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| Deinde considerandum est de partibus subiectivis prudentiae. Et quia de prudentia per quam aliquis regit seipsum iam dictum est, restat dicendum de speciebus prudentiae quibus multitudo gubernatur. Circa quas quaeruntur quatuor. | We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence. And since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man rules himself (Question [47], seqq.), it remains for us to discuss the species of prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum legispositiva debeat poni species prudentiae. | (1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative? |
| Secundo, utrum politica. | (2) Whether political and |
| Tertio, utrum oeconomica. | (3) domestic economy are species of prudence? |
| Quarto, utrum militaris. | (4) Whether military prudence is? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod regnativa non debeat poni species prudentiae. Regnativa enim ordinatur ad iustitiam conservandam, dicitur enim in V Ethic. quod princeps est custos iusti. Ergo regnativa magis pertinet ad iustitiam quam ad prudentiam. | Objection 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the preservation of justice, since according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to justice rather than to prudence. |
| Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in III Polit., regnum est una sex politiarum. Sed nulla species prudentiae sumitur secundum alias quinque politias, quae sunt aristocratia, politia (quae alio nomine dicitur timocratia), tyrannis, oligarchia, democratia. Ergo nec secundum regnum debet sumi regnativa. | Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a kingdom [regnum] is one of six species of government. But no species of prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of government, which are "aristocracy," "polity," also called "timocracy" [*Cf. Ethic. viii, 10], "tyranny," "oligarchy" and "democracy." Therefore neither should a regnative species be ascribed to a kingdom. |
| Praeterea, leges condere non solum pertinet ad reges, sed etiam ad quosdam alios principatus, et etiam ad populum; ut patet per Isidorum, in libro Etymol. Sed philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit legispositivam partem prudentiae. Inconvenienter igitur loco eius ponitur regnativa. | Objection 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part of prudence to be "legislative." Therefore it is not becoming to substitute regnative prudence in its place. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Polit., quod prudentia est propria virtus principis. Ergo specialis prudentia debet esse regnativa. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that "prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince." Therefore a special kind of prudence is regnative. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod sicut ex supradictis patet, ad prudentiam pertinet regere et praecipere. Et ideo ubi invenitur specialis ratio regiminis et praecepti in humanis actibus, ibi etiam invenitur specialis ratio prudentiae. Manifestum est autem quod in eo qui non solum seipsum habet regere, sed etiam communitatem perfectam civitatis vel regni, invenitur specialis et perfecta ratio regiminis, tanto enim regimen perfectius est quanto est universalius, ad plura se extendens et ulteriorem finem attingens. Et ideo regi, ad quem pertinet regere civitatem vel regnum, prudentia competit secundum specialem et perfectissimam sui rationem. Et propter hoc regnativa ponitur species prudentiae. | I answer that, As stated above (Question [47], Articles [8],10), it belongs to prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we find a special kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind of governance in one who has to govern not only himself but also the perfect community of a city or kingdom; because a government is the more perfect according as it is more universal, extends to more matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species of prudence is reckoned to be regnative. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia quae sunt virtutum moralium pertinent ad prudentiam sicut ad dirigentem, unde et ratio recta prudentiae ponitur in definitione virtutis moralis, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo etiam executio iustitiae, prout ordinatur ad bonum commune, quae pertinet ad officium regis, indiget directione prudentiae. Unde istae duae virtutes sunt maxime propriae regi, scilicet prudentia et iustitia, secundum illud Ierem. XXIII, regnabit rex, et sapiens erit et faciet iudicium et iustitiam in terra. Quia tamen dirigere magis pertinet ad regem, exequi vero ad subditos, ideo regnativa magis ponitur species prudentiae, quae est directiva, quam iustitiae, quae est executiva. | Reply to Objection 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated above (Question [47], Article [5], ad 1; FS, Question [58], Article [2], ad 4). For this reason also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance of prudence. Hence these two virtues—prudence and justice—belong most properly to a king, according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign and shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth." Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of prudence which is directive, rather than to justice which is executive. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod regnum inter alias politias est optimum regimen, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Et ideo species prudentiae magis debuit denominari a regno. Ita tamen quod sub regnativa comprehendantur omnia alia regimina recta, non autem perversa, quae virtuti opponuntur, unde non pertinent ad prudentiam. | Reply to Objection 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not pertain to prudence. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophus denominat regnativam a principali actu regis, qui est leges ponere. Quod etsi conveniat aliis, non convenit eis nisi secundum quod participant aliquid de regimine regis. | Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as they have a share of kingly government. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod politica inconvenienter ponatur pars prudentiae. Regnativa enim est pars politicae prudentiae, ut dictum est. Sed pars non debet dividi contra totum. Ergo politica non debet poni alia species prudentiae. | Objection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political prudence, as stated above (Article [1]). But a part should not be reckoned a species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence. |
| Praeterea, species habituum distinguuntur secundum diversa obiecta. Sed eadem sunt quae oportet regnantem praecipere et subditum exequi. Ergo politica, secundum quod pertinet ad subditos, non debet poni species prudentiae distincta a regnativa. | Objection 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as what the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as regards the subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from regnative prudence. |
| Praeterea, unusquisque subditorum est singularis persona. Sed quaelibet singularis persona seipsam sufficienter dirigere potest per prudentiam communiter dictam. Ergo non oportet poni aliam speciem prudentiae quae dicatur politica. | Objection 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence called political. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., eius autem quae circa civitatem haec quidem ut architectonica prudentia legispositiva; haec autem commune nomen habet politica, circa singularia existens. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the common name political, and deals with individuals." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod servus per imperium movetur a domino et subditus a principante, aliter tamen quam irrationalia et inanimata moveantur a suis motoribus. Nam inanimata et irrationalia aguntur solum ab alio, non autem ipsa agunt seipsa quia non habent dominium sui actus per liberum arbitrium. Et ideo rectitudo regiminis ipsorum non est in ipsis, sed solum in motoribus. Sed homines servi, vel quicumque subditi, ita aguntur ab aliis per praeceptum quod tamen agunt seipsos per liberum arbitrium. Et ideo requiritur in eis quaedam rectitudo regiminis per quam seipsos dirigant in obediendo principatibus. Et ad hoc pertinet species prudentiae quae politica vocatur. | I answer that, A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion, since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not in their power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, men who are slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their free-will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is called political. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut dictum est, regnativa est perfectissima species prudentiae. Et ideo prudentia subditorum, quae deficit a prudentia regnativa, retinet sibi nomen commune, ut politica dicatur, sicut in logicis convertibile quod non significat essentiam retinet sibi commune nomen proprii. | Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect species of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls short of regnative prudence, retains the common name of political prudence, even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence of a thing retains the name of "proper." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod diversa ratio obiecti diversificat habitum secundum speciem, ut ex supradictis patet. Eadem autem agenda considerantur quidem a rege secundum universaliorem rationem quam considerentur a subdito, qui obedit, uni enim regi in diversis officiis multi obediunt. Et ideo regnativa comparatur ad hanc politicam de qua loquimur sicut ars architectonica ad eam quae manu operatur. | Reply to Objection 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the species of a habit, as stated above (Question [47], Article [5]). Now the same actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, as by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod per prudentiam communiter dictam regit homo seipsum in ordine ad proprium bonum, per politicam autem de qua loquimur, in ordine ad bonum commune. | Reply to Objection 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod oeconomica non debeat poni species prudentiae. Quia ut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., prudentia ordinatur ad bene vivere totum. Sed oeconomica ordinatur ad aliquem particularem finem, scilicet ad divitias, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo oeconomica non est species prudentiae. | Objection 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "prudence is directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic prudence is directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic. i, 1. Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic. |
| Praeterea, sicut supra habitum est, prudentia non est nisi bonorum. Sed oeconomica potest esse etiam malorum, multi enim peccatores providi sunt in gubernatione familiae. Ergo oeconomica non debet poni species prudentiae. | Objection 2: Further, as stated above (Question [47], Article [13]) prudence is only in good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked people, since many sinners are provident in governing their household. Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of prudence. |
| Praeterea, sicut in regno invenitur principans et subiectum, ita etiam in domo. Si ergo oeconomica est species prudentiae sicut et politica, deberet etiam paterna prudentia poni, sicut et regnativa. Non autem ponitur. Ergo nec oeconomica debet poni species prudentiae. | Objection 3: Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and subject, so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like political is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal corresponding to regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither should domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod illarum, scilicet prudentiarum quae se habent ad regimen multitudinis, haec quidem oeconomica, haec autem legispositiva, haec autem politica. | On the contrary, The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, "one of which is domestic, another legislative, and another political." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ratio obiecti diversificata secundum universale et particulare, vel secundum totum et partem, diversificat artes et virtutes, secundum quam diversitatem una est principalis respectu alterius. Manifestum est autem quod domus medio modo se habet inter unam singularem personam et civitatem vel regnum, nam sicut una singularis persona est pars domus, ita una domus est pars civitatis vel regni. Et ideo sicut prudentia communiter dicta, quae est regitiva unius, distinguitur a politica prudentia, ita oportet quod oeconomica distinguatur ab utraque. | I answer that, Different aspects of an object, in respect of universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality, diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act of virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident that a household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom, since just as the individual is part of the household, so is the household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as prudence commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct from political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from both. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod divitiae comparantur ad oeconomicam non sicut finis ultimus, sed sicut instrumenta quaedam, ut dicitur in I Polit. Finis autem ultimus oeconomicae est totum bene vivere secundum domesticam conversationem. Philosophus autem I Ethic. ponit exemplificando divitias finem oeconomicae secundum studium plurimorum. | Reply to Objection 1: Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the other hand, the end of political prudence is "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the household. In Ethic. i, 1 the Philosopher speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way of example and in accordance with the opinion of many. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ad aliqua particularia quae sunt in domo disponenda possunt aliqui peccatores provide se habere, sed non ad ipsum totum bene vivere domesticae conversationis, ad quod praecipue requiritur vita virtuosa. | Reply to Objection 2: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in regard to "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the household, for which above all a virtuous life is required. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod pater in domo habet quandam similitudinem regii principatus, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic., non tamen habet perfectam potestatem regiminis sicut rex. Et ideo non ponitur separatim paterna species prudentiae, sicut regnativa. | Reply to Objection 3: The father has in his household an authority like that of a king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, but he has not the full power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod militaris non debeat poni species prudentiae. Prudentia enim contra artem dividitur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed militaris videtur esse quaedam ars in rebus bellicis; sicut patet per philosophum, in III Ethic. Ergo militaris non debet poni species prudentiae. | Objection 1: It would seem that military prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the art of warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore military prudence should not be accounted a species of prudence. |
| Praeterea, sicut militare negotium continetur sub politico, ita etiam et plura alia negotia, sicut mercatorum, artificum et aliorum huiusmodi. Sed secundum alia negotia quae sunt in civitate non accipiuntur aliquae species prudentiae. Ergo etiam neque secundum militare negotium. | Objection 2: Further, just as military business is contained under political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither therefore should any be assigned to military business. |
| Praeterea, in rebus bellicis plurimum valet militum fortitudo. Ergo militaris magis pertinet ad fortitudinem quam ad prudentiam. | Objection 3: Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather than to prudence. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. XXIV, cum dispositione initur bellum, et erit salus ubi sunt multa consilia. Sed consiliari pertinet ad prudentiam. Ergo in rebus bellicis maxime necessaria est aliqua species prudentiae quae militaris dicitur. | On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 24:6): "War is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels." Now it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great need in warfare for that species of prudence which is called "military." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ea quae secundum artem et rationem aguntur conformia esse oportet his quae sunt secundum naturam, quae a ratione divina sunt instituta. Natura autem ad duo intendit primo quidem, ad regendum unamquamque rem in seipsa; secundo vero, ad resistendum extrinsecis impugnantibus et corruptivis. Et propter hoc non solum dedit animalibus vim concupiscibilem, per quam moveantur ad ea quae sunt saluti eorum accommoda; sed etiam vim irascibilem, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus. Unde et in his quae sunt secundum rationem non solum oportet esse prudentiam politicam, per quam convenienter disponantur ea quae pertinent ad bonum commune; sed etiam militarem, per quam hostium insultus repellantur. | I answer that, Whatever things are done according to art or reason, should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature, and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby they are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but also with the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant. Therefore in those things also which are in accordance with reason, there should be not only "political" prudence, which disposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the common good, but also a "military" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod militaris potest esse ars secundum quod habet quasdam regulas recte utendi quibusdam exterioribus rebus, puta armis et equis, sed secundum quod ordinatur ad bonum commune, habet magis rationem prudentiae. | Reply to Objection 1: Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it has certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, it belongs rather to prudence. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod alia negotia quae sunt in civitate ordinantur ad aliquas particulares utilitates, sed militare negotium ordinatur ad tuitionem totius boni communis. | Reply to Objection 2: Other matters in the state are directed to the profit of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of the entire common good. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod executio militiae pertinet ad fortitudinem, sed directio ad prudentiam, et praecipue secundum quod est in duce exercitus | Reply to Objection 3: The execution of military service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence. |