| ARTICLE I
The question is about grace,
and in the first article we ask:
Is grace something created which is in the soul positively?
[ARTICLE II Sent., 26, a. 1; C.G., III, 150; S.T., I-II, 110, 1.]
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| Et primo quaeritur utrum gratia sit aliquid creatum positive in anima
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it is not, for the life of the body,
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| Quia, secundum Augustinum, sicut anima est vita corporis, ita Deus est vita animae. Sed anima est vita corporis, nulla alia forma mediante. Ergo similiter Deus animae; et ita, vita quae est per gratiam, non est per aliquam formam creatam in anima existentem.
| 1. According to Augustine, “just as the soul is the life of the body, God is the life of the soul.” But the soul is the life of the body without any intervening form. Then God is also the life of the soul in the same way. Thus the life which is had through grace is not had through any created form existing in the soul.
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| Praeterea, gratia gratum faciens, de qua loquimur, nihil aliud esse videtur quam id secundum quod homo est Deo gratus. Sed homo dicitur esse Deo gratus secundum quod acceptatus est a Deo. Acceptatus autem dicitur aliquis per Dei acceptionem, quae quidem est in ipso; sicut et aliquis dicitur homini acceptus non per aliquid quod sit in acceptato, sed per acceptionem quae est in acceptante. Ergo gratia nihil ponit in homine, sed in Deo tantum.
| 2. Ingratiatory grace (gratia gratum faciens), of which we are speaking, seems to be nothing but that according to which a man is in God’s good graces. But a man is said to be in God’s good graces in so far as he has been favorably received by God; and a person is said to be favorably received by God because of God’s acceptance, which is of course in God Himself. It is just as we say that a person is acceptable to a man, not by something which is in the one accepted, but by the acceptance which is in the one accepting. Grace therefore does not imply anything in man but only in God.
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| Praeterea, per esse spirituale gratiae magis Deo appropinquamus quam per esse naturale. Sed esse naturale Deus in nobis fecit nulla alia causa mediante, quia immediate nos creavit. Ergo et esse spirituale gratuitum facit in nobis nullo alio mediante; et sic idem quod prius.
| 3. We come closer to God by the spiritual existence that comes from grace than by natural existence. But God causes natural existence in us without the intervention of any other cause, because He created us immediately. He therefore also causes gratuitous spiritual existence in us without the intervention of anything else; and so the conclusion is the same as before.
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| Praeterea, gratia est quaedam animae sanitas. Sanitas autem in sano nihil aliud videtur ponere quam ipsos humores adaequatos. Ergo et gratia non ponit aliquam formam in anima, sed praesupponit potentias animae aequalitate iustitiae adaequatas.
| 4. Grace is a sort of health of the soul. Now health does not seem to imply anything else in the healthy person than balanced humors. Then grace too does not imply any form in the soul, but presupposes that the powers of the soul are balanced in an equality of justice.
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| Praeterea, gratia nihil aliud esse videtur quam quaedam liberalitas: idem enim esse videtur gratis dare quod liberaliter dare. Liberalitas autem non est in accipiente, sed in dante. Ergo et gratia est in Deo, qui nobis sua bona dat, non autem in nobis.
| 5. Grace seems to be nothing but a sort of liberality; for “to give gratuitously” seems to mean the same as “to give liberally.” Liberality, however, is not in the recipient but in the giver. Then grace too is in God, who gives us His good things, and not in us.
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| Praeterea, nulla creatura anima Christi est nobilior. Gratia autem est nobilior, quia per gratiam anima Christi nobilitatur. Ergo gratia non est aliquid creatum in anima.
| 6. No creature is nobler than the soul of Christ. But grace is nobler, because Christ’s soul is ennobled by grace. Grace is therefore not something created in the soul.
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| Praeterea, sicut se habet veritas ad intellectum, ita gratia ad affectum. Una est autem veritas, secundum Anselmum, quam omnes intellectus intelligunt. Ergo et una est gratia, per quam omnes affectus perficiuntur. Nullum autem creatum unum potest esse in multis. Ergo gratia non est quid creatum.
| 7. Grace bears the same relation to the will as truth to the intellect. But according to Anselm, the truth, which all intellects understand, is one. Then the grace by which all wills are perfected is also one. But no one created thing can be in many. Consequently grace is not something created.
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| Praeterea, nihil est in genere nisi compositum. Gratia autem non est composita, sed forma simplex. Ergo non est in genere. Omne autem creatum est in aliquo genere. Ergo gratia non est quid creatum.
| 8. Nothing but a composite is in a genus. Now grace is not a composite but a simple form. It is therefore not in a genus. But everything created is in some genus. Then grace is not something created.
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| Praeterea, si gratia est aliquid in anima, non videtur esse nisi habitus: tria enim sunt in anima, secundum philosophum in II Ethic.: potentia, habitus et passio. Gratia autem potentia non est, quia sic esset naturalis; nec est passio, quia sic respiceret irrationalem partem principaliter; sed iterum non est habitus: nam habitus est qualitas difficile mobilis secundum philosophum in praedicamentis: gratia autem facillime removetur, quia per unum actum peccati mortalis. Ergo gratia non est aliquid in anima.
| 9. If grace is anything in the soul, it seems to be only a habit. “There are three things in the soul,” the Philosopher says, “power, habit, and passion.” Now grace is not a power, because in that case it would be natural. Nor is it a passion, because then it would be concerned principally with the irrational part of the soul. But it is furthermore not a habit, for a habit is a quality difficult to displace, according to the Philosopher, whereas grace is very easily removed, because this can be done by one act of a mortal sin. Grace is therefore not something in the soul.
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| Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, inter animam nostram et Deum nihil creatum cadit medium. Sed gratia inter animam nostram et Deum medium cadit, quia per gratiam anima nostra Deo unitur. Ergo gratia non est aliquid creatum.
| 10. According to Augustine nothing created intervenes between our soul and God. But grace intervenes between our soul and God, because our soul is united to God through grace. Grace is therefore not something created.
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| Praeterea, homo est aliis creaturis nobilior et perfectior. Sed aliis creaturis non apponitur aliquid supra sua naturalia, ad hoc ut a Deo acceptentur, cum tamen a Deo probata sint, secundum illud Genes. I, 31, vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Ergo nec homini aliquid superadditur ad sua naturalia secundum quod dicatur Deo acceptus; et sic gratia non est aliquid positive in anima.
| 11. Man is nobler and more perfect than the other creatures. But in order to make these latter acceptable to Himself God did not confer upon them anything over and above their natural endowments, since they have been approved by Him as they were, according to the words of Genesis (1: 3 1): “And God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.” Then neither is anything added to man's natural gifts on the basis of which he is said to be acceptable to God; and so grace is not something positively existing in the soul.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod dicit Glossa, super illud Psalm. CIII, 15: ut exhilaret faciem in oleo: gratia est quidam nitor animae, sanctum concilians amorem. Sed nitor est aliquid positive in anima, quod est creatum. Ergo et gratia.
| 1. Commenting on the words of the Psalm (103:15): “That he may make the face cheerful with oil,” the Gloss says: “Grace is a certain splendor of the soul winning holy love.” But splendor is something in the soul positively which is created. Then so is grace.
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| Praeterea, Deus dicitur esse in sanctis per gratiam quodam modo speciali prae aliis creaturis. Non autem dicitur esse Deus novo modo in aliquo nisi propter aliquem effectum. Ergo gratia est aliquis effectus Dei in anima.
| 2. God is said to be in His saints by grace in a special way that distinguishes them from other creatures. Now God is not said to be in anything in a new manner except by reason of some effect. Grace is therefore an effect of God in the soul.
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| Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, quod gratia est delectatio animae. Sed delectatio est aliquid creatum in anima. Ergo et gratia.
| 3. Damascene says that grace is the delight of the soul. But delight is something created in the soul. Then so is grace.
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| Praeterea, omnis actio est ab aliqua forma. Sed actio meritoria est a gratia. Ergo gratia est aliqua forma in anima.
| 4. Every action is from some form. But a meritorious action is from grace. Grace is therefore a form in the soul.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod nomen gratiae dupliciter consuevit accipi. Uno modo pro aliquo quod gratis datur; sicut consuevimus dicere: facio tibi hanc gratiam. Alio modo pro acceptatione, qua aliquis ab alio acceptatur; sicut dicimus: iste habet gratiam regis, quia acceptus est regi. Et hae duae significationes ordinem habent ad invicem: non enim aliquid gratis datur nisi propter hoc quod aliquo modo ille cui datur, est acceptus.
| The term grace is wont to be taken in two senses: (1) For something which is given gratis, as we are accustomed to say, “I do you this grace or favor.” (2) For the favorable reception which one gets from another, as we say, “That fellow is in the king’s good graces” because he is favorably received by the king. And these two senses are related, for nothing is gratuitously given unless the recipient is somehow favorably received.
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| Sic et in divinis duplicem gratiam dicimus: quarum una dicitur gratia gratis data, ut donum prophetiae et sapientiae et huiusmodi, de qua nunc non quaeritur, quia constat huiusmodi esse aliquid creatum in anima; alia vero dicitur gratia gratum faciens, secundum quam dicitur homo Deo acceptus, de qua nunc loquimur. Et quod haec gratia ponat aliquid in Deo, manifestum est: ponit enim actum divinae voluntatis acceptantis istum hominem; sed utrum tamen haec ponat aliquid in ipso homine acceptato, fuit dubium apud quosdam; quibusdam asserentibus gratiam huiusmodi nihil creatum in anima esse, sed solum in Deo.
| In divine matters we accordingly speak of two kinds of grace. One is called grace gratuitously given or gratuitous grace, as the gift of prophecy and of wisdom and the like. But this is not in question at present, because it is evident that such gifts are something created in the soul. The other is called grace that makes one pleasing to God or ingratiatory grace, and according to it man is said to be acceptable to God. It is of this that we are now speaking. That this grace implies something in God is obvious, for it implies an act of the divine will welcoming that man. But whether along with this it implies something in the man welcomed was doubted by some, since some” asserted that this kind of grace was nothing created in the soul, but was only in God.
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| Sed hoc stare non potest: Deum enim acceptare aliquem vel diligere, quod idem est, nihil est aliud quam velle ei aliquod bonum. Vult autem Deus omnibus creaturis bonum naturae, propter quod dicitur omnia diligere, Sap. XI, 25: diligis omnia quae sunt; et omnia approbare, Genes. I, 31: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat. Sed ratione huiusmodi acceptationis non consuevimus dicere aliquem habere gratiam Dei; sed in quantum Deus vult ei aliquod bonum supernaturale, quod est vita aeterna; sicut Isa. LXIV, 4: oculus non vidit, Deus, absque te quae praeparasti diligentibus te. Unde, Roman. VI, 23, dicitur: gratia Dei vita aeterna.
| But this cannot stand. For God’s accepting or loving someone (for they are the same thing) is nothing else but His willing him some good. Now God wills the good of nature for all creatures; and on this account He is said to love all things: “For you love all things that are...” (Wisdom 1:25), and to approve all: “And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good” (Genesis 1:31). But it is not by reason of this sort of acceptance that we are accustomed to say that someone has the grace of God, but inasmuch as God wills him a certain supernatural good, which is eternal life, as is written in Isaiah (64:4): “The eye has not seen, O God, besides thee, what things you has prepared for them that love thee.” Hence it is written in the Epistle to the Romans (6:23): “The grace of God [is] life everlasting.”
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| Sed hoc bonum Deus non vult alicui indigno. Ex natura autem sua homo non est dignus tanto bono, cum sit supernaturale. Et ideo, ex hoc ipso quod ponitur aliquis Deo gratus respectu huius boni, ponitur quod sit dignus tali bono supra sua naturalia; quod quidem non movet divinam voluntatem ut hominem ad bonum illud ordinet, sed potius e converso: quia ex hoc ipso quod Deus sua voluntate aliquem ordinat ad vitam aeternam, praestat ei aliquid per quod sit dignus vita aeterna. Et hoc est quod dicitur Coloss. I, vers. 12: qui dignos nos fecit in partem sanctorum in lumine. Et huius ratio est, quia, sicut scientia Dei est causa rerum, non causata a rebus, ut nostra, ita voluntas eius est effectrix boni, et non causata a bono, sicut nostra.
| God does not, however, will this for anyone unworthy. But from his own nature man is not worthy of so great a good, since it is supernatural. Consequently, by the very fact that someone is affirmed to be pleasing to God with reference to this good, it is affirmed that there is in him something by which he is worthy of such a good above his natural endowments. This does not, to be sure, move the divine will to destine the man for that good, but rather the other, way about: by the very fact that by His will God destines someone for eternal life, He supplies him with something by which he is worthy of eternal life. This is what is said in the Epistle to the Colossians (1:12): “...who has made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light.” And the reason for this is that, just as God’s knowledge is the cause of things and is not, like ours, caused by them, in the same way the act of His will is productive of good and not, like that of ours, caused by good.
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| Sic ergo homo dicitur Dei gratiam habere, non solum ex hoc quod a Deo diligitur in vitam aeternam, sed ex hoc quod datur ei aliquod donum per quod est dignus vita aeterna, et hoc donum dicitur gratia gratum faciens. Aliter enim in peccato mortali existens posset dici in gratia esse, si gratia solam acceptationem divinam diceret; cum contingat aliquem peccatorem esse praedestinatum ad vitam aeternam habendam. Sic igitur gratia gratum faciens potest dici gratis data, sed non e converso; quia non omne donum gratis datum nos dignos vita aeterna facit.
| Man is accordingly said to have the grace of God not only from his being loved by God with a view to eternal life but also from his being given some gift (ingratiatory grace) by which he is worthy of eternal life. Otherwise even a person in the state of mortal sin could be said to be in grace if grace meant only divine acceptance, since it can happen that a particular sinner is predestined to have eternal life. Thus ingratiatory grace can be called gratuitous grace, but not conversely, because not every gratuitous grace makes us worthy of eternal life.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod anima est causa formalis vitae corporalis; unde nulla forma mediante corpus vivificat. Deus autem vivificat animam non sicut causa formalis, sed sicut causa efficiens; unde aliqua forma cadit media; sicut pictor album facit parietem effective albedine mediante: albedo vero nulla forma mediante, quia facit album formaliter.
| 1. The soul is the formal cause of the life of the body, and for this reason gives life to the body without the intervention of any form. God, however, does not give life to the soul as its formal cause, but as its efficient cause. For this reason a form intervenes, as a painter effectively makes a wall white by means of whiteness, but whiteness makes it white by means of no other form, because it makes it white formally.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod ipsa acceptatio quae est in voluntate divina respectu aeterni boni, producit in homine acceptato aliquid unde dignus sit consequi bonum illud; quod non contingit in acceptatione humana. Et secundum hoc gratia gratum faciens aliquid creatum est in anima.
| 2. The very acceptance which is in the divine will with regard to an eternal good produces in the man accepted something from which he is worthy to obtain that good, though this does not occur in human acceptance. Ingratiatory grace is accordingly something created in the soul.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod esse naturale per creationem Deus facit in nobis nulla causa agente mediante, sed tamen mediante aliqua causa formali: forma enim naturalis principium est esse naturalis. Et similiter esse spirituale gratuitum Deus facit in nobis nullo agente mediante, sed tamen mediante aliqua forma creata, quae est gratia.
| 3. God causes natural existence in us by creation without the intervention of any agent cause, but nevertheless with the intervention of a formal cause; for a natural form is the principle of natural existence. Similarly God brings about gratuitous spiritual existence in us without the intervention of any agent, yet with the intervention of a created form, grace.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod sanitas est quaedam qualitas corporalis ex humoribus adaequatis causata: ponitur enim in prima specie qualitatis; et sic ratio procedit ex falso.
| 4. Health is a certain bodily quality caused by balanced humors, for it is listed in the first species of quality. Thus the argument is based upon a false supposition.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod ex ipsa liberalitate Dei qua nobis bonum aeternum vult, sequitur quod sit aliquid in nobis ab eo datum, quo illo bono digni efficiamur.
| 5. From the very liberality of God by which He wills us an eternal good it follows that there is in us something given by Him by which we are made worthy of that good.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod nulla creatura simpliciter est anima Christi nobilior; sed secundum quid omne accidens animae est ea nobilior, in quantum comparatur ad ipsam ut forma eius. Vel potest dici, quod gratia in quantum creatum, non est nobilior anima Christi; sed in quantum est quaedam similitudo divinae bonitatis expressior quam similitudo naturalis quae est in anima Christi.
| 6. No creature is simply nobler than the soul of Christ; but in a certain respect every accident of His soul is nobler than it inasmuch as the accident is compared to it as its form.—Or it can be said that grace is nobler than the soul of Christ, not as a creature, but in so far as it is a certain likeness of the divine goodness more explicit than the natural likeness which is in Christ’s soul.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod una est veritas prima increata, a qua tamen multae veritates, quasi primae veritatis similitudines, in mentibus creatis causantur; ut dicit Glossa super illud Psal. XI, 1: diminutae sunt veritates, etc.; similiter una est bonitas increata, cuius sunt multae similitudines in creatis mentibus per participationem gratiae. Tamen sciendum est, quod non eodem modo se habet gratia ad affectum sicut veritas ad intellectum: nam veritas se habet ad intellectum ut obiectum, gratia autem ad affectum ut forma informans. Contingit autem idem esse subiectum diversorum, non autem eamdem formam.
| 7. There is one first uncreated truth, from which many truths, likenesses of the first truth, so to speak, are nevertheless caused in created minds, as the Gloss says in comment upon the words of the Psalm (11:2): “Truths are decayed from among the children of men.” Similarly there is one uncreated good, of which there are many likenesses in created minds through participation in it by means of grace. Yet it should be noted that grace does not bear the same relation to the will as truth to the intellect. For truth is related to the intellect as its object, but grace to the will as its informing form. Now distinct beings may have the same object, but not the same form.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod omne quod est in genere substantiae, est compositum reali compositione; eo quod id quod est in praedicamento substantiae est in suo esse subsistens, et oportet quod esse suum sit aliud quam ipsum, alias non posset differre secundum esse ab illis cum quibus convenit in ratione suae quidditatis; quod requiritur in omnibus quae sunt directe in praedicamento: et ideo omne quod est directe in praedicamento substantiae, compositum est saltem ex esse et quod est.
| 8. Everything that is in the genus of substance is composite with a real composition, because whatever is in the category of substance is subsistent in its own existence, and its own act of existing must be distinct from the thing itself; otherwise it could not be distinct in existence from the other things with which it agrees in the formal character of its quiddity; for such agreement is required in all things that are directly in a category. Consequently everything that is directly in the category of substance is composed at least of the act of being and the subject of being.
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| Sunt tamen quaedam in praedicamento substantiae per reductionem, ut principia substantiae subsistentis, in quibus praedicta compositio non invenitur; non enim subsistunt, ideo proprium esse non habent. Similiter accidentia, quia non subsistunt, non est eorum proprie esse; sed subiectum est aliquale secundum ea; unde proprie dicuntur magis entis quam entia. Et ideo, ad hoc quod aliquid sit in praedicamento aliquo accidentis, non requiritur quod sit compositum compositione reali, sed solummodo compositione rationis ex genere et differentia: et talis compositio in gratia invenitur.
| Yet there are some things in the category of substance reductively, such as the principles of a subsistent substance, in which the composition in question is not found; for they do not subsist, and therefore do not have their own act of being. In the same way, because accidents do not subsist, they do not properly have existence, but the subject is of a particular sort as a result of them. For this reason they are properly said to be “of a being” rather than beings. For something to be in some category of accident, then, it does not have to be composite with a real composition, but may have only a conceptual composition from genus and differentia. Such composition is found in grace.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod quamvis per unum actum peccati mortalis gratia amittatur, non tamen facile gratia amittitur; quia habenti gratiam non est facile illum actum exercere, propter inclinationem in contrarium; sicut philosophus dicit in V Ethic., quod iusto difficile est operari iniusta.
| 9. Even though grace is lost because of one act of mortal sin, it is still not easily lost, because for one who has grace, which confers an inclination to the contrary, it is not easy to perform that act. Thus even the Philosopher says” that it is difficult for a just man to act unjustly.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod inter mentem nostram et Deum nihil cadit medium nec per modum efficientis, quia immediate a Deo creatur et iustificatur; nec per modum obiecti beatificantis, quia ex ipsa Dei fruitione anima fit beata: potest tamen aliquid esse medium formale, quo anima Deo assimiletur.
| 10. Nothing intervenes between our mind and God either as an efficient cause (because our soul is created and justified immediately by God) or as the beatifying object (because the soul is made blessed by enjoying the possession of God Himself). There can nonetheless be a formal medium by which the soul is made like God.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod aliae creaturae irrationales acceptantur a Deo solummodo respectu bonorum naturalium; unde divina acceptatio nihil in eis addit supra naturalem conditionem, per quam huiusmodi bonis proportionata sunt. Homo autem acceptatur a Deo respectu boni supernaturalis; et ideo requiritur aliquid superadditum naturalibus, per quod ad illud bonum proportionetur.
| 11. Other creatures, which are irrational, are accepted by God only with regard to natural goods. Consequently, in their case divine acceptance does not add anything above the natural condition by which they are made proportionate to such goods. But man is accepted by God with regard to a supernatural good; and so there is required something added to his natural gifts by which he is proportioned to that good.
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Q. 27: Grace
ARTICLE II
In the second article we ask:
Is ingratiatory grace the same as charity?
[ARTICLE II Sent., 26, a. 4; S.T., I-II, 110, 3.]
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| Secundo quaeritur utrum gratia gratum faciens sit idem quod caritas
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod sic.
| it seems that it is, for
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| Gratia enim gratum faciens in nobis est illud Dei donum per quod accepti sumus ei. Hoc autem est per caritatem: Prov. VIII, 17: ego diligentes me diligo. Ergo gratia gratum faciens est idem quod caritas.
| 1. Ingratiatory grace in us is that gift of God by which we are acceptable to Him. But we are so by charity, as is written in Proverbs (8:17): “I love them that love me.” Ingratiatory grace is therefore the same as charity.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod illud Dei beneficium quo voluntas hominis praeparatur et praevenitur, est fides: non tamen informis, sed formata, quae est per caritatem. Cum ergo illud beneficium sit gratia gratum faciens, videtur quod caritas sit ipsa gratia.
| 2. Augustine says that the benefit of God by which the will of man is prepared antecedently is faith—not unformed but formed faith, which is achieved by charity. Now since that benefit is antecedent grace, it therefore seems that charity is grace itself.
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| Praeterea, ad hoc spiritus sanctus mittitur invisibiliter ad aliquem ut ipsum inhabitet. Ergo secundum idem donum mittitur et inhabitat. Dicitur autem mitti secundum donum caritatis, sicut filius secundum donum sapientiae, propter similitudinem horum donorum ad personas; dicitur vero inhabitare animam spiritus sanctus per gratiam. Ergo gratia est idem quod caritas.
| 3. The Holy Spirit is sent invisibly to a person in order to dwell within him. By the same gift, then, He is sent and indwells. Now He is said to be sent by the gift of charity, just as the Son is said to be sent by the gift of wisdom, because of the similarity of these gifts to the divine persons. But the Holy Spirit is said to dwell in the soul by grace. Grace is therefore the same as charity.
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| Praeterea, illud donum est gratia per quod digni reddimur ad vitam aeternam habendam. Sed per caritatem redditur quis dignus vita aeterna, ut patet Ioan. XIV, 21: si quis diligit me diligetur a patre meo; et ego diligam eum, et manifestabo ei meipsum; in qua manifestatione vita aeterna consistit. Ergo caritas est idem quod gratia.
| 4. Grace is that gift of God by which we are made worthy to have eternal life. But man is made worthy of eternal life by charity, as is evident from the words in John (14:21): “If anyone shall love me he shall be loved of my Father: and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him.” Now eternal life consists in that manifestation. Charity is therefore the same as grace.
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| Praeterea, de ratione caritatis duo possunt intelligi: scilicet quod per eam homo sit Deo carus, et quod per eam homo habeat Deum carum. Per prius autem est de ratione caritatis quod homo sit Deo carus, quam quod habeat Deum carum, ut patet I Ioan. IV, 10: non quasi nos dilexerimus Deum, sed quoniam ipse prior dilexit nos. Sed haec est ratio gratiae, ut per eam aliquis sit habitu Deo gratus. Ergo, cum idem sit esse Deo carum quod Deo gratum, videtur quod idem sit gratia quod caritas.
| 5. In charity we can distinguish two aspects that are essential to it: by it man is dear to God, and by it man holds God dear. But man’s being dear to God is essential to charity antecedently to his holding God dear, as is made clear in the first Epistle of St. John (4:10): “Not as though we had loved God, but because he has first loved us.” But this is the essence of grace: by it man is pleasing to God. Now, since it is the same thing to be dear to God and to be pleasing to Him, it therefore seems that grace is the same as charity.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod sola caritas est quae dividit inter filios regni et filios perditionis; cetera enim dona sunt bonis malisque communia. Sed gratia gratum faciens distinguit inter filios perditionis et regni, nec est nisi in bonis. Ergo est idem quod caritas.
| 6. Augustine says: “It is only charity which distinguishes between the sons of the kingdom and the sons of perdition, for the rest of God’s gifts are common to the good and the bad alike. But ingratiatory grace distinguishes between the sons of perdition and those of the kingdom and is found only in the good. It is therefore the same as charity.
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| Praeterea, gratia gratum faciens, cum sit quoddam accidens, non potest esse nisi in genere qualitatis, nec nisi in prima specie, quae est habitus vel dispositio: et cum non sit scientia, non videtur esse aliud quam virtus; nec aliqua virtus potest dici gratia, nisi caritas, quae est forma virtutum. Ergo gratia est caritas.
| 7. Since ingratiatory grace is an accident, it can only be in the genus of quality, and there only in the first species: habit and disposition. Since it is not knowledge, it does not seem to be anything else than virtue. And no virtue can be called grace except charity, which is the form of the other virtues. Grace is therefore charity.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Nihil praevenit seipsum. Sed gratia praevenit caritatem, ut Augustinus dicit in II de praedestinatione sanctorum. Ergo gratia non est idem quod caritas.
| 1. Nothing precedes itself. But “grace precedes charity,” as Augustine says. Grace is therefore not the same as charity.
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| Praeterea, Roman. V, 5: caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Ergo datio spiritus sancti praecedit caritatem sicut causa effectum. Sed spiritus sanctus datur secundum aliquod donum suum. Ergo aliquod donum est in nobis quod praecedit caritatem; et hoc non videtur esse aliud quam gratia. Ergo gratia est aliud quam caritas.
| 2. It is written in the Epistle to the Romans (5:5): “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost who is given to us.” Then the giving of the Holy Ghost precedes charity as a cause its effect. But the Holy Ghost is given to us as a result of a particular gift of His. Then there is a particular gift in us which precedes charity, and this does not seem to be anything but grace. Consequently grace is something other than charity.
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| Praeterea, gratia semper est in suo actu, quia semper facit hominem gratum; caritas vero non semper est in suo actu; non enim semper habens caritatem actu diligit. Ergo caritas non est gratia.
| 3. Grace is always in its act, because it always ingratiates man with God. But charity is not always in its act; for a man who has charity does not always actually love. Charity is therefore not grace.
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| Praeterea, caritas quaedam dilectio est. Dilectio autem est secundum quam diligentes sumus. Ergo caritas proprie est secundum quam diligentes sumus. Sed non secundum hoc sumus Deo accepti quod sumus diligentes, sed potius e converso; actus enim nostri non sunt causa gratiae, sed e converso. Ergo gratia, per quam sumus Deo accepti, est aliud quam caritas.
| 4. Charity is a type of love. Now it is on the basis of love that we are loving. It is therefore on the basis of charity that we are loving. But we are not acceptable to God inasmuch as we are loving, but rather the other way about; for our acts are not the cause of grace, but vice versa. Consequently the grace by which we are made acceptable to God is something other than charity.
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| Praeterea, quod pluribus commune est, non inest alicui eorum ratione alicuius quod sit sibi proprium. Sed producere actum meritorium est commune omni virtuti. Ergo nulli convenit, secundum quod est ei proprium; et ita nec caritati. Convenit ergo ei secundum aliquid commune sibi et omnibus virtutibus. Sed actus meritorius est a gratia. Ergo gratia dicit aliquid commune caritati et aliis virtutibus. Sed non commune per praedicationem, ut videtur: quia sic essent tot gratiae quot sunt virtutes. Ergo est commune per modum causae: et sic gratia est aliud per essentiam a caritate.
| 5. Whatever is common to many is not in any one of them by reason of anything that is proper to that one. But to produce a meritorious act is common to all virtue. It therefore belongs to no particular virtue on the basis of anything proper to it, and so not to charity either. It belongs to charity, then, on the basis of something common to it and all the virtues. But a meritorious act is from grace. Grace therefore expresses something common to charity and the other virtues. But it is apparently not common just predicatively, because then there would be as many graces as there are virtues. It is therefore common causally; and so grace is essentially distinct from charity.
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| Praeterea, caritas perficit animam in ordine ad obiectum diligibile. Sed gratia non importat respectum ad aliquod obiectum, quia nec ad actum; sed ad quoddam esse, scilicet esse gratum Deo. Ergo gratia non est caritas.
| 6. Charity perfects the soul in relation to a lovable object. But grace does not imply a relation to any object, because it does not imply a relation to an act but to a particular way of being, namely, being pleasing to God. Therefore grace is not charity.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod quidam dicunt, quod gratia est idem per essentiam quod virtus secundum rem; differt autem secundum rationem, ut virtus dicatur secundum quod perficit hominem, et eius actum Deo acceptum reddit: et inter alias virtutes praecipue caritas est gratia secundum eos. Alii vero dicunt e contrario, quod caritas et gratia per essentiam differunt, nec aliqua virtus est gratia per essentiam: et haec opinio rationabilior videtur.
| Some say that grace is essentially the same as virtue in reality, though it differs conceptually, so that virtue is spoken of in so far as it perfects an act, and grace in so far as it makes man and his act acceptable to God. And among the virtues charity especially is grace according to these men. Others,” on the contrary, say that charity and grace differ essentially, and that no virtue is essentially grace. This latter opinion seems the more reasonable.
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| Cum enim diversarum naturarum diversi sint fines, ad consecutionem alicuius finis in rebus naturalibus tria praeexiguntur: scilicet natura proportionata ad finem illum; et inclinatio ad finem illum, quae est naturalis appetitus finis; et motus in finem. Sicut patet quod in terra est natura quaedam, per quam sibi competit esse in medio; et hanc naturam sequitur inclinatio in locum medium, secundum quam appetit naturaliter talem locum, cum extra ipsum per violentiam detinetur; et ideo, nullo prohibente, semper deorsum movetur.
| Since different natures have different ends, there are three prerequisites for obtaining any end among natural things: a nature proportioned to that end, an inclination which is a natural appetite for that end, and a movement toward the end. Thus it is clear that in the element earth there is a certain nature by which being in the center is characteristic of it, and consequent upon this nature there is an inclination to the center according to which earth naturally tends to such a place even when it is violently kept away from it; and so when the obstacle is removed it always moves downward.
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| Homo autem secundum naturam suam proportionatus est ad quemdam finem, cuius habet naturalem appetitum; et secundum naturales vires operari potest ad consecutionem illius finis: qui finis est aliqua contemplatio divinorum, qualis est homini possibilis secundum facultatem naturae, in qua philosophi ultimam hominis felicitatem posuerunt.
| Now in his nature man is proportioned to a certain end for which he has a natural appetite and for the obtaining of which he can work by his natural powers. That end is a contemplation of divine things such as is possible to man according to the capabilities of his nature; and in this contemplation philosophers have placed man’s ultimate happiness.
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| Sed est aliquis finis ad quem homo a Deo praeparatur, naturae humanae proportionem excedens, scilicet vita aeterna, quae consistit in visione Dei per essentiam, quae excedit proportionem cuiuslibet naturae creatae, soli Deo connaturalis existens. Unde oportet quod homini detur aliquid, non solum per quod operetur ad finem, vel per quod inclinetur eius appetitus in finem illum, sed per quod ipsa natura hominis elevetur ad quamdam dignitatem, secundum quam talis finis sit ei competens: et ad hoc datur gratia; ad inclinandum autem affectum in hunc finem datur caritas; ad exequendum autem opera quibus praedictus finis acquiritur, dantur aliae virtutes.
| But there is an end for which man is prepared by God which surpasses the proportion of human nature, that is, eternal life, which consists in the vision of God by His essence. That vision is not proportionate to any creature whatsoever, being connatural only to God. It is therefore necessary that there be given to man not only something by which he can work toward that end or by which his appetite should be inclined to that end, but also something by which man’s very nature should be raised to a dignity which would make such an end suited to him. For this, grace is given. But to incline his will to this end charity is given; and for carrying out the works by which that end is acquired, the other virtues are given.
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| Et ideo, sicut in rebus naturalibus est aliud natura ipsa quam inclinatio naturae, et eius motus vel operatio; ita et in gratuitis est aliud gratia a caritate, et a ceteris virtutibus. Et quod haec comparatio sit recte accepta, patet per Dionysium in cap. II Cael. Hier.; ubi dicit, quod non potest aliquis habere spiritualem operationem, nisi prius esse spirituale accipiat; sicut nec operationem alicuius naturae, nisi prius habeat esse in natura illa.
| Accordingly, just as in natural things the nature itself is distinct from the inclination of the nature and its motion or operation, in the same way in man’s gratuitous gifts grace is distinct from charity and the other virtues. And that this comparison is rightly taken can be seen from Dionysius where he says that no one can have a spiritual operation unless he first receives a spiritual existence, just as he cannot have the operation of a particular nature unless he first has existence in that nature.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus diligit diligentes se; non tamen ita quod dilectio se diligentium sit ratio quare ipse diligat; sed potius e converso.
| 1. God loves those who love him, yet not in such a way that the love of those who love him is the reason why He Himself loves, but rather the other way about.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod fides dicitur esse gratia praeveniens, in quantum in motu fidei primo apparet gratiae praevenientis effectus.
| 2. Faith is said to be an antecedent grace inasmuch as there appears in the first movement of faith the effect of antecedent grace.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod tota Trinitas in nobis habitat per gratiam; sed specialiter alicui personae appropriari potest inhabitatio per aliquod aliud speciale donum, quod habet similitudinem cum ipsa persona, ratione cuius persona mitti dicitur.
| 3. The whole Trinity dwells in us by means of grace; but indwelling can be appropriated specially to one person because of some other special gift which bears a resemblance to that person and provides the basis for saying that that person is Sent.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod caritas non sufficeret ad merendum bonum aeternum, nisi praesupposita idoneitate merentis, quae est per gratiam; aliter enim dilectio nostra non esset tanto praemio condigna.
| 4. Charity would not suffice for meriting eternal life unless it presupposed the fitness of the one meriting, and this is had by means of grace. Otherwise our love would not be deserving of so great a reward.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod non est inconveniens, aliquid esse prius secundum rem, quod tamen posterius est de ratione alicuius hominis; sicuti prius est causa sanitatis quam ipsa sanitas in sanitatis subiecto; et tamen sanum per prius significat habentem sanitatem quam sanitatis causam. Similiter, quamvis prius sit divina dilectio qua Deus nos diligit, dilectione qua nos eum diligimus; tamen de ratione caritatis per prius est quod Deum faciat nobis carum quam quod nos Deo caros faciat: primum enim pertinet ad dilectionem in quantum est dilectio, non autem secundum.
| 5. It is not out of keeping that something which is prior in reality should only posteriorly fulfill the notion of a particular name. Thus the cause of health is prior to health itself in the subject of health, and yet the term healthy signifies the one having health before it signifies the cause of health. In the same way, even though the divine love by which God loves us is prior to the love by which we love Him, yet charity implies in its notion that it makes God dear to us before it implies that it makes us dear to God. For the first belongs to love inasmuch as it is love, but not the second.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod hoc quod caritas sola distinguat inter filios perditionis et regni, convenit ei in quantum non potest esse informis, sicut aliae virtutes: unde per hoc non excluditur gratia, qua ipsa caritas formatur.
| 6. The fact that charity alone distinguishes between the sons of perdition and those of the kingdom belongs to it inasmuch as it cannot be unformed like the other virtues. Hence grace, by which charity itself is formed, is not thereby excluded.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod gratia est in prima specie qualitatis, quamvis non proprie possit dici habitus, quia non immediate ordinatur ad actum, sed ad quoddam esse spirituale quod in anima facit, et est sicut dispositio quae est respectu gloriae, quae est gratia consummata. Nihil tamen simile gratiae in accidentibus animae quae philosophi sciverunt, invenitur: quia philosophi non cognoverunt nisi illa animae accidentia quae ordinantur ad actus naturae humanae proportionatos.
| 7. Grace is in the first species of quality, though it cannot properly be called a habit because it is not immediately directed to an act but to a certain spiritual existence which it causes in the soul; and it is like a disposition in regard to glory, which is consummated grace. Yet nothing like grace is found among the accidents which the philosophers knew, because the philosophers knew only those accidents of the soul which are directed to acts proportioned to human nature.
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| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
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| Alia concedimus, quamvis quaedam eorum non recte concludant.
| We concede these even though some of them do not arrive at their conclusions correctly.
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Q. 27: Grace
ARTICLE III
In the third article we ask:
Can any creature be the cause of grace?
[ARTICLE I Sent., 14, q. 3; 40, 4, 2 ad 3; II Sent., 26, a. 1; IV Sent., 5, 1, 3 sol. 1; S.T., I-II, 112, 1; III, 62, 1; 64, 1.]
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| Tertio quaeritur utrum aliqua creatura possit esse causa gratiae
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that it can, for
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| Ioan. XX, 23, dominus dixit discipulis suis: quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur eis. Ex quo patet quod homines possunt peccata remittere. Sed peccata non remittuntur nisi per gratiam. Ergo homines possunt gratiam conferre.
| 1. In John (20:23) our Lord says to His disciples: “Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.” From this it is evident that men can forgive sins. But sins are forgiven only by means of grace. Then men can confer grace.
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| Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, IV cap. Cael. Hierarch., quod sicut corpora soli propinquiora lumen ab eo recipiunt, et in alia corpora transfundunt; ita substantiae Deo appropinquantes eius lumen plenius recipiunt, et aliis tradunt. Sed lumen divinum est gratia. Ergo creaturae quaedam plenius gratiam recipientes, possunt eam aliis tradere.
| 2. Dionysius says that, just as the spheres closer to the sun receive light from it and transmit it to other spheres, in the same way the substances that come close to God receive His light more fully and hand it on to others. But divine light is grace. Consequently certain creatures that more fully receive grace can hand it on to others.
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| Praeterea, bonum, secundum Dionysium, est diffusivum sui. Ergo quod plus habet de ratione boni, plus habet de ratione diffusionis. Sed formae spirituales plus habent de ratione boni quam corporales, utpote summo bono propinquiores. Cum ergo formae corporales in aliquibus creaturis existentes, sint principium suae communicationis in similitudine speciei; multo magis qui habet gratiam, poterit in alio gratiam causare.
| 3. According to Dionysius, good tends to pour itself out. Then anything that has goodness in greater measure also has diffusiveness in greater measure. But spiritual forms have more goodness than bodily forms, being closer to the highest good. Now, since bodily forms existing in some creatures are the principle of their sharing in the likeness of the species, all the more then can one who has grace cause grace in another.
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| Praeterea, sicut affectus perficitur divino lumine gratiae, ita intellectus perficitur lumine veritatis. Sed lumen intellectus una creatura potest alteri praebere; quod patet ex hoc quod, secundum Dionysium, superiores Angeli inferiores illuminant: quae quidem illuminatio, secundum ipsum, est divinae scientiae assumptio. Ergo gratiam potest rationalis creatura aliis praebere.
| 4. The intellect is perfected by the light of truth just as the will is perfected by the divine light of grace. But one creature can furnish another with the light of the intellect. This is evident from the fact that according to Dionysius the higher angels enlighten the lower, and according to him that enlightenment is “the assumption of divine knowledge.” A rational creature can therefore also furnish another with grace.
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| Praeterea, Christus est caput nostrum, secundum humanam naturam. Sed capitis est sensus et motus in membra diffundere. Ergo Christus secundum humanam naturam diffundit spirituales sensus et motus, per quos gratiae intelliguntur, secundum Augustinum, in membra corporis mystici.
| 5. Christ is our head in His human nature. But it is the function of the head to send forth feeling and movement into the members. Then Christ too in His human nature sends forth into the members of the Mystical Body spiritual feelings and movements, which mean graces according to Augustine.
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| Sed dicendum, quod Christus secundum humanam naturam per ministerium gratiam in homines effudit.- Sed contra: Christus prae aliis omnibus singulariter est caput Ecclesiae. Sed per modum ministerii operari ad gratiae collationem convenit aliis Ecclesiae ministris. Ergo ad rationem capitis non sufficit quod gratiam infundat per modum ministerii.
| 6. It was said in answer that by His ministry Christ in His human nature poured out grace upon men.—On the contrary, Christ all alone and in preference to all others is the head of the Church. But to work for the conferring of grace by way of the ministry is attributable to other ministers of the Church as well. It therefore does not suffice for the character of the head that He imparts grace by way of the ministry.
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| Praeterea, mors et resurrectio Christi convenit ei secundum humanam naturam. Sed sicut dicit Glossa super illud Psalm. XXIX, 6, ad vesperum demorabitur fletus, resurrectio Christi est causa resurrectionis animae in praesenti, et corporis in futuro: resurrectio autem animae in praesenti est per gratiam. Ergo Christus secundum humanam naturam est causa gratiae.
| 7. The death and resurrection of Christ belong to Him according to His human nature. But in commenting upon the words of the Psalm (29:6): “In the evening weeping shall have place,” the Gloss says: “Christ’s resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of the soul in the present time and of the body in the future.” Now the resurrection of the soul in the present is through grace. In His human nature therefore Christ is the cause of grace.
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| Praeterea, forma substantialis, quae dat esse et vivere, est nobilior forma accidentali qualibet. Sed aliquod agens creatum potest in formam substantialem, quae dat esse et vivere, scilicet vegetabilem et sensibilem. Ergo multo fortius potest in formam accidentalem, quae est gratia.
| 8. A substantial form, which gives existence and life, is nobler than any accidental form. But a created agent has power over a substantial form which gives existence and life, that is, a vegetative and sensitive form. With all the more reason, then, does it have power over an accidental form, grace.
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| Sed dicebatur, quod ideo gratiam creatura causare non potest, quia, cum non educatur de potentia materiae, non fit nisi per creationem: creare autem est infinitae potentiae, propter infinitam distantiam inter ens et nihil; et sic nulli creaturae potest competere.- Sed contra: infinita non est pertransire. Sed distantiam quae est de ente in nihil, contingit pertransire: quia creatura per seipsam in nihilum decideret, nisi manu conditoris teneretur, secundum Gregorium. Ergo inter ens et nihil non est infinita distantia.
| 9. It was said that the reason why a creature cannot cause grace is that, since it is not drawn out of the potentiality of matter, it does not come into being except through creation, whereas an infinite power is needed to create because of the infinite distance between being and nothing; and so it cannot be within the competence of any creature. On the contrary, it is impossible to traverse infinite distances. But the distance from being to nothing is in fact traversed, since a creature would of itself fall into nothingness “unless sustained by the hand of its Creator” according to Gregory. The distance between being and nothing is therefore not infinite.
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| Praeterea, posse creare gratiam non dicit potentiam infinitam simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid; quod patet ex hoc quod, si diceremus Deum nihil aliud posse facere nisi gratiam, non diceremus eum potentiae infinitae simpliciter. Sed non est inconveniens quod alicui creaturae conferatur potentia infinita secundum quid, quia ipsa gratia habet quodammodo virtutem infinitam, in quantum infinito bono coniungit. Ergo nihil prohibet quin creatura habeat virtutem causandi gratiam.
| 10. The ability to cause grace does not imply a power that is infinite simply but only in a certain respect. That can be seen from this: if we said that God could not make anything but grace, we should not be saying that He has a power simply infinite. But it is not incongruous for a power that is infinite in a certain respect to be conferred upon a creature; for grace itself has a power which is in some sense infinite, inasmuch as it joins one to the infinite good. Consequently nothing prevents a creature from having the power of causing grace.
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| Praeterea, ad gloriam regis pertinet quod habeat sub se potentes et virtuosos milites. Ergo ad gloriam Dei pertinet quod qui sunt ei subiecti, sint magnae potestatis. Si ergo ponatur quod aliquis sanctus possit conferre gratiam, in nullo praeiudicatur divinae gloriae.
| 11. It is a part of the glory of a king to have under him powerful and valorous soldiers. Then it is a part of God’s glory that the saints who are subject to Him should be of great power. If, then, it is held that a saint is able to confer grace, the divine glory will not be prejudiced at all.
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| Praeterea, Rom. III, 22, dicitur: iustitia autem Dei per fidem Iesu Christi. Sed, ut dicitur Rom. X, 17, fides ex auditu, auditus autem per verbum Christi. Cum ergo verbum Christi sit a praedicatore, videtur quod gratia, sive iustitia, sit a fidei praedicatore.
| 12. In the Epistle to the Romans (3:22) it is written: “Even the justice of God, by faith of Jesus Christ.” And again in the same Epistle (10:17) we read: “Faith then comes by hearing; and hearing by the word of Christ.” Now since the word of Christ comes from a preacher, it therefore seems that grace or justice is from the preacher of the faith.
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| Praeterea, unusquisque potest alteri dare quod suum est. Sed gratia, sive spiritus sanctus, est alicuius hominis, quia ei datur. Ergo aliquis potest dare alteri gratiam, sive spiritum sanctum.
| 13. Anyone can give to another what is his own. But grace or the Holy Spirit belongs to a man because it is given to him. A person can therefore give another grace or the Holy Spirit.
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| Praeterea, nullus debet reddere rationem de eo quod non est in potestate sua. Sed praelati Ecclesiae debent reddere rationem de animabus subditorum; Hebr. XIII, 17: ipsi enim pervigilant tamquam rationem reddituri pro animabus vestris. Ergo animae subditorum sunt in potestate praelatorum, ut eas per gratiam possint iustificare.
| 14. No one has to give an account of what is not under his control. But the prelates of the Church are to give an account of the souls of their subjects; for we read in the Epistle to the Hebrews (13:17): “For they watch as being to render an account of your souls.” The souls of the subjects are therefore under the control of the prelates so that the latter can justify them by grace.
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| Praeterea, ministri Dei magis sunt accepti Deo quam ministri regis temporalis ipsi regi. Sed ministri regis possunt alicui gratiam regis conciliare. Ergo ministri Dei possunt gratiam conciliare.
| 15. God’s ministers are more acceptable to Him than are the ministers of a temporal king to that king. But the ministers of a king can bestow upon someone the king’s grace or favor. Then God’s ministers too can bestow the grace of God.
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| Praeterea, quidquid est causa causae, est causa causati. Sed sacerdos est causa impositionis manuum, quae est causa quod spiritus sanctus detur; actuum VIII, 17: imponebant manus super eos et accipiebant spiritum sanctum. Ergo sacerdos est causa gratiae, in qua spiritus sanctus datur.
| 16. Whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of the effect. But a priest is the cause of the imposition of hands, which in turn is the cause of the Holy Spirit’s being given, according to the Acts of the Apostles (8:17): “They laid their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost.” The priest is therefore the cause of grace in which the Holy Spirit is given.
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| Praeterea, omnis potestas communicabilis creaturae, ei communicata est: quia si Deus eam potuit et noluit communicare, fuit invidus: sicut Augustinus ad filii aequalitatem probandam argumentatur. Sed potestas conferendi gratiam fuit creaturae communicabilis, ut Magister dicit, 5 dist. IV Lib. Ergo potentia conferendi gratiam est communicata alicui creaturae.
| 17. All power that is communicable to creatures has been communicated to them, because, if God could have communicated it and was unwilling to, He was jealous, as Augustine argues, to prove the equality of the Son. But the power of conferring grace was communicable to creatures, as the Master says. Therefore the power of conferring grace has been communicated to some creature.
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| Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, lex divinitatis est, per media, ultima in Deum reducere. Reductio autem creaturae rationalis in Deum est praecipue per gratiam. Ergo per superiores creaturas rationales, inferiores gratiam consequuntur.
| 18. According to Dionysius, it is a law of the godhead to lead the last things back to God through intermediate things. But the leading of rational creatures back to God is accomplished especially by means of grace. By means of the higher rational creatures, then, the lower obtain grace.
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| Praeterea, magis est expellere principale quam accessorium. Sed hominibus data est potestas Daemones expellendi, qui sunt nobis causa malitiae, ut patet Lucae X, 17: et Matth. X, 8. Ergo hominibus data est potestas expellendi peccata, et ita conferendi gratiam.
| 19. To drive out something principal is more than to drive out something accessory. But the power of driving out demons, the cause of our wickedness, has been given to men, as is evident from Luke (10:17) and Matthew. Then there is also given to men the power of driving out sins, and therefore of conferring grace.
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| Sed dicendum, quod hoc facit per ministerium.- Sed contra: sacerdos evangelicus est potior sacerdote legali. Sacerdos autem legalis operatur per modum ministerii. Ergo sacerdos evangelicus habet aliquid plus quam ministerium.
| 20. It was answered that a man does this only through his ministry—On the contrary, the priest of the gospel is more powerful than the priest of the Law. But the priest of the Law works by way of ministry. The priest of the gospel therefore has something more than ministry.
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| Praeterea, anima vivit vita naturae, et vita gratiae. Sed vitam naturae communicat alteri, scilicet corpori. Ergo et vitam gratiae potest alteri communicare.
| 21. The soul lives by the life, of nature and by the life of grace. But it communicates the life of nature to another, the body. Then it can also communicate to another the life of grace.
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| Praeterea, culpa et gratia sunt contraria. Sed anima potest sibi ipsi esse causa culpae. Ergo potest sibi esse causa gratiae.
| 22. Guilt and grace are contraries. But the soul can be the cause of its own guilt. Consequently it can be the cause of its own grace.
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| Praeterea, homo dicitur minor mundus, in quantum in se gerit maioris mundi similitudinem. Sed in maiori mundo aliquis spiritualis effectus, scilicet anima sensibilis et vegetabilis, est ab aliqua creatura. Ergo et in minori mundo, id est in homine, effectus spiritualis gratiae est ab aliqua creatura.
| 23 Man is called a microcosm inasmuch as he bears within himself the likeness of the macrocosm. But in the macrocosm a spiritual effect, the sentient and vegetative soul, is from a creature. Then in the microcosm too, that is, in man, the spiritual effect of grace is from a creature.
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| Praeterea, secundum Philos. in IV Metaph., perfectum est unumquodque quando potest alterum sibi simile facere: et loquitur de perfectione naturae. Maior autem est perfectio gratiae quam naturae. Ergo habens perfectionem gratiae potest alterum in gratia constituere.
| 24. According to the Philosopher, anything is perfect when it can make another like itself; and he is speaking of the perfection of nature. But the perfection of grace is greater than that of nature. Therefore one who has the perfection of grace can establish another in grace.
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| Praeterea, actio formae attribuitur habenti formam; sicut calefacere, qui est actus caloris, attribuitur igni. Sed iustificare est actus iustitiae. Ergo attribuenda est iusto. Iustificatio autem non est nisi per gratiam. Ergo et iustus potest dare gratiam.
| 25. The action of a form is attributed to the one having the form, as heating, which is the act of heat, is attributed to fire. But to justify is the act of justice. It is therefore attributed to a just person. But justification is effected only through grace. Therefore a just man can give grace.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod Augustinus dicit, Lib. XV de Trin.: quod sancti viri non possunt dare spiritum sanctum. Sed in dono gratiae datur spiritus sanctus. Ergo homo sanctus non potest gratiam dare.
| 1. Augustine says that holy men cannot give the Holy Spirit. But in the gift of grace the Holy Spirit is given. A holy man therefore cannot give grace.
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| Praeterea, si habens gratiam alteri gratiam dare potest: hoc non est creando in eo gratiam ex nihilo, quia creare solius Dei est; nec iterum de gratia quam ipse habet, aliquid largiendo, quia sic sua gratia minueretur, et esset minus acceptus Deo ex hoc quod facit opus Deo acceptum: quod est inconveniens. Ergo nullo modo homo alteri gratiam dare potest.
| 2. If one who has grace can give it to another, he does not do so by creating grace in him from nothing, because creating is the work of God alone. Nor again does he do so by bestowing some of the grace which he himself has, because then his own grace would be diminished and he would become less acceptable to God by doing a work acceptable to God. But that is unreasonable. In no way, then, can a man give grace to another.
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| Praeterea, Anselmus probat in Lib. cur Deus homo, quod reparatio humani generis non poterat fieri per Angelum, quia sic esset suae salutis debitor Angelo, et nullo modo posset ad Angeli aequalitatem pervenire. Sed salus hominis est per gratiam. Ergo idem inconveniens sequeretur, si Angelus homini gratiam daret. Multo autem minus homo homini gratiam dat. Ergo nulla creatura potest gratiam dare.
| 3. Anselm proves that the reparation of the human race could not have been done by an angel, because then the human race would have been indebted to the angel for its salvation, and it could by no means attain equality with the angel. But the salvation of man is by grace. The same difficulty would therefore follow if an angel were to give man grace. But much less can a man give man grace. No creature, therefore, can give grace.
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| Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, maius est iustificare impium quam creare caelum et terram. Sed per gratiam iustificatur impius. Cum igitur creare caelum et terram nulla creatura possit, nec gratiam conferre poterit.
| 4. According to Augustine “to justify a sinner is greater than to create heaven and earth.” But a sinner is justified through grace. Consequently, since no creature can create heaven and earth, neither can it confer grace.
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| Praeterea, omnis actio est per aliquam coniunctionem agentis ad patiens. Sed mentem, in qua est gratia, nulla creatura illabitur. Ergo nulla creatura potest gratiam conferre.
| 5. Every action takes place through some connection of the agent with the patient. But no creature insinuates itself into the mind, in which grace is found. Therefore no creature can confer grace.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod simpliciter concedendum est, quod nulla creatura potest creare gratiam effective; quamvis aliqua creatura possit aliquod ministerium adhibere ordinatum ad gratiae susceptionem. Cuius ratio triplex est.
| It must simply be granted that no creature can effectively create grace, though a creature can make use of a ministry ordained to the reception of grace. There are three reasons for this.
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| Prima sumitur ex conditione ipsius gratiae. Gratia enim, ut dictum est, art. 1 huius quaest., est quaedam perfectio elevans animam ad quoddam esse supernaturale: nullus autem effectus supernaturalis potest esse ab aliqua creatura, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia eius solius est rem ultra statum naturae promovere, cuius est gradus naturae statuere et limitare; quod solius Dei constat esse. Secundo, quia nulla virtus creata agit nisi praesupposita potentia materiae, vel alicuius loco materiae. Potentia autem naturalis creaturae non se extendit ultra perfectiones naturales; unde nullam supernaturalem operationem aliqua creatura efficere potest. Et inde est quod miracula sola divina virtute agente fiunt, quamvis ad miraculi expulsionem aliqua creatura cooperetur vel orando vel qualitercumque aliter ministerium adhibendo. Et propter hoc nulla creatura effective gratiam causare potest.
| The first reason is taken from the nature of grace itself. For grace is a perfection raising the soul to a supernatural existence, as has been said. But no supernatural effect can be caused by a creature, for two reasons: (1) Because advancing a thing beyond the state of its nature is the work of him alone whose business it is to establish the degrees of nature and set their limits. But it is obvious that only God can do that. (2) Because no created power acts without presupposing the potentiality of matter or of something taking the place of matter. But the natural potentiality of a creature does not go beyond natural perfections. Hence a creature cannot perform any supernatural action. It is for this reason that miracles are worked only by the agency of divine power, even though a creature may cooperate in the accomplishment of a miracle either by praying or by making use of a ministry in any other way whatsoever. Consequently no creature can effectively cause grace.
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| Secunda ratio sumitur ex operatione gratiae. Nam per gratiam voluntas hominis immutatur: ipsa enim est quae praeparat hominis voluntatem ut bonum velit, secundum Augustinum. Voluntatem autem immutare solius Dei est, quamvis aliquo modo aliquis possit intellectum alterius immutare. Quod ideo est, quia cum principium alicuius actus sit potentia et obiectum, dupliciter actus alicuius potentiae potest immutari. Uno modo ex parte potentiae, dum aliquis in ipsa potentia operatur: quod solius Dei est respectu potentiarum quae non sunt organis affixae, scilicet intellectus et voluntatis; in aliis enim potentiis aliqualiter potest alius operari per accidens, secundum quod habet in organa actionem. Alio modo ex parte obiecti, adhibendo scilicet obiectum quod potentiam moveat.
| The second reason is taken from the working of grace. For the will of man is changed by grace, since it is grace which prepares the will of man to will good, according to Augustine.” But it is the work of God alone to change the will, even though a person can in some way change another’s intellect. This is due to the fact that, since the principle of any act is the power and the object together, the act of any power can be changed in two ways: (1) From the point of view of the power, when someone works upon the power itself. Now in regard to the powers which are not attached to organs, namely, the intellect and the will, that belongs to God alone. Upon the other powers someone else can work indirectly, inasmuch as he acts upon their organs. (2) From the point of view of the object, by making use of an object that will move the power.
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| Voluntatem autem non movet obiectum de necessitate, nisi quod est naturaliter volitum, ut beatitudo, vel aliquid huiusmodi, quod voluntati a solo Deo proponitur. Alia vero obiecta voluntatem non ex necessitate movent. Sed intellectum movent ex necessitate non solum prima principia naturaliter cognita, sed conclusiones, quae non sunt naturaliter notae, propter necessariam habitudinem earum ad principia; quae scilicet necessaria habitudo non invenitur ex parte voluntatis aliorum bonorum respectu boni naturaliter desiderati, cum multipliciter, saltem secundum existimationem, ad illud bonum naturaliter desideratum perveniri possit. Unde intellectum sufficienter aliqua creatura potest movere ex parte obiecti, non autem voluntatem. Ex parte vero potentiae, nec intellectum nec voluntatem. Quia ergo voluntatem nulla creatura immutare potest, nec gratiam, per quam voluntas immutatur, aliqua creatura conferre poterit.
| Now no object moves the will with necessity except one which is naturally willed, such as happiness or the like, which is presented to the will only by God. The other objects do not necessarily move the will. But the intellect is moved with necessity not only by naturally known first principles but also by conclusions, which are not naturally known, because of their necessary relationship to principles. This necessary relationship is not found on the part of the will with regard to the good naturally desired when it is willing other goods, since it is possible to arrive at that good naturally desired in many different ways, at least in one’s own opinion. A creature can therefore sufficiently move the intellect from the point of view of its object, but not the will. But from the point of view of the power neither the intellect nor the will can be so moved. Because, then, no creature can change the will, neither can any creature confer grace, by which the will is changed.
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| Tertia ratio sumitur ex fine ipsius gratiae. Finis enim proportionatur principio agenti, eo quod finis et principium totius universi est unum; et ideo, sicut prima actio, per quam res in esse exeunt, scilicet creatio, est a solo Deo, qui est creaturarum primum principium et ultimus finis; ita gratiae collatio, per quam mens rationalis immediate ultimo fini coniungitur, a solo Deo est.
| The third reason is taken from the end of grace. For the end is proportioned to the principle which is acting, seeing that the end and principle of the whole universe are one. Consequently, just as the first action by means of which things come into being, creation, is from God alone, who is the first principle and last end of creatures; in the same way the conferring of grace, by means of which a rational mind is immediately joined to the last end, is from God alone.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod solus Deus remittit peccata active, ut patet Isa. XLIII, vers. 25: ego sum (...) qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me; homines autem dicuntur remittere ministerio.
| 1. Only God forgives sins by reason of authority, as is made clear in Isaiah (4 3: 25): “I am he that blot out your iniquities by my own power.”“ Men are said to forgive sins by their ministry.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod Dionysius loquitur de transfusione divini luminis per modum doctrinae; sic enim inferiores Angeli a superioribus illuminantur, quod ibi intendit.
| 2. Dionysius is speaking of the outpouring of divine light through teaching, for it is in this way that the lower angels are enlightened by the higher. That is his meaning in the passage.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod non est ex defectu bonitatis gratiae quin habens eam possit in alium diffundere; sed est ex eius eminentia pariter, et defectu habentis, quia ipsa transcendit statum naturae creatae, et habens eam non ipsam participat in tanta perfectione ut eam communicare possit.
| 3. It is not from any lack of goodness in grace that the one who has it cannot impart it to another; but it is from its surpassing nobility as well as from the deficiency of the one who has it, because it transcends the state of created nature and the one who has it does not share it to such a degree of perfection that he can communicate it.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod non est simile de voluntate et intellectu, ratione iam dicta, in corp. artic.
| 4. The case of the will is not the same as that of the intellect, for the reason already explained.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod Christus, secundum quod Deus, infundit gratiam effective: secundum quod homo, ministerio; unde dicitur Rom. cap. XV, 8: dico autem Christum Iesum ministrum fuisse circumcisionis, propter veritatem Dei, ad confirmandas promissiones patrum.
| 5. Christ as God imparts grace effectively, but as man by His ministry. Thus it is written in the Epistle to the Romans (15: 8): “For I say that Christ Jesus was minister...”
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod ideo Christus secundum humanam naturam prae aliis ministris caput Ecclesiae dicitur, quia prae ceteris aliis ministerium habuit, in quantum per fidem ipsius sanctificamur, et per invocationem nominis eius sacramentis imbuimur, et virtute passionis eius tota humana natura a peccato primi parentis purgatur: et multa alia huiusmodi sunt quae Christo singulariter conveniunt.
| 6. The reason why Christ in His human nature is called the head of the Church in preference to all the other ministers is that He had a higher ministry than the others inasmuch as we are justified by faith in Him, we undergo the influence of the sacraments by calling upon His name, and by His passion the whole of human nature is cleansed of the sin of our first parent; and there are many other such marks of pre-eminence that are peculiar to Christ.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Damascenus III libro, ipsa Christi humanitas fuit quasi quoddam instrumentum divinitatis: et ideo quasi instrumentaliter ea quae sunt humanitatis, ut resurrectio, passio, et alia, ad effectum divinitatis se habent. Sic ergo resurrectio Christi non causat resurrectionem spiritualem in nobis quasi causa principaliter agens, sed sicut causa instrumentalis. Vel potest dici quod est causa nostrae resurrectionis spiritualis in quantum per eius fidem beatificamur. Vel potest dici quod est causa exemplaris resurrectionis spiritualis, in quantum in ipsa resurrectione Christi est quaedam similitudo nostrae spiritualis resurrectionis.
| 7. As Damascene says, Christ’s humanity was like an “instrument of His divinity.” For this reason the works of His humanity, such as the resurrection, the passion, etc., are instrumental with regard to the effect of His divinity. Christ’s resurrection, accordingly, does not cause spiritual resurrection in us as the principal agent but as the instrumental cause.—Or it can be said that it is the cause of our spiritual resurrection in so far as we are justified by faith in Him.—Or again the answer could be that it is the exemplary cause of spiritual resurrection inasmuch as there is in Christ’s resurrection a pattern of our spiritual resurrection.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod anima sensibilis et vegetabilis non excedunt statum naturae creatae, sicut nec aliae formae naturales; et ideo agens naturale, praesupposita potentia quae est in natura respectu huiusmodi formarum, potest aliquo modo in earum eductionem: non autem est simile de gratia, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet.
| 8. Like other natural forms, the sentient and vegetative soul does not go beyond the state of created nature. And therefore, given the potentiality which there is in nature as regards such forms, a natural agent has some influence upon their education. But the case is not the same with grace, as is evident from what has been said.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod illa ratio non est usquequaque sufficiens. Nam creari proprie est rei subsistentis, cuius est proprie esse et fieri: formae autem non subsistentes, sive substantiales sive accidentales, non proprie creantur, sed concreantur: sicut nec esse habent per se, sed in alio: et quamvis non habeant materiam ex qua, quae sit pars eorum, habent tamen materiam in qua, a qua dependent, et per cuius mutationem in esse educuntur; ut sic eorum fieri sit proprie subiecta eorum transmutari. Secus autem est de anima rationali, quae est forma subsistens; unde proprie ei creari convenit.
| 9. The reason given in answer is not sufficient in every respect. To be created properly applies to subsistent beings, to which it properly belongs to be and to become; but forms that are not subsistent, whether accidental or substantial forms, are properly not created but co-created, just as they do not have being of themselves but in another. Even though they do not have as one of their constituents any matter from which they come, yet they do have matter in which they are, upon which they depend and by whose change they are brought forth into existence. Consequently their becoming is properly the transformation of their subjects. Hence by reason of the matter in which they are, creation is not properly ascribed to them. The case is different, however, for a rational soul, which is a subsistent form; and so being created properly applies to it.
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| Supposita tamen hac ratione, solvendum est argumentum, dicendo, quod falsum, et falso concludit. Ad quod dicendum, quod duorum ad invicem distantia potest tripliciter se habere. Uno modo quod sit ex utraque parte infinita; sicut si unus haberet albedinem infinitam, et alius infinitam nigredinem. Et hoc modo est infinita distantia inter esse divinum et esse simpliciter. Alio modo ita quod sit ex utraque parte finita; sicut cum unus habet albedinem finitam et alter nigredinem finitam. Et sic esse creatum a non esse, secundum quid distat. Tertio modo ita quod sit ex una parte finita, et ex alia parte infinita; ut si unus haberet albedinem finitam, et alius infinitam nigredinem. Et talis est distantia inter esse creatum, et non esse simpliciter; quia esse creatum finitum est, non esse autem simpliciter est infinitum, in quantum omnem defectum qui cogitari potest, excedit. Haec ergo distantia transiri potest ex parte illa qua finita est; in quantum ipsum esse finitum vel acquiritur vel perditur: non autem ex parte illa qua infinita est.
| But granting the reason given, we must answer the argument of the rejoinder, which comes to a false conclusion and in a false manner. It must be said in answer that there are three different cases as regards the distance between two things: (1) It is infinite on both sides, as, for instance, if one man would have infinite whiteness and another would have infinite blackness. The distance between the divine existence and absolute non-existence is infinite in this way. (2) It is finite on both sides, as when one man would have finite whiteness and the other finite blackness. In this way created existence is distant from non-existence under a certain aspect. (3) It is finite on the one side and infinite on the other, as, for example, if one man would have finite whiteness and the other infinite blackness. The distance between created existence and absolute non-existence is of this kind; for created existence is finite, and absolute non-existence is infinite in the sense that it exceeds every lack that can be thought of. This distance, then, can be traversed from its finite side, inasmuch as finite existence is cither acquired or lost, but not from its infinite side.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod posse causare gratiam pertinet ad potentiam simpliciter infinitam, in quantum est potentiae instituentis naturam, quae est infinita; et ideo ista duo non sunt compossibilia, quod aliquis possit dare gratiam, et alia facere non possit.
| 10. The ability to cause grace belongs to a power that is absolutely infinite, seeing that it belongs to the power which establishes nature, which is infinite. To be able to give grace and to be unable to create other things are therefore incompatible.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod ad gloriam regis pertinet potentia militum talis et tanta, quae eos ab eius subiectione non subtrahat; non autem si per potentiam ab eius subiectione auferrentur. Per potentiam autem conferendi gratiam creatura Deo aequaretur utpote habens potentiam infinitam. Unde divinae gloriae derogaret, si aliqua creatura talem potentiam haberet.
| 11. The power of his soldiers is a part of the glory of a king if it is of such a kind and of such a degree that it does not withdraw them from their subjection to him, but not if by their power they are removed from that subjection. Now by the power of conferring grace a creature would be made equal to God, as having infinite power. It would therefore derogate from the divine glory if a creature had such power.
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| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod auditus non est causa sufficiens fidei; quod patet ex hoc quod multi audiunt qui non credunt. Sed causa fidei est ille qui facit credentem assentire his quae dicuntur. Non autem ad assentiendum cogitur aliqua necessitate rationis, sed voluntate; et ideo homo exterius annuntians non causat fidem, sed Deus, qui solus voluntatem potest mutare. Causat autem fidem in credente inclinando voluntatem, et illustrando intellectum fidei, ut non repugnet his quae a praedicatore proponuntur. Praedicator autem se habet sicut disponens exterius ad fidem.
| 12. Hearing is not the adequate cause of faith, as is evident from the fact that many hear who do not believe. But he who makes the believer assent to what is said is the cause of faith. The believer is not, however, forced to assent by any necessity of reason but by his will. Consequently it is not the man who announces the truths externally that causes faith, but God, who alone can change the will. He causes faith in the believer by inclining his will and enlightening his intellect with the light of faith so that he does not fight against the truths proposed by the preacher. The preacher meanwhile does the work of exteriorly disposing him for the faith.
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| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod illud quod meum est sicut possessio, possum alii dare: non autem quod meum est sicut forma inhaerens; non enim dare colorem vel quantitatem meam alteri possum. Sic autem gratia hominis est, et non primo modo.
| 13. I can give what is mine as a possession, but not what is mine as an inherent form. I cannot, for instance, give my color or my quantity. Now grace belongs to a man in this way, and not in the first.
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| Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod praelatus quamvis non possit dare gratiam subdito, potest tamen cooperari ad hoc quod gratia alicui detur, vel data non perdatur, admonendo vel corrigendo; et ratione huius, rationem reddere tenetur de animabus subditorum.
| 14. Even though a prelate cannot give grace to his subject, still by admonishing and rebuking he can cooperate in giving grace to someone or in keeping him from losing the grace already given. In virtue of such a responsibility he is held to give an account of the souls of his subjects.
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| Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod ministri regis temporalis non conciliant regis gratiam alicui nisi per modum intercessionis. Et sic ministri Dei possunt divinam gratiam alicui peccatori conciliare, precibus impetrando, non autem effective causando.
| 15. The ministers of a king do not bestow the king’s grace upon anyone except by way of intercession. God’s ministers too can in the same way bestow grace upon a sinner by obtaining it with their prayers, but not by effectively causing, the grace.
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| Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod manus impositio non causat spiritus sancti adventum; sed simul cum manus impositione spiritus sanctus advenit. Unde non dicitur in textu, quod apostoli imponentes manus, darent spiritum sanctum, sed quod imponebant manus, et illi accipiebant spiritum sanctum.
| 16. The imposition of hands does not cause the coming of the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit comes simultaneously with the imposition of hands. It is accordingly not said in the text that the Apostles, imposing their hands, gave the Holy Spirit, but that they imposed their hands and the people received the Holy Spirit, i.e., from God.
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| Si tamen impositio manuum dicatur aliquo modo causa acceptionis spiritus sancti per modum quo sacramenta sunt causa gratiae, ut post dicetur, hoc non habebit manus impositio in quantum est ab homine, sed ex institutione divina.
| Yet if the imposition of hands is in some sense called the cause of the reception of the Holy Spirit (in the manner in which the sacraments are the cause of grace, as will be explained later) the imposition of hands will have this power, not as being from man, but from its divine institution.
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| Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod opinio Magistri non tenetur hic communiter, ut scilicet potestas creandi et iustificandi possit creaturae conferri; quamvis etiam Magister non dicat quod potestas iustificandi per auctoritatem possit creaturae conferri, sed solum per ministerium.
| 17. The opinion of the Master is not commonly held on this point, namely, that the power of creating and justifying can be conferred upon a creature, though even the Master did not say that the power of justifying by authority could be conferred upon a creature, but only of doing so by ministry.
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| Nec tamen sequitur, si communicabilis est creaturae, quod sit communicata. Cum enim dicitur quod omne quod est creaturae communicabile, est ei communicatum, intelligendum est de illis quae natura eius requirit; non autem de illis quae possunt esse naturalibus superaddita ex sola liberalitate divina; de his enim non apparet invidia, si non conferantur: et ideo non est simile de filio. Nam de ratione filiationis est ut filius habeat naturam generantis. Unde, si Deus pater plenitudinem suae naturae filio non communicaret, videretur vel ad impotentiam vel ad invidiam pertinere; et praecipue secundum eos qui dicebant, quod pater filium necessitate naturae generat.
| Yet even if it is communicable to a creature, it still does not follow that it was in fact communicated. For when it is said that everything that is communicable to creatures has been communicated to them, this must be understood of the things that their nature requires, not of the things that can be superadded to their natural attributes by the divine liberality alone. Concerning these no jealousy is apparent even if they are not conferred. There is consequently no parallel with the Son. For it is essential to sonship that the son have the nature of his begetter. Hence, if God the Father did not communicate to His Son the fullness of His nature, that would seem to be due either to impotency or to jealousy; and particularly if one follows the opinion of those who said that the Father begot the Son by His will.
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| Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod verbum Dionysii non est intelligendum quod infima fini ultimo coniungantur virtute causarum mediarum; sed quia causae mediae disponunt ad hanc coniunctionem, vel per illuminationem, vel quocumque alio ministerio.
| 18. The statement of Dionysius is not to be taken to mean that the lowest things are joined to the last end by means of the intermediate causes, but that the intermediate causes dispose them for that union either by enlightenment or by any other sort of ministry.
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| Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod potestas illa data est apostolis ad expellendum Daemones a corporibus, quod constat esse minus quam expellere peccatum ab anima. Nec iterum datum est eis ut propria virtute Daemones expellerent, sed per invocationem nominis Christi impetrando per orationem: quod patet ex hoc quod dicitur Marc. XVI, 17: in nomine meo Daemonia eiicient.
| 19. That power was given to the Apostles in order to expel demons from bodies, and obviously that is less than to expel sin from the soul. And furthermore it was not given to them to expel the demons by their own power but by calling upon the name of Christ, obtaining it through prayer. This appears from what is said in Mark (16:17): “In my name they shall cast out devils.”
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| Ad vigesimum dicendum, quod sacerdos legalis nec etiam per modum ministerii ad gratiae collationem operatur, nisi remote per exhortationem et doctrinam. Sacramenta enim veteris legis, quorum erat minister, gratiam non conferebant, sicut conferunt sacramenta novae legis, quorum est minister sacerdos evangelicus; unde sacerdotium novum est dignius veteri, ut probat apostolus in epistola ad Hebr.
| 20. The priests of the Law did not do anything to confer grace even by way of ministry except remotely, by their exhortation and doctrine. For the sacraments of the Old Law, of which they were the ministers, did not confer grace, as do the sacraments of the New Law, whose ministers are the priests of the gospel. The new priesthood is therefore nobler than the old, as the Apostle proves in the Epistle to the Hebrews (chs. 7-10).
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| Ad vigesimumprimum dicendum, quod anima aliter se habet ad vitam naturalem, et ad vitam gratiae. Ad vitam enim gratiae se habet ut quod alio vivit: ad vitam vero naturae, ut quo aliud vivit. Et ideo vitam gratiae communicare non potest, sed communicatam recipit; vitam vero naturae communicat, nec tamen eam communicat nisi in quantum formaliter corpori unitur. Non est autem possibile quod anima alteri animae, quae vita gratiae vivere potest, formaliter uniatur; unde non est simile.
| 21. The soul has a different relation to natural life than it has to the life of grace. It stands to the life of grace as that which lives by something else, but to the life of nature as that by which something else lives. Consequently it cannot communicate the life of grace, but receives it when communicated. It does, however, communicate the life of nature; but it does this only as being formally united to the body. Now it is not possible for the soul to be formally united to another soul capable of living by the life of grace. Hence there is no parallel.
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| Ad vigesimumsecundum dicendum, quod non est impossibile aliquod agens agere secundum suam speciem vel infra; sed supra suam speciem nihil agere potest. Gratia autem est supra naturam animae; culpa vero est vel iuxta naturam respectu animalis partis, vel infra naturam respectu rationis; unde non est simile de culpa et gratia.
| 22. It is not impossible for an agent to act according to its own species or even beneath it; but nothing can act above its own species. Now grace is above the nature of the soul, whereas guilt is either on the level of nature as regards the animal part or beneath it as regards reason. There is accordingly no parallel between guilt and grace.
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| Ad vigesimumtertium dicendum, quod in minori mundo, scilicet homine, aliquod accidens spirituale quod naturam non excedit, virtute creata aliqualiter causatur, scilicet scientia a doctore in discipulo; non autem gratia, quia naturam excedit. Anima vero sensibilis et vegetabilis infra naturalem ordinem continetur.
| 23. Even in the microcosm, man, a spiritual accident which does not surpass nature is to some extent caused by a created power; that is, knowledge is caused by a teacher in his pupil. This is not true of grace, however, because it surpasses nature. But the sentient and vegetative soul is contained within the order of natural beings.
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| Ad vigesimumquartum dicendum, quod perfectio gratiae potior est perfectione naturae ex parte formae perficientis, non autem ex parte perfectibilis. Nam quodammodo perfectius possidetur quod est naturale, quam quod est supra naturam: in quantum est naturali virtuti activae proportionatum; cuius proportionem donum supernaturale excedit: et ideo propria virtute non potest aliquod donum supernaturale transfundere, quamvis possit facere sibi simile in natura.
| 24. The perfection of grace is superior to the perfection of nature from the standpoint of the perfecting form, not from that of the thing perfected. For in a way what is natural is more perfectly possessed than what is above nature, inasmuch as it is proportioned to a natural active power which does not measure up to a supernatural gift. It therefore cannot transmit a supernatural gift by its own power, though it can make something like itself in nature.
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| Nec tamen hoc universaliter verum est; quia perfectiores creaturae sibi simile facere non possunt, ut sol non potest producere alium solem, nec Angelus alium Angelum; sed hoc tantum verum est in corruptibilibus creaturis, quibus vis generativa divinitus est provisa, ut continuetur esse secundum speciem, quod secundum individuum continuari non potest.
| This is, however, not universally true, because the more perfect creatures cannot make anything like themselves. The sun, for example, cannot produce another sun, nor an angel another angel. It is true only among corruptible creatures, which have been divinely provided with a generative power in order that what cannot perdure as an individual may perdure in the species.
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| Ad vigesimumquintum dicendum, quod duplex est actus formae. Unus qui est operatio, ut calefacere, qui est actus secundus; et talis actus formae supposito attribuitur. Alius vero actus formae est materiae informatio, quae est actus primus; sicut vivificare corpus est actus animae; et talis actus supposito formae non attribuitur. Sic autem iustificare est actus iustitiae seu gratiae.
| 25. The act of a form is of two kinds. There is one which is an operation, such as to heat. This is a second act. And such an act of the form is attributed to the supposit. Another act of the form is the information of the matter, as to give life to the body is the act of the soul. This is the first act. Such an act is not attributed to the supposit of the form. Now it is in this sense that the act of justice or of grace is to justify.
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Q. 27: Grace
ARTICLE IV
In the fourth article we ask:
Are the sacraments of the new law the cause of grace?
[ARTICLE IV Sent., I, 1, 4 sol. 1 & 2; 18, 1, 3 sol. 1 ad 1; In Gal., c. 2, lect. 4 (P 13:397b); S.T., IV, 56 & 57; De art. fidei et eccl. sac. (P 16:119b); S.T., I-II, 112, 1 ad 2; III, 62, 1 & 6; Quodl. XII, (10), 14.]
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| Quarto quaeritur utrum sacramenta novae legis sint causa gratiae
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that they are not, for
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| Sicut enim dicit Bernardus in sermone de coena domini: sicut canonicus per librum, abbas per baculum, episcopus per annulum investitur, sic divisiones gratiarum diversis sunt traditae sacramentis. Sed liber non est causa canonicatus, nec baculus abbatiae, nec annulus episcopatus; ergo nec sacramenta gratiae.
| 1. Bernard says: “Just as a canon is invested by means of a book, an abbot by means of a crosier, and a bishop by means of a ring, so the different classes of grace are bestowed by the different sacraments.” But the book is not the cause of the canonry; nor the crosier, of the abbacy; nor the ring, of the episcopacy. Then neither are the sacraments the cause of grace.
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| Praeterea, si sacramentum est causa gratiae: aut principalis, aut instrumentalis. Non autem principalis, quia sic solus Deus gratiae est causa, ut dictum est; nec iterum instrumentalis, quia omne instrumentum habet aliquam actionem naturalem circa quod instrumentaliter operatur; sacramentum autem cum sit quid corporale, non potest aliquam naturalem actionem habere circa animam, quae est gratiae susceptiva: et sic instrumentalis causa gratiae esse non potest.
| 2. If a sacrament is the cause of grace, it is either the principal or the instrumental cause. Now it is not the principal cause, because only God is the cause of grace in this way, as has been said. Nor again is it the instrumental cause, because every instrument has some natural action upon the thing on which it works instrumentally. But since a sacrament is something corporeal, it cannot have any natural action upon the soul, which is the recipient of grace. And so it cannot be the instrumental cause of grace.
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| Praeterea, omnis causa activa, vel est perfectiva, vel dispositiva, ut ex verbis Avicennae haberi potest. Sed sacramentum non est causa gratiae perfectiva, quia sic esset causa gratiae principalis: nec iterum dispositiva, quia dispositio ad gratiam est in eodem in quo est gratia; scilicet in anima, ad quam res corporalis non attingit. Ergo sacramentum nullo modo est causa gratiae.
| 3. Every active cause is either perfective or dispositive, as can be gathered from the words of Avicenna. But a sacrament is not a perfective cause of grace, because in that case it would be its principal cause. Nor is it a dispositive cause, because the disposition for grace is in the same subject that grace is in, the soul, which is not affected by anything corporeal. A sacrament is therefore in no way the cause of grace.
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| Praeterea, si est causa gratiae: aut per propriam virtutem, aut per aliquam superadditam. Non per propriam virtutem, quia sic quaelibet aqua sanctificaret sicut aqua Baptismi; similiter nec per aliquam virtutem superadditam, quia omne quod recipitur in altero, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis: et sic, cum sacramentum sit materiale elementum, ut Hugo de sancto Victore dicit, non recipiet nisi virtutem materialem, quae non sufficit ad productionem formae spiritualis. Ergo sacramentum nullo modo est causa gratiae.
| 4. If it is the cause of grace, it is so either by its own power or by some power added to it. It is not so by its own power, because in that case any water would sanctify just as well as the water of baptism. Likewise it is not so by any power added to it, because whatever is received into another is received after the manner of the recipient. Thus, since a sacrament is “a material element,” as Hugh of St. Victor says, it will not receive anything but a material power, which does not suffice for the production of a spiritual form. A sacrament is therefore in no wise the cause of grace.
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| Praeterea, illa virtus suscepta in materiali elemento, aut erit corporea, aut incorporea. Si incorporea, cum sit accidens quoddam, et subiectum eius sit corpus, accidens erit dignius subiecto: nam incorporeum corpore nobilius est; si autem sit virtus corporea, et causat gratiam, quae est forma spiritualis et incorporea, sequitur quod effectus sit nobilior causa: quod iterum est impossibile. Ergo impossibile est quod sacramentum gratiam causet.
| 5. The power received into this “material element” will be either corporeal or incorporeal. If it is incorporeal, since it is an accident and its subject is a body, it will be nobler than its subject; for something incorporeal is nobler than a body. If, on the other hand, it is a corporeal power and causes grace, which is a spiritual form and incorporeal, the effect will as a consequence be nobler than its cause. But that again is impossible. It is therefore also impossible for a sacrament to cause grace.
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| Si dicatur quod huiusmodi virtus superaddita non est quid completum in aliqua specie, sed quoddam incompletum.- Contra: incompletum non potest esse causa completi. Gratia autem quoddam completum est. Ergo huiusmodi virtus incompleta causa gratiae esse non potest.
| 6. It was said in answer that this added power is not something complete in a species but something incomplete.—On the contrary, what is incomplete cannot be the cause of what is complete. But grace is something complete, whereas this power is something incomplete. Such an incomplete power therefore cannot be the cause of grace.
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| Praeterea, perfectum agens debet habere perfectum instrumentum. Sacramenta autem agunt ut instrumenta Dei, qui est agens perfectissimum. Ergo debent esse perfecta, et habere perfectam virtutem.
| 7. A perfect agent should have a perfect instrument. But the sacraments act as the instruments of God, who is the most perfect agent. They should therefore be perfect, and so have perfect power.
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| Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, in V c. Cael. Hier., lex divinitatis est per prima media, et per media ultima adducere. Ergo contra legem divinitatis est ut per ultima reducantur media vel prima in Deum. Sed in ordine creaturarum corporales sunt ultimae, substantiae vero spirituales sunt primae. Ergo non est conveniens quod per corporalia elementa gratia humanae menti conferatur, qua reducitur in Deum.
| 8. According to Dionysius, it is a law of divinity to conduct the intermediate things by means of the first, and the last thing by means of the intermediate. It is therefore against the law of divinity for intermediate or first things to be led back to God by means of the last things. But in the hierarchy of creatures corporeal ones are the last, and spiritual substances are first. It is consequently out of keeping for grace, by which the human mind is led back to God, to be conferred upon it by means of corporeal elements.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus in Lib. LXXXIII quaestionum, distinguit duplicem Dei actionem: unam quam operatur per subiectam creaturam; et aliam quam per seipsum immediate facit: et huiusmodi est illuminare animas. Sed gratiam conferre animae, est eam illuminare. Ergo Deus non utitur sacramento quasi instrumento medio ad gratiam conferendam.
| 9. Augustine distinguishes” a twofold action on the part of God: one which He performs “by means of a creature which stands for Him,” and another which He immediately performs “by Himself.” “To enlighten souls” is of this latter kind. But to confer grace upon a soul is to enlighten it. God therefore does not make use of a sacrament as an intermediate instrument to confer grace.
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| Praeterea, si aliqua virtus elemento materiali confertur, per quam possit gratiam causare: aut illa virtus manet peracto sacramento, aut non. Si manet: tunc in aqua Baptismi, postquam verbo vitae est sanctificata, si aliquis baptizatur post Baptismum alterius, nullis verbis prolatis, erit baptizatus: quod falsum est. Si autem non manet: cum non sit assignare aliquod corruptivum contrarium, per seipsam deficit; et hoc videtur inconveniens (cum sit quoddam spirituale, et de maximis bonis, ex hoc quod est causa gratiae), ut tam subito evanescat.
| 10. If any power is conferred upon a material element by which it might cause grace, when the sacrament is finished that power either remains or not. If it remains, then in the case of baptismal water after it has been sanctified by the word of life, if a person were to be baptized after another’s baptism without the pronouncing of any words, he would be baptized. But that is false. If, on the other hand, it does not remain, since no contrary cause of its perishing can be assigned, it will wear out of itself. But since it is something spiritual and one of the greatest goods, being the cause of grace, it seems incongruous for it to disappear so quickly.
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| Praeterea, agens praestantius est patiente: unde Augustinus probat, libro XII super Genesim ad litteram, quod corpus non imprimit in anima similitudines quibus cognoscit. Sed magis est remotum ut corpus non coniunctum animae in ea causet formam gratiae supernaturalem, quam quod corpus unitum in ea effectum naturalem causet. Ergo nullo modo videtur possibile quod huiusmodi corporalia elementa, quae sunt in sacramentis, sint causa gratiae.
| 11. An agent is superior to its patient. Thus Augustine proves that a body does not imprint upon the soul the likenesses by which the soul knows. But that a body not joined to the soul should cause in it the supernatural form of grace is even more to be rejected than that the body united to it should cause in it a natural effect. It therefore seems by no means possible that such bodily elements, which are found in the sacraments, should be the cause of grace.
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| Praeterea, efficacius anima disponit se ad habendam gratiam quam disponatur per sacramenta: quia dispositio qua se anima disponit, ducit ad gratiam sine sacramento, non autem e converso. Sed anima, quamvis se ad gratiam disponat, non ostenditur causa gratiae. Ergo, etsi sacramenta aliquo modo ad gratiam disponant, non sunt dicenda causa gratiae.
| 12. The soul disposes itself to have grace more effectively than it is disposed by the sacraments, because the disposition which the soul produces in itself leads to grace even without any sacrament, but not vice versa. Now even though the soul disposes itself for grace, it is not called the cause of grace. Consequently, even if the sacraments in some way dispose for grace, they should not be called the cause of grace.
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| Praeterea, nullus artifex sapiens utitur instrumento aliquo nisi secundum convenientiam instrumenti; sicut carpentarius non utitur malleo ad secandum. Sed Deus est artifex sapientissimus. Ergo non utitur instrumento corporali ad effectum spiritualem, qui corporali naturae non competit.
| 13. No wise craftsman uses a tool except in accordance with its fitness, as a carpenter does not use a saw for hewing. But God is a most wise craftsman. He therefore does not make use of a corporeal instrument for a spiritual effect, which is beyond the competence of a corporeal nature.
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| Praeterea, medicus sapiens fortioribus morbis fortiora adhibet remedia. Sed morbus peccati est vehementissimus. Ergo ad eius curationem per gratiae collationem fortiora remedia Deus apponere debuit, et non corporalia elementa.
| 14. A wise physician uses more powerful remedies for more virulent diseases. But the disease of sin is most virulent. Consequently for its cure through the conferring of grace God should have used powerful remedies and not corporeal elements.
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| Praeterea, recreatio animae creationi debet respondere per similitudinem. Sed Deus animam creavit nulla creatura mediante. Ergo similiter recreare debet per gratiam non mediante sacramento.
| 15. The re-creation of the soul ought to be similar to its creation. But God created the soul without the intervention of any creature. Then in like manner He should re-create it by means of grace without the intervention of a sacrament.
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| Praeterea, habere auxilia signum est impotentiae agentis. Sed instrumenta coadiuvant ad effectum principalis agentis. Ergo Deo, qui est potentissimus agens, non competit ut per sacramenta, quasi per instrumenta, gratiam conferat.
| 16. It is a sign of the impotence of the agent to have helps. But instruments help toward producing the effect of the principal agent. Then it does not befit God, who is the most powerful agent, to confer grace by means of the sacraments as His instruments.
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| Praeterea, in omni instrumento requiritur sua naturalis actio, quae aliquid conferat ad effectum intentum a principali agente. Sed materialis elementi naturalis actio nihil facere videtur ad effectum gratiae, quam Deus in anima efficere intendit; ablutio enim non magis de prope respicit animam, quam ipsa aqua in Baptismo. Ergo huiusmodi sacramenta non operantur ad gratiam per modum instrumenti.
| 17. In every instrument its natural action, which contributes something to the effect intended by the principal agent, is required. But the natural action of a material element does not seem to have anything to do with the effect of grace which God intends to produce in the soul. In baptism, for instance, the washing does not have any closer bearing upon the soul than the water itself. Such sacraments therefore do not work toward the conferring of grace as instruments.
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| Praeterea, sacramenta sine ministro non conferuntur. Si ergo sacramenta sunt aliquo modo causa gratiae, et homo erit aliquo modo causa gratiae; quod est contra dictum Augustini qui dicit, quod ministro non est collata potestas iustificandi, ne spes ponatur in homine.
| 18. Sacraments are not conferred without a minister. Now if sacraments are in any way the cause of grace, man will in some way be the cause of grace. But that is contrary to the teaching of Augustine, who says” that the power of justifying has not been conferred upon the minister, lest hope be placed in a man.
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| Praeterea in gratia datur spiritus sanctus. Si ergo sacramenta sunt causa gratiae, erunt causa dationis spiritus sancti; quod est contra Augustinum, qui dicit, quod nulla creatura potest dare spiritum sanctum. Ergo sacramenta nullo modo sunt causa gratiae.
| 19. In grace the Holy Spirit is given. If, then, the sacraments are the cause of grace, they will cause the giving of the Holy Spirit. But that is contrary to Augustine, who says that no creature “can give the Holy Spirit.” Sacraments are therefore by no means the cause of grace.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod Magister dicit in IV Sentent., dist. 1, definiens sacramentum novae legis sic: sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma, ut imaginem gerat, et causa existat.
| 1. Defining a sacrament of the New Law, the Master says: A sacrament is the visible form of an invisible grace, in the sense that it bears the image and becomes the cause of the grace.”
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| Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, quod gratia est fortior culpa; et hoc patet ab apostolo Rom. V, 15 sqq. Sed culpa causatur in anima per infectionem corporis. Ergo gratia potest causari in anima per sanctificationem corporalis elementi.
| 2. Ambrose says that grace is stronger than guilt. And this is evident also from the Apostle in his Epistle to the Romans (5:15-19). But guilt is caused in the soul through the infection of the body. Then grace too can be caused in the soul through the sanctification of a bodily element.
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| Praeterea, aut per institutionem sacramentorum aliquid superadditur naturalibus elementis, aut nihil. Si nihil, tunc non est aliquid collatum mundo in institutione sacramentorum; quod est inconveniens. Si vero aliquid additur, cum non frustra addatur, erit effectivum alicuius quod prius efficere non poterat. Sed non nisi gratiae, cum ad hoc sint sacramenta instituta. Ergo sacramenta sunt effectiva gratiae.
| 3. Through the institution of the sacraments there is added to the natural instruments either something or nothing. If nothing, then nothing has been conferred upon the world in the institution of the sacraments. But that is unacceptable. If, on the other hand, something is added, since it is not added in vain, the natural instrument will be capable of effecting something that it was previously unable to effect. But this can be only grace, since sacraments were instituted to this end. The sacraments are therefore capable of effecting grace.
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| Sed dicendum, quod non additur nisi ordo quidam ad gratiam.- Sed contra: ordo, relatio quaedam est. Relatio autem semper fundatur super aliquid absolutum, rationem cuius in ad aliquid est motus per accidens. Si ergo additur ordo, oportet quod aliquid absolutum addatur.
| 4. It was said that only a certain ordination to grace is added. On the contrary, an ordination is a relation. But a relation is always founded upon something absolute, on which account there is motion in the category of relation indirectly. Consequently, if an ordination is added, something absolute must be added.
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| Praeterea, absolutum non causatur a relativo, quia relativum habet esse debilissimum. Si ergo sacramentis nihil additur nisi relatio per institutionem, non poterunt ex institutione sanctificare; quod est contra Hugonem de sancto Victore.
| 5. What is absolute is not caused by what is relative, because what is relative has a very weak act of being. Now if nothing but a relation is added to the sacraments by their institution, they will not be able to sanctify by reason of their institution. But this is contrary to Hugh of St. Victor.
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| Sed dicendum, quod relatio illa non est causa sanctificationis, sed divina virtus sacramentis assistens. —Sed contra: aut assistit divina virtus, quae est ipse Deus, alio modo sacramentis post institutionem quam ante, aut non. Si non alio modo, non habebunt effectum post institutionem alium quam ante. Si vero alio modo, cum Deus non dicatur novo modo esse in creatura nisi per hoc quod novum effectum in ea facit, oportebit quod aliquid de novo sit superadditum ipsis sacramentis; et sic idem quod prius.
| 6. It was said that the cause of the sanctification is not that relation but the divine power attached to the sacraments.—On the contrary, the divine power, which is God Himself, is connected with the sacraments after their institution either in a different way than before or not. If not in a different way, they will not have any different effect after their institution than they did before. If, however, in a different way, since God is said to be in a creature in a new way only because He causes a new effect in it, something new will have to be added to the sacraments themselves. And so the conclusion is the same as before.
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| Praeterea, in quibusdam sacramentis requiritur materia sanctificata, sicut in extrema unctione et in confirmatione. Sed illa sanctificatio non inutiliter fit. Ergo per eam aliqua virtus spiritualis sacramentis confertur, ratione cuius esse poterunt gratiae aliqualiter causa, cum ad hoc illa virtus ordinetur.
| 7. In certain sacraments consecrate d matter is required, as in extreme unction and confirmation. But that consecration is not without purpose. By it, then, some spiritual power is conferred upon the sacraments by reason of which they can be in some measure the cause of grace, since that power is directed to this end.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod sacramenta novae legis esse aliqualiter causam gratiae necesse est poni. Propter hoc enim lex occidere dicebatur et transgressionem augere, quia cognitionem peccati faciebat, gratiam vero adiutricem contra peccatum non conferebat. Si ergo nova lex gratiam non conferret, similiter occidere diceretur, et transgressionem augere; cuius contrarium apostolica doctrina profitetur. Non autem confert gratiam per solam instructionem, quia lex vetus hoc habebat, sed per sua sacramenta gratiam aliqualiter causando; unde Ecclesia non est contenta catechismo, quo instruit accedentem, sed ei superaddit sacramenta ad gratiam habendam, quam quidem veteris legis sacramenta non conferebant, sed tantum significabant. Signa vero ad instructionem pertinent. Sic ergo, quia vetus lex tantum instruebat, eius sacramenta erant gratiae solum signa; quia vero nova lex et instruit et iustificat, eius sacramenta sunt gratiae et signum et causa. Quomodo vero sunt causa, non eodem modo omnes tradunt.
| It is necessary to hold that the sacraments of the New Law are in some sense the cause of grace. For the Old Law was said to kill and to increase the transgressions because it gave knowledge of sin but did not confer any grace as a help against sin. Now if the New Law did not confer grace, it would likewise be said to kill and to increase the transgressions. But the teachings of the apostles proclaim the contrary. It does not, however, confer grace merely by instruction (because even the Old Law had this feature), but by causing grace in some sense through its sacraments. The Church is accordingly not content with the catechizing by which it instructs a convert; but it adds the sacraments that he may have grace, which the sacraments of the Old Law did not confer but merely signified. But signification pertains to instruction. Thus, because the Old Law merely instructed, its sacraments were only signs of grace; whereas, because the New Law both instructs and justifies, its sacraments are both the sign and the cause of grace. But how they are the cause of grace not all explain in the same way.
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| Quidam enim dicunt quod sunt causa gratiae, non quia aliquid ad gratiam habendam operentur per aliquam virtutem eis inditam, sed quia in eorum susceptione gratia datur a Deo, qui sacramentis assistit, ut sic dicantur causa gratiae per modum causae sine qua non: et ponunt exemplum de hoc quod aliquis deferens denarium plumbeum accipit centum libras, non ideo quia denarius plumbeus sit causa faciens aliquid ad acceptionem centum librarum, sed quia sic statutum est ab eo qui potest dare, ut quicumque defert talem denarium accipiat tantam pecuniam. Similiter statutum est a Deo ut quicumque accipit sacramentum non fictus, gratiam accipiat, non quidem a sacramentis, sed ab ipso Deo; et hoc idem dicunt sensisse Magistrum in IV Sent. distinct. 1, cum dixit, quod accipiens sacramentum quaerit salutem in inferioribus se, etsi non ab illis.
| Some say that they are the cause of grace, not because they themselves by any power vested in them do anything effective for bringing about grace, but because in their reception grace is given by God, who upholds the sacraments. As a result they are called the cause of grace in the manner of an indispensable (sine qua non) cause. They give as an example of this the case of a man who hands over a lead nickel and receives a hundred dollars in exchange, not because the lead nickel is the cause which brings on the reception of the hundred dollars, but because one who is able to give it has decreed that whoever brings in such a nickel should receive so much money. It has similarly been decreed by God that whoever sincerely receives the sacraments should receive grace, not indeed from the sacraments but from God Himself. And they say that the Master was of this opinion when he said that one receiving a sacrament seeks salvation in things beneath himself, though not from them.
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| Haec autem opinio non videtur sufficienter dignitatem sacramentorum novae legis salvare. Si enim recte consideretur exemplum ab eis propositum, et alia similia, non invenitur quod id quod causam dicunt sine qua non, se habeat ad effectum nisi sicut signum. Denarius enim plumbeus non est nisi signum acceptionis pecuniae, et baculus potestatis, quae confertur abbati.
| Now this opinion does not seem sufficiently to safeguard the dignity of the sacraments of the New Law. For if the example proposed by them and similar cases are rightly considered, we find that what they call an indispensable cause is related to the effect only as a sign. For the lead nickel is nothing but a sign of the reception of the money, like the staff of authority which is conferred upon an abbot.
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| Unde, si sic se habent sacramenta novae legis ad gratiam, sequitur quod sint solum signa gratiae, et ita nihil habebunt prae sacramentis veteris legis. Nisi forte quis dicat quod sacramenta novae legis sunt signa gratiae simul cum eis datae, sacramenta vero veteris legis gratiae promissae. Sed hoc magis pertinet ad conditionem temporis quam ad dignitatem sacramentorum: quia in tempore illo promittebatur gratia, nunc autem est tempus plenitudinis gratiae, propter reparationem humanae naturae iam factam; unde, secundum hoc, sacramenta ista si tunc fuissent cum toto eo quod nunc habent, nihil plus fecissent quam illa, nec illa nunc minus facerent quam ista, nulla eis additione facta.
| Consequently, if the sacraments of the New Law are so related to grace, it will follow that they are only signs of grace; and thus they will have nothing to set them above the sacraments of the Old Law unless perhaps one were to say that the sacraments of the New Law are signs of a grace given simultaneously with them, whereas those of the Old Law are signs of a grace that is promised. But this refers more to a difference of time than to the dignity of the sacraments, because at that time grace was promised, but now is the time of the fullness of grace on account of the restoration of human nature already accomplished. According to this opinion, then, if these same sacraments of the New Law had existed then with everything which they now have, they would not have effected anything more than those of the Old Law, nor would the ancient sacraments now effect anything less than the present ones even if nothing were added to them.
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| Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod sacramenta novae legis aliquid ad gratiam habendam operantur. Sed ad aliquem effectum operatur aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo sicut per se agens; et dicitur per se agere quod agit per aliquam formam sibi inhaerentem per modum naturae completae, sive habeat illam formam a se, sive ab alio, aut naturaliter, aut violenter; per quem modum dicuntur illuminare sol et luna; calefacere ignis et ferrum ignitum et aqua calefacta. Alio modo aliquid operatur ad effectum aliquem instrumentaliter: quod quidem non operatur ad effectum per formam sibi inhaerentem, sed solum in quantum est motum a per se agente.
| We must therefore solve the problem differently and say that the sacraments of the New Law have some effect upon our having grace. Now a thing works for the production of an effect in two ways: (1) By acting of itself. And something is said to act of itself if it acts by means of a form inherent to it after the manner of a complete nature, whether it has that form of itself or from another, and whether naturally or violently. In this way the sun and the moon are said to light things, and fire and red-hot iron and heated water to heat things. (2) A thing is said to work toward the production of an effect instrumentally if it does not do so by means of a form inherent to it but only in so far as it is moved by an agent that acts of itself.
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| Haec enim est ratio instrumenti, in quantum est instrumentum, ut moveat motum; unde, sicut se habet forma completa ad per se agentem, ita se habet motus quo movetur a principali agente, ad instrumentum, sicut serra operatur ad scamnum. Quamvis enim serra habeat aliquam actionem quae sibi competit secundum propriam formam, ut dividere, tamen aliquem effectum habet qui sibi non competit nisi in quantum est mota ab artifice, scilicet facere rectam incisionem, et convenientem formae artis. Et sic instrumentum habet duas operationes: unam quae competit ei secundum formam propriam; aliam quae competit ei secundum quod est motum a per se agente, quae transcendit virtutem propriae formae.
| It is the nature of an instrument as instrument to move something else when moved itself. The motion by which the instrument is moved by the principal agent is therefore related to the instrument as a complete form is related to an agent acting, of itself. It is in this way, for instance, that a saw works upon a bench. Now although the saw has an action which attaches to it in accordance with its own form, that is, to divide, nevertheless it has an effect which does not attach to it except in so far as it is moved by a craftsman, namely, to make a straight cut agreeing with the pattern. Thus an instrument has two operations, one which belongs to it according to its own form, and another which belongs to it in so far as it is moved by the principal agent and which rises above the ability of its own form.
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| Dicendum est ergo, quod nec sacramentum nec aliqua creatura potest gratiam dare per modum per se agentis, quia hoc solius virtutis divinae est, ut ex praecedenti art. patet. Sed sacramenta ad gratiam operantur instrumentaliter; quod sic patet.
| We must therefore say that neither a sacrament nor any other creature can give grace as a principal agent, because this is proper to the divine power exclusively, as is evident from the preceding article. But the sacraments work instrumentally toward the production of grace. This is explained as follows.
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| Damascenus in libro III dicit quod humana natura in Christo erat velut quoddam organum divinitatis; et ideo humana natura aliquid communicabat in operatione virtutis divinae, sicut quod Christus tangendo leprosum mundavit; sic enim ipse tactus Christi causabat instrumentaliter salutem leprosi.
| Damascene says that in Christ His human nature was like a tool of His divinity, and thus His human nature shared somewhat in the working of the divine power. By touching a leper, for instance, Christ made him clean. The very touch of Christ thus caused the health of the leper instrumentally.
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| Sicut autem humana natura in Christo communicabat ad effectus divinae virtutis instrumentaliter in corporalibus effectibus, ita in spiritualibus; unde sanguis Christi pro nobis effusus habuit vim ablutivam peccatorum; Apoc. I, 5: lavit nos a peccatis nostris in sanguine suo; et Rom. III, 24: iustificati (...) in sanguine ipsius.
| It was not merely in corporeal effects that Christ’s human nature shared instrumentally in the effect of the divine power but also in spiritual effects. Thus Christ’s blood poured out for us had the ability to wash away sins, as is said in the Apocalypse (1: 5): “[Jesus Christ] washed us from our sins in his own blood,” and in the Epistle to the Romans (3:24): “Being justified... in his blood.”
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| Et sic humanitas Christi est instrumentalis causa iustificationis; quae quidem causa nobis applicatur spiritualiter per fidem, et corporaliter per sacramenta: quia humanitas Christi et spiritus et corpus est; ad hoc scilicet ut effectum sanctificationis, quae est Christi, in nobis percipiamus. Unde illud est perfectissimum sacramentum in quo corpus Christi realiter continetur, scilicet Eucharistia, et est omnium aliorum consummativum, ut Dionysius dicit in Eccl. Hierarch., cap. III. Alia vero sacramenta participant aliquid de virtute illa qua humanitas Christi instrumentaliter ad iustificationem operatur, ratione cuius sanctificatus Baptismo, sanctificatus sanguine Christi dicitur ab apostolo Hebr. X, 10. Unde passio Christi in sacramentis novae legis dicitur operari. Et sic sacramenta novae legis sunt causa gratiae quasi instrumentaliter operantia ad gratiam.
| Thus the humanity of Christ is the instrumental cause of justification. This cause is applied to us spiritually through faith and bodily through the sacraments, because Christ’s humanity is both spirit and body. This is done to the end that we may receive within ourselves the effect of sanctification, which is had through Christ. As a consequence the most perfect sacrament is that in which the body of Christ is really contained, the Eucharist; and it is the consummation of all the others, as Dionysius says. But the other sacraments also share some of the efficacy by which Christ’s humanity works instrumentally for our justification. By reason of it a person sanctified by baptism is said by the Apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews (10: 10-2 2) to be sanctified by the blood of Christ. Christ’s passion is accordingly said to work in the sacraments of the New Law. Thus the sacraments of the New Law are causes of grace working in some sense instrumentally to produce it.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Bernardus sufficienter rationem sacramentorum novae legis tangit, loquendo de eis secundum quod sunt signa, et non secundum quod sunt causae.
| 1. Bernard does not deal adequately with the nature of the sacraments of the New Law, for he speaks of them inasmuch as they are signs and not inasmuch as they are causes.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod sacramenta novae legis non sunt causa gratiae principalis, quasi per se agentia, sed causa instrumentalis. Et secundum modum aliorum instrumentorum habent duplicem actionem: unam quae excedit formam propriam, sed est ex virtute formae principalis agentis, scilicet Dei: quae est iustificare; et aliam quam exercet secundum formam propriam, sicut abluere vel ungere: et haec actio attingit corporaliter ipsum quidem hominem qui iustificatur, secundum corpus per se, et secundum animam per accidens, quae huiusmodi corporalem actionem sentit; spiritualiter vero attingit ipsam animam, in quantum ab ea percipitur in intellectu ut quoddam signum spiritualis mundationis.
| 2. The sacraments of the New Law are not the principal cause of grace as agents acting of themselves, but the instrumental cause; and after the manner of other instruments they have a twofold action: one which surpasses its own form, being from the power of the form of the principal agent, God; and this is to justify; and another which they exercise according to their own form, as to wash or to anoint. This latter action affects in a bodily manner the man who is justified in his body directly and in his soul, which senses the bodily action, indirectly. But it affects in a spiritual manner the soul itself inasmuch as by means of the intellect the soul perceives it as a sign of a spiritual cleansing.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod quia ultimus finis respondet primo agenti tamquam principalis, ideo non principaliter agentibus non attribuitur ultimus finis, sed dispositio ad finem ultimum. Et sic sacramenta dicuntur esse causa gratiae per modum instrumentorum disponentium.
| 3. Because the last end corresponds to the first agent as principal to principal, for this reason not the last end but a disposition for the last end is attributed to instrumental agents. And so the sacraments are said to be the cause of grace as disposing instruments.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod sacramenta non operantur ad gratiam per virtutem propriae formae: sic enim operarentur ut per se agentia; sed operantur per virtutem principalis agentis, scilicet Dei, in eis existentem. Quae quidem virtus non habet esse completum in natura, sed est quid incompletum in genere entis; quod patet ex hoc quod instrumentum movet in quantum movetur. Motus autem est actus imperfectus, secundum philosophum; unde, sicut illa quae movent in quantum sunt iam quasi in termino motus assimilata agenti, movent per formam perfectam: ita illa quae movent prout sunt in ipso moveri, movent per virtutem incompletam. Et huiusmodi virtus est in aere ad movendum visum secundum quod immutatur a colore parietis ut in fieri, non ut in facto esse: unde species coloris est in aere per modum intentionis, et non per modum entis completi, sicut est in pariete.
| 4. The sacraments do not work for the production of grace by the power of their own form, for in that case they would work as principal agents; but they work by the power of the principal agent, God, existing in them. That power does not have a complete act of being in nature, but is something incomplete in the line of being. That is shown from the fact that an instrument moves in so far as it is moved. But motion is “an imperfect act” according to the Philosopher. Consequently, things which cause motion as being at the term of the motion and already assimilated to the agent, move by means of a perfect form; but things which cause motion as being in the midst of motion, move by means of an incomplete power. It is this sort of power which is in the air to move sight in so far as it is changed by the color of a wall, in the sense of being in process and not in that of already being in the completed state. The species of the color is accordingly in the air after the manner of an intention, and not after the manner of a complete being as it is in the wall.
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| Et similiter sacramenta operantur ad gratiam prout sunt quasi mota a Deo ad hunc effectum. Qui quidem motus attenditur secundum institutionem, sanctificationem, et applicationem ad eum qui accedit ad sacramenta: unde habent virtutem non per modum entis completi, sed quasi incomplete. Et sic non est inconveniens quod virtus spiritualis sit in re materiali, sicut species colorum sunt spiritualiter in aere.
| In the same way the sacraments have an effect upon grace inasmuch as they are, as it were, moved by God to this effect. And that motion can be considered on the basis of their institution, their sanctification, and their application to the one who goes to the sacraments. They consequently do not have their efficacy after the manner of a complete being, but in a sense incompletely. Thus it is not out of keeping for a spiritual power to be in a material being, just as the species of color are spiritually in the air.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod virtus illa neque potest dici corporea neque incorporea, proprie loquendo: corporeum enim et incorporeum sunt differentiae entis completi; sed proprie dicitur virtus ad incorporeum, sicut motus magis dicitur ad ens quam ens. Obiectio autem procedit ac si ista virtus esset quaedam forma completa.
| 5. That power cannot, properly speaking, be called either corporeal or incorporeal; for corporeal and incorporeal are differences of complete being. Properly it is called a power for something incorporeal, just as motion is rather said to be to a being than a being. But the difficulty argues as if that power were a complete form.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod incompletum non potest esse causa completi sicut per se agens; potest tamen incompletum ordinari aliqualiter ad completum per modum causae instrumentalis; sicut dicimus motum instrumenti esse causam formae inductae a principali agente.
| 6. Something incomplete cannot be the cause of something complete as a principal agent; yet something incomplete can in a sense be directed after the manner of a cause to something complete, as we say that the motion of the instrument is the cause of the form introduced by the principal agent.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod de perfectione instrumenti non est quod agat per virtutem completam, sed quod agat in quantum movetur, et ita per virtutem incompletam; unde non sequitur sacramenta esse imperfecta instrumenta, quamvis virtus eorum non sit ens completum.
| 7. It does not pertain to the perfection of an instrument to act by a complete power, but to act in so far as it is moved, and thus by an incomplete power. It therefore does not follow that the sacraments are imperfect instruments even though their power is not a complete being.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod instrumentum comparatur ad actionem magis ut quo agitur, quam ut quod agit: principalis enim agentis est ut agat instrumento. Et sic, quamvis ultima non reducant media vel suprema in Deum, possunt tamen ultima se habere ut quibus fiat reductio superiorum et mediorum in Deum. Unde Dionysius dicit, quod naturale est nobis ut per sensibilia in Deum manuducamur. Et hanc etiam causam assignat necessitatis visibilium sacramentorum, in I capite caelestis Hierarch.
| 8. An instrument is related to an action more like that by which it is done than like that which does it; for the principal agent acts by means of the instrument. Accordingly, although the lowest beings do not lead the intermediate or highest beings back to God, they can still serve as the means by which the intermediate and higher beings are led back to God. Consequently Dionysius also says that it is connatural for us to be led to God by means of sensible things, and he gives this as the reason for the necessity of visible sacraments.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod illuminare animam Deo competit nulla creatura mediante quae ad illuminationem animae agat sicut principale et per se agens; potest tamen esse aliquod medium agens instrumentaliter et dispositive.
| 9. It is suitable for God to enlighten the soul without the intervention of any creature which would act in this work as a principal agent acting of itself. There can nevertheless be a means acting instrumentally and dispositively.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod quaedam sacramenta sunt in quibus requiritur materia sanctificata, sicut in extrema unctione et confirmatione; quaedam vero sunt in quibus non requiritur ex necessitate sacramenti. In omnibus igitur verum est quod virtus sacramenti non consistit in materia tantum, sed in materia et forma simul, quae duo sunt unum sacramentum: unde, quantumcumque applicetur materia sacramenti ad hominem, sine debita forma verborum et aliis quae ad hoc requiruntur, non sequitur sacramenti effectus.
| 10. There are some sacraments in which consecrated matter is required, e.g., extreme unction and confirmation; but there are others in which this is not required as necessary for the sacrament. It is therefore true in the case of all that the power of the sacrament does not consist in the matter alone, but in the matter and form together, both of which constitute a single sacrament. Consequently, however much the matter of the sacrament is applied to a man, if the due form of the words and the other requisites are missing, the effect of the sacrament does not follow.
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| Sed in sacramentis quae indigent materia sanctificata, manet virtus sacramenti in materia post usum sacramenti partialiter, sed non complete. In sacramentis vero quae non indigent materia sanctificata, nihil remanet post sacramenti usum; unde aqua in qua celebratus est Baptismus, nihil plus habet quam alia aqua, nisi forte propter permixtionem chrismatis, quod tamen non est de necessitate sacramenti. Nec est inconveniens ut virtus illa cesset, quia virtus illa se habet ut in fieri existens et moveri, ut dictum est; et huiusmodi cessat cessante motione moventis: statim enim quando movens cessat movere, et mobile cessat moveri.
| But in the case of the sacraments which need consecrated matter, the power of the sacrament remains partially though not completely in the matter of the sacrament after its use. But in the case of the sacraments which do not need consecrated matter, nothing remains after the use of the sacrament. Thus the water with which baptism has been conferred has nothing more than any other water, unless it be because of the mingling of the chrism, which is not, however, necessary for the sacrament. Nor is there anything incongruous in the fact that the power ceases immediately, because that power is like a thing in the process of becoming and moving, as has been said. Such things cease to exist when the motion of the mover ceases; for as soon as the mover ceases to move, the mobile ceases to be moved.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod quamvis corporis elementum sit ignobilius anima, et propter hoc non possit aliquid efficere in anima virtute propriae naturae; potest tamen aliquid efficere in anima prout est instrumentum agens in virtute divina.
| 11. Although a bodily element is inferior to the soul, and for this reason cannot effect anything in the soul by virtue of its own nature, it can nonetheless effect something in the soul inasmuch as it is an instrument acting by the divine power.
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| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod anima agit disponendo ad gratiam virtute naturae propriae, sacramentum autem virtute divina ut eius instrumentum; et ideo non est simile.
| 12. In disposing itself for grace the soul acts by virtue of its own nature, whereas a sacrament acts by the divine virtue as God’s instrument. And so the case is not the same.
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| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod sacramentum secundum propriam formam significat vel natum est significare effectum illum ad quem divinitus ordinatur; et secundum hoc est conveniens instrumentum, quia sacramenta significando causant.
| 13. In keeping with its own form a sacrament signifies or is such as to signify the effect to which it is divinely ordained. In this respect it is a suitable instrument, because the sacraments cause by signifying.
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| Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod sacramenta novae legis non sunt infirma remedia, sed valida, in quantum eis Christi passio operatur. Sacramenta vero veteris legis, quae passionem Christi praecesserunt, dicuntur infirma, ut patet Galat. IV, 9: conversi estis ad infirma et egena elementa.
| 14. The sacraments of the New Law are not weak remedies, but powerful, seeing that the passion of Christ works in them. The sacraments of the Old Law, however, which preceded the passion of Christ, are called weak, as appears in the Epistle to the Galatians (4:9): “You have turned to the weak and needy elements.”
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| Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod creatio nihil praesupponit circa quod posset fieri instrumentalis agentis actio; recreatio vero praesupponit; et ideo non est simile.
| 15. Creation does not presuppose anything in which the action of an instrumental agent could terminate, but re-creation does. There is accordingly no parallel.
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| Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod Deus non utitur instrumentis vel causis mediis in sua actione propter sui indigentiam, sed propter effectuum convenientiam. Conveniens enim est ut nobis divina remedia exhibeantur secundum modum nostrum, id est per sensibilia, ut Dionysius dicit, II cap. Cael. Hierarch.
| 16. It is not because of His own need but for their aptness for the effects that God uses instruments or intervening causes in His action. For it is fitting that the divine remedies should be presented to us conformably to our condition, that is, through sensible things, as Dionysius says.
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| Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod actio naturalis materialis instrumenti adiuvat ad effectum sacramenti, in quantum per eam sacramentum suscipienti applicatur, et in quantum sacramenti significatio per actionem praedictam completur, sicut significatio Baptismi per ablutionem.
| 17. The natural action of a material instrument helps toward the effect of the sacrament in so far as the sacrament is applied by it to the recipient and in so far as the signification of the sacrament is completed by the said action, as the signification of baptism by washing.
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| Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod aliqua sacramenta sunt in quibus non requiritur determinatus minister, sicut patet in Baptismo; et in talibus virtus sacramenti nullo modo consistit in ministro. Quaedam vero sacramenta sunt in quibus requiritur minister determinatus; et horum virtus partialiter consistit in ministro, sicut in materia et in forma. Nec tamen iustificare dicitur minister nisi per modum ministerii, in quantum operatur ad iustificationem conferendo sacramentum.
| 18. There are some sacraments in which a definite minister is not required, as in baptism. In these the power of the sacrament is not situated in the minister at all. But there are some sacraments in which a definite minister is required. The power of these is partially situated in the minister as well as in the matter and the form. And yet the minister is not said to justify except by way of the ministry, inasmuch as he cooperates in justification by conferring a sacrament.
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| Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod spiritus sanctus non datur nisi ab eo qui causat gratiam sicut principale agens, quod solius Dei est; et ideo solus Deus spiritum sanctum dat.
| 19. The Holy Spirit is given only by him who causes grace as the principal agent; and this is the business of God alone. Thus only God gives the Holy Spirit.
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Q. 27: Grace
ARTICLE V
In the fifth article we ask:
In one man is there only one ingratiatory grace?
[ARTICLE II Sent., 26, a. 6; IV Sent., I, 1, 4 sol. 5.]
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| Quinto quaeritur utrum in uno homine sit una tantum gratia gratum faciens
| Difficulties:
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that there is not, for
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| Nihil enim contra seipsum dividitur per operantem et cooperantem. Ergo diversae sunt gratiae, operans scilicet et cooperans; et sic in uno homine est non una tantum gratia gratum faciens.
| 1. Nothing is distinguished from itself. But grace is distinguished into operating and cooperating grace. Operating and cooperating grace are therefore different kinds, and in one man there is not just one ingratiatory grace.
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| Sed dicendum, quod est una gratia secundum habitum operans et cooperans: sed divisio sumitur secundum diversos actus.- Sed contra: habitus distinguitur per actus. Si igitur actus sunt diversi, utriusque gratiae non poterit esse habitus unus.
| 2. It was said in answer that operating and cooperating grace are one and the same from the viewpoint of the habit, but the distinction is made from the viewpoint of the distinct acts.—On the contrary, habits are distinguished by their acts. If, then, the acts are distinct, the two kinds of grace cannot be a single habit.
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| Praeterea, nullus habet necesse petere id quod iam habet. Sed habens gratiam praevenientem necesse habet petere subsequentem, secundum Augustinum. Ergo non est una gratia praeveniens et subsequens.
| 3. No one has to ask for what he already has. But a person who has antecedent grace has to ask for subsequent grace, according to Augustine. Antecedent grace and subsequent grace are therefore not one and the same.
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| Sed dicebatur, quod habens gratiam praevenientem non petit gratiam subsequentem quasi aliam gratiam, sed quasi eiusdem gratiae conservationem.- Sed contra: gratia est potentior quam natura. Sed homo in statu naturae integrae potuit stare per se in eo quod acceperat, ut dicitur 24 dist., II Lib. Sentent. Ergo ille qui accepit gratiam praevenientem, potest in ea stare; et sic non habet necesse hoc petere.
| 4. It was said that a person having antecedent grace does not ask for subsequent grace as a distinct grace but as the preservation of the same one.—On the contrary, grace is stronger than nature. But man in the state of uncorrupted nature was able by himself to remain in possession of what he had received, as is said in the Sentences. Consequently one who has received antecedent grace is able to remain in it, and so he does not have to ask for this.
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| Praeterea, forma diversificatur secundum diversitatem perfectibilium. Sed gratia est forma virtutum. Cum ergo virtutes sint multae, gratia non poterit esse una.
| 5. Form is distinguished in the same way as the things to be perfected. But grace is the form of virtues. Since there are many virtues, grace therefore cannot be one.
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| Praeterea, gratia praeveniens pertinet ad viam; sed gratia subsequens pertinet ad gloriam; unde Augustinus dicit: praevenit, ut pie vivamus, subsequitur, ut cum illo vivamus: praevenit, ut vocemur; subsequitur, ut glorificemur. Alia autem est gratia viae, et gratia patriae, cum non sit eadem perfectio naturae conditae et naturae glorificatae, ut Magister dicit in 3 dist., II Lib. Ergo gratia praeveniens et subsequens non sunt idem.
| 6. Antecedent grace refers to this present life, but subsequent grace refers to glory. Thus Augustine says: “It precedes in order that we may live piously, and it follows in order that we may always live with God; it precedes that we may be called, and it follows that we may be glorified. Now the grace of this present life is different from that of our heavenly home, since nature as created and nature as glorified do not have the same perfection, as the Master says. Antecedent grace and subsequent grace are therefore not the same.
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| Praeterea, gratia operans pertinet ad actum interiorem, gratia vero cooperans ad actum exteriorem: unde Augustinus dicit, quod praevenit ut velimus, et subsequitur ne frustra velimus. Sed non est idem quod est principium actus interioris et exterioris; sicut patet in virtutibus, quod caritas datur ad actum interiorem, fortitudo vero et iustitia et alia huiusmodi, ad actus exteriores. Ergo non est eadem gratia operans et cooperans, sive praeveniens et subsequens.
| 7. Operating grace pertains to the internal act, whereas cooperating grace pertains to the external act. Augustine thus says: “It precedes in order that we may will, and it follows lest we will in vain.” But the principle of the internal act and that of the external act are not the same. In regard to the virtues, for instance, it is evident that ,charity is given for the internal act, but fortitude, justice, and the like for external acts. Consequently operating and cooperating grace or antecedent and subsequent grace are not the same.
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| Praeterea, sicut culpa est defectus in anima ex parte affectus, ita ignorantia ex parte intellectus. Sed nullus habitus unus expellit omnem ignorantiam ab intellectu. Ergo nec potest esse unus habitus qui expellat omnem culpam ab affectu. Sed gratia expellit omnem culpam. Ergo gratia non est unus habitus.
| 8. Ignorance is a defect in the soul on the part of the intellect like guilt on the part of the will. But no one habit drives all ignorance out of the intellect. Consequently there cannot be a single habit which would drive all guilt out of the will. But grace drives out all guilt. Then grace is not a single habit.
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| Praeterea, gratia et culpa sunt contraria. Sed una culpa non inficit omnes potentias animae. Ergo nec una gratia potest omnes perficere.
| 9. Grace and guilt are contraries. But a single guilt does not infect all the powers of the soul. Then neither can a single grace perfect all.
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| Praeterea, Exod. XXXIII, 13, super illud, si inveni gratiam, dicit Glossa: sanctis non sufficit una gratia. Una est quae praecedit, ut Deum cognoscant et diligant; alia est quae sequitur, ut se mundos et inviolatos custodiant, et proficiant. Et sic in uno homine non est tantum una gratia.
| 10. On the words of Exodus (3 3: 13): “If therefore I have found favor...” the Gloss comments: “A single grace is not sufficient for the saints; there is one which precedes in order that they may know and love God; and there is another which follows in order that they may keep themselves clean and inviolate and make progress.” There is accordingly not merely one grace in one man.
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| Praeterea, diversus modus habens specialem difficultatem, requirit diversum habitum; sicut circa collationem magnorum donorum, quae sua magnitudine difficultatem faciunt, requiritur specialis virtus, scilicet magnificentia praeter liberalitatem, quae consistit circa communia dona. Sed perseveranter bene velle habet specialem difficultatem super hoc quod est bene velle simpliciter: velle autem bene simpliciter, est gratiae praevenientis; velle autem bene perseveranter, est gratiae subsequentis: unde Augustinus dicit, quod gratia praevenit, ut homo velit; sequitur, ut impleat atque persistat. Ergo gratia subsequens est alius habitus a gratia praeveniente.
| 11. A different manner of acting having a special difficulty requires a different habit. In regard to the granting of large gifts, for example, which cause difficulty because of their magnitude, there is required a special virtue, magnificence, over and above liberality, which is concerned with ordinary gifts. But to persevere in willing rightly has a special difficulty over and above that of simply willing. But simply to will rightly is a matter of antecedent grace, whereas perseverance in willing rightly is a matter of subsequent grace. Thus Augustine says that grace precedes in order that man may will, and follows in order that he may fulfill and persist. Subsequent grace is therefore a different habit from antecedent grace.
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| Praeterea, sacramenta novae legis sunt causa gratiae, ut dictum est, art. IV, huius quaest. Sed ad eumdem effectum diversa sacramenta non ordinantur. Ergo sunt diversae gratiae in homine, quae per diversa sacramenta conferuntur.
| 12. The sacraments of the New Law are the cause of grace, as has been said. But different sacraments are not ordained to the same effect. Consequently there are different graces in man which are conferred by the different sacraments.
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| Sed dicendum, quod posteriora sacramenta non conferuntur ad aliam gratiam inducendam sed ad habitam augmentandam.- Sed contra: augmentum gratiae speciem gratiae non variat. Si ergo proportio causarum est secundum proportionem effectuum, sequeretur ex responsione praedicta quod sacramenta secundum speciem non differant.
| 13. It was answered that later sacraments are not conferred in order to introduce grace but to increase it.—On the contrary, the increase of grace does not change its species. If, then, causes are proportioned to their effects, it will follow from the answer given that the sacraments do not differ in species.
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| Sed dicendum, quod sacramenta differunt specie penes diversas gratias gratis datas quae in diversis sacramentis conferuntur, et sunt proprii sacramentorum effectus.- Sed contra: gratia gratis data non opponitur culpae. Cum ergo sacramenta praecipue ordinentur contra culpam, videtur quod proprii effectus sacramentorum, penes quos sacramenta distinguuntur, non sunt gratiae gratis datae.
| 14. It was said that the sacraments differ specifically in accordance with the different gratuitous graces which are conferred in the different sacraments and are the distinctive effects of the sacraments. On the contrary, gratuitous grace is not opposed to guilt. Now since the sacraments are especially directed against guilt, it therefore seems that the distinctive effects of the sacraments, in accordance with which the sacraments are distinguished, are not gratuitous graces.
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| Praeterea, ex diversis peccatis diversa vulnera animae infliguntur, quae quidem omnia per gratiam sanantur. Cum igitur diversis vulneribus diversae respondeant medicinae, quia, secundum verbum Hieronymi; non sanat oculum quod sanat calcaneum; videtur quod sint diversae gratiae.
| 15. Different wounds are inflicted upon the soul by different sins, but all are healed by grace. Since different medicines correspond to different wounds, because (in the words of Jerome) “what heals a heel will not heal an eye,” it therefore seems that there are distinct graces.
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| Praeterea, idem ab eodem non potest simul haberi et non haberi. Sed aliqui habent gratiam operantem qui non habent gratiam cooperantem, sicut parvuli baptizati. Ergo non est eadem gratia operans et cooperans.
| 16. The same thing cannot at the same time be had and not had by the same thing. But some people who do not have cooperating grace do have operating grace—baptized infants, for instance. Operating grace and cooperating grace are therefore not the same.
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| Praeterea, gratia proportionatur naturae sicut perfectio perfectibili. Sed in natura humana sic est quod non ab eodem principio immediate est esse et operatio: nam anima secundum suam essentiam est principium essendi, sed secundum potentiam est principium operationis. Ergo, cum in gratuitis gratia operans vel praeveniens sit principium a quo est esse spirituale, gratia vero cooperans sit spiritualis operationis principium; videtur quod non sit eadem gratia operans et cooperans.
| 17. Grace is proportioned to nature as a perfection to a perfectible thing. But in human nature it so happens that being and operation are not immediately from the same principle; for the soul is the principle of being on the basis of its essence, but that of operation on the basis of its power. Now since on the supernatural plane operating or antecedent grace is the principle from which spiritual existence is had, but cooperating grace is the principle of spiritual operation, it therefore seems that operating and cooperating grace are not the same.
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| Praeterea, unus habitus non potest simul et semel duos actus producere. Sed actus gratiae operantis, qui est iustificare, vel sanare animam; et actus gratiae cooperantis vel subsequentis, qui est iuste operari, sunt simul in anima. Ergo gratia operans et cooperans non sunt eadem; et sic in homine non est una tantum gratia.
| 18. One habit cannot produce two acts at one and the same time. But the act of operating grace, which is to justify or heal the soul, and the act of cooperating or subsequent grace, which is to act justly, are in the soul at the same time. Operating grace and cooperating grace are therefore not identical; and so there is not just one grace in man.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Ubi sufficit unum, superfluum est ponere plura. Sed una gratia homini sufficit ad salutem: dicitur enim II Cor. cap. XII, 9: sufficit tibi gratia mea. Ergo in homine est una tantum gratia.
| 1. Where one thing suffices it is superfluous to posit many. But one grace suffices for man’s salvation, as is said in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:9): “My grace is sufficient for thee.” Then there is only one grace in man.
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| Praeterea, relatio non multiplicat essentiam rei. Sed gratia cooperans supra operantem nonnisi relationem addit. Ergo eadem est gratia per essentiam operans et cooperans.
| 2. A relation does not multiply the essence of a thing. But cooperating grace does not add anything to operating grace except a relation. Cooperating grace is therefore essentially the same as operating grace.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod sicut ex dictis, art. I huius quaest., patet, gratia dicitur vel quod est gratis data, vel quod est gratum faciens. Gratias autem gratis datas diversas esse, manifestum est. Sunt enim diversa quae homini divinitus conferuntur et gratis supra meritum et facultatem humanae naturae, ut prophetia, operatio miraculorum, et alia huiusmodi, de quibus apostolus dicit I Cor. XII, 4: divisiones gratiarum sunt. Sed de his ad praesens non quaeritur. Gratia vero gratum faciens, ut ex dictis, art. I huius quaest., patere potest, dupliciter accipitur: uno modo pro ipsa divina acceptatione, quae est gratuita Dei voluntas; alio modo pro dono quodam creato, quod formaliter perficit hominem, et facit eum dignum vita aeterna.
| As is clear from what has been said, grace is so called either because it is gratuitously given or because it puts us in God’s good graces. Now it is evident that there are different graces gratuitously given. For there are different gifts which are conferred upon man by God gratuitously and above the merit and capability of human nature, such as prophecy, the working of miracles, and the like, of which the Apostle says in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:4): “Now there are diversities of graces.” But our present inquiry is not concerned with these. But as can be gathered from what has been said,” the grace that puts us in God’s good graces, or ingratiatory grace, is taken in two ways: (1) for the divine acceptance itself, which is the gratuitous will of God, and (2) for a created gift which formally perfects a man and makes him worthy of eternal life.
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| Accipiendo igitur gratiam hoc secundo modo, impossibile est esse in homine uno nisi unam gratiam. Cuius ratio est, quia gratia dicitur secundum quod per eam homo ordinatur in vitam aeternam sufficienter: dicitur enim gratus quasi acceptatus a Deo ut habeat vitam aeternam. Illud autem quod ponitur sufficienter ordinare ad aliquid unum, oportet esse unum tantum; quia si multa essent, neutrum eorum sufficeret, vel alterum superflueret.
| Now if we take grace in this second sense, it is impossible for more than one grace to be in one man. The reason for this is that grace is spoken of inasmuch as by it man is destined for eternal life, and adequately. For to have grace means to be accepted by God with a view to having eternal life. Now anything held to direct things adequately to one term must itself be only one, because if there were many such, either no one of them would be adequate or every other would be superfluous.
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| Sed ex hoc necesse est gratiam etiam aliquid unum esse simplex. Possibile enim esset quod nihil unum sufficienter dignum redderet vita aeterna; sed ad hoc homo redderetur dignus ex multis, utpote ex multis virtutibus: quod si esset, nihil illorum multorum posset dici gratia, sed omnia simul una gratia dicerentur, quia ex omnibus illis non fieret in homine nisi una dignitas respectu vitae aeternae. Sic autem gratia non est una, sed sicut unus simplex habitus: et hoc ideo quia habitus in anima diversificatur in ordine ad diversos actus; ipsi autem actus non sunt ratio acceptationis divinae; sed prius homo acceptatur a Deo, deinde actus eius, ut habetur Genes. IV, 4: respexit Deus ad Abel et ad munera eius.
| But it is not necessary on this account for grace to be one simple thing. For it is possible that no one thing would sufficiently make a man worthy of eternal life, but that man would be made worthy of it by many things, as by many virtues. But if that were the case, no one of those many things would be called grace, but all taken together would be called one grace, because from all of them there would arise in the man only one worthiness with regard to eternal life. Grace is, however, not one in this way, but rather as one simple habit. This is so because habits in the soul are differentiated in relation to different acts. The acts themselves, however, are not the reason for the divine acceptance; but first the man is accepted by God and then his acts, as is indicated in Genesis (4:4): “And the Lord had respect to Abel, and to his offerings.”
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| Unde illud donum quod Deus tribuit his quos acceptat in suum regnum et gloriam, praesupponitur ad perfectiones vel habitus, quibus humani actus perficiuntur, ut sint digni acceptari a Deo. Et sic oportet habitum gratiae indivisum manere, utpote praecedentem ea quibus fit distinctio habituum in anima.
| That gift, then, which God grants to those whom He accepts into His kingdom and glory is presupposed to the perfections or habits by which human acts are perfected so as to be worthy of acceptance by God. Thus the habit of grace must remain undivided, as preceding the things by which the differentiation of habits takes place in the soul.
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| Si autem accipiatur gratia gratum faciens primo modo, scilicet pro gratuita Dei voluntate, sic constat quod ex parte ipsius Dei acceptantis est una tantum Dei gratia, non solum respectu unius, sed respectu omnium: quia quidquid est in eo, non potest esse diversum; ex parte autem effectuum divinorum potest esse multiplex: ut dicamus omnem effectum quem Deus facit in nobis ex gratuita sua voluntate, qua nos in suum regnum acceptat, pertinere ad gratiam gratum facientem; sicut quod immittat nobis bonas cogitationes, et sanctas affectiones. Sic igitur gratia, secundum quod est quoddam donum habituale in nobis, est una tantum: secundum autem quod dicit effectum aliquem Dei in nobis ordinatum ad nostram salutem, possunt dici multae gratiae in nobis.
| If, on the other hand, grace is taken in the first sense, namely, for God’s gratuitous will, then it is evident that from the viewpoint of God who does the accepting there is only one grace of God, not only in regard to one man, but also in regard to all, because whatever is in Him cannot be distinct. But from the viewpoint of its effects it can be multiple. As a result we say that every effect which God works in us by His gratuitous will accepting us into His kingdom pertains to ingratiatory grace, such as giving us good thoughts and holy affections. In so far, then, as grace is a habitual gift within us, it is only one; but in so far as it refers to an effect of God within us destined for our salvation, there can be said to be many graces in us.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod gratia operans et cooperans potest distingui et ex parte ipsius gratuitae Dei voluntatis, et ex parte doni nobis collati. Operans enim dicitur gratia respectu illius effectus quem sola efficit, sed dicitur cooperans respectu effectus quem sola non efficit, sed cum libero arbitrio cooperante.
| 1. Operating and cooperating grace can be distinguished from the point of view of God’s gratuitous will and from that of the gift conferred upon us. Grace is called operating in regard to an effect which the will of God brings about in us, whereas grace is called cooperating in regard to an effect which God’s will does not produce alone, but with the cooperation of our free choice.
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| Ex parte vero gratuitae Dei voluntatis gratia operans dicetur ipsa iustificatio impii, quae fit ipsius doni gratuiti infusione. Hoc enim donum sola gratuita divina voluntas causat in nobis, nec aliquo modo eius causa est liberum arbitrium, nisi per modum dispositionis sufficientis. Ex parte vero eiusdem gratia cooperans dicetur secundum quod in libero arbitrio operatur, motum eius causando, et exterioris actus executionem expediendo, et perseverantiam praebendo, in quibus omnibus aliquid agit liberum arbitrium. Et sic constat quod aliud est gratia operans et cooperans.
| From the point of view of God’s gratuitous will, therefore, the very justification of a sinner, which is brought about by means of the infusion of a gratuitous gift, will be called operating grace. For only God’s gratuitous will causes this gift in us, and free choice is in no way its cause except as a disposition, and that is inadequate. From the same point of view grace will be called cooperating inasmuch as it works in our free choice, causing its movement, removing the obstacles to the execution of the external act, and giving perseverance, in all of which our free choice plays a part. Thus it is clear that operating grace is distinct from cooperating grace.
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| Ex parte vero doni gratuiti eadem gratia per essentiam dicetur operans et cooperans: operans quidem, secundum quod informat animam; ut operans formaliter intelligatur per modum loquendi quo dicimus quod albedo facit album parietem: hoc enim nullo modo est actus liberi arbitrii; cooperans vero dicetur secundum quod inclinat ad actum intrinsecum et extrinsecum, et secundum quod praestat facultatem perseverandi usque in finem.
| From the point of view of the gratuitous gift essentially the same grace will be called operating and cooperating. It will be called operating grace in so far as it informs the soul, so that the term operating will be understood formally, in the way in which we speak of whiteness making a wall white. For this information it is nowise the act of our free choice. It will be called cooperating, however, in so far as it inclines us to the internal and the external act and supplies the ability to persevere to the end.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod diversi effectus qui attribuuntur gratiae operanti et cooperanti, non possunt habitum diversificare. Effectus enim qui attribuuntur gratiae operanti, sunt causae effectuum qui attribuuntur gratiae cooperanti: ex hoc enim quod voluntas est informata aliquo habitu, sequitur quod in actum volendi exeat. Et ex ipso actu volendi causatur exterior actus. Ab ipsa etiam firmitate habitus causatur resistentia qua resistimus peccato. Et sic unus et idem habitus gratiae est qui informat animam, et elicit actum interiorem et exteriorem, et quodammodo perseverantiam facit, in quantum tentationibus resistit.
| 2. The different effects which are attributed to operating and to cooperating grace cannot differentiate the habit. For the effects which are attributed to operating grace are the causes of the effects which are attributed to cooperating grace. As a consequence of being informed by a habit, the will passes into the act of willing, and from the act of willing the external act is caused. Moreover the resistance which we offer to sin is caused by the firmness of the habit. Thus it is one and the same habit which informs the soul, elicits the internal and the external act, and in a sense accounts for perseverance inasmuch as it resists temptations.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod quantumcumque homo habeat habitum gratiae, semper tamen indiget divina operatione, qua in nobis operatur modis praedictis; et hoc propter infirmitatem nostrae naturae, et multitudinem impedimentorum, quae quidem non erant in statu naturae conditae: unde magis tunc poterat homo stare per seipsum quam nunc possint habentes gratiam, non quidem propter defectum gratiae, sed propter infirmitatem naturae; quamvis etiam tunc indigerent divina providentia eos dirigente et adiuvante. Et ideo habens gratiam necesse habet petere divinum auxilium, quod ad gratiam cooperantem pertinet.
| 3. However much a man has the habit of grace, he still has need of the divine operation working in us in the ways mentioned above. This is because of the infirmity of our nature and the multiplicity of impediments, which were of course not found in the state of nature as it was created. Man was accordingly better able to stand by himself then than even those who have grace can now, not because of any deficiency in the grace but because of the infirmity of our nature, though even then men needed divine providence to guide and help them. One who has grace therefore has the necessity of asking for divine help, which is a form of cooperating grace.
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| Et per hoc patet solutio ad quartum.
| 4. The answer is clear from what has just been said.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod gratia non dicitur forma virtutum quasi pars essentialis virtutum: sic enim oporteret quod multiplicatis virtutibus multiplicaretur gratia; sed dicitur forma virtutis, in quantum formaliter actum virtutis complet.
| 5. Grace is not called the form of the virtues as being an essential part of the virtues. Were that the case, when the virtues are multiplied, grace would have to be multiplied. But it is called the form of the virtues as formally completing the act of virtue.
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| Informatur autem actus virtutis tripliciter. Uno modo in quantum circa substantiam actus apponuntur debitae conditiones, per quarum limitationem in medio virtutis constituitur. Et hoc habet actus virtutis a prudentia; nam medium virtutis accipitur secundum rationem rectam, ut dicitur in libro II Ethic. Et sic prudentia dicitur forma omnium virtutum moralium. Actus autem virtutis sic constitutus in medio, est quasi materialis respectu ordinis in finem ultimum, qui quidem ordo apponitur actui virtutis ex imperio caritatis; et sic caritas dicitur esse forma omnium aliarum virtutum. Ulterius vero efficaciam merendi adhibet gratia: nullus enim operum nostrorum valor reputatur dignus aeternae gloriae, nisi praesupposita acceptatione divina; et sic gratia dicitur esse forma et caritatis et aliarum virtutum.
| Now an act of virtue is given form in three ways. This is done first of all in so far as the due conditions for the substance of the act are placed, setting limits to the act and establishing it in the mean of virtue. The act of virtue has this from prudence; for the mean of virtue is determined by a correct norm, as is said in the Ethics. In this sense prudence is called the form of all the moral virtues. But the act of virtue thus established in the mean is, as it were, material in regard to the ordination to the last end. This order is conferred upon the act of virtue by the command of charity. In this sense charity is said to be the form of all the other virtues. And furthermore grace contributes efficacy for meriting. For no value on the part of our works would be held to be deserving of eternal glory unless divine acceptance were presupposed. In this sense grace is said to be the form both of charity and of the other virtues.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod gratia praeveniens et subsequens dicitur secundum ordinem eorum quae in esse gratuito inveniuntur: quorum quidem primum est subiecti informatio, sive impii iustificatio, quod idem est; secundum vero est actus voluntatis; tertium vero est actus exterior; quartum vero est spiritualis profectus et perseverantia in bono; quintum vero est praemii consecutio.
| 6. Antecedent and subsequent grace are distinguished on the basis of the sequence of factors found in gratuitous existence. The first of these is the information of the subject by grace or the justification of a sinner (which is the same thing). The second is the act of the will. The third is the external act. The fourth is spiritual progress and perseverance in good. The fifth is the obtaining of one’s reward.
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| Distinguitur igitur uno modo gratia praeveniens et subsequens, ut gratia praeveniens dicatur qua iustificatur impius, subsequens vero secundum quam iustificatus operatur. Secundo, ut praeveniens dicatur secundum quam aliquis recte vult, subsequens vero secundum quod rectam voluntatem in exteriori opere consequitur. Tertio, ut gratia praeveniens ad omnia haec referatur, subsequens vero ad perseverantiam in praedictis. Quarto, ut gratia praeveniens ad totum statum meriti referatur, gratia vero subsequens ad praemium.
| Antecedent and subsequent grace are therefore distinguished in the following ways: (1) The grace by which sinners are justified is called antecedent; that by which those already justified operate is called subsequent. (2) That by which a person wills correctly is called antecedent; that by which he carries out his correct will in the external act is called subsequent. (3) Antecedent grace is referred to all of these; subsequent grace, to perseverance in the foregoing. (4) Antecedent grace is referred to the whole state of merit; subsequent grace, to reward.
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| In tribus autem primis distinctionibus patet qualiter gratia praeveniens et subsequens est eadem vel diversa, ex his quae de operante et cooperante sunt dicta: quia secundum hos modos idem videtur esse gratia praeveniens et subsequens quod operans et cooperans. Secundum quartam vero distinctionem, si ipsum donum gratuitum in se accipiatur, quod gratia dicitur, idem invenitur esse gratia praeveniens et subsequens. Sicut enim caritas viae non tollitur, sed in patria remanet augmentata, propter hoc quod in sua ratione nullum defectum importat: ita gratia, cum nullum in sui ratione importet defectum, per sui augmentum fit gloria: nec dicitur esse diversa perfectio naturae in statu viae et patriae quantum ad gratiam propter diversam formam perficientem, sed propter diversam perfectionis mensuram. Si autem gratiam accipiamus cum omnibus virtutibus quas informat, sic gratia et gloria non sunt idem; quia aliquae virtutes in patria evacuantur, ut fides et spes.
| In the first three distinctions it is clear from what was said about operating, grace and cooperating grace, in what sense antecedent grace and subsequent grace are the same or different, because in these ways antecedent and subsequent grace seem to be the same as operating and cooperating grace. According to the fourth distinction too, if the gratuitous gift which is called grace is taken in itself, antecedent grace and subsequent grace are found to be the same thing. For just as the charity of this present life is not taken away but remains and is increased in our heavenly home because it involves no defect in its essence; in the same way grace too, involving no defect in its essence, when increased becomes glory. Nor is the perfection of nature in the present life and in heaven said to be different in point of grace because of any difference in the perfecting form but because of a difference in the measure of perfection. But if we take grace along with all the virtues to which it gives form, then grace and glory are not the same thing, because some virtues, such as faith and hope, are voided in heaven.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod actus exterior et interior, quamvis sint diversa perfectibilia, sunt tamen ordinata, quia unum est causa alterius, ut dictum est.
| 7. Although the external act and the internal act are distinct subjects of perfection, they are nevertheless subordinated, because one is the cause of the other, as has been explained.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod in peccato est duo considerare: scilicet conversionem et aversionem. Secundum conversionem quidem, peccata ab invicem distinguuntur, sed in aversione sunt connexa, in quantum homo per quodlibet peccatum mortale a bono incommutabili avertitur. Peccatis igitur ex parte conversionis virtutes opponuntur; et sic diversa peccata diversis virtutibus expelluntur, sicut diversae ignorantiae diversis scientiis. Ex parte vero aversionis omnia remittuntur per unum, quod est gratia. Ignorantiae autem non convertuntur in aliquo uno; et ideo non est simile.
| 8. There are two aspects to be taken into account in sin: turning towards creatures and turning away from God. As regards turning toward creatures sins are distinguished from one another, but as regards turning away from God they are linked, inasmuch as by any mortal sin a man is turned away from the unchangeable good. Virtues are therefore opposed to sins from the standpoint of turning toward creatures, and in this sense different sins are driven out by different virtues, as different types of ignorance by different sciences. From the standpoint of turning away from God, however, all sins are forgiven by one and the same thing, grace. But different types of ignorance are not linked in any one thing; and so the case is not the same.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod una culpa formaliter non invenitur perficere omnes culpas, sicut unus habitus virtutis vel gratiae perficit omnes virtutes; et hac ratione una culpa non inficit omnes potentias, sicut una gratia perficit: non quidem ita quod sit in omnibus sicut in subiecto, sed in quantum informat omnium potentiarum actus.
| 9. One type of guilt is not found to be the formal completion of all types of guilt as one habit of virtue or of grace completes all the virtues. For this reason one type of gat does not infect all the powers as one grace perfects them—not, of course, in such a way that it is in all as its subject, but as giving form to the acts of all the powers.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod illa gratia quae sequitur, vel intelligitur alius effectus divinae voluntatis gratuitae, vel intelligitur idem habitus gratiae ad alium effectum relatus, ut ex praedictis, in solut. ad 6 arg., patet.
| 10. The grace which follows means either another effect of the divine gratuitous will or the same habit of grace referred to another effect, as is clear from what has been said above.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod firme et immutabiliter habere habitum et operari, est conditio quae requiritur ad omnem virtutem; sicut patet ex philosopho in II Ethic.: et ideo iste modus non requirit specialem habitum.
| 11. To have the habit and the operation firmly and unchangeably is a condition which is required for every virtue, as is made clear by the Philosopher. That manner, then, does not require a special habit.
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| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod sicut diversae virtutes et diversa dona spiritus sancti ad diversos actus ordinantur, ita diversi sacramentorum effectus sunt ut diversae medicinae peccati, et participationes virtutis dominicae passionis, quae a gratia gratum faciente dependent, sicut virtutes et dona.
| 12. Just as different virtues and different gifts of the Holy Spirit are directed to different actions, so too the different effects of the sacraments are like different medicines for sin and different shares in the efficacy of our Lord’s passion, which depend upon sanctifying grace, as do the virtues and gifts.
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| Sed virtutes et dona nomen speciale habent, propter hoc quod actus ad quos ordinantur, sunt manifesti: unde secundum nomen a gratia distinguuntur. Defectus autem peccati, contra quos sacramenta instituuntur, latentes sunt: unde sacramentorum effectus nomen proprium non habent, sed nomine gratiae nominantur; dicuntur enim gratiae sacramentales, et penes has sacramenta distinguuntur sicut penes proprios effectus. Pertinent autem isti effectus ad gratiam gratum facientem, quae istis effectibus coniungitur; et sic cum propriis effectibus habent effectum communem qui est gratia gratum faciens, quae etiam per sacramentum et non habenti datur, et habenti augetur.
| The virtues and gifts have a special name, however, because the acts to which they are directed are evident. They are accordingly distinguished from grace in name also. But the defects of sin, against which the sacraments are instituted, are hidden. Hence the effects of the sacraments do not have a proper name but go by the name of grace; for they are called sacramental graces, and the sacraments are distinguished on the basis of these graces as their proper effects. Those effects, moreover, belong to ingratiatory grace, which also is joined to those effects. Thus along with their proper effects they have a common effect, ingratiatory grace, which is given by means of the sacraments to one who does not have it and increased by them in one who does.
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| Et per hoc patet solutio ad decimumtertium et decimumquartum.
| 13-14. The answer is clear from the above.
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| Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod omnia peccata ex parte aversionis inferunt unum vulnus, ut dictum est, in Sol. ad 8 argum., et sic per unum donum gratiae sanantur: sed ex parte conversionis inferunt diversa vulnera, quae sanantur per diversas virtutes, et per diversos sacramentorum effectus.
| 15. From the point of view of turning away from God all sins inflict a single wound, as has been said,” and so are healed by a single gift of grace. But from the point of view of turning towards creatures they inflict different wounds, which are healed by different virtues and by the different effects of the sacraments.
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| Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod in parvulis etsi non sit gratia cooperans in actu, est tamen cooperans in virtute: illa enim gratia operans quam acceperunt, sufficiens erit cooperari libero arbitrio quando ipsius usum habere poterunt.
| 16. Even though there is no cooperating grace in infants actually, there is nonetheless virtually; for the operating grace which they have received will be sufficient to cooperate with free choice when they have its use.
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| Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod sicut essentia animae immediate est essendi principium, operationis vero principium est mediantibus potentiis, ita immediatus effectus gratiae est conferre esse spirituale, quod pertinet ad informationem subiecti, sive ad iustificationem impii, quae est effectus gratiae operantis. Sed effectus gratiae mediantibus virtutibus et donis est elicere actus meritorios, quod pertinet ad gratiam cooperantem.
| 17. Just as the essence of the soul is immediately the principle of being but, through the mediation of the powers, the principle of acting; in the same way the immediate effect of grace is to confer spiritual existence. This concerns the information of the subject or the justification of sinners and is the effect of operating grace. But the effect of grace through the mediation of the virtues and gifts is to elicit meritorious acts, and this has reference to cooperating grace.
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| Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod duos actus qui sunt operationes distinctae et ad invicem non ordinatae, non potest unus habitus causare simul et semel; sed duos actus quorum unus est operatio, et alius subiecti informatio, vel duas operationes, quarum una sit causa alterius, sicut actus interior est causa exterioris, unus habitus causare potest: et sic se habent actus gratiae operantis et cooperantis, ut ex dictis, in solut. ad 6 et 7 argum., patet.
| 18. Two acts which are distinct operations not subordinated to one another cannot be caused at one and the same time by one habit. But two acts of which one is an operation and the other the information of a subject, or even two operations of which one is the cause of the other, as an internal act is the cause of an external, can be caused by one habit. It is in this way that operating and cooperating grace are related, as appears from what has been said.
|
Q. 27: Grace
ARTICLE VI
In the sixth article we ask:
Is grace in the essence of the soul?
[ARTICLE II Sent., 26, a. 3; IV Sent., 4, 1, 3 sol. 1; sol. 3 ad 1; S.T., I-II, 110, 14.]
|
| Sexto quaeritur utrum gratia sit in essentia animae
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it is not, for
|
| Sicut enim se habet habitus qui est in potentia, ad potentiae effectum; ita se debet habere habitus vel perfectio in essentia existens, ad essentiae effectum. Sed habitus qui est in potentia aliqua, perficit potentiam ad actum suum, sicut caritas perficit voluntatem ad volendum: proprius autem effectus essentiae animae est esse, quod anima corpori confert, quia anima secundum sui essentiam est forma corporis. Cum ergo gratia non perficiat ad esse naturale, quod anima corpori confert, non erit in essentia animae sicut in subiecto.
| 1. A habit or perfection which is in the essence of the soul has the same relation to the effect of the essence as a habit which is in a power has to the effect of the power. But a habit which is in a power perfects the power for its act, as charity perfects the will for willing. But the proper effect of the essence is to be, which the soul confers upon the body, because the soul in its essence is the form of the body. Now since grace does not perfect the soul with regard to the natural act of being which the soul confers upon the body, it will not be in the essence of the soul as its subject.
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| Praeterea, opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem. Gratia autem et culpa opponuntur. Cum ergo culpa non sit in essentia animae (quod patet ex hoc quod nihil ab essentia animae privatur, cum tamen peccatum sive culpa secundum Augustinum, Lib. de natura boni, c. IV, sit privatio modi speciei et ordinis), videtur quod gratia non sit in essentia animae sicut in subiecto.
| 2. Opposites are by their nature concerned with the same thing. Now grace and guilt are opposed. But guilt is not in the essence of the soul, as is evident from the fact that the essence of the soul suffers no privation, though according to Augustine sin or guilt is “the privation of measure, species, and order.” It therefore seems that grace is not in the essence of the soul as its subject.
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| Praeterea, gratuita praesupponunt naturalia. Sed potentiae sunt naturales proprietates animae, secundum Avicennam. Ergo gratia non est in essentia animae nisi praesupposita potentia; et sic est immediate in potentia sicut in subiecto.
| 3. Gratuitous gifts presuppose natural ones. But the powers are natural properties of the soul according to Avicenna. Grace is therefore not in the essence of the soul unless a power is presupposed. Thus it is immediately in the power as its subject.
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| Praeterea, ibi est habitus vel quaecumque forma, ubi invenitur eius effectus. Sed effectus gratiae quilibet, tam operantis quam cooperantis, invenitur in potentiis, ut patet per singulos inducenti. Ergo gratia est in potentiis animae sicut in subiecto.
| 4. A habit or form is there where its effect is found. But any effect of grace, whether operating or cooperating, is found in the powers, as can be seen from an enumeration of the effects. Grace therefore has the powers of the soul as its subject.
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| Praeterea, imago recreationis respondet imagini creationis; quae duplex imago distinguitur in Glossa super illud Psalm. IV, 7, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine. Imago autem creationis attenditur secundum potentias: scilicet secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, quae sunt tres animae vires, ut Magister dicit in I Sent., 3 dist. Ergo gratia potentias animae respicit.
| 5. “The image of re-creation” corresponds to “the image of creation.” These two sorts of image are distinguished in the Gloss in its comment upon the words of the Psalm (4:7): “The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us.” But the image of creation is taken with reference to the powers, memory, intelligence, and will, which are three faculties of the soul, as the Master says. Then grace also refers to the powers of the soul.
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| Praeterea, habitus acquisiti contra habitus infusos distinguuntur. Sed omnes habitus acquisiti, sunt in potentiis animae. Ergo et gratia, quae est donum habituale infusum.
| 6. Acquired habits are distinguished from infused habits. But all acquired habits are in the powers of the soul. Then so is grace, which is a habitual infused gift.
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| Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, per gratiam bona voluntas hominis praeparatur. Sed non nisi in quantum per gratiam voluntas perficitur. Ergo gratia est perfectio voluntatis; et sic est in voluntate sicut in subiecto, et non in essentia animae.
| 7. According to Augustine “the good will of man is prepared” by means of grace. But this is done only in so far as the will is perfected by means of grace. Grace is therefore a perfection of the will, and so it has as its subject the will and not the essence of the soul.
|
| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Gratia est in anima secundum hoc quod ad Deum ordinatur. Sed tota anima ordinatur ad Deum ut habens in potentia accipiendi aliquid ab ipso. Ergo anima secundum suam totalitatem est gratiae susceptiva. Sed totum in anima est ipsa substantia animae, partes vero potentiae. Ergo anima secundum substantiam est subiectum gratiae.
| 1. Grace is in the soul in that respect in which the soul is ordained to God. But the whole soul is ordained to God as being in potency to receive something from Him. The soul in its totality is therefore capable of receiving grace. But in the soul the whole is the substance itself, whereas the parts are powers. The soul in its substance is there fore the subject of grace.
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| Praeterea, primum Dei donum est in eo quod est in nobis prius, et Deo propinquius. Sed gratia est primum Dei donum, in nobis: ipsa enim praecedit et fidem et caritatem et alia huiusmodi, ut patet per Augustinum in II libro de praedestinatione sanctorum. Id autem quod in nobis prius est, et Deo propinquius, est animae essentia, a qua fluunt potentiae. Ergo gratia est in essentia animae sicut in subiecto.
| 2. The first gift of God is in that which is in us first and is closest to God. But grace is the first gift of God in us, “for it precedes both faith and charity” and other such gifts, as Augustine brings out. But what is first and nearest to God in us is the essence of the soul, from which the powers flow. Grace therefore has its subject in the essence of the soul.
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| Praeterea, idem creatum non potest esse in diversis. Sed gratia est quid creatum. Ergo non potest esse in diversis. Sed gratia se extendit ad omnium potentiarum actus, in quantum possunt esse meritorii. Ergo est in essentia animae, vel in omnibus potentiis. Sed non in omnibus. Ergo est in essentia animae sicut in subiecto.
| 3. The same created thing cannot be in distinct subjects. But grace is something created. It therefore cannot be in distinct powers. But since grace extends to the acts of all the powers inasmuch as they are meritorious, it is either in the essence of the soul or in all the powers. But it is not in all. Therefore it is in the essence of the soul as its subject.
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| Praeterea, causa secundaria per prius recipit influentiam primae causae quam effectus causae secundariae. Sed essentia animae est principium potentiarum; et sic est causa secundaria earum, quarum primaria causa est Deus. Ergo essentia animae per prius recipit influentiam gratiae quam potentiae.
| 4. A secondary cause receives the influence of the first cause before the effect of the secondary cause does. But the soul’s essence is the principle of its powers, and so it is the secondary cause of the powers, whose first cause is God. The soul’s essence therefore receives the influence of grace before its powers do.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod sicut prius, art. 4, dictum est, de gratia duplex est opinio. Una quae dicit, gratiam et virtutem esse idem per essentiam. Et secundum hanc necesse est dicere quod gratia sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto secundum rei veritatem, eo quod virtus quae perficit ad operandum, non nisi in potentia esse potest, quae est operationis principium: sed per quamdam appropriationem potest dici, secundum hanc opinionem, quod gratia respicit essentiam, virtus vero potentiam, secundum quod gratia et virtus, etsi non per essentiam, saltem differunt ratione; quia gratificatio per prius ad ipsam animam pertinet quam ad actum eius, cum non propter actum anima acceptetur a Deo, sed e converso, ut dictum est, art. 4.
| As was said above, there are two opinions about grace. There is one which says that grace and virtue are the same essentially. According to this opinion it is necessary to say that in reality grace is in a power as its subject. This is because a virtue, which perfects for operating, cannot be anywhere but in a power, the principle of operation. But according to this opinion, by a sort of appropriation it can be said that grace looks to the essence, and virtue to a power, in so far as grace and virtue differ conceptually though not essentially; for being constituted in grace refers to the soul itself before it refers to its act, since the soul is not accepted by God on account of its acts but vice versa, as has been said.
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| Alia vero opinio, quam sustinemus, est quod gratia et virtus non sint idem per essentiam. Et secundum hoc necesse est dicere quod gratia sit in essentia animae sicut in subiecto, et non in potentiis; quia cum potentia, in quantum huiusmodi, ordinetur ad operationem, oportet perfectionem potentiae secundum propriam rationem ad operationem ordinari. Istud autem est quod facit rationem virtutis, ut sit proxime perfectiva ad recte agendum; unde oporteret, si gratia in potentia animae esset, quod esset idem cum aliqua virtutum. Si ergo hoc non sustinetur, oportet dicere quod gratia sit in essentia animae, perficiens ipsam, in quantum dat ei quoddam esse spirituale, et facit eam per quamdam assimilationem consortem divinae naturae, ut habetur II Pet. I, 4; sicut virtutes perficiunt potentias ad recte operandum.
| The other opinion, which we hold, is that grace and virtue are not the same essentially. According to this opinion it is necessary to say that grace has as its subject the essence of the soul and not the powers; for in view of the ordination of powers as such to operations, the perfection of powers according to their proper character must be ordained to operation. Now what constitutes the formal character of a virtue is that it proximately perfects a power to act rightly. Consequently, if grace were in a power of the soul, it would have to be the same as some virtue. If, then, this is not maintained, it is necessary to say that grace is in the essence of the soul, perfecting it inasmuch as it gives it a spiritual existence and makes it by a certain assimilation “a partaker of the divine nature,” in the words of the second Epistle of St. Peter (1:4), just as virtues perfect the powers to operate rightly.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis gratia non sit principium esse naturalis; perficit tamen esse naturale, in quantum addit spirituale.
| 1. Even though grace is not the principle of natural existence, it nevertheless perfects natural existence inasmuch as it adds to it a spiritual existence.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod culpa actualis non potest esse nisi in potentia, quae est principium actus. Culpa autem originalis est in anima secundum suam essentiam, per quam coniungitur ut forma carni, ex qua infectio originalis in anima contrahitur. Et quamvis ab anima nihil essentialium auferatur, impeditur tamen ordo ipsius essentiae animae per modum cuiusdam elongationis, sicut contrariae dispositiones elongant potentiam materiae ab actu formae.
| 2. Actual guilt can be only in a power, which is the principle of an act, but original guilt is in the soul as to its essence; through its essence it is joined to flesh as its form, and from the flesh the original infection is contracted in the soul. And even though none of its essentials are taken away, nevertheless the ordination of the soul’s essence to grace is hindered by a sort of remoteness, as contrary dispositions make the potency of the matter remote from the act of the form.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod gratuita praesupponunt naturalia, si proportionabiliter utraque accipiantur: et ideo virtus, quae est gratuitum operationis principium praesupponit potentiam, quae est eiusdem principium naturale; et gratia, quae est principium esse spiritualis, praesupponit essentiam animae, quae est principium esse naturalis.
| 3. Gratuitous gifts presuppose natural ones if both kinds are taken proportionally. Thus virtue, which is the gratuitous principle of operation, presupposes a power, which is the natural principle of the same thing; and grace, which is the principle of spiritual existence, presupposes the essence of the soul, which is the principle of natural existence.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod primus et immediatus effectus gratiae invenitur in essentia animae, scilicet forma secundum esse spirituale.
| 4. The first and immediate effect of grace is found in the essence of the soul, namely, information in the line of spiritual existence.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod imago creationis consistit et in essentia et in potentiis, secundum quod per essentiam animae repraesentatur unitas essentiae divinae, et per distinctionem potentiarum distinctio personarum; et similiter imago recreationis consistit in gratia et virtutibus.
| 5. “The image of creation” is situated in both the essence and the powers according as the unity of the divine essence is represented by the essence of the soul, and the distinction of the divine persons by the distinction of the powers. Similarly “the image of re-creation” is found in grace and the virtues.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod habitus acquisiti causantur ex nostris actibus, et ideo non pertinent ad animam nisi mediantibus potentiis quarum sunt actus; gratia autem ex influentia divina; et ideo non est simile.
| 6. Acquired habits are caused by our acts, and so they do not belong to the soul except through the mediation of the powers of which they are the acts. But grace is from the divine influence, and so there is no [Parallel.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod gratia praeparat voluntatem mediante caritate, cuius gratia est forma.
| 7. Grace prepares the will by means of charity, of which grace is the form.
|
Q. 27: Grace
ARTICLE VII
In the seventh article we ask:
Is grace in the sacraments?
[ARTICLE I Sent., 15, 5, 1 sol. 1 ad2; IV Sent., I, 1, 4 sol. 4; S.T., I, 43, 6 ad 4; III, 62, 3.]
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| Septimo quaeritur utrum gratia sit in sacramentis
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod non.
| it seems that it is not, for
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| Culpa enim opponitur gratiae. Sed culpa non est in aliquo corporali. Ergo nec gratia est in sacramentis, quae sunt elementa materialia, secundum Hugonem de sancto Victore.
| 1. Guilt is opposed to grace. But guilt is not anything corporeal. Then neither is grace in the sacraments, which are “material elements, according to Hugh of St. Victor.
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| Praeterea, gratia ordinat ad gloriam. Sed sola natura rationalis est capax gloriae. Ergo in ea sola potest esse gratia; et ita non est in sacramentis.
| 2. Grace is subordinated to glory. But only a rational nature is capable of glory. Consequently, in it alone can there be grace, and therefore not in the sacraments.
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| Praeterea, gratia inter maxima bona computatur. Sed maxima bona sunt in mediis bonis sicut in subiecto. Cum ergo media bona sint anima et potentiae eius, videtur quod gratia non possit esse in alio subiecto; et sic non est in sacramentis.
| 3. Grace is counted among the greatest goods. But the greatest goods are in intermediate goods as their subject. Now since the intermediate goods are the soul and its powers, it seems that grace cannot be in any other subject, and therefore not in the sacraments.
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| Praeterea, sicut se habet subiectum corporale ad accidens corporale, ita subiectum spirituale ad accidens spirituale. Ergo commutatim, sicut subiectum corporale ad accidens spirituale, ita subiectum spirituale ad accidens corporale. Sed accidens corporale in nullo subiecto spirituali esse potest. Ergo nec accidens spirituale, quod est gratia, potest esse in corporalibus elementis sacramentorum.
| 4. A spiritual subject stands to a spiritual accident as a corporeal subject to a corporeal accident. Then by transposition, a spiritual subject stands to a corporeal accident as a corporeal subject to a spiritual accident. But a corporeal accident cannot be in any spiritual subject. Then neither can the spiritual accident, grace, be in the corporeal elements of the sacraments.
|
| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod Hugo de sancto Victore dicit, quod sacramenta ex sanctificatione invisibilem gratiam continent.
| 1. Hugh of St. Victor says: “From their sanctification the sacraments contain an invisible grace.”
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| Praeterea, Galat. IV, 9, dicit apostolus, sacramenta legalia esse infirma et egena elementa: quia gratiam non continent, ut dicit Glossa. Si ergo in sacramentis novae legis non esset gratia, essent ipsa infirma et egena elementa; quod est absurdum.
| 2. In his Epistle to the Galatians (4:9) the Apostle says that the sacraments of the Law are “weak and needy elements,” and this is because they do not contain grace, as the Gloss explains. Then if grace were not in the sacraments of the New Law, they also would be “weak and needy elements” themselves. But that is absurd.
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| Praeterea, super illud Psalm. XVII, 12, posuit tenebras etc., dicit Glossa quod remissio peccatorum posita est in Baptismo. Remissio autem peccatorum est per gratiam. Ergo gratia est in sacramento Baptismi, et pari ratione in aliis.
| 3. On the words of the Psalm (17:12): “And he made darkness his covert,” the Gloss comments: “The forgiveness of sins has been placed in baptism.” Now the forgiveness of sins is had through grace. Grace is therefore in the sacrament of baptism, and for like reason in the other sacraments.
|
| Respondeo.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod gratia est in sacramentis, non quidem sicut accidens in subiecto, sed sicut effectus in causa, per modum illum quo sacramenta causa gratiae esse possunt. Effectus autem dicitur esse in causa dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod causa habet dominium super effectum, sicut actus nostri dicuntur esse in nobis: et sic nullus effectus est in causa instrumentali, quae non movet nisi mota; unde nec sic gratia est in sacramentis. Alio modo per sui similitudinem, secundum quod causa producit effectum sibi similem; et hoc contingit quatuor modis.
| Grace is in the sacraments, not as an accident in a subject, but as an effect in a cause—in the manner in which the sacraments can be the cause of grace. Now an effect can be said to be in its cause in two ways. In one way it is in the cause inasmuch as the cause has control over the effect, as our acts arc said to be in us. In this sense no effect is in an instrumental cause, which does not move except when moved. Consequently neither is grace in the sacraments. In another way it is in the cause by means of its own likeness, inasmuch as the cause produces an effect like itself. This happens in four ways:
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| Uno modo quando similitudo effectus est in causa secundum esse naturale, et secundum eamdem rationem, sicut est in effectibus univocis; per quem modum potest dici quod calor aeris est in igne calefaciente.
| (1) When the likeness of the effect is in the cause as regards its natural existence and in the same manner, as it is in univocal effects. In this way it can be said that the heat of the air is in the fire which heats it.
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| Secundo quando similitudo effectus est in causa secundum esse naturale, sed non secundum eamdem rationem, sicut patet in effectibus aequivocis, per quem modum calor aeris est in sole.
| (2)When the likeness of the effect is in the cause as regards its natural existence but not in the same manner, as is the case with equivocal effects. In this way the heat of the air is in the sun.
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| Tertio modo quando similitudo effectus est in causa non secundum esse naturale, sed spirituale, tamen quietum, sicut similitudines artificiatorum sunt in mente artificis: forma enim domus in aedificatore non est natura quaedam, sicut virtus calefactiva in sole, vel calor in igne; sed est quaedam intentio intelligibilis in anima quiescens.
| (3) When the likeness of the effect is in the cause not as regards its natural existence but as regards a spiritual existence, and yet statically, as the likenesses of works of art are in the mind of the artist; for the form of a house in the builder is not a real being, like the heating power in the sun or heat in a fire, but it is an intellectual intention at repose in the soul.
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| Quarto modo quando similitudo effectus non secundum eamdem rationem, nec ut natura quaedam, nec ut quiescens, sed per modum cuiusdam defluxus est in causa; sicut similitudines effectuum sunt in instrumentis, quibus mediantibus defluunt formae a causis principalibus in effectus. Et hoc modo gratia est in sacramentis; et tanto minus, quanto sacramenta non perveniunt directe et immediate ad ipsam gratiam, de qua nunc loquimur; sed ad proprios effectus, qui dicuntur gratiae sacramentales, ad quod sequitur infusio gratiae gratum facientis, vel augmentum.
| (4) When the likeness of the effect is in the cause not in the same manner nor as a real being nor statically, but as a dynamic influence, as the likenesses of effects are in instruments, through the mediation of which forms flow from the principal causes into their effects. It is in this way that grace is in the sacraments, and even less, seeing that the sacraments do not arrive directly and immediately at the grace of which we are now speaking in itself, but at their proper effects, called sacramental graces, upon which the infusion or increase of ingratiatory grace follows.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod culpa est sicut in causa in aliquo pure corporali, scilicet in semine peccatum originale.
| 1. Even guilt is in something purely corporeal as its cause; that is, original sin is in the seed.
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| Secundum et tertium concludunt quod gratia non sit in sacramentis sicut in subiecto.
| 2-3. These difficulties conclude that grace is not in the sacraments as its subject.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod spirituale non potest esse instrumentum rei corporalis, sicut e converso; et ideo non tenet in proposito proportio commutata.
| 4. Something spiritual cannot be the instrument of a corporeal thing, as a corporeal thing may be of a spiritual. Thus the transposed proportion does not hold in the case at hand.
|
|
| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
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| Alia quae sunt in oppositum, concedimus; ut tamen intelligatur gratia esse in sacramentis sicut in causis instrumentalibus et dispositionibus; et hoc ratione virtutis, per quam ad gratiam operantur.
| We concede these arguments, yet with the understanding that grace is in the sacraments as its instrumental and disposing causes, and this by reason of the power through which they work toward the production of grace.
|