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In the next place we must consider how angels became evil: first of all
with regard to the evil of fault; and secondly, as to the evil of
punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for
consideration:
(1) Can there be evil of fault in the angels?
(2) What kind of sins can be in them?
(3) What did the angel seek in sinning?
(4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing, are
any of them naturally evil?
(5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil in
the first instant of his creation by an act of his own will?
(6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his
creation and fall?
(7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among the
angels?
(8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others sinning?
(9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast?
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Question: 63 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the angels.
For there can be no evil except in things which are in potentiality, as
is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19), because the subject of
privation is a being in potentiality. But the angels have not being in
potentiality, since they are subsisting forms. Therefore there can be no
evil in them.
Objection 2: Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies. But
philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies.
Therefore neither can there by in the angels.
Objection 3: Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But it is
natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love towards God.
Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in loving God
they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.
Objection 4: Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently good. Now
for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a true good;
because in them either there can be no error at all, or at least not
before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what it truly good.
But no one sins by desiring what is truly good. Consequently the angel
does not sin by desire.
On the contrary, It is said (Job 4:18): "In His angels He found
wickedness."
I answer that, An angel or any other rational creature considered in his
own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to sin, such
creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the condition of nature.
The reason of this is, because sinning is nothing else than a deviation
from that rectitude which an act ought to have; whether we speak of sin
in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, the rule of which is the very
virtue of the agent, can never fall short of rectitude. Were the
craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving, he could not engrave the wood
otherwise than rightly; but if the rightness of engraving be judged by
another rule, then the engraving may be right or faulty. Now the Divine
will is the sole rule of God's act, because it is not referred to any
higher end. But every created will has rectitude of act so far only as it
is regulated according to the Divine will, to which the last end is to be
referred: as every desire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by the
will of his superior; for instance, the soldier's will, according to the
will of his commanding officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be
no sin; whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature;
considering the condition of its nature.
Reply to Objection 1: In the angels there is no potentiality to natural
existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as
regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this respect
there can be evil in them.
Reply to Objection 2: The heavenly bodies have none but a natural operation.
Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their nature; so
neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action. But
besides their natural action there is the action of free-will in the
angels, by reason of which evil may be in them.
Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the movement
of love, according as God is the principle of his natural being. But for
him to turn to God as the object of supernatural beatitude, comes of
infused love, from which he could be turned away by sinning.
Reply to Objection 4: Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-will.
First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by choosing adultery,
which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance or error;
otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. The adulterer errs
in the particular, choosing this delight of an inordinate act as
something good to be performed now, from the inclination of passion or of
habit; even though he does not err in his universal judgment, but retains
a right opinion in this respect. In this way there can be no sin in the
angel; because there are no passions in the angels to fetter reason or
intellect, as is manifest from what has been said above (Question [59], Article [4]);
nor, again, could any habit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In
another way sin comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself,
but not according to proper measure or rule; so that the defect which
induces sin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly
regulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen; as if one were to
pray, without heeding the order established by the Church. Such a sin
does not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration of the
things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel sinned, by
seeking his own good, from his own free-will, insubordinately to the rule
of the Divine will.
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Question: 63 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be other sins in the angels besides
those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can delight in any kind of
sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even in the
obscenities of carnal sins; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3).
Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons.
Objection 2: Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are sloth,
avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the spirit,
just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can there be
pride and envy in the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice.
Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), many vices spring
from pride; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause is granted,
the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and envy in the
angels, for the same reason there can likewise be other vices in them.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3) that the devil "is
not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort; yet he is
proud and envious."
I answer that, Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: first of all by
actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are in the
demons; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of all sins. But
as to affection only those sins can be in the demons which can belong to
a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot be affected by such
pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only by such as are in keeping with
spiritual things; because nothing is affected except with regard to
something which is in some way suited to its nature. But there can be no
sin when anyone is incited to good of the spiritual order; unless in such
affection the rule of the superior be not kept. Such is precisely the sin
of pride---not to be subject to a superior when subjection is due.
Consequently the first sin of the angel can be none other than pride.
Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them,
since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something involves on its
part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines over
the good possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his neighbor's good
to be a hindrance to his own. But another's good could not be deemed a
hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked angel, except inasmuch as he
coveted a singular excellence, which would cease to be singular because
of the excellence of some other. So, after the sin of pride, there
followed the evil of envy in the sinning angel, whereby he grieved over
man's good, and also over the Divine excellence, according as against the
devil's will God makes use of man for the Divine glory.
Reply to Objection 1: The demons do not delight in the obscenities of the sins of
the flesh, as if they themselves were disposed to carnal pleasures: it is
wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all sorts of human sins,
so far as these are hindrances to a man's good.
Reply to Objection 2: Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is the
immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human
life, and which can be estimated in value of money; to these demons are
not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal pleasures.
Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them. But if every
immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed avarice, in
this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in the demons.
Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence; consequently they can
only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth is a kind of sadness,
whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual exercises because they weary
the body; which does not apply to the demons. So it is evident that pride
and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in demons; yet so
that envy is not to be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the
good of another.
Reply to Objection 3: Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are comprised
all other sins derived from them.
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Question: 63 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as God. For
what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under desire;
because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite, whether
sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists only in such
desire. But for any creature to be God's equal does not fall under
apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for it the finite
equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite. Therefore an angel
could not desire to be as God.
Objection 2: Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin. But
to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature naturally
tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not by equality,
but by likeness, it would seem that he did not thereby sin.
Objection 3: Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of wisdom
than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being the equal
of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only things which
are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation. Therefore much less
did the angel sin by desiring to be as God.
On the contrary, It is said, in the person of the devil (Is. 14:13,14),
"I will ascend into heaven . . . I will be like the Most High." And
Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) says that being "inflated with pride,
he wished to be called God."
I answer that, Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God.
But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality; secondly, by
likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first way; because by
natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible: and there was no
habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his mind,
so as to lead him to choose what was impossible by failing in some
particular; as sometimes happens in ourselves. And even supposing it were
possible, it would be against the natural desire; because there exists in
everything the natural desire of preserving its own nature; which would
not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently,
no creature of a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature;
just as an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were it to be so
upraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays
us false; for one is liable to think that, because a man seeks to occupy
a higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the
destruction of the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of nature, to
which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it is quite
evident that God surpasses the angels, not merely in accidentals, but
also in degree of nature; and one angel, another. Consequently it is
impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire equality with a
higher; and still more to covet equality with God.
To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways. In
one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be likened
unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits
no sin; provided that he desires such likeness in proper order, that is
to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin were he to desire
to be like unto God even in the right way, as of his own, and not of
God's power. In another way one may desire to be like unto God in some
respect which is not natural to one; as if one were to desire to create
heaven and earth, which is proper to God; in which desire there would be
sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be as God. Not that he
desired to resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely; for
so he would be desiring his own 'not-being'; since no creature can exist
except by holding its existence under God. But he desired resemblance
with God in this respect---by desiring, as his last end of beatitude,
something which he could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning
his appetite away from supernatural beatitude, which is attained by God's
grace. Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is
bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of his own nature;
and not from Divine assistance according to God's ordering. This
harmonizes with Anselm's opinion, who says [*De casu diaboli, iv.] that
"he sought that to which he would have come had he stood fast." These two
views in a manner coincide; because according to both, he sought to have
final beatitude of his own power, whereas this is proper to God alone.
Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of
another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have dominion
over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be like unto God.
From this we have the answer to all the objections.
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Question: 63 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For Porphyry
says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): "There is a class of
demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and the souls of
the dead." But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some demons are
naturally wicked.
Objection 2: Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men. But some
men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said (Ws. 12:10): "Their malice
is natural." Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked.
Objection 3: Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions by
nature: thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally rapacious;
yet they are God's creatures. Therefore, although the demons are God's
creatures, they may be naturally wicked.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the demons are not
naturally wicked."
I answer that, Everything which exists, so far as it exists and has a
particular nature, tends naturally towards some good; since it comes from
a good principle; because the effect always reverts to its principle. Now
a particular good may happen to have some evil connected with it; thus
fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes other things: but
with the universal good no evil can be connected. If, then, there be
anything whose nature is inclined towards some particular good, it can
tend naturally to some evil; not as evil, but accidentally, as connected
with some good. But if anything of its nature be inclined to good in
general, then of its own nature it cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is
manifest that every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in
general, which it can apprehend and which is the object of the will.
Hence, since the demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise
have a natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever; consequently they
cannot be naturally evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons are
naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not naturally so,
but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held that they are
naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons are animals with a
sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is inclined towards some
particular good, with which evil may be connected. In this way, then, it
can have a natural inclination to evil; yet only accidentally, inasmuch
as evil is connected with good.
Reply to Objection 2: The malice of some men can be called natural, either
because of custom which is a second nature; or on account of the natural
proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate
passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful or lustful; but
not on the part of the intellectual nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their sensitive
nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain evils are
connected; thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural inclination to
do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit. Wherefore it is not evil
in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to him; as it is not evil in
the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes (De Div. Nom. iv).
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Question: 63 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of his own
will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said of the devil
(Jn. 8:44): "He was a murderer from the beginning."
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), the lack of
form in the creature did not precede its formation in order of time, but
merely in order of nature. Now according to him (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8), the
"heaven," which is said to have been created in the beginning, signifies
the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed: and when it is said
that God said: "Be light made: and light was made," we are to understand
the full formation of the angel by turning to the Word. Consequently, the
nature of the angel was created, and light was made, in the one instant.
But at the same moment that light was made, it was made distinct from
"darkness," whereby the angels who sinned are denoted. Therefore in the
first instant of their creation some of the angels were made blessed, and
some sinned.
Objection 3: Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual nature
can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul of Christ, or
also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could sin in the
first instant of their creation.
Objection 4: Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than the corporeal
nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation in the first
instant of its creation; as fire begins to move upwards in the first
instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also have his operation
in the first instant of his creation. Now this operation was either
ordinate or inordinate. It ordinate, then, since he had grace, he thereby
merited beatitude. But with the angels the reward follows immediately
upon merit; as was said above (Question [62], Article [5]). Consequently they would have
become blessed at once; and so would never have sinned, which is false.
It remains, then, that they sinned by inordinate action in their first
instant.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:31): "God saw all the things that
He had made, and they were very good." But among them were also the
demons. Therefore the demons were at some time good.
I answer that, Some have maintained that the demons were wicked
straightway in the first instant of their creation; not by their nature,
but by the sin of their own will; because, as soon as he was made, the
devil refused righteousness. To this opinion, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree with those Manichean
heretics who say that the devil's nature is evil of itself. Since this
opinion, however, is in contradiction with the authority of
Scripture---for it is said of the devil under the figure of the prince of
Babylon (Is. 14:12): "How art thou fallen . . . O Lucifer, who didst rise
in the morning!" and it is said to the devil in the person of the King of
Tyre (Ezech. 28:13): "Thou wast in the pleasures of the paradise of God,"
---consequently, this opinion was reasonably rejected by the masters as
erroneous.
Hence others have said that the angels, in the first instant of their
creation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet this view also is
repudiated by some, because, when two operations follow one upon the
other, it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the one
instant. Now it is clear that the angel's sin was an act subsequent to
his creation. But the term of the creative act is the angel's very being,
while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked. It seems, then, an
impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first instant of
his existence.
This argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds good only in such
movements as are measured by time, and take place successively; thus, if
local movement follows a change, then the change and the local movement
cannot be terminated in the same instant. But if the changes are
instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant there can be a
term to the first and the second change; thus in the same instant in
which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere is lit up by the
moon. Now, it is manifest that creation is instantaneous; so also is the
movement of free-will in the angels; for, as has been already stated,
they have no occasion for comparison or discursive reasoning (Question [58], Article [3]). Consequently, there is nothing to hinder the term of creation and of
free-will from existing in the same instant.
We must therefore reply that, on the contrary, it was impossible for the
angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate act of free-will. For
although a thing can begin to act in the first instant of its existence,
nevertheless, that operation which begins with the existence comes of the
agent from which it drew its nature; just as upward movement in fire
comes of its productive cause. Therefore, if there be anything which
derives its nature from a defective cause, which can be the cause of a
defective action, it can in the first instant of its existence have a
defective operation; just as the leg, which is defective from birth,
through a defect in the principle of generation, begins at once to limp.
But the agent which brought the angels into existence, namely, God,
cannot be the cause of sin. Consequently it cannot be said that the devil
was wicked in the first instant of his creation.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), when it is stated
that "the devil sins from the beginning," "he is not to be thought of as
sinning from the beginning wherein he was created, but from the beginning
of sin": that is to say, because he never went back from his sin.
Reply to Objection 2: That distinction of light and darkness, whereby the sins of
the demons are understood by the term darkness, must be taken as
according to God's foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi,
15), that "He alone could discern light and darkness, Who also could
foreknow, before they fell, those who would fall."
Reply to Objection 3: All that is in merit is from God; and consequently an angel
could merit in the first instant of his creation. The same reason does
not hold good of sin; as has been said.
Reply to Objection 4: God did not distinguish between the angels before the
turning away of some of them, and the turning of others to Himself, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15). Therefore, as all were created in
grace, all merited in their first instant. But some of them at once
placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby destroying their
preceding merit; and consequently they were deprived of the beatitude
which they had merited.
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Question: 63 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that there was some interval between the angel's
creation and his fall. For, it is said (Ezech. 28:15): "Thou didst walk
perfect [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast walked in the midst of the stones of fire;
thou wast perfect . . .'] in thy ways from the day of thy creation until
iniquity was found in thee." But since walking is continuous movement, it
requires an interval. Therefore there was some interval between the
devil's creation and his fall.
Objection 2: Further, Origen says (Hom. i in Ezech.) that "the serpent of old
did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly"; which refers to
his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin at once after the first instant
of his creation.
Objection 3: Further, capability of sinning is common alike to man and angel.
But there was some delay between man's formation and his sin. Therefore,
for the like reason there was some interval between the devil's formation
and his sin.
Objection 4: Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was distinct from
the instant wherein he was created. But there is a middle time between
every two instants. Therefore there was an interval between his creation
and his fall.
On the contrary, It is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44): "He stood not in
the truth": and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), "we must
understand this in the sense, that he was in the truth, but did not
remain in it."
I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point. But the more
probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings of the
Saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first instant of his
creation. This must be maintained if it be held that he elicited an act
of free-will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was
created in grace; as we have said (Question [62], Article [3]). For since the angels
attain beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said above (Question [62], Article [5]),
if the devil, created in grace, merited in the first instant, he would at
once have received beatitude after that first instant, if he had not
placed an impediment by sinning.
If, however, it be contended that the angel was not created in grace, or
that he could not elicit an act of free-will in the first instant, then
there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed between his
creation and fall.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes in Holy Scripture spiritual instantaneous
movements are represented by corporeal movements which are measured by
time. In this way by "walking" we are to understand the movement of
free-will tending towards good.
Reply to Objection 2: Origen says, "The serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly," because of the first instant in which he was not wicked.
Reply to Objection 3: An angel has an inflexible free-will after once choosing;
consequently, if after the first instant, in which he had a natural
movement to good, he had not at once placed a barrier to beatitude, he
would have been confirmed in good. It is not so with man; and therefore
the argument does not hold good.
Reply to Objection 4: It is true to say that there is a middle time between every
two instants, so far as time is continuous, as it is proved Phys. vi,
text. 2. But in the angels, who are not subject to the heavenly movement,
which is primarily measured by continuous time, time is taken to mean the
succession of their mental acts, or of their affections. So the first
instant in the angels is understood to respond to the operation of the
angelic mind, whereby it introspects itself by its evening knowledge
because on the first day evening is mentioned, but not morning. This
operation was good in them all. From such operation some of them were
converted to the praise of the Word by their morning knowledge while
others, absorbed in themselves, became night, "swelling up with pride,"
as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24). Hence the first act was common
to them all; but in their second they were separated. Consequently they
were all of them good in the first instant; but in the second the good
were set apart from the wicked.
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Question: 63 [<< | >>]
Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the highest among the angels who sinned was
not the highest of all. For it is stated (Ezech. 28:14): "Thou wast a
cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain
of God." Now the order of the Cherubim is under the order of the
Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii). Therefore, the highest
angel among those who sinned was not the highest of all.
Objection 2: Further, God made intellectual nature in order that it might
attain to beatitude. If therefore the highest of the angels sinned, it
follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated in the noblest creature
which is unfitting.
Objection 3: Further, the more a subject is inclined towards anything, so much
the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel is, so much
the more is he inclined towards God. Therefore so much the less can he
turn away from God by sinning. And so it seems that the angel who sinned
was not the highest of all, but one of the lower angels.
On the contrary, Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.) says that the chief angel
who sinned, "being set over all the hosts of angels, surpassed them in
brightness, and was by comparison the most illustrious among them."
I answer that, Two things have to be considered in sin, namely, the
proneness to sin, and the motive for sinning. If, then, in the angels we
consider the proneness to sin, it seems that the higher angels were less
likely to sin than the lower. On this account Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set over the
terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the view of the
Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Dei vii, 6,7; x, 9,10,11).
For they said that all the gods were good; whereas some of the demons
were good, and some bad; naming as 'gods' the intellectual substances
which are above the lunar sphere, and calling by the name of "demons" the
intellectual substances which are beneath it, yet higher than men in the
order of nature. Nor is this opinion to be rejected as contrary to faith;
because the whole corporeal creation is governed by God through the
angels, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5). Consequently there is
nothing to prevent us from saying that the lower angels were divinely set
aside for presiding over the lower bodies, the higher over the higher
bodies; and the highest to stand before God. And in this sense Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii) that they who fell were of the lower grade of
angels; yet in that order some of them remained good.
But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find that it existed in
the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as has been said (Article [2]),
the demons' sin was pride; and the motive of pride is excellence, which
was greater in the higher spirits. Hence Gregory says that he who sinned
was the very highest of all. This seems to be the more probable view:
because the angels' sin did not come of any proneness, but of free choice
alone. Consequently that argument seems to have the more weight which is
drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet this must not be prejudicial to the
other view; because there might be some motive for sinning in him also
who was the chief of the lower angels.
Reply to Objection 1: Cherubim is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," while
"Seraphim" means "those who are on fire," or "who set on fire."
Consequently Cherubim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible with
mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of charity, which is
incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who sinned is
called, not a Seraph, but a Cherub.
Reply to Objection 2: The Divine intention is not frustrated either in those who
sin, or in those who are saved; for God knows beforehand the end of both;
and He procures glory from both, saving these of His goodness, and
punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual creature, when it
sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this unfitting in any exalted
creature; because the intellectual creature was so made by God, that it
lies within its own will to act for its end.
Reply to Objection 3: However great was the inclination towards good in the
highest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him: consequently it
was in his power not to follow it.
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First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 63 [<< | >>]
Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not the cause
of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the effect. But, as
Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at one time.
Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others' sinning.
Objection 2: Further, an angel's first sin can only be pride, as was shown
above (Article [2]). But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more contrary to
excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than to a superior;
and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by desiring to be
subject to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the sin of one angel
would have been the cause of the others sinning, if he had induced them
to be his subjects. Therefore it does not appear that the sin of the
highest angel was the cause of the others sinning.
Objection 3: Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to another
against God, than to wish to be over another against God; because there
is less motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of the foremost angel
was the cause of the others sinning, in that he induced them to subject
themselves to him, then the lower angels would have sinned more deeply
than the highest one; which is contrary to a gloss on Ps. 103:26: "This
dragon which Thou hast formed---He who was the more excellent than the
rest in nature, became the greater in malice." Therefore the sin of the
highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning.
On the contrary, It is said (Apoc. 12:4) that the dragon "drew" with him
"the third part of the stars of heaven."
I answer that, The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others
sinning; not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind of
exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons are
subjects of that highest one; as is evident from our Lord's words: "Go
[Vulg. 'Depart from Me'], you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was
prepared for the devil and his angels" (Mt. 25:41). For the order of
Divine justice exacts that whosoever consents to another's evil
suggestion, shall be subjected to him in his punishment; according to (2
Pt. 2:19): "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave."
Reply to Objection 1: Although the demons all sinned in the one instant, yet the sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning. For the angel needs no delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as man, who requires deliberation in order to choose and consent, and vocal speech in order to exhort; both of which are the work of time. And it is evident that even man begins to speak in the very instant when he takes thought; and in the last instant of speech, another who catches his meaning can assent to what is said; as is especially evident with regard to primary concepts, "which everyone accepts directly they are heard" [*Boethius, De Hebdom.].
Taking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is
required in us; in the same instant in which the highest angel expressed
his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for the others to
consent thereto.
Reply to Objection 2: Other things being equal, the proud would rather be subject
to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to be subject to
an inferior than to a superior, if he can procure an advantage under an
inferior which he cannot under a superior. Consequently it was not
against the demons' pride for them to wish to serve an inferior by
yielding to his rule; for they wanted to have him as their prince and
leader, so that they might attain their ultimate beatitude of their own
natural powers; especially because in the order of nature they were even
then subject to the highest angel.
Reply to Objection 3: As was observed above (Question [62], Article [6]), an angel has nothing
in him to retard his action, and with his whole might he is moved to
whatsoever he is moved, be it good or bad. Consequently since the highest
angel had greater natural energy than the lower angels, he fell into sin
with intenser energy, and therefore he became the greater in malice.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 63 [<< | >>]
Article: 9 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that more angels sinned than stood firm. For, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Evil is in many, but good is in
few."
Objection 2: Further, justice and sin are to be found in the same way in men
and in angels. But there are more wicked men to be found than good;
according to Eccles. 1:15: "The number of fools is infinite." Therefore
for the same reason it is so with the angels.
Objection 3: Further, the angels are distinguished according to persons and
orders. Therefore if more angelic persons stood firm, it would appear
that those who sinned were not from all the orders.
On the contrary, It is said (4 Kgs. 6:16): "There are more with us than
with them": which is expounded of the good angels who are with us to aid
us, and the wicked spirits who are our foes.
I answer that, More angels stood firm than sinned. Because sin is
contrary to the natural inclination; while that which is against the
natural order happens with less frequency; for nature procures its
effects either always, or more often than not.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking with regard to men, in whom
evil comes to pass from seeking after sensible pleasures, which are known
to most men, and from forsaking the good dictated by reason, which good
is known to the few. In the angels there is only an intellectual nature;
hence the argument does not hold.
And from this we have the answer to the second difficulty.
Reply to Objection 3: According to those who hold that the chief devil belonged
to the lower order of the angels, who are set over earthly affairs, it is
evident that some of every order did not fall, but only those of the
lowest order. According to those who maintain that the chief devil was of
the highest order, it is probable that some fell of every order; just as
men are taken up into every order to supply for the angelic ruin. In this
view the liberty of free-will is more established; which in every degree
of creature can be turned to evil. In the Sacred Scripture, however, the
names of some orders, as of Seraphim and Thrones, are not attributed to
demons; since they are derived from the ardor of love and from God's
indwelling, which are not consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names of
Cherubim, Powers, and Principalities are attributed to them; because
these names are derived from knowledge and from power, which can be
common to both good and bad.