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Question: 54 [<< | >>]
After considering what belongs to the angel's substance, we now proceed
to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold. In the first place
inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge: secondly, into his
medium of knowledge: thirdly, into the objects known: and fourthly, into
the manner whereby he knows them.
Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Is the angel's understanding his substance?
(2) Is his being his understanding?
(3) Is his substance his power of intelligence?
(4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect?
(5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the intellect?
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Question: 54 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is his
substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active
intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect is its own
action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and from his
Commentator [*Averroes, A.D. 1126-1198]. Therefore much more is the
angel's substance his action---that is, his act of understanding.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text 39) that "the action of the intellect is life." But "since in living things to live is to be," as he says (De Anima ii, text 37), it seems that life is essence. Therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of an angel who understands.
Objection 3: Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not differ
from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the middle is.
But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same, at
least in so far as he understands his own essence. Therefore the act of
understanding, which is between the intellect and the thing understood,
is one with the substance of the angel who understands.
On the contrary, The action of anything differs more from its substance
than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its substance,
for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was said above
(Question [3], Article [4]). Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any other
creature, is its substance.
I answer that, It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any
creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the
actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance
or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure
act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own
actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is
pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as His existence
and His action.
Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it would
be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of
intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists.
Consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from
God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in
itself, nor from the substance of another angel.
Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then
be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes
about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding.
Reply to Objection 1: When the active intellect is said to be its own action,
such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since its
very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in itself, action
accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive intellect, for this
has no actions until after it has been reduced to act.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation between "life" and "to live" is not the same
as that between "essence" and "to be"; but rather as that between "a
race" and "to run," one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and
the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if "to live" is "to
be," that "life" is "essence." Although life is sometimes put for the
essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x), "Memory and understanding and
will are one essence, one life": yet it is not taken in this sense by the
Philosopher, when he says that "the act of the intellect is life."
Reply to Objection 3: The action which is transient, passing to some extrinsic
object, is really a medium between the agent and the subject receiving
the action. The action which remains within the agent, is not really a
medium between the agent and the object, but only according to the manner
of expression; for it really follows the union of the object with the
agent. For the act of understanding is brought about by the union of the
object understood with the one who understands it, as an effect which
differs from both.
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Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist. For in
living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii,
text. 37). But to "understand is in a sense to live" (De Anima ii, text.
37). Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.
Objection 2: Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect to
effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the form by
which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel to
understand is to exist.
On the contrary, The angel's act of understanding is his movement, as is
clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not movement.
Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.
I answer that, The action of the angel, as also the action of any
creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text. 16),
there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to something
beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting; and another
which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the agent, as to
feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing outside is changed,
but the whole action takes place within the agent. It is quite clear
regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be the agent's very
existence: because the agent's existence is signified as within him,
while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the
thing done. But the second action of its own nature has infinity, either
simple or relative. As an example of simple infinity, we have the act "to
understand," of which the object is "the true"; and the act "to will," of
which the object is "the good"; each of which is convertible with being;
and so, to understand and to will, of themselves, bear relation to all
things, and each receives its species from its object. But the act of
sensation is relatively infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible
things; as sight does to all things visible. Now the being of every
creature is restricted to one in genus and species; God's being alone is
simply infinite, comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. v). Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of
understanding and its own act of will.
Reply to Objection 1: Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living
subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one whereby
something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher says that to
understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he distinguishes the
various grades of living things according to the various functions of
life.
Reply to Objection 2: The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire
existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding, since he
cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently in its own
specific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the existence of
the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is compared as included
in the idea of a more universal object, namely, truth and being. Thus it
is evident, that, although the form is the same, yet it is not the
principle of existence and of understanding according to the same
formality. On this account it does not follow that in the angel "to be"
is the same as 'to understand.'
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Question: 54 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of
understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and
"intellect" express the power of understanding. But in many passages of
his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and "minds." Therefore
the angel is his own power of intelligence.
Objection 2: Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything besides
his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which is besides
the essence of anything, we call it accident. But "a simple form cannot
be a subject," as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an angel would not
be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been previously said
(Question [50], Article [2]).
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the angelic
nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made primary matter "nigh unto
nothing"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature
than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter is its
own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of intelligence.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the angels are
divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore substance,
power, and operation, are all distinct in them.
I answer that, Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or
operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident thus.
Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the diversity
of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account it is said
that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in every creature
the essence differs from the existence, and is compared to it as
potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been already said
(Question [44], Article [1]). Now the act to which the operative power is compared is
operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist,
nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as
his existence. Hence the angel's essence is not his power of
intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation.
Reply to Objection 1: An angel is called "intellect" and "mind," because all his
knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is partly
intellectual and partly sensitive.
Reply to Objection 2: A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of
accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality is to
act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking there.
But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is compared to it
as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of accident; and especially
of such accident as follows the species: for such accident belongs to the
form---whereas an accident which belongs to the individual, and which
does not belong to the whole species, results from the matter, which is
the principle of individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to
substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards
accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.
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Question: 54 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that there is both an active and a passive
intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17)
that, "in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby
it can become all things, and there is something whereby it can make all
things." But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an active
and a passive intellect in an angel.
Objection 2: Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is to
receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active
intellect, as is made clear in De Anima iii, text. 2,3,18. But an angel
receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one.
Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect.
On the contrary, The distinction of active and passive intellect in us
is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive
intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as colors
to the light, as is clear from De Anima iii, text. 18. But this is not so
in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in the
angel.
I answer that, The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is
derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potentiality,
and not actually. Hence there must exist some power, which, previous to
the act of understanding, is in potentiality to intelligible things, but
which becomes actuated in their regard when it apprehends them, and
still more when it reflects upon them. This is the power which is
denominated the passive intellect. The necessity for admitting an active
intellect is due to this---that the natures of the material things which
we understand do not exist outside the soul, as immaterial and actually
intelligible, but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they
are outside the soul. Consequently it is necessary that there should be
some power capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible: and
this power in us is called the active intellect.
But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are
neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to such
things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their intelligible in
potentiality, but they are actually such; for they first and principally
understand immaterial things, as will appear later (Question [84], Article [7]; Question [85], Article [1]). Therefore there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in
them, except equivocally.
Reply to Objection 1: As the words themselves show, the Philosopher understands
those two things to be in every nature in which there chances to be
generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels,
but is present naturally. Hence there is not need for admitting an active
and a passive intellect in them.
Reply to Objection 2: It is the function of the active intellect to enlighten,
not another intellect, but things which are intelligible in potentiality,
in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually intelligible. It
belongs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality with regard to
things which are naturally capable of being known, and sometimes to
apprehend them actually. Hence for one angel to enlighten another does
not belong to the notion of an active intellect: neither does it belong
to the passive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard to
supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which he is sometimes in
potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call these by the names of active
and passive intellect, he will then be speaking equivocally; and it is
not about names that we need trouble.
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Question: 54 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not exclusively
intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii) that in the angels
there is "life which understands and feels." Therefore there is a
sensitive faculty in them as well.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the angels have learnt
many things by experience. But experience comes of many remembrances, as
stated in Metaph. i, 1. Consequently they have likewise a power of memory.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that there is a sort of
"perverted phantasy" in the demons. But phantasy belongs to the
imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the imagination is in the
demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are of
the same nature.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that "man senses in
common with the brutes, and understands with the angels."
I answer that, In our soul there are certain powers whose operations are
exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts of
the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are some
other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed through
bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of any parts of
the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to them, as is
manifest from what has been said already (Question [51], Article [1]). Hence of the
soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to them.
The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the
separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it is in
keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual
creature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul. For
this reason the angels are called "intellects" and "minds," as was said
above (Article [3], ad 1).
A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First, it
may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the
opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies
naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this opinion in
his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence he says (De Civ.
Dei xxi) that "such an inquiry does not call for much labor." Secondly,
it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be understood by
way of similitude. Because, since sense has a sure apprehension of its
proper sensible object, it is a common usage of speech, when he
understands something for certain, to say that we "sense it." And hence
it is that we use the word "sentence." Experience can be attributed to
the angels according to the likeness of the things known, although not by
likeness of the faculty knowing them. We have experience when we know
single objects through the senses: the angels likewise know single
objects, as we shall show (Question [57], Article [2]), yet not through the senses. But
memory can be allowed in the angels, according as Augustine (De Trin. x)
puts it in the mind; although it cannot belong to them in so far as it is
a part of the sensitive soul. In like fashion 'a perverted phantasy' is
attributed to demons, since they have a false practical estimate of what
is the true good; while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy,
whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as to the things
themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics.