Question Thirteen: Rapture

Primo quid sit raptus. Secundo utrum Paulus in raptu viderit Deum per essentiam. Tertio utrum intellectus alicuius viatoris possit elevari ad videndum Deum per essentiam sine hoc quod a sensibus abstrahatur. Quarto quanta abstractio requiratur ad hoc quod intellectus Deum per essentiam videre possit. Quinto quid est illud quod apostolus circa suum raptum scivit, et quid nescivit.

What is rapture? Did Paul see God through His essence when he was enraptured? Can one in this life have his understanding raised to see God through His essence without being carried out of his senses? How great an abstraction is required for our understanding to be able to see God through His essence? What did the Apostle know and not know about his rapture?

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Q. 13: Rapture ARTICLE I The question is about rapture. In the first article we ask: What is rapture? [ARTICLE De ver., 13, 2, ad 9; 2 Cor., c. 12., lect. 1; S.T., II-II, 175, 1.]
Quaestio est de raptu. Et primo quaeritur quid sit raptus	Difficulties
Describitur autem a magistris sic: raptus est ab eo quod est secundum naturam, in id quod est contra naturam, vi superioris naturae elevatio.	The Masters describe it in this way: “Rapture is elevation, by the power of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to that which is contrary to nature.”
Et videtur quod inconvenienter.	It seems that rapture is unsuitably described, for
Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, intelligentia hominis naturaliter cognoscit Deum. Sed in raptu elevatur hominis intellectus ad Dei cognitionem. Ergo non elevatur in id quod est contra naturam, sed quod est secundum naturam.	1. Augustine says: “Man’s understanding knows God naturally.” But, in rapture, man’s understanding is raised to a knowledge of God. Therefore, it is not raised to that which is contrary to nature, but to that which is according to nature.
Praeterea magis dependet spiritus creatus ab increato quam corpus inferius a superiori. Sed impressiones superiorum corporum sunt inferioribus corporibus naturales, ut dicit Commentator in III caeli et mundi. Ergo elevatio spiritus humani, quamvis fiat vi superioris naturae, non est nisi naturalis.	2. A created spirit depends more on the uncreated spirit than a lower body depends on a higher body. But impressions from higher bodies are natural to lower bodies, as the Commentator says. Therefore, elevation of the human spirit, even though it takes place in virtue of a higher nature, is only natural.
Praeterea, Roman. XI, 24, super illud: contra naturam insertus es in bonam olivam etc., dicit Glossa, quod Deus auctor naturae nihil contra naturam facit; quia hoc est unicuique natura quod ab eo accepit a quo est omnis modus et ordo naturae. Sed elevatio raptus fit a Deo, qui est conditor humanae naturae. Ergo non est contra naturam, sed secundum naturam.	3. The Gloss on Romans(11:24), “Contrary to nature [thou] wert grafted into the good olive tree,” reads that God, the author of nature, “does nothing contrary to nature,” since that which each one receives from the source of all rule and order of nature is the nature for it. But the elevation of rapture is from God, who is the creator of human nature. Therefore, it is not against nature but according to it.
Sed dicebat, quod dicitur esse contra naturam, quia fit divinitus, non per modum spiritus humani.- Sed contra, Dionysius dicit, VIII de divinis Nomin., quod iustitia Dei in hoc attenditur, quod omnibus rebus distribuit secundum suum modum et dignitatem. Sed Deus non potest aliquid facere contra suam iustitiam. Ergo nulli rei aliquid tribuit quod non sit secundum modum eius.	4. It was said that it is against nature because it is done in a divine manner and not in the manner of human spirit.—On the contrary, Dionysius says: “We see the justice of God in this that He distributes [His goods] to all things according to the measure of their worth.” But God cannot do anything contrary to His justice. Therefore, He does not give a thing something which is not according to its manner of being.
Praeterea, si modus hominis quantum ad aliquid mutetur, non mutatur hoc modo quod hominis bonum auferatur; quia Deus non est causa quare homo sit deterior, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. LXXXIII quaest. Sed bonum hominis est secundum rationem vivere et voluntarie operari, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de divinis nominibus. Cum ergo violentia sit contraria voluntario, et bonum rationis evacuet: ex hoc enim necessitas est contristans quod est contraria voluntati, ut dicitur V Metaph.; videtur quod divinitus non fiat in homine aliqua violenta elevatio contra naturam; quod esse videtur in raptu, ut ipsum nomen importat, et descriptio praedicta designat in hoc quod dicit, vi superioris naturae.	5. If man’s manner is changed in some respect, it is not changed in such a way that man’s proper good would be taken away. For, as Augustine says, God is not the cause of man’s deterioration. But man’s proper good is to live according to reason and to act in a voluntary way, as is clear in Dionysius. Therefore, since violence is contrary to what is voluntary and does away with the good of reason (for necessity causes sorrow since it is contrary to the will, as is said in the Metaphysics), it seems that God brings about no violent elevation in man contrary to nature. Now, this is what seems to take place in rapture, as the very name implies, and as the previously mentioned description points out in the words, “by the power of a higher nature.”
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in III de anima, excellentiae sensibilium corrumpunt sensum, non autem excellentiae intelligibilium intellectum. Sed ideo sensus deficit a cognitione excellentium sensibilium, quia ab eis corrumpitur. Ergo intellectus naturaliter potest quantumcumque excellentia intelligibilia cognoscere. Ad quaecumque igitur intelligibilia mens hominis elevetur, non erit elevatio contra naturam.	6. According to the Philosopher,” excessive intensity of sensible objects destroys the senses, but excessive intensity of intelligible objects does not destroy the understanding. Now, the senses fail of knowledge of intense sensible objects because they are destroyed by them. Therefore, the understanding can know intelligible objects naturally no matter how intense they are. Hence, no matter to what intelligible objects the mind of man is raised up, the elevation will not be contrary to nature.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. de spiritu et anima, quod Angelus et anima natura sunt pares sed officio dispares. Sed non est contra naturam Angeli cognoscere ea ad quae homines elevantur in raptu. Ergo nec elevatio raptus est homini contra naturam.	7. Augustine says that angels and souls have similar natures but dissimilar duties.” Now, it is not contrary to the nature of an angel to know the things to which man is raised in rapture. Therefore, for man, the elevation of rapture is not contrary to nature.
Praeterea, si aliquis motus sit naturalis; et perventio ad terminum motus naturalis erit, cum nullus motus sit infinitus. Sed mens hominis movetur naturaliter in Deum; quod patet ex hoc quod non quiescit nisi ad eum pervenerit; unde Augustinus in I confessionum: fecisti nos, domine, ad te; et inquietum est cor nostrum donec quiescat in te. Ergo elevatio illa qua mens pertingit ad Deum, ut est in raptu, non est contra naturam.	8. If any movement is natural, arrival at the term of the movement will also be natural, since no movement is infinite. But the mind of man is naturally moved toward God. This is clear from the fact that it rests only when it has reached God. Hence, Augustine says: “You made us for Thee, Lord; and our heart is not at rest until it rests in Thee.” Therefore, the elevation by which the mind reaches God, as happens in rapture, is not contrary to nature.
Sed dicebat, quod ferri in Deum non est naturale humanae menti ex seipsa, sed solum ex praestitutione divina; et sic non est simpliciter naturale.- Sed contra, natura inferior non operatur nec tendit in aliquem finem nisi ex praestitutione divina, ratione cuius dicitur esse opus naturae, opus intelligentiae; et tamen rerum naturalium dicimus esse naturales motus simpliciter, et operationes. Ergo et ferri in Deum, si sit naturale menti ex praestitutione divina, debet iudicari simpliciter naturale.	9. It was said that it is not natural for the human mind to be drawn to God by reason of the mind itself, but by reason of an ordination of God. Thus, it is not natural simply.—On the contrary, a lower nature does not engage in activity or tend toward any end except by reason of a divine ordination. It is for this reason that every natural work is called a work of intelligence. Nevertheless, we say that the movements and activities of natural things are simply natural. Therefore, to be drawn toward God should also be judged simply natural if it is natural to the mind by reason of a divine ordination.
Praeterea, prius est anima in se, secundum quod spiritus dicitur, quam prout est coniuncta, secundum quod dicitur anima. Sed animae, inquantum est spiritus quidam, actus est cognoscere Deum, et alias substantias separatas; inquantum vero est corpori coniuncta, actus eius est cognoscere res corporales et sensibiles. Ergo per prius inest animae cognoscere intelligibilia quam sensibilia. Cum igitur sensibilium cognitio sit animae naturalis, et cognitio divinorum intelligibilium erit ei naturalis; et sic idem quod prius.	10. The soul, in so far as it exists in itself and is thus called a spirit, is prior to the soul as joined to the body and, accordingly, called a soul. But the activity of the soul as a spirit is to know God and the other separated substances. But, in so far as it is joined to the body, its activity is to know corporeal and sensible things. Therefore, the capacity of the soul to know intelligible things is prior to that to know sensible things. Since, therefore, it is natural for the soul to know sensible things, it is also natural for it to know divine intelligible things. Thus, we conclude as before.
Praeterea, naturalius aliquid ordinatur ad ultimum terminum quam ad medium, cum ad medium ordo fit propter ordinem ad ultimum. Sed res sensibiles sunt quaedam media quibus pervenitur in Dei cognitionem; Rom. I, 20: invisibilia Dei (...) per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur. Sed cognitio sensibilium est homini naturalis. Ergo et cognitio intelligibilium; et sic idem quod prius.	11. The ordination of a thing to its final end is more natural than the ordination to the means, for the ordination to the means exists because of the ordination to the final end. But sensible things are the means by which we reach the knowledge of God, as we see in Romans (1:20): “For the invisible things of him... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” But the knowledge of sensible things is natural to man. Therefore, knowledge of intelligible things is also natural. We conclude as before.
Praeterea, nihil quod fit virtute aliqua naturali, potest dici simpliciter esse contra naturam. Sed quaedam res habent, ut herbae vel lapides, naturales virtutes evocandi mentem a sensibus ut quaedam mirabilia cernantur; quod videtur esse in raptu. Ergo raptus non est elevatio contra naturam.	12. Nothing that takes place by a natural power can be said to be unconditionally contrary to nature. But certain things, as herbs or stones, have natural powers to release the mind from the senses, so that wonderful visions are beheld. This is what seems to happen in rapture. Therefore, rapture is not an elevation contrary to nature.
Sed contra,	To the Contrary
II Corinth., XII, 2, super illud: scio hominem in Christo etc., dicit Glossa: raptum, id est contra naturam elevatum. Ergo raptus est elevatio contra naturam.	The Gloss on the passage in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2), “I know a man in Christ,” says: “Rapture, that is exaltation contrary to nature...” Therefore, rapture is an elevation contrary to nature.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod sicut cuiuslibet alterius rei est quaedam operatio talis rei, inquantum est haec res, ut ignis aut lapidis; ita etiam et hominis est quaedam operatio inquantum est homo, quae est ei naturalis.	just as everything else has a certain activity which is natural to it in so far as it is this thing, fire or a stone, for example; so, too, man as man has a certain activity which is natural to him.
In rebus autem naturalibus dupliciter contingit transmutari rem aliquam a sua naturali operatione. Uno modo ex defectu propriae virtutis, undecumque talis defectus contingat, sive ex causa extrinseca, sive intrinseca; sicut cum ex defectu virtutis formativae in semine generatur fetus monstruosus. Alio modo ex operatione divinae virtutis, cui omnis natura ad nutum obedit, sicut fit in miraculis; ut cum virgo concipit, vel caecus illuminatur.	Now, in physical reality the natural activity of a thing may be modified in two ways. In one, the change arises from a deficiency of its proper power, whatever be the source of such a deficiency, whether an extrinsic or an intrinsic cause. Thus, an abnormal fetus is produced because of a lack of formative power in the seed. In the other way, the change arises from the activity of the divine power, whose will all nature obeys. This happens in miracles, as when a virgin conceives or a blind man is made to see. Similarly, man’s natural and proper activity can be modified in two ways.
Et similiter etiam homo a sua naturali et propria operatione dupliciter immutari potest. Est autem hominis propria operatio intelligere mediante imaginatione et sensu: operatio enim eius qua solis intellectualibus inhaeret, omnibus inferioribus praetermissis, non est eius inquantum est homo, sed inquantum in eo aliquod divinum existit, ut dicitur X Ethicorum; operatio vero qua solis sensibilibus inhaeret praeter intellectum et rationem, non est eius inquantum est homo, sed secundum naturam quam cum brutis habet communem. Tunc igitur a naturali modo suae cognitionis transmutatur, quando a sensibus abstractus aliqua praeter sensum inspicit.	Man’s proper activity, however, is to understand through the mediation of sense and imagination. For the activity by which he fixes on intellectual things alone, passing over all lower things, does not belong to man as man, but in so far as something divine exists in him, as is said in the Ethics. Moreover, the activity by means of which he grasps only sensible things apart from understanding and reasoning does not belong to him as man, but according to the nature which he has in common with the brute animals. Therefore, when man is transported out of his senses and sees things beyond sense, his natural mode of knowing is modified.
Haec ergo transmutatio quandoque fit ex defectu propriae virtutis, sicut accidit in phreneticis, et aliis mente captis; et haec quidem abstractio a sensibus non est elevatio hominis, sed magis depressio. Aliquando vero talis abstractio fit virtute divina: et tunc proprie elevatio quaedam est: quia cum agens assimilet sibi patiens, abstractio quae fit a virtute divina, quae est supra hominem, est in aliquid altius quam sit homini naturale.	Sometimes, this change takes place because of some deficiency in man’s proper power, as happens with insane people and others who are mentally deranged. This kind of transport out of their senses is not an elevation but rather a debasing of man. Sometimes, however, such transport takes place through the divine power, and then it is properly an elevation. For, since the agent makes that which is passive like itself, the transport which takes place by the divine power, and which is above man, has an ordination to something higher than that which is natural to man.
Sic ergo in descriptione praedicta raptus, qua definitur ut quidam motus, tangitur eius genus in hoc quod dicitur, elevatio; causa efficiens in hoc quod dicit, vi superioris naturae; duo termini motus a quo, et in quem, in hoc quod dicit, ab eo quod est secundum naturam in id quod est contra naturam.	Thus, in the foregoing description of rapture, which defines it as a movement, “elevation” gives its genus, and “by the power of a higher nature” gives the efficient cause. “From that which is according to nature to that which is contrary to nature” gives the starting point and the term of the movement.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod cognoscere Deum contingit multipliciter: scilicet per essentiam suam, et per res sensibiles, aut etiam per effectus intelligibiles. Similiter etiam distinguendum est de eo quod est homini naturale. Uni enim et eidem rei est aliquid secundum naturam et contra naturam, secundum eius status diversos; eo quod non est eadem natura rei dum est in fieri, et dum est in perfecto esse, ut dicit Rabbi Moyses; sicut quantitas completa est naturalis homini cum ad aetatem pervenerit perfectam, et alia huiusmodi, esset autem contra naturam puero, si in perfecta quantitate nasceretur.	1. One can know God in many ways: through His essence, through sensible things, or through intelligible effects. We have to make a similar distinction about that which is natural to man. For something is contrary to nature and according to nature for one and the same thing according to its different states, because the nature of the thing is not the same when it is in the state of becoming and when it has complete existence, as Rabbi Moses says. Thus, full stature and other things of the kind are natural to man when he has reached maturity, but it would be contrary to nature for a boy to have full stature at birth.
Sic igitur dicendum est, quod intelligentiae humanae secundum quemlibet statum est naturale aliquo modo cognoscere Deum; sed in sui principio, scilicet in statu viae, est naturale ei quod cognoscat Deum per creaturas sensibiles. Est autem ei naturale quod perveniat ad cognoscendum Deum per seipsum in sui consummatione, id est in statu patriae. Et sic si in statu viae elevetur ad hoc quod cognoscat Deum secundum statum patriae, hoc erit contra naturam, sicut esset contra naturam quod puer mox natus haberet barbam.	Thus, it must be said that to know God in some fashion is natural for the human intelligence according to any state. But in the beginning, that is, in this life, it is natural for it to know God through sensible creatures. It is also natural for it to reach the knowledge of God through Himself when it reaches its full perfection, that is, in heaven. Thus, if in this life it is raised to the knowledge of God which it will have in heaven, this will be contrary to nature, just as it would be contrary to nature for a baby boy to have a beard.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod duplex est natura; scilicet particularis, quae est propria unicuique rei, et universalis, quae complectitur totum ordinem causarum naturalium. Et ex hoc dupliciter dicitur aliquid esse secundum naturam vel contra naturam: uno modo quantum ad naturam particularem, alio quantum ad universalem; sicut omnis corruptio et defectus et senium est contra naturam particularem: sed tamen naturale secundum naturam universalem ut omne compositum ex contrariis corrumpatur.	2. Nature can be taken in two ways: in particular, as proper to each thing, and in general, as embracing the whole order of natural causes. For this reason a thing is said to be according to nature or contrary to nature in two ways: in one, with reference to nature in particular; in the other, with reference to nature in general. Thus, every deficiency, decay, and the weakness of old age is contrary to nature in particular, but, according to nature in general, it is natural for everything which is composed of contraries to decay.
Quia igitur ordo universalis causarum hoc habet ut inferiora a suis superioribus moveantur; omnis motus qui fit in inferiori natura ex impressione superioris, sive in corporalibus sive in spiritualibus, est quidem naturalis secundum naturam universalem, non autem semper secundum naturam particularem; nisi quando a natura superiori sic imprimitur in naturam inferiorem, ut ipsa impressio sit eius natura. Et sic patet quomodo ea quae a Deo in creaturis fiunt, possunt dici secundum naturam, vel contra naturam.	Therefore, since the universal order of causes is so ordained that lower things should be moved by those which are higher, all movement which takes place in lower nature because of the impressions of what is higher, whether this be in physical or in spiritual things, is natural according to universal nature, but not according to particular nature unless the impression made on the lower nature by the higher nature is such that the very impression is its nature. Thus, it is clear how the effects which God brings about in creatures can be called according to nature or contrary to nature.
Unde etiam patet responsio ad tertium. Vel dicendum, quod ista elevatio dicitur esse contra naturam, quia est contra solitum cursum naturae, sicut Glossa exponit Rom. XI, 24.	3. The answer to the third difficulty is clear from this. Or else we should say that that elevation is called contrary to nature because it is contrary to the ordinary course of nature, as the Gloss explains.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod Deus, quamvis nunquam contra iustitiam faciat, aliquid tamen praeter iustitiam facit. Tunc enim est aliquid contra iustitiam, cum subtrahitur alicui quod sibi debetur; ut patet in humanis, cum quis alteri furatur. Si vero ex liberalitate quadam tribuat quod non est debitum, hoc non est contra iustitiam, sed praeter iustitiam. Sic igitur cum Deus mentem humanam in statu viae elevat supra modum suum, non facit contra iustitiam, sed praeter iustitiam.	4. Although God never acts contrary to justice, He sometimes does do something beyond justice. For a thing is contrary to justice when something one deserves is taken away from him. This is clear in human dealings when someone robs another. But, if out of liberality one gives what is not deserved, this is not contrary to justice, but beyond it. Accordingly, when in this life God raises a human mind above its proper level, He does not act contrary to justice, but beyond it.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod opus hominis ex hoc quod meriti habet bonitatem, exigit ut sit secundum rationem et voluntatem. Sed bonum quod ei confertur in raptu, non est huiusmodi; unde non oportet quod procedat ex voluntate humana, sed ex sola virtute divina. Nec tamen potest dici omnino esse violentia, nisi sicut dicitur motus violentus quando lapis deorsum proiicitur velocius quam sit dispositio motus naturalis: proprie tamen violentum est in quo nihil confert vim patiens, ut dicitur III Ethic.	5. By the very fact that a man’s work has a meritorious value it must be under the direction of reason and the will. But the good which is imparted to a work in rapture is not of this sort. Hence, it is not necessary that it proceed from the human will, but only from the divine power. Nevertheless, we cannot call it violence in every respect, unless in the sense that we say there is violent movement when a stone is thrown down faster than it would fall by its natural motion. Nevertheless, properly speaking, “that is violent in which that which is passive contributes nothing,” as is said in the Ethics.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod hoc est commune sensui et intellectui quod uterque deficit a perfecta acceptione excellentis intelligibilis vel sensibilis etsi uterque de eo aliquid accipiat. Sed in hoc est differentia: quod per hoc quod sensus movetur ab excellenti sensibili, corrumpitur, ut non possit postmodum minora sensibilia cognoscere; sed per hoc quod intellectus accipit de intelligibili excellenti, confortatur, ut melius postmodum possit minora intelligibilia cognoscere. Unde patet quod auctoritas praedicta philosophi non est ad propositum.	6. Understanding and sense have this in common, that both fail of perfect perception of an excessively intense object, although both perceive something of it. The difference lies in this, that sense is destroyed by an excessively intense sensible object, so that afterwards it cannot know lesser sensibles, but understanding is strengthened through reception of an excessively intense intelligible object, so that afterwards it can know lesser intelligible objects better. Hence, the authoritative statement of the Philosopher cited above is not to the point.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod Angelus et anima non dicuntur esse pares natura nisi quantum ad statum ultimae consummationis, in quo homines erunt sicut Angeli in caelo, ut dicitur Matth., c. XXII, 30. Vel secundum quod communicant in natura intellectuali, quamvis in Angelis perfectior inveniatur.	7. Angels and souls are said to be equal in nature only in relation to the state of final perfection in which men will be like angels in heaven, as is said in Matthew (22:30), or in so far as they share in intellectual nature, although it is more perfect in the angels.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod perventio ad terminum motus naturalis est naturalis, non quidem in principio vel medio, sed in fine motus; et propter hoc non sequitur.	8. Arrival at the term of natural movement is natural, not in the beginning or middle of the movement, but at the end. Hence, the argument does not follow.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod operationes rerum naturalium, quae sunt ex praestitutione divina, dicuntur naturales quando principia illarum operationum sunt rebus indita, sic ut sint earum naturae; non autem sic a Deo praestituitur homini elevatio raptus, unde non est simile.	9. Activities of physical things which come from a divine ordination are said to be natural when the sources of these activities are implanted in things in the way in which their natures are. However, God does not ordain the elevation of rapture for man in this way. Hence, they are not alike in this respect.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod illud quod est prius in intentione naturae, quandoque est posterius tempore, sicut se habet actus ad potentiam in eodem susceptibili: quia esse in actu est per prius a natura, quamvis una et eadem res prius tempore sit in potentia quam in actu. Et similiter operatio animae, inquantum est spiritus, est prior quantum ad intentionem naturae, sed est posterior tempore; unde, si una operatio fiat in tempore alterius, hoc erit contra naturam.	10. That which is prior in the intention of nature is sometimes subsequent in time, as actuality relates to potentiality in the same receiving subject, for to be in act is prior in nature, although in time one and the same thing is first in potentiality before it is in actuality. In like manner, the activity of the soul, in so far as it is a spirit, is prior, relative to the intention of nature, but subsequent in time. Hence, if one activity takes place at the time for another activity, this is contrary to nature.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod quamvis ordo ad medium sit propter ordinem ad ultimum, tamen ad ultimum non pervenitur naturaliter nisi per medium; et si aliter fiat, erit perventio non naturalis; et sic est in proposito.	11. Although the ordination to the means is because of the ordination to the final end, it is only through the means that one arrives naturally at the final end. If it happens otherwise, the arrival is not natural. And it is thus in the case in question.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod illa abstractio a sensibus quae fit virtute aliquarum rerum naturalium, reducitur in illam abstractionem quae fit ex defectu propriae virtutis: non enim illae res habent naturam a sensibus abstrahendi, nisi inquantum obstupefaciunt sensus; unde patet quod talis abstractio a sensu est aliena a raptu.	12. The transport out of the senses which is brought about by the power of physical things is classified with that transport which takes place because of a deficiency of the proper power. For the nature of those things is such that they can effect a transport out of the senses only in so far as they deaden the senses. Hence, it is clear that such transport from sense is foreign to rapture.

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Q. 13: Rapture ARTICLE II In the second article we ask: Did Paul see God through his essence when he was enraptured? [ARTICLE IV Sent., 49, 2, 7, ad 5; 2 Cor., c. 12, lect. 1-2; S.T., I, 12, 11, ad 2; II-II, 175,3.]
Secundo quaeritur utrum Paulus in raptu viderit Deum per essentiam	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems that he did not, for
Eph. IV, 18, super illud: tenebris obscuratum habentes intellectum, dicit Glossa: omnis qui intelligit, quadam luce interiori illustratur. Si ergo intellectus elevetur ad videndum Deum, oportet quod illustretur aliqua luce ad huiusmodi visionem proportionata. Sed lux talis non est aliud quam lux gloriae, de qua in Psal.: in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Ergo Deus per essentiam videri non potest nisi ab intellectu beato. Et sic Paulus in raptu cum glorificatus non esset, Deum per essentiam videre non potuit.	1. The Gloss on Ephesians (4:18), “Having their understanding darkened... “ says: “Everyone who understands is enlightened with an inner light.” Therefore, if the understanding is raised up to see God, it must be enlightened by some light proportionate to this kind of sight. But the only such light is the light of glory, of which Psalms (35:10) says: “In your light we shall see light.” Therefore, God can be seen through His essence only by an intellect enjoying beatitude. And, since Paul was not glorified when he was enraptured, he could not see God through His essence.
Sed dicebat quod Paulus ut tunc beatus fuit.- Sed contra, perpetuitas est de ratione beatitudinis, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de civitate Dei. Sed status ille non mansit in Paulo in perpetuum. Ergo in statu illo beatus non fuit.	2. It was said that in that state Paul did enjoy beatitude.—On the contrary, perpetuity is of the nature of beatitude, as Augustine says. But that state did not remain in Paul forever. Therefore, he did not enjoy beatitude in that state.
Praeterea, a gloria animae redundat gloria in corpus. Sed corpus Pauli non fuit glorificatum. Ergo nec mens eius fuit lumine gloriae illustrata; et sic non vidit Deum per essentiam.	3. From the glory in the soul glory overflows into the body. But Paul’s body was not glorified. Therefore, neither was his mind enlightened by the light of glory. And, so, he did not see God through His essence.
Sed dicebat, quod videndo Deum per essentiam in statu etiam illo non fuit beatus simpliciter, sed secundum quid.- Sed contra, ad hoc quod aliquis sit beatus simpliciter, non requiritur nisi actus gloriae, et dos gloriae, quae est principium illius actus; sicut corpus Petri fuisset glorificatum simpliciter, si cum hoc quod ferebatur super aquas, etiam huius actus in se habuisset principium quod dicitur agilitas. Sed claritas quae est principium divinae visionis, quae est actus gloriae, est dos gloriae. Si igitur mens Pauli Deum vidit per essentiam, et illustrata fuit luce quae est principium huius visionis, fuit simpliciter glorificata.	4. It was said that by seeing God through His essence in that state he was made blessed, not without qualification, but only in a qualified way.—On the contrary, all that is needed for one to be blessed in all respects is the act of glory and the gift of glory, which is the principle of that act. Thus, Peter’s body would have been glorified if, along with being held up on the water, he had also had within him agility, which is the principle of this act. But splendor, the principle of the vision of God, which is the act of glory, is the gift of glory. Therefore, if Paul’s mind saw God through His essence and was enlightened by the light which is the source of this vision, he was glorified without qualification.
Praeterea, Paulus in raptu habuit fidem et spem. Sed ista non possunt simul stare cum visione Dei per essentiam; quia fides est non apparentium, ut dicitur Hebr. cap. XI, 1, et quod videt quis, quid sperat? Ut dicitur Rom. VIII, 24. Ergo non vidit Deum per essentiam.	5. While he was enraptured, Paul had faith and hope. But these are incompatible with the vision of God through His essence, for faith concerns things that appear not, as is said in Hebrews (11:1), and: “What a man sees, why does he hope for? “ as is said in Romans (8:24). Therefore, he did not see God through His essence.
Praeterea, caritas patriae non est principium merendi. Sed Paulus in raptu fuit in statu merendi, quia eius anima nondum erat a corpore corruptibili soluta, ut Augustinus dicit, XII super Genes. ad litteram. Ergo non habuit caritatem patriae. Sed ubi est visio patriae, quae est perfecta, etiam est ibi caritas patriae, quae est perfecta; quia quantum de Deo quisque cognoscit, tantum diligit. Ergo non vidit Deum per essentiam.	6. In heaven, charity is not a principle of merit. But in his rapture Paul was capable of meriting, since his soul had not yet been separated from the corruptible body, as Augustine says. Therefore, he did not have the charity proper to heaven. But where there is the vision proper to heaven, which is perfect, there also is the charity proper to heaven, which is perfect, for one loves God to the extent that he knows about God. Therefore, Paul did not see God through His essence.
Praeterea, divina essentia sine gaudio videri non potest, ut patet per Augustinum, in I de Trinit. Si igitur vidit Paulus Deum per essentiam, in ipsa visione delectabatur; non ergo volebat ab ea separari; nec iterum Deus eum separavit invitum, quia, cum ipse sit summe liberalis, sua bona, quantum in se est, non subtrahit. Ergo Paulus ab illo statu nunquam separatus fuisset; quod falsum est; non ergo vidit Deum per essentiam.	7. The divine essence cannot be seen without joy, as Augustine says. Therefore, if Paul saw God through His essence, he took delight in that sight. Accordingly, he did not wish to be separated from it, nor, on the other hand, did God cut him off from it against his wishes. For, since God is most generous, He does not on His part withdraw His gifts. Therefore, Paul would never have been cut off from that state. But he was cut off. Therefore, he did not see God through His essence.
Praeterea, nullus habens aliquod bonum ex merito, amittit illud sine peccato. Cum igitur videre Deum per essentiam sit quiddam quod habetur ex merito, nullus Deum per essentiam videns potest ab hac visione removeri, nisi forte contingeret ipsum peccare; quod de Paulo dici non potest, qui de se ipso dicit Roman. VIII, 38-39: certus sum (...) quod neque mors neque vita separabit etc., et sic idem quod prius.	8. No one who has a good because of merit loses it without sin. Therefore, since to see God through His essence is a good which one has because of merit, no one who sees God through His essence can be cut off from this sight unless he should happen to sin. But this cannot be said of Paul, who says in Romans (8:38, 39): “For I am sure that neither death, nor life... shall... separate us...” We conclude as before.
Praeterea quaeritur, cum Paulus dicatur raptus, in quo differt eius raptus a sopore Adae, et a raptu Ioannis Evangelistae, secundum quem dicit se in spiritu fuisse, Apocal. cap. I, 10, et ab excessu mentis in quo fuit Petrus, Act. XI, 5.	9. When Paul is said to be enraptured, there is also question of the difference between his rapture and the deep sleep of Adam and the rapture of John the Evangelist, in which he says he “was in the spirit” (Apocalypse 1:10), and the “ecstasy of mind” which Peter had (Acts 11:5).
Sed contra,	To the Contrary
est quod Augustinus dicit, XII super Genes. ad Litt. et etiam ad Paulinam de videndo Deum, et quod habetur etiam in Glossa II Corinth., cap. XII; ex quibus omnibus locis expresse habetur quod Paulus in raptu Deum per essentiam vidit.	From what Augustine says and from the Gloss” we see clearly that Paul saw God through His essence when he was enraptured.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod circa hoc quidam dixerunt, quod Paulus in raptu non vidit Deum per essentiam, sed quadam visione media inter visionem viae, et visionem patriae. Quae quidem visio media potest intelligi talis qualis est Angelo naturalis, ut scilicet videat Deum non quidem per essentiam cognitione naturali, sed per aliquas species intelligibiles, utpote considerando essentiam suam, quae est quaedam similitudo intelligibilis essentiae increatae, prout dicitur in libro de causis, quod intelligentia scit quod est supra se inquantum est causata ab eo. Ut sic etiam intelligatur Paulus in raptu vidisse Deum per refulgentiam alicuius luminis intellectualis in mentem ipsius. Cognitio vero viae, quae est per speculum et aenigma sensibilium creaturarum, est naturalis homini; sed cognitio patriae, qua Deus per essentiam suam videtur, est soli Deo naturalis. Sed haec opinio repugnat dictis Augustini, qui expresse in locis supradictis dicit Paulum in raptu Deum per essentiam vidisse.	Concerning this, some have said that Paul, when he was enraptured, did not see God through His essence, but with a vision midway between the vision had in this life and the vision had in heaven. We can take this intermediate vision to mean the kind of vision which is natural to an angel, such that he would see God, not, indeed, through His essence with natural knowledge, but through intelligible species, in so far as he considers his own essence, which is an intelligible likeness of the uncreated essence, according to the saying of The Causes that an intelligence knows what is above it in so far as it is caused by it. According to this, Paul, when enraptured, is conceived of as having seen God through the refulgence of some intelligible light in his mind. However, the knowledge of this life, which is through the mirror and obscurity of sensible creatures, is natural to man. And the knowledge of heaven, by which we see God through His essence, is natural only to God. But this opinion is contrary to what Augustine says, for he states expressly that, when Paul was enraptured, he saw God through His essence.
Nec est etiam probabile ut minister veteris testamenti ad Iudaeos Deum per essentiam viderit, ut habetur ex hoc quod dicitur Num. cap. XII, 8: palam, et non per aenigmata et figuras, videt Deum; et ministro novi testamenti, doctori gentium, hoc concessum non fuerit; praecipue cum ipse apostolus sic argumentetur, II Cor. III, 9: si ministratio damnationis fuit in gloria, multo magis abundat ministerium iustitiae.	Nor is it likely that a minister of God to the Jews of the Old Testament would see God through His essence, as appears from Numbers (12:8): “Plainly and not by riddles and figures does he see the Lord,” and that this would not be granted to the minister of the New Testament, the Teacher of the Gentiles. This is especially true since the Apostle himself argues in this way: “For if the ministration of condemnation be glory, much more the ministration of justice abounds in glory” (2 Cor 3:9).
Nec tamen beatus fuit simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid, quamvis mens eius illustrata fuerit supernaturali lumine ad Deum videndum. Quod quidem apparere potest exemplo luminis corporalis. In quibusdam enim invenitur lumen a sole, ut quaedam forma immanens quasi connaturalis effecta, sicut in stellis, et in carbunculo, et huiusmodi. In quibusdam vero recipitur lumen a sole sicut quaedam passio transiens, sicut in aere: non enim efficitur lumen forma permanens in aere quasi connaturalis, sed transit abeunte sole.	Still, he did not have beatitude without qualification, but only in some respects, although his mind was enlightened with supernatural light to enable it to see God. This will become clear from the example of physical light. For, in some things, we find the light from the sun as an abiding form, as though it had become connatural to them, as in the stars, rubies, and things of this sort. But, in other things, the light from the sun is received as a passing impression, as light in the air. For the light does not become a form abiding in the air, as though connatural to it, but passes when the sun leaves.
Similiter etiam et lumen gloriae dupliciter menti infunditur. Uno modo per modum formae connaturalis factae, et permanentis; et sic facit mentem simpliciter beatam; et hoc modo infunditur beatis in patria. Alio modo contingit lumen gloriae mentem humanam sicut quaedam passio transiens: et sic mens Pauli in raptu fuit lumine gloriae illustrata. Ipsum etiam nomen raptim et pertranseundo ostendit hoc esse factum.	In like fashion, also, the light of glory is infused into the mind in two ways. In one, it follows the mode of a form which becomes connatural and abiding. This makes the mind blessed without qualification, and is the manner in which it is infused in the blessed in heaven. In the other way, the mind receives the light of glory as a passing impression. It was in this way that Paul’s mind was enlightened with the light of glory when he was enraptured. The very name shows that this took place quickly (raptim) and in passing.
Unde non fuit simpliciter glorificatus, nec habuit dotem gloriae, cum illa claritas non fuerit effecta proprietas eius; et propter hoc non fuit derivata ab anima in corpus, nec in hoc statu perpetuo mansit.	Hence, he was not glorified without qualification, nor did he have the gift of glory, since that splendor did not become a property in him. For this reason it did not flow down from the soul to the body, nor did he remain in this state permanently.
	Answers to Difficulties
Unde patet responsio ad quatuor primas rationes.	1-4. The response to the first four objections is clear from what has been said.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod adveniente plena visione recedit fides. Unde secundum hoc quod in Paulo fuit visio Dei per essentiam, non fuit ibi fides; fuit autem ibi visio Dei per essentiam secundum actum, non secundum habitum gloriae. Unde e contrario fides fuit ibi secundum habitum, non secundum actum; similiter spes.	5. When full vision comes, faith leaves. Hence, in so far as Paul had the vision of God through His essence, he did not have faith. Now, he had the vision of God through His essence by way of act, not according to the habit of glory. Consequently, he had faith not in act but habitually, and hope likewise.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis Paulus tunc fuerit in statu merendi, non tamen in actu tunc merebatur; quia sicut habuit actum visionis patriae, ita habuit actum caritatis patriae. Quidam tamen dicunt, quod quamvis habuit actum visionis patriae, non tamen habuit actum caritatis patriae; quia si intellectus fuit raptus, non tamen fuit raptus eius affectus. Sed hoc est expresse contra id quod habetur II Cor., XII, 4: raptus est in Paradisum; Glossa: id est in eam tranquillitatem qua fruuntur illi qui sunt in caelesti Ierusalem. Fruitio autem est per amorem.	6. Although Paul was then in a state in which he could merit, he did not actually merit, for, just as he had the act of vision possessed by those in heaven, so he had the act of charity possessed by those in heaven. Nevertheless, some say that, although he had the vision of those in heaven, he did not have the act of charity of those in heaven. For, although his understanding was rapt, his affections were not. But this is clearly contrary to what the Gloss on “He was caught up into paradise” (2 Cor 12:4), says: “That is, into that tranquility which those who are in the heavenly Jerusalem enjoy.” But enjoyment takes place through love.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod hoc fuit ex ipsa conditione luminis mentem illustrantis, quod visio illa in Paulo non permansit, ut ex dictis patet.	7. That the vision did not remain in Paul was due to the nature of the light which illumined his mind, as is clear from what has been said.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod quamvis visio Dei in beatis sit ex merito, tamen Paulo non est reddita quasi praemium meriti; unde ratio non sequitur. Tamen sciendum, quod hae duae ultimae rationes non magis concludunt contra hoc quod Paulus Deum per essentiam viderit, quam contra hoc quod viderit quocumque modo supra modum communem.	8. Although in the blessed the vision of God is due to merit, at that time it was not given to Paul as a reward of merit. Hence, the reasoning does not follow. However, it should be noted that these last two objections bring no better argument against the fact that Paul saw God through His essence than against the fact that he saw Him in any way which surpassed the common manner of sight.
Ad id quod ultimo quaerebatur, dicendum, quod excessus mentis, extasis, et raptus, omnia in Scripturis pro eodem accipiuntur; et significant elevationem quamdam ab exterioribus sensibilibus, quibus naturaliter intendimus ad aliqua quae sunt supra hominem. Sed hoc dupliciter contingit. Quandoque enim intelligitur abstractio ab exterioribus quantum ad intentionem tantum, ut videlicet cum quis exterioribus sensibus et rebus utitur, sed tota sua intentio divinis inspiciendis et diligendis intendit; et sic in excessu mentis, sive extasi aut raptu, est quilibet divinorum contemplator et amator: unde Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de divinis Nomin.: est autem extasim faciens divinus amor: et Gregorius in moralibus de contemplatore loquens dicit: qui ad interiora intelligenda rapitur, a rebus visibilibus oculos claudit.	9. In the Scriptures, transport of mind, ecstasy, and rapture are all used in the same sense and indicate some raising up of the mind from sensible things outside of us toward which we naturally turn our attention, to things which are above man. This takes place in two ways. For, at times, this transport from things outside is taken to refer to attention only, as when someone makes use of the external senses and things about him, but his whole attention is engaged in contemplating and loving things divine. Such is the state of anyone who contemplates and loves things divine in transport of the mind, whether ecstasy or rapture. For this reason Dionysius says: “Divine love brings about ecstasy.” And Gregory, speaking of contemplation, says: “One who is rapt in order that he may understand the things within closes his eyes to visible things.”
Alio modo, secundum quod in usu praedicta nomina magis habentur, fit extasis aut raptus aut excessus mentis, cum aliquis etiam actu ab usu sensuum et sensibilium rerum abstrahitur ad aliqua supernaturaliter videnda; videtur autem supernaturaliter praeter sensum et intellectum et imaginationem, sicut in quaestione de prophetia dictum est.	Ecstasy or rapture or transport of the mind take place in another way, and the names are more generally used in this sense, when one is also deprived of the use of his senses and sensible things in order to see certain things supernaturally. Now, a thing is seen supernaturally when it is seen beyond sense, understanding, and imagination, as we said in the question on prophecy.
Et ideo duplicem raptum distinguit Augustinus, XII super Genes. ad Litt. Unum quo mens rapitur a sensibus ad imaginariam visionem, et sic accidit in Petro et Ioanne Evangelista in Apocalypsi, ut ibidem Augustinus dicit. Alium quo mens rapitur a sensu et imaginatione simul ad intellectualem visionem; et hoc quidem dupliciter.	Therefore, Augustine distinguishes” two kinds of rapture. There is one in which the mind is carried out of the senses to the vision in the imagination. This is what happened to Peter and to John the Evangelist in the Apocalypse, as Augustine says. There is another in which the mind is at once transported out of the senses and out of the imagination to an intellectual vision. This happens in two ways.
Uno modo secundum quod intellectus intelligit Deum per aliquas intelligibiles immissiones, quod est proprie Angelorum; et sic fuit extasis Adae, unde dicitur Gen. II, 21, in Glossa, quod extasis recte intelligitur ad hoc immissa, ut mens Adae particeps angelicae curiae, et intrans in sanctuarium Dei, novissima intelligeret. Alio modo secundum quod intellectus videt Deum per essentiam; et ad hoc fuit raptus Paulus, ut dictum est.	In one, the intellect understands God through certain intelligible communications, and this is proper to angels. Adam’s ecstasy was of this sort, as the Gloss on Genesis(2:21)says: “The correct interpretation of this ecstasy is that it was given so that Adam’s mind might become a member of the heavenly court and, entering into the sanctuary of God, might understand the last things.” In the other way, the understanding sees God through His essence. It was for this that Paul was enraptured, as we have said.

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Q. 13: Rapture ARTICLE III In the third article we ask: Can one in this life have his understanding raised to see God through his essence without being carried out of his senses? [ARTICLE De ver., 10, 11; IV Sent., 49, 2, 7, ad 4; Quodl., I, 1; 2 Cor., c. 12, lect. 1; S.T., II-II, 175, 4; 180, 5; In Ioan., c. 1, lect. 11.]
Tertio quaeritur utrum intellectus alicuius viatoris possit elevari ad videndum Deum per essentiam, sine hoc quod a sensibus abstrahatur	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic.	It seems that he can, for
Eadem enim est natura hominis in statu viae et post resurrectionem; non idem numero resurgeret, nisi etiam idem specie esset. Sed post resurrectionem sancti mente videbunt Deum per essentiam sine hoc quod a sensibus abstrahantur. Ergo et in viatoribus idem possibile est.	1. Man’s nature is the same in this life and after the resurrection. For, if it were not specifically the same, numerically the same man would not arise. But after the resurrection the saints will see God mentally through His essence and no transport out of the senses will take place. Therefore, the same thing is possible for those in this life.
Sed dicebat, quod corpus viatoris, quia corruptibile est, aggravat intellectum, ne libere in Deum ferri possit, nisi a corporeis sensibus absolvatur; quae quidem corruptio post resurrectionem non erit.- Sed contra, nihil impeditur, sicut nec patitur, nisi a suo contrario. Sed corruptio corporis non videtur contrariari actui intellectus, cum intellectus non sit corporis actus. Ergo corruptio corporis non impedit quin intellectus libere possit ferri in Deum.	2. But it was said that, since the body of one in this life is corruptible, it weighs down the understanding so that it cannot be drawn freely to God unless it is carried out of the senses of the body. And this corruption will be gone after the resurrection.—On the contrary, nothing is hindered, just as nothing suffers, except through the activity of its contrary. But bodily corruption does not seem to be opposed to the act of understanding, since understanding is not an act of the body. Therefore, corruption of the body does not prevent the understanding from being drawn freely to God.
Praeterea, constat quod Christus nostram mortalitatem et corruptionem poenae assumpsit. Sed intellectus eius continue visione Dei fruebatur, cum tamen in eo non fieret semper abstractio ab exterioribus sensibus. Ergo corruptio corporis non facit ut intellectus ferri non possit in Deum sine hoc quod a sensibus abstrahatur.	3. It is certain that Christ took on our mortality and the corruption which is a punishment for us. But His understanding enjoyed the sight of God continuously, although He was not always transported out of his external senses. Therefore, corruption does not make it impossible for the understanding to be drawn to God without being transported out of the senses.
Praeterea, Paulus postquam Deum per essentiam viderat, memor fuit illorum quae in illa visione conspexit; alias non diceret II Cor., cap. XII, 4, quod audivit arcana verba quae non licet homini loqui, si eorum immemor esset. Ergo dum Deum per essentiam videbat, videbat aliquid in eius memoriam imprimebatur. Sed memoria ad partem sensitivam pertinet, ut patet per philosophum in Lib. de memoria et reminiscentia. Ergo cum quis in statu viae videt Deum per essentiam, non omnino abstrahitur a corporeis sensibus.	4. After Paul had seen God through His essence, he remembered the things which he had seen in that vision. Otherwise, if he had not remembered them, he would not have said: “He heard secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter” (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore, while he saw God through His essence, something was being imprinted on his memory. But memory belongs to the sensitive part of man, as the Philosopher plainly shows. Therefore, when in this life someone sees God through His essence, he is not entirely transported out of his bodily senses.
Praeterea, propinquiores sunt potentiae sensitivae sibi invicem, quam intellectivae sensitivis. Sed imaginatio, quae est de potentiis sensitivis, potest esse in actu comprehensionis quorumcumque imaginabilium sine abstractione ab exterioribus sensibus. Ergo et intellectus potest esse in actu visionis divinae sine abstractione a potentiis sensitivis.	5. The sensitive powers are closer to each other than the intellective powers are to the sensitive powers. But the imagination, which is one of the sensitive powers, can actually grasp any of its objects whatever without being cut off from the external senses. Therefore, the understanding, too, can actually see God without being cut off from the sensitive powers.
Praeterea, illud quod est secundum naturam, non exigit ad sui praeexistentiam aliquid eorum quae sunt contra naturam. Sed naturale est intellectui humano quod Deum per essentiam videat, cum ad hoc creatus sit. Cum igitur abstractio a sensibus homini sit contra naturam, quia sensitiva cognitio connaturalis ei sit, videtur quod ad videndum Deum per essentiam, abstractione a sensibus non indigeat.	6. That which is according to nature does not require for its existence anything which is contrary to nature. But it is natural for the human understanding to see God through His essence, since it was created for this. Therefore, since transport out of the senses is contrary to nature for man, inasmuch as sensitive cognition is natural to him, it seems that he does not require transport from the senses as a prerequisite to see God through His essence.
Praeterea, abstractio non est nisi unitorum. Sed intelligentia, cuius obiectum est Deus, ut dicitur in Lib. de spiritu et anima, non videtur corporeis sensibus esse coniuncta, sed maxime distans. Ergo ad hoc quod Deum per essentiam videat homo per intelligentiam, non indiget abstractione a sensibus.	7. Only those things which are joined together can be cut off from each other. But intelligence, whose object is God, as is said in Spirit and Soul, does not seem to be joined to the bodily senses but rather seems extremely distant from them. Therefore, for man to see God through His essence by means of intelligence he does not need to be cut off from the senses.
Praeterea, ad hoc videtur Paulus ad Dei visionem esse elevatus, ut testis illius gloriae existeret quae sanctis repromittitur: unde Augustinus dicit X super Genesim ad litteram: cur non credamus quod tanto apostolo, doctori gentium, rapto usque ad ipsam excellentissimam visionem, voluerit Deus demonstrare vitam in qua post hanc vitam vivendum est in aeternum? Sed in illa sanctorum visione quae post hanc vitam erit in videntibus Deum, non fiet abstractio a sensibus corporeis post resurrectionem. Ergo nec in Paulo huiusmodi abstractio facta fuisse videtur, cum Deum per essentiam vidit.	8. Paul seems to have been raised up to the sight of God so that there would be a witness of the glory which is promised to the saints. Hence, Augustine says: “Why should we not believe that it was God’s wish to show to this great Apostle, the Teacher of the Gentiles, that life which is to be lived forever after this life? [God did this] while Paul was raised in rapture to that most lofty sight.”But, after the resurrection, in that vision of the saints which will be given to those who see God in the next life, there will be no transport out of the bodily senses. Therefore, it seems that this kind of transport did not take place in Paul either, when he saw God through His essence.
Praeterea, martyres in ipsis tormentorum suorum suppliciis interius aliquid de divina gloria percipiebant: unde Vincentius dicebat: ecce iam in sublime agor, et omnes principes tuos saeculo altior, tyranne, despicio; et in aliis sanctorum passionibus multa leguntur quae hoc sonare videntur. Sed constat quod in eis non fiebat abstractio a sensibus; alias doloris sensum non habuissent. Ergo ad hoc quod aliquis sit particeps gloriae, qua Deus per essentiam videtur, non requiritur abstractio a sensibus.	9. During their sufferings and torments the martyrs inwardly perceived something of the divine glory. Hence, Vincent says: “Behold, I am already raised on high, and from above the world I look down on all your distinguished men, O tyrant.”And in other records of the sufferings of the saints we read many passages which seem to have the same tenor. But it is obvious that there was no withdrawal from the senses in these people. Otherwise, they would not have felt the pain. Therefore, there is no transport out of the senses in order for one to share in the glory by which God is seen through His essence.
Praeterea, propinquior est operationi, quae circa sensibilia versatur, intellectus practicus quam speculativus. Sed non est necessarium quod intellectus practicus semper intendat his quae homo circa sensibilia operatur, ut dicit Avicenna in sua sufficientia. Alias contingeret quod optimus citharoedus imperitissimus videretur, si ad singulas cordarum percussiones oporteret eum artis consideratione uti: fieret enim nimia sonorum interruptio, quae impediret debitam melodiam. Ergo multo minus intellectus speculativus cogitur intendere his quae homo circa sensibilia operatur; et sic liberum ei remanet in quaelibet intelligibilia ferri, etiam in ipsam divinam essentiam, dum sensitivae vires circa operationes sensibiles occupantur.	10. The practical understanding is closer than the speculative understanding to the activity which has sensible things as its object. But, as Avicenna says,, it is not necessary for the practical understanding always to pay attention to man's operations which are concerned with sensible objects. Otherwise, the best harpist Would seem to be the worst if it Were necessary for him to give artistic reflection to each stroke of the strings. For, in such a case, there would be too much interruption of the sounds, which would hurt the proper melody. Therefore, it is far less necessary for the speculative understanding to pay attention to man’s operations which concern sensible things. Thus, it remains free to be drawn to any act of understanding, even to the divine essence itself, while the sense powers are engaged in sensible activities.
Praeterea, Paulus dum vidit Deum per essentiam, adhuc fidem habebat. Sed fidei est videre per speculum in aenigmate. Ergo Paulus simul dum videbat Deum per essentiam, videbat per speculum in aenigmate. Sed aenigmatica cognitio est specularis, et est per sensibilia. Ergo simul videbat Deum per essentiam, et intendebat sensibilibus; et sic idem quod prius.	11. While Paul saw God through His essence, he still had faith. But it belongs to faith to see darkly through a mirror. Therefore, while Paul saw God through His essence, at the same time he saw darkly through a mirror. But this obscure knowledge is through a mirror and through sensible things. Therefore, while he saw God through His essence, he also gave his attention to sensible things. The conclusion is the same as before.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Est quod Augustinus dicit, XII Sup. Genes. ad Litt., et habetur in Glossa II Cor. c. XII: in illa specie quae Deus est, nemo Deum videns vivet vita ista qua mortaliter vivitur in istis sensibus corporeis. Sed nisi ab hac vita quisque quodammodo moriatur, sive omnino exiens de corpore, sive ita aversus et alienatus a corporeis sensibus, ut merito nesciat utrum in corpore an extra corpus sit; in illam non rapitur et subvehitur visionem.	1. As Augustine says, and is quoted in the Gloss on the second Epistle to the Corinthians(12:2): “No man who sees God, as He is in Himself, lives the mortal life which we live in the bodily senses. But unless one in some way dies to this life, either leaving the body completely, or so turning away and cutting himself off from the bodily senses that with good reason he does not know whether he is in the body or outside of it, he is not enraptured and transported to that vision.”
Praeterea, II Cor., V, 13, super illud: sive mente excedimus, Deo etc., dicit Glossa: excessum mentis dicit quod mente levatur ad intelligenda caelestia, ita ut quodammodo a memoria labantur inferiora. In hoc mentis excessu fuerunt omnes sancti quibus arcana Dei mundum istum excedentia revelata sunt. Ergo quicumque videt Deum per essentiam, oportet quod avertatur a consideratione inferiorum; et ita per consequens ab usu sensuum, quibus nonnisi inferiora considerantur.	2. The Gloss on the second Epistle to the Corinthians (5:13), “Whether we be transported in mind, it is to God,” says: “He calls ecstasy that by which the mind is raised to an understanding of heavenly things, so that in some sense lower things drop from the memory. All the saints to whom secrets of God which surpass this world have been revealed were in this ecstasy.”Therefore, it is necessary for everyone who sees God through His essence to be withdrawn from the consideration of lower things, and, consequently, also from the use of the senses with which we see only lower things.
Praeterea, in Psal. dicitur: ibi Beniamin adolescentulus in mentis excessu, Glossa: Beniamin, id est Paulus, in mentis excessu, mente scilicet alienata a sensibus corporis, ut quando raptus fuit usque ad tertium caelum, sed per tertium caelum intelligitur visio Dei per essentiam, ut dicit August., XII super Genes. ad litteram. Ergo visio Dei per essentiam requirit alienationem a sensibus corporis.	3. The Gloss on Psalms (67:28), “There is Benjamin, a youth in ecstasy of mind,” says: “Benjamin, (that is, Paul), in ecstasy, that is, with his mind unconscious of the bodily senses, as when he was carried up into the third heaven.” But the third heaven means vision of God through His essence, as Augustine says. Therefore, the vision of God through His essence requires loss of consciousness of the bodily senses.
Praeterea, efficacior est operatio intellectus qui ad videndam Dei essentiam elevatur, quam quaecumque imaginationis operatio. Sed aliquando homo propter vehementiam imaginationis abstrahitur a corporeis sensibus. Ergo multo fortius oportet quod abstrahatur ab eis, quando in divinam provehitur visionem.	4. The activity of an understanding which is raised to see the essence of God is more effective than any activity of the imagination. But, sometimes, a man is transported out of the bodily senses because of the intensity of the activity of the imagination. Therefore, he should be transported out of them with much greater reason when he is lifted up to the vision of God.
Praeterea, Bernardus dicit: delicata est divina consolatio, non dabitur admittentibus alienam. Ergo, eadem ratione, divina visio non compatitur secum alterius rei visionem; et ita nec usum sensuum.	5. Bernard says: “Divine consolation is sensitive and will not be given to those who admit any other.” So, for the same reason, the divine vision does not tolerate sight of anything else along with it. Therefore, neither does it tolerate the use of the senses along with it.
Praeterea, ad videndum Deum per essentiam requiritur summa cordis munditia; ut habetur Matth., V, 8: beati mundo corde et cetera. Sed cor dupliciter immundatur: scilicet peccato et phantasiis materialibus: ut patet per hoc quod dicit Dionysius, VII cap. caelestis hierarchiae: puras esse eas, scilicet caelestes essentias, extimandum est, non ut immundis maculis et inquinationibus liberatas, in quo tangitur immunditia peccati, quod nunquam in beatis Angelis fuit: neque ut materialium receptivas phantasiarum, in quo tangitur immunditia quae est per phantasias; ut patet per Hugonem de s. Victore. Oportet igitur mentem videntis Deum per essentiam non solum a sensibus exterioribus, sed ab interioribus phantasmatibus abstrahi.	6. The greatest cleanness of heart is needed to see God through His essence, according to Matthew (5:8): “Blessed are the clean of heart.” But the heart is sullied in two ways, namely, by the contamination of sin, and by phantasies of material things. This is clear from what Dionysius says: “Those [celestial essences] should be considered pure, not in the sense that they are free of unclean stains and defilements (in which he refers to uncleanness because of guilt, which never existed in the blessed angels), nor in the sense that they are receptive of phantasies of material things” (in which is included the uncleanness which comes through phantasies, as is clear from Hugh of St. Victor.) Therefore, the mind of one who sees God through His essence must be transported not only out of the external senses, but also out of the internal phantasms.
Praeterea, I ad Cor. XIII, 10, dicitur: cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est. Sed perfectum ibi nominatur visio Dei per essentiam; et imperfectum visio specularis et aenigmatica, quae est per sensibilia. Ergo, quando quis elevatur ad visionem Dei per essentiam, abstrahitur a visione sensibilium.	7. In the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:10) we read: “When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be put away.” But, here, “perfect” refers to the vision of God through His essence, and “imperfect” refers to vision through a mirror darkly, which is through sensible things. Therefore, when one is raised to the vision of God through His essence, he must be deprived of the vision of sensible things.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod, sicut ex auctoritate Augustini patet, homo in hoc mortali corpore constitutus non potest Deum per essentiam videre, nisi a sensibus corporeis alienetur. Cuius ratio ex duobus potest sumi. Primo quidem ex hoc quod est commune intellectui et aliis potentiis animae. Hoc enim in omnibus animae potentiis invenimus, quod quando una potentia in suo actu intenditur, alia vel debilitatur in suo actu, vel ex toto abstrahitur; sicut patet in illo in quo operatio visus fortissime intenditur, quod auditus eius non percipit ea quae dicuntur, nisi forte sua vehementia ad se trahant sensum audientis.	As is clear from the authoritative statement of Augustine, a man living in this mortal body cannot see God through His essence, unless he is made unconscious of the bodily senses. We can see the reason for this from two things. First, from that which is common to the understanding and the other powers of the soul, for with all the powers of the soul we find that, when the act of one power becomes intense, the act of another is either weakened or entirely suppressed. Thus, it is clear that, when one is giving very close attention to the activity of sight, his hearing does not perceive the things which are being said, unless, perhaps, their force attracts the sense of the hearer to them.
Cuius ratio est, quia ad actum alicuius cognoscitivae potentiae requiritur intentio, ut probat Augustinus in Lib. de Trinit. Intentio autem unius non potest ferri ad multa simul, nisi forte illa multa hoc modo sint ad invicem ordinata, ut accipiantur quasi unum; sicut nec alicuius motus vel operationis possunt esse duo termini non ad invicem ordinati. Unde, cum sit una anima, in qua omnes potentiae cognoscitivae fundantur unius et eiusdem intentio requiritur ad omnium potentiarum cognoscitivarum actus: et ideo, cum totaliter anima intendit ad actum unius, abstrahitur homo ab actu alterius potentiae.	The reason for this, as Augustine proves, is that attention is needed for the act of any cognoscitive power. Moreover, one’s attention cannot be given to many things at once, unless they are related to one another in such a way that they can be taken as one, just as the motion or activity of a thing cannot have two termini not related to each other. Hence, since there is one soul, in which all cognoscitive powers are rooted, the attention of one and the same soul is needed for the acts of all the cognoscitive powers. Therefore, when the soul gives complete attention to the act of one power, the man is cut off from the act of another power.
Ad hoc autem quod intellectus elevetur ad videndam divinam essentiam, oportet quod tota intentio in hac visione colligatur, cum hoc sit vehementissimum intelligibile, ad quod intellectus pertingere non potest, nisi toto conamine in illud tendat: et ideo oportet, quod quando mens ad divinam visionem elevatur, quod omnino abstrahatur homo a corporeis sensibus.	But for the understanding to be raised up to the vision of the divine essence, the whole attention must be concentrated on this vision, since this is the most intensely intelligible object, and the understanding can reach it only by striving for it with a total effort. Therefore, it is necessary to have complete abstraction from the bodily senses when the mind is raised to the vision of God.
Secundo vero potest eiusdem ratio assignari ex eo quod est intellectui proprium. Cum enim cognitio de rebus habeatur secundum quod sunt in actu, et non secundum quod sunt in potentia, ut dicitur in IX Metaph., intellectus qui summam cognitionis tenet, proprie immaterialium est, quae sunt maxime in actu. Unde omne intelligibile vel est in se a materia immune, vel est actione intellectus a materia abstractum: et ideo, quanto intellectus purior est a materialium quasi contactu, tanto perfectior est.	Second, we can find a reason for this in that which is proper to the understanding. For, since we know things in so far as they are in act, and not in so far as they are in potency, as is said in the Metaphysics, the understanding, which holds the highest place in knowledge, properly deals with immaterial things, which are most in act. Hence, every intelligible thing is either free from matter or separated from it by the activity of the understanding. Therefore, the freer the understanding is of contact, as it were, with material things, the more perfect it is.
Et ideo est quod intellectus humanus, quia materialia contingit ad phantasmata intuendo, a quibus intelligibiles species abstrahit, est minoris efficaciae quam intellectus angelicus, qui semper ad formas pure immateriales intuetur. Nihilominus tamen, inquantum in intellectu humano puritas intellectualis cognitionis non penitus obscuratur, sicut accidit in sensibus quorum cognitio ultra materialia ferri non potest; ex hoc ipso quod in eo de puritate remanet, inest ei facultas ad ea quae sunt pure immaterialia contuenda.	For this reason, the human understanding, which reaches material things by considering phantasms; from which it abstracts intelligible species, has less efficacy than the angelic understanding, which always considers purely immaterial forms. Nevertheless, in so far as the purity of intellectual knowledge is not wholly obscured in human understanding, as happens in the senses whose knowledge cannot go beyond material things, it has the power to consider things which are purely immaterial by the very fact that it retains some purity.
Et ideo oportet quod, si aliquando praeter communem modum ad summum immaterialium videndum, scilicet divinam essentiam, elevetur, quod saltem in illo actu penitus a materialium intuitu abstrahatur. Unde, cum sensitivae vires non nisi circa materialia versentur, non potest aliquis videre divinam essentiam nisi abstrahatur ab usu sensuum corporeorum penitus.	Therefore, if it is ever raised beyond its ordinary level to see the highest of immaterial things, namely, the divine essence, it must be wholly cut off from the sight of material things at least during that act. Hence, since the sensitive powers can deal only with material things, one cannot be raised to vision of the divine essence unless he is wholly deprived of the use of the bodily senses.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod alia ratione coniungetur anima beata corpori post resurrectionem, et alia nunc coniungitur. In resurrectione enim corpus erit omnino spiritui subditum, in tantum quod ex ipso spiritu proprietates gloriae redundabunt in corpus, unde et spiritualia corpora appellantur.	1. After the resurrection the beatified soul will be joined to the body in a different way from that in which it is now united to it. For, in the resurrection, the body will be entirely subject to the spirit to such an extent that the properties of glory will overflow from the spirit into the body. Hence, they will be called spiritual bodies.
Quando autem duo adiunguntur quorum unum super alterum totaliter dominium obtinet, non est ibi mixtio, cum alterum totaliter transeat in potestatem dominantis; sicut cum una gutta aquae in mille vini amphoras infunditur, in nullo puritati vini praeiudicatur. Et ideo in resurrectione ex coniunctione ad corpus qualicumque, nulla erit impuritas intellectus, nec in aliquo virtus eius debilitabitur: unde et sine abstractione a corporeis sensibus contemplabitur essentiam divinam. Nunc autem corpus non est hoc modo spiritui subditum; et ideo non est similis ratio.	Moreover, when two things are united and one of them has complete control over the other, there is no mixture there, since the one falls completely under the power of the other which rules it. Thus, if one drop of water is poured into a thousand jars of wine, the purity of the wine is not at all impaired. Therefore, in the resurrection there will be no defilement of the understanding and its power will not be weakened in any way by any union whatsoever with the body. Hence, even without transport out of the bodily senses, it will contemplate the divine essence. However, the body is not now subject to the spirit in this way, and, therefore, the reasoning does not have the same force.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex hoc corpus nostrum corruptibile est, quod ipsum corpus non est plene animae subditum: si enim ei plene subderetur, ex immortalitate animae redundaret immortalitas etiam in corpus, sicut post resurrectionem erit. Et exinde est quod corruptio corporis aggravat intellectum: quamvis enim secundum se intellectui non contrarietur, tamen eius causa, intellectus puritati praeiudicat.	2. Our body is corruptible because it is not fully subject to the soul. For, if it were fully subject to the soul, immortality would also overflow into the body from the immortality of the soul, as will happen after the resurrection. It is for this reason that the corruption of the body oppresses the understanding. Although in itself it is not directly opposed to the understanding, its cause impairs the purity of the understanding.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod Christus ex hoc quod erat Deus et homo, habebat plenariam potestatem super omnes partes animae suae, et super corpus; unde ex virtute deitatis, secundum quod nostrae reparationi competebat, permittebat unicuique potentiarum animae agere id quod est ei proprium, ut dicit Damascenus. Et sic non erat necessarium in ipso neque quod fieret redundantia ex una potentia in aliam, neque quod una potentia a suo actu abstraheretur per vehementiam actus alterius; unde per hoc quod intellectus eius videbat Deum, non oportebat aliquam abstractionem a corporeis sensibus fieri. Secus autem est in aliis hominibus, in quibus ex quadam colligantia potentiarum animae ad invicem sequitur de necessitate quod fiat redundantia vel impedimentum ex una potentia in aliam.	3. From the fact that Christ was God and man, He had full power over all the parts of His soul and over His body. Hence, as Damascene says, by the power of the Godhead He permitted each power of the soul to do that which is proper to it in so far as it fitted in with our redemption. Thus, it was not necessary for Him to have an overflow from one power to another, nor for one power to be deprived of its act because of the intensity of the act of another power. Consequently, the fact that His understanding saw God did not necessitate any transport out of the bodily senses. However, it is different with other men, in whom redundance or interference of one power with another necessarily follows from the intimate connection of the powers of the soul with one another.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod Paulus postquam cessavit videre Deum per essentiam, memor fuit illorum quae in illa visione cognoverat, per aliquas species in intellectu eius remanentes, quae erant quasi quaedam reliquiae praeteritae visionis. Quamvis enim ipsum Dei verbum per essentiam viderit, et ex ipso viso multa cognoverit, et sic illa visio nec quantum ad ipsum verbum, nec quantum ad ea quae videbantur in verbo, fuerit per species aliquas; sed per essentiam solam verbi; tamen ex ipsa inspectione verbi imprimebantur in intellectum eius quaedam rerum visarum similitudines, quibus postmodum cognoscere poterat ea quae prius per essentiam verbi viderat. Et ex illis speciebus intelligibilibus per quamdam applicationem ad particulares intentiones vel formas in memoria vel in imaginatione conservatas, postmodum poterat memorari eorum quae prius viderat, etiam secundum actum memoriae quae est potentia sensitiva. Et sic non oportet ponere, quod in ipso actu divinae visionis aliquid fieret in eius memoria quae est pars potentiae sensitivae, sed solum in mente.	4. After Paul had stopped seeing God through His essence, he remembered what he had known in that vision by means of certain species which remained in his understanding and were relics, so to speak, of the previous vision. For, although he saw the very Word of God through His essence, and from the vision of that essence knew many truths, (and thus neither for the Word Himself nor for the things which he saw in the Word did this vision take place through any species, but only through the essence of the Word), nevertheless, by reason of the vision of the Word, certain likenesses of the things which he saw were imprinted on his understanding. And with these likenesses he could see afterwards the things which he had previously seen through the essence of the Word. Later, by applying these intelligible species to the individual intentions or forms which were stored in his memory or imagination, he could remember the things which he had seen previously, and this even through the activity of memory, which is a sensitive power. Thus, it is not necessary to hold that in the act of seeing God something took place in his memory, which is part of the sensitive power, but only in his mind.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis non per quemlibet actum imaginativae virtutis fiat abstractio a sensibus exterioribus, fit tamen abstractio praedicta quando actus imaginationis est vehemens. Et similiter non oportet quod per quemlibet actum intellectus fiat abstractio a sensibus. Oportet tamen quod fiat per actum vehementissimum, qui est visio Dei per essentiam.	5. Although transport from the external senses does not arise from every act of imaginative power, the transport mentioned above does take place when the act of the imagination is very intense. Similarly, it is not necessary that transport out of the senses take place because of every act of understanding; nevertheless, it does come about through the most intense act, which is the vision of God through His essence.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis naturale sit intellectui humano quod quandoque ad visionem divinae essentiae perveniat; non tamen est sibi naturale quod ad hoc perveniat secundum statum viae huius, ut prius dictum est; et ideo ratio non sequitur.	6. Although it is natural for the human understanding at some time to reach the vision of God through His essence, it is not natural for it to reach this in the conditions of this life, as we have said. For this reason the conclusion does not follow.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod intelligentia nostra, qua divina apprehendimus, quamvis non admisceatur sensibus per viam apprehensionis, admiscetur tamen eis per viam iudicii. Unde dicit Augustinus, XII super Genesim ad litteram, quod per intelligentiae lumen et ista inferiora diiudicantur, et ea cernuntur quae neque sunt corpora, neque ullas gerunt formas similes corporum; et ideo intelligentia quandoque a sensibus abstrahi dicitur, cum de eis non iudicat, sed solis supernis conspiciendis intendit.	7. Although our intelligence, with which we grasp things divine, does not combine with the senses in the process of perception, it does combine with them in the process of judging. Hence, Augustine says: “Through the light of our intelligence we judge even of the lower things and we perceive things which are neither bodies nor bear forms like those of bodies.”“ Therefore, our intelligence is said at times to abstract from the senses when it does not make judgments concerning them, but focuses its attention on the vision of heavenly things alone.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod substantia beatitudinis sanctorum in visione divinae essentiae consistit; unde dicit Augustinus quod visio est tota merces. Unde ex hoc ipso quod divinam essentiam vidit, potuit esse illius beatitudinis idoneus testis. Nec tamen oportuit quod omnia in se experiretur, quae in beatis erunt; sed ut ex his quae experiebatur etiam alia scire posset: non enim rapiebatur ut esset beatus, sed ut esset beatitudinis testis.	8. The essence of the beatitude of the saints consists in the vision of the divine essence. Hence, Augustine says: “Vision is the whole reward.” For this reason one could be a suitable witness of that beatitude because he had seen the divine essence. Still, it would not be necessary for him to experience all the privileges which belong to the blessed. But, from that which he did experience, he could also know the other things. For he was not enraptured to become blessed, but to be a witness of beatitude.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod martyres in tormentis existentes percipiebant aliquid de divina gloria, non quasi eam in suo fonte bibentes, sicut illi qui Deum per essentiam vident: sed aliqua illius gloriae aspersione refrigerabantur; unde dicit Augustinus, XII super Genesim ad litteram; ibi, scilicet ubi Deus per essentiam videtur, beata vita in suo fonte bibitur: inde aspergitur aliquid huic humanae vitae, ut in tentationibus huius saeculi temperanter, fortiter, iuste prudenterque vivatur.	9. In their sufferings the martyrs perceived something of divine glory, not as if they drank it at its source, as do those who see God through His essence, but, rather, they were refreshed by a sprinkling of that glory. Hence, Augustine says: “There,” where God is seen through His essence, “the blessed life is drunk from its source. From that source some of it is sprinkled on this human life, so that in the temptations of this world that life may be lived temperately, justly, bravely, and prudently.”
Ad decimum dicendum, quod intellectus speculativus non cogitur ut attendat his quae circa sensibilia aliquis operatur; sed potest circa alia intelligibilia negotiari. Tanta tamen potest esse in actu speculationis vehementia, quod omnino a sensibili operatione abstrahet.	10. The speculative understanding is not forced to turn its attention to the activities in which one is occupied with sensible things, but it can busy itself with other intelligible things. Moreover, the intensity of the act of speculation can be so great that it is altogether abstracted from sensible activity.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod quamvis in illo actu Paulus habuerit habitum fidei, non tamen habuit actum, unde ratio non sequitur.	11. Although in that act Paul had the habit of faith, he did not have the act of faith.

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Q. 13: Rapture ARTICLE IV In the fourth article we ask: How great an abstraction is required for our understanding to be able to see god through his essence? [ARTICLE De ver., 10, 11; Quodl., I, 1; 2 Cor., c. 12, lect. 1; S.T., I, 12, 11; II-II, 17, 5; In loan., c. 1, lect. 11.]
Quarto quaeritur quanta abstractio requiratur ad hoc quod intellectus Deum per essentiam videre possit	Difficulties
Et videtur quod requiratur abstractio ab ipsa unione qua anima unitur corpori ut forma.	And it seems that there has to be an abstraction from the very union by which the soul is united to the body as its form, for
Vires enim animae vegetabilis sunt magis materiales quam etiam vires animae sensibilis. Sed ad hoc quod intellectus videat Deum per essentiam, oportet quod fiat abstractio a sensibus, ut prius dictum est. Ergo, multo fortius, ad puritatem illius visionis requiritur quod fiat abstractio ab actibus animae vegetabilis. Sed haec abstractio non potest fieri in statu animalis vitae, quamdiu anima corpori unitur ut forma, quia, ut dicit philosophus, nutriuntur animalia semper. Ergo ad visionem divinae essentiae requiritur quod fiat abstractio ab unione qua anima corpori unitur ut forma.	1. The powers of the vegetative soul are more material than the powers of the sensitive soul. But for our understanding to see God through His essence it must abstract from the senses, as has been said., Therefore, abstraction from the acts of the vegetative soul is much more urgently required for the purity of that vision. But this abstraction cannot take place where there is brute life as long as the soul is united to the body as its form. For, as the Philosopher says: “In animals the process of nutrition is always going on.” Therefore, for the vision of the divine essence there must be an abstraction from the union by which the soul is united to the body as its form.
Praeterea, Exod., XXXIII, 20, super illud: non videbit me homo et vivet, dicit Glossa August.: ostendit huic vitae corruptibilis carnis, Deum, sicut est, apparere non posse. In illa tamen vita potest, ubi ut vivatur, huic vitae moriendum est. Et Glossa Gregorii, ibid.: qui sapientiam, quae Deus est, videt, huic vitae funditus moritur. Sed mors est per separationem animae a corpore, cui uniebatur ut forma. Ergo oportet fieri separationem omnimodam animae a corpore, ad hoc quod Deus per essentiam videatur.	2. The gloss of Augustine on Exodus (33:20), “For man shall not see me and live,” says: “This shows that God cannot appear as He is to this life of corruptible flesh. But He can in the other life, which one can live. only by dying to this life.” The gloss of Gregory reads: “He who sees the wisdom which is God dies entirely to this life.” But death is the result of the separation of the soul from the body to which it was united as its form. Therefore, there has to be a complete separation of the soul from the body in order to see God through His essence.
Praeterea, vivere viventibus est esse, ut dicitur II de anima. Esse autem hominis viventis est per hoc quod anima corpori unitur ut forma. Sed Exod. XXXIII, 20, dicitur: non videbit me homo et vivet. Ergo quamdiu anima corpori unitur ut forma, non potest per essentiam Deum videre.	3. “For a living thing, its act of life is its act of existence,” as is said in The Soul. But the act of existence of a man who is alive arises from the union of his soul with his body as its form. But Exodus (33:20) says: “For man shall not see me and live.” Therefore, as long as the soul is united to the body as its form, he cannot see God through His essence.
Praeterea, fortior est unio qua unitur anima corpori ut forma, quam illa qua unitur ei ut motor, ex qua unione proveniunt operationes potentiarum quae per organa corporea operantur. Sed haec secunda unio impedit visionem divinae essentiae, propter quod oportet quod fiat abstractio a corporeis sensibus. Ergo multo fortius et prima unio impediet; et sic oportebit ab ea abstractionem fieri.	4. The union by which the soul is united to the body as its form is stronger than that by which it is united to the body as a mover. From this latter union arise the activities of the powers and the activities which are carried on through bodily organs. But this latter union hinders the vision of the divine essence, for which there must be abstraction from the bodily senses. Therefore, the first union will interfere with it much more, and thus it will be necessary to dissolve it.
Praeterea, potentia non elevatur supra modum essentiae; cum potentia ab essentia fluat, et in ipsa radicetur. Si igitur essentia animae fuerit corpori materiali unita ut forma, non poterit esse quod intellectiva potentia ad ea quae sunt omnino immaterialia, elevetur; et sic idem quod prius.	5. Since powers flow from the essence and are rooted in it they are not raised to a level higher than that of their essence. Therefore, if the essence of the soul is united to a material body as its form, it is not possible for the power of understanding to be raised to things which are altogether immaterial. We conclude as before.
Praeterea, maior impuritas contrahitur in anima ex coniunctione corporis ad animam quam ex coniunctione similitudinis corporalis ad ipsam. Sed ad hoc quod mens Deum per essentiam videat, oportet eam depurari a similitudinibus corporis, quae apprehenduntur per imaginationem et sensum, ut dictum est. Ergo multo fortius oportet eam a corpore separari ad hoc quod Deum per essentiam videat.	6. Greater contamination results in the soul from its connection with the body than from its union with a bodily likeness. But for the mind to see God through His essence, it must be purified of bodily likenesses, which are perceived through imagination and sense, as has been said. Therefore, for the soul to see God through His essence, it must with much greater reason be separated from the body.
Praeterea, II Cor. V, 6-7,: quamdiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a domino: per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem. Ergo quamdiu anima est in corpore, non potest Deum in sua specie videre.	7. In the second Epistle to the Corinthians (5:6, 7) we read: “While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord. (For we walk by faith, and not by sight.) “ Therefore, as long as the soul is in the body, it cannot see God as He is in Himself.
Sed contra	To the Contrary
est quod Exod., XXXIII, 20, super illud non videbit me homo et vivet dicit Glosa Gregorii: quibusdam in hac carne viventibus, sed inaestimabili virtute crescentibus, potest aeterni videri claritas Dei. Sed claritas Dei est eius essentia, ut in eadem Glossa dicitur. Ergo ad hoc quod essentia Dei videatur, non oportet omnino animam separari a corpore.	1. The gloss of Gregory on the passage from Exodus (33:20), “For man shall not see me and live,” says: “The splendor of the eternal God can be seen by some who live in this flesh, but who are growing in priceless virtue.”“ But the splendor of God is His essence, as the same gloss says. Therefore, it is not necessary to have complete separation of soul from body to see the essence of God.
Praeterea, Augustinus, XII super Genesim ad litteram dicit, quod anima rapitur non solum ad visionem imaginariam, sed etiam ad intellectualem, qua ipsa veritas perspicua cernitur, facta aversione a sensibus minus quam in morte, sed plus quam in somno. Ergo ad videndum veritatem increatam de qua Augustinus ibi loquitur, non requiritur quod fiat separatio a corpore prout unitur ut forma.	2. Augustine says: “The soul is enraptured not only to the vision of imagination, but also to the vision of understanding, through which the truth itself is clearly seen. Meanwhile, it has been carried out of its senses less than in death, but more than in sleep.” Therefore, to see the uncreated truth of which Augustine is speaking there is no need to dissolve the union whereby the soul is united to the body as its form.
Praeterea, hoc idem patet per Augustinum in epistola ad Paulinam de videndo Deum: non est, inquit, incredibile quibusdam sanctis, nondum ita defunctis ut sepelienda cadavera remanerent, etiam istam excellentiam revelationis fuisse concessam, ut scilicet Deum per essentiam viderent. Ergo anima potest Deum videre adhuc corpori unita ut forma.	3. The same thing is clear from these words of Augustine: “It is not beyond belief that even that lofty degree of revelation”—to see God through His essence—“was given to some holy men before they were dead and their corpses ready for burial.” Therefore, while the soul is still united to the body as its form, it can see God.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod ad visionem divinae essentiae, quae est actus perfectissimus intellectus, requiritur abstractio ab illis quae vehementiam intellectivi actus nata sunt impedire, et per eam impediuntur. Hoc autem in quibusdam contingit per se, in quibusdam per accidens tantum.	To see the divine essence, which is the most perfect act of understanding, there must be an abstraction from those things which of their nature interfere with the excessive intensity of the act of understanding and which are hindered by this same intensity. This happens in some things because of something intrinsic to the act itself, and in others merely for some extrinsic reason.
Per se quidem impediunt se invicem intellectivae et sensitivae operationes, tum propter hoc quod in utrisque operationibus oportet intentionem adesse; tum etiam quia intellectus quodammodo sensibilibus operationibus admiscetur, cum a phantasmatibus accipiat. Et ita ex sensibilibus operationibus quodammodo intellectus puritas inquinatur, ut prius dictum est. Sed ad hoc quod anima corpori uniatur ut forma, non requiritur aliqua intentio; cum haec unio non dependeat ex voluntate animae, sed magis ex natura.	The activities of sense and understanding interfere with each other by reason of the acts themselves, inasmuch as attention is needed for both activities, and also because the understanding in some fashion enters into the sensible activities since it receives something from the phantasms. Thus, the purity of the understanding is contaminated to some extent by sense activities, as we have said. But no attention is needed for the union of the soul to the body as its form, since this union does not depend on the will of the soul, but on nature.
Similiter etiam ex tali unione puritas intellectus directe non inquinatur. Anima enim non unitur corpori ut forma mediantibus suis potentiis, sed per essentiam suam; cum nihil sit medium inter formam et materiam, ut probatur in VIII Metaphysic. Nec tamen essentia animae ita corpori unitur quod totaliter corporis conditionem sequatur, sicut aliae formae materiales, quae sunt omnino in materia quasi submersae, in tantum quod nulla virtus aut actio ex eis prodire potest nisi materialis. Ab essentia autem animae non solum procedunt quaedam vires sive potentiae quodammodo corporales, utpote corporeorum organorum actus existentes, scilicet vires sensitivae et vegetativae; sed etiam vires intellectivae, quae sunt penitus immateriales, nullius corporis aut partis corporis actus existentes, ut probatur III de anima.	In the same way, the purity of the understanding is not directly contaminated by such a union. For the soul is not joined to the body as its form through the mediation of its powers, but through its essence, since nothing stands as a medium between matter and form, as is proved in the Metaphysics. Furthermore, the essence of the soul is not united to body in such a way that it follows the condition of the body completely, as other material forms, which are, as it were, completely engulfed in matter to such an extent that only material power or activity can proceed from them. Now, from the essence of the soul there proceed not only the forces and powers which are in some sense bodily, as the existent acts of the bodily organs, that is, the sensitive and vegetative powers, but also the powers of understanding, which are completely immaterial and not the existent acts of any body or part of a body, as is proved in The Soul.
Unde patet quod vires intellectivae non procedunt ex essentia animae ex illa parte qua est corpori unita, sed magis secundum hoc quod remanet a corpore libera, utpote ei non totaliter subiugata; et sic unio animae ad corpus non pertingit usque ad operationem intellectus, ut possit eius puritatem impedire. Unde, per se loquendo, ad operationem intellectus, quantumcumque intensam non requiritur abstractio ab illa unione qua anima unitur corpori ut forma.	From this it is clear that the powers of our understanding do not proceed from the essence of the soul in so far as it is united to the body, but, rather, in so far as it stays free of the body and is not entirely bound down to it. In this sense the union of the soul with the body does not extend to the activity of the understanding and so cannot interfere with its purity. Hence, if we consider what is intrinsic to the acts, the dissolution of the union by which the soul is united to the body as its form is not a necessary condition for the activity of the understanding, no matter how intense.
Similiter etiam nec requiritur abstractio ab operationibus animae vegetabilis. Operationes enim huius partis animae, sunt quasi naturales; quod patet ex hoc quod complentur virtute qualitatum activarum et passivarum, scilicet calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci. Unde nec rationi sive voluntati obediunt, ut patet in I Ethic. Et sic patet quod ad huiusmodi actiones non requiritur intentio; et ita per earum actus non oportet intentionem averti ab operatione intellectiva.	In like manner, there is no need for the suppression of the activities of the vegetative soul. For the activities of this part of the soul are really natural, as is clear from the fact that they are brought to full perfection by the power of the active and passive qualities, namely, the warm and the cold, the moist and the dry. For this reason they obey neither reason nor will, as is clear in the Ethics. Thus, it is plain that attention is not needed for actions of this kind, and so it is not necessary to turn our attention from intellectual activity because of the acts of these qualities.
Similiter etiam nec operatio intellectiva aliquo modo huiusmodi operationibus admiscetur; cum neque ab eis accipiat, propter hoc quod non sunt cognoscitivae; neque instrumento aliquo corporeo utatur intellectus, quod oporteat per operationes vegetabilis animae sustentari, sicut accidit de organis potentiarum sensitivarum; et sic puritati intellectus nihil praeiudicatur per operationes animae vegetabilis. Unde patet quod per se loquendo, operatio animae vegetabilis et operatio intellectus non se impediunt.	In like manner, the activity of the understanding has nothing to do with the activities of this sort, since it receives nothing from them, because they are not related to knowledge and because the understanding does not use any bodily instrument which would have to be sustained through the activities of the vegetative soul, as is the case with the organs of the sensitive powers. Thus, the purity of our understanding is in no wise impaired through the activities of the vegetative soul. From this it is clear that, if we consider merely what is intrinsic to the acts themselves, the activity of the vegetative and the activity of the intellectual soul do not hinder each other.
Per accidens tamen potest ex altero alteri impedimentum provenire; inquantum scilicet intellectus accipit a phantasmatibus, quae sunt in organis corporalibus, quae oportet per actum vegetabilis animae nutriri et conservari. Et sic per actus nutritivae potentiae eorum dispositio variatur, et per consequens operatio sensitivae potentiae, a qua intellectus accipit. Et ita per accidens etiam ipsius intellectus operatio impeditur, sicut patet in somno et post cibum. Et etiam e converso per hunc modum operatio intellectus impedit operationem animae vegetabilis, inquantum ad operationem intellectus requiritur operatio imaginativae virtutis,	Nevertheless, one of these can interfere with the other for some extrinsic reason; for example, in so far as the understanding receives something from the phantasms, which are in bodily organs, which must be nourished and sustained through the activity of the vegetative soul. Thus, because of the acts of the nutritive power variation may occur in the disposition of the organs, and, consequently, in the activity of the sensitive power from which the understanding receives something. Thus, the activity of the understanding itself is hindered for an extrinsic reason. This is plain during sleep and after eating. On the other hand, also, the activity of understanding interferes with the activity of the vegetative soul in this way, inasmuch as the activity of the power of imagination is needed for the activity of understanding.
ad cuius vehementiam oportet caloris et spirituum concursum fieri; et sic impeditur actus virtutis nutritivae per vehementiam contemplationis. Sed hoc non habet locum in illa contemplatione qua Dei essentia videtur cum talis contemplatio imaginationis operatione non egeat.	And intensity of the imagination requires the co-operation of heat and the [animal] spirits. Thus, the act of the nutritive power is hindered by the intensity of contemplation. But this plays no part in the contemplation by which God’s essence is seen, since such contemplation does not need the activity of the imagination.
Et sic patet quod ad videndum Deum per essentiam nullo modo requiritur abstractio ab actibus animae vegetabilis, neque etiam aliqua eorum debilitatio; sed solum ab actibus sensitivarum potentiarum.	From this it is clear that abstraction from the acts of the vegetative soul or any impairment of those acts is not in any way required for the vision of God through His essence. All that is required is abstraction from the acts of the sensitive powers.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod quamvis potentiae animae vegetabilis sint magis materiales quam sensitivae, cum hoc tamen sunt etiam magis ab intellectu remotae, et sic minus possunt impedire vehementiam intellectus, vel impediri ab ea.	1. Although the powers of the vegetative soul are more material than the powers of the sensitive soul, still, along with this they are more remote from the understanding and so are less able to interfere with the intensity of the understanding or be hindered by it.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod vivere dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo ipsum esse viventis, quod relinquitur ex hoc quod anima unitur corpori ut forma. Alio modo ponitur vivere pro operatione vitae; sicut distinguit philosophus in II de anima, vivere per intelligere et sentire, et alias animae operationes.	2. “To live” can be taken in two senses. In one, it means the very act of existence of that which is living, which rests on the union of the soul to the body as its form. In the other sense, “to live” is taken to mean the activity of life. Thus the Philosopher distinguishes living into understanding, sensing, and the other activities of the soul.
Et similiter, cum mors sit vitae privatio, oportet quod similiter distinguatur; ita quod quandoque designet privationem illius unionis qua anima corpori unitur ut forma, aliquando vero privationem operum vitae. Unde Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram: ab hac vita quisque quodammodo moritur, sive omnino exiens de corpore, sive aversus et alienatus a carnalibus sensibus; et sic accipitur mori in Glossis inductis: quod patet ex hoc quod subiungitur in Glossa Gregorii: qui sapientiam, inquit, quae Deus est, videt, huic vitae funditus moritur, ne eius amore teneatur.	Similarly, since death is the loss of life, we must distinguish it in like manner. Thus, sometimes it means the loss of that union by which the soul is joined to the body as its form, and sometimes it means the loss of the vital activities. For this reason Augustine says: “One dies to this life to some extent whether he leaves the body entirely, or whether he is transported out of the senses of the body and made unconscious of them.” Death is thus understood in the glosses which have been cited,” as is plain from the words following the quotation from the gloss of Gregory: “He who sees the wisdom which is God dies entirely to this life, so that he may not be held back by love of it.”
Et per hoc patet solutio ad tertium.	3. The solution to the third difficulty is clear from what has just been said.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod unio illa qua anima corpori unitur ut forma, est fortior, sequitur quod ab ea possit fieri minus abstractio.	4. Since the union by which the soul is united to the body as its form is stronger, it follows that it is less possible to withdraw from it.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod ratio illa recte concluderet, si essentia animae ita corpori uniretur quod esset omnino corpori subiugata; quod falsum esse iam diximus.	5. The reasoning would conclude correctly if the essence of the soul were so united to the body that it were entirely bound down to the body. But we have already said that this is false.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod similitudo corporalis, quae requiritur ad operationem imaginationis et sensus, quamvis sit immaterialior quam ipsum corpus, tamen est etiam vicinius se habens ad operationes intellectus; et ideo magis eas impedire potest, ut dictum est.	6. Although the bodily likeness which is necessary for the activity of the imagination and the senses is more immaterial than the body itself, it has a closer relation to the activity of the understanding. Thus, it is more able to hinder it, as we have said.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod verbum apostoli est intelligendum secundum quod dicimur esse in corpore, non solum ex hoc quod anima corpori unitur ut forma, sed etiam ex hoc quod sensibus corporeis utimur.	7. What the Apostle says should be applied to our existence in the body not only by reason of the union of the soul with the body as its form, but also by reason of our use of the bodily senses.

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Q. 13: Rapture ARTICLE V In the fifth article we ask: What did the apostle know and not know about his rapture? [ARTICLE 2 Cor., c. 12, lect. 1; S.T., II-II, 175,6; 180, 5.]
Quinto quaeritur quid est illud quod apostolus circa suum raptum scivit, et quid nescivit	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sciverit an anima eius esset in corpore.	It seems that he knew whether his soul was in the body, for
Ipse enim melius hoc scivit quam aliquis sequentium. Sed communiter a multis determinatur quod anima Pauli tunc fuerit in corpore eius unita ei ut forma. Ergo multo fortius hoc Paulus scivit.	1. He knew this better than any of those who followed, But many commonly agree that during the rapture Paul’s soul was united to his body as its form. Therefore, with much greater reason Paul knew this.
Praeterea, Paulus in illo raptu scivit quid viderit, et qua visione viderit; quod patet quia dicit: scio hominem (...) raptum usque ad tertium caelum. Scivit igitur quid esset illud caelum, utrum res corporalis vel spiritualis; et an illud spiritualiter vel corporaliter viderit. Sed ad hoc sequitur eum scivisse an in corpore an extra corpus viderit: quia corporalis visio non potest fieri nisi per corpus, intellectualis vero semper fit sine corpore. Ergo ipse scivit an esset in corpore vel extra corpus.	2. In the rapture Paul knew what he saw and with what vision he saw it. This is clear from the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2), because he says: “I know a man... caught up to the third heaven.” Therefore, he knew what that heaven was, whether it was something corporeal or spiritual, and he knew whether he saw it spiritually or corporeally. But it follows from this that he knew whether he saw it while in the body or out of it. For bodily vision cannot take place except through the body, and the vision of understanding is always without the body. Therefore, he knew whether he was in the body or out of it.
Praeterea, sicut ipsemet dicit, scivit hominem raptum usque ad tertium caelum. Sed homo nominat coniunctum ex anima et corpore. Ergo scivit animam corpori esse coniunctam.	3. As Paul himself says, he knew “a man [who was] caught up to the third heaven” (2 Cor. 12:2). But man means that which is made up of the union of the body and the soul. Therefore, he knew that the soul was united to the body.
Praeterea, ipse scivit se esse raptum, ut ex verbis suis patet. Sed mortui non dicuntur rapti. Ergo ipse scivit se non esse mortuum; et ita scivit animam suam esse corpori coniunctam.	4. He himself knew that he was enraptured, as is clear from what he says. But dead people are not said to be enraptured. Therefore, he knew that he was not dead. Therefore, he knew that his soul was joined to his body.
Praeterea, ipse vidit Deum in raptu illa visione qua vident Deum sancti in patria, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Genes. ad litteram, et in epistola de videndo Deum. Sed sanctorum animae quae sunt in patria, sciunt an sint in corpore, vel extra corpus. Ergo et apostolus hoc scivit.	5. As Augustine says, in the rapture he saw God with that vision with which the saints in heaven see God. But the souls of the saints in heaven know whether they are in the body or out of it. Therefore, the Apostle also knew this.
Praeterea, Gregorius dicit: quid est quod non videat qui videntem omnia videt? Quod praecipue pertinere videtur de his quae ad ipsos videntes pertinent. Sed hoc maxime pertinet ad animam, utrum sit corpori coniuncta vel non. Ergo anima Pauli scivit utrum esset corpori coniuncta vel non.	6. Gregory says: “What is there that they do not see who see Him who sees everything?” This seems to refer especially to the things which pertain to those who are seeing. But whether it is united to the body or not has very special pertinence to the soul. Therefore, the soul of Paul knew whether it was united to the body or not.
Sed contra,	To the Contrary
est quod dicitur II Cor. XII, 2: scio hominem in Christo ante annos quatuordecim (sive in corpore sive extra corpus nescio, Deus scit) raptum huiusmodi et cetera. Ergo nescivit utrum esset in corpore, vel extra corpus.	In the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2) it says: “I know a man in Christ above fourteen years ago, whether in the body, I know not, or out of the body, I know not; God knows.” Therefore, he did not know whether he was in the body or out of the body.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod circa hoc est multiplex opinio. Quidam enim intellexerunt quod apostolus diceret se nescire non quidem an anima esset corpori coniuncta in illo raptu an non; sed an esset raptus secundum animam et corpus simul, ut etiam corporaliter portaretur in caelum, sicut Habacuc portatus legitur, Danielis ultimo; an secundum animam tantum, id est in visionibus Dei, sicut dicitur Ezech. cap. XL, 2: in visionibus Dei adduxit me in terram Israel; et hunc intellectum cuiusdam Iudaei exprimit Hieronymus in prologo super Danielem, ubi dicit: denique et apostolum nostrum non fuisse ausum affirmare se raptum in corpore, sed dixisse: sive in corpore sive extra corpus nescio.	There are many opinions on this point. For some have understood the Apostle to say that what he did not know was not whether he was in the body or not, but whether the rapture was one of the soul and the body together, so that he was carried bodily to heaven, as we read in Daniel (14:35) that Habakkuk was transported, or whether it was a rapture of the soul alone, that is, in the visions of God, as is said in Ezechiel (40:2): “In the visions of God he brought me into the land of Israel.” And Jerome adopts this interpretation of a certain Jew when he says: “Finally, our Apostle, too, did not dare to assert that he was caught up in body, but said: “Whether in body or out of the body, I know not....”
Hunc autem intellectum Augustinus reprobat XII super Genesim ad litteram. Constat enim ex verbis apostoli, quod ipse scivit se raptum esse usque ad tertium caelum. Constat igitur illud caelum in quod raptus est, esse vere caelum, non aliquam caeli similitudinem.	Augustine, however, disapproves of this interpretation. For it is clear from the words of the Apostle that he himself knew that he was caught up to the third heaven. Therefore, it is clear that that heaven to which he was transported was truly heaven, and not some likeness of heaven.
Si enim hoc voluisset intelligere, cum dixit se raptum in caelum id est ad videndam imaginarie similitudinem caeli, eodem modo poterat affirmare se raptum esse in corpore, id est in similitudine corporis. Et sic non fuisset necessarium discernere quid sciret et quid nesciret, quia utrumque aequaliter sciret; scilicet et se esse raptum in caelum, et se esse raptum in corpore, id est in similitudinem corporis, sicut accidit in somniis.	For, if he had wanted to mean that, when he said he was caught up to heaven, he was transported in order to see a likeness of heaven in his imagination, he could have asserted in the same way that he was transported in the body, that is, to a likeness of this body. Thus, it would not have been necessary to distinguish between what he knew and what he did not know, since he would know both equally, that is, that he was in heaven and that he was transported in the body, that is, to a likeness of the body, as happens in dreams.
Scivit igitur pro certo quod illud in quod raptus fuit, vere erat caelum; ergo scivit an esset corpus vel res incorporea. Si enim erat corpus, in eam rapiebatur corporaliter: si vero erat res incorporea, in eam corporaliter rapi non poterat.	Therefore, he knew for certain that that to which he was transported was really heaven. Therefore, he knew whether it was a body or something incorporeal. For, if it was a body, he was transported to it bodily, but, if it was something incorporeal, he could not be transported to it bodily.
Restat igitur quod apostolus non dubitavit an raptus ille esset corporalis vel spiritualis solum; sed scivit solo intellectu se in illud caelum esse raptum; dubitavit autem an in ipso raptu anima eius esset in corpore, an non.	Therefore, it remains that the Apostle did not doubt whether he was enraptured bodily or only spiritually, but knew that he was transported to that heaven only in his understanding. However, he did have doubts whether in that rapture his soul was in his body, or not.
Et hoc quidam alii concedunt; sed dicunt, quod quamvis in illo raptu apostolus hoc nesciverit, scivit tamen illud post, coniiciens ex ipsa visione quam prius habuerat. In illo enim raptu tota mens eius in divina ferebatur, nec hoc percipiebat an anima esset in corpore, an non. Sed hoc etiam expresse contrariatur verbis apostoli. Sicut enim distinguit quid sciverit et quid nesciverit, ita distinguit praesens a praeterito: quasi enim praeteritum narrat raptum hominem ante annos quatuordecim usque ad tertium caelum, sed quasi praesens confitetur se scire aliquid, et aliquid nescire. Ergo post annos quatuordecim ab illo raptu adhuc nesciebat an in corpore an extra corpus fuerit, quando fuit raptus.	Some others concede this, but say that, although during the rapture the Apostle did not know this, he did, nevertheless, know it afterwards, surmising it from the vision which he had had. For in the rapture his whole mind was given over to things divine, and he did not perceive whether his soul was in his body or not. But this opinion, too, is openly opposed to what the Apostle says. For, as he distinguishes what he knew and did not know, so he distinguishes the present from the past. And he speaks of the man enraptured, as in the past, fourteen years before, but he admits, as in the present, that he knows something and does not know something. Therefore, fourteen years after that rapture he still did not know whether he was in the body or not when the rapture took place.
Et ideo alii dicunt, quod nec in raptu nec post scivit, an anima esset in corpore, secundum aliquem modum, et non simpliciter. Dicunt enim, quod scivit, et tunc et postea, quod anima uniebatur corpori ut forma; sed nescivit utrum hoc modo corpori uniretur ut eius anima aliquid a sensibus acciperet. Vel secundum alios, utrum vires nutritivae essent in suis actibus, secundum quas anima corpus administrat.	Hence, others have said that he did not know either during the rapture or after it whether his soul was in the body to some extent and not completely. For they say that he knew both then and afterwards that his soul was united to the body as its form, but did not know whether it was so united to it that it could receive something from the senses. Or, according to others, he did not know whether the nutritive powers exercised their activities by means of which the soul takes care of the body.
Sed hoc etiam non videtur consonum verbis apostoli, qui dicit se nescire an in corpore fuerit, an extra corpus, simpliciter: et praeterea etiam hoc non multum ad rem pertinere videbatur, ut diceret se nescire utrum tali vel tali modo in corpore fuerit, ex quo anima a corpore omnino separata non erat.	But this, too, does not seem to fit the words of the Apostle, for he said with no reservations that he did not know whether he was in the body or out of it. Furthermore, it would not seem very much to the point to say that he did not know whether the soul was in the body in this way or that way, when these did not cut the soul off entirely from the body.
Et ideo dicendum est quod simpliciter nescivit an anima esset corpori coniuncta vel non: et hoc est quod Augustinus, XII super Genesim ad litteram, post longam inquisitionem concludit, dicens: restat ergo fortasse ut hoc ipsum eum ignorasse intelligamus utrum quando in tertium caelum raptus est, in corpore fuerit, quomodo est anima in corpore cum corpus vivere dicitur, sive vigilantis sive dormientis, sive in extasi a sensibus corporis alienata, an omnino de corpore exierit, ut mortuum corpus iaceret, donec peracta illa demonstratione, membris mortuis anima redderetur, et non quasi dormiens evigilaret, aut extasi alienatus rediret in sensus, sed mortuus omnino revivisceret.	Therefore, we have to say that he simply did not know whether his soul was united to the body or not. This is the conclusion which Augustine reaches after a long investigation, when he says: “Perhaps, then, we should conclude that he was ignorant of this matter: while he was transported to the third heaven, was he in the body—that is, as the soul of one awake, or asleep, or in ecstasy and completely unconscious of the bodily senses, is in the body when the body is said to be alive—or did he leave the body completely so that the body lay dead until, the vision finished, the soul returned to the dead members, and he was not as one awaking from sleep or returning to his senses from the transport of ecstasy, but as one completely dead returning to life?
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, XII super Genesim ad litteram, utrum in corpore, an extra corpus, dubitat apostolus. Unde, illo dubitante, quis nostrum certus esse audeat? Unde Augustinus hoc indeterminatum relinquit. Quod autem posteriores de hoc aliquid determinant, magis loquuntur ex probabilitate quam ex certitudine. Ex quo enim fieri potuit quod anima illa adhuc unita remanens hoc modo raperetur, sicut se dicit apostolus raptum, ut ex dictis patet, probabilius est quod unita remanserit.	1. As Augustine says: “The Apostle doubts whether he was in the body or out of it. Hence, if he is in doubt, which of us dares to be certain?” Thus, Augustine leaves the question undecided. When later writers take a stand on this question, they are speaking with probability rather than with certitude. For, since it could happen that one would be enraptured in the way the Apostle says he was enraptured while his soul remained united to the body, as is clear from what has been said, it is more probable that it did remain united to the body.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit contra intellectum verborum apostoli primo positum, quo intelligitur apostolum dubitasse non de conditione rapti, id est utrum anima corpori fuerit unita; sed de modo raptus, id est utrum fuerit raptus corporaliter, vel spiritualiter tantum.	2. The reason given here holds against the interpretation of the words of the Apostle first given, in which he is considered to have doubted not about the state of the one enraptured, that is, whether the soul was united to the body, but of the manner of the rapture, namely, whether the rapture was bodily or only spiritual.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod per synecdochen quandoque pars hominis homo nominatur, et praecipue anima, quae est hominis eminentior pars. Quamvis et possit intelligi, eum quem raptum dicit, non tunc fuisse hominem quando raptus fuit, sed post annos quattuordecim, quando scilicet hoc dicebat apostolus: scio hominem in Christo; non autem raptum dicit hominem usque ad tertium caelum.	3. Through synecdoche, sometimes only a part of man is called man, especially the soul, which is the more noble part of man. Yet this can also be taken to mean that the one who he says was enraptured was not a man during the rapture, but was a man fourteen years later, that is, when the Apostle said this.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod dato quod fuerit in illo statu anima apostoli a corpore separata, illa tamen separatio non fuit per aliquem naturalem modum; sed per virtutem divinam ipsam animam a corpore abstrahentem, non ad hoc quod simpliciter separata remaneret, sed ad tempus. Et pro tanto raptus dici potuit, etsi non omnis mortuus raptus dici possit.	4. Granted that in that state the soul of the Apostle was separated from the body, that separation was not due to any natural mode of acting, but to the divine power which transported the soul out of the body, not to have it remain separated permanently, but for a time, and to this extent one can be said to be enraptured, although not every dead person can be said to be enraptured.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus dicit XII super Genesim ad litteram, apostolo arrepto a carnis sensibus in tertium caelum et Paradisum, hoc ipsum certe defuit ad plenam perfectamque cognitionem rerum quae Angelis inest, quod sive in corpore sive extra corpus esset, nesciebat. Hoc itaque non deerit cum receptis corporibus in resurrectione mortuorum corruptibile hoc induerit incorruptionem. Et sic patet quod, licet eius visio quantum ad aliquid similis fuerit visioni beatorum, tamen etiam quantum ad aliquid fuit imperfectior.	5. As Augustine says: “When the Apostle was carried out of the senses of the body to the third heaven and paradise, he certainly fell short of the full and perfect knowledge of things which the angels have, in so far as he did not know whether he was in the body or outside of it. And, so, this will not be lacking when this corruption puts on incorruption in the resurrection of the dead.” Thus, it is clear that his vision was to some extent more imperfect than the sight of the blessed, although in some respects it was like theirs.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod Paulus non fuit raptus ad videndum Deum, ut esset beatus simpliciter; sed ut esset testis beatitudinis sanctorum, et divinorum mysteriorum, quae ei revelata sunt. Unde illa tantum vidit in visione verbi propter quae cognoscenda rapiebatur, non autem omnia, sicut erit in beatis, praecipue post resurrectionem. Tunc enim, ut Augustinus praemissis verbis subiungit, omnia erunt evidentia, sine ulla falsitate, sine ulla ignorantia.	6. Paul was not transported to see God in order to have beatitude without qualification, but to be a witness of the beatitude of the saints and of the divine mysteries which were revealed to him. Consequently, he saw in the vision of the Word only those things the knowledge of which the rapture was ordained to communicate. Thus, he did not see everything as the blessed do, especially after the resurrection. For, then, as Augustine adds to the words already cited: “All things will be plain, and there will be no falsity nor ignorance.”

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