ARTICLE I
This question treats predestination.
In the first article we ask:
Does predestination belong to knowledge or will?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 23, aa. 1, 3-4; I Sent., 40,1, 2; C.G., III, 163; In Rom., c. 1, lect. 3 (P.
13:7a, 82).]
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| Quaestio est de praedestinatione. Et primo quaeritur utrum pertineat ad scientiam, vel ad voluntatem
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod ad voluntatem sicut ad genus.
| It seems that it has will as its genus, for
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| Quia, ut dicit Augustinus in Lib. de praedestinatione sanctorum, praedestinatio est propositum miserendi. Sed propositum est voluntatis. Ergo et praedestinatio.
| 1. As Augustine says,’ predestination is the intention of being merciful. But intention belongs to the will. Consequently, predestination also belongs to the will.
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| Praeterea, praedestinatio videtur idem esse cum electione aeterna, de qua dicitur Ephes., I, 4: elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem, quia idem dicuntur electi et praedestinati. Sed electio, secundum philosophum in VI et X Ethicorum, magis est appetitus quam intellectus. Ergo et praedestinatio magis ad voluntatem, quam ad scientiam pertinet.
| 2. Predestination seems to be the same as the eternal election referred to in the Epistle to the Ephesians (1:4): “He chose us in him before the foundation of the world”—because the chosen are the same as the predestinated. Now, according to the Philosopher, choice belongs rather to appetite than to intellect. Hence, predestination belongs more to the will than to knowledge.
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| Sed dicebat, quod electio praedestinationem praecedit, nec est idem ei.- Sed contra, voluntas sequitur scientiam, et non praecedit. Sed electio ad voluntatem pertinet. Si igitur electio praedestinationem praecedit, praedestinatio non potest ad scientiam pertinere.
| 3. But it was said that election comes before predestination and is not the same as it.—On the contrary, will comes after knowledge, not before it. But choice pertains to the will. If, therefore, choice comes before predestination, then predestination cannot belong to knowledge.
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| Praeterea, si praedestinatio ad scientiam pertineret, idem videretur esse praedestinatio quod praescientia; et sic quicumque praesciret salutem alicuius, praedestinaret illum. Sed hoc est falsum. Prophetae enim praesciverunt salutem gentium, quam non praedestinaverunt. Ergo et cetera.
| 4. If predestination belonged to knowledge, then it would seem to be the same as foreknowledge; and thus whoever foreknew the salvation of a person would predestine him. Now, this is false; for the prophets foreknew the salvation of the Gentiles; yet they did not predestine it. Therefore.
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| Praeterea, praedestinatio causalitatem importat. Sed causalitas non est de ratione scientiae, sed magis de ratione voluntatis. Ergo praedestinatio magis pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad scientiam.
| 5. Predestination implies causality. Now, causality does not have the nature of knowledge, but rather the nature of will. Consequently, predestination belongs more to the will than to knowledge.
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| Praeterea, voluntas in hoc a potentia differt quod potentia effectus respicit tantum in futuro (non enim est potentia respectu eorum quae sunt vel fuerunt), voluntas vero respicit aequaliter effectum praesentem et futurum. Sed praedestinatio habet effectum in praesenti et in futuro; unde et ab Augustino dicitur, quod praedestinatio est praeparatio gratiae in praesenti, et gloriae in futuro. Ergo praedestinatio ad voluntatem pertinet.
| 6. The will differs from a passive potency in this respect, that the latter refers only to effects taking place in the future, for we, cannot speak of passive potency in relation to things that are or have been, whereas the will extends equally to both present and future effects. Now, predestination has both present and future effects; for, as Augustine says: “Predestination is the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future.” Therefore, it belongs to the will.
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| Praeterea, scientia non respicit res ut factas vel faciendas, sed magis ut scitas vel sciendas; praedestinatio vero respicit id quod faciendum est. Ergo praedestinatio ad scientiam non pertinet.
| 7. Knowledge is not related to things in so far as they are made or to be made but in so far as they are known or to be known. Now, predestination is related to a thing as something that must be effected. Consequently, it does not belong to knowledge.
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| Praeterea, effectus magis denominatur a causa proxima quam a causa remota, sicut homo generatus ab homine generante magis quam a sole. Sed praeparatio est a scientia et voluntate; scientia autem est causa prior et remotior quam voluntas. Ergo praeparatio magis pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad scientiam. Sed praedestinatio est praeparatio alicuius ad gloriam, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo et praedestinatio magis erit voluntatis quam scientiae.
| 8. An effect receives its name from its proximate cause rather than from its remote cause. For example, we say that a man is begotten by a man, instead of saying by the sun, which also begets him. Now, preparation is the effect of both knowledge and will, but knowledge is prior to the will and more remote than it. Consequently, preparation belongs more to the will than to knowledge. But, as Augustine says: “Predestination is the preparation of someone for glory.” Therefore, predestination pertains rather to the will than to knowledge.
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| Praeterea, quando multi motus ordinantur ad unum terminum, tota motuum coordinatio recipit nomen ultimi motus; sicut ad educendum formam substantialem de potentia materiae ordinatur primo alteratio et secundo generatio, et totum nominatur generatio. Sed ad aliquid praeparandum ordinatur primo motus scientiae et deinceps motus voluntatis. Ergo totum debet voluntati attribui; et ita praedestinatio praecipue in voluntate esse videtur.
| 9. When many motions are ordered to only one term, then the entire co-ordinated complex of motions takes the name of the last motion. For example, in the drawing out of a substantial form from the potency of matter, the following order is had: first, alteration, then generation. But the whole is called generation. Now, when something is prepared, this order is had: first, movements of knowledge, then movements of the will. Consequently, the whole should be attributed to the will; therefore, predestination seems to be especially in the will.
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| Praeterea, si unum contrariorum appropriatur alicui, reliquum maxime removetur ab eodem. Sed mala maxime appropriantur divinae praescientiae; malos enim praescitos dicimus; ergo praescientia non respicit bona. Sed praedestinatio est de bonis salutaribus tantum. Ergo praedestinatio non pertinet ad praescientiam.
| 10. If he of two contraries is appropriated to something, then the other contrary is removed from it in the highest possible degree. Now, evil is appropriated especially to God’s foreknowledge, for we say that the damned are known beforehand. Consequently, His foreknowledge does not have good things as its object. Predestination, however, is concerned only with those good things that lead to salvation. Therefore, predestination is not related to foreknowledge.
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| Praeterea, illud quod proprie dicitur, glosatione non indiget. Sed in sacra Scriptura quando cognitio respectu boni dicitur, glossatur pro approbatione, ut patet in I Cor., cap. VIII, 3: si quis diligit Deum, hic cognitus est ab eo id est approbatus: et II Tim. II, 19: novit dominus qui sunt eius, id est approbat. Ergo notitia non est proprie de bonis. Sed praedestinatio est bonorum. Ergo, et cetera.
| 11. When a word is used in its proper sense, it does not need a gloss. But; whenever the sacred Scripture speaks of knowledge of good, a gloss is added saying that this means approval. This is evident from the Gloss on the first Epistle to the Corinthians (8:3): “‘If any man love God, the same is known by him’—that is, he is approved by God”; and from the Gloss on the second Epistle to Timothy (2:19): “‘The Lord knows who are his’—that is, God approves him.” In its proper sense, therefore, knowledge is not related to good things. But predestination is related to good things. Therefore.
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| Praeterea, praeparare est motivae virtutis, quia ad opus pertinet. Sed praedestinatio est praeparatio, ut dictum est. Ergo praedestinatio ad virtutem motivam pertinet: ergo ad voluntatem, et non ad scientiam.
| 12. To prepare belongs to a power that moves, for preparation is related to some work. But, as has been said, predestination is a preparation. Therefore, it belongs to a moving power and so to the will, not to knowledge.
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| Praeterea, ratio exemplata sequitur rationem exemplarem. Sed in ratione humana, quae est exemplata a divina, videmus quod praeparatio est voluntatis, et non scientiae. Ergo et in praeparatione divina erit similiter; et sic idem quod prius.
| 13. A reasoning power modeled upon another reasoning power imitates it. Now, in the case of the human reason, which is modeled upon the divine, we see that preparation belongs to the will, not to knowledge. Consequently, divine preparation is similar; and the conclusion is the same as before.
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| Praeterea, omnia attributa divina sunt idem secundum rem, sed differentia eorum ostenditur ex diversitate effectuum. Ad illud ergo attributum reduci debet aliquid de Deo dictum, cui eius effectus appropriatur. Sed gratia et gloria sunt effectus praedestinationis, et appropriantur voluntati, sive bonitati. Ergo et praedestinatio ad voluntatem pertinet, non ad scientiam.
| 14. Although the divine attributes are one reality, the difference between them is manifested in the difference in their effects. Consequently, something said of God should be reduced to that attribute to which this effect is appropriated. Now, grace and glory are the effects of predestination, and they are appropriated either to His will or His goodness. Therefore, predestination also belongs to His will, not to His knowledge.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod dicit Glossa Rom. VIII, 29 super illud quos praescivit, hos et praedestinavit: praedestinatio, inquit, est praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, et cetera.
| 1. The Gloss on the Epistle to the Romans (8:29), “For whom he foreknew, he also predestinates,” says: “Predestination is God’s foreknowledge and preparation of benefits...”
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| Praeterea, omne praedestinatum est scitum, sed non convertitur. Ergo praedestinatum est in genere sciti. Ergo et praedestinatio est in genere scientiae.
| 2. Whatever is predestined is known, but the opposite is not true. Consequently, what is predestined belongs to the class of things that are known; hence, it is included in the genus of knowledge.
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| Praeterea, magis est ponendum unumquodque in genere eius quod convenit ei semper, quam in genere eius quod non convenit ei semper. Sed praedestinationi semper convenit id quod est ex parte scientiae: semper enim praedestinationem praescientia concomitatur, non autem semper concomitatur eam appositio gratiae, quae est per voluntatem: quia praedestinatio est aeterna, appositio autem gratiae est temporalis. Ergo praedestinatio magis debet poni in genere scientiae quam voluntatis.
| 3. A thing should be placed in the genus to which it always belongs, rather than in a genus which is not always proper to it. Now, the element of knowledge always belongs to predestination, because foreknowledge always accompanies it. The granting of grace, however, which takes place through the will, does not always accompany predestination, since predestination is eternal while the bestowal of grace takes place in time. Predestination, therefore, should be placed in the genus of knowledge rather than in that of will acts.
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| Praeterea, habitus cognitivi et operativi inter intellectuales virtutes a philosopho computantur, qui ad rationem pertinent magis quam ad appetitum, ut patet de prudentia et arte in VI Ethic. Sed praedestinatio importat principium cognitivum et operativum quia est et praescientia et praeparatio, ut ex definitione inducta patet. Ergo praedestinatio magis pertinet ad cognitionem quam ad voluntatem.
| 4. The Philosopher places habits of knowing and doing among the intellectual virtues, for they belong more to reason than to appetite. This is clearly what he does in the case of art and prudence, as can be seen in his Ethics.” Now, predestination implies a principle of doing and of knowing, since, as is evident from the definition given, predestination is both foreknowledge and preparation. Predestination, therefore, belongs more to knowledge than it does to the will.
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| Praeterea, contraria sunt in eodem genere. Sed praedestinationi est contraria reprobatio. Cum ergo reprobatio sit in genere scientiae, quia Deus praescit malitiam reproborum et non facit eam, videtur quod etiam praedestinatio sit in genere scientiae.
| 5. Contraries belong to the same genus. But predestination is the contrary of reprobation. Now, since reprobation belongs to the genus of knowledge, because God foreknows the malice of the damned but does not cause it, it seems that predestination also belongs to the genus of knowledge.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod destinatio, unde nomen praedestinationis accipitur, importat directionem alicuius in finem: unde aliquis dicitur nuntium destinare qui eum dirigit ad aliquid faciendum. Et quia id quod proponimus, ad executionem dirigimus, sicut ad finem; ideo id quod proponimus, dicimur destinare, secundum illud II Machab., cap. VI, 20, de Eleazaro, quod destinavit in corde suo non admittere illicita propter vitae amorem.
| Destination (from which predestination is derived) implies the direction of something to an end. For this reason, one is said to destine a messenger if he directs him to do something. And because we direct our decisions to execution as to an end, we are said to destine what we decide. For example, Eleazar (2 Maccabees 6:19) is said to have “destined” in his heart not to do “any unlawful things for the love of life.”
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| Sed haec praepositio prae, quae adiungitur, adiungit ordinem ad futurum; unde cum destinare non sit nisi eius quod est, praedestinare potest esse etiam eius quod non est: et quantum ad haec duo praedestinatio sub providentia collocatur ut pars eius. Dictum est enim in praecedenti quaestione quod ad providentiam pertinet directio in finem: providentia etiam a Tullio ponitur respectu futuri; et a quibusdam definitur, quod providentia est praesens notio futurum pertractans eventum.
| Now, the particle pre-, when joined to a word, adds a relation to the future. Consequently, to destine refers to what is present, while to predestine can also refer to what is future. For two reasons, therefore, predestination is placed under providence as one of its parts, namely, because direction to an end, as pointed out in the preceding question,” pertains to providence, and because providence—even according to Cicero—includes a relation to the future. In fact, some define providence by saying that it is present knowledge bearing upon future event.
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| Sed tamen praedestinatio quantum ad duo a providentia differt: providentia enim dicit universaliter ordinationem in finem, et ideo se extendit ad omnia quae a Deo in finem aliquem ordinantur, sive rationalia sive irrationalia, sive bona sive mala; sed praedestinatio respicit tantum illum finem qui est possibilis rationali creaturae, utpote gloriam; et ideo praedestinatio non est nisi hominum, et respectu horum quae pertinent ad salutem. Differt etiam alio modo. In qualibet enim ordinatione ad finem est duo considerare: scilicet ipsum ordinem, et exitum vel eventum ordinis: non enim omnia quae ad finem ordinantur, finem consequuntur. Providentia ergo, ordinem in finem respicit tantum, unde per Dei providentiam homines omnes ad beatitudinem ordinantur. Sed praedestinatio respicit etiam exitum vel eventum ordinis, unde non est nisi eorum qui gloriam consequentur. Sicut igitur se habet providentia ad impositionem ordinis, ita se habet praedestinatio ad ordinis exitum vel eventum: quod enim aliqui finem gloriae consequantur, non est principaliter ex propriis viribus, sed ex auxilio gratiae divinitus dato.
| On the other hand, predestination differs from providence in two respects. Providence means a general ordering to an end. Consequently, it extends to all things, rational or irrational, good or bad, that have been ordained by God to an end. Predestination, however, is concerned only with that end which is possible for a rational creature, namely, his eternal glory. Consequently, it concerns only men, and only with reference to those things that are related to salvation. Moreover, predestination differs from providence in a second respect. In any ordering to an end, two things must be considered: the ordering itself, and the outcome or result of the ordering, for not everything that is ordered to an end reaches that end. Providence, therefore, is concerned only with the ordering to the end. Consequently, by God’s providence, all men are ordained to beatitude. But predestination is also concerned with the outcome or result of this ordering, and, therefore, it is related only to those who will attain heavenly glory. Hence, providence, is related to the initial establishment of an order, and predestination is related to its outcome or result; for the fact that some attain the end that is eternal glory is not due primarily to their own power but to the help of grace given by God.
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| Unde, sicut de providentia, supra dictum est, quod consistit in actu rationis, sicut et prudentia cuius est pars, eo quod solius rationis est dirigere vel ordinare; ita etiam et praedestinatio in actu rationis consistit dirigentis vel ordinantis in finem. Sed ad directionem in finem praeexigitur voluntas finis: nullus enim aliquid in finem ordinat quem non vult: unde etiam et perfecta prudentiae electio non potest esse nisi in eo qui habet virtutem moralem, secundum philosophum in VI Ethicorum: per virtutem enim moralem affectus alicuius in fine stabilitur, ad quem prudentia ordinat. Finis autem in quem praedestinatio dirigit, non est universaliter consideratus, sed secundum comparationem eius ad illum qui finem ipsum consequitur, quem oportet esse distinctum apud dirigentem ab his qui finem illum non consequentur: et ideo praedestinatio praesupponit dilectionem, per quam Deus vult salutem alicuius. Ut sicut prudens non ordinat in finem nisi inquantum est temperatus vel iustus, ita Deus non praedestinat nisi inquantum est diligens.
| Therefore, just as we said above that providence consists in an act of reason, like prudence, of which it is a part, because it belongs to reason alone to direct and to ordain, so now we say that predestination also consists in an act of reason, directing or ordering to an end. However, the willing of an end is required before there can be direction to an end, because no one directs anything to an end which he does not will. This is why the Philosopher says that a perfect prudential choice can be made only by a man of good moral character, because moral habits strengthen one’s affections for the end which prudence dictates. Now, the one who predestines does not consider in a general way the end to which his predestination directs him; he considers it, rather, according to the relation it has to one who attains it, and such a person must be distinct in the mind of the one predestining from those persons who will not achieve this end. Consequently, predestination presupposes a love by which God wills the salvation of a person. Hence, just as a prudent man directs to an end only in so far as he is temperate or just, so God predestines only in so far as He loves.
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| Praeexigitur etiam et electio, per quam ille qui in finem infallibiliter dirigitur ab aliis separatur qui non hoc modo in finem ordinantur. Haec autem separatio non est propter aliquam diversitatem inventam in his qui separantur quae posset ad amorem incitare: quia cum nondum nati essent aut aliquid boni egissent aut mali, dictum est: Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui; ut dicitur Roman., cap. IX, 11-13. Et ideo praedestinatio praesupponit electionem et dilectionem; electio vero dilectionem. Ad praedestinationem vero duo sequuntur: scilicet consecutio finis, quod est glorificatio, et collatio auxilii ad consequendum finem, quod est appositio gratiae, quae ad vocationem pertinet; unde et praedestinationi duo effectus assignantur, scilicet gratia et gloria.
| Another prerequisite of predestination is the choice by which he who is directed to the end infallibly is separated from others who are not ordained to it in the same manner. This separation, however, is not on account of any difference, found in the predestined, which could arouse God’s love; for, as we read in the Epistle to the Romans (9:11-13): “When the children were not yet born nor had done any good or evil... it was said... ‘Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated.’” Consequently, predestination presupposes election and love, and election presupposes love. Again, two things follow upon predestination: the attainment of the end, which is glory, and the granting of help to attain this end, namely, the bestowal of the grace that pertains to the call to be among the predestined. Predestination, therefore, has two effects: grace and glory.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in actibus animae ita est quod praecedens actus includitur quodammodo virtute in sequenti: et quia praedestinatio praesupponit dilectionem, quae est actus voluntatis, ideo in ratione praedestinationis aliquid includitur ad voluntatem pertinens, et propter hoc, propositum, et alia ad voluntatem pertinentia, in definitione praedestinationis quandoque ponuntur.
| 1. The acts of the soul are such that a preceding act in some way is virtually contained in the act that follows. Since predestination presupposes love, an act of the will, the notion of predestination includes something that belongs to the will. For this reason, intention and other elements belonging to the will are sometimes put into its definition.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod praedestinatio non est idem electioni, sed praesupponit eam, ut dictum est; et ideo est quod idem sunt praedestinati et electi.
| 2.Predestination is not the same as election, but, as we said above, it presupposes election. This is why the predestined are the same as the elect.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum electio sit voluntatis et directio rationis, semper directio electionem praecedit, si referantur ad idem; sed si ad diversa, tunc non est inconveniens quod electio praecedat praedestinationem, quae directionis rationem importat: electio enim, prout hic accipitur, pertinet ad ipsum qui in finem dirigitur: prius autem est accipere illum qui dirigitur in finem, quam ipsum in finem dirigere; et ideo electio in proposito praedestinationem praecedit.
| 3. Since choice belongs to the will, and direction to the intellect, direction always precedes election if both have the same object. But if they have different objects, then there is no inconsistency in election’s coming before predestination, which implies the existence of direction. As election is taken here, however, it pertains to one who is directed to an end; and the acceptance of one who is to be directed toward an end comes before the direction itself. In the case stated, therefore, election precedes predestination.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod praedestinatio, quamvis ponatur in genere scientiae, tamen aliquid supra scientiam et supra praescientiam addit: scilicet directionem vel ordinationem in finem, sicut etiam prudentia supra cognitionem; unde, sicut non omnis cognoscens quid agendum sit, est prudens, ita nec omnis praesciens est praedestinans.
| 4. Even though predestination is placed under the genus of knowledge, it adds something to knowledge and foreknowledge, namely, direction or an order to an end. In this respect, it resembles prudence, which also adds something to the notion of knowledge. Consequently, just as every person who knows what to do is not thereby prudent, so also not every one who has foreknowledge thereby predestines.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis causalitas non sit de ratione scientiae inquantum huiusmodi, est tamen de ratione scientiae inquantum est dirigens et ordinans in finem; quod non est voluntatis, sed rationis tantum; sicut etiam intelligere est de ratione animalis rationalis, non inquantum est animal, sed inquantum est rationale.
| 5. Even though causality does not belong to the notion of knowledge as such, it belongs to that knowledge which directs and orders to an end; and direction of this kind is not proper to the will but to the intellect alone. Similarly, understanding does not belong to the nature of a rational animal in so far as it is animal but only in so far as it is rational.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod sicut voluntas respicit effectum praesentem et futurum, ita scientia; unde quantum ad hoc non magis potest probari quod praedestinatio ad unum eorum pertineat quam ad alterum. Sed tamen praedestinatio, proprie loquendo, non respicit nisi futurum, quod ex praepositione designatur, quae importat ordinem ad futurum; nec est idem dicere habere effectum in praesenti, et habere effectum praesentem, quia in praesenti esse dicitur quidquid pertinet ad statum huius vitae, sive sit praesens, sive praeteritum, sive futurum.
| 6. Knowledge is related to both present and future effects, just as the will is. On this basis, therefore, it cannot be proved that predestination belongs more to one than to the other. Yet predestination, properly speaking, is related only to the future-as the prefix pre- indicates, because it implies an ordering to the future. Nor is it the same to speak of having an effect in the present and of having a present effect, because whatever pertains to the state of this life—whether it be present, past, or future—is said to be in the present.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis scientia inquantum est scientia, non respiciat facienda, tamen scientia practica facienda respicit; et ad talem scientiam praedestinatio reducitur.
| 7. Even though knowledge as knowledge is not related to things in so far as they are to be made, practical knowledge is related to things under this aspect, and predestination is reduced to this type of knowledge.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod praeparatio proprie importat dispositionem potentiae ad actum. Est autem duplex potentia: scilicet activa et passiva: et ideo duplex est praeparatio: una patientis, secundum quem modum materia dicitur praeparari ad formam; alia agentis, secundum quam aliquis dicitur se praeparare ad aliquid agendum; et talem praeparationem praedestinatio importat, quae nihil aliud in Deo ponere potest quam ipsam ordinationem alicuius in finem. Ordinationis autem principium proximum est ratio, sed remotum voluntas, ut ex dictis patet; et ideo secundum rationem inductam, praedestinatio principalius rationi quam voluntati attribuitur.
| 8. In its proper sense, preparation implies a disposing of a potency for act. There are, however, two kinds of potencies: active and passive; consequently, there are two kinds of preparations, There is a preparation of the recipient, which we speak of when we say that matter is prepared for a form. Then there is a preparation of the agent, which we speak of when we say that someone is preparing himself in order to do something. It is this latter kind of preparation that predestination implies; for it asserts simply this, that in God there exists the ordering of some person to an end. Now, the proximate principle of ordering is reason, and, as is clear from above, its remote principle is will. Consequently, for the reason given in the difficulty, predestination is attributed more to reason than to will.
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| Similiter autem dicendum est ad nonum.
| 9. A similar answer should be given to the ninth difficulty.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod mala appropriantur praescientiae, non quia praescientia sit magis proprie de malis quam de bonis, sed quia bona habent aliquid aliud respondens in Deo quam praescientiam, mala vero non; sicut etiam convertibile non indicans substantiam appropriat sibi nomen proprii, quod etiam aeque proprie definitioni convenit, propter hoc quod definitio aliquid dignitatis addit.
| 10. Evil things are ascribed as proper to foreknowledge, not because they are more proper objects of foreknowledge than good things, but because good things in God imply something more than mere foreknowledge, while evil things have no such added implication. Similarly, a convertible term which does not signify an essence appropriates to itself the name of property, which belongs just as properly to the definition, because the definition adds a certain priority.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod glossatio non semper significat improprietatem, sed est quandoque necessaria ad specificandum quod generaliter dicitur; et hoc modo glossatur notitia per approbationem.
| 11. A gloss does not always mean that a word has not been used in its proper sense. Sometimes a gloss is necessary merely to make specific what has been stated in a general way. This is why the gloss explains knowledge as meaning knowledge of approval.
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| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod praeparare vel ordinare est motivae tantum; sed motiva non solum est voluntas, sed etiam ratio practica, ut patet in III de anima.
| 12. To prepare or direct belongs only to powers that move. But to move is not peculiar to the will. As is clear from The Soul, this is also a property of the practical intellect.
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| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod etiam in ratione humana ita est, quod praeparatio, secundum quod importat ordinationem vel directionem in finem, est actus proprius rationis, et non voluntatis.
| 13. In so far as preparation made even in a human reason implies an ordering or directing to an end, it is an act proper to the intellect, not to the will.
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| Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod in attributo divino non solum est considerandus effectus, sed respectus eius ad effectum: quia idem est effectus scientiae et potentiae et voluntatis, sed non idem respectus ad illum effectum per illa tria nomina importatur. Respectus autem quem praedestinatio importat ad effectum suum, cum respectu scientiae, inquantum est dirigens, magis convenit quam cum respectu potentiae et voluntatis; et ideo praedestinatio ad scientiam reducitur.
| 14. When treating a divine attribute, we should not consider only its effect but also its relation to the effect; for, while the effects of knowledge, power, and will are the same, still, as the names of these attributes imply, their relations to them are not. Now, in so far as predestination is directive, the relation implied by predestination to its effect is more logically said to be a relation of knowledge than a relation of power or will. Consequently, predestination is reduced to a type of knowledge.
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| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
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| Alia concedimus: quamvis ad secundum posset dici, quod non omne quod est in plus, sit genus, quia potest accidentaliter praedicari.
| 1.-2.-4. We concede the other arguments presented here. One might reply to the second, however, by pointing out that not everything that is found in more things is thereby a genus, for it might be predicated of them as an accident.
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| Ad tertium etiam posset dici, quod quamvis dare gratiam non semper concomitetur praedestinationem, tamen velle dare semper concomitatur.
| 3. Even though the granting of grace does not always accompany predestination, the will to grant grace always does.
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| Ad quintum etiam posset dici, quod reprobatio directe non opponitur praedestinationi, sed electioni, quia qui eligit, alterum accipit et alterum reiicit, quod dicitur reprobare; unde etiam reprobatio ex ratione sui nominis magis pertinet ad voluntatem: est enim reprobare quasi refutare; nisi forte dicatur reprobare idem quod iudicare indignum quod admittatur. Sed pro tanto reprobatio ad praescientiam dicitur in Deo pertinere, quia nihil positive ex parte voluntatis est in Deo respectu mali culpae; non enim vult culpam, sicut vult gratiam. Et tamen etiam reprobatio dicitur praeparatio quantum ad poenam, quam etiam Deus vult voluntate consequenti, sed non antecedenti.
| 5. Reprobation is directly opposed, not to predestination, but to election, for He who chooses accepts one and rejects another and this is called reprobation. Consequently, as the word itself shows, reprobation pertains more to the will. For to reprobate is, as it were, to reject—except that it might be said that to reprobate means the same as to judge unworthy of admittance. However, reprobation is said to belong to God’s foreknowledge for this reason, that there is nothing positive on the part of His will that has any relation to sin. He does not will sin as He wills grace. Yet reprobation is said to be a preparation of the punishment which God wills consequent to sin—not antecedent to it.
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ARTICLE II
In the second article we ask:
Is foreknowledge of merits the cause of or reason for predestination?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 19, 5; 2 3, aa. 2, 4-5; I Sent., 40, 1, 1; 41, 3; C.G., III,163; In Ephes., c. 1, lects. 1, 4 (P. 13:445b, 45 1 b); In Evang. Johannis, c. 15, lect. 3 (P. 10:568b) ; In Rom., c. 1, lect. 3; c. 8, lect. 6; c. 9, lect. 3 (P. 13:8a, 86b, 96a, 972).]
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| Secundo quaeritur utrum praescientia meritorum sit causa vel ratio praedestinationis
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that it is, for
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| Quia Rom., IX 15, super illud, miserebor cui misereor etc., dicit Glossa Ambrosii: misericordiam illi dabo, quem praescio post errorem toto corde reversurum ad me. Hoc est dare illi cui dandum est et non dare illi cui dandum non est; ut eum vocet quem sciat obedire, illum vero non quem sciat non obedire. Sed obedire et toto corde ad dominum reverti ad meritum pertinet; contraria vero ad demeritum. Ergo praescientia meriti vel demeriti est causa quare Deus proponat alicui misericordiam facere vel aliquem a misericordia excludere; quod est praedestinare vel reprobare.
| 1. In his gloss on the verse in Romans (9:15), “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy,” Ambrose writes as follows: “I will give mercy to him who I know will return with his whole heart to Me after his error. This is to give mercy to him to whom it should be given, and not to give it to one to whom it should not. Consequently, He calls him who He knows will obey, not him who He knows will disobey.”’ Now, to obey and to return to God with all one’s heart are meritorious; the opposite actions are demeritorious. Foreknowledge of merit or of demerit is therefore the cause of God’s intention of being merciful to some and of excluding others from His mercy. This is equivalent to predestination and reprobation.
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| Praeterea, praedestinatio includit in se voluntatem divinam salutis humanae; nec potest dici quod includat solam voluntatem antecedentem, quia hac voluntate Deus vult omnes salvos fieri, ut dicitur I Timoth., II, 4, et sic sequeretur quod omnes homines essent praedestinati, relinquitur igitur quod includat voluntatem consequentem. Sed voluntas consequens, ut dicit Damascenus, est ex nostra causa, scilicet inquantum nos diversimode nos habemus ad merendam salutem vel damnationem. Ergo merita nostra praescita a Deo, sunt causa praedestinationis.
| 2. Predestination includes God’s will to save men. It cannot be said that it includes only His antecedent will, because, according to this will—as is said in the first Epistle to Timothy (2:4): “God wills all men to be saved”; hence, it would follow that all are predestined. It remains, therefore, that predestination includes only His consequent will. Now, “We are the cause,” as Damascene says, “of God’s consequent will,” according as we merit salvation or deserve damnation. Our merits foreknown by God are therefore the cause of predestination.
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| Praeterea, praedestinatio principaliter dicitur propositum divinum de salute humana. Sed salutis humanae causa est humanum meritum; scientia etiam causa et ratio est voluntatis, quia appetibile scitum voluntatem movet. Ergo praescientia meritorum causa est praedestinationis, cum duo eorum quae praescientia continet, sint causa illorum duorum quae in praedestinatione continentur.
| 3. Predestination means primarily God’s will with respect to man’s salvation. But men’s merits are the cause of their salvation. Moreover, knowledge causes and specifies the act of the will, since that which moves the will is a desirable thing which is known. Consequently, foreknowledge of merits is a cause of predestination, since two of the things which foreknowledge contains cause the two things contained in predestination.
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| Praeterea, reprobatio et praedestinatio significant divinam essentiam, et connotant effectum; in essentia autem divina non est aliqua diversitas. Ergo tota diversitas praedestinationis et reprobationis ex effectibus procedit. Effectus autem sunt considerati, ex parte nostra. Ergo ex parte nostra causa est quod praedestinati a reprobis segregantur, quod per praedestinationem fit. Ergo idem quod prius.
| 4. Reprobation and predestination signify the divine essence while connoting an effect. There is no diversity, however, in the divine essence. Consequently, the difference between predestination and reprobation comes entirely from their effects. Now, effects are considered as caused by us. It is due to us, as cause, therefore, that the predestined are segregated from the reprobate, as takes place through predestination. Hence, the same must be said as before.
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| Praeterea, sicut sol uniformiter se habet quantum est de se, ad omnia corpora illuminabilia, quamvis non omnia possint eius lumen aequaliter participare; ita Deus se habet aequaliter ad omnia quamvis non omnia aequaliter se habeant ad participandum bonitatem ipsius, ut a sanctis et philosophis communiter dicitur. Sed propter similem habitudinem solis ad omnia corpora, sol non est causa huius diversitatis, quare aliquid sit tenebrosum et aliquid luminosum, sed diversa dispositio corporum ad recipiendum lumen ipsius. Ergo et similiter causa huius diversitatis, quod quidam perveniunt ad salutem, quidam autem damnantur, aut quod quidam praedestinantur et quidam reprobantur, non est ex parte Dei, sed nostra; et sic idem quod prius.
| 5. Taken in itself, the sun is in the same relation to all bodies that can be illuminated, even though all bodies cannot share its light equally. Similarly, God is equally related to all, even though all do not participate in His divine goodness in an equal measure, as the saints and philosophers say so often. Now, since the sun is in the same relation to all bodies, it is not the cause of the differences that we find in these bodies, namely, that some of them are dark and others bright. This is due, rather, to differences in the physical constitution of the bodies which affect their reception of sunlight. Similarly, the reason for this difference, namely, that some reach salvation and others are damned, or that some are predestined while others are rejected, is to be found not in God but in us. Consequently, our original thesis stands.
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| Praeterea, bonum est communicativum sui ipsius. Ergo summi boni est summe communicare se ipsum, secundum quod unumquodque est capax. Si ergo alicui non se communicat, hoc est quia illud non est capax eius. Sed aliquis est capax vel non capax salutis, ad quam praedestinatio ordinat, propter qualitatem meritorum. Ergo merita praescita sunt causa quare aliqui praedestinantur, et aliqui non.
| 6. Good communicates itself. It belongs to the highest good, therefore, to communicate itself in the highest possible degree, that is, as much as each and every thing is capable of receiving it. Consequently, if it does not communicate itself to something, this is because that thing is not capable of receiving it. Now, according to the quality of his merits, a person is capable or not capable of receiving that salvation which predestination ordains. Foreknowledge of merits, therefore, is the reason wily some are predestined and others are not.
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| Praeterea, Numer., III, 12: ego tuli Levitas, etc. dicit Glossa Origenis: Iacob, natu posterior, primogenitus iudicatus est; ex proposito enim cordis, quod Deo patuit priusquam in hoc mundo nascerentur, aut aliquid agerent boni vel mali, dictum est: Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui. Sed hoc pertinet ad praedestinationem Iacob, ut sancti communiter exponunt. Ergo praecognitio propositi quod habiturus erat Iacob in corde, fuit ratio praedestinationis eius; et sic idem quod prius.
| 7. Concerning the passage in Numbers (3:12), “1 took Levites...,” Origen writes: “Jacob, younger by birth, was judged to be the firstborn. Because what they intended to do was in their hearts, and this was clear to God before they were born or did any good or evil, It was said of them:‘Jacob have I loved, Esau have I hated.’” Now, this love, the saints commonly explain, pertains to Jacob’s predestination. Consequently, God’s foreknowledge of the intention Jacob was going to have in his heart was the reason for his predestination. Thus, the same must be said as was said previously.
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| Praeterea, praedestinatio non potest esse iniusta, cum universae viae domini sint misericordia et veritas; nec potest ibi alia iustitia attendi inter Deum et homines quam distributiva; non enim cadit ibi commutativa iustitia, cum Deus, qui bonorum nostrorum non eget, nihil a nobis recipiat. Iustitia autem distributiva, inaequalia nonnisi inaequalibus dat; inaequalitas autem non potest attendi inter homines nisi secundum diversitatem meritorum. Ergo, quod Deus aliquem praedestinat et alium non, ex praescientia meritorum diversorum procedit.
| 8. Predestination cannot be unjust, since the ways of the Lord are always the ways of mercy and truth. Nor can there be any form of justice between God and men other than distributive justice. There is no place for commutative justice, since God, who needs none of our good things, receives nothing from us. Now, distributive justice rewards unequally only those that are unequal. But the only cause of inequality among men is difference in merit. Therefore, the reason why God predestines one man and not another is that He foreknows their different merits.
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| Praeterea, praedestinatio praesupponit electionem, ut supra dictum est. Sed electio non potest esse rationabilis, nisi sit aliqua ratio propter quam unus ab altero discernatur: nec in electione de qua loquimur, potest alia ratio discretionis assignari nisi ex meritis. Ergo, cum electio Dei irrationabilis esse non possit, ex praevisione meritorum procedit, et per consequens etiam praedestinatio.
| 9. As mentioned previously, predestination presupposes election. But a choice cannot be reasonable unless there is some reason why one person is to be preferred to another. Now, in the election we are speaking about, there can be no reason for the preference other than merits. Therefore, since God’s choice cannot be irrational, His election and, consequently, His predestination also must be caused by His foreknowledge of merits.
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| Praeterea, Augustinus exponens illud Malach., I, 2: Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui, dicit, quod voluntas ista Dei qua unum elegit, et alium reprobavit, non potest esse iniusta; venit enim ex occultissimis meritis. Sed haec occultissima merita non possunt accipi in proposito, nisi secundum quod sunt in praescientia. Ergo praedestinatio de praescientia meritorum venit.
| 10. Commenting on that verse in the Prophecy of Malachi (1:2-3), “I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau,” Augustine says that “the will of God,” by which He chose one and rejected the other “cannot be’ unjust, for it came from their hidden merits.” But the hidden merits can enter into an intention only in so far as they are foreknown. Consequently, predestination comes from foreknowledge of merits.
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| Praeterea, sicut se habet abusus gratiae ad effectum reprobationis, ita bonus usus gratiae ad ultimum praedestinationis effectum. Sed abusus gratiae in Iuda fuit ratio reprobationis eius; secundum hoc enim reprobus effectus est quod sine gratia decessit. Quod autem tunc gratiam non habuit, non fuit causa quia Deus ei dare noluerit, sed quia ipse accipere noluit, ut Anselmus dicit, et Dionysius. Ergo et bonus gratiae usus in Petro vel alio quolibet, est causa quare ipse est electus vel praedestinatus.
| 11. As the use of grace is related to the final effect of predestination so the abuse of it is related to the effect of reprobation. Now, in the case of Judas, the abuse of grace was the reason for his reprobation, since he was made reprobate because he died without grace. Moreover, the fact that he did not have grace when he died was not due to God’s unwillingness to give it but to his unwillingness to accept it—as both Anselm and Dionysius point out. Consequently, the good use of grace by Peter or anyone else is the reason why he is elected or predestined.
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| Praeterea, unus potest alteri mereri primam gratiam; et eadem ratione videtur quod possit ei mereri gratiae continuationem usque in finem. Sed ad gratiam finalem sequitur esse praedestinatum. Ergo praedestinatio potest ex meritis provenire.
| 12. One person can merit the first grace for another. For the same reason, it seems that he could merit for that other person a continuation of grace up to the end. Now, if one gets final grace, he is predestined. Consequently, predestination can be caused by merits.
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| Praeterea, prius est a quo non convertitur consequentia, secundum philosophum; sed hoc modo se habet praescientia ad praedestinationem, quia omnia Deus praescit quae praedestinat; mala autem praescit, quae non praedestinat. Ergo praescientia est prius quam praedestinatio. Sed prius in quolibet ordine est causa posterioris. Ergo praescientia est causa praedestinationis.
| 13. According to the Philosopher: “One thing is said to be prior to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed.” But God’s foreknowledge is related to predestination in this way, because God knows beforehand what He predestines, while He foreknows the evil which He does not predestine. Foreknowledge, therefore, is antecedent to predestination. But what is prior in any order is the cause of what is posterior. Consequently, foreknowledge is the cause of predestination.
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| Praeterea, nomen praedestinationis a destinatione vel missione imponitur. Sed missionem vel destinationem cognitio praecedit: nullus enim mittit nisi quem cognoscit. Ergo et cognitio est prior praedestinatione; et ita videtur esse causa ipsius; et sic idem quod prius.
| 14. The word predestination is derived from sending or destining. But knowledge precedes sending or destining, because no one can send a person without knowing him first. Knowledge, therefore, is prior also to predestination; hence, it seems that it is the cause of predestination. Consequently, our thesis stands.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod dicitur Rom. IX, 12, in Glossa super illud: non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est, quae sic dicit: sicut non pro meritis praecedentibus illud fuisse dictum ostendit, scilicet Iacob dilexi, etc., ita nec pro meritis futuris. Et infra, super illud: numquid iniquitas est apud Deum? Nemo dicat Deum, quia futura opera praevidebat, alterum elegisse, alterum reprobasse. Et sic ut prius.
| 1. The Gloss on the following verse in the Epistle to the Romans (9:12), “Not of works, but of him who calls was it said,” reads: “He shows that the words ‘I have loved Jacob, etc.,’ were due neither to any previous nor to any future merits.” And the Gloss on the verse, “Is there injustice with God?” (9:4), says: “Let no one say that God chooses one man and rejects another because He foresaw future works.” Consequently, it does not seem that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.
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| Praeterea, gratia est effectus praedestinationis, est autem principium meriti. Ergo non potest esse quod praescientia meritorum sit praedestinationis causa.
| 2. Grace is the effect of predestination but the principle of merit. Hence, foreknowledge of merits cannot possibly be the cause of predestination.
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| Praeterea, ad Tit., III, 5, dicit apostolus: non ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus nos. Sed secundum suam misericordiam et cetera. Ergo praedestinatio salutis humanae non provenit ex praescientia meritorum.
| 3. In the Epistle to Titus (3:5), the Apostle says: “Not by the works of justice which we have done but according to his mercy...” Predestination of one’s salvation, therefore, does not arise from foreknowledge of merits.
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| Praeterea, si praescientia meritorum esset praedestinationis causa, nullus esset praedestinatus qui non esset merita habiturus. Sed aliqui sunt huiusmodi, sicut patet de pueris. Ergo praescientia meritorum non est praedestinationis causa.
| 4. If foreknowledge of merits were the cause of predestination, then no one would be predestined who did not merit. But some predestined never merit, as is evidently the case of children. Consequently, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause of predestination.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod hoc distat inter causam et effectum, quod quidquid est causa causae, oportet esse causam effectus; non autem quod est causa effectus, oportet quod sit causa causae; sicut patet quod causa prima per causam secundam producit effectum suum, et sic causa secunda causat aliquo modo effectum causae primae; cuius tamen causae causa non est.
| There is this difference between a cause and an effect—that whatever is the cause of the cause must be the cause of the effect, but the cause of the effect is not necessarily the cause of the cause. It is evident, for example, that the first cause produces its effect through a second cause, and so the second cause, in some way, causes the effect of the first cause, although it is not the cause of the first cause.
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| In praedestinatione autem est duo accipere; scilicet ipsam praedestinationem aeternam, et effectum eius temporalem duplicem, scilicet gratiam et gloriam: quorum alter habet causam meritoriam actum humanum, scilicet gloria; sed gratiae causa non potest esse humanus actus per modum meriti, sed sicut dispositio materialis quaedam, inquantum per actus praeparamur ad gratiae susceptionem. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod actus nostri, sive gratiam praecedant, sive sequantur, sint ipsius praedestinationis causa.
| Now, we must distinguish two aspects of predestination, the eternal predestination itself and its twofold temporal effect, grace and glory. Glory has human acts as its meritorious cause, but grace cannot have human acts as its meritorious cause; human acts can act only as a certain material disposition to grace, inasmuch as through these acts men are prepared for the acceptance of it. It does not follow from this, however, that our acts, whether they precede or follow grace, are the cause of predestination.
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| Ad inveniendum autem causam praedestinationis oportet accipere quod prius dictum est, scilicet quod praedestinatio est quaedam directio in finem, quam facit ratio a voluntate mota; unde secundum hoc potest aliquid esse praedestinationis causa, prout potest esse voluntatis motivum. Circa quod sciendum est, quod aliquid movet voluntatem dupliciter: uno modo per modum debiti, alio modo sine debiti ratione. Per modum autem debiti movet aliquid dupliciter voluntatem: uno modo absolute, et alio modo ex suppositione alterius. Absolute quidem ipse finis ultimus, qui est voluntatis obiectum: et hoc modo voluntatem movet, ut ab ipso divertere non possit; unde nullus homo potest non velle esse beatus, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de libero Arbit. Sed ex suppositione alterius movet secundum debitum illud sine quo finis haberi non potest. Illud autem sine quo finis haberi potest, sed facit ad bene esse finis ipsius, non movet voluntatem secundum debitum, sed est libera inclinatio voluntatis in ipsum. Sed tamen ex quo voluntas libere inclinata est iam in ipsum, inclinatur in omnia sine quibus hoc haberi non potest, per modum debiti, ex praesuppositione tamen illius quod primo volitum ponebatur: sicut rex ex sua liberalitate facit aliquem militem; sed quia non potest esse miles nisi habeat equum, efficitur debitum et necessarium ex suppositione liberalitatis praedictae quod ei det equum.
| Now, to discover the cause of predestination we must recall what we have said previously, namely, that predestination is a certain direction to an end, and this direction is brought about by reason, moved by the will. Consequently, a thing can be the cause of predestination if it can move the will. However, a thing can move the will in two ways, first, as something due, secondly, as something not due. Now, as something due, a thing can move the will in two ways, namely, either absolutely or on the supposition of something else. The ultimate end, which is the object of the will, moves absolutely; and it moves the will in such a fashion that the will cannot turn away from it. For example, as Augustine says, no man is capable of not willing to be happy. But that without which an end cannot be had is said to move as something due “on the supposition of something else.” If an end can be had, however, without a certain thing which contributes merely to the well-being of the end, then that thing does not move the will as something due. In this case, the will inclines to it freely; but when the will is already inclined to it freely, the will is thereby inclined to all the things without which it cannot be had, as to things that are due on the supposition of that which was first willed. For example, out of liberality a king makes a person a soldier; but, because one cannot be a soldier without a horse, on the supposition of the afore-mentioned liberality, giving the soldier a horse becomes due and necessary.
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| Finis autem divinae voluntatis est ipsa eius bonitas, quae non dependet ab aliquo alio; unde ad hoc quod habeatur a Deo, nullo alio indiget; et ideo voluntas eius non inclinatur ad aliquid primo faciendum per modum alicuius debiti, sed liberaliter tantum, in quantum sua bonitas in eius opere manifestatur. Sed ex quo supponitur quod Deus aliquid facere velit; per modum cuiusdam debiti ex suppositione liberalitatis ipsius sequitur quod faciat ea sine quibus res illa volita esse non potest; sicut si facere vult hominem, quod det ei rationem. Ubicumque autem occurrerit aliquid sine quo aliud a Deo volitum esse possit, hoc non procedit ab eo secundum rationem alicuius debiti, sed secundum meram liberalitatem. Perfectio autem gratiae et gloriae sunt huiusmodi bona quod sine eis natura esse potest, excedunt enim naturalis virtutis limites; unde quod Deus velit alicui dare gratiam et gloriam, hoc ex mera liberalitate procedit. In his autem quae ex liberalitate tantum procedunt causa volendi est ipsa superabundans affectio volentis ad finem, in quo attenditur perfectio bonitatis ipsius. Unde causa praedestinationis nihil est aliud quam bonitas Dei.
| Now, the end-object of the divine will is God’s own goodness, which does not depend on anything else. God needs nothing to help Him possess it. Consequently, His will is inclined first to make something freely, not something due, inasmuch as it is His goodness that is manifested in His works. But, supposing that God wishes to make something, it follows as something due from the supposition of His liberality that He make those things also without which those that He has first willed cannot be had. For example, if He wills to make a man, He must give him an intellect. But if there is anything which is not necessary for that which God wills, then that thing comes from God, not as something due, but simply as a result of His generosity. Now, the perfection of grace and glory are goods of this kind, because nature can exist without them inasmuch as they surpass the limits of natural powers. Consequently, the fact that God wishes to give grace and glory is due simply to His generosity. The reason for His willing these things that arise simply from His generosity is the overflowing love of His will for His end-object, in which the perfection of His goodness is found. The cause of predestination, therefore, is nothing other than God’s goodness.
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| Et modo etiam praedicto potest solvi quaedam controversia quae inter quosdam versabatur: quibusdam dicentibus omnia a Deo secundum simplicem voluntatem procedere, quibusdam vero asserentibus omnia procedere a Deo secundum debitum. Quarum opinionum utraque falsa est: prima enim tollit necessarium ordinem qui est inter effectus divinos ad invicem; secunda autem ponit omnia a Deo procedere secundum necessitatem naturae. Media autem via est eligenda; ut ponatur ea quae sunt a Deo primo volita, procedere ab ipso secundum simplicem voluntatem; ea vero quae ad hoc requiruntur, procedere secundum debitum, ex suppositione tamen: quod debitum non ostendit Deum esse rebus debitorem, sed suae voluntati, ad cuius expletionem debetur id quod dicitur a Deo secundum debitum procedere.
| According to these principles, a solution can be found to the controversy that has been taking place between certain groups. Some have asserted that everything comes from God’s simple pleasure, while others say that everything which comes from God is due. Both opinions are false. The former ignores the necessary order that exists between the things God causes, and the latter asserts that everything arises from God because of a natural necessity. A middle course must therefore be chosen so that it may be laid down that those things which are first willed by God come from His simple pleasure, but those that are required for this first class of things come as something due, although on the basis of a supposition. This “debt” does not, however, make God obliged to things but only to His own will; for what is said to come from God as something due is due simply in order that His will be fulfilled.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod debitus gratiae usus est quiddam ad quod divina providentia gratiam collatam ordinat: unde non potest esse quod ipse rectus gratiae usus praescitus sit causa movens ad gratiam dandum. Quod ergo Ambrosius dicit: dabo illi gratiam quem scio, ad me toto corde reversurum, non est intelligendum quasi perfecta cordis reversio sit inclinans voluntatem ad dandum gratiam, sed quia gratiam datam ad hoc ordinat ut aliquis ex accepta gratia, perfecte convertatur in Deum.
| 1. Divine providence ordains that grace bestowed be used as it should. Consequently, it is impossible for foreknowledge of this right use of grace to be the cause that moves God to give grace. The words of Ambrose, “I will give grace to him who I know will return to me with his whole heart,” cannot be understood as meaning that a perfect change of heart inclines God’s will to give grace but that His will ordains that the grace given be accepted by the person and that he be turned completely toward God.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod praedestinatio includit voluntatem consequentem, quae respicit aliquo modo id quod est ex parte nostra, non quidem sicut inclinans divinam voluntatem ad volendum, sed sicut id ad cuius productionem divina voluntas gratiam ordinat; vel etiam sicut id quod ad gratiam quodammodo disponit, et gloriam meretur.
| 2. Predestination includes God’s consequent will, which is related in some way to that which we cause on our part, not by inclining the divine will to act, but by bringing about that effect for which His will has ordained grace or by bringing about that which, in a certain sense, disposes us for grace and merits glory.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod scientia est movens voluntatem; non autem quaelibet scientia, sed scientia finis, quod est obiectum movens voluntatem; et ideo ex cognitione suae bonitatis procedit quod Deus suam bonitatem amet; et ex hoc procedit quod eam in alios diffundere velit; non autem propter hoc sequitur quod meritorum scientia sit causa voluntatis, secundum quod in praedestinatione includitur.
| 3. While it is true that knowledge moves the will, not every kind of knowledge does this but only knowledge of an end; and an end is an object moving the will. Consequently, it is because of His knowledge of His own goodness that God loves it; and, from this love, He wishes to pour out His goodness upon others. But it does not therefore follow that knowledge of merits is the cause of His will in so far as it is included in predestination.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis secundum diversitatem effectuum sumatur diversa ratio attributorum divinorum, non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod effectus sint attributorum divinorum causae: non enim hoc modo accipiuntur rationes attributorum secundum ea quae in nobis sunt, sicut secundum causas, sed magis sicut secundum signa quaedam causarum; et ideo non sequitur quod ea quae ex parte nostra sunt, sint causa quare unus reprobetur et alius praedestinetur.
| 4. Although the different formal characters of God’s attributes are drawn from the differences in their effects, it does not follow from this that these effects are the cause of His attributes. For the different formal characteristics of His attributes are not derived from our qualities as though our qualities caused them; rather, our qualities are signs that the attributes themselves are causes. Consequently, it does not follow that that which comes from us is the reason why one man is reprobated and another predestined.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod habitudinem Dei ad res possumus dupliciter considerare. Uno modo quantum ad primam rerum dispositionem, quae est secundum divinam sapientiam diversos gradus in rebus constituentem; et sic non eodem modo se habet Deus ad omnia. Alio modo secundum quod iam rebus dispositis providet; et sic similiter se habet ad omnia, in quantum omnibus aequaliter dat secundum suam proportionem. Ad primam autem rerum dispositionem pertinet totum hoc quod dictum est a Deo procedere secundum simplicem voluntatem, inter quae etiam praeparatio gratiae computatur.
| 5. We can consider God’s relation to things in two ways. We can consider it only with respect to the first disposition of things that took place according to His divine wisdom, which established different grades of things. If only this is considered, then God is not related to all things in the same way. We can, however, consider His relation to things also according to the way in which He provides for them as already disposed. If His relation to them is considered in this manner, then He is related to all things in the same way, because He gives equally to all, according to the proportion He has made. Now, all that has been said to proceed from God, according to His will taken simply, belongs to the first disposition of things, of which preparation for grace is a part.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod ad bonitatem divinam pertinet, in quantum est infinita, ut de perfectionibus quas unaquaeque res secundum suam naturam requirit, unicuique largiatur, secundum quod eius est capax; non autem requiritur hoc de perfectionibus superadditis, inter quas est gloria et gratia; et ideo ratio non sequitur.
| 6. It belongs to the divine goodness as infinite to give from its perfections whatever the nature of each thing requires and is capable of receiving. But this is not required for superabundant perfections such as grace and glory. Hence, the argument proves nothing.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod propositum cordis Iacob praescitum a Deo, non fuit causa quare ei dare gratiam voluit, sed fuit quoddam bonum ad quod Deus gratiam ei dandam ordinavit. Et ideo dicitur, quod ex proposito cordis, quod ei patuit, eum dilexit, quia scilicet ad hoc eum dilexit ut tale propositum cordis haberet, vel quia praevidit quod propositum cordis eius fuit ad gratiae susceptionem dispositio.
| 7. God’s foreknowledge of what lay in the heart of Jacob was not the reason for His willing to give grace to him. Instead, the intention in Jacob’s heart was a good for which God ordained the grace to be given to him. It is for this reason that God is said to have loved him “because his heart’s intention was known by Him.” For God loved him in order that he might have such an intention in his heart or because He foresaw that his heart’s intention was a disposition for the acceptance of grace.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod in illis quae sunt secundum rationem debiti inter aliquos distribuenda, esset contra rationem iustitiae distributivae, si aequalibus inaequalia darentur; sed in his quae ex liberalitate donantur, in nullo iustitiae contradicit; possum enim uni dare, et alteri non dare, pro meae libitu voluntatis. Huiusmodi autem est gratia; et ideo non est contra rationem iustitiae distributivae, si Deus proponat se daturum gratiam alicui, et non alteri, nulla inaequalitate meritorum considerata.
| 8. It would be contrary to the nature of distributive justice if things that were due to persons and were to be distributed to them were given out unequally to those that had equal rights. But things given out of liberality do not come under any form of justice. I may freely choose to give them to one person and not to another. Now, grace belongs to this class of things. Consequently, it is not contrary to the nature of distributive justice if God intends to give grace to one person and not to another, and does not consider their unequal merits.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod electio Dei qua unum reprobat et alterum eligit, rationabilis est; non tamen oportet quod ratio electionis sit meritum; sed ratio electionis est divina bonitas. Ratio autem reprobationis est in hominibus peccatum originale, ut Augustinus dicit, vel infuit hoc ipsum quod est non habere debitum ad hoc quod eis gratia conferretur. Rationabiliter enim possum velle denegare aliquid alicui quod sibi non debetur.
| 9. The election by which God chooses one man and reprobates another is reasonable. There is no reason why merit must be the reason for His choice, however, since the reason for this is the divine goodness. As Augustine says,” moreover, a justifying reason for reprobation [in the present] is the fact of original sin in man—for reprobation in the future, the fact that mere existence gives man no claim to grace. For I can reasonably deny something to a person if it is not due to him.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod Magister distinct. 41, l. I dicit illam auctoritatem esse retractatam ab August. in suo simili. Vel si debeat sustineri, referendum est ad effectum reprobationis et praedestinationis, qui habet aliquam causam vel meritoriam vel dispositivam.
| 10. Peter Lombard says that Augustine retracted that statement in a similar passage. But, if it must be sustained, then it should be taken as referring to the effect of reprobation and of predestination, which has a meritorious or disposing cause.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod praescientia abusus gratiae, non fuit causa reprobationis in Iuda, nisi forte ex parte effectus, quamvis Deus nulli volenti accipere gratiam eam deneget; sed hoc ipsum quod est velle accipere gratiam, est nobis ex praedestinatione divina; unde non potest esse praedestinationis causa.
| 11. God’s foreknowledge of this abuse of grace was not the reason why Judas was reprobated, unless we are considering only the consequences of this abuse—though it is true that God denies grace to no one who is willing to accept it. Now, the very fact that we are willing to accept grace comes to us through God’s predestination. Hence, our willingness cannot be a cause of predestination.
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| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod quamvis meritum possit esse causa effectus praedestinationis, non tamen potest esse praedestinationis causa.
| 12. Although merit can be the cause of the effect of predestination, it cannot be the cause of predestination itself.
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| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod licet illud a quo non convertitur consequentia, sit aliquo modo prius, non tamen sequitur quod semper sit eo modo prius quo causa prius dicitur, sic enim coloratum esset causa hominis; et propter hoc non sequitur quod praescientia sit causa praedestinationis.
| 13. Although that with which the consequent cannot be interchanged is prior in some way, it does not always follow that it is prior as a cause is said to be prior; for, if this were true, then to be colored would be the cause of being a man. Consequently, it does not follow that foreknowledge is the cause of predestination.
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| Et per hoc patet solutio ad ultimum.
| 14. The answer to this difficulty is clear from our last response. |
ARTICLE III
In the third article we ask:
Is predestination certain?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 23, aa. 6-7; I Sent., 40, 3; Quodl., XI, 3, 3; XII, 3, 3; De rationibus fidei, c.10 (P. 16:96a); C.G., III, cc. 94, 162-63. See also readings given for q. 5, a. 5.]
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| Tertio quaeritur de certitudine praedestinationis
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod certitudinem non habeat.
| It seems that it has no certitude, for
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| Nulla enim causa cuius effectus variari potest habet certitudinem respectu effectus sui. Sed effectus praedestinationis potest variari, quia ille qui est praedestinatus, potest non consequi praedestinationis effectum; quod patet ex hoc quod Augustinus dicit, exponens illud quod habetur Apocal., III, 11: tene quod habes ne alius accipiat etc.: si, inquit, alius non est accepturus nisi iste perdiderit, certus est electorum numerus. Ex quo videtur quod unus possit amittere, et alius accipere coronam, quae est praedestinationis effectus.
| 1. No cause whose effects can vary can be certain of its effects. But the effects of predestination can vary, for one who is predestined may not attain the effect of his predestination. This is clear from the commentary of Augustine on the words of the Apocalypse (3:1 1), “Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take...” in which he says: “If one person will not receive glory unless another loses it, then the number of the elect is certain.”’ Now, from this it seems that one could lose and another receive the crown of glory, which is the effect of predestination.
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| Praeterea, sicut res naturales subduntur divinae providentiae, ita et res humanae. Sed illi soli effectus naturales certitudinaliter ex suis causis procedunt secundum ordinem divinae providentiae, quos necessario causae suae producunt. Cum igitur effectus praedestinationis, qui est salus humana, non necessario, sed contingenter ex causis proximis eveniat, videtur quod ordo praedestinationis non sit certus.
| 2. Human affairs fall under God’s providence as things in nature do. But, according to the ordering of God’s providence, only those natural effects that are produced necessarily by their causes proceed from them with certainty. Now, since the effect of predestination, man’s salvation, arises not necessarily but contingently from its proximate causes, it seems that the ordering of predestination is not certain.
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| Praeterea, si aliqua causa habet certum ordinem ad aliquem effectum, effectus ille ex necessitate proveniet, nisi aliquid possit resistere virtuti causae agentis; sicut dispositiones in corporibus inferioribus inventae resistunt interdum actioni caelestium corporum, ut non producant proprios effectus, quos necessario producerent, nisi esset aliquid resistens. Sed praedestinationi divinae nihil potest resistere: voluntati enim eius quis resistit? Ut dicitur Rom. IX, 19. Ergo si habet certum ordinem ad effectum suum, effectus eius necessario producetur.
| 3. If a cause has certitude with respect to some effect, that effect will necessarily follow unless there is something that can resist the power of the agent. For example, dispositions in bodies here below are sometimes found to resist the action of celestial bodies; and, as a consequence, these celestial bodies do not produce their characteristic effects, which they would produce were there not something resisting them. But nothing can resist divine predestination, because, as we read in the Epistle to the Romans (9:19): “Who resists his will?” Therefore, if divine predestination is ordered with certitude to its effect, its effect will necessarily be produced.
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| Sed dicebat, quod certitudo praedestinationis ad effectum, est cum praesuppositione causae secundae. —Sed contra, omnis certitudo quae est cum suppositione alicuius, non est certitudo absoluta, sed conditionalis; sicut non est certum quod sol causet fructum in planta, nisi cum hac conditione, si virtus generativa in planta fuerit bene disposita, propter hoc quod certitudo solis ad effectum praedictum praesupponit plantae virtutem quasi causam secundam. Si igitur certitudo divinae praedestinationis sit cum praesuppositione secundae causae, non erit certitudo absoluta, sed conditionalis tantum; sicut in me est certitudo quod Socrates movetur si currit, et quod iste salvabitur, si praeparabit se; et ita non erit in divina praedestinatione alia certitudo de salvandis quam apud me; quod est absurdum.
| 4. The answer was given that the certitude which predestination has of its effect presupposes the second cause.—On the contrary, any certitude based on the supposition of something is not absolute but conditional certitude. For example, it is not certain that the sun will cause a plant to bear fruit unless the generative power of the plant is in a favorable condition; and, because of this, the certitude of the sun’s producing this effect presupposes the power of the plant as though the latter were a second cause. Consequently, if the certitude of divine predestination includes the presupposition of a second cause, that certitude will not be absolute but merely conditional—like the certitude I have that Socrates is moving if he runs, and that he will be saved if he prepares himself. Therefore, God will have no more certitude about those who are to be saved than I have. But this is absurd.
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| Praeterea, Iob XXXIII, 24, dicitur: conteret multos et innumerabiles, et stare faciet alios pro eis: quod exponens Gregorius dicit: locum vitae, aliis cadentibus, alii sortiuntur. Sed locus vitae est ad quem praedestinatio ordinat. Ergo a praedestinationis effectu praedestinatus deficere potest; et sic non est certa praedestinatio.
| 5. We read in Job (34:24): “He shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and shall make others to stand in their stead.” In explanation of this passage, Gregory writes: “Some fall from the place of life, while others are given it.” Now, the place of life is that place to which men are ordained by predestination. Hence, one who is predestined can fall short of the effect of predestination; therefore, predestination is not certain.
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| Praeterea, secundum Anselmum, eadem est veritas praedestinationis et propositionis de futuro. Sed propositio de futuro non habet veritatem certam et determinatam, sed variari potest, ut patet per philosophum in Lib. Periher., et in II Perigeneseos, ubi dicit, quod futurus quis incedere, non incedet. Ergo nec veritas praedestinationis certitudinem habet.
| 6. According to Anselm, predestination has the same kind of truth that a proposition about the future has. But a proposition about the future does not have certain and determinate truth. Such a proposition is open to correction—as is clear from that passage in Aristotle where he says: “One about to walk may not walk.” Similarly, therefore, the truth that predestination has does not possess certitude.
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| Praeterea, aliquis praedestinatus quandoque est in peccato mortali, sicut patet de Paulo, quando Ecclesiam persequebatur. Potest autem in peccato mortali perseverare usque ad mortem, vel tunc statim tunc interfici; quorum utrolibet posito, praedestinatio effectum suum non consequetur. Ergo possibile est praedestinationem non consequi effectum suum.
| 7. Sometimes one who is predestined is in mortal sin. This was clearly true of Paul when he was persecuting the Church. Now, he can stay in mortal sin until death or be killed immediately. If either happens, predestination will not obtain its effect. Therefore, it is possible for predestination not to obtain its effect.
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| Sed dicebat, quod cum dicitur praedestinatus potest in peccato mortali mori, si accipiatur subiectum prout stat sub forma praedestinationis, sic est composita, et falsa; si autem accipiatur prout consideratur sine tali forma, sic est divisa, et vera.- Sed contra, in formis illis quae non possunt removeri a subiecto, non differt utrum aliquid attribuatur subiecto sub forma considerato, vel sine forma; utroque enim modo haec est falsa: corvus niger potest esse albus. Sed praedestinatio est talis forma quae non potest a praedestinato removeri. Ergo praedicta distinctio in proposito locum non habet.
| 8. But it was said that, when it is stated that one predestined may possibly die in the state of sin, the proposition is taken compositely and so is false; for its subject is taken as simultaneously having the determination predestined. But if its subject is taken without this determination, then the proposition is taken in a divided sense and is true. —On the contrary, with those forms which cannot be removed from the subject, it does not matter whether a thing is attributed to the subject with those qualifying determinations or without them. For example, taken either way, the following proposition is false: “A black crow can be white.” Now, predestination is the kind of form that cannot be removed from the one predestined. In the matter at hand, therefore, there is no room for the afore-mentioned distinction.
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| Praeterea, si aeternum coniungatur temporali et contingenti, totum erit temporale et contingens: sicut patet de creatione, quae est temporalis, quamvis claudat in sua ratione essentiam Dei aeternam et effectum temporalem; et similiter missio, quae importat processionem aeternam et effectum temporalem. Sed praedestinatio, quamvis importet aliquid aeternum, tamen importat etiam cum hoc effectum temporalem. Ergo totum hoc quod est praedestinatio, est temporale et contingens; et ita non videtur certitudinem habere.
| 9. If what is eternal be joined to what is temporal and contingent, then the whole is temporal and contingent. Thus, it is clear that creation is temporal, even though its notion includes God’s eternal essence as well as a temporal effect. The same is true of a divine mission, which implies an eternal procession and a temporal effect. Now, even though predestination implies something eternal, it also implies a temporal effect. Therefore, predestination as a whole is temporal and contingent and, consequently, does not seem to have certitude.
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| Praeterea, quod potest esse et non esse, non habet aliquam certitudinem. Sed praedestinatio Dei de salute alicuius potest esse et non esse; sicut enim potuit ab aeterno praedestinare et non praedestinare, ita et nunc potest praedestinasse et non praedestinasse; cum in aeternitate non differant praesens, praeteritum et futurum. Ergo praedestinatio non habet certitudinem.
| 10. What can be or not be cannot have any certitude. But the fact that God predestines to salvation can be or not be. For just as He can, from all eternity, predestine and not predestine, so even now He can predestine and not predestine, since present, past, and future do not differ in eternity. Consequently, predestination cannot have any certitude.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod dicitur Roman. VIII, 29: quos praescivit et praedestinavit, et cetera. Glossa: praedestinatio est praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, qua certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur.
| 1. In explanation of that verse in the Epistle to the Romans (8:29), “Whom he foreknew, he also predestined,” the Gloss says: “Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God by which whoever are freed are most certainly freed.”
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| Praeterea, illud cuius est immobilis veritas, oportet esse certum. Sed veritas praedestinationis est immobilis, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de praedestinatione sanctorum. Ergo praedestinatio habet certitudinem.
| 2. If the truth of a thing is unshakable, it must be certain. But, as Augustine says: “The truth of predestination is unshakable.” Therefore, predestination is certain.
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| Praeterea, cuicumque convenit praedestinatio, ab aeterno ei convenit. Sed quod est ab aeterno, invariabile est. Ergo praedestinatio est invariabilis, et ita certa.
| 3. Whoever is predestined has this predestination from all eternity. But what exists from all eternity cannot be changed. Predestination, therefore, is unchangeable and, consequently, certain.
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| Praeterea, praedestinatio includit praescientiam, ut patet ex Glossa inducta; sed praescientia habet certitudinem, ut probat Boetius in V de Consolat. Ergo et praedestinatio.
| 4. As is clear from the Gloss mentioned above, predestination includes foreknowledge. But, as Boethius has proved, foreknowledge is certain. Therefore, predestination is also certain.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod duplex est certitudo: scilicet cognitionis, et ordinis. Cognitionis quidem certitudo est, quando cognitio non declinat in aliquo ab eo quod in re invenitur, sed hoc modo existimat de ea sicut est; et quia certa existimatio de re praecipue habetur per causam rei, ideo tractum est nomen certitudinis ad ordinem causae ad effectum, ut dicatur ordo causae ad effectum esse certus, quando causa infallibiliter effectum producit. Praescientia ergo Dei, quia non importat universaliter habitudinem causae respectu omnium quorum est, non consideratur in ea nisi certitudo cognitionis tantum; sed praedestinatio, quia praescientiam includit, et habitudinem causae ad ea, quorum est, addit, inquantum est directio sive praeparatio quaedam; sic potest in ea considerari supra certitudinem cognitionis, certitudo ordinis; de qua solum certitudine praedestinationis nunc quaerimus: de certitudine enim cognitionis, in ipsa inventa, patere potest ex his quae dicta sunt, cum de scientia Dei quaereretur.
| There are two kinds of certitude: certitude of knowledge and certitude of ordination. Now, certitude of knowledge is had when one’s knowledge does not deviate in any way from reality, and, consequently, when it judges about a thing as it is. But because a judgment which will be certain about a thing is had especially from its causes, the word certitude has been transferred to the relation that a cause has to its effect; therefore, the relation of a cause to an effect is said to be certain when the cause infallibly produces its effect. Consequently, since God’s foreknowledge does not imply, in all cases, a relation of a cause to all the things which are its objects, it is considered to have only the certitude of knowledge. But His predestination adds another element, because it includes not only His foreknowledge but also the relation of a cause to its objects, since predestination is a kind of direction or preparation. Thus, not only the certitude of knowledge, but also the certitude of ordination is contained in predestination. Now we are concerned only with the certitude of predestination; the certitude of knowledge, found also in predestination, has been explained in our investigation of God’s knowledge.
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| Sciendum est autem, quod, cum praedestinatio sit quaedam providentiae pars, sicut secundum suam rationem supra providentiam addit, sic etiam et certitudo eius supra certitudinem providentiae. Ordo enim providentiae dupliciter certus invenitur. Uno modo in particulari; quando scilicet res quae a divina providentia in finem aliquem ordinantur, absque defectu ad finem illum particularem deveniunt; sicut patet in motibus caelestibus, et in omnibus quae necessario aguntur in natura. Alio modo in universali sed non in particulari; sicut videmus in generabilibus et corruptibilibus, quorum virtutes quandoque deficiunt a propriis effectibus, ad quos sunt ordinatae sicut ad proprios fines, sicut virtus formativa quandoque deficit a perfecta consummatione membrorum; sed tamen ipse defectus divinitus ordinatur ad aliquem finem, ut patet ex dictis, dum de providentia ageretur; et sic nihil potest deficere a generali fine providentiae, quamvis quandoque deficiat ab aliquo particulari fine.
| It should be known that, since predestination is a particular type of providence, not only its notion adds something to providence, but also its certitude adds something to the certitude of providence. Now, the ordering of providence is found to be certain in two respects. First, it is certain with relation to a particular thing, when God’s providence ordains things to some particular end, and they attain that end without failure. This is evident in the motions of celestial spheres and in all things in nature that act necessarily. Second, providence is certain in relation to things in general, but not in particular. For example, we see that the power of beings capable of generation and corruption sometimes falls short of the proper effects to which it has been ordered as its proper ends. Thus, the power that shapes bodies sometimes falls short of forming members completely. Yet, as we saw above when treating providence, these very defects arc directed by God to some end. Consequently, nothing can fail to attain the general end of providence, even though it may at times fall short of a particular end.
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| Sed ordo praedestinationis est certus non solum respectu universalis finis, sed etiam respectu particularis et determinati, quia ille qui est ordinatus per praedestinationem ad salutem, nunquam deficit a consecutione salutis. Nec tamen hoc modo est certus ordo praedestinationis respectu particularis finis, sicut erat ordo providentiae: quia in providentia ordo non erat certus respectu particularis finis, nisi quando causa proxima necessario producebat effectum suum; in praedestinatione autem invenitur certitudo respectu singularis finis; et tamen causa proxima, scilicet liberum arbitrium, non producit effectum illum nisi contingenter.
| The ordering of predestination, however, is certain, not only with respect to its general end, but also with respect to a particular and determinate end. For one who is ordained to salvation by predestination never fails to obtain it. Moreover, the ordering of predestination is not certain with reference to a particular end in the way in which the ordering of providence is; for, in providence, the ordering is not certain with respect to a particular end unless the proximate cause necessarily produces its effect. In predestination, however, there is certitude with respect to an individual end even though the proximate cause, free choice, does not produce that effect except in a contingent manner.
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| Unde difficile videtur concordare infallibilitatem praedestinationis cum arbitrii libertate. Non enim potest dici quod praedestinatio supra certitudinem providentiae nihil aliud addat nisi certitudinem praescientiae; ut scilicet dicatur, quod Deus ordinat praedestinatum ad salutem, sicut et quemlibet alium; sed cum hoc de praedestinato scit, quod non deficiet a salute. Sic enim non diceretur praedestinatus differre a non praedestinato ex parte ordinis, sed tantum ex parte praescientiae eventus; et sic praescientia esset causa praedestinationis, nec praedestinatio esset per electionem praedestinantis; quod est contra auctoritatem Scripturae et dicta sanctorum. Unde etiam praeter certitudinem praescientiae ipse ordo praedestinationis habet infallibilem certitudinem; nec tamen causa proxima salutis ordinatur ad eam necessario, sed contingenter, scilicet liberum arbitrium.
| Hence, it seems difficult to reconcile the infallibility of predestination with freedom of choice; for we cannot say that predestination adds nothing to the certitude of providence except the certitude of foreknowledge, because this would be to say that God orders one who is predestined to his salvation as He orders any other person, with this difference, that, in the case of the predestined, God knows he will not fail to be saved. According to this position, one predestined would not differ in ordination from one not predestined; he would differ only with respect to [God’s] foreknowledge of the outcome. Consequently, foreknowledge would be the cause of predestination, and predestination would not take place by the choice of Him who predestines. This, however, is contrary to the authority of the Scriptures” and the sayings of the saints. Thus, the ordering of predestination has an infallible certitude of its own—over and above the certitude of foreknowledge. Nevertheless, the proximate cause of salvation, free choice, is related to predestination contingently, not necessarily.
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| Quod hoc modo potest considerari. Invenimus enim ordinem infallibilem esse respectu alicuius dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum una causa singularis necessario inducit effectum suum ex ordine divinae providentiae; alio modo quando ex concursu multarum causarum contingentium, et deficere possibilium, pervenitur ad unum effectum; quarum unamquamque Deus ordinat ad consecutionem effectus loco eius quae defecit, vel ne altera deficiat; sicut videmus quod omnia singularia unius speciei sunt corruptibilia, et tamen per successionem unius ad alterum potest secundum naturam in eis salvari perpetuitas speciei, divina providentia taliter gubernante, quod non omnia deficiant uno deficiente:
| This can be considered in the following manner. We find that an ordering is infallible in regard to something in two ways. First, an individual cause necessarily brings about its own effect because of the ordering of divine providence. Secondly, a single effect may be attained only as the result of the convergence of many contingent causes individually capable of failure; but each one of these causes has been ordained by God either to bring about that effect itself if another cause should fail or to prevent that other cause from failing. We see, for example, that all the individual members of a species are corruptible. Yet, from the fact that one succeeds another, the nature of the species can be kept in existence; and this is how God keeps the species from extinction, despite the fact that the individual perishes.
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| et hoc modo est in praedestinatione. Liberum enim arbitrium deficere potest a salute; tamen in eo quem Deus praedestinat, tot alia adminicula praeparat, quod vel non cadat, vel si cadit, quod resurgat, sicut exhortationes, suffragia orationum, gratiae donum, et omnia huiusmodi, quibus Deus adminiculatur homini ad salutem. Si ergo consideremus salutem respectu causae proximae, scilicet liberi arbitrii, non habet certitudinem, sed contingentiam; respectu autem causae primae, quae est praedestinatio, certitudinem habet.
| A similar case is had in predestination; for, even though free choice can fail with respect to salvation, God prepares so many other helps for one who is predestined that he either does not fall at all or, if he does fall, he rises again. The helps that God gives a man to enable him to gain salvation are exhortations, the support of prayer, the gift of grace, and all similar things. Consequently, if we were to consider salvation only in relation to its proximate cause, free choice, salvation would not be certain but contingent; however, in relation to the first cause, namely, predestination, salvation is certain.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod verbum illud Apocalypsis potest intelligi vel de corona praesentis iustitiae, vel de corona gloriae. Utrolibet autem modo intelligatur, secundum hoc unus dicitur accipere coronam alterius, alio cadente, inquantum bona unius alteri prosunt vel in auxilium meriti, vel etiam in augmentum gloriae propter connexionem caritatis, quae facit omnia bona membrorum Ecclesiae communia esse; et ita contingit quod unus coronam alterius accipit, dum, aliquo per peccatum cadente et ita suorum meritorum praemium non consequente, alius fructum percipit de meritis quae ille habuit, sicut etiam percepisset alio persistente. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod praedestinatio umquam cassetur.
| 1. The word crown as used in the Apocalypse (3:11) may mean either the crown of present justice or the crown of future glory. No matter which meaning is taken, however, one person is said to receive the crown of another when that other person falls in the sense that the goods of one person help another, either by aiding him to merit or even by increasing his glory. The reason for this is that all the members of the Church are connected by charity in such a way that their goods are common. Consequently, one receives the crown of another when that other falls through sin and does not achieve the reward of his merits; and another person receives the fruits of the sinner’s merits, just as he would have benefited from the sinner’s merits had the latter persevered. From this, however, it does not follow that predestination is ever in vain.
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| Vel potest dici, quod unus coronam alterius accipere dicitur, non quod aliquis amittat coronam quae est ei praedestinata, sed quia quandoque aliquis amittit coronam sibi debitam secundum praesentem iustitiam, et in locum eius alius substituitur ad complendum numerum electorum, sicut in locum Angelorum cadentium sunt homines substituti.
| Or it can be answered that one is said to receive the crown of another, not because the other lost a crown that was predestined for him, but because whenever a person loses the crown that was due to him because of the justice he possessed, another person is substituted in his place to make up the number of the elect—just as men have been substituted to take the place of the fallen angels.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod effectus naturalis qui ex divina providentia infallibiliter evenit, consequitur ex una causa proxima in effectum necessario ordinata; ordo autem praedestinationis non est certus per hunc modum, sed per alium, ut dictum est.
| 2. A natural effect issuing infallibly from God’s providence takes place because of one proximate cause necessarily ordered to the effect. The ordering of predestination, however, is not made certain in this manner but in the manner described above.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod corpus caeleste agit in haec inferiora necessitatem quasi inducens, quantum est de se; et ideo effectus eius necessario provenit, nisi sit aliquid resistens. Sed Deus agit in voluntate non per modum necessitatis, quia voluntatem non cogit, sed movet eam non auferendo ei modum suum, qui in libertate ad utrumlibet consistit: et ideo, quamvis nihil divinae voluntati resistat, tamen voluntas, et quaelibet alia res, exequitur divinam voluntatem secundum modum suum, quia et ipsum modum divina voluntas rebus dedit, ut sic eius voluntas impleretur; et ideo quaedam explent divinam voluntatem necessario, quaedam vero contingenter, quamvis illud quod Deus vult, semper fiat.
| 3. A celestial body, taken in itself, imposes a kind of determinism in its action on bodies here below. Consequently, its effect necessarily takes place, unless something resists it. But God does not act on the will in the manner of one necessitating; for He does not force the will but merely moves it, without taking away its own proper mode, which consists in being free with respect to opposites. Consequently, even though nothing can resist the divine will, our will, like everything else, carries out the divine will according to its own proper mode. Indeed, the divine will has given things their mode of being in order that His will be fulfilled. Therefore, some things fulfill the divine will necessarily, other things, contingently; but that which God wills always takes place.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod causa secunda, quam oportet supponere ad inducendum praedestinationis effectum, etiam ordini praedestinationis subiacet; non autem est ita in virtutibus inferioribus respectu alicuius virtutis superioris agentis. Et ideo ordo divinae praedestinationis, quamvis sit cum suppositione voluntatis humanae, nihilominus tamen absolutam certitudinem habet, etsi contrarium in exemplo inducto appareat.
| 4. The second cause, which we must suppose as prerequisite for obtaining the effect of predestination, lies also under the ordering of predestination. The relationship between lower powers and the power of a superior agent is not one of predestination. Consequently, even though the ordering of God’s predestination includes the supposition of a human will, it nevertheless has absolute certitude, despite the fact that the example given points to the contrary.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod verba illa Iob et Gregorii sunt referenda ad statum praesentis iustitiae, a quo aliqui quandoque decidunt, aliis subrogatis; unde per hoc non potest concludi aliquid incertitudinis circa praedestinationem quia illi qui finaliter a gratia deficiunt, nunquam praedestinati fuerunt.
| 5. Those words of Job and Gregory should be referred to the state of present justice. If some fall from it, others are chosen in their place. From this, therefore, we cannot conclude to any uncertainty with reference to predestination; for those who fall from grace at the end were never predestined at all.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod similitudo Anselmi quantum ad hoc tenet, quod, sicut veritas propositionis de futuro non aufert futuro contingentiam, ita nec veritas praedestinationis; sed differt quantum ad hoc, quod propositio de futuro respicit futurum ut futurum est, et hoc modo non potest habere certitudinem; sed veritas praescientiae et praedestinationis respicit futurum ut est praesens, ut in quaest. de scientia Dei dictum est; et ideo certitudinem habet.
| 6. The comparison Anselm makes holds good in this respect, that just as the truth of a proposition about the future does not remove contingency from a future event, so also the truth of predestination [does not take away the contingency of predestination]. But, in another respect, the comparison is weak. For a proposition about the future is related to the future in so far as it is future, and, under this aspect, it cannot be certain. As we pointed out previously, however, the truth of predestination and foreknowledge is related to the future as present, and, consequently, is certain.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod aliquid potest dici posse dupliciter. Uno modo considerando potentiam quae in ipso est, sicut dicitur quod lapis potest moveri deorsum. Alio modo considerando id quod ex parte alterius est, sicut si dicerem, quod lapis potest moveri sursum, non per potentiam quae in ipso sit, sed per potentiam proiicientis.
| 7. A thing can be said to be possible in two ways. First, we may consider the potency that exists in the thing itself, as when we say that a stone can be moved downwards. Or we may consider the potency that exists in another thing, as when we say that a stone can be moved upwards, not by a potency existing in the stone, but by a potency existing in the one who hurls it.
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| Cum ergo dicitur: praedestinatus iste potest in peccato mori; si consideretur potentia ipsius, verum est; si autem loquamur de praedestinato secundum ordinem quem habet ad aliud, scilicet ad Deum praedestinantem, sic ordo ille non compatitur secum istum eventum, quamvis compatiatur secum istam potentiam. Et ideo potest distingui secundum distinctionem prius inductam, scilicet cum forma, vel sine forma consideratio subiecti.
| Consequently, when we say: “That predestined person can possibly die in sin,” the statement is true if we consider only the potency that exists in him. But, if we are speaking of this predestined person according to the ordering which he has to another, namely, to God, who is predestining him, that event is incompatible with this ordering, even though it is compatible with the person’s own power. Hence, we can use the distinction given above; that is, we can consider the subject with this form or without it.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod nigredo et albedo sunt quaedam formae existentes in subiecto, quod dicitur album vel nigrum; et ideo non potest aliquid attribui subiecto nec secundum potentiam nec secundum actum, quod repugnet formae praedictae, quamdiu in subiecto manet. Sed praedestinatio non est forma existens in praedestinato, sed in praedestinante, sicut et scitum denominatur a scientia quae est in sciente; et ideo quantumcumque immobiliter stet sub ordine scientiae, tamen potest ei aliquid attribui considerando suam naturam, etsi etiam repugnet ordini praedestinationis. Hoc enim modo praedestinatio est aliquid praeter ipsum hominem qui dicitur praedestinatus, sicut nigredo est aliquid praeter essentiam corvi, quamvis non sit aliquid extra corvum; considerando autem tantummodo essentiam corvi, potest aliquid ei attribui quod repugnat nigredini eius; secundum quem modum dicit Porphyrius, quod potest intelligi corvus albus. Et ita etiam in proposito potest ipsi homini praedestinato attribui aliquid secundum se considerato, quod non attribuitur ei secundum quod intelligitur stare sub praedestinatione.
| 8. Blackness and whiteness are, in a sense, examples of forms that exist in a subject said to be white or black. Consequently, nothing can be attributed to the subject, either according to potency or according to act, as long as blackness remains, if it is repugnant to this form of blackness. Predestination, however, is a form that exists, not in the person predestined, but in the one predestining, just as the known gets its, name from knowledge in the knower. Consequently, no matter how fixed predestination may remain in the order of knowledge, yet, if we consider only the nature [of the predestined], we can attribute something to it which is repugnant to the ordering of predestination. For, considered this way, predestination is something other than the man who is said to be predestined, just as blackness is something other than the essence of a crow, even though it is not something outside the crow, but, by considering only the essence of a crow, one can attribute to it something that is repugnant to its blackness. For this reason, as Porphyry says, one can think of a white crow. Similarly, in the problem being discussed, one can attribute something to a predestined person taken in himself which cannot be attributed to him in so far as he is predestined.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod creatio et missio, et huiusmodi, important productionem alicuius temporalis effectus, et ideo ponunt temporalem effectum esse; et propter hoc oportet ea esse temporalia, quamvis in se aliquid aeternum claudant. Sed praedestinatio non importat productionem alicuius effectus temporalis secundum suum nomen, sed tantummodo ordinem ad aliquid temporale, sicut voluntas, potentia, et huiusmodi omnia: et ideo, quia non ponitur effectus temporalis esse in actu, qui etiam est contingens, non oportet quod praedestinatio sit temporalis et contingens: quia ad aliquod temporale et contingens potest aliquid ordinari ab aeterno et immutabiliter.
| 9. Creation and mission imply the production of a temporal effect. Consequently, they affirm the existence of a temporal effect, and so must be temporal themselves, even though they include something eternal. Predestination, however, does not imply the production of a temporal effect—as the word itself shows—but only an ordering to something temporal, such as will, power, and all such attributes also imply. Since it does not affirm the actual existence of a temporal effect, which is also contingent, predestination is not necessarily temporal and contingent itself, because from eternity something can be unchangeably ordained to a temporal and contingent effect.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod, absolute loquendo, Deus potest unumquemque praedestinare vel non praedestinare, aut praedestinasse vel non praedestinasse: quia actus praedestinationis, cum mensuretur aeternitate, nunquam cedit in praeteritum, sicut nunquam est futurus; unde semper consideratur ut egrediens a voluntate per modum libertatis. Tamen ex suppositione hoc efficitur impossibile: non enim potest non praedestinare cum suppositione quod praedestinaverit, vel e converso, quia mutabilis esse non potest; et ita non sequitur quod praedestinatio possit variari.
| 10. Absolutely speaking, it is possible for God to predestine or not to predestine each and every person, and it is possible for Him to have predestined or not to have predestined. For, since the act of predestination is measured by eternity, it never is past and never is future. Consequently, it is always considered as issuing from His will as something free. Because of the supposition, however, certain things are impossible: He cannot predestine if He has predestined, and He cannot predestine if He has already not predestined—for God does not change. Hence, it does not follow that predestination can change.
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ARTICLE IV
In the fourth article we ask:
Is the number of predestined certain?
[ARTICLE See readings given for preceding article.]
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| Quarto quaeritur utrum numerus praedestinatorum sit certus
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems not, for
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| Quia nullus numerus cui potest fieri additio, est certus. Sed numero praedestinatorum additio fieri potest: hoc enim petit Moyses Deuter. cap. I, 11,: dominus Deus patrum nostrorum addat ad hunc numerum multa millia. Glossa: definitum apud Deum, qui novit qui sunt eius. Frustra autem peteret, nisi fieri posset. Ergo numerus praedestinatorum non est certus.
| 1. No number is certain if something can be added to it. But something can be added to the number of the predestined, because Moses’ petition for such an increase is described in Deuteronomy (1:11) where he says: “The Lord God of your fathers add to this number many thousands.” And the Gloss comments: “This number is fixed by God, who knows who belong to Him.” Now, unless such an addition were possible, Moses would have asked in vain. Consequently, the number of the predestined is not certain.
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| Praeterea, sicut dispositio naturalium bonorum est praeparatio ad gratiam, ita per gratiam praeparamur ad gloriam. Sed in quocumque est praeparatio sufficiens ex naturalibus bonis, est invenire gratiam. Ergo etiam in quocumque est invenire gratiam, erit invenire gloriam. Sed aliquis non praedestinatus quandoque habet gratiam. Ergo habebit gloriam; ergo erit praedestinatus. Ergo aliquis non praedestinatus potest fieri praedestinatus, et sic augeri numerus praedestinatorum; et ita non erit certus.
| 2. As we are prepared for grace through the disposition of natural perfections, so are we prepared through grace for the attainment of glory. Now, grace is found in whomsoever there is sufficient preparation of natural gifts. Similarly, then, glory will be found wherever grace is found. But one not predestined may, at one time, possess grace. Therefore, he will possess glory and so be predestined. Consequently, one not predestined may become predestined. In this way, the number of the predestined can be increased; hence, it is not certain.
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| Praeterea, si aliquis habens gratiam non sit habiturus gloriam: aut hoc erit propter defectum gratiae, aut propter defectum dantis gloriam. Non autem est ex defectu gratiae, quae, quantum est in se, sufficienter ad gloriam disponit; nec ex defectu dantis gloriam, quia quantum est in se, paratus est omnibus dare. Ergo quicumque habet gratiam, de necessitate habebit gloriam; et sic aliquis praescitus habebit gloriam; et erit praedestinatus; et sic idem quod prius.
| 3. If one who has grace is not to have glory, his loss of glory will be due to a failure either on the part of grace or on the part of the one giving glory. However, this loss cannot be due to a failure on the part of grace, for, in itself, it sufficiently disposes for glory; nor can it be due to a failure on the part of the one giving glory, for, on His part, He is ready to give it to all. Consequently, whoever has grace will necessarily have glory. Thus, one who is foreknown [as lost] will have glory and be predestined. Accordingly, our original argument stands.
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| Praeterea, quicumque praeparat se ad gratiam sufficienter, habet gratiam. Sed aliquis praescitus potest se ad gratiam praeparare. Ergo potest habere gratiam. Sed quicumque habet gratiam, potest perseverare in illa. Ergo praescitus potest usque ad mortem in gratia perseverare, et sic fieri praedestinatus, ut videtur; et sic idem quod prius.
| 4. Whoever prepares himself sufficiently for grace, gets grace. But one foreknown [as lost] can prepare himself for grace. Therefore, it is possible for him to have grace. Whoever has grace, however, can persevere in it. So it seems that one who is foreknown [as lost] can persevere in grace up to the time of his death and thus become predestined. Consequently, the same must be said as before.
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| Sed dicebat, quod praescitum mori sine gratia, est necessarium necessitate conditionata, quamvis non absoluta.- Contra, omnis necessitas carens principio et fine, et continuata in medio, est simplex et absoluta, et non conditionata. Sed talis est necessitas praescientiae, cum sit aeterna. Ergo est simplex, et non conditionata.
| 5. It was said, however, that God’s foreknowledge that a man will die without grace is necessary by conditional necessity, not by absolute necessity.—On the contrary, any necessity, which lacks a beginning and an end, and which is without succession, is not conditional but simple and absolute. Now, this is the kind of necessity that the necessity of foreknowledge is, because it is eternal. Therefore, it is simple and not conditioned.
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| Praeterea, quolibet numero finito potest esse aliquis maior. Sed numerus praedestinatorum est finitus. Ergo eo potest esse aliquis maior: ergo non est certus.
| 6. A number larger than any finite number is possible. But the number of the predestined is finite. Therefore, a larger number is possible, and the number of the predestined is not certain.
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| Praeterea, cum bonum sit communicativum sui, infinita bonitas non debet terminum ponere suae communicationi. Sed praedestinatis divina bonitas se maxime communicat. Ergo non est eius statuere certum praedestinatorum numerum.
| 7. Since good communicates itself, infinite goodness should not impose a limit on its communication. Now, the divine goodness communicates itself to the predestined in the highest possible degree. Therefore, it does not belong to the divine goodness to establish a certain number of predestined.
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| Praeterea, sicut factio rerum est ex voluntate divina, ita et hominum praedestinatio. Sed Deus plura potest facere quam fecit: subest enim ei, cum voluerit, posse, ut dicitur Sap. XII, 18. Ergo similiter non tot praedestinat quin plures possit praedestinare; et sic idem quod prius.
| 8. Like the creation of things, the predestination of men depends on the divine will. Now, God can make more things than He has made, because, as we read in Wisdom (12:18): “His power is at hand when He wills.” Similarly, He has not predestined so many men that He cannot predestine more; and so our original argument returns.
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| Praeterea, quidquid Deus potuit, adhuc potest. Sed Deus potuit ab aeterno illum praedestinare quem non praedestinavit. Ergo modo etiam potest eum praedestinare, et sic potest fieri additio numero praedestinatorum.
| 9. Whatever God was at one time able to do He still is able to do. But from eternity God was able to predestine one whom He did not predestine. Consequently, He is still able to predestine him, and so an addition can be made to the number of the predestined.
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| Praeterea, in omnibus potentiis quae non sunt determinatae ad unum, quod potest esse, potest non esse. Sed potentia praedestinantis ad praedestinatum, et potentia praedestinati ad consequendum praedestinationis effectum sunt huiusmodi, quia et praedestinans voluntate praedestinat, et praedestinatus voluntate effectum praedestinationis consequitur. Ergo praedestinatus potest esse non praedestinatus, et non praedestinatus potest esse praedestinatus; ergo idem quod prius.
| 10. In the case of all powers not determined to one course of action, what can be can also not be. Now, the power of the one predestining with respect to the one to be predestined, and the power of the one predestined with respect to his obtaining the effect of predestination, belong to this class of powers, because the one predestining predestines by His will, and the one predestined obtains the effect of predestination by his will. Consequently, the predestined can be non-predestined, and the non-predestined can be predestined. Hence, the conclusion is the same as before.
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| Praeterea, Luc. V, 6, super illud: rumpebatur autem rete eorum, dicit Glossa: in Ecclesia circumcisionis rumpitur rete, quia non tot intrant de Iudaeis, quot apud (Deum ad) vitam erant praeordinati. Ergo numerus praedestinatorum potest diminui, et ita non est certus.
| 11. In commentary on that verse in Luke (5:6), “And their net broke,” the Gloss reads: “In the Church, the net of circumcision is broken, for not as many Jews enter as were preordained by God to life.” Consequently, since the number of the predestined can be diminished, it is not certain.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Dicit Augustinus in libro de correctione et gratia: certus est praedestinatorum numerus, qui nec augeri potest nec minui.
| 1. Augustine says: “The number of the predestined is certain and can neither be increased nor diminished.”
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| Praeterea, Augustinus in Enchiridio, dicit: superna Ierusalem mater nostra, civitas Dei, nulla civium suorum numerositate fraudabitur, aut uberiori etiam copia fortasse regnabit. Sed cives illius civitatis sunt praedestinati. Ergo praedestinatorum numerus non potest augeri nec minui, et ita est certus.
| 2. Augustine says: “The heavenly Jerusalem, our mother, the City of God, will not be robbed of any of the number of its citizens nor will it reign with more than the predestined number.” Now, the citizens mentioned are the predestined. Consequently, the number of the predestined cannot be increased or decreased. Hence, it is certain.
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| Praeterea, quicumque est praedestinatus, ab aeterno est praedestinatus. Sed quod est ab aeterno, est immutabile; et quod non fuit ab aeterno, nunquam potest esse aeternum. Ergo ille qui non est praedestinatus, non potest esse praedestinatus, nec e contrario.
| 3. Whoever is predestined is predestined from eternity. But what exists from eternity is unchangeable, and what did not exist from eternity can never be eternal. Consequently, he who is not predestined cannot be predestined and, conversely, he who is predestined cannot be non-predestined.
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| Praeterea, omnes praedestinati post resurrectionem erunt cum corporibus suis in caelo Empyreo. Sed locus ille finitus est, cum omne corpus sit finitum: duo etiam glorificata corpora, ut communiter dicitur, non possunt esse simul. Ergo oportet esse determinatum praedestinatorum numerum.
| 4. After the resurrection, all the predestined will be in the highest heaven with their own bodies. Now, that place is finite, since all bodies are finite, and, as is commonly held, not even two glorified bodies can exist, simultaneously [in one place]. Consequently, the number of the predestined should be determinate.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem quidam ita distinxerunt dicentes, quod numerus praedestinatorum certus est, si loquamur de numero numerante, sive de numero formaliter; non autem est certus, si loquamur de numero numerato, sive materialiter accepto; puta, si diceretur, quod certum est esse centum praedestinatos, non autem est certum qui centum sint. Et istud dictum occasionem sumere videtur ex verbo Augustini supra inducto, in quo innuere videtur quod unus amittere possit, et alius accipere praedestinatam coronam, numero tamen praedestinatorum nullatenus variato. Sed si haec opinio loquatur de certitudine per comparationem ad causam primam, scilicet Deum praedestinantem, omnino apparet absurda: ipse enim Deus habet certam cognitionem de numero praedestinatorum et formali et materiali: scit enim quot et qui sint salvandi, et utrumque infallibiliter ordinat, ut sic, quantum ex parte Dei est, respectu utriusque numeri inveniatur certitudo non solum cognitionis, sed etiam ordinis.
| Treating this question, some have distinguished, saying that the number of the predestined is certain if we mean number understood actively or formally, but not certain if we mean number understood passively or materially. For example, one could say that it is certain that one hundred have been predestined, but it is not certain who these one hundred are. The occasion for such a position seems to be the words of Augustine mentioned previously. Augustine seems to imply that one can lose and another receive the predestined crown without the number of the predestined at all varying. But, if those holding this opinion are speaking about certitude of predestination in its relation to the first cause, that is, to God who predestines, then the opinion is entirely absurd, because God Himself has definite knowledge of the number of the predestined, whether the number be taken formally or materially. He knows exactly how many and who are to be saved, and, with respect to both, His ordination is infallible. Consequently, with respect to both numbers, God has certitude, not only of knowledge, but also of ordination.
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| Sed si loquamur de certitudine numeri praedestinatorum per comparationem ad causam proximam salutis humanae, ad quam praedestinatio ordinatur, non erit idem iudicium de numero formali et materiali. Numerus enim materialis aliquo modo subiacet voluntati humanae, quae est variabilis, inquantum salus uniuscuiusque est sub libertate arbitrii constituta, sicut sub causa proxima; et sic numerus materialis aliquo modo certitudine caret. Sed numerus formalis nullo modo cadit sub voluntate humana, eo quod nulla voluntas se extendit per modum causalitatis alicuius ad totam integritatem numeri praedestinatorum; et ideo numerus formalis remanet omnibus modis certus. Et sic potest praedicta distinctio sustineri, ut tamen simpliciter concedatur, quod uterque numerus ex parte Dei certitudinem habet. Sciendum tamen est quod numerus praedestinatorum secundum hoc dicitur esse certus, quod additionem vel diminutionem non patitur.
| On the other hand, if we are speaking about the certitude that can be had about the number of the predestined from its relation to the proximate cause of man’s salvation (to which predestination is ordained), then our judgment about the formal number and the material number will not be the same. For, since the salvation of each individual has been produced through free choice as through its proximate cause, in some way the material number is subject to man’s will, which is changeable. Consequently, the material number in some way lacks certainty. But the formal number is not determined in any manner by man’s will, because by no kind of causality does the human will affect the number of the predestined taken as a whole. Consequently, the formal number remains completely certain. In this way the aforementioned distinction can be sustained, as long as we concede, without any qualifications, that both numbers are certain as far as God is concerned.
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| Secundum autem hoc pateretur additionem, si aliquis praescitus posset praedestinatus fieri, quod esset contra certitudinem praescientiae vel reprobationis; secundum hoc autem posset diminui, si aliquis praedestinatus posset effici non praedestinatus, quod est contra certitudinem praedestinationis. Et sic patet quod certitudo numeri praedestinatorum colligitur ex duplici certitudine: scilicet ex certitudine praedestinationis, et certitudine praescientiae vel reprobationis. Sed hae duae certitudines differunt: quia certitudo praedestinationis est certitudo cognitionis et ordinis, ut dictum est, certitudo autem praescientiae est certitudo cognitionis tantum. Non enim Deus praeordinat ad peccandum homines reprobos, sicut praedestinatos ordinat ad merendum.
| It should be noted, moreover, that the number of the predestined is certain in this respect, that it cannot be increased or diminished. The number could be increased if one who was foreknown [as lost] could be predestined; but this would be contrary to the certainty of foreknowledge or of reprobation. Again, the number could be diminished if it were possible for one who is predestined to become non-predestined; but this would be contrary to the certainty of predestination. Thus, it is clear that the certitude about the number of the predestined is made up of two certitudes, the certitude of predestination and the certitude of foreknowledge or reprobation. These two certitudes differ, however; for, as has been said, the certitude of predestination is the certitude of knowledge and of direction to an end, while the certitude of foreknowledge is merely the certitude of knowledge. For God does not preordain the reprobate to sin as He ordains the predestined to merit.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod auctoritas illa est intelligenda non de numero praedestinatorum, sed de numero eorum qui sunt in statu praesentis iustitiae; quod patet ex interlineari, quae ibi dicit: numero et merito. Numerus autem iste et augetur et minuitur, quamvis praefinitio Dei, qua etiam istum numerum praediffinit, nunquam fallatur. Diffinit enim quod uno tempore sint plures et alio pauciores; vel etiam diffinit per modum sententiae aliquem certum numerum secundum rationes inferiores convenientem, quae definitio mutari potest; sed praediffinit alium per modum consilii secundum rationes superiores; et haec praefinitio invariabilis est, quia ut dicit Gregorius: Deus mutat sententiam, sed non consilium.
| 1. That quotation from Deuteronomy should be understood as referring, not to the number of the predestined, but to the number of those who are in the state of present justice. This is clear from the Interlinear Gloss, which adds: “In number and in merit.” Now, this number of those in present justice is both increased and diminished; but God’s appointment, which predefines this number, too, is never wrong, because it is He who decrees that there be more of these at one time and fewer at another. Or we could even answer that God defines a certain number in the manner of a judgment in harmony with inferior reasons, and this limitation can be changed; but He predestines another number in the manner of an election in harmony with superior reasons, and this limitation cannot be changed. For Gregory says: “He changes His judgment but never His election.”
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod nulla praeparatio disponit ad habendam aliquam perfectionem nisi suo tempore; sicut naturalis complexio disponit puerum ad hoc quod sit fortis vel sapiens, non quidem tempore pueritiae, sed tempore perfectae aetatis. Tempus autem habendi gratiam est simul cum tempore praeparationis naturae; unde non potest inter utrumque aliquod impedimentum intercidere; et sic in quocumque invenitur praeparatio naturae, invenitur et gratia. Sed tempus habendi gloriam non est simul cum tempore gratiae; unde inter utrumque potest medium impedimentum intercidere; et propter hoc non est necessarium quod praescitus qui habet gratiam, sit habiturus gloriam.
| 2. No preparation disposes anything to have a perfection at a time other than its proper time. For example, his natural temperament may dispose a boy to be brave or wise—not, however, in the days of his childhood, but in the days of his manhood. Now, the time when one obtains grace is simultaneous with the time when nature is prepared. Consequently, no barrier can come between them. Thus, when the preparation of nature is found in a person, grace is also found in him. But the time when one obtains glory is not simultaneous with the time when he has grace. Consequently, a barrier can come between these two. For this reason, one who is foreknown to possess grace will not necessarily possess glory also.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod non est neque ex defectu gratiae neque ex defectu dantis gloriam, quod habens gratiam gloria privetur, sed ex defectu recipientis, in quo impedimentum intervenit.
| 3. That one who had grace is nevertheless deprived of glory is not due to failure either on the part of grace or on the part of Him who gives glory. It is due rather to a failure on the part of the recipient, in whom an impediment has arisen.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod ponitur aliquis esse praescitus, ponitur non habiturus finalem gratiam, cum cognitio Dei feratur ad res futuras sicut super praesentia, ut alibi dictum est; et ideo, sicut huic quod est non esse habiturum finalem gratiam, est incompossibile hoc quod est eundem esse habiturum finalem gratiam quamvis in se sit possibile, ita est incompossibile ei quod est esse praescitum, quamvis in se scit possibile.
| 4. When we affirm that a person is foreknown [as lost], we thereby affirm that he will not have final grace; for, as we pointed out previously,” God’s knowledge is directed to future things as though they were present. Consequently, just as the condition of not having final grace cannot be reconciled with the condition of having final grace, even though the former condition is possible if taken by itself, so the condition of having final grace cannot be reconciled with the condition of being foreknown [as lost], even though the former condition is also possible if taken by itself.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod non est defectus ex divina scientia, quin scitum a Deo sit simpliciter necessarium, sed est defectus ex causa proxima. Aeternitatem autem, ut sit sine principio et fine durans in medio, habet praedicta necessitas ex divina scientia, quae aeterna est, non ex causa proxima, quae est temporalis et mutabilis.
| 5. The fact that such a thing known by God is not absolutely necessary comes, not from a defect in God’s knowledge, but from a defect in the proximate cause. On the other hand, the reason why this necessity is eternal—without beginning and end, and, as it were, without succession—comes from God’s knowledge, which is eternal, not from the proximate cause, which is temporal and changeable.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis de ratione finiti numeri non sit quin possit esse eo aliquis maior, tamen hoc potest esse ex aliquo alio, scilicet ex immobilitate divinae praescientiae, ut in proposito apparet; sicut quod aliqua quantitate in rebus naturalibus accepta, non possit alia maior inveniri, non est ex ratione quantitatis, sed ex condicione rei naturalis.
| 6. Even though finite number as finite number does not prevent a larger number from existing, the impossibility may come from another source, namely, from the fixed character of God’s foreknowledge, which is apparent in the problem at hand. Similarly, when we consider the size of some natural thing, we see that a larger size cannot exist, not because of the nature of quantity, but because of the nature of the thing itself.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod bonitas divina non communicat seipsam nisi secundum ordinem sapientiae; hic est enim optimus communicandi modus. Ordo autem divinae sapientiae requirit ut omnia sint facta in numero et pondere et mensura, ut dicitur Sap. XI, 21; et ideo convenit divinae bonitati ut sit certus praedestinatorum numerus.
| 7. The divine goodness communicates itself only under the guidance of wisdom, for this is the best manner for its communication. Now, as we read in Wisdom (11:2 1), the ordering of God’s wisdom requires that all things be made according to “number, weight, and measure.” Consequently, that there be a definite number of predestined is in harmony with God’s goodness.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod, sicut ex dictis patet, quamvis de quolibet absolute concedi posset quod Deus potest eum praedestinare vel non praedestinare, tamen supposito quod praedestinaverit, non potest non praedestinare, vel e contrario, quia non potest esse mutabilis. Et ideo dicitur communiter quod haec: Deus potest non praedestinatum praedestinare, vel praedestinatum non praedestinare; in sensu composito est falsa sed in diviso est vera. Et propter hoc omnes illae locutiones quae sensum compositum implicant, sunt falsae simpliciter. Unde non est concedendum quod numero praedestinatorum possit fieri additio vel subtractio, quia additio praesupponit illud cui additur, et subtractio illud a quo subtrahitur; et eadem ratione non potest concedi quod Deus possit plures praedestinare quam praedestinet, vel pauciores.
| 8. As is clear from what was said previously, while it may be granted with reference to a determined person that God, absolutely speaking, can predestine or not predestine him, nevertheless, supposing that God has predestined him, He cannot not predestine him. Nor is the opposite possible, because God cannot change. Consequently, it is commonly said that the following proposition, “God can predestine one who is not predestined or not predestine one who is predestined,” is false if taken in a composite sense, but true if taken in a divided sense. All statements, therefore, which imply that composite sense are absolutely false. Thus, we must not concede that the number of the predestined can be increased or diminished, because addition presupposes something which is increased, and subtraction, something which is diminished. For the same reason, we cannot concede that God can predestine more or fewer than He has already predestined.
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| Nec est simile quod inducitur de factione, quia factio est actus quidam qui terminatur ad effectum exterius; et ideo quod Deus facit primo, et post non facit aliquid, non ostendit aliquam mutationem in ipso, sed in effectu solum. Sed praedestinatio et praescientia, et huiusmodi sunt actus intrinseci, in quibus non posset esse variatio sine variatione Dei; et ideo nihil quod ad variationem horum actuum pertineat concedi debet.
| Furthermore, the example drawn from the making of things is not to the point; for making is a particular action terminating exteriorly in an effect, and the fact that God makes something first and does not make it later indicates no change in God but only in the effect. On the other hand, predestination, foreknowledge, and similar things are acts intrinsic to God; and no change can take place in them without a change taking place in God. Nothing, therefore, that implies a change in these acts should be granted.
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| Ad nonum autem et decimum patet responsio per haec quia procedunt de potentia absoluta, non facta aliqua praesuppositione de praedestinatione facta vel non facta.
| 9-10. The answer to these arguments is clear, for they are based on an understanding of God’s power as absolute, not as modified by a supposition of predestination or non-predestination.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod Glossa illa intelligenda est hoc modo quod non intrant tot de Iudaeis, quot sunt omnes qui sunt praeordinati ad vitam, quia non soli Iudaei sunt praedestinati. Vel potest dici, quod non loquitur de praeordinatione praedestinationis, sed praeparationis, qua per legem disponebantur ad vitam. Vel potest dici, quod non intraverunt tot in primitiva Ecclesia, quia cum plenitudo gentium intraverit, tunc et omnis Israel salvus fiet in Ecclesia finali.
| 11. That Gloss should be understood as meaning this: the number of Jews entering is not as large as the total number of all those who have been preordained to life, for it is not only Jews who have been predestined. Or one could reply that the Gloss is not speaking about the preordination of predestination but about the preordination of preparation by which the Jews were disposed for life by means of the Law. Or, finally, one could reply that not as many Jews entered the early Church as are predestined, because, as we read in the Epistle to the Romans(11:25-26): “When the fulness of the Gentiles should come in... all Israel will be saved” in the Church at the end of time.
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ARTICLE VI
In the sixth article we ask:
Can predestination be helped by the prayers of the saints?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 23, 8; I Sent., 41, 1, 4; IV Sent., 45, 3, 3; C.G., III, cc. 95-96, 113.]
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| Sexto quaeritur utrum praedestinatio possit iuvari precibus sanctorum
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems not, for
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| Quia eiusdem est adiuvari et impediri. Sed praedestinatio non potest impediri. Ergo nec aliquo adiuvari.
| 1. What can be aided can be prevented, but predestination cannot be prevented. Therefore, it cannot be aided in any way.
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| Praeterea, illud quo posito vel remoto nihilominus alterum habet suum effectum, non iuvat ipsum. Sed praedestinatio oportet quod suum effectum habeat, cum falli non possit: sive oratio fiat, sive non fiat. Ergo praedestinatio orationibus non iuvatur.
| 2. When one thing has its effect whether another thing is present or not, the latter is no help to it. But predestination must have its effect, because it cannot fail whether prayers take place or not. Consequently, predestination is not helped by prayers.
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| Praeterea, nullum aeternum praeceditur ab aliquo temporali. Sed oratio est temporalis, praedestinatio autem aeterna. Ergo praedestinationem oratio praecedere non potest, et ita nec eam adiuvare.
| 3. Nothing eternal is preceded by something temporal. But prayer is temporal, and predestination is eternal. Therefore, prayer cannot precede predestination, and, consequently, cannot help it.
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| Praeterea, membra corporis mystici gerunt in se similitudinem membrorum corporis naturalis, ut patet I Corinth., cap. XII, 12 ss. Sed unum membrum in corpore naturali non acquirit perfectionem suam per alterum. Ergo nec in corpore mystico. Sed membra corporis mystici maxime perficiuntur per praedestinationis effectus. Ergo unus homo non iuvatur ad effectus praedestinationis consequendos precibus alterius.
| 4. As is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:12), the members of the mystical body resemble the members of a natural body. Now, in a natural body, a member does not acquire its perfection by means of another member. Consequently, the same is true [of members] in the mystical body. But the members of the mystical body receive their greatest perfection through the effects of predestination. Therefore, one man is not aided in obtaining the effects of predestination by the prayers of another.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod dicitur Genes. cap. XXV, 21: quod Isaac rogavit dominum pro Rebecca uxore sua, eo quod sterilis esset; qui exaudivit eum, et dedit conceptum Rebeccae; et ex illo conceptu natus est Iacob, qui ab aeterno praedestinatus fuerat; nec unquam fuisset praedestinatio impleta, nisi natus fuisset. Quod oratione Isaac est impetratum; ergo praedestinatio orationibus iuvatur.
| 1. We read in Genesis (25:2 1): “Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and he heard him, and made Rebecca to conceive.” As a result of this conception Jacob was born, who had been predestined from all eternity; and this predestination would never have been fulfilled had he not been born. But it was effected by the prayer of Isaac. Consequently, predestination is helped by prayers.
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| Praeterea, in quodam sermone de conversione sancti Pauli legitur quasi ex persona domini dicentis ad Paulum: disposui in mente mea perdere te nisi Stephanus servus meus orasset pro te; ergo oratio Stephani Paulum a reprobatione liberavit; ergo et per eam est praedestinatus; et sic idem quod prius.
| 2. In a certain sermon on the conversion of St. Paul, in which the Lord is represented as speaking to Paul, we read: “Unless Stephen, my servant, had prayed for you, I would have destroyed you.” The prayers of Stephen, therefore, freed Paul from reprobation; and so through these prayers he was predestined. Hence, we conclude as before.
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| Praeterea, aliquis potest alicui mereri primam gratiam. Ergo eadem ratione et gratiam finalem. Sed quicumque gratiam finalem habet, est praedestinatus. Ergo aliquis potest iuvari orationibus alterius ad hoc quod sit praedestinatus.
| 3. One can merit the first grace for someone. For the same reason, therefore, he can also merit final grace for him. But whoever possesses final grace is predestined. Therefore, the predestination of one person can be furthered by the prayers of another.
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| Praeterea, Gregorius oravit pro Traiano, et eum ab Inferno liberavit, ut Damascenus narrat in quodam sermone de mortuis; et ita videtur quod ipse liberatus sit a societate reproborum orationibus Gregorii; et sic idem quod prius.
| 4. As Damascene tells us in a certain sermon on the dead, Gregory prayed for Trajan and freed him from hell. It seems, therefore, that he was freed from the company of the damned by Gregory’s prayers. Hence, the same must be said as before.
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| Praeterea, membra corporis mystici sunt similia membris corporis naturalis. Sed membrum unum iuvatur per alterum in corpore naturali. Ergo etiam in corpore mystico; et sic idem quod prius.
| 5. The members of the mystical body resemble the members of a natural body. But in a natural body one member is helped by another. Consequently, the same is true in the mystical body, and the above proposition stands.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod praedestinationem iuvari precibus sanctorum dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod orationes sanctorum iuvent ad hoc quod aliquis praedestinetur; et hoc non potest esse verum neque de orationibus secundum quod in propria natura existunt, quia temporales sunt, praedestinatio autem aeterna; neque etiam secundum quod existunt in Dei praescientia, quia praescientia meritorum vel propriorum vel alienorum non est praedestinationis causa, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo potest intelligi praedestinationem precibus sanctorum iuvari, quod oratio iuvet ad consequendum praedestinationis effectum, sicut aliquis iuvatur instrumento, quo suum opus perficit; et sic est inquisitum de hac quaestione ab omnibus qui Dei providentiam circa res humanas posuerunt; sed diversimode est ab eis determinatum.
| That predestination can be helped by the prayers of the saints can be understood in two ways. First, it can mean that the prayers of the saints help one to be predestined. This, however, cannot be true of prayers, either as they exist in their own proper condition, which is temporal while predestination is eternal, or as they exist in God’s foreknowledge, because, as explained above, foreknowledge of merits is. not the cause of predestination, whether the merits be one’s own or those of another. On the other hand, that predestination is furthered by the prayers of the saints can mean that their prayers help us obtain the effect of predestination as an instrument helps one in finishing his work. The problem has been considered in this way by all those who have studied God’s providence over human affairs. Their answers, however, have been different.
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| Quidam enim, attendentes immobilitatem divinae ordinationis, posuerunt quod oratio vel sacrificium vel huiusmodi in nullo prodesse potest. Et haec dicitur fuisse Epicureorum opinio, qui omnia immobiliter evenire dicebant ex dispositione superiorum corporum, quae deos nominabant.
| Attending only to the immutability of God’s decrees, some have declared that prayer, sacrifice, and similar actions help in no way at all. This is said to have been the opinion of the Epicureans, who taught that all things happened necessarily because of the influence of celestial bodies, which they called gods.
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| Alii autem dixerunt, quod secundum hoc sacrificia et orationes valent, quia per huiusmodi mutatur praeordinatio eorum ad quos pertinet disponere de actibus humanis. Et haec dicitur fuisse opinio Stoicorum, qui ponebant res omnes regi quibusdam spiritibus, quos deos vocabant; et cum ab eis esset aliquid praedefinitum, orationibus et sacrificiis poterat obtineri ut talis definitio mutaretur, placatis deorum animis, ut dicebant. Et in istam sententiam quasi videtur incidisse Avicenna in fine suae Metaph.: ponit enim omnia quae aguntur in rebus humanis, quorum principium est voluntas humana, reducuntur in voluntates animarum caelestium. Ponit enim, corpora caelestia esse animata; et sicut corpus caeleste habet influentiam super corpus humanum, ita animae caelestes, secundum eum, habent influentiam super animas humanas, et quod ad earum imaginationem sequuntur ea quae in his inferioribus eveniunt. Et ideo sacrificia et orationes valent, secundum eum, ad hoc quod huiusmodi animae concipiant ea quae nobis volumus evenire.
| Others said that sacrifices and prayers help to this extent, that they change the preordination made by those who have the power to determine human acts. This is said to have been the opinion of the Stoics, who taught that all things are ruled by certain spirits whom they called gods; and, even though something had been pre-established by them, according to the Stoics, such a prearrangement could be changed by placating their souls through prayers and sacrifices. Avicenna seems to have fallen into this error, too; for he asserts that all human actions whose principle is the human will can be reduced to the wills of celestial souls. He thought that the heavenly bodies had souls, and, just as a heavenly body influences a human body, so, according to him, the celestial souls influence human souls. In fact, what takes place in things here below is according to the notions of these celestial souls. Consequently, he thought that sacrifices and prayers helped these souls to conceive what we wished to take place.
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| Sed istae positiones a fide sunt alienae; quia prima positio tollit libertatem arbitrii, secunda autem tollit praedestinationis certitudinem. Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod praedestinatio divina nunquam mutatur; sed tamen orationes et alia bona opera valent ad consequendum praedestinationis effectum. In quolibet enim ordine causarum, attendendus est non solum ordo primae causae ad effectum, sed etiam ordo causae secundae ad effectum, et ordo causae primae ad secundam, quia causa secunda non ordinatur ad effectum nisi ex ordinatione causae primae. Causa enim prima dat secundae quod influat super effectum suum, ut patet in Lib. de causis.
| These theories, however, are opposed to the Faith. For the first destroys freedom of choice; the second, the certainty of predestination. Consequently, we must answer the problem differently, and must say that, while God’s predestination never changes, prayers and other good works are nevertheless effective in obtaining the effect of predestination. Now, when considering any order of causes, we must consider not only the order of the first cause to the effect but also the order of the second cause to the effect and the order of the first cause to the second cause, since the second cause is ordered to an effect only through the direction of the first cause. For, as is clear from The Causes, the first cause gives to the second cause the power of influencing the effect.
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| Dico igitur, quod praedestinationis effectus est salus humana, quae ab ea procedit sicut a causa prima; sed eius possunt esse multae causae aliae proximae quasi instrumentales, quae sunt ordinatae a divina praedestinatione ad salutem humanam, sicut instrumenta applicantur ab artifice ad effectum artis explendum. Unde, sicut praedestinationis divinae est effectus quod iste salvetur, ita et quod per orationes talis vel per talia merita salvetur. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit in I libro dialogorum ea quae sancti viri orando efficiunt, ita praedestinata sunt, ut precibus obtineantur; propter quod, ut dicit Boetius in libro V de consolatione: preces, cum rectae sunt, inefficaces esse non possunt.
| I say, therefore, that the effect of predestination is man’s salvation, and this comes from it as from its first cause. It can have, however, many other proximate and, as it were, instrumental causes, which are ordered by divine predestination for man’s salvation, as tools are used by a craftsman for completing a product of his craft. Consequently, the effect of God’s predestination is not only that an individual person be saved but also that he be saved by certain prayers or certain merits. Gregory also said this: “What holy men effect by their prayers is predestined to be obtained by prayer.” Consequently, Boethius says: “If we pray well, our prayers cannot be without effect.”
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod nihil est quod ordinem praedestinationis possit infringere, et ideo impediri non potest; sed multa sunt quae ordini praedestinationis subiacent ut causae mediae; et ista dicuntur iuvare praedestinationem, modo praedicto.
| 1. There is nothing that can check the ordering of predestination. Consequently, predestination cannot be impeded. Many things, however, are related to the ordering of predestination as intermediate causes; and these are said to further predestination in the manner described.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex quo praedestinatum est quod talis orationibus talibus salvetur, non possunt orationes removeri nisi praedestinatione remota; sicut nec salus humana, quae est praedestinationis effectus.
| 2. From the fact that it is predestined that a certain man will be saved because of certain prayers, these prayers cannot be omitted without detriment to his predestination. The same is true of man’s salvation, which is the effect of predestination.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit quod oratio non iuvet praedestinationem quasi causa; et hoc concedendum est.
| 3. That argument proves that prayer does not help predestination by being, as it were, its cause. This we concede.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod effectus praedestinationis, qui sunt gratia et gloria, non se habent per modum perfectionis primae, sed per modum perfectionis secundae. Membra autem corporis naturalis, quamvis non iuventur ab invicem in perfectionibus primis consequendis, iuvantur tamen invicem, quantum ad perfectiones secundas; et est etiam aliquod membrum in corpore quod primo formatum iuvat ad formationem aliorum membrorum, scilicet cor; unde ratio procedit ex falso.
| 4. The effects of predestination, which are grace and glory, are not, as it were, basic perfections but secondary perfections. Now, even though the members of a natural body do not help each other in acquiring their basic perfections, they nevertheless do help each other to acquire their secondary perfections. There is, moreover, a member in the body which, having been formed first, helps in the formation of other members—namely, the heart. Consequently, the argument proceeds on a false assumption.
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| Answers to Contrary Difficulties
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| Ad primum autem in contrarium concedimus.
| 1. We concede this argument.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod Paulus nunquam fuit reprobatus secundum dispositionem divini consilii, quod est immutabile; sed solum secundum dispositionem divinae sententiae quae accipitur secundum inferiores causas, quae quandoque mutantur. Unde non sequitur quod oratio fuerit praedestinationis causa, sed quod iuverit solum ad praedestinationis effectum.
| 2. Paul was never reprobated according to the disposition made by divine election, because this is unchangeable. He was reprobated, however, according to a [provisional] judgment of God in harmony with lower causes, a judgment which sometimes changes. It follows, therefore, not that prayer was the cause of predestination, but that it furthered only the effect of predestination.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis praedestinatio et gratia finalis convertantur, tamen non oportet quod quidquid est causa gratiae finalis, quocumque modo, sit etiam causa praedestinationis, sicut patet ex supra dictis.
| 3. Although predestination and final grace are interchangeable, it does not necessarily follow that whatever is the cause of final grace in any manner whatsoever is also the cause of predestination. This is clear from what has been said previously.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis Traianus esset in loco reproborum, non tamen erat simpliciter reprobatus; praedestinatum enim erat quod precibus Gregorii salvaretur.
| 4. Although Trajan was in the place of the damned, he was not damned absolutely; for he was predestined to be saved by the prayers of Gregory.
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| Quintum concedimus.
| 5. We concede the fifth argument.
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