ARTICLE I
This question treats the communication of angelic knowledge by illumination and
speech;
and in the first article we ask:
Does one angel illumine another?
[Parallel readings; S.T., I, 106, 1; 111, 1; 1I Sent., 9, 1, 2; 11, 1, 2; Comp. Theol., I, c. 126.]
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| Quaestio est de communicatione scientiae angelicae per illuminationes et locutiones. Et primo quaeritur utrum unus Angelus alium illuminet
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems not, for
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| Quia, ut dicit Augustinus, solus Deus potest mentem formare. Sed illuminatio Angeli est quaedam formatio mentis illuminati, ergo solus Deus potest Angelum illuminare.
| 1. As Augustine says,’ only God can perfect a mind. But the illumination of an angel is, in a way, a perfecting of the mind of the person illumined. Hence, only God can illumine an angel.
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| Praeterea, in Angelis non est aliud lumen nisi gratiae et naturae. Sed lumine naturae unus Angelus alium non illuminat, quia unusquisque habet naturalia sua immediate a Deo; similiter nec lumine gratiae, quae immediate a solo Deo est. Ergo unus Angelus alium non potest illuminare.
| 2. There are no lights in angels other than those of nature and of grace. Now, one angel does not illumine another by the light of nature, because every angel has his natural powers directly from God, nor does one angel illumine another by the light of grace, because grace also comes directly from God alone. Consequently, one angel cannot illumine another.
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| Praeterea, sicut se habet corpus ad lumen corporale, ita spiritus ad lumen spirituale. Sed corpus illuminatum a lumine superexcedenti, non illuminatur simul a lumine minori; sicut aer illuminatus a lumine solis, non simul illuminatur a luna. Ergo, cum plus excedat lumen spirituale divinum quodlibet lumen creatum, quam lumen solis lumen candelae vel stellae; videtur quod, cum omnes Angeli illuminentur a Deo, quod unus ab alio non illuminetur.
| 3. As a body is related to material light, so is a spirit related to spiritual light. Now, a body illuminated by a very bright light is not illuminated simultaneously by a weaker light. For example, air illuminated by the light of the sun is not illuminated at the same time by the moon Consequently, since God’s spiritual light surpasses any created light more than the light of the sun surpasses that of a star or of a candle, it seems one angel is not illumined by another, simply because all angels are illumined by God.
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| Praeterea, si unus Angelus alium illuminat, aut hoc est per medium, aut sine medio. Sed non sine medio, quia sic oporteret unum Angelum alteri illuminato per ipsum esse coniunctum; quod esse non potest cum solus Deus mentibus illabatur. Similiter nec per medium: quia nec per corporale medium, cum non sit spiritualis luminis receptivum; nec per spirituale, quia hoc spirituale medium non potest poni aliud quam Angelus; et sic vel esset abire in infinitum in mediis: quod si esset, non posset sequi aliqua illuminatio, cum sit impossibile infinita pertransire; vel erit devenire ad hoc quod unus Angelus alium immediate illuminet: quod ostensum est esse impossibile. Ergo impossibile est quod unus Angelus alium illuminet.
| 4. If one angel illumines another, he does this either through a medium or directly. But he cannot do it directly, because then he would have to be joined directly to the angel he is to illumine; and only God can be joined to minds in this manner. On the other hand, he cannot illumine another angel through a medium. He cannot illumine by means of a material medium, because such a medium cannot receive a spiritual light. Nor can he illumine by means of a spiritual medium because this medium would have to be an angel, and then an infinite series would arise, and illumination would be utterly impossible, for it is impossible to pass through an infinite. And, if we finally arrive at a point where one angel directly illumines another, this has already been shown to be impossible. Consequently, it is impossible for one angel to illumine another.
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| Praeterea, si unus Angelus alium illuminet, aut hoc est per hoc quod tradit ei lumen proprium, aut per hoc quod dat ei aliquod aliud lumen. Sed non primo modo, quia sic unum et idem lumen esset in diversis illuminatis. Nec iterum secundo modo, quia sic oporteret quod illud lumen esset factum a superiori Angelo; ex quo sequeretur quod Angelus esset creator illius luminis, cum illud lumen non fiat ex materia. Ergo videtur quod unus Angelus alium non illuminet.
| 5. If one angel illumines another, he does this by giving him either his own light or some other light. But he does not do it in the first manner, because, in that case, one and the same light would be in two different illuminated beings; nor does he do it in the second manner, because that light then would have to be made by the higher angel and from this it would follow that he created that light, since such a light is not made out of matter. Therefore, it seems that one angel doe not illumine another.
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| Praeterea, si unus Angelus ab alio illuminatur, oportet quod Angelus illuminatus reducatur de potentia in actum, quia illuminari est quoddam fieri. Sed quandocumque aliquid reducitur de potentia in actum, oportet in eo aliquid corrumpi. Cum igitur in Angelis nihil corrumpatur, videtur quod unus ab alio non illuminetur.
| 6. If one angel is to be illumined by another, then the illumined angel must be reduced from potency to act, because to be illumined is a kind of becoming. But whenever a thing is reduced from potency to act something in it must undergo corruption. Now, since nothing in an gels can corrupt, it seems that one angel is not illumined by another.
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| Praeterea, si unus ab alio illuminatur, lumen quod unus alii tradit, aut est substantia, aut accidens. Sed non potest esse substantia, quia forma substantialis superaddita variat speciem, sicut unitas speciem numeri, sicut dicitur VIII Metaphys.; et sic sequeretur quod Angelus per hoc quod illuminatur, secundum speciem variaretur. Similiter non potest esse accidens, quia accidens non se extendit ultra subiectum. Ergo unus Angelus alium non illuminat.
| 7. If one angel is illumined by another, the light which one gives to the other is either a substance or an accident. Now, it cannot be a substance, because, as Aristotle says, when a substantial form is added to a thing, it changes the species of the thing, just as an added unit changes the species of a number; hence, it would follow that an angel, by the fact of being illumined, would undergo a specific change. Similarly this light cannot be an accident, because an accident does not extend beyond its subject. Hence, one angel does not illumine another.
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| Praeterea, ad hoc visus noster et corporalis et intellectualis lumine indiget, quia eius obiectum est intelligibile et visibile in potentia, ut per lumen fiat intelligibile et visibile in actu. Sed obiectum cognitionis angelicae est intelligibile in actu, quod est ipsa divina essentia, vel species concreatae. Ergo ad cognoscendum non indigent intelligibili lumine.
| 8. Our sensible and intellectual vision needs light, because its object is only potentially visible and potentially intelligible, but, by means of light, becomes actually visible and actually intelligible. Now, the object of angelic knowledge is actually intelligible, because it is the divine essence itself or co-created species. Consequently, angels do not need intellectual light in order to know.
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| Praeterea, si unus alium illuminat, aut hoc est respectu cognitionis naturalis, aut respectu cognitionis gratiae. Sed non respectu cognitionis naturalis, quia tam in superioribus quam in inferioribus naturalis cognitio est perfecta per formas innatas. Similiter nec quantum ad cognitionem gratiae qua res in verbo cognoscunt, quia omnes Angeli verbum immediate vident. Ergo unus alium non illuminat.
| 9. If one angel illumines another, he illumines him with respect to either natural or gratuitous knowledge. However, he does not illumine him with respect to natural knowledge, because the natural knowledge had by both higher and lower angels is made perfect through innate forms; nor does he illumine him with respect to the gratuitous knowledge by which angels know things in the Word, because all angels see the Word directly. Consequently, one angel does not illumine another.
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| Praeterea, ad cognitionem intellectus non requiritur nisi forma intelligibilis et lumen intelligibile. Sed unus Angelus alteri non tradit neque formas intelligibiles, quae sunt concreatae, neque lumen intelligibile, cum unusquisque a Deo illuminetur, secundum Iob, XXV, 3: numquid est numerus militum eius, et super quem non fulget lumen illius? Ergo unus alium non illuminat.
| 10. For intellectual knowledge, all that is required is an intelligible form and an intelligible light. Now, one angel does not give another angel intelligible forms, which are co-created, nor does he give him an intelligible light, because every angel is illumined by God, as we read in Job (25:3): “Is there any numbering of his soldiers? and upon whom shall not his light arise?” Therefore, one angel does not illumine another.
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| Praeterea, illuminatio ordinatur ad tenebras pellendas. Sed in cognitione Angelorum nulla est tenebra vel obscuritas; unde II Corinth., XII, dicit Glossa, quod in regione intelligibilium, quam constat esse regionem Angelorum, sine omni imaginatione corporis mens videt perspicuam veritatem, nullis opinionum falsarum nebulis fuscatam. Ergo Angelus ab Angelo non illuminatur.
| 11. The purpose of illumination is to dispel darkness. But there is no darkness or obscurity in angelic knowledge. Consequently, the Gloss reads: “In the region of intelligible substances,”—clearly a reference to the regions where angels dwell—“the mind sees truth clearly, without any corporeal images, and not obscured by the mists of false opinions.” Hence, one angel is not illumined by another.
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| Praeterea, intellectus angelicus est nobilior quam intellectus agens animae nostrae. Sed intellectus agens nostrae animae nunquam illuminatur, sed solum illuminat. Ergo nec Angeli illuminantur
| 12. An angelic intellect is more noble than the active intellect of our soul. But the active intellect of our soul only illumines; it is never illumined. Therefore, angels are not illumined.
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| Praeterea, Apoc. XXI, 23, dicitur, quod civitas (beatorum) non eget sole neque luna, nam claritas Dei illuminabit eam; et exponit Glossa solem et lunam doctores maiores et minores. Ergo, cum Angelus sit iam civis illius civitatis, non illuminatur nisi a solo Deo.
| 13. We read the following in the Apocalypse (21:23): “And the city has no need of the sun, nor of the moon, to shine in it. For the glory of God has enlightened it...” The Gloss expounds this text as referring to the principal and minor Doctors of the Church. Therefore, since an angel is already a citizen of that city, he is illumined only by God.
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| Praeterea, si Angelus Angelum illuminat, aut hoc est per abundantiam naturalis luminis, aut per abundantiam gratuiti. Sed non per abundantiam naturalis, quia cum Angelus qui cecidit, fuerit de supremis Angelis, habuit naturalia excellentissima, quae in eo integra manent, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Divin. Nomin., et sic Daemon Angelum illuminaret, quod est absurdum. Similiter nec per abundantiam luminis gratiae, quia aliquis homo in statu viae est maioris gratiae quam inferiores Angeli; cum ex virtute gratiae aliqui homines transferantur ad ordinem superiorum Angelorum; et sic homo in statu viae existens Angelum illuminaret, quod est absurdum. Ergo unus Angelus alium non illuminat.
| 14. If one angel illumines another, he does this either through the abundance of the light given to him by his nature or through the abundance of light given him gratuitously. Now, one angel cannot illumine another through the abundance of his natural light, because the angel who fell belonged to the highest angels, and possessed the highest natural gifts, which, as Dionysius says, remained with him in their full strength. Consequently, a demon would be able to illumine an angel, and this is clearly absurd. Nor does one angel illumine another through the abundance of light given him gratuitously, because some men still living possess more grace than the lower angels do; indeed, because of their grace, they will be elevated to the ranks of the higher angels. Hence, a man still living could illumine an angel, and this is equally absurd. Therefore, one angel does not illumine another.
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| Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, cap. VII caelestis hierarchiae, quod illuminatio est divinae scientiae assumptio. Sed divina scientia non potest dici nisi quae est de Deo, vel quae est de rebus divinis. Et utrolibet modo scientiam divinam non assumit Angelus nisi a Deo. Ergo unus Angelus alium non illuminat.
| 15. Dionysius says: “To be illumined is to receive divine knowledge.” Now, divine knowledge can be only that knowledge which is about God or divine things; and, in either case, angels can receive such knowledge only from God. Consequently, one angel does not illumine another.
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| Praeterea, cum potentia intellectus angelici sit tota terminata per formas innatas, formae innatae sufficiunt ad omnia cognoscenda quae Angelus cognoscere potest. Ergo non oportet quod a superiori Angelo illuminetur ad aliquid cognoscendum.
| 16. Since the potency of an angelic intellect is entirely terminated by means of innate forms, these forms suffice for an angel to know all that he can know. Consequently, an angel should not need to be illumined by a higher angel in order to know something.
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| Praeterea, Angeli omnes ad invicem specie differunt; vel saltem illi qui sunt diversorum ordinum. Sed nihil illuminatur a lumine alterius speciei; sicut res corporalis non illuminatur lumine spirituali. Ergo unus Angelus ab alio non illuminatur.
| 17. All angels, or at least those belonging to different orders, differ specifically from one another. Now, nothing is illumined by a light belonging to another species; for example, a material thing is not illumined by a light that is spiritual. Therefore, one angel is not illumined by another.
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| Praeterea, lumen intellectus angelici est perfectius quam lumen intellectus agentis nostri. Sed lumen intellectus nostri agentis sufficit ad omnes species quas a sensu accipimus. Ergo et lumen intellectus angelici sufficit ad omnes species innatas; et sic non oportet quod aliud lumen superaddatur.
| 18. The light of an angel’s intellect is more perfect than the light of our active intellect. But the light of our active intellect suffices for us to know all the species we receive from our senses. Therefore, the light of an angel’s intellect is also sufficient for an angel to know all his innate species; consequently, no other light need be added to him.
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| To the Contrary
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| Sed contra. Est quod dicit Dionysius, cap. III Cael. Hierarch., quod ordo hierarchiae est hos quidem illuminari, illos vero illuminare; ergo et cetera.
| 1. Dionysius says that the angelic hierarchy is divided into “those who are illumined and those who illumine.” Therefore.
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| Praeterea, sicut est ordo in hominibus, ita est ordo in Angelis; ut patet per Dionysium. Sed in hominibus superiores illuminant inferiores, ut dicitur Ephes. cap. III, 8-9: mihi autem omnium sanctorum minimo data est gratia haec (...) illuminare omnes, etc., ergo et superiores Angeli inferiores illuminant.
| 2. just as there is a hierarchy among men, so is there a hierarchy among angels. This is clear from what Dionysius has written. Now, among men, superiors enlighten inferiors. For example, St. Paul says in the Epistle to the Ephesians (3:8-9): “To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace, to preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ, and to enlighten all men...” Therefore, superior angels likewise illumine inferior angels.
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| Praeterea, lumen spirituale est efficacius quam corporale. Sed superiora corpora illuminant inferiora. Ergo et superiores Angeli illuminant inferiores.
| 3. Spiritual light is more efficacious than material light. But higher bodies illumine lower bodies. Therefore, higher angels illumine lower angels.
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| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod de lumine intellectuali oportet nos loqui ad similitudinem corporalis luminis. Lumen autem corporale est medium quo videmus; et servit nostro visui in duobus: uno modo in hoc quod per ipsum fit nobis visibile actu quod erat potentia visibile; alio modo in hoc quod visus ipse confortatur ad videndum ex luminis natura; unde et oportet esse lumen in compositione organi.
| We should discuss intellectual light in terms of its resemblance to material light. Now, material light is a medium by which we can see things, serving our sense of sight in two ways: first, it makes things actually visible that were previously only potentially visible; second, its nature helps the sense of sight to see. Consequently, light must be in the very composition of the organ.
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| Unde et lumen intellectuale potest dici ipse vigor intellectus ad intelligendum, vel etiam id quo aliquid fit nobis notum. Unde secundum duo potest aliquis illuminari ab alio: scilicet secundum hoc quod eius intellectus confortatur ad cognoscenda, et secundum hoc quod intellectus ex aliquo manuducitur in aliquod cognoscendum. Et haec duo coniunguntur in intellectu, sicut patet cum aliquis per aliquod medium quod mente concipit, intellectus eius confortatur ad alia videnda quae prius videre non poterat.
| Similarly, intellectual light can be said to be the power of knowing which the intellect possesses, or even that thing by which another thing becomes known to us. There are two ways, therefore, in which a person can be illumined by another: first, his intellect can be strengthened for the acts of knowledge; second, it can be guided by something to the knowledge of some other thing. Both of these actions are found together in the intellect; and we have a clear case of both of them happening together when the medium which a person mentally conceives strengthens his intellect to see some things which it previously could not see.
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| Secundum hoc ergo unus intellectus ab alio illuminari dicitur, inquantum traditur ei aliquod medium cognoscendi, quo intellectus confortatus potest in aliqua cognoscibilia, in quae prius non poterat. Quod quidem dupliciter apud nos contingit. Uno modo per sermonem; ut cum docens verbo suo tradit aliquod medium discipulo, per quod eius intellectus confortatur ad aliqua intelligenda, quae prius intelligere non poterat. Et sic magister dicitur illuminare discipulum. Alio modo inquantum alicui proponitur aliquod sensibile signum, ex quo quis potest manuduci in alicuius intelligibilis cognitionem. Et sic sacerdos dicitur illuminare populum, secundum Dionysium, inquantum populo sacramenta ministrat et ostendit, quae sunt manuductiones in divina intelligibilia.
| Accordingly, one intellect is said to be illumined by another in so far as the latter gives it some medium of knowledge, which strengthens it, and enables it to know some things which it previously could not know. Now, among men this takes place in two ways. First, it takes place through speech, as happens when a teacher, by what he says, gives some medium to his student that strengthens the latter’s intellect, enabling him to know things which he previously could not. In this sense, a teacher is said to enlighten his pupil. Second, a person can be given a sensible sign, and this can lead him to the knowledge of some truth. In this sense, according to Dionysius, priests are said to enlighten the people, inasmuch as they display and administer to them the mysteries which lead them to divine truths.
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| Sed Angeli neque per sensibilia signa in cognitionem divinorum deveniunt, neque intelligibilia media recipiunt cum varietate et discursu, sicut nos recipimus, sed immaterialiter. Et hoc est quod Dionysius dicit, cap. VII caelestis hierarchiae, ostendens quomodo superiores Angeli illuminentur: contemplativae, inquit, sunt primae Angelorum essentiae, sensibilium symbolorum, aut intellectualium speculativae; non ut varietate sacrae Scripturae in Deum reductae, sed sicut immaterialis scientiae altiori lumine repletae. Nihil ergo est aliud Angelum ab Angelo illuminari, quam confortari intellectum inferioris Angeli per aliquid inspectum in superiori, ad aliqua cognoscenda.
| Angels, however, do not arrive at the knowledge of divine truths by means of sensible signs; nor do they receive intellectual media in a successive and discursive way, as we do, but immaterially. This is also what Dionysius held; for, when showing how the higher angels are illumined, he writes: “The highest essences, the angels, contemplate, [not] by gazing on symbols that can be known by the senses or intellect, nor by being led to God by the elaborations found in the Scriptures, but by being filled with the higher light of spiritual knowledge.” Consequently, for one angel to be illumined by another means simply this, that, through something seen in a higher angel, a lower angel’s intellect is strengthened to know other things.
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| Et hoc quidem hoc modo fieri potest. Sicut enim in corporibus superiora sunt quasi actus respectu inferiorum, ut ignis respectu aeris; ita et superiores spiritus sunt quasi actus respectu inferiorum. Omnis autem potentia confortatur et perficitur ex coniunctione ad actum suum; unde et corpora inferiora conservantur in superioribus, quae sunt locus eorum; et ideo etiam inferiores Angeli confortantur ex eorum continuatione ad superiores, quae quidem continuatio est per intuitum intellectus; et pro tanto ab eis dicuntur illuminari.
| This can take place in the following manner. Just as among bodies, higher bodies are, as it were, act with respect to lower bodies (as fire is, with respect to air), so a higher spirit is act, as it were, with respect to lower spirits. Now, every potency is strengthened and made perfect by being joined to its act. For this reason, lower bodies are preserved in higher bodies, which are the place of the former. Similarly, therefore, the lower angels can be strengthened by their being connected with the higher, and this connection takes place through intellectual intuition. For this reason, the lower angels are said to be illumined by the higher.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de formatione ultima, qua mens formatur per gratiam, quae est immediate a Deo.
| 1. Augustine is speaking of that ultimate perfecting by which the mind is perfected with grace; and grace comes directly from God.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod ab Angelo illuminante non fit novum lumen gratiae vel naturae nisi ut participatum. Cum enim omne quod intelligitur, ex vi intellectualis luminis cognoscatur; ipsum cognitum inquantum huiusmodi includit in se intellectuale lumen ut participatum, ex cuius virtute habet intellectum confortare; sicut patet quando magister tradit discipulo medium alicuius demonstrationis, in quo participatur lumen intellectus agentis ut in instrumento. Prima enim principia sunt quasi instrumenta intellectus agentis, ut dicit Commentator in III de anima; et similiter etiam omnia principia secunda quae continent propria media demonstrationum. Unde per hoc quod superior Angelus suum cognitum alteri Angelo demonstrat, eius intellectus confortatur ad aliqua cognoscenda, quae prius non cognoscebat; et sic non fit in Angelo illuminato novum lumen naturae vel gratiae; sed lumen quod prius inerat, confortatur per lumen contentum in cognito percepto a superiori Angelo.
| 2. The illumining angel does not make a new light of grace or of nature; he merely shares his light. For, since whatever is known is understood by means of an intellectual light, the known as known includes in its notion a shared intellectual light that has the power to strengthen the intellect. This is evident if we consider the teacher who gives his pupil a medium of demonstration in which the light of the active intellect is contained as in an instrument; for, as the Commentator says,” first principles are quasi-instruments of the active intellect; and the same is true of all second principles which contain their own means of demonstration. Consequently, when a higher angel shows his knowledge to another angel, the intellect of the latter is strengthened so that it knows what it previously did not. Hence, no new light of nature or of grace comes into existence in the enlightened angel, but the light that was there previously is strengthened by the light contained in the higher angel’s knowledge.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod non est simile de lumine corporali et spirituali. Quodlibet enim corpus potest indifferenter illuminari a quocumque lumine corporali; quod ideo est, quia omne lumen corporale aequaliter ad formas visibiles se habet. Sed non quilibet spiritus potest aequaliter illuminari quolibet lumine, quia quodlibet lumen non aequaliter continet formas intelligibiles; lumen enim supremum continet formas intelligibiles magis universales. Et ideo, cum inferior intellectus sit proportionatus ad accipiendum cognitionem per formas magis particulares, non sufficit ei quod illuminetur a superiori lumine; sed oportet quod illuminetur lumine inferiori ad hoc quod in cognitionem rerum adducatur, sicut patet apud nos. Philosophus enim primus habet cognitionem rerum omnium in principiis universalibus. Medicus autem considerat res maxime in particulari: unde non accipit immediate principia a primo philosopho, sed accipit immediate a naturali, qui habet principia magis contracta quam primus philosophus. Naturalis autem, cuius consideratio est universalior quam medici, potest accipere immediate principia suae considerationis a primo philosopho.
| 3. Material and spiritual light are not entirely similar. For all bodies can be illumined by any material light whatsoever, since all material light is equally related to all visible forms; but not all spirits can be illumined by any light whatsoever, because not all lights contain intelligible forms in the same manner. The supreme light contains intelligible forms that are more universal. Consequently, it is not sufficient for an inferior intellect to be illumined by a higher light, since such an intellect is proportioned to receive its knowledge through forms that are more particular. To be led to the knowledge of things, this intellect must be illumined by an inferior light, as, of course, takes place in the case of men. For example, a metaphysician knows all things in their universal principles. A doctor, however, considers things especially in their particulars; hence, he does not take his principles directly from a metaphysician but directly from a philosopher of nature, whose principles are less general than those of a metaphysician. However, the natural philosopher, who considers things more universally than the doctor does, can take the principles for his science directly from the metaphysician.
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| Unde, cum in lumine intellectus divini rerum rationes maxime uniantur quasi in uno principio maxime universali, inferiores Angeli non sunt proportionati ad hoc quod per illud lumen solum cognitionem accipiant, nisi adiungatur lumen Angelorum superiorum, in quibus formae intelligibiles contrahuntur.
| Consequently, since the intelligible characters of all things are united in the highest degree in the light of the divine intellect, as in a single most universal principle, the lower angels are not proportioned to receive knowledge through such a light, unless there is joined to them the light of the higher angels, in whom the intelligible forms are made less universal.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod Angelus quandoque alium Angelum illuminat per medium, quandoque sine medio. Per medium autem (spirituale tamen), sicut cum Angelus superior illuminat medium, et medius illuminat infimum virtute luminis superioris Angeli. Sine medio autem, sicut cum Angelus superior Angelum immediate sub se existentem illuminat. Nec oportet quod hoc modo coniungatur illuminans illuminato quasi in eius mentem illabatur; sed quasi continuati ad invicem, per hoc quod unus alium intuetur.
| 4. An angel illumines another angel, sometimes through a medium, sometimes without a medium. Illumination through a medium (which is, of course, spiritual) takes place, for example, when a very high angel illumines an angel that stands halfway in the angelic hierarchy, and when the latter, by means of the light given him by the first, illumines an angel in the lowest part of the hierarchy. On the other hand, illumination without a medium takes place when, for example, a superior angel illumines an angel existing immediately below him in the hierarchy. It is not necessary that the angel who illumines be directly joined to the mind of the angel who is enlightened; the two are joined together simply by the fact that one intuits the other directly.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod unum et idem numero medium quod cognoscitur a superiori Angelo, cognoscitur ab inferiori; sed cognitio superioris Angeli de illo est alia a cognitione inferioris: et sic quodammodo idem est lumen, et quodammodo aliud. Nec tamen sequitur quod secundum hoc quod est aliud, sit creatum a superiori Angelo: quia res per se non subsistentes, non per se loquendo fiunt, sicut nec per se sunt; unde non fit color, sed fit coloratum, ut dicitur VII Metaph. Unde non fit ipsum lumen Angeli, sed fit ipsum illuminatum, de potentia illuminato, actu illuminatum.
| 5. The medium that is known by the lower angel is numerically the same as that which is known by the higher; but the knowledge which the higher angel has of that medium is other than that which the lower angel has. Consequently, in some sense, it is the same light, and, in another sense, it is another light. But even in the sense that it is another light it does not follow that it is created by the higher angel, because things which do not exist substantially do not, properly speaking, come into existence, just as they do not exist substantially. For example, as we read in the Metaphysics, it is not color but a colored thing that comes into existence. Consequently, the angel’s light does not come into existence, but the illumined angel, from being potentially enlightened, becomes actually enlightened.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod sicut in illuminatione corporali non removetur aliqua forma, sed sola privatio luminis, quae est tenebra; ita etiam in illuminatione spirituali: unde non oportet quod sit ibi aliqua corruptio, sed solum negationis remotio.
| 6. just as no form is removed but only the privation of light, namely, darkness, is removed when material illumination takes place, so does a similar removal take place in spiritual illumination. Consequently, it is not necessary for any corruption to take place when spiritual illumination occurs. There is merely a removal of a negation.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod illud lumen Angeli quo illuminari dicitur, non est perfectio essentialis ipsius Angeli, sed perfectio secunda quae reducitur ad genus accidentale: nec sequitur quod accidens se extendat ultra subiectum, quia illa cognitio qua illuminatur superior Angelus, non est in Angelo inferiori eadem numero; sed specie et ratione, inquantum est eiusdem, sicut et eadem specie, non numero, lux est in aere illuminato et sole illuminante.
| 7. That light by which an angel is said to be illumined is not one of his essential perfections but a second perfection, which is reduced to the genus of accidents. Moreover, it does not follow that the accident extends beyond its subject, because the knowledge by which the higher angel is enlightened is not numerically the same as that which is in the lower angel. Their knowledge is the same merely in so far as it has the same nature and belongs to the same species, just as the light which is in illuminated air and that which is in the illumining sun is specifically, but not numerically, the same.
|
| Ad octavum dicendum, quod per lumen fit aliquid intelligibile actu quod prius erat intelligibile in potentia; sed hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo ita quod illud quod est in se intelligibile in potentia, fiat intelligibile actu, ut in nobis accidit. Et sic lumine non indiget intellectus angelicus, cum non abstrahat speciem a phantasmatibus. Alio modo ita quod illud quod est intelligibile in potentia alicui intelligenti, fiat ei intelligibile actu, sicut nobis fiunt substantiae superiores intelligibiles actu per media quibus in eorum cognitionem devenimus. Et hoc modo intellectus Angeli lumine indiget ad hoc ut ducatur in actualem cognitionem eorum ad quae cognoscenda est in potentia.
| 8. It is true that through light a thing which was potentially intelligible becomes actually so, but this can happen in two ways. First, it may be that that which is in itself only potentially intelligible becomes actually intelligible. This happens in our knowledge. But in this respect an angelic intellect does not need light, for it does not abstract species from phantasms. Secondly, it may be that that which is potentially intelligible to some particular knower becomes actually intelligible to him. This takes place, for example, when the higher substances become actually intelligible to us, that is, when we arrive at knowledge of them by reasoning. It is for such knowledge that an angel’s intellect needs light, that is, so it can be led to the actual knowledge of those things which it knows only potentially.
|
| Ad nonum dicendum, quod illuminatio qua unus Angelus alium illuminat non est de his quae ad naturalem cognitionem Angelorum pertinent; quia sic omnes ex principio suae conditionis perfectam habent naturalem cognitionem; nisi forte poneremus quod superiores Angeli essent causa inferiorum: quod est contra fidem. Sed cognitio ista est de his quae revelantur Angelis, eorum cognitionem naturalem excedentibus; sicut de divinis mysteriis pertinentibus ad Ecclesiam superiorem vel inferiorem. Unde et ponitur actio hierarchica a Dionysio. Nec sequitur quod, quamvis omnes verbum videant, quod quidquid vident in verbo superiores Angeli, videant et inferiores.
| 9. The illumination by which one angel illumines another does not concern those things that belong to angels’ natural knowledge, because, in that case, all the angels would have perfect natural knowledge from the moment when they first existed—unless we held that the higher angels caused the lower, and this position is contrary to faith. It concerns, rather, the knowledge that is revealed to angels and the things that surpass their natural knowledge, for example, mysteries pertaining to the Church in heaven or on earth. Hence, Dionysius also speaks of a hierarchical action among angels. Moreover, it does not follow from the fact that all angels see the Word that, whatever the higher angels see there, the lower also see.
|
| Ad decimum dicendum, quod quando unus Angelus ab alio illuminatur, non infunduntur ei novae species; sed ex eisdem speciebus quas prius habebat, intellectus eius confortatus per lumen superius, modo praedicto efficitur plurium cognoscitivus; sicut intellectus noster confortatus per lumen divinum vel angelicum, ex eisdem phantasmatibus in plurium cognitionem pervenire potest quam per se posset.
| 10. When one angel is enlightened by another, new species are not infused into him, but, by the very same species which he had previously, his intellect is strengthened through a higher light, and, in the manner described, it is enabled to know more things. Similarly, when our intellect is strengthened by divine or angelic light, from the same phantasms it can come to know more things than it could know if left unaided.
|
| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod quamvis in Angelis non sit aliqua obscuritas erroris, est tamen in eis aliquorum nescientia, quae eorum naturalem cognitionem excedunt; et propter hoc illuminatione indigent.
| 11. Although there is no obscurity or error in angels’ intellects, angels do not know things which surpass their natural powers of knowing. For this reason, they need light.
|
| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod nulla res, quantumcumque materialis, recipit aliquid secundum id quod est formale in ipsa, sed solum secundum id quod est materiale in ea; sicuti anima nostra non recipit illuminationem ratione intellectus agentis, sed ratione possibilis; velut etiam res corporales non recipiunt aliquam impressionem ex parte formae, sed ex parte materiae; et tamen intellectus possibilis noster est simplicior quam aliqua forma materialis. Ita etiam et intellectus Angeli illuminatur secundum id quod habet de potentialitate, quamvis ipse sit nobilior intellectu agente nostro, qui non illuminatur.
| 12. No matter how material a thing is, it does not receive something else according to what is formal in itself, but only according to what is material in it. For example, our soul does not receive an illumination according to its active intellect but only according to its possible intellect. Similarly, material things do not receive impressions according to their own forms but merely according to their own matter. Yet our possible intellect is more simple than any material form. Similarly, an angel’s intellect is illumined only with respect to that which it possesses potentially, even though it is more noble than our active intellect, which is not illumined.
|
| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod auctoritas illa est intelligenda de his quae pertinent ad cognitionem beatitudinis, in quibus omnes Angeli immediate illuminantur a Deo.
| 13. That text should be understood as referring to the things that belong to the knowledge the blessed have. Without any intermediary God illumines all angels about these things.
|
| Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod ista illuminatio de qua loquimur, fit per lumen gratiae perficiens lumen naturae. Nec tamen sequitur quod homo in statu viae possit Angelum illuminare: non enim habet maiorem gratiam in actu, sed solum in virtute; quia habet gratiam ex qua potest mereri perfectiorem statum; sicut etiam pullus equi statim natus est maior virtute quam asinus, minor autem actuali quantitate.
| 14. The illumination of which we are speaking takes place through the light of grace, which perfects natural light. Moreover, it would not follow that a man, still in this life, could illumine an angel, because he possesses greater grace only virtually, not actually. He has merely grace, by which he can merit a more perfect state, just as, in the same sense, a colt, immediately after birth, is said to have greater strength than an ass, even though its strength is actually less.
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| Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod cum dicitur quod illuminatio est divinae scientiae assumptio, scientia dicitur divina, quia ex divina illuminatione originem habet.
| 15. When we say that to be illumined is to receive divine knowledge, this knowledge is called divine merely because it has its origin in a divine enlightenment.
|
| Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod formae innatae sufficiunt ad omnia cognoscenda quae naturali cognitione ab Angelo cognoscuntur; sed ad ea quae sunt supra naturalem cognitionem, indigent lumine altiori.
| 16. Innate forms are sufficient for an angel to know all that he can know naturally; but, to know those things that are above his natural powers, he needs a higher light.
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| Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod in Angelis specie differentibus non oportet quod sit lumen intelligibile specie differens; sicut et in corporibus specie differentibus est idem specie color. Et hoc est praecipue verum de lumine gratiae, quae etiam in hominibus et in Angelis est eadem specie.
| 17. It is not necessary for the intelligible lights existing in angels, who are specifically different, to be specifically different themselves. For example, color existing in bodies that are specifically different is nevertheless specifically the same. The same principle is especially true of the light of grace, which is specifically the same both in men and in angels.
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| Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod lumen intellectus agentis in nobis sufficit ad ea quae sunt cognitionis naturalis; sed ad alia requiritur altius lumen, ut fidei vel prophetiae.
| 18. The light of the active intellect is sufficient for us to know those things that can be known naturally; but, to know other things, we need a higher light, such as that of faith or of prophecy.
|
ARTICLE II
In the second article we ask:
Is an inferior angel always illumined by a superior angel or is he sometimes illumined directly by God?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 107, 3; II Sent., 3, 1, 3, ad 4; 9, 1, 29 ad 3-4.]
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| Secundo quaeritur utrum inferior Angelus semper illuminetur a superiori, vel quandoque a Deo immediate
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod immediate a Deo.
| It seems that he is illumined directly by God, for
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| Angelus enim inferior est in potentia ad gratiam affectus, et ad illuminationem intellectus. Sed tantum suscipit de gratia a Deo, quantum est capax. Ergo tantum suscipit de illuminatione a Deo, quantum est capax; et ita immediate a Deo illuminatur, non per Angelum intermedium.
| 1. An inferior angel is in potency to receiving grace in his will and illuminations in his intellect. Now, he receives only as much grace from God as he is capable of receiving. Therefore, he receives only as much illumination from God as he is capable of receiving. Consequently, he is directly illumined by God, and not through an intermediate angel.
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| Praeterea, sicut inter Deum et inferiores Angelos sunt medii superiores, ita inter superiores et nos sunt medii inferiores. Sed superiores Angeli quandoque illuminant nos immediate, sicut Seraphim illuminavit Isaiam, ut patet Isa., VI, 6. Ergo et inferiores Angeli quandoque illuminantur immediate a Deo.
| 2. just as superior angels stand midway between God and the inferior angels, so do the inferior angels stand midway between superior angels and men. Now, the superior angels sometimes illumine us directly. For example, a Seraph illumined Isaiah (Isaiah 6:6). Consequently, the inferior angels also are sometimes illumined directly by God.
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| Praeterea, sicuti est ordo quidam determinatus in substantiis spiritualibus, ita et in substantiis corporalibus. Sed quandoque in rebus corporalibus divina virtus operatur praetermissis causis mediis; sicut cum suscitat mortuum non cooperante corpore caelesti. Ergo etiam et quandoque illuminat inferiores Angelos sine ministerio superiorum.
| 3. just as there is a definite order of spiritual substances, so is there also a definite order of material substances. But God’s power sometimes acts directly on material things, passing over intermediate causes. For example, He sometimes raises a person from the dead without the co-operation of a celestial body. Consequently, He sometimes illumines inferior angels without the services of superior angels.
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| Praeterea, quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest et superior. Si ergo Angelus superior potest illuminare inferiorem Angelum, multo fortius Deus potest immediate eum illuminare; et ita non oportet quod illuminationes divinae semper deferantur per superiores ad inferiores.
| 4. Whatever a lower power can do a high power can. Therefore, if a higher angel can illumine a lower angel, God can certainly illumine the lower angel directly. Hence, it is not necessary that God’s illuminations should always be given to lower angels by means of higher.
|
| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
|
| Est quod dicit Dionysius, hanc legem esse divinitatis immobiliter firmatam, ut inferiora reducantur in Deum mediantibus superioribus. Ergo nunquam illuminantur inferiores immediate a Deo.
| 1. Dionysius says’ that God has established an unchangeable law that lower beings be led back to God through the mediation of higher beings. Consequently, God never directly illumines lower angels.
|
| Praeterea, sicut Angeli secundum naturam sunt superiores corporibus, ita superiores inferioribus praeeminent. Sed nihil fit a Deo in corporalibus rebus nisi ministerio Angelorum, quantum ad eorum gubernationem pertinet; ut patet per Augustinum, III de Trinitate. Ergo etiam nihil fit a Deo in inferioribus Angelis nisi mediantibus superioribus.
| 2. just as angels are, by their very nature, superior to bodies, so are the higher angels, by their very nature, superior to the lower. Now, in matters related to God’s rule over material things, He never causes anything to happen without the ministry of His angels. This is clear from what Augustine has written. Consequently, God likewise never causes anything to happen in lower angels without the ministry of the higher.
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| Praeterea, a corporibus superioribus non moventur inferiora corpora nisi per media; sicut terra a caelo mediante aere. Sed ita est ordo in corporibus sicut in spiritibus. Ergo et summus spiritus non illuminat inferiores nisi per medios.
| 3. Lower bodies are not moved by higher except through media. For example, the earth is moved by the heavens through the mediation of air. Now, the order of spirits resembles that of bodies. Consequently, the highest spirits do not illumine the lower except by means of intermediate spirits.
|
| Respondeo.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod ex bonitate divina procedit quod ipse de perfectione sua creaturis communicet secundum earum proportionem; et ideo non solum intantum communicat eis de sua bonitate, quod in se sint bona et perfecta, sed etiam ut aliis perfectionem largiantur, Deo quodammodo cooperando. Et hic est nobilissimus modus divinae imitationis; unde dicit Dionysius, cap. III caelestis hierarchiae, quod omnium divinius est Dei cooperatorem fieri; et exinde procedit ordo qui est in Angelis, quod quidam alios illuminant.
| Because of His goodness, God communicates His perfections to creatures according to their capacity. Consequently, He shares His goodness with them, not only so that they will be good and perfect themselves, but also so that they can, with God’s help, give perfection to others. Now, to give perfection to other creatures is the most noble way of imitating God. Hence, Dionysius says: “The most God-like of all actions is to cooperate with God.” On this principle rests the ordering of angels, according to which some illumine others.
|
| Sed circa hunc ordinem diversimode quidam opinantur. Quidam enim aestimant hunc ordinem ita esse firmiter stabilitum, ut nunquam praeter ipsum aliquid accidat, sed in omnibus et semper hic ordo servetur. Alii vero extimant ita hunc ordinem stabilitum, ut secundum hunc ordinem eveniat ut frequenter, quandoque tamen ex causis necessariis, praetermittatur; sicut etiam et naturalium rerum cursus mutatur divina dispensatione, aliqua causa nova suborta, ut patet in miraculis.
| There have, however, been several opinions on this ordering. Some think that this order is so firmly fixed that nothing can happen outside of it, and it is always and in all cases preserved. Others, however, concede that this ordering is stable, but say that, while events usually happen according to it, it is sometimes passed over by the action of necessary causes—as when, by God’s dispensation, even the natural course of things is changed, and a new cause springs into being, as clearly takes place in miracles.
|
| Sed prima opinio videtur rationabilior, propter tria. Primo, quia cum hoc sit de dignitate superiorum Angelorum ut per eos inferiores illuminentur, eorum dignitati derogaretur, si quandoque praeter eos illuminarentur. Secundo, quia quanto aliqua sunt Deo, qui est summe immobilis, propinquiora, tanto debent esse magis immobilia; unde corpora inferiora, quae maxime a Deo distant, quandoque deficiunt a cursu naturali; corpora vero caelestia semper naturalem motum servant. Unde non videtur esse rationabile ut ordo caelestium spirituum, qui sunt Deo propinquissimi, aliquando immutetur. Tertio, quia in rebus quae pertinent ad statum naturae, non fit aliqua immutatio, divina virtute, nisi propter aliquid melius; scilicet propter aliquid quod pertineat ad gratiam vel gloriam. Sed statu gloriae, in quo ordines Angelorum distinguuntur, nullus est altior status. Unde non videtur rationabile ut ea quae ad ordines Angelorum spectant, aliquando immutentur.
| But the first opinion seems to be more logical for three reasons. First, it belongs to the dignity of higher angels that the lower should be illumined through them. It would detract from their dignity if the lower angels were sometimes illumined without their ministry. Second, the closer beings are to God, who is most unchangeable, the more unchangeable should they themselves be. For this reason, bodies here below, standing at a great distance from God, are sometimes defective in their natural action, while celestial bodies always preserve the motion prescribed by their natures. Consequently, it does not seem reasonable that the ordering of celestial spirits, who are closest to God, should sometimes be changed. Third, God does not make any change in the things of nature except for something better, namely, for something pertaining to grace or glory. But there is no state higher than the states of glory by which the orders of angels are distinguished from each other. Therefore, it does not seem reasonable that matters concerning the order of angels should sometimes be changed.
|
|
| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod et de gratia et de illuminatione dat Deus Angelis secundum eorum capacitatem, differenter tamen: quia gratia quae ad affectum pertinet, immediate a Deo omnibus datur, eo quod in voluntatibus eorum non est ordo, ut unus in alium imprimere possit; sed illuminatio descendit a Deo in ultimos per primos et medios.
| 1. God gives grace and illuminations to angels according to their capacity—with this difference, however, that, because grace pertains to the will, He gives grace to all of them directly; for there is no ordering in angels’ wills whereby one could act upon another. But God’s illuminations descend from Him to the lowest angels by means of the angels standing at the top and middle of the hierarchy.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod Dionysius, cap. XIII Caelest. Hierarch., dupliciter solvit. Uno modo quod ille Angelus qui ad purgandum prophetae labia missus est, cum de inferioribus fuerit, Seraphim tamen aequivoce dictus est, eo quod incendendo purgavit, calculo scilicet ignito, quem forcipe tulerat de altari; dicitur enim Seraphim quasi ardens vel incendens. Alio modo sic: dicit enim, quod ille Angelus inferioris ordinis, qui labia prophetae purgavit, non intendebat reducere in seipsum, sed in Deum et in superiorem Angelum, quia utriusque virtute agebat: unde ostendit ei Deum et superiorem Angelum; sicut et episcopus dicitur absolvere aliquem, quando sacerdos auctoritate eius absolvit. Et sic non oportet quod Seraphim aequivoce dicatur, neque quod Seraphim prophetam illuminaverit immediate.
| 2. Dionysius gives two answers to this difficulty. First, the angel that was sent to cleanse the lips of the prophet belonged to the inferior angels, but, by equivocation, was called a Seraph since he cleansed the prophet’s lips by burning them with a glowing coal brought from the altar by tongs; hence, he was said to be a Seraph only because he burned or set on fire. Dionysius’ second answer is that this angel, belonging to a lower order, cleansed the lips of the prophet because he did not intend to summon him to himself but to God and a higher angel, since he acted by the power of both. This is why he showed the prophet the higher angel and God. Similarly, a bishop is also said to absolve a person when a priest absolves by the bishop’s authority. Following this interpretation, we need not say that this angel was called a Seraph by equivocation or that a Seraph illumined the prophet directly.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod cursus naturalis habet aliquem statum nobiliorem, propter quem dignum est ut quandoque immutetur; sed statu gloriae nihil est nobilius; et ideo non est simile.
| 3. The course of nature can have a more noble state; hence, it is proper for it to be changed at times. But there is nothing more noble than the state of glory. Therefore, no parallel can be drawn.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod non est ex impotentia Dei vel superiorum Angelorum, quod inferiores, mediantibus mediis, a Deo et primis Angelis illuminantur; sed est ad hoc ut servetur dignitas et perfectio omnium; quod est dum plures in eodem, Deo cooperantur.
| 4. It is not because of any defect in God’s power or in that of the higher angels that God and the higher angels illumine the lower through the mediation of angels between them and the lower angels. This order is kept merely to preserve the dignity and perfection of all; and this demands that many co-operate with God in the same action.
|
ARTICLE III
In the third article we ask:
Does one angel cleanse another when he illumines him?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 106, 2, ad I; I-II, 112, 1, ad 3; II Sent., 3, 3, 2. See also readings given for q. 9, a. 1.]
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| Tertio quaeritur utrum unus Angelus, alium illuminando, eum purget
| Difficulties
|
| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems that he does not, for
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| Purgatio enim est ab impuritate. Sed in Angelis non est aliqua impuritas. Ergo unus alium purgare non potest.
| 1. To be cleansed is to be freed from impurity. But there is no impurity in angels; consequently, one angel cannot cleanse another.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod purgatio illa non intelligitur a peccato, sed ab ignorantia sive nescientia.- Sed contra, cum illa ignorantia non possit esse in beatis Angelis ex peccato, quia in eis nullum fuit, non erit nisi ex natura. Sed quae sunt naturalia, non removentur natura manente. Ergo Angelus ab ignorantia purgari non potest.
| 2. But it was said that this cleansing is not from sin but from ignorance or lack of knowledge.—On the contrary, since such ignorance cannot be the result of any sin in the beatified angels, for they have no sin, it must be the result of nature. Now, those things that are natural cannot be removed while the nature remains. Consequently, an angel cannot be freed of his ignorance.
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| Praeterea, illuminatio tenebras pellit. In Angelis autem non possunt intelligi aliae tenebrae nisi ignorantiae vel nescientiae. Si ergo per purgationem nescientia removetur, purgatio et illuminatio idem erunt, nec debent distingui.
| 3. Illumination dispels darkness. Now, the only darkness which makes sense in regard to angels is the darkness of ignorance or of lack of understanding. Consequently, if their ignorance is removed when they are cleansed, their being cleansed and their being illumined come to the same thing, and the two should not be distinguished.
|
| Sed dicebat, quod illuminatio respicit terminum ad quem, purgatio vero terminum a quo.- Sed contra, in nullo medio est invenire tertium terminum praeter terminum a quo et terminum ad quem. Si ergo istae duae actiones hierarchicae purgatio et illuminatio distinguantur penes terminos a quo et ad quem, non erit ponere tertiam actionem; quod est contra Dionysium, qui tertio loco ponit perfectionem.
| 4. But it was said that illumination is referred to the end-term, while cleansing is referred to the initial term.—On the contrary, in no way of taking them is there found a term that is other than the end-term or the initial term. Consequently, if those two hierarchical actions, purgation and illumination, are distinguished according as one is referred to the initial term and the other to the end-term, a third hierarchical action cannot be posited; but to deny such a third action is to oppose Dionysius, who places’ the action of perfecting third.
|
| Praeterea, quamdiu aliquid est in statu proficiendi, nondum est perfectum. Sed cognitio Angelorum aliquo modo crescit usque ad diem iudicii, ut Magister dicit in II Sentent., 11 dist. Ergo nunc unus alium perficere non potest.
| 5. As long as a thing is in the state of progression, it is not yet perfect. But, as the Master of the Sentences says, angels’ knowledge grows in some way until judgment day. Hence, at the present time, one angel cannot perfect another.
|
| Praeterea, sicut illuminatio est causa purgationis, ita est causa perfectionis. Sed causa est prior causato. Ergo, sicut illuminatio praecedit perfectionem, ita praecedit purgationem, si purgatio sit a nescientia.
| 6. Illumination is the cause of perfecting, just as it is the cause of cleansing. Now, a cause must be prior to its effect. Therefore, just as illumination precedes perfection, so does it also precede purgation if the purgation be from ignorance.
|
| Sed contra,
| To the Contrary
|
| est quod Dionysius huiusmodi actiones hoc modo distinguit et ordinat, cap. III Cael. Hierarch., dicens, quod ordo hierarchiae est hos quidem purgari, illos vero purgare; hos illuminari, illos vero illuminare; hos quidem perfici, illos autem perficere.
| Dionysius distinguishes and orders these actions in this manner, saying: “The hierarchical order is such that some angels are cleansed, others do the cleansing, some are illumined, others illumine, some are perfected, others do the perfecting.”
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
|
| Dicendum, quod istae tres actiones in Angelis non nisi ad acceptionem cognitionis pertinent; unde dicit Dionysius, cap. VII Cael. Hierarch., quod purgatio illuminatio et perfectio est divinae scientiae assumptio. Distinctio vero earum hoc modo accipienda est. In qualibet enim generatione vel mutatione est duos terminos invenire; scilicet terminum a quo, et terminum ad quem. Uterque autem diversimode invenitur in diversis.
| In angels those three actions pertain merely to their reception of knowledge; for this reason Dionysius says: “Purgation, perfection, and illumination are the reception of divine knowledge.” However, the distinction between them should be understood in the following manner. Two terms can be found in any generation or change, namely, the initial term and the end-term. Both, however, are found in different ways in different changes.
|
| In quibusdam enim terminus a quo est aliquid contrarium perfectioni acquirendae; sicut nigredo est contraria albedini, quae per dealbationem acquiritur. Quandoque vero perfectio acquirenda non habet contrarium directe; sed praecedunt in subiecto dispositiones quae sunt contrariae dispositionibus ordinantibus ad perfectionem inducendam, sicut patet in corporis animatione. Quandoque vero nihil praesupponitur nisi privatio sive negatio introducendae formae; sicut in aere illuminando praecedunt tenebrae, quae per lucis praesentiam removentur.
| In some changes the initial term is something contrary to the perfection to be acquired. For example, blackness is the contrary of the whiteness acquired when a thing becomes white. On the other hand, sometimes the perfection to be acquired does not have a contrary directly, but the dispositions existing in the subject before the change are contrary to the dispositions ordered to the perfection to be introduced. This condition is found, for example, when a soul is infused into a body. Again, it sometimes happens that nothing is presupposed for the introduction of the form except a privation or negation. For example, in air that is to be illumined only darkness precedes; and this is removed by the presence of light.
|
| Similiter etiam terminus ad quem, quandoque est unus tantum, ut in dealbatione terminus ad quem est albedo; quandoque vero sunt duo termini ad quem, quorum unus ad alium ordinatur, sicut patet in alteratione elementorum, cuius unus terminus est dispositio quae est necessitas, alius autem ipsa forma substantialis.
| Similarly, there is at times only one end-term. For example, the end-term of the process of whitening is whiteness only. At other times, there are two end-terms, one of which is directed to the other. This is clearly the case when elements undergo change: one end-term is a disposition which demands a form, the other is the substantial form itself.
|
| In acceptione igitur cognitionis quantum ad terminum a quo invenitur praedicta diversitas, quia quandoque in accipiente scientiam praeextitit error contrarius scientiae acquirendae; quandoque vero dispositiones contrariae, sicut impuritas animae, aut immoderata occupatio circa res sensibiles vel aliquid aliud; quandoque vero praeexistit solummodo cognitionis privatio vel negatio, sicut cum in cognitione de die in diem proficimus; et sic tantummodo est accipere terminum a quo in Angelis.
| Now, in the reception of knowledge, we find the diversity mentioned above with respect to its initial term, because sometimes, before a person receives knowledge, there exists in him an error contrary to it. Again, at times there are in him beforehand only contrary dispositions, such as impurity of soul, an immoderate occupation with sense-objects, or something of this nature. Again, at other times, there may be in him beforehand only a privation or negation of the knowledge, such as exists in us whose knowledge increases from day to day. It is in this last-named sense that we should understand the initial term of illumination in angels.
|
| Ex parte autem termini ad quem est invenire in acceptione cognitionis duos terminos. Primus est id quo intellectus perficitur ad aliquid cognoscendum; sive sit forma intelligibilis, aut lumen intelligibile, vel quodcumque cognitionis medium. Secundus autem terminus est ipsa cognitio, quae exinde procedit, quae est ultimus terminus in acceptione cognitionis.
| Moreover, we find that there are two end-terms in the reception of knowledge. The first is that by which the intellect is perfected in order to know something. This end-term may be either an intelligible form, an intelligible light, or any medium of cognition whatsoever. The second end-term is the knowledge itself, which follows; and this is the final term in the reception of knowledge.
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| Sic igitur purgatio est in Angelis per remotionem nescientiae; unde dicit Dionysius, cap. VII Cael. Hierarch., quod divinae scientiae assumptio est purgans ignorantiam. Illuminatio vero est secundum primum terminum ad quem: unde dicit ibidem, quod illuminantur Angeli inquantum eis aliquid manifestatur per altiorem illuminationem. Sed perfectio est quantum ad ipsum terminum ultimum: unde dicit, quod perficiuntur ipso lumine scientia lucidarum doctrinarum. Ut hoc modo intelligitur differre illuminatio et perfectio, sicut formatio visus per speciem visibilis, et cognitio ipsius visibilis;
| In angels’ cleansing takes place through the simple removal of ignorance in the manner described; for this reason Dionysius says: “To receive divine knowledge is to be cleansed of ignorance.” The illumination, however, takes place in the first end-term. Hence, Dionysius also says that angels are illumined in so far as something is manifested to them “through a higher illumination.” Finally, “perfection” takes place in the ultimate end-term; and, for this reason, Dionysius says: “They are perfected by the light of resplendent knowledge.” In other words, illumination and perfection are understood to differ as the informing of the sense of sight by a species of what is seen differs from the knowledge of the thing seen.
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| et secundum hoc Dionysius in Eccles. Hierarch., cap. V, dicit, quod ordo diaconorum est ad purgandum institutus, sacerdotum ad illuminandum, episcoporum ad perficiendum; quia scilicet diaconi habebant officium super catechumenos et energumenos, in quibus sunt dispositiones contrariae illuminationi, quae eorum ministerio removentur; sacerdotum autem officium est populo sacramenta communicare et ostendere, quae sunt quasi quaedam media quibus deducimur in divina; episcoporum autem officium erat populo aperire spiritualia, quae erant in sacramentorum significatione velata.
| Drawing an analogy from the principles laid down above, Dionysius writes that the order of the deacons is to purify neophytes in the faith, that of priests is to illumine them, and that of bishops, to perfect them. He said this because deacons exercise their office over catechumens and those possessed by the devils; and, in these persons, there are dispositions contrary to illumination which are removed by the deacons’ ministry. The duty of priests, however, is to teach and communicate the mysteries of the faith to the people; for these are, as it were, means for leading us to God. Finally, the duty of bishops is to uncover the spiritual riches that were concealed in the mystical symbols.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod sicut dicit Dionysius VI cap. ecclesiasticae hierarchiae, quod purgatio in Angelis non est intelligenda ab aliqua impuritate, sed solummodo a nescientia.
| 1. As Dionysius says, the cleansing of angels is to be understood as a cleansing, not from any impurity, but from lack of knowledge.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliqua negatio vel defectus dicitur esse ex natura dupliciter. Uno modo quasi sit naturae debitum talem negationem habere, sicut non habere rationem est naturale asino; et huiusmodi naturalis defectus nunquam removetur manente tali natura. Alio modo, quia non est naturae debitum talem perfectionem habere, dicitur esse negatio ex natura; et praecipue quando naturae facultas non sufficit ad huiusmodi perfectionem acquirendam; et talis naturalis defectus tollitur: sicut patet de ignorantia quam pueri habent, et de defectu gloriae, qui a nobis tollitur per gloriae collationem. Et similiter etiam ab Angelis nescientia aufertur.
| 2. A negation or defect is said to be natural in two senses. In the first, it is said to be natural because the presence of such a negation is, as it were, due to nature. For example, not having an intellect is natural to an ass. Now, this kind of natural defect is never removed as long as the nature itself remains. In the second sense, however, a negation is said to be natural because to have some certain perfection is not due to nature. This kind of a negation is found especially when a faculty of the nature is not able to acquire a perfection of the sort mentioned. Such natural defects can be removed. For example, the ignorance boys have is removed, and our lack of glory is removed by the bestowal of glory. Similarly, the ignorance angels have can be removed.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod illuminatio et purgatio se habent in acquisitione scientiae angelicae sicut generatio et corruptio in acquisitione formae naturalis; quae quidem sunt unum subiecto, differunt autem ratione.
| 3. Illumination and cleansing are related to each other in the acquisition of knowledge by angels as generation and corruption are related in the acquisition of a natural form. Needless to say, generation and corruption arc one in so far as they are in one subject, but they differ in their formal character.
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| Ad quartum patet responsio ex dictis.
| 4. The reply is clear from what has been said.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod perfectio non accipitur, in proposito, respectu totius cognitionis angelicae, sed respectu unius cognitionis tantum, quae perficitur dum in cognitionem alicuius rei perducitur.
| 5. In our proposition, perfection is not taken as referring to all the knowledge an angel has, but only to a single act of knowledge; and he is perfected by this when he is led to the knowledge of some particular thing.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod sicut forma est quodammodo causa materiae inquantum dat ei esse actu, quodam vero modo materia est causa formae, inquantum sustentat ipsam; ita etiam quodammodo ea quae sunt ex parte formae, sunt priora his quae sunt ex parte materiae, quodam vero modo e converso. Et quia privatio se tenet ex parte materiae, ideo remotio privationis est prior introductione formae naturaliter, secundum ordinem quo materia est prior forma, qui dicitur ordo generationis; sed introductio formae est prior illo ordine quo forma est prior materia, qui est ordo perfectionis. Et eadem ratio est de ordine illuminationis et perfectionis.
| 6. just as form is, in some way, the cause of matter inasmuch as it gives matter actual existence, so, in some way, matter is the cause of form inasmuch as it sustains the form. Similarly, the things coming from form are, in a certain sense, prior to those coming from matter, but in the case of some the opposite is true. Now, because privation is related to matter, the removal of the privation is naturally prior to the introduction of the form according to the order in which matter is prior to form, namely, the order of generation. But the introduction of the form is prior according to that order in which the form is prior to matter, namely, the order of perfection. The same argument can be applied to the orders of illumination and perfection.
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ARTICLE IV
In the fourth article we ask:
Does one angel speak to another?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 107, 1; 108, 5, ad 5; 108, 6; 109, 3; II Sent., 11, 2, 3; In I Cor., c. 13, lect. 1 (P. 13:259b).]
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| Quarto quaeritur utrum unus Angelus alii loquatur
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems not, for
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| Quia, ut dicit Gregorius in Moral. XVIII super illud Iob XXVIII, 17: non adaequabitur ei aurum vel vitrum, tunc erit unus conspicabilis alteri, sicut nunc non est conspicabilis ipse sibi. Sed nunc non oportet quod aliquis sibi loquatur, ad hoc quod conceptum suum cognoscat. Ergo nec in patria erit necessarium ut unus alteri loquatur ad suum conceptum demonstrandum; ergo nec in Angelis, qui sunt beati, necessaria est locutio.
| 1. Commenting on the words of Job (28:17), “Gold or crystal cannot equal it,” Gregory says: “In heaven everyone will be seen by others as now he does not even see himself.” But while on earth person does not have to speak to himself in order to know his own idea. Consequently, in heaven it will not be necessary for him to speak to another so that he can know it. Hence, speech is unnecessary for beatified angels.
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| Praeterea, Gregorius, ibidem, dicit: cum uniuscuiusque vultus attenditur, simul et conscientia penetratur. Ergo non requiritur ibi locutio, ad hoc quod unus alterius conceptum sciat.
| 2. In the same passage, Gregory writes: “When one’s face is seen, in the same instant, his conscience will be penetrated.” Therefore, in heaven speech is not required for one person to know another’s concept.
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| Praeterea, maximus in commento super Eccl. Hierarch., cap. II, sic dicit, de Angelis loquens: in incorporalitate consistentes, et in alterutrum accedentes et discedentes, omni sermone expressius alterutrorum sensus speculantes, quodammodo mutuo disputant, per silentium verbi communicantes alterutris. Sed silentium locutioni opponitur. Ergo Angeli cognoscunt invicem sensus suos sine locutione.
| 3. Referring to angels, Maximus writes as follows: “When spiritual creatures meet and leave each other, one knows far more clearly what the other wishes to convey than were they to speak to each other. For, in some way, they silently discuss things and communicate their thoughts to each other.” Now, since silence is opposed to speech, angels know what other angels want to signify, without having to speak.
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| Praeterea, omnis locutio est per aliquod signum. Sed signum non est nisi in sensibilibus, quia signum est quod praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus, facit aliud in cognitionem venire, ut dicitur 1 distinct., IV Sentent. Ergo cum Angeli non accipiant scientiam a sensibilibus, non accipient cognitionem per aliqua signa; et ita nec per locutionem.
| 4. All speech takes place through signs. Now, a sign must be some thing that can be sensed, because, as is said in the Sentences: “A sign is that which, besides impressing a species upon the senses, make something else known.” Consequently, since angels do not receive their knowledge from sensible things, they do not receive it by mean of signs, and, hence, not through speech.
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| Praeterea, signum videtur esse id quod est notius quoad nos, minus autem notum secundum naturam; et secundum hoc distinguit Commentator in Princ. Lib. Physic., demonstrationem signi contra demonstrationem simplicem, quae est demonstratio propter quid. Sed Angelus non accipit cognitionem ex his quae sunt posteriora in natura. Ergo nec per signum; et ita nec per locutionem.
| 5. A sign seems to be something that is more known to us but les known according to nature. Accordingly, the Commentator distinguishes between a demonstration through a sign and a perfect demonstration, the latter being a demonstration which is causal. Now, angels do not receive their knowledge from things posterior in nature, consequently, not from signs. Hence, they do not receive knowledge by means of speech.
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| Praeterea, in omni locutione oportet esse aliquid quod excitet audientem ad attendendum verbis loquentis, quod apud nos est ipsa vox loquentis. Hoc autem non potest poni in Angelo. Ergo nec locutio.
| 6. In all speech the speaker must arouse his listener to attention to his words, which, in our case, are produced by the voice of the speaker. But to listen to words of this kind is impossible for an angel. Therefore, speech is likewise impossible for him.
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| Praeterea, ut Plato dicit, sermo ad hoc datus est nobis ut cognoscamus voluntatis indicia. Sed unus Angelus cognoscit indicia voluntatis alterius Angeli per seipsum, quia sunt spiritualia; et omnia spiritualia ab Angelo eadem cognitione cognoscuntur. Unde, cum Angelus per seipsum spiritualem naturam alterius Angeli cognoscat, per seipsum cognoscet voluntatem ipsius; et ita non indiget aliqua locutione.
| 7. As Plato says,” speech was given to us so we could know signs of others’ wills. But one angel knows the signs of another angel’s will by knowing himself, because these signs are spiritual, and, by the same knowledge, an angel knows all spiritual things. Hence, since one angel knows the spiritual nature of another angel by knowing himself in the same way he knows his will. Therefore, he has no need of speech.
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| Praeterea, formae intellectus angelici ordinantur ad cognitionem rerum, sicut rationes rerum in Deo ad earum productionem, cum sint similes eis. Sed per rationes ideales producitur res, et quidquid est in re, vel intus vel extra. Ergo et Angelus per formam intellectus sui cognoscit Angelum, et omne id quod est intrinsecum Angelo; et ita cognoscit conceptum eius; et sic idem quod prius.
| 8. The forms within an angelic intellect are ordered to the knowledge of things, as in God the intelligible characters of things are ordered to their production, for angels’ intellectual forms resemble these characters. Now, all things and whatever exists in a thing, whether it be interior or exterior, are produced by means of these intelligible characters. Therefore, when an angel knows another angel by means of the forms within his own intellect, he also knows all that is within that angel; and, as a consequence, he knows that angel’s thought. Hence, the same must be said as before.
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| Praeterea, duplex est locutio in nobis: interior scilicet et exterior. Exterior autem in Angelis non ponitur; alias oporteret quod voces formarent dum unus alii loqueretur: locutio autem interior non est nisi cogitatio ut patet per Anselmum, et Augustinum. Ergo in Angelis non potest poni locutio praeter cogitationem.
| 9. We have two kinds of speech, namely, internal and external. Now, we do not say that there is external speech in angels, because, if this were true, angels would have to form vocal speech to speak to each other. However, as Anselm~ and Augustine” say, “Internal speech is nothing other than thought.” Therefore, it is not necessary to assert that there exists in angels any kind of speech other than thought.
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| Praeterea, Avicenna dicit, quod in nobis causa locutionis est multitudo desideriorum, quam constat ex multis defectibus provenire, quia desiderium est rei non habitae, ut Augustinus dicit. Cum ergo in Angelis non sit ponere defectuum multitudinem, non erit in eis ponere locutionem.
| 10. Avicenna says that we speak because we have a multitude of desires. This evidently arises from our many needs, because, as Augustine remarks, we desire a thing only if we do not have it. Now, since we cannot say that angels need many things, we cannot say that they speak to one another.
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| Praeterea, unus Angelus non potest alterius cogitationem cognoscere per essentiam ipsius cogitationis, cum non sit per essentiam intellectui eius praesens. Ergo oportet quod per aliquam speciem eam cognoscat. Sed Angelus per seipsum sufficit ad cognoscendum omnia quae naturaliter sunt in alio Angelo per species innatas. Ergo, eadem ratione, per easdem species cognoscet omnia quae voluntate fiunt in alio Angelo. Et ita non videtur quod in Angelis sit ponenda locutio ad hoc quod conceptus unius alteri innotescat.
| 11. One angel cannot know another’s thought through its essence, because it is not present through its essence, to the other’s intellect. Hence, he must know the other’s thought by means of a species. Now, of himself, an angel is able to know, by means of innate species, all that naturally exists in another angel. For the same reason, therefore, through these same species he knows all that takes place by the will of the other angel. Hence, it does not seem necessary to affirm the existence of speech in angels in order that one can make his thought known to another.
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| Praeterea, nutus et signa non fiunt ad auditum, sed ad visum; locutio autem fit ad auditum: Angeli autem conceptus suos mutuo sibi indicant nutibus et signis, ut dicitur I Cor. XIII, 1, in Glossa super id: si linguis hominum et cetera. Ergo non communicat per locutionem.
| 12. Signs and nods are directed to the sense of sight, not to that of hearing, but speech is directed to the sense of hearing. Now, angels indicate their thought “by signs and nods,” for this is how the Gloss explains that verse in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:1): “If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels...” Therefore, angels do not use speech to communicate.
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| Praeterea, locutio est motus quidam cognitivae virtutis. Sed motus cognitivae terminatur ad animam, et non ad id quod est extra. Ergo per locutionem non ordinatur Angelus ad alium, ut ei suum conceptum demonstret.
| 13. Speech is a motion of a cognitive power. Now, the motion of a cognitive power terminates in the soul, not in something outside. Therefore, through speech, an angel is not directed to the manifestation of his thought to another angel.
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| Praeterea, in omni locutione, oportet manifestari aliquid ignotum per notum, sicut nos manifestamus conceptus nostros per sonos sensibiles. Sed hoc in Angelis non potest poni: quia Angeli natura, quae est alteri Angelo naturaliter nota, est infigurabilis, ut dicit Dionysius; et sic non potest in ea aliquid fieri quo demonstretur id quod est in ea ignotum. Ergo locutio in Angelis esse non potest.
| 14. In all speech something unknown should be manifested by means of what is known. For example, we manifest our concepts by means of sensible sounds. Now, we cannot say that this is possible for angels, because, as Dionysius says, the nature of an angel, naturally known by other angels, has no shape. Hence, there is nothing in an angel’s nature that can be used to indicate what is not known about it. Consequently, for angels speech is impossible.
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| Praeterea, Angeli sunt quaedam spiritualia lumina. Sed lux, ex hoc ipso quod videtur, seipsam totaliter manifestat. Ergo, ex hoc ipso quod Angelus videtur, totaliter cognoscitur omne id quod in ipso est; et sic locutio in eis locum non habet.
| 15. Angels are spiritual lights. But when light is seen it totally manifests itself. Therefore, when an angel is seen, whatever is in him is totally known. Consequently, there is no need for speech among angels.
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| Sed contra.
| To the Contrary
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| Est quod dicitur I Corinth. cap. XIII, 1: si linguis hominum loquar et Angelorum et cetera. Sed frustra esset lingua, nisi esset locutio. Ergo Angeli loquuntur.
| 11. We read in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:1): “If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels...” Now, tongues would be useless were there not speech. Consequently, angels speak.
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| Praeterea, quod potest virtus inferior, potest et superior, secundum Boetium. Sed homo potest conceptum suum alteri homini revelare. Ergo similiter et Angelus potest. Hoc autem est eum loqui. Ergo in eis est locutio.
| 2. As Boethius says, what a lower power can do a higher power also can. Now, men can reveal their thoughts to other men. Therefore, angels can do the same. However, to reveal one’s thought means to speak it. Hence, angels possess speech.
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| Praeterea, Damascenus, dicit, quod Angeli sermone prolato sine voce tradunt sibi invicem voluntates et consilia et intelligentias. Sermo autem non est nisi per locutionem. Ergo in Angelis est locutio.
| 3. Damascene says: “In their discourses, which are not oral, angels tell each other what their wills are, and also what are their plans and their thoughts.” Now, discourse can be had only through speech. Therefore, angels possess the power of speech.
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| vResponsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod in Angelis aliquem modum locutionis ponere oportet. Cum enim Angelus secreta cordis non cognoscat specialiter et directe, ut in praecedenti quaest. de cognitione Angelorum, habitum est, oportet quod unus alteri manifestet suum conceptum; et haec est locutio Angelorum. In nobis enim locutio dicitur ipsa manifestatio interioris verbi quod mente concipimus.
| There must be some kind of speech among angels, for, as we proved earlier, one angel does not have direct and particular knowledge of what lies hidden in the heart of another; consequently, an angel must have some way of manifesting his thought to another. This way can be called angelic speech, for what we call speech in our own case is simply the manifestation of an interior word, which we mentally conceive.
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| Quomodo autem Angeli suos conceptus aliis manifestent, oportet accipere ex similitudine rerum naturalium, eo quod formae naturales sunt quasi imagines immaterialium, ut Boetius dicit. Invenimus autem formam aliquam existere in materia tripliciter. Uno modo imperfecte; medio scilicet modo inter potentiam et actum, sicut formae quae sunt in fieri. Alio modo in actu perfecto, perfectione dico, qua habens formam est perfectum in seipso. Tertio modo in actu perfecto, secundum quod habens formam potest communicare etiam alteri perfectionem: aliquid enim est in se lucidum, quod alia illuminare non potest.
| We can understand how angels manifest their concepts to one another if we study the resemblance their speech has to things in nature, because, as Boethius says, forms in nature are quasi-images of immaterial things. Now, we find that a form exists in matter in three ways. First, it can exist imperfectly, that is, in a mode halfway between potency and act. This, for example, is how forms exist that are coming into existence. Second, it can exist in perfect act; and I mean a perfection such that the being having it is perfected in itself. Third, it can exist in perfect act in such a way that the being having the form also can communicate this perfection to another. Some things are bright themselves, but cannot illumine other things.
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| Similiter etiam intelligibilis forma in intellectu existit tripliciter: primo quasi mediocriter inter potentiam et actum: quando scilicet est ut in habitu; secundo, ut in actu perfecto quantum ad ipsum intelligentem, et hoc est quando intelligens actu cogitat secundum formam quam penes se habet; tertio vero, in ordine ad alterum: et transitus quidem de uno modo in alterum est, quasi de potentia in actum, per voluntatem. Ipsa enim voluntas Angeli facit ut actualiter se convertat ad formas quas in habitu habebat; et similiter voluntas facit ut intellectus Angeli adhuc perfectius fiat in actu formae penes ipsum existentis: ut scilicet non solum secundum se, sed in ordine ad alium tali forma perficiatur. Et quando sic est, tunc alius Angelus eius cognitionem percipit; et secundum hoc dicitur alteri Angelo loqui.
| Intelligible forms exist in the intellect in a similar way. First, they can exist, as it were, halfway between potency and act, as a form possessed habitually. Second, they may exist in perfect act with respect to the knower. This is true when a knower actually thinks according to a form which he has within himself. Third, they may exist with a relation to some other being; and their transition from one being to the other (a transition, as it were, from potency to act) is made through the will. For the will of an angel causes him to turn actually to the forms he possesses, as it were, habitually; and, similarly, it makes his intellect actually more perfect with respect to the form within him, so that the angel is perfected, not only by this intellectual form itself, but also by the relation it has to another angel. When this takes place, his thought is perceived by the other angels; and, in this sense, one angel is said to speak to another.
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| Et similiter esset apud nos, si intellectus noster posset ferri in intelligibilia immediate: sed quia intellectus noster a sensibilibus naturaliter accipit, oportet quod ad interiores conceptus exprimendos quaedam sensibilia signa aptentur, quibus cogitationes cordium nobis manifestentur.
| We would have the same way of speaking if our intellect could be directed to intelligibles without having to have recourse to media; but, because it is the nature of our intelligence to receive from the senses, sensible signs are used to express our interior concepts, and by these signs we manifest our heart’s thoughts.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum Gregorii potest intelligi et de corporali visione, et de spirituali. In patria enim, sanctorum corporibus glorificatis, unus corporali oculo poterit videre intima corporis alterius, quae nunc non potest etiam inspicere in seipso: quia corpora gloriosa erunt quasi pervia; unde ibidem Gregorius comparat ea vitro. Similiter etiam oculo spirituali unusquisque videbit an alius habeat caritatem et mensuram caritatis, quod non potest quis nunc scire de seipso. Non tamen oportet quod actuales cogitationes ex voluntate dependentes unus in altero cognoscat.
| 1. Gregory’s statement can be understood of both physical and spiritual vision; for in heaven, after the bodies of the saints have been glorified, a saint will be able to see with his physical eyes the interior of another’s body—something which is now impossible. It will be possible then, because glorified bodies will in some way be transparent. For this reason, Gregory compares them to glass. Similarly, one will be able to see with his spiritual eyes whether or not another person has charity, and, if so, how much he possesses—something which is likewise impossible now. From this it does not follow, however, that one, will be able to know the actual thoughts of another, because these depend on the will.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod conscientia alterius dicitur penetrari quantum ad habitus, et non quantum ad actuales cogitationes.
| 2. The conscience is said to be penetrated, but this is with respect to its habits, not to its actual thoughts.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod silentium ibi privat locutionem vocalem, qualis est in nobis, non spiritualem, qualis est in Angelis.
| 3. In this statement, silence is opposed to oral speech such as we have, not to spiritual speech such as angels have.
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod signum, proprie loquendo, non potest dici nisi aliquid ex quo deveniatur in cognitionem alterius quasi discurrendo; et secundum hoc, signum in Angelis non est, cum eorum scientia non sit discursiva, ut in praecedenti quaestione est habitum. Et propter hoc etiam in nobis signa sunt sensibilia, quia nostra cognitio, quae discursiva est, a sensibilibus oritur. Sed communiter possumus signum dicere quodcumque notum in quo aliquid cognoscatur; et secundum hoc forma intelligibilis potest dici signum rei quae per ipsam cognoscitur. Et sic Angeli cognoscunt res per signa; et sic unus Angelus per signum alii loquitur; scilicet per speciem, in cuius actu intellectus eius perfecte fit in ordine ad alterum.
| 4. A thing cannot be called a sign in the proper sense unless one can come to know something else as if by reasoning from it. In this sense, signs do not exist among angels, because, as we proved in the previous question, angels’ knowledge is not discursive. The signs we use are sensible, because our knowledge, which is discursive, has its origin in sense-objects. But we commonly call anything a sign which, being known, leads to the knowledge of something else; and for this reason an intelligible form can be called a sign of the thing which is known by its means. It is in this sense that angels know things through signs; and thus one angel speaks to another by means of signs, that is, through a species which actuates his intellect and puts it perfectly in relation to the other.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis in naturalibus, quorum effectus sunt nobis magis noti quam causae, signum sit id quod est posterius in natura, tamen de ratione signi proprie accepti non est quod sit vel prius vel posterius in natura, sed solummodo quod sit nobis praecognitum: unde quandoque accipimus effectus ut signa causarum, sicut pulsum signum sanitatis; quandoque vero causas signa effectuum, sicut dispositiones corporum caelestium signa imbrium et pluviarum.
| 5. Although it is true that in natural things, whose effects are more known to us than their causes are, a sign is that which is posterior in nature, the notion of a sign, even properly speaking, is not such that a sign need be prior or posterior in nature, but only that it must be known previously by us. For this reason, at times we take effects as signs of causes, as when we judge health from the pulse, and at other times we take causes as signs of effects, as we take the dispositions of heavenly bodies as signs of stormy weather and rain.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod Angeli ex hoc ipso quod se ad alios convertunt, dum se in actu aliquarum formarum in ordine ad alios faciunt, quodammodo alios excitant ad eis intendendum.
| 6. When angels turn to others, as long as they put some of their intelligible forms into an actual relation to these others, the angels may be said to be arousing others’ attention to them.
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| Ad septimum dicendum, quod Angelus eodem genere cognitionis cognoscit omnia spiritualia, scilicet intellectualiter; sed hoc quod est cognoscere per se vel per alterum, non pertinet ad speciem cognitionis, sed magis ad modum accipiendi cognitionem. Unde non oportet quod, si unus Angelus cognoscat naturam alterius per seipsum, quod etiam locutionem alterius per seipsum cognoscat: quia cogitatio Angeli non est ita cognoscibilis alteri Angelo sicut eius natura.
| 7. It is true that an angel knows all spiritual things with the same kind of knowledge, that is, intellectually. But whether the knowledge of a thing comes through knowing oneself or through knowing something else concerns, not the type of knowledge, but only the manner in which this knowledge has been received. Hence, even if one angel knows the nature of another angel by knowing himself, it does not follow that he also knows the speech of the other in the same manner, because the thought of one angel is not as intelligible to another as his nature is.
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| Ad octavum dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si formae intellectus angelici essent ita efficaces ad cognoscendum sicut sunt rationes rerum in Deo efficaces ad producendum; sed hoc non est verum, cum nulla sit aequalitas creaturae ad creatorem.
| 8. That reasoning would follow if the intellectual forms in an angel were as efficacious for the knowledge of things as the intelligible characters of things in God are for their production. But this is not true, since a creature is not in any respect equal to God.
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| Ad nonum dicendum, quod quamvis in Angelis non sit locutio exterior, sicut in nobis, scilicet per signa sensibilia; est tamen alio modo, ut ipsa ordinatio cogitationis ad alterum exterior locutio in Angelis dicatur.
| 9. Although angels do not speak exteriorly as we do, namely, through sensible signs, they do speak exteriorly in another manner. The direction of their thoughts to other angels can be called exterior angelic speech.
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| Ad decimum dicendum, quod multitudo desideriorum pro tanto dicitur esse causa locutionis, quia ex multitudine desideriorum sequitur multitudo conceptuum, qui non possent nisi signis valde variis exprimi. Animalia autem bruta habent paucos conceptus, quos paucis naturalibus signis exprimunt. Unde, cum in Angelis sint multi conceptus, requiritur etiam ibi locutio. Nec multitudo conceptuum alia desideria requirit in Angelis quam desiderium communicandi alteri quod ipse mente concepit; quod desiderium imperfectionem in Angelis non ponit.
| 10. A multitude of desires is said to be the cause of speech merely because desires give rise to a multitude of concepts and these concepts could be expressed only by signs that differ greatly. Now, animals have just a few concepts, which they can express by a few natural signs. But, since angels have many concepts, they need speech. However, their having many concepts is a sign of no desire other than that of one angel’s wanting to communicate his mental conception to another angel; and this desire is not a sign that he is imperfect.
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| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod unus Angelus cogitationem alterius cognoscit per speciem innatam per quam alium Angelum cognoscit, quia per eamdem cognoscit omne quod cognoscit in alio Angelo. Unde quam cito Angelus se ordinat ad alium Angelum secundum actum alicuius formae, ille Angelus cognoscit eius cogitationem; et hoc quidem dependet ex voluntate Angeli. Sed cognoscibilitas naturae angelicae non dependet ex voluntate Angeli; et ideo non requiritur locutio in Angelis ad cognoscendum naturam, sed ad cognoscendam cogitationem tantum.
| 11. One angel knows the thought of another through the innate species by which he knows that other angel, because through this same species he knows all that he knows about the other angel. Consequently, as soon as one angel relates himself to another angel according to an act of some form, the other angel knows his thought; and this depends on the will of the first angel. But the knowability of the angelic nature does not depend on the will of the angel. Therefore, angels do not need speech to know the nature of other angels but only to know their thoughts.
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| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod secundum Augustinum, visus et auditus solummodo exterius differunt, interius autem sunt idem in mente; quia in mente non est aliud audire et videre, sed in sensu exteriori tantum. Unde apud Angelum, qui sola mente utitur, non differt audire et videre; sed tamen dicitur in Angelis locutio ad similitudinem eius quod in nobis fit: nos enim per auditum scientiam ab aliis acquirimus. Nutus autem et signa hoc modo possunt in Angelis distingui, ut signum dicatur ipsa species, nutus autem ordinatio ad alium. Sed potestas hoc faciendi dicitur lingua.
| 12. According to Augustine,” sight and hearing differ only exteriorly. Interiorly, in the mind, they are one and the same, because, in the mind, seeing and hearing do not differ. They differ only as they are in the external senses. Consequently, in angels, who have only minds, there is no difference between seeing and hearing. However, angelic speech gets its name from its resemblance to what takes place in us, for we receive our knowledge from others through our sense of hearing. Moreover, we can distinguish between angelic nods and signs in the following way: the species may be called signs, and the reference of the species to others, nods. But the very ability to do this is called their speech.
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| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod locutio est motus cognitivae, non qui sit ipsa cognitio, sed est cognitionis manifestatio; et ideo oportet quod sit ad alium; unde etiam philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod lingua est, ut significet alii.
| 13. Speech is a motion of a cognitive power; however, the motion is not in the cognition but in the manifestation of the cognition. Hence, this motion must have an order to another being. For this reason, the Philosopher also says: “Speech exists in order that one can signify something to another.”
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| Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod essentia Angeli non est figurabilis figura corporali; sed intellectus eius quasi figuratur forma intelligibili.
| 14. The essence of an angel does not have a material shape, but his intellect is, as it were, shaped by its intelligible forms.
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| Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod lux corporalis manifestat seipsam ex necessitate naturae; unde uniformiter se manifestat quantum ad omnia quae in ipsa sunt. Sed in Angelis est voluntas, cuius conceptus manifesti esse non possunt nisi secundum imperium voluntatis; et ideo opus est locutione.
| 15. Physical light manifests itself because of a natural necessity. Consequently, it manifests itself in the same way in regard to everything it contains. An angel, however, possesses a will; and his concepts cannot be manifested unless his will commands that they be manifested. This is why an angel needs speech.
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ARTICLE V
In the fifth article we ask:
Do the inferior angels speak to the superior?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 107, aa. 2-3; In I Cor., c. 13, lect. 1 (P. 13:259b).]
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| Quinto quaeritur utrum inferiores Angeli superioribus loquantur
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod non.
| It seems not, for
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| Per Glossam quae habetur I Cor. XIII, 1: si linguis hominum etc., quae sic dicit: linguae sunt quibus Angeli praepositi significant minoribus quod de Dei voluntate primi sentiunt. Ergo locutio, quae est actus linguae, ad solos superiores Angelos pertinet.
| 1. In its explanation of that verse in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:1), “If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels,” the Gloss reads as follows: “These tongues are the means by which the superior angels tell the inferior angels what they are first to learn about the will of God.” Consequently, speech, an act of the tongue, belongs only to the higher angels.
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| Praeterea, a quolibet loquente fit aliquid in audiente. Sed ab Angelis inferioribus nihil potest in superiores fieri, quia superiores non sunt in potentia respectu inferiorum, sed magis e converso; cum superiores habeant magis de actu, et minus de potentia. Ergo inferiores Angeli non possunt loqui superioribus.
| 2. Whenever anyone speaks, something takes place in his listener. Now, in the higher angels, nothing can take place that is caused by the lower, because the higher are not in potency with respect to the lower; rather, the opposite is true, since the superior angels have more act and less potency. Consequently, the lower angels cannot speak to the higher.
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| Praeterea, locutio supra cogitationem addit scientiae infusionem. Sed inferiores Angeli non possunt aliquid infundere superioribus, quia sic in eos agerent, quod esse non potest. Ergo eis non loquuntur.
| 3. To the notion of thought speech adds that of infusing knowledge. But the lower angels cannot infuse anything into the higher angels, because in that case they would be acting upon them, and this is impossible. Therefore, the lower do not speak to the higher angels.
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| Praeterea, illuminatio nihil est aliud quam manifestatio alicuius ignoti. Sed locutio est in Angelis ad manifestandum aliquid ignotum. Ergo locutio in Angelis est illuminatio quaedam. Ergo, cum Angeli inferiores non illuminent superiores, videtur quod inferiores superioribus non loquantur.
| 4. To illumine is simply to manifest something unknown. Now, angelic speech is for the manifestation of something unknown. Therefore, angelic speech is an illumination. Hence, since inferior angels do not illumine superior angels, it would seem that they also do not speak to them.
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| Praeterea, Angelus ad quem fit locutio, est in potentia cognoscens id quod locutione exprimitur; per locutionem autem fit actu cognoscens. Ergo Angelus loquens reducit illum cui loquitur de potentia in actum. Sed hoc non est possibile inferioribus Angelis respectu superiorum, quia sic essent eis nobiliores. Ergo non loquuntur inferiores superioribus.
| 5. The angel to whom another angel speaks is in potency to knowing what is expressed in the speech, and, by means of this speech, he comes to know it actually. Consequently, the angel speaking reduces the one spoken to from potency to act. Now, this is not possible for inferior angels with respect to superior angels, because in that case the inferior angels would be more noble. Hence, inferior angels do not speak to superior angels.
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| Praeterea, quicumque loquitur alteri de aliquo ei ignoto, docet ipsum. Si ergo inferiores Angeli loquuntur superioribus de propriis conceptibus quos illi ignorant, videtur quod eos doceant; et sic eos perficiunt, cum perficere sit docere, secundum Dionysium; et hoc est contra ordinem hierarchiae, secundum quem inferiores a superioribus perficiuntur.
| 6. One person teaches another if he tells him something that he did not know. Consequently, if inferior angels speak to superior angels about their concepts, which the superior are ignorant of, it would seem that they teach the superior angels, and thus perfect them, since, as Dionysius says, to teach is to perfect. But this would be contrary to the hierarchical order, according to which inferior angels are perfected by superior.
|
| Sed contra,
| To the Contrary
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| est quod Gregorius dicit in II Moral., quod Deus loquitur Angelis, et Angeli loquuntur Deo. Ergo eadem ratione et superiores Angeli inferioribus, et e converso.
| Gregory says: “God speaks to angels, and angels speak to God.” On the same principle, therefore, superior angels can talk to the inferior, and inferior to the superior.
|
| Responsio.
| REPLY
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| Dicendum, quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis oportet scire qualiter illuminatio et locutio in Angelis differant; quod quidem sic potest accipi. Intellectus aliquis deficit a cognitione alicuius cognoscibilis, propter duo. Uno modo propter absentiam cognoscibilis; sicut non cognoscimus gesta praeteritorum temporum, vel aliorum locorum remotorum, quae ad nos non pervenerunt. Alio modo propter defectum intellectus, qui non est adeo fortis ut possit pertingere ad illa cognoscibilia quae penes se habet, sicut intellectus omnes conclusiones penes se habet in primis principiis naturaliter notis, quae tamen non cognoscit nisi roboratus exercitio vel doctrina. Locutio igitur proprie est qua aliquis ducitur in cognitionem ignoti, per hoc quod fit sibi praesens quod alias erat ei absens; sicut apud nos patet dum unus alteri refert aliqua quae ille non vidit, et sic facit ei quodammodo praesentia per loquelam. Sed illuminatio est quando intellectus confortatur ad aliquid cognoscendum supra id quod cognoscebat, ut ex praedictis patet.
| To resolve this question satisfactorily, we must consider how, in angels, illumination differs from speech; and this can be done in the following way. An intellect falls short of knowing something for two reasons. First, the knowable object may be absent. For example, we do not know what has happened in past times or in remote places, if these happenings have not come to our attention. Second, there may be a defect in the intellect. That is, the intellect may not be strong enough to arrive at those truths which it already has in its possession, as, for instance, the intellect has all conclusions within itself in possessing first principles naturally known, but it does not know those conclusions unless it is strengthened by exercise or instruction. Properly speaking, therefore, speech is that by which a person is led to the knowledge of the unknown, because, through speech, something becomes present to him that would otherwise be absent. We have an evident example of this in our own case when one person shows another what the other did not see, and thus, in some sense, makes this thing present to him by means of speech. On the other hand, illumination takes place when the intellect is merely strengthened to know something above that which it already knew. We have explained this previously.
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| Sed tamen sciendum, quod locutio potest esse in Angelis et in nobis sine illuminatione; quia quandoque contingit aliqua nobis manifestari per locutionem, ex quibus intellectus nullo modo ad intelligendum magis roboratur; sicut cum recitantur mihi aliquae historiae, vel cum unus Angelus alteri conceptionem suam demonstrat; huiusmodi enim indifferenter possunt cognosci et ignorari ab eo qui habet debilem intellectum et fortem. Sed illuminatio semper habet locutionem adiunctam et in Angelis et in nobis. Nos enim secundum hoc alium illuminamus quod ei aliquod medium tradimus, quo intellectus eius roboratur ad aliquid cognoscendum; quod per locutionem fit. Similiter etiam oportet quod et in Angelis fiat per locutionem. Superior enim Angelus habet cognitionem de rebus per formas magis universales; unde inferior Angelus non est proportionatus ad accipiendum cognitionem a superiori Angelo, nisi superior Angelus cognitionem suam quodammodo dividat et distinguat, concipiendo in se illud de quo vult illuminare, per modum talem quo sit comprehensibile ab inferiori Angelo. Et talem conceptum suum Angelo alteri manifestando, cum illum illuminat;
| It should be noted, however, that both angels and men can have speech without illumination, because sometimes a thing is shown to us through speech only, and this does not strengthen our intellect in any way for knowing more. For example, one can recite to me merely a historical narrative, or one angel can reveal merely his thought to another angel; such matters can be equally known or not known by one having a strong intellect as well as by one having a weak intellect. But illumination in angels and men always has speech joined to it. For we illumine another person inasmuch as we give him some means by which his intellect is strengthened to know something, and this strengthening takes place through speech. In angels, this must also take place through speech, because the superior angel has his knowledge about things through forms that are more universal. Consequently, the inferior angel is not proportioned to receive knowledge from the superior unless the latter in some way distinguishes and divides his knowledge by conceiving within himself that about which he wishes to illumine in such a way that it will be comprehensible to the lower angel, and by manifesting this concept to him when he illumines him.
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| unde dicit Dionysius, cap. XV Cael. Hierarch.: unaquaeque intellectualis essentia donatam sibi a diviniore uniformem intelligentiam, provida virtute dividit et multiplicat ad inferioris ductricem analogiam; et est simile de magistro, qui videt discipulum non posse capere ea quae ipse cognoscit, per illum modum quo ipse cognoscit; et ideo studet distinguere et multiplicare per exempla, ut sic possit a discipulo comprehendi.
| Consequently, Dionysius says: “In its providence, every intellectual essence divides and multiplies what it understands by one form, given to it by a godlike being, so that these divisions may act as guiding analogies for those below.” The same is true of the teacher who, seeing that his pupil cannot grasp things which he himself knows in the same way in which he knows them, makes a special effort to distinguish and multiply his knowledge by means of examples, so that his pupil will grasp his knowledge in this manner.
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| Dicendum est igitur, quod illa locutione quae illuminationi adiungitur, superiores solum inferioribus, loquuntur; sed secundum aliam locutionem indifferenter loquuntur et superiores inferioribus, et e converso.
| Hence, we must admit that angelic speech joined with illumination is found only when superior angels speak to inferior; but the other type of angelic speech is used both when inferior angels speak to superior and when superior speak to inferior.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod Glossa illa loquitur de locutione adiuncta illuminationi.
| 1. The Gloss is referring here to angelic speech joined with an illumination.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod Angelus loquens nihil facit in Angelo cui loquitur; sed fit aliquid in Angelo ipso loquente, et ex hoc ab alio cognoscitur modo prius dicto; unde etiam non oportet quod loquens aliquid infundat ei cui loquitur.
| 2. The angel who speaks causes nothing in the angel to whom he is speaking. A change does take place, however, in himself; and, by reason of this change, he is known in the manner described above. Hence, there is no necessity for the angel speaking to infuse something into the one he is addressing.
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| Et sic patet solutio ad tertium.
| 3. The answer just given also solves the third difficulty.
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| Ad quartum patet responsio ex dictis.
| 4. The reply is evident from what has been said.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod Angelus cui aliquis loquitur, fit actu cognoscens de potentia cognoscente; non per hoc quod ipse reducatur de potentia in actum, sed per hoc quod ipse Angelus loquens reducit seipsum de potentia in actum, dum facit se in actu perfecto alicuius formae secundum ordinem ad alterum.
| 5. It is true that the angel to whom another angel speaks becomes an actual knower from being a potential knower; however, this takes place, not because he is reduced from potency to act, but because the angel who is speaking reduces himself from potency to act by making himself, with respect to some form, in perfect act according to an ordering to the other angel.
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| Ad sextum dicendum, quod doctrina est proprie de his quibus perficitur intellectus. Hoc autem quod unus Angelus cognoscat cogitationem alterius, non pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus eius; sicut nec pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus mei, quod cognoscam res absentes quae ad me non pertinent.
| 6. Properly speaking, teaching is applied only to those things which perfect an intellect. However, the fact that one angel knows the thoughts of another does not pertain to his intellectual perfection, just as it does not pertain to the perfection of my intellect if I learn about things that are not present to me and in no way concern me.
|
ARTICLE VI
In the sixth article we ask:
Is a determinate local distance required in order that one angel can speak to another?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 107, 4; II Sent., 11, 2, 3, ad 3.]
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| Sexto quaeritur utrum requiratur determinata distantia localis ad hoc quod unus Angelus alii loquatur
| Difficulties
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| Et videtur quod sic.
| It seems that it is, for
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| Quia ubicumque requiritur accessus et recessus, necessaria est determinata distantia. Sed Angeli accedentes in alterutrum et discedentes, sibi suos sensus mutuo conspiciunt, ut maximus dicit super cap. II Cael. hierarchiae. Ergo, et cetera.
| 1. Whenever arrival and departure are involved, there is necessarily a determinate distance. But, as Maximus says, angels see each other’s thoughts as they approach and depart from one another. Therefore.
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| Praeterea, secundum Damascenum, Angelus ubi operatur, ibi est. Si ergo Angelus alteri Angelo loquitur, oportet quod sit ubi est ille cui loquitur, et sic requiritur determinata distantia.
| 2. According to Damascene, an angel is where he operates. Consequently, if he speaks to another angel, he must be where his listener is; hence, some determinate distance is involved.
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| Praeterea, Isa. VI, 3, dicitur quod alter clamabat ad alterum. Sed locutio clamosa non habet locum nisi propter distantiam eius cui loquimur. Ergo videtur quod distantia impediat locutionem Angeli.
| 3, We read in Isaiah (6:3): “They cried one to another.” Now, the only reason for making cries is that a distance separates us from the one to whom we are speaking. Therefore, it seems that distance impedes the speech of angels.
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| Praeterea, locutio oportet quod deferatur a loquente in audientem; sed hoc non potest esse si sit localis distantia inter loquentem Angelum et audientem, quia locutio spiritualis per medium corporale non defertur. Ergo distantia localis locutionem Angeli impedit.
| 4. Speech must be carried from the one speaking to the one listening. Now, this is not possible unless local distance separates the angel speaking from the one listening, because spiritual speech cannot be carried by a material medium.. Therefore, local distance impedes the speech of angels.
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| Praeterea, anima Petri si esset hic, cognosceret ea quae hic aguntur: cum autem est in caelo, non cognoscit; unde Isa. LXIIII, super illud Abraham nescivit nos, dicit Glossa Augustini: nesciunt mortui, etiam sancti, quid agant vivi etiam eorum filii. Ergo distantia localis impedit animae beatae cognitionem; et eadem ratione Angeli et etiam locutionem.
| 5. If Peter’s soul were on earth, it would know the events taking place here; but, since it is in heaven, it does not. Hence, the gloss of Augustine on Isaiah (6 3:16), “Abraham has not known us,” says: “The dead”—even the saints—“do not know what the living are doing”—even their own sons. Consequently, local distance impedes the cognition of a separated soul, and, by the same reasoning, that of angels, and also their speech.
|
| Sed contra,
| To the Contrary
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| est, quod maxima distantia est inter Paradisum et Infernum. Sed illi mutuo se inspiciunt, maxime ante diem iudicii, ut patet per id quod habetur Lucae XVI, 23 de Lazaro et divite. Ergo nulla distantia localis impedit animae separatae cognitionem, et similiter nec Angeli; et eadem ratione nec locutionem.
| The greatest possible distance separates paradise from hell; but the blessed and the damned can see each other, especially before the day of final judgment. This is clear from Luke’s account of Lazarus and the rich man (Luke 16:19-31). Consequently, no local distance impedes the cognition of a separated soul or that of an angel. By the same reasoning, it does not impede angels’ speech.
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| REPLY
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| Respondeo. Dicendum, quod actio sequitur modum agentis; et ideo illa quae corporalia et situalia sunt, corporaliter et situaliter agunt; quae vero sunt spiritualia, non agunt nisi spiritualiter. Unde, cum Angelus, inquantum est intelligens, nullo modo sit situalis, actio intellectus ipsius nullo modo habet proportionem ad situm. Et ideo, cum locutio sit operatio intellectus ipsius, nihil facit ad eam propinquitas vel distantia loci; et sic aequaliter a propinquo loco vel remoto Angelus locutionem Angeli percipit, illo modo quo Angelos in loco esse dicimus.
| An agent acts according to its manner of existing. Hence, things that are material and circumscribed by place have actions that are material and circumscribed by place; and things that are spiritual act in a spiritual manner only. Consequently, because an angel as a knower is in no way circumscribed by place, the action of his intellect has no relation to place. Hence, since his speech is an operation of his intellect, local distance or proximity does not affect it. Therefore, one angel can understand the speech of another, whether that other be in a near or distant place—in the sense in which we say that angels are in place.
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| Answers to Difficulties
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| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod accessus ille et recessus non est intelligendus secundum locum, sed secundum conversionem ad alterutrum.
| 1. That arrival and departure should be understood, not according to place, but according to the angels’ turning to one another.
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| Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum dicitur, Angelus est ubi operatur, intelligendum est de operatione qua circa aliquod corpus agit; quae quidem operatio situalis est ex parte eius in quod terminatur. Locutio autem Angeli non est talis operatio; et ideo ratio non sequitur.
| 2. The statement that an angel is where he operates is to be under stood as referring to an operation which he carries out on some body; and this operation gets its place from that in which it terminates. Angelic speech, however, is not an operation of this kind. Hence, the argument does not follow.
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| Ad tertium dicendum, quod clamor ille quo Seraphim clamasse dicuntur, designat magnitudinem eorum quae loquebantur, scilicet unitatem essentiae et Trinitatem personarum, dicentes: sanctus, sanctus, et cetera.
| 3. The cries which the Seraphim are said to have made signify rather the magnitude of the things they spoke about, namely, the unity of God’s essence and the trinity of the persons; for they said: “Holy, Holy, Holy, the Lord God of hosts...” (Isaiah 6:3).
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| Ad quartum dicendum, quod Angelus ad quem fit locutio, ut dictum est, non recipit aliquid a loquente; sed per speciem quam penes se habet, et alium Angelum et locutionem eius cognoscit. Unde non oportet ponere aliquod medium per quod deferatur aliquid ab uno in alterum.
| 4. As already stated, the angel addressed does not receive anything from the one speaking; but, through species within himself, he knows the other angel as well as what he is saying. Consequently, there is no need of positing a medium by which something could be carried from one angel to another.
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| Ad quintum dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de cognitione naturali animarum, per quam etiam sancti non possunt cognoscere quae hic aguntur; sed ex virtute gloriae ea cognoscunt, ut expresse dicit Gregorius in Moral., exponens illud Iob XIV, 21: sive fuerint nobiles filii eius, sive ignobiles, non intelliget. Sed Angeli habent naturalem cognitionem magis elevatam quam animae; unde non est simile de Angelo et anima.
| 5. Augustine is speaking about the natural knowledge souls have. Through this, not even the saints can know what takes place here on earth. They can know these events, however, by means of the glory they have received. Gregory states, this explicitly when commenting on that verse in Job (14:2 1): “Whether his children come to honor or dishonor, he shall not understand.” But angels have a natural knowledge that is more perfect than that of the separated soul. Hence, no parallel can be drawn between a soul and an angel.
|