St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

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OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fear is an effect of faith?

(2) Whether the heart is purified by faith?

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Article: 1  [<< | >>]

Whether fear is an effect of faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not an effect of faith. For an effect does not precede its cause. Now fear precedes faith: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye that fear the Lord, believe in Him." Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.

Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. Now fear and hope are contraries, as stated above (FS, Question [23], Article [2]): and faith begets hope, as a gloss observes on Mt. 1:2. Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.

Objection 3: Further, one contrary does not cause another. Now the object of faith is a good, which is the First Truth, while the object of fear is an evil, as stated above (FS, Question [42], Article [1]). Again, acts take their species from the object, according to what was stated above (FS, Question [18], Article [2]). Therefore faith is not a cause of fear.

On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . . believe and tremble."

I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power, as stated above (FS, Question [41], Article [1]). Now the principle of all appetitive movements is the good or evil apprehended: and consequently the principle of fear and of every appetitive movement must be an apprehension. Again, through faith there arises in us an apprehension of certain penal evils, which are inflicted in accordance with the Divine judgment. In this way, then, faith is a cause of the fear whereby one dreads to be punished by God; and this is servile fear.

It is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads to be separated from God, or whereby one shrinks from equalling oneself to Him, and holds Him in reverence, inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate God as an unfathomable and supreme good, separation from which is the greatest evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equalled. Of the first fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless faith is the cause, while living faith is the cause of the second, viz. filial fear, because it makes man adhere to God and to be subject to Him by charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Fear of God cannot altogether precede faith, because if we knew nothing at all about Him, with regard to rewards and punishments, concerning which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear Him. If, however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain articles of faith, for example the Divine excellence, then reverential fear follows, the result of which is that man submits his intellect to God, so as to believe in all the Divine promises. Hence the text quoted continues: "And your reward shall not be made void."

Reply to Objection 2: The same thing in respect of contraries can be the cause of contraries, but not under the same aspect. Now faith begets hope, in so far as it enables us to appreciate the prize which God awards to the just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it makes us appreciate the punishments which He intends to inflict on sinners.

Reply to Objection 3: The primary and formal object of faith is the good which is the First Truth; but the material object of faith includes also certain evils; for instance, that it is an evil either not to submit to God, or to be separated from Him, and that sinners will suffer penal evils from God: in this way faith can be the cause of fear.

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Article: 2  [<< | >>]

Whether faith has the effect of purifying the heart?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not purify the heart. For purity of the heart pertains chiefly to the affections, whereas faith is in the intellect. Therefore faith has not the effect of purifying the heart.

Objection 2: Further, that which purifies the heart is incompatible with impurity. But faith is compatible with the impurity of sin, as may be seen in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore faith does not purify the heart.

Objection 3: Further, if faith were to purify the human heart in any way, it would chiefly purify the intellect of man. Now it does not purify the intellect from obscurity, since it is a veiled knowledge. Therefore faith nowise purifies the heart.

On the contrary, Peter said (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their hearts by faith."

I answer that, A thing is impure through being mixed with baser things: for silver is not called impure, when mixed with gold, which betters it, but when mixed with lead or tin. Now it is evident that the rational creature is more excellent than all transient and corporeal creatures; so that it becomes impure through subjecting itself to transient things by loving them. From this impurity the rational creature is purified by means of a contrary movement, namely, by tending to that which is above it, viz. God. The first beginning of this movement is faith: since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," according to Heb. 11:6. Hence the first beginning of the heart's purifying is faith; and if this be perfected through being quickened by charity, the heart will be perfectly purified thereby.

Reply to Objection 1: Things that are in the intellect are the principles of those which are in the appetite, in so far as the apprehended good moves the appetite.

Reply to Objection 2: Even lifeless faith excludes a certain impurity which is contrary to it, viz. that of error, and which consists in the human intellect, adhering inordinately to things below itself, through wishing to measure Divine things by the rule of sensible objects. But when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible with any kind of impurity, because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12).

Reply to Objection 3: The obscurity of faith does not pertain to the impurity of sin, but rather to the natural defect of the human intellect, according to the present state of life.

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Latin — Corpus Thomisticum

Textum Leoninum Romae 1895 editumet automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticasdenuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit

Corpus Thomisticum: sth3001.html

[39065] IIª-IIae q. 7 pr. Deinde considerandum est de effectibus fidei. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum timor sit effectus fidei. Secundo, utrum purificatio cordis sit effectus fidei.

[39066] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit effectus fidei. Effectus enim non praecedit causam. Sed timor praecedit fidem, dicitur enim Eccli. II, qui timetis Deum, credite illi. Ergo timor non est effectus fidei.

[39067] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, idem non est causa contrariorum. Sed timor et spes sunt contraria, ut supra dictum est, fides autem generat spem, ut dicitur in Glossa, Matth. I. Ergo non est causa timoris.

[39068] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, contrarium non est causa contrarii. Sed obiectum fidei est quoddam bonum, quod est veritas prima, obiectum autem timoris est malum, ut supra dictum est. Actus autem habent speciem ex obiectis, secundum supradicta. Ergo fides non est causa timoris.

[39069] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Iac. II, Daemones credunt et contremiscunt.

[39070] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod timor est quidam motus appetitivae virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Omnium autem appetitivorum motuum principium est bonum vel malum apprehensum. Unde oportet quod timoris et omnium appetitivorum motuum sit principium aliqua apprehensio. Per fidem autem fit in nobis quaedam apprehensio de quibusdam malis poenalibus quae secundum divinum iudicium inferuntur, et per hunc modum fides est causa timoris quo quis timet a Deo puniri, qui est timor servilis. Est etiam causa timoris filialis, quo quis timet separari a Deo, vel quo quis refugit se Deo comparare reverendo ipsum; inquantum per fidem hanc existimationem habemus de Deo, quod sit quoddam immensum et altissimum bonum, a quo separari est pessimum et cui velle aequari est malum. Sed primi timoris, scilicet servilis, est causa fides informis. Sed secundi timoris, scilicet filialis, est causa fides formata, quae per caritatem facit hominem Deo inhaerere et ei subiici.

[39071] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod timor Dei non potest universaliter praecedere fidem, quia si omnino eius ignorantiam haberemus quantum ad praemia vel poenas de quibus per fidem instruimur, nullo modo eum timeremus. Sed supposita fide de aliquibus articulis fidei, puta de excellentia divina, sequitur timor reverentiae, ex quo sequitur ulterius ut homo intellectum suum Deo subiiciat ad credendum omnia quae sunt promissa a Deo. Unde ibi sequitur, et non evacuabitur merces vestra.

[39072] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod idem secundum contraria potest esse contrariorum causa, non autem idem secundum idem. Fides autem generat spem secundum quod facit nobis existimationem de praemiis quae Deus retribuit iustis. Est autem causa timoris secundum quod facit nobis aestimationem de poenis quas peccatoribus infliget.

[39073] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectum fidei primum et formale est bonum quod est veritas prima. Sed materialiter fidei proponuntur credenda etiam quaedam mala, puta quod malum sit Deo non subiici vel ab eo separari, et quod peccatores poenalia mala sustinebunt a Deo. Et secundum hoc fides potest esse causa timoris.

[39074] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod purificatio cordis non sit effectus fidei. Puritas enim cordis praecipue in affectu consistit. Sed fides in intellectu est. Ergo fides non causat cordis purificationem.

[39075] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod causat cordis purificationem non potest simul esse cum impuritate. Sed fides simul potest esse cum impuritate peccati, sicut patet in illis qui habent fidem informem. Ergo fides non purificat cor.

[39076] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, si fides aliquo modo purificaret cor humanum, maxime purificaret hominis intellectum. Sed intellectum non purificat ab obscuritate, cum sit cognitio aenigmatica. Ergo fides nullo modo purificat cor.

[39077] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Petrus, Act. XV, fide purificans corda eorum.

[39078] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod impuritas uniuscuiusque rei consistit in hoc quod rebus vilioribus immiscetur, non enim dicitur argentum esse impurum ex permixtione auri, per quam melius redditur, sed ex permixtione plumbi vel stanni. Manifestum est autem quod rationalis creatura dignior est omnibus temporalibus et corporalibus creaturis. Et ideo impura redditur ex hoc quod temporalibus se subiicit per amorem. A qua quidem impuritate purificatur per contrarium motum, dum scilicet tendit in id quod est supra se, scilicet in Deum. In quo quidem motu primum principium est fides, accedentem enim ad Deum oportet credere, ut dicitur Heb. XI. Et ideo primum principium purificationis cordis est fides, quae si perficiatur per caritatem formatam, perfectam purificationem causat.

[39079] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt in intellectu sunt principia eorum quae sunt in affectu, inquantum scilicet bonum intellectum movet affectum.

[39080] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod fides etiam informis excludit quandam impuritatem sibi oppositam, scilicet impuritatem erroris, quae contingit ex hoc quod intellectus humanus inordinate inhaeret rebus se inferioribus, dum scilicet vult secundum rationes rerum sensibilium metiri divina. Sed quando per caritatem formatur, tunc nullam impuritatem secum compatitur, quia universa delicta operit caritas, ut dicitur Prov. X.

[39081] IIª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod obscuritas fidei non pertinet ad impuritatem culpae, sed magis ad naturalem defectum intellectus humani, secundum statum praesentis vitae.