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Consequenter post fidem considerandum est de spe.
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non sit virtus. Virtute enim nullus male utitur; ut dicit Augustinus, in libro de Lib. Arb. Sed spe aliquis male utitur, quia circa passionem spei contingit esse medium et extrema, sicut et circa alias passiones. Ergo spes non est virtus. | Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man makes ill use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18). But one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope, like the other passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore hope is not a virtue. |
| Praeterea, nulla virtus procedit ex meritis, quia virtutem Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed spes est ex gratia et meritis proveniens; ut Magister dicit, XXVI dist. III Lib. Sent. Ergo spes non est virtus. | Objection 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue. |
| Praeterea, virtus est dispositio perfecti; ut dicitur in VII Physic. Spes autem est dispositio imperfecti, scilicet eius qui non habet id quod sperat. Ergo spes non est virtus. | Objection 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing" (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But hope is the disposition of an imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have. Therefore hope is not a virtue. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius, in I Moral., dicit quod per tres filias Iob significantur hae tres virtutes, fides, spes, caritas. Ergo spes est virtus. | On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and charity. Therefore hope is a virtue. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in II Ethic., virtus uniuscuiusque rei est quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit. Oportet igitur, ubicumque invenitur aliquis actus hominis bonus, quod respondeat alicui virtuti humanae. In omnibus autem regulatis et mensuratis bonum consideratur per hoc quod aliquid propriam regulam attingit, sicut dicimus vestem esse bonam quae nec excedit nec deficit a debita mensura. Humanorum autem actuum, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est mensura, una quidem proxima et homogenea, scilicet ratio; alia autem est suprema et excedens, scilicet Deus. Et ideo omnis actus humanus attingens ad rationem aut ad ipsum Deum est bonus. Actus autem spei de qua nunc loquimur attingit ad Deum. Ut enim supra dictum est, cum de passione spei ageretur, obiectum spei est bonum futurum arduum possibile haberi. Possibile autem est aliquid nobis dupliciter, uno modo, per nos ipsos; alio modo, per alios; ut patet in III Ethic. Inquantum igitur speramus aliquid ut possibile nobis per divinum auxilium, spes nostra attingit ad ipsum Deum, cuius auxilio innititur. Et ideo patet quod spes est virtus, cum faciat actum hominis bonum et debitam regulam attingentem. | I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good likewise." Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it must correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper measurement. But, as we stated above (Question [8], Article [3], ad 3) human acts have a twofold measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the reason, while the other is remote and excelling, viz. God: wherefore every human act is good, which attains reason or God Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For, as we have already stated (FS, Question [40], Article [1]), when we were treating of the passion of hope, the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is possible to us in two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of others, as stated in Ethic. iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything as being possible to us by means of the Divine assistance, our hope attains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to attain its due rule. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in passionibus accipitur medium virtutis per hoc quod attingitur ratio recta, et in hoc etiam consistit ratio virtutis. Unde etiam et in spe bonum virtutis accipitur secundum quod homo attingit sperando regulam debitam, scilicet Deum. Et ideo spe attingente Deum nullus potest male uti, sicut nec virtute morali attingente rationem, quia hoc ipsum quod est attingere est bonus usus virtutis. Quamvis spes de qua nunc loquimur non sit passio, sed habitus mentis, ut infra patebit. | Reply to Objection 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on right reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue. Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill use of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus is to make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we speak now, is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show further on (Article [5]; Question [18], Article [1]). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod spes dicitur ex meritis provenire quantum ad ipsam rem expectatam, prout aliquis sperat se beatitudinem adepturum ex gratia et meritis. Vel quantum ad actum spei formatae. Ipse autem habitus spei, per quam aliquis expectat beatitudinem, non causatur ex meritis, sed pure ex gratia. | Reply to Objection 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our merits, but from grace alone. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui sperat est quidem imperfectus secundum considerationem ad id quod sperat obtinere, quod nondum habet, sed est perfectus quantum ad hoc quod iam attingit propriam regulam, scilicet Deum, cuius auxilio innititur. | Reply to Objection 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help he leans. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo aeterna non sit obiectum proprium spei. Illud enim homo non sperat quod omnem animi sui motum excedit, cum spei actus sit quidam animi motus. Sed beatitudo aeterna excedit omnem humani animi motum, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. II, quod in cor hominis non ascendit. Ergo beatitudo non est proprium obiectum spei. | Objection 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses every movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now eternal happiness surpasses every movement of the human soul, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not "entered into the heart of man." Therefore happiness is not the proper object of hope. |
| Praeterea, petitio est spei interpretativa, dicitur enim in Psalm., revela domino viam tuam et spera in eo, et ipse faciet. Sed homo petit a Deo licite non solum beatitudinem aeternam, sed etiam bona praesentis vitae tam spiritualia quam temporalia, et etiam liberationem a malis, quae in beatitudine aeterna non erunt, ut patet in oratione dominica, Matth. VI. Ergo beatitudo aeterna non est proprium obiectum spei. | Objection 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written (Ps. 36:5): "Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He will do it." Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for eternal happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and spiritual, of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord's Prayer, to be delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal happiness. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope. |
| Praeterea, spei obiectum est arduum. Sed in comparatione ad hominem multa alia sunt ardua quam beatitudo aeterna. Ergo beatitudo aeterna non est proprium obiectum spei. | Objection 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VI, habemus spem incedentem, idest incedere facientem, ad interiora velaminis, idest ad beatitudinem caelestem; ut Glossa ibidem exponit. Ergo obiectum spei est beatitudo aeterna. | On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that we have hope "which entereth in," i.e. maketh us to enter . . . "within the veil," i.e. into the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of a gloss on these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal happiness. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, spes de qua loquimur attingit Deum innitens eius auxilio ad consequendum bonum speratum. Oportet autem effectum esse causae proportionatum. Et ideo bonum quod proprie et principaliter a Deo sperare debemus est bonum infinitum, quod proportionatur virtuti Dei adiuvantis, nam infinitae virtutis est proprium ad infinitum bonum perducere. Hoc autem bonum est vita aeterna, quae in fruitione ipsius Dei consistit, non enim minus aliquid ab eo sperandum est quam sit ipse, cum non sit minor eius bonitas, per quam bona creaturae communicat, quam eius essentia. Et ideo proprium et principale obiectum spei est beatitudo aeterna. | I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), the hope of which we speak now, attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped for good. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore the good which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is the infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an infinite good. Such a good is eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing less than Himself, since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things to His creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the proper and principal object of hope is eternal happiness. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beatitudo aeterna perfecte quidem in cor hominis non ascendit, ut scilicet cognosci possit ab homine viatore quae et qualis sit, sed secundum communem rationem, scilicet boni perfecti, cadere potest in apprehensione hominis. Et hoc modo motus spei in ipsam consurgit. Unde et signanter apostolus dicit quod spes incedit usque ad interiora velaminis, quia id quod speramus est nobis adhuc velatum. | Reply to Objection 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its nature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect good, it is possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in this way that the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the Apostle says pointedly (Heb. 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within the veil," because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to speak. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod quaecumque alia bona non debemus a Deo petere nisi in ordine ad beatitudinem aeternam. Unde et spes principaliter quidem respicit beatitudinem aeternam; alia vero quae petuntur a Deo respicit secundario, in ordine ad beatitudinem aeternam. Sicut etiam fides respicit principaliter Deum, et secundario respicit ea quae ad Deum ordinantur, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards secondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith regards God principally, and, secondarily, those things which are referred to God, as stated above (Question [1], Article [1]). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod homini qui anhelat ad aliquid magnum, parvum videtur omne aliud quod est eo minus. Et ideo homini speranti beatitudinem aeternam, habito respectu ad istam spem, nihil aliud est arduum. Sed habito respectu ad facultatem sperantis, possunt etiam quaedam alia ei esse ardua. Et secundum hoc eorum potest esse spes in ordine ad principale obiectum. | Reply to Objection 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser things seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness, nothing else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although, as compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things besides may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such things in reference to its principal object. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis possit sperare alteri beatitudinem aeternam. Dicit enim apostolus, Philipp. I, confidens hoc ipsum, quia qui coepit in vobis opus bonum perficiet usque in diem Christi Iesu. Perfectio aut illius diei erit beatitudo aeterna. Ergo aliquis potest alteri sperare beatitudinem aeternam. | Objection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being confident of this very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of Jesus Christ." Now the perfection of that day will be eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's eternal happiness. |
| Praeterea, ea quae a Deo petimus speramus obtinere ab eo. Sed a Deo petimus quod alios ad beatitudinem aeternam perducat, secundum illud Iac. ult., orate pro invicem ut salvemini. Ergo possumus aliis sperare beatitudinem aeternam. | Objection 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him. But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to James 5:16: "Pray for one another that you may be saved." Therefore we can hope for another's eternal happiness. |
| Praeterea, spes et desperatio sunt de eodem. Sed aliquis potest desperare de beatitudine aeterna alicuius, alioquin frustra diceret Augustinus, in libro de Verb. Dom., de nemine esse desperandum dum vivit. Ergo etiam potest aliquis sperare alteri vitam aeternam. | Objection 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it is possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else Augustine would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can also hope for another's eternal salvation. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod spes non est nisi rerum ad eum pertinentium qui earum spem gerere perhibetur. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is only of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for them." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod spes potest esse alicuius dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, absolute, et sic est solum boni ardui ad se pertinentis. Alio modo, ex praesuppositione alterius, et sic potest esse etiam eorum quae ad alium pertinent. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod amor et spes in hoc differunt quod amor importat quandam unionem amantis ad amatum; spes autem importat quendam motum sive protensionem appetitus in aliquod bonum arduum. Unio autem est aliquorum distinctorum, et ideo amor directe potest respicere alium, quem sibi aliquis unit per amorem, habens eum sicut seipsum. Motus autem semper est ad proprium terminum proportionatum mobili, et ideo spes directe respicit proprium bonum, non autem id quod ad alium pertinet. Sed praesupposita unione amoris ad alterum, iam aliquis potest desiderare et sperare aliquid alteri sicut sibi. Et secundum hoc aliquis potest sperare alteri vitam aeternam, inquantum est ei unitus per amorem. Et sicut est eadem virtus caritatis qua quis diligit Deum, seipsum et proximum, ita etiam est eadem virtus spei qua quis sperat sibi ipsi et alii. | I answer that, We can hope for something in two ways: first, absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous and pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way its object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous good. Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can directly regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love, looking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is always towards its own term which is proportionate to the subject moved. Therefore hope regards directly one's own good, and not that which pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of love with another, a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another eternal's life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and for another. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis possit licite sperare in homine. Spei enim obiectum est beatitudo aeterna. Sed ad beatitudinem aeternam consequendam adiuvamur patrociniis sanctorum, dicit enim Gregorius, in I Dial., quod praedestinatio iuvatur precibus sanctorum. Ergo aliquis potest in homine sperare. | Objection 1: It wold seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the object of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain eternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says (Dial. i, 8) that "predestination is furthered by the saints' prayers." Therefore one may hope in man. |
| Praeterea, si non potest aliquis sperare in homine, non esset reputandum alicui in vitium quod in eo aliquis sperare non possit. Sed hoc de quibusdam in vitium dicitur, ut patet Ierem. IX, unusquisque a proximo suo se custodiat, et in omni fratre suo non habeat fiduciam. Ergo licite potest aliquis sperare in homine. | Objection 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not to be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope in him. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4: "Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in any brother of his." Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man. |
| Praeterea, petitio est interpretativa spei, sicut dictum est. Sed licite potest homo aliquid petere ab homine. Ergo licite potest sperare de eo. | Objection 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above (Article [2], Objection [2]). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something. Therefore it is lawful to trust in him. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. XVII, maledictus homo qui confidit in homine. | On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 17:5): "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod spes, sicut dictum est, duo respicit, scilicet bonum quod obtinere intendit; et auxilium per quod illud bonum obtinetur. Bonum autem quod quis sperat obtinendum habet rationem causae finalis; auxilium autem per quod quis sperat illud bonum obtinere habet rationem causae efficientis. In genere autem utriusque causae invenitur principale et secundarium. Principalis enim finis est finis ultimus; secundarius autem finis est bonum quod est ad finem. Similiter principalis causa agens est primum agens; secundaria vero causa efficiens est agens secundarium instrumentale. Spes autem respicit beatitudinem aeternam sicut finem ultimum; divinum autem auxilium sicut primam causam inducentem ad beatitudinem. | I answer that, Hope, as stated above (Article [1]; FS, Question [40], Article [7]), regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man hopes to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a secondary cause. For the principal end is the last end, while the secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the principal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance as the first cause leading to happiness. |
| Sicut igitur non licet sperare aliquod bonum praeter beatitudinem sicut ultimum finem, sed solum sicut id quod est ad finem beatitudinis ordinatum; ita etiam non licet sperare de aliquo homine, vel de aliqua creatura, sicut de prima causa movente in beatitudinem; licet autem sperare de aliquo homine, vel de aliqua creatura, sicut de agente secundario et instrumentali, per quod aliquis adiuvatur ad quaecumque bona consequenda in beatitudinem ordinata. Et hoc modo ad sanctos convertimur; et ab hominibus aliqua petimus; et vituperantur illi de quibus aliquis confidere non potest ad auxilium ferendum. | Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any creature, as though it were the first cause of movement towards happiness. It is, however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary and instrumental agent through whom one is helped to obtain any goods that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way that we turn to the saints, and that we ask men also for certain things; and for this reason some are blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non sit virtus theologica. Virtus enim theologica est quae habet Deum pro obiecto. Sed spes non habet solum Deum pro obiecto, sed etiam alia bona quae a Deo obtinere speramus. Ergo spes non est virtus theologica. | Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has for its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to obtain from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue. |
| Praeterea, virtus theologica non consistit in medio duorum vitiorum, ut supra habitum est. Sed spes consistit in medio praesumptionis et desperationis. Ergo spes non est virtus theologica. | Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two vices, as stated above (FS, Question [64], Article [4]). But hope is a mean between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue. |
| Praeterea, expectatio pertinet ad longanimitatem, quae est pars fortitudinis. Cum ergo spes sit quaedam expectatio, videtur quod spes non sit virtus theologica, sed moralis. | Objection 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue. |
| Praeterea, obiectum spei est arduum. Sed tendere in arduum pertinet ad magnanimitatem, quae est virtus moralis. Ergo spes est virtus moralis, et non theologica. | Objection 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue. |
| Sed contra est quod, I ad Cor. XIII, connumeratur fidei et caritati quae sunt virtutes theologicae. | On the contrary, Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith and charity, which are theological virtues. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, cum differentiae specificae per se dividant genus, oportet attendere unde habeat spes rationem virtutis, ad hoc quod sciamus sub qua differentia virtutis collocetur. | I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue. |
| Dictum est autem supra quod spes habet rationem virtutis ex hoc quod attingit supremam regulam humanorum actuum; quam attingit et sicut primam causam efficientem, inquantum eius auxilio innititur; et sicut ultimam causam finalem, inquantum in eius fruitione beatitudinem expectat. Et sic patet quod spei, inquantum est virtus, principale obiectum est Deus. Cum igitur in hoc consistat ratio virtutis theologicae quod Deum habeat pro obiecto, sicut supra dictum est, manifestum est quod spes est virtus theologica. | Now it has been stated above (Article [1]) that hope has the character of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that has God for its object, as stated above (FS, Question [62], Article [1]), it is evident that hope is a theological virtue. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quaecumque alia spes adipisci expectat, sperat in ordine ad Deum sicut ad ultimum finem et sicut ad primam causam efficientem, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause, as stated above (Article [4]). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod medium accipitur in regulatis et mensuratis secundum quod regula vel mensura attingitur; secundum autem quod exceditur regula, est superfluum; secundum autem defectum a regula, est diminutum. In ipsa autem regula vel mensura non est accipere medium et extrema. Virtus autem moralis est circa ea quae regulantur ratione sicut circa proprium obiectum, et ideo per se convenit ei esse in medio ex parte proprii obiecti. Sed virtus theologica est circa ipsam regulam primam, non regulatam alia regula, sicut circa proprium obiectum. Et ideo per se, et secundum proprium obiectum, non convenit virtuti theologicae esse in medio. Sed potest sibi competere per accidens, ratione eius quod ordinatur ad principale obiectum. Sicut fides non potest habere medium et extrema in hoc quod innitatur primae veritati, cui nullus potest nimis inniti, sed ex parte eorum quae credit, potest habere medium et extrema, sicut unum verum est medium inter duo falsa. Et similiter spes non habet medium et extrema ex parte principalis obiecti, quia divino auxilio nullus potest nimis inniti, sed quantum ad ea quae confidit aliquis se adepturum, potest ibi esse medium et extrema, inquantum vel praesumit ea quae sunt supra suam proportionem, vel desperat de his quae sunt sibi proportionata. | Reply to Objection 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes. Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not proper for a theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to follow the mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with regard to something that is referred to its principal object. Thus faith can have no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on the part of the things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has no mean or extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is impossible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain, in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or despairs of things of which he is capable. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod expectatio quae ponitur in definitione spei non importat dilationem, sicut expectatio quae pertinet ad longanimitatem, sed importat respectum ad auxilium divinum, sive illud quod speratur differatur, sive non differatur. | Reply to Objection 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod magnanimitas tendit in arduum sperans aliquid quod est suae potestatis. Unde proprie respicit operationem aliquorum magnorum. Sed spes, secundum quod est virtus theologica, respicit arduum alterius auxilio assequendum, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its proper object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by another's help, as stated above (Article [1]). |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non sit virtus distincta ab aliis theologicis. Habitus enim distinguuntur secundum obiecta, ut supra dictum est. Sed idem est obiectum spei et aliarum virtutum theologicarum. Ergo spes non distinguitur ab aliis virtutibus theologicis. | Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, as stated above (FS, Question [54], Article [2]). Now the object of hope is the same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues. |
| Praeterea, in symbolo fidei, in quo fidem profitemur, dicitur, expecto resurrectionem mortuorum et vitam futuri saeculi. Sed expectatio futurae beatitudinis pertinet ad spem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo spes a fide non distinguitur. | Objection 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession of faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come." Now expectation of future happiness belongs to hope, as stated above (Article [5]). Therefore hope is not distinct from faith. |
| Praeterea, per spem homo tendit in Deum. Sed hoc proprie pertinet ad caritatem. Ergo spes a caritate non distinguitur. | Objection 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity. |
| Sed contra, ubi non est distinctio ibi non est numerus. Sed spes connumeratur aliis virtutibus theologicis, dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., esse tres virtutes, fidem, spem et caritatem. Ergo spes est virtus distincta ab aliis theologicis. | On the contrary, There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says (Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity. Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod virtus aliqua dicitur theologica ex hoc quod habet Deum pro obiecto cui inhaeret. Potest autem aliquis alicui rei inhaerere dupliciter, uno modo, propter seipsum; alio modo, inquantum ex eo ad aliud devenitur. Caritas igitur facit hominem Deo inhaerere propter seipsum, mentem hominis uniens Deo per affectum amoris. | I answer that, A virtue is said to be theological from having God for the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love. |
| Spes autem et fides faciunt hominem inhaerere Deo sicut cuidam principio ex quo aliqua nobis proveniunt. De Deo autem provenit nobis et cognitio veritatis et adeptio perfectae bonitatis. Fides ergo facit hominem Deo inhaerere inquantum est nobis principium cognoscendi veritatem, credimus enim ea vera esse quae nobis a Deo dicuntur. Spes autem facit Deo adhaerere prout est nobis principium perfectae bonitatis, inquantum scilicet per spem divino auxilio innitimur ad beatitudinem obtinendam. | On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from God both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness. Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells us is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the Divine assistance for obtaining happiness. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus secundum aliam et aliam rationem est obiectum harum virtutum, ut dictum est. Ad distinctionem autem habituum sufficit diversa ratio obiecti, ut supra habitum est. | Reply to Objection 1: God is the object of these virtues under different aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the object suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above (FS, Question [54], Article [2]). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod expectatio ponitur in symbolo fidei non quia sit actus proprius fidei, sed inquantum actus spei praesupponit fidem, ut dicetur, et sic actus fidei manifestantur per actus spei. | Reply to Objection 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on (Article [7]). Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod spes facit tendere in Deum sicut in quoddam bonum finale adipiscendum, et sicut in quoddam adiutorium efficax ad subveniendum. Sed caritas proprie facit tendere in Deum uniendo affectum hominis Deo, ut scilicet homo non sibi vivat sed Deo. | Reply to Objection 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be obtained finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity, properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God. |
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| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes praecedat fidem. Quia super illud Psalm., spera in domino, et fac bonitatem, dicit Glossa, spes est introitus fidei, initium salutis. Sed salus est per fidem, per quam iustificamur. Ergo spes praecedit fidem. | Objection 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on Ps. 36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the entrance to faith and the beginning of salvation." But salvation is by faith whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith. |
| Praeterea, illud quod ponitur in definitione alicuius debet esse prius et magis notum. Sed spes ponitur in definitione fidei, ut patet Heb. XI, fides est substantia rerum sperandarum. Ergo spes est prior fide. | Objection 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in the definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Therefore hope precedes faith. |
| Praeterea, spes praecedit actum meritorium, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. IX, quod qui arat debet arare in spe fructus percipiendi. Sed actus fidei est meritorius. Ergo spes praecedit fidem. | Objection 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit." But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope precedes faith. |
| Sed contra est quod Matth. I dicitur, Abraham genuit Isaac, idest fides spem, sicut dicit Glossa. | On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac," i.e. "Faith begot hope," according to a gloss. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod fides absolute praecedit spem. Obiectum enim spei est bonum futurum arduum possibile haberi. Ad hoc ergo quod aliquis speret, requiritur quod obiectum spei proponatur ei ut possibile. Sed obiectum spei est uno modo beatitudo aeterna, et alio modo divinum auxilium, ut ex dictis patet. Et utrumque eorum proponitur nobis per fidem, per quam nobis innotescit quod ad vitam aeternam possumus pervenire, et quod ad hoc paratum est nobis divinum auxilium, secundum illud Heb. XI, accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est, et quia inquirentibus se remunerator est. Unde manifestum est quod fides praecedit spem. | I answer that, Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the object of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In order, therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of hope to be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way, eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as explained above (Article [2]; Article [6], ad 3): and both of these are proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able to obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine assistance is ready for us, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." Therefore it is evident that faith precedes hope. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem subdit, spes dicitur introitus fidei, idest rei creditae, quia per spem intratur ad videndum illud quod creditur. Vel potest dici quod est introitus fidei quia per eam homo intrat ad hoc quod stabiliatur et perficiatur in fide. | Reply to Objection 1: As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is called "the entrance" to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by hope we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is called the "entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be established and perfected in faith. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod in definitione fidei ponitur res speranda quia proprium obiectum fidei est non apparens secundum seipsum. Unde fuit necessarium ut quadam circumlocutione designaretur per id quod consequitur ad fidem. | Reply to Objection 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the definition of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something not apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a circumlocution by something resulting from faith. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod non omnis actus meritorius habet spem praecedentem, sed sufficit si habeat concomitantem vel consequentem. | Reply to Objection 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but it suffices for it to accompany or follow it. |
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| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas sit prior spe. Dicit enim Ambrosius, super illud Luc. XVII, si habueritis fidem sicut granum sinapis, etc., ex fide est caritas, ex caritate spes. Sed fides est prior caritate. Ergo caritas est prior spe. | Objection 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose says on Lk. 27:6, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard seed," etc.: "Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity." But faith precedes charity. Therefore charity precedes hope. |
| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod boni motus atque affectus ex amore et sancta caritate veniunt. Sed sperare, secundum quod est actus spei, est quidam bonus animi motus. Ergo derivatur a caritate. | Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good emotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity." Now to hope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul. Therefore it flows from charity. |
| Praeterea, Magister dicit, XXVI dist. III Lib. Sent., quod spes ex meritis provenit, quae praecedunt non solum rem speratam, sed etiam spem, quam natura praeit caritas. Caritas ergo est prior spe. | Objection 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope proceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but also hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by charity. Therefore charity precedes hope. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. I, finis praecepti caritas est de corde puro et conscientia bona, Glossa, idest spe. Ergo spes est prior caritate. | On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience," i.e. "from hope," according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes charity. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est ordo. Unus quidem secundum viam generationis et materiae, secundum quem imperfectum prius est perfecto. Alius autem ordo est perfectionis et formae, secundum quem perfectum naturaliter prius est imperfecto. Secundum igitur primum ordinem spes est prior caritate. Quod sic patet. Quia spes, et omnis appetitivus motus, ex amore derivatur, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. | I answer that, Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and of matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect: the other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first order hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated above (FS, Question [27], Article [4]; FS, Question [28], Article [6], ad 2; FS, Question [40], Article [7]) in the treatise on the passions. |
| Amor autem quidam est perfectus, quidam imperfectus. Perfectus quidem amor est quo aliquis secundum se amatur, ut puta cui aliquis vult bonum, sicut homo amat amicum. Imperfectus amor est quo quis amat aliquid non secundum ipsum, sed ut illud bonum sibi ipsi proveniat, sicut homo amat rem quam concupiscit. Primus autem amor Dei pertinet ad caritatem, quae inhaeret Deo secundum seipsum, sed spes pertinet ad secundum amorem, quia ille qui sperat aliquid sibi obtinere intendit. | Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person some good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but that he may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he desires. The first love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to God for His own sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since he that hopes, intends to obtain possession of something for himself. |
| Et ideo in via generationis spes est prior caritate. Sicut enim aliquis introducitur ad amandum Deum per hoc quod, timens ab ipso puniri, cessat a peccato, ut Augustinus dicit, super primam canonicam Ioan.; ita etiam et spes introducit ad caritatem, inquantum aliquis, sperans remunerari a Deo, accenditur ad amandum Deum et servandum praecepta eius. Sed secundum ordinem perfectionis caritas naturaliter prior est. Et ideo, adveniente caritate, spes perfectior redditur, quia de amicis maxime speramus. Et hoc modo dicit Ambrosius quod spes est ex caritate. | Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as a man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for his sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too, hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments. On the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made more perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense that Ambrose states (Objection [1]) that charity flows from hope: |
| Unde patet responsio ad primum. | so that this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod spes, et omnis motus appetitivus, ex amore provenit aliquo, quo scilicet aliquis amat bonum expectatum. Sed non omnis spes provenit a caritate, sed solum motus spei formatae, qua scilicet aliquis sperat bonum a Deo ut ab amico. | Reply to Objection 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed from some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not every kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as from a friend. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Magister loquitur de spe formata, quam naturaliter praecedit caritas, et merita ex caritate causata. | Reply to Objection 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity. |