| ARTICLE I
The question is about God’s will,
and in the first article we ask:
Does it belong to God to have a will?
[ARTICLE I Sent., 45, a. 1; C.G., I, 72 & 73; IV, 19; S.T., I, 19, 1; Comp. theol., I, 32-34.]
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| Et primo quaeritur utrum Deo competat voluntatem habere
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it does not, for
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| Omni enim voluntatem habenti competit secundum electionem voluntatis agere. Sed Deus non agit secundum voluntatis electionem; ut enim dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Divin. Nomin.: sicut noster visibilis sol non ratiocinans aut praeeligens, sed per ipsum esse illuminat omnia; ita et divina bonitas. Ergo Deo non competit voluntatem habere.
| 1. It belongs to everyone who has a will to act according to the choice of his will. But God does not act according to the choice of His will; for, as Dionysius says, just as our visible sun enlightens all things, not by reasoning or choosing, but by its very being, so too does the divine goodness. It therefore does not belong to God to have a will.
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| Praeterea, ex causa contingenti non possunt effectus necessarii provenire. Sed voluntas est causa contingens, cum se habeat ad utrumlibet. Ergo non potest esse causa necessariorum. Deus autem est causa omnium, tam necessariorum quam contingentium. Ergo non agit per voluntatem; et sic idem quod prius.
| 2. Necessary effects cannot come from a contingent cause. But the will is a contingent cause, since it is open to alternatives. It cannot, then, be the cause of necessary things. But God is the cause of all things, necessary as well as contingent. He therefore does not act through a will, and so the conclusion is the same as before.
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| Praeterea, ei quod non habet aliquam causam, non competit aliquid quod importet respectum ad causam. Sed Deus, cum sit prima causa omnium, non habet aliquam causam. Ergo, cum voluntas importet habitudinem in causam finalem, quia voluntas est finis, secundum philosophum in III Ethicorum, videtur quod voluntas Deo non competat.
| 3. Nothing which implies a reference to a cause belongs to that which has no cause. But since God is the first cause of all things, He has no cause. Now a will implies a relationship to a final cause, because the will is referred to an end, as the Philosopher says. It therefore seems that will does not pertain to God.
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| Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in III Ethic., voluntarium meretur laudem vel vituperium; involuntarium autem veniam et misericordiam. Ergo ei non competit ratio voluntarii cui non competit ratio laudabilis. Sed Deo non competit ratio laudabilis, quia laus, ut dicitur in I Ethic., non est optimorum, sed eorum quae ordinantur in optimum; honor autem est optimorum. Ergo Deo non competit habere voluntatem.
| 4. According to the Philosopher, what is voluntary deserves praise or blame; what is involuntary deserves pardon and mercy. Voluntariness therefore does not belong to anything to which praiseworthiness does not belong. But praiseworthiness does not belong to God because, as is said in the Ethics, praise is not for the best, but for those things which are directed to the best. Honor is for the best. It therefore does not belong to God to have a will.
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| Praeterea, opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem. Sed voluntario opponitur duplex involuntarium, ut dicitur in libro III Ethic.: scilicet involuntarium per ignorantiam, et per violentiam. Sed Deo non competit involuntarium per violentiam, quia coactio in Deum non cadit; nec involuntarium per ignorantiam, quia ipse omnia novit. Ergo nec voluntarium Deo competit.
| 5. Opposites have reference to the same thing. But two species of the involuntary are opposed to the voluntary, as is said in the Ethics: the involuntary “from violence” and the involuntary “from ignorance.” Now nothing involuntary from violence is attributable to God because force cannot be applied to Him; nor is anything involuntary from ignorance, because He knows everything. Then neither is anything voluntary attributable to God.
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| Praeterea, ut dicitur in Lib. de regulis fidei, est duplex voluntas: scilicet affectionis respectu interiorum actuum, et effectionis respectu exteriorum. Voluntas autem affectionis, ut ibi dicitur, est faciens ad meritum; voluntas autem effectionis est perficiens meritum. Deo autem non competit mereri. Ergo nec voluntatem aliquo modo habere.
| 6. As is said in The Rules of Faith, there are two kinds of will: affective, regarding internal acts, and effective, regarding external acts. Affective will works for merit, as is said there; effective will achieves merit. But it does not belong to God to merit. Then neither does it belong to Him in any way to have a will.
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| Praeterea, Deus movens est non motum: quia secundum Boetium, immobilis manens dat cuncta moveri. Sed voluntas est movens motum, ut dicitur in Lib. III de anima; unde et in II Metaphys., probat philosophus quod movet sicut desideratum et intellectum ex hoc quod est movens non motum. Ergo Deo non competit voluntatem habere.
| 7. God is an unmoved mover because, in the words of Boethius, “while remaining immobile He communicates motion to all things.” But a will is a moved mover, as is said in The Soul. Hence the Philosopher likewise argues from the principle that God is an unmoved mover to show that He moves only by being desired and known. It therefore does not belong to God to have a will.
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| Praeterea, voluntas appetitus quidam est; sub appetitiva enim animae parte continetur. Sed appetitus est imperfectio; est enim non habiti, secundum Augustinum. Ergo, cum nulla imperfectio in Deum cadat, videtur quod ei non competat voluntatem habere.
| 8. Will is a sort of appetite, for it is included in the appetitive part of the soul. But appetite is an imperfection, since it is directed to what is not had, as Augustine points out. Since no imperfection is found in God, it therefore seems that it does not belong to Him to have a will.
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| Praeterea, nihil quod se habet ad opposita, videtur Deo competere; cum talia sint generabilia et corruptibilia, a quibus longe Deus removetur. Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita, cum inter rationales potestates contineatur, quae ad opposita se habent, secundum philosophum. Ergo voluntas Deo non competit.
| 9. Nothing that has reference to opposites seems to belong to God, since things having such reference are subject to generation and corruption. But God is far removed from these. Now the will has reference to opposites, since it is numbered among the rational powers, and these are open to opposite determinations according to the Philosopher.” Will is therefore not attributable to God.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, dicit, quod Deus non aliter afficitur ad res cum sunt, et aliter cum non sunt. Sed cum non sunt, Deus non vult res esse: essent enim, si eas esse vellet. Ergo et cum sint, Deus non vult eas esse.
| 10. Augustine says that God is not disposed in one way to things when they are and in another when they are not. But when they are not, God does not want things to be; for, if He willed them to be, they would be. Therefore even when they are, God does not will them to be.
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| Praeterea, Deo non competit perfici, sed perficere. Voluntatis autem est perfici bono, sicut intellectus vero. Ergo voluntas Deo non competit.
| 11. It is compatible with God to perfect but not to be perfected. It belongs to the will, however, to be perfected by good, as to the intellect to be perfected by truth. Will is therefore not compatible with God.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod in Psalm. CXIII, 3, dicitur: omnia quaecumque voluit fecit; ex quo videtur quod voluntatem habeat, et ex voluntate sua res creatae sint.
| 1. In one of the Psalms (113:3) it is said that the Lord “has done all things whatsoever he would.” From this it appears that He has a will and that created things exist by His will.
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| Praeterea, beatitudo maxime in Deo invenitur. Sed beatitudo voluntatem requirit, quia beatus dicitur, secundum Augustinum, qui habet quidquid vult, et nihil mali vult. Ergo voluntas competit Deo.
| 2. Happiness is found most perfectly in God. But happiness demands will, because according to Augustine a happy person is one “who has whatever he wishes and wishes no evil.” Will therefore belongs to God.
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| Praeterea, ubicumque inveniuntur perfectiores conditiones voluntatis, ibi est perfectius voluntas. Sed in Deo perfectissime inveniuntur conditiones voluntatis: est enim in eo indistantia voluntatis a subiecto, quia sua essentia est sua voluntas; est in eo indistantia voluntatis ab actu, quia sua actio est sua essentia; est in eo indistantia voluntatis a fine, sive ab obiecto, quia sua voluntas est sua bonitas. Ergo in Deo perfectissime invenitur voluntas.
| 3. Wherever more perfect conditions for willing are found, will exists in a more perfect way. But in God the conditions for willing are found most perfectly. In Him there is no separation of the will from its subject, because His essence is His will. There is no separation of the will from its act, because His action also is His essence. There is no separation of the will from the end, its object, because His will is His goodness. Therefore will is found most perfectly in God.
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| Praeterea, voluntas est radix libertatis. Sed libertas praecipue competit Deo; liber enim est qui causa sui est, secundum philosophum in I metaphysicorum; quod maxime de Deo verificatur. Ergo in Deo invenitur voluntas.
| 4. Will is the root of freedom. But freedom belongs especially to God. In the words of the Philosopher, “a free person is one who is for his own sake,” and this is most true of God. Will is therefore found in God.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod voluntas propriissime in Deo invenitur. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod cognitio et voluntas radicantur in substantia spirituali super diversas habitudines eius ad res. Est enim una habitudo spiritualis substantiae ad res, secundum quod res quodammodo sunt apud ipsam spiritualem substantiam, non quidem secundum esse proprium, ut antiqui ponebant, dicentes, quod terram terra cognoscimus, aqua vero aquam, et sic de aliis; sed secundum propriam rationem. Non enim lapis est in anima, sed species lapidis, sive ratio eius, secundum philosophum in III de anima. Et quia ratio rei absoluta sine concretione non potest inveniri nisi in substantia immateriali, ideo cognitio non rebus omnibus attribuitur, sed solum immaterialibus; et secundum gradum immaterialitatis est gradus cognitionis; ut quae sunt maxime immaterialia, sint maxime cognoscibilia: in quibus, quia ipsa eorum essentia immaterialis est, se habet ad ea ut medium cognoscendi; sicut Deus per suam essentiam seipsum et omnia alia cognoscit; voluntas autem in quibus appetitus fundatur super habitudinem, qua substantia spiritualis refertur ad res, ut habens ordinem aliquem ad eas in seipsis existentes.
| Will is most properly found in God. In support of this it should be noted that knowledge and will in a spiritual substance are founded upon its different relations to things. There is one relation of a spiritual substance to things according as the things are in some sense within the spiritual substance itself, not indeed in their own existence, as the ancients held, saying that by earth we know earth and by water, water, etc., but in their distinctive intelligible design. “For a stone is not in the soul, but its species is” (that is, its intelligible design), as the Philosopher taught. Because the intelligible design of a being cannot be found by itself without a subject except in an immaterial substance, knowledge is not attributed to all things but only to immaterial beings. And the degree of knowledge parallels the degree of immateriality so that the things which are most immaterial are most capable of knowledge. Because their essence is immaterial, it serves them as a medium for knowing. Through His essence God knows Himself and all other things. Will, however, and any appetite is based upon the relation by which a spiritual substance is oriented to things as existing in themselves.
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| Et quia cuiuslibet rei tam materialis quam immaterialis est ad rem aliam ordinem habere; inde est quod cuilibet rei competit habere appetitum vel naturalem, vel animalem, vel rationalem seu intellectualem; sed in diversis diversimode invenitur. Cum enim res habeat ad rem aliam ordinari per aliquid quod in se habet, secundum quod diversimode in se aliquid habet, secundum hoc diversimode ad aliud ordinatur.
| Inasmuch as it is characteristic of any being, whether material or immaterial, to have some reference to something else, it accordingly follows that it pertains to everything whatever to have an appetite, natural or animal or rational (that is, intellectual); but in different beings it is found in different ways. Since a thing has its reference to another being through something which it has within itself, its different ways of being referred to another correspond to the different ways in which it has something within itself.
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| Res ergo materiales, in quibus est, quidquid eis inest, quasi materiae obligatum et concretum, non habent liberam ordinationem ad res alias, sed consequentem ex necessitate naturalis dispositionis. Unde huius ordinationis ipsae res materiales non sunt sibi ipsis causae, quasi ipsae se ordinent in hoc ad quod ordinantur, sed aliunde ordinantur; unde scilicet naturalem dispositionem accipiunt. Et ideo competit eis habere tantummodo appetitum naturalem.
| Whatever is in material things is in them as bound up and compounded with matter. The reference of material beings to other things is accordingly not free but dependent upon the necessity of a natural disposition. Material beings are therefore not the cause of their own reference as if they directed themselves to the end to which they are in fact directed. They receive that direction from elsewhere, namely, the source from which they get their natural disposition. They are consequently able to have only a natural appetite.
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| Substantiis vero immaterialibus et cognoscibilibus est aliquid absolute non concretum et ligatum ad materiam; et hoc secundum gradum suae immaterialitatis; et ideo ex hoc ipso ordinantur ad res ordinatione libera, cuius ipsae sunt causae, quasi se ordinantes in hoc ad quod ordinantur. Et ideo competit eis voluntarie et sponte aliquid agere aut appetere. Si enim arca quae est in mente artificis, esset forma materialis habens determinatum esse, non inclinaret nisi secundum modum suum determinatum quem haberet; unde non remaneret artifici liberum facere domum vel non facere, vel facere sic, aut aliter. Sed quia forma domus in mente artificis est ratio domus absoluta, non se habens, quantum est de se, magis ad esse quam ad non esse, nec ad sic quam ad aliter esse, respectu accidentium dispositionum domus; remanet artifici libera inclinatio respectu domus faciendae vel non faciendae.
| In immaterial and knowing substances, on the other hand, there is found something in the pure state and not compounded or tied up with matter. This is proportioned to the degree of their immateriality. By this very fact, too, they are referred to things by a free reference of which they are the cause, directing themselves to that to which they are referred. It is accordingly their lot to do or seek something voluntarily and of their own accord. If the house” in the mind of the builder were a material form having a determinate act of being, it would incline him only in accordance with its own determinate mode of existence. Hence the builder would not remain free to make the house or not, or to make it in this way or in some other. But because the form of the house in the mind of the builder is the plan of the house taken absolutely, of itself not disposed any more to existence than to non-existence or to existence in one particular way rather than in another as far as the accidental features of the house go, the builder’s inclination in regard to making the house or not remains free.
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| Quia vero in substantia spirituali sensitiva, licet recipiantur formae rerum sine materia, non tamen omnino immaterialiter et absque materiae conditionibus, ex hoc quod recipiuntur in organo corporali; ideo inclinatio in eis non est omnino libera, quamvis in eis aliqua libertatis imitatio vel similitudo sit. Inclinantur enim per appetitum in aliquid ex seipsis, in quantum ex apprehensione aliquid appetunt; sed inclinari in id quod appetunt, vel non inclinari, non subiacet dispositioni eorum. Sed in natura intellectuali, ubi perfecte aliquid recipitur immaterialiter, invenitur perfecta ratio liberae inclinationis; quae quidem libera inclinatio rationem voluntatis constituit.
| In the case of a sentient spiritual substance, however, the forms, though received without matter, are nevertheless, as a consequence of their being received in a bodily organ, not received altogether immaterially and without the conditions of matter. Their inclination is for this reason not altogether free, though they have a certain imitation or semblance of freedom. They incline appetitively to something by themselves inasmuch as they desire something as a result of their apprehension; but it does not lie within their competence to incline or not to incline to that which they desire. But in an intellectual nature, in which something is received altogether immaterially, the essence of a free inclination is found perfectly verified. And this free inclination is what constitutes the essential character of will.
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| Et ideo rebus materialibus non attribuitur voluntas, sed appetitus naturalis; animae vero sensitivae attribuitur non voluntas, sed appetitus animalis; soli vero substantiae intellectivae attribuitur voluntas. Et quanto est immaterialior, tanto ei magis competit ratio voluntatis. Unde, cum Deus sit in fine immaterialitatis, sibi summe competit et propriissime ratio voluntatis.
| Will is accordingly not attributed to material things, though natural appetite is. To a sensitive soul there is attributed not will but animal appetite. Only to an intellectual substance is will attributed; and the more immaterial this substance is, the more the essence of will belongs to it. Consequently, since God is at the extreme of immateriality, the essential character of will supremely and most properly belongs to Him.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Dionysius non intendit ex verbis illis excludere voluntatem et electionem a Deo, sed ostendere universalem eius influentiam in res. Non enim ita communicat suam bonitatem rebus, ut quasdam eligat quas suae bonitatis participes faciat, quasdam vero a participatione suae bonitatis omnino excludat; sed omnibus dat affluenter ut dicitur Iac. I, 5; quamvis quantum ad hoc eligere dicatur quod quibusdam plura quam aliis dat ex ordine suae sapientiae.
| 1. By the words cited Dionysius does not mean to exclude will and choice from God but to show His universal influence upon things, God does not communicate His goodness to things in such a way that He chooses certain ones to receive a share in His goodness and excludes others completely from a share in it; but He “gives to all... abundantly,” as is said in the Epistle of St. James (1:5). He is, however, said to choose in this respect, that in the order of His wisdom he gives more to some than to others.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod voluntas Dei non est causa contingens, eo quod illud quod vult, immutabiliter vult; et ideo ex ipsa ratione suae immobilitatis res necessariae causari possunt; et praecipue cum nulla res creata sit necessaria secundum se considerata, sed in se possibilis, et necessaria per aliud.
| 2. The will of God is not a contingent cause, inasmuch as what He wills He wills immutably. By reason of its very immutability necessary things can be caused. This is of particular importance since of itself no created thing is necessary but is possible in itself and necessary through something else.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas est alicuius dupliciter: uno modo principaliter, et alio modo secundario. Principaliter quidem voluntas est finis, qui est ratio volendi omnia alia; secundario autem est eorum quae sunt ad finem, quae propter finem volumus. Voluntas autem non habet habitudinem ad volitum quod est secundarium, sicut ad causam; sed tantummodo ad volitum principale, quod est finis. Sciendum est autem, quod voluntas et volitum aliquando distinguuntur secundum rem; et tunc volitum comparatur ad voluntatem sicut realiter causa finalis. Si autem voluntas et volitum distinguuntur tantum ratione, tunc volitum non erit causa finalis voluntatis nisi secundum modum significandi.
| 3. The will is directed to something in two ways: (1) principally, and(2) secondarily. Principally the will is directed to the end, which is the reason for willing everything else. Secondarily it is directed to the means, which we want for the sake of the end. Now the will does not stand in a relationship of an effect to a cause in regard to its secondary object, but only in regard to its principal object, the end. It should be noticed, however, that the will and its object are sometimes really distinct, and in that case the object is related to the will as its real final cause. But if the will and its object arc only conceptually distinct, the object will then not be the final cause of the will except according to our way of expressing it.
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| Voluntas ergo divina comparatur, sicut ad finem, ad bonitatem suam, quae secundum rem idem est quod sua voluntas; distinguitur autem solum secundum modum significandi. Unde relinquitur quod voluntatis divinae nihil sit causa realiter, sed solum secundum modum significandi. Nec est inconveniens, in Deo significari aliquid per modum causae; sic enim divinitas significatur in Deo ut habens se ad Deum per modum causae formalis.
| The divine will is accordingly referred to God’s goodness as to an end, whereas the two are really identical. They are distinguished only in our manner of speaking. There accordingly remains only the conclusion that nothing is really the cause of the divine will, but it is a cause only in our manner of designating it. Nor is it out of place for something to be designated after the manner of a cause in regard to God. It is in this way for instance, that deity is spoken of as if it were related to God as His formal cause.
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| Res vero creatae, quas Deus vult, non se habent ad divinam voluntatem ut fines, sed ut ordinata ad finem: propter hoc enim Deus creaturas vult esse, ut in eis sua bonitas manifestetur, et ut sua bonitas, quae per essentiam multiplicari non potest, saltem similitudinis participatione in plures effundatur.
| The created things which God wills, however, are not related to the divine will as ends but as directed to an end. God wills creatures to exist in order that His goodness may be manifested in them, and that His goodness, which in its essence cannot be multiplied, may be poured out upon many at least by a participation through likeness.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod laus non debetur voluntati secundum quemlibet actum suum, si laus stricte accipitur, ut philosophus accipit; sed secundum quod voluntas comparatur ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Constat enim quod actus voluntatis invenitur non solum in operibus virtutis, quae sunt laudabilia, sed etiam in actu felicitatis, quae est honorabilium: constat enim quod felicitas delectationem habet. Et tamen etiam laus Deo attribuitur, cum ad laudandum Deum in multis locis Scripturae invitemur; sed laus communius accipitur quam philosophus accipiat. Vel potest dici, quod laus, etiam proprie accepta, Deo competit, in quantum sua voluntate ordinat creaturas in seipsum sicut in finem.
| 4. If praise is taken strictly, as the Philosopher takes it, it is not due to the will in every one of its acts but only in that in which the will regards the means to an end. It is clear that an act of the will is found not only in virtuous deeds, which are praiseworthy, but also in the act of happiness, which is concerned with honorable things; for happiness obviously involves pleasure. And yet praise is attributed to God too, since we are invited in many places in Holy Scripture to praise God. But in this case praise is taken more broadly than the Philosopher takes it.—Or it can be said that praise, even in its proper sense, is attributable to God in so far as by His will He directs creatures to Himself as their end.
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| 5. [This answer is lacking.]
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod in Deo est voluntas affectionis, et voluntas effectionis: vult enim se velle, et vult se agere quod agit; sed non oportet quod ubicumque est altera istarum, inveniatur meritum, sed solummodo in natura imperfecta tendente in perfectionem.
| 6. There is in God both affective and effective will, for He wills to will and He wills to do what He does. But it is not necessary that, wherever there is either one of these types of will, merit be found, but only in an imperfect nature which is tending to perfection.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod quando volitum est aliud a voluntate, volitum movet voluntatem realiter; sed quando volitum est idem voluntati, tunc non movet nisi secundum modum significandi. Et quantum ad hunc modum loquendi, secundum Commentatorem in Lib. VIII Phys., verificatur dictum Platonis, qui dicebat, quod primum movens movet seipsum, in quantum scilicet intelligit et vult seipsum. Nec tamen quia vult creaturas, sequitur quod a creaturis movetur; quia creaturas non vult nisi ratione suae bonitatis, ut dictum est, in solut. ad 3 argum.
| 7. When the object of the will is distinct from the will itself, the object really moves the will. But when it is identical with the will, then it moves it only in our way of speaking. And in regard to this way of speaking, in the opinion of the Commentator there is verified the saying of Plato that the first mover moves itself inasmuch as it understands and wills itself. Nor does it follow from the fact that God wills creatures to be that He is moved by creatures, because He does not will the creatures except by reason of His own goodness, as has been said.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod per eamdem naturam aliquid movetur ad terminum quem nondum obtinet, et in termino quiescit quem iam obtinuit. Unde eiusdem potentiae est tendere in bonum cum nondum habetur, et diligere ipsum, et delectari in eo postquam habetur; et utrumque horum pertinet ad potentiam appetitivam, quamvis nominetur magis ab illo actu quo tendit in id quod non habet, ratione cuius dicitur quod appetitus est imperfecti. Sed voluntas indifferenter se habet ad utrumque: unde voluntas secundum propriam rationem competit Deo, non autem appetitus.
| 8. It is by one and the same nature that a thing both moves toward a term which it does not yet possess and reposes in a term which it has already come to possess. It is accordingly the function of one and the same power to tend to a good when it is not yet had, and to love it and take pleasure in it after it is had. Both belong to the appetitive power, though it gets its name rather from that act by which it tends to what it does not have. That is why appetite is said to belong to what is imperfect. But will is equally applicable to both. Hence will in its proper meaning is attributable to God, but not appetite.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod Deo non competit ad opposita se habere quantum ad ea quae sunt in essentia eius; sed ad opposita se habet quantum ad effectus in creaturis, quos potest facere et non facere.
| 9. It is not compatible with God to have reference to opposites as regards the things that are in His essence; but He can have opposite dispositions as regards His effects in creatures, which He can produce or not.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod Deus cum non operatur res, vult res esse; sed tamen non vult quod tunc sint: unde obiectio procedit ex suppositione falsi.
| 10. Even when God is not producing things, He wants things to be; but He does not want them to be at that time. The argument accordingly proceeds from a false supposition.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod Deus non potest aliquo perfici secundum rem; tamen per modum significandi aliquando aliquo perfici significatur, sicut cum dico quod Deus intelligit aliquid. Sicut enim volitum est perfectio voluntatis, ita intelligibile perfectio intellectus. In Deo autem idem est intelligibile primum et intellectus, et volitum primum et voluntas.
| 11. God cannot really be perfected by anything; yet in our manner of expressing it He is sometimes referred to as being perfected by something; for example, when I say that God understands something. The intelligible object is the perfection of the intellect just as the willed object is the perfection of the will. In God, however, the first intelligible object and the intellect are identical, and also the first object willed and the will.
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Q. 23: God’s Will
ARTICLE Il
In the second article we ask:
Can the divine will be distinguished into antecedent and consequent?
[ARTICLE I Sent., 46, a. 1; 47, 22. 2 & 3; In I Timoth., c. 2, lect. 1 (P 13: 593b); S.T., I, 19, 6 ad 1.]
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| Secundo quaeritur utrum voluntas divina possit distingui per antecedens et consequens
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it cannot, for
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| Ordo enim distinctionem praesupponit. Sed in divina voluntate non est aliqua distinctio, cum uno simplici actu voluntatis velit omnia quae vult. Ergo in divina voluntate non est antecedens et consequens, quod ordinem importet.
| 1. Order presupposes distinction. But in the divine will there is no distinction, since in one simple act it wills everything which it wills. Therefore antecedent and consequent, which imply order, are not found in the divine will.
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| Sed dicendum, quod in voluntate divina etsi non sit distinctio ex parte volentis, est tamen distinctio ex parte volitorum.- Sed contra: ex parte volitorum non potest ordo in voluntate poni nisi dupliciter: aut respectu diversorum, aut respectu unius voliti. Si respectu diversorum volitorum, sequitur quod voluntas antecedens dicatur de primis creaturis, voluntas autem consequens de posterioribus creaturis: quod falsum est. Si autem respectu unius voliti, hoc non potest esse nisi secundum diversas circumstantias in illo volito consideratas. Hoc autem non potest ponere distinctionem vel ordinem in voluntate; cum voluntas referatur ad rem secundum quod in sua natura existit; res autem in sua natura implicita est omnibus suis conditionibus. Ergo nullo modo in divina voluntate debet poni antecedens et consequens.
| 2. The answer was given that, although there is no distinction in the divine will on the part of the one Willing, there is no the part of the things willed.—On the contrary, order can be held to be in the will on the part of the things willed in only two ways: either in regard to different things willed or in regard to one and the same thing willed. If this order is taken in regard to different things willed, it follows that the will will be said to be antecedent concerning the first creatures and consequent concerning those which follow. But this is false. If, however, this order is taken in regard to one and the same thing willed, this can only be according to different circumstances considered in that thing. But this cannot put any distinction or order in the will, since the will is referred to the thing as existing in its own nature whereas the thing in its own nature is enmeshed in all its conditions. In no sense, therefore, should antecedent and consequent be affirmed of the divine will.
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| Praeterea, sicut voluntas comparatur ad creaturas, ita et scientia et potentia. Sed propter ordinem creaturarum non distinguimus scientiam nec potentiam Dei per antecedentem et consequentem. Ergo nec voluntas hoc modo distingui debet.
| 3. Knowledge and power are referred to creatures in just the same way as will. But we do not distinguish God’s knowledge and power into antecedent and consequent on the basis of the order of creatures. Then neither should His will be so distinguished.
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| Praeterea, illud quod non recipit mutationem nec impedimentum ab alio, non iudicatur ex alio, sed ex seipso tantum. Voluntas autem divina a nullo potest immutari nec impediri. Ergo nec debet iudicari ex alio, sed ex seipsa tantum. Sed voluntas antecedens in Deo dicitur, secundum Damascenum, ex ipso existens; consequens autem ex causa nostra. Ergo in Deo non debet distingui voluntas consequens contra antecedentem.
| 4. Whatever is not subject to change or hindrance by another is not judged according to that other but only in itself. Now the divine will cannot be changed or hindered by anything. It should not, therefore, be judged according to anything else but only in itself. But according to Damascene “antecedent will” is spoken of in God “as arising from Him; consequent will, as arising because of us.” Consequent will should therefore not be distinguished in God from antecedent will.
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| Praeterea, in affectiva non videtur esse ordo nisi ex cognitiva, quia ordo ad rationem pertinet. Sed Deo non attribuitur cognitio habens ordinem, quae est ratio, sed cognitio simplex, quae est intellectus. Ergo nec in voluntate eius debet poni ordo antecedentis et consequentis.
| 5. In the affective power there does not seem to be any order except that derived from the cognitive, because order pertains to reason. But we do not attribute to God ordered cognition, which is reasoning, but rather simple cognition, which is understanding. Then neither should we affirm the order of antecedent and consequent of His will.
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| Praeterea, Boetius dicit in Lib. de Consol., quod Deus uno mentis intuitu omnia cernit. Ergo pari ratione ad omnia quae vult, uno simplici actu voluntatis se extendit: ergo in eius voluntate non debet poni antecedens et consequens.
| 6. Boethius says that God “beholds all things in a single look of His mind.” In like fashion, then, with one simple act of His will He reaches out to everything which He wills; and so antecedent and consequent should not be affirmed of His will.
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| Praeterea, Deus cognoscit res in seipso et in propria natura rerum; et quamvis res posterius sint in propria natura quam in verbo, non tamen in cognitione Dei ponitur antecedens et consequens. Ergo nec in voluntate poni debet.
| 7. God knows things in Himself and in their own nature; and although they are in their own nature only after being in the Word, even so the distinction of antecedent and consequent is not affirmed of God’s knowledge. Then neither should it be affirmed of His will.
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| Praeterea, sicut divinum esse mensuratur aeternitate, ita et divina voluntas. Sed duratio divini esse, propter hoc quod est aeternitate mensurata, est tota simul, non habens prius et posterius. Ergo nec in voluntate divina debet poni antecedens et consequens.
| 8. The divine will, like the divine existence, is measured by eternity. But the duration of the divine existence, because measured by eternity, is all simultaneous, having no before and after. Then neither should antecedent and consequent be placed in the divine will.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod Damascenus dicit in II Lib.: oportet scire, quod Deus antecedente voluntate vult omnes salvari: non autem consequente, ut post subdit. Ergo distinctio antecedentis et consequentis competit divinae voluntati.
| l. Damascene says that it should be noted that “God wills all to be saved by His antecedent will,” and not by His consequent will, as he adds just afterwards. The distinction of antecedent and consequent therefore applies to the divine will.
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| Praeterea, Deo competit voluntas habitualis aeterna secundum quod Deus est, et voluntas actualis secundum quod creator est, volens res actu esse. Sed haec voluntas comparatur ad primam sicut consequens ad antecedens. Ergo in voluntate divina antecedens et consequens invenitur.
| 2. There is in God an eternal habitual will inasmuch as He is God, and an actual will inasmuch as He is the Creator, willing things actually to be. But this latter will is compared to the former as consequent to antecedent. Antecedent and consequent are therefore found in the divine will.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod voluntas divina per antecedentem et consequentem convenienter distinguitur. Cuius distinctionis intellectus ex verbis Damasceni est assumendus, qui hanc distinctionem introduxit: dicit enim in Lib. II, quod voluntas antecedens est acceptio Dei ex ipso existens: sed voluntas consequens est concessio ex nostra causa.
| The divine will is fittingly distinguished into antecedent and consequent. An understanding of this distinction is to be got from thee words of Damascene, who introduced it. He says: “Antecedent will is God’s acceptance of something on His own account,” whereas consequent will is a concession on our account.
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| Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod in qualibet actione est aliquid considerandum ex parte agentis, et aliquid ex parte recipientis: et sicut agens est prius facto et principalius, ita id quod est ex parte facientis, est prius naturaliter eo quod est ex parte facti. Sicut patet in operatione naturae, quod ex parte virtutis formativae, quae est in semine, est quod animal perfectum producatur: sed ex parte materiae recipientis, quae quandoque est indisposita, contingit quandoque quod non producitur perfectum animal, sicut contingit in partubus monstruosis. Et sic dicimus de prima intentione naturae esse quod animal perfectum producatur; sed quod producatur animal imperfectum, est ex secunda intentione naturae: quae ex quo non potest propter suam indispositionem tradere formam perfectionis, tradit ei id cuius est capax.
| For the clarification of this point it should be noted that in any action there is something to be considered on the part of the agent and something on the part of the recipient. The agent is prior to the product and more important. Thus what pertains to the maker is naturally prior to what pertains to the thing made. It is evident in the operation of nature, for instance, that the production of a perfect animal depends upon the formative power, which is found in the semen; but it occasionally happens because of the matter receiving it, which is sometimes indisposed, that a perfect animal is not produced. This happens, for example, in the births of monsters. We accordingly say that it is by the primary intention of nature that a perfect animal is produced, but that the production of an imperfect animal is by the secondary intention of nature, which gives to the matter what it is capable of receiving, since it is unable because of the indisposition of the matter to give it the form of the perfect state.
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| Et similiter est considerandum in operatione Dei qua operatur in creaturis. Quamvis enim ipse in sua operatione materiam non requirat, et res a principio creaverit nulla materia praeexistente, nunc tamen operatur in rebus quas primo creavit, eis administrans, praesupposita natura quam prius eis dedit; et quamvis posset a creatura omne impedimentum auferre, quo perfectionis incapaces existunt; tamen secundum ordinem suae sapientiae disponit de rebus secundum earum conditionem, ut unicuique tribuat secundum modum suum.
| In God’s operation in regard to creatures similar factors must be taken into account. Though in His operation He requires no matter, and created things originally without any pre-existing, matter, nevertheless He now works in the things which He first created, governing them in accordance with the nature which He previously gave them. And although He could remove from His creatures every obstacle by which they are made incapable of perfection, yet in the order of His wisdom He disposes of things conformably to their state, giving to each one in accordance with its own capacity.
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| Illud ergo ad quod Deus creaturam ordinavit quantum est de se, dicitur esse volitum ab eo quasi prima intentione, sive voluntate antecedente. Sed quando creatura impeditur propter sui defectum ab hoc fine, nihilominus tamen Deus implet in ea id bonitatis cuius est capax; et hoc est quasi de secunda intentione eius, et dicitur voluntas consequens. Quia ergo Deus omnes homines propter beatitudinem fecit, dicitur voluntate antecedente omnium salutem velle: sed quia quidam suae saluti adversantur, quos ordo suae sapientiae ad salutem venire non patitur propter eorum defectum, implet in eis alio modo id quod ad suam bonitatem pertinet, scilicet eos per iustitiam damnans; ut sic dum a primo ordine voluntatis deficiunt, in secundum labantur; et dum Dei voluntatem non faciunt, impleatur in eis voluntas Dei. Ipse autem defectus peccati, quo aliquis redditur dignus poena in praesenti vel in futuro, non est volitus a Deo neque voluntate antecedente neque consequente; sed est ab eo solummodo permissus.
| That to which God has destined the creature as far as He is concerned is said to be willed by Him in a primary intention or antecedent will. But when the creature is held back from this end because of its own failure, God nonetheless fulfills in it that amount of goodness of which it is capable. This pertains to His secondary intention and is called His consequent will. Because, then, God has made all men for happiness, He is said to will the salvation of all by His antecedent will. But because some work against their own salvation, and the order of His wisdom does not admit of their attaining salvation in view of their failure, He fulfills in them in another way the demands of His goodness, damning them out of justice. As a result, falling short of the first order of His will, they thus slip into the second. And although they do not do God’s will, His will is still fulfilled in them. But the failure constituting sin, by which a person is made deserving of punishment here and now or in the future, is not itself willed by God with either an antecedent or a consequent will; it is merely permitted by Him.
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| Nec tamen intelligendum est ex praedictis quod intentio Dei frustrari possit: quia istum qui non salvatur, praescivit ab aeterno fore non salvandum; nec ordinat ipsum in salutem secundum ordinem praedestinationis, qui est ordo absolutae voluntatis; sed quantum ex parte sua est, dedit ei naturam ad beatitudinem ordinatam.
| It should not, however, be concluded from what has just been said that God’s intention can be frustrated, because from all eternity God has foreseen that the one who is not saved would not be saved. Nor did He ordain that particular one for salvation in the order of predestination, which is the order of His absolute will. But as far as He was concerned, He gave that creature a nature intended for happiness.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in voluntate divina nec ordo nec distinctio est ex parte actus voluntatis, sed solummodo ex parte volitorum.
| 1. In the divine will neither the order nor the distinction is in the act of the will but only in the things willed.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod ordo divinae voluntatis non attenditur secundum diversa volita, sed per respectum ad unum et idem volitum propter diversa in eo reperta; sicut aliquem hominem vult Deus salvari voluntate antecedente, ratione humanae naturae, quam ad salutem fecit; sed vult eum damnari voluntate consequente, propter peccata quae in eo inveniuntur. Quamvis autem res in quam fertur actus voluntatis, sit cum omnibus suis conditionibus, non tamen oportet quod quaelibet illarum conditionum quae inveniuntur in volito, sit ratio movens voluntatem; sicut vinum non movet appetitum bibentis ratione virtutis inebriandi quam habet, sed ratione dulcedinis; quamvis simul utrumque in uno inveniatur.
| 2. The order of the divine will is not based upon the different objects of the will but upon the different factors found in one and the same object. For example, by His antecedent will God wants a certain man to be saved by reason of his human nature, which He made for salvation; but by His consequent will He wishes him to be damned because of the sins which are found in him. Now although the thing to which the act of the will is directed exists with all its conditions, it is not necessary that every one of those conditions which are found in the object should be the reason which moves the will. Wine, for instance, does not move the appetite of the drinker by reason of its power of inebriating but by reason of its sweetness, although both factors are found together in it.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas divina est immediatum creaturarum principium, ordinando attributa divina per modum intelligendi, secundum quod ad opus applicantur. Potentia enim non exit in opus nisi recta per scientiam, et determinata per voluntatem ad aliquid agendum; et ideo magis ordo rerum refertur in voluntatem divinam quam in potentiam vel scientiam. Vel dicendum, quod ratio voluntatis consistit, ut dictum est, in comparatione voluntatis ad ipsas res; sed res dicuntur esse scitae, vel possibiles alicui agenti, in quantum sunt in ipso per modum intelligibilem vel virtualem. Res autem secundum quod sunt in Deo, non habent ordinem; sed secundum quod sunt in seipsis; et ideo ordo rerum non attribuitur scientiae vel potentiae, sed solum voluntati.
| 3. The divine will is the immediate principle of creatures, ordering the divine attributes (as we must conceive the matter) in so far as they are applied to operation; for no power passes into operation unless it is regulated by knowledge and determined by the will to do something. The order of things is accordingly referred to God’s will rather than to His power or knowledge.—Or the answer may be given that the essence of willing consists in a reference of the one willing to things themselves, as has been said. But things are said to be known or possible for a given agent in so far as they are within its knowledge or its power. Things do not have any order as they are in God but as they are in themselves. Thus the order of things is not attributed to His knowledge or to His power but only to His will.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis divina voluntas non impediatur nec immutetur ex aliquo alio, tamen secundum ordinem sapientiae fertur in aliquid secundum conditionem illius; et sic voluntati divinae attribuitur aliquid ex parte nostra.
| 4. Although the divine will is not hindered or changed by anything else, yet in the order of wisdom it is directed to a thing in accordance with its state. In this way something is attributed to the divine will because of us.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de ordine voluntatis ex parte ipsius actus; sic autem ibi non est ordo antecedentis et consequentis.
| 5. That difficulty argues from the order of the will on the part of its act. But the order of antecedent and consequent is not found in it from that point of view.
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| Et similiter dicendum ad sextum.
| 6. The same is to be said here.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis res posterius habeat esse in sua natura quam in Deo, non tamen posterius cognoscitur a Deo in propria natura quam in seipso: quia hoc ipsum quod Deus essentiam suam cognoscit, intuetur res et prout sunt in seipso, et prout sunt in propria natura.
| 7. Although a thing has existence in its own nature after it has it in God, it is not, however, known by God in its own nature after it is known in Him, because by the very fact of knowing His own essence God beholds things both as they are in Himself and as they are in their own nature.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod in voluntate Dei non ponuntur antecedens et consequens ad importandum ordinem successionis, qui repugnat aeternitati; sed ad denotandum diversam comparationem eius ad volita.
| 8. Antecedent and consequent are not affirmed of God’s will for the purpose of implying any succession (for that is repugnant to eternity), but to denote a diversity in its reference to the things willed.
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Q. 23: God’s Will
ARTICLE III
In the third article we ask:
Is God’s will suitably divided into his embracing will and his indicative will?
[ARTICLE I Sent., 45, a. 4; S.T., I, 19, 11 & 12.]
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| Tertio quaeritur utrum voluntas Dei convenienter dividatur per voluntatem beneplaciti et voluntatem signi
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it is not, for
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| Sicut enim ea quae in creaturis aguntur, sunt signa divinae voluntatis; ita et scientiae et potentiae. Sed scientia et potentia non distinguuntur per potentiam et scientiam quae sunt essentia Dei, et signa eius. Ergo nec voluntas hoc modo distingui debet per voluntatem beneplaciti quae est divina essentia, et voluntatem signi.
| 1. What is done in creatures is a sign or indication not only of the divine will but also of the divine knowledge and power. But knowledge and power are not distinguished into power and knowledge which are God’s essence and those which are indications of it. Then neither should God’s will be thus distinguished into His embracing will (voluntas beneplaciti), which is the divine essence, and His indicative will (voluntas signi).
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| Praeterea, per hoc quod aliquid Deus vult voluntate beneplaciti, ostenditur actum divinae voluntatis ferri in illud, ut sic sit Deo placitum. Aut ergo illud in quod fertur voluntas signi, est placitum Deo, aut non. Si est placitum Deo, ergo vult illud voluntate beneplaciti; et sic voluntas signi non debet a voluntate beneplaciti distingui. Si autem non sit placitum Deo, significatur autem esse placitum ei per voluntatem signi; ergo signum divinae voluntatis erit falsum; et ita in doctrina veritatis talia signa divinae voluntatis poni non debent.
| 2. By the fact that God wishes something by His embracing will it is shown that the act of the divine will is brought to bear upon it with the result that it is pleasing to God. Then that upon which His indicative will is brought to bear is either pleasing to God or not. If it is pleasing to God, then He wills it with His embracing will; and in that case His indicative will should not be distinguished from His embracing will. If, however, it is not something pleasing to God, it is nevertheless designated as pleasing to Him by His indicative will; and consequently the indication of the divine will is false. And so in the true doctrine such indications of the divine will should not be affirmed.
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| Praeterea, omnis voluntas est in volente. Sed quidquid est in Deo, est divina essentia. Si ergo voluntas signi Deo attribuitur, erit idem quod divina essentia; et sic non distinguitur a voluntate beneplaciti; nam illa voluntas dicitur esse beneplaciti, quae est ipsa divina essentia, ut Magister in I Sent., distinct. 45, dicit.
| 3. Every will is in the one willing. But whatever is in God is the divine essence. Consequently, if indicative will is attributed to God, it will be the same as the divine essence. In this way it will not be distinguished from His embracing will; for that will is said to be embracing which is the very divine essence, as the Master says.
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| Praeterea, quidquid Deus vult, bonum est. Sed signum voluntatis debet divinae voluntati respondere. Ergo signum voluntatis non debet esse de malo. Cum ergo permissio sit de malo, et similiter prohibitio; videtur quod non debeant poni signa divinae voluntatis.
| 4. Whatever God wills is good. But the indication of His will ought to correspond to the divine will. There should therefore not be an indication of His will concerning evil. Since permission concerns evil, and likewise prohibition, it therefore seems that indications of the divine will should not be affirmed.
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| Praeterea, sicut invenitur bonum et melius, ita malum et peius. Sed secundum bonum et melius distinguitur duplex voluntas signi: scilicet praeceptum quod est de bono, et consilium quod est de meliori bono. Ergo et similiter respectu mali et peioris debent duo signa voluntatis poni.
| 5. Not only are good and better found but also bad and worse. But on the basis of good and better two sorts of indicative will are distinguished: precept, which concerns good, and counsel, which concerns a better good. Then two signs or indications of will should be affirmed in regard to bad and worse.
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| Praeterea, voluntas Dei magis inclinatur ad bonum quam ad malum. Sed signum voluntatis quod respicit malum, scilicet permissio, nunquam potest impediri. Ergo et praeceptum et consilium, quae sunt respectu boni, non deberent impedimentum suscipere; quod tamen apparet esse falsum.
| 6. God’s will is more inclined to good than to evil. But the indication of will which regards evil, permission, can never be frustrated. Then precept and counsel, too, which are referred to good, should not be subject to frustration. Yet this is evidently false.
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| Praeterea, eorum quae se invicem consequuntur, unum non debet contra aliud distingui. Sed voluntas beneplaciti et Dei operatio se consequuntur: nihil enim operatur quod non velit voluntate beneplaciti; et nihil vult voluntate beneplaciti in creaturis, quod non operetur, secundum illud Psalm. CXIII, 3: omnia quaecumque voluit, dominus fecit. Ergo operatio non debet poni sub voluntate signi, quae contra voluntatem beneplaciti distinguitur.
| 7. Things that stand in a sequence of dependence should not be opposed. But God’s embracing will and His operation stand in a sequence of dependence; for God does not do anything which He does not will with His embracing will, and He wills nothing in creatures with His embracing will which He does not do, according to the words of the Psalm (113: 3): “[The Lord] has done all things whatsoever he would.” God’s operation should therefore not be listed under His indicative will, which is opposed to His embracing will.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod in divinis est duplex modus loquendi. Unus secundum propriam locutionem: quando scilicet Deo attribuimus id quod sibi competit secundum suam naturam; quamvis semper sibi eminentius competat quam a nobis mente concipiatur, vel sermone proferatur; ratione cuius nulla nostra locutio de Deo potest esse propria ad plenum. Alius modus est secundum figurativam sive tropicam vel symbolicam locutionem. Quia enim ipse Deus, secundum quod in se est, aciem nostrae mentis excedit, oportet quod de eo loquamur per ea quae apud nos inveniuntur. Et sic sensibilium nomina Deo attribuimus, ut cum eum nominamus vel lucem, vel leonem, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Quarum quidem locutionum veritas in hoc fundatur, quod nulla creatura, ut dicit Dionysius, II cap. Cael. Hierarch., est universaliter boni participatione privata; et ideo in singulis creaturis est invenire aliquas proprietates repraesentantes quantum ad aliquid divinam bonitatem; et ita nomen in Deum transfertur, in quantum res significata per nomen, signum est divinae bonitatis. Quodcumque ergo signum loco signati accipitur in divinis, est modus tropicae locutionis.
| In matters dealing with God there are two different ways of speaking: (1) In proper language. This is found when we attribute to God what pertains to Him in His own nature, although it always pertains to Him in a way that goes beyond what we conceive in our minds or express in speech. For this reason none of our language about God can be proper in the full sense. (2) In figurative, transferred, or symbolic language. Because God, as He is in Himself, exceeds the grasp of our mind, we must speak of Him by means of the things that are found in our world. Thus we apply the names of sensible things to God, calling Him light or a lion or something of the sort. The truth of such expressions is founded on the fact that no creature “is deprived altogether of participation in good,” as Dionysius says. In every creature there are to be found certain properties representing the divine goodness in some respect. Thus the name is transferred to God inasmuch as the thing signified by the name is a sign of the divine goodness. Any sign, then, that is used instead of what is signified in speaking of God is a figurative expression.
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| Uterque autem istorum modorum loquendi concurrit in voluntate divina. Invenitur enim in Deo proprie ratio voluntatis, ut supra, art. 1, dictum est; et sic voluntas de Deo proprie dicitur; et haec est voluntas beneplaciti, quae per antecedentem et consequentem distinguitur, ut dictum est, art. praeced. Quia vero voluntas in nobis habet quamdam animi passionem consequentem; ideo, sicut alia nomina passionum metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, ita et nomen voluntatis. Dicitur autem nomen irae de Deo, quia in eo invenitur effectus qui solet esse irati apud nos, scilicet punitio; unde ipsa punitio, qua punit, Dei ira nominatur. Et simili modo loquendi, illa quae solent esse signa voluntatis apud nos, Dei voluntates appellantur: et pro tanto dicitur voluntas signi, quia ipsum signum quod solet esse voluntatis, voluntas appellatur.
| Both of these two ways of speaking are used in regard to the divine will. There is found in God in a proper sense the formal character of will, as was said above; and so will is properly predicated of God. This is His embracing will (voluntas beneplaciti), which is distinguished into antecedent and consequent, as has been said . Because, however, will in us has some passion of the soul consequent upon it, the name of the will is predicated of God metaphorically like the names of the other passions. The name of anger is applied to God because there is found in Him an effect which is commonly that of an angry person among us, namely, punishment. As a consequence the punishment itself which God inflicts is called God’s anger. In like manner whatever is commonly a sign or indication of will among us is called the will of God. For this reason we speak of His indicative will (voluntas signi) because the sign itself which is usually the sign or indication of the will is called will.
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| Cum autem voluntas possit designari et secundum quod proponit de agendis, et secundum quod impetum facit ad opus, utroque modo voluntati aliqua signa attribuuntur. Secundum enim quod proponit de agendis quantum ad fugam mali, est signum eius prohibitio. Quantum autem ad prosecutionem boni, est duplex signum voluntatis: nam respectu boni necessarii, sine quo non potest voluntas finem suum consequi, est signum voluntatis praeceptum; respectu autem boni utilis, quo faciliori modo et convenientiori acquiritur finis, est signum voluntatis consilium. Sed secundum quod voluntas impetum facit ad opus, attribuitur ei duplex signum: unum expressum, quod est operatio; quod enim quis operatur, indicat se expresse velle: aliud vero est signum interpretativum, scilicet permissio; qui enim non prohibet aliquid quod impedire potest, interpretative videtur consentire in illud; hoc autem nomen permissionis importat.
| Now since the will can be considered both as prescribing a course of action and as setting the work in motion, in either sense certain signs are attributed to the will. From the viewpoint of its proposing a course of action regarding flight from evil, its sign is a prohibition. Regarding the pursuit of good there are two signs of the will. If the good is necessary and the will cannot attain its end without it, the sign of the will is a command. If the good is useful and by it the end can be acquired in an easier and more suitable fashion, the sign of the will is a counsel. From the viewpoint of setting the work in motion two signs are attributed to the will. One is express, and this is an operation; for the fact that a person does something indicates that he expressly wills it. The other is an interpretative sign, permission; for anyone, who does not forbid what he can prevent, when interpreted seems to consent to it. This is what the name permission implies.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus, quamvis sit omnia potens et omnia sciens, non tamen omnia volens; et ideo, praeter signa in creaturis inventa, quibus ostenditur quod est sciens et potens et volens, voluntati assignantur quaedam signa, ut ostendatur quid Deus velit, et non solum quod est volens. Vel dicendum, quod scientia et potentia non habent ita adiunctum modum passionis sicut voluntas, prout in nobis invenitur. Et ideo voluntas magis appropinquat ad illa quae metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, quam potentia vel scientia; et ideo signa voluntatis magis dicimus voluntatem metaphorice loquendo, quam signa scientiae et potentiae, scientiam et potentiam.
| 1. Although God is capable of doing all things and knows all things, yet He does not will all things. Consequently, besides the signs found in creatures, by which it is shown that He is knowing, powerful, and willing, certain signs are ascribed to His will to show what God wills and not only the fact that He is willing.—Or it may be said that knowledge and power are not accompanied by a passion, as the will is in our case. Thus the will comes closer to the things which are said metaphorically of God than do either power or knowledge. And so the signs of will we call will, metaphorically speaking, more than we call the signs of knowledge and power knowledge and power.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis Deus non velit omne quod praecipit vel permittit, vult tamen aliquid circa hoc. Vult enim omnes esse debitores eius quod praecipit, et in potestate nostra esse id quod permittit; et hanc voluntatem divinam praeceptum et permissio significat.
| 2. Although God does not will everything that He commands or permits, yet He does will something concerning it. He wills that we be obliged to what He commands and that there be in our power what He permits. It is this divine will which the command or permission signifies.
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| Vel potest dici, quod voluntas signi non pro tanto dicitur quia significet Deum velle illud; sed quia id quod solet esse signum voluntatis apud nos, voluntas nominatur. Non autem oportet ut id quod solet esse alicuius rei signum, sit falsum quando ei non respondet id quod solet significare, nisi tunc tantum quando ad significandum illud adhibetur. Quamvis ergo praecipere in nobis sit signum volendi illud, non tamen quandocumque praecipit aliquid vel Deus vel homo, oportet quod significet se velle illud esse. Unde non sequitur quod sit signum falsum.
| Or the answer can be given that His indicative will is not so called because it means that God wills the matter itself, but because what is ordinarily the indication of a will in our case is called will. It is not necessary that what is usually the sign of a certain thing be false when its usual term of reference does not correspond to it, but only when it is used in that signification. Although among us to command something is the sign of our willing it, yet is not necessary, whenever either God or man commands something, for him to signify that he wishes it to be. It consequently does not follow that it is a false sign.
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| Et inde est quod in actibus non semper est mendacium, quandocumque aliqua actio agitur per quam solet aliquid significari, si illud non subsit. Sed in verbo, si non subsit illud quod significat, de necessitate est falsitas, quia scilicet verba ad hoc sunt instituta ut sint signa; unde si non respondet eis signatum, est ibi falsitas. Actiones autem non sunt ad hoc institutae ut significent, sed ut aliquid per eas fiat; accidit autem quod per eas aliquid significetur. Et ideo non semper est falsitas in eis si signatum non respondet; sed tunc tantum quando ad significandum applicantur ab agente.
| That is why there is not always a falsehood in our actions whenever an action which usually signifies something is performed and that signification is not there. But in our words, if what they signify does not underlie them, there is necessarily falsity, because words have been instituted for the very purpose of being signs. Hence, if what is signified does not correspond to them, there is falsity there. Actions, on the other hand, have not been instituted to serve as signs but to get something done. That they signify anything is quite accidental to them. There is consequently not always falsity in them if what is usually signified does not correspond. There can be falsity only when they are made use of by the agent in order to signify something.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas signi non est in Deo, sed a Deo; est enim aliquis Dei effectus talis, qualis solet apud nos voluntas hominis designari.
| 3. Indicative will is not in God but is from God; for it is an effect of God such as we usually term, when the effect of a man, that man’s will.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod voluntas Dei quamvis non sit respectu mali ut fiat, est tamen respectu eius ut impediat prohibendo, vel in potestate nostra constituat permittendo.
| 4. Although the will of God does not concern evil with a view to its being done, it nevertheless does concern evil with a view to preventing it by forbidding it, or with a view to putting it within our power by permitting it.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum omne in quod voluntas tendit, habeat ordinem ad finem, qui est ratio volendi omnia; mala autem careant ordine ad finem; omnia mala unum tenent locum, sicut respectu finis, ita et respectu voluntatis divinae; sed bona quae ordinantur in finem, secundum diversum ordinem quem habent ad finem, diversimode ad ea se habet voluntas. Et propter hoc sunt diversa signa de bono et meliori, non autem de malo et peiori.
| 5. Since everything to which the will tends has a relation to the end which is the reason for willing, but all evils lack a relation to that end, all evils are on the same footing not only in regard to the end but also in regard to the divine will. But to goods, which are referred to the end, the will stands in different relations according to the different relation which they have to the end. For this reason there are different indications for the good and the better, but not for the bad and the worse.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod voluntas signi non distinguitur contra voluntatem beneplaciti per hoc quod est impleri et non impleri: unde, quamvis voluntas beneplaciti semper impleatur, potest tamen ad voluntatem signi aliquid pertinere quod impletur: unde ea quae Deus praecipit vel consulit, quandoque vult voluntate beneplaciti. Distinguitur autem voluntas signi a voluntate beneplaciti, quia unum est ipse Deus, aliud est effectus eius, ut iam dictum est, in corp. art.
| 6. God’s indicative will is not opposed to His embracing will on the basis of fulfillment and non-fulfillment. Although His embracing will is always fulfilled, something which is fulfilled can also belong to His indicative will. Hence, even the matters which God commands or counsels He sometimes wills with an embracing will. But His indicative will is distinguished from His embracing will because the one is God Himself, the other is an effect of His, as has already been explained.
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| Et sciendum est, quod voluntas signi tribus modis se habet ad voluntatem beneplaciti: quaedam enim est voluntas signi quae nunquam incidit in idem cum voluntate beneplaciti, sicut permissio qua permittit mala fieri, cum mala fieri nunquam velit; quaedam autem semper in idem incidit, sicut operatio; quaedam vero quandoque incidit, et quandoque non, sicut praeceptum, prohibitio et consilium.
| It should, be noted that God’s indicative will is related to His embracing will in three ways: (1) there is an indicative will which never coincides with an embracing will, as the permission by which God permits evil to be done, since He never wills evil to be done; (2) there is another which always coincides, as an operation; (3) there is another which sometimes coincides, sometimes not, as a precept, a prohibition, or a counsel.
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| Et per hoc patet solutio ad ultimum.
| 7. This answer is clear from the above.
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Q. 23: God’s Will
ARTICLE IV
In the fourth article we ask:
Does God of necessity will whatever he wills?
[ARTICLE C.G.., I, 80-83; II, 28; III, 97; De pot., 1, 5; 10, 2 ad 6; S.T., I, 19, 3 & 10; Comp. theol., I, 96.]
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| Quarto quaeritur utrum Deus de necessitate velit quidquid vult
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that He does, for
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| Omne enim aeternum est necessarium. Sed Deus ab aeterno vult quidquid vult. Ergo de necessitate vult quidquid vult.
| 1. Everything that is eternal is necessary. But from eternity God wills whatever He wills. Therefore of necessity He wills whatever He wills.
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| Sed dicendum, quod velle Dei est necessarium et aeternum ex parte voluntatis, quae est divina essentia, et ex parte eius quod est ratio volendi, quod est divina bonitas; non autem quantum ad respectum voluntatis ad volitum.- Sed contra: hoc ipsum quod est Deum velle aliquid, importat habitudinem voluntatis ad volitum. Sed hoc ipsum quod est Deum velle aliquid, est aeternum. Ergo ipsa habitudo voluntatis ad volitum est aeterna et necessaria.
| 2. The answer was given that God’s willing is necessary and eternal on the part of the One willing both from the viewpoint of the act of will, which is the divine essence, and from that of the reason for willing, which is the divine goodness; but not under the aspect of the relation of the will to the thing willed.—On the contrary, the very fact of God’s willing anything implies a relationship of the will to the thing willed. But the fact of God’s willing something is eternal. Then the relationship of the will to the thing willed is itself eternal and necessary.
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| Sed dicendum, quod habitudo ad volitum est aeterna et necessaria, secundum quod volitum est in ratione exemplari, non autem secundum quod est in seipso, sive in propria natura.- Sed contra: secundum hoc aliquid est volitum quod ad ipsum refertur voluntas. Si ergo ab aeterno non refertur voluntas Dei ad volitum, secundum quod est in seipso, sed secundum quod est in ratione volendi exemplari; tunc aliquod temporale, utpote Petrum salvari, non esset ab aeterno volitum a Deo, ut scilicet in propria natura esset; sed solummodo ab aeterno esset a Deo volitum ut esset in rationibus aeternis; quod patet esse falsum.
| 3. The answer was given that the relationship to the thing willed is eternal and necessary inasmuch as the thing willed exists in its exemplary idea, not inasmuch as it exists in itself or in its own nature.—On the contrary, a thing is willed by the fact of having the will of God referred to it. Consequently, if the will of God were not referred from all eternity to the thing willed as it exists in itself but merely as it exists in its exemplary idea, then a temporal fact, such as the salvation of Peter, would not be willed by God from all eternity as it exists in its own nature; but it would merely be the object of God’s will from all eternity as it exists in God’s eternal ideas. But this is obviously false.
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| Praeterea, quidquid Deus voluit vel vult, postquam vult illud vel voluit, non potest illud non velle vel non voluisse. Sed quidquid Deus vult, nunquam non voluit; eo quod semper et ab aeterno voluit quidquid vult. Ergo Deus non potest non velle quidquid vult; ergo de necessitate vult quidquid vult.
| 4. Whatever God has willed or wills, after He wills or has willed it, He is unable not to will or not to have willed it. But whatever God wills He never has not willed, because He always and from all eternity has willed whatever He wills. God is therefore unable not to will whatever He wills. Whatever He wills He therefore wills from necessity.
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| Sed diceretur, quod ratio ista procedit secundum quod velle Dei consideratur quantum ad ipsum volentem, vel actum, vel rationem volendi, non autem quantum ad habitudinem qua refertur ad volitum.- Sed contra: creare est actus semper importans respectum ad effectum; connotat enim effectum temporalem. Sed ratio ista verificatur de creatione, si supponeretur Deum semper creasse; quod quia creavit aliquid, non potest non creasse. Ergo de necessitate sequitur, secundum quod habet respectum ad volitum.
| 5. The answer was given that the above argument is based upon God’s willing, taken from the viewpoint of the One willing or of the act or of the reason for willing, not from that of its relationship to the thing willed.—On the contrary, to create is an act which always implies a relation to its effect, for it connotes a temporal effect. But the above reasoning would be verified concerning creation if it were supposed that God had always been creating, because what He has created He is unable not to have created. It therefore follows with necessity also from the viewpoint of the relation to the thing willed.
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| Praeterea, Deo idem est esse quod velle. Sed Deum necesse est esse omne quod est, quia in perpetuis non differt esse et posse, secundum philosophum in III Phys. Ergo et Deum necesse est velle omne quod vult.
| 6. To be and to will are one and the same for God. But God must necessarily be everything that He is, because “in everlasting beings there is no difference between being and being able to be” in the words of the Philosopher. God must therefore also necessarily will everything that He wills.
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| Sed dicendum, quod quamvis velle et esse sint idem secundum rem, tamen differunt secundum modum significandi, quia velle significatur per modum actus, qui transit in alterum.- Sed contra: esse etiam Dei quamvis sit idem quod essentia secundum rem, differunt tamen secundum modum significandi; quia esse significat per modum actus. Ergo quantum ad hoc non est differentia inter esse et velle.
| 7. The answer was given that, although to will and to be are in this case really identical, they nevertheless differ in the manner in which they are expressed, because to will is expressed after the manner of an act that passes, over into something else.—On the contrary, even God’s act of being, though really identical with His essence, nevertheless differs in the manner of its expression, because to be is expressed after the manner of an act. There is therefore no difference in this respect between being and willing.
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| Praeterea, aeternitas repugnat successioni. Sed velle divinum aeternitate mensuratur. Ergo non potest ibi esse successio. Esset autem successio, si quod ab aeterno voluit non vellet; aut si quod non voluit, vellet. Ergo impossibile est eum velle quod non voluit, vel non velle quod voluit. Ergo quidquid vult, de necessitate vult; et quidquid non vult, de necessitate non vult.
| 8. Eternity does not admit of succession. But divine willing is measured by eternity. Hence there cannot be any succession in it. But there would be succession in it if God did not will what He has willed from eternity, or if He willed what He has not willed. It is consequently impossible for Him to will what He has not willed or not to will what He has willed. Hence whatever He wills He wills from necessity, and whatever He does not will He necessarily does not will.
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| Praeterea, quicumque voluit aliquid necessarium, impossibile est eum non voluisse illud, quia quod factum est, non potest non fuisse. Sed in Deo idem est velle et voluisse, qui actus voluntatis eius non est novus, sed aeternus. Ergo Deus non potest non velle quod vult; et sic de necessitate vult quod vult.
| 9. It is impossible for anyone who has willed anything not to have willed it, because what has been done is unable not to have been done. But in God to will and to have willed are identical because the act of His will is not new but is eternal. God is therefore unable not to will what He wills; and so He necessarily wills what He wills.
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| Sed dicendum, quod vult de necessitate quantum ad rationem volendi, non autem quantum ad ipsum volitum.- Sed contra: ratio volendi Deo est ipsemet, qui a seipso vult quidquid vult. Si ergo seipsum de necessitate vult, et omnia alia de necessitate vellet.
| 10. The answer was given that He necessarily wills from the point of view of His reason for willing, but not from that of the thing willed.—On the contrary, God’s reason for willing is Himself, because He wills for Himself whatever He wills. Then, if He necessarily wills Himself, He will also necessarily will all other things.
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| Praeterea, ratio volendi est finis. Finis autem, secundum philosophum in II Physic., et in VII Ethicorum, ita se habet in appetitivis et operativis sicut principium in demonstrativis. Sed in demonstrativis si principia sunt necessaria, sequitur conclusio necessaria. Ergo et in appetitivis, si aliquis vult finem, vult ea de necessitate, quae sunt ad finem; et ita, si velle divinum est necessarium quantum ad rationem volendi, erit necessarium per comparationem ad volita.
| 11. The reason for willing is the end. But according to the Philosopher in matters of appetite and operation the end occupies the same place as the principle in matters of demonstration. Now in matters of demonstration, if the principles are necessary, a necessary conclusion follows. Hence also in matters of appetite, if a person wills the end, he necessarily wills the means to the end; and so, if the divine act of willing is necessary from the standpoint of the reason for willing, it will also be necessary with reference to the things willed.
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| Praeterea, quicumque potest velle aliquid et non velle, potest incipere velle illud. Sed Deus non potest incipere velle aliquid. Ergo non potest aliquid velle et non velle; et ita de necessitate vult quidquid vult.
| 12. Whoever can will and not will something can begin to will it. But God cannot begin to will something. Hence He cannot will and not will something; and so He necessarily wills whatever He wills.
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| Praeterea, sicut Dei voluntas importat respectum ad creaturas, ita et potentia et scientia. Sed necessarium est Deum posse quidquid potest, et necessarium est eum scire quidquid scit. Ergo necessarium est eum velle quidquid vult.
| 13. God’s power and knowledge, like His will, imply a relation to creatures. But it is necessary for God to be able to do anything that He is able to do, and it is necessary for Him to know whatever He knows. It is therefore necessary for Him to will whatever He wills.
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| Praeterea, illud quod semper eodem modo se habet, est necessarium. Sed respectus divinae voluntatis ad volita, semper est eodem modo se habens. Ergo est necessarius; et ita velle divinum quantum ad habitudinem ad substantiam voliti est necessarium.
| 14. Whatever is always the same is necessary. But the relation of the divine will to the things willed is always the same. It is therefore necessary; and so the divine act of willing is also necessary from the standpoint of its relationship to the substance of the thing willed.
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| Praeterea, si Deus vult Antichristum fore, de necessitate sequitur Antichristum fore, quamvis Antichristum fore non sit necessarium. Hoc autem non esset, nisi esset necessarius respectus sive necessaria habitudo divinae voluntatis ad volitum. Ergo ipsum velle divinum, secundum quod importat respectum voluntatis ad volitum, est necessarium.
| 15. If God wills that there shall be an Antichrist, it follows with necessity that there will be an Antichrist even though it is not necessary that there should be an Antichrist. Now this would not be the case if there were not a necessary relation or reference of the divine will to the thing willed. The divine act of willing inasmuch as it implies a relation of the will to the thing willed is therefore itself necessary.
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| Praeterea, ordo divinae voluntatis ad rationem volendi est causa ordinis divinae voluntatis ad volitum; voluntas enim in aliquod volitum fertur propter rationem volendi. Inter utrumque autem ordinem non cadit aliquod contingens medium. Posita autem causa necessaria sequitur effectus necessarius, nisi intercidat media causa contingens. Ergo, cum velle divinum sit necessarium in ordine ad rationem volendi, erit necessarium in ordine ad volitum; et ita Deus de necessitate vult quidquid vult.
| 16. The relation of the divine will to the reason for willing is the cause of the relation of the divine will to the thing willed, for the will is directed to some object because of the reason for willing. Between the two relations, moreover, there does not fall any contingent intermediary. When a necessary cause is placed, a necessary effect follows unless there happens to be a contingent cause between them. Consequently, since the divine act of will is necessary in its relation to the reason for willing, it will also be necessary in its relation to the thing willed; and so God wills necessarily whatever He wills.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Voluntas Dei magis est libera quam voluntas nostra. Sed voluntas nostra non de necessitate vult quod vult. Ergo nec voluntas Dei.
| 1. God’s will is more fully free than our will. But our will does not necessarily will whatever it wills. Then neither does God’s.
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| Praeterea, necessitas opponitur gratuitae voluntati. Sed Deus vult salutem hominum ex gratuita voluntate. Ergo non vult ex necessitate.
| 2. Necessity is opposed to gratuitous willing. But God wills the salvation of men with a gratuitous will. He therefore does not will from necessity.
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| Praeterea, cum nihil extrinsecum a Deo, possit Deo necessitatem imponere; si aliquid ex necessitate vellet, non vellet illud nisi ex necessitate suae naturae. Ergo idem sequeretur ex hoc quod ponitur Deum agere ex voluntate et ex hoc quod ponitur ex necessitate naturae. Sed ponentibus Deum agere ex necessitate naturae, sequitur omnia ab eo facta fuisse. Ergo idem sequetur nobis ponentibus eum ex voluntate omnia facere.
| 3. Since nothing extrinsic to God can impose necessity upon Him, if He willed anything from necessity, He would will it only from the necessity of His own nature. The same consequence would therefore follow from positing that God acts by His will and from positing that He acts by the necessity of nature. Now since it follows for those who hold that God acts by the necessity of nature that all things have been made by Him from all eternity, the same conclusion would follow for us, who hold that He makes all things by His will.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod divinum velle necessitatem habere ex parte ipsius volentis et actus, indubitabiliter verum est: nam actio Dei est eius essentia, quam constat esse aeternam. Unde hoc in quaestione non ponitur; sed utrum velle ipsum necessitatem habeat per comparationem ad volitum: quae quidem comparatio intelligitur cum dicimus; Deum velle hoc vel illud; hoc enim quaeritur, cum quaerimus utrum Deus de necessitate aliquid velit.
| It is undoubtedly true that the divine act of willing has necessity from the point of view of the One willing and of the act; for God’s action is His essence, which is clearly eternal. That is accordingly not the question, but rather whether God’s willing has any necessity with respect to the thing willed. It is this respect which is understood when we say that God wills this or that. And this is what we ask about when we ask whether God wills anything from necessity.
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| Sciendum est igitur, quod cuiuslibet voluntatis est duplex volitum: unum quidem principale, et aliud quasi secundarium. Principale quidem volitum est in quod voluntas fertur secundum suam naturam; eo quod ipsa voluntas natura quaedam est, et naturalem ordinem ad aliquid habet; hoc autem est quod naturaliter voluntas vult: sicut humana voluntas naturaliter appetit beatitudinem, et respectu huius voliti voluntas necessitatem habet, cum in ipsum tendat per modum naturae; non enim potest homo velle non esse beatus, aut esse miser. Secundaria vero volita sunt quae ad hoc principale volitum ordinantur sicut in finem. Et ad haec duo volita hoc modo se habet voluntas diversimode, sicut intellectus ad principia quae naturaliter novit, et ad conclusiones quas ex eis elicit.
| It should therefore be noted that the object of any will is twofold: one which. is principal and another which is, in a sense, secondary. The principal object is that to which the will is directed of its own nature, since the will is a nature and has a natural ordination to something. This is what the will naturally wills, as the human will naturally desires happiness. In regard to this object the will is under necessity, since it tends to it in the manner of a nature. A man, for instance, cannot will to be miserable or not to be happy. Secondary objects of the will are the things which are directed to this principal object as to an end. Now upon these two different sorts of objects the will has a different bearing, just as the intellect has upon the principles which are naturally known and the conclusions which it draws out of these.
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| Voluntas igitur divina habet pro principali volito id quod naturaliter vult, et quod est quasi finis voluntatis suae; scilicet ipsa bonitas sua, propter quam vult quidquid aliud a se vult: vult enim creaturas propter suam bonitatem, ut Augustinus dicit; ut videlicet sua bonitas, quae per essentiam multiplicari non potest, saltem per quamdam similitudinis participationem diffundatur ad multa. Unde ea quae circa creaturas vult, sunt quasi eius volita secundaria, quae propter suam bonitatem vult; ut divina bonitas sit eius voluntati ratio volendi omnia, sicut sua essentia est ei ratio cognoscendi omnia.
| The divine will has as its principal object that which it naturally wills and which is a sort of end of its willing, God’s own goodness, on account of which He wills whatever else He wills distinct from Himself. For He makes things on account of His own goodness, as Augustine says; that is to say, He does it in order that His goodness, which cannot be multiplied in its essence, may at least by a certain participation through likeness be poured out upon many recipients. Hence the things which He wills concerning creatures are, as it were, the secondary objects of His will. He wills them on account of His goodness. Thus the divine goodness serves His will as the reason for willing all things, just as His essence is the reason for His knowing all things.
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| Respectu igitur illius principalis voliti, quod est sua bonitas, voluntas divina necessitatem habet, non quidem coactionis, sed naturalis ordinis, qui libertati non repugnat, secundum Augustinum in V de civitate Dei: non enim potest Deus velle se non esse bonum, et per consequens se non esse intelligentem vel potentem, vel quodcumque eorum quae ratio eius bonitatis includit.
| In regard to that principal object, God’s goodness, the divine will is under a necessity, not of force but of natural ordination, which is not incompatible with freedom, according to Augustine. God cannot will Himself not to be good, nor, consequently, not to be intelligent or powerful or anything else which the nature of His goodness includes.
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| Sed respectu nullius alterius voliti necessitatem habet. Cum enim ratio volendi his quae sunt ad finem, sit ipse finis; secundum hoc quod id quod est ad finem, comparatur ad finem, secundum hoc comparatur ad voluntatem. Unde si quod est ad finem, sit quasi fini proportionatum, hoc modo scilicet quod finem perfecte includat, et sine eo finis haberi non possit; sicut de necessitate appetitur finis, ita de necessitate appetitur id quod est ad finem; et praecipue a voluntate quae sapientiae regulam exire non potest. Eiusdem enim rationis videtur desiderare vitae continuationem, et nutrimenti sumptionem, quo vita conservatur, et sine quo vita conservari non potest.
| It is not, however, under any necessity in regard to any other object. Since the reason for willing the means is the end, the means stands to the will in the same relation as it stands to the end. Hence if the means is proportioned to the end so that it embraces the end perfectly and without it the end cannot be obtained, the means, like the end, is desired of necessity, and especially by a will which cannot depart from the rule of wisdom. It seems to be all of a piece, for instance, to desire the continuance of life and the taking of food by which life is sustained and without which it cannot be preserved.
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| Sed sicut nullus effectus divinus potentiam causae adaequat, ita nihil quod in Deum sicut in finem ordinatur, est fini adaequatum: nulla enim creatura perfecte Deo assimilatur; hoc enim est solius verbi increati. Unde contingit quod quantumcumque nobiliori modo aliqua creatura pura in Deum ordinetur aliquo modo ei assimilata, possibile sit aliquam aliam creaturam modo aeque nobili in ipsum Deum ordinari, et divinam bonitatem repraesentare.
| But just as no effect of God is equal to the power of the cause, so nothing which is directed to God as its end is equal to the end. No creature is made perfectly like God. That is the exclusive property of the uncreated Word. From this it comes about that, no matter how much more nobly any pure creature is related to God, being assimilated to Him in some way, it is still possible for some other creature to be related to God and to represent the divine goodness in a manner equally noble.
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| Unde patet quod non est necessitas divinae voluntatis ex amore quem habet ad suam bonitatem, quod velit hoc vel illud circa creaturam; nec inest ei aliqua necessitas respectu totius creaturae, eo quod divina bonitas in se perfecta est, etiamsi nulla creatura existeret, quia bonorum nostrorum non eget, ut in Psalm. XV, 2, dicitur. Non enim divina bonitas est talis finis qui efficiatur ex his quae sunt ad finem; sed magis quo efficiuntur et perficiuntur ea quae ad ipsum ordinantur. Unde Avicenna dicit, quod solius actio Dei est pure liberalis, quia nihil sibi accrescit ex his quae vult, vel operatur circa creaturam.
| It is accordingly clear that from the love which God has for His own goodness there is no necessity in the divine will for willing this or that concerning a creature. Nor is there any necessity in it as regards the whole of creation, since the divine goodness is perfect in itself, and would be so even though no creature existed, because God has no need of our goods, as is said in the Psalm (15:2). For the divine goodness is not an end of the kind which is produced by the means to the end, but rather one by which the things which are directed to it are produced and perfected. For this reason Avicenna says that only God’s action is purely liberal, because nothing accrues to Him from what He wills or does regarding any creature.
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| Patet igitur ex dictis, quod quidquid Deus vult in seipso, de necessitate vult; quidquid autem vult circa creaturam, non de necessitate vult.
| It is therefore clear from what has been said that whatever God wills to be in His own regard He wills from necessity, but whatever He wills to be concerning creatures He does not will from necessity.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur necessarium dupliciter: uno modo absolute; alio modo ex suppositione. Absolute quidem dicitur aliquid necessarium propter necessariam habitudinem ad invicem terminorum qui in aliqua propositione ponuntur; sicut hominem esse animal, vel omne totum esse maius sua parte, aut aliqua huiusmodi. Necessarium vero ex suppositione est quod non est necessarium ex se, sed solummodo posito alio; sicut Socratem cucurrisse: Socrates enim, quantum est de se, non se habet magis ad hoc quam ad huius oppositum; sed facta suppositione quod cucurrerit, impossibile est eum non cucurrisse.
| 1. Something is said to be necessary in two ways: (1) absolutely, and (2) conditionally. Something is said to be necessary absolutely because of a necessary relation which the terms used in a proposition have to each other; e.g., “Man is an animal” or “Every whole is greater than its part” and the like. But something is necessary conditionally which is not necessary of itself but only if something else is given; e.g., “Socrates has run.” In himself Socrates is no more disposed to this than to its opposite; but on the condition that he has run it is impossible for him not to have run.
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| Sic igitur dico, quod Deum velle aliquid in creaturis, utpote Petrum salvari, non est necessarium absolute, eo quod voluntas divina non habet ad hoc necessarium ordinem, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet; sed facta suppositione quod Deus illud velit vel voluerit, impossibile est eum non voluisse vel non velle eo quod voluntas eius immutabilis est. Unde huiusmodi necessitas apud theologos vocatur necessitas immutabilitatis. Quod autem non sit necessarium absolute Deum velle, hoc est ex parte voliti, quod deficit a perfecta proportione in finem, ut dictum est. Et quantum ad hoc verificatur responsio prius, in corp. art., posita. Et eodem modo distinguendum est de aeterno sicut de necessario.
| I say, therefore, that God’s willing something in creatures, as that Peter be saved, is not necessary absolutely, since the divine will does not have a necessary relation to this, as is evident from what has been said. But on the condition that God wills or has willed it, then it is impossible for Him not to have willed or not to will it, since His will is unchangeable. Among the theologians such necessity is accordingly called the necessity of unchangeability. Now the fact that God’s act of willing is not absolutely necessary comes from the thing willed, which falls short of a perfect proportion to the end, as has been said. In this respect the answer given above is verified. And eternity is to be distinguished in the same way as necessity.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod illa habitudo importata est necessaria et aeterna ex suppositione, non autem absolute; et non solum secundum quod terminatur ad volitum, prout est exemplariter in ratione volendi, sed prout est temporaliter in propria natura.
| 2. The relationship implied is necessary and eternal conditionally, not absolutely; and this is from the standpoint of its termination in the object, not only as it has its exemplar in the reason for willing but also as in its own nature it exists in time.
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| Unde tertium concedimus.
| 3. This we concede.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod Deum velle aliquid vel voluisse postquam vult vel voluit, est necessarium ex suppositione, non autem absolute, sicut et Socratem cucurrisse postquam cucurrit; et similiter est de creatione et de quolibet actu divinae voluntatis qui terminatur ad aliquid exterius.
| 4. After God wills or has willed something, that He wills or has willed it is necessary conditionally, not absolutely; as it is that Socrates has run, after he has run. This is the case with creation or any act of the divine will which terminates in something external.
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| Unde quintum concedimus.
| 5. We concede this.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis ipsum esse divinum sit in se necessarium, non tamen creaturae exeunt a Deo per necessitatem, sed per liberam voluntatem. Et ideo illa quae important comparationem Dei ad exitum creaturarum in esse, ut velle, creare, et huiusmodi, non sunt necessaria absolute, sicut illa quae de Deo secundum seipsum dicuntur, ut esse bonum, viventem, sapientem, et alia huiusmodi.
| 6. Although the divine existence is necessary in itself, yet creatures do not proceed from God through necessity but through a free act of will. Whatever implies a reference of God to the origin of creatures, as to will, to create, etc., is not necessary absolutely, like the predicates which refer to God in Himself, such as to be good, living, wise, etc.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod esse non dicit actum qui sit operatio transiens in aliquid extrinsecum temporaliter producendum, sed actum quasi primum; velle autem dicit actum secundum, qui est operatio; et ideo ex diverso modo significandi aliquid, attribuitur divino esse quod non attribuitur divino velle.
| 7. To be does not express the kind of act which is an operation passing over into something external to be produced in time, but rather the act that is primary. To will, however, expresses a secondary act, which is an operation. Thus it is from the different manner of expression that something is attributed to the divine act of being which is not attributed to the divine act of willing.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod successio non importatur, si dicimus Deum posse velle aliquid et non velle, nisi intelligatur hoc modo quod, supposito ipsum velle aliquid, ponatur ipsum postea non velle illud. Sed hoc excluditur per hoc quod ponimus, Deum velle aliquid, esse necessarium ex suppositione.
| 8. We do not imply succession if we say that God can will or not will something unless this is understood in the sense that, on the condition that He wills something, it is asserted that He afterward does not will it. But this is excluded by our affirmation that God’s willing something is necessary conditionally.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod Deum voluisse illud quod voluit, est necessarium ex suppositione, non autem absolute; et similiter Deum velle illud quod vult.
| 9. God’s having willed what He has willed is necessary conditionally, not absolutely. The same is true of God’s willing what He wills.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod quamvis Deus ex necessitate velit se esse, non tamen sequitur quod alia ex necessitate velit: non enim dicitur aliquid esse necessarium ex conditione finis nisi quando est tale sine quo finis haberi non potest; ut patet in V Metaphys. Hoc autem in proposito non accidit.
| 10. Although God necessarily wills that He be, it nevertheless does not follow that He wills other things necessarily. Nothing is said to be necessary by reason of the end except when it is such that without it the end cannot be had, as is evident in the Metaphysics. But that is not the case in the point at issue.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod in syllogismis, si principium sit necessarium, non sequitur conclusio necessaria, nisi sit necessaria habitudo principii ad conclusionem. Et ita, quantumcumque finis sit necessarius, nisi id quod est ad finem habeat necessariam habitudinem ad ipsum, ut sine quo finis esse non possit, nulla erit necessitas ex fine in eo quod est ad finem; sicut, etsi principia possint esse vera, conclusione existente falsa propter defectum necessariae habitudinis, non sequitur ex necessitate principiorum conclusionis necessitas.
| 11. If the principle is necessary in syllogisms, it does not follow that the conclusion is necessary unless the relationship of the principle to the conclusion is also necessary. In the same way, no matter how necessary the end is, unless the means has a necessary relationship to the end so that without it the end cannot exist, there will be no necessity arising from the end in the means; just as, even though the principles may be true, if the conclusion is false because of the lack of a necessary relationship, no necessity on the part of the conclusion follows from the necessity of the principles.
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| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod quicumque potest velle et non velle, si possit velle postquam noluit, et non velle postquam voluit, potest incipere velle. Si enim vult, potest desinere velle, et iterum incipere velle; si autem non vult potest statim incipere velle. Sic autem Deus non potest velle et non velle, propter immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis. Sed potest velle et non velle in quantum voluntas sua non obligatur, quantum est de se, ad hoc quod velit. Unde remanet quod Deum velle aliquid est necessarium ex suppositione, non autem absolute.
| 12. If anyone who can will and not will can will after he has been unwilling and can be unwilling after he has willed, he can begin to will. If he wills, he can cease to will and again begin to will. If he does not will, he can immediately begin to will. God cannot will and not will in this way because of the unchangeableness of the divine will. But He can will and not will inasmuch as His will is not bound on its part to will or not to will. It remains, then, that God’s willing something is necessary conditionally, not absolutely.
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| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod scientia et potentia quamvis importent respectum ad creaturas, tamen pertinent ad ipsam perfectionem divinae essentiae, in qua nihil potest esse nisi per se necessarium. Secundum hoc enim dicitur aliquis esse sciens, quod res scita dicitur esse in sciente; dicitur autem esse potens ad aliquid agendum, secundum quod est in actu completo respectu eius quod agendum est. Quidquid autem est in Deo, necesse est ei inesse; et quidquid Deus est actu, necesse est eum esse actu. Cum vero dicitur Deum velle aliquid, non significatur illud aliquid inesse Deo, sed tantummodo importatur ordo ipsius Dei ad illius factionem in propria natura; et ideo ex hac parte deficit conditio absolutae necessitatis, ut dictum est prius.
| 13. Although knowledge and power imply a relation to creatures, they nevertheless pertain to the very perfection of the divine essence, in which there can be nothing except what is necessary of itself. A thing is said to have knowledge because the thing known is in the knower. Something is said to have power to do something inasmuch as it is in complete act with respect to that which is to be done. Whatever is in God, however, must necessarily be in Him; and whatever God actually is, He must necessarily be actually. But when it is said that God wills something, that something is not designated as being in God, but there is merely implied the relationship of God Himself to the production of that thing in its own nature. From this point of view the condition of absolute necessity is accordingly lacking, as was said above.
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| Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod respectus ille semper uno modo se habet, propter immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis; unde ratio non concludit nisi de necessitate quae est ex suppositione.
| 14. That relationship is always the same because of the immutability of the divine will. The argument is accordingly conclusive only in regard to the necessary which is conditional.
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| Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod voluntas ad volitum habet duplicem respectum: primum quidem habet ad ipsum in quantum est volitum; secundum vero habet ad idem, in quantum est producendum in actu per voluntatem; et hic quidem respectus praesupponit primum. Primo enim intelligimus voluntatem velle aliquid; deinde, ex hoc ipso quod vult illud, intelligimus quod producat ipsum in rerum natura, si voluntas sit efficax. Primus ergo respectus divinae voluntatis ad volitum non est necessarius absolute, propter improportionem voliti ad finem, qui est ratio volendi, ut dictum est; unde non est necessarium absolute quod Deus velit illud. Sed secundus respectus est necessarius propter efficaciam divinae voluntatis; et exinde est quod de necessitate sequitur, si Deus vult aliquid voluntate beneplaciti, quod illud fiat.
| 15. The will has a twofold relation to its object: (1) inasmuch as the latter is the object, and (2) inasmuch as it is to be brought into act by the will. The second relation presupposes the first. We first understand that the will wills something. Then, from the fact that it wills it, we understand that it is bringing it forth into reality, if the will is efficacious. The first relation of the divine will to its object is not necessary in an absolute sense because of the lack of proportion of the object to the end, which is the reason for willing, as has been said. Hence it is not necessary absolutely that God will it. But the second relation is necessary because of the efficacy of the divine will; and for this reason it follows of necessity that if God wills anything with His embracing will, it comes about.
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| Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod quamvis inter illos duos ordines quos obiectio tangit, non cadat aliqua causa contingens media; tamen, propter defectum proportionis primi ordinis, non inducit in secundum ordinem necessitatem, ut ex dictis patet.
| 16. Although between the two relations mentioned in the difficulty there intervenes no contingent cause, yet because of the lack of proportion the necessity of the first relation does not introduce necessity into the second, as is clear from what has been said.
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| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
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| Quod autem in contrarium obiicitur de libertate voluntatis, iam solutum est per hoc quod necessitas naturalis ordinis libertati non repugnat, sed sola necessitas coactionis.
| 3. The difficulty about the freedom of the will has already been solved inasmuch as the necessity of the order of nature is not incompatible with freedom, but only the necessity of force.
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| Alia vero concedimus.
| 1-2. These we concede.
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| Etiam similiter dicendum est ad quartum de effectu causae mediae.
| 4. The same is to be said about the deficiency of the intervening cause.
Q. 23: God’s Will
ARTICLE VI
In the sixth article we ask:
Does justice as found among created things depend simply upon the divine will?
[ARTICLE No direct parallels; but cf. S.T., II, 24; S.T., I, 21, 2; I-II, 68, 4 ad 1.]
| | Sexto quaeritur utrum iustitia in rebus creatis dependeat ex simplici divina voluntate
| Difficulties
| | Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that it does, for
| | Anselmus enim dicit in Monol.: id solum iustum est quod vis. Ergo iustitia dependet solum ex Dei voluntate.
| 1. Anselm says: “That only is just which You wish.” justice therefore depends only upon God’s will.
| | Praeterea, secundum hoc aliquid est iustum quod concordat legi. Sed lex non videtur esse aliud quam explicatio voluntatis principis: quia quod principi placet, legis habet vigorem, ut dicit legislator. Cum igitur princeps rerum omnium sit divina voluntas, videtur quod ex ipsa sola dependeat omnis ratio iustitiae.
| 2. Something is just by reason of its agreement with a law. But a law seems to be nothing but the expression of the will of a sovereign, because “what has pleased the prince has the force of law,” as the Legislator says. Since the sovereign of all things is the divine will, it therefore seeing that the whole character of justice depends upon it alone.
| | Praeterea, iustitia politica quae est in rebus humanis, exemplatur a iustitia naturali, quae consistit in hoc quod quaelibet res suam implet naturam. Sed unaquaeque res participat ordinem suae naturae propter divinam voluntatem: dicit enim Hilarius in libro de symbolo, quod omnibus creaturis essentiam Dei voluntas attulit. Ergo omnis iustitia dependet solummodo ex Dei voluntate.
| 3 Political justice, which is found in human affairs, has its model in natural justice, which consists in the fulfillment of its own nature by anything whatever. But each thing participates in the order of its nature because of the divine will; for Hilary says: “The will of God has conferred upon all creatures their essence.” All justice therefore depends merely upon the will of God.
| | Praeterea, iustitia, cum sit rectitudo quaedam, dependet ex imitatione alicuius regulae. Regula autem effectus est debita causa eius. Cum igitur potissima omnium rerum causa sit divina voluntas, videtur quod ipsa sit prima regula, ex qua unumquodque iustum iudicetur.
| 4 Since justice is a certain correctness, it depends upon the imitation of some rule. But the rule of the effect is its due cause. Since the first cause of all things is the divine will, it therefore seems to be the first rule from which everything just is judged.
| | Praeterea, voluntas Dei non potest esse nisi iusta. Si ergo ex aliquo alio dependeret ratio iustitiae quam ex divina voluntate, illud restringeret et quodammodo ligaret divinam voluntatem, quod est impossibile.
| 5. God’s will cannot be anything but just. If the character of justice depended upon anything else besides the divine will, that would restrict and, in a sense, bind the divine will. But that is impossible.
| | Praeterea, omnis voluntas quae est iusta aliqua alia ratione quam seipsa, ita se habet, quod eius ratio debet quaeri. Sed voluntatis Dei causa quaerenda non est, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. LXXXIII quaestionum. Ergo ex nullo alio dependet ratio iustitiae nisi ex divina voluntate.
| 6. Every will which is just by a principle other than itself is such that its principle should be sought. But “the cause of God’s will is not to be sought,” as Augustine says. The principle of justice therefore depends upon no other than the divine will.
| | Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
| | Opera iustitiae ab operibus misericordiae distinguuntur. Sed opera divinae misericordiae dependent ab eius voluntate. Ergo aliquid aliud exigitur ad rationem iustitiae quam sola Dei voluntas.
| 1. The works of justice are distinguished from the works of mercy. But the works of divine mercy depend upon God’s will. Hence something else besides the mere will of God is demanded for the character of justice.
| | Praeterea, secundum Anselmum in Lib. de veritate, iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis. Sed rectitudo voluntatis est aliud a voluntate: in nobis quidem secundum rem, cum voluntas nostra possit esse recta et non recta; in Deo autem saltem ratione, sive secundum modum intelligendi. Ergo ratio iustitiae non dependet solum ex divina voluntate.
| 2. According to Anselm justice is “correctness of will.” But correctness of will is distinct from the will. In us it is really distinct, since our will can be correct or not. In God it is distinct at least conceptually or according to our manner of understanding it. Therefore the character of justice does not depend upon the divine will alone.
| | Respondeo.
| REPLY
| | Dicendum, quod cum iustitia rectitudo quaedam sit, ut dicit Anselmus, vel adaequatio secundum philosophum, oportet quod ex hoc primo dependeat ratio iustitiae, ubi primo invenitur ratio regulae, secundum quam aequalitas et rectitudo iustitiae constituitur in rebus. Voluntas autem non habet rationem primae regulae, sed est regula recta: dirigitur enim per rationem et intellectum, non solum in nobis, sed in Deo: quamvis in nobis sit aliud intellectus et voluntas secundum rem, et per hoc nec idem est voluntas et rectitudo voluntatis: in Deo autem est idem secundum rem intellectus et voluntas; et propter hoc est idem rectitudo voluntatis et ipsa voluntas. Et ideo primum ex quo pendet ratio omnis iustitiae, est sapientia divini intellectus, quae res constituit in debita proportione et ad se invicem, et ad suam causam: in qua quidem proportione ratio iustitiae creatae consistit. Dicere autem quod ex simplici voluntate dependeat iustitia, est dicere quod divina voluntas non procedat secundum ordinem sapientiae, quod est blasphemum.
| Since justice is a certain “correctness,” as Anselm says or “equation,” as the Philosopher teaches, the essential character of justice must depend first of all upon that in which there is first found the character of a rule according to which the equality and correctness of justice is established in things. Now the will does not have the character of the first rule; it is rather a rule which has a rule, for it is directed by reason and the intellect. This is true not only in us but also in God, although in us the will is really distinct from the intellect. For this reason the will and its correctness are not the same thing. In God, however, the will is really identical with the intellect, and for this reason the correctness of His will is really the same as His will itself. Consequently the first thing upon which the essential character of all justice depends is the wisdom of the divine intellect, which constitutes things in their due proportion both to one another and to their cause. In this proportion the essential character of created justice consists. But to say that justice depends simply upon the will is to say that the divine will does not proceed according to the order of wisdom, and that is blasphemous.
| |
| Answers to Difficulties
| | Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod nihil potest esse iustum nisi volitum a Deo; tamen id quod est volitum a Deo, habet primam causam iustitiae ex ordine sapientiae divinae.
| 1. Nothing can be just unless it is willed by God. Yet what is willed by God has the first cause of its justice from the order of divine wisdom.
| | Ad secundum dicendum, quod voluntas principis licet habeat vim legis in cogendo, ex hoc ipso quod voluntas est, non tamen habet rationem iustitiae, nisi ex hoc quod utitur ratione.
| 2. Although the will of the prince, by the fact of its being a will, has the coercive force of law, yet it does not have the character of justice except from being led by reason.
| | Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus operatur in rebus naturalibus dupliciter: primo instituens ipsas naturas; secundo providens unicuique rei id quod competit suae naturae. Et quia ratio iustitiae debitum requirit, ideo, cum ipsas creaturas institui non sit aliquo modo debitum, sed voluntarium, prima operatio non habet rationem iustitiae, sed dependet ex simplici voluntate divina; nisi forte dicatur iustitiae rationem habere propter ordinem ipsius rei factae ad voluntatem: debitum enim est fieri omne quod Deus vult, ex hoc ipso quod Deus illud vult. Sed ad hunc ordinem implendum sapientia dirigit quasi prima regula. Sed in secunda operatione invenitur ratio debiti non ex parte agentis, cum Deus nulli sit debitor, sed ex parte recipientis: debitum enim est unicuique rei naturali ut habeat ea quae exigit sua natura, tam in essentialibus quam in accidentalibus. Hoc autem debitum ex divina sapientia dependet; in quantum scilicet res naturalis debet esse talis quod imitetur propriam ideam quae est in mente divina: et per hunc modum invenitur ipsa divina sapientia prima regula iustitiae naturalis. In omnibus autem divinis operationibus quibus Deus creaturae aliquid supra debitum naturae impendit, utpote in muneribus gratiarum, idem modus iustitiae invenitur qui in prima operatione est assignatus qua naturas instituit.
| 3. God works in natural things in two ways: (1) by establishing the natures themselves, and (2) by providing each thing with whatever belongs to its nature. The essence of justice demands something due. Now, since it is no way due that creatures be brought into being, but purely voluntary, the first operation does not have the note of justice, but it depends simply upon the divine will. It might, however, conceivably be said to have the note of justice because of the ordination of the thing made to the will. For it is of obligation from the very fact that God wills it that everything which God wills be done. But in the fulfillment of this ordination it is wisdom which does the directing as the first rule. In the second sort of operation, however, there is found the character of something due, not on the part of the agent, since God is indebted to no one, but rather on the part of the recipient. It is due to every natural being that it have the things which its nature calls for both in essentials and in accidentals. But what is due depends upon the divine wisdom inasmuch as the natural being should be such as to imitate the idea of it which is in the divine mind. In this way the divine wisdom is found to be the first rule of justice. In all the divine operations, however, by which God bestows upon the creature anything beyond the debt of nature, as in the gifts of grace, the same sort of justice is found as is assigned in the first sort of operation, by which God establishes natures.
| | Ad quartum dicendum, quod voluntas divina secundum modum intelligendi praesupponit sapientiam, quae primo habet regulae rationem.
| 4. According to our manner of understanding, the divine will presupposes wisdom, “Which first has the character of a rule.
| | Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum in Deo intellectus et voluntas non differant secundum rem; voluntas per hoc quod ab intellectu dirigitur, et ad aliquid definitur, non ab aliquo alio restringitur, sed movetur secundum suam naturam, cum naturale sit illi voluntati ut semper secundum ordinem sapientiae agat.
| 5. Since. intellect and will do not really differ in God, by the fact of being directed and determined to something definite the will is not restricted by anything other than itself; but it is moved according to its own nature, since it is natural for that will always to act according to the order of wisdom.
| | Ad sextum dicendum, quod voluntatis divinae ex parte volentis non potest esse aliqua causa quae sit aliud ab ipsa voluntate, existens ei ratio volendi: nam voluntas, sapientia et bonitas, secundum rem sunt idem in Deo. Sed ex parte voliti divina voluntas habet aliquam rationem, quae scilicet est ratio voliti, non volentis, secundum quod ipsum volitum ordinatur ex debito vel ex congruo ad aliquid: qui quidem ordo ad divinam sapientiam pertinet: unde ipsa est prima radix iustitiae.
| 6. On the part of the One willing there cannot be any cause of the divine will other than the will itself as its reason for willing. For in God will, wisdom, and goodness are really identical. But on the part of the thing willed the divine will has a principle, which is that of the thing willed, not that of the One willing, according to which the thing willed is ordained to something else either by desert or by fitness. This ordination belongs to the divine wisdom. Hence this is the first root of justice.
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Q. 23: God’s Will
ARTICLE VII
In the seventh article we ask:
Are we obliged to conform our will to the divine will?
[ARTICLE I Sent., 48, aa. 1 & 3; S.T., I-II, 19, 9.]
| | Septimo quaeritur utrum teneamur voluntatem nostram conformare voluntati divinae
| Difficulties
| | Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that we are not, for
| | Nullus enim tenetur ad impossibile. Sed impossibile est nobis nostram voluntatem conformare divinae, cum divina voluntas sit nobis ignota. Ergo non tenemur ad conformitatem praedictam.
| 1. No one is held to the impossible. But it is impossible for us to conform our will to the divine will, since the divine will is unknown to us. Therefore we are not held to the conformity mentioned.
| | Praeterea, quicumque non facit hoc ad quod tenetur, peccat. Si ergo tenemur ad conformandam voluntatem nostram divinae, non conformando ipsam peccamus. Sed quicumque peccat mortaliter, in hoc in quo peccat, non conformat suam voluntatem divinae. Ergo ex hoc ipso peccat. Peccat autem aliquo alio speciali peccato, utpote quod furatur vel fornicatur. Ergo quicumque peccat duo peccata committit; quod videtur esse absurdum.
| 2. Whoever does not do that to which he is obliged sins. If, then, we are obliged to conform our will to the divine will, we sin in not conforming it. But whoever sins mortally does not conform his will to the divine in the matter in which he sins. By that very fact, therefore, he sins. He sins, however, by some other specific sin, such as stealing or fornicating. Hence whoever sins commits two sins. But this seems to be absurd.
| | Sed diceretur, quod praeceptum de conformitate voluntatis nostrae ad divinam, cum sit affirmativum, quamvis semper obliget, non tamen obligat ad semper; et sic non oportet quod quandocumque non conformatur, peccet.- Sed contra: quamvis aliquis non servans praeceptum affirmativum non peccet in quolibet instanti quo non servat, peccat tamen quandocumque contrarium agit; sicut peccat aliquis quandocumque inhonorat parentes, licet non semper peccet quando non actu honorat. Sed ille qui peccat mortaliter, agit contrarium conformitati praedictae. Ergo ex hoc ipso peccat.
| 3. The answer was given that the commandment about the conformity. of our will to the divine, being affirmative, does not bind to constant compliance though it constantly binds. Thus it is not necessary that whenever conformity is lacking there is sin.—On the contrary, although a person not observing an affirmative commandment does not sin at every moment in which he is not observing it, yet he does sin whenever he acts contrary to it. Thus a person sins whenever he dishonors his parents, although he does not always sin when he is not actually honoring them. But he who sins mortally acts contrary to the conformity in question. It is therefore by this fact that he sins.
| | Praeterea, quicumque non servat hoc ad quod tenetur, est transgressor. Sed ille qui peccat venialiter, non conformat voluntatem suam voluntati divinae. Si ergo ad conformandum tenetur, erit transgressor, et ita peccabit mortaliter.
| 4. Whoever does not observe that to which he is obliged is a transgressor. But one who sins venially does not conform his will to the divine will. If he is obliged to conform to it, he will be a transgressor and so will sin mortally.
| | Sed diceretur, quod non tenetur pro illo instanti conformare quo venialiter peccat, quia praecepta affirmativa non obligant ad semper.- Sed contra: quicumque non servat praeceptum affirmativum loco et tempore pro quo obligatur transgressor iudicatur. Sed tempus conformandi voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae non videtur posse aliud determinari nisi hoc quod voluntas exit in actum. Ergo quandocumque voluntas in actum exit, nisi conformetur divinae voluntati, videtur esse peccatum; et ita quando aliquis venialiter peccat, videtur esse peccatum mortale.
| 5. The answer was given that he is not obliged at that moment in which he is sinning venially, because affirmative commandments do not oblige us to comply always.—On the contrary, whoever does not comply with an affirmative commandment at the place and time at which it binds, is adjudged a transgressor. But it seems that no other time for conforming our will to the divine will can be determined upon than that at which the will passes into act. Hence, whenever the will passes into act, unless it is conformed to the divine will, there seems to be a sin; and so when a person sins venially, the sin seems to be mortal.
| | Praeterea, nullus ad impossibile tenetur. Sed obstinati non possunt suam voluntatem conformare divinae. Ergo ad hanc conformitatem non tenentur; ita nec alii; alias obstinati de sua obstinatione commodum reportarent.
| 6. No one is held to the impossible. But the obstinate cannot conform their will to the divine. They are therefore not held to this conformity. And so neither are others; otherwise the obstinate would draw an advantage from their obstinacy.
| | Praeterea, cum Deus quidquid vult, ex caritate velit, ipse enim est caritas; si tenemur nostram voluntatem conformare divinae, tenemur caritatem habere. Sed non habens caritatem, non potest eam consequi, nisi ad eam se praeparet diligenter. Ergo non habens caritatem, tenetur se continue ad habendam caritatem praeparare. Et ita in quolibet instanti quo non habet caritatem, peccat, cum hoc ex defectu praeparationis proveniat.
| 7. Since God wills from charity whatever He wills, being charity Himself, if we are obliged to conform our will to God’s, we are obliged to have charity. But a person who does not have charity cannot obtain it unless he carefully prepares himself for it. One not having charity is therefore obliged to prepare himself continuously to have it. Thus at every instant at which he does not have charity he sins, since his not having it comes from a lack of preparation.
| | Praeterea, cum forma actus praecipue in modo agendi consistat; si ad conformitatem divinae voluntatis tenemur, oportet ut eodem modo aliquid velimus quo Deus vult. Modum autem divinae voluntatis potest aliquis aliqualiter imitari et dilectione naturali et dilectione gratuita. Non autem potest secundum dilectionem naturalem attendi conformitas de qua loquimur: quia hoc modo conformant voluntatem suam divinae infideles et peccatores, dum in eis naturalis dilectio boni viget. Similiter non potest attendi quantum ad dilectionem gratuitam, quae est caritas: sic enim teneremur velle quidquid volumus, ex caritate; quod est contra opinionem multorum, qui dicunt, quod modus non cadit in praecepto. Ergo videtur quod non teneamur ad conformandum nostram voluntatem divinae.
| 8. Since the form of an act consists especially in the manner of acting, if we are held to conformity with the divine will, we must will a thing in the same manner in which God wills it. Now a person can imitate the manner of the divine will after a fashion both by natural love and by gratuitous love. The conformity of which we speak, however, cannot be taken with reference to natural love, because even infidels and sinners conform their will to God’s in this manner as long as the natural love of good is alive within them. Similarly it cannot be taken with reference to gratuitous love, that is, charity. In that case we should be obliged to will from charity whatever we will. But this is contrary to the opinion of many, who say that the manner does not fall within the scope of the commandment. It therefore seems that we are not obliged to conform our will to the divine will.
| | Praeterea, quantum distat Deus ab homine, tanto voluntas Dei ab hominis voluntate, ut dicit Glossa super illud Ps. XXXII, 1: rectos decet collaudatio. Sed Deus tantum distat ab homine, quod homo non potest ei conformari. Cum enim homo a Deo in infinitum distet, nulla potest esse ipsius ad Deum proportio. Ergo nec voluntas hominis divinae voluntati conformari poterit.
| 9. Commenting on the words of the Psalm (32:1): “Praise becomes the upright,” the Gloss says: “The distance between God’s will and man’s is just as great as that between God and man.” But God is so distant from man that man cannot be conformed to Him. Since man is infinitely distant from God, there cannot be any proportion between him and God. Then neither can man’s will be conformed to God’s.
| | Praeterea, illa dicuntur esse conformia quae in aliqua una forma conveniunt. Si ergo voluntas nostra divinae conformari potest, oportet quod sit aliqua una forma in qua utraque voluntas conveniat; et sic esset aliquid simplicius divina voluntate, quod est impossibile.
| 10. Those things are said to be conformed which agree in some one form. Consequently, if our will can be conformed to the divine, there must be some one form in which the two wills agree. Then there would be something simpler than the divine will. But that is impossible.
| | Praeterea, conformatio est relatio aequiparantiae. Sed in talibus relationibus utrumque extremorum ad alterum refertur eadem relatione; sicut dicitur amicus amico amicus, et frater fratri frater. Si ergo voluntas nostra potest conformari divinae, ut sic ad conformitatem praedictam teneamur, et voluntas divina nostrae poterit conformari; quod videtur inconveniens.
| 11. Conformity is a reciprocal relation. In such relations each one of the extremes is referred to the other by the same relation. Thus a friend is said to be a friend to his friend, and a brother, a brother to his brother. If, then, our will can conform to the divine will, and as a result we are held to the conformity in question, the divine will can conform to ours. But that seems unacceptable.
| | Praeterea, illa cadunt in praecepto et ad ea tenemur, quae possumus facere et non facere. Sed non possumus facere quin nostram voluntatem conformemus divinae; quia, sicut dicit Anselmus, sicut quod est intra corpus sphaericum, quo magis ab una parte circumferentiae se elongat, eo magis ad alteram appropinquat, ita, quod ex una parte a Dei voluntate discedit, ex alia parte divinam voluntatem implet. Ergo non tenemur ad conformitatem praedictam, sicut tenemur ad ea quae cadunt sub praecepto.
| 12. Things that we are able to do or not do fall within the scope of commandments, and we are held to them. But we cannot help but conform our will to God’s, because, as Anselm says, whoever departs from God’s will in some particular fulfills the divine will in another, just as the more distant something that is within a spherical body gets from one part of the circumference, the more it draws near to some other part. We are therefore not bound to the conformity in question as we arc bound to the matters which fall under a commandment.
| | Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
| | Est quod super illud Psal. XXXII, 1: rectos decet collaudatio, dicit Glossa: recti sunt qui dirigunt cor suum secundum voluntatem Dei. Sed quilibet tenetur esse rectus. Ergo quilibet tenetur ad conformitatem praedictam.
| 1. Regarding the words of the Psalm (32:1): “Praise becomes the upright,” the Gloss says: “The upright are those who direct their hearts according to the will of God.” But everyone is obliged to be upright. Hence everyone is obliged to the above-mentioned conformity.
| | Praeterea unumquodque debet suae regulae conformari. Sed voluntas divina nostrae voluntatis est regula, cum in Deo primo rectitudo voluntatis inveniatur. Ergo voluntas nostra debet divinae voluntati conformari.
| 2. Every being should conform to its rule. But the divine will is the rule of ours, since correctness of will is found first in God. Our will should therefore conform to the divine will.
| | Respondeo.
| REPLY
| | Dicendum, quod quilibet tenetur suam voluntatem conformare divinae. Cuius ratio ex hoc accipi potest: quod in quolibet genere est unum primum, quod est mensura omnium quae sunt in illo genere, in quo perfectissime natura generis invenitur: sicut natura coloris in albedine, quae pro tanto mensura omnium colorum dicitur, quia de unoquoque colore cognoscitur quantum participet de natura generis ex propinquitate ad albedinem, vel ex remotione ab ipsa, ut dicitur in X Metaph. Et per hunc modum ipse Deus est mensura omnium entium, ut ex verbis Commentatoris ibidem haberi potest.
| Everyone is obliged to conform his will to God’s. The reason for this can be taken from the fact that in every genus there is some one thing which is primary and is the measure of all the other things which are in that genus, for in it the nature of the genus is most perfectly found. This is verified of the nature of color, for example, in whiteness, which is called the measure of all colors because the extent to which each color shares in the nature of the genus is known from its nearness to whiteness or its remoteness from it, as is said in the Metaphysics. In this way God Himself is the measure of all beings, as can be gathered from the words of the Commentator.
| | Tantum enim unumquodque habet de esse, quantum ei per similitudinem appropinquat; secundum vero quod ei dissimile invenitur, ad non esse accedit. Et sic de omnibus quae in Deo et creaturis pariter inveniuntur, dici oportet. Unde et intellectus eius omnis cognitionis est mensura, et bonitas omnis bonitatis, et, ut specialius loquar, bona voluntas omnis bonae voluntatis. Ex hoc ergo unaquaeque voluntas bona est quod divinae voluntati conformatur. Unde, cum quilibet teneatur ad habendam bonam voluntatem, tenetur pariter ad habendam voluntatem divinae voluntati conformem.
| Every being has the act of existing in the proportion in which it approaches God by likeness. But according as it is found to be unlike Him, it approximates non-existence. And the same must be said of all the attributes which are found both in God and in creatures. Hence His intellect is the measure of all knowledge; His goodness, of all goodness; and, to speak more to the point, His good will, of every good will. Every good will is therefore good by reason of its being conformed to the divine good will. Accordingly, since everyone is obliged to have a good will, he is likewise obliged to have a will conformed to the divine will.
| | Sed sciendum, quod ista conformitas multipliciter attendi potest. Loquimur enim hic de voluntate quae est actus: conformitas enim nostri ad Deum secundum potentiam voluntatis est naturalis, ad imaginem pertinens; unde sub praecepto non cadit. Actus vero divinae voluntatis non solum hoc habet quod sit voluntatis actus, sed simul habet quod sit causa omnium quae sunt actus. Ergo actus nostrae voluntatis divinae voluntati conformari potest vel sicut effectus causae, vel sicut voluntas voluntati.
| But it should be noted that this conformity can be taken in many senses. We are speaking here of will in the sense of the volitional act. Our conformity to God on the part of the will as a faculty is natural, belonging to the image. It accordingly does not fall under any commandment. But the act of the divine will has not only this characteristic, that it is an act of will, but at the same time this also, that it is the cause of all things that are acts. The act of our will can therefore conform to the divine will either as an effect to its cause or as a will to a will.
| | Conformitas autem effectus ad causam aliter invenitur in naturalibus et in voluntariis causis. In naturalibus enim causis attenditur conformitas secundum similitudinem naturae, sicut quod homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem; sed in voluntariis dicitur effectus causae conformari ex hoc quod in effectu impletur sua causa: sicut artificiatum assimilatur suae causae, non quod sit eiusdem naturae cum arte quae est in mente artificis, sed quia forma artis in artificiato impletur. Et similiter conformatur voluntati effectus eius, quando hoc fit quod voluntas disposuit. Et ita ex hoc actus nostrae voluntatis divinae voluntati conformatur, quod volumus id quod Deus vult nos velle.
| Now the conformity of an effect to its cause is found in a different way among natural and among voluntary causes. In the case of natural causes the conformity is to be found according to a likeness in nature. For example, man begets a man, and fire begets fire. But in the case of voluntary causes the effect is said to conform to the cause by reason of the fact that the cause is fulfilled in the effect. Thus a product of art is likened to its cause, not because it is of the same nature as the art which is in the mind of the artist, but because the form of the art is fulfilled in the product. It is in this way that an effect of the will is conformed to the will when what the will disposes comes about. And so an act of our will conforms to the divine will by reason of the fact that we will what God wants us to will.
| | Voluntatis vero ad voluntatem secundum actum conformitas potest attendi dupliciter: uno modo quasi secundum formam speciei, ut homo similatur homini; alio modo secundum formam superinductam, sicut sapiens sapienti similatur:
| The conformity of one will to another in its act, however, can be taken in two ways: (1) according to the form of a species, as man is like man, and (2) according to an added form, as a wise man is like a wise man.
| | et dico assimilari secundum speciem, quando est convenientia in obiecto, a quo actus speciem trahit. Sed in obiecto voluntatis duo sunt consideranda: unum quod est quasi materiale, scilicet ipsa res volita; aliud quod est quasi formale, scilicet ratio volendi, quae est finis: sicut in obiecto visus color est quasi materiale, lux vero quasi formale, quia per eam efficitur color visibilis in actu. Et sic ex parte obiecti duplex conformitas inveniri potest. Una ex parte voliti, ut quando homo vult aliquid quod Deus vult; et hoc est quasi secundum causam materialem: obiectum enim est quasi materia actus. Unde est minima inter alias. Alia ex parte rationis volendi, sive ex parte finis, ut cum aliquis propter hoc vult aliquid propter quod Deus: et haec conformitas est secundum causam finalem.
| One will is like another in species, I say, when the two have in common the same object; for from the object the act draws its species. But in the object of the will two aspects are to be taken into account: one which is, as it were, material—the thing willed; another which is, as it were, formal—the reason for willing, which is the end. It is like the case of the object of sight, in which color is in effect material, and light is formal, because by light the color is made actually visible. Thus on the part of the object two sorts of conformity can be found. One derives from the thing willed. A man, for instance, wills something that God wills. This conformity is, in a sense, based upon the material cause; for the object is, as it were, the matter of the act. It is accordingly the least among the types of conformity. The other sort of conformity derives from the reason for willing or the end. This is had when someone wills something for the same reason for which God wills it. Conformity of this kind is based upon the final cause.
| | Forma vero superveniens actui est modus quem consequitur ex habitu eliciente. Et sic voluntas nostra dicitur conformis esse divinae, quando aliquis vult aliquid ex caritate sicut Deus; et hoc est quasi secundum causam formalem.
| A form added to an act, however, is the mode which it gets from the habit which elicits it. It is in this way that our will is said to be conformed to the divine when a person wills something from charity just as God does. This is, in a sense, based upon the formal cause.
| |
| Answers to Difficulties
| | Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod voluntas Dei plenarie nobis nota esse non potest: unde nec plenarie voluntatem nostram eius voluntati possumus conformare; sed secundum quod cognoscimus, conformare possumus et tenemur.
| 1. The will of God cannot be fully known to us. Hence, neither can we fully conform our will to His. But we can conform it in proportion to the knowledge which we have, and we are held to this.
| | Ad secundum dicendum, quod uno actu homo non committit duo peccata, cum ipsa essentia peccati sit actus; sed tamen in uno actu possunt esse duae peccati deformitates: et hoc quando actui alicuius peccati specialis supervenit aliqua circumstantia, quae transfert eum in alterius peccati deformitatem; ut cum quis aliqua rapit ut in meretrices expendat, actus rapinae accipit deformitatem luxuriae ex circumstantia propter quid.
| 2. A man does not commit two sins in one act, since the essence of sin is an act. There can, however, be two deformities of sin in one act. This is the case when there is joined to the act of some particular sin a circumstance which transmits to it the deformity of another sin. When a man steals the goods of another in order to spend them upon harlots, for instance, the act of theft takes on the deformity of lust from the circumstance of the reason why.
| | Quando vero aliquid ad deformitatem pertinens invenitur in actu alicuius peccati, praeter specialem deformitatem illius peccati, quod quidem sit omni peccato commune, per hoc nec peccatum geminatur, neque peccati deformitas; eo quod huiusmodi quae communiter in omnibus peccatis inveniuntur, sunt quasi principia essentialia peccati in quantum est peccatum, et includuntur in deformitate cuiuslibet specialis peccati, sicut principia generis in ratione speciei; et ideo non ponunt in numerum contra specialem deformitatem peccati: sicut hoc quod est averti a Deo, non obedire divinae legi, et huiusmodi, inter quae computari debet defectus conformitatis de qua loquimur. Unde non oportet quod talis defectus peccatum geminet vel peccati deformitatem.
| When, however, there is found in the act of some sin, over and above the specific deformity of that sin, some element of deformity which is common to every sin, by that fact neither the sin nor the deformity of the sin is doubled. For such things as are to be found in all sins in common are, as it were, the essential principles of sin as such; and they are included in the deformity of any specific sin just as the principles of a genus are included in the formal character of the species. Not being distinct from the specific deformity of the sin, they do not add to it numerically. Such things are turning away from God, not obeying the divine law, and others, among which must be accounted the lack of conformity of which we are speaking. Hence it is not necessary that such a defect should double the sin or the deformity of the sin.
| | Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis faciens contrarium conformitati ex hoc ipso peccet, tamen ex hoc quod est generale, non ponit in numerum contra speciale.
| 3. Although one who acts contrary to conformity sins by this very fact, yet by reason of what is generic he does not add anything numerically to what is specific.
| | Ad quartum dicendum, quod ille qui peccat venialiter, quamvis non conformet actu suam voluntatem divinae, conformat tamen habitu: nec tenetur ut semper in actum exeat, sed pro loco et tempore; tenetur tamen ut nunquam contrarium agat. Peccans autem venialiter non agit contra conformitatem praedictam, sed praeter eam; unde non sequitur quod peccet mortaliter.
| 4. Although one who sins venially does not in this act conform his will to the divine, yet he does conform it habitually. Nor is he obliged always to go into act, but only according to the place and time. He is, however, obliged never to do anything contrary. But one who sins venially does not act contrary to the conformity in question but rather beyond its scope. Hence it does not follow that he sins mortally.
| | Ad quintum dicendum, quod non pro omni tempore quo voluntas nostra in actum exit, obligat praeceptum de conformitate voluntatis; sed pro illo tempore quo quis tenetur de statu suae salutis cogitare; sicut quando tenetur confiteri, vel sacramenta accipere, vel aliquid huiusmodi facere.
| 5. The commandment about the conformity of will does not bind every time our will passes into act but just when we are obliged to think about the state of our salvation, as when we are obliged to confess or receive the sacraments or do something of the sort.
| | Ad sextum dicendum, quod aliquis dicitur obstinatus dupliciter. Uno modo simpliciter; quando scilicet habet voluntatem irreversibilem, malo adhaerentem. Et sic sunt obstinati illi qui sunt in Inferno, non autem aliquis in hac vita existens. Illi autem qui sunt in Inferno, adhuc tenentur ad conformitatem de qua agimus; ad quam quamvis pervenire non possint, ipsi tamen huius impotentiae sibi causa extiterunt: unde non conformando peccant, quamvis forte non demerentur, eo quod non sunt viatores. Alio modo dicitur aliquis obstinatus secundum quid, quando habet voluntatem adhaerentem malo, non quidem omnino irreversibilem, sed per difficultatem. Per quem modum aliqui dicuntur obstinati in hac vita. Et tales possunt voluntatem suam conformare divinae: unde non solum peccant non conformando, sed etiam demerentur.
| 6. A person is said to be obstinate in two senses: (1) This is said absolutely, when he has a will irreversibly adhering to evil. In this sense those who are in hell are obstinate, but not anyone in this life. Those who are in hell are still held to the conformity of which we are treating. Although they cannot attain it, nevertheless they were themselves the cause of their own impotence. They accordingly sin in not conforming their wills, although it happens that they do not incur demerit because they are not wayfarers. (2) A person is said to be obstinate in a certain respect, when, namely, he has a will adhering to evil which is not altogether irreversible but reversible only with great difficulty. It is in this sense that some are said to be obstinate in this life. These are able to conform their will to God’s. Hence in not conforming they not only sin but also incur demerit.
| | Ad septimum dicendum, quod quilibet tenetur, quantum in se est, ad caritatem habendam; et si non facit quod in se est, peccat peccato omissionis. Non tamen oportet quod in quolibet instanti in quo non facit, peccet, sed tunc tantum quando facere tenebatur; utpote cum ei necessitas imminebat aliquid faciendi quod sine caritate fieri non potest, ut sacramenta accipere.
| 7. Everyone is obliged, as far as depends upon him, to have charity; and whoever does not sins by a sin of omission. Still he does not necessarily sin at every moment in which he does not have it, but at the time at which he was bound to have it, as when it was incumbent upon him to do something which cannot be done without charity, such as to receive the sacraments.
| | Ad octavum dicendum, quod dupliciter ad aliquid tenemur. Uno modo sic quod si non faciamus, poenam incurremus, quod est proprie ad aliquid teneri; et sic, secundum communiorem opinionem, non tenemur ad faciendum aliquid ex caritate, sed ad faciendum aliquid ex dilectione naturali, sine qua ad minus quidquid fit, male fit. Et dico dilectionem naturalem non solum illam quae est nobis naturaliter indita, et est omnibus communis, ut quod omnes beatitudinem appetunt; sed illam ad quam aliquis per principia naturalia pervenire potest, quae invenitur in bonis ex genere, et in virtutibus politicis. Alio modo dicimur ad aliquid teneri, quia sine hoc non possumus finem beatitudinis consequi; et sic tenemur ut aliquid ex caritate faciamus, sine qua nihil potest esse aeternae vitae meritorium. Et sic patet quomodo modus caritatis aliquo modo cadit sub praecepto, et aliquo modo non.
| 8. We are said to be obliged to something in two ways: (1) We are obliged in such a way that, if we do not do it, we incur a penalty. And this is the proper sense of being obliged. According to the more common opinion we are not obliged in this way to do anything from charity; but we are so obliged to do something from natural love, and without at least this whatever is done is badly done. By natural love I mean not only that which is implanted in us by nature and is common to all, as all desire happiness, but also that to which a person can attain by natural principles. It is found in actions that are good by reason of their genus, and also in the political virtues. (z) We are said to be obliged to something because without it we are unable to attain our end, beatitude. In this way we are obliged to do something from charity, without which nothing that merits eternal life can be done. It is accordingly clear how the mode of charity in one way falls within the scope of commandment and in another does not.
| | Ad nonum dicendum, quod homo conformatur Deo, cum sit ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei factus. Quamvis autem propter hoc quod a Deo in infinitum distat, non possit esse ipsius ad Deum proportio, secundum quod proportio proprie in quantitatibus invenitur, comprehendens duarum quantitatum ad invicem comparatarum certam mensuram; secundum tamen quod nomen proportionis translatum est ad quamlibet habitudinem significandam unius rei ad rem aliam, utpote cum dicimus hic esse proportionum similitudinem, sicut se habet princeps ad civitatem ita gubernator ad navim, nihil prohibet dicere aliquam proportionem hominis ad Deum, cum in aliqua habitudine ipsum ad se habeat, utpote ab eo effectus, et ei subiectus.
| 9. Man is conformed to God since he is made to God’s image and likeness. It is true that, because man is infinitely distant from God, there cannot be a proportion between him and God in the proper sense of proportion as found among quantities, consisting of a Certain measure of two quantities compared to each other. Nevertheless, in the sense in which the term proportion is transferred to signify any relationship of one thing to another (as we say that there is a likeness of proportions in this instance: the pilot is to his ship as the ruler to the commonwealth), nothing prevents our saying that there is a proportion of man to God, since man stands in a certain relationship to Him inasmuch as he is made by God and subject to Him.
| | Vel potest dici, quod finiti ad infinitum quamvis non possit esse proportio proprie accepta, tamen potest esse proportionalitas, quae est duarum proportionum similitudo: dicimus enim quatuor esse proportionata duobus, quia sunt eorum dupla; sex vero esse quatuor proportionabilia, quia sicut se habeat sex ad tria, ita quatuor ad duo. Similiter finitum et infinitum, quamvis non possint esse proportionata, possunt tamen esse proportionabilia; quia sicut infinitum est aequale infinito, ita finitum finito. Et per hunc modum est similitudo inter creaturam et Deum, quia sicut se habet ad ea quae ei competunt, ita creatura ad sua propria.
| Or the answer could be given that, although there cannot be between the finite and the infinite a proportion properly so called, yet there can be a proportionality or the likeness of two proportions. We say that four is proportioned to two because it is the double; but we say that four is proportionable to six because four is to two as six is to three. In the same way, although the finite and the infinite cannot be proportioned, they can be proportionable, because the finite is equal to the finite just as the infinite is to the infinite. In this way there is a likeness of the creature to God, because the creature stands to the things which are its own as God does to those which belong to Him.
| | Ad decimum dicendum, quod creatura non dicitur conformari Deo quasi participanti eamdem formam quam ipsa participat, sed quia Deus est substantialiter ipsa forma, cuius creatura per quamdam imitationem est participativa; sicut si ignis similaretur calori per se separato existenti.
| 10. The creature is not said to be conformed to God as to one who shares in the same form in which it shares, but because God is substantially the very form in which the creature participates by a sort of imitation. It is as if fire were likened to a separate subsistent heat.
| | Ad undecimum dicendum, quod similitudo et conformitas, quamvis sint relationes aequiparantiae, non tamen semper utrumque extremorum denominatur in respectu ad alterum; sed tunc tantum quando forma secundum quam attenditur similitudo vel conformitas, eadem ratione in utroque extremorum existit, sicut albedo in duobus hominibus, eo quod uterque convenienter potest dici alterius formam habere; quod significatur cum aliquid simile alteri dicitur. Sed quando forma est in uno principaliter, in altero vero quasi secundario, non recipitur similitudinis reciprocatio; sicut dicimus statuam Herculis similem Herculi, sed non e converso; non enim potest dici quod Hercules habeat formam statuae, sed solum quod statua habeat Herculis formam. Et per hunc modum creaturae dicuntur esse Deo similes et conformes, non tamen e contra. Sed conformatio, cum sit motus ad conformitatem, non importat aequiparantiae relationem, sed praesupponit aliquid ad cuius conformitatem alterum moveatur; unde posteriora prioribus conformantur, sed non e converso.
| 11. Although likeness and conformity are reciprocal relations, these terms do not always designate indifferently the reference of either one of the related members to the other. It is only when the form on which the likeness or conformity is based is in each of the extremes in the same way, as whiteness is in two men. In that case either one can aptly be said to have the form of the other; and this is what is meant when something is said to be like another. But when the form is in one principally and in the other in a secondary way, reciprocity of the likeness is not had. Thus we say that the statue of Hercules is like Hercules, but not the other way about; for it cannot be said that Hercules has the form of the statue, but only that the statue has the form of Hercules. In this way creatures are said to be similar and conformed to God but not God to creatures. But since conformation is a motion toward conformity, it does not imply a reciprocal relation but presupposes one of the related members and denotes that something else is moving toward conformity with it. Succeeding things are conformed to preceding, but not conversely.
| | Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod verbum Anselmi est intelligendum non pro tanto quod homo semper faciat divinam voluntatem quantum in ipso est; sed quia divina voluntas semper de eo impletur, vel eo volente, vel eo nolente.
| 12. The statement of Anselm is to be understood as meaning, not that man always does the will of God as far as he can, but that the divine will is always fulfilled in his regard whether he wills it or not.
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Q. 23: God’s Will
ARTICLE VIII
In the eighth article we ask:
Are we obliged to conform our will to the divine will as regards its object so as to be bound to will what we know God wills?
[ARTICLE I Sent., 48, aa. 2 & 4; S.T., I-II, 10, 10.]
| | Octavo quaeritur utrum teneamur conformare voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae in volito, ut scilicet teneamur velle hoc quod scimus Deum velle
| Difficulties
| | Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that we are not, for
| | Paulus enim cupiebat dissolvi, et esse cum Christo, ut dicitur Philipp. I, 23. Hoc autem Deus non volebat; unde ibidem subditur: scio quod manebo propter vos. Si ergo tenemur hoc velle quod Deus vult, Paulus cupiens dissolvi et esse cum Christo, peccabat; quod est absurdum.
| 1. Paul desired “to be dissolved and to be with Christ,” as is said in the Epistle to the Philippians (1: 23). But God did not want this, Hence Paul adds: “I know that I shall abide”(1: 25) for your sake. If, then, we are obliged to will what God wills, in desiring to be dissolved and to be with Christ, Paul sinned. But that is absurd.
| | Praeterea, quod Deus scit, potest alteri revelare. Scit autem Deus aliquem esse reprobatum. Potest ergo alicui suam reprobationem revelare. Si ergo ponatur alicui revelare, sequitur quod iste teneatur velle suam damnationem, si tenemur velle hoc quod scimus Deum velle. Velle autem suam damnationem est contrarium caritati, per quam quilibet se diligit ad vitam aeternam. Ergo teneretur aliquis velle contra caritatem; quod est inconveniens.
| 2. What God knows can be revealed to someone else. Now God knows that a certain person is reprobated. He can therefore reveal to someone his reprobation. On the supposition that He reveals this to someone, it therefore follows that this person is bound to will his own damnation if we are bound to will what we know God wills. To will one’s own damnation, however, is contrary to charity, by which each one loves himself even to eternal life. A person would therefore be bound to will something against charity. But that is not befitting.
| | Praeterea, praelato tenemur sicut Deo obedire, cum ei vice Dei obediamus. Sed non tenetur subditus facere aut velle quidquid scit praelatum velle, si sciat praelatum velle quod ipse faciat, nisi hoc expresse ei praecipiat. Ergo non tenemur velle quidquid Deus scit, vel quidquid Deus vult nos velle.
| 3 We are obliged to obey a superior as God Himself since we obey him in God’s stead. But a subject is not obliged to do and to will whatever he knows his superior wishes, even if he knows that the superior wishes him to do it, unless the superior expressly commands it. We are therefore not obliged to will whatever God wills or whatever He wishes us to will.
| | Praeterea, quidquid est laudabile et honestum, in Christo perfectissime ac sine omni contraria permixtione invenitur. Sed Christus aliqua voluntate voluit contrarium eius quod scivit Deum velle; voluit enim aliqua voluntate non pati, ut ostendit oratio qua oravit, Matth. XXVI, 39: pater, si fieri potest, transeat a me calix iste; cum tamen Deus vellet eum pati. Ergo velle quidquid Deus vult, non est laudabile; nec ad hoc tenemur.
| 4 Whatever is praiseworthy and honorable is found in Christ most perfectly and without the admixture of anything contrary. But with some will Christ willed the contrary of what He knew God wished; for with some kind of will he willed not to suffer, as the prayer He prayed shows: “My Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from me” (Matthew 26:39), even though God wished Him to suffer. To will whatever God wills is therefore not praiseworthy, nor are we held to it.
| | Praeterea, Augustinus, in libro de civitate Dei, dicit: tristitia est de his quae nobis nolentibus accidunt. Sed beata virgo dolorem sensit de filii morte; quem significant verba Simeonis dicentis, Luc. II, 35: tuam ipsius animam pertransibit gladius. Ergo beata virgo nolebat Christum pati; Deus autem hoc volebat. Si ergo tenemur velle id quod Deus vult, beata virgo in hoc peccavit, quod est inconveniens. Et ita videtur quod non teneamur conformare voluntatem nostram divinae in volito.
| 5. According to Augustine’ sadness is had regarding the things which have happened to us against our will. But the Blessed Virgin felt sorrow at the death of her son, as is indicated in the words of Simeon: “Thy own soul a sword shall pierce” (Luke 2:35). The Blessed Virgin therefore did not wish Christ to suffer, but God wished it. Now if we are obliged to will what God wills, the Blessed Virgin sinned in this instance. But that cannot be granted. Thus it is seen that we are not obliged to conform our will to God’s as to the object.
| | Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
| | Super illud Psalm. c, 3-4: non adhaesit mihi cor pravum, dicit Glossa: cor tortum habet qui non vult quaecumque Deus vult. Sed quilibet tenetur cordis tortitudinem vitare. Ergo quilibet tenetur velle quod Deus vult.
| 1. Concerning the words of the Psalm (100:4): “The perverse heart did not cleave to me,” the Gloss says: “He who does not will whatever God wills has a twisted heart.” But everyone is obliged to avoid having a twisted heart. Therefore everyone is obliged to will what God wills.
| | Praeterea, secundum Tullium, amicorum est idem velle et idem nolle. Sed quilibet tenetur habere amicitiam ad Deum. Ergo quilibet tenetur velle hoc quod Deus vult, et non velle quod non vult.
| 2. According to Tully, friendship is willing and not willing the same thing. But everyone is obliged to have friendship for God. Hence everyone is obliged to will what God wills and not to will what He does not will.
| | Praeterea, propter hoc debemus voluntatem nostram divinae conformare, quia voluntas Dei regula est nostrae voluntatis, ut dicit Glossa, super illud Psalm. XXXII, 1: rectos decet collaudatio. Sed volitum divinum est regula omnis alterius voliti, cum sit primum volitum, et primum in quolibet genere sit mensura eorum quae sunt post, ut dicitur in X Metaph. Ergo tenemur volita nostra conformare divino volito.
| 3. We should conform our will to God’s for the reason that the will of God is the rule of our will, as the Gloss says commenting on the words of the Psalm (32:1): “Praise becomes the upright.” But the object of the divine will, too, is the rule of every other object, since it is the first thing willed, and the first in each genus is the measure of the things that come after, as is said in the Metaphysics. We are therefore obliged to conform the objects of our will to the object of the divine will.
| | Praeterea, peccatum praecipue in perversitate electionis consistit. Sed perversitas electionis est quando minus bonum magis bono praefertur. Hoc autem facit quicumque non vult quod Deus vult; cum constet, id quod Deus vult, optimum esse. Ergo quicumque non vult id quod Deus vult, peccat.
| 4. Sin consists principally in perversity of choice. But there is perversity of choice when the lesser good is preferred to the greater. Now whoever does not will what God wills does this, since it is evident that what God wills is best. Hence, whoever does not will what God wills sins.
| | Praeterea, secundum philosophum, virtuosus est regula et mensura in omnibus humanis actibus. Sed Christus est maxime virtuosus. Ergo Christo maxime nos debemus conformare tamquam regulae et mensurae. Sed Christus voluntatem suam conformabat divinae quantum ad volita, quod omnes beati faciunt. Ergo et nos tenemur voluntatem nostram conformare divinae quantum ad volita.
| 5. According to the Philosopher, the virtuous man is “the rule and measure” for all human acts. But Christ is most virtuous. We should therefore most of all conform ourselves to Christ as our rule and measure. Now Christ conformed his will to the divine will even as regards its objects; and all the blessed do the same. Therefore we too are obliged to conform our will to the divine even as regards its objects.
| | Respondeo.
| REPLY
| | Dicendum, quod in volito quodammodo tenemur nostram voluntatem conformare divinae, quodammodo vero non. Secundum hoc enim, ut dictum est, art. praeced., voluntatem nostram divinae conformare tenemur quod bonitas divinae voluntatis regula est et mensura omnis bonae voluntatis. Cum autem bonum ex fine dependeat, voluntas bona dicitur secundum ordinem ad rationem volendi, quae est finis. Comparatio vero voluntatis ad volitum absolute non facit actum voluntatis esse bonum, cum ipsum volitum se habeat quasi materialiter ad rationem volendi, quae est finis rectus: potest enim unum et idem volitum bene vel male appeti, secundum quod in diversos fines ordinatur; et e contrario diversa et contraria volita potest quis bene velle, in finem rectum referendo utrumque. Quamvis ergo voluntas Dei non possit esse nisi bona, et omne quodcumque vult, bene velit; tamen bonitas in ipso actu voluntatis divinae consideratur ex ratione volendi, id est ex fine ad quem ordinat quidquid vult, qui est bonitas sua.
| in regard to the object of our will we arc in a sense obliged to conform our will to God’s and in a sense we are not. We are obliged to conform our will to God’s in this respect (as has been said), that the divine goodness is the rule and measure of every good will. But since good depends upon the end, a will is called good on the basis of its relation to the reason for willing, which is the end. The reference of the will to the object, however, does not in itself make the act of will good, since the object stands materially, as it were, to the reason for willing, which is an upright end. One and the same object can be desired either rightly or wrongly according as it is referred to different ends; and on the other hand different and even contrary objects can both be willed rightly by being referred to an upright end. Therefore, although the will of God cannot be anything but good, and whatever He wills He wills rightly, nevertheless the goodness in the very act of the divine will is viewed from the standpoint of the reason for willing, that is, the end to which God refers whatever He wills, His own goodness.
| | Et ideo divinae voluntati simpliciter in fine conformari tenemur; in volito autem nonnisi secundum quod illud volitum consideratur sub ordine ad finem. Qui quidem ordo semper nobis debet placere, quamvis hoc idem volitum possit nobis merito displicere secundum aliquam aliam considerationem, utpote secundum quod in contrarium finem est ordinabile. Et inde est quod voluntas humana secundum hoc invenitur conformari divinae voluntati in volito, quod se habet ad finem divinae voluntatis.
| Thus we are obliged to conform absolutely to the divine will in regard to the end, but in regard to the object only in so far as it is viewed under the aspect of its relation to the end. This relation must always please us too, though the same object of will can justly displease us under some other aspect, such as its being referable to some contrary end. Hence it is that the human will is found to conform to the divine will in its object inasmuch as it stands related to the divine will.
| | Voluntas enim beatorum, qui sunt in continua contemplatione divinae bonitatis et ex ea regulant omnes suas affectiones, utpote plene cognoscentes uniuscuiusque desiderandorum ordinem ad ipsam, conformatur divinae voluntati in quolibet suo volito: omne enim quod sciunt Deum velle, volunt absolute, et sine aliquo motu in contrarium.
| The will of the blessed, who are in continuous contemplation of the divine goodness and regulate by it all their affections, knowing fully the relationship to it of each object of their desires, is conformed to the divine will in every one of its objects. For everything that they know God wills, they will absolutely and without any motion to the contrary.
| | Peccatores vero, qui sunt aversi a voluntate divinae bonitatis, discordant in pluribus ab his quae Deus vult, ea improbantes, et nulla ratione assentientes.
| Sinners, however, who are turned away from willing the divine goodness, are at variance in many respects from what God wills, disapproving of it and in no way assenting to it.
| | Iusti vero viatores quorum voluntas adhaeret divinae bonitati, et tamen eam non ita perfecte contemplantur, ut omnem ordinem volendorum ad ipsam manifeste percipiant, conformantur quidem divinae voluntati quantum ad illa volita quorum rationem percipiunt, quamvis in eis sit aliqua affectio ad contrarium, laudabilis tamen propter alium ordinem in eis consideratum. Quam tamen affectionem non obstinate sequuntur, sed divinae voluntati supponunt, dum eis placet quod ordo divinae voluntatis in omnibus impleatur; sicut ille qui vult patrem suum vivere propter affectum pietatis, quem Deus vult mori; si iustus sit, hanc suam propriam voluntatem divinae supponit, ut non impatienter ferat, si Dei voluntas in contrarium propriae voluntatis impleatur.
| Righteous wayfarers, on the other hand, whose will adheres to the divine goodness but who yet do not so perfectly contemplate it that they clearly perceive every relation to it of the things to be willed, conform to the divine will as regards those objects for which they perceive the reason, though there is in them some affection for the contrary. It is praiseworthy in them, however, because of the other relation considered in their case. They do not follow this affection obstinately but subject it to the divine will, because it pleases them that the order of the divine will be fulfilled in all things. A man, for instance, who wishes his father to live because of his filial affection while God wishes him to die, if he is saintly, subjects his own will to God’s so as not to bear it impatiently if the will of God contrary to his own will is fulfilled.
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| Answers to Difficulties
| | Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Paulus cupiebat dissolvi et esse cum Christo, tamquam per se bonum: nihilominus tamen placebat ei contrarium in ordine ad fructum quem Deus ex eius vita fieri volebat; unde dicebat: permanere autem in carne necessarium propter vos.
| 1. Paul desired to be dissolved and to be with Christ as something good in itself. Nonetheless the contrary was pleasing to him with reference to the fruit that God willed to draw from his living. For this reason he said: “But to abide still in the flesh is needful for you” (Philippians 1: 24).
| | Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis de potentia absoluta Deus possit revelare suam damnationem alicui, non tamen hoc potest fieri de potentia ordinaria, quia talis revelatio cogeret eum desperare. Et si alicui talis revelatio fieret, deberet intelligi non secundum modum prophetiae praedestinationis vel praescientiae, sed per modum prophetiae comminationis, quae intelligitur supposita conditione meritorum. Sed dato quod esset intelligenda secundum praescientiae prophetiam, adhuc non teneretur ille cui talis revelatio fieret, velle suam damnationem absolute, sed secundum ordinem iustitiae, quo Deus vult persistentes in peccato damnare. Non enim vult Deus ex parte sua aliquem damnare, sed secundum id quod ex nobis est, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde velle suam damnationem absolute, non esset conformare voluntatem suam divinae, sed voluntati peccati.
| 2. Although in His absolute power God could reveal to someone his damnation, this can nevertheless not be done in His ordered power, because such a revelation would drive the man to despair. And if such a revelation were made to anyone, it would have to be understood, not as a prophecy of predestination or foreknowledge, but as one of warning, which is based upon the supposition that merits are taken into account. But granted that it were to be understood in the sense of a prophecy of foreknowledge, the one to whom such a revelation were made would still not be obliged to will his own damnation absolutely but only according to the order of justice, in which God wills to damn those who persist in sin. For God does not on His own part wish to damn anyone, but only in accordance with what depends upon us, as is clear from what has been said above. To will one’s own damnation absolutely, then, would not be to conform one’s will to God’s but to conform it to the will of sin.
| | Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas praelati non est regula nostrae voluntatis sicut divina voluntas, sed praeceptum eius; et ideo non est simile.
| 3. The will of the superior is not, like the divine will, the rule of our will; rather his command is. Thus the case is not the same.
| | Ad quartum dicendum, quod passio Christi dupliciter considerari poterat: uno modo per se, in quantum scilicet erat quaedam afflictio innocentis; alio modo secundum ordinem ad fructum ad quem Deus eam ordinabat: et sic erat a Deo volita, non autem primo modo. Voluntas ergo Christi, quae poterat istum ordinem considerare, scilicet voluntas rationis, hanc passionem volebat, sicut et Deus; sed voluntas sensualitatis, cuius est non conferre, sed in aliquid absolute ferri, non volebat hanc passionem. Et in hoc divinae voluntati quodammodo in volito conformabatur, quando nec ipse Deus passionem Christi vellet secundum se solum consideratam.
| 4. The passion of Christ could be considered in two ways: (1) in itself, inasmuch as it was an affliction of an innocent person, and (2) in its relation to the fruit to which God ordained it. In this latter sense it was willed by God, not in the former. The will of Christ which could consider that relation, namely, His rational will, therefore willed this passion as God did; but the will of sensuality, which is not capable of comparing but is brought to bear upon something absolutely, did not will this passion. In this respect also it was conformed to the divine will, in a sense, even as regards the object, because even God Himself did not will the passion of Christ taken in itself.
| | Ad quintum dicendum, quod voluntas b. virginis dissentiebat a passione Christi in se considerata: volebat tamen fructum salutis qui ex passione Christi consequebatur: et ita divinae voluntati conformabatur quantum ad hoc quod volebat.
| 5. The will of the Blessed Virgin was averse to the passion of Christ considered in itself; yet it willed the fruit of salvation which was coming from the passion of Christ. Thus it was conformed to the divine will both as regards what it was willing and as regards what it was not willing.
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| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
| | Ad primum quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum, quod verba Glossae sunt intelligenda de volitis divinae voluntatis secundum quod stant sub ordine ad finem, et non absolute.
| 1. The words of the Gloss are to be understood of the objects of the divine will as they stand under the reference to the end and not absolutely.
| | Ad secundum dicendum, quod amicitia consistit in concordia voluntatum magis quoad finem quam quoad ipsa volita. Plus enim esset amicus febricitanti medicus qui ei vinum negaret propter desiderium sanitatis, quam si vellet eius desiderio satisfacere de vini potatione in periculum sanitatis.
| 2. Friendship consists in harmony of wills rather as regards the end than as regards the direct objects themselves. A fever patient whose craving for wine was denied by his physician because of their common desire for the patient’s health would find in that physician a truer friend than if the latter were willing to satisfy the patient’s desire for a drink of wine at the peril of his health.
| | Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut supra, art. 4 huius quaest., dictum est, primum volitum a Deo, quod est mensura et regula omnium aliorum volitorum, est finis voluntatis eius, scilicet sua bonitas; omnia vero alia non vult nisi propter hunc finem: et ideo, dum voluntas nostra divinae voluntati conformatur in fine, ad primum volitum omnia nostra volita regulantur.
| 3. As was said above, the first object of God’s will and the measure and rule of all its other objects is the end which His will has, His own goodness. All other things He wills only for this end. Thus, as long as our will is conformed to the divine will in regard to the end, all the objects of our will are regulated by the first object of will.
| | Ad quartum dicendum, quod electio habet in se et rationis iudicium, et appetitum. Si ergo aliquis iudicio praeferat id quod est minus bonum magis bono, erit perversitas electionis; non autem si praeferat in appetendo: non enim homo tenetur prosequi meliora semper in operando, nisi sint talia ad quae ex praecepto obligetur: aliter enim quilibet teneretur sequi perfectionis consilia, quae constat esse meliora.
| 4. Choice includes both the judgment of reason and appetitive tendency. If, then, anyone should in a judgment prefer what is less good to what is more good, there will be perversity of choice, but not if he should prefer it in tending appetitively; for a man is not obliged always to carry out in his action what is better unless it is something that he is bound to by a commandment. Otherwise everyone would be obliged to follow the counsels of perfection, which clearly are better.
| | Ad quintum dicendum, quod quaedam sunt in quibus Christum admirari possumus, non imitari; sicut ea quae pertinent ad divinitatem eius, et ad beatitudinem quam habuit adhuc viator existens; ad quod pertinebat quod Christus quantum ad volita rationis, voluntatem divinae voluntati conformabat.
| 5. There are certain respects in which we can admire Christ but not imitate Him. Examples would be whatever pertains to His divinity and to the beatitude which He had while still in this life. An instance of this is the conformity of Christ’s rational will to the divine will even as regards its objects.
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