| ARTICLE I
The question is about the justification of sinners,
and in the first article we ask:
Is the justification of sinners the forgiveness of sins?
[ARTICLE IV Sent., 17, 1, 1 sol. 1 & 5; S.T., I-II, 113, 1 & 6; Comp. theol., I, 239.]
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| Et primo quaeritur utrum iustificatio impii sit remissio peccatorum
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it is not, for
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| Iustificatio enim a iustitia dicitur, quae est una virtus. Peccatorum autem remissio non fit per unam tantum virtutem; nam peccata non uni tantum virtuti opponuntur, sed omnibus. Ergo iustificatio non est peccatorum remissio.
| 1. Justification gets its name from justice, which is one of the virtues. But the forgiveness of sins is not effected by one virtue alone, for sins are not opposed to just one virtue but to all. Justification is therefore not the forgiveness of sins.
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| Sed dicendum, quod peccatorum remissio fit per iustitiam generalem.- Sed contra: iustitia generalis, secundum philosophum in V Ethic., cap. I, est idem quod omnis virtus. Remissio autem peccatorum non est effectus virtutis, sed gratiae. Ergo peccatorum remissio non debet dici iustificatio, sed magis gratificatio.
| 2. The answer was given that the forgiveness of sins is effected by generic justice.—On the contrary, generic justice is the same as all virtue, according to the Philosopher. But the forgiveness of sins is not the effect of virtue but of grace. The forgiveness of sins should therefore not be called justification but rather the conferring of grace.
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| [57672] De veritate, q. 28 a. 1 arg. 3
Praeterea, si per aliquam virtutem fit peccatorum remissio, per illam praecipue fieri debet quae cum peccato simul esse non potest. Haec autem est caritas, quae nunquam est informis. Ergo remissio peccatorum non debet iustitiae attribui, sed magis caritati.
| 3. If the forgiveness of sins is effected by any virtue, it should be by that one in particular which cannot coexist with sin. But this is charity, which is never unformed. The forgiveness of sins should therefore not be attributed to justice but rather to charity.
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| Praeterea, idem videtur ex hoc quod dicitur Prov. X, 12: universa delicta operit caritas.
| 4. The same is seen from the words of Proverbs (10:12): “Charity covers all sins.”
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| Praeterea, peccatum est mors spiritualis animae. Morti autem vita opponitur. Cum ergo vita spiritualis praecipue fidei attribuatur in Scriptura, ut patet Habac. II, 4, et Rom. I, vers. 17: iustus autem meus ex fide vivit; videtur quod peccatorum remissio fidei attribui debeat, et non iustitiae.
| 5. Sin is the spiritual death of the soul. Now life is opposed to death. Since in Holy Scripture spiritual life is especially attributed to faith, as in Habakkuk (2:4) and the Epistle to the Romans (1: 17): “The just man lives by faith,” it therefore seems that the forgiveness of sins should be ascribed to faith and not to justice.
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| Praeterea, idem videtur ex hoc quod habetur Act. XV, 9: fide purificans corda eorum.
| 6. The same is seen from the words of the Acts (15: 9):purifying their hearts by faith.”
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| Praeterea, iustificatio praecedit gratiam sicut motus terminum ad quem. Remissio autem peccatorum sequitur gratiam sicut effectus causam. Ergo iustificatio prior est quam peccatorum remissio; et sic non sunt idem.
| 7. Justification precedes grace just as a motion precedes its term. But the forgiveness of sins follows grace as an effect follows its cause. Justification is therefore prior to the forgiveness of sins, and so the two are not the same.
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| Praeterea, iustitiae actus est reddere debitum. Sed peccatori non debetur venia, sed magis poena. Ergo remissio peccatorum non debet iustitiae attribui.
| 8. The act of justice is to return what is due. But what is due to a sinner is not pardon but rather punishment. The forgiveness of sins should therefore not be attributed to justice.
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| Praeterea, iustitia respicit meritum, misericordia vero miseriam, ut Bernardus dicit. Sed peccatoris non est aliquod meritum, sed magis est in statu miseriae: quia miseros facit populos peccatum, ut habetur Prov. XIV, 34. Ergo remissio peccatorum non debet attribui iustitiae, sed magis misericordiae.
| 9. “Justice is concerned with merit; mercy, with misery,” as Bernard says. But a sinner has no merit but is rather in a state of misery, because “sin makes nations miserable,” as is written in Proverbs 04:34). The forgiveness of sins should therefore not be attributed to justice but rather to mercy.
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| Sed dicendum, quod licet in peccatore non sit meritum condigni, est tamen in eo meritum congrui.- Sed contra: iustitia aequalitatem respicit. Meritum autem congrui non est aequale praemio. Ergo meritum congrui non sufficit ad rationem iustitiae.
| 10. The answer was given that, although there is no condign merit in the sinner, there is congruous merit.—On the contrary, justice demands equality. But congruous merit is not equal to the reward. Then congruous merit is not sufficient for the notion of justice.
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| Praeterea, remissio peccatorum est unum de quatuor quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii. Ergo iustificatio impii non est peccatorum remissio.
| 11. The forgiveness of sins is one of four prerequisites for the justification of sinners. The justification of sinners is therefore not the forgiveness of sins.
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| Praeterea, quicumque fit iustus, iustificatur. Sed aliquis factus est iustus cui peccata remissa non sunt, scilicet Christus, et primus homo in statu innocentiae, si gratiam habuit. Ergo iustificatio non est peccatorum remissio.
| 12.Whoever becomes just is justified. But some have become just without having had any sins forgiven, as Christ and (if he had grace) the first man while in the state of innocence. justification is therefore not the forgiveness of sins.
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| Sed contra,
| To the Contrary
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| est quod dicitur in Glossa Rom. VIII, 29, super illud: quos vocavit, hos et iustificavit: Glossa, remissione peccatorum. Ergo remissio peccatorum est iustificatio.
| In commenting upon the words of the Epistle to the Romans (8:30): “Whom he called, them he also justified,” the Gloss adds “by the forgiveness of sins.”The forgiveness of sins is therefore justification.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod differentia est inter motum et mutationem. Nam motus unus est quo aliquid affirmative significatum abiicitur, et aliquid affirmative significatum acquiritur: est enim motus de subiecto in subiectum, ut dicitur in V Physic. Per subiectum autem intelligitur hoc aliquid affirmative monstratum, ut album et nigrum. Unde unus motus alterationis est quo album abiicitur et nigrum acquiritur. Sed in mutationibus quae sunt generatio et corruptio, aliter est; nam generatio est mutatio de non subiecto in subiectum, ut de non albo in album; corruptio vero est mutatio de subiecto in non subiectum, ut de albo in non album. Et ideo in abiectione unius affirmati, et adeptione alterius, oportet duas mutationes intelligi, quarum una sit generatio, et alia corruptio, vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid. Sic ergo, si in transitu qui est de albedine in nigredinem, consideretur ipse motus: idem motus figuratur per ablationem unius et inductionem alterius; non autem significatur eadem mutatio, sed diversa: tamen se invicem concomitantes, quia generatio unius non est sine corruptione alterius.
| There is a difference between motion and change. For a single motion is that by which something signified affirmatively is lost and something else signified affirmatively is acquired. “Motion is from a subject to a subject,” as is said in the Physics. By subject is meant here something affirmatively designated, as white or black. Hence there is a single motion of alteration by which white is lost and black is acquired. But it is otherwise with becoming and perishing, which are types of change. For becoming is a change from a non-subject to a subject, as from non-white to white; and perishing is a change from a subject to a non-subject, as from white to non-white. Thus in the loss of one thing that is affirmed and in the acquisition of another two changes must be understood, one of which is becoming and the other perishing, in either an unrestricted or a restricted sense. If, then, in the passage from whiteness to blackness we consider the motion itself, the very same motion is designated by the removal of the one and the introduction of the other. But the same change is not designated, but rather different ones which are nevertheless associated, because the becoming of the one does not take place without the perishing of the other.
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| Iustificatio autem significat motum ad iustitiam, sicut dealbatio motum ad albedinem; quamvis posset iustificatio significare formalem iustitiae effectum, nam iustitia iustificat, sicut albedo facit album.
| Now justification means a motion to justice, just as whitening means a motion to whiteness, though justification could also signify the formal effect of justice; for justice justifies in the same way as whiteness makes white.
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| Si ergo iustificatio accipiatur ut quidam motus; cum oporteat eumdem motum intelligi quo peccatum aufertur et iustitia inducitur, idem erit iustificatio quod peccatorum remissio, solum ratione differens: prout ambo eumdem motum nominant, sed unum, secundum respectum ad terminum a quo, aliud vero secundum respectum ad terminum ad quem. Si autem accipiatur iustificatio per viam mutationis, sic aliam mutationem significat iustificatio, scilicet iustitiae generationem; et aliam peccatorum remissio, scilicet corruptionem culpae. Sic autem iustificatio et remissio peccatorum non erunt idem nisi per concomitantiam. Utrolibet autem modo iustificatio accipiatur, oportet quod a tali iustitia dicatur quae peccato cuilibet opposita sit; nam, et motus est de contrario in contrarium, et generatio et corruptio sese concomitantes contrariorum sunt. Dicitur autem iustitia tripliciter.
| If, then, justification is taken as a motion, since we must mean the same motion by which sin is removed and justice is introduced, justification will be the same as the forgiveness of sins. They will differ only in concept, seeing that both names apply to the same motion, but one designates it with reference to the starting point, the other with reference to the final term. If, however, justification is taken in the line of change, then justification will signify one change, namely, the ‘coming of justice into being, and the forgiveness of sins will signify another, the perishing of guilt. From this point of view justification and the forgiveness of sins will not be the same except by association. But in whichever way justification is taken, it must get its name from a justice which is opposed to any sin whatever; for not only is motion from contrary to contrary, but also becoming and perishing, when taken in a common reference, apply to contraries. justice is used, however, in three different ways:
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| Uno modo secundum quod est quaedam specialis virtus contra alias cardinales divisa, prout dicitur iustitia qua homo dirigitur in his quae veniunt in communicationem vitae, sicut sunt contractus diversi. Haec autem virtus non est omni peccato contraria, sed tantum illis peccatis quae circa huiusmodi communicationem fiunt, sicut furtum, rapina, et alia huiusmodi. Unde sic non potest iustitia hic accipi.
| (1) As a specific virtue distinguished from the other cardinal virtues. In this sense justice is spoken of as the virtue by which man is directed in acts which contribute to community life, such as the different types of contracts. Now this virtue is not contrary to every sin, but only to those sins which are concerned with such interchanges, as theft, robbery, and the like. justice cannot, therefore, bee taken in this sense in the present context.
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| Alio modo dicitur iustitia legalis, quae, secundum philosophum, est omnis virtus, sola ratione a virtute differens. Virtus enim secundum quod actum suum in bonum commune ordinat, ad quod etiam intendit legislator, iustitia legalis dicitur, quia legem servat: sicut fortis cum in acie fortiter confligit propter salutem reipublicae. Sic ergo patet quod quamvis omnis virtus sit iustitia legalis quodammodo, non tamen quilibet actus virtutis est actus legalis iustitiae, sed ille solus qui est ad bonum commune ordinatus: quod potest contingere de actu cuiuslibet virtutis; et sic per consequens nec omnis actus peccati iustitiae legali opponitur. Unde nec a iustitia legali dici potest iustificatio, quae est remissio peccatorum.
| (2) It is used of legal justice, identified by the Philosopher with all virtue, as differing from virtue only in concept. In so far as virtue directs its act to the common good, which is also the aim of the legislator, it is called legal justice because it upholds the law, as when a brave man fights valiantly on the field of battle for the safety of the commonwealth. It is thus evident that, although every virtue is in some sense legal justice, yet not every act of virtue is an act of legal justice, but only one which is directed to the common good, as can be true of the act of any virtue. Consequently, neither is every act of sin opposed to legal justice. Then neither can the justification which is identified with the forgiveness of sins be so designated from legal justice.
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| Tertio modo iustitia nominat quemdam statum proprium, secundum quem homo se habet in debito ordine ad Deum, ad proximum et ad seipsum, ut scilicet in eo inferiores vires superiori subdantur; quod appellat philosophus in V Ethic. iustitiam metaphorice dictam, cum consideretur inter diversas vires eiusdem personae, iustitia proprie dicta semper existente inter diversas personas. Et huic iustitiae omne peccatum opponitur, cum per quodlibet peccatum aliquid de praedicto ordine corrumpatur. Et ideo ab hac iustitia iustificatio nominatur sive sicut motus a termino, sive sicut effectus formalis a forma.
| (3) Justice designates a distinctive state in which man stands in the right relation to God, to his neighbor, and to himself, so that his lower powers are subject to the higher. This is what the Philosopher calls “justice taken metaphorically,” since it is viewed as between different powers of the same person, whereas justice in the proper sense is always between different persons. To justice in this sense every sin is opposed, since some of the order mentioned is destroyed by every sin. Consequently it is from this sort of justice that justification gets its name, whether it is taken as a motion from a starting point or as the formal effect of a form.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod obiectio illa procedit de iustitia speciali.
| 1. That objection is based upon specific justice.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod iustificatio non dicitur a iustitia legali, quae est omnis virtus; sed a iustitia quae dicit generalem rectitudinem in anima, a qua potius quam a gratia iustificatio denominatur: quia huic iustitiae directe et immediate omne peccatum opponitur, cum omnes potentias animae attingat; gratia vero est in essentia animae.
| 2. justification is not so called from legal justice, which is all virtue, but from the justice which means a general good order in the soul; for it is from this good order rather than from grace that justification gets its name, because every sin is opposed directly and immediately to this good order, involving as it does all the soul’s powers, whereas grace is in the essence of the soul.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod caritas dicitur causa remissionis peccatorum, in quantum per eam homo Deo coniungitur, a quo aversus peccato erat. Non tamen omne peccatum directe et immediate caritati opponitur, sed praedictae iustitiae.
| 3. Charity is called the cause of the forgiveness of sins because by it man is united to God, from whom he had been turned away in sinning. Yet not every sin is directly and immediately opposed to charity, but rather to the justice mentioned above.
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| Et per hoc patet solutio ad quartum.
| 4. The answer is clear from what has just been said.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod vita spiritualis attribuitur fidei, eo quod in actu fidei primo manifestatur spiritualis vita; sicut dicitur in II de anima, quod vivere inest viventibus secundum animam vegetabilem, propter hoc quod in eius actu, primo manifestatur vita; non tamen omnis actus vitae naturalis est per animam vegetabilem. Et similiter non omnis actus vitae spiritualis est fidei, sed aliarum virtutum. Unde non omne peccatum directe et immediate fidei opponitur.
| 5. Spiritual life is attributed to faith because in the act of faith spiritual life is first manifested. Life is said in The Soul to be in living beings by reason of the vegetative soul, not because every act of physical life is due to the vegetative soul, but because in its act life first appears. In the same way not every act of spiritual life is an act of faith, but it may be of the other virtues as well. Hence not every sin is directly and immediately opposed to faith.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod purificatio cordium fidei attribuitur, in quantum in purificatione praedicta primo apparet motus fidei: accedentem enim ad Deum oportet credere quia est, ut habetur Hebr. XI, 6.
| 6. The purifying of hearts is attributed to faith in so far as the movement of faith first appears in the said purification, as is expressed in the Epistle to the Hebrews (11:6): “For he that cometh to God must believe that he is.”
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod sicut iustificatio potest accipi ut motus ad iustitiam, et ut effectus formalis iustitiae, ita etiam remissio culpae: nam, sicut iustitia formaliter iustificat, ita et culpam formaliter abiicit, sicut formaliter albedo abiicit nigredinem. Sic ergo remissio culpae, ut est formalis effectus iustitiae vel gratiae, sequitur gratiam; et similiter iustificatio. Prout autem significatur ut motus quidam, praeintelligitur ad gratiam, sicut et iustificatio.
| 7. Not only justification but also the forgiveness of guilt can be taken either as the motion to justice or as the formal effect of justice; for justice not only formally justifies but also formally casts out guilt, just as whiteness formally casts out blackness. Thus the forgiveness of guilt, as the formal effect of justice, like justification, follows grace; but taken as a motion, it is, like justification, understood prior to grace.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod aliqua operatio potest dupliciter nominari, scilicet a principio, et a fine: sicut actio qua medicus agit in infirmum, nominatur medicatio ex parte principii, quia est effectus medicinae; sed ex parte finis dicitur sanatio, quia est via ad sanitatem. Sic ergo remissio peccatorum dicitur iustificatio ex parte termini vel finis: dicitur etiam et miseratio ex parte principii, in quantum est opus divinae misericordiae; quamvis et in remissione peccatorum aliqua iustitia servetur, secundum quod omnes viae domini sunt misericordia et veritas: praecipue quidem ex parte Dei, in quantum remittendo peccata facit quod Deum decet, secundum quod Anselmus dicit in Proslogio: cum parcis peccatoribus, iustus es, decet enim te. Et hoc est quod in Psal. XXX, 1, dicitur: in iustitia tua libera me. Aliquo etiam modo, sed non sufficienter, apparet iustitia ex parte eius cui peccatum remittitur, in quantum in eo aliqua dispositio ad gratiam invenitur, licet insufficiens.
| 8. An operation can get its name in two ways: either from its principle or from its end. Thus the action by which a physician acts upon a sick person is called medication from the point of view of the principle, because it is the effect of medicine; but it is called healing from the point of view of the end, because it is the way to health. The forgiveness of sins is accordingly called justification from the term or end. It is also called having mercy from the principle, inasmuch as it is a work of divine mercy. Nevertheless in the forgiveness of sins a sort of justice is observed, since “all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth” (Psalm 24:10). This is especially true on the part of God, since in forgiving sins He does what befits Him, as Anselm says: “When You pardon sinners it is just, for it does befit You.” And that is what is said in the Psalm (30:1): “Deliver me in your justice.” From another point of view also, but not adequately, justice appears on the part of the one whose sin is forgiven inasmuch as there is found in him some disposition for grace, though inadequate.
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| Et per hoc patet responsio ad nonum et decimum.
| 9-10. The answer to these is clear from what has just been said.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod remissio peccatorum aliquo modo distinguitur vel re vel ratione a iustificatione; et sic condividitur contra gratiae infusionem, et ponitur unum de quatuor quae ad iustificationem impii requiruntur.
| 11. The forgiveness of sins is in some sense distinguished from justification either in reality or in concept, and so it is differentiated from the infusion of grace and listed as one of the four prerequisites for the justification of sinners.
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| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod ad iustificationem, in quantum huiusmodi, pertinet iustitiae collatio; sed in quantum est impii iustificatio, sic ad eam pertinet peccatorum remissio: et hoc modo Christo non competit, nec etiam homini in statu innocentiae.
| 12. The conferring of justice belongs to justification as such, but the forgiveness of sins pertains to it as the justification of sinners. In this sense it is not referable to Christ or even to man in the state of innocence.
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Q. 28: The Justification of Sinners
ARTICLE II
In the second article we ask:
Can there be forgiveness of sins without grace?
[ARTICLE IV Sent., 17, 1, 3 sol. 1; In Ephes., c. 5, lect. 5; S.T., I-II, 113, 2.]
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| Secundo quaeritur utrum peccatorum remissio possit esse sine gratia
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that there can, for
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| Facilius enim est destruere quam construere. Sed homo sufficit per seipsum ad construendum peccatum. Ergo per seipsum sufficit ad destruendum; et ita remissio peccatorum potest fieri sine gratia.
| 1. It is easier to tear down than to build up. But man is able to build up sin by himself. He is therefore able to tear it down by himself, and so the forgiveness of sins can take place without grace.
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| Praeterea, contraria peccata non possunt simul inesse eidem. Sed aliquis qui fuit in peccato uno, potest per seipsum transire ad contrarium; sicut qui fuit avarus, potest per seipsum fieri prodigus. Ergo aliquis per seipsum potest exire a peccato in quo fuit: et sic ad remissionem peccatorum non requiritur gratia, ut videtur.
| 2. Contrary sins cannot be in the same subject at the same time. But a person who has been in sin of one kind can by himself pass to its contrary, as a man who has been a miser can by himself become a spendthrift. A person can therefore free himself from a sin in which he has been; and so grace is apparently not required for the forgiveness of sins.
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| Sed dicendum, quod peccata sunt contraria sicut contrarii actus, non autem sicut contrariae formae.- Sed contra: peccatum adhuc remanet quando actu transit, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de nuptiis et concupiscentia; nec ad remissionem peccatorum sufficit quod actus peccati transierit. Ergo aliquid remanet ex peccato quod remissione indiget. Sed contrariorum contrarii sunt effectus. Illa ergo quae ex contrariis peccatis remanent, sunt contraria; et sic non possunt simul esse; et ita idem sequetur quod prius.
| 3. It was said in answer that sins are contrary as contrary acts, not as contrary forms.—On the contrary, as Augustine says, sin still remains when its act has passed; and it is not enough for the forgiveness of sins that the act of sin has passed. Something therefore remains from the sin which needs forgiveness. But contraries have contrary effects. The remnants of contrary sins are therefore contrary and so cannot coexist. Thus the same conclusion follows as before.
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| Praeterea, contrariorum mediatorum unum potest removeri sine hoc quod aliud inducatur; sicut nigredo potest expelli absque inductione albedinis. Sed inter statum culpae et statum gratiae est aliquod medium; scilicet status naturae conditae, in quo, secundum quosdam, homo neque gratiam habuit neque culpam. Ergo non est necessarium ad remissionem culpae quod aliquis gratiam accipiat.
| 4. One mediated contrary can be removed without introducing the other, as blackness can be driven out independently of the introduction of whiteness. But between the state of guilt and the state of grace there is a mean, the state of created nature, in which, according to some, man had neither grace nor guilt. It is therefore not necessary for the forgiveness of sins that a person receive grace.
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| Praeterea, plus potest Deus in reparando quam homo possit in corrumpendo. Sed homo potuit a statu naturae, in quo gratiam non habebat, corruere in statum culpae. Ergo Deus potest hominem a statu culpae reducere in statum naturae sine gratia.
| 5. God can repair more than man can spoil. But man was able to plunge from the state of nature, in which he did not have grace, to the state of guilt. Consequently without grace God can lead man back from the state of guilt to the state of nature.
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| Praeterea, peccatum postquam actu transit, dicitur remanere reatu, secundum Augustinum in Lib. de nuptiis et Concupisc. in quantum actus peccati praeteritus imputatur ad poenam. Ergo e contrario dicitur remitti, secundum quod non imputatur ad poenam; secundum illud Psalm. XXXI, 2: beatus vir cui non imputavit dominus peccatum. Sed imputare vel non imputare ponit aliquid tantum in Deo. Ergo ad remissionem peccati non requiritur gratia in eo cui peccatum remittitur.
| 6. After the act of sin has passed its guilt is said to remain, according to Augustine, in the sense that the past act of a sin is laid to the account of the sinner for punishment. Then contrariwise it is said to be forgiven in the sense that it is not laid to his account for punishment, according to the words of the Psalm (3 1: 2): “Blessed is the man to whom the Lord has not imputed sin.” But to impute or not to impute implies something positive only in God, who imputes or does not. For the forgiveness of sin grace is therefore not required in the one whose sin is forgiven.
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| Praeterea, quicumque est totaliter causa alicuius, potest totaliter in illud ad destruendum et construendum, quia cessante operatione causae cessat effectus. Sed homo est totaliter causa peccati. Ergo totaliter potest in peccatum destruendum vel construendum; et sic, ut videtur, homo ad remissionem peccati gratia non indiget.
| 7. Whoever is the complete cause of anything has complete power over it both to tear it down and to set it up, because the effect ceases when the operation of the cause ceases. But man is the complete cause of sin. He therefore has complete power over the tearing down or the setting up of sin, and so man seemingly does not need grace for the forgiveness of sin.
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| Praeterea, cum peccatum sit in anima, ab illo solo potest fieri peccatorum remissio quod animae illabitur. Solus autem Deus animae illabitur, secundum Augustinum. Ergo Deus solus per seipsum absque gratia peccatum remittit.
| 8. Since sin is in the soul, the forgiveness of sins can be brought about only by something which enters into the soul. But according to Augustine only God enters into the soul. Consequently only God can forgive sin by Himself and without grace.
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| Praeterea, si gratia removet culpam: aut gratia quae est, aut gratia quae non est. Non autem gratia quae non est, quia quod non est, non facit aliquid; similiter neque gratia quae est, quia cum sit accidens, eius esse est inesse: cum autem inest gratia, iam culpa non inest, et ita expelli non potest. Ergo gratia non requiritur ad remissionem culpae.
| 9. If grace removes guilt, it is either a grace which exists or one which does not. Now it is not a grace which does not exist, because what does not exist does nothing. But neither is it a grace which exists, because it is an accident and its existence is to exist in something. When, however, grace is in the soul, guilt is not there; and so it cannot be driven out. Grace is therefore not required for the forgiveness of guilt.
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| Praeterea, gratia et culpa non possunt simul esse in anima. Si ergo gratia infunditur ad remissionem culpae, oportet quod culpa primo fuerit in anima quando gratia non erat. Ergo cum culpa esse desierit, erit dare ultimum instans in quo fuit culpa: et similiter cum gratia esse incipiat, oportet dare primum instans in quo gratia inest. Haec autem oportet esse duo instantia, quia gratia et culpa non simul insunt: inter quaelibet autem duo instantia est tempus medium, ut probatur in VI Phys. Ergo erit aliquod tempus in quo homo neque culpam neque gratiam habet; et sic non est necessaria gratia, ut videtur, ad remissionem culpae.
| 10. Grace and guilt cannot be in the soul together. If, then, grace is infused for the forgiveness of guilt, the guilt must first have been in the soul when grace was not. Now since the guilt has ceased to be, a last instant can be designated in which the guilt existed. Similarly, since the grace begins to be, a first instant can be designated in which grace exists in the soul. But these must be two distinct instants, because grace and guilt cannot exist in the soul at the same time, as has been said. Between any two instants, however, there is an intervening time, as is proved in the Physics. There will therefore be a time in which man has neither guilt nor grace, and so grace is seemingly not necessary for the forgiveness of guilt.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod quia Deus nos amat, ideo nobis sua dona dat, et non e converso. Donum ergo gratiae praesupponit amorem divinum. Sed amor iste divinus quo Deus pater diligit unigenitum suum et membra eius, non est hominis existentis in culpa. Ergo culpae remissio praecedit gratiam ordine naturae; et sic gratia non requiritur ad peccatorum remissionem.
| 11. Augustine says that God gives us gifts because He loves us, and not the other way about. The gift of grace therefore presupposes divine love. But that divine love by which God the Father loves His only-begotten Son and His members, is not had for a man in the state of guilt. The forgiveness of guilt therefore precedes grace in the order of nature; and so grace is not required for the forgiveness of sins.
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| Praeterea, per circumcisionem remittebatur in lege veteri peccatum originale, ut patet per Bedam. Circumcisio autem gratiam non conferebat, quia cum minima gratia sufficiat ad resistendum cuilibet tentationi, homo in statu legis habuit unde concupiscentiam posset vincere; et sic lex vetus non occidebat occasionaliter, ut dicitur Roman. VII, vers. 8, 11, et sic non fuit necessaria mors Christi: quia si ex lege est iustitia, Christus gratis mortuus est, ut dicitur Galat. II, 21. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Ergo inconveniens videtur quod circumcisio gratiam conferret: potest ergo remissio peccatorum fieri sine gratia.
| 12. In the Old Law original sin was forgiven by circumcision, as Bede makes clear. Circumcision, however, did not confer grace, because, since the least grace is sufficient for resisting any temptation, man in the state of the Law would have had the means of conquering concupiscence. Then the Old Law would not have killed by giving occasion, as it is said to have done in the Epistle to the Romans (7: 11). The death of Christ, moreover, would not have been necessary, because “if justice be by the law, then Christ dies in vain” (Galatians 2:21). But this cannot be admitted. It therefore seems inadmissible that circumcision conferred grace. Thus the forgiveness of sins can take place without grace.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXVII, 39: recordatus est quia caro sunt, spiritus vadens et non rediens; Glossa Hieron.: per se vadens in peccatum, et non rediens per se a peccato; ideo Deus per gratiam revocat homines, quia per se redire non possunt.
| 1. The words of the Psalm (77:39): “He remembered that they are flesh: a wind that goes and returns not,” are explained in the Gloss as meaning “a wind that of itself goes into sin and of itself returns not from sin; therefore God calls men back because of themselves they cannot return.”
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| Praeterea, Rom. III, 24, dicitur: iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius.
| 2. In the Epistle to the Romans (3:24) it is written: “Being justified freely by his grace...”
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod remissio peccatorum nullo modo sine gratia gratum faciente esse potest. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod cum in peccato sint duo, scilicet aversio et conversio; remissio et retentio peccati non respiciunt conversionem, sed magis aversionem et id quod ad aversionem sequitur: et ideo cum aliquis desinit habere voluntatem peccandi, non ex hoc ipso est sibi peccatum remissum, etiamsi in contrariam transeat voluntatem. Unde Augustinus in Lib. de nuptiis et concupiscentia: si a peccato desistere, hoc esset non habere peccatum, sufficeret ut hoc nos moneret Scriptura: fili, peccasti, non adiicias iterum. Non autem sufficit, sed addidit: et de pristinis deprecare, ut tibi remittantur. Secundum hoc ergo peccatum remitti dicitur quod aversio et ea quae consequuntur ipsam ex actu peccati praeteriti, sanantur.
| There can by no means be any forgiveness of sins without ingratiatiatory grace. For the clarification of this point it should be borne in mind that, since there are two elements in sin, turning away from something and turning toward something, the forgiveness and retention of sin do not have reference to the turning toward but rather to the turning away and its consequences. For this reason, when a person ceases to have the will to sin, he does not by this fact have his sin forgiven, even if he should change to a contrary attitude of will. Augustine accordingly says: “If ceasing to sin were the same as not having any sins, it would be enough for Scripture (Sirach 21:1) to admonish us: ‘My son, have you sinned? Do so no more. But that is not enough; Scripture has added: ‘But for your former sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee. “ Sin is therefore said to be forgiven in so far as the turning away and its consequences, the result of a past act of sin, are healed.
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| Sunt autem tria ex parte aversionis, sese concomitantia, ratione quorum sine gratia remissio peccatorum fieri non potest: scilicet aversio, offensa, et reatus. Aversio namque intelligitur a bono incommutabili, quod quis poterat habere, respectu cuius se impotentem fecit; alias aversio non esset culpabilis. Non ergo potest praedicta aversio removeri, nisi fiat coniunctio ad bonum incommutabile, a quo per peccatum discessit. Haec autem coniunctio non est nisi per gratiam, per quam Deus mentes inhabitat, et mens ipsi Deo per amorem caritatis inhaeret. Unde ad sanandam praedictam aversionem requiritur gratiae et caritatis infusio; sicut ad sanationem caecitatis requiritur restitutio potentiae visivae.
| From the point of view of turning away, there are three factors which account for the impossibility of having sins forgiven without grace: the turning away, the offense against God, and the imputability. For the turning away is from the unchangeable good, which the person could have possessed but in regard to which he has made himself impotent; otherwise the turning away would not be culpable. The turning away in question cannot, then, be removed unless there is brought about a union with the unchangeable good from which the man withdrew by his sin. But this union is effected only by means of grace, by which God dwells in souls and the soul cleaves to God by the love of charity. The healing of this turning away, accordingly, requires the infusion of grace and charity, just as the healing of blindness requires the restoration of the power of sight.
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| Offensa etiam, quae ex peccato sequitur, sine gratia aboleri non potest; sive accipiatur offensa ex parte hominis, in quantum homo peccando Deum offendit; sive ex parte Dei, secundum quod peccatori est offensus, secundum illud Ps. V, 7: odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem. Quicumque enim rem aliquam digniorem indigniori postponit, iniuriam ei facit; et tanto amplius, quanto res est dignior. Quicumque autem in re temporali finem sibi constituit (quod facit omnis mortaliter peccans), ex hoc ipso quantum ad effectum suum praeponit creaturam creatori, diligens plus creaturam quam creatorem; finis enim est quod maxime diligitur. Cum ergo Deus in infinitum creaturam excedat, erit peccantis mortaliter contra Deum infinita offensa ex parte dignitatis eius cui per peccatum quodammodo iniuria fit, dum ipse Deus contemnitur, et eius praeceptum. Unde ad hanc offensam abolendam non sufficiunt vires humanae, sed requiritur munus divinae gratiae.
| The offense, moreover, which follows from sin cannot be blotted out without grace, whether the offense is viewed from the standpoint of man, inasmuch as by sinning he has offended God, or from the standpoint of God, inasmuch as He has taken offense at the sinner, according to the words of the Psalm (5:7): “You hate all the workers of iniquity.” For whoever puts the more worthy beneath the less worthy insults it, and the more so, the more worthy it is. Now whoever places his end in anything temporal, as everyone who sins mortally does, by this very fact prefers in his own affections a creature to the Creator, loving a creature more than the Creator; for the end is that which is loved most. Since God infinitely surpasses a creature, one who sins mortally will have offered to God an infinite offense from the point of view of the dignity of Him who is insulted, seeing that God and His commandments are contemned. Human strength is accordingly incapable of blotting out this offense; the good offices of divine grace are required.
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| Ipse etiam Deus dicitur peccatori offensus, vel eum odire, non odio quod opponitur amori quo diligit omnia; sic enim nihil odit eorum quae fecit, ut dicitur Sapient. cap. XI, 25; sed quod opponitur amori quo diligit sanctos, bona aeterna eis praeparando. Huius autem amoris effectus est donum gratiae gratum facientis, ut in quaestione de gratia dictum est. Unde offensa qua Deus homini offenditur, non removetur nisi per hoc quod gratiam dat.
| God Himself, moreover, is said to take offense at the sinner or to hate him—not with a hate that is opposed to the love which He has for all things, for in this sense He hates none of the things which He has made, as is said in Wisdom(11:25); but with a hate that is opposed to the love which He has for the saints, preparing for them eternal goods. The effect of this love is the gift of ingratiatory grace, as was explained in the question on grace. The offense which God takes at man is accordingly not removed except by His giving grace.
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| Reatus etiam peccati non solum est obligatio ad poenam sensibilem, sed praecipue ad poenam damni, quae est carentia gloriae. Unde reatus non tollitur quamdiu homini non datur unde possit ad gloriam pervenire. Hoc autem est gratia: et ideo sine gratia peccatorum remissio fieri non potest.
| The imputability of sin, furthermore, is an obligation not merely to sensible pain, but especially to the pain of loss, which is the lack of glory. The imputability is therefore not canceled so long as man is not given the means to arrive at glory. This is grace; and so without grace there cannot be any forgiveness of sins.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ipsum peccatum est quaedam gratiae destructio, eius autem remissio est constructio. Unde facilius est peccatum incurrere quam a peccato exire.
| 1. Sin itself is the demolition of grace, whereas the forgiveness of sin is its erection. It is consequently easier to incur sin than to get free of it.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod peccata habent contrarietatem ex parte conversionis, ex qua non attenditur peccatorum remissio, ut dictum est, in corp. art. Ex parte autem aversionis, et eorum quae aversionem sequuntur, habent convenientiam. Unde nihil prohibet contrariorum actuum praecedentium reatus simul in anima remanere; non enim qui ex avaritia in prodigalitatem mutatur, reatum avaritiae habere desinit, sed solum actum vel habitum.
| 2. There is contrariety among sins in so far as they imply turning toward something, but the forgiveness of sins does not have reference to this aspect, as has been said. From the viewpoint of turning away and its consequences, however, they are on common ground. As a result, nothing prevents the imputability of contrary preceding acts from remaining in the soul at the same time; for a man who turns from avarice does not cease to have the imputability of avarice but only its act or habit.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod peccata quamvis sint contraria ex parte conversionis, non tamen oportet quod aversiones vel reatus remanentes sint contraria, quia sunt effectus contrariorum per accidens, cum eveniant praeter intentionem operantis. Ex contrarietate autem causarum sequitur contrarietas in effectibus qui sunt per se, et non qui sunt per accidens. Unde et ex contrariis actibus sequuntur contrarii habitus et dispositiones; huiusmodi enim sunt effectus actuum peccati secundum suam speciem.
| 3. Even though sins are contrary from the viewpoint of turning toward something, the residual conditions of aversion or imputability do not have to be contrary, because they are the indirect effects of turning toward creatures since they come about independently of the intention of the agent. From the contrariety of causes there results the contrariety of the effects which are direct, not of those which are indirect. From contrary acts there accordingly follow contrary habits and dispositions, for these are the effects of sinful acts and agree with them in species.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod supposita illa opinione, quod Adam aliquo tempore neque gratiam neque culpam habuerit (quamvis hoc a quibusdam non concedatur), dicendum est, quod nihil prohibet aliqua contraria esse mediata respectu alicuius subiecti simpliciter accepti, quae sunt immediata quantum ad tempus determinatum; sicut caecus et videns sunt mediata in cane, non tamen post nonum diem. Similiter et homini respectu status naturae conditae gratia et culpa comparantur ut contraria mediata. Sed post illud tempus quo Adam gratiam accepit vel accipere potuit, ita quod in omnes eius posteros transiret, nullus caret gratia nisi per culpam actualem vel originalem.
| 4. If we grant the opinion that Adam at one time had neither grace nor guilt (though some” will not concede it), we must say that nothing prevents some contraries from having a mean with regard to some particular subject taken simply, which nevertheless have no mean when limited by a definite time. With reference to a dog, for instance, blind and seeing have a mean, but not after the ninth day. Similarly with reference to man in the state of created nature, grace and guilt are related to each other as contraries with a mean. But from the time when Adam received grace, or could have received it, in such a way that it would be handed on to all his posterity, no one is without grace except by reason of guilt, either actual or original.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod etsi Adam in statu suae conditionis gratiam non habuit secundum quosdam, ponitur tamen ab eisdem quod ante casum gratiam est adeptus. Unde a statu gratiae cecidit, et non solum a statu naturae. Sed tamen si a solo statu naturae decidisset, nihilominus tamen ad expiationem infinitae offensae donum divinae gratiae requireretur.
| 5. Even though Adam in the state in which he was created did not have grace, as some hold, he is nevertheless held by the same theologians to have been given grace before the fall. He consequently fell from the state of grace and not just from the state of nature. But even if he had fallen only from the state of nature, the gift of divine grace would nonetheless be required for the expiation of an infinite offense.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod sicut dilectio Dei qua nos diligit, consequenter aliquem effectum in nobis relinquit, scilicet gratiam, per quam digni reddimur vita aeterna ad quam nos dirigit; ita hoc ipsum quod est Deum non imputare nobis nostra delicta, ex consequenti relinquit in nobis aliquid per quod a reatu praedicto digni sumus absolvi; et hoc est gratia.
| 6. God’s love for us leaves in us a certain ensuing effect, namely grace, by which we are made worthy of eternal life; for that is the extent to which He loves us. In the same way God’s abstention from holding us accountable for our sins resultantly leaves in us something by which we deserve to be absolved of the imputability in question; and this is grace.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod peccator per se est peccati causa quantum ad conversionem; sed quoad aversionem, et ea quae eam consequuntur, est causa per accidens, cum sit non intenta. Haec enim per se causam habere non possunt, cum ex his sit ratio mali in peccato; malum enim causam non habet, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Divin. Nomin.
| 7. A sinner is the direct cause of his sin from the point of view of turning to something; but from that of turning away and the consequences of this he is the indirect cause, since he does not intend these. They cannot in fact have a direct cause, since the character of evil in sin comes from these, and evil does not have a cause, as Dionysius holds.
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| Vel dicendum, et melius, quod peccator est causa peccati quantum ad fieri, non autem est causa permanentiae eorum quae ex peccato relinquuntur; immo horum est causa partim iustitia divina, per quam iuste ordinatum est ut qui noluit stare in gratia dum posset, non possit etiam si velit; partim ex defectu virium naturae, quae non sufficiunt ad expiationem, rationibus iam dictis. Sicut homo cum se in foveam proiicit, est causa ipsius proiectionis; sed quies quae consequitur, est ex natura: unde non potest a fovea exire, sicut potuit se in foveam proiicere. Et similiter est in proposito.
| Or the answer can be and is better given that the sinner is the cause of his sin in its becoming, but not the cause of the permanence of the remains of the sin. The cause of these is rather in part the divine justice, by which it has been justly ordained that anyone who has not wished to remain in grace when he could, should not be able to do so even if he should so wish; in part the cause is the deficiency of the powers of nature, which are insufficient for this expiation, for the reasons already indicated. When a man jumps into a ditch, he is the cause of his fall, but the state of rest which follows upon it is from nature; and for this reason he cannot get out of the ditch as he was able to jump into it. It is the same in the question at hand.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod operari remissionem culpae intelligitur dupliciter: effective et formaliter: sicut facere album effective convenit pictori, formaliter albedini. Gratia igitur non est medium in remissione culpae sicut effective operans, sed tantum formaliter. Per hoc autem quod dicitur quod solus Deus animae illabitur, non excluduntur qualitates animae vel naturales vel gratuitae: his enim anima informatur; sed excluduntur aliae substantiae subsistentes, quae intra animam esse non possunt sicut Deus est, qui intimius est in anima quam formae praedictae; eo quod Deus est in ipso esse animae ut causans et conservans; sed praedictae formae vel qualitates ad hoc non pertingunt, sed essentiam animae quasi circumstant.
| 8. The expression to bring about the forgiveness of guilt can be taken in either of two ways, effectively or formally, as making something white applies to the painter effectively, but formally to whiteness. Now in the forgiveness of guilt grace is the means of bringing it about, not effectively, but only formally. When it is said that only God enters into the soul, the qualities of the soul, either natural or gratuitous, are not excluded; for by these the soul is informed. But other subsistent substances are excluded; for they cannot be within the soul in the same way as God, who is within it even more intimately than the forms just mentioned. God is in the very existence of the soul, causing and conserving it; whereas the forms or qualities in question do not reach to the existence but surround as it were the essence of the soul.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod gratia quae est et inest, culpam expellit, non eam quae est, sed quae non est, prius autem erat. Non enim expellit culpam per modum causae efficientis (sic enim oporteret quod ageret in culpam existentem ad ipsius expulsionem, sicut ignis agit in aerem existentem ad eius corruptionem), sed expellit culpam formaliter. Ex hoc enim ipso quod informat subiectum, sequitur quod culpa in subiecto non sit, sicut patet de sanitate et infirmitate.
| 9. Grace which exists and exists in the soul drives out guilt—not a guilt which exists, but rather one which does not exist but formerly existed. It does not drive out guilt in the same way as an efficient cause, for in that case it would have to act upon an existing guilt in order to expel it. Rather it drives it out formally. From the fact that grace informs the subject it follows that guilt is not in the subject, as is seen in the example of health and sickness.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod ad hoc et similia solet esse multiplex responsio.
| 10. To this and similar difficulties a number of answers are ordinarily given.
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| Prima est, quod instans quamvis sit unum re, est tamen plura ratione, in quantum est principium futuri et finis praeteriti. Et sic nihil prohibet simul in eodem instanti esse culpam et gratiam in anima; ita tamen quod culpa insit in illo instanti, secundum quod est finis praeteriti, gratia autem, secundum quod est principium futuri.
| The first is that, although that instant is really one, it is nevertheless several in thought, being the beginning of the future and the end of the past; and so nothing prevents guilt and grace from being in the soul at the same time, but in such a way that guilt is in that instant in so far as it is the end of the past, whereas grace is in it in so far as it is the beginning of the future.
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| Sed hoc stare non potest. Nam esse principium futuri et finem praeteriti, dicit diversum respectum instantis, ex quo eius substantia non multiplicatur, sed manet una; et ita secundum rem, sequitur culpam et gratiam in eodem indivisibili temporis esse in anima. Nam instans nominat indivisibile temporis: hoc autem est simul esse; et ita sequitur contraria simul inesse. Et praeterea, secundum philosophum in VIII Physic., quando aliquid in movendo utitur uno signo ut duobus, necesse est intercidere quietem mediam; propter quod probat motus reflexos non esse continuos. Unde si aliquis utatur uno instanti ut duobus, oportet quod intelligat aliquod medium: et sic erit anima aliquando sine gratia et culpa; quod est inconveniens.
| But this cannot stand. For the distinction given implies different aspects of the instant which do not multiply its substance but leave it one. The real consequence is that guilt and grace are in the soul in the same indivisible point of time; for the term instant means an indivisible point of time. But this is to be together at the same time; and so it follows that contraries are in the same subject at the same time. Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, when anything in moving makes use of one point as two, a period of rest must intervene. It is by this argument that he proves that reciprocating motions are not continuous. Likewise, if anyone makes use of one instant as two, he must understand some interval; as a consequence the soul would at some time be without guilt or grace. But this is inadmissible.
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| Et ideo alii dicunt, quod sicut inter duo puncta unius lineae cadit linea media, non autem inter duo puncta duarum linearum se tangentium; ita non est necessarium quod inter instans quod est ultimum temporis in quo culpa inerat, et inter instans quod est primum temporis in quo gratia inest, sit tempus medium: cum sint instantia diversorum temporum.
| On this account others say that, just as a line extends between two points on a single line but not between two points on two line—segments in contact at their end-points; in the same way it is not necessary that between the instant which is the last of the time in which guilt was present and the instant which is the first of the time in which grace is present, there be any intervening time, since they are instants of distinct times.
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| Sed hoc iterum stare non potest. Nam linea, quia est mensura intrinseca, dividitur secundum rerum distinctionem. Tempus autem est mensura extrinseca, et est unum respectu omnium quae sunt in tempore: non enim alio tempore mensuratur esse culpae et esse gratiae, nisi dicamus alio tempore, id est alia parte eiusdem temporis continui. Et ideo oportet inter quaelibet duo instantia, respectu quarumcumque rerum designentur, esse aliquod tempus medium. Et praeterea, duo puncta duarum linearum sese tangentium designatarum in corporibus locatis, uniuntur in uno puncto designato in exteriori linea corporis locantis; quia contigua sunt quorum ultima sunt simul. Unde, dato quod diversarum sint diversa tempora non continua, sed quasi contigua, oportebit nihilominus quod in tempore exterius mensurante respondeat eorum terminis unum instans indivisibile; et sic redibit inconveniens praedictum, quod culpa et gratia sint simul.
| But this again cannot stand. Because a line is an intrinsic measure, it is divided according to the distinction of real things. But time is an extrinsic measure and is one with regard to all things that are in time; for the existence of guilt is not measured by one time and that of grace by another, unless we mean by another time another part of the same continuous time. It is therefore necessary that between any two instants, whatever the things to which they may be referred, there should be an intervening time. Furthermore, two points on two line segments in contact described on located bodies are united at a single point designated on an external line on the locating body; for contiguous beings are those whose extremities coincide. If, then, it is granted that distinct beings have distinct times which are not continuous but in a sense contiguous, it will nevertheless be necessary that in the time serving as the extrinsic measure there correspond to their end-points a single indivisible instant. Consequently the same inadmissible conclusion mentioned above, that guilt and grace are, together, comes back again.
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| Et ideo alii dicunt, quod huiusmodi mutationes spirituales non mensurantur tempore quod est numerus motus caeli, eo quod anima, et quaelibet spiritualis substantia, est supra tempus; sed habent proprium tempus, in quantum in eis invenitur prius et posterius. Nec tamen huiusmodi tempus est continuum, cum continuitas temporis, secundum philosophum in IV Physic., consequatur continuitatem motus; affectiones autem animae non sunt continuae.
| For this reason others say that such spiritual changes are not measured by a time which is the number of the movement of the heavens, because the soul and every spiritual substance are above time; but they have their own time inasmuch as there is found in them a before and after. But this time is not continuous, since according to the Philosopher the continuity of time is dependent upon the continuity of motion, whereas the affections of the soul are not continuous.
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| Sed hoc etiam in proposito non habet locum. Nam tempore mensurantur non solum quae sunt per se in tempore, sicut est motus caeli, sed etiam ea quae habent per accidens ordinem ad motum caeli, in quantum consequuntur ex aliquibus quae per se habent ordinem ad tempus praedictum. Et sic etiam est in iustificatione impii, quae consequitur ex aliquibus cogitationibus, locutionibus, et aliis huiusmodi motibus, qui per se mensurantur tempore motus caeli.
| But this likewise has no place in the matter at hand. For not only things essentially in time, which is the movement of the heavens, are measured by time, but also those having an accidental reference to the movement of the heavens because they are dependent upon things that have an essential reference to the time just mentioned. And this holds even for the justification of sinners, which is dependent upon thoughts, conversations, and other such motions that are essentially measured by the time of the movement of the heavens.
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| Et ideo aliter est dicendum, quod non est dare ultimum instans in quo peccator habet culpam, sed ultimum tempus. Contingit autem dare primum instans in quo habuit gratiam: quod quidem instans est terminus illius temporis in quo culpa habuit: inter tempus autem et terminum temporis nihil cadit medium. Unde nec oportet dare aliquod tempus vel instans in quo aliquis nec culpam nec gratiam habeat.
| A different explanation must therefore be given: we cannot indicate the last instant in which the sinner had guilt, but the last time. We can, however, indicate the first instant in which he has grace, and this instant is the end of the time in which he had guilt; but between a time and the end of that time nothing intervenes. We therefore do not have to indicate any time or instant in which a person would have neither guilt nor grace.
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| Hoc autem sic patet. Nam infusio gratiae, cum sit in instanti, est terminus cuiusdam continui utpote actus meditationis, per quam affectus disponitur ad gratiae susceptionem; et eiusdem motus terminus est remissio culpae, quia ex hoc ipso culpa remittitur quod gratia infunditur. In illo ergo instanti est primo terminus remissionis culpae, scilicet non habere culpam, et infusionis gratiae, scilicet habere gratiam. In toto ergo tempore praecedenti quod terminatur ad hoc instans, quo tempore mensurabatur motus meditationis praedictae, fuit peccator habens culpam et non habens gratiam, nisi tantummodo in ultimo instanti, ut dictum est. Sed ante ultimum instans huius temporis non est accipere aliud immediate proximum: quia quodcumque instans accipiatur aliud ab ultimo, inter ipsum et ultimum erunt infinita instantia media.
| This is explained as follows. Since the infusion of grace takes place in an instant, it is the end of a continuous movement, such as a meditation by which the will is disposed for the reception of grace; and the end of the same movement is the forgiveness of guilt, for guilt is forgiven by the very fact that grace is infused. In that first instant, then, there is the end of the forgiveness of guilt, that is, the absence of guilt, and the end of the infusion of grace, that is, the possession of grace. Then in the whole preceding time that ends at this instant, by which the movement of the meditation just mentioned was measured, the sinner had guilt and not grace, except only at the last instant, as we have said. But before the last instant of this time we cannot pick out another immediately next to it, because, if any instant at all other than the last is taken, between it and the last there will be an infinite number of intervening instants.
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| Et sic patet quod non est accipere ultimum instans in quo iustificatus sit habens culpam et non habens gratiam; est autem accipere primum instans in quo habet gratiam, et non habet culpam. Et haec solutio potest accipi ex verbis philosophi in VIII Physic.
| Thus it is clear that we cannot distinguish a last instant in which the person justified would have guilt and not have grace; but we can distinguish a first instant in which he has grace and does not have guilt. This solution can be gathered from the words of the Philosopher.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod Deus suo amore sicut causat in nobis donum gratiae, ita et remissionem culpae; unde non oportet quod remissio culpae gratiam praecedat. Sequeretur autem, si remissio culpae Dei amorem praecederet, et non ex eo sequeretur.
| 11. By His love God not only causes the gift of grace in us but also the forgiveness of guilt. Consequently the forgiveness of guilt does not have to precede grace. Such a necessity would follow, however, if the forgiveness of guilt preceded God’s love instead of following from it.
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| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod sacramenta significando causant; hoc enim causant quod figurant. Et quia circumcisio habet significationem in removendo, ideo eius efficacia directe ordinabatur ad remotionem culpae originalis, sed ex consequenti ad gratiam: sive ex virtute circumcisionis gratia daretur per modum quo datur ex virtute Baptismi, ut quidam dicunt; sive daretur a Deo concomitanter ad circumcisionem. Et sic remissio culpae non fiebat sine gratia; tamen illa gratia non ita perfecte reprimebat concupiscentiam sicut gratia baptismalis. Unde difficilius erat concupiscentiae resistere circumciso quam baptizato: et occasione huius lex vetus occasionaliter occidere dicebatur, quamvis circumcisio intra legis Mosaicae sacramenta non contineatur, eo quod non est ex Moyse, sed ex patribus, ut dicitur Ioan. VII, 22. Et si in circumcisione aliqua dabatur gratia, non est contra hoc quod dicitur: lex vetus non iustificabat.
| 12. The sacraments cause by signifying, for they cause what they represent. And because circumcision has its signification in removing, its effectiveness was directly related to the removal of original guilt and only consequently to grace, whether grace was given in virtue of circumcision in the same way as it is given in virtue of baptism, as some say, or was given by God concomitantly with circumcision. Thus the forgiveness of guilt did not take place without grace. Yet that grace did not as completely repress concupiscence as does the grace of baptism. It was accordingly harder for a circumcised person to resist concupiscence than it is for a baptized person. From this circumstance the Old Law was said to kill by giving occasion, although circumcision is not included among the sacraments of the Mosaic law because it is not “of Moses but of the fathers,” as is said in John (7:22). Thus, if circumcision gave any grace, this is not contrary to the statement that the Old Law did not justify.
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Q. 28: The Justification of Sinners
ARTICLE III
In the third article we ask:
Does the justification of sinners require free choice?
[ARTICLE II Sent., 27, a. 2 ad 7; IV Sent., 17, 1, 3 sol. 2; In Ephes., c. 5, lect. 5; S.T., I-II, 113, 3; In Joan., c. 4, lect. 2, §1 (P 10:363b).]
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| Tertio quaeritur utrum ad iustificationem impii liberum arbitrium requiratur
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it does not, for
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| Illud enim quod potest competere non habentibus usum liberi arbitrii, non requirit usum liberi arbitrii. Sed iustificatio competit pueris nondum habentibus usum liberi arbitrii, qui per Baptismum iustificantur. Ergo iustificatio impii usum liberi arbitrii non requirit.
| 1. Anything that applies to those who do not have the use of free choice does not require the exercise of free choice. But justification applies to children who do not yet have the use of free choice, for they are justified by baptism. The justification of sinners therefore does not require the exercise of free choice.
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| Sed dicendum, quod hoc speciale est in pueris qui tenentur peccato solum quod aliunde contrahitur; nec habet locum in adultis, qui propriis peccatis tenentur.- Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in IV confessionum, quod cum quidam suus amicus laboraret febribus, iacuit diu sine sensu in sudore letali: et cum desperaretur, baptizatus est nesciens, me non curante, et praesumente id retinere potius animam eius quod a me acceperat, non quod in nescientis corpore fiebat. Longe autem aliter erat, nam recreatus est. Recreatio autem fit per gratiam iustificantem. Ergo gratia iustificans quandoque confertur adulto sine motu liberi arbitrii.
| 2. The answer was given that this is something special for children, who are in the grip only of a sin which is contracted from someone else; and it does not apply to adults, who are in the grip of their own sins.—On the contrary, Augustine says that when a certain friend of his “was suffering from fever, he lay unconscious for a long time in a deadly sweat. Since all hope for him had been given up, he was baptized without his knowledge. I was not much concerned and assumed that his soul would retain what it had received from me rather than what was done to his body while he was unaware of it. But the event proved far different, for he recovered.” But recovery takes place by reason of justifying grace. Justifying grace is accordingly sometimes conferred upon an adult without the motion of his free choice.
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| Sed dicendum, quod hoc habet locum solum ubi homo iustificatur per sacramentum.- Sed contra: Deus potentiam suam non alligavit sacramentis. Cum ergo iustificatio sit opus divinum, ex eius potentia dependens, videtur quod etiam sine sacramentis aliquis adultus iustificari possit praeter motum liberi arbitrii.
| 3. It was said in answer that this takes place only when man is justified by a sacrament.—On the contrary, God has not tied His power down to the sacraments. Since justification is a divine work depending upon His power, it therefore seems that an adult can be justified even without the sacraments independently of the motion of his free choice.
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| Praeterea, homo in aliquo statu esse potest in quo sit adultus, et non habeat peccatum actuale, sed originale tantum. In primo enim instanti quo aliquis est adultus, si non sit baptizatus, adhuc subiectus est originali peccato, neque tamen adhuc habet aliquod actuale, quia adhuc nihil transgrediendo commisit quo reus peccati teneatur. Nec iterum est reus omissionis, quia praecepta affirmativa non obligant ad semper; unde non oportet quod homo statim in primo instanti quo est adultus, praecepta affirmativa observet. Sic ergo adultus potest habere peccatum originale absque omni actuali, ut videtur. Si ergo haec est causa quare puer potest iustificari sine motu liberi arbitrii, videtur quod eadem ratio sit in adulto.
| 4. A man can be in a state in which he is an adult and does not have any actual sin but only original sin. For at the first instant at which a person is an adult, if he has not been baptized he is still subject to original sin without as yet having any actual sin, because by not transgressing anything he has as yet done nothing for which he would be held guilty of sin; nor again is he guilty of omission, because affirmative precepts do not oblige to constant compliance, so that a man does not immediately have to observe affirmative precepts the first instant he is an adult. It accordingly appears that an adult can have original sin without any actual sin. If, then, that is the reason why a child can be justified without any motion of his free choice, it seems that the same reason may apply for an adult.
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| Praeterea, quandocumque aliquid communiter inest aliquibus oportet quod eis conveniat secundum aliquam causam communem. Iustificari autem convenit pueris et adultis cum ergo sola gratia sit causa iustificationis in pueris, videtur quod etiam absque usu liberi arbitrii sufficiat ad iustificationem in adultis.
| 5. Whenever anything is found in a number of things in common, they must agree in some common cause. Now to be justified applies alike to children and to adults. Since grace alone is the cause of justification in children, it therefore seems that grace without the use of free choice is sufficient for justification in adults.
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| Praeterea, sicut iustitia est donum Dei, ita sapientia. Sed sapientiam Salomon accepit dormiens, ut habetur III Reg., III, 5, 12. Ergo eadem ratione et gratiam iustificantem homo potest dormiens et absque usu liberi arbitrii accipere.
| 6. Wisdom is a gift of God as well as justice. But Solomon received wisdom while he was asleep, as is recorded in the third book of Kings (3:5-15). Then in the same way man can also receive justifying grace while he is asleep and without the use of his free choice.
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| Sed dicendum, quod merito praecedenti Salomon in dormiendo sapientiam accepit.- Sed contra: sicut in bonis requiritur voluntas, ita et in malis, quia peccatum non est nisi voluntarium. Sed voluntas praecedens somnum non facit ut id quod in somno agitur, sit peccatum. Ergo nec aliquid facit ad hoc quod aliquod divinum donum in somno recipiatur.
| 7. It was said that Solomon received wisdom in his sleep as a reward for a previous act of his will.—On the contrary, will is required in evil acts just as well as in good, because nothing is a sin unless it is voluntary. But an act of will previous to sleep does not make what is (lone during sleep a sin. Then neither does it have anything to do with the reception of a divine gift during sleep.
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| Praeterea, sicut in dormiente ligatur usus liberi arbitrii, ita et in aegrotante. Sed aegrotans absque usu liberi arbitrii iustificatur, ut patet ex auctoritate Augustini inducta. Ergo et dormiens; et sic idem quod prius.
| 8. The use of free choice is inhibited not only in one asleep but also in a sick person. But a sick person can be justified without the use of his free choice, as is clear from the passage from Augustine which was cited. Consequently so can one who is sleeping.
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| Praeterea, Deus est potentior omni creato agente. Sed sol materialis lumen suum influit aeri, nulla praeparatione in ipso aere praecedente. Ergo multo fortius Deus lumen gratiae animae infundit absque omni praeparatione, quae fit per actum liberi arbitrii.
| 9. God is more powerful than any created agent. But the material sun diffuses its light into the air without any previous preparation in the air itself. Then all the more does God infuse the light of His grace without any preparation, which is made through the act of free choice.
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| Praeterea, cum bonum sit communicativum sui, secundum Dionysium; Deus qui summe bonus est, summe seipsum communicat. Hoc autem non esset, nisi se communicaret et praeparanti se et non praeparanti. Ergo in iustificatione impii non requiritur usus liberi arbitrii quasi praeparatio ex parte hominis.
| 10. Since good tends to communicate itself, according to Dionysius, God, who is supremely good, most fully communicates Himself. This would not be true, however, unless He communicated Himself both to those who prepare and to those who do not. Consequently the exercise of free choice as a preparation on the part of man is not required in the justification of sinners.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, VIII super Genesim ad litteram, quod Deus hoc modo operatur iustitiam in homine, sicut sol lumen in aere, quod deficit solis deficiente influxu; non sicut artifex qui operatur arcam, in qua postquam facta est, nihil operatur. Sed sol eodem modo operatur in aere cum primo illuminatur aer, et cum lumen in eo continuatur. Ergo Deus eodem modo operatur iustitiam in homine cum primo iustificatur, et cum iustitia in eo conservatur. Sed iustitia conservatur in homine, usu liberi arbitrii cessante; sicut patet in dormiente. Ergo homo potest a principio iustificari absque omni motu liberi arbitrii.
| 11. Augustine says that God causes justice in man in the same way as the sun causes light in the air; when the sun’s influence ceases, the light ceases. He is not like a cabinetmaker working upon a cabinet, upon which he does nothing once it is made. The sun works in the air in the same way when the air is first illuminated and as long as the light continues in it. God accordingly causes justice in man when he is first justified and as long as justice is conserved in him. But justice is conserved in man even when the exercise of free choice ceases, as is seen in one asleep. Man can therefore be justified in the beginning without any movement of his free choice.
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| Praeterea, dispositio quae requiritur de necessitate ad introductionem alicuius formae, ita se habet, quod sine ea forma remanere non potest; sicut patet de calore et forma ignis. Sed sine usu liberi arbitrii potest remanere iustitia, ut in dormiente. Ergo usus liberi arbitrii non est dispositio quae de necessitate requiratur ad gratiae infusionem.
| 12. The disposition which is required as a necessity for the introduction of a form is such that without it the form cannot remain, as is exemplified in heat and the form of fire. But without the exercise of free choice justice can remain, as it does in one asleep. Consequently the exercise of free choice is not a disposition which is required as a necessity for the infusion of grace.
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| Praeterea, id quod naturaliter est prius, et potest esse et non esse sine posteriori, non requirit posterius ad hoc quod inesse dicatur; ut patet de gravitate et descensu, sine quo gravitas esse potest; cum scilicet corpus grave impeditur a suo motu. Sed gratia est prior naturaliter quam usus liberi arbitrii, sine quo et potest esse et non esse: est enim eius formale principium, sicut gravitas naturalis motus. Ergo gratia potest infundi sine usu liberi arbitrii.
| 13. Anything which is naturally prior to something else and can exist either with or without that which comes after it, has no need of the latter in order to be brought into existence. An example would be heaviness and falling; there can be heaviness without falling, as occurs when a heavy body is kept from its proper motion. But grace naturally comes before the exercise of free choice, and can either be without that exercise or not; for it is the formal principle of free choice as heaviness is that of natural motion. Grace can therefore be infused without the exercise of free choice.
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| Praeterea, corpus infirmum culpam in animam inducit originalem absque omni usu liberi arbitrii. Ergo multo fortius Deus, qui est potentissimus, non requirit usum liberi arbitrii ad hoc quod gratiam infundat.
| 14. An ailing body introduces original sin into the soul without any exercise of free choice. All the more, then, does God, who is most powerful, not need the exercise of free choice in order to infuse grace.
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| Praeterea, Deus pronior est ad miserendum quam ad condemnandum, ut dicit Glossa in principio Hierem. Sed Deus punit pueros decedentes sine Baptismo absque omni usu liberi arbitrii. Ergo multo magis miseretur gratiam infundendo.
| 15. God is more ready to have mercy than to condemn, as is said in the Gloss” in the beginning of its commentary upon Jeremiah. But God punishes children who die without baptism independently of any use of free choice. He therefore much more surely has mercy by infusing grace.
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| Praeterea, dispositio ad formam, quae exigitur in recipiente formam, non est ab ipso recipiente, sed ab alio; sicut calor qui in lignis praecedit ut dispositio ad formam ignis, non est ab ipsis lignis. Sed usus liberi arbitrii est ab homine iustificando. Ergo non requiritur ut dispositio ad gratiam habendam.
| 16. The disposition for a form which is needed in the recipient of the form is not from the recipient but from another. Thus heat, which is in wood antecedently as a disposition for the form of fire, is not from the wood itself. But the exercise of free choice is from the man who is to be justified. It is therefore not needed as a disposition for having grace.
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| Praeterea, iustificatio est per infusionem gratiae et virtutum. Sed secundum Augustinum, virtutem solus Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Ergo ad iustificationem operatio nostra, quae est per usum liberi arbitrii, non requiritur.
| 17. justification comes about by the infusion of grace and the virtues. But according to Augustine” only God causes virtue in us without our own efforts. Consequently our own activity, which takes place through the use of free choice, is not needed for our justification.
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| Praeterea, secundum apostolum, Roman. IV, 4, ei qui operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum. Usus autem liberi arbitrii quaedam operatio est. Si ergo usus liberi arbitrii ad iustificationem requiritur, iustificatio non erit ex gratia, sed ex debito; quod est haereticum.
| 18. According to the Apostle (Romans 4:4) “to him that works, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt.” But the exercise of free choice is a form of working. If, then, the exercise of free choice is required for justification, justification will not be from grace but from debt. But that is heretical.
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| Praeterea, magis est remotus ille a gratia qui contra operatur gratiae, quam ille qui penitus non operatur. Sed Deus aliquando dat gratiam alicui qui per liberum arbitrium contra operatur, sicut patet de Paulo, Act. IX, vers. 5, cui dictum est: durum est tibi contra stimulum calcitrare. Ergo multo fortius alicui absque usu liberi arbitrii quandoque gratia infunditur.
| 19. One who works against grace is farther removed from grace than one who does not work at all. But God sometimes gives grace to someone who by his free choice works against grace, as He did to Paul, to whom it was said: “It is hard for thee to kick against the goad” (Acts 9:5). With all the more reason, then, grace is sometimes imparted to a person independently of his use of free choice.
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| Praeterea, agens infinitae virtutis non requirit aliquam dispositionem in patiente: quanto enim agens est virtuosius, tanto minori dispositione praeexistente complet suum effectum. Sed Deus est agens infinitae virtutis, in tantum quod non requirit materiam praeexistentem, sed operatur ex nihilo. Ergo multo minus requirit dispositionem; et ita in iustificatione impii, quae est opus divinum, non requirit usum liberi arbitrii quasi dispositionem ex parte hominis.
| 20. An agent with infinite power does not need any disposition in the patient; for the more powerful the agent, the less he needs a previous disposition for the production of his effect. But God is an agent with infinite power, even to the extent that He does not need preexisting matter but draws His products out of nothing. Much less, then, does He need a disposition; and so in the justification of sinners, Which is a divine work, God does not need the exercise of free choice as a disposition on the part of man.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod super illud, III Reg. III, 5, postula quod vis, ut dem tibi, dicit Glossa: gratia Dei liberum requirit arbitrium. Sed iustificatio fit per gratiam Dei, ut habetur Rom. III, 24. Ergo ad iustificationem requiritur usus liberi arbitrii.
| 1. The comment on the words of III Kings (3:5): “Ask what you will that I should give you” that is given in the Gloss is this: “The grace of God requires free choice.” But justification is brought about by the grace of God, as is taught in the Epistle to the Romans (3: 24). The exercise of free choice is therefore required for justification.
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| Praeterea, Bernardus dicit, quod iustificatio tam absque consensu non potest esse recipientis, quam absque gratia dantis. Sed consensus recipientis est actus liberi arbitrii. Ergo absque usu liberi arbitrii homo iustificari non potest.
| 2. Bernard says that “there cannot be justification without either the consent of the recipient or the grace of the giver.” But the consent of the recipient is an act of free choice. Man therefore cannot be justified without the use of free choice.
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| Praeterea, ad receptionem formae requiritur aliqua dispositio in recipiente: non enim quaelibet forma in quolibet recipitur. Sed actus liberi arbitrii se habet ut dispositio ad gratiam. Ergo ad receptionem gratiae iustificantis usus liberi arbitrii requiritur.
| 3. For the reception of a form a disposition is needed in the recipient, for it is not possible for just any form at all to be received in any given subject. But the act of free choice serves as a disposition for grace. The exercise of free choice is therefore required for the reception of justifying grace.
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| [57749]Praeterea, in iustificatione impii contrahitur quoddam spirituale matrimonium hominis ad Deum; Osee, II, 19: sponsabo te mihi in iustitia. Sed in matrimonio carnali requiritur mutuus consensus. Ergo multo fortius in iustificatione impii. Et sic requiritur ibi usu liberi arbitrii.
| 4. In the justification of sinners man contracts a kind of spiritual marriage with God, as is written in Hoseah (2: 19): “I will espouse you to me in justice.” But in carnal marriage mutual consent is required. With all the more reason, then, is this true of the justification of sinners. And so the use of free choice is needed for it.
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| Praeterea, iustificatio impii non fit sine caritate: quia, ut dicitur Prov. X, 12, universa delicta operit caritas. Sed caritas, cum sit quaedam amicitia, cum redamatione est, ut patet per philosophum in VIII Ethic. Mutuus autem amor requirit in utroque usum liberi arbitrii. Ergo iustificatio sine usu liberi arbitrii esse non potest.
| 5. The justification of sinners does not take place without charity, because, as is written in Proverbs (10:12), “charity covers all sins.” But since charity is a kind of friendship, it demands mutual love. For, as the Philosopher makes clear, friendship involves reciprocated love. But mutual love requires the use of free choice in each of the parties. Consequently there cannot be justification without the use of free choice.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod nullus habens usum liberi arbitrii potest iustificari absque usu liberi arbitrii qui sit in ipso instanti suae iustificationis. In his autem qui non sunt compotes suae voluntatis, sicut pueri, hoc non requiritur ad iustificationem: cuius ratio triplex assignari potest.
| No one having the use of free choice can be justified without the use of free choice at the instant of his justification. But in those who do not have control over their own wills, such as children, this is not needed for justification. Three reasons can be assigned for this.
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| Prima sumitur ex habitudine agentis et patientis ad invicem. Patet enim in corporalibus, quod actio non perficitur sine aliquo contactu, quo vel solum agens tangit patiens, quando patiens non est natum tangere agens, sicut cum corpora superiora agunt in ista inferiora tangentia ea, et non tacta ab eis; vel mutuo se tangunt agens et patiens, quando utrumque natum est tangere et tangi, sicut cum ignis agit in aquam, vel e converso.
| The first reason is taken from the mutual relationship of agent and patient. It is clear that in corporeal beings an action is not performed without some contact. It may be that only the agent touches the patient. This occurs when the patient is not capable of touching the agent, as when higher bodies act upon lower, touching them and not’ being touched by them. Or it may be that the agent and patient each touch the other. This occurs when both are capable of touching and being touched, as when fire acts upon water or vice versa.
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| Unde et in spiritualibus, quando natus est esse mutuus contactus, non completur actio sine contactu mutuo; alioquin sufficit quod agens tangat patiens. Ipse autem Deus, qui iustificat impium, tangit animam, gratiam in ea causando: unde et in Psalmo CXLIII, 5, tange montes; Glossa: de gratia tua. Mens autem humana aliquo modo tangit Deum, eum cognoscendo vel amando: unde et in adultis, qui possunt Deum cognoscere et amare, requiritur aliquis usus liberi arbitrii, quo Deum cognoscant et ament: et ista est conversio ad Deum, de qua dicitur Zach. cap. I, 3: convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos. Pueri autem carentes usu liberi arbitrii non possunt Deum cognoscere et amare: unde in eis sufficit ad iustificationem quod ab eo tangantur per gratiae infusionem.
| Among spiritual beings, when mutual contact is possible, action is not performed without mutual contact. In other cases it is enough for the agent to touch the patient. Now God, who justifies sinners, touches the soul, causing grace in it. It is accordingly said in the Psalm (143: 5): “Touch the mountains”; and the Gloss adds: “with you grace.” But the human soul in some sense touches God by knowing Him or loving Him. As a consequence there is required in adults, who can know and love God, some exercise of free choice by which they know and love Him. That is the turning to God of which Zacharias (1: 3) speaks: “Turn to me.... and I will turn to you.” Children lacking the use of reason, however, cannot know and love God. This is why it is sufficient for their justification that they be touched by Him through the infusion of grace.
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| Secunda ratio sumitur ex ipsa ratione iustificationis. Iustitia enim, secundum Anselmum in Lib. de Verit., est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata; unde iustificatio est quaedam voluntatis immutatio. Voluntas autem accipitur et pro ipsa potentia, et pro actu potentiae. Actus autem potentiae voluntatis immutari non potest nisi ipsa cooperante: si enim non esset in ipsa, non esset eius actus. Ipsa vero potentia voluntatis, sicut sine sua cooperatione est facta, ita sine sua cooperatione potest immutari.
| The second reason is taken from the very notion of justification. According to Anselm justice is “the rectitude of the will kept for its own sake.” Justification is accordingly a change of the will. Now will can be taken either as the power itself or as the act of the power. But the act of the power of will cannot be changed except with its own cooperation; for if it were not from the power, it would not be its act. The power of will, however, can be changed without its cooperation, just as it was made without its cooperation.
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| In adultis autem requiritur immutatio actus voluntatis ad iustificationem; sunt enim per actum voluntatis ad aliquid inordinate conversi. Quae quidem conversio immutari non potest nisi per actum contrarium voluntatis; et ideo ad iustificationem adultorum actus liberi arbitrii requiritur. Sed pueri, qui non habent per actum voluntatis propriae voluntatem ad aliquid conversam, sed habent solam potentiam voluntatis culpabiliter originali iustitia destitutam, possunt iustificari sine motu propriae voluntatis.
| In adults a change in the act of the will is needed for justification; for by an act of the will they are turned to something inordinately. The direction in which they are turned cannot be changed except by a contrary act of the will. For the justification of adults an act of free choice is therefore required. But children, who do not have their will turned to anything by the act of their own will but have only the power of will culpably deprived of original justice, can be justified without the activity of their own will.
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| Tertia ratio sumitur ex similitudine divinae operationis in rebus corporalibus. Deus enim aliquem effectum producens, quem iterum potest producere natura, secundum eamdem dispositionem producit sicut et natura. Sicut si Deus aliquem miraculose sanet, sanitatem in eo causabit cum quadam adaequatione humorum, quam etiam natura operando interdum aliquem sanat, secundum illud philosophi in II Physic., quod si natura faceret opus artis, eodem modo faceret sicut ars facit, et e converso. Ex naturalibus autem homo iustitiam habere potest dupliciter: uno modo ut naturalem vel innatam, secundum quod quidam ex ipsa natura sunt proni ad opera iustitiae; alio modo ut acquisitam. Iustitiae igitur acquisitae ex operibus similis est iustitia infusa, per quam iustificantur adulti: unde, sicut in iustitia politica acquisita requiritur actus voluntatis, quo quis amat iustitiam: ita etiam in adultis iustificatio non completur sine usu liberi arbitrii. Iustitia vero infusa, per quam iustificantur parvuli, similis est naturali aptitudini ad iustitiam, quae etiam in pueris invenitur; et ad neutram usus liberi arbitrii requiritur.
| The third reason is drawn from a likeness to the divine operation upon corporeal things. When producing an effect which nature can likewise produce, God produces it in accordance with the same disposition as nature does. If, for example, God were to heal someone miraculously, He would cause health in him with a certain balance of humors which nature also in some cases brings about to heal a man. This agrees with the statement of the Philosopher that, if nature produced a work of art, it would produce it in just the same way as art does, and conversely. Now from his natural endowments a man can have some kind of justice in two ways: (1) as natural or innate, inasmuch as some have a natural bent for works of justice; and (2) as acquired. The infused justice, then, by which adults are justified is like that acquired by deeds. Consequently, just as in acquired political justice an act of the will is needed by which one loves justice, similarly justification is not accomplished in adults without the exercise of free choice. But the infused justice by which infants are justified is like the natural aptitude for justice, which is also found in infants; for neither, however, is the exercise of free choice required.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia pueri non habent unde possint converti ad causam iustificantem, ipsa causa iustificans, scilicet passio Christi, applicatur eis per sacramentum Baptismi, et ex hoc iustificantur.
| 1. Because children do not have the means of turning to the justifying cause, the justifying cause itself, namely, the passion of Christ, is applied to them through the sacrament of baptism. By this they are justified.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod de adulto qui non est suae mentis compos, distinguendum est: quia si nunquam habuit usum suae rationis, idem iudicium est de eo quod de parvulis; si autem iudicium rationis aliquando habuit, si in illo tempore quo usum rationis habuit, Baptismum desideravit, si tempore amentiae baptizetur non sentiens vel renitens, consequitur effectum Baptismi propter voluntatem praecedentem: et tunc praecipue quando post Baptismum recuperat usum liberi arbitrii, et placet ei quod factum est; in quo casu loquitur Augustinus. Hoc enim quod contra nititur, non sibi imputatur, cum non voluntate agat, sed phantasia agatur.
| 2. Regarding an adult who is not in the possession of his faculties a distinction must be made. If he never had the use of reason, he is to be judged in the same way as infants; but if at any time he had the use of reason, then if he desired baptism during the time when he was in possession of his faculties and is baptized while out of his senses, not being aware of it or even resisting, he obtains the effect of baptism because of his previous disposition of will. This is particularly true when after baptism he recovers the use of his free choice and is pleased with what was done. This is the situation of which Augustine speaks. The resistance which is offered is not imputed to the sick man, since he does not act by his will but is acted upon by his imagination.
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| Si autem dum erat suae mentis compos Baptismum non desideravit, non est sibi vel non sentienti vel renitenti Baptismus exhibendus in quantocumque sit mortis periculo: iudicabitur enim secundum ultimum instans in quo suae mentis compos fuit. Et si sibi exhibeatur, non accipit nec sacramentum nec rem sacramenti; quamvis ex ipsa invocatione Trinitatis et sanctificatione aquae miraculose possit in eo aliqua dispositio relinqui, ut cum recuperaverit usum liberi arbitrii, facilius ad bonum immutetur.
| If, however, while he was in possession of his faculties he did not desire baptism, he is not to be given baptism even when he is unaware of it or offering no resistance, however great may be the danger of death; for he is to be judged on the basis of the last instant in which he was in his right mind. And if he is given baptism, he receives neither the sacrament nor the grace of the sacrament; though from the invocation of the Holy Trinity and the consecration of the water some disposition may miraculously be left in him so that when he recovers the use of his free choice he will more easily be changed for the good.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam sine sacramento Deus aliquibus parvulis gratiam infundit: sicut patet de sanctificatis in utero. Similiter autem posset alicui adulto qui non esset compos suae mentis, absque sacramento gratiam conferre, eodem modo quo cum sacramento confert.
| 3. Even without any sacrament God gives grace to some infants, as is evident of those sanctified in the womb. And He could similarly confer grace without any sacrament upon an adult who was out of his mind, just as he does with a sacrament.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod ista positio apud quosdam impossibilis reputatur, quod aliquis adultus habeat peccatum originale sine actuali. Cum enim adultus esse incipit, si quod in se est, faciat, gratia ei dabitur, per quam a peccato originali erit immunis; quod si non faciat, reus erit peccato omissionis. Cum enim quilibet teneatur peccatum vitare, et hoc fieri non possit nisi praestituto sibi debito fine; tenetur quilibet, cum primo suae mentis est compos, ad Deum se convertere, et in eo finem constituere; et per hoc ad gratiam disponitur. Et praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod concupiscentia peccati originalis parvulum facit habilem ad concupiscendum, adultum vero actu concupiscere. Non enim de facili contingere potest ut aliquis peccato originali infectus, concupiscentiae peccati se per consensum peccati non subdat.
| 4. The opinion that an adult may have original sin without any actual sin is held by some to be an impossible position. For when he begins to be adult, if he does what he can, there will be given to him the grace by which he will be freed from original sin; but if he does not do what he can, he will be guilty of a sin of omission. Since everyone is obliged to avoid sin and he cannot do this without setting his aim upon the due end, as soon as anyone is in possession of his faculties he is obliged to turn to God and make Him his end. By so doing he is disposed for grace. Furthermore, Augustine says that the concupiscence deriving from original sin makes infants disposed to experience concupiscence, and adults actually to do so; for it is unlikely that one who is infected with original sin will not submit to the concupiscence of sin by consent to a sin.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod iustificatio secundum unam communem causam inest parvulo et adulto, scilicet secundum gratiam; quae tamen recipitur in parvulo et adulto diversimode, secundum diversam utriusque conditionem. Omne enim quod recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis. Et inde est quod in adulto recipitur gratia cum usu liberi arbitrii, non autem in parvulo.
| 5. Justification is in infants and in adults from a common cause, grace, which is, however, received differently by infants and by adults in accordance with their different condition. For whatever is received in another is in it after the manner of the recipient. For this reason the reception of grace in an adult is associated with the exercise of free choice, but not in an infant.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod ad hoc potest tripliciter responderi.
| 6. Three different answers to this difficulty can be given:
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| Uno modo ut dicatur, quod somnus ille in quo Salomoni fuit sapientia infusa, non fuit somnus naturalis, sed somnus prophetiae, de quo habetur Num. XII, 6: si quis fuerit inter vos propheta domini, in visione apparebo ei, vel per somnium loquar ad eum. In hoc autem somno usus liberi arbitrii non ligatur.
| (1) It can be said that the sleep in which wisdom was imparted to Solomon was not a natural sleep but one of prophecy, of which it is written in Numbers (12:6): “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will speak to him in a dream or in a vision.” In such a sleep, however, the use of free choice is not prevented.
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| Alio modo potest dici, quod sicut ad infusionem iustitiae requiritur quod voluntas, quae est eius obiectum convertatur ad Deum; ita in infusione sapientiae requiritur quod intellectus convertatur ad Deum. In somno autem potest intellectus converti ad Deum, non autem liberum arbitrium vel voluntas. Cuius ratio est, quia ad intellectum duo pertinent: scilicet percipere, et iudicare de perceptis.
| (2) It can be said that in the infusion of wisdom the intellect must be turned to God, just as in the infusion of justice the will, which is its subject, must be turned to Him. Now in sleep the intellect can be turned to God but not free choice or the will. This is because the intellect has two operations, perceiving and judging about what it has perceived.
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| Intellectus autem in dormiendo non impeditur quin aliquid percipiat, vel ex his quae prius consideravit, unde, quandoque homo dormiendo syllogizat; vel ex illustratione alicuius substantiae superioris, ad cuius perceptionem intellectus dormientis est habilior propter quietem ab actibus sensuum, et praecipue phantasmatibus quietatis; unde dicitur Iob, cap. XXXIII, 15-16: per somnium in visione nocturna quando sopor solet occupare homines, et dormiunt in lectulo suo, tunc aperit aures vivorum, et erudiens eos instruit disciplinam. Et ista est causa praecipua quare in somnis praevidentur futura.
| In sleep the intellect is not prevented from perceiving something either from what it has previously considered (and this is why a man sometimes makes syllogisms in his sleep) or from illumination by some higher substance. The intellect of a sleeping person is more adapted to the reception of this illumination because of the repose of his senses and freedom from their acts, and especially because his phantasms are at rest. It is accordingly written in Job (33:15-16): “By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falls upon men, and they are sleeping in their beds: then he opens the ears of men, and teaching instructs them in what they are to learn.” That is the chief reason why future things are foreseen in sleep.
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| Sed perfectum iudicium intellectus non potest esse in dormiendo, eo quod tunc ligatus est sensus, qui est primum principium nostrae cognitionis. Iudicium enim fit per resolutionem in principia; unde de omnibus oportet nos iudicare secundum id quod sensu accipimus, ut dicitur in III caeli et mundi. Usus autem liberi arbitrii sequitur iudicium rationis; et ideo usus liberi arbitrii, per quem voluntas in Deum convertitur, in dormiendo sufficiens esse non potest: quia etsi sit aliquis motus voluntatis, magis sequitur phantasiam quam iudicium completum rationis; et ideo homo in dormiendo percipere potest sapientiam, non autem iustitiam.
| But the perfect judgment of the intellect cannot be found in one who is sleeping, because at that time our senses, which are the primary source of our knowledge, are inhibited. For a judgment is made by reducing to principles, and for this reason we must judge about everything on the basis of what we receive by the senses, as is said in Heaven and Earth. But the exercise of free choice depends upon rational judgment; and so the exercise of free choice, which is the means by which the will turns to God, cannot be sufficient during sleep; for even if there should be some motion of the will, it depends more upon the imagination than upon a complete rational judgment. Consequently a man can receive wisdom while sleeping, but not justice.
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| Tertio modo potest dici quod intellectus cogitur ab intelligibili, voluntas autem non potest cogi ab appetibili; et ideo absque usu liberi arbitrii potest infundi sapientia, quae est rectitudo intellectus, non autem iustitia, quae est rectitudo voluntatis.
| (3) It can be said that the intellect is forced by the intelligible object, but the will cannot be forced by the object of appetite. For this reason wisdom, which is the rectitude of the intellect, can be infused independently of the use of free choice, but not justice, which is the rectitude of the will.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod motus liberi arbitrii qui praecedit in vigilante, non potest facere ut actus dormientis sit meritorius vel demeritorius secundum se consideratus; potest tamen facere quod habeat aliquam rationem bonitatis vel malitiae, in quantum virtus actus vigilantis relinquitur in operibus dormientium, sicut virtus causae relinquitur in effectu. Et inde est quod virtuosi nanciscuntur in dormiendo meliora theoremata prae aliis non virtuosis, ut dicitur in I Ethicorum; et inde est etiam quod nocturna pollutio interdum culpabilis imputatur. Et sic etiam Salomon in vigilando potuit se disponere ad sapientiam accipiendam in dormiendo.
| 7. The movement of free choice in one awake antecedent to sleep cannot cause the act of one asleep to be meritorious or demeritorious in itself, but it can cause it to have some aspect of goodness or badness in so far as the influence of our waking acts is left in what we do while asleep, as the influence of the cause is left in the effect. That is why virtuous men have better dreams in their sleep than others who are not virtuous, as is said in the Ethics. That is why, too, nocturnal pollution is sometimes accounted as culpable. Solomon could accordingly dispose himself while awake to receive wisdom in his sleep.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod sacramentum Baptismi non est exhibendum aegroto dum non est suae mentis compos, etiam si prius habuit votum Baptismi, nisi quando timetur periculum mortis, quod quidem de dormiente non timetur; unde quantum ad hoc est dissimile, quantum vero ad alia simile.
| 8. The sacrament of baptism is not to be given to a sick person while he is out of his senses, even if he previously had the desire for baptism, unless the danger of death is feared; but in the case of a sleeping person that is not feared. In this respect, then, the two cases differ, though in other respects they are alike.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod aer secundum naturam suae speciei est in ultima dispositione ad lumen suscipiendum ratione diaphaneitatis: et ideo statim ad praesentiam illuminantis illuminatur; nec requiritur aliqua alia praeparatio, nisi forte remotio prohibentis. Sed mens intellectualis non est in ultima dispositione ad susceptionem iustitiae, nisi cum est actu volens; quia potentia completur per actum, per quem determinatur ad alterum oppositorum, de se in potentia existens ad utrumque; sicut materia in potentia existens ad plures formas, per dispositiones aptatur ad unam formam magis quam ad aliam.
| 9. According to the nature of its species air is in the final disposition, to receive light by reason of its transparency. Thus immediately upon the presence of a source of light it is lighted; and no other preparation is needed unless it be the removal of an obstacle. But the intellectual soul is not in the final disposition for the reception of justice except when it is actually willing, because a power is perfected by its act, being in potency to either of two opposites until determined to one of them by that act, just as matter, which is in potency to a number of forms, by being disposed is fitted for one form rather than another.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod Deus infinita bonitate seipsum communicat creaturis secundum aliquam similitudinem suae bonitatis, quam eis largitur ex hoc ipso quod optimo modo suam bonitatem communicat; ad quem modum pertinet ut ordinate secundum suam sapientiam dona sua largiatur, hoc est unicuique secundum suam conditionem; et inde est quod requiritur dispositio vel praeparatio aliqua ex parte eorum quibus Deus sua dona largitur.
| 10. With infinite goodness God communicates Himself to creatures by means of a certain similarity to His goodness, which He imparts to them by the very fact that He communicates His goodness in the best possible way. It belongs to this way that He impart His gifts in an orderly fashion according to His wisdom; that is to say, He gives to each one according to its own condition. That is why a disposition or some preparation is needed on the part of those to whom God gives His gifts.
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| Vel potest dici quod obiectio illa procedit de praeparatione quae tempore praecedit gratiae infusionem, sine qua Deus quandoque gratiam tribuit, subito in aliquo motum contritionis operans, et gratiam infundens; quia ut dicitur Eccles. XI, 23, facile est in oculis Dei honestare pauperem. Non autem per hoc excluditur usus liberi arbitrii qui est in ipso instanti quo gratia infunditur. In hoc enim ostenditur perfectior communicatio divinae bonitatis quod simul facit in homine habitum et actum iustitiae, quam si faceret habitum tantum.
| An alternative answer would be that the difficulty argues from a preparation which precedes in time the infusion of grace. God sometimes gives grace without such preparation, suddenly causing in someone a sentiment of contrition and pouring in His grace; for, as is written in Sirach (11:23), “it is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make the poor man rich.” This does not, however, exclude the use of free choice at the instant at which grace is infused. God reveals a more perfect communication of His goodness by causing simultaneously in man the habit and the act of justice than He would by causing the habit alone.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod sicut sol est causa luminis non solum quantum ad esse, sed quantum ad fieri; ita etiam Deus est causa gratiae et quantum ad esse et quantum ad fieri. Aliquid autem requiritur ad fieri rei quod importat quamdam immutationem, quod non requiritur ad esse ipsius; sicut cum fit lumen in aere, requiritur quod aer se habeat in alio respectu ad solem quam ante; quod fit per motum solis, sine quo posset esse conservatio luminis in aere, sole semper praesente. Et similiter ad fieri ipsius gratiae requiritur quod voluntas alio modo se habeat ad Deum quam prius; ad quod exigitur immutatio voluntatis, quae sine usu liberi arbitrii non est in adultis, ut dictum est.
| 11. The sun is the cause of light not only in its being but also in its becoming. In the same way God is the cause of grace both in its being and in its becoming. Something not required for the existence of a thing is required for its becoming, which involves a kind of change. Thus when light comes to be in the air, it is required that the air stand in a relation to the sun different from before. This comes about through the movement of the sun, though without this movement there could be conservation of the light in the air by the constant presence of the sun. Similarly, for grace to come to be, the will must be related to God in a way different from before. For this a change in the will is required, and this is not had in adults without the exercise of free choice, as we have said.
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| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod aliqua dispositio requiritur ad fieri rei quae non requiritur ad esse rei, sicut patet praecipue in generatione animalium et plantarum; unde nihil prohibet, talibus dispositionibus cessantibus postquam res iam facta est, eam nihilominus in suo esse conservari. Et sic, cessante motu liberi arbitrii, qui erat necessarius ad iustificationem, potest iustitia habitualiter remanere.
| 12. A disposition not needed for the existence of a thing is needed for its becoming, as is particularly clear in the procreation of animals and plants. After a thing has already been made, nothing prevents its being kept in existence even though such dispositions disappear. And so when the motion of free choice, which was necessary for justification, ceases, justice can remain as a habit.
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| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod nihil prohibet aliquid naturaliter prius non posse fieri sine posteriori, quod tamen sine posteriori esse potest: sicut anima, quae, cum sit causa corporis formalis, efficiens et finalis, ut dicitur in II de anima, est naturaliter prior corpore, potest esse sine corpore, cum tamen secundum ordinem naturae non possit fieri nisi in corpore. Et similiter est de gratia et usu liberi arbitrii.
| 13. Even though something which by nature comes before something else can exist without the latter, that does not mean that it can come into being without the thing which comes after it. Thus the soul, being the formal, efficient, and final cause of the body, as is said in The Soul, is naturally prior to the body and can exist without the body; yet in accordance with the order of nature it can come into being only in the body. The same is true of grace and the exercise of free choice.
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| Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod corpus inficit animam originali peccato ex hoc ipso quod ei unitur. Hoc autem peccatum non respicit voluntatem ipsius qui inficitur, sed naturam; et ideo non est mirum si ad huiusmodi infectionem usus liberi arbitrii non requiratur. Similiter autem anima pueri gratiam consequitur ex hoc ipso quod Christo per sacramentum Baptismi unitur absque usu liberi arbitrii. In adultis vero requiritur usus liberi arbitrii, ratione iam dicta.
| 14. The body infects the soul with original sin by the very fact that it is united to the soul. This sin, however, does not concern the will of the one infected but his nature. It is therefore not surprising if the use of free choice is not needed for such infection. Now in a similar way the soul of a child gets grace by the very fact that it is united to Christ through the sacrament of baptism without the exercise of free choice. In adults, however, the exercise of free choice is required, for the reason already explained.
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| Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod ex hoc quod dicitur Deus pronior ad miserendum quam ad puniendum, non excluditur tam bonum quod miserendo Deus in nobis operatur, quam malum quod Deus in nobis punit; quia bonum, secundum Dionysium, consistit ex una et integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus. Sed ex hoc ostenditur quod Deus miseretur secundum id quod ex eo est, punit autem secundum id quod ex nobis est, quod est tale ut ordinatum esse non possit nisi in poenam; unde ex principali intentione miseretur, sed punit quasi praeter intentionem voluntatis antecedentis, secundum voluntatem consequentem. Et tamen ad propositum potest dici, quod infectioni peccati originalis, qua anima inficitur antequam usum liberi arbitrii habeat, respondet per quamdam similitudinem iustificatio puerorum ante usum liberi arbitrii.
| 15. The fact that God is said to be more ready to have mercy than to punish does not mean that nothing more is needed for the good which God brings about in us by having mercy than for the evil which God punishes in us; for according to Dionysius good arises from an integral cause all taken together, but evil from any single defect. This shows that God has mercy because of what is from Him, whereas He punishes because of what is from us; and this product of ours is such that it cannot have a place in right order except by means of punishment. He accordingly has mercy from His principal intention but punishes—as if it were beyond the intention of His antecedent will—by a consequent will. Yet on the point at issue it can be said that by a certain resemblance the justification of children before the use of free choice corresponds to the infection of original sin, which enters the soul before it has the use of free choice.
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| Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod res naturales per quamdam violentiam possunt disponi ad formam, ut scilicet principium dispositionis sit extra, nil conferente vim passo; unde in eis dispositio ad formam non est ab aliquo principio intrinseco, sed ab extra. Voluntas vero violentiam pati non potest; et ideo non est similis ratio.
| 16. The things of nature can be disposed for a form by a sort of violence, having an extrinsic source of their disposition and contributing nothing themselves to their change. In them, then, the disposition for a form is not from an intrinsic principle but from without. But the will cannot suffer violence. There is accordingly no [Parallel from which to draw an argument.
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| Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod Deus virtutes in nobis operatur sine nobis virtutes causantibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus.
| 17. God causes virtues in us without our causing them but not without our consent.
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| Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod actus liberi arbitrii qui est in iustificatione impii, alio modo se habet ad habitum iustitiae generalis, de qua dictum est, art. I huius quaest., et alio modo se habet ad eius executionem et augmentum. Ad habitum quidem se non potest habere ut meritum, eo quod in ipso instanti iustitia infunditur, quae est principium merendi; sed se habet ut dispositio tantum. Ad executionem vero iustitiae et eius augmentum se habet in ratione meriti; quia per primum actum gratia informatum homo meretur divinum auxilium in praedictis. Sic ergo iustitia non redditur humanis operibus quasi merces; sed iustitiae augmentum et continuatio aliquo modo habet rationem mercedis in comparatione ad actus meritorios praecedentes.
| 18. The act of free choice involved in the justification of sinners is related in one way to the habit of justice in general explained above, and in a different way to the execution and increase of justice. It cannot be related to, the habit as merit, because justice, the principle of meriting, is infused at the very instant; but it is related merely as a disposition. It is related to the execution and increase of justice, however, in the line of merit, because man merits divine help in these by the first act which has grace as its form. Thus justice is not given to human deeds as a reward, but the increase and perdurance of justice are of the nature of a reward with reference to previous meritorious acts.
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| Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod licet Paulus antequam iustificatus esset, immediate gratiam fidei impugnaret, tamen in ipso instanti iustificationis suae consensit per liberum arbitrium divina gratia commotum. Motum enim gratuitae voluntatis in instanti potest Deus alicui mittere, sine quo non est iustificatio; sed sine praeparatione praecedenti iustificatio esse potest.
| 19. Although before he was justified Paul was fighting directly against the grace of faith, yet in the very instant of his justification he consented to grace by his free choice, which was moved by divine grace. For God can in an instant induce the movement of a will elevated by grace without which there is no justification; but there can be justification without any previous preparation.
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| Ad vigesimum dicendum, quod ista dispositio non requiritur propter impotentiam agentis, sed propter conditionem recipientis, scilicet voluntatis, quae immutari non potest per violentiam, sed proprio motu immutatur. Iste autem motus liberi arbitrii non solum se habet ad gratiam ut dispositio, sed ut complementum: operationes enim sunt quaedam completiones habituum; unde perfectionem agentis attestatur quod habitus inducatur simul cum sua operatione, quia perfectio effectus demonstrat perfectionem causae.
| 20. The disposition in question is needed, not because of the impotency of the agent, but because of the condition of the recipient, the will, which cannot be changed by violence but is changed by its own motion. The motion of free choice, moreover, is related to grace not only as a disposition but also as a complement; for operations are in a sense the completion of habits. It therefore attests the perfection of the agent if the habit is introduced at the same time as its operation, because the perfection of the effect is a sign of the perfection of the cause.
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Q. 28: The Justification of Sinners
ARTICLE IV
In the fourth article we ask
What motion of free choice is needed for justification: is a motion toward god required?
[ARTICLE IV Sent., 17, 1, 3 sol. 3; In Ephes., c. 2, lect. 3; S.T., I-II, 113, 4.]
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| Quarto quaeritur quis motus liberi arbitrii ad iustificationem requiratur; utrum scilicet requiratur motus in Deum
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that a motion toward God is not required, for
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| Illud enim quod iustificationem sequitur, non requiritur ad iustificationem. Sed moveri in Deum, cum sit ex gratia, iustificationem sequitur; unde dicitur Threnor. V, 21: converte nos, domine, ad te, et convertemur. Ergo motus liberi arbitrii in Deum non est de his quae requiruntur ad iustificationem.
| 1. Nothing that follows justification is required for justification. But since being moved toward God comes from grace, this follows justification. Hence it is written in Lamentations (5:21): “Convert us, O Lord, to you...” The motion of free choice toward God is therefore not one of the things required for justification.
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| Praeterea, motus liberi arbitrii requiritur ad iustificationem ut dispositio quaedam ex parte liberi arbitrii. Id autem ad quod homo trahi indiget, non pertinet ad liberum arbitrium. Cum ergo ad hoc quod homo convertatur in Deum, indigeat trahi, secundum illud Ioan. VI, 44: nemo venit ad me, nisi pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum; videtur quod motus liberi arbitrii in Deum non sit de his quae ad iustificationem impii requiruntur.
| 2. A motion of free choice is required for justification as a disposition of the part of free choice. Now that to which man needs to be drawn does not pertain to free choice. But since man needs to be drawn in order to be turned toward God, according to the words recorded in John (6:44): “No man can come to me, except the Father, who has sent me, draw him,” it therefore seems that the motion of free choice toward God is not one of the things required for the justification of sinners.
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| Praeterea, ad iustitiam homo pervenit per viam timoris: nam qui sine timore est, non poterit iustificari, ut dicitur Eccli. I, 28. Sed per timorem homo non movetur in Deum, sed magis in poenas. Ergo motus liberi arbitrii qui requiritur ad iustificationem impii, non est motus in Deum.
| 3. Man comes to justice by way of fear, “for he that is without fear, cannot be justified,” as is written in Sirach (1: 2 8). But through fear man is not moved toward God but rather toward punishment. The motion of free choice required for justification of sinners is therefore not a motion toward God.
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| Sed dicendum, quod hoc verum est de timore servili, non autem de filiali.- Contra: omnis timor fugam in sui ratione includit. Sed per fugam aliquis recedit ab eo quod fugitur, non autem accedit ad ipsum. Ergo ex hoc quod homo timet Deum, non movetur in Deum, sed magis recedit a Deo.
| 4. Should it be said that this is true of servile, not of filial fear, the rejoinder would be: all fear includes flight in its essential notion. But by flight we withdraw from that which we are fleeing; we do not approach it. By fearing God, then, a man does not move toward God but rather away from Him.
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| Praeterea, si motus liberi arbitrii in Deum ad iustificationem requiritur, praecipue ille deberet requiri per quem homo in Deum completissime movetur. Completius autem movetur homo in Deum per caritatem quam per fidem. Si ergo motus liberi arbitrii in Deum ad iustificationem requiritur, non deberet attribui iustificatio fidei, sed magis caritati; cuius contrarium apparet Rom. V, 1: iustificati ex fide pacem habeamus ad Deum.
| 5. If a motion of free choice toward God is required for justification, that motion in particular should be required through which man is most completely moved toward God. Now man is more completely moved toward God through charity than through faith. Consequently, if a motion of free choice toward God is required for justification, justification should not be attributed to faith but rather to charity. The contrary, however, appears in the Epistle to the Romans (5: “Being justified therefore by faith...”
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| Praeterea, motus liberi arbitrii qui in iustificatione requiritur, est sicut ultima dispositio ad gratiam, cum qua gratia infunditur. Dispositio autem ad formam cum qua inducitur forma, talis est quod sine forma esse non potest, cum sit necessitas ad formam. Cum igitur motus fidei possit esse sine gratia, videtur quod iustificatio non debeat attribui motui fidei.
| 6. The motion of free choice required in justification is like the last disposition for grace, at the presence of which grace is infused. Now a disposition for a form, at the presence of which the form is introduced, is such that it cannot exist without the form, since it is an exigency for the form. Since the motion of faith can exist without grace, it accordingly seems that justification should not be attributed to the motion of faith.
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| Praeterea, homo naturali ratione potest Deum cognoscere. Sed fides non requiritur ad iustificationem nisi in quantum facit Deum cognoscere. Ergo videtur quod sine motu fidei possit homo iustificari.
| 7. Man can know God by his natural reason. But faith is required for justification only because it makes us know God. It therefore seems that man can be justified without the motion of faith.
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| Praeterea, sicut per motum fidei homo cognoscit Deum, ita per actum sapientiae. Non ergo magis fidei quam sapientiae iustificatio debet adscribi.
| 8. Man knows God not only by a motion of faith but also by an act of wisdom. Then justification should not be attributed to faith any more than to wisdom.
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| Praeterea, in fide multi articuli continentur. Si ergo motus fidei requiritur ad iustificationem, videtur quod oporteat omnes articulos fidei cogitare; quod non potest subito fieri.
| 9. Many articles are contained in faith. Now if a motion of faith is required for justification, it therefore seems that one would have to think of all the articles of faith. But that cannot be done instantaneously.
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| Praeterea, Iac. IV, 6, dicitur, quod Deus humilibus dat gratiam: et sic ad iustificationem impii requiritur motus humilitatis, qui non est motus in Deum; alias humilitas haberet Deum pro obiecto et fine, et esset virtus theologica. Ergo motus qui requiritur ad iustificationem impii, non est motus liberi arbitrii in Deum.
| 10. In the Epistle of St. James (4:6) we read that God “gives grace to the humble.” There is accordingly required for justification a motion of humility, which is not a motion toward God; otherwise humility would have God as its object and end and would be a theological virtue. The motion that is required for the justification of sinners is therefore not a motion of free choice toward God.
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| Praeterea, in iustificatione impii voluntas hominis ad iustitiam immutatur. Ergo motus liberi arbitrii debet esse actus iustitiae, qui non est motus in Deum.
| 11. In the justification of sinners man’s will is changed to justice. The motion of free choice should therefore be an act of justice; but that is not a motion toward God, for justice does not have God As its object. The motion required for the justification of sinners is therefore not a motion toward God.
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| Praeterea, ad iustificationem impii se habet homo ut removens prohibens; sicut ille qui aperit fenestram, dicitur causa illuminationis domus. Sed impedimentum gratiae est peccatum. Ergo ex parte iustificati non requiritur motus liberi arbitrii in Deum, sed solum in peccatum.
| 12. Man is related to the justification of sinners as the remover of an obstacle, just as one who opens the shutters is called the cause of lighting the house. But the obstacle to grace is sin. On the part of the one justified, then, a motion of free choice toward God is not required but only one toward sin.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod dicitur Iac. IV, 8: appropinquate Deo, et appropinquabit vobis. Appropinquat autem Deus nobis per gratiae infusionem. Ergo ad hoc quod iustificemur per gratiam, requiritur quod nos appropinquemus Deo per motum liberi arbitrii in Deum.
| 1. In the Epistle of St. James (4:8) it is written: “Draw nigh to God: and he will draw nigh to you.” Now God draws near to us by the infusion of grace. Consequently for us to be justified by grace we are required to draw near to God through the motion of our free choice toward Him.
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| Praeterea, iustificatio impii est quaedam hominis illuminatio. Sed in Psal. XXXIII, 6, dicitur: accedite ad eum et illuminamini. Cum ergo ad Deum non accedat homo passibus corporis, sed motibus mentis, ut Augustinus dicit, videtur quod motus liberi arbitrii requiratur ad iustificationem impii.
| 2. The justification of sinners is a kind of enlightenment of man. But we read in the Psalm (33:6): “Come ye to him and be enlightened.” Now, since man does not come to God by steps of the body but by movements of the mind, as Augustine says, it therefore seems that a motion of free choice is required for the justification of sinners.
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| Praeterea, Rom. IV, 5, dicitur: reputabitur fides ad iustitiam credentibus in eum qui iustificat impium. Ergo ad hoc quod impius iustificetur, requiritur motus fidei in Deum.
| 3. In the Epistle to the Romans (4:5) we read: “To him that... believes in him that justifies the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice.” For a sinner to be justified, then, a motion of faith toward God is required.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod, sicut supra, art. praec., dictum est, motus liberi arbitrii qui est in iustificatione, requiritur ad hoc quod homo causam iustificantem contingat per actum proprium. Causa autem iustificationis Deus est, qui nostram operatus est iustificationem per mysterium incarnationis suae, per quam factus est Dei et hominum mediator. Et ideo motus liberi arbitrii in Deum ad iustificationem impii requiritur.
| As was said above, a motion of free choice is required in justification in order that through his own act man may come in contact with the justifying cause. Now the cause of justification is God, who wrought our justification through the mystery of His own incarnation, by which He became the mediator between God and men. A motion of free choice toward God is accordingly required for the justification of sinners.
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| Sed cum liberum arbitrium multipliciter in Deum moveri possit; ille motus de necessitate ad iustificationem requiri videtur qui est primus inter alios, et in omnibus aliis includitur; hic autem est motus fidei: accedentem enim ad Deum oportet primo credere quia est, ut habetur Heb. XI, 6. Nullus quocumque alio motu potest in Deum moveri, nisi simul cum hoc motu fidei moveatur; quia omnes alii motus mentis in Deum iustificantem pertinent ad affectum, solus autem fidei motus ad intellectum pertinet. Affectus autem non movetur in suum obiectum nisi secundum quod est apprehensum; bonum enim apprehensum movet affectum, ut dicitur in libro III de anima. Unde motus apprehensivae requiritur ad motum affectivae, sicut motio moventis ad moveri mobilis. Et per hunc modum motus fidei includitur in motu caritatis, et in quolibet alio motu quo mens movetur in Deum.
| Since free choice can move toward God in many ways, for justification that motion seems to be required which is the first among all and is included in all others. This is the motion of faith; “for he that comes to God must (first) believe that he is,” as is written in the Epistle to the Hebrews (11:6). Moreover, no one can move toward God by any other motion unless at the same time he move with this motion of faith; for all other motions of the mind toward God the Justifier belong to the affections, whereas only the motion of faith belongs to the intellect. The affections, however, are moved toward their object only in so far as it is apprehended; for the apprehended good moves the affections, as is said in The Soul. Hence the motion of the apprehensive power is required for the motion of the affective, just as the mover needs to move actively for the mobile to be moved. In this way also the motion of faith is included in that of charity and in every other motion by which the mind is moved toward God.
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| Sed quia iustitia completiva in affectu existit; ideo, si homo secundum intellectum tantum converteretur in Deum, non contingeret Deum secundum id quod iustitiam recipit, id est secundum affectum; et sic iustificari non posset. Requiritur ergo quod non solum intellectus convertatur in Deum, sed affectus. Primus autem motus affectus in aliquid est motus amoris, ut in quaestione de passionibus animae dictum est; qui quidem motus in desiderio includitur sicut causa in effectu; desideratur enim aliquid quasi amatum. Ipsa vero spes desiderium quoddam importat cum quadam animi erectione, quasi in quoddam arduum tendens. Sicut ergo simul est motus cognitionis cum motu amoris, ita motus amoris cum motu spei vel desiderii; sicut enim apprehensum movet amorem, ita amor movet desiderium seu spem.
| But because justice is completed in the affections, if man were turned toward God only with his intellect, he would not be coming into contact with God by the power that receives justice, his affections. Thus he could not be justified. It is therefore required that not only the intellect be turned toward God but also the affections. But the first motion of the affections toward anything is the motion of love, as was explained in the question on the passions of the soul. This motion is included in desire as a cause in an effect; for something is desired as loved. Hope, moreover, implies desire accompanied by the rousing of one’s spirits as tending to something arduous. Then, just as the motion of cognition is accompanied by a motion of love, so too the motion of love is accompanied by a motion of hope or desire; for love arouses desire or hope just as the object apprehended arouses love.
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| Sic ergo liberum arbitrium in iustificatione impii movetur in Deum motu fidei, caritatis et spei: oportet enim iustificatum in Deum converti amando ipsum cum spe veniae. Et haec tria computantur pro uno motu completo, in quantum unum includitur in alio; denominatur tamen iste motus a fide, eo quod virtute continet in se illos motus, et in eis includitur.
| Thus in the justification of sinners free choice is moved toward God by the motion of faith, of charity, and of hope; for the one justified must be turned toward God by loving Him with the hope of pardon. These three motions are counted as a single complete motion inasmuch as they are included in one another. Yet that motion takes its name from faith because faith contains the other motions virtually and is included in them.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod moveri in Deum per liberum arbitrium, sequitur quodammodo ordine naturae gratiae infusionem, non autem tempore, ut infra, art. VII, patebit. Gratiae autem infusio est unum eorum quae requiruntur ad iustificationem: unde non sequitur propter hoc, quod motus liberi arbitrii in Deum iustificationem sequatur.
| 1. To be moved toward God by free choice follows the infusion of grace in some sense by the order of nature, though not by that of time, as will be made clear below. Hence it does not follow from this, seeing that the infusion of grace is one of the requisites for justification, that the motion of free choice toward God follows justification.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod tractus ille non importat violentiam, sed operationem divinam qua operatur in liberum arbitrium vertendo id quocumque voluerit: et sic illud ad quod homo trahitur, aliquo modo ad liberum arbitrium pertinet.
| 2. The drawing in question does not imply violence, but it does imply the operation of God by which He works upon free choice, turning it whithersoever He wills. That to which man is drawn accordingly pertains in some sense to free choice.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod timor servilis, qui habet oculum ad poenam tantum, requiritur ad iustificationem ut dispositio praecedens, non autem ut intrans substantiam iustificationis: quia simul cum caritate esse non potest, sed introeunte caritate timor discedit; unde I Io. IV, 18: timor non est in caritate. Timor autem filialis, qui timet separationem, includitur virtute in motu amoris: eiusdem enim rationis est desiderare coniunctionem amati, et timere separationem.
| 3. Servile fear, which has its eye upon punishment alone, is required for justification as a previous disposition, though not as entering into the substance of justification; for fear cannot coexist with charity, but when charity enters fear leaves. Thus we read in the first Epistle. of St. John (4:18): “Fear is not in charity.” Filial fear, however, which is afraid of separation, is included virtually in the motion of love; for to desire union with one’s beloved means the same thing as to fear separation.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod timor filialis includit aliquam fugam; non tamen fugam Dei, sed fugam separationis a Deo, vel adaequationis ad Deum, secundum quod timor importat quamdam reverentiam per quam homo non audet divinae maiestati se comparare, sed ei se subiicit.
| 4. Filial fear includes some flight—not flight from God, but flight from separation from God, or else flight from equaling oneself to God inasmuch as fear implies a kind of reverence by which man does not dare to compare himself to the divine majesty but rather submits to it.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod motus caritatis in Deum requiritur, sed tamen in hoc motu includitur motus fidei, ut dictum est, in corp. art.
| 5. The motion of charity toward God is also required, but in this motion the motion of faith also is included, as has been said.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod licet credere Deo vel Deum possit esse sine iustitia; tamen credere in Deum, quod est actus fidei formatae, sine gratia vel iustitia esse non potest. Et tale credere requiritur ad iustificationem, ut patet Rom. IV, 5: credenti in eum qui iustificat impium, fides reputatur ad iustitiam.
| 6. Although it is possible to believe God or to believe about God without justice, yet without grace or justice it is not possible to believe with a tendency toward God, for this is an act of faith informed [by charity]. Such belief is required for justification, as is clear from the Epistle to the Romans (4:5): “To him that... believes in him that justifies the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice.”
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod quia post lapsum humanae naturae, homo non potest reparari nisi per mediatorem Dei et hominum Iesum Christum (quod quidem sacramentum, scilicet mediationis Christi, sola fide tenetur); ideo ad iustificationem impii non sufficit cognitio naturalis, sed requiritur fides Iesu Christi vel explicite vel implicite, secundum diversa tempora et diversas personas. Et hoc est quod dicitur Rom. III, 22: iustitia autem Dei per fidem Iesu Christi.
| 7. After the fall of human nature man cannot be restored except through the mediator between God and men, Jesus Christ; and this mystery of the mediation of Christ is held only by faith. For this reason natural knowledge does not suffice for the justification of sinners, but faith in Jesus Christ, either explicit or implicit according to the differences of times or persons, is required. This is what is said in the Epistle to the Romans (3:22): “Even the justice of God by faith in Jesus Christ.”
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod sicut intellectus principiorum naturaliter cognitorum se habet ad sapientiam vel scientiam ratione acquisitam in ratione principii, ita fides ad sapientiam infusam; unde primus motus cognitionis gratuitae in Deum non est sapientiae, vel scientiae infusae, sed fidei.
| 8. Faith stands to infused wisdom in the same relation as the understanding of naturally known principles stands to wisdom or science acquired by reason, as being its source. Hence the first motion of gratuitous knowledge toward God is not one of infused wisdom or science but one of faith.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod licet sint multi articuli fidei, non tamen oportet quod actu omnes cogitentur in ipso instanti iustificationis; sed solum quod cogitetur Deus secundum hunc articulum, quod est iustificans, et peccata remittens; in quo includitur implicite articulus incarnationis et passionis Christi, et aliorum quae ad nostram iustificationem requiruntur.
| 9. Though there are many articles of faith, not all have to be actually thought of at the very instant of justification; one need only think of God according to that article which holds that He justifies and forgives sins. Implicitly in this is included the article on the incarnation and passion of Christ and the other requisites for our justification.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod motus humilitatis consequitur motum fidei, secundum quod aliquis considerata altitudine divinae maiestatis seipsum ei subiicit; et ita motus humilitatis non est primus qui requiritur in iustificatione.
| 10. The motion of humility follows that of faith inasmuch as a person considering the sublimity of the divine majesty, submits to it.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod in iustitia generali, de qua nunc loquimur, includitur ordinatio debita hominis ad Deum, ut supra, art. I huius quaest., dictum est; et sic tam fides quam spes quam caritas sub huiusmodi iustitia continentur.
| 11. In generic justice of which we are now speaking, the due subordination of man to God is included, as was said above. Thus faith, hope and charity are all contained within this kind of justice.
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| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod peccatum prohibet gratiam praecipue ratione aversionis; et ideo ad removendum hoc prohibens, requiritur conversio liberi arbitrii in Deum.
| 12. Sin is an obstacle to grace especially from the point of view of turning away from God. To remove this obstacle there is accordingly required the turning of our free choice toward God.
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Q. 28: The Justification of Sinners
ARTICLE V
In the fifth article we ask:
In the justification of sinners is a motion of free choice toward sin required?
[ARTICLE IV Sent., 17,1, 3 sol. 4; C.G., III, 158; S.T., I-II, 113, 5; III, 86, 2.]
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| Quinto quaeritur utrum in iustificatione impii requiratur motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it is not, for
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| Motus enim caritatis ad remissionem sufficit; Luc. VII, 47: dimissa sunt ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit multum. Sed motus caritatis est directe in Deum. Ergo ad iustificationem impii sufficit motus in Deum, et non requiritur motus in peccatum.
| 1. A motion of charity toward forgiveness is enough: “many sins are forgiven her, because she has loved much” (Luke 7:47). But the motion of charity is directly toward God. For the justification of sinners, then, a motion toward God is enough, and a motion toward sin is not required.
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| Praeterea, bonum incommutabile est efficacius quam bonum commutabile. Sed conversio ad bonum commutabile sufficit ad hoc quod homo incurrat peccatum. Ergo conversio ad bonum incommutabile sufficit ad hoc quod homo iustificetur.
| 2. The unchangeable good is more efficacious than a changeable good. But it is enough for a man to turn to a changeable good for him to incur sin. It is therefore enough for a man to turn to the unchangeable good for him to be justified.
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| Praeterea, homo non potest moveri in peccatum nisi de peccato cogitet. Nullus autem cogitare potest de eo quod memoria non tenet; contingit autem aliquem oblitum esse peccati commissi. Si ergo ad iustificationem impii requiritur motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum, videtur quod talis qui est peccatorum suorum oblitus, nunquam possit iustificari.
| 3. A man cannot move toward sin without thinking of sin. Now no one can think of something which his memory does not retain. But it happens that some have forgotten about sins committed. If the motion of free choice toward sin is required for the justification of sinners, then, it seems that a person who has forgotten about his sins can never be justified.”
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| Praeterea, contingit aliquem multis esse criminibus involutum. Si ergo motus liberi arbitrii in iustificatione requiritur, videtur pari ratione quod eum oporteat in illo instanti de singulis suis peccatis cogitare; quod est impossibile: non enim est maior ratio de uno quam de alio.
| 4 It is possible for a man to be entangled in many crimes. But if a motion of free choice is required in justification, it seems that with equal reason he must at that instant think of each one of his sins which is impossible. For there is no more reason for singling out one than another.
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| Praeterea, quicumque convertitur in aliquid sicut in finem ultimum, ex hoc ipso ab alio fine avertitur ultimo: quia impossibile est unius esse multos fines ultimos. Sed homo, quando movetur per fidem formatam in Deum, movetur in ipsum sicut in finem ultimum. Ergo ex hoc ipso avertitur a peccato; et ita non videtur esse necessarius aliquis motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum.
| 5. Whoever is turned to something as his last end is by that very fact turned away from any other last end , because it is impossible for one thing to have many last ends. But when a man is moved toward God by faith informed by charity, he is moved to Him as his last end. By this very fact, then, he is turned away from sin. Consequently no motion of free choice toward sin seems necessary.
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| Praeterea, non est idem motus a peccato et in peccatum, sicut nec ab albo et in album. Sed iustificatio est motus a peccato. Ergo non est motus ad peccatum.
| 6. The motion away from sin is not the same as that toward sin, just as the motion from white is not the same as that toward white. But justification is a motion away from sin. It is therefore not a motion toward sin.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod in Psalm. XXXI, vers. 5, dicitur: confitebor adversum me iniustitiam meam domino: et tu remisisti impietatem peccati mei. Sed homo non potest hoc dicere nisi de peccato cogitando. Ergo motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum ad iustificationem requiritur.
| 1. In the Psalm (31:5) it is written: “I said: I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord. And you has forgiven the wickedness of my sin.” But a man cannot say this without thinking of his sin. A motion of free choice toward sin is therefore required for justification.
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| Praeterea, ad iustificationem impii contritio requiritur, quae est prima poenitentiae pars, per quam peccata tolluntur. Sed contritio est dolor de peccato. Ergo motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum requiritur in iustificatione impii.
| 2. Contrition, the first part of [the sacrament of] penance, by which sins are taken away, is required for the justification of sinners. But contrition is sorrow for sin. Hence a motion of free choice toward sin is required in justification.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod iustificatio impii addit aliquid supra iustificationem simpliciter. Nam iustificatio simpliciter importat solummodo iustitiae infusionem; sed super hoc addit iustificatio impii remissionem culpae: quae quidem remissio non fit solum per hoc quod homo desistit a peccato, sed aliquid amplius requiritur. Unde Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Nupt. et Concup.: si a peccando desistere, hoc esset non habere peccata, sufficeret ut hoc nos moneret Scriptura: fili peccasti; non autem sufficit; sed addidit: et de praeteritis deprecare ut tibi remittantur.
| The justification of sinners adds something to justification taken absolutely. Justification in an absolute sense implies only the infusion of justice. The justification of sinners adds to this the forgiveness of guilt. This forgiveness does not come about merely by the fact that a man ceases to sin, but something further is needed. Hence Augustine says: “If ceasing to sin were the same as not having any sins, it would be enough for Scripture (Sirach 21:1) to admonish us: ‘My son, hast you sinned? Do so no more.’ But that is not enough. Scripture has added: ‘But for thy former sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee.’”
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| Sic ergo ad iustificationem simpliciter requiritur conversio hominis per liberum arbitrium in causam iustificantem, quae est motus liberi arbitrii in Deum. Sed supra hoc in iustificationem impii requiritur quod convertatur ad destructionem peccati praeteriti. Sicut autem conversio in Deum fit per hoc quod homo cognoscit Deum per fidem, et eum amat, et gratiam desiderat seu sperat; ita oportet quod conversio liberi arbitrii in peccatum sit per hoc quod homo se peccatorem recognoscit, quod est humilitatis; et peccatum praeteritum detestatur, ut pigeat fecisse et iterare non velit.
| Thus for justification in an unqualified sense it is required that man by his free choice turn to the justifying cause; and this turning is the motion of free choice toward God. But in the justification of sinners it is required in addition that he be turned toward the destruction of past sin. Now just as turning toward God comes about by the fact that a man knows God by faith and loves Him and desires or hopes for grace, in the same way the turning of free choice toward sin must take place by the fact that a man recognizes that he is a sinner (which is an act of humility) and detests his past sin so that he is ashamed to have committed it and does not wish to repeat the offense.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod dilectio non potest esse sine detestatione eius quod a Deo separat; et ideo praeter motum dilectionis in Deum requiritur in iustificatione peccati detestatio. Unde et Magdalena, cui dictum est dimissa sunt ei peccata multa, lacrimas emiserat pro peccatis.
| 1. There cannot be love of God apart from a detestation of what separates one from God. In justification there is accordingly required besides the motion of love toward God a detestation for sin. For this reason tears for her sins were shed by Magdalene, of whom were spoken the words (Luke 7:47): “Many sins are forgiven her, because she has loved much.”
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod conversio in bonum incommutabile sufficit ad iustificationem simpliciter; sed ad iustificationem impii requiritur etiam motus in peccatum, ut dictum est, in corp. art.; quia ad hoc quod homo iustificetur a peccato praeterito, non solum sufficit quod iustitiam velit, et non peccet, sed quod contra praeteritam iniquitatem operetur detestando ipsam. Non autem in eo qui peccat, requiritur detestatio Dei, vel iustitiae, nisi ex consequenti: quia id quod est bonum, nullus habet odio, nisi in quantum est incompossibile alteri bono quod diligit; unde peccator non nisi per accidens vidit iustitiam et Deum: ex hoc ipso videlicet quod amat immoderate bonum commutabile.
| 2. Turning toward the unchangeable good is sufficient for justification in an unqualified sense; but for the justification of sinners a motion toward sin is also required, as has been said; for in order that a man may be justified it is not sufficient merely to wish for justice and not to sin, but he must also work against his past wickedness by detesting it. In one who sins, however, the detestation of God or of justice is not required except as a consequence, because no one hates what is good except in so far as it is incompatible with some other good which he loves. The sinner therefore hates justice and God only indirectly, by immoderately loving a changeable good.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod non est necessarium quod aliquis in ipso momento iustificationis de hoc vel illo peccato determinate cogitet; sed solum quod doleat se propria culpa a Deo esse aversum, vel absolute, vel sub conditione, si scilicet aversus est; quando scilicet aliquis ignorat an unquam per peccatum mortale a Deo aversus fuerit: et per huiusmodi motum ille qui oblitus est de peccato, conteri potest.
| 3. It is not necessary for a person at the very moment of justification to think of this or that particular sin; but it is necessary, either absolutely or conditionally (if he has turned away from God), only to be sorry for having by his own fault turned away. This condition applies when a person does not know whether he has ever turned away from God by a mortal sin. By such a motion even one who has forgotten about his sin can have contrition for sin.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod omnia peccata conveniunt in aversione a Deo, ratione cuius gratiam impediunt; unde ad iustificationem non requiritur quod in ipso iustificationis momento aliquis de peccatis singulis cogitet, sed sufficit quod cogitet de hoc quod per culpam suam est aversus a Deo. Recogitatio autem singulorum peccatorum debet vel praecedere, vel saltem sequi iustificationem.
| 4. All sins have in common turning away from God, by reason of which they are an obstacle to grace. For justification it is accordingly not required that a person think of his individual sins at the very moment of justification, but it suffices to think of having turned away from God by one’s own fault. But the recalling of sins individually must either precede or at least follow justification.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod ex hoc quod aliquis sibi Deum finem constituit, sequitur quod non constituat sibi finem in peccato, et ita quod avertatur a proposito peccandi. Hoc autem non sufficit ad deletionem peccati praeteriti, ut dictum est, in corp. artic.; et ideo ratio non sequitur.
| 5. If someone fixes upon God as his end, it follows that he does not put his end in sin, and therefore that he is turned away from the intention of sinning. This does not, however, suffice for the wiping out of past sin, as has been said. The argument accordingly proves nothing.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum prosequendum vel amplectendum, iustificationi opponitur, non autem motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum fugiendum: hic enim motus cum iustificatione convenit, quae est motus a peccato: nam fuga alicuius est motus ab illo.
| 6. The motion of free choice to pursue and embrace sin is opposed to justification, but not the motion of free choice to flee from sin. This rather coincides with justification, which is a motion away from sin; for flight from something is motion away from it.
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Q. 28: The Justification of Sinners
ARTICLE VI
In the sixth article we ask:
Are the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt the same?
[ARTICLE IV Sent., 17,1, 3 sol. 5; S.T., I-II, 113, 6.]
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| Sexto quaeritur utrum gratiae infusio et culpae remissio sint idem
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that they are, for
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| Idem enim est propositio affirmationis, et remotio negationis. Sed culpa nihil aliud esse videtur quam defectus gratiae. Ergo idem videtur esse remotio culpae, et infusio gratiae.
| 1. The positing of an affirmation and the removal of a negation are the same. But guilt seems to be nothing but the lack of grace. It therefore seems that the removal of guilt and the infusion of grace are the same.
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| Praeterea, gratia et culpa opponuntur sicut tenebra et lux. Sed remotio tenebrae et inductio lucis sunt idem. Ergo remissio culpae et infusio gratiae sunt idem.
| 2. Guilt and grace are opposed in the same way as darkness and light. But the removal of darkness and the introduction of light are the same. Then the forgiveness of guilt and the infusion of grace are also the same.
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| Praeterea, remotio culpae praecipue attenditur quantum ad deletionem maculae. Macula autem non videtur esse aliquid positive in anima, quia sic aliquo modo esset a Deo; et sic videtur quod sit privatio sola: non autem est privatio nisi eius cum quo simul esse non potest, quod est gratia. Remotio ergo culpae nihil est aliud quam infusio gratiae.
| 3. In the forgiveness of guilt what we especially have in mind is the effacement of a stain. But the stain does not seem to be anything positive in the soul, because in that case it would somehow be from God. And so it seems to be only a privation; but it is not the privation of anything but that with which it cannot coexist, namely, grace. Now the removal of a privation is nothing but the positing of a possession or habit. The forgiveness of guilt is therefore nothing else than the infusion of grace.
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| Sed diceretur, quod macula non solum ponit absentiam gratiae, sed aptitudinem et debitum respectu gratiae habendae.- Sed contra: omnis privatio ponit aptitudinem in subiecto, cum remotio privationis et inductio habitus sint idem. Ergo hoc non impedit quin remotio culpae et infusio gratiae sint idem.
| 4. The answer was given that the stain posits not only the absence of grace but also an aptitude and an obligation to have grace.—On the contrary, every privation posits an aptitude in a subject, and yet the removal of a privation and the introduction of a habit are the same thing. Then this does not keep the forgiveness of guilt and the infusion of grace from being the same.
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| Praeterea, secundum philosophum, generatio unius est corruptio alterius. Cum ergo remotio culpae sit quaedam ipsius corruptio, infusio gratiae est quaedam ipsius generatio. Ergo idem est infusio gratiae quod remotio culpae.
| 5. According to the Philosopher “the coming to be of one thing is the perishing of another.” Now, since in some sense the forgiveness of guilt is its perishing, and the infusion of grace is its coming to be, the infusion of grace is the same as the forgiveness of guilt.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod inter quatuor quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii, connumerantur duo, infusio gratiae et culpae remissio.
| 1. Among the four requisites for the justification of sinners, two are listed together: the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt.
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| Praeterea, quaecumque sic se habent quod unum potest esse sine altero, non sunt idem. Sed infusio gratiae potest esse sine remissione alicuius culpae; sicut in Angelis beatis, et in primo homine ante casum, et in Christo. Ergo remissio culpae et infusio gratiae non sunt idem.
| Things such that one can be found without the other are not thee same. But the infusion of grace can take place without the forgiveness of guilt, as is seen in the blessed angels, in the first man before the fall, and in Christ. The forgiveness of guilt and the infusion of grace are therefore not the same.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod remissio culpae et infusio gratiae non sunt idem et hoc sic patet.
| The forgiveness of guilt and the infusion of grace are not the same. This is shown as follows.
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| Mutationes enim penes terminos distinguuntur. Infusionis autem gratiae terminus est gratiam inesse, remissionis vero culpae culpam non esse. Est autem oppositorum quantum ad hoc attendenda quaedam differentia.
| Changes are distinguished on the basis of their terms. Now the term of the infusion of grace is the existence of grace in the soul, whereas the term of the forgiveness of guilt is its non-existence. In this connection there is a difference between opposites to be taken into account.
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| Nam quaedam opposita sunt quorum utrumque ponit naturam aliquam, ut album et nigrum; et in talibus oppositis negatio utriusque est negatio realis, id est alicuius rei. Et ideo, cum affirmatio non sit negatio, quia esse album non est idem quod non esse nigrum, sed realiter differunt, ideo corruptio nigri cuius terminus est non esse nigrum, et generatio albi cuius terminus est esse album, sunt realiter diversae mutationes, quamvis sit unus motus, ut supra, art. I huius quaest., dictum est.
| There are some opposites each of which posits some natural being, such as white and black. In such opposites the negation of either term is a real negation, that is, the negation of a real being. Accordingly, since affirmation is not negation, to be white is not the same as not to be black, but they are really different; and likewise the destruction of black (whose term is not to be black) and the coming to be of white (whose term is to be white) are really different changes, although there is a single motion, as was said above.
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| Quaedam vero opposita sunt quorum alterum tantum est natura quaedam, reliquum vero non est nisi remotio vel negatio ipsius, sicut patet in oppositis secundum affirmationem et negationem vel secundum privationem et habitum; et in talibus negatio oppositi, quod ponit naturam aliquam, est realis, quia est alicuius rei; negatio vero alterius oppositi non est realis, quia non est alicuius rei. Est enim negatio negationis, quae est negatio alterius oppositi: et ideo haec negatio negationis nihil differt secundum rem a positione alterius; unde secundum rem idem est generatio albi et corruptio non albi. Sed quia negatio, quamvis non sit res naturae, est tamen res rationis, ideo negatio negationis secundum rationem, sive secundum modum intelligendi, est aliud a positione affirmationis: et sic corruptio non albi secundum modum intelligendi est aliud quam generatio albi.
| There are other opposites of which only one of the two terms is a natural being, and the other is only its removal or negation. This appears, for instance, in opposites based upon affirmation and negation or upon privation and possession. In such cases the negation of an opposite which posits a natural being is real, because it is the negation of a real being; but the negation of the other opposite is not real, because it is not the negation of any real being. It is the negation of a negation. Consequently, this negation of a negation, which is the negation of the second opposite, in no way differs in reality from the positing of the other. In reality, then, the coming to be of white and the destruction of not-white are the same. But because a negation, though not a real being, is nevertheless a conceptual being, the negation of the negation is distinct conceptually or in our manner of understanding from the positing of the affirmation. Thus in the manner of understanding it the destruction of not-white is distinct from the coming to be of white.
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| Patet igitur quod, si culpa omnino non est aliquid positive, idem est infusio gratiae et remissio culpae secundum rem; secundum rationem vero non idem. Si autem culpa aliquid ponit non secundum rationem, sed re; est aliud remissio culpae et infusio gratiae, si considerentur ut mutationes, quamvis in ratione motus sint unum, ut supra dictum est.
| It is therefore clear that if guilt is nothing positive at all, the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt are the same in reality, but conceptually they are not the same. If, On the other hand, guilt posits something not only conceptually but also really, the forgiveness of guilt is distinct from the infusion of grace if they are considered as changes, even though from the point of view of motion they are one, as was said above.
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| Culpa autem aliquid ponit et non solam absentiam gratiae. Absentia enim gratiae secundum se considerata habet tantum rationem poenae, non autem rationem culpae, nisi secundum quod relinquitur ex actu voluntario praecedente; sicut tenebra non habet rationem umbrae nisi secundum quod relinquitur ex interpositione corporis opaci. Sicut ergo ablatio umbrae importat non solum remotionem tenebrae, sed remotionem corporis impedientis; ita remissio culpae non solum importat ablationem absentiae gratiae, sed ablationem impedimenti gratiae, quod erat ex actu peccati praecedente; non ut actus ille non fuerit, quia hoc est impossibile; sed ut propter illum influxus gratiae non impediatur. Patet igitur quod remissio culpae et infusio gratiae non sunt idem secundum rem.
| Now guilt posits something, and not only the absence of grace. The absence of grace considered in itself has only the note of punishment and not that of guilt except in so far as the guilt is left from a preceding voluntary act. Darkness, for instance, does not have the note of a shadow except in so far as it is left from the interposition of an opaque body. Then, just as the removal of a shadow implies not only the removal of darkness but also the removal of the obstructing body, in the same way the forgiveness of guilt implies not only the removal of the absence of grace but also the removal of the obstacle to grace, which arose from a preceding act of sin. This does not mean that that act must be made not to have been, for that is impossible, but it means that the entry of grace is not hindered by it. It is therefore clear that the forgiveness of guilt and the infusion of grace are not the same in reality.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Et per hoc patet solutio ad prima quatuor.
| 1-4. These answers are clear from the reply.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod generatio unius dicitur esse a philosopho corruptio alterius per concomitantiam, quia de necessitate sunt simul, vel propter unitatem motus qui ad has duas mutationes terminatur.
| 5. The coming to be of one thing is said by the Philosopher to be the perishing of the other by concomitance, because they are necessarily simultaneous, or else because of the oneness of the motion which terminates in these two changes.
|
Q. 28: The Justification of Sinners
ARTICLE VII
In the seventh article we ask:
Does the forgiveness of guilt naturally precede the infusion of grace?
[ARTICLE IV Sent., 17, 1, 4 sol. 1; S.T., I-II, 113, 8.]
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| Septimo quaeritur utrum remissio culpae naturaliter praecedat infusionem gratiae
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that it does, for
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| Quia super illud Psal. LXII, 3: sic in sancto apparui tibi, dicit Glossa: nisi quis prius deficiat in malo, nunquam perveniet ad bonum. Sed remissio culpae facit deficere a malo, infusio autem gratiae pervenire ad bonum. Ergo prius naturaliter est remissio culpae quam infusio gratiae.
| 1. In its comment upon the words of the Psalm (62:3): “So in the sanctuary have I come before thee,” the Gloss says: “Unless a man first is wanting in evil, he will never arrive at good.” But the forgiveness of guilt makes a man wanting in evil, whereas the infusion of grace makes him arrive at good. The forgiveness of guilt is therefore naturally prior to the infusion of grace.
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| Praeterea, prius in ordine naturae est intelligere recipiens quam ipsam receptionem. Sed forma non recipitur nisi in propria materia. Ergo prius est intelligere materiam propriam quam receptionem formae. Sed ad hoc quod materia sit propria alicui formae, requiritur quod sit denudata a forma contraria. Ergo prius naturaliter materia denudatur ab una forma quam recipiat aliam; et sic naturaliter prius est remissio culpae quam infusio gratiae.
| 2. In the order of nature our understanding of the recipient is prior to that of the reception itself. But a form is not received save in its proper matter. Our understanding of the proper matter is therefore prior to that of the reception of the form. But for a matter to be proper to a given form it must be stripped of the contrary form. Matter is therefore by a natural priority stripped of one form before it receives another; and so by a natural priority the forgiveness of guilt comes before the infusion of grace.
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| Sed diceretur, quod gratia, secundum quod habet respectum ad Deum infundentem gratiam, est prior naturaliter quam remissio culpae; secundum vero quod habet ordinem ad subiectum, sic est posterior quam remissio culpae.- Sed contra: in infusione gratiae includitur respectus gratiae ad suum subiectum cui infunditur. Si ergo secundum hunc respectum ad subiectum est posterior, videtur quod simpliciter infusio gratiae naturaliter sit post remissionem culpae.
| 3. It was said in answer that, from the standpoint of its relation to God who infuses it, grace is naturally prior to the forgiveness of guilt; but from that of its relation to the subject, it is posterior to the forgiveness of guilt.—On the contrary, in the infusion of grace is included the relation of grace to the subject into which it is infused. If it is posterior to the subject on the basis of this relation, it therefore seems that in itself the infusion of grace naturally comes after the forgiveness of guilt.
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| Sed diceretur, quod gratia habet duplicem respectum ad subiectum: unum, secundum quod informat subiectum: et quantum ad hunc respectum est posterior quam remissio culpae; alium, quo culpam expellit a subiecto: et sic infusio gratiae naturaliter praecedit remissionem culpae.- Sed contra: gratia expellit culpam ratione oppositionis quam habet ad ipsam. Opposita autem mutuo se expellunt, ex hoc quod non patiuntur se in eodem subiecto. Ergo ex hoc ipso quod gratia informat subiectum, expellit culpam. Et sic non potest esse quod gratia secundum respectum quem habet ad subiectum quod informat, sit posterior, et secundum respectum quem habet ad culpam quam expellit, sit prior.
| 4. It was said that grace has two different relations to the subject: one as informing the subject, and from the standpoint of this relation it is posterior to the forgiveness of guilt; another as driving guilt out of the subject, and in this sense the infusion of grace naturally precedes the forgiveness of guilt.—On the contrary, grace drives out guilt by reason of its opposition to guilt. Opposites drive each other out because they do not suffer one another in the same subject. Then by the very fact that grace informs the subject it drives out guilt. Thus it is impossible for grace to be posterior on the basis of its relation to the subject that it informs, and prior on the basis of its relation to the guilt that it drives out.
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| Praeterea, esse rei naturaliter prius est quam agere ipsius. Sed gratia, cum sit accidens, eius esse est inesse. Ergo prior est naturaliter respectus quem habet gratia ad subiectum quod informat, quam respectus quem habet ad contrarium quod expellit. Et sic praedicta responsio non videtur posse stare.
| 5. The being of a thing is naturally prior to its acting. But since grace is an accident, its being is to be in a subject. Its relation to the subject that it informs is therefore naturally prior to its relation to the contrary which it drives out. It accordingly seems that the answer given above cannot stand.
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| Praeterea, prius naturaliter est declinare a malo quam facere bonum. Sed remissio culpae pertinet ad declinationem mali, infusio autem gratiae ordinatur ad operationem boni. Ergo prius naturaliter est remissio culpae quam infusio gratiae.
| 6. Turning away from evil is naturally prior to doing good. But the forgiveness of guilt refers to turning away from evil, and the infusion of grace is directed to doing good. The forgiveness of guilt is therefore naturally prior to the infusion of grace.
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| Praeterea, secundum ordinem effectuum est ordo causarum. Sed effectus remissionis culpae est esse mundum, effectus autem infusionis gratiae est esse gratum. Prius autem est naturaliter esse mundum quam esse gratum: nam omne gratum est mundum, sed non convertitur; prius autem, secundum philosophum, est a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequentia. Ergo prius naturaliter est remissio culpae quam infusio gratiae.
| 7. The sequence of causes corresponds to the sequence of effects. Now the effect of the forgiveness of guilt is to be clean, and the effect of the infusion of grace is to be graced. But to be clean is naturally prior to being graced, for everything graced is clean; but the converse does not hold. For according to the Philosopher “the prior is that from which there is a sequence that cannot be reversed.”The forgiveness of guilt is therefore naturally prior to the infusion of grace.
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| Praeterea, culpa et gratia se habent ad invicem sicut formae contrariae in natura. Sed in rebus naturalibus prius naturaliter est expulsio unius formae quam introductio alterius, eo quod non contingit formas contrarias esse simul in materia: unde oportet quod forma quae prius erat, intelligatur expulsa antequam nova forma introducatur. Ergo et remissio culpae naturaliter prius est quam infusio gratiae.
| 8. Guilt and grace are related to each other like contrary forms in the order of nature. Now in natural things the expulsion of one form is naturally prior to the introduction of the other, because it is impossible for contrary forms to be simultaneously in matter. It must accordingly be understood that the form that was there before is driven out before the new form is introduced. Likewise, then, the forgiveness of guilt is naturally prior to the infusion of grace.
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| Praeterea, prius naturaliter est recedere a termino a quo quam pervenire ad terminum ad quem. Sed in iustificatione impii culpa se habet ut terminus a quo receditur per culpae remissionem: terminus autem ad quem est ipsa gratia, ad quam pervenitur per eius infusionem. Ergo prius naturaliter est culpae remissio quam gratiae infusio.
| 9. Leaving the starting point is naturally prior to arriving at the terminal point. But in the justification of sinners guilt stands as the starting point which is left through the forgiveness of guilt, whereas the terminal point is grace itself, which is arrived at through its infusion. The forgiveness of guilt is therefore naturally prior to the infusion of grace.
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| Sed diceretur, quod gratiae infusio est posterior, in quantum gratia est terminus iustificationis: sed in quantum est principium disponens removendo contrarium, sic est prius.- Sed contra: agens infinitae virtutis non exigit dispositionem in materia in quam operatur. Sed gratiae infusio est ab agente infinitae virtutis, scilicet a Deo. Ergo non exigitur aliqua dispositio.
| 10. The answer was given that the infusion of grace is posterior in so far as grace is the term of justification; but in so far as it is a principle which disposes by removing the contrary, it is prior.—On the contrary, an agent with infinite power does not need a disposition in the matter upon which it works. But the infusion of grace is effected by an agent of infinite power, God Himself. Consequently no disposition is needed.
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| Praeterea, nulla forma quae totaliter est ab extrinseco, exigit dispositionem in materia. Sed gratia est huiusmodi. Ergo et cetera.
| 11. No form that is wholly from without needs a disposition in matter. But grace is such a form. Therefore.
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| Praeterea, remissio culpae et infusio gratiae se habent sicut purgatio et illuminatio. Sed secundum Dionysium, purgatio anteponitur illuminationi. Ergo remissio culpae naturaliter praecedit gratiae infusionem.
| 12. The forgiveness of guilt and the infusion are related in the same way as cleansing and enlightenment. But according to Dionysius cleansing is placed before enlightenment. Therefore, the forgiveness of guilt likewise naturally precedes the infusion of grace.
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| Praeterea, si Deus successive operaretur in iustificatione impii, prius tempore removeret culpam quam infunderet gratiam; sicut in dealbatione natura prius removet nigredinem quam inducat albedinem. Sed hoc quod Deus subito operatur iustificationem, removet ordinem temporis, non naturae. Ergo naturaliter prius est remissio culpae quam infusio gratiae.
| 13. If God worked successively in the justification of sinners, He would first with chronological priority remove the guilt before He infused grace, just as nature in whitening first removes blackness before it introduces whiteness. Now by effecting justification instantaneously God obviates chronological sequence but not that of nature. The forgiveness of guilt is therefore naturally prior to the infusion of grace.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Causa naturaliter praecedit effectum. Sed gratia est causa remissionis culpae, nonnisi secundum quod est infusa. Ergo gratiae infusio naturaliter praecedit culpae remissionem.
| 1. A cause naturally precedes its effect. But grace is the cause of the forgiveness of guilt only inasmuch as it is infused. The infusion of grace therefore naturally precedes the forgiveness of guilt.
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| Praeterea, agens naturale non expellit formam contrariam a materia nisi per hoc quod inducit similitudinem suae formae in materia. Ergo eadem ratione et Deus non removet culpam ab anima nisi per hoc quod similitudinem suae bonitatis, scilicet gratiam, in ea inducit; et sic infusio gratiae naturaliter praecedit culpae remissionem.
| 2. A natural agent drives out of matter a form contrary to its own only by introducing into the matter a likeness of its own form. In the same way, then, God removes guilt from the soul only by introducing into it a likeness of His own goodness, grace. Thus the infusion of grace naturally precedes the forgiveness of guilt.
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| Praeterea, sicut quandoque culpa remittitur per gratiam, ita aliquando gratia expellitur per culpam. Sed gratia expellitur per culpam praecedentem expulsionem gratiae. Ergo similiter culpa remittitur per gratiam praecedentem culpae remissionem.
| 3. Grace is sometimes driven out, and that by guilt, just as at times guilt is forgiven, and that through grace. But grace is driven out by guilt that precedes the driving out of grace. In the same way, then, guilt is forgiven through a grace that precedes the forgiveness of guilt.
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| Praeterea, gratia creando infunditur, et infundendo creatur. Sed creatio gratiae est prius naturaliter quam remissio culpae. Ergo infusio gratiae naturaliter prior est quam culpae remissio.
| 4. Grace is infused by being created and is created by being infused. But the creation of grace is naturally prior to the forgiveness of guilt. Then the infusion of grace also is naturally prior.
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| Praeterea, agens naturaliter est prius patiente. Sed in iustificatione impii gratia est ex parte agentis, culpa ex parte patientis seu recipientis. Ergo prius naturaliter est gratiae infusio quam culpae remissio.
| 5. An agent is naturally prior to its patient. But in the justification of sinners grace derives from the agent and guilt derives from the patient or recipient. The infusion of grace is therefore naturally prior to the forgiveness of guilt.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod in quolibet genere causae, causa naturaliter est prior causato. Contingit autem secundum diversa genera causarum idem respectu eiusdem esse causam et causatum; sicut purgatio est causa sanitatis in genere causae efficientis, sanitas vero est causa purgationis secundum genus causae finalis; similiter materia causa est formae aliquo modo in quantum sustinet formam, et forma est aliquo modo causa materiae in quantum dat materiae esse actu. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquid altero esse prius et posterius secundum diversum genus causae.
| In each genus of cause the cause is naturally prior to that which is caused. It happens, however, that according to different genera of causes one and the same thing is both cause and caused in regard to a single term of reference. Thus purgation is the cause of health in the genus of efficient cause, but health is the cause of purgation in the genus of final cause. Similarly matter is in a way the cause of the form in so far as it sustains the form, and the form is in a way the cause of the matter in so far as it confers upon matter actual existence. Accordingly, nothing prevents a thing from being prior and also posterior to another in different genera of causes.
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| Sed tamen illud est prius simpliciter dicendum ordine naturae, quod est prius secundum genus illius causae quae est prior in ratione causalitatis; sicut finis, qui dicitur causa causarum, quia a causa finali omnes aliae causae recipiunt quod sint causae: quia efficiens non agit nisi propter finem, et ex actione efficientis forma perficit materiam, et materia sustinet formam.
| What must be called simply prior in the order of nature, however, is that which is prior in the line of that cause which is prior in the very character of causality. The outstanding example of this is the end, which is called the cause of causes because all the other causes receive from the final cause their status as causes; for the efficient cause does not act except for the sake of the end, and by reason of the action of the efficient cause the form perfects the matter and the matter supports the form.
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| Sic ergo dicendum, quod quandocumque a materia una forma expellitur et alia inducitur, expulsio formae praecedentis est prior naturaliter in ratione causae materialis: omnis enim dispositio ad formam reducitur ad causam materialem: denudatio autem materiae a forma contraria, est quaedam dispositio ad formae susceptionem. Subiectum etiam, id est materia, ut dicitur in libro I Physic., numerabilis est: numeratur enim secundum rationem, in quantum in eo praeter subiecti substantiam invenitur privatio, quae se tenet ex parte materiae et subiecti.
| It must accordingly be said that, whenever one form is driven out of matter and another is introduced, the expulsion of the previous form is naturally prior in the line of material causality; for every disposition for a form is reduced to the material cause, and stripping the matter of the contrary form is a kind of disposition for the reception of the form. Furthermore, the subject or matter is numberable, as is said in the Physics; for it is numbered conceptually, since in addition to the substance of the subject there is found in it privation, which attaches to matter and the subject.
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| Sed in ratione causae formalis est prior naturaliter introductio formae; quae formaliter perficit subiectum, et expellit contrarium. Et quia forma et finis in idem numero incidunt, forma vero et efficiens in idem specie, in quantum forma est similitudo agentis; ideo formae introductio est prior naturaliter secundum ordinem causae efficientis et finalis: et ex hoc patet, secundum praedicta, quod ordine naturae sit simpliciter prior.
| In the line of formal causality, however, the introduction of the form, which formally perfects the subject and drives out the contrary, is naturally prior. And because the form and the end coincide in numerically the same thing, and the form and the efficient cause coincide in species inasmuch as the form is the likeness of the agent, for this reason the introduction of the form is also naturally prior in the line of efficient and final causality. And from this it is evident, according to what was said above, that it is prior without qualification in the order of nature.
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| Sic ergo patet quod simpliciter loquendo secundum ordinem naturae, prior est gratiae infusio quam culpae remissio; sed secundum ordinem causae materialis est e converso.
| It is accordingly clear that, speaking without qualification according to the order of nature, the infusion of grace is prior to the forgiveness of guilt; but according to the order of the material cause the reverse holds true.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Glossa illa loquitur quantum ad vitationem operis mali, et operationem operis boni: minus est enim dimittere malum quam operari bonum, et ideo naturaliter prius; non autem loquitur quantum ad habitus qui infunduntur vel expelluntur.
| 1. The comment in question refers to the avoidance of an evil action and the performance of a good one. To put aside evil is less than to do good, and therefore is naturally prior. The comment does not refer to the habit which is infused or driven out.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit secundum ordinem causae materialis, secundum quem in respectu ad subiectum infusio gratiae posterior est.
| 2. That argument is based upon the order of the material cause, according to which even as regards the subject the infusion of grace is prior.
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| Unde patet solutio ad tertium.
| 3. From the above answer the answer to this difficulty is clear.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod obiectio illa procedit secundum ordinem causae formalis: formaliter enim gratia inhaerendo expellit culpam.
| 4. This difficulty is based upon the order of the formal cause; for by inhering, grace drives out guilt formally.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod gratia non expellit culpam effective, sed formaliter; unde non est prius quam expellat culpam, sed simul.
| 5. Grace does not drive out guilt efficiently but formally. Hence it does not exist before it drives out guilt but simultaneously with this effect.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod obiectio illa procedit quantum ad operationes, et non quantum ad habitus, sicut et prima.
| 6. This difficulty, like the first, applies to actions and not to habits.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod esse mundum non est proprius effectus remissionis culpae, quia potest esse, non intellecta remissione culpae, ut in homine in statu innocentiae; sed proprius effectus remissionis culpae est fieri mundum; et hoc non est communius quam esse gratum, quia nullus potest fieri mundus nisi per gratiam. Sciendum tamen, quod per hoc non probaretur prioritas naturalis nisi secundum ordinem causae materialis: nam genera se habent per modum materiae in comparatione ad species.
| 7. To be clean is not the proper effect of the forgiveness of guilt, because it can be found even if the forgiveness of guilt is not taken into account, as for example in man in the state of innocence. The proper effect of the forgiveness of guilt is to become clean; and that is not more general than to be graced, because no one can become clean except through grace. It should be noted, moreover, that the argument given would not prove natural priority except in the line of material causality; for genera have the function of matter with reference to their species.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod eadem distinctione opus est in formis naturalibus et in proposito.
| 8. There is need of the same distinction in natural forms and in the matter at hand.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod recessus a termino a quo est prius in via generationis et motus, cum reducatur ad ordinem materiae (nam motus est actus existentis in potentia); sed accessus ad terminum ad quem est prior secundum ordinem causae finalis.
| 9. Leaving the starting point is prior in the line of coming to be and of motion. These are reduced to the order of matter, for motion is the act of a being that is in potency. The arrival at the terminus, however, is prior in the line of formal causality.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod in operibus Dei non requiritur dispositio propter impotentiam agentis, sed propter conditionem effectus; et praecipue talis dispositio, scilicet remotio contrarii, quia contraria simul esse non possunt.
| 10. In God’s operations a disposition is needed, not because of the impotence of the agent, but because of the condition of the effect; and especially such a disposition—the removal of the contrary—because contraries cannot exist together.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod forma quae est totaliter ab extrinseco, requirit dispositionem debitam in subiecto, vel praeexistentem, sicut lumen diaphaneitatem in aere, vel simul impressam ab eodem agente, sicut calor consummatus simul introducitur cum forma ignis. Et similiter a Deo simul cum infusione gratiae expellitur culpa.
| 11. Even a form which is wholly from without requires the right disposition in the subject, either one pre-existing, as light requires transparency in the air, or one inserted by the same agent at the same time, as heat in its fullness is introduced along with the form of fire. In the same way guilt is driven out by God simultaneously with the infusion of grace.
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| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod simili distinctione utendum est in ordine purgationis et illuminationis, sicut in proposito.
| 12. The same distinction is to be applied to the sequence of cleansing and enlightenment as is applied in the matter at hand.
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| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod si Deus successive iustificationem operaretur, expulsio culpae esset prior tempore, sed posterior natura: ordo enim temporis sequitur ordinem motus et materiae. Et secundum hunc modum philosophus dicit, quod in eodem actus est posterior tempore quam potentia, sed natura prior: quia secundum illud dicitur aliquid esse simpliciter natura prius, quod est prius secundum ordinem causae finalis, ut dictum est in corp. art.
| 13. If God effected justification successively, the driving out of guilt would be prior in time but posterior in nature; for the order of time follows that of motion and matter. In agreement with this distinction the Philosopher says, that in the same being act is posterior to potency in time but prior in nature, because what is prior in the line of final causality is prior in nature without qualification, as has been said.
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Q. 28: The Justification of Sinners
ARTICLE VIII
In the eighth article we ask:
In the justification of sinners does the motion of free choice naturally precede the infusion of grace?
[ARTICLE IV Sent., 17, 1, 4 sol. 2.]
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| Octavo quaeritur utrum in iustificatione impii motus liberi arbitrii naturaliter praecedat gratiae infusionem
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that it does, for
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| Causa enim naturaliter praecedit effectum. Sed contritio est causa remissionis culpae. Ergo naturaliter eam praecedit; et per consequens gratiae infusionem, quia se concomitantur.
| 1. A cause naturally precedes its effect. But contrition is the cause of the forgiveness of guilt. It therefore naturally precedes it; and consequently it also precedes the infusion of grace, because forgiveness and the infusion of grace are concomitant.
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| Sed diceretur, quod contritio non est causa remissionis culpae nisi per modum dispositionis materialis. —Sed contra: contritio est causa sacramentalis remissionis culpae, et infusionis gratiae. Poenitentia enim, cum sit sacramentum novae legis, gratiam causat, et sic remissionem culpae: nec hoc facit ratione aliarum suarum partium, scilicet confessionis et satisfactionis, quae gratiam et culpae remissionem praesupponunt: et sic relinquitur quod ipsa contritio sit sacramentalis causa remissionis culpae, et infusionis gratiae. Sed causa sacramentalis est causa instrumentalis, ut ex praecedenti quaest. patet. Ergo, cum instrumentum reducatur ad genus causae efficientis, contritio non erit causa remissionis culpae ut dispositio materialis, sed magis in genere causae efficientis.
| 2. The answer was given that contrition is not the cause of the forgiveness of guilt except as a material disposition.—On the contrary, contrition is the sacramental cause of the forgiveness of guilt and of the infusion of grace. Since penance is a sacrament of the New Law, it causes grace, and therefore also the forgiveness of guilt; and it does not do this by reason of its other parts, confession and satisfaction, which presuppose grace and the forgiveness of guilt. We are thus left with the conclusion that contrition itself is the sacramental cause of the forgiveness of guilt and of the infusion of grace. But a sacramental cause is an instrumental cause, as is evident from the preceding question. Since an instrument is reduced to the genus of efficient cause, contrition will not be the cause of the forgiveness of guilt as a material disposition but rather in the genus of efficient cause.
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| Praeterea, attritio praecedit gratiae infusionem, et culpae remissionem. Sed contritio ab attritione non differt nisi secundum intensionem doloris, quae speciem non variat. Ergo contritio naturaliter ad minus praecedit gratiae infusionem et culpae remissionem.
| 3. Attrition precedes the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt. But contrition differs from attrition only in the intensity of sorrow, and that does not change its species. Then contrition also at least naturally precedes the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt.
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| Praeterea, in Psalm. LXXXVIII, 15, dicitur: iustitia et iudicium praeparatio sedis eius. Anima autem efficitur sedes Dei per gratiae infusionem et culpae remissionem. Cum ergo homo iustitiam et iudicium faciat per hoc quod de peccato conteritur, videtur quod contritio sit praeparatio ad gratiae infusionem; et ita naturaliter est prior.
| 4. It is written in the Psalm (88:15): “Justice and judgment are the preparation of your throne.” Now the soul is made the throne of God by the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt. Consequently, since a man works justice and judgment by being contrite for his sin, it seems that contrition is a preparation for the infusion of grace; and so it is naturally prior.
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| Praeterea, motus ad terminum naturaliter praecedit terminum. Sed contritio est quidam motus tendens in destructionem peccati. Ergo naturaliter praecedit remissionem culpae.
| 5. Motion to a term naturally precedes the term. But contrition is a kind of motion tending to the destruction of sin. It therefore naturally precedes the forgiveness of sin.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit: qui creavit te sine te, non iustificabit te sine te; et ita motus liberi arbitrii, qui ex parte nostra est, requiritur ad iustificationem, et naturaliter praecedit eam. Sed iustificatio terminatur in remissionem culpae. Ergo motus liberi arbitrii praecedit naturaliter remissionem culpae.
| 6. Augustine says: “He who created you without you will not justify you without you.” Thus the motion of free choice, which is from us, is required for justification and naturally precedes it. But justification terminates in the forgiveness of guilt. The motion of free choice therefore naturally precedes the forgiveness of guilt.
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| Praeterea, in matrimonio carnali consensus mutuus naturaliter matrimonii copulam praecedit. Sed per gratiae infusionem contrahitur quoddam spirituale matrimonium animae cum Deo, secundum illud Osee, II, 19: sponsabo te mihi in iustitia. Ergo motus liberi arbitrii, per quem est animae consensus in Deum, praecedit naturaliter gratiae infusionem.
| 7. In carnal marriage mutual consent naturally precedes the marriage bond. But through the infusion of grace a certain spiritual marriage of the soul with God is contracted, according to the words of Hoseah (2:19): “I will espouse thee to me for ever.” Consequently the motion of free choice, by which the consent of the soul to God is given, naturally precedes the infusion of grace.
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| Praeterea, sicut in his quae moventur ab alio, se habet motio moventis exterioris ad moveri mobilis, ita in his quae moventur a seipsis. Sed motio qua exterius agens movet, sive moveat ut principale agens, sive ut coadiuvans, naturaliter praecedit moveri ipsius mobilis. Ergo, cum in iustificatione impii anima non totaliter moveatur, sed ipsa quodammodo se moveat ut coadiuvans, secundum illud I Cor. III, 9: Dei adiutores sumus; videtur quod ipsa operatio animae, scilicet motus liberi arbitrii, naturaliter praecedat remissionem culpae, secundum quam movetur anima de vitio in virtutem.
| 8. The relation between the imparting of motion by the mover and its reception by the thing moved is the same in things moved by another and in those which are moved by themselves. But the motion imparted by an external agent, whether it acts as a principal agent or only as a helper, naturally precedes its reception by the thing moved. Now, since in the justification of sinners the soul is not moved wholly from without, but in a certain sense it moves itself as a helper, according to the words of the first Epistle to the Corinthians (3:9): “We are God’s coadjutors,” it therefore seems that the operation of the soul, that is, the motion of free choice, naturally precedes the forgiveness of guilt, in which the soul is moved from vice to virtue.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Contritio est actus meritorius. Sed actus meritorius non est nisi a gratia. Ergo gratia est causa contritionis. Sed causa naturaliter praecedit effectum. Ergo gratiae infusio naturaliter praecedit contritionem.
| 1. Contrition is a meritorious act. But a meritorious act comes only from grace. Then grace is the cause of contrition. But the cause naturally precedes the effect. The infusion of grace therefore naturally precedes contrition.
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| Praeterea, Rom. V, 3, super illud, iustificati igitur ex fide etc., dicit Glossa: gratiam Dei non praecedit aliquod meritum humanum. Sed contritio est quoddam humanum meritum. Ergo non praecedit gratiae infusionem.
| 2. In its comment upon the words of the Epistle to the Romans (5: 1): “Being justified therefore by faith... “ the Gloss says: “No meritorious act of man precedes the grace of God.” But contrition is a meritorious act of man. It therefore does not precede the infusion of grace.
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| Sed diceretur, quod praecedit sicut quaedam dispositio.- Sed contra: dispositio est minus perfecta quam forma ad quam disponit. Sed contritio dicit aliquid magis perfectum quam gratia. Ergo contritio non est dispositio ad gratiam. Probatio mediae. Actus secundus est maioris perfectionis quam primus, cum se habeat per modum habitus. Contritio autem est actus secundus, cum sit operatio gratiae, sicut considerare est operatio scientiae. Ergo sicut consideratio est perfectius quam scientia, ita contritio est perfectius quam gratia.
| 3. It was said in answer that it precedes as a kind of disposition. On the contrary, a disposition is less perfect than the form for which it disposes. But contrition is something more perfect than grace. Contrition is therefore not a disposition for grace. Proof of the minor: A second act has greater perfection than a first act. But grace is a first act since it. is like a habit; but contrition is a second act since it is the operation of grace, just as considering is the operation of science. Then contrition is more perfect than grace, just as considering is more perfect than science.
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| Praeterea, effectus causae efficientis nunquam est dispositio ad causam efficientem, quia in via motus sequitur efficientem; cum tamen in eadem via dispositio praecedat id ad quod disponit. Sed contritio se habet ad gratiam sicut effectus causae efficientis ad suam causam efficientem. Ergo contritio non est dispositio ad gratiam; et sic idem quod prius. Probatio mediae. Habitus et potentia ad idem genus causae reducuntur, cum habitus suppleat quod potentiae deest. Sed potentia est causa actus in genere causae efficientis. Ergo et habitus. Sed gratia comparatur ad contritionem sicut habitus ad actum. Ergo contritio comparatur ad gratiam sicut effectus ad causam efficientem.
| 4. The effect of an efficient cause is never a disposition for that efficient cause, because in the line of motion it follows the efficient cause, though in the same line a disposition precedes that for which it disposes. But contrition is related to grace as the effect of an efficient cause is related to that cause. Contrition is therefore not a disposition for grace; and so the conclusion is the same as above. Proof of the minor: Habit and power are reduced to the same genus of causes, since the habit supplies what is lacking to the power. But a power is the cause of its act in the line of efficient causality. Then so is a habit. But the relation of grace to contrition is that of a habit to its act. The relation of contrition to grace is therefore that of an effect to an efficient cause.
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| Praeterea, quod nihil facit ad introductionem formae, non est dispositio ad formam. Sed contritio nihil facit ad gratiae infusionem, quia sine contritione potest esse gratiae infusio; sicut patet in Christo, Angelis, et primo homine in statu innocentiae. Ergo contritio non est dispositio ad gratiam; et sic idem quod prius.
| 5. Whatever has no influence upon the introduction of a form is not a disposition for the form. But contrition has no influence upon the infusion of grace, because apart from contrition the infusion of grace can take place. Examples are had in Christ, in the angels, and in the first man in the state of innocence. Contrition is therefore not a disposition for grace; and so we must conclude the same as before.
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| Praeterea, Bernardus dicit, quod ad opus salutis nostrae duo requiruntur: scilicet Deus dans, et liberum arbitrium recipiens. Sed datio naturaliter est prius quam receptio. Ergo gratia, quae in iustificatione nostra est ex parte Dei dantis, naturaliter praecedit contritionem, quae est ex parte liberi arbitrii recipientis.
| 6. Bernard says that there are two requisites for the work of our salvation: God to give it, and free choice to receive it. But giving is naturally prior to receiving. Consequently grace, which in our justification is from God who gives it, naturally precedes contrition, which is from our free choice which receives it.
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| Praeterea, contritio non potest esse simul cum peccato. Ergo remissio peccati naturaliter contritionem praecedit.
| 7. Contrition cannot coexist with sin. The forgiveness of sin therefore naturally precedes contrition.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod circa hoc est triplex opinio.
| On this matter there are three opinions.
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| Quidam enim dicunt, quod motus liberi arbitrii naturaliter praecedit gratiae infusionem absolute. Dicunt enim, quod ille motus liberi arbitrii non est contritio, sed attritio, quae non est actus fidei formatae, sed fidei informis. Sed hoc non videtur esse ad propositum. Nam omnis dolor de peccato in habente gratiam est contritio: et similiter omnis actus fidei gratiae coniunctus est fidei formatae actus. Ergo actus fidei informis, et attritio, de quibus isti loquuntur, tempore praecedunt gratiae infusionem. Et de talibus motibus liberi arbitrii ad praesens non loquimur; sed de illis qui sunt simul cum gratiae infusione, sine quibus iustificatio esse non potest in adultis; nam sine praecedentibus potest, ut ex supra dictis patet.
| Some say that the motion of free choice naturally precedes without qualification the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt. For they say that that motion of free choice is not contrition but attrition, and that it is an act not of formed but of unformed faith. But this does not seem to be to the point. For all sorrow for sin in one who has grace is contrition; and similarly every act of faith joined to grace is an act of formed faith. Accordingly the act of unformed faith and the attrition of which these men speak precede in time the infusion of grace. Of such motions of free choice we are not at present speaking, but rather of those which are accompanied by the infusion of grace and without which there cannot be any justification in adults; for it can take place without any preceding acts, as is clear from what was said above.
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| Et ideo alii dicunt, quod motus isti sunt meritorii et gratia informati, unde naturaliter gratiam sequuntur. Praecedunt autem remissionem culpae naturaliter, quia gratia per hos actus remissionem culpae operatur. Sed hoc non potest esse. Nam quod causat aliquid per operationem, causat per modum causae efficientis. Gratia igitur, si per actum contritionis et fidei formatae, remissionem culpae causat, causabit eam per modum causae efficientis; quod esse non potest. Nam causa effective destruens aliquid, prius ponitur in esse quam hoc quod destruit sit in non esse; non enim ageret ad eius destructionem quod iam non est. Unde sequeretur quod gratia prius esset in anima quam culpa esset remissa: quod est impossibile. Unde patet, quod gratia non per aliquam operationem est causa remissionis culpae, sed per informationem subiecti, quae importatur per gratiae infusionem et culpae remissionem; et ideo inter gratiae infusionem et culpae remissionem nihil cadit medium.
| For this reason others say that those motions are meritorious and informed by grace, and hence naturally follow grace; but they naturally precede the forgiveness of guilt, because through those acts grace brings about that forgiveness. Now this cannot be true. For anything that causes an effect by its operation causes it as an efficient cause. If, then, grace causes the forgiveness of guilt through an act of contrition and of faith that is formed, it will cause it as an efficient cause. But that is impossible; for a cause which effectively destroys something is placed in existence before the thing destroyed is reduced to non-existence, because it would not work for the destruction of something which already does not exist. It would accordingly follow that grace would be in the soul before guilt is forgiven. But that is impossible. It is therefore clear that grace is not the cause of the forgiveness of sin through any operation, but through the information of its subject: implied in the infusion of grace. Nothing intervenes, then, between the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt.
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| Oportet igitur dicere, secundum aliam opinionem, quod praedicti motus eodem ordine se habent ad utrumque, ut quodammodo praecedant, quodammodo sequantur ordine naturae. Nam si ordo naturae attendatur secundum rationem causae materialis, sic motus liberi arbitrii praecedit naturaliter gratiae infusionem sicut dispositio materialis formam. Si autem attendatur secundum rationem causae formalis, est e converso. Et est simile in rebus naturalibus de dispositione quae est necessitas ad formam, quae quodammodo praecedit formam substantialem, scilicet secundum rationem causae materialis. Dispositio enim materialis ex parte materiae se tenet. Sed alio modo, scilicet ex parte causae formalis, forma substantialis est prior, in quantum perficit et materiam, et accidentia materialia.
| We must therefore hold, as another opinion has it, that the motions in question are so related in the same order to both forgiveness and grace that in one sense they precede and in another they follow by the order of nature. For if we view the order of nature in the line of material causality, the motion of free choice naturally precedes the infusion of grace as a material disposition precedes the form. If, on the other hand, we view them in the line of formal causality, the sequence is reversed. The same situation obtains in natural things as regards a disposition that is an exigency for a form, which in some sense precedes the substantial form, namely, in the line of material causality; for a material disposition attaches to the matter. In the other line of causality—formal—however, the substantial form is prior inasmuch as it perfects both the matter and the material accidents.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod contritio est causa remissionis culpae, in quantum est dispositio ad gratiam.
| 1. Contrition is the cause of the forgiveness of guilt in so far as it is a disposition for grace.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod poenitentiae sacramentum habet conferre gratiam ex virtute clavium, quibus se poenitens subiicit. Contritio igitur, si secundum se consideretur, non se habet ad gratiam nisi per modum dispositionis; sed si consideretur in quantum habet virtutem clavium in voto, sic sacramentaliter operatur in virtute sacramenti poenitentiae, sicut et in virtute Baptismi, ut patet in adulto qui habet sacramentum Baptismi in voto tantum. Ex hoc igitur non habetur quod contritio sit causa efficiens remissionis culpae, per se loquendo, sed virtus clavis, vel Baptismus.
| 2. The sacrament of penance has the ability to confer grace from the power of the keys, to which the penitent submits. If contrition is considered in itself, then, it is related to grace only as a material disposition; but if it is considered in so far as it has the power of the keys in desire, then it works sacramentally in virtue of the sacrament of penance, as also in virtue of baptism, as is clear in the case of an adult who has the sacrament of baptism only in desire. We do not conclude from this, then, that contrition is itself directly the efficient cause of the forgiveness of guilt, but rather that the power of the keys or baptism is.
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| Vel potest dici quod contritio ad remissionem culpae quoad reatum temporalis poenae se habet per modum causae efficientis; sed quantum ad maculam et reatum poenae aeternae se habet solum per modum dispositionis.
| Or the answer may be given that with reference to the debt of temporal punishment contrition stands as an efficient cause, but with reference to the stain and the debt of eternal punishment it stands only as a disposition.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod contritio ab attritione praecedenti non differt solum secundum intensionem doloris, sed secundum informationem gratiae; et ita contritio habet aliquem ordinem posterioritatis ad gratiam, quod non habet attritio.
| 3. Contrition does not differ from previous attrition merely in the intensity of the sorrow but also in information by, grace. Thus contrition has a certain relation of posteriority to grace which attrition does not have.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod praeparatio illa est per modum dispositionis materialis.
| 4. That preparation is by way of a material disposition.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod contritio est motus ad remissionem culpae non quasi ab ea distans, sed ut ei coniuncta: unde magis consideratur ut in motum esse quam ut in moveri, et tamen motus praecedit terminum in ordine causae materialis, quia motus est existentis in potentia.
| 5. Contrition is a motion to the forgiveness of guilt, not as if the contrition were distant from the forgiveness but as joined to it. Hence it is considered as being in the condition of having been moved rather than in that of being moved. And yet the motion precedes the term in the line of material causality, because motion is the act of a being that is in potency.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod intelligendum est, non iustificabit te sine te disponente aliqualiter ad gratiam; et sic non oportet quod motus liberi arbitrii praecedat nisi per modum dispositionis.
| 6. The words “He will not justify you without you” are to be understood as meaning “not without you in some way disposing yourself for grace.” So the motion of free choice does not have to precede except as a disposition.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod consensus est causa efficiens matrimonii carnalis; motus autem liberi arbitrii non est causa efficiens infusionis gratiae: et ideo non est simile.
| 7. Consent is the efficient cause of carnal marriage; but the motion of free choice is not the efficient cause of the infusion of grace; and so there is no parallel.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod in iustificatione impii homo non est adiutor Dei quasi cum eo simul efficiens gratiam; sed solum sicut praeparans se ad gratiam.
| 8. In the justification of sinners man is not God’s helper in the sense of producing grace along with Him, but only in the sense that he prepares himself for grace.
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| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
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| Ad primum quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum, quod contritio est a gratia sicut ab informante: et ita sequitur quod in ratione causae formalis gratia sit prior.
| 1. Contrition is from grace as from that which informs it. It accordingly follows that in the line of formal causality grace is prior.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod meritum humanum non praecedit gratiam in ratione merendi, ita scilicet quod gratia cadat sub merito; potest tamen praecedere actus humanus gratiam ut dispositio materialis.
| 2. The meritorious act of man does not precede grace in the line of meriting so that grace becomes subordinate to the meritorious act. Yet the human act can precede grace as a material disposition.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod contritio est a libero arbitrio et a gratia. Secundum quod procedit a libero arbitrio, est dispositio ad gratiam simul existens cum gratia, sicut dispositio quae est necessitas, simul est cum forma. Sed secundum quod est a gratia, comparatur ut actus secundus ad gratiam.
| 3. Contrition is from free choice and from grace. Inasmuch as it proceeds from free choice it is a disposition for grace that arrives simultaneously with grace, just as a disposition that is an exigency exists simultaneously with the form; but inasmuch as it is from grace it is related to grace as a second act.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut actus formaliter perficit potentiam; ita id quod ex habitu relinquitur in actu, est formale respectu substantiae actus, quam potentia ministrat: et sic habitus est formale principium actus formati, quamvis respectu formationis habeat rationem causae efficientis.
| 4. just as a habit perfects a power formally, in the same way the remnant of the habit left in the act is formal as regards the substance of the act which the power furnishes. Thus the habit is a formal principle of the formed act, although in regard to the formation it has the character of an efficient cause.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod dispositio non facit aliquid ad formam effective, sed materialiter tantum, in quantum per dispositionem materia efficitur congrua ad receptionem formae. Et sic contritio facit ad gratiae infusionem in eo qui culpam habet, quamvis non requiratur in innocente. Plura enim requiruntur dispositive ad remotionem formae contrariae et ad introductionem formae simul, quam ad solam formae introductionem.
| 5. A disposition does not have any influence upon the form effectively but only materially, inasmuch as through the disposition the matter is made suitable for the reception of the form. Contrition accordingly has an influence upon the infusion of grace in one who has guilt, though it is not required in an innocent person. For there are more dispositive requisites for the removal of a contrary form and the simultaneous introduction of a form than for the introduction of a form alone.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod illud quod est ex parte dantis, est prius formaliter: sed quod est ex parte recipientis, prius materialiter.
| 6. The contribution of the giver is prior formally, but that of the receiver is prior materially.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod ex illa ratione non sequitur quod remotio culpae praecedat contritionem, quia per ipsam contritionem quodammodo culpa remittitur; sicut per calorem in summo expellitur forma aquae; et ita non sunt simul; et similiter nec culpa et contritio.
| 7. It does not follow from that argument that the removal of guilt precedes contrition, because guilt is in some sense forgiven through contrition itself, just as the form of water is driven out by means of heat in the highest degree and therefore the two forms are not simultaneous. In the same way, neither are guilt and contrition.
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Q. 28: The Justification of Sinners
ARTICLE IX
In the ninth article we ask:
Is the justification of sinners instantaneous?
[ARTICLE De ver., 28, 2 ad 10; IV Sent., 17, 1, 5 sol. 2 & 3; S.T., I-II, 113, 7.]
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| Nono quaeritur utrum iustificatio impii fiat in instanti
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that it is not, for
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| Impossibile enim est eiusdem potentiae simul et semel esse plures motus; sicut nec una materia simul et semel est sub formis diversis disparatis. Sed in iustificatione impii requiritur duplex motus liberi arbitrii, ut ex dictis, art. 4 et 5 huius quaest., patet. Ergo iustificatio impii non potest esse in instanti.
| 1. it is impossible for the same power to have several motions at one and the same time, just as a single matter is not under different distinct forms at one and the same time. But in the justification of sinners two different motions of free choice are required, as is clear from what has been said. The justification of sinners therefore cannot be instantaneous.
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| Sed diceretur, quod illi duo motus sunt diversarum potentiarum: nam motus liberi arbitrii in Deum est concupiscibilis; motus autem liberi arbitrii in peccatum, cum sit quaedam detestatio peccati, est in irascibili.- Sed contra: detestari est idem quod odire. Sed odium est in concupiscibili, sicut et amor, secundum philosophum in II Top. Ergo detestari non est in irascibili.
| 2. The answer was given that those two motions belong to different powers; for the motion of free choice toward God belongs to the concupiscible power, and that toward sin, being a sort of detestation of sin, is in the irascible.—On the contrary, to detest is the same as to hate. But hatred, like love, is in the concupiscible power, as the Philosopher teaches. To detest is therefore not in the irascible power.
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| Praeterea, irascibilis et concupiscibilis, secundum Damascenum, sunt partes sensibilis appetitus. Sed sensibilis appetitus non se extendit nisi in bonum quod est ei conveniens, vel in eius contrarium: huiusmodi autem non sunt ipse Deus, et peccatum sub ratione peccati in quantum est detestabile. Ergo non pertinent isti motus ad concupiscibilem et irascibilem, sed ad voluntatem; et sic sunt unius potentiae.
| 3. According to Damascene the irascible and concupiscible powers are parts of sense appetite. But sense appetite extends only to a good suited to it or to the contrary of this. But objects of this kind are not God Himself and sin under the aspect of being detestable. The motions in question therefore do not pertain to the concupiscible and irascible powers but to the will; and so they belong to the same power.
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| Sed diceretur, quod motus liberi arbitrii in Deum est motus fidei, qui ad intellectum pertinet; contritio autem pertinet ad voluntatem, cuius est de peccato dolere; et sic non sunt unius potentiae.- Sed contra: secundum Augustinum, credere non potest homo nisi volens. Ergo, licet in credendo requiratur actus intellectus, nihilominus requiritur ibi actus voluntatis; et sic relinquitur quod duo motus eiusdem potentiae ad iustificationem impii requiruntur.
| 4. It was said in answer that the motion of free choice toward God is the motion of faith, which belongs to the intellect, whereas contrition belongs to the will, whose business it is to sorrow for sin; and thus they are not motions of a single power.—On the contrary, according to Augustine “man cannot believe unless he so wills.”Consequently, even though an act of the intellect is required in believing, there is nevertheless required in it an act of the will. We are accordingly left with the conclusion that two motions of the same power are required for the justification of sinners.
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| Praeterea, eiusdem est moveri a termino et ad terminum. Sed detestari peccatum est moveri a termino; moveri autem in Deum est moveri ad terminum. Ergo contritio, quae est peccati detestatio, est eiusdem potentiae cuius est motus in Deum; et sic non possunt esse simul.
| 5. To be moved from one term to another belongs to the same being. But to detest sin is to be moved from a term, and to be moved toward God is to be moved to a term. Consequently contrition, which is detestation for sin, is an act of the same power to which motion toward God belongs; and so they cannot coexist.
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| Praeterea, nihil movetur simul ad diversos et contrarios terminos. Sed Deus et peccatum sunt diversi et contrarii termini. Ergo anima non potest simul in Deum et in peccatum moveri; et sic idem quod prius.
| 6. Nothing is moved at the same time to distinct and contrary terms. But God and sin are distinct and contrary terms. The soul therefore cannot at the same time be moved toward God and toward sin; and so we must conclude as before.
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| Praeterea, gratia non datur nisi digno. Sed quamdiu aliquis est subiectus culpae, non est dignus gratia. Ergo oportet quod prius expellatur culpa quam infundatur gratia. Et sic iustificatio, quae haec duo includit, non est in instanti.
| 7. Grace is given only to one who is worthy. But as long as a person is subjected to guilt he is not worthy of grace. Guilt must therefore be driven out before grace is infused. Then justification, which includes the two, is not instantaneous.
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| Praeterea, forma quae recipit magis et minus, successive, ut videtur, debet in subiecto fieri; sicut forma quae non recipit magis et minus, recipitur subito in subiecto, ut patet de formis substantialibus. Sed gratia intenditur in subiecto. Ergo videtur quod successive introducatur: et ita infusio gratiae non est in instanti: et per consequens, nec iustificatio impii.
| 8. A form susceptible of more or less must, it seems, come to be in a subject successively, just as a form not susceptible of more or less comes to be in the subject all at once, as is clear of substantial forms. But grace is intensified in its subject. It therefore seems to be introduced successively; and so the infusion of grace is not instantaneous, and consequently neither is the justification of sinners.
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| Praeterea, sicut in qualibet mutatione, ita in iustificatione impii necesse est ponere duos terminos: scilicet terminum a quo, et terminum ad quem. Sed cuiuslibet mutationis duo termini sunt incontingentes, id est qui non possunt simul esse. Ergo in iustificatione impii includuntur duo quae se habent secundum prius et posterius. Et ita iustificatio impii est successiva, et non in instanti.
| 9. In the justification of sinners, as in any change, two terms must be set down, a starting point and a finish. But the two terms of any change are incompatible; that is, they cannot coexist. In the justification of sinners, then, two things are included which are related as prior and posterior; and so the justification of sinners is successive and not instantaneous.
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| Praeterea, nihil quod prius est in fieri quam in facto esse, fit in instanti. Sed gratia prius est in fieri quam in facto esse. Igitur infusio gratiae non est in instanti; et sic idem quod prius. Probatio mediae. In permanentibus, quod fit, non est; cum vero factum est, iam est. Sed gratia est permanentium. Si ergo simul fit et facta est, simul est et non est; quod est impossibile.
| 10. Nothing which is in the process of becoming before it is in the state of having become, comes into being instantaneously. But grace is in the process of becoming before it is in the state of having become. The infusion of grace is therefore not instantaneous. Thus the conclusion is the same as above. Proof of the minor: In permanent beings what is becoming is not; but when it has become it already is. But grace belongs to permanent beings. If, then, it is becoming and has become at the same time, it at the same time is and is not. But that is impossible.
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| Praeterea, omnis motus est in tempore. Sed in iustificatione impii requiritur quidam motus liberi arbitrii. Ergo iustificatio impii fit in tempore; et ita non in instanti.
| 11. All motion is in time. But in the justification of sinners a motion of free choice is required. The justification of sinners therefore takes place in time, and so it is not instantaneous.
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| Praeterea, ad iustificationem impii requiritur contritio de peccatis. Sed quando aliquis multa peccata commisit, non potest de omnibus peccatis in eodem instanti conteri nec cogitare. Ergo iustificatio impii non potest esse in instanti.
| 12. Contrition for sins is required for the justification of sinners. But when someone has committed many sins, he cannot at the same instant be contrite for all his sins or even think of them. Consequently the justification of sinners cannot be instantaneous.
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| Praeterea, quandocumque inter extrema mutationis est aliquod medium, mutatio est successiva, non momentanea. Sed inter culpam et gratiam est aliquid medium; scilicet status naturae conditae. Ergo iustificatio impii est mutatio successiva.
| 13. Whenever there is anything intermediate between the extremes of a change, the change is successive and not instantaneous. But between guilt and grace there is something intermediate, the state of created nature. The justification of sinners is therefore a successive change.
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| Praeterea, culpa et gratia non sunt simul in anima. Ergo instans in quo ultimo culpa inest, est aliud ab instanti in quo primo gratia inest. Sed inter quaelibet duo instantia cadit tempus medium. Ergo inter expulsionem culpae et infusionem gratiae cadit tempus medium. Sed iustificatio utrumque horum includit. Ergo iustificatio est in tempore, et non in instanti.
| 14. Guilt and grace are not in the soul simultaneously. Then the instant at which guilt is last in the soul is distinct from the instant at which grace is first there. But between any two instants a time intervenes. Then a time intervenes between the expulsion of guilt and the infusion of grace. But justification includes both of these. Therefore justification takes place in time and is not instantaneous.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Iustificatio impii est quaedam spiritualis illuminatio. Sed illuminatio corporalis fit in instanti, non in tempore. Cum ergo spiritualia sint simpliciora corporalibus et minus tempori subiecta, videtur quod iustificatio impii sit in instanti.
| 1. The justification of sinners is a sort of spiritual enlightenment. But corporeal enlightenment takes place instantaneously, not in time. Now since. spiritual beings are simpler than corporeal and less subject to time, it therefore seems that the justification of sinners is instantaneous.
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| Praeterea, quanto aliquod agens est potentius, tanto in minori tempore suum effectum producit. Sed actor iustificationis est Deus, qui est infinitae virtutis. Ergo iustificatio est in instanti.
| 2. The more powerful an agent is, the shorter the time in which it produces its effect. But God, who has infinite power, works justification. justification is therefore instantaneous.
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| Praeterea, in Lib. de causis dicitur, quod substantiae spiritualis, cuiusmodi est anima, et substantia et actio est in momento aeternitatis, et non in tempore.
| 3. In The Causes we read that both the substance and the action of a spiritual substance (which is the genus to which the soul belongs) is in a moment of eternity and not in time. But justification pertains to the action of the soul. It is therefore not in time.
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| Praeterea, in eodem instanti in quo est dispositio completa in materia, est et forma. Sed motus liberi arbitrii, qui in iustificatione requiritur, est dispositio completa ad gratiam. Ergo in eodem instanti in quo sunt illi motus, est gratia.
| 4. At the same instant at which the disposition is complete in the matter, the form also is present. But the motion of free choice which is required in justification is a complete disposition for grace. Therefore, at the same instant at which those motions are given, grace is present.
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| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod iustificatio impii est in instanti.
| The justification of sinners is instantaneous.
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| Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod quando dicitur aliqua mutatio esse in instanti, non intelligitur quod duo termini eius sint in instanti: hoc enim est impossibile, cum omnis mutatio sit inter terminos oppositos, per se loquendo; sed intelligitur quod transitus de uno termino in alium est in instanti: quod quidem in aliquibus oppositis contingit, in aliquibus non contingit.
| For the clarification of this matter it should be noted that, when any change is said to be instantaneous, we do not mean that its two terms exist at the same instant; for this is impossible, since every change is between terms that are, properly speaking, opposed. We mean rather that the passage from one term to the other is instantaneous. That does in fact happen in some opposites, though in others it does not.
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| Quando enim inter terminos motus est accipere aliquod medium, oportet quod transitus de uno termino in alium sit successivus, quia medium est in quod primo mutatur quod movetur continue, quam in ultimum; ut patet per philosophum in V Phys.: et intelligo medium per qualemcumque distantiam ab extremis, sive sit distantia in situ, sicut in motu locali; sive sit distantia secundum rationem quantitatis, sicut in motu augmenti et diminutionis; sive secundum rationem formae, ut in alteratione; et hoc, sive illud medium sit alterius speciei, sicut pallidum inter album et nigrum; sive eiusdem speciei, sicut minus calidum inter magis calidum et frigidum.
| Whenever any mean must be recognized between the terms of a motion, the passage from one term to the other must be successive, because the thing which is undergoing continuous motion is first changed to the mean before it is changed to the final term, as the Philosopher makes clear. And by “mean” I refer to any sort of distance from the extremes, whether it be distance in situation, as is had in local motion; or distance in the line of quantity, as is had in increase and decrease; or in the line of form, as in alteration; and this whether the mean is of another species, as gray is between white and black, or of the same species, as the less warm is between the more warm and cold.
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| Quando vero inter duos terminos mutationis vel motus non potest esse medium aliquo praedictorum modorum, tunc transitus de uno termino in alterum non est in tempore, sed in instanti. Hoc autem est quando duo termini motus vel mutationis sunt affirmatio et negatio, sive privatio et forma. Nam inter affirmationem et negationem nullo modo est medium; neque inter privationem et formam circa proprium susceptibile. Et hoc dico per modum quo aliquid alterius speciei est medium inter extrema.
| Whenever, on the other hand, there cannot be a mean between the two terms of a motion or change in any of the ways mentioned, then the passage from one term to the other is not in time but is instantaneous. This occurs whenever the terms of motion or change are affirmation and negation or privation and form. For between affirmation and negation there is no mean in any sense, nor between privation and form with regard to its proper subject. I am speaking here in the sense in which there is a mean of another species between the extremes.
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| Sed per modum quo aliquid est medium secundum intensionem et remissionem, etsi non possit esse medium per se, potest tamen esse medium per accidens. Nam negatio sive privatio, per se loquendo, non intenditur neque remittitur; sed per accidens secundum suam causam potest considerari aliqua eius intensio vel remissio: ut dicatur magis esse caecus ille qui habet oculum erutum, quam ille qui habet aliquem pannum in oculo, ex eo quod causa caecitatis est efficacior.
| But in the sense in which there is a mean in intensity and slackness, even though there cannot be a mean essentially, there nevertheless can be a mean accidentally. For essentially negation or privation is neither intensified nor abated; but accidentally some intensification or abatement of it can be viewed on the basis of its cause. Thus a man who has his eye gouged out may be said to be more blind than one who has a bandage over his eye, because the cause of blindness is more efficacious.
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| Sic igitur accipiendo huiusmodi mutationes secundum proprios terminos, per se loquendo, oportet eas esse instantaneas, et non in tempore; sicut est illuminatio, generatio et corruptio, et alia huiusmodi. Accipiendo vero eas quantum ad causas suorum terminorum, potest in eis considerari successio; sicut patet in illuminatione. Nam quamvis aer subito transeat de tenebris ad lumen, tamen causa tenebrositatis successive tollitur, scilicet absentia solis, qui per motum localem successive fit praesens: et sic illuminatio est terminus motus localis, et est indivisibilis, sicut et quilibet terminus continui.
| If, then, we take such changes according to their proper terms and speak essentially, they must be instantaneous and not in time. Examples are illumination, coming to be and perishing, and the like. But if we take them from the point of view of the causes of their terms, we can consider succession in them. This is evident in illumination; for, although the air passes straightway from darkness to light, the cause of darkness is successively removed, that is, the absence of the sun, since by means of local motion the sun becomes successively present. In this way illumination is the term of a local motion and is indivisible, like any term of a continuum.
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| Dico igitur, quod extrema iustificationis sunt gratia et privatio gratiae, inter quae non cadit medium circa proprium susceptibile: unde oportet quod transitus de uno in alterum sit in instanti, quamvis causa huius privationis successive tollatur; vel secundum quod homo cogitando disponit se ad gratiam, vel saltem secundum quod tempus praeterit postquam Deus se gratiam daturum praeordinavit; et sic gratiae infusio fit in instanti. Et quia expulsio culpae est formalis effectus gratiae infusae, inde est quod tota iustificatio impii in instanti est. Nam forma et dispositio ad formam completam et abiectio alterius formae, totum est in instanti.
| I say, then, that the extremes of justification are grace and the privation of grace, between which no mean as regards their proper subject intervenes. The passage from the one to the other must accordingly be instantaneous, although the cause of such a privation is removed successively, either inasmuch as by taking thought the man disposes himself for grace, or at least inasmuch as a time passes after which God has preordained that He will give grace. Thus the infusion of grace takes place instantaneously. And because the driving out of guilt is the formal effect of the grace infused, hence it is that the whole justification of sinners is instantaneous; for the form and the disposition for the form and the loss of the other form are all instantaneous.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quando duo sunt motus omnino disparati, non possunt esse simul in eadem potentia, nisi unum sit ratio alterius. Tunc enim simul esse possunt, quia quodammodo sunt unus motus; sicut cum aliquis appetit aliquid propter finem, simul appetit finem et id quod est ad finem; et similiter cum aliquis fugit illud quod est fini repugnans, simul appetit finem et fugit contrarium. Et similiter voluntas simul movetur in Deum et odit peccatum, quia est contra Deum.
| 1. When the two motions are altogether different, they cannot coexist in the same power. But if one is the reason for the other, then they can coexist, because they are in some sense a single motion. When, for example, a person desires something for the sake of an end, he at the same time desires the end and the means. In the same way when someone flees from what is repugnant to the end, he at the same time desires the end and flees from the contrary. It is in this way that the will at the same time is moved toward God and hates sin as contrary to God.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod huiusmodi motus liberi arbitrii ad voluntatem pertinent, non ad irascibilem et concupiscibilem; et hoc ideo quia obiectum eorum est aliquid intelligibile, non aliquid sensibile. Inveniuntur tamen aliquando attribui irascibili et concupiscibili, in quantum voluntas ipsa dicitur irascibilis et concupiscibilis propter similitudinem actus. Et tunc contritio potest attribui et concupiscibili in quantum homo odit peccatum, et irascibili in quantum contra peccatum irascitur, vindictam de eo sumere proponens.
| 2. Such motions of free choice pertain to the will, not to the irascible and the concupiscible power. This is because their object is something intelligible, not something sensible. Yet they are sometimes found to be attributed to the irascible and the concupiscible powers in so far as the will itself is sometimes called irascible or concupiscible because of the resemblance of its act to theirs. In this case contrition can be attributed both to the concupiscible power inasmuch as the man hates sin, and to the irascible inasmuch as he is worked up against the sin, purposing within himself revenge for it.
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| Et per hoc patet solutio ad tertium, ad quartum et ad quintum.
| 3-5. The answers to these are clear from the above.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod voluntas non movetur simul ad contraria prosequenda: sed simul potest moveri ad unum fugiendum et aliud prosequendum et praecipue si prosecutio unius sit ratio fugae alterius.
| 6. The will is not moved at the same time to pursue contraries, but it can be moved at the same time to flee from one thing and to pursue another, particularly if the pursuit of the one is the reason for the flight from the other.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod gratia datur digno, non ita quod aliquis sit sufficienter dignus antequam gratiam habeat; sed quia ex hoc ipso quod datur, facit hominem dignum: unde simul est dignus gratia et gratiam habens.
| 7. Grace is given to one worthy of it, not in the sense that anyone is sufficiently worthy before he has grace, but in the sense that grace by being given makes the man worthy. Hence he is at the same time worthy of grace and in possession of grace.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod ad hoc quod aliqua forma successive recipiatur in subiecto, nihil operatur intensio vel remissio eius in subiecto, sed intensio vel remissio formae contrariae vel oppositi termini. Privatio autem gratiae non suscipit magis vel minus nisi per accidens ratione suae causae, ut iam dictum est, in corp. art.: et ideo non oportet quod gratia successive recipiatur in subiecto. Si autem in subiecto remitteretur, posset hoc aliquid conferre ad hoc quod successive gratia abiiceretur. Sed gratia non remittitur in eodem subiecto: et ideo nec successive abiicitur, propter hoc quod ipsa non remittitur; nec successive inducitur, propter hoc quod eius privatio non remittitur.
| 8. It is not the intensification or abatement of the form itself in a subject, but rather the intensification or abatement of the contrary form or opposite term, which brings about the successive reception of the form in its subject. Now the privation of grace is not susceptible of more or less except accidentally, by reason of its cause, as has already been explained. Consequently it is not necessary for grace to be received successively in its subject. If, however, it did abate in the subject, this could have some influence upon the successive loss of grace; but grace does not abate in the same subject. Therefore it is not successively lost, because it does not abate itself; nor is it successively introduced, because its privation does not abate.
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| Ad nonum patet solutio ex praedictis: nam non ideo dicitur mutatio esse in instanti, quia duo termini eius sint in eodem instanti, ut dictum est in corp. articuli.
| 9. The answer is clear from what has been said; for a change is not said to be instantaneous because the two terms coexist at the same instant, as has been explained.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod fieri alicuius rei permanentis potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo proprie; et sic dicitur res fieri quamdiu durat motus, cuius terminus est rei generatio: et sic quod fit non est in permanentibus; sed fieri est rei per successionem, secundum quod philosophus dicit in VI Phys.: quod fit, fiebat et fiet. Alio modo dicitur fieri improprie, ut scilicet dicatur aliquid fieri in illo instanti in quo primo factum est; et hoc ideo quia illud instans, in quantum est terminus prioris temporis in quo fiebat, usurpat sibi hoc quod priori tempori debetur. Et sic non est verum quod id quod fit non est; sed quod nunc primo est, et ante hoc non erat; et sic est intelligendum quod in his quae fiunt subito, simul est fieri et factum esse.
| 10. The coming to be of a permanent being can be taken in two senses: (1) Properly. In this sense a thing is said to be coming to be so long as the motion, whose term is the coming of the thing into existence, continues. So what comes to be is not in permanent beings, but the becoming of the thing takes place through a succession. It is in this sense that the Philosopher says that what is in process of becoming was becoming and will become. (2) Improperly, so that a thing is said to come to be at the instant at which it first has become, and this because that instant, inasmuch as it is the term of the previous time in which the thing was becoming, appropriates to itself what rightly belongs to the previous time. In this sense it is not true that what is in process of becoming is not, but rather that it is now for the first time and was not before this. This is the meaning of the statement that in things that become all at once, the becoming and the having become are simultaneous.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod motus non accipitur hic secundum quod est exitus de potentia in actum, sic enim tempore mensuratur; sed accipitur motus liberi arbitrii pro ipsa eius operatione, quae est actus perfecti, ut dicitur in III de anima; et ita potest esse in instanti, sicut perfectum est in instanti.
| 11. Motion is not taken in the present context as a passage from potency to act (in which sense it is measured by time); but the motion of free choice is taken for its very operation, and this is an “act of a perfect being,” as is said in The Soul. It can accordingly be instantaneous, just as to be perfect is also instantaneous.
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| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod in illo instanti quo homo iustificatur, non requiritur quod sit contritio specialiter de singulis peccatis, sed generaliter de omnibus, contritione speciali de singulis peccatis praecedente vel subsequente.
| 12. At the instant at which a man is justified it is not: required that he have contrition in particular for each one of his sins, but in general for all of them, with particular contrition for each sin either preceding or following.
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| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod postquam homo in culpam incidit, non potest esse medium inter gratiam et culpam, quia culpa non aufertur nisi per gratiam, ut ex supradictis patet: nec gratia perditur nisi per culpam; quamvis ante culpam esset status medius inter gratiam et culpam, secundum quorumdam opinionem.
| 13. After a man has fallen into sin there cannot be any mean between grace and guilt, because guilt is not taken away except through grace, as is evident from what was said above. Nor is grace destroyed except through guilt, though before guilt there would be a mean between grace and guilt in the opinion of some.
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| Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod non est accipere ultimum instans in quo culpa fuit, sed ultimum tempus, ut supra dictum est.
| 14. We should not take the last instant at which there was guilt, but the last time, as was said above.”
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