Q. 17: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE II

In the second article we ask:

Did man in the state of innocence see god through creatures?

[Parallel readings: II Sent., 2 3, 2, 1; S.T., I, 94, 1.]

Difficulties

It seems that he did not, for

1. To know God through creatures is to know a cause through an effect. But this is knowledge which involves comparison and investigation, and, since this is feeble and imperfect, it did not befit man in the state of innocence. Therefore, in the state of innocence Adam did not see God through creatures.

2. When the cause is removed the effect is removed. But Isidore says that the cause why man sees God through creatures is that he turned from the Creator and toward creatures. This was not yet so at that time in the state of innocence. Therefore, at that time man did not see God through creatures.

3. According to Hugh of St. Victor, man in that state knew God, tcontemplating Him as present.” But He is seen in contemplation without the medium of creatures. Therefore, he did not see God through creatures.

4. Isidore says that the angels, created before the rest of creation, did not know God through creatures. But, according to Damascene, man in the state of innocence saw God as another angel. Therefore, he did not know God from creatures.

5. Darkness is not the reason for knowing light. But, compared to the Creator, every creature is darkness. Therefore, the Creator cannot be known through creatures.

6. Augustine says: “I say that perhaps He spoke with them [our first parents] in this way, although not with the same degree of participation in the divine wisdom as the angels possess, yet, with whatever greater limitations imposed by human nature, within the same general category of vision and conversation. “ From this it seems that we can conclude that man in the state of innocence knew God with the same mode of knowledge with which the angels know him. But angels do not know God through creatures, as is clear in Augustine and Dionysius. Therefore, man in the state of innocence did not see God through creatures.

7. The soul of man is more like God than is any sensible creature, Therefore, when the soul of man was in its purity, it did not seek knowledge of God through visible creation.

8. Less perfect knowledge is superfluous when more perfect is given. But, as Hugh of St. Victor says,” man in the state of innocence knew God “as present in contemplation.” Therefore, he did not know God through creatures.

To the Contrary

Damascene says that Adam was established in a bodily paradise that there he might view his Creator through creatures.

REPLY

For a clear understanding of this question we must bear in mind that, according to Boethius, nature begins with perfect things. This can be seen in divine works, for in any work of God the things which are first are perfect. Hence, since in the state of innocence God made Adam the source of the whole human race, not only to transmit human nature to posterity but also to pass on original justice to others, man in the state of innocence must be considered as having had a twofold perfection. One of these is natural and the other is given freely by God over and above what is due from natural principles.

According to natural perfection, however, man could fittingly know God only from creation. This is clear from the following. In any genus a passive power extends only to those things to which an active power extends. Therefore, the Commentator says” that there is no passive power in nature for which there is not a corresponding active power.

In human nature, however, there is a double power for understanding: one passive, which is the possible intellect, and the other active, which is the agent intellect. Consequently, the possible intellect according to the natural process is in potency only to those forms which become actually intelligible through the agent intellect. But these are only the forms of sensible things which are abstracted from phantasms’ For immaterial substances are intelligible of themselves and not because we make them intelligible. Therefore, our possible intellect cannot reach any intelligible objects except through those forms which it abstracts from phantasms. Thus it is that by our natural power we can know God and’ other immaterial substances only through sensible things.

But, in the state of innocence, man, by reason of the perfection of grace, received a knowledge of God by means of an internal inspiration due to the irradiation of divine wisdom. In this way he did not know God from visible creation but from a spiritual likeness imprinted on his mind.

Accordingly, there were thus in man two kinds of knowledge of God, one, by which he knew God as the angels do, through an internal inspiration; the other, by which he knew God as we do, through sensible creatures. However, this second knowledge of his differed from our knowledge as the investigation of one who has the habit of a science and proceeds from things he knows to a consideration of things which he had once known differs from the investigation of one who is learning and strives to proceed from what he knows to things which he does not know. However, we cannot have knowledge of God any other way except by coming to know Him from creatures. But Adam, who already knew God in a different way, that is, through an internal inspiration, also possessed a knowledge of Him from creatures.

Answers to Difficulties

1. That process of reasoning by which we reach the unknown from the known includes imperfection, since through it what is sought is unknown. But the process of reasoning which man in the state of innocence made use of was not of that sort. However, there is nothing to prevent us from saying that something [im]perfect belonged to man in that state, not indeed [im]perfect in that which was due to his nature, but by comparison with a higher nature. For, when human nature was created, it did not have as much perfection as an angelic nature or the divine nature.

2. What Isidore says gives the reason why man had of necessity to get his knowledge of God, as an unknown, from creatures. Man in the state of innocence did not need this, as has been said.

3. Besides the knowledge of contemplation, he had another knowledge of God by which he knew Him from creatures, as was said above.

4. Through grace, Adam was like an angel in the knowledg e of contemplation.,But besides this he had another knowledge belonging to his nature, as has been said.

5. Creatures are darkness in so far as they are from nothing, but, in so far as they are from God, they participate in some likeness of Him and thus lead to His likeness.

6. There, Augustine is talking of that knowledge which is had through divine inspiration. This is clear from the fact that he mentions there the speech of God, and is not altogether silent about the other mode of knowledge, when he adds: “Perhaps, also, God spoke to him with that manner of speaking which takes place through creatures,” whether by images of bodies in ecstasy of spirit, or by some image presented to the senses of the body themselves.

7. Although the soul is more like God than any other creature is, it cannot reach a knowledge of His nature so that it can distinguish it from other things except through sensible creatures, from which our knowledge takes its origin.

8. Although Adam saw God through the light of contemplation, the knowledge by which he saw God by means of creatures was not superfluous, that is to say, it was not superfluous that he knew the same thing in several ways, and that he had not only gratuitous but also natural knowledge.

Q. 17: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE III

In the third article we ask:

Did adam in the state of innocence have faith about God?

[Parallel readings: II Sent., 29, 3; S.T., I, 95, 3; II-II, 5, 1.]

Difficulties

It seems that he did not, for

1. The knowledge of faith is obscure knowledge, as is clear in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:12): “We see now in a glass...” But in the state of innocence Adam had plain, not obscure, knowledge. Therefore, he did not have faith.

2. Hugh of St. Victor says: “He knew his Creator not with the knowledge with which believers now seek their absent Creator by faith.” We conclude as before.

3. Gregory says that faith belongs to him “who cannot know by experience” the things which must be believed. But, as is said in the same place, Adam knew by experience what we believe. Therefore, he did not have faith.

4. Faith concerns not only the Creator but also the Redeemer. But in the state of innocence Adam seems to have known nothing about the Redeemer, because he did not foresee his fall, without which there would have been no redemption. Therefore, Adam did not have faith.

To the Contrary

1. Augustine says3 that in the state of innocence Adam had “the charity of a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned.”

2. As the Master says, he had all the virtues. Therefore, he also had faith.

REPLY

In his first state, Adam had faith. This becomes evident if we consider the object of faith. For the object of faith is the first truth itself, in so far as it is not evident. Moreover, I say not evident, either through an intentional likeness, as it appears to the blessed, or through natural reason, as some things about God are known to some philosophers, as that He is intelligible, incorporeal, and so on. Adam, however, knew not only what can be known about God by natural reason, but even more. However, he did not attain to vision of God through His essence. Consequently, it is clear that he had knowledge of God through faith.

But faith is twofold, according to a twofold hearing and a twofold speaking. For “faith cometh by hearing,” as is said in Romans (10:17). Now, there is an external speaking, by which God speaks to us through preachers, and an interior speaking, by which He speaks to us through an internal inspiration. This internal inspiration is called a kind of speaking in view of its likeness to external speaking. For, as in external speaking we present to the hearer not the thing itself which we want to make known but a sign of that thing, that is to say, a word which expresses some meaning; so in internal inspiration it is not His essence which God presents to view, but some sign of His essence, which is some spiritual likeness of His wisdom.

Faith arises in the hearts of the faithful from both kinds of hearing. By interior hearing it arose in those who first received faith and taught it, as in the Apostles and Prophets. Hence, in Psalms (84:9) we read: “I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me.” But faith arises in the hearts of the rest of the faithful, who receive knowledge of the faith through other men, by the second kind of hearing. Adam, however, had faith, and as one who first learned it from God. Therefore, he should have had faith through interior speaking.

Answers to Difficulties

1. He did not have knowledge so plain that it was enough to remove the obscurity of faith. This is removed only through the appearance of the first truth.

2. Hugh denies to the first man the kind of knowledge of faith which belongs to us, who have knowledge of faith, not through a revelation made to us, but through adherence to revelations made to others.

3. That experience which man had was not the kind which those who see God through His essence have, as has been said earlier. Therefore, it is not enough to make faith superfluous.

4. Adam had only implicit and not explicit faith about the Redeemer in so far as he believed that God would make ample provision for all the things which would be necessary for his salvation.

Q. 17: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE IV

In the fourth article we ask:

Did Adam in the state of innocence have knowledge of all creatures?

[Parallel readings: II Sent., 23, 2, 2; S.T., I, 94, 3; II-II, 5, 2, ad 2.]

Difficulties

It seems that he did not, for

1. He did not have knowledge of futures, since this is proper only to God, according to Isaiah (41:23): “Shew the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods.” But among creatures there were many things which were in the future. Therefore, he did not have knowledge of all creatures.

2. As Avicenna says, the senses are necessary to the human soul so that through them it may get perfect knowledge of things. Therefore, if the soul of Adam had knowledge of all things from the beginning, his senses would have been given to him to no purpose. But this cannot be, since nothing is to no purpose in the works of God. Therefore, he did not have knowledge of all things.

3. As Boethius says: “Though the mind is born enfolded in the cloud of bodily members, it has not completely forgotten itself, and, while losing the particulars, it retains the sum.” Here it is shown that the soul, when first created, had confused knowledge, by which it knew things in general, but did not have distinct knowledge, by which it knew individual things in their proper natures. Therefore, if Adam had the kind of knowledge which it is fitting for the human soul to have when it is created, it seems that he did not have knowledge of creatures distinctly, but only in a confused way.

4. Proper knowledge of a thing is had only through the existence of its proper species in the soul. But, as appears from the Philosopher, when the human soul is created, it is “like a tablet on which nothing is written.” Therefore, when Adam was first created, he could not have proper knowledge of created things.

5. It was said that, although he did not have this in virtue of his nature, he had it by divine gift.—On the contrary, when first created, all men are equal with respect to merit, and specifically similar to each other. Therefore, if perfect knowledge of things was conferred on Adam by God when he was first created, it seems that with equal reason this is conferred on all other men when they are created. But we see that this is false.

6. Nothing which is moved toward the perfection of knowledge is at the term of its perfection. But Adam was moved toward the perfection of knowledge. Therefore, he was not at the term of knowledge, as one who had perfect knowledge of creatures. I prove the minor: According to the Philosopher, before the intellect understands, it is not anything of the things which exist. But, after it understands, it is actually something of those things. Thus, at some time it is actually something of things that exist, and sometimes it is not. But everything which has this kind of existence is on the way to perfect act. Therefore, when first created, the human understanding is on the way to perfect knowledge. Hence, when Adam’s understanding was first created, it was not at the term of perfect knowledge, but on the way to perfection.

7. For angels to be infused with knowledge of all natural things as soon as they are created is part of the excellence of angelic nature, according to The Causes: “Every intelligence is full of forms.” But human nature does not rise to the excellence of angelic nature. Therefore, it was not fitting for the soul of the first man, when first created, to have knowledge of all things.

8. It is possible for the intellect to understand only when it actually becomes the intelligible thing. But the human understanding cannot actually become many intelligible things at once. Therefore, neither can it know many intelligible things at once; hence, the first man could not have knowledge of all things at once.

9. For every subject of perfectibility there is one corresponding perfection, because one power cannot be perfected at one time except by one act of one kind. Thus, in first matter there can be only one substantial form, and in a body only one color. But the human understanding is a power which is perfected by the habits of the sciences. Therefore, it is impossible for many habits to be in the soul at the same time. Consequently, Adam’s soul could not have knowledge of all things, since different things are known through different habits.

10. If Adam knew all creatures, he knew them either in the Word, or in their proper natures, or in his intelligence. But he did not know them in the Word, for that is the knowledge of the blessed, who see the Word. Nor did he see them in their proper natures, since all of them did not yet exist in their proper natures. Nor did he see them in his own intelligence, for it is not contrary to the perfection of the first state for a higher power to receive something from a lower power, as imagination from sense. Hence, it was appropriate for the human soul to have the intellect receive from sense. Consequently, since he did not perceive all creatures through sense, it was impossible for all things to be in his intelligence. Therefore, he did not in any way have knowledge of all creatures.

11. Adam was created in a state in which he could with equal reason progress in understanding as well as in affection. But he who has knowledge of all things cannot make progress in that knowledge. Therefore, he did not have knowledge of all things.

12. Augustine seems to say that Adam was placed in paradise to work, not from necessity but for the pleasure of tilling the soil. This comes from the fact that “human reason in a certain sense converses with physical reality, with the seeds which have been sown, with the shoots which have been planted, as if it asked them what the power of the root and the seed was, what it could do or could not do.” But to ask nature about the power of nature is nothing else but to learn the powers of nature from seeing the activities of nature. Therefore, Adam had to receive knowledge of things from things. Thus, he did not have knowledge of all creatures.

13. In the state of innocence Adam was not more perfect than the beatified angels. But they do not know everything. For this reason, Dionysius says that the lower angels are purified from ignorance by the higher angels. Therefore, neither did man in the state of innocence know all things.

14. As Augustine says, the demons can know the secrets of hearts only in so far as thtse become known from movements of the body. Therefore,, since the angelic understanding has clearer sight than the human understanding, it seems that even Adam in the state of innocence could not know the secrets of hearts. Thus, he did not have knowledge of all creatures.

To the Contrary

1. Augustine says” that in that state “nothing was missing which a good will could acquire.” But with a good will he could want to have knowledge of all things. Therefore, he had knowledge of all things.

2. Adam was an image [of God] more in his soul than in his body. But, when first created, Adam was perfect in body as regards age, stature, and all his members. Therefore, he was perfect also in soul as regards all knowledge.

3. The perfection of nature when it was created is greater than the perfection of fallen nature. But knowledge of the future pertains to the state of fallen nature. Hence, after the fall some saints were raised to the perfection of knowing the future through the gift of prophecy. Therefore, with much greater reason Adam had knowledge of the future, and much more of the present.

[4. Adam had all the virtues. Therefore, he had all knowledge.]

5. The names of things should fit their properties. But Adam gave names to things, as is clear from Genesis(2:20). Therefore, he had full knowledge of the nature of things.

REPLY

Adam had a twofold knowledge: one natural and one due to grace. Natural human knowledge can extend to those things which we can know under the guidance of natural reason. And there is a beginning and a term of this natural knowledge. It has its beginning in a kind of confused knowledge of all things, in so far as man naturally has within him a knowledge of the general principles in which, as in seeds, there virtually pre-exist all the objects of knowledge which can be known by natural reason. This knowledge reaches its term when the things which are virtually in the principles are expressed in act, as animal generation is said to reach its term when the animal, with all its members perfect and distinct, is developed from the seed of the animal in which all its members pre-existed virtually.

Adam, however, when first created, had to have natural knowledge not only in its first stage but also in its term, because he was created as the father of the whole human race. For the sons should receive from their father not only existence through generation, but also instruction through teaching.

One is not a principle in so far as he is in potency, but in so far as he is in act, and, for this reason, act is naturally prior to potency, and the activity of nature always begins from things which are perfect. Because of this, the first man had to be set at the term of perfection as soon as he was created, and this both in body, so that he would be a suitable principle of generation of the whole human race, and in mind, so that he would be an adequate principle of instruction.

And, just as nothing in his body which pertained to bodily perfection was not actually developed, so, too, whatever there was seminally or virtually in the first principles of reason was developed in its entirety, in so far as the perfect knowledge of all those things to which the power of the first principles could extend was concerned, Consequently, we must say that whatever knowledge of things any man could ever acquire by his natural talents Adam had in its entirety by habitual natural knowledge.

There also are many things in creatures which cannot be known by natural knowledge, that is, those to which the power of first principles does not extend, such as future contingents, the secret thoughts of men, and the dispositions of creatures in so far as they are subject to divine providence. For he could not have a comprehensive grasp of divine providence, and so no comprehensive grasp of the order of creatures themselves in so far as they are subject to divine providence. For providence sometimes ordains creatures to many things beyond their natural capacity. But he was helped to know these things to some extent by the other knowledge, which is knowledge due to grace, through which God spoke internally to him, as Augustine says. But the first man was not given this knowledge as though he were placed at the term of its perfection, since one reaches the term of this freely conferred knowledge only in the vision of glory, to which he had not yet arrived. Therefore, he did not know all of these things, but only as much of them as God revealed to him. Accordingly, we have to answer both sets of difficulties.

Answers to Difficulties

1. There are some futures which can be known naturally in their causes. Adam had knowledge of these. But he did not know all the others which cannot be known naturally, but only those which were revealed to him by God.

2. Adam should’have had in its perfection everything which human nature requires. But, just as the power of growth is given to man so that he may reach perfect stature, so the senses are given to the human soul to attain the perfection of knowledge. Accordingly, just as Adam did not have the power of growth, in order through it to grow larger, but in order that he might lack nothing of what is needed for the perfection of his nature, so, too, he did not have senses to acquire knowledge through them, but to have a perfect human nature, and so that through the senses he might experience again what he knew habitually.

3. Adam, in so far as he was made the source of all human nature, had something more than is commonly due to all men. For, in so far as he was the teacher of the whole human race, it was incumbent on him not to have confused, but distinct, knowledge, so that with it he could teach. And for this reason it was also necessary that, when he was first created, his understanding should not be like a tablet on which nothing is written, but should have the fullness of knowledge by reason of God’s action. Nor was this necessary for other men, who were not made the source of the human race.

4.-6. The solution to the fourth, fifth, and sixth difficulties is clear from the third response.

7. The angels were created with full knowledge of physical reality because it is due to their nature, but this is not so with man, who obtained this knowledge by reason of God’s action. Therefore, human nature still remains lower than the angelic nature. Similarly, man’s body is naturally more imperfect than a heavenly body, even though, by the power of God, Adam’s body had its full stature when it was created. This belongs to heavenly bodies as due to their nature.

8. Adam’s understanding could not actually be many intelligible things, as actually informed by them; however, it could simultaneously be habitually informed by many intelligible things.

9. That argument is valid when the power is perfected completely by one perfection, as a substantial form perfects matter and color perfects the potency of a surface. But one habit of knowledge does not fully perfect the power of understanding with reference to all intelligible things. Therefore the case is not the same.

10. Adam had knowledge of all natures, not in the Word, but in their proper nature and in his intelligence. This twofold manner of knowing is not distinguished according to the species of things in so far as something is known by these species, but in so far as they are what is known. For, even when the understanding knows things in their proper nature, it knows them only through species which are present to it. Accordingly, when through species which are present to it the understanding is directed to things which are outside the soul, then it is said to know things in their proper nature. But, when the understanding stops at the species themselves, studying their nature and arrangement, then is it said to know things in its intelligence, as, for instance, when it understands that it understands and how it understands.

Therefore, to say that all things did not yet exist in their proper nature, and so could not be known in their proper nature, does not follow. For to know a thing in its proper nature is used in two senses. In one, it is used by way of a statement, namely, when the thing itself is known to be in its own proper nature. And this can be done only when the thing exists in its proper nature. Adam did not know all things in their proper nature in this way, for all things did not yet exist in their proper nature, unless we were to say that they were not in their proper nature perfectly, but imperfectly. For all things which were produced later in the works of the six days [of creation] did pre-exist in some way, as is clear from Augustine.

In the other way, one is said to know a thing in its proper nature by way of a definition, that is to say, when one knows what the proper nature of a thing is. In this way, even things which do not exist can be known in their proper nature. Thus, I would be able to know what a lion is even if all lions were dead. In this way, Adam could know in their proper nature even things which did not then exist.

Similarly, there is nothing to prevent all creatures from being in his intelligence through their likenesses, although he did not perceive them all by his senses. For, although it is not contrary to the dignity of the first state for a higher power to receive something from a lower, to be created without the fullness of knowledge and to have to receive knowledge only from sense were contrary to the perfection which belonged to the first man.

11. Adam could make progress in knowledge in two ways. One of these related to things which he did not know, that is, those to which natural reason could not reach. In these he could make progress partly by reason of divine revelation, as in knowledge of divine mysteries, and partly from sense experience, as in knowledge of futures, which, though previously unknown to him, would become known when they came to pass. The other way related to that which he knew, and thus he could later know also through sense experience that which he knew only through intellectual knowledge.

12. Those words of Augustine are not to be taken as though he meant that Adam had to, know the power of nature from the works of nature, but that he knew by experience that the nature, which he knew interiorly with his mind, acted according to that which pre-existed in his knowledge. And this he found delightful.

13. The angels are purified from ignorance, not of natural things, but of divine mysteries. This ignorance existed in Adam, too, as has been said.And for this he himself needed an angelic illumination.

14. The secret thoughts of men are among those things to which natural reason cannot extend its knowledge. Hence, our judgment about these is the same as that about the knowledge of future contingents.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

1. With a good will Adam was able to will only what he willed according to right order, that is, to seek to have what he wanted at its proper time, and not to want what did not befit him.

2. Adam had natural perfection in his body, but not the supernatural perfection which is the perfection of glory. Consequently, it does not follow that he had in his soul any other than the perfection of natural knowledge.

3. Foreknowledge of futures is indeed a perfection of human nature, because it does have this perfection even after the fall; it is not a perfection, however, in such a way that it is natural to man. Hence, there was no need for Adam to have such a perfection. For it belongs to Christ alone to be given everything which the other saints had through grace, because He is the source of grace for us, as Adam is the source of nature. It was for this reason that the perfection of natural knowledge was due to Adam.

4. It was by reason of the state of innocence that Adam had all the virtues, for, if any were lacking in him, he would not have had original justice. But the state of innocence does not require the possession of all knowledge. Hence, the case is not the same.

5. We read that Adam gave names to the animals and knew their natures fully, and, consequently, knew the natures of all other natural things. But it does not follow from this that he knew things which surpass natural knowledge.

Q. 17: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE V

In the fifth article we ask:

Did Adam in the State of innocence see the angels through their essence?

[Parallel readings: S.T., I, 94, 2.]

Difficulties

It seems that he did, for

1. Gregory says: “In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God and to share in purity of heart and loftiness of vision with the spirits of the beatified angels.” Therefore, through the loftiness of his vision he seems to have attained even to the vision of the angels.

2. On the words of Genesis (2:2 1), “Then the Lord God cast a deep sleep upon Adam,” the Gloss reads: “The correct interpretation of this ecstasy is that it was given so that Adam’s mind, sharing the company of the heavenly court, might enter into the sanctuary of God and understand the last things.”But he could not share the company of the heavenly court unless he knew the angels. Therefore, he had knowledge of the angels.

3. The Master says: “Man had a knowledge of the things which were made for his sake.” But, along with other creatures, even the angels are made in some way for man’s sake, as the Master says. Therefore, he had knowledge of the angels.

4. It is more difficult to make something which is intelligible in potency become intelligible actually and to understand it than to understand that which is of itself actually intelligible. But Adam’s understanding could make species of material things, which of themselves are intelligible in potency, become actually intelligible, and in this way understand material things. Therefore, with much more reason he was able to understand the essences of the angels, which of themselves are actually intelligible, since they are free of matter.

5. That someone does not better understand things which are of themselves more intelligible is due to a defect of his understanding. But the essences of the angels are of themselves more intelligible than the essences of material things, and there was no defect in Adam’s understanding. Accordingly, since he knew material things through their essence, with much more reason he could know the angels through their essence.

6. The intellect can understand material things by abstracting the quiddity from the material supposite. And, if that quiddity is again a supposite having a quiddity, it can with equal reason abstract the quiddity from it. And, since this cannot go on to infinity, it will at last arrive at the understanding of some simple quiddity, which does not have [another] quiddity. But such a quiddity is the quiddity of a separate substance, that is to say, of an angel. Therefore, Adam’s intellect could know the essence of an angel.

7. According to the Philosopher, since understanding is a power not joined to an organ, it is not destroyed by an excessively intelligible object. “For, after it has understood the highest intelligible, it does not understand the lowest intelligibles; less, but more,” contrary to what takes place in sense. But Adam’s understanding in the state of innocence was whole and complete. Therefore, the excellence of an intelligible object was not an impediment to his understanding of it. Consequently, he was able to know the angels through their essence, since the only impediment to this knowledge seems to be the excellence of the intelligible object.

8. As was mentioned above, Adam, as soon as he was created, had all the knowledge to which a man can come naturally. But man can naturally come to a knowledge of the separated substances through their essence, as is clear from the statements of many philosophers, which the Commentator mentions. Therefore, Adam knew the angels through their essence.

9. It is evident that Adam knew his own soul through its essence. But the essence of the soul is free from matter, just as an angel’s essence. Therefore, he could also know the angels through their essence.

10. Adam’s knowledge was intermediate between our knowledge and that of the blessed. But the blessed see and know the essence of God, and we know the essence of material things. But between God and material things are spiritual substances, that is, the angels. Therefore, Adam knew the angels through their essence.

To the Contrary

1. In its knowledge no power can reach beyond its object. But the objects of the intellective soul are phantasms, to which the intellective soul is related, as sense is to sensibles, as is said in The Soul. Therefore, our soul can attain to knowledge only of those things which it can derive from phantasms. But the essence of the angels is beyond all phantasms. Therefore, by natural knowledge, the perfection of which we assign to Adam, man cannot reach a knowledge of the angels through their essence.

2. It was said that, although an angel cannot be perceived through phantasms, some effect of an angel can be grasped under the guise of a phantasm, and from such an effect the angel can be known.—On the contrary, no effect which is not equal to its cause is sufficient of itself to be a means to knowledge of the essence of its cause. Otherwise, those who know God from creatures would see the essence of God, which is false. But a physical effect, which alone can be grasped in a phantasm, is the kind of effect which is not equal to the power of the angels. Therefore, through this kind of effect one cannot know what an angel is, but only whether he exists.

3. It was said that Adam was able to know the angels through some intelligible effect, according to the dictum of Avicenna that the presence of intelligences in us is nothing other than the presence of their imprints in us.—On the contrary, what is received in a thing is received there according to the mode of being of that in which it is received. flut the mode of being of the human soul is lower than that of the allgelic nature. Therefore, the imprint made on the human soul by an angel, or by the angelic light, with which it enlightens the mind, is in the human soul in a lower manner than in the angelic nature. Accordingly, since the soul knows a thing through the mode in which the thing known is within it, through this kind of imprint the soul does not reach knowledge of an angel as it is in its essence.

REPLY

There is a twofold knowledge by which something can be known. One is that by which we know whether a thing exists, and according to this in the state of innocence Adam knew the angels both by natural knowledge and divine revelation far more fully and familiarly than we know them. The other is that by which we know what a thing is, and this is to know it through its essence. And, as I see it, Adam in the state of innocence did not know the angels in this way. The reason for this is that a twofold knowledge is ascribed to Adam: natural knowledge and knowledge due to grace.

That he did not know angels through their essence with natural knowledge can be seen with certainty from this. In no genus does a natural passive power extend farther than that to which the active power of the same genus extends, just as in nature there is a passive power only with reference to those things to which some natural active power can extend, as the Commentator says. In the understanding of the human soul, however, there is a twofold power: one passive, the possible intellect, and the other active, the agent intellect. Consequently, the possible intellect is naturally in potency to have produced in it only those things which the agent intellect is naturally constituted to pfoduce. However, this does not exclude the possibility of other things being produced in it by divine activity, as they are produced in physical nature through miraculous activity. But the action of the agent intellect does not make intelligible those things which are of themselves intelligible, such as the essences of the angels, but things which of themselves are potentially intelligible, such as the essence of material things, which are received through sense and imagination. Hence, in the possible intellect there are naturally produced only those intelligible species which are abstracted from phantasms. However, it is impossible to reach vision of the essence of separated substances through this type of species, since they have no proportion to separated substances and belong, as it were, to a different genus from spiritual essences. Therefore, by natural knowledge man cannot attain to knowledge of the angels through their essence.

Similarly, Adam was not capable of this even through the knowledge due to grace. For knowledge due to grace is higher than knowledge due to nature, but this elevation can be taken with reference either to the intelligible object or to the manner of understanding. With reference to the intelligible object, man’s knowledge is indeed raised through grace even without a change of state, as when we are raised to a knowledge of things which are above reason through the grace of faith, and similarly through the grace of prophecy. But, in so far as its manner of knowing is concerned, human knowledge is not elevated without a change of man’s state. But the manner in which his understanding knows naturally is by receiving from phantasms, as has been said. Consequently, unless there is a change in man’s state, his understanding, even in the knowledge due to grace, which is through divine revelation, must always recur to phantasms. This is what Dionysius says: “It is impossible for the divine radiance to shine on us in any other way, except as shrouded in a variety of sacred veils.” But in the state of innocence Adam was in the state of a wayfarer. Hence, in all knowledge due to grace he had to look to phantasms. The essences of angels, however, cannot be seen with that mode of knowledge, as has been said. 13 Thus, Adam did not know the angels through their essence either through natural knowledge or through knowledge due to grace, unless, perhaps, we say that he was elevated to a higher state through grace, as Paul was in his rapture.

Answers to Difficulties

1. All we can conclude from the authoritative citation from Gregory is that Adam knew the angels in some lofty vision, not, however, so lofty that it reached a knowledge of their essence.

2. If we understand that Adam’s sleep was of the same nature as Paul’s rapture, there would be nothing to prevent us from saying that he saw the angels through their essence in that rapture. But this was above the common mode of knowing which then belonged to him. However, if we understand that his sleep was not of such a nature that in it Adam in some respect was elevated to the state of the blessed, but was like that in which it is customary for the minds of the prophets to be raised to vision of the divine mysteries, as the words of the Gloss seem to intend, then he is said to have shared the company of the heavenly court through a certain pre-eminence of knowledge, which still did not reach their essence.

3. Adam had knowledge of the angels in so far as they were made for his sake. For he knew that they would be companions of his beatitude and helpers for his salvation in this life, in so far as he knew the distinction of [angelic] orders and their duties much better than we know them.

4. Difficulty in understanding arises in two ways. In one, the difficulty comes from the thing known; in the other, from the one knowing. On the part of the thing known, it is more difficult to make something intelligible and understand it than to understand that which of itself is intelligible. But, on the part of the one knowing, it can be more difficult to know that which is itself intelligible. And this is the case with the human understanding, since naturally to understand separated essences is out of proportion with its power, for the reason we have given.

5. Adam’s understanding did not suffer from the lack of any perfection which should have been in it at that time. However, it did have some natural deficiencies, among which one was that in knowing it had to look to phantasms. But this is a natural condition of human understanding by reason of its union with the body, and by reason of the fact that by its nature it is the lowest in the order of intellects.

6. By abstraction, understanding can reach a quiddity of a natural thing which does not have another quiddity, and which it can understand because it abstracts it from phantasms and makes it intelligible through the light of the agent intellect. From this it receives the possibility of being perfected by the quiddity as by a proper perfection. But it cannot rise from this quiddity to a knowledge of the essence of a separated substance, because the former quiddity is completely incapable of representing the latter, since quiddity does not exist in separated subsOnces and in material things in entirely the same manner, but, as it were, equivocally, as the Commentator says. And, granted that through this quiddity he could know in some general way that the quiddity of separated substance is of such a nature, he nevertheless would not see the essence of an angel in such a way that he could know the difference between any one separated essence and the others.

7. Although human understanding is not destroyed by an excessively intelligible object, it lacks the proportion needed to be able naturally to reach the highest intelligibles. Hence, we cannot conclude from what the Philosopher says that it understands the highest intelligibles; but only that, if it did understand them, it would not understand others less.

8. The Philosopher leaves this question unsolved when he inquires whether an intellect joined [to a body] can understand separated substances. Nor does he solve the question anywhere else in the works which have come down to us. And his followers have disagreed on this point.

For some have said that our intellect cannot achieve an understanding of separated essences. Some, however, have held that it can. Some of these men have given insufficient reasons, as Avempace, who gave the argument about quiddity, and Themistius, who gave the argument about ease of understanding. Both of these arguments, the Commentator answered. Some, however, as Alexander and the Commentator himself, have taken non-Aristotelian positions, which are against the faith. For Alexander says that, since the possible intellect can be produced by generation and can perish, it can in his theory in no wise reach an understanding of the separated substances. But, at the term of its perfection, it does reach the point where the agent intellect, which Alexander makes one of the separated substances, is united to us as form. In that state we understand through the agent intellect, just as now we understand through the possible intellect. And it is because the agent intellect, as a separated substance, understands separated substances that we understand separated substances in that state. In his opinion it is in this that the final happiness of man will consist.

However, since it does not seem possible for something which is incorruptible and separated, as the agent intellect, to be united as the form for the possible intellect, which, for Alexander, is corruptible and material, it has seemed to others that the possible intellect itself is separated and incorruptible. Hence, Themistius says that the possible intellect, too, is separated, and that it is natural to it to understand not only material things but also separated substances. He adds that its intelligible objects are not temporal, but eternal, things, and that the speculative intellect, by which we understand, is made up of the agent and the possible intellects. But, if this is so, we can know separated substances from the beginning, since the possible intellect is united to us from the beginning.

Therefore, the Commentator takes a third way, between the opinion of Alexander and that of Themistius. For he says that the possible intellect is separated and eternal, in which he agrees with Themistius and differs from Alexander, and, nevertheless, that the objects of the speculative understanding are temporal things and produced through the activity of the agent intellect. In this he agrees with Alexander and differs from Themistius. He says that these objects have a double existence: one, by which they are based on phantasms, and in this sense they are in us; the other, by which they are in the possible intellect. Consequently, through the mediation of these intelligible objects the possible intellect is united to us.

Now, the agent intellect is related to these intelligible things as form to matter. For, since the possible intellect receives intelligibles of this type which are grounded in phantasms, and also receives the agent intellect, and since the agent intellect is more perfect, the proportion of the agent intellect to’intelligibles of this sort, which are in us, must be like the proportion of form to matter. This is like the reciprocal proportion between light and color which are received in the transparent, as also between all things, one of which is more perfect than the other, which are received in one thing. Therefore, when the production of such intelligibles takes place in us, then the agent intellect is united to us perfectly as a form. And in this way we will be able to know separated substances through the agent intellect, just as we are now able to know through the understanding which is in its habitual state.

It is evident from the statements of these philosophers that they could find no way for us to understand separated substances except by understanding through some separated substance. But it is not in harmony with the truths of the faith to say that the possible or the agent intellect is a separated substance. Neither does it agree with the opinion of the Philosopher, who holds that agent and possible intellects are part of the human soul.

Accordingly, if we retain that position, it does not seem possible for man by his natural knowledge to achieve a knowledge of separated essences.

9. In the state of Innocence man knew his act of understanding perfectly because he understood some intelligible object perfectly. And, since the act of understanding is an effect proportionate to, and commensurate with, the power from which it proceeds, it follows that he understood the essence of his soul perfectly. But it does not follow from this that he understood the essence of the angels, since that act of understanding is not commensurate with the power of his understanding.

10. As the angelic nature is intermediate between the divine and physical nature, so the knowledge by which an angelic essence is known is intermediate between the knowledge by which the divine essence is known and by which the essences of material things are known. But there can be many things intermediate between two extremes. And it is not necessary for anyone who exceeds one extreme to reach every intermediate level, but to reach some intermediate level. Accordingly, in the state of innocence man reached one intermediate level, namelythat of receiving knowledge of God not from sensible creatures but from internal revelation. However, he did not arrive at the level of knowing angelic essences. Nevertheless, when the angels were created and not yet beatified, they had arrived at this level.

Q. 17: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE VI

In the sixth article we ask:

Could Adam in the state of innocence be mistaken or deceived?

[Parallel readings: II Sent., 23, 2, 3; S.T., I, 94, 4.]

Difficulties

It seems that he could, for

1. As Ambrose says, error is the source of every sin. But Adam could sin. Therefore, he could be mistaken.

2. The will concerns only that which is good or regarded as good. But, when the will deals with what is good, there is no sin. Therefore, there is never sin unless there is an antecedent evaluation in which something is regarded as good, but is not. But in every such evaluation there is deception of some sort. Therefore, before he sinned, Adam in the state of innocence was deceived.

3. The Master says: “The woman was not frightened by the fact that the serpent talked because, since she knew it, was created, she considered that it had received even the power of speech from God.” But this was false. Therefore, the woman judged falsely before she sinned. Hence, she was deceived.

4. According to the Master, and as Augustine also says: “The devil was allowed to come in that form in order that his malice could be easily detected.” But, if in the state of innocence man could not have been deceived, the devil could have been detected in any form in which he came. Therefore, man could be deceived.

5. When the woman heard what the serpent promised, she hoped to be able to obtain it; otherwise, her desire would have been stupid. I foxvever, there was no stupidity before the fall. But no one hopes for what he considers impossible. Therefore, since what the devil promised was impossible, it seems that in believing this the woman was deceived before the fall.

6. In the state of innocence man’s understanding argued to conclusions and needed deliberation. But it needed deliberation only to avoid error. Therefore, in the state of innocence it could err.

7. The understanding of demons, since it is not united to a body, seems to be much more discerning than the understanding of man in the state of innocence, which was joined to a body. But a demon can be deceived. Consequently, the saints say that, when the demons saw Christ suffering infirmities, they thought He was simply man, but, when they saw him working miracles, they thought He was God. Therefore, man in the state of innocence with much greater reason can be deceived.

8. While man was committing the first sin, in that act itself he was not in the state of guilt. For, since the state of guilt is caused by sin, there would have been another sin before the first sin. But in the act by which man first sinned he was deceived. Therefore, he could be deceived before the state of guilt.

9. Damascene says: “This,” that is, fallacious knowledge, “existed in Adam when he was first created.” But whoever has fallacious knowledge is deceived. Therefore, Adam was deceived when he was first created.

10. Speculative knowledge is distinguished from the affections. But there can be sin in the affective part without deception in the speculative part. For, many times we have knowledge and act contrary to it. Therefore, in the first man, too, there could have been deception in the speculative part before there was sin in the affective part.

11. As the Gloss on the first Epistle to Timothy (2:14), “Adam was not seduced... “ reads: “Adam was not led astray in the way the woman was, that is, so that he thought that what the devil suggested was true. Still we can believe that he was led astray in this, that he thought that the sin committed was venial when it was mortal.” Therefore, before the fall Adam could be deceived.

12. No one is freed from deception except through knowledge of the truth. But Adam did not know all things. Therefore, he could not have been free from deception in all things.

13 It was said that through divine providence he was saved from deception.—On the contrary, divine providence brings assistance especially in necessary matters. But in his greatest need, when it would have been most useful for him to be freed from being led astray, divine providence did not protect him from being misled. Therefore, with much less reason would divine providence have freed him from being led astray in other matters.

14. In the state of innocence man would have slept, and likewise would have dreamed, as Boethius says. But every man is deceived in dreams, since to some extent he considers the likenesses of things as if they were the things themselves. Therefore, in the state of innocence Adam could be deceived.

15. Adam would have used his bodily senses. But there is frequent deception in sense knowledge, as when one thing seems to be two, and when something which is seen from a distance seems small. Therefore, in the state of innocence Adam would not have been altogether free from deception.

To the Contrary

1. As Augustine says: “To accept as true things that are false is not natural for man as he was created, but a punishment for the condemned.”“ Therefore, in the state of innocence he could not be deceived, which is to accept as true things which are false.

2. The soul is more noble than the body. But in the state of innocence man could suffer no bodily defect. Therefore, much less could he suffer deception, which is a defect of the soul.

3. In the state of innocence there could be nothing contrary to man’s will, since pain thus would have been able to exist in him. But in man, to be deceived is contrary to his will, according to Augustine, even in those who want to deceive. Therefore, in the state of innocence man could not be deceived.

4. Every error is due either to guilt or to punishment, neither of which could exist in the state of innocence. Therefore, error could not exist there either.

5. When that which is higher in the soul directs what is lower, there cannot be any error, because the whole of man’s knowledge is corrected by that which is higher in the soul, that is to say, by synderesis and the understanding of principles. But in the state of innocence that which is lower in man was subject to higher reason. Therefore, there could not then be deception.

6. According to Augustine: “The capacity to believe is in man’s nature, but actual belief is a gift of grace to the faithful.” Therefore, by the same token, the capacity to be deceived is due to nature, but to be deceived is a defect. But in the state of innocence there were no defects. Therefore, neither could there be deception.

7. Damascene says that in the state of innocence man “delighted in the sweetest fruit of contemplation, being nourished by this [contemplation 1.”“ But, when man is turned toward the things of God, he is not deceived. Therefore, in that state Adam could not be deceived.

8. Jerome says: “Whatever evil we suffer, our sins have merited.” But deception is evil. Therefore, it could not exist before sin.

REPLY

There are two opinions on this question. For some” say that, since Adam did not have full knowledge of everything, but knew some things and was ignorant of others, in the things which he knew he could not be deceived, that is, in those which he knew naturally and those which were divinely revealed to him. But in other things, which he did not know, such as men’s secret thoughts, future contingents, and individual things absent from his senses, he could indeed judge falsely, if without serious consideration he formed some false opinion about these things, not, however, in such a way that he gave unqualified assent. Accordingly, they say that error could have no place in him, nor could he accept something false as true, because in these things there is question of unqualified assent to that which is false.

But others attempt to reject this declaration because Augustine calls every false judgment error and also says that every error is evil, great in important matters, and small in small matters.

But we should not insist too much on this, because we should pass over the question of names when we are treating of things. Hence, I say that in the state of innocence there could be not only no error but not even false opinion of any sort. This is evident from the following.

Although in the state of innocence some good could be absent, in no sense could there be any corruption of a good. However, the good of our understanding is the knowledge of truth. Accordingly, those habits by which the understanding is perfected for knowledge of the truth are called virtues, as is said in the Ethics, because they make the act of the understanding good. Falsity, on the other hand, is not only lack of truth but also a corruption of it. For one who has no knowledge of truth at all, who lacks the truth, yet has no contrary opinion, does not have the same relation to truth as one who holds some false opinion and whose judgment is vitiated by falsity. Consequently, just as truth is the good of the understanding, so that which is false is its evil. For this reason, the habit of opinion is not an intellectual virtue, since by it one says what is false, as we see in the Ethics. But no act of virtue can be evil, as if the false opinion itself would be an evil act of [the virtue of ] understanding. Consequently, since in the state of innocence there was not any corruption or any evil, there could not be any false opinion in that state.

The Commentator also says that a false opinion has the same place in matters of knowledge as a monstrosity has in physical nature. For a false opinion is one which originates without being intended by first principles, which are the seminal powers, as it were, of knowledge, just as monstrosities originate without being intended by the natural power which is at work. This is because all evil is “unintended,” as Dionysius says. Hence, just as in the state of innocence there would be no monstrosities in the conception of the human body, so in understanding there could be no falsity.

This is likewise clear from the fact that disorder always arises when a thing is moved by something which is not its proper mover, as would happen if the will should be moved by what gives pleasure to sense, since it should be moved only by what is noble. The proper mover of the understanding, however, is that which contains infallible truth. Consequently, whenever the understanding is moved by some fallible sign, there is some disorder in it, whether the movement is complete or incomplete. As a result, since in the state of innocence there could be no disorder in man’s understanding, it would never have been inclined more to one part than to the other except by an infallible motive.

From this it is clear that not only was there no false opinion in man’s understanding, there was no opinion there at all. And whatever he knew, he knew with certainty.

Answers to Difficulties

1. That error from which all sin proceeds is an error of choice, in so far as one chooses what should not be chosen. According to this, the Philosopher says20 that everyone who is evil lacks knowledge. But this error presupposes disorder in the appetitive part. For it is due to the fact that sensible appetite is drawn toward that which delights it and the higher appetite does not resist it, that reason is hindered from choosing that which it has habitually. Consequently, it is evident that this error does not entirely precede sin, but follows it.

2. That which is perceived as an apparent good cannot lack all goodness whatsoever. Rather, it is good to some extent, and in this respect it is perceived as good from the beginning. This is the case Mien some forbidden food is perceived as agreeable to see and pleasAnt to taste, and when the sensible appetite is attracted to such a good as to its proper object. But when the higher appetite follows the lower, it follows that which is good in some respect, as though it were good for it without qualification. Therefore, error of choice follows afterward from disorder of appetite, as has been said.

3. If we understand that the woman believed that the serpent had received the use of speech as part of its nature, this argument seems to be contrary to both opinions. For those who believe that in the state of innocence man could be deceived do not at all believe that he could be deceived when judging about the natures of things, since he had full knowledge of natural things. However, it is contrary to the serpent’s nature to have the use of speech naturally, since this belongs only to rational animals. Therefore, we have to say that the woman did not believe that the serpent had the use of speech by its nature, but by reason of some power acting inside it in a hidden way. She did not consider whether it was from God or from the demon.

4. That reason why he appeared in the form of a serpent should not be taken to mean that he could not be detected under whatever form he appeared, but that he could be more easily detected under such a form.

5. The woman hoped that in some way she would be able to get what the serpent promised, and she believed that this was in some way possible. In this she was led astray, as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:14). But a certain elation of mind preceded that leading astray, and because of it she inordinately desired her own excellence, which she realized as soon as the serpent spoke, as men frequently are lifted above themselves when they hear words of flatterers. And this exaltation which preceded concerned her own proper excellence in general and is the first sin. There followed this the seduction by which she believed that what the serpent was saying was true. Thus, there resulted the exaltation with which she definitely desired this excellence which the serpent promised.

6. In the state of innocence man’s understanding needed deliberation in order not to fall into error, just as he needed to eat in order that his body might not waste away. However, he was so gifted with correct deliberation that by deliberating he would be able to avoid every error, just as by eating he could avoid every bodily infirmity. Therefore, just as he would commit a sin of omission if he did not eat, so,, if he did not deliberate when the occasion was given, error and sin would follow.

7. It was by his natural power that man in the state of innocence was protected from internal bodily suffering, as that of fever and the like, but it was not by any internal power that he was protected from external suffering, as blows or wounds, since he did not have the gift of impassibility. This was due rather to divine providence, which preserved him from all injury. Similarly, it was by the strength of his own reason that he was protected from the deception which comes from within, as when someone independently reasons incorrectly, but it was by the divine aid, which he had at that time for all necessary matters, that he was protected from deception from without. The demons, however, do not have this; hence, they can be deceived.

8. Instantaneous actions have their effect as soon as they begin, just as the eye sees in the same instant that the air is illuminated. Hence, since the movement of will, in which sin primarily consists, is instantaneous, one loses the state of innocence in the same instant in which he sins. Thus, he could be deceived in that instant.

9. Damascene is speaking of the fallacy of the first man by which he was deceived in the sin itself. And, indeed, he committed this sin shortly after he was created, for he did not long persevere in the state ofinnocence.

10. Since the soul of man in the state of innocence was united to the highest good, there could be no defect in man as long as this union lasted. But this union was brought about principally through the affections. Consequently, no deception could exist in the understanding nor any defect in the body before the affective part was corrupted, although, conversely, there could be defect in the affections without a pre-existing defect in speculative understanding, since the union with God is not completed in the understanding but in the affections.

11. In Adam the elation of spirit preceded the false opinion by which he believed that what was mortally sinful was only venially so, just as happened with the woman, as has been said.

12. In those things which he did not know he was able to be protected from deception partly from within, since his understanding would not be inclined to one part except for a sufficient motive, and partly, and more especially, by divine providence, which preserved him from deception.

13. In the state in which he sinned had he turned to God, he would have had divine help to keep him from being led astray. But, since he did not do this, he fell into sin and was led astray. Yet, his being led astray followed the sin, as is clear from what has been said.

14. Some say that in the state of innocence Adam did not dream. But this is not necessary, for the vision of dreams is not in the intellective, but in the sensitive, part. Hence, the deception would not have been in the understanding, which does not have free exercise in sleep, but in the sensitive part.

15. When sense represents what it receives, there is no falsity in sense, as Augustine says, but falsity is in the understanding, which judges that things exist in reality in the way in which sense portrays them. However, this never happened in Adam, since his understanding would either have refrained from judgment, as in dreams, or, when judging about sensible objects when awake, would have had a true judgment.

Q. 17: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE VII

In the seventh article we ask:

Would the children who were born of Adam in the state of innocence have had full knowledge of all things, as Adam did?

[Parallel readings: II Sent., 23, 2, 2; S.T., I, 101, 1.]

Difficulties

It seems that they would, for

1. According to Anselm, Adam would have begotten sons such as he himself was. But Adam had full knowledge of all natural things, as has been said. Therefore, his sons, too, would have had that knowledge immediately at birth.

2. As the affections are perfected by virtue, so the understanding is perfected by knowledge. But the sons born of Adam, in the state of innocence, would have had the fullness of all the virtues immediately at birth. For he would have passed original justice on to them, as Anselm says. Therefore, they would likewise have had all knowledge.

3. According to Bede, weakness, concupiscence, ignorance, and malice result from sin. But there would have been no wickedness, weakness, or concupiscence in those children immediately at birth. Therefore, there would not have been any ignorance either; hence, they would have had all knowledge.

4. It would have been more fitting for them to be born perfect in soul than in body. But they would have been born without any bodily defect. Therefore, there would likewise have been no ignorance in their souls.

5. According to Damascene, man in the state of innocence was “as another angel.” But, immediately upon their creation, the angels had knowledge of all natural things. Therefore, for the same reason, men in the state of innocence had it, also.

6. Adam’s soul and the souls of his sons had the same nature. But in its very beginning Adam’s soul was created full of all natural knowledge, as has been said. Therefore, the souls of his sons would have been created with the same fullness of knowledge.

7. Greater perfection of knowledge belongs to man than to the other animals. But, immediately at birth, the other animals have natural [instinctive] judgment of what is helpful and what is harmful. Thus, a newborn lamb flees from the wolf and follows its mother. Therefore, children in the state of innocence with much greater reason would have had perfect knowledge.

To the Contrary

1. Hugh of St. Victor says that they would not have been born with perfect knowledge, but would have reached it in the course of time.

2.. Since the soul is the perfection of the body, its development must be proportionate to that of the body. But in the state of innocence Adam’s children would not have had full bodily stature as Adam did when he was first created. Therefore, for the same reason they would not have had the fullness of knowledge as Adam had.

3. Sons receive existence, nature, and instruction from their father. But, if Adam’s sons had had full knowledge as soon as they were born, they would not have been able to receive instruction from him. Therefore, the full relationship of paternity would have not been preserved between them and the first parent.

REPLY

On this question there have been two opinions. For some have said that children in the state of innocence would have been perfect, just as Adam, with reference to everything belonging to the soul, that is, as regards both virtues and knowledge. They would not, however, have been perfect as regards the body. This was due to the exigencies of their mother’s womb, for they had to be born.

Others, however, following Hugh, say that, just as they would not immediately have received perfect stature of body, but in time would have reached it, so, too, they would in time have reached perfect knowledge.

However, in order to know which of these opinions contains more truth, we must remember that the same reasons do not hold for Adam and for his sons immediately upon birth. For, since Adam was ordained to be the source of the whole human race, as soon as he was created he had to have not only what belonged to the beginning of natural perfection but also that which belonged to its term. But his sons, who were not constituted the source of the human race, but as having existence from its source, did not have to be set at the term of natural perfection. It was enough for them to have at birth only as much as the initial state of natural perfection demands.

However, according to two opinions, the initial stage of the natural perfection of knowledge is placed at different levels. For some, as the Platonists, have held that the soul comes to the body filled with all the sciences, but it is clouded over by the body and thus its capacity for free use of the knowledge which it has is inhibited except with reference to some universals. But afterwards, through the exercise of study and of the senses, these obstacles are removed, so that it can use its knowledge freely. Thus, they say that learning is the same as remembering. But, if this opinion were true, we would have to say that in the state of innocence, as soon as children were born, they would have had knowledge of all things because the body in that state of innocence was altogether subject to the soul, and, so, the weight of the body would not have been able so to oppress the soul that it would lose its perfection in any way.

But this opinion seems to proceed from the position that the nature of the angels and of the soul is the same, so that the soul would have full knowledge as soon as it is created, just as an intelligence is said to be created full of forms. For this reason, the Platonists said that souls existed before being united to bodies and, after leaving bodies, return as intelligences to stars of rank equal to theirs. But this opinion is out of harmony with Catholic truth.

Therefore, others according to the opinion of Aristotle say that human understanding is last in the order of intelligible things, just as first matter is last in the order of sensible things. And as matter, considered in its essence, has no form, so the human understanding, in the beginning, is “like a tablet, on which nothing is written,” but, later, acquires knowledge through the senses by virtue of the agent intellect. Thus, the beginning of natural human knowledge is, indeed, to be in potency to all things knowable, but to know from the beginning only those things which are known immediately through the light of the agent intellect, that is to say, universal first principles.

Hence, it was not necessary for Adam’s sons to have knowledge of all things immediately at birth, but they would have reached it as they advanced in age. Nevertheless, it is necessary to ascribe to them some perfect knowledge, namely, the knowledge of things which must be chosen or avoided, a knowledge which pertains to prudence. For, as is proved in the Ethics, without prudence the other virtues cannot exist. And Adam’s children must have had these virtues because of original justice.

To me this opinion seems to contain more truth, if we look to what was required by the integrity of nature. But, if by divine grace anything else had been given them beyond that which integrity of nature required, this could not be asserted, since there is no express authority for it.

Answers to Difficulties

1. Adam would have begotten sons like himself in those things which were due to him by his specific nature. But it was not necessary for his sons to be born like him in those things which were due to him as the source of the whole human race.

2. For the perfect union with God, which the state of innocence demands, all the virtues are needed, but not all the sciences.

3. Although the children would not have all knowledge as soon as they were born, they would not have had the ignorance which follows from sin, which is a lack of knowledge of things which ought to be known. For they would have been ignorant of those things which their state did not require them to know.

4. In the bodies of these children there would have been no defect by which they would be deprived of a good which then was their due. Nevertheless, their bodies did lack a good which would accrue to them later, such as fullness of stature and the gifts of glory. The same must be said of the soul.

5. Angels are on a higher level of nature than souls, although souls can be equal to them in the gifts of grace. Consequently, it is not necessary to concede to the soul as something natural that which is naturally due to angels. However, in the state of innocence, man is said to be as another angel because of the fullness of grace.

6. Although the soul of Adam and the souls of his sons had the same nature, they did not have the same office. For Adam’s soul was made a source from which all teaching would come to posterity. Therefore, it had to be perfect immediately, which was not necessary for the souls of his children.

7. At the beginning, brute animals receive natural [instinctive] judgment in order to know what is harmful and what is helpful, because they cannot reach this through their own investigation. Man, however, can reach this and many other things through the investigation of reason. He nce, it is not necessary for all knowledge to exist in him naturally. Nevertheless, the knowledge of practical matters, which pertains to prudence, is more natural to man than the knowledge of speculative matters. For this reason we find that some are naturally prudent but do not naturally possess learning, as is said in the Ethics. For this reason men do not forget prudence as easily as they forget science. Therefore, at that time the children would have been more perfect in the matters which pertain to prudence than in those which pertain to speculative science, as has been said.

Q. 17: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE VIII

In the eighth article we ask:

In the state of innocence would children have had the full use of reason immediately at birth?

[Parallel readings: II Sent., 20, 2, 2; S.T., I, 101, 2.]

Difficulties

It seems that they would, for

1. If they were restricted in its use, this would have resulted only from some bodily defect. But in that state there was nothing in which the body resisted the soul. Therefore the use of reason could not be restricted.

2. A virtue or power which does not use an organ is not restricted in its activity because of a defect of an organ. But the understanding is a power which does not use an organ as is said in The Soul. Therefore, the act of the understanding could not then be impeded because of the defect of a bodily organ.

3. If it be said that the act of understanding was restricted because of a defect of body in so far as the understanding received something from the senses, the answer is that the understanding is higher than any sense power. But it seems to be out of order for the higher to receive from the lower. Therefore, since there was nothing out of order in man’s nature in that state, it seems that it would not have been necessary for the understanding to receive from the senses.

4. The understanding needs the senses to acquire knowledge through them. But, once it has acquired knowledge, it does not need them, just as a man does not need a horse once he has finished his journey, as Avicenna says. But, according to one opinion, children in the state of innocence had the fullness of all knowledge. Therefore, they could not be kept from using the knowledge they had because of imperfection in the sense organs.

5. Defect of bodily organs hinders sense more than understanding. But children do not suffer so great a bodily defect that they cannot see and hear. Therefore, neither is their understanding hindered because of bodily defect, but seemingly because of the punishment for the first sin. But this would not have existed before the fall. Therefore, children at that time would have had the full use of understanding as soon as they were born.

6. Man’s relation to the knowledge which he has naturally is the same as that which brute animals have to natural [instinctive] judgment. But brute animals can make use of this natural judgment immediately at birth. Therefore, in the state of innocence children were able to make use of natural knowledge, at least of first principles, immediately at birth.

7. Wisdom (9:15) says: “For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul...” But in the state of innocence the body was not corruptible. Therefore, the soul was not weighed down by it, and so kept from having free use of reason.

To the Contrary

1. Every activity which is common to soul and body is hindered because of a defect of the body. But understanding is an activity common to soul and body, as is clear from The Soul. Therefore, the use of reason could be hindered by a bodily defect or imperfection which t lie children suffered.

2. According to the Philosopher: “The soul in no way understands without a phantasm.” But the use of the imagination can be hindered by a defect of a bodily organ. Therefore, so can the use of understanding. We conclude as before.

REPLY

There are two opinions on this question. For some6 say that children in the state of innocence would have had the full use of all their bodily members and that the clumsiness which we now see in children, that they are not able to use their feet to walk, their hands to carve, and so on, comes entirely from the first sin.

Others,.thinking that this type of clumsiness has its cause in natural principles, as moistness, which must abound in children, say that in the state of innocence the members of children would not have been altogether suitable for their acts, although they would not be so com pletely deficient as they now are, since now what is due to corruption has been added to that which is due to nature. And this opinion seems more probable.

Hence, since it is necessary that moistness, especially in the brain, abound in children, and it is the brain in which imagination, natural judgment, memory, and common sense have their organs, the acts of these powers must be particularly hindered, and, consequently, understanding, which receives something immediately from these powers, and turns to them whenever it is in act, must be hindered, too. Nevertheless, the use of understanding was not fettered in children to the extent that it is now. However, if the other opinion were true, the use of understanding in children at that time would not have been fettered in any way.

Answers to Difficulties

1. The soul can be restricted by the body in two ways. One is by way of opposition, as happens when the body resists the soul and obscures it. This, however, would not have happened in the state of innocence. The other is by way of incapacity and defect, namely, in so far as the body is unable to execute all that the soul would be capable of considered in itself. And there was nothing to keep the soul from being restricted by the body in this way in the state of innocence. For it is thus evident that by reason of the body the soul is hindered from passing through things thrust in its path and from changing its location with as much ease as it does when separated from the body. In this way, also, it is kept from being able to have perfect use of its powers. Still, there would have been no pain in this, since the soul, by reason of its orderly disposition, would have given only those commands which the body could carry out.

2. Although the understanding does not use an organ, nevertheless, it receives something from faculties which use an organ. Therefore, its act can be restricted because of an impediment or defect of the bodily organs.

3. The intelligible species has that which is formal in it, through which it is actually intelligible, from the agent intellect, which is a higher power than the possible intellect, although that which is material in it is abstracted from phantasms. Therefore, more properly, the possible intellect receives from what is higher than from what is lower, since that which is from the lower can be received by the possible intellect only in so far as it receives the form of intelligibility from the agent intellect.

Or we should say that the lower powers are higher in some respect, especially in the ability to act and to cause. This is due to their greater proximity to external things, which are the cause and measure of our knowledge. It is for this reason that the sense serves imagination, not of itself, but in so far as it is informed by the species of a sensible thing, and so for the rest.

4. According to the Philosopher, the intellective soul is related to phantasms as to its objects. Consequently, our understanding needs conversion to phantasms not only in acquiring knowledge but also in using knowledge once it is acquired. This is evident from the fact that, as long as the soul is in the body, a man cannot use even previously acquired knowledge if the organ of the power of imagination is injured, as happens in the insane. What Avicenna says should be taken of the soul separated from the body, which has a different mode of understanding.

5. The organ of the power of imagination, of memory, and of the cogitative sense is in the brain itself, which is the place of greatest moistness in the human body. Therefore, because of the large measure of moistness which is in children, the acts of these powers are hindered more than the acts of the external senses. But understanding receives immediately from the interior and not the exterior senses.

6. Some other animals naturally have a dry disposition; hence, at their birth there is not so great a profusion of moistness which greatly impedes the acts of the interior senses. But man naturally has a moderate disposition, and therefore he must have a high degree of warmth and moistness. So, at the beginning of his existence there has to be proportionately more moistness in him. For all animal and plant generations begin from moistness.

7. The body which corrupts weighs down the soul not only because it is powerless but also because it resists and obscures the soul. However, the human body in the state of innocence hindered the acts of the soul only because of the imperfection of a power or disposition.