, finis humanae vitae est, ut philosophi tradunt, ut homo secundum mentem coniungatur saeculo altiori, quod est saeculum intelligibilium substantiarum. Sed inconveniens esset, nisi homo ad finem suum perveniret. Ergo homo quandoque pervenit ad hoc quod coniungatur mente substantiis intelligibilibus, quarum suprema est divina essentia in qua omnia relucent. Ergo propheta, qui inter homines maxime habet mentem elevatam, ad hoc pervenit ut mente coniungatur essentiae divinae, quae videtur esse speculum aeternitatis et sic idem quod prius.
| 7. As the philosophers tell us, the end of human life is the union of man’s mind with a higher world, which is the world of the intelligible substances. But it would hardly fit in with what we know if man did not reach his end. Therefore, at some time man’s mind will be united with the intelligible substances, the highest of which is the divine essence, in which everything shines forth. Therefore, the prophet, who among men has the mind which receives the loftiest elevation, will have his mind united with the divine essence, which seems to be the mirror of eternity. The same conclusions follow as before.
|
| Praeterea, si sint duo specula, quorum unum sit superius, et alterum inferius, et a speculo superiori resultent similitudines in inferiori; ille qui in inferiori speculo species videt, non dicitur in superiori videre, quamvis eius visio quodammodo a superiori speculo derivetur. Sed a mente divina resultant rerum futurarum species in mente prophetae, sicut a speculo superiori in speculum inferius. Ergo ex hoc quod propheta intuetur in sua mente species receptas a mente divina, non debet dici videre in mente divina, sed in propria mente. Sed mens propria non est speculum aeternitatis, sed temporale. Ergo si prophetae non videant nisi in mente propria, ut prius dicebatur, non dicerentur videre in speculo aeternitatis, sed in temporali, quamvis a speculo aeterno derivetur.
| 8. If there should be two mirrors, one higher and the other lower, and the likenesses come into the lower from the higher, one who sees the species in the lower mirror is not said to see them in the higher, although his sight is in a way derived from the higher mirror. But the species of future things come into the mind of the prophet from the divine mind, as into a lower mirror from a higher mirror. Therefore, the fact that the prophet sees in his own mind species received from the divine mind does not force us to say that he sees them in the divine mind, but rather in his own mind. But his own mind is not the mirror of eternity, but a mirror dependent on time. Therefore, if the prophets see only in their own minds, as has just been said, we should not say that they see in the mirror of eternity, but in a mirror which is dependent on time, although derived from the eternal mirror.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod aliquis dicitur videre non solum in re illuminata per solem, sed etiam in sole ipso, inquantum per illuminationem solis videt.- Sed contra est quod in sole non resultant rerum similitudines visibilium, quod videtur ad rationem speculi pertinere. Ergo videtur quod videre in sole non sic dicatur sicut videre in speculo.
| 9. But it was said that someone is said to see not only in the thing illumined by the sun, but also in the sun itself, in so far as he sees by reason of the illumination of the sun.—On the contrary, the likenesses of visible things do not exist in the sun, yet this seems to pertain to the nature of a mirror. Therefore, it seems that to see something in the sun does not mean the same as to see it in a mirror.
|
| Praeterea, visio qua videtur Deus ut est obiectum beatitudinis, est dignior quam illa qua videtur ut species rerum: quia illa facit beatum, ista vero non. Sed ad videndum Deum ut est beatitudinis obiectum, homo in statu viae existens potest elevari maiori elevatione, qua scilicet mens abstrahitur omnino a sensibus, ut est in raptu. Ergo minori elevatione etiam sine raptu potest elevari mens prophetae ad videndum essentiam divinam, ut est species rerum; et sic propheta potest videre in speculo aeternitatis.
| 10. The sight by which we see God as the object of beatitude is more lofty than that by which we see Him as an intentional likeness of things, for the former makes one blessed, and the latter does not. But a man living in this life can be raised up to see God as the object of beatitude by a loftier elevation, namely, that by which the mind is altogether transported out of the senses, as happens in rapture. Therefore, the mind of a prophet can be raised up to see the divine essence as the intentional likeness of things by a lesser elevation without rapture. Thus, the prophet can see things in the mirror of eternity.
|
| Praeterea, plus distat essentia divina, prout in se consideratur, et prout est similitudo alterius rei, quam prout est similitudo unius rei et similitudo alterius: quia plus distat Deus a creatura quam una ab alia. Sed aliquis potest videre Deum ut est species unius creaturae, sine hoc quod videat eum ut est species creaturae alterius; alias oporteret quod omnes videntes Deum omnia cognoscerent. Ergo aliquis potest videre eum ut est species quarumdam rerum, sine hoc quod videat essentiam eius in seipsa. Ergo etiam qui non vident Deum per essentiam, possunt videre in speculo aeternitatis; quod maxime videtur prophetis competere.
| 11. The difference between the divine essence as considered in itself and as the likeness of something else, is greater than the difference between the divine essence as the likeness of one thing and as the likeness of another. For God is farther from any creature than one creature is from another. But one can see God in so far as He is the intentional likeness of one thing without seeing Him in so far as He is the likeness of something else. Otherwise, it would be necessary for all who saw God to know everything. Therefore, one can see God as the intentional likeness of some things without seeing His essence in itself. Therefore, those who do not see God through His essence can see in the mirror of eternity. And this seems especially to belong to the prophets.
|
| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, VI de Trinitate, quod quorumdam mentes ita elevantur, ut in ipsa suprema rerum arce incommutabiles rationes inspiciant. Sed prophetarum mentes videntur esse maxime elevatae. Ergo videtur quod ea quae prophetice vident, in ipsa rerum arce inspiciant, scilicet divina essentia; et sic idem quod prius.
| 12. Augustine says that the minds of some are elevated in such a manner that they look at the unchangeable intelligible natures in the highest citadel of all reality. But the minds of the prophets seem to have the most lofty elevation. Therefore, it seems that those things which they see prophetically they see in the very citadel of all reality, that is to say, in the divine essence. The same conclusion follows as before.
|
| Praeterea, iudicium non potest esse de aliquo nisi per id quod est eo superius, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. de vera Relig. Sed ea de quibus prophetae iudicant, sunt rerum immobiles veritates. Ergo non potest esse quod de eis iudicent per aliquid temporale et mobile, sed per immobilem veritatem, quae est ipse Deus; et sic idem quod prius.
| 13. A thing can be judged only by that which is superior to it, as is clear from Augustine. But the prophets judge about the unchangeable truths of reality. Therefore, it is not possible for them to judge of these things through anything transitory and changeable, but through the unchangeable truth, which is God Himself. Thus, we reach the same conclusion as before.
|
| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
|
| Est quod Luc. X, 24, super illud, dico vobis quod multi prophetae et reges etc. dicit Glossa: prophetae et iusti a longe gloriam Dei viderunt per speculum in aenigmate. Sed qui videt in ipsa aeterna praescientia Dei, non videt in aenigmate. Ergo prophetae non viderunt in ipsa praescientia divina, quam speculum aeternitatis appellant.
| 1. The Gloss on the Gospel of St. Luke (10:24), “Many kings and prophets...” says” that the prophets and just men saw the glory of God from afar, through a mirror darkly. But one who sees in the eternal foreknowledge of God does not see darkly. Therefore, prophets did not see in the divine foreknowledge, which they call the mirror of eternity.
|
| Praeterea, Gregorius dicit super Ezech. in II omelia secundae partis: quamdiu in hac mortali carne vivitur, nullus ita in contemplationis virtute proficit ut in ipso iam incircumscripto luminis radio mentis oculos infigat. Neque enim omnipotens Deus iam in sua claritate conspicitur; sed quiddam sub illa speculatur anima, unde refecta proficiat, et post ad visionis eius gloriam pertingat. Sic namque Isaias propheta cum se dominum vidisse fateretur, dicens: vidi dominum sedentem etc. protinus adiunxit: et ea quae sub ipso erant replebant templum quia, sicut dictum est, cum mens in contemplatione profecerit, non iam quod ipse est, sed quod sub ipso est contemplatur. Ex quo patet quod Isaias et alii prophetae non viderunt in ipso speculo aeterno.
| 2. Gregory says: “As long as we live in this mortal flesh, no one advances so far in the power of contemplation that he fixes the eyes of his mind on that incomprehensible beam of light. For we do not now see the omnipotent God in His brightness, but the soul does observe something beneath that brightness. Strengthened by this sight, it advances and later reaches the glory of His sight. It was thus that the prophet Isaiah (6:1), when he confessed that he had seen the Lord, said immediately: ‘I saw the Lord sitting...’ and added: ‘and the things beneath him filled the temple,’ because, as has been said, when the mind advances in contemplation, it does not fix its gaze on what He is, but on that which is below Him.” From this it is clear that Isaiah and the other prophets did not see anything in the eternal mirror.
|
| Praeterea, nullus malus potest in speculo aeterno videre, unde dicitur Isa. XXVI, v. 10, secundum aliam litteram: tollatur impius, ne videat gloriam Dei. Sed aliqui mali sunt prophetae. Ergo prophetica visio non est in speculo aeterno.
| 3. No evil man can see in the eternal mirror, for Isaiah (26:10) says, according to a variant reading: “Let the wicked man be carried away, lest he see the glory of God.” But some evil men are prophets. Therefore, prophetic vision does not take place in the eternal mirror.
|
| Praeterea, prophetae de rebus quas prophetice vident, habent distinctam cognitionem. Sed speculum aeternum, cum sit penitus uniforme, non videtur esse tale ut in eo possit plurium rerum distincta cognitio accipi. Ergo visio prophetica non est in speculo aeterno.
| 4. The prophets have distinct knowledge of the things which they see prophetically. But, since the eternal mirror is entirely uniform, it does not seem to be the kind of thing in which one could perceive many things separately. Therefore, there is no prophetic sight in the eternal mirror.
|
| Praeterea, non videtur aliquid in speculo quod est coniunctum visui, sed in speculo distante. Sed speculum aeternitatis est menti prophetae coniunctum, cum ipse Deus sit in omnibus per essentiam. Ergo mens prophetae non potest in speculo aeterno videre.
| 5. We do not see something in a mirror which is in contact with the sense of sight, but in a mirror which is at a distance. But the mirror of eternity is in contact with the mind of the prophet, since God is in everything by His essence. Therefore, the mind of the prophet cannot see in the eternal mirror.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod speculum, proprie loquendo, non invenitur nisi in rebus materialibus. Sed in rebus spiritualibus per quamdam transumptionem dicitur per similitudinem acceptam a speculo materiali; ut scilicet in rebus spiritualibus dicatur esse speculum id in quo alia repraesentantur, sicut in speculo materiali rerum visibilium formae apparent.
| Properly speaking, a mirror exists only in material things. But in spiritual things something is called a mirror in a transferred sense, because of the likeness taken from the material mirror. Thus, in spiritual things we call that a mirror in which other things are represented, just as the forms of visible things appear in a material mirror.
|
| Sic ergo dicunt quidam, ipsam mentem divinam, in qua omnes rerum rationes relucent, esse speculum quoddam; et dici aeternitatis speculum ex hoc quod est aeternum, quasi aeternitatem habens. Dicunt igitur, quod istud speculum videri potest dupliciter. Vel per essentiam suam, secundum quod est beatitudinis obiectum; et sic non videtur nisi a beatis, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid, sicut in raptu. Vel prout in eo resultant rerum similitudines; et sic proprie videtur ut speculum. Et hoc modo dicunt speculum aeternitatis visum ab Angelis ante suam beatitudinem, et a prophetis. Sed haec opinio non videtur rationabilis, propter duo.
| Therefore, some” say that the divine mind, in which all the intelligible characters of things shine forth, is a kind of mirror, and that it is called the mirror of eternity because it is eternal, inasmuch as it has eternity. Accordingly, they say that that mirror can be seen in two ways. It can be seen either through its essence, as the object of beatitude, and in this way it is seen only by those who have beatitude in its fullness or in some respect, as those in a rapture. Or it can be seen in so far as the likenesses of things are reflected in it, and in this way it is properly seen as a mirror. And they say that the mirror of eternity was seen in this way by the angels before they received beatitude, and by the prophets. But this opinion seems unreasonable on two scores.
|
| Primo, quia ipsae species rerum in mente divina resultantes non sunt aliud secundum rem ab ipsa essentia divina; sed huiusmodi species vel rationes distinguuntur in ipsa secundum diversos respectus eius ad creaturas diversas. Cognoscere igitur divinam essentiam et species in ipsa resultantes, nihil est aliud quam cognoscere ipsam in se et relatam ad aliud. Prius est autem cognoscere aliquid in se quam prout est ad aliud comparatum; unde visio qua videtur Deus ut est rerum species, praesupponit illam qua videtur Deus ut est in se essentia quaedam, secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis. Unde impossibile est quod aliquis videat Deum, secundum quod est species rerum, et non videat eum, secundum quod est beatitudinis obiectum.
| First, these intentional likenesses of things reflected in the divine mind are not really anything different from the divine essence itself. But the likenesses and intelligible natures of this sort are distinguished in it in so far as it is related differently to different creatures. Therefore, to know the divine essence and the intentional likenesses reflected in it is nothing else than to know the divine essence in itself and in relation to other things. But one knows something in itself before knowing it as related to something else. Hence, the vision by which God is seen as the intentional likeness of things presupposes that vision by which He Himself is seen as an essence, in so far as He is the object of beatitude. Thus, it is impossible for someone to see God as the species of things and not to see Him as the object of beatitude.
|
| Secundo, quia species alicuius rei invenitur in alio dupliciter: uno modo sicut praeexistens ad rem cuius est species; alio modo sicut a re ipsa resultans. Illud igitur in quo apparent species rerum ut praeexistentes ad rem, non potest proprie speculum dici, sed magis exemplar. Illud autem speculum potest dici in quo rerum similitudines a rebus ipsis resultant.
| Second, the intentional likeness of one thing is found in another in two ways. In the first way, it is there as pre-existing before the thing of which it is the likeness, and, in the second, as arising from the thing itself. Accordingly, that in which the likenesses of things appear as existing before the things cannot properly be called a mirror, but, rather, an exemplar. But that in which likenesses of things are caused by the things themselves can be called a mirror.
|
| Quia igitur in Deo sunt species vel rationes rerum, nusquam invenitur dictum a sanctis, quod Deus sit rerum speculum, sed magis quod ipsae res creatae sunt speculum Dei, prout dicitur I Corinth. cap. XIII, 12: videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate; et sic etiam dicitur filius esse speculum patris, prout a patre in ipso species divinitatis recipitur, secundum quod habetur, Sap. VII, 26: candor enim est lucis aeternae et speculum sine macula Dei maiestatis.
| Accordingly, it has never been said by the saints that God is the mirror of things, because there are in God the intentional likenesses or intelligible natures of things, but that created things themselves are the mirror of God, according to the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:12): “We see now through a glass in a dark manner.” And it is thus, too, that the Son is called the mirror of the Father, inasmuch as the species of Divinity is received in Him from the Father, according to Wisdom (7:2 6): “For she is the brightness of eternal light and the unspotted mirror of God’s majesty.”
|
| Quod igitur a magistris dicitur, prophetas in speculo aeternitatis videre, non sic intelligendum est quasi ipsum Deum aeternum videant prout est speculum rerum; sed quia aliquid creatum intuentur, in quo ipsa aeternitas Dei repraesentatur: ut sic speculum aeternitatis intelligatur non quod est aeternum, sed quod est aeternitatem repraesentans. Ex hoc enim Deo competit futura certitudinaliter, ut praesentia, cognoscere, ut Boetius dicit, quia eius intuitus aeternitate mensuratur, quae est tota simul, unde uni eius aspectui subiacent omnia tempora, et quae in eis geruntur.
| But when the Masters say that the prophets see in the mirror of eternity, we should not take this to mean that they see the eternal God Himself in so far as He is the mirror of things, but that they see something created, in which the eternity of God is portrayed. Thus, we understand that the mirror of eternity is not itself eternal, but represents eternity. For it belongs to God to have the same certain knowledge of the future as He has of the present, as Boethius says, because His sight is measured by eternity, in which everything is simultaneous. Hence, all times and all that take place in them are present to His sight at once.
|
| In quantum igitur ab isto divino aspectu resultat in mente prophetae futurorum scientia per lumen propheticum, et per species in quibus propheta videt, ipsae species simul cum lumine prophetico speculum aeternitatis dicuntur, quia divinum intuitum repraesentant, prout in aeternitate futurorum eventus praesentialiter inspicit.
| Accordingly, in so far as the knowledge of the future is reflected in the mind of the prophet from that divine sight by means of the prophetic light and through the species in which the prophet sees, those species together with the prophetic light are called the mirror of eternity, since they represent the divine sight in so far as in eternity it sees all future events as present.
|
| Concedendum est ergo, quod prophetae in speculo aeternitatis vident, non ita quod speculum aeternum videant, ut obiectiones pro prima parte inductae ostendere videbantur; unde ad eas per ordinem respondendum est.
| Therefore, we must concede that the prophets see in the mirror of eternity, but not that they see the eternal mirror as the first set of difficulties seemed to show. Therefore, we must answer them in order.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
|
| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod prophetae in libro praescientiae dicuntur legere hac similitudine, quia ex ipso libro divinae praescientiae efficitur rerum futurarum notitia in mente prophetae, sicut ex lectione libri efficitur notitia rerum quae scribuntur in libro, in mente legentis; non autem quantum ad hanc similitudinem quod propheta ipsam Dei praescientiam videat, sicut legens in libro materiali videt librum materialem.
| 1. The metaphor which says that the prophets read in the book of foreknowledge means that the book of divine foreknowledge is a source of the knowledge of the future in the mind of the prophet, just as reading a book is the source of knowledge in the mind of the reader of the things which are written in the book. It does not mean that the prophet sees the very foreknowledge of God as one who reads a material book sees the material book.
|
| Vel potest dici, quod sicut notitia quae fit in mente prophetae, dicitur speculum aeternitatis, id est aeternitatem repraesentans; ita potest dici liber praescientiae quasi materialiter, quia in ea notitia Dei praescientia quantum ad aliquid describitur.
| Or we can say that the knowledge which is caused in the mind of the prophet is called the mirror of eternity, that is, something which represents eternity. Thus, it can be called the book of foreknowledge in a material sense, since the foreknowledge of God is to some extent copied in that knowledge.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis omnis cognitio a divina praescientia derivetur, non tamen omnis cognitio repraesentat eam, ut ratione aeternitatis etiam futura praesentialiter intueatur. Unde non potest dici quaelibet scientia speculum aeternitatis; sed in hoc privilegiata ostenditur cognitio prophetarum.
| 2. Although all knowledge is derived from the divine foreknowledge, not all knowledge represents it in such a way that its eternity makes us see even future things as present. Hence, not any knowledge can be called a mirror of eternity. But in this we see the privileged nature of the knowledge of the prophets.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod rationes futurorum contingentium secundum immobilem veritatem originaliter sunt in mente divina, sed exinde effluunt in mentem prophetae; et sic in revelatione accepta, propheta futura immobiliter cognoscere potest.
| 3. The intelligible natures of future contingent things exist according to unchangeable truth in the divine mind as in their source, but they flow thence to the mind of the prophet. Hence, in the revelation which he receives the prophet can have unchangeable knowledge of future things.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod forma recepta sequitur modum recipientis quantum ad aliquid, prout habet esse in subiecto; est enim in eo materialiter vel immaterialiter, uniformiter vel multipliciter, secundum exigentiam subiecti recipientis. Sed quantum ad aliquid forma recepta trahit subiectum recipiens ad modum suum: prout scilicet nobilitates quae sunt de ratione formae, communicantur subiecto recipienti. Sic enim subiectum per formam perficitur et nobilitatur. Et hoc modo per gloriam immortalitatis corpus corruptibile immortale efficitur; et similiter etiam per irradiationem ab immobili veritate elevatur mens prophetae ad hoc quod mobilia immobiliter videat.
| 4. A form which is received follows the manner of the receiver in some respects, in so far as it has existence in the subject. For it is there materially or immaterially, uniformly or variably, according to the requirements of the subject receiving it. But the form which is received does in some respects draw the subject to its own mode of being, in so far as, for instance, the excellences which belong to the nature of the form are communicated to the receiving subject. For in this way the subject is perfected and ennobled through the form. And in this way the corruptible body is made immortal by reason of the glory of immortality, and similarly, by the light of unchangeable truth the mind of the prophet is raised up to see changeable things in their unchangeable truth.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod quia futurorum notitia est Deo propria, ideo futurorum cognitio non potest accipi nisi a Deo; non tamen oportet quod ipsum Deum videat quicumque futura a Deo cognoscit.
| 5. Since knowledge of the future is proper to God, it therefore can be received only from God. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for everyone who learns the future from God to see God Himself.
|
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod mens prophetae, secundum illum philosophum, saeculo praescientiarum sive intelligentiarum coniungitur, non quod ipsas intelligentias videat, sed quia ex ipsarum irradiatione, earum praescientiae particeps fit.
| 6. According to that philosopher, the mind of the prophet is united to the world of the intelligences or foreknowledge, not in the sense that it sees these intelligences themselves, but in the sense that it shares in their foreknowledge from their illumination.
|
| Ad septimum dicendum, quod etiam secundum fidem finis humanae vitae est ut homo saeculo altiori coniungatur; sed ad hunc finem pertingitur solum in patria, non in via.
| 7. According to the faith, too, the end of human life is for man to be united with a higher world. But man reaches this end only in heaven, not in this life.
|
| Ad octavum dicendum, quod speculum in quo videt propheta, quamvis sit temporale, tamen est Dei aeternam praescientiam repraesentans; et secundum hoc in speculo aeternitatis videt.
| 8. Although the mirror in which the prophet sees is dependent on time, it represents the eternal foreknowledge of God. And in this sense he sees in the mirror of eternity.
|
| Ad nonum dicendum, quod quamvis sol non possit dici speculum rerum visibilium, tamen res visibiles quodammodo possunt dici speculum solis, inquantum in eis claritas solis refulget; et sic etiam notitia in mente prophetae effecta dicitur aeternitatis speculum.
| 9. Although the sun cannot be called the mirror of visible things, visible things can in some way be called the mirror of the sun, in so far as the brightness of the sun shines in them. Thus, too, the knowledge caused in the mind of the prophet is called the mirror of eternity.
|
| Ad decimum dicendum, quod perfectior est visio qua videtur Deus ut est species rerum, quam illa qua videtur ut est beatitudinis obiectum: quia haec illam praesupponit et eam perfectiorem esse ostendit: perfectius enim videt causam qui in ea eius effectus inspicere potest, quam qui solam essentiam causae videt.
| 10. The sight by which God is seen as the intentional likeness of things is more perfect than that by which He is seen as the object of beatitude. For the latter presupposes the former and shows that it is more perfect. For one who can see the effects in the cause sees better than one who sees only the essence of the cause.
|
| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod relatio qua Deus refertur ad unam creaturam, non praesupponit relationem qua refertur ad alteram, sicut relatio qua refertur ad creaturam, praesupponit ipsam Dei essentiam absolute; et sic non sequitur.
| 11. The relation by which God is referred to one creature does not presuppose the relation by which He is referred to another the way the relation by which He is referred to a creature presupposes the essence of God taken absolutely. Thus, the argument does not follow.
|
| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod verbum Augustini non est referendum ad visionem prophetarum, sed ad visionem sanctorum in patria, vel eorum qui in statu viae vident secundum modum patriae, ut Paulus in raptu.
| 12. We should not apply Augustine’s words to the sight of the prophets, but to the vision of the saints in heaven, or of those who, in this life, see in the manner of heaven, as Paul did when enraptured (2 Cor. 12:1-13).
|
| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod de immobili veritate futurorum prophetae iudicant per veritatem increatam, non quia eam videant, sed quia ab ea illustrantur.
| 13 Prophets judge about the unchangeable truth of future events by means of uncreated truth, not because they see it, but because they are enlightened by it.
|
|
| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
|
| Rationes autem quae sunt in contrarium, concedimus quantum ad hoc quod non vident ipsum Deum aeternum, quamvis in speculo aeternitatis videant, ut dictum est. Duae tamen ultimae rationes non recte concludunt: quia, quamvis Deus sit omnino uniformis, tamen in eo rerum cognitio distincte accipi potest, prout ipse est propria ratio uniuscuiusque. Similiter quamvis speculum a materialibus ad spiritualia transferatur, non tamen haec translatio attenditur secundum omnes conditiones speculi materialis, ut quamlibet earum in speculo spirituali observare oporteat, sed solum secundum repraesentationem.
| We concede the reasons to the contrary in so far as they state that the prophets do not see the eternal God Himself, although they do see in the mirror of eternity, as we have said. But the last two arguments do not conclude correctly, for, although there is complete uniformity in God, nevertheless, in Him things can be known distinctly inasmuch as He is the proper exemplar of each one. Similarly, although mirror is transferred from material to spiritual things, in this transfer we do not apply all the conditions of the material mirror, so that all of these conditions have to be found in the spiritual mirror. Rather, we take it only according to the act of representing.
|
Q. 12: Prophecy
ARTICLE VII
In the seventh article we ask:
Does God in the revelation made to a prophet imprint on the mind of the prophet new species of things or only intellectual light?
[ARTICLE 1 Cor., c. 14, lect. i; In Isaiam, 1; S.T., II-II, 173, 2.]
|
| Septimo quaeritur utrum in revelatione prophetica imprimantur divinitus in mentem prophetae novae rerum species, vel solum intellectuale lumen
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod solum lumen sine speciebus.
| It seems that He imprints only intellectual light without the species, for
|
| Quia, ut habetur in Glossa II Corinth. XIV, 2, a sola visione intellectuali dicitur aliquis propheta. Sed visio intellectualis non est de rebus per rerum similitudines, sed per ipsas rerum essentias, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo in visione prophetica nullae species in mente prophetae sunt.
| 1. The Gloss on the first Epistle to the Corinthians (14:2): says that one is called prophet because of intellectual sight alone. But intellectual sight does not refer to things through likenesses of the things, but through their very essences, as is said in the same Gloss. Therefore, in prophetic sight no species are imprinted on the mind of the prophet.
|
| Praeterea, intellectus abstrahit a materia et materialibus conditionibus. Si igitur in visione intellectuali, quae facit prophetam, fiant aliquae similitudines, illae similitudines non erunt admixtae materiae vel conditionibus materialibus. Ergo per eas propheta non poterit cognoscere particularia, sed universalia solum.
| 2. Our understanding abstracts from matter and material conditions. If, therefore, in the intellectual sight which constitutes prophecy some likenesses are produced, those likenesses will not be involved with matter or material conditions. Therefore, through them the prophet will not be able to know particular things, but only universals.
|
| Praeterea, earum rerum de quibus fit prophetae revelatio, habent prophetae aliquas species in mente sua; sicut Ieremias, qui prophetabat combustionem Ierusalem, habebat in anima sua speciem civitatis illius a sensu acceptam, et similiter ignis comburentis, quem frequenter viderat. Si igitur aliae species earumdem rerum menti prophetae divinitus imprimantur, sequetur quod sint duae formae eiusdem rationis in eodem subiecto: quod est inconveniens.
| 3 Prophets have in their minds some species of those things which are revealed to them. Thus, Jeremiah, who prophesied the burning of Jerusalem, had in his soul a species of that city received from sense, and, similarly, he had a species of fire burning, which he had frequently seen. If, then, other species of the same things are imprinted by God on the mind of the prophet, it follows that there would be in the same subject two forms with the same specific nature. But this is incorrect.
|
| Praeterea, visio qua videtur divina essentia, est potior quam illa qua videntur quaecumque rerum species. Sed visio qua videtur essentia divina, non sufficit ad accipiendam cognitionem de rebus quibuscumque: alias videntes essentiam divinam omnia viderent. Ergo nec species quaecumque menti prophetae imprimantur, poterunt prophetam ducere in rerum cognitionem.
| 4. The sight by which one sees the divine essence is more powerful than the sight by which one sees the species of anything else whatever. But the sight by which one sees the divine essence is not enough to acquire knowledge of all things whatever. Otherwise, those who saw the divine essence would see everything. Therefore, no matter what species are imprinted on the mind of the prophet, they will not be able to cause the prophet to know reality.
|
| Praeterea, illud quod quis potest propria virtute efficere, non oportet quod in propheta divina operatione fiat. Sed quilibet potest rerum quarumlibet in mente sua species formare per virtutem imaginativam, quae componit et dividit imagines a rebus acceptas. Ergo non oportet quod aliquae rerum species in animam prophetae divinitus imprimantur.
| 5. It is not necessary for the divine action to produce in the prophet that which anyone can do of his own power. But through the power of imagination, which joins and divides the images received from things, anyone can form in his mind the species of anything whatever. Therefore, it is not necessary for the species of things to be impressed by God on the soul of the prophet.
|
| Praeterea, natura operatur breviori via qua potest; et multo magis Deus, qui ordinatius operatur. Sed brevior via est ut a speciebus quae in anima prophetae sunt, ducatur in rerum aliqualem cognitionem, quam ex aliis speciebus de novo impressis. Ergo non videtur quod aliquae species de novo imprimantur.
| 6. Nature works through the shortest way possible; much more so does God, whose works have even better order. But the shorter way is to bring the prophet to some knowledge of things by means of the species which are in his soul, rather than by other newly imprinted species. Therefore, it does not seem that any species are imprinted anew.
|
| Praeterea, ut dicit Glossa Hieronymi, Amos I, 2: prophetae utuntur similitudinibus rerum in quibus conversati sunt. Hoc autem non esset, si eorum visiones fierent per species de novo impressas. Ergo non imprimuntur aliquae species in animam prophetae de novo, sed solum lumen propheticum.
| 7. The gloss of Jerome on Amos(1:2) reads: “Prophets use likenesses of things with which they are familiar.”But this would not be so if their visions took place through newly imprinted species. Therefore, no new species, but only the prophetic light, is imprinted on the soul of the prophet.
|
| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
|
| Visus non determinatur ad aliquod determinatum visibile cognoscendum per lumen, sed per species visibilis; et similiter intellectus possibilis non determinatur ad intelligibilia cognoscenda per lumen intellectus agentis, sed per species intelligibiles. Cum ergo cognitio prophetae determinetur ad quaedam quae prius non cognoscebat, videtur quod non sufficiat luminis infusio, nisi etiam species imprimantur.
| 1. It is not through light, but through a species of something visible, that sight receives the determination to know some definite visible object. Likewise, it is not through the light of the agent intellect, but through an intelligible species, that the possible intellect receives the determination to know intelligible objects. Therefore, since the knowledge of the prophet receives a determination to some things which he did not know before, it seems that the infusion of light without the impression of species is not sufficient.
|
| Praeterea, Dionysius dicit in I cap. caelestis hierarchiae, quod impossibile est nobis superlucere divinum radium nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum. Velamina autem appellat figuras. Ergo prophetae non infunditur lumen intelligibile nisi figurativis speciebus.
| 2. Dionysius says: “It is impossible for the divine radiance to shine on us unless it is shrouded with a variety of sacred veils.”But for him figures are veils. Therefore, intelligible light is showered on the prophet only with figurative likenesses.
|
| Praeterea, in omnibus prophetis infusio luminis est uniformis. Sed non omnes prophetae uniformem cognitionem accipiunt; cum quidam de praesenti, quidam de praeterito, quidam de futuro prophetent, ut Glossa Gregorii dicit super principium Ezech. Ergo non solum lumen prophetis infunditur, sed aliquae species imprimuntur, quibus prophetarum cognitiones distinguantur.
| 3. The infusion of light is uniform in all the prophets. But not all the prophets receive uniform knowledge, since some prophesy of the present, some of the past, and some of the future, as Gregory says. Therefore, there is not only the infusion of prophetic light but the impression of certain species by which the knowledge of the various prophets is distinguished.
|
| Praeterea, revelatio prophetica fit secundum locutionem interiorem ad prophetam per Deum vel per Angelum factam; sicut patet omnium prophetarum scripta intuenti. Sed locutio omnis fit per aliqua signa. Ergo revelatio prophetica fit per aliquas similitudines.
| 4. The prophet receives the prophetic revelation through internal speech made to him by God or by an angel. This is clear to anyone who looks at the writings of all the prophets. But all speech takes place through some signs. Therefore, prophetic revelation takes place through some likenesses.
|
| Praeterea, visio imaginaria et intellectualis sunt excellentiores corporali. Sed quando fit visio corporalis supernaturaliter, tunc nova species corporalis videntis oculis exhibetur, sicut patet de manu scribentis in pariete ostensa Balthassari, Daniel. V, 5. Ergo multo amplius oportet quod in visione imaginaria et intellectuali supernaturaliter factis novae species imprimantur.
| 5. The sight of the imagination and of the understanding are higher than bodily sight. But when bodily sight takes place supernaturally, a new bodily species is shown to the eyes of the one who sees, as is evident in the case of the hand of one writing on the wall which appeared to Baltazar (Daniel 5:5). Therefore, it is much more necessary for new species to be imprinted on the sight of the imagination and the understanding when these take place supernaturally.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod prophetia est quaedam supernaturalis cognitio. Ad cognitionem autem duo requiruntur; scilicet acceptio cognitorum, et iudicium de acceptis, ut supra dictum est. Quandoque igitur cognitio est supernaturalis secundum acceptionem tantum, quandoque secundum iudicium tantum, quandoque secundum utrumque.
| Prophecy is a kind of supernatural knowledge. But two things are required for knowledge: reception of the things known, and judgment of what is received, as we have said previously. Accordingly, knowledge is supernatural sometimes only in reception, sometimes only in judgment, and sometimes in both.
|
| Si autem sit secundum acceptionem tantum supernaturalis, non dicetur ex hoc aliquis propheta; sicut Pharao non est dictus propheta, qui supernaturaliter accepit futurae fertilitatis et sterilitatis indicium, sub boum et spicarum figuris. Si vero habeat supernaturale iudicium, vel simul iudicium et acceptionem, ex hoc dicetur esse propheta.
| However, one is not called a prophet if this knowledge is supernatural only in reception, just as Pharaoh, who supernaturally received a sign of abundance and famine under the figures of oxen and ears of corn (Genesis 41:25-36), was not called a prophet. But, if someone has supernatural judgment or judgment and reception together, he is called a prophet.
|
| Acceptio autem supernaturalis non potest esse nisi secundum tria genera visionis: scilicet secundum visionem corporalem, quando aliqua corporalibus oculis divinitus demonstrantur, ut manus scribens Baltasar; et secundum imaginariam visionem, quando divinitus aliquae rerum figurae prophetis ostenduntur, ut olla succensa Ieremiae, et equi et montes Zachariae; et secundum intellectualem, quando aliqua intellectui ostenduntur supra naturalem facultatem.
| Now, supernatural reception can take place only through the three kinds of sight: through bodily sight, when certain things are shown to the bodily eyes by the divine power, as the hand of one writing was shown to Baltazar (Daniel 5:5); through the sight of imagination, when by the divine power some figures of things appear to the prophets, as the boiling cauldron appeared to Jeremiah (1:13) and horses and mountains to Zacharias (6:1-6); and through intellectual sight, when something is shown to the understanding in a way which surpasses its natural capacity.
|
| Cum autem intellectus humanus sit in potentia naturali ad omnes formas intelligibiles sensibilium rerum, non erit supernaturalis acceptio, quaecumque species intelligibiles in intellectu fiant, sicut erat supernaturalis acceptio in visione corporali quando inspiciuntur res quae non sunt secundum naturam formatae, sed solummodo divinitus ad aliquid ostendendum; et sicut erat supernaturalis acceptio in visione imaginaria, quando videntur aliquae similitudines non a sensibus acceptae, sed per aliquam vim animae formatae. Sed tunc solum intellectus supernaturaliter accipit, quando videt ipsas substantias intelligibiles per essentiam suam, utpote Deum et Angelos, ad quod pertingere non potest secundum virtutem naturae suae.
| But, since the human understanding is in natural potency to all the intelligible forms of sensible things, no matter what intelligible species arise in the understanding, there will be no supernatural reception; as there was supernatural reception in bodily vision when it saw things which were not formed naturally, but only by the divine power in order to reveal something. Similarly, there was supernatural reception in the sight of imagination when it saw some likenesses not received from the senses, but fashioned through some force of the soul. But our understanding receives supernaturally only when it sees through their essence the intelligible substances themselves, such as God and the angels. For it cannot reach this by virtue of its nature.
|
| Inter has autem tres supernaturales acceptiones haec ultima excedit modum prophetiae, unde dicitur Num. XI: si quis fuerit inter vos propheta domini, in somnio aut visione loquar ad eum. At non talis servus meus Moyses, qui palam, et non per figuras et aenigmata, videt Deum. Videre igitur Deum in essentia sua, sicut videtur in raptu, vel sicut videtur a beatis; aut etiam videre alias substantias intelligibiles per essentiam suam, modum propheticae visionis excedit.
| But the last of these three supernatural receptions surpasses the mode of prophecy. Hence, we read in Numbers (12:6-8): “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. But it is not so with my servant Moses... and plainly, and not in riddles and figures doth he see the Lord.” But to see God in His essence, as He is seen in rapture or by the blessed, or to see other intelligible substances through their essence, surpasses the mode of prophetic sight.
|
| Sed prima supernaturalis acceptio, scilicet quae est secundum corporalem visionem, est infra propheticam acceptionem; quia per hanc acceptionem non praefertur propheta aliis quibuscumque; cum speciem divinitus formatam ad videndum, omnes aequaliter videre possint. Supernaturalis ergo acceptio quae est propria prophetiae, est acceptio imaginariae visionis. Sic ergo omnis propheta vel habet iudicium tantum supernaturale de his quae ab alio videntur, sicut Ioseph de visis a Pharaone; vel habet acceptionem simul cum iudicio secundum imaginariam visionem.
| But the first supernatural reception, which takes place through bodily sight, is lower than prophetic reception. For in this reception the prophet is not given preference over anyone else, since all can equally see a species which God fashions for sight. Therefore, the supernatural reception which is proper to prophecy is the reception of the sight of imagination. Thus, every prophet has either only supernatural judgment of those things which are seen by another, as Joseph did about the things which Pharaoh saw (Genesis 41:25-36), or reception through the sight of imagination together with judgment.
|
| Iudicium igitur supernaturale prophetae datur secundum lumen ei infusum, ex quo intellectus roboratur ad iudicandum; et quantum ad hoc nullae species exiguntur. Sed quantum ad acceptionem requiritur nova formatio specierum, sive ut fiant in mente prophetae species quae prius non fuerunt, utpote si alicui caeco nato imprimerentur species colorum; sive ut species praeexistentes ordinentur et componantur divinitus tali modo quod competat significationi rerum quae debent prophetae ostendi. Et per hunc modum concedendum est, quod prophetae revelatio non solum fit secundum lumen, sed secundum species etiam; quandoque vero secundum species; quandoque vero secundum lumen tantum.
| Therefore, supernatural judgment is given to the prophet through the light infused in him which gives his understanding strength to judge. For this no species are required, but for reception there must be a new formation of species, whether to produce in the mind of the prophet species which were not there previously, as the species of colors might be imprinted on one born blind, or by the divine power to set in order and join the pre-existing species in a way which is capable of signifying the things which should be shown to the prophet. We must concede that revelation is made to the prophet in this way not only through the light, but also through species; but sometimes it is according to the light alone.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
|
| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod quamvis propheta non dicatur nisi qui habet intellectualem visionem, non tamen sola visio intellectualis ad prophetiam pertinet, sed etiam imaginaria, in qua species formari possunt convenientes etiam ad singularium repraesentationem.
| 1. Although only he who has intellectual sight is called a prophet, yet, not only intellectual light pertains to prophecy, but also the sight of imagination, in which suitable species can be formed to represent singular things.
|
| Unde patet responsio ad secundum.
| 2. The solution to the second difficulty is clear from the first response.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod illarum rerum quas propheta vidit, non oportet ut ei denuo species infundantur; sed ut ex speciebus reservatis in thesauro virtutis imaginariae fiat quaedam ordinata aggregatio, conveniens designationi rei prophetandae.
| 3. The prophet does not need a new infusion of the species of those things which he has seen, but only an orderly grouping of the species retained in the storehouse of the imaginative power, which can suitably designate the thing to be prophesied.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod divina essentia, quantum in se est, expressius repraesentat res quaslibet quam quaelibet species vel figura; sed ex hoc quod aspectus intuentis vincitur ab eminentia illius essentiae, contingit quod essentiam videns non omnia videt quae repraesentat. Species vero in imaginatione impressae, sunt nobis proportionatae; unde ex eis in rerum cognitionem possumus pervenire.
| 4. The divine essence, in so far as it exists in itself, represents all things whatsoever more explicitly than any species or figure does. But, since the sight of the one who looks at it is overcome by the loftiness of that essence, the one who sees the essence does not see all that it represents. But the species imprinted on the imagination are proportioned to us; hence, from them we can come to knowledge of things.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod sicut in eo qui ex signis scientiam accipit, signorum cognitio est via ducens ad res ipsas; ita e converso in eo qui significat aliquid, cognitio rei significandae praesupponitur ad formationem signorum: non enim potest aliquis rei quam ignorat, congrua signa adhibere. Quamvis igitur homo quilibet possit quaslibet imagines formare naturali virtute, tamen quod formentur convenienter rei futurae significandae, non potest fieri nisi ab eo qui rerum illarum cognitionem habet et secundum hoc formatio imaginariae visionis in propheta supernaturalis existit.
| 5. just as one who receives knowledge from signs reaches the things themselves by way of the signs, so, conversely, one who uses signs to express something must know the thing represented before he can form the symbol. For one cannot use fitting signs for things which he does not know. Therefore, although any man can by his natural power form any images whatever, only one who knows the future events to be symbolized can form figures to represent them properly. This formation of images in the sight of imagination takes place supernaturally in the prophet.
|
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod species illae quae praeexistunt in vi imaginaria prophetae, prout ibi existunt, non sufficiunt ad significationem rerum futurarum; et ideo oportet quod divinitus aliter transformentur.
| 6. The species pre-existing in the imaginative power of the prophet, in so far as they exist there, are not capable of signifying future things. Therefore, they must be reshaped into something else by the divine power.
|
| Ad septimum dicendum, quod species praeexistentes in imaginatione prophetae sunt quasi elementa illius visionis imaginariae, quae divinitus ostenduntur, cum ex eis quodammodo componatur; et exinde contingit quod propheta utitur similitudinibus rerum in quibus conversatus est.
| 7. The species pre-existing in the imagination of the prophet are, as it were, the elements of that sight of imagination which is revealed by the divine power, since it is somehow made up of them. Thus it is that the prophet uses the likenesses of things with which he is familiar.
|
|
| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
|
| Sed quia non semper per aliquas species fit revelatio prophetica, ut dictum est, ideo ad rationes in contrarium adductas respondere oportet.
| But, since prophetic revelation does not always take place through species, as has been said, we must answer the arguments given to the contrary.
|
| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod etsi in propheta non determinetur cognitio ad aliquid per intellectuale lumen, quando ei datur solummodo supernaturale iudicium, determinatur tamen per species ab alio visas; sicut cognitio Ioseph, per species visas a Pharaone, vel per species a seipso visas non supernaturaliter.
| 1. Although the knowledge of the prophet receives no determination to some particular thing from the intellectual light when he receives supernatural judgment alone, his knowledge does receive its determination from species seen by someone else, as Joseph’s knowledge received its determination from the species seen by Pharaoh, or from any species seen by Joseph himself without supernatural aid.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod divini luminis radius superlucet prophetae semper quidem velatus figuris, non ita quod semper species infundantur, sed quia radius praedictus speciebus existentibus admiscetur.
| 2. When the rays of divine light shine on the prophet, they are always veiled in figures, not in the sense that species are always infused, but that these rays are always combined with the pre-existing species.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod prophetarum revelatio distinguitur etiam ex parte luminis intellectualis, quod quidam plenius aliis percipiunt; et ex parte specierum, quae vel praeexistunt, vel de novo accipiuntur ab ipso propheta, aut ab alio.
| 3. The revelation which the prophets receive is also differentiated by reason of the intellectual light, which some perceive more fully than others, and by reason of the species, which either exist beforehand or are received anew by the prophet himself or by another.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut dicit Gregorius in II Moralium, Deus ad Angelos loquitur eo ipso quo cordibus eorum occulta sua iudicia ostendit; et similiter subiungit, quod animabus sanctis loquitur, in quantum eis certitudinem infundit. Sic ergo locutio qua Deus prophetis locutus esse dicitur in Scripturis, non solum attenditur quantum ad species rerum impressas, sed etiam quantum ad lumen inditum, quo mens prophetae de aliquo certificatur.
| 4. As Gregory says: “God speaks to the angels by the very act by which He shows His invisible secrets to their hearts,” and he adds that He speaks to holy souls by infusing certainty in them. Thus, in speech with which God is said to have spoken to the prophets in Holy Scripture, we consider not only the species of things which are imprinted, but also the light which is given, by which the mind of the prophet is made certain of something.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod visio intellectualis et imaginaria dignior est corporali, secundum eas cognoscimus non solum praesentia, sed etiam absentia, cum visione corporali solummodo praesentia cernantur; et ideo in imaginatione et intellectu reservantur species rerum, non autem in sensu. Ad hoc ergo quod visio corporalis sit supernaturalis, semper oportet quod novae formentur species corporales; non autem hoc requiritur ad hoc quod visio imaginaria vel intellectualis sit supernaturalis.
| 5. Since the sight of understanding and imagination are higher than bodily sight, through them we know not only things which are present, but even things which are absent, whereas with bodily sight we perceive only things which are present. Therefore, the species of things are stored in the imagination and the understanding, but not in the senses. Consequently, for bodily sight to be supernatural new bodily species must always be formed. But this is not needed for the sight of imagination or understanding to be supernatural.
|
Q. 12: Prophecy
ARTICLE VIII
In the eighth article we ask:
Does all prophetic revelation take place through the mediation of an angel?
[ARTICLE In Matth., 2; C.G., III, 154; In Isaiam, 6; S.T., II-II, 172, 2.]
|
| Octavo quaeritur utrum omnis revelatio prophetica fiat Angelo mediante
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it does not, for
|
| Quia, ut dicit Augustinus, VI de Trinit., quorumdam mentes ita elevantur, ut non per Angelum, sed in ipsa summa rerum arce incommutabiles videant rationes. Hoc autem maxime videtur competere prophetis. Ergo revelatio eorum non fit Angelo mediante.
| 1. As Augustine says, the minds of some are so elevated that they do not see the unchangeable natures through an angel, but in the highest citadel of reality itself. But this seems especially to belong to the prophets. Therefore, their revelation does not take place through the mediation of an angel.
|
| Praeterea, dona spiritus sancti immediate sunt a Deo, et habitus infusi. Sed prophetia est donum spiritus sancti, ut patet I Corinth., XII, 10; et est etiam quoddam lumen infusum. Ergo est a Deo sine Angelo mediante.
| 2. The gifts of the Holy Spirit and the infused habits come directly from God. But prophecy is a gift of the Holy Spirit, as is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:10). It is also a kind of infused light. Therefore, it is from God without the mediation of an angel.
|
| Praeterea, prophetia quae ex virtute creata procedit, est prophetia naturalis, ut supra dictum est. Sed Angelus est creatura quaedam. Ergo prophetia quae non est naturalis, sed spiritus sancti donum, non perficitur Angelo mediante.
| 3. The prophecy which proceeds from a created power is natural prophecy, as has been said. But an angel is a creature. Therefore, prophecy which is not natural but the gift of the Holy Spirit is not produced through the mediation of an angel.
|
| Praeterea, prophetia perficitur secundum infusionem luminis, et impressionem specierum. Sed neutrum horum videtur posse fieri per Angelum; quia vel esset creator luminis vel speciei; cum haec non possint fieri nisi ex nihilo. Ergo visio prophetica non fit Angelo mediante.
| 4. Prophecy takes place through the infusion of light and the imprinting of species. But it seems that neither of these can take place through an angel. For the angel would have to be the creator either of the light or of the species, since these cannot be made from anything pre-existing. Therefore, prophetic sight does not take place through the mediation of an angel.
|
| Praeterea, in definitione prophetiae dicitur quod prophetia est divina revelatio vel inspiratio. Si autem fieret Angelo mediante, diceretur esse angelica, non divina. Ergo non fit mediantibus Angelis.
| 5. In the definition of prophecy we read that prophecy is a divine revelation or inspiration. But, if it took place through the mediation of an angel, it would be called angelic and not divine. Therefore, it does not take place through the mediation of angels.
|
| Praeterea, Sapient. VII, 27, dicitur, quod divina sapientia per nationes in animas sanctas se transferens amicos Dei et prophetas constituit. Ergo ab ipso Deo immediate aliquis propheta constituitur, non per Angelum.
| 6. Wisdom (7:27) says that the divine wisdom, “through nations conveys herself into holy souls, she makes the friends of God and prophets.” Therefore, one is made a prophet directly by God Himself, and not through an angel.
|
|
| To the Contrary
|
| Sed contra. Est quod Moyses aliis prophetis excellentior fuisse videtur, ut patet Num. XI, 16 ss., et Deuteron., XXXIV, 10. Sed Moysi facta est divinitus revelatio mediantibus Angelis; unde dicitur Galat. cap. III, 19, quod lex (...) ordinata est per Angelos in manu mediatoris; et Act., VII, 38, dicit Stephanus de Moyse: hic est qui fuit in Ecclesia in solitudine cum Angelo, qui loquebatur ei in monte Sinai, et cum patribus nostris. Ergo multo fortius omnes alii prophetae mediante Angelo revelationem acceperunt.
| 1. Moses seems to have been higher than the other prophets, as is clear in Numbers (11:16-17,25; 12:3,-8) and Deuteronomy (34:10). But God made the revelation to Moses through the mediation of angels. Hence, it is said in Galatians (3:19): “(the law) being ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator:” and in Acts (7:3 8) Stephen said of Moses: “This is he that was in the Church in the wilderness, with the angel who spoke to him on Mount Sinai, and with our fathers.” Therefore, the other prophets with much greater reason received their revelation through the mediation of an angel.
|
| Praeterea, Dionysius dicit IV cap. caelestis hierarchiae quod divinas visiones gloriosi patres nostri adepti sunt per medias caelestes virtutes.
| 21. Dionysius says: “Our glorious fathers received divine visions through the mediation of the celestial powers.”
|
| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Trinit. quod omnes apparitiones patribus factae in veteri testamento, fuerunt per Angelos administratae.
| 3. Augustine says that all appearances made to the fathers in the Old Testament took place through the ministration of the angels.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod in revelatione prophetica duo concurrunt; scilicet mentis illustratio, et formatio specierum in imaginativa virtute.
| Two things concur in effecting prophetic revelation: the illumination of the mind and the formation of the species in the imaginative power.
|
| Ipsum ergo propheticum lumen, quo mens prophetae illustratur, a Deo originaliter procedit; sed tamen ad eius congruam susceptionem mens humana angelico lumine confortatur, et quodammodo praeparatur. Cum enim lumen divinum sit simplicissimum et universalissimum in virtute, non est proportionatum ad hoc quod ab anima humana in statu viae percipiatur, nisi quodammodo contrahatur et specificetur per coniunctionem ad lumen angelicum, quod est magis contractum, et humanae menti magis proportionatum.
| Therefore, the prophetic light itself, by which the mind of the prophet is enlightened, comes from God as its primary source. Nevertheless, the human mind is strengthened and to some extent prepared for its proper reception by the angelic light. For, since the power of the divine light is most simple and most universal, there is no proportion between it and reception of it by the human soul in this life, unless it is limited and specified through union with the angelic light, which is narrower, in scope and more commensurate with the human mind.
|
| Sed ipsa formatio specierum in imaginativa virtute proprie Angelis est attribuenda, eo quod tota corporalis creatura administratur per creaturam spiritualem, ut Augustinus probat in III de Trinit. Vis autem imaginaria utitur organo corporali; unde specierum formatio in ipsa ad ministerium proprie pertinet Angelorum.
| But the formation of the species in the imaginative power must be attributed properly to the angels, since the whole of bodily creation is under the direction of the spiritual creation, as Augustine proves. Now, the imaginative power uses a bodily organ; hence, the formation of species in the imaginative power is part of the work proper to the angels.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
|
| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod sicut supra dictum est, verbum illud Augustini referendum est ad visionem patriae, vel ad visionem raptus, non ad visionem propheticam.
| 1. As has been said earlier, Augustine’s words are to be taken as referring to the vision of heaven or to the sight of rapture, but not to prophetic sight.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod prophetia inter dona spiritus sancti computatur ratione luminis prophetici: quod quidem a Deo infunditur immediate, quamvis ad eius congruam receptionem cooperetur ministerium Angelorum.
| 2. Prophecy is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit by reason of the prophetic light, which, it is true, is directly infused by God. Still, the ministration of the angels assists in its proper reception.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud quod fit a creatura propria virtute, est quodammodo naturale; sed quod fit a creatura non propria virtute, sed inquantum est mota a Deo, velut quoddam divinae operationis instrumentum, est supernaturale. Unde prophetia, quae habet ortum ab Angelo secundum naturalem Angeli cognitionem, est prophetia naturalis; sed illa quae habet ortum ab Angelo, secundum quod Angelus revelationem a Deo accepit, est prophetia supernaturalis.
| 3. That which a creature performs by its own power is in some way natural, but that which a creature performs not of its own power, but in so far as it is moved by God or is an instrument of the divine activity, is supernatural. Hence, the prophecy which takes its origin from an angel according to the natural knowledge of the angel is natural prophecy. But that which takes its origin from an angel in so far as the angel receives revelation from God is supernatural prophecy.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod Angelus neque lumen in intellectu humano creat, neque species in vi imaginativa; sed operatione Angeli lumen naturale humano intellectui divinitus confortatur, et secundum hoc hominem Angelus illuminare dicitur. Ex hoc etiam quod habet potestatem Angelus commovere organum phantasiae, potest visionem imaginativam formare, secundum quod competit prophetiae.
| 4. An angel does not create light in the human understanding or species in the imaginative power. But God uses the activity of the angel to strengthen the natural light in the human understanding. In this way an angel is said to illuminate man. Also, since an angel has the power to move the organ of phantasy, it can fashion the sight of imagination in the way which befits prophecy.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod actio non attribuitur instrumento, sed principali agenti; sicut scamnum non dicitur effectus serrae, sed carpentarii. Et similiter cum Angelus non sit causa revelationis propheticae nisi sicut instrumentum divinum per revelationem a Deo perceptam, prophetia non debet dici revelatio angelica, sed divina.
| 5. Activity is not attributed to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as a bench is not called the effect of the saw, but of the carpenter. Similarly, since an angel is the cause of prophetic revelation only as a divine instrument using the revelation received from God, the prophecy should not be called angelic, but divine.
|
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod sapientia divina in animam se transferens, aliquos effectus facit non mediante ministerio Angelorum, sicut gratiae infusionem, per quam quis amicus Dei constituitur. Nihil autem prohibet quin quosdam alios effectus faciat praedicto ministerio mediante; et sic in animas sanctas se transferens, prophetas constituit Angelo mediante.
| 6. The divine wisdom, in transferring itself to the soul, brings about some effects without the mediation of the ministration of the angels, as the infusion of grace, through which one is made a friend of God. But nothing hinders it from bringing about some other effects through the mediation of the aforesaid ministration. And, transferring itself to holy souls in this way, it makes prophets through the mediation of an angel.
|
Q. 12: Prophecy
ARTICLE IX
In the ninth article we ask:
Does a prophet always lose sense-consciousness when he is under the influence of the spirit of prophecy?
[ARTICLE S.T., II-II, 173, 3.]
|
| Nono quaeritur utrum propheta semper quando a spiritu prophetiae tangitur, a sensibus alienetur
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that he does, for
|
| Quia dicitur Num., XII, 6: si quis fuerit inter vos propheta domini, in somnio et visione loquar ad eum. Sed, ut dicit Glossa in principio Psalterii, tunc fit prophetia per somnia et visiones quando fit per ea quae videntur dici vel fieri. Cum autem apparent ea quae videntur dici vel fieri, et non dicuntur vel fiunt, homo est a sensibus abstractus. Ergo visio prophetiae semper est propheta a sensu abstracto.
| 1. Numbers (12:6) says: “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear in a vision or I will speak to him in a dream.” But as the Gloss says, prophecy takes place “through dreams and visions” when it takes place “through those things which seem to be said or done.” But when there is an appearance of those things which seem to be said or done and they are not actually said or done, a man is transported out of his senses. Therefore, the sight of prophecy is always in a prophet who is transported out of his senses.
|
| Praeterea, quando una virtus multum intenditur in sua operatione, oportet aliam a sua operatione abstrahi. Sed in visione prophetiae interiores vires maxime in suis operationibus intenduntur, scilicet intellectus et imaginatio, cum hoc sit perfectissimum ad quod pervenire possunt secundum statum viae. Ergo in visione prophetica semper propheta ab operatione exteriorum virium abstrahitur.
| 2. When one power is applied intensely to its activity, another power must be withdrawn from its activity. But in the sight of prophecy the interior powers, that is, the intellect and the imagination, are intensely applied to their activities, since prophetic sight is the most perfect thing which they can reach in this life. Therefore, in prophetic sight the prophet is always withdrawn from the activity of the exterior powers.
|
| Praeterea, intellectualis visio est nobilior quam imaginaria, et haec quam corporalis. Sed permixtio ignobilioris detrahit aliquid de perfectione nobilioris. Ergo visio intellectualis et imaginaria, quando visioni corporali non permiscentur, sunt perfectiores. Cum igitur in prophetica visione ad summam perfectionem perveniant secundum statum viae, videtur quod tunc nullo modo corporali visioni permisceantur, ut scilicet propheta cum eis simul corporali visione utatur.
| 3. Intellectual sight is more noble than the sight of imagination, and this latter is more noble than bodily sight. But combination with that which is less noble detracts somewhat from the perfection of the more noble. Therefore, intellectual sight and the sight of imagination are more perfect when they are not combined with bodily sight. Therefore, since they reach their highest perfection in this life in prophetic sight, it seems that they are not at all combined with bodily sight in such a way that the prophet would make use of bodily sight together with them.
|
| Praeterea, plus distat sensus ab intellectu et imaginatione quam ratio inferior a superiori. Sed consideratio superioris rationis, qua intenditur aeternis contemplandis, abstrahit hominem a consideratione inferioris rationis, qua homo temporalibus inhaeret. Ergo multo fortius visio intellectualis et imaginaria prophetiae abstrahunt a visione corporali.
| 4. The senses are more remote from the understanding and the imagination than lower reason is from higher reason. But the consideration of higher reason, by which one devotes himself to the contemplation of eternal things, withdraws man from the consideration of lower reason, by which man employs himself in things temporal. With much more reason does the prophetic sight of the understanding and the imagination withdraw man from bodily sight.
|
| Praeterea, una et eadem vis non potest simul pluribus intendere. Sed quando aliquis sensibus corporalibus utitur, eius intellectus et imaginatio illis rebus intendit quae corporaliter videntur. Ergo simul cum hoc non posset intendere illis, quae apparent absque sensibus corporis in prophetica visione.
| 5. One and the same power cannot apply itself to many things simultaneously. But, when one is using his bodily senses, his understanding and imagination are occupied with those things which are seen bodily. Therefore, one cannot at the same time occupy himself with this and with those things which appear in prophetic sight apart from the senses of the body.
|
| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
|
| Est quod dicitur I Cor., cap. XIV, 32: spiritus prophetarum prophetis subiecti sunt. Hoc autem non esset, si propheta esset a sensibus alienatus; quia sic non esset sui ipsius compos. Ergo prophetia non fit in homine alienato a sensibus.
| 1. The first Epistle to the Corinthians (14:32) says: “The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets.” But this would not be so if the prophet lost sense-consciousness, for then he would not have control over himself. Therefore, prophecy does not take place in a man who has lost sense-consciousness.
|
| Praeterea, secundum visionem prophetiae accipitur certa cognitio de rebus sine errore. Sed in his qui sunt abstracti a sensibus, vel in somnio, vel quocumque alio modo, est cognitio permixta errori, et incerta; quia similitudinibus rerum inhaerent quasi rebus ipsis, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Gen. ad litteram. Ergo prophetia non fit cum alienatione a sensu.
| 2. Through the sight of prophecy one receives certain and inerrant knowledge of things. But in those who are transported out of their senses, either in a dream, or in some other way, the knowledge is mixed with error and is uncertain. For they hold fast to likenesses of things as if they were the things themselves, as Augustine says. Therefore, prophecy does not take place when one loses sense-consciousness.
|
| Praeterea, si hoc ponatur, videtur sequi error Montani qui dixit prophetas quasi abreptitios esse locutos, quid dicerent nescientes.
| 3. If we posit this, we seem to fall into the error of Montanus, who said that the prophets spoke as insane people who did not know what they were saying.
|
| Praeterea, prophetia, ut dicitur in Glossa in principio Psalterii, quandoque fit per facta et dicta: per facta, sicut per arcam Noe significatur Ecclesia; per dicta, sicut ea quae Angeli dixerunt Abrahae. Sed constat quod Noe arcam constituens, et Abraham Angelis colloquens et eis serviens, non erant a sensibus abstracti. Ergo prophetia non fit per abstractionem a sensibus semper.
| 4. As the Gloss says, prophecy sometimes takes place through words and deeds: “Through deeds, as the ark of Noe signified the Church, and through words, as those which the angels spoke to Abraham.” But it is clear that Noe, when building the ark, and Abraham, when conversing with angels and serving them, were not transported out of their senses. Therefore, prophecy does not always take place through transport out of the senses.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod prophetia habet duo actus: unum principalem, scilicet visionem; alium secundarium, scilicet denuntiationem.
| Prophecy has two acts: one is principal, namely, sight, and the other is secondary, namely, announcing.
|
| Denuntiatio autem fit a propheta vel verbis, vel etiam factis, sicut patet Ierem., cap. XIII, quod lumbare suum iuxta fluvium posuit ad putrescendum. Utrolibet autem modo denuntiatio prophetica fiat, semper fit ab homine non abstracto a sensibus, quia huiusmodi denuntiatio per signa quaedam sensibilia fit. Unde prophetam denuntiantem oportet sensibus uti ad hoc quod eius denuntiatio sit perfecta; alias denuntiaret quasi arreptus.
| The prophet does the announcing either by words or even by deeds, as is clear in Jeremiah (13:5), inasmuch as he put his girdle near the river to rot. But in whichever of the two ways the prophetic announcing is made, it is always made by a man not transported out of his senses, for such an announcing takes place through certain sensible signs. Hence, the prophet doing the announcing has to use his senses for his announcement to be perfect. Otherwise, he would make the announcement like an insane person.
|
| Sed quantum ad visionem prophetiae duo concurrunt, ut ex dictis patet, scilicet iudicium et acceptio propria prophetiae. Quando igitur propheta inspiratur divinitus, ut sit tantum iudicium eius supernaturale, et non acceptio, tunc talis inspiratio abstractionem a sensibus non requirit, quia iudicium intellectus naturaliter est perfectus in utente sensibus quam in non utente.
| But in the sight of prophecy two things concur, as we have said earlier, namely, judgment and the proper reception of the prophecy. Now, when the prophet is divinely inspired, so that only his judgment is supernatural, and not his reception, such inspiration does not require transport out of the senses, for the judgment of the understanding is more perfect according to its nature in one who has the use of his senses than in one who does not have the use of them.
|
| Acceptio autem supernaturalis propria prophetiae, est secundum imaginariam visionem, ad quam visionem inspiciendam rapitur mens humana ab aliquo spiritu, et a sensibus abstrahitur, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Genes. ad litteram. Cuius ratio est, quia vis imaginativa, dum quis utitur sensibus, principaliter est intenta his quae per sensus accipiuntur; unde non potest esse quod intentio eius principaliter transferatur ad ea quae aliunde accipiuntur, nisi quando homo est a sensu abstractus. Unde quandocumque fit prophetia secundum imaginariam visionem, oportet a sensibus abstractum esse prophetam.
| But the supernatural reception proper to prophecy is in the sight of imagination, and in order to see this vision human power is enraptured by some spirit and transported out of the senses, as Augustine says. The reason for this is that the power of imagination is mainly intent on the things which are received through the senses, as long as one uses his senses. Hence, its primary attention can be transferred to those things which are received from another source only when the man is transported out of his senses. Hence, whenever prophecy takes place according to the sight of imagination, the prophet must be transported out of his senses.
|
| Sed haec abstractio dupliciter contingit: uno modo ex causa animali; alio modo ex causa naturali. A causa quidem naturali quando exteriores sensus stupescunt vel propter aegritudinem, vel propter vapores somni ad cerebrum ascendentes, ex quibus contingit organum tactus immobilitari. Ex causa vero animali, sicut quando homo ex nimia attentione ad intellectualia vel imaginabilia omnino a sensibus exterioribus abstrahitur.
| But this transport happens in two ways. In one it is from some cause in the soul, and in the other, from a physical cause. It comes from a physical cause when the external senses become dull either because of sickness or because of the vapors occurring in sleep, which ascend to the brain and deaden the organ of touch. It comes from a cause in the soul when a man, from too much attention to the objects of the understanding or the imagination, is altogether abstracted from the external senses.
|
| Nunquam autem fit in propheta abstractio a sensibus corporalibus per aegritudinem, sicut fit in epilepticis vel furiosis; sed solummodo per causam naturalem, ordinatam, scilicet per somnum. Et ideo prophetia quae fit cum visione imaginaria, semper fit vel in somnio, quando scilicet est abstractio a sensibus per causam naturalem ordinatam, vel in visione, quando fit abstractio a causa animali.
| However, transport from the bodily senses never takes place in a prophet through sickness, as happens in epileptics and those who are mad, but only through a properly disposed physical cause, as through sleep. Therefore, prophecy which takes place with the sight of imagination always comes either in a dream, when one is deprived of sense-consciousness through a properly disposed physical cause, or in a vision, when the transport comes from some cause in the soul.
|
| In hoc tamen differt propheta in sua abstractione a sensibus, sive abstrahatur per somnium, sive per visionem, ab omnibus aliis qui abstrahuntur a sensibus, quod mens prophetae illustratur de his quae in visione imaginaria videntur, unde cognoscit ea non esse res, sed aliquarum rerum similitudines, de quibus certum iudicium habet per lumen mentis. Sic igitur patet quod prophetiae inspiratio quandoque fit cum abstractione a sensibus, quandoque non: unde ad utrasque rationes est respondendum.
| Nevertheless, between the prophet in his transport out of the senses, whether it be through a dream or through a vision, and all others who are carried out of their senses, there is this difference, that the mind of the prophet is enlightened about those things which are seen in the sight of imagination. Consequently, he knows that they are not things, but in some way, the likenesses of things about which his judgment is certain because of the light of the mind. Therefore, it is clear from this that the inspiration of prophecy takes place sometimes with transport out of the senses and sometimes without it. Hence, we must answer both sets of difficulties.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
|
| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod in verbis illis dominus intendit ostendere praeeminentiam Moysi ad alios prophetas quantum ad acceptionem supernaturalem, quia scilicet Moyses supernaturaliter ad hoc promotus est ut ipsam Dei essentiam in seipsa videret; sed omnia quae prophetae acceperunt, non acceperunt nisi in similitudinibus somnii vel visionis. Sed tamen iudicium prophetae non est per similitudines aliquas somnii et visionis; unde iudicium prophetiae fit sine abstractione a sensibus.
| 1. In those words our Lord wanted to show the pre-eminence of Moses over the other prophets in supernatural reception. For Moses was raised to the sight of the very essence of God in itself. But everything which the prophets have received they have received only in the likenesses belonging to dreams or visions. Nevertheless, the judgment of the prophet is not by means of the likenesses belonging to dreams or visions. Hence judgment of prophecy takes place without transport out of the senses.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod quando vis interior intenditur in visione sui obiecti, abstrahitur, si sit perfecta attentio, ab exteriori visione. Sed quantumcumque sit perfectum iudicium interioris virtutis, non abstrahit ab operatione exteriori, quia ad interiorem virtutem pertinet de exteriori iudicare; unde iudicium superioris in idem ordinatur cum operatione exteriori; et ideo non mutuo se impediunt.
| 2. When an interior power applies itself to the sight of its object, if there is perfect attention, it is cut off from exterior sight. But no matter how perfect the judgment of the interior power is, it does not withdraw from exterior activity, for it is the duty of the internal power to judge of the external. Hence, the judgment of that which is higher is ordained to the same thing as the exterior activity. Therefore, they do not hinder each other.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de visione intellectuali et imaginaria, secundum acceptionem, et non secundum iudicium, ut dictum est.
| 3. This argument follows for the sight of the intellect and the imagination according to reception, but not according to judgment, as has been said.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso potentiae animae mutuo se in suis operationibus impediunt, quod in una essentia animae sunt fundatae; unde quanto aliquae vires animae sunt sibi magis propinquae, tanto magis natae sunt se impedire, si ad diversa ferantur; unde ratio non sequitur.
| 4. The powers of the soul hinder each other in their operations because they are rooted in the one essence of the soul. Hence, the closer the powers are to each other, the more they naturally hinder each other if they are directed toward different objects. Hence, the argument does not follow.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit quantum ad acceptionem supernaturalem virtutis imaginariae vel intellectualis; et non quantum ad iudicium.
| 5. This argument follows for supernatural reception of the imaginative or intellectual power, but not for judgment.
|
|
| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
|
| Ad primum autem in contrarium dicendum, quod apostolus loquitur quantum ad prophetiae denuntiationem, quia suo arbitrio subiacet denuntiare de quibus inspiratur vel non: quantum autem ad revelationem, ipse propheta spiritui subiicitur; non enim fit revelatio secundum arbitrium prophetae, sed secundum arbitrium spiritus revelantis.
| 1. The Apostle is speaking of the announcing of prophecy, for it is in the power of free choice to announce or not to announce those things about which he is inspired. However, as concerns the revelation, the prophet himself is subject to the spirit, for the revelation does not take place as the prophet wishes, but as the revealing spirit wishes.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc est ex lumine prophetiae quod mens prophetae sic illustratur ut etiam in ipsa abstractione a sensibus verum iudicium habeat de his quae videt in somnio vel visione.
| 2. It is from the light of prophecy that the mind of the prophet is so enlightened that even in the transport out of his senses he has a true judgment about those things which he sees in the dream or vision.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod error Montani fuit in duobus. Primo quia subtrahebat prophetis lumen mentis, quo de visis verum iudicium haberent. Secundo quod in ipsa denuntiatione eos a sensibus abstractos dicebat, sicut in furiosis contingit, vel in his qui loquuntur in dormiendo. Hoc autem non sequitur ex positione praedicta.
| 3. Montanus erred on two points. First, he took away from the prophets the light of mind by which they have true judgment about the things which they have seen. Second, he said that, when they were announcing, they were carried out of their senses, as happens with those who are mad, or with those who talk in their sleep. But this does not follow from the above position.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum quod hoc quod prophetia dicitur fieri per dicta vel facta, referendum est ad denuntiationem prophetiae magis quam ad propheticam visionem.
| 4. The fact that prophecy is said to take place through words or deeds is to be referred more to the announcing of prophecy than to prophetic sight.
|
Q. 12: Prophecy
ARTICLE X
In the tenth article we ask:
Is prophecy suitably divided into prophecy of predestination, foreknowledge, and threats?
[ARTICLE In Matth., 11; In Ierem., 18; S.T., II-II, 174, 1.]
|
| Decimo quaeritur utrum prophetia convenienter dividatur in prophetiam praedestinationis, praescientiae et comminationis
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it is not, for
|
| Quia Glossa in principio Psalterii dividit prophetiam, dicens, quod alia est secundum praescientiam, quam necesse est omnibus modis impleri secundum tenorem verborum, ut: ecce virgo concipiet; alia secundum comminationem, ut: quadraginta dies sunt, et Ninive subvertetur; quae non secundum verborum superficiem, sed tacitae intelligentiae significatione completur. Ergo videtur superfluere tertium membrum, quod Hieronymus apponit, scilicet de prophetia secundum praedestinationem.
| 1. When the Gloss divides prophecy, it says: “One type of prophecy is according to foreknowledge, and this must be fulfilled in every way according to the meaning of the words. ‘Behold a virgin shall conceive’ (Isaiah 7:14) belongs to this type. The other kind of prophecy is a threat, as: ‘Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be destroyed’ (Jonas 3:4). This is not fulfilled in the superficial meaning of the words, but in the meaning of a tacit construction put on the words.” Therefore, it seems that the third division which Jerome made of prophecy of predestination is superfluous.
|
| Praeterea, illud quod consequitur omnem prophetiam, non debet poni ut membrum dividens prophetiam. Sed omnem prophetiam consequitur esse secundum praescientiam divinam: quia ut, Glossa dicit, Isa., XXXVIII, 1, prophetae in libro praescientiae legunt. Ergo prophetia secundum praescientiam non debet poni membrum dividens prophetiam.
| 2. That which is a property of all prophecy should not be set down as a member dividing prophecy. But to be according to divine foreknowledge is a property of all prophecy, for, as the Gloss reads: “The prophets read in the book of foreknowledge.” Therefore, prophecy according to foreknowledge should not be set down as a division of prophecy.
|
| Praeterea, cum praescientia sit superius ad praedestinationem, quasi in eius definitione posita, non potest praescientia contra praedestinationem dividi, nisi quantum ad ea in quibus praescientia praedestinationem excedit. Sed praescientia excedit praedestinationem in malis: quia de eis est praescientia, et non praedestinatio; de bonis vero praedestinatio et praescientia. Ergo cum dicitur quod prophetia alia est secundum praescientiam, alia secundum praedestinationem hoc est dictu, alia est de bonis, alia de malis. Sed bona et mala indifferenter ex libero arbitrio dependent. Ergo nulla est differentia quam assignat Hieronymus inter has duas prophetias, dicens, prophetiam praedestinationis esse quae sine nostro impletur arbitrio; prophetiam vero secundum praescientiam, cui nostrum admiscetur arbitrium.
| 3. Since foreknowledge is a more general term than predestination, inasmuch as it is part of its definition, foreknowledge can be divided from predestination only with reference to those things in which the extension of foreknowledge is greater than that of predestination. But it is with respect to evil things that the extension of foreknowledge is greater than that of predestination, for there is foreknowledge of these and not predestination. But there is both foreknowledge and predestination of good things. Therefore, when there is said to be one prophecy of predestination and another of foreknowledge, this means that one concerns good acts and the other evil. But as far as dependence on free will is concerned, there is no difference between good and evil. Therefore, there is no difference at all between these two kinds of prophecy which Jerome distinguishes when he says: “The prophecy of predestination is that which is fulfilled without our free choice, but the prophecy of foreknowledge is that in which our free choice is involved.”
|
| Praeterea, praedestinatio, ut dicit Augustinus, est de bonis salutaribus. Sed inter bona salutaria etiam nostra merita computantur, quae ex libero dependent arbitrio. Ergo prophetiae, secundum praedestinationem, nostrum admiscetur arbitrium; et sic Hieronymus male distinguit.
| 4. As Augustine says, predestination concerns goods connected with salvation. But our merits, also, which depend on free choice, are numbered among these goods. Therefore, our free choice is involved in prophecy of predestination. Thus, Jerome made a poor division.
|
| Praeterea, in prophetia non possunt considerari nisi tria: scilicet a quo est, in quo est, et de quo est. Sed penes illud a quo est prophetia, non distinguitur, quia omnis prophetia est ab uno principio, scilicet spiritu sancto; nec iterum penes id in quo est, quia prophetiae subiectum est humanus spiritus; ea autem de quibus est prophetia, non sunt nisi bona vel mala. Ergo prophetia non debet dividi nisi divisione bimembri.
| 5. Only three things can be considered in prophecy: that from whom it is, that in which it is, and that about which it is. But there is no distinction in that from whom it is, for all prophecy is from one source, the Holy Spirit. Nor is there any difference in that in which it is, for the human spirit is the subject of prophecy. And those things which prophecy concerns are only good and evil things. Therefore, prophecy should be divided only into a division with two members.
|
| Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit, quod illa prophetia: ecce virgo concipiet, est secundum praedestinationem. Sed ad impletionem illius prophetiae liberum arbitrium se immiscuit in virginis consensu. Ergo prophetia secundum praedestinationem habet liberum arbitrium immixtum; et sic non differt a prophetia quae est secundum praescientiam.
| 6. Jerome says that the prophecy, “Behold a virgin shall conceive” (Isaiah 7:14; Matthew 1:23), is a prophecy of predestination. But, for the fulfillment of that prophecy, free choice played a part in the assent of the Blessed Virgin. Therefore, the prophecy of predestination has free will involved in it, and, thus, it does not differ from the prophecy of foreknowledge.
|
| Praeterea, omnis enuntiatio de futuro quod nescitur esse futurum, vel est falsa, vel saltem dubia annuntianti. Sed per prophetiam comminationis praedicitur aliquid esse futurum, utpote destructionem alicuius civitatis. Cum igitur haec denuntiatio non sit falsa, nec dubia, quia in spiritum sanctum, qui est prophetiae auctor, nec falsitas nec dubitatio cadit, oportet hoc futurum, esse ad minus a spiritu sancto praescitum. Ergo prophetia secundum comminationem non distinguitur a prophetia secundum praescientiam.
| 7. Every declaration about something future which we do not know will exist, is either false or doubtful to the one making the declaration. But through the prophecy containing a threat one predicts that something will exist, as for example, the destruction of some city. Since this declaration is neither false nor doubtful because there is neither falsity nor doubt in the Holy Spirit, who is the author of the prophecy, this has to be foreknown at least by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the prophecy containing a threat is not distinct from the prophecy of foreknowledge.
|
| Praeterea, cum aliquid praedicitur secundum prophetiam comminationis: aut illa praedictio est intelligenda sine conditione, aut sub conditione. Si sub conditione, hoc non videtur competere prophetiae quae in quadam supernaturali cognitione consistit: futura enim praecognoscere quibusdam conditionibus stantibus, etiam naturalis ratio potest. Ergo oportet ut sine conditione intelligatur. Aut igitur prophetia est falsa, aut eveniet quod praedicitur; et sic oportet a Deo esse praescitum. Ergo prophetia comminationis non debet distingui contra prophetiam praescientiae.
| 8. When something is predicted according to the prophecy containing a threat, the prediction should be interpreted conditionally or unconditionally. If conditionally, it is not said to belong to prophecy, which consists in a kind of supernatural knowledge, for even natural reason can know that some things will happen if certain conditions are fulfilled. Therefore, it must be interpreted unconditionally. Accordingly, either the prophecy is false, or the outcome is as predicted. And this must be known beforehand by God. Therefore, prophecy containing a threat should not be distinguished from the prophecy of foreknowledge.
|
| Praeterea, Ierem. XVIII, 8, similis regula ponitur de divinis comminationibus et promissionibus adimplendis, quia scilicet comminationes revocantur, quando gens contra quam est facta comminatio, poenitentiam agit a malis; similiter promissio deficit, quando gens cui facta est, iustitiam relinquit. Ergo, sicut ponit prophetiam comminationis quoddam membrum prophetiae, ita debet ponere quartum membrum prophetiam promissionis.
| 9. In Jeremiah (17:18, 24-27) there is a similar rule for the fulfillment of divine promises and threats, for the threats are recalled when the nation against whom the threat was made repents of its sins, and similarly the promise ceases when the nation to whom it was made leaves the path of justice. Therefore, just as one makes the prophecy containing a threat a division of prophecy, he ought to make the prophecy containing a promise a fourth division.
|
| Praeterea, Isa. XXXVIII, 1, hoc prophetice Isaias dixit ad Ezechiam: dispone domui tuae, quia morieris etc.; haec autem prophetia non est secundum praedestinationem, quia talem prophetiam necesse est omnibus modis impleri etiam sine nostro arbitrio: nec iterum secundum praescientiam, quia hoc futurum Deus non praesciebat, alias praescientiae subesset falsum: nec iterum secundum comminationem, quia sine conditione praedicebatur futurum. Ergo oportet (ponere) aliquod quartum genus prophetiae.
| 10. Isaiah (38:1) spoke prophetically to Ezechias: “Take order with your house, for you shall die...” This is not a prophecy of predestination, for that kind must be fulfilled in every way even apart from our free choice. Again, it is not a prophecy of foreknowledge because God did not have foreknowledge of this future event, otherwise there would have been falsity in His foreknowledge. Similarly, it does not belong to prophecy containing a threat, since the event was predicted unconditionally. Therefore, there must be a fourth class of prophecy.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod hoc praedicebatur esse futurum secundum causas inferiores, et sic erat prophetia comminationis. —Sed contra, causae inferiores mortis hominis aegrotantis, possunt homini esse notae secundum artem medicinae. Si igitur Isaias hoc non praedixit nisi secundum causas inferiores futurum, vel non prophetice praedixit, vel prophetica praedictio non differt a medici praedictione.
| 11. It was said that this was predicted to happen according to the lower causes, and thus was a prophecy containing a threat.—On the contrary, by the art of medicine man can know the lower causes of the death of a sick man. Therefore, if Isaiah predicted this only according to lower causes, either he did not predict it prophetically, or prophetic prediction does not differ from the prediction of a doctor.
|
| Praeterea, omnis prophetia est de rebus, vel intuendo causas superiores, vel intuendo causas inferiores. Si igitur praedicta prophetia intelligatur conditionalis, quia est secundum aliquas causas, scilicet inferiores, pari ratione omnis prophetia conditionalis est; et sic omnis prophetia erit eiusdem rationis cum comminatoria.
| 12. Every prophecy deals with things either by viewing the higher causes or by viewing the lower causes. If we take the previously mentioned prophecy as conditional, since it is according to some causes, namely, lower causes, there is equal reason to say that all prophecy is conditional. Thus, all prophecy will have the same character as the prophecy containing a threat.
|
| Praeterea, prophetia comminationis quamvis non impleatur secundum superficiem verborum, impletur tamen tacitae intelligentiae significatione, ut Cassiodorus dicit; sicut quod dictum est, per Ionam, Ninive subvertetur, impletum est secundum Augustinum in Lib. de civitate Dei, quia quamvis Ninive steterit in moenibus, corruit tamen in pravis moribus. Sed hoc etiam invenitur in prophetia praedestinationis et praescientiae, quod non impletur secundum exteriorem verborum superficiem, sed secundum spiritualem sensum: sicut quod dictum est Isa., LIV, 11: fundabo Ierusalem in saphiris, et Daniel. II, 34: quod lapis abscissus de monte sine manibus confregit statuam; et multa alia huiusmodi. Ergo prophetia comminationis non debet distingui contra prophetiam praescientiae et praedestinationis.
| 13. Although the prophecy of threatening is not fulfilled “in the superficial meaning of the words, nevertheless it is fulfilled in the meaning of the tacit construction put on the words,” as Cassiodorus says..Thus, Jonas’ words, “Nineveh shall be destroyed” (Jonas 3:4), were fulfilled according to Augustine, for, “although the walls of Nineveh remained standing, its evil ways were wiped out.” But the fulfillment of prophecy, not according to the exterior superficial meaning of the words, but according to their spiritual sense, takes place in the prophecy of predestination and of foreknowledge. We see this in Isaiah (54:11) “I will lay your foundations with sapphires, Jerusalem,” and in Daniel (2:45): “the stone was cut out of the mountain without hands, and broke in pieces the statue,” and in many other similar passages. Therefore, prophecy containing a threat should not be distinguished from the prophecy of foreknowledge and predestination.
|
| Praeterea, si alicui demonstrantur aliquae futurorum similitudines, non dicitur propheta, nisi intelligat ea quae per illas significantur; sicut Pharao non est dictus propheta, qui spicas et boves vidit: intelligentia enim opus est in visione, ut dicitur Daniel. cap. X, 1. Sed illi per quos comminationes divinae fiunt, intelligunt tantum hoc quod proponunt secundum verborum superficiem; non autem illuminantur de his quae per illa significantur, sicut patet de Iona, qui intellexit Ninive materialiter subvertendam; unde ea non subversa, sed correcta, doluit, quasi sua prophetia non esset impleta. Ergo propheta ex hoc dici non debuit. Et sic nec comminatio debet poni species prophetiae; unde videtur praedicta distinctio nulla esse.
| 14. If likenesses of future things are shown to someone, he still is not called a prophet unless he understands the things signified through these likenesses. Thus, Pharaoh was not called a prophet when he saw the ears of corn and the cattle, “for there is need of understanding in a vision,” as Daniel (10:1) says. But those through whom the divine threats are made understand what they declare only according to the superficial meaning of the words, for they are not enlightened about the things which are signified through the words. This is clear in the case of Jonas, who understood that Nineveh was to be overturned materially. Hence, he grieved as though his prophecy were not fulfilled when the city was not overturned but mended its ways. Therefore, one should not on this account be called a prophet, and, thus, threatening should not be made a species of prophecy. Hence, the distinction previously mentioned seems no distinction at all.
|
| Sed contrarium
| To the Contrary
|
| apparet ex Glossa, quae habetur super illud Matth. I, 23: ecce virgo concipiet; ubi praedicta divisio ponitur et explanatur.
| The opposite appears from the Gloss on Matthew(1:23): “Behold a virgin shall conceive.” Here, the above division is given and explained.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod prophetia a divina praescientia derivatur, ut supra dictum est. Sciendum est autem, quod Deus alio modo praescit futura ab aliis qui futura praecognoscunt. Circa futurorum enim cognitionem duo est considerare: scilicet ipsum ordinem causarum ad futuros effectus; et exitum sive executionem huius ordinis in hoc quod effectus actu procedunt ex suis causis.
| Prophecy is derived from the divine foreknowledge, as has been said above. But we must bear in mind that God knows futures differently from all others who have foreknowledge of them. For there are two things to consider in the knowledge of the future: the order of the causes to the future effects and the outcome or execution of this order in the actual procession of the effects from their causes.
|
| Quaecumque igitur virtus creata aliquam cognitionem habet de futuris, sua cognitio non fertur nisi ad ordinem causarum; sicut medicus secundum hoc dicitur futuram mortem praescire, inquantum scit naturalia principia esse ordinata ad defectum mortis; et eodem modo astrologus dicitur praecognoscere futuras pluvias aut ventos. Unde, si sint tales causae quarum effectus impediri possint, non semper evenit quod sic praescitur esse futurum.
| Accordingly, no matter what created power has some knowledge of the future, its knowledge reaches only the order of the causes. Thus, a doctor is said to foreknow future death in so far as he knows that natural principles have an ordination to death. And a meteorologist is said to foresee future rains and winds in the same way. Hence, if these causes are such that their effects can be impeded, the event which is thus foreseen to happen does not always come to pass.
|
| Sed Deus non solum cognoscit futura ratione ordinis causarum, sed etiam quantum ad ipsum exitum vel executionem ordinis. Cuius ratio est, quia eius intuitus aeternitate mensuratur, quae omnia tempora in uno nunc indivisibili comprehendit: unde uno simplici intuitu videt et ad quid causae sunt ordinatae, et qualiter ordo ille impleatur vel impediatur. Hoc autem creaturae est impossibile, cuius intuitus limitatur ad aliquod tempus determinatum. Unde cognoscit ea quae sunt in illo tempore. Futura vero in tempore quando adhuc sunt futura, non sunt nisi in ordine suarum causarum; unde sic solummodo a nobis praecognosci possunt: ut recte considerantibus appareat, in hoc quod futura praescire dicimur, magis nos praesentium quam futurorum scientiam habere; et sic remaneat solius Dei proprium esse vere scire futura.
| But God knows the future not only by reason of the order of the causes, but also in the very outcome or execution of that order. The reason for this is that His vision is measured by eternity, which comprehends all times in one indivisible present. Thus, in one simple glance He sees that to which the causes are ordered and how that order is fulfilled or obstructed. But this is impossible for a creature whose gaze is limited to a determined time. Hence, He knows those things which exist at that time. And at the time when futures are still future they exist only in the order of their causes, and hence, we can know them only in this way. Consequently, it is clear to all who consider it correctly that when we are said to foresee the future we have knowledge more of present things than of the future. And, so, it remains proper to God alone to have true foreknowledge of future events.
|
| Quandoque igitur a divina praescientia derivatur prophetia ratione ordinis causarum; quandoque vero etiam ratione executionis vel impletionis illius ordinis. Cum ergo fit prophetae revelatio solummodo de ordine causarum, dicitur prophetia comminationis; tunc enim nihil aliud prophetae revelatur nisi quod secundum ea quae nunc sunt, talis ad hoc vel illud est ordinatus.
| Therefore, prophecy is derived from divine foreknowledge sometimes by reason of the order of the causes and sometimes by reason of the execution or fulfillment of that order. Therefore, when prophetic revelation concerns only the order of the causes, it is called prophecy containing a threat. For, then, all that is revealed to the prophet is that according to the things which now exist such a person is ordained to this or that.
|
| Impletio vero ordinis causarum fit dupliciter. Quandoque quidem ex sola operatione divinae virtutis, ut suscitatio Lazari, conceptio Christi, et huiusmodi; et secundum hoc est prophetia praedestinationis, quia, ut dicit Damascenus, ea Deus praedestinat, quae non sunt in nobis; unde et praedestinatio quasi quaedam Dei praeparatio dicitur. Hoc autem aliquis praeparat quod facturus est ipse, non quod alius.
| The fulfillment of the order, however, takes place in two ways. Sometimes it comes from the activity of the divine power alone, as the resuscitation of Lazarus, the conception of Christ, and things of this sort. And the prophecy of predestination follows this divine activity, for, as Damascene says: “Those things which God predestines are not in our power.” Hence, predestination is called a kind of preparatory action on the part of God. Now, preparatory action concerns that which one will do himself and not what someone else will do.
|
| Quaedam vero explentur etiam operatione causarum aliarum sive naturalium sive voluntariarum; et haec, inquantum per alias causas complentur, non sunt praedestinata, sunt tamen praescita; unde horum dicitur esse prophetia secundum praescientiam. Quia tamen praescientia propter homines fit; circa ea quae per homines fiunt libero arbitrio, praecipue prophetia praescientiae consistit. Unde praetermissis aliis causis creatis, Hieronymus prophetiam praescientiae notificans, de solo libero arbitrio mentionem facit.
| Some things, however, are brought to completion by the operation of other causes, whether natural or voluntary. These things, in so far as they are accomplished through other causes, are not predestined, but they are nevertheless foreknown. Hence, prophecy of these things is said to be according to foreknowledge. However, since prophecy takes place for the sake of men, the prophecy of foreknowledge especially concerns those things which men do by their free will. For this reason Jerome puts aside other created causes and makes mention only of free will when referring to the prophecy of foreknowledge.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
|
| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod ista trimembris divisio quam Hieronymus ponit, reducitur ad bimembrem, ut dictum est, quia quaedam respicit ordinem causarum, quaedam autem exitum ordinis: et in hac divisione Cassiodorus stetit. Hieronymus vero alterum membrum subdivisit: et ideo duo Cassiodorus membra divisionis posuit; Hieronymus autem tria. Praescientiam etiam Cassiodorus accepit secundum sui communitatem: est enim de omnibus eventibus, sive virtute creata sive increata fiant. Sed Hieronymus accepit praescientiam secundum quamdam restrictionem, prout est de illis tantum de quibus non est praedestinatio per se loquendo, scilicet de his quae virtute creata proveniunt.
| 1. The threefold division which Jerome makes is reduced to a twofold division, as has been said, because one division looks to the order of causes and the other to the outcome of that order. This is the division which Cassiodorus held. But Jerome subdivided the second member; thus, Cassiodorus gave two members of the division and Jerome three. Cassiodorus also took foreknowledge in its generality, for it refers to all existing things, whether they come about through created or uncreated power. But Jerome took foreknowledge with a certain restriction, inasmuch as it concerns only those things about which there is no predestination by reason of themselves, that is to say, those things which come to pass by created power.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod omnis prophetia divinam praescientiam habet quasi radicem. Sed cum in divina praescientia sit cognitio ordinis et eventus, quaedam prophetia derivatur ex una parte, quaedam ex alia. Praescientia vero Dei, secundum hoc proprie praescientiae nomen habet, quod ad eventum respicit qui futurus est; ordo enim ad eventum est in praesenti; unde de eo magis est scientia quam praescientia: et sic illa prophetia quae ordinem respicit, non dicitur secundum praescientiam, sed solum illa quae est secundum eventum.
| 2. Every prophecy has divine foreknowledge as its root. But, since there is knowledge of the order and the outcome in divine foreknowledge, one kind of prophecy is derived from the one of these and one from the other. However, the foreknowledge of God is properly called foreknowledge in so far as it looks to an outcome which is future. For the order to the outcome is in the present; hence, of it there is knowledge rather than foreknowledge. Thus, not that prophecy which looks to the order, but only that which deals with the outcome, is said to take place according to foreknowledge.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, praescientia hic accipitur contra praedestinationem divisa, quantum ad ea in quibus praescientia praedestinationem excedit; non autem excedit praescientia praedestinationem solum in malis, si praedestinatio stricte accipiatur, sed etiam in omnibus bonis, quae non fiunt sola virtute divina; unde ratio non sequitur.
| 3. Foreknowledge is taken here in contrast with predestination in so far as foreknowledge has a broader extension than predestination. Now, foreknowledge has a broader extension than predestination not only in evil things, if predestination be taken strictly, but also in all good things which do not take place exclusively by the divine power. Hence, the argument does not follow.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod meritum nostrum et est ex gratia et est ex libero arbitrio; non autem subiacet praedestinationi nisi secundum quod est ex gratia, quae a solo Deo est; unde id quod ex nostro arbitrio est, praedestinationi subesse est per accidens.
| 4. Our merit is from grace and from free will. However, it belongs to predestination only in so far as it comes from grace, which is from God alone. Hence, that which is from our free will is said to belong to predestination for some extrinsic reason.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod prophetia hic distinguitur secundum ea de quibus est, non quidem secundum bona et mala; quia huiusmodi differentiae per accidens se habent ad futurum quod per prophetiam cognoscitur, sed secundum quod est de ordine vel de exitu ordinis, ut dictum est.
| 5. Here, prophecy is distinguished according to the things of which it treats. This is not according to good and evil, for differences of this sort are related by some extrinsic reason to the future thing which is known through prophecy, but rather according to that which concerns the order or the outcome of the order, as has been said.
|
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod ad Christi conceptionem intervenit consensus virginis, non quasi operans, sed sicut impedimentum removens; non enim invitae tantum beneficium praestari decebat.
| 6. The consent of the Blessed Virgin intervened in the conception of Christ as something which removed a hindrance and not as an operative cause. For it was not fitting that so great a benefit be given to one who was unwilling.
|
| Ad septimum dicendum, quod aliquid potest dici esse futurum non solum ex hoc quia ita erit, sed quia ita est ordinatum in causis suis ut sic sit futurum; sic enim medicus dicit: iste sanabitur vel morietur; et si aliter contingat, non falsum dixit; sic enim tunc futurum erat ex ordine causarum, quem tamen possibile est impediri: et tunc quod prius futurum fuerat, consequenter non erit futurum; unde philosophus dicit in II de Generat. quod futurus quis incedere, non incedet; et secundum hoc denuntiatio prophetae comminantis nec falsa est nec dubia, quamvis non eveniat quod praedixit.
| 7. We can say that something will exist not only from the fact that it will exist in this way, but also from the fact that it is so ordained in its causes that it will thus exist. For it is in this way that a doctor says: “That man will be cured or will die.” And, if the event prove otherwise, he does not speak falsely. For at that time this was about to take place from the order of the causes, although it was possible for this to be impeded. Then, that which beforehand was going to take place in the event will not take place. For this reason the Philosopher says: “One who is about to enter will not enter.” And according to this the threat of the prophet is neither false nor doubtful, although what he has predicted does not come to pass.
|
| Ad octavum dicendum, quod si prophetia comminationis referatur ad ordinem causarum quem directe respicit, sic est absque omni conditione; absolute enim verum est ita ordinatum esse in causis ut hoc contingat. Si autem referatur ad eventum quem respicit indirecte, sic intelligenda est sub conditione causae; et tamen supernaturalis est, quia naturali cognitione non potest sciri etiam causa exstante, utpote iniquitate remanente, quod talis poena vel talis determinate secundum divinam iustitiam debeatur.
| 8. If the prophecy containing a threat is referred to the ordination of causes to which it directly looks, it is consequently free from all condition. For it is absolutely true that it is so ordained in the causes that this happen. But, if it is referred to the event to which it looks indirectly, it must be understood under this condition: if the cause acts. Nevertheless, it is supernatural, because we cannot know by natural knowledge that precisely such or such a punishment is deserved according to divine justice, even if the cause does exist, namely, if the wickedness remain.
|
| Ad nonum dicendum, quod sub prophetia comminationis intelligitur etiam prophetia promissionis, quia de eis est eadem ratio. Ideo tamen magis exprimitur de prophetia comminationis, quia frequentius invenitur revocata comminatio quam promissio; Deus enim pronior est ad miserendum quam ad puniendum.
| 9. We take the prophecy containing a promise as belonging to the prophecy containing a threat because both have the same intelligible nature. However, this nature is better expressed in prophecy containing a threat, because threats are more frequently revoked than promises, for God is more inclined to be merciful than to punish.
|
| Ad decimum dicendum, quod prophetia illa fuit secundum comminationem; et quamvis non esset conditio explicite proposita, est tamen illa denuntiatio sub implicita conditione intelligenda, scilicet tali ordine rerum remanente.
| 10. That prophecy was a prophecy containing a threat, and although the condition was not stated explicitly, that threat should be interpreted under the implicit condition: if such an order of things continues.
|
| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod causae inferiores non solum sunt causae naturales quas medici praecognoscere possunt, sed etiam causae meritoriae, quae ex sola divina revelatione cognoscuntur. Causae etiam naturales salutis vel mortis multo perfectius divina revelatione quam humano ingenio cognosci possunt.
| 11. Lower causes include not only natural causes, which doctors can know beforehand, but also meritorious causes, which are known from divine revelation alone. Likewise, the natural causes of health or death can be known much more perfectly by divine revelation than by human ingenuity.
|
| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod causae superiores, scilicet rationes rerum in divina praescientia, nunquam deficiunt ab impletione suorum effectuum, sicut deficiunt causae inferiores; et ideo in causis superioribus cognoscuntur eventus rerum absolute, sed in inferioribus non nisi sub conditione.
| 12. Higher causes, which are the intelligible natures of things [represented] in the divine foreknowledge, never fail of fulfillment of their effects, as lower causes do. Therefore, the outcomes of things are known absolutely in the higher causes, but only conditionally in lower causes.
|
| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod in prophetia praedestinationis et praescientiae quamvis proponatur veritas adimplenda sub aliquibus similitudinibus, tamen ratione illarum similitudinum non attenditur aliquis sensus litteralis; sed litteralis sensus attenditur secundum ea quae per similitudines significantur, sicut in omnibus metaphoricis significationibus accidit. Unde in talibus prophetiis nulla veritas invenitur quantum ad similitudines, sed solum quantum ad ea quae per similitudines significantur.
| 13. Although in the prophecy of predestination and of foreknowledge the truth to be fulfilled is presented under some likenesses, no literal sense is understood by reason of those likenesses, but the literal sense is grasped according to those things which are signified through the likenesses, as happens in all metaphorical expressions. Hence, in such prophecies we find no truth in the likenesses, but only in those things which are declared through the likenesses.
|
| Sed in prophetia comminationis sensus litteralis verborum prophetae attenditur secundum illas similitudines rerum quae evenient, quia similitudines illae non tantum proponuntur ut similitudines, sed ut res quaedam. Unde et illud quod eveniet, significatum per huiusmodi similitudines, non pertinet ad sensum litteralem, sed ad sensum mysticum; sicut cum dicitur, Ninive subvertetur, subversio materialis pertinet ad sensum litteralem, sed subversio a pravis moribus pertinet ad moralem: et in ipso sensu litterali attenditur aliqua veritas ratione ordinis causarum, ut dictum est.
| But, in the prophecy containing a threat, the literal sense of the words of the prophet is considered according to those likenesses of the things which will come to pass, because those likenesses are not given only as likenesses but as things. Hence, that which will come to pass and is represented through likenesses of this sort does not belong to the literal sense, but to the mystical sense. Thus, when it is said that Nineveh will be destroyed, material destruction belongs to the literal sense, but destruction of evil ways belongs to the moral sense. By reason of the order of causes we see some truth in the literal sense itself, as has been said.
|
| Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod in somnio Pharaonis spicae illae et boves non demonstrabantur ut res quaedam, sed solum ut similitudines; et ideo Pharao, qui solum illas similitudines vidit, non habuit alicuius rei intellectum; et propter hoc propheta non fuit. Sed Ionae, cui dictum est, Ninive subvertetur, aderat intelligentia alicuius rei, scilicet ordinis meritorum ad subversionem, etsi forte alterius rei, scilicet subversionis, praescius non fuerit; unde quantum ad hoc quod non intelligebat, propheta non fuit. Sciebat tamen Ionas, et prophetae comminantes, prophetiam quam praedicebant, non esse secundum praescientiam, sed secundum comminationem: unde dicitur Ionae IV, vers. 2: propter hoc praeoccupavi ut fugerem in Tharsis; scio enim quod tu clemens et misericors es.
| 14. The ears of corn and the cattle were not shown in Pharaoh’s dream as things, but only as likenesses. Therefore, Pharaoh, who saw only those likenesses, had no understanding of any thing and for this reason was not a prophet. But Jonas, to whom it was said: “Nineveh shall be destroyed,” had some understanding of a thing, namely, of the ordination of merits to destruction, even though, perhaps, he had no foreknowledge of the other thing, namely, the conversion. Thus, he was not a prophet in that which he did not understand. Nevertheless, Jonas and the prophets who threatened knew that the prophecy they foretold was not a prophecy according to foreknowledge, but according to threat. Hence, it is said in Jonas (4:2): “Therefore I went before to flee into Tharsis: for I know that you are a gracious and merciful God.”
|
Q. 12: Prophecy
ARTICLE XI
In the eleventh article we ask:
Is there unchangeable truth in prophecy?
[ARTICLE C.G., III, 154; S.T., II-II, 171,6; 172, 5, ad 3; 172, 6, ad 2.]
|
| Undecimo quaeritur utrum in prophetia inveniatur immobilis veritas
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that there is not, for
|
| Cum enim immobilis veritas in definitione prophetiae ponatur, si prophetiae conveniat, oportet ut per se ei conveniat. Sed futura contingentia, de quibus est prophetia, per se non sunt immobilia, sed solum secundum quod ad praescientiam divinam referuntur, ut dicit Boetius. Ergo immobilis veritas non debet assignari prophetiae quasi in eius definitione posita.
| 1. Since unchangeable truth is put in the definition of prophecy, if it belongs to prophecy at all, it must belong to it for some intrinsic reason. But future contingent things, about which we have prophecy, are not unchangeable for any intrinsic reason, but only in so far as they are referred to the divine foreknowledge, as Boethius says. Therefore, unchangeable truth should not be attributed to prophecy as part of its definition.
|
| Praeterea, illud quod non impletur nisi aliqua variabili conditione existente, non habet immobilem veritatem. Sed aliqua prophetia est, scilicet comminationis, quae non impletur nisi variabili conditione existente, scilicet perseverantia iustitiae vel iniquitatis, ut habetur Ierem. XVIII, 8-10. Ergo non omnis prophetia habet immobilem veritatem.
| 2. That which is fulfilled only if some changeable condition exists does not have unchangeable truth. But there is a prophecy, that containing a threat, which is fulfilled only if there exists a changeable condition, namely, persistence in justice or wickedness, as we see this in Jeremiah (18:8). Therefore, not all prophecy possesses unchangeable truth.
|
| Praeterea, Isa. XXXVIII, 1, dicit Glossa, quod Deus prophetis revelat suam sententiam, sed non consilium. Sententia autem eius est variabilis, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo prophetia non habet immobilem veritatem.
| 3. The Gloss on Isaiah (38:1) reads: “God reveals His sentence (sententia) but not His chosen plan (consilium) to the prophets.” But His sentence is changeable, as is said in the same place. Therefore, prophecy does not possess unchangeable truth.
|
| Praeterea, si prophetia habet immobilem veritatem; aut hoc est ex parte prophetae videntis, aut ex parte rei quae videtur, aut a parte speculi aeterni a quo videtur. Non a parte videntis, quia humana cognitio variabilis est; nec ex parte rei, quae contingens est; nec ex parte divinae praescientiae sive speculi, quia per hoc necessitas rebus non imponitur. Ergo prophetia nullo modo habet immobilem veritatem.
| 4. If prophecy contains unchangeable truth, this happens because of the prophet who sees it, or because of the thing which is seen, or because of the eternal mirror by reason of which it is seen. But its source is none of these. Not the seer, for human knowledge is changeable. Not the thing which is seen, for that is contingent. Finally, not the divine foreknowledge or mirror, for this does not impose necessity on things. Therefore, prophecy in no way contains unchangeable truth.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod divina praescientia non imponit necessitatem quin aliter evenire possit; sed tamen aliter non eveniet quod praescitur, et hoc modo prophetia habet immobilem veritatem. Immobile enim dicitur, secundum philosophum, quod non potest moveri, vel quod difficile movetur, vel quod non movetur.- Sed contra, posito possibili, nihil sequitur impossibile. Si igitur possibile est id, quod est praescitum et prophetatum, aliter se habere, si ponatur aliter se habere, nullum sequetur impossibile. Sequitur autem prophetiam habere mobilem veritatem. Ergo non est necesse prophetiam habere immobilem veritatem.
| 5. It was said that divine foreknowledge does not impose a necessity which makes it impossible for the outcome to be different, but nevertheless the outcome which was foreknown will not be different, and that in this way prophecy contains unchangeable truth. For, according to the Philosopher, that is called unchangeable which cannot be changed, or is changed with difficulty, or simply does not change.—On the contrary, granted the occurrence of what is possible, nothing impossible follows. If, therefore, that which is foreknown and prophesied can vary, then, if we assume that it does vary, nothing impossible follows. But it does follow that prophecy possesses changeable truth. Therefore, prophecy does not necessarily contain unchangeable truth.
|
| Praeterea, veritas propositionis sequitur conditionem rei, quia ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est, ut dicit philosophus. Sed res de quibus est prophetia, sunt contingentes et mutabiles. Ergo et prophetica denuntiatio habet mobilem veritatem.
| 6. The truth of a proposition follows the condition of the thing, for: “A statement is true or false as the thing is or is not,” as the Philosopher says. But the things about which there is prophecy are contingent and changeable. Therefore, the prophetic statement contains changeable truth.
|
| Praeterea, effectus denominatur necessarius vel contingens a causa proxima, non a causa prima. Sed causae proximae rerum de quibus est prophetia, sunt causae mobiles, quamvis causa prima sit immobilis. Ergo prophetia non habet immobilem veritatem, sed mobilem.
| 7. An effect is called necessary or contingent from the proximate cause, not from the first cause. But the proximate causes of the things of which we have prophecy are changeable causes, although the first cause is unchangeable. Therefore, prophecy does not possess unchangeable, but changeable, truth.
|
| Praeterea, si prophetia habet immobilem veritatem, impossibile est aliquid esse prophetatum, et illud non fieri. Sed quod est prophetatum, impossibile est non esse prophetatum. Ergo si prophetia habet immobilem veritatem, necesse est evenire illud quod prophetatum est; et sic prophetia non erit de futuris contingentibus.
| 8. If prophecy possesses unchangeable truth, it is impossible for something to be prophesied and not happen. But it is impossible for what has been prophesied not to have been prophesied. Therefore, if prophecy has unchangeable truth, that which has been prophesied must necessarily happen. Thus, prophecy will not concern future contingent things.
|
| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
|
| Est quod dicitur in Glossa in principio Psalterii: prophetia est divina inspiratio vel revelatio, rerum eventus immobili veritate denuntians.
| l. The Gloss says: “Prophecy is divine inspiration or revelation which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth.”
|
| Praeterea, prophetia est divinae praescientiae signum, ut dicit Hieronymus. Sed praescita, inquantum subsunt praescientiae, sunt necessaria. Ergo et prophetata, inquantum de illis est prophetia; ergo prophetia habet immobilem veritatem.
| 2. “Prophecy is a sign of divine foreknowledge,” as Jerome says. But things which arc foreknown are necessary in so far as they are subjects of foreknowledge. Therefore, the things prophesied are also necessary in so far as there is prophecy about them. Therefore, prophecy has unchangeable truth.
|
| Praeterea, scientia Dei potest esse immobilis de rebus mobilibus, quia a rebus ortum non habet. Sed similiter cognitio prophetica non sumitur a rebus ipsis. Ergo prophetia habet immobilem veritatem de rebus mobilibus.
| 3. God’s knowledge about changeable things can be unchangeable, for He does not obtain it from things. But in the same way prophetic knowledge is not received from the things themselves. Therefore, Prophecy has unchangeable truth about changeable things.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod in prophetia duo est considerare; scilicet ipsas res prophetatas, et cognitionem quae de illis habetur; et horum duorum invenitur diversus ordo originis. Ipsae enim res prophetatae sunt immediate a causis mobilibus sicut a causis proximis, sed a causa immobili sicut a causa remota; cognitio vero prophetica e converso est a divina praescientia sicut a causa proxima, a rebus vero prophetatis non dependet sicut a causa, sed est solum sicut earum signum.
| In prophecy there are two things to consider, the things prophesied and the knowledge which is had of those things. And the order of the causes in these two is different. For the things prophesied come immediately from changeable causes as from their proximate cause, but from the unchangeable causes as from their remote cause. Prophetic knowledge, on the other hand, comes from the divine foreknowledge as its proximate cause and depends on the things prophesied not as a proximate cause, but only as a sign of these things.
|
| Omnis autem effectus in necessitate et contingentia sequitur causam proximam, et non causam primam. Unde res ipsae prophetatae mobiles sunt; sed prophetica cognitio est immobilis, sicut et divina praescientia, a qua derivatur ut exemplatum ab exemplari. Sicut enim ex hoc quod veritas intellectus est necessaria, sequitur quod enuntiatio, quae est signum intellectus, habeat necessariam veritatem; ita ex hoc ipso quod divina praescientia est immobilis, sequitur quod prophetia, quae est signum eius, immobilem habeat veritatem.
| Moreover, the necessity and contingency of every effect depends on the proximate cause and not on the first cause. Hence, the things prophesied are changeable, but the prophetic knowledge is unchangeable, just as is the divine foreknowledge from which it is derived as a copy from the pattern. For, just as the necessity of the truth of the understanding causes necessary truth in the statement which is a sign of understanding, so also the immutable divine foreknowledge causes unchangeable truth in the prophecy which is its sign.
|
| Quomodo autem praescientia Dei possit esse immobiliter vera de rebus mobilibus, dictum est in alia quaestione de scientia Dei; unde non oportet hic repetere, cum immobilitas prophetiae tota dependeat ex immobilitate divinae praescientiae.
| But the way in which God’s foreknowledge can be unchangeably true about changeable things is explained in another question, on God’s knowledge. Consequently, it is not necessary to repeat it here, since the whole immutability of prophecy depends on the immutability of the divine foreknowledge.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
|
| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod nihil prohibet aliquid inesse per accidens alicui secundum se sumpto, quod eidem per se inest alio addito; sicut homini per accidens inest moveri, per se vero homini inquantum est currens. Sic etiam et huic rei quae prophetatur, non per se competit esse immobilem, sed solum inquantum est prophetata; unde convenienter in definitione prophetiae ponitur.
| 1. Nothing prevents something from being in another thing for an extrinsic reason, if that thing is taken in itself, and yet being in the thing for an intrinsic reason, if it is taken together with something else. Thus, to be moved belongs to man for an extrinsic reason, but, in so far as he is running, it belongs intrinsically to a man. So also, to be unchangeable does not belong intrinsically to the thing which is prophesied, but belongs to it only inasmuch as it is prophesied. Therefore, it is fittingly included in the definition of prophecy.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod prophetia comminationis omnino habet immobilem veritatem; non enim est de eventibus rerum, sed de ordine causarum ad eventus, ut dictum est; et hunc ordinem esse quem propheta praedicit, necessarium est, quamvis eventus quandoque non sequatur.
| 2. The prophecy containing a threat fully possesses unchangeable truth, for it does not deal with the outcomes of things, but with the order of the causes to the outcomes, as has been said. And this order, predicted by the prophet, must necessarily be, although sometimes the events do not follow.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod consilium Dei dicitur ipsa aeterna Dei dispositio, quae nunquam variatur propter quod dicit Gregorius, quod Deus nunquam mutat consilium. Sententia vero dicitur hoc ad quod aliquae causae sunt ordinatae. Sententiae enim in iudiciis ex causarum meritis proferuntur. Quandoque autem hoc ad quod causae sunt ordinatae, est etiam a Deo ab aeterno dispositum: et tunc idem est Dei consilium et sententia. Quandoque vero ad aliquid ordinatae sunt causae, quod non est a Deo ab aeterno dispositum: et tunc Dei consilium et sententia feruntur ad diversa. Ergo ex parte sententiae, quae respicit causas inferiores, invenitur mutabilitas; sed ex parte consilii invenitur semper immutabilitas.
| 3. That eternal disposition of God which never changes we call the chosen plan of God. For this reason Gregory says: “God never changes His chosen plan.” Sentence, however, is that to which some causes are ordained. Moreover, sentences are handed down in trials according to the merits of the cases (causae). However, sometimes that to which the causes (causae) are ordained is arranged by God from eternity. And, then, God’s chosen plan and sentence are the same. But, sometimes, causes are ordained to something which is not arranged by God from eternity. Then, God’s chosen plan and sentence are directed to different things. Therefore, there is mutability in the sentence which looks to lower causes, but there is always immutability in the chosen plan.
|
| Prophetae vero revelatur quandoque sententia consilio conformis: et tunc prophetia habet immobilem veritatem etiam quantum ad eventum. Quandoque vero revelatur sententia consilio non conformis: et tunc habet immobilem veritatem quantum ad ordinem, et non quantum ad eventum, ut dictum est.
| Sometimes, then, a sentence which is in conformity with the chosen plan is revealed to the prophet. In this case, the prophecy possesses unchangeable truth even with reference to the outcome. Sometimes, however, there is revealed a sentence which is not in conformity with the chosen plan. In this case, there is unchangeable truth with reference to the order, but not with reference to the outcome, as we have said.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod immobilitas prophetiae est ex parte speculi aeterni, non quod rebus prophetatis necessitatem imponat; sed quia prophetiam facit necessariam esse de rebus contingentibus, sicut et ipsa est.
| 4. The eternal mirror gives immutability to prophecy, not because it imposes necessity on the things prophesied, but because it makes the prophecy about contingent things necessary just as it itself is necessary.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod posito quod aliquid sit secundum praescientiam prophetatum, quamvis illud non esse in se sit possibile, tamen incompossibile posito huic, scilicet quod dicitur esse praescitum; quia ex hoc ipso quod praescitum ponitur, ponitur ita futurum esse, cum praescientia ipsum eventum respiciat.
| 5. Given that something has been prophesied according to foreknowledge, although in itself it is possible for it to fail to exist, still, granted that it is said to be foreknown, it is then impossible for it not to exist. For, from the fact that it is established as foreknown, it is established that it will be so, since foreknowledge looks to the outcome.
|
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod veritas propositionis sequitur conditionem rei, quando scientia veritatem proponentis ex rebus oritur. Sic autem non est in proposito.
| 6. The truth of a proposition follows the condition of the thing when the knowledge of the one proposing the truth has its origin from things. However, this is not so in our case.
|
| Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis rei prophetatae causa proxima sit mobilis, tamen ipsius prophetiae causa proxima est immobilis, ut dictum est; et ideo ratio non sequitur.
| 7. Although the proximate cause of the thing prophesied is changeable, the proximate cause of the prophecy itself is unchangeable, as has been said. Therefore, the argument does not follow.
|
| Ad octavum dicendum, quod prophetatum non evenire habet simile iudicium, sicut et praescitum non evenire. Quod qualiter debeat concedi et qualiter negari, dictum est in quaestione de scientia Dei.
| 8. We should pass like judgment on the failure of what is prophesied to come to pass and on the failure of what is foreknown to come to pass. To what extent this should be conceded and to what extent it should be denied is treated in the question on God’s knowledge.
|
Q. 12: Prophecy
ARTICLE XII
In the twelfth article we ask:
Is the prophecy which is according to the sight of understanding alone higher than that which has the sight of understanding together with imagination?
[ARTICLE S.T., II-II, 174, 2-3; III, 30, 3, ad 1.]
|
| Duodecimo quaeritur utrum prophetia quae est secundum visionem intellectualem tantum, sit eminentior ea quae habet visionem intellectualem simul cum imaginaria visione
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it is not, for
|
| Quia illa prophetia quae habet intellectualem visionem cum imaginaria, includit eam quae habet intellectualem visionem tantum. Ergo visio prophetica quae habet utramque visionem, est potior ea quae habet unam tantum. Quod enim includit aliquid, excedit illud quod ab eo includitur.
| 1. Prophecy which has the sight of understanding along with imagination includes that which has the sight of understanding alone. Therefore, the prophetic sight which has both is better than that which has only one. For that which embraces something surpasses that which it embraces.
|
| Praeterea, quanto in aliqua prophetia est abundantius lumen intellectuale, tanto perfectior est. Sed ex plenitudine intellectualis luminis contingit quod fit redundantia in propheta ab intellectu in imaginationem, ut ibi formetur imaginaria visio.
| 2. The more abundantly the light of understanding is in a prophecy, the more perfect it is. But, because of the fullness of the light of understanding in prophecy, there is an overflow from the understanding into the imagination, so that the sight of imagination is produced there.
|
| Ergo perfectior est prophetia quae habet imaginariam visionem adiunctam, quam illa quae habet intellectualem tantum.
| Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of imagination added to it is more perfect than that which has the sight of understanding alone.
|
| Praeterea, de Ioanne Baptista dicitur Matth. XI, 9, quod ipse est propheta, et plus quam propheta. Hoc autem dicitur inquantum Christum non solum intellectualiter vel imaginarie vidit, ut alii prophetae, sed etiam corporaliter digito demonstravit. Ergo prophetia cui admiscetur corporalis visio, est nobilissima; et eadem ratione illa cui adiungitur visio imaginaria, est nobilior quam illa quae habet intellectualem visionem tantum.
| 3 It is said of John the Baptist that he is a prophet and “more than a prophet” (Mat 11:9). But this is stated because he saw Christ not only through his understanding or imagination, as the other prophets did, but also physically pointed him out. Therefore, prophecy with which bodily sight is combined is the most noble, and for the same reason that to which the sight of imagination is added is more noble than that which has the sight of understanding alone.
|
| Praeterea, tanto aliquid est magis perfectum, quanto plenius in eo inveniuntur differentiae rationem speciei constituentes. Sed differentiae constituentes prophetiam sunt visio et denuntiatio. Ergo illa prophetia quae denuntiationem habet, videtur esse perfectior ea quae non habet. Sed denuntiatio fieri non potest sine imaginaria visione; quia oportet eum qui denuntiat, habere imaginatos sermones. Ergo prophetia illa est perfectior quae fit cum visione imaginaria et intellectuali.
| 4. The more fully a thing contains the differences which make up the intelligible nature of the species, the more perfect it is. But the differences which constitute prophecy are sight and declaration. Therefore, the prophecy which includes declaration seems to be more perfect than that which does not have it. But the declaration cannot take place without the sight of imagination, because the one who declares a prophecy must have in his imagination the words he is going to speak. Therefore, the prophecy which includes the sight of imagination and of understanding is more perfect.
|
| Praeterea, I Cor., XIV, 2, super illud, spiritus autem loquitur mysteria, dicit Glossa: minus est propheta qui rerum significatarum solo spiritu videt imagines; et magis est propheta qui solo earum intellectu praeditus est; sed maxime propheta est qui in utroque praecellit; ergo idem quod prius.
| 5. The Gloss on “Yet by the Spirit he speaks mysteries” (1 Cor. 14:2) says: “One who by spirit alone sees the likenesses of the things signified is less a prophet, and one who is granted only the understanding of them is more a prophet, but he is most a prophet who excels in both.” Thus, we conclude as before.
|
| Praeterea, prophetia, ut dicit Rabbi Moyses, inchoatur in intellectu, et perficitur in imaginatione. Ergo prophetia quae habet visionem imaginariam, est perfectior quam quae habet intellectualem tantum.
| 6. As Rabbi Moses says, prophecy begins in the understanding and is completed in the imagination. Therefore, prophecy which has the sight of imagination is more perfect than that which has only the sight of understanding.
|
| Praeterea, debilitas intellectualis luminis imperfectionem indicat prophetiae. Sed ex debilitate intellectualis luminis, videtur contingere quod visio prophetica non derivetur usque ad imaginationem. Ergo videtur quod illa prophetia, quae habet imaginariam visionem, sit perfectior.
| 7. Weakness of the light of understanding betrays an imperfection of the prophecy. But the fact that prophetic sight does not overflow into the imagination seems to come from weakness of the light of understanding. Therefore, prophecy which has the sight of imagination seems to be more perfect.
|
| Praeterea, maioris perfectionis est cognoscere rem aliquam in se, et prout est alterius signum, quam cognoscere eam in se tantum. Ergo, eadem ratione, perfectius est cognoscere aliquam rem ut est significata, quam cognoscere eam in se tantum. Sed in prophetia quae habet imaginariam visionem cum intellectuali, cognoscitur res prophetata non solum in se, sed etiam prout est imaginibus designata. Ergo prophetia quae habet imaginariam visionem, est nobilior prophetia quae habet intellectualem tantum, in qua cognoscuntur res prophetatae in se solummodo, et non prout sunt signatae.
| 8. To know a thing as it is in itself and as the sign of something else is more perfect than to know it only in itself. Therefore, for the same reason it is more perfect to know a thing as it is represented in a sign than to know it only in itself. But, in the prophecy which has the sight of imagination and that of understanding, the thing prophesied is known not only in itself but also as it is represented by the images. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of imagination is more noble than that which contains only the sight of understanding, in which one understands the things prophesied only in themselves and not as represented in a sign.
|
| Praeterea, sicut dicit Dionysius, I cap. caelestis hierarchiae, impossibile est nobis aliter superlucere divinum radium nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum. Velamina autem appellat figuras imaginarias, quibus puritas intellectualis luminis quasi velatur. Ergo in omni prophetia oportet esse imaginarias figuras, vel ab homine formatas, vel divinitus immissas. Nobiliores autem videntur esse illae quae sunt immissae divinitus quam quae sunt formatae ab homine. Illa ergo videtur esse nobilissima prophetia in qua, simul, divinitus infunditur lumen intellectuale et figurae imaginariae.
| 9. Dionysius says: “It is impossible for the divine radiance to shine on us unless it is shrouded with a variety of sacred veils. But, for him veils are the imagery of the imagination, in which the purity of the light of understanding is, as it were, shrouded. Therefore, in every prophecy there must be imagery of the imagination either formed by man or introduced by God. Now, the imagery introduced by God seems to be more noble than that formed by man. Therefore, those prophecies seem to be most noble in which God at the same time infuses the light of understanding and the imagery of the imagination.
|
| Praeterea, ut dicit Hieronymus in prologo super librum regum, prophetae contra Agyographas distinguuntur. Sed illi quos ibi prophetas nominat, omnes, aut fere omnes, revelationem acceperunt sub figuris imaginariis; plures autem eorum quos inter Agyographas nominat, sine figuris revelationem acceperunt. Ergo magis proprie dicuntur prophetae illi quibus fit revelatio secundum visionem intellectualem et imaginariam, quam illi quibus fit secundum intellectualem tantum.
| 10. As Jerome says, the prophets are distinguished from the writers of sacred books. But, of those whom he calls the prophets, all, or almost all, received revelation under the imagery of imagination. But many of those whom he calls writers of sacred books received revelation without imagery. Therefore, those to whom revelation is given according to the sight of understanding and imagination are more properly called prophets than those to whom revelation is given according to the sight of understanding only.
|
| Praeterea, secundum philosophum II Metaph., intellectus noster se habet ad primas rerum causas, quae sunt maxime notae in natura, sicut se habet oculus noctuae ad lucem solis. Sed oculus noctuae non potest inspicere solem nisi sub quadam obscuritate. Ergo et intellectus noster divina sub quadam obscuritate intelligit; ergo videtur quod sub aliquibus similitudinibus; et sic intellectualis visio non erit certior quam imaginaria, cum utraque sub similitudinibus fiat. Unde videtur quod illa visio imaginaria intellectuali adiuncta nihil diminuat de eius nobilitate; et sic illa prophetia quae fit sub utraque visione, vel est dignior, vel ad minus aeque digna.
| 11. According to the Philosopher, our understanding is related to the first causes of things, which naturally are most knowable, “just as the eye of the owl is related to the light of the sun.” But the eye of the owl can look at the light of the sun only when it is darkened to some extent. Therefore, our understanding, too, understands divine things when they are dimmed to some extent, and therefore seems to understand them in this way under certain likenesses. Consequently, the sight of understanding will not be more certain than that of imagination, since both take place under likenesses. Hence, it seems that the addition of the sight of imagination to that of understanding does not lessen the nobility of the latter. Thus, that prophecy which takes place under both sights is either of greater dignity or at least of equal dignity.
|
| Praeterea, sicut se habet imaginabile ad imaginationem, ita intelligibile ad intellectum. Sed imaginabile non apprehenditur ab imaginatione nisi mediante similitudine. Ergo nec intelligibile ab intellectu; et sic idem quod prius.
| 12. That which can be understood is related to the understanding as that which can be imagined is related to the imagination. But that which can be imagined is apprehended by the imagination only through the mediation of a likeness. Therefore, what can be understood is apprehended by the understanding only in the same way. Thus, we conclude as before.
|
| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
|
| Est quod dicitur in Glossa in principio Psalterii: alius prophetiae modus est ceteris dignior, quando scilicet ex sola spiritus sancti inspiratione, remoto omni exteriori adminiculo facti vel dicti vel visionis vel somnii, prophetatur. Illa vero prophetia quae habet imaginariam visionem annexam, est cum adminiculo somnii vel visionis. Ergo prophetia quae est cum visione intellectuali tantum, est nobilior.
| 1. The Gloss says: “There is another kind of prophecy which is of greater dignity than the others, that in which one prophesies by means of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit alone and apart from every outside help of action or word or vision or dream.”But the prophecy which has the sight of imagination joined to it takes place with the help of a dream or a vision. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of understanding alone is more noble.
|
| Praeterea, omne quod in aliquo recipitur, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis. Sed intellectus in quo aliquid recipitur in visione intellectuali, est nobilior quam imaginatio, in qua recipitur aliquid in visione imaginaria. Ergo prophetia quae fit secundum intellectualem visionem, est nobilior.
| 2. Everything which is received into a thing is received there according to the manner of the receiver. But the understanding, in which something is received by the sight of understanding, is more noble than the imagination, in which it is received by the sight of imagination. Therefore, prophecy which takes place according to the sight of understanding is more noble.
|
| Praeterea, ubi est intellectualis visio, non potest esse deceptio, quia qui fallitur, non intelligit, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de vera religione. Visio autem imaginaria habet plurimum falsitatis admixtum; unde in Lib. IV metaphysicorum, ponitur esse quasi principium falsitatis. Ergo prophetia, quae habet visionem intellectualem, est nobilior.
| 3. Where there is sight of understanding there can be no deception, for one who is mistaken does not understand, as Augustine says. However, the sight of imagination contains a great mixture of falsity. Hence, in the Metaphysics it is given as a kind of source of falsity. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of understanding is more noble.
|
| Praeterea, quando una vis animae a sua actione retrahitur, alia in sua actione roboratur. Si ergo in prophetia aliqua vis imaginaria omnino vacet, intellectualis visio erit fortior. Ergo et prophetia erit nobilior.
| 4. When one power of the soul recedes from its activity, another is strengthened in its activity. Therefore, if the power of imagination is completely inactive in some prophecy, the sight of understanding will be stronger. Therefore, the prophecy will also be more noble.
|
| Praeterea, sicut se habent potentiae ad invicem, ita et actus potentiarum. Sed intellectus non coniunctus imaginationi utpote angelicus, est nobilior intellectu imaginationi coniuncto, utpote humano. Ergo et prophetia quae habet visionem intellectualem sine imaginaria, nobilior est quam illa quae habet utramque.
| 5. The acts of the powers are related to each other just as the powers are. But understanding not joined to imagination, as in the angels, is more noble than understanding joined to imagination, as in men. Therefore, the prophecy which contains the sight of understanding without the sight of imagination is more noble than that which has both.
|
| Praeterea, adminiculum actionis designat imperfectionem agentis. Sed visio imaginaria ponitur in Glossa in principio Psalterii ut adminiculum prophetiae. Ergo prophetia quae habet imaginariam visionem, est imperfectior.
| 6. Assistance in an action shows imperfection in the agent. But the sight of imagination is given in the Gloss as a help to prophecy. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of imagination is more imperfect.
|
| Praeterea, quanto aliquod lumen est magis remotum ab obscuritatibus sive nebulis, tanto est magis clarum. Sed imaginariae figurae sunt quasi quaedam nebulae, quibus obumbratur intellectuale lumen; ratione cuius ratio humana quae a phantasmatibus abstrahit, dicitur ab Isaac oriri in umbra intelligentiae. Ergo prophetia quae habet lumen intellectuale sine imaginibus, est perfectior.
| 7. The more remote light is from darkness or clouds, the brighter it is. But the imagery of imagination is, as it were, clouds which darken the light of understanding. For this reason Isaac says that human reason, which abstracts from phantasms, has its origin in the shadow of intelligence. Therefore, prophecy which has the light of understanding without images is more perfect.
|
| Praeterea, tota nobilitas propheticae cognitionis consistit in hoc quod Dei praescientiam imitatur. Sed prophetia quae est sine imaginaria visione, magis imitatur divinam praescientiam, in qua non est aliqua imaginatio, quam quae habet imaginariam visionem. Ergo illa prophetia quae caret imaginaria visione, est nobilior.
| 8. The whole nobility of prophetic knowledge consists in this, that it imitates God’s foreknowledge. But prophecy which has no sight of imagination imitates divine foreknowledge, in which there is no imagination, more than that which has the sight of imagination. Therefore, that which does not have the sight of imagination is more noble.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod cum natura speciei consistat ex natura generis et natura differentiae, ex utroque dignitas speciei potest pensari; et secundum has duas considerationes inveniuntur aliqua se invicem in dignitate excedere quandoque. Et quantum pertinet ad rationem speciei, semper illud participat perfectius speciei rationem in quo differentia formaliter speciem constituens nobilius invenitur. Sed simpliciter loquendo, quandoque est nobilius simpliciter id in quo natura generis est perfectior, quandoque vero id in quo est perfectior natura differentiae.
| Since the nature of a species is made up of the nature of the genus and the nature of the difference, the dignity of the species can be estimated from either of these. Likewise, according to these two considerations; certain things sometimes surpass each other in dignity. In so far as the nature of the species is concerned, that in which the difference formally constituting the species exists more nobly, always participates more perfectly in the nature of the species. But, absolutely speaking, sometimes that in which the nature of the genus is more perfect is more noble and sometimes that in which the nature of the difference exists more perfectly is more noble.
|
| Cum enim differentia addit aliquam perfectionem supra generis naturam tunc, praeeminentia quae est ex parte differentiae, facit aliquid esse simpliciter nobilius; sicut in specie hominis, qui est animal rationale, simpliciter est dignior ille qui est potior in rationalitate, quam qui est potior in his quae ad rationem animalis spectant, utpote sunt sensus, et motus, et alia huiusmodi.
| For, since the difference adds some perfection to the nature of the genus, the excellence which comes from the difference makes the thing more noble absolutely. Thus, just as in the species of man, who is a rational animal, he is more noble absolutely who is more gifted in rationality than one who is more gifted in the things which refer to the animal nature, as the senses, movement, and other things of this sort.
|
| Quando vero differentia aliquam imperfectionem importat, tunc id in quo est completius natura generis, est simpliciter nobilius; ut patet in fide, quae est cognitio aenigmatica, eorum scilicet quae non videntur. Qui enim abundat in natura generis, et deficit in fidei differentia, utpote fidelis qui iam percipit aliquem intellectum credibilium, et quodammodo ea iam videt, habet simpliciter nobiliorem fidem eo qui minus cognoscit; et tamen quantum ad rationem fidei pertinet, magis proprie habet fidem ille qui omnino non videt illa quae credit.
| However, when the difference implies a certain imperfection, then that which has the nature of the genus more completely is more noble absolutely. This is clear in faith, which is an obscure knowledge, namely, of things which are not seen. For one who has a large share of the nature of the genus of faith and is deficient in the difference (as one of the faithful who has some understanding of matters of belief and in a way already sees them) has a faith simply more noble than one who has less knowledge. Nonetheless, as far as the nature of faith is concerned, he has it more properly who does not at all see the things which he believes.
|
| Et sic etiam est in prophetia. Prophetia enim videtur esse quaedam cognitio obumbrata et obscuritate admixta, secundum id quod habetur II Petri, I, 19: habetis firmiorem propheticum sermonem, cui bene facitis attendentes, quasi lucernae lucenti in caliginoso loco. Et hoc etiam ipsum nomen prophetiae demonstrat, quia prophetia dicitur quasi visio de longinquo: quae enim clare videntur, quasi de prope videntur.
| The same is true in prophecy. For prophecy seems to be a knowledge which is shadowy and mixed with darkness, as the second Epistle of St. Peter (1:19) has: “We have the more firm prophetical word: whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shines in a dark place.” This, too, the very name prophecy shows, for prophecy is called a kind of sight from afar. And things which are seen clearly are seen, as it were, from nearby.
|
| Si igitur comparemus prophetias quantum ad differentiam quae rationem prophetiae complet, illa invenitur perfectius rationem prophetiae habere, et magis proprie, cui imaginaria visio admiscetur; sic enim veritatis propheticae cognitio obumbratur.
| Therefore, if we compare the types of prophecy on the basis of the difference which completes the essence of prophecy, we find that the prophecy in which there is admixture of the sight of imagination possesses that nature of prophecy more perfectly and more properly. For in this the knowledge of prophetic truth is darkened.
|
| Si autem comparemus prophetias secundum id quod pertinet ad generis naturam, scilicet cognitionem vel visionem, sic videtur distinguendum. Cum enim omnis cognitio perfecta duo habeat; acceptionem et iudicium de acceptis: iudicium quidem de acceptis in prophetia est solum secundum intellectum; acceptio vero est et secundum intellectum, et secundum imaginationem. Quandoque igitur in prophetia non est aliqua supernaturalis acceptio, sed iudicium tantum supernaturale; et sic solus intellectus illustratur sine aliqua imaginaria visione. Et talis forte fuit inspiratio Salomonis, inquantum de moribus hominum et naturis rerum, quae naturaliter accipimus, divino instinctu ceteris certius iudicavit.
| But if we compare prophecies according to the attributes of the nature of the genus, namely, knowledge or sight, we see that we have to make a distinction. For all perfect knowledge has two elements, reception and judgment about that which is received. Now, in prophecy, judgment about that which is received is according to the understanding alone, but reception is according to the understanding and the imagination. Sometimes, therefore, there is no supernatural reception in prophecy, but only supernatural judgment. Thus, the understanding alone is enlightened without any sight of imagination. Perhaps Solomon’s inspiration was of this nature, since by a divine impulse he made more certain judgments than the rest of us about human actions and the natures of things, which we perceive naturally.
|
| Quandoque vero est etiam acceptio supernaturalis; et hoc dupliciter: quia vel est acceptio ab imaginatione, utpote quando divinitus in spiritu prophetae imagines rerum formantur vel est acceptio ab intellectu, utpote quando ita clare veritatis cognitio intellectui infunditur, ut non ex similitudine aliquarum imaginum veritatem accipiat, immo ex veritate iam perspecta ipse sibi imagines formare possit, quibus utatur propter naturam nostri intellectus. Non autem potest esse aliqua prophetia quae habeat acceptionem sine iudicio, unde nec imaginariam visionem sine intellectuali.
| But, sometimes, there is also supernatural reception, and this takes place in two ways. For there is either reception by the imagination, as when images of things are formed by the divine power in the spirit of the prophet, or reception by the understanding, as happens when the understanding is so clearly flooded with knowledge of the truth that it does not grasp the truth from the likeness of any images, but in fact can form images for itself from the truth it has seen. And it uses these because of the nature of our understanding. But there can be no prophecy in which there is reception without judgment. Hence, no one can have sight of imagination without that of understanding.
|
| Sic igitur patet quod visio intellectualis pura, quae habet iudicium tantum sine aliqua acceptione supernaturali, est inferior ea quae habet iudicium et acceptionem imaginariam. Illa vero intellectualis visio pura quae habet iudicium et acceptionem supernaturalem, est ea nobilior quae cum iudicio habet acceptionem imaginariam. Et quantum ad hoc concedendum est, quod prophetia quae habet visionem intellectualem tantum, est dignior ea quae habet imaginariam adiunctam.
| Thus, it is clear that the pure sight of understanding, which has judgment alone without supernatural reception, is inferior to that which has judgment and the reception of imagination. But the sight of understanding which has judgment and supernatural reception is more noble than that which has judgment and the reception of imagination. In this respect we must concede that prophecy which contains the sight of understanding alone is more worthy than that which has sight of imagination joined to it.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
|
| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod quamvis illa prophetia quae in utraque visione consistit, habeat etiam intellectualem visionem, non tamen includit illam prophetiam quae in sola intellectuali visione consistit, eo quod illa habeat intellectualem visionem excellentiorem quam ista; cum in illa intellectualis luminis perceptio sufficiat ad acceptionem et iudicium, in hac vero ad iudicium tantum.
| 1. Although the prophecy which consists of both sights does also have sight of understanding, it does not include the prophecy which consists of the sight of understanding alone, because the latter has the sight of understanding more nobly than the former, since in it the perception of the light of understanding is sufficient for reception and judgment, whereas in the other it is sufficient only for judgment.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod in utraque prophetia fit derivatio luminis prophetici ab intellectu ad imaginationem, sed diversimode: quia in illa prophetia quae dicitur visionem tantum intellectualem habere, tota plenitudo propheticae revelationis in intellectu percipitur, et exinde secundum intelligentis arbitrium in imaginativa congrue formantur imagines propter nostri intellectus naturam, qui sine phantasmatibus intelligere non potest; sed in alia prophetia non tota plenitudo propheticae revelationis recipitur in intellectu, sed partim in intellectu quantum ad iudicium, et partim in imaginativa quantum ad acceptionem.
| 2. In both types of prophecy the prophetic light descends from the understanding to the imagination, but in different ways. For in the type of prophecy which is said to contain the sight of understanding alone we perceive the whole fullness of the prophetic revelation in the understanding. Thereupon, because of the nature of our understanding, which cannot understand without phantasms, images are suitably formed in the imaginative power as the one who understands wishes. But in the other type of prophecy the whole fullness of prophetic revelation is not received in the understanding, but partly in the understanding, in so far as there is judgment, and partly in the imagination, in so far as there is reception.
|
| Unde in illa prophetia quae visionem intellectualem tantum continet, est visio intellectualis plenior: ex defectu enim luminis recepti in intellectu contingit quod exinde quodammodo decidit, quantum ad aliquid, a puritate intelligibili in imaginarias figuras, sicut in somniis accidit.
| Hence, the sight of understanding is more complete in the prophecy which contains only the sight of understanding. For the deficiency of the light received in the understanding causes it, in a sense, to fall to some extent from the intelligible purity into the imagery of imagination, as happens in dreams.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc quod Ioannes Christum digito demonstravit non pertinet ad visionem propheticam, prout nunc de prophetiae comparatione loquimur, sed magis ad denuntiationem. Hoc etiam quod Christum corporaliter vidit, non ei dedit prophetiam perfectioris rationis, sed fuit quoddam munus divinitus concessum amplius quam prophetia; unde dicitur Luc. X, 24: multi reges et prophetae voluerunt videre quae videtis, et cetera.
| 3. That John pointed out Christ physically does not belong to prophetic sight in the way we are now speaking about the comparison of prophecy. Rather, it belongs to the declaration of prophecy. Also, that he saw Christ bodily did not give him prophecy of a more perfect nature, but was a concession greater than prophecy given him by God. Hence, Luke (10:24) says: “Many prophets and kings have desired to see the things that you see...”
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod denuntiatio per verba vel facta communis est utrique prophetiae; quia et prophetia quae tantum visionem intellectualem habet, potest denuntiare secundum imagines quas ad libitum format.
| 4. Declaration through words or deeds is common to both kinds of prophecy, for even the prophecy which has the sight of understanding alone can be declared according to images which [the prophet] freely forms.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod Glossa illa loquitur de eo qui secundum intellectum non habet nisi iudicium de his quae ab alio accipiuntur; sicut Ioseph habuit solummodo iudicium de his quae a Pharaone sunt visa, non quod ipse acceperit quid esset futurum; et sic ratio concludit non de illa prophetia intellectualem tantum visionem habente, de qua nunc loquimur.
| 5. That Gloss speaks of one who in his understanding has only judgment about those things which are received by another, as Joseph had only judgment about the things which Pharaoh had seen and he himself did not receive [knowledge of] what would happen. Thus, the argument does not reach any conclusion about the prophecy which has the sight of understanding alone. And it is of this that we are now speaking.
|
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod in hoc Rabbi Moysi opinio non sustinetur. Ipse enim ponit quod prophetia David fuit inferior prophetia Isaiae vel Ieremiae; cuius contrarium dicitur a sanctis. Habet tamen veritatem quantum ad aliquid eius dictum, quia scilicet iudicium non perficitur nisi propositis his de quibus est iudicandum. Unde in illa prophetia in qua percipitur intellectuale lumen solummodo ad iudicandum, est ipsum lumen, non determinatam cognitionem alicuius faciens, quousque proponantur aliqua de quibus est iudicandum, vel a se vel ab alio accepta; et sic intellectualis visio perficitur per imaginariam, sicut commune determinatur per speciale.
| 6. On this point we do not follow the opinion of Rabbi Moses, for he holds that the prophecy of David was below that of Isaiah and Jeremiah, which is the opposite of what holy men say. Still, there is some truth in what he says, because the judgment is not completed unless the things about which we are to judge are brought forward. Hence, in the prophecy in which the light of understanding is perceived only in order to make a judgment, there is only the light itself, which does not cause determinate knowledge of anything until some things about which we must judge are put before it, whether these are received either from the light itself or from another. Thus, the sight of understanding is perfected through the sight of imagination as what is common is determined through that which is particular.
|
| Ad septimum dicendum, quod non semper contingit ex debilitate intellectualis luminis quod sit prophetia secundum visionem intellectualem tantum; sed quandoque propter plenissimam acceptionem intellectus ut dictum est; et ideo ratio non sequitur.
| 7. It is not always weakness of the light of understanding which is the source of prophecy according to the sight of understanding alone. But sometimes it is caused by a very complete reception of the understanding, as we have noted.” Therefore, the argument does not follow.
|
| Ad octavum dicendum, quod signum, inquantum huiusmodi, est causa cognitionis; signatum vero est id quod est notum per aliud. Sicut autem nobilius cognoscitur id quod in se notum est et alia cognoscere facit, eo quod tantum in se notum est; ita etiam e contrario id quod notum est per se, non per aliud, nobilius cognoscitur quam quod per aliud notum est, sicut principia conclusionibus, et ideo e contrario se habet de signo et signato; unde ratio non sequitur.
| 8. A sign as such is a cause of knowledge. The thing which is represented is that which is known through something else. But, just as that which is known in itself and makes other things known is known in a more noble way than that which is known only in itself, so also, on the other hand, that which is known through itself and not through something else is known in a more noble way than that which is known through something else. Thus, principles are known in a more noble way than conclusions, and therefore, the case is just the opposite with the sign and the thing signified. Hence, the argument does not follow.
|
| Ad nonum dicendum, quod quamvis imagines impressae divinitus sint nobiliores imaginibus per hominem formatis, tamen acceptio cognitionis quae est in intellectu divinitus, est nobilior illa acceptione quae fit per imaginarias formas.
| 9. Although images imprinted by God are more noble than images formed by a man, the reception of knowledge which is in the mind from God is more noble than that which takes place through the forms of imagination.
|
| Ad decimum dicendum, quod ideo illi specialius prophetae nuncupantur in distinctione praedicta qui secundum imaginarias visiones prophetiam habuerunt, quia in eis invenitur plenior ratio prophetiae, etiam ratione differentiae. Agyographae autem dicuntur qui supernaturaliter solum visiones intellectuales habuerunt sive quantum ad iudicium tantum, sive quantum ad iudicium et acceptionem simul.
| 10. Those who have prophecy according to visions of imagination are more especially called prophets in the above-mentioned distinction, for in them there is a fuller character of prophecy even by reason of the difference. They, however, are called sacred writers who had only intellectual visions supernaturally, whether in judgment alone or in judgment and reception together.
|
| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod quamvis intellectus noster intelligat divina per aliquas similitudines, tamen illae similitudines sunt nobiliores, ex hoc quod sunt immateriales, quam similitudines imaginariae; unde et visio intellectualis nobilior.
| 11. Although our intellect understands divine things through certain likenesses, still, because these are immaterial, they are more noble than the likenesses of imagination. Hence, the sight of understanding, also, is more noble.
|
| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod non potest esse quod aliqua res sit imaginabilis per suam essentiam, sicut est per suam essentiam intelligibilis; imaginatio enim non est nisi de rebus materialibus. Nec tamen potest imaginatio aliquid recipere nisi sine materia; unde semper necesse est quod imaginatio sit alicuius non per essentiam suam, sed per suam similitudinem. Intellectus vero immaterialiter recipit, et eo cognoscuntur non solum materialia, sed etiam immaterialia; unde et quaedam cognoscuntur ab eo per essentiam, quaedam autem per similitudinem.
| 12. A thing cannot be imaginable through its essence as it can be intelligible through its essence, for the imagination concerns only material things. Yet, it cannot receive anything except without matter. Consequently, it is always necessary for the imagination to attain an object not through its essence, but through its likeness. But understanding receives things immaterially, and so, knows not only material things, but also immaterial things. Hence, it knows some things through their essence and some through likenesses.
|
|
| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
|
| Ad rationes vero quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, de facili patet responsio secundum hoc quod falsum concludunt.
| The response to the difficulties to the contrary is easily seen, in so far as they conclude to something false.
|
Q. 12: Prophecy
ARTICLE XIII
In the thirteenth article we ask:
Are the grades of prophecy distinguished according to the sight of imagination?
[ARTICLE IV Sent., 49, 2, 7, ad 2; 1 Cor., c. 13, lect. 4; S.T., II-II, 174, 3.]
|
| Tertiodecimo quaeritur utrum gradus prophetiae distinguantur secundum visionem imaginariam
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod sic.
| And it seems that they are, for
|
| Nobilior enim est prophetia ubi est nobilior prophetatae rei acceptio. Sed quandoque acceptio rei prophetatae est per visionem imaginariam. Ergo secundum visionem imaginariam possunt gradus prophetiae distingui.
| 1. Prophecy is more noble where the reception of the thing prophesied is more noble. But, sometimes, the reception of the thing prophesied takes place through the sight of imagination. Therefore, grades of prophecy can be distinguished according to the sight of imagination.
|
| Praeterea, perfectius medium cognoscendi facit perfectiorem cognitionem; et exinde est scientia opinione perfectior. Sed similitudines imaginariae sunt medium cognoscendi in prophetia. Ergo ubi est nobilior imaginaria visio, est altior gradus prophetiae.
| 2. A more perfect medium of knowing produces more perfect knowledge. It is for this reason that scientific knowledge is more perfect than opinion. But the likenesses of imagination are a medium of knowing in prophecy. Therefore, where the sight of imagination is more noble, the grade of prophecy will be higher.
|
| Praeterea, in omni cognitione quae est per similitudinem, ubi est expressior similitudo, est perfectior cognitio. Sed figurae imaginatae in prophetia sunt similitudines rerum de quibus fit revelatio prophetiae. Ergo ubi est perfectior imaginaria visio, est altior gradus prophetiae.
| 3. In all knowledge which takes place through a likeness the knowledge is more perfect where the likeness is more explicit. But in prophecy the imagery of imagination is made up of the likenesses of the things about which there is revelation of prophecy. Therefore, where the sight of imagination is more perfect, the grade of prophecy is higher.
|
| Praeterea, cum lumen propheticum descendat ab intellectu in imaginationem; quanto est perfectius lumen in intellectu prophetae, tanto est perfectior imaginaria visio. Ergo diversi gradus imaginariae visionis demonstrant diversos gradus intellectualis. Sed ubi est perfectior intellectualis visio, est perfectior prophetia. Ergo et secundum imaginariam visionem gradus prophetiae distinguuntur.
| 4. Since the prophetic light descends from the understanding to the imagination, when the light in the understanding of the prophet is more perfect, the sight of imagination is the more perfect. Therefore, different grades of the sight of imagination show different grades of the sight of understanding. But where the sight of understanding is more perfect, the prophecy is more perfect. Therefore, grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the sight of imagination.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod diversitas visionis imaginariae non distinguit speciem prophetiae; et ideo nec secundum ipsam gradus prophetiae distinguuntur.- Sed contra, omne calidum elementare est eiusdem speciei; et tamen apud medicos distinguitur calidum in primo et in secundo aut tertio et quarto gradu. Ergo distinctio graduum non requirit speciei distinctionem.
| 5. It was said that diversity of the sight of imagination does not distinguish species of prophecy and, therefore, grades of prophecy are not distinguished according to it.—On the contrary, every warm element is of the. same species, but doctors distinguish warmth into first, second, third, and fourth grades. Therefore, the distinction of grades does not require the distinction of species.
|
| Praeterea, magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed etiam intellectualis visio non distinguitur in prophetis nisi secundum lumen propheticum perfectius et minus perfecte receptum. Ergo differentia visionis intellectualis non diversificat speciem prophetiae; ergo nec gradus secundum responsionem praedictam; et sic non essent in prophetia aliqui gradus si nec secundum visionem intellectivam, nec secundum imaginariam distinguuntur. Relinquitur ergo gradus prophetiae distingui secundum imaginariam visionem.
| 6. Greater and less do not constitute distinct species. But even the sight of understanding is distinguished in prophecy only according to the more or less perfect reception of the prophetic light. Therefore, difference in the sight of understanding does not constitute distinct species of prophecy and so it does not constitute distinct grades of prophecy according to the response just given. Thus, there would not be grades in prophecy if it were distinguished neither according to the sight of understanding nor the sight of imagination. Therefore, it remains that grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the sight of imagination.
|
| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
|
| Visio imaginaria non facit prophetam, sed solum intellectualis. Ergo nec secundum visionem imaginariam gradus prophetiae distinguuntur.
| 1. Only the sight of understanding, and not the sight of imagination, makes one a prophet. Therefore, neither are grades of prophecy distinguished according to the sight of imagination.
|
| Praeterea, illud quod distinguitur per se, distinguitur penes id quod est ei formale. Sed in prophetia intellectualis visio est formalis, imaginaria vero quasi materialis. Ergo gradus prophetiae distinguuntur secundum intellectualem, et non secundum imaginariam visionem.
| 2. That which is distinguished by reason of something intrinsic is distinguished according to that which is formal to it. But in prophecy the sight of understanding is formal and the sight of imagination is, as it were, material. Therefore, grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the sight of understanding and not according to the sight of imagination.
|
| Praeterea, imaginariae visiones etiam in eodem propheta pluries variantur, quia quandoque hoc modo revelationem accipit, quandoque illo. Ergo non videtur quod secundum imaginariam visionem possint prophetiae gradus distingui.
| 3. The visions of imagination frequently vary in the same prophet, for sometimes he apprehends revelation in one way and sometimes in another. Therefore, it does not seem possible to distinguish grades of prophecy according to the sight of imagination.
|
| Praeterea, sicut se habet scientia ad res scitas, ita prophetia ad res prophetatas. Sed scientiae distinguuntur secundum res scitas, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo et prophetia secundum res prophetatas, et non secundum imaginariam visionem.
| 4. Prophecy is related to the things prophesied just as scientific knowledge is related to the things known. But the sciences are distinguished according to the things known, as is said in The Soul. Therefore, prophecy is distinguished according to the things prophesied and not according to the sight of imagination.
|
| Praeterea, secundum Glossam in principio Psalterii, prophetia consistit in dictis et factis, somnio et visione. Non ergo debent magis prophetiae gradus distingui secundum imaginariam visionem, ad quam pertinet visio et somnium, quam secundum dicta et facta.
| 5. According to the Gloss, prophecy consists in “words and deeds, dreams and visions.” Therefore, grades of prophecy should not be distinguished more according to the sight of imagination to which visions and dreams belong than according to words and deeds.
|
| Praeterea, etiam miracula ad prophetiam requiruntur; unde Moyses cum a domino mitteretur, signum petivit, Exod. III, 13; et in Psal. LXXIII, 9, dicitur: signa nostra non vidimus; iam non est propheta et cetera. Ergo non magis debent distingui gradus prophetiae secundum imaginariam visionem quam secundum signa.
| 6. Miracles also are needed for prophecy. Hence, when Moses was sent by the Lord (Exodus 3:11-13), he sought a sign. And in Psalms (73:9) we read: “Our signs we have not seen, there is now no prophet...” Therefore, grades of prophecy should not be distinguished according to the sight of imagination rather than according to signs.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod quando ad aliquid constituendum duo concurrunt, quorum unum est alio principalius, in eo quod ex eis constituitur, potest comparationis gradus attendi et secundum id quod est principale, et secundum id quod est secundarium. Sed excessus eius quod est principale, ostendit eminentiam simpliciter; excessus vero eius quod est secundarium, ostendit eminentiam secundum quid, et non simpliciter, nisi secundum quod excessus, in eo quod est secundarium, est signum excessus in eo quod est principalius.
| When two things combine to make up something, and one of them is more important than the other in the composite which they constitute, we can consider grades of comparison according to that which is primary and according to that which is secondary. But a high degree of that which is primary shows an absolute pre-eminence, whereas a high degree of that which is secondary shows a pre-eminence in some respect and not absolutely, unless the high degree of that which is secondary is a sign of a high degree of that which is primary.
|
| Sicut ad meritum humanum concurrit caritas quasi principale, et opus exterius quasi secundarium; meritum autem, simpliciter loquendo, scilicet respectu praemii essentialis, iudicatur maius, quod ex maiori caritate procedit; magnitudo vero operis facit maius meritum secundum quid respectu alicuius praemii accidentalis, non autem simpliciter, nisi inquantum demonstrat magnitudinem caritatis, secundum id quod Gregorius dicit: amor Dei magna operatur si est. Cum ergo ad prophetiam concurrat intellectualis visio quasi principalis et imaginaria quasi secundaria, gradus prophetiae est simpliciter eminentior iudicandus ex eo quod visio intellectualis est eminentior. Ex eminentia vero imaginariae visionis ostenditur eminentior gradus prophetiae secundum quid, et non simpliciter, nisi inquantum perfectio imaginariae visionis demonstrat perfectionem intellectualis.
| Thus, for human merit, charity, as that which is primary, unites with an external work, as that which is secondary. However, absolutely speaking, that is to say, with reference to the essential reward, we judge merit to be greater when it proceeds from greater charity. And the magnitude of the work makes for greater merit in so far as it refers to some accidental reward, but not absolutely, except in so far as it shows intensity of charity, according to what Gregory says: “Love of God, if it exists, does great things.” Therefore, since prophecy is achieved through the joint activity of both the sight of understanding and that of imagination, the former functioning as the principal factor, and the latter in a secondary capacity, it follows that pre-eminence of the sight of understanding should be the basis for judging one grade of prophecy as absolutely superior. However, pre-eminence of the sight of imagination shows a grade of prophecy to be higher in some respect, and not absolutely, unless to the extent that perfection of the sight of imagination exhibits perfection of the sight of understanding.
|
| Ex parte autem intellectualis visionis non possunt accipi aliqui determinati gradus, quia plenitudo intellectualis luminis non manifestatur nisi per aliqua signa: unde penes illa signa oportet distinguere prophetiae gradus. Sic ergo possunt distingui gradus prophetiae secundum quatuor.
| But we cannot perceive determinate grades of the sight of understanding, because the fullness of the light of understanding is displayed only through certain signs. Hence, we must distinguish grades of prophecy according to those signs. And in this way there are four bases on which we can distinguish grades of prophecy.
|
| Primo secundum ea quae requiruntur ad prophetiam. Est autem duplex actus prophetiae: scilicet visio et denuntiatio. Ad visionem autem requiruntur duo: scilicet iudicium, quod est secundum intellectum, et acceptio, quae est quandoque secundum intellectum, quandoque secundum imaginationem. Sed ad denuntiationem requiritur aliquid ex parte denuntiantis; scilicet quaedam audacia, ut aliquis non terreatur loqui veritatem propter adversarios veritatis, secundum id quod dominus dixit ad Ezechielem, Ezech., III, 8: dedi faciem tuam valentiorem faciebus eorum, et frontem tuam duriorem frontibus eorum; et sequitur: ne timeas eos, neque metuas a facie eorum. Aliud autem requiritur ex parte rei denuntiatae scilicet signum, per quod veritas rei denuntiatae demonstratur; unde et Moyses a domino signum accepit, ut ei crederetur.
| The first is according to the elements which are necessary for prophecy. Now, prophecy has two acts: sight and declaration. For sight, however, two things are needed: judgment, which is in the understanding, and reception, which is sometimes in the understanding and sometimes in the imagination. But for declaration something is needed in the one declaring, namely, a certain boldness so that he will not be afraid to speak the truth because of the opponents of the truth. In this sense the Lord said to Ezechiel (3:8-9): “Behold I have made your face stronger than their faces: and your forehead harder than their foreheads..., fear them not, neither be you dismayed at their presence.” And something else is needed in the thing to be declared, namely, a sign through which the truth of the thing declared is made known. Thus, Moses received a sign from God in order that he might be believed.
|
| Sed quia denuntiatio in prophetia non principaliter, sed consequenter se habet in prophetia, ideo infimus gradus prophetiae est in eo in quo invenitur quaedam audacia vel promptitudo ad aliquid dicendum vel faciendum, sine hoc quod ei aliqua revelatio fiat; sicut si dicamus aliquem gradum prophetiae fuisse in Sampsone, largo modo accipiendo prophetiam, secundum quod omnis supernaturalis influxus ad prophetiam reducitur. Secundus vero gradus erit in eo qui habet visionem intellectualem tantum secundum iudicium, ut in Salomone. Tertius vero in eo qui habet intellectualem visionem cum imaginaria, ut in Isaia et Ieremia. Quartus vero in eo qui habet visionem intellectualem plenissimam quantum ad iudicium et quantum ad acceptionem, sicut in David.
| But, since the place of declaration in prophecy is not primary but only secondary, the lowest grade of prophecy exists in one in whom there is a certain boldness or readiness to say or do something without having a revelation. This would be the case if we say that there was a grade of prophecy in Samson, taking prophecy in a broad sense in which every supernatural influx is reduced to prophecy. The second grade will be that in which the prophet has the sight of understanding only according to judgment, as in Solomon. The third grade is that in which one has the sight of understanding together with that of imagination, as in Isaiah and Jeremiah. The fourth is that in which the prophet has the very fullness of the sight of understanding in judgment and reception, as in David.
|
| Secundo possunt distingui gradus prophetiae ex dispositione prophetantis; et sic cum prophetia fiat in somnio et in visione vigiliae, ut dicitur Numer., XII, 6, perfectior est gradus prophetiae quae est in vigilia, quam quae est in somnio: tum quia intellectus est melius dispositus ad iudicandum; tum quia etiam evocatio a sensibilibus non est facta naturaliter, sed ex intensione perfecta interiorum virium, ad ea quae divinitus demonstrantur.
| A second basis on which grades of prophecy can be distinguished is the disposition of the one prophesying. Thus, since prophecy takes place in a dream or in a vision when one is awake, as we read in Numbers (12:6), the grade of prophecy which takes place when one is awake is more perfect than that which takes place in a dream. This is so both because the understanding is better disposed for judging when one is awake and because the transport from sensible things does not take place naturally, but comes from the perfect concentration of the inner powers on the things which God is disclosing.
|
| Tertio ex modo accipiendi: quia quanto expressius significatur res prophetata, prophetiae gradus est sublimior. Nulla autem signa aliquid expressius significant quam verba; et ideo altior gradus prophetiae est quando percipiuntur verba expresse designantia rem prophetatam, sicut de Samuele legitur I regum, III, 4, quam quando demonstrantur aliquae figurae, quae sunt aliarum rerum similitudines, sicut olla succensa ostensa est Ieremiae, Ierem., I, 13: ex hoc enim manifeste ostenditur quod lumen propheticum magis in suo vigore percipitur quando secundum expressiorem similitudinem res propheticae demonstrantur.
| A third basis is the manner of perceiving these things, for the more distinctly the things prophesied are signified, the higher is the grade of prophecy. Rut no signs portray anything more distinctly than words. Therefore, when one perceives words expressly indicating the thing prophesied, as we read of Samuel in the first Book of Kings (3:11), the grade of prophecy is higher than when certain figures which are likenesses of the things are shown to us, as the boiling caldron which was shown to Jeremiah (1:13). From this it is clearly shown that the prophetic light is better grasped in its power when the things to be prophesied are exhibited according to more distinct likenesses.
|
| Quarto ex parte eius qui revelationem facit: eminentior enim gradus prophetiae est quando videtur ille qui loquitur quam quando verba audiuntur tantum, sive sit in somnio, sive sit in visione: quia ex hoc ostenditur quod magis accedit propheta ad cognitionem eius qui revelat. Quando vero videtur ille qui loquitur, altior gradus prophetiae est quando videtur in specie Angeli, quam quando videtur in specie hominis; et adhuc eminentior, si videatur in figura Dei, sicut Isa. VI, 1, vidi dominum sedentem etc.: cum enim prophetiae revelatio a Deo descendat in Angelum, et ab Angelo in hominem, tanto ostenditur plenior prophetiae receptio, quanto magis acceditur ad primum principium prophetiae.
| The fourth basis is the one who makes the revelation. For the grade of prophecy is higher when he who speaks is seen than when one only hears the words, whether in a dream or in a vision. For this shows that the prophet approaches closer to the knowledge of him who reveals. And the grade of prophecy is higher when he who speaks is seen under the guise of an angel than when he is seen in the form of a man, and even higher if he should be seen in the image of God, as in Isaiah (6:1) “I saw the Lord sitting....” For, since revelation of prophecy descends from God to an angel and from the angel to man, the reception of prophecy is manifestly fuller, the more it approaches the first source of prophecy.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
|
| Rationes illae quae ostendunt quod gradus prophetiae distinguuntur secundum imaginariam visionem, concedendae sunt secundum modum praedictum: nec hoc dicendum est, quod diversitas gradus distinctionem exigat speciei.
| We must concede the arguments which show that grades of prophecy arc distinguished according to sight of imagination in the manner we have explained. And we must not say that diversity of grade requires distinction of species.
|
|
| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
|
| Ad rationes vero quae sunt in oppositum, per ordinem respondendum est. Ad quarum etiam primam patet responsio ex praedictis.
| 1. The answer to the first difficulty is clear from what has been said.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod quando aliquid distinguitur secundum speciem, oportet quod fiat distinctio secundum illud quod est formale; sed si fiat distinctio graduum in eadem specie potest esse etiam secundum id quod est materiale; sicut animal distinguitur per masculinum et femininum, quae sunt differentiae materiales, ut in X Metaphysic. dicitur.
| 2. When something is distinguished according to species, the distinction must be made according to that which is formal. But if there is distinction of grades within the same species, it can be according to that which is material, as animal is distinguished according to male and female, which are material differences, as is said in the Metaphysics.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum lumen propheticum non sit aliquid immanens prophetae, sed sit quasi quaedam passio transiens, non oportet etiam ut propheta semper sit in eodem gradu prophetiae; immo quandoque fit ei revelatio secundum unum gradum, quandoque secundum alium.
| 3. Since prophetic light is not something abiding in the prophet, but a kind of transient impression, it is not necessary for the prophet always to possess the same grade of prophecy. In fact, revelation comes to him sometimes according to one grade and sometimes according to another.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum aliqua nobiliora quandoque minus perfecte cognoscantur, sicut cum de divinis habetur opinio et de creaturis scientia; non potest ex rebus prophetatis gradus accipi prophetiae; et praecipue cum ea quae sunt denuntianda, prophetae revelantur secundum quod exigit eorum dispositio propter quos prophetia datur.
| 4. Since some things which are more noble are at times known less perfectly, as when there is opinion about things divine and scientific knowledge about creatures, we cannot derive grades of prophecy from the things prophesied. This is especially true when the things which are to be declared are revealed to the prophet according to the demands of the disposition of those for whose sake the prophecy is given.
|
| Potest etiam dici, quod etiam secundum res prophetatas gradus prophetiae distinguuntur; sed tamen propter nimiam rerum revelatarum diversitatem non possunt secundum hoc aliqui gradus determinati prophetiae assignari, nisi forte in genere; ut si dicatur, quod cum revelatur aliquid de Deo, est eminentior gradus quam cum revelatur de creaturis.
| Still, it can be said that grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the things prophesied, but, because of their great diversity, we cannot thus assign definite grades of prophecy, except perhaps in a general way, as if we should say that the grade is higher when something about God is revealed than when something about creatures is revealed.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod dicta et facta quae ibi tanguntur, non pertinent ad revelationem prophetiae, sed ad denuntiationem, quae fit secundum dispositionem eorum quibus denuntiatur. Unde secundum hoc non possunt gradus prophetiae distingui.
| 5. The words and deeds treated in this objection do not belong to the revelation of prophecy, but to the declaration which takes place according to the disposition of those to whom it is declared. Consequently, we cannot distinguish grades of prophecy according to this.
|
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod gratia signorum est differens a prophetia. Potest tamen reduci ad prophetiam secundum hoc quod per signa veritas prophetae demonstratur; unde et gratia signorum quantum ad hoc est potior quam prophetia, sicut et scientia quae demonstrat propter quid, est potior quam scientia quae dicit quia. Et propter hoc I Corinth., XII, 9-10, praemittitur gratia signorum gratiae prophetiae. Unde et ille propheta est excellentissimus qui etiam signa facit habens revelationem propheticam. Si autem signa faciat sine revelatione prophetica, etsi forte sit dignior simpliciter, non tamen est dignior quantum pertinet ad rationem prophetiae; sed sic computabitur talis in infimo gradu prophetiae, sicut ille qui habet audaciam tantum ad aliquid faciendum.
| 6. The grace of working miracles differs from prophecy, yet it can be reduced to prophecy inasmuch as the truth of the prophet is shown forth through miracles. Hence, in this respect the grace of working miracles is better than prophecy, just as scientific knowledge which gives the reason is better than scientific knowledge which gives the fact. For this reason the grace of working miracles is put before the grace of prophecy in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:10). Therefore, he is the most distinguished prophet who has prophetic revelation and also works miracles. However, if he works miracles without prophetic revelation, he is not more noble in what belongs to the nature of prophecy, although, perhaps, all things considered, he is more noble. But such a one is numbered among those in the lowest grade of prophecy, just as one who has only the boldness to do something.
|
Q. 12: Prophecy
ARTICLE XIV
In the fourteenth article we ask:
Was Moses more outstanding than other prophets?
[ARTICLE De ver., 12, 9, ad 1; In Isaiam, 6; S.T., II-II, 174,4.]
|
| Quartodecimo quaeritur utrum Moyses fuerit excellentior aliis prophetis
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that he was not, for
|
| Quia, ut dicit Gregorius, per successiones temporum crevit divinae cognitionis augmentum. Ergo posteriores prophetae fuerunt excellentiores Moyse.
| 1. Gregory says:. “As there has been a growth age by age, there has been an increase in the knowledge about God.” Therefore, the later prophets were more outstanding than Moses.
|
| Praeterea, Glossa in principio Psalterii dicit quod David dicitur propheta per excellentiam. Ergo Moyses non fuit excellentissimus.
| 2. The Gloss reads: “David was the most outstanding of the prophets. Therefore, Moses was not the most outstanding.
|
| Praeterea, maiora miracula facta sunt per Iosue, qui fecit solem et lunam stare, Iosue, X, 13, quam per Moysen; et similiter per Isaiam, qui fecit solem retrocedere, ut habetur Isaiae, XXXVIII, 8. Ergo Moyses non fuit prophetarum maximus.
| 3. Greater miracles were worked through Joshua, who made the sun and the moon stand still (Joshua 10:13), than through Moses. Greater miracles were also worked through Isaiah, who made the sun go backward (Isaiah 38:8). Therefore, Moses was not the greatest prophet.
|
| Praeterea, Eccli., XLVIII, 4, dicitur de Elia: quis poterit tui similiter gloriari, qui sustulisti mortuum ab Inferis? etc.; et sic idem quod prius.
| 4. In Sirach (48:4-5) there is this said of Elijah: “Who can glory like to you who raise up a dead man from below... ? “ Thus, we conclude as before.
|
| Praeterea, Matth. XI, 11, dicitur de Ioanne Baptista: inter natos mulierum non surrexit maior Ioanne Baptista. Ergo nec fuit Moyses eo maior; et sic idem quod prius.
| 5. In Matthew (11:11), we read of John the Baptist: “There has not risen among them that are born of women a greater than John the Baptist.” Therefore, Moses was not greater than he. Thus, we conclude as before.
|
| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
|
| Est quod dicitur Deuter., ultimo: non surrexit propheta ultra in Israel sicut Moyses.
| 1. Deuteronomy (34: 10) says: “And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses.”
|
| Praeterea, Num., XII, 6-7, dicitur: si quis fuerit inter vos propheta domini, in somnio aut visione loquar ad eum; at non talis servus meus Moyses, qui in omni domo fidelissimus est. Ex quo patet quod ipse aliis prophetis praefertur.
| 2. Numbers (12:6-7) says: “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. But it is not so with my servant Moses who is most faithful in all my house.” From this it is clear that he is given preference over the other prophets.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod inter prophetas secundum aliquid diversimode diversi possunt maiores reputari. Simpliciter autem loquendo omnium maximus Moyses fuit; in eo enim quatuor quae ad prophetiam requiruntur, excellentissime sunt inventa.
| Among the prophets, eminence can, according to various criteria, be attributed to some in a qualified way, but speaking without qualification, Moses was the greatest of them all. For in him the four things necessary for prophecy were present in a most outstanding manner.
|
| Primo quidem visio intellectualis in eo excellentissima fuit, secundum quam tantum meruit elevari, ut ipsam Dei essentiam videret, ut dicitur Numer. XII, 8: palam, non per figuras et aenigmata, videt Deum. Et haec quidem eius visio non est facta Angelo mediante, sicut aliae visiones prophetales; unde et ibidem dicitur: ore ad os loquar ei. Et hoc expresse dicit Augustinus ad Paulinam de videndo Deum et XII super Genesim ad litteram.
| First, the sight of understanding was most eminent in him, and through this he was lifted up to see the very essence of God, as is said in Numbers (12:8): “And plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord.” Moreover, this sight of his did not take place through the mediation of an angel, as it did in other prophetic visions. Hence, in the same place in Numbers (12:8) we read: “For I speak to him mouth to mouth.” And Augustine says this plainly.
|
| Secundo imaginaria visio fuit in eo perfectissima, quia eam quasi ad nutum habebat; unde dicitur Exod. XXXIII, 11, quod loquebatur ei dominus (...) facie ad faciem, sicut homo solet loqui ad amicum suum; in quo etiam alia eius eminentia quantum ad imaginariam visionem potest notari: quod ipse scilicet non solum audivit verba revelantis, sed vidit, non in figura hominis vel Angeli, sed quasi ipsum Deum, non in somnio, sed in vigilia; quod de nullo aliorum legitur.
| Second, the sight of imagination existed in Moses most perfectly because he had it, as it were, at will. Hence, we read in Exodus (33:10: “And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend.” We can also note in this another excellence with reference to the sight of imagination, that he not only heard the words of the one revealing, but saw Him, and this not in the shape of a man or an angel, but as God Himself; not in a dream, but when awake. We read this of none of the other prophets.
|
| Tertio etiam eius denuntiatio fuit excellentissima; quia omnes qui fuerunt ante eum, instruxerunt familias suas per modum disciplinae; Moyses autem fuit primus qui locutus est ex parte domini, dicens: haec dicit dominus; et non uni familiae, sed toti populo; nec denuntiavit ex parte domini ut attenderetur dictis alterius alicuius prophetae praecedentis, sicut prophetae denuntiando inducebant ut observaretur lex Moysi; unde denuntiatio praecedentium fuit praeparatio ad legem Moysi, quae fuit fundamentum quoddam denuntiationis sequentium prophetarum. Quarto etiam fuit eminentior quantum ad ea quae ordinantur ad denuntiationem. Quantum ad miracula quidem, quia fecit signa ad conversionem et instructionem totius generis; alii vero prophetae fecerunt particularia signa ad speciales personas, et specialia negotia; unde dicitur Deuter. XXXIV, 10: non surrexit ultra propheta in Israel sicut Moyses, quem nosset dominus facie ad faciem. Quantum ad eminentiam revelationis, in omnibus signis atque portentis quae per eum misit, ut faceret in terra Aegypti Pharaoni et omnibus servis eius, et infra magnaque mirabilia quae fecit Moyses coram universo Israel. Quantum etiam ad audaciam apparet eminentissimus, quia in sola virga descendit in Aegyptum, non solum ad denunciandum verba domini, sed etiam ad flagellandum Aegyptum, et populum liberandum.
| Third, his declaration was most outstanding because all who were before him taught their families as one teaches a lesson, but Moses was the first who spoke for the Lord, saying: “The Lord says this.” And he spoke to the whole people and not to one family. Nor did he declare something for the Lord in such a way that his hearers should give heed to what another previous prophet said, as the prophets by their preaching led the people to observe the law of Moses. Hence, the preaching of previous prophets was a preparation for the law of Moses, and this law was the foundation of the preaching of subsequent prophets. Fourth, he was more outstanding in the matters which refer to the declaration of prophecy. For, as regards miracles, he worked signs for the conversion and teaching of a whole race, whereas other prophets worked particular miracles for special persons and special tasks. Hence, we read in Deuteronomy (34:10): “And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses whom the Lord knew face to face”. as for pre-eminence of revelation: “In all the signs and wonders, which he sent by him to do in the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to all his servants” (Deuteronomy 34:11); and “Great miracles, which Moses did before all Israel” (Deuteronomy 34:12). He also showed himself most outstanding in boldness, for with only a rod he went down into Egypt, not only to preach the words of the Lord, but also to scourge Egypt and to free his people.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
|
| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod verbum Gregorii est intelligendum de his quae pertinent ad mysterium incarnationis de quibus aliqui posteriores expressius revelationem acceperunt quam Moyses; non autem quantum ad cognitionem divinitatis, de quo plenissime Moyses instructus fuit.
| 1. We should take what Gregory says as referring to the things which pertain to the mystery of the Incarnation. Later prophets received more explicit revelations about these than Moses did. However, they did not receive more explicit revelations of the Divinity, about which Moses was most fully taught.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod David dicitur esse excellentissimus prophetarum, quia expressissime de Christo prophetavit et sine aliqua imaginaria visione.
| 2. David is called the most outstanding of the prophets because he prophesied most clearly about Christ without any vision of imagination.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis illa miracula fuerint maiora miraculis Moysi quantum ad substantiam facti, tamen illa Moysi fuerunt maiora quantum ad modum faciendi, quia facta sunt toti populo, et ad populi institutionem in nova lege, et liberationem; illa vero fuerunt ad aliqua particularia negotia.
| 3. Although those miracles were greater than the miracles of Moses in the substance of what was done, the miracles of Moses. were greater in the manner in which they were performed because they were performed for the whole people and for the instruction of the people in a new law and for their liberation. These other miracles were for particular tasks.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod eminentia Eliae praecipue in hoc attenditur quod a morte immunis conservatus fuit; fuit etiam multis aliis prophetis eminentior quoad audaciam qua non pertimuit in diebus suis principes et quoad magnitudinem signorum, ut ex verbis Ecclesiastici ibidem habetur.
| 4. The pre-eminence of Elijah is noted especially in this, that he was preserved from death and was more outstanding than many other prophets in boldness, by reason of which he did not fear the rulers of his times, and in greatness of miracles, as appears from the same place in Sirach (48:4).
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum Moyses aliis praefertur, intelligendum est de his qui fuerunt in veteri testamento; quia tunc praecipue fuit prophetia in suo statu, quando Christus, ad quem omnis prophetia ordinabatur, expectabatur venturus. Ioannes autem ad novum pertinet testamentum; unde Matth. XI, 13: lex et prophetae usque ad Ioannem. In novo tamen testamento facta est manifestior revelatio: unde dicitur II Corinth. III, 18: nos autem revelata facie gloriam domini etc., ubi expresse apostolus se et alios apostolos Moysi praefert. Et tamen non sequitur, si Ioanne Baptista nullus fuit maior, quod propter hoc nullus fuerit eo excellentior in gradu prophetiae: quia, cum prophetia non sit donum gratiae gratum facientis, potest esse potior in prophetia qui est minor in merito.
| 5. When Moses is put before the other prophets, we should understand this as referring to prophets of the Old Testament, for, at that time especially, when the world awaited the coming of Christ, to whom all prophecy was ordained, prophecy was in its proper environment. John, however, belongs to the New Testament. Hence, Matthew (11:13) has: “For all the prophets and the law prophesied until John.” However, there is a clearer revelation in the New Testament; the second Epistle to the Corinthians (3:18) has: “But we all, beholding the glory of the Lord with open face...” Here, the Apostle distinctly puts himself and the other apostles ahead of Moses. Nevertheless, granted that no man was greater than John the Baptist, it does not follow from this that no prophet had a higher grade of prophecy than he, for one can be greater in prophecy and less in merit, since prophecy is not a gift of sanctifying grace.
|