Question Twenty-Five: Sensuality
ARTICLE I
The question is about sensuality,
and in the first article we ask:
Is sensuality a cognitive or only an appetitive power?
[Parallel readings: II Sent., 24, 2, 1; S.T., I, 81, 1.]
Difficulties
It seems that it is a cognitive power, for
1. As the Master says, anything in our soul that is found to be had in common with beasts belongs to sensuality.” But the sense cogmtive powers are common to us and the beasts. They therefore belong to sensuality.
2. Augustine says: “The movement of the sensual soul, which is directed to the senses of the body, is common to us and beasts and quite outside reason as the principle of wisdom.” In expatiating upon this he adds: “Corporeal things are sensed by a sense of the body, whereas eternal and unchangeable things are understood by spiritual reason, the principle of wisdom.” But to sense corporeal things is the function of a cognitive power. Consequently sensuality, to which the act of sensual movement belongs, is a cognitive power.
3. The answer was given that Augustine adds this in order to point out the objects of the senses, for the movement of sensuality is attributed to the senses of the body inasmuch as it is concerned with the objects of sense.—On the contrary, Augustine adds this to show in what respect sensuality is discriminated from reason. But reason too is concerned with corporeal things, which Augustine says are the objects of the senses—lower reason by disposing them, and higher reason by judging them. And so sensuality is not by this fact discriminated from reason. Augustine therefore did not have the meaning alleged in the answer.
4. In the commission of a sin in progress within us sensuality has the role of the serpent, as Augustine says. Now in the temptation of our first parents the serpent’s role was that of suggesting and proposing the sin. But that is the function of the cognitive, not the appetitive power, because the business of the latter is to be drawn to the sin. Sensuality is therefore a cognitive power.
5. Augustine says again: “Sensuality is very close to reason as the principle of science.” It would not be very close to it, however, if it were only an appetitive power, since reason as the principle of science is cognitive; for in that case it would belong to a different genus of the powers of the soul. Consequently sensuality is cognitive, and not only appetitive.
6. According to Augustine6 sensuality is distinguished from both higher reason and lower, in both of which is contained the higher appetite, the will. Otherwise there could not be any mortal sin in them. But the lower appetite is not distinguished from the higher appetite as a different power, as will be proved directly. Therefore sensuality is not the lower appetite. It is, however, some sort of lower power of the soul, as appears from its definition. It is therefore the lower cognitive power.—Proof of the minor: An accidental difference in objects does not indicate a specific difference in powers. Sight, for example, is not divided into different species by the difference between seeing a man and seeing an ass; for man and ass are accidental differences in the object of sight as such. But the object of appetite apprehended by sense and that apprehended by intellect the difference on which the distinction of higher and lower appetite seems to be based are accidental to the object of appetite as such, since the appetible as appetible is good, and it is accidental to good to be apprehended by sense or by intellect. The lower appetite is therefore not a power distinct from the higher.
7. The answer was given that the two appetites mentioned are distinguished on the basis of good in an unqualified sense and sometiling good here and now.—On the contrary, appetite is related to good as the intellect to truth. But truth in an unqualified sense and something true here and now, which is contingent, do not distinguish the intellect into two powers. Then neither can the appetite be distinguished into two powers on the basis of good in an unqualified sense and something good here and now.
8. Something good here and now is an apparent good, it seems, whereas good in an unqualified sense is the true good. But the higher appetite sometimes consents to an apparent good, and the lower appetite sometimes tends to a true good, such as the necessities of the body. Consequently good here and now and good in an unqualified sense do not distinguish a higher and a lower appetite. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.
9. The sensitive power is set over against the appetitive, as is clear from the Philosopher’s distinction of five genera of activities in the soul: to nourish, to sense, to tend appetitively, to be moved locally, and to understand. But sensuality is included in the sensitive power, as even the name shows. Sensuality is therefore not an appetitive but a cognitive power.
10. What is defined corresponds to the same thing as the definition. But the definition of sensuality which the Master gives corresponds to lower reason, which also is sometimes directed to the senses of the body and the body’s concerns. Lower reason and sensuality are there fore the same thing. But reason is a cognitive power; then so too is sensuality.
To the Contrary
l. In its definition sensuality is said to be an appetite for things which pertain to the body.
2. Sin consists in tending by appetite, not in knowing. But in sensuality’there is some very slight sin, as Augustine says. Therefore sensuality is an appetitive power.
REPLY
Sensuality seems to be nothing but the appetitive power of the sensitive part of the soul, and it is called sensuality as being something derived from sense. The movement of the appetitive part arises somehow from apprehension, because every operation of a passive principle takes its origin from an active principle. Now appetite is a passive power, because it is moved by the object of appetite, which is an “unmoved mover,” as is said in The Soul. But the object of appetite does not move the appetite unless it is apprehended. Inasmuch as the lower appetitive power is moved by the appetible object apprehended by sense, its movement is called sensual, and the power itself is called sensuality.
Now this sense appetite stands midway between natural appetite and the higher, rational appetite, which is called the will. This can be seen from the fact that in any object of appetite there are two aspects which can be considered: the thing itself which is desired, and the reason for its desirability, such as pleasure, utility, or something of the sort.
Natural appetite tends to the appetible thing itself without any apprehension of the reason for its appetibility; for natural appetite is nothing but an inclination and ordination of the thing to something else which is in keeping with it, like the ordination of a stone to a place below. But because a natural thing is determined in its natural existence, its inclination to some determined thing is a single one. Hence there is not required any apprehension by which an appetible thing is distinguished from one that is not appetible on the basis of the reason for its appetibility. But this apprehension is a prerequisite in the one who established the nature, who gave to each nature its own inclination to a thing in keeping with itself.
The higher appetite, the will, however, tends directly to the very reason for appetibility itself in an absolute way. Thus the will tends primarily and principally to goodness itself, or utility, or something like that. It tends to this or that appetible thing, however, secondarily, inasmuch as it shares in the above-mentioned reason. This is because a rational nature has a capacity so great that an inclination to one determinate thing would not be sufficient for it, but it has need of a number of different things. For that reason its inclination is to something common found in many things; and so by the apprehension of that common aspect it tends to the appetible thing in which it knows that this aspect is to be sought.
The lower appetite of the sensitive part, called sensuality, tends to the appetible thing itself as containing that which constitutes the reason for its appetibility. It does not tend to the reason for the appetibility in itself because the lower appetite does not tend to goodness or utility or pleasure itself, but to this particular useful or pleasurable thing. In this respect the sense appetite is lower than the rational appetite. But because it does not tend only to this or only to that thing, but to every being which is useful or pleasurable to it, it is higher than natural appetite. For this reason it too has need of an apprehension by which to distinguish the pleasurable from what is not pleasurable.
It is a manifest sign of this distinction that natural appetite is under necessity in regard to the thing to which it tends, as a heavy body necessarily tends to a place downward; whereas sense appetite does not lie under any necessity in regard to any particular thing before it is apprehended under the aspect of the pleasurable or the useful, but of necessity goes out to it once it is apprehended as pleasurable (for a brute animal is unable, while looking at something pleasurable, not to desire it); but the will is under necessity in regard to goodness and utility itself (for man of necessity wills good), but is not under any necessity in regard to this or that particular thing, however much it may be apprehended as good or useful. This is so because each power has some kind of necessary relationship to its proper object.
From this it can be understood that the object of natural appetite is this thing inasmuch as it is of this particular kind; that of sense appetite is this thing inasmuch as it is agreeable or pleasurable (as water inasmuch as it is agreeable to taste, and not inasmuch as it is water); and the proper object of the will is good itself taken absolutely. And the apprehension of sense and that of intellect differ in the same way; for it is the function of sense to apprehend this colored thing, but of intellect to apprehend the very nature of color.
It is accordingly clear that the will and sensuality are specifically different appetites, just as goodness itself and a particular good thing are tended to in different ways; for goodness is tended to for its own sake, but a particular good thing is tended to as sharing in something. And so, just as things which share are perfected by what they share, as a particular good thing. by goodnessi, in the same way the higher appetite rules the.ower, and the intellect likewise judges about the things which sense apprehends. The proper object of sensuality is accordingly a thing which is good or suitable for the one sensing. This comes about in two ways: (1) because it is suitable for the very existence of the one sensing, as food and drink and the like; and (7,) because it is suitable to our senses for sensing, as a beautiful color is suitable for sight to see and a modulated sound suitable for hearing to hear, and so on.
The Master thus explains” sensuality completely. For in saying that it is “a lower power of the soul,” he points out its distinction from the higher appetite; in saying “from which there is a movement which is directed to the senses of the body,” he shows its relation to the things which are suitable to our senses for sensing; and in saying “and an appetite for the concerns of the body,” he shows its relation to the things which are suitable for preserving the existence of the one sensing.
Answers to Difficulties
1. Something belongs to sensuality in three ways: (1) As of the essence of sensuality. In this way only the appetitive powers belong to sensuality. (2) As a prerequisite for sensuality. In this way the sense apprehensive powers belong to sensuality. (3) As pursuant to sensuality. In this way the motive and executive powers belong to sensuality. It is accordingly true that everything which is common to us and the beasts belongs in some way to sensuality, though not everything is of the essence of sensuality.
2. Augustine adds the passage quoted in order to exemplify to what sort of acts the movement of sensuality is directed. He does not mean that sensing corporeal things is itself the movement of sensuality.
3. Lower reason has a motion in regard to the senses of the body, but not of the same kind as that by which the senses perceive their objects. For the senses perceive their objects in particular, whereas lower reason has an act concerning sensible things according to a universal intention. But sensuality tends to the object of the senses in the same way as the senses themselves, that is, in particular, as has been said. The conclusion accordingly does not follow.
4. In the temptation of our first parents the serpent not only proposed something to be sought, but by his suggestions he deceived them. Now a man would not be deceived when a pleasurable object of sense is proposed if the judgment of reason were not inhibited by a passion of the appetitive faculty. Sensuality is accordingly an appetitive power.
5. Sensuality is said to be very near reason as the principle of scicnce, not as regards the genus of the power, but as regards its objects, because both deal with temporal matters, though in different ways, as has been said.
6. The difference in the apprehensions would be accidental to the appetitive powers if there were not joined to it a difference of things apprehended. For sense, which attains only particulars, does not apprehend goodness taken absolutely, but a particular good; whereas the intellect, which attains universals, apprehends goodness itself taken absolutely. But from this difference the difference of lower and higher appetite is taken, as has been said.
7. The good here and now to which sense appetite is directed is a particular good considered as it is here and now, whether it be necessary or contingent, for “it is delightful for the eyes to see the sun,” as is had in Ecclesiastes [11:7]) and also whether it be a true or an apparent good.
8. From the previous answer the answer to this difficulty is clear.
9. The sensitive part is taken in two ways: (1) Sometimes it is taken as opposed to the appetitive power, and then it includes only the apprehensive powers. Thus taken sensuality does not belong to the sensitive part except as to that which is, so to speak, its source. This is enough to justify the name derived from it. (2) It is sometimes taken as including both the appetitive and the motive powers, as is the case when the sensitive soul is opposed to the rational and the vegetative. In this usage sensuality is included in the sensitive part of the soul.
10. Lower reason is directed to the senses of the body and the body’s concerns in a different way from sensuality, as was said above. For this reason the argument is not consequent.
Q. 25: Sensuality
ARTICLE II
In the second article we ask:
Is sensuality one simple power or is it divided into several: the irascible and the concupiscible powers?
[Parallel readings: III Sent., 26,1, 2; S.T., I, 81, 2; 82, 5; In III de an., 14; De malo, 8, 3.]
Difficulties
It seems that it is one simple power not divided into several, for
1. In its definition sensuality is said to be a lower power of the soul. This would not be said if it contained several powers. It therefore does not seem to be divided into several powers.
2. One and the same power of the soul “is concerned with one contrariety, as sight is concerned with white and black,” as is said in The Soul. But agreeable and harmful are contraries. One and the same power of the soul is therefore referred to both. But the concupiscible power is referred to the agreeable, and the irascible to the harmful. The irascible and the concupiscible are therefore one and the same power, and sensuality is accordingly not divided into several powers.
3. It is by the same force that a person withdraws from one extreme and approaches the other, as by reason of gravity a stone leaves the top and goes to the bottom. But by the irascible power the soul withdraws from the harmful by shunning it; and by the concupiscible power it approaches the agreeable by craving it. The irascible and the concupiscible are therefore the same power of the soul. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.
4. The proper object of joy is the agreeable. Now joy is found only in the concupiscible power. The proper object of the concupiscible power is therefore the agreeable. But the agreeable is the object of the whole of sensuality, as is evident from the definition of sensuality explained above;3 for the body’s concerns are things agreeing with the body. Consequently the whole of sensuality is nothing but the concupiscible power. Then either the irascible and the concupiscible powers are the same, or the irascible does not belong to sensuality. Whichever of these two is granted, the thesis (that sensuality is one simple power) stands.
5. The answer was given that the object of sensuality is also the harmful or disagreeable, which the irascible power attains.—On the contrary, the harmful or disagreeable is the object of sadness, just as the agreeable is the object of joy. But both joy and sadness are found in the concupiscible power. Consequently both the agreeable and the harmful are the object of the concupiscible. Thus, whatever is the object of sensuality is the object of the concupiscible. And so the same must be concluded as above.
6. Sense appetite presupposes apprehension. But the agreeable and the harmful are apprehended by the same apprehensive power. Then the same appetitive power is concerned with both. Thus the conclusion is the same as above.
7. According to Augustine “hatred is inveterate anger.” But hatred is in the concupiscible power, as is proved in the Topics, because love is in the same power. But anger is in the irascible. Therefore the irascible and the concupiscible are one and the same power, for otherwise anger could not be in both.
8. That function of the soul which belongs to every power does not require a definite power distinct from the rest. But to crave (concupiscere) belongs to every power of the soul, as is evident from the fact that every power of the soul delights in its object and craves it.
Consequently a power distinct from the rest need not be referred to craving. Thus the concupiscible power is not distinct from the irascible.
9. Powers are distinguished according to their acts. But in any act of the irascible power the act of the concupiscible is included, for anger has a craving for revenge, and so of the others. The concupiScible is therefore not a power distinct from the irascible.
To the Contrary
1. Damascene distinguishes the sensitive appetite into the irascible and the concupiscible powers, and so does Gregory of Nyssa..But the lower appetite is sensuality. Sensuality therefore includes several powers.
2. In Spirit and Soul these three motive powers are distinguished: “the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible.” But the rational power is distinct from the irascible. Then so also is the irascible from the concupiscible.
3. The Philosopher places in the sensitive appetite “desire and high spirit,” that is, the concupiscible and the irascible.
REPLY
The appetite of sensuality contains these two powers: the irascible and the concupiscible, which are faculties distinct from one another. This can be seen from the following consideration.
Sense appetite has something in common with natural appetite inasmuch as both tend to a thing agreeing with the subject of the tendency. Natural appetite is found to tend to two things in accordance with the two types of operation of a natural being. One of these is that by which the natural being strives to acquire what is capable of preserving its nature, as a heavy body moves downward in order to be preserved there” The other type is that by which the natural being destroys its contraries by an active quality. This is necessary for a corruptible being because, if it did not have the strength to conquer its contrary, it would be destroyed by it.
Natural appetite accordingly has a twofold tendency: to obtain what is suited and favorable to this nature, and to gain, as it were, a victory over whatever is opposed to it. The first is done by way of reception, the second by ‘way of action. They are consequently reduced to different principles, for receiving and acting are not from the same principle, as fire is borne upward by its lightness and by heat destroys things contrary to it.
In sense appetite those same two tendencies are likewise found. For by its appetitive faculty an animal desires what is suited and favorable to it. This is done by the concupiscible power, whose proper object is what is delightful to sense. It also seeks to gain the mastery and victory over things that are contrary to it. This it does by the irascible power. Its object is accordingly said to be something arduous.
From this it is clear that the irascible is a different power from the concupiscible. If something is pleasurable it has a different reason for its appetibility than if it is arduous, since the arduous sometimes keeps us away from pleasure and involves us in affairs that bring sadness, as when an animal leaves the pleasure which he was enjoying and enters a fight and is not made to withdraw from it by the pains which he incurs. One of the two, moreover, the concupiscible power, seems to be directed to reception; for it tends in order that the object of its delight may be joined to it. The other, however, the irascible power, is directed to action, because by its action it overcomes something which is contrary or harmful to it, getting the upper hand by victory over it. It is found to be the case among the powers of the soul in general that receiving and acting belong to different powers, as is clear of the agent and possible intellect. It is for this reason too that according to Avicenna courage and faintness of heart pertain to the irascible power as the faculty directed to action, whereas the expansion and contraction of the heart pertain to the concupiscible power as the faculty directed to reception.
It is clear, then, from what has been said that the irascible power is in some sense subordinated to the concupiscible as its defender. For it is necessary for an animal to gain victory over the things contrary to it by means of the irascible power, as has been said, in order that the concupiscible may possess the object of its delight without hindrance. An indication of this is the fact that animals fight among themselves on account of things that give them pleasure, such as copulation and food, as is said in Animals. For this reason all the passions of the irascible power have their beginning and end in the concupiscible. Anger, for instance, begins with some sadness that has been caused (1n the concupiscible power) and, after revenge has been got, ends with joy (which is likewise in the concupiscible power). In the same way hope begins with desire or love and ends in enjoyment.
It should be noted, however, that not only in the apprehensive powers but also in the appetitive there is something which belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance with its own nature and something else according as it has some slight participation in reason, coming into contact at its highest level of activity with reason at its lowest.
There is verified here the statement of Dionysius that the divine wisdom “joins the ends of the first things to the beginnings of the second.”
Thus the imaginative power belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance with its own nature, because forms received from sense are stored up in it; but the estimative power, by which an animal apprehends intentions not received by the senses, such as friendship or hostility, is in the sensitive soul according as it shares somewhat in reason. It is accordingly in virtue of this estimative power that animals are said to have a sort of prudence, as is seen in the beginning of the Metaphysics. A sheep, for example, flees from a wolf whose hostility it has never sensed.
The same principle is verified also in regard to the appetitive power. The fact that an animal seeks what is pleasurable to its senses (the business of the concupiscible power) is in accordance with the sensitive soul’s own nature; but that it should leave what is pleasurable and seek something for the sake of a victory which it wins with pain (the business of the irascible), this belongs to it according as it in some measure reaches up to the higher appetite. The irascible power, therefore, is closer to reason and the will than the concupiscible. On this account a man unable to control his anger is less base than one unable to control his concupiscence, being less deprived of reason, as the Philosopher says.
It is therefore clear from what has been said that the irascible and the concupiscible are distinct powers, and also what is the object of each and how the irascible power helps the concupiscible and is higher and nobler than it, like the estimative among the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part.
Answers to Difficulties
1. Sensuality is called a power in the singular because it is one in genus although it is divided into different species or parts.
2. Both the agreeable object of delight and the harmful object of sadness belong to the concupiscible inasmuch as one is to be fled, the other to be pursued. But to get the upper hand over both of them, so as to be able to overcome the harmful and possess with some security the pleasurable, belongs to the irascible power.
3. To draw away from the harmful and to draw near to the pleasurable are both the business of the concupiscible power. But to fight against and overcome what can be harmful pertains to the irascible.
4-5. From the above answer the answer to these also is clear, because the agreeable is the object of the concupiscible power inasmuch as it is pleasurable, but it is the object of the whole of sensuality inasmuch as it is in any way advantageous to the animal, either by way of the arduous or by way of the pleasurable.
6. The same concupiscible appetitive power pursues the agreeable and flees the disagreeable. Consequently the irascible and the concupiscible powers are not distinguished on the basis of the agreeable and the harmful, as appears from what has been said.
7. The statement that “hatred is inveterate anger” is a predication by cause, not by essence; for the passions of the irascible power end in the passions of the concupiscible, as has been said.
8. To crave (concupiscere) with an animal appetite belongs to the concupiscible power alone; but to crave with natural appetite belongs to every power, for every power of the soul is a nature and naturally inclines to something. And the same distinction is to be applied to love and pleasure and the like.
9. In the definition of the passions of the irascible power there is placed the common act of the appetitive power, to tend, but not anything that belongs to the concupiscible except as the beginning or the end, as would be the case if one were to say that anger is the desire for revenge because of a previous saddening.
Q. 25: Sensuality
ARTICLE III
In the third article we ask:
Are the irascible and the concupiscible powers only in the lower appetite or also in the higher?
[Parallel readings: III Sent., 17, a. 1, sol. 3; S.T., I, 59, 4; 82, 5; In III de an., 14.]
Difficulties
It seems that they are also in the higher, for
1. The higher appetite extends to more things than the lower, since it is concerned with both corporeal and spiritual things. Now if the lower appetite is divided into two powers, the irascible and the concupiscible, then all the more should the higher be so divided.
2. To the higher part of the soul pertain those powers which belong to it alone, for the lower powers are common to the soul and the body. But the irascible and the concupiscible are powers of the soul alone. Thus it is said in Spirit and Soul: “The soul has these powers before being commingled with the body, since they are natural to it and are nothing but the soul itself as a whole. For the full and complete substance of the soul consists in these three: rationality, concupiscibility, and irascibility.” Consequently the irascible and the concupiscible powers pertain to the higher appetite.
3. According to the Philosopher only the rational part of the soul is separable from the body. But the irascible and the concupiscible powers remain in the soul when it is separated from the body, as is said in Spirit and Soul. They therefore belong to the rational part.
4. The image of the Trinity is to be sought in the higher part of the soul. But according to some the image is ascribed to the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible powers. Hence the irascible and the concupiscible belong to the higher part of the soul.
5. Charity is said to be in the concupiscible power; hope, in the irascible. But charity and hope are not found in the sensitive appetite’ which cannot extend to immaterial things. The irascible and the concupiscible powers are therefore not only in the lower appetite but also in the higher.
6. Those powers are called human which man has beyond the other animals and which belong to the higher part of the soul. But two kinds of irascible powers are distinguished by the masters: one human and another not human; and the same is done with the concupiscible. The powers in question are therefore not only in the lower appetite but are also in the higher.
7. The operations of the sensitive powers, both apprehensive and appetitive, do not remain in the separated soul because they are exercised through org~dhs of the body; otherwise the sensitive soul in brutes would be incorruptible, as being capable of having its operation by itself. But in the separated soul there remain joy and sadness, love and fear, and the like, which are attributed to the irascible and the concupiscible powers. The irascible and concupiscible powers are therefore not only in the sensitive part but also in the intellective.
To the Contrary
Damascene, Gregory of Nyssa and the Philosophers hold that they are in sense appetite only.
REPLY
Since the acts of the appetitive parts presuppose the act of the apprehensive, the distinction of the appetitive parts from each other is also somewhat similar to the distinction of the apprehensive.
Among the apprehensive faculties we find that the higher apprehensive remains one and undivided with reference to things regarding which the lower apprehensive faculties are distinguished. By one and the same intellective power we come to know as to their natures all sensible things with reference to which the sense powers are distinguished. According to Augustine, what a man sees and what he hears is different externally, but internally in the intellect it is the same. And the same is to be said of the appetitive powers: the higher appetitive is one and the same in regard to all the objects of appetite, though the lower appetitive powers are distinguished in regard to all the different appetible objects.
The reason for this is found in the nature of each. The higher power has a universal object; the lower powers have particular objects. Many things correspond essentially to particulars which have only an accidental reference to something universal. Since it is not an accidental difference but only an essential one which distinguishes a species, the lower powers are found to be specifically distinct while the higher power remains undivided. It is clear, for example, that the object of the intellect is the what, and that the same faculty of intellect extends to all things that have quiddity and is not distinguished by any differences that do not differentiate the very notion of quiddity. But since the object of sense is a body, which is capable of moving the sense organ, the sensitive powers must be differentiated according to differences in the manner of moving. Sight and hearing are accordingly distinct powers because color and sound move the sense in different ways.
The same is true of the appetitive powers. For the object of higher appetite is good taken absolutely, as was said above, whereas the object of the lower appetite is a thing in some way advantageous to the animal. But the arduous and the pleasurable are not suited to the animal under the same aspect, as appears from what has been said. Consequently the object of lower appetite is thereby essentially diversified, but not the object of higher appetite, which tends to what is good absolutely in any way whatever.
It should, however, be borne in mind that, just as the intellect has some of its operations directed to the same things as the senses, but in a higher way, since it knows universally and immaterially what sense knows materially and in particular; in the same way higher appetite has some of its operations directed to the same things as the lower appetites, though in a higher way. For the lower appetites tend to their objects materially and accompanied by a bodily passion; and it is from these passions that the irascible and concupiscible get their names. Now higher appetite has certain acts similar to those of lower appetite, though without any passion. The operations of higher appetite are accordingly sometimes given the names of passions. Thus the will for revenge is called “anger,” and the repose of the will in some object of spiritual affection is called “love.” By the same process the will itself which produces these acts is sometimes called “irascible” or “concupiscible,” not properly but by OL figure of speech; and even so there is no implication in this that there are in the will two distinct powers corresponding to the irascible and the concupiscible.
Answers to Difficulties
1. Even though the higher appetite extends to more things than the lower, yet, because it has good in general as its proper object, it is not divided into several powers.
2. That book is not Augustine’s, nor need it be accepted as an authority. We can nevertheless say that it is either speaking of the irascible and concupiscible powers. figuratively, or it is speaking of them from the point of view of their source; for all of the powers, even the sensitive, flow from the essence of the soul.
3. There are two opinions on the sensitive powers of the soul. Some say that these powers remain in the separated soul essentially; others say that they remain in the essence of the soul radically. And whichever opinion is taken, the irascible and the concupiscible powers do not remain in any other way than the rest of the sensitive powers. Thus it is said in the work mentioned that when withdrawing from the body, the soul takes with it sense and imagination.
4. In his work The Trinity Augustine investigates many sorts of trinities in our soul in which there is some resemblance to the uncreated Trinity, though the image in the proper sense of the term exists only in the mind. By reason of the resemblance mentioned some place the image in the rational, irascible, and concupiscible powers, though this is not said in a proper sense.
5. Charity and hope are not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, properly speaking, since the love of charity and the expectation of hope are without any passion. But charity is said to be in the concupiscible power inasmuch as it is in the will, viewed as having acts like those of the concupiscible; and in the same way hope is said to be in the irascible.
6. The irascible and concupiscible powers are said to be human or rational, not by their essence, as if they belonged to the higher part of the soul, but by participation, inasmuch as they obey reason and participate in its rule, as Damascene again says.
7. Joy and fear, which are passions, do not remain in the separated soul, since they take place with a bodily change. But there remain acts of the will similar to those passions.
Q. 25: Sensuality
ARTICLE IV
In the fourth article we ask:
Does sensuality obey reason?
[Parallel readings: II Sent., 24, 3, 1 ad 5; In I Eth., 20; S.T., I, 81, 3; I-II, 17, 7; Quodl. IV, (11), 21; In III de an., 16.]
Difficulties
It seems that it does not, for
1. In the Epistle to the Romans (7:15) it is written: “For [the good] which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do.” As a comment in the Gloss’ explains, this is said because of the motions of sensuality. Sensuality therefore does not obey the will and reason.
2. In the same Epistle (7:23) it is written: “But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind...” Now this law is concupiscence. It is therefore fighting against the law of the mind, that is, reason; and so it does not obey it.
3. The relation among the appetitive powers is the same as that among the apprehensive. But the intellect does not have control of the acts of the external senses, for we do not see or hear whatever the intellect decides. Then neither are the motions of sensuality under the control of rational appetite.
4. Natural activities in us. are not subject to reason. But sensuality tends to the object of its desire by a natural appetite. Consequently the motions of sensuality are not subject to reason.
5. The motions of sensuality are passions of the soul, for which definite dispositions of the body are required, as Avicenna determines. Thus for anger, hot thin blood is needed; and for joy, temperate blood. But one’s bodily disposition is not subject to reason. Then neither are the motions of sensuality.
To the Contrary
Damascene says that the irascible and the concupiscible powers participate to some extent in reason. But they are the parts of sensuality. Consequently the motions of sensuality also are under the control of reason. And the same can be gathered from what is said by the Philosopher and by Gregory of Nyssa.
REPLY
In a series of mobile beings and movers we must arrive at some first being which moves itself and by which is moved whatever is not moved by itself, because everything that exists through another is reduced to that which exists through itself, as is gathered from the Physics. Then, since the will moves itself by reason of its being the master of its own act, the other powers which do not move themselves must somehow be moved by the will. Now the nearer any of the other powers comes to the will, the more it participates in the will’s motion. Consequently the lower appetitive powers obey the will in their principal acts as being nearest to the will; and the other powers farther removed, as the nutritive and generative, are moved by the will in some of their external acts.
Now the lower appetitive powers, the irascible and the concupiscible, are subject to reason in three respects: (1) On the part of reason itself. For since the same thing considered under different conditions can be made either pleasurable or repulsive, by means of the imaginatiott reason lays a particular thing before sensuality under the aspect of the pleasurable or the disagreeable as it appears to reason; and so sensuality is moved’io joy or to sorrow. The Philosopher accordingly says that reason persuades “to the best.” (2) On the part of the will For among powers hierarchically connected the situation is such that an intense movement in one, and especially in the higher, overflows into the other. Accordingly, when by a choice the movement of the will is directed to something intensely, even the irascible and the concupiscible powers follow the movement of the will. It is accordingly said in The Soul that appetite moves appetite (that is, the higher moves the lower) as sphere moves sphere among the heavenly bodies.
(3) On the part of the motive power which carries it out. For just as in an army the advance to battle depends upon the command of the general, so in us the motive power moves the members only at the command of that which rules in us, namely reason, whatever sort of movement may occur in the lower powers. Reason therefore holds the irascible and the concupiscible powers in check lest they proceed to an external act. On this account it is said in Genesis (4:7): “The lust thereof shall be under thee.”
Thus it is clear that the irascible and the concupiscible powers are subject to reason, and likewise sensuality, though the name sensuality does not refer to these powers according to their participation in reason but according to the nature of the sensitive part of the soul. It is consequently not said in as proper a sense that sensuality is subject to reason as that the irascible and the concupiscible powers are so subject.
Answers to Difficulties
1. The statement of the Apostle is to be understood as meaning that it is not in our power universally to prevent all inordinate movements of sensuality, though we can prevent individual ones, as is clear from what has been said.
2. As far as sensuality itself goes, it fights against reason; yet reason can keep it in check, as is clear from what has been said.
3. The lower apprehensive powers also obey the higher, as is clear in the case of the imagination and the other internal senses; but the fact that the external senses do not obey the intellect is due to their need of a sensible thing, and to their inability to sense without it.
4. The lower appetitive power does not naturally tend to anything until after that thing is presented to it under the aspect of its proper object, as is clear from what has been said. Since it is in the power of reason to present one and the same thing under different aspects, a particular sort of food, for instance, as delicious or as deadly, reason is able to move sensuality to different objects.
5. A disposition of the body which is in its very constitution is not subject to reason. But that such a disposition be had is a requisite not [directly] for the actualization of the passions in question, but for man to be capable of them. The actual modification of the body, however, such as the boiling of the blood around the heart, or something of the sort, which actually accompanies passions of this kind, depends upon the imagination, and on that account is subject to reason.
Q. 25: Sensuality
ARTICLE V
In the fifth article we ask:
Can there be sin in sensuality?
[Parallel readings: II Sent., 24, 3, 2.; De malo, 7, 6; S.T., I-II, 74, 3 & 4; Quodl. IV, (11), 21 & 22.]
Difficulties
It seems that there cannot, for
1. According to Augustine, no sin is ever committed except by the will. But sensuality is distinguished from the will. Sin is therefore not in sensuality.
2. [No difficulty is given for this number.]
3 Sins remain in the separated soul. But sensuality does not remain in the separated soul, since it is a power of the composite; for its act is exercised by means of the body. “But the act belongs to the same subject as the power,” as the Philosopher says. Consequently there is no sin in sensuality.
4. According to Augustine there is something which acts and is not acted upon, that is, God; and in this there is no sin. There is some thing else which acts and is acted upon, namely, the will; and in this there is clearly sin. And there is something else which is acted upon and does not act, that is, sensuality. Then sin is not in this either.
5. The answer was given that there can be sin in sensuality by the mere fact that reason can prevent its movement.—On the contrary, the fact that reasan can prevent it and does not, merely indicates the interpretative consent of reason, which is not sufficient for sin since nothing less than express consent suffices for merit. “For God is more ready to have mercy than to punish,” as is said in the Gloss in a comment upon the beginning of Jeremiah. Then not even for this reason can it be said that there is sin in sensuality.
6. No one sins in doing something which he cannot avoid. But we cannot keep the movements of sensuality from being inordinate; for, as Augustine says, because man was unwilling to avoid sin when he was able, there has been inflicted upon him the inability to avoid it when he so wills. There is therefore no sin in sensuality.
7. When the movement of sensuality is to something licit, there is no sin, as when a husband is aroused in regard to his wife. But sensuality does not distinguish between what is licit and what is illicit. Then not even when it is moved to something illicit will there be sin in it. 8. Virtue and vice are contraries. But virtue cannot be in sensuality. Then neither can vice.
9. Sin is in that to which it is imputed. But since sensuality does not have control over its own act, sin is not imputed to it, but rather to the will. There is therefore no sin in sensuality.
10. The material element of mortal sin can be in sensuality; and yet we do not say that mortal sin is there, because the formal element of mortal sin is not found in it. But the formal element of venial sin, the privation of due order, is not in sensuality but in reason, whose business it is to put things in order. Consequently venial sin is not found in sensuality.
11. If a blind man being led by one who sees falls into a ditch, it is not the fault of the blind man but of the one who sees. Since sensuality is, so to speak, blind in regard to divine things, should it fall into something illicit, that will not be its own sin but that of reason, which is supposed to guide it.
12. Like sensuality, the external members are guided by reason; and yet we do not say that there is sin in them. Then neither is it in sensuality.
13. Disposition and form are in the same subject, because the acts of active principles are in the thing acted upon and disposed. But venial sin is a disposition for mortal sin. Therefore, since mortal sin cannot be in sensuality, neither can venial sin.
14. The act of fornication is nearer to sensuality than to reason. If, then, there could be any sin in sensuality, it would be a mortal sin, namely, that of fornication. But since that is false, it seems that there cannot be any sin in it.
To the Contrary
1. Augustine says: “There is some fault when the flesh lusts against the spirit.” Now that lust of the flesh belongs to sensuality. There can therefore be some sin in sensuality.
2. The Master says that there is venial sin in sensuality.
REPLY
Sin is nothing but an act which lacks the right order which it was supposed to have. It is in this sense that “sin” or defect is taken in matters applying to nature and to art, as the Philosopher says. But there is question of mortal sin only when the defective act is moral.
An act is moral by the fact that it is somehow in our power, for thus it deserves praise or blame. Consequently an act which is completely in our power is completely moral and is capable of verifying the full notion of mortal sin. Such are the acts which the will elicits or commands. The act of sensuality, however, is not completely in our power, because it precedes the judgment of reason; yet it is in our power to some extent inasmuch as sensuality is subject to reason, as appears from what has been said. Its act accordingly attains to the genus of moral acts, but incompletely. In sensuality there consequently cannot be mortal sin, which is complete sin, but only venial sin, in which the incomplete character of mortal sin is found.
Answers to Difficulties
1. The subject of a thing is of either of two kinds: it is either first or secondary, as a surface is the first subject of color, and a body is its secondary subject inasmuch as it is the subject of the surface. Similarly we must say that the first subject of sin is the will, but sensuality is the subject of sin inasmuch as it in some way shares in the will.
2. The act of sensuality is in our power in some fashion, not from the nature of sensuality, but in so far as the powers of sensuality are rational by participation.
3. The marks of our sins remain in our conscience, regardless of which faculty it may have been by which they were committed. Granted, then, that sensuality does not remain at all, in the sense explained above, the sin of sensuality can remain. The problem whether sensuality remains, however, is to be discussed elsewhere.”
4. Although it is not the function of sensuality considered in itself to act, it is its fundtion in so far as it in some measure participates in reason.
5. The reason why sin is said to be in sensuality is not the interpretative consent of reason. When the movement of sensuality precedes the judgment of reason, there is no consent either interpreted or expressed; but from the very fact that sensuality is able to be subjected to reason its act, even though it precedes reason, has the character of sin. It should, however, be borne in mind that, even though interpreted consent sometimes may suffice for sin, it does not have to suffice for merit. There are more requisites for good than for evil, since evil occurs from individual defects, whereas good depends upon a total situation not vitiated in any particular, as Dionysius says.
6. We can in fact avoid individual sins of sensuality, though not aH, as is clear from what was said in another question.
7. When a man approaches his wife from concupiscence there is venial sin, provided that he does not exceed the bounds of wedded life. It is accordingly clear that the very movement of concupiscence preceding reason in a married person is a venial sin. But when reason determines what one may licitly crave, then even though sensuality goes out to it, there will be no sin.
8. Moral virtue is in the powers of sensuality, the irascible and the concupiscible, as the Philosopher makes clear when he says that temperance and fortitude belong to the non-rational parts. But because sensuality designates these powers as having an inclination which is natural to sense but to something contrary to reason, and not as participating in reason, on this account vice is more properly said to be in sensuality, and virtue to be in the irascible and the concupiscible powers. The sin which is in sensuality, however, is not opposed to virtue as its contrary. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
9. Every sin is imputed to man inasmuch as he has a will; and yet sin is said to be in some sense in that power whose act ha ens to be deformed.
10. The material element in mortal sin can be taken in three ways: (1) In so far as the object is the matter of the act. In this sense the matter of mortal sin is sometimes in sensuality, as when a person consents to sensual pleasure. (2) In so far as the external act is called material with reference to the internal act, which is the formal element in mortal sin, since the external and the internal act constitute one sin. In this sense too the act of sensuality can be regarded as the material element in mortal sin. (3) In so far as the material element in mortal sin is the turning towards a changeable good as one’s end, whereas the formal element is the turning away from the unchangeable good. In this sense the material element in mortal sin cannot be in sensuality. Nor does it follow (for the reason given above) that, if mortal sin cannot be found there, then there is no venial sin there either.
11. Sin is said to be in sensuality, not as being imputed to that power, but as being committed through its act. Sin is rather imputed to the man inasmuch as that act is in his power.
12. The external members are merely moved, whereas the lower appetitive powers do the moving somewhat like the will. In so far, then, as they in some sense participate in the will, they can be the subject of sin.
13. Dispositions are of two kinds. There is one by which a patient is disposed to receive a form. Such a disposition is in the same subject as the form. There is another disposition by which an agent is disposed to act. Regarding this kind it is not true that it is in the same subject as the form for which it disposes. Venial sin, which is in sensuality, is this kind of disposition to mortal sin, which is in reason; for sensuality is like an agent in regard to mortal sin, since it inclines reason to sin.
14. Although the act of fornication is closer to the concupiscible power than to reason as regards the nature of the object, it is nonetheless closer to reason as regards the nature of command. The external members are applied to the act only by the command of reason. Mortal sin can accordingly be in them but not in the act of sensuality, which precedes the judgment of reason.
Q. 25: Sensuality
ARTICLE VI
In the sixth article we ask:
Is the concupiscible power more corrupt and infected than the irascible?
[Parallel readings: II Sent., 31, 2, 2; De malo, 4, ad 12; S.T., I-II, 83, 4.]
Difficulties
It seems that it is not, for
1. The corruption and infection of human nature comes from original sin. But original sin is in the essence of the soul as its subject, as some say, because the soul contracts it from its union with the body, to which it is joined by its essence. Since all the powers of the soul are equally close to its essence, being rooted in it, the infection and corruption does not seem to be any more in the concupiscible than in the irascible and other powers.
2. From the corruption of our nature there is in us a certain inclination to sin. But the sins of the irascible power are more serious than those of the concupiscible, because according to Gregory spiritual sins are more culpable than carnal sins. The irascible power is therefore more corrupt than the concupiscible.
3. Sudden movements of the soul occur in us because of the corruption of our nature. But the movements of the irascible power seem to be more sudden than those of the concupiscible. For the irascible is moved with a certain virility of spirit, whereas the concupiscible is moved with a certain effeminacy. The irascible is therefore more, corrupt than the concupiscible.
4. The sort of corruption and infection of which we are speaking is a corruption of nature handed on by generation. But the sins of the irascible power are “more natural” and are handed on from parents to children more than sins of the concupiscible, as the Philosopher says. The irascible is therefore more corrupt than the concupiscible.
5. Corruption in us comes from the sin of our first parent. But the first sin of our first parent was one of pride or self-exaltation, which is in the irascible power. Consequently the irascible power is more corrupt and infected in us than is the concupiscible.
To the Contrary
1. Where there is greater foulness there is greater corruption and infection. But according to the Philosopher a man unable to control his concupiscence is fouler than one unable to control his anger. Then the concupiscible power is more corrupt and infected than the irascible.
2. We are more corrupt where we resist with greater difficulty. But it is more difficult to fight against sensual pleasure, which pertains to the concupiscible power, than against anger, as the Philosopher makes clear. We are therefore more corrupt in the concupiscible power than in the irascible.
REPLY
The corruption and the infection of original sin differ in this respect, that infection refers to guilt, corruption to penalty.
Now original guilt is said to be in a power of the soul in two different ways: essentially and causally. Essentially it is either in the very essence of the soul or in the intellectual part, formerly the seat of original justice, which is taken away by original sin. Causally it is in the powers concerned in the act of human generation, by which original sin is handed on: the generative power, which carries it out, the concupiscible power, which commands it for the sake of pleasure, and the sense of touch, which perceives the pleasure. That infection is accordingly attributed to touch among the senses, to the concupiscible among the appetitive powers, and among the faculties of the soul in general to the generative power, which is said to be infected and corrupted.
The corruption of the soul of which we are speaking is to be viewed after the manner of bodily corruption. The latter comes about from the fact that, when the principle which holds the individual contrary parts together is removed, they tend to whatever agrees with them individually according to their own natures, and so the dissolution of the body takes place. So too since the loss of original justice, through which reason held the lower powers altogether subject to itself in the state of innocence, each of the lower powers tends to what is proper to it: the concupiscible to pleasure, the irascible to anger, and so on. The Philosopher accordingly compares these parts of the soul to palsied members of the body.
Now the corruption of the body is not said to be in the soul, whose withdrawal occasions the body’s dissolution, but rather in the body, which is dissolved. In the same way the corruption spoken of is in the sensitive powers inasmuch as they are deprived of the unifying control exercised by reason and go out in all directions; but it is not in reason itself except to the extent that it is deprived of its own proper perfection when separated from God. On this account the more one of the lower powers gets away from reason, the more corrupt it is; and consequently, since the irascible power is closer to reason as participating to some extent in reason in its own movement, as the Philosopher teacheS,.the irascible power will be less corrupt than the concupiscible.
Answers to Difficulties
1. Even though all the powers are rooted in the essence of the soul, some flow from that essence more immediately than the others and have a different relationship to the cause of original sin. The corruption and infection of original sin are accordingly not in all in the same way.
2. From the fact that the irascible power shares in the movement of reason more than the concupiscible it results that the sins of the irascible power are more serious but those of the concupiscible more shameful. The very discernment of reason increases the guilt, just as ignorance lessens it. But because the whole human dignity consists in reason, withdrawal from it entails shamefulness. It is accordingly clear from this that the concupiscible power is more corrupt as withdrawing farther from reason.
3. The movement of the irascible and of the concupiscible powers can be considered in two respects: in desiring and in executing. In desiring, the movement of the concupiscible power is more sudden than that of the irascible, because the irascible is moved by deliberating and comparing, as it were, the intended revenge with the insult
received, as if syllogizing, as is said in the Ethics. But the concupiscible power is moved to enjoyment upon the mere apprehension of the pleasurable object, as is said in the same place. But in executing, the movement of the irascible is more sudden than that of the concupiscible, because the irascible power acts with a certain courage and confidence, whereas the concupiscible with a certain pusillanimity tends to the attainment of its purposes by wiles. The Philosopher accordingly says that “the wrathful man does not lay snares but works out in the open, whereas concupiscence lays snares.” And he alludes to the verse of Homer who said that Venus is guileful and her seducing girdle is cunningly adorned, thereby conveying the deception by which Venus snatches away the understanding even of a very wise man.
4. Something is said to be natural in either of two senses: from the point of view of the nature of the species or from that of the nature of the individual. From the point of view of the nature of the species sins of the concupiscible power are more natural than those of the irascible. Thus the Philosopher says that sensual pleasure “grows up with all of us from our infancy,” as if it were contemporary with life. But from the point of view of the nature of the individual the sins of the irascible power are more natural.
The reason for this is that, if the motion of the sensible appetite is viewed from the standpoint of the soul, the concupiscible power tends more naturally to its object as being more natural and better suited to it in itself; for this power is concerned with food and drink and other things of the sort by which nature is preserved. But if this sort of motion is viewed from the standpoint of the body, a greater alteration and commotion of the body is brought about by the motion of anger than by that of concupiscence, commonly and proportionately speaking.
For this reason the bodily make-up, in which children are for the most part like their parents, has more influence in the control of anger than in that of concupiscence. Consequently children imitate their parents more in sins of anger than in those of concupiscence. For what depends upon the soul relates to the species, but what depends upon a definite make-up of the body relates more to the individual. Original sin, however, is a sin of the whole of human nature. Hence it is clear that the argument proves nothing.
5. Corruption occurs in us in an order the inverse of that in Adam, because in Adam the soul corrupts the body, and the person the nature, whereas in us it is the other way about. Consequently, although the sin of Adam belonged first to the irascible power, yet in us corruption belongs more to the concupiscible.
Q. 25: Sensuality
ARTICLE VII
In the seventh article we ask:
Can sensuality be cured in this life of the aforesaid corruption?
[Parallel readings: S.T., I-II, 74, 3 ad 2.]
Difficulties
It seems that it can, for
1. The aforesaid corruption is called the “fuel of sin.” But it is said of the Blessed Virgin that even in this life she was entirely freed from the fuel of sin, especially after the conception of the Son of God. Sensuality is therefore curable in this life.
2. Whatever obeys reason is susceptible of the rectitude of reason. But the powers of sensuality, the irascible and the concupiscible, obey reason, as was made clear above. Sensuality is therefore susceptible of the rectitude of reason, and so can be cured of the contrary corruption.
3. Virtue is opposed to sin. But there can be virtue in sensuality; for, as the Philosopher says, temperance and fortitude belong to the non-rational parts of the soul. Sensuality can therefore be cured in this life of the corruption of sin.
4. It is a part of the corruption of sensuality that there proceed from it inordinate movements of depraved concupiscence. But “the temperate man does not have movements of concupiscence of this sort” and consequently differs in this respect from the continent mail, who has them but does not follow them, as is explained in the Ethics. Sensuality can therefore be entirely cured in this life.
5. If this corruption is incurable, the reason is to be found either in the physician, or in the medicine, or in the sickness, or in the nature to be healed. Now it is not to be found in the physician, that is, God, because He is omnipotent; nor in the medicine, because, as the Epistle to the Romans (5:15) makes clear, Christ’s gift is more potent than Adam’s sin by which this corruption was brought on; nor in the sickness, because it is against nature, since it was not in nature as instituted; nor in the nature to be healed, for it would be useful to have this infirmity removed, since because of it man is prone to evil and sluggish in good. Sensuality is therefore curable in this life.
To the Contrary
1. The necessity of sinning, at least venially, is a consequence of the necessity of dying. But in this life the necessity of dying is not taken away. Then neither is the necessity of sinning, and therefore neither is the corruption of sensuality from which the said necessity comes.
2. If sensuality were curable in this life, it would be cured particularly through the sacraments of the Church, which are spiritual medicines. But it still remains even after the reception of the sacraments, as is evident from experience. Sensuality is therefore not curable in this life.
REPLY
Sensuality cannot be cured in this life except by a miracle. The reason for this is that what is natural cannot be changed except by a supernatural power. But the sort of corruption by which the parts of the soul are said to be corrupt, in some sense follows the inclination of nature.
The gift bestowed upon man in his first state, as a result of which reason kept the lower powers entirely in check, and the soul kept in check the body, was not from the efficacy of any natural principles but from the efficacy of original justice, which was given by divine liberality over and above them. When this justice was removed by sin, man returned to a state which befitted him according to his own natural principles. Dionysius accordingly says that by sin human nature “was deservedly brought to an end befitting its beginning.”
Just as man naturally dies and cannot be restored to immortality except miraculously, in the same way the concupiscible power naturally tends to what is pleasurable and the irascible to what is arduous, even outside the order of reason. As a consequence it is not possible for that corruption to be removed unless a supernatural power miraculously brings it about.
Answers to Difficulties
1. The Blessed Virgin was freed from the fuel of sin miraculously.
2. The irascible and the concupiscible powers obey reason inasmuch as their motions are either ordered or restrained by reason, but not so that their inclination is entirely taken away.
3. The virtue which is in the irascible and the concupiscible powers is not opposed to the aforesaid corruption as its contrary. Consequently it is not entirely removed. It is, however, contrarily opposed to any excess in the inclination of the said powers toward their objects; and this is removed by the virtue.
4. In the explanation of the Philosopher, the temperate man is not altogether without any movements of concupiscence but without vigorous movements, such as can be in the continent man.
5. The reason why sensuality is not cured in this life is to be found in all four of the factors proposed. For God Himself, though able to cure it, has nevertheless appointed according to the order of His wisdom that it should not be cured in this life. In like manner the gift of grace which has been conferred upon us by Christ, though more efficacious than the sin of the first man, is not ordained to the removal of the corruption in question, which is one of our nature, but to the removal of the guilt of the person. In like manner too, although this corruption is against the state of nature as originally instituted, it is nevertheless a consequence of the principles of nature left to itself; and it is also useful for man in order to avoid the vice of self-exaltation that the infirmity of sensuality remain: “And lest the greatness of the revelations should exalt me, there was given me a sting of my flesh” (2 Cor. 12: 7). Consequently this infirmity remains in man after baptism, just as a wise physician discharges a patient without having cured his illness if it could not be cured without the danger of a more serious illness.