| Tertio quaeritur utrum christus sit unum neutraliter vel duo. Et videtur quod sit duo neutraliter. | Article 3: "Whether Christ is one or two in the neuter?" It seems that he is two in the neuter: |
| Dicit enim Augustinus in I Trinit.: quia forma dei suscepit formam hominis, utrumque est deus, et utrumque homo. Sed in eo quod est unum tantum non potest dici utrumque. ergo christus non est unum tantum, sed duo. | Objection 1: For Augustine says in On the Trinity, I, ch. 7: Since the form of God took the form of man, both are God and both are man. But to the extent that he is only one he cannot be called "both". Therefore, Christ is not merely one, but two. |
| Praeterea, sicut in tribus personis divinis est una natura, ita in una persona Christi sunt duae naturae. Sed tres personae divinae dicuntur unum propter unitatem naturae. Ergo Christus dicendus est duo propter duas naturas. | Objection 2: Further, just as there is one nature in the three divine persons, so there are two natures in the one person of Christ. But, the three divine persons are called one because of a unity of nature. Therefore Christ must be called two because of the two natures. |
| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit Contra Felicianum: aliud est Filius Dei, et aliud filius hominis. sed ubicumque est aliud et aliud, ibi sunt duo. Ergo Christus, secundum quod est Filius Dei et filius hominis, est duo. | Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in Against Felicianus I, ch.11: the Son of God is one thing, the son of man another. But, wherever there is one thing and another, there are two things. Therefore, insofar as Christ is the Son of God and the son of man, he is two. |
| Praeterea, illud quod est unum supposito, fit alterum ex seipso successive propter diversum accidens; sicut Socrates senex a seipso puero. Sed sicut differentia accidentalis facit alterum, ita differentia substantialis facit aliud. Ergo si idem suppositum mutari posset de una differentia substantiali in aliam esset aliud et aliud. Pari ergo ratione, si idem suppositum habeat simul duas differentias substantiales, simul erit aliud et aliud. Sed habere duas naturas, est habere duas differentias substantiales: quia natura est unumquodque informans specifica differentia, ut Boetius dicit in libro De Duabus Naturis. Ergo Christus simul est aliud et aliud; et ita simul est duo. | Objection 4: Further, that which is one in the suppositum becomes different from itself successively because of diverse accidents; just as Socrates as an old man is different from himself as a boy. But just as an accidental difference makes something other, so a substantial difference makes another thing. Therefore if the same suppositum can be changed from one substantial difference to another it would be one thing and another thing. Therefore, for the same reason, if the same suppositum has two substantial differences at the same time, it will be one thing and another thing at the same time. But to have two natures is to have two substantial differences; because a nature is the specific difference informing each and everything as Boethius says in Concerning the Two Natures. Therefore, Christ is one thing and another thing at the same time, thus he is two things at once. |
| Praeterea, unumquodque est illud quod vere de eo praedicatur. Sed aliud praedicat hoc nomen homo de Christo, et aliud hoc nomen Deus: hoc enim praedicat utrumque nomen quod significat. Sicut enim hoc nomen album nihil aliud significat quam qualitatem, secundum philosophum; ita hoc nomen homo nihil aliud significat quam humanitatem quae est aliud a divinitate, quam significat hoc nomen Deus. Ergo Christus est aliud et aliud; et ita est duo. | Objection 5: Further, each thing is that which is truly predicated of it. But, this term "man" predicates one thing of Christ and this term "God" another thing. For each name predicates what it signifies. For just as this name white signifies nothing other than a quality according to the Philosopher; so this name man signifies nothing other than humanity which is different from divinity, which this name "God" signifies. Therefore, Christ is one thing and another thing, and thus he is two. |
| Sed dicebat, quod hoc nomen homo in sui significatione includit suppositum humanitatis, non est aliud a supposito divinitatis. Et ideo Christus, secundum quod est Deus et homo, non est aliud et aliud. Sed contra, ad diversitatem aliquorum non requiritur quod sint diversa secundum omne quod in eis est; sed sufficit si secundum aliquid sunt diversa. Homo enim et asinus conveniunt quidem in animali, sed differunt rationali et irrationali differentia. Ad hoc ergo quod aliud praedicet hoc nomen homo de Christo et aliud hoc nomen Deus, sufficit si natura significata sit alia et alia, quamvis sit suppositum idem. | Objection 6: But, it was said that this term "man" includes in its own signification the suppositum of humanity, which is not different from the divine suppositum. And thus, Christ, insofar as he is God and man is not one thing and another. But to the contrary, it is not required for the diversity of some things that they be diverse according to everything which is in them; but, it suffices if they are diverse in any way. For a man and an ass indeed agree in being animals, but they differ by the differentia rational and irrational. In order, therefore, that the term "man" should predicate one thing of Christ and the name "God" another thing, it suffices if the nature signified is one thing and another thing, although the suppositum is the same. |
| Praeterea, Christus, in quantum Deus, est aliud unum unitate increata; in quantum autem est homo, est unum unitate creata. Sed unitas creata et unitas increata sunt duae unitates. Ergo Christus est duo. | Objection 7: Further, Christ, inasmuch as he is God, is one thing by an uncreated unity; but inasmuch as he is man he is another individual thing by a created unity. But created and uncreated unities are two unities. Therefore, Christ is two. |
| Praeterea, sequitur: Christus est unum tantum; ergo est hoc et non aliud. A destructione consequentis: sequitur, si non potest dici quod Christus sit homo et non aliud, quod non possit dici quod Christus sit unum tantum. Sed haec est falsa: Christus est homo tantum. Ergo Christus est homo et aliud; et ita Christus est duo. | Objection 8: Further, it follows: Christ is only one; therefore he is this thing and not another. From the denial of the consequent: it follows if it cannot be said that Christ is a man and not something else, then what cannot be said is that Christ is only one. But this is false: Christ is only a man. Therefore, Christ is a man and something else; and thus he is two. |
| Praeterea, haec propositio, Christus est Deus et homo, est propositio plures, cum sit de praedicato copulato. Sed omnis talis propositio praedicat plura. Ergo Christus non est unum tantum, sed plura. | Objection 9: Further, this proposition, Christ is God and man, is an ambiguous proposition, since it has a conjoint predicate. But every such proposition predicates many things. Therefore, Christ is not merely one, but many. |
| Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, in viii Metaph., ex pluribus quorum unum est in potentia et aliud non, non fit aliquid unum, sed multa. Unde cum dico: homo est animal bipes, praedicatur de homine aliquid unum; non autem cum dicitur, Socrates est albus musicus. Sed humanitas et divinitas non se habent ut potentia et actus. Ergo cum dicitur, Christus est Deus et homo, non ponitur unum, sed multa; et ita Christus non est unum, sed duo. | Objection 10: Further, according to the Philosopher in 10 Metaphys. 15-6, from many things, one of which is in potency and the other is not, does not come one thing, but many things. Hence when I say " man is a two-footed animal", something one is predicated of man; but not when it is said "Socrates is a white musician". But humanity and divinity are not related as potency and act. Therefore, when it is said Christ is God and man there is not one thing posited, but many things. And thus Christ is not one but two. |
| Praeterea, suppositum dicitur id quod est subsistens. Sed alia ratio subsistendi est filii hominis, et Filii Dei. Ergo est aliud et aliud suppositum; et ita Christus non est unum, sed duo. | Objection 11: A suppositum is called that which is subsisting. But the manner (ratio) of subsisting for the son of man and the Son of God is different. Therefore they are one suppositum and another. And thus Christ is not one but two. |
| Praeterea, differentia conducit ad pluralitatem. sed maxima differentia est inter humanam naturam et divinam. Ergo maxime Christus est duo. | Objection 12: Further, a difference leads to plurality. But there is the greatest difference between man and God. Therefore, Christ is surely two. |
| Praeterea, nihil unum potest participare incompossibiles proprietates. Sed Christo conveniunt incompossibiles proprietates; sicut esse aeternum et in tempore natum, infinitum et loco circumscriptum, et alia huiusmodi. Ergo Christus non est unum, sed duo. | Objection 13: Further, nothing one can share in incompatible properties. But incompatible properties belong to Christ; just as to be eternal and to be born in time, to be infinite and to be circumscribed in a place, and other things of this kind. Therefore, Christ is not one, but two. |
| Praeterea, Christus est homo. Homo autem est humanitas, quia essentia rei est idem cum eo cuius est essentia, ut dicitur in vii Metaph. Ergo Christus est sua humanitas. Est etiam divinitas. Cum ergo humanitas non sit divinitas, sequitur quod Christus non sit unum, sed duo. | Objection 14: Further, Christ is a man. But, a man is humanity, because the essence of a thing is identical with the thing whose essence it is, as is said in book VII of the Metaphys. Therefore, Christ is his own humanity. He is also divinity. Therefore, since humanity is not divinity, it follows that Christ is not one, but two. |
| Sed contra. Christus non est duae personae nec duae hypostases nec duo supposita, ut ex praedictis patet; nec duae naturae, quia humana natura non praedicatur de Christo. Ergo Christus non est duo. | To the contrary - 1. Christ is not two persons, nor two hypostases, nor two supposita, as is clear from the aforesaid; neither is he two natures, because the human nature is not predicated of Christ. Therefore, Christ is not two. |
| Praeterea, secundum Boetium De Unitate et Uno, unumquodque ideo est, quia unum numero est. Si ergo Christus non sit unum, sequitur quod non sit ens. | 2. Further, according to Boethius Concerning Unity, each and every thing is because it is one in number. Therefore, if Christ is not one, it follows that he is not a being. |
| Praeterea, ea quae de se invicem praedicantur, non ponunt in numerum. Sed homo et Deus de se invicem praedicantur in Christo. Ergo Christus non est duo, secundum quod Deus et homo. | 3. Further, those things which are predicated mutually of each other are not pluralized. But, man and God are predicated of one another in Christ. Therefore, Christ is not two insofar as he is God and man. |
| Praeterea, maior est unio divinae et humanae naturae in Christo, quam unio accidentis et subiecti ut supra habitum est. Sed accidens et subiectum sunt unum numero, secundum Philosophum. Ergo multo magis Christus est unum, secundum quod Deus et homo. | 4. Further, the union of the human and divine natures in Christ is greater than the union of an accident to a subject as is stated above. [a. 1] But, an accident and its subject are one in number, according to the Philosopher [5 Metaphys., com. 7] Therefore, much more is Christ one insofar as he is God and man. |
| Praeterea, Athanasius dicit de Christo: licet Deus sit et homo; non duo tamen, sed unus est Christus. | 5. Further, Athanasius says of Christ: "Although he is God and man, nevertheless he is not two, but he is one Christ". |
| Praeterea, quod factum est unum, unum est; sicut quod factum est album, est album. Sed secundum Hugonem, in libro De Sacramentis, Verbum Dei est factum unum cum homine. Ergo Christus, Deus et homo existens, est unum. | 6. Further, what is made one, is one; just as what is made white is white. But according to Hugh in the book On the Sacraments [II,1, cc., 4 and 9], the Word of God was made one with man. Therefore, Christ, existing as God and man, is one. |
| Praeterea, unitas est qua unumquodque dicitur unum. Sed post unitatem trinitatis maxime unitas est Verbi incarnati. Ergo est maxime unum. | 7. Further, unity is that by which each and every thing is called one. But, after the unity of the Trinity the greatest unity is of the Word incarnate. Therefore, he [i.e. Christ] is entirely one. |
| Respondeo. Dicendum quod masculinum genus, quia est formatum, consuevit ad personam referri; et ideo manifestum est quod Christus non est duo masculine, sed unus: quia in Christo non sunt duae personae, sed una. | I answer that, a word formulated in the masculine gender is customarily referred to the person; and thus it is clear that Christ is not two in the masculine, but one; since there are not two persons in Christ, but one. |
| Quidam vero ponentes in Christo unam personam, posuerunt in Christo duo supposita aut duas hypostases, unam Filii Dei, aliam filii hominis. Unde, licet non dicerent Christum esse duo masculine propter unitatem personae, dicebant tamen ipsum esse duo neutraliter, propter dualitatem suppositorum. Sed quia haec etiam opinio repugnat fidei veritati ut supra habitum est; ideo, hac opinione praetermissa, considerandum est utrum supposito quod in Christo sit una hypostasis et unum suppositum, utrum Christus debeat dici duo neutraliter, vel unum. | But, certain authors, positing one person in Christ, posited two supposita or hypostases, one of the Son of God and another of the son of man (Cf. S.T. III, q. 2, a. 3). Hence, although they did not say that Christ is two in the masculine because of the unity of person, still they said that he was two in the neuter because of the duality of supposita. But, because this opinion too is contrary to the truth of the faith, as was said above; thus, leaving aside this opinion, we must consider whether, supposing that in Christ there is one hypostasis and one suppositum, Christ ought to be called two in the neuter or one. |
| Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod unum denominative dicitur quod habet unitatem, sicut album quod habet albedinem, sive quod ei subiicitur. et eadem ratione multa denominative dicuntur a multitudine, et duo a dualitate. Quia vero unum convertitur cum ente, sicut est esse accidentale et esse substantiale, ita dicitur aliquid esse unum vel multa vel secundum formam accidentalem, vel secundum substantialem. Secundum quidem formas accidentales dicitur aliquid multa quod est subiectum diversis formis accidentalibus vel successive vel simul. Successive quidem, sicut Socrates sedens est alter a se stante; unde Socrates, in quantum est prius stans et postea sedens, est multa successive. simul autem, sicut Socrates in quantum est albus et musicus est multa. | For a clear understanding of this, we must consider that what has unity is called 'one' denominatively, just as a white thing is what has whiteness, or what is a subject for it. And for the same reason 'many' is said denominatively from a multitude, and two from a duality. But, since one (unum) is convertible with being (ente), so according as it is an accidental and a substantial being (esse), something is called one or many either according to an accidental form or according to a substantial form. Indeed, something which is a subject for diverse accidental forms is called many, either successively or simultaneously, according to the accidental forms. Successively, indeed, as when Socrates sitting is different from Socrates standing; hence, Socrates, insofar as he is first standing and later sitting, is many things successively. Simultaneously, on the other hand, as when Socrates, insofar as he is white and musical, is many. |
| Quod enim animal bipes, quod praedicatur de Socrate, sit unum et non multa, ex hoc contingit, quia unum eorum comparatur ad alterum ut potentia ad actum, ut dicitur in viii Metaph. Album autem et musicum non sic se habent ad invicem; et ideo Socrates, in quantum est albus et musicus, est multa, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sicut et secundum accidentia dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, et non simpliciter. Secundum substantiam autem dicitur aliquid unum et multa simpliciter sicut ens. Sed secundum Philosophum, in v Metaph., substantia secundum duos modos dicitur, scilicet: suppositum, quod de alio non praedicatur; et forma, vel natura speciei, quae de supposito praedicatur. Et haec quidem in creaturis puris non sunt simul unum et multa. Non est enim una numero essentia diversorum suppositorum, nec iterum invenitur in creaturis puris aliquod unum suppositum habens duas naturales substantias. Sed hoc singulare est in Christo; primum autem est singulare in tribus personis divinis. Manifestum est ergo quod Christus potest dici aliqualiter unum, quia est unum supposito; et aliqualiter multa, vel duo, quia est habens duas naturas. Multo amplius quam Socrates, de quo praedicatur unum, in quantum est unum subiecto; multa, in quantum est album et musicum. | However, a two-footed animal, which is predicated of Socrates, is one and not many, since one of them is compared to the other as potency is to act, as is said in VIII Metaphy. [text. 15-6] (I.e. being two-footed is a way of being an animal, whereas being white is not a way of being musical. Cf.Aquinas, In Metaph. Marietti, 8, lect. 5, 1755 A. Cf. obj. 10.ys). Now white and musical are not related to each other in this way; and thus Socrates insofar as he is white and musical is many, indeed not simply, but in a certain respect (Cf. obj. 10). This is because it is according to accidents that something is said to be in a certain respect, and not simply. But something that is a being is called one or many simply, according to substance. But according to the Philosopher, in V Metaphy., [text. 15] (Reference? Cf. X.L.3., 1979. #903?), substance is said in two ways, namely: the suppositum, which is not predicated of another; and the form, or nature of the species which is predicated of the suppositum. And indeed in mere creatures these are not one and many at the same time. For the essence of different supposita is not one in number, nor again is some one suppositum found in pure creatures having two natural substances. But this singular is in Christ [i.e. one suppositum and two natures]; but first [type of] singular is in the three divine persons [i.e. one essence, dietas, and three supposita]. Therefore, it is clear that Christ can in some measure be called one, since he is one suppositum; and in some way many, or two, because he has two natures - much more so than Socrates, of whom one is predicated insofar as he is one in subject; many, inasmuch as he is white and musical. |
| Sed considerandum est, quid horum dicatur simpliciter, et quid secundum quid. Sciendum est ergo, quod simpliciter et proprie dicitur aliquid esse tale, quod est secundum seipsum tale. Dicitur autem aliquid esse secundum seipsum tale, quod est secundum totum, magis quam quod est secundum partem; quia pars non est simpliciter idem toti. Ipsum autem cum sit reciprocum, est relativum identitatis. Et ideo quod convenit alicui secundum totum, magis convenit ei simpliciter quam quod convenit ei secundum partem. Unde si aliquid natum sit convenire alicui secundum totum et partem, si conveniat ei solum secundum partem, dicitur convenire ei secundum quid, et non simpliciter. Sicut si dicatur Aethiops albus qui habet albos dentes. Secus autem est de eo quod non est natum inesse nisi secundum partem; sicut aliquis dicitur simpliciter crispus, si habeat capillos crispos. Manifestum est autem quod suppositum significatur per modum totius, natura autem per modum partis formalis, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo, cum unum et multapossint referri et ad suppositum et ad naturam, manifestum est quod si aliquod unum suppositum habeat plures naturas substantiales, erit unum simpliciter et multa secundum quid. Cuius signum est; quia ea quae differunt supposito et sunt unum in eo quod per se pertinet ad naturam, sunt plura quidem simpliciter, sed unum genere vel specie. Et ideo, e contrario, si unum suppositum habeat multas naturas, erit unum simpliciter et multa secundum quid. Quia igitur Christus est unum suppositum habens duas naturas, sequitur quod sit unum simpliciter, et duo secundum quid. | But, we should consider which of these is said simply and which in a qualified way. Therefore, it must be known that something is said to be such a thing simply and properly which is such according to itself. But, something is said to be such according to itself is according to a whole, more than according to a part; because a part is not the same as a whole simply. Now the term "ipsum", since it is reciprocal, is a relative term of identity. And thus what belongs to something according to the whole, belongs to it more simply than what belongs to it only according to a part. Hence, if it is appropriate for something to belong to another according to both whole and part, then if it belongs to it only according to the part, it is said to belong to it in a certain respect, and not simply. Just as if an Ethiopian who has white teeth is called white. It is quite otherwise for something which can be attributed only according to a part; as when someone is called curly simply if he has curly hair. But it is clear that the suppositum is signified through the manner of a whole, but the nature through the manner of a formal part, as is obvious from the aforesaid. Thus, although one and many can be referred both to the suppositum and the nature, it is clear that if some one suppositum has many substantial natures, it will be one simply and many in a certain respect. A sign of this is that those things which differ in suppositum and are one in that which pertains to the nature per se, are indeed many simply, but one in genus or species. And thus, from the contrary, if one suppositum has many natures it will be one simply and many in a certain respect. Since, therefore, Christ is one suppositum having two natures, he will be one simply and two in a certain respect. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod Augustinus dicit, utrumque deus et utrumque homo, non est referendum ad dualitatem suppositi secundum quam Christus simpliciter duo esse diceretur; sed ad dualitatem naturarum per duo nomina significatarum, quae sunt Deus et homo. quia scilicet de Deo praedicantur humana et divina; et de homine praedicantur etiam divina et humana. | 1. What Augustine says, "both are God and both are man", must not be referred to a duality of supposita in the sense that Christ would be called two simply; but to a duality of natures through the two names of the things signified: which are "God" and "man", since, of course, human and divine things are predicated of both God and man. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod unaquaeque divinarum personarum est omnino idem secundum rem cum divina essentia, nec aliquid additur in persona supra naturam divinam quod aliquam diversitatem substantialem faciat. Et ideo per hoc quod in natura divina conveniunt tres personae, sunt simpliciter unum. Non autem similiter se habet humana natura ad divinam personam; unde non est similis ratio. | 2. Each of the divine persons is entirely identical with the divine essence in reality, nor is anything added to the divine person over and above the divine nature which could produce any substantial diversity. And thus since the three persons agree in the divine nature, they are one simply. But the human nature is not related to the divine person in a similar way; hence the reasoning is not the same. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod in Christo dicitur esse aliud filius hominis, et aliud Filius Dei, propter hoc quod aliam et aliam naturam praedicat utrumque nomen; non propter hoc quod sit aliud et aliud suppositum, ad quod sequeretur Christum esse simpliciter duo. Cum enim suppositum humanum et divinum sint differentia, necesse esset substantialiter differre. | 3. In Christ, the son of man is said to be one thing and the son of God another, because each name predicates a different nature; not because there is a different suppositum [for each nature], from which it would follow that Christ is two simply. For since the human and the divine suppositum would be different, it would be necessary that they differ substantially. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod diversae formae inhaerentes, sive in eodem sive in diversis temporibus, non faciunt aliud simpliciter, si maneat idem suppositum; sed solum propter suppositum; quando suppositum est diversum. | 4. Diverse forms inhering, whether in the same or diverse times, do not make another thing simply, if the same suppositum remains [they only produce many things simply] on account of the suppositum; when the suppositum is diverse. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod in hoc nomine album intelligitur albedo, et subiectum albedinis; sed albedo determinate, subiectum autem albedinis indeterminate. Nam cum dicimus album, intelligimus aliquid albedine informatum; non autem determinatur quid sit illud, sicut determinatur forma. Similiter etiam cum dico hominem, vel aliquid aliud substantialiter dictum, intelligitur habens humanitatem. Sed quia aliquid determinatur ad speciem per suam essentiam vel naturam, non autem per suum accidens; in hoc nomine homo determinate intelligitur id quod est habens humanitatem, magis quam in hoc nomine album intelligatur habens albedinem. Et quia id quod per nomen determinate intelligitur est proprie nominis significatum; magis hoc nomen homo significat suppositum humanitatis, quam hoc nomen album subiectum albedinis. Quamvis nec hoc nomen homo significet humanitatis suppositum, secundum quod est determinatum in sua singularitate; sed solum secundum quod est determinatum in natura speciei. Quia ergo suppositum humanae naturae et divinae in Christo, secundum quod accipitur in sua singularitate discretum, est unum et idem in duabus naturis determinatis; est quidem simpliciter unum secundum seipsum, secundum quid autem duo, in quantum scilicet habet duas naturas. | 5. In this name "white" [album] [both] whiteness is understood and the subject of whiteness (Reading "nomine" for Marietti's "homine"). But, whiteness is understood determinately, the subject of whiteness is understood indeterminately. For when we say "white", we understand something informed by whiteness; but, that does not determine what it is [quid sit], in the way that the form is determined. So also, when I say man, or something else said substantially, "having humanity" is understood. But, since something is determined to a species by its essence or nature, but not through its accidents, by the name "man" is determinately understood that which has humanity, more than having whiteness is understood in the name "white". And since that which is understood determinately through a name is the thing properly signified by the name, the name "man" signifies the suppositum of humanity more than the name "white" signifies the subject of whiteness. Although the name "man" does not signify humanity's suppositum insofar as it is determined in its own singularity; but [it does so] only insofar as it is determined to the nature of a species. Therefore, since the suppositum of the human and divine nature in Christ according as it is taken in its discrete singularity separately, is one and the same thing in two determined natures, He is indeed one thing simply according to himself, but he is two in a certain respect, namely, insofar as he has two natures. |
| Ad sextum dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit aliud, non oportet quod secundum totum distinguatur, ad hoc tamen quod simpliciter sit aliud, oportet quod distinguatur secundum seipsum. | 6. For something to be other, it is not necessary that it be distinguished according as it is a whole, but for it to be other simply, it is necessary that it be distinguished according to itself. |
| Ad septimum dicendum quod ex hoc quod unitas creata non est
unitas increata, non potest concludi quod Christus sit duo; sed quod subsistat in duplici unitate, sicut subsistit in duplici natura. |
7. From the fact that a created unity is not an uncreated unity, it cannot be concluded that Christ is two; but that he subsists in a two-fold unity, just as he subsists in a two-fold nature. |
| Ad octavum dicendum quod si Christus esset unum, quod est homo, et non aliud quam homo; sequeretur quod esset unum omnino, id est et secundum naturam et secundum suppositum. per hoc autem quod Christus est unum quod est homo, et aliud quod est Deus, sequitur quod sit duo secundum naturam; non autem quod sit omnino et simpliciter duo, propter unitatem suppositi. | 8. If Christ were one thing, that is a man, and not other than man; it would follow that he would be completely one, that is both according to nature and according to the suppositum. But, by the fact that Christ is one thing, that is a man, and another thing, that is God, it follows that he is two according to nature, but he is not two entirely and simply, on account of the unity of the suppositum. |
| Ad nonum dicendum quod illud de quo plura praedicantur in propositione quae est de copulato praedicato, non oportet esse plura simpliciter; alioquin Socrates esset plura simpliciter, si sit albus et musicus. Et ideo non oportet, si Christus est Deus et homo, quod sit duo simpliciter. | 9. It is not necessary for that of which many things are predicated in a proposition with conjoint predicate to be many simply. Otherwise Socrates would be many things simply, if he were white and musical. And thus it is not necessary if Christ is God and man that he is two simply. |
| Ad decimum dicendum quod ex divina natura et humana non fit unum secundum naturam. Concurrunt tamen in unum suppositum propter quod Christus est unum. | 10. One thing according to nature is not made out of the human and divine natures. Yet, they come together in one suppositum because Christ is one. |
| Ad undecimum dicendum quod sicut non oportet quod Christus sit duo filii, propter hoc quod alia ratione est natus a Patre, et alia a matre; ita etiam non oportet quod sit duo secundum suppositum, propter diversam rationem subsistendi qua subsistit in quantum Deus et in quantum homo. | 11. Just as it is not necessary that Christ is two sons, on account of the fact that in one way he was born from the Father and in another way from [his] mother; so also, it is not necessary that he be two according to the suppositum, on account of a different manner of subsisting by which he subsists insofar as he is God and insofar as he is man. |
| Ad duodecimum dicendum quod maxima differentia quae est inter humanam naturam et divinam, ostendit quod non potest esse una natura Dei et hominis; non autem ex hoc sequitur quod non possit esse unum suppositum utriusque naturae. | 12. The greatest difference is that between the human nature and the divine nature, this shows that there cannot be one nature of God and man; but it does not follow from this that there cannot be one suppositum of both natures. |
| Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet contrarias et incompossibiles differentias inesse eidem secundum diversa: sicut homo secundum animam est incorruptibilis, et secundum corpus corruptibilis. Et ita etiam in Christo opposita quaedam conveniunt secundum humanam et divinam naturam. | 13. Nothing prevents contraries and incompatible differences being present in the same thing in different ways: just as a man is incorruptible with respect to the soul and corruptible with respect to the body. And so too certain incompatible things belong to Christ according to the human and divine nature. |
| Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod haec est falsa, homo est humanitas; non enim omnino idem significatur per utrumque. Quia, ut Philosophus dicit, in vii Metaph., quod quid est, id est essentia uniuscuiusque, est idem cum eo quantum ad ea quae sunt per se, non autem quantum ad ea quae sunt per accidens. Et ideo quidquid sit illud cui potest aliquid accidere praeter naturam suae speciei, non est omnino idem cum sua essentia. Homini autem multa accidunt praeter essentiam speciei. Unde patet quod non est omnino idem homo et humanitas; nam humanitas dicitur qua aliquis est homo, et sic in sua significatione includit sola ea quae pertinent ad essentiam speciei. Homo autem dicitur qui habet humanitatem, in quo etiam multa sunt alia praeter essentiam speciei. | 14. This is false: a man is humanity; for what is signified through both is not entirely the same. Since as the Philosopher says, in book VII of the Metaphys. that which is, i.e. the essence of anything, is identical with the thing with regard to those things which are per se, but not with regard to those things which are accidentally. And thus, whatever is a thing to which something can pertain besides the nature of its own species, is not entirely identical with its essence. Now many things happen to a man beyond the essence of the species. Hence it is obvious that a man and humanity are not entirely the same. For "humanity" means that by which anything is a man and so it includes only those things which pertain to the essence of the species in its signification. But, "man" means the one who has humanity, in whom, indeed, there are many other things beyond the essence of the species (Cf. The account of suppositum in terms of what is beyond the essence in III, q. 2, a. 2). |