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| Deinde considerandum est de peccatis aliarum iniuriarum quae in personam committuntur. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, de mutilatione membrorum. | (1) The mutilation of members; |
| Secundo, de verberatione. | (2) Blows; |
| Tertio, de incarceratione. | (3) Imprisonment; |
| Quarto, utrum peccatum huiusmodi iniuriarum aggravetur ex hoc quod committitur in personam coniunctam aliis. | (4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries are aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with others? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mutilare aliquem membro in nullo casu possit esse licitum. Damascenus enim dicit, in II libro, quod peccatum committitur per hoc quod receditur ab eo quod est secundum naturam in id quod est contra naturam. Sed secundum naturam a Deo institutam est quod corpus hominis sit integrum membris; contra naturam autem est quod sit membro diminutum. Ergo mutilare aliquem membro semper videtur esse peccatum. | Objection 1: It would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim anyone. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20) that "sin consists in departing from what is according to nature, towards that which is contrary to nature." Now according to nature it is appointed by God that a man's body should be entire in its members, and it is contrary to nature that it should be deprived of a member. Therefore it seems that it is always a sin to maim a person. |
| Praeterea, sicut se habet tota anima ad totum corpus, ita se habent partes animae ad partes corporis, ut dicitur in II de anima. Sed non licet aliquem privare anima occidendo ipsum, nisi publica potestate. Ergo etiam non licet aliquem mutilare membro, nisi forte secundum publicam potestatem. | Objection 2: Further, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so are the parts of the soul to the parts of the body (De Anima ii, 1). But it is unlawful to deprive a man of his soul by killing him, except by public authority. Therefore neither is it lawful to maim anyone, except perhaps by public authority. |
| Praeterea, salus animae praeferenda est saluti corporali. Sed non licet aliquem mutilare se membro propter salutem animae, puniuntur enim secundum statuta Nicaeni Concilii qui se castraverunt propter castitatem servandam. Ergo propter nullam aliam causam licet aliquem membro mutilare. | Objection 3: Further, the welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the welfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim himself for the sake of the soul's welfare: since the council of Nicea [*P. I, sect. 4, can. i] punished those who castrated themselves that they might preserve chastity. Therefore it is not lawful for any other reason to maim a person. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod. XXI, oculum pro oculo, dentem pro dente, manum pro manu, pedem pro pede. | On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod cum membrum aliquod sit pars totius humani corporis, est propter totum, sicut imperfectum propter perfectum. Unde disponendum est de membro humani corporis secundum quod expedit toti. Membrum autem humani corporis per se quidem utile est ad bonum totius corporis, per accidens tamen potest contingere quod sit nocivum, puta cum membrum putridum est totius corporis corruptivum. Si ergo membrum sanum fuerit et in sua naturali dispositione consistens, non potest praecidi absque totius hominis detrimento. Sed quia ipse totus homo ordinatur ut ad finem ad totam communitatem cuius est pars, ut supra dictum est; potest contingere quod abscisio membri, etsi vergat in detrimentum totius corporis, ordinatur tamen ad bonum communitatis, inquantum alicui infertur in poenam ad cohibitionem peccatorum. Et ideo sicut per publicam potestatem aliquis licite privatur totaliter vita propter aliquas maiores culpas, ita etiam privatur membro propter aliquas culpas minores. Hoc autem non est licitum alicui privatae personae, etiam volente illo cuius est membrum, quia per hoc fit iniuria communitati, cuius est ipse homo et omnes partes eius. Si vero membrum propter putredinem sit totius corporis corruptivum, tunc licitum est, de voluntate eius cuius est membrum, putridum membrum praescindere propter salutem totius corporis, quia unicuique commissa est cura propriae salutis. Et eadem ratio est si fiat voluntate eius ad quem pertinet curare de salute eius qui habet membrum corruptum. Aliter autem aliquem membro mutilare est omnino illicitum. | I answer that, Since a member is part of the whole human body, it is for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence a member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is expedient for the body. Now a member of the human body is of itself useful to the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source of corruption to the whole body. Accordingly so long as a member is healthy and retains its natural disposition, it cannot be cut off without injury to the whole body. But as the whole of man is directed as to his end to the whole of the community of which he is a part, as stated above (Question [61], Article [1]; Question [64], Articles [2],5), it may happen that although the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may nevertheless be directed to the good of the community, in so far as it is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of restraining sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is lawfully deprived of life altogether on account of certain more heinous sins, so is he deprived of a member on account of certain lesser sins. But this is not lawful for a private individual, even with the consent of the owner of the member, because this would involve an injury to the community, to whom the man and all his parts belong. If, however, the member be decayed and therefore a source of corruption to the whole body, then it is lawful with the consent of the owner of the member, to cut away the member for the welfare of the whole body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own welfare. The same applies if it be done with the consent of the person whose business it is to care for the welfare of the person who has a decayed member: otherwise it is altogether unlawful to maim anyone. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est contra particularem naturam esse secundum naturam universalem, sicut mors et corruptio in rebus naturalibus est contra particularem naturam eius quod corrumpitur, cum tamen sit secundum naturam universalem. Et similiter mutilare aliquem membro, etsi sit contra naturam particularem corporis eius qui mutilatur, est tamen secundum naturalem rationem in comparatione ad bonum commune. | Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a particular nature from being in harmony with universal nature: thus death and corruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the particular nature of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping with universal nature. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary to the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to the common good. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod totius hominis vita non ordinatur ad aliquid proprium ipsius hominis, sed ad ipsam potius omnia quae sunt hominis ordinantur. Et ideo privare aliquem vita in nullo casu pertinet ad aliquem nisi ad publicam potestatem, cui committitur procuratio boni communis. Sed praecisio membri potest ordinari ad propriam salutem unius hominis. Et ideo in aliquo casu potest ad ipsum pertinere. | Reply to Objection 2: The life of the entire man is not directed to something belonging to man; on the contrary whatever belongs to man is directed to his life. Hence in no case does it pertain to a person to take anyone's life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted the procuring of the common good. But the removal of a member can be directed to the good of one man, and consequently in certain cases can pertain to him. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod membrum non est praecidendum propter corporalem salutem totius nisi quando aliter toti subveniri non potest. Saluti autem spirituali semper potest aliter subveniri quam per membri praecisionem, quia peccatum subiacet voluntati. Et ideo in nullo casu licet membrum praecidere propter quodcumque peccatum vitandum. Unde Chrysostomus, exponens illud Matth. XIX, sunt eunuchi qui seipsos castraverunt propter regnum caelorum, dicit, non membrorum abscisionem, sed malarum cogitationum interemptionem. Maledictioni enim est obnoxius qui membrum abscidit, etenim quae homicidarum sunt talis praesumit. Et postea subdit, neque concupiscentia mansuetior ita fit, sed molestior. Aliunde enim habet fontes sperma quod in nobis est, et praecipue a proposito incontinenti et mente negligente, nec ita abscisio membri comprimit tentationes, ut cogitationis frenum | Reply to Objection 3: A member should not be removed for the sake of the bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to further the good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further one's spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member, because sin is always subject to the will: and consequently in no case is it allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever. Hence Chrysostom, in his exposition on Mt. 19:12 (Hom. lxii in Matth.), "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven," says: "Not by maiming themselves, but by destroying evil thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims himself, since they are murderers who do such things." And further on he says: "Nor is lust tamed thereby, on the contrary it becomes more importunate, for the seed springs in us from other sources, and chiefly from an incontinent purpose and a careless mind: and temptation is curbed not so much by cutting off a member as by curbing one's thoughts." |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat patribus verberare filios, aut dominis servos. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Ephes. VI, vos, patres, nolite ad iracundiam provocare filios vestros. Et infra subdit, et vos, domini, eadem facite servis, remittentes minas. Sed propter verbera aliqui ad iracundiam provocantur. Sunt etiam minis graviora. Ergo neque patres filios, neque domini servos debent verberare. | Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves. For the Apostle says (Eph. 6:4): "You, fathers, provoke not your children to anger"; and further on (Eph. 9:6): "And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves [Vulg.: 'to them'] forbearing threatenings." Now some are provoked to anger by blows, and become more troublesome when threatened. Therefore neither should parents strike their children, nor masters their slaves. |
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod sermo paternus habet solum monitionem, non autem coactionem. Sed quaedam coactio est per verbera. Ergo parentibus non licet filios verberare. | Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that "a father's words are admonitory and not coercive." Now blows are a kind of coercion. Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their children. |
| Praeterea, unicuique licet alteri disciplinam impendere, hoc enim pertinet ad eleemosynas spirituales, ut supra dictum est. Si ergo parentibus licet propter disciplinam filios verberare, pari ratione cuilibet licebit quemlibet verberare. Quod patet esse falsum. Ergo et primum. | Objection 3: Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Question [32], Article [2]). If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. XIII, qui parcit virgae, odit filium suum; et infra XXIII, noli subtrahere a puero disciplinam. Si enim percusseris eum virga, non morietur, tu virga percuties eum, et animam eius de Inferno liberabis. Et Eccli. XXXIII dicitur, servo malevolo tortura et compedes. | On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod hateth his son," and further on (Prov. 23:13): "Withhold not correction from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and deliver his soul from hell." Again it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): "Torture and fetters are for a malicious slave." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod per verberationem nocumentum quoddam infertur corpori eius qui verberatur, aliter tamen quam in mutilatione, nam mutilatio tollit corporis integritatem, verberatio vero tantummodo afficit sensum dolore. Unde multo minus nocumentum est quam membri mutilatio. Nocumentum autem inferre alicui non licet nisi per modum poenae propter iustitiam. Nullus autem iuste punit aliquem nisi sit eius ditioni subiectus. Et ideo verberare aliquem non licet nisi habenti potestatem aliquam super illum qui verberatur. Et quia filius subditur potestati patris, et servus potestati domini, licite potest verberare pater filium et dominus servum, causa correctionis et disciplinae. | I answer that, Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as when it is maimed: since maiming destroys the body's integrity, while a blow merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much less harm than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a person a harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice. Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum ira sit appetitus vindictae, praecipue concitatur ira cum aliquis se reputat laesum iniuste, ut patet per philosophum, in II Rhet. Et ideo per hoc quod patribus interdicitur ne filios ad iracundiam provocent, non prohibetur quin filios verberent causa disciplinae, sed quod non immoderate eos affligant verberibus. Quod vero inducitur dominis quod remittant minas, potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ut remisse minis utantur, quod pertinet ad moderationem disciplinae. Alio modo, ut aliquis non semper impleat quod comminatus est, quod pertinet ad hoc quod iudicium quo quis comminatus est poenam, quandoque per remissionis misericordiam temperetur. | Reply to Objection 1: Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is aroused chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows on them without moderation. The command that masters should forbear from threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation of correction; secondly, that they should not always carry out their threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness temper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod maior potestas maiorem debet habere coactionem. Sicut autem civitas est perfecta communitas, ita princeps civitatis habet perfectam potestatem coercendi, et ideo potest infligere poenas irreparabiles, scilicet occisionis vel mutilationis. Pater autem et dominus, qui praesunt familiae domesticae, quae est imperfecta communitas, habent imperfectam potestatem coercendi secundum leviores poenas, quae non inferunt irreparabile nocumentum. Et huiusmodi est verberatio. | Reply to Objection 2: The greater power should exercise the greater coercion. Now just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of a city has perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable punishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the father and the master who preside over the family household, which is an imperfect community, have imperfect coercive power, which is exercised by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows, which do not inflict irreparable harm. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod exhibere disciplinam volenti cuilibet licet. Sed disciplinam nolenti adhibere est solum eius cui alterius cura committitur. Et ad hoc pertinet aliquem verberibus castigare. | Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat aliquem hominem incarcerare. Actus enim est malus ex genere qui cadit supra indebitam materiam, ut supra dictum est. Sed homo, habens naturalem arbitrii libertatem, est indebita materia incarcerationis, quae libertati repugnat. Ergo illicitum est aliquem incarcerare. | Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which deals with undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above (FS, Question [18], Article [2]). Now man, having a free-will, is undue matter for imprisonment which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is unlawful to imprison a man. |
| Praeterea, humana iustitia regulari debet ex divina. Sed sicut dicitur Eccli. XV, Deus reliquit hominem in manu consilii sui. Ergo videtur quod non est aliquis coercendus vinculis vel carcere. | Objection 2: Further, human justice should be ruled by Divine justice. Now according to Ecclus. 15:14, "God left man in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by chains or prisons. |
| Praeterea, nullus est cohibendus nisi ab opere malo, a quo quilibet licite potest alium impedire. Si ergo incarcerare aliquem esset licitum ad hoc quod cohiberetur a malo, cuilibet esset licitum aliquem incarcerare. Quod patet esse falsum. Ergo et primum. | Objection 3: Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from doing an evil deed; and any man can lawfully prevent another from doing this. If, therefore, it were lawful to imprison a man, in order to restrain him from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put a man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows. |
| Sed contra est quod Levit. XXIV legitur quendam missum fuisse in carcerem propter peccatum blasphemiae. | On the contrary, We read in Lev. 24 that a man was imprisoned for the sin of blasphemy. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod in bonis corporis tria per ordinem considerantur. Primo quidem, integritas corporalis substantiae, cui detrimentum affertur per occisionem vel mutilationem. Secundo, delectatio vel quies sensus, cui opponitur verberatio, vel quidlibet sensum dolore afficiens. Tertio, motus et usus membrorum, qui impeditur per ligationem vel incarcerationem, seu quamcumque detentionem. | I answer that, In the goods three things may be considered in due order. First, the substantial integrity of the body, and this is injured by death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or rest of the senses, and to this striking or anything causing a sense of pain is opposed. Thirdly, the movement or use of the members, and this is hindered by binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention. |
| Et ideo incarcerare aliquem, vel qualitercumque detinere, est illicitum nisi fiat secundum ordinem iustitiae, aut in poenam aut ad cautelam alicuius mali vitandi. | Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man, unless it be done according to the order of justice, either in punishment, or as a measure of precaution against some evil. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo qui abutitur potestate sibi data, meretur eam amittere. Et ideo homo qui peccando abusus est libero usu suorum membrorum, conveniens est incarcerationis materia. | Reply to Objection 1: A man who abuses the power entrusted to him deserves to lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the free use of his members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus quandoque, secundum ordinem suae sapientiae, peccatores cohibet ne possint peccata implere, secundum illud Iob V, qui dissipat cogitationes malignorum, ne possint implere manus eorum quod coeperant. Quandoque vero eos permittit quod volunt agere. Et similiter secundum humanam iustitiam non pro qualibet culpa homines incarcerantur, sed pro aliquibus. | Reply to Objection 2: According to the order of His wisdom God sometimes restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin, according to Job 5:12: "Who bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so that their hand cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes He allows them to do what they will." In like manner, according to human justice, men are imprisoned, not for every sin but for certain ones. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod detinere hominem ad horam ab aliquo opere illicito statim perpetrando, cuilibet licet, sicut cum aliquis detinet aliquem ne se praecipitet, vel ne alium feriat. Sed simpliciter aliquem includere vel ligare ad eum solum pertinet qui habet disponere universaliter de actibus et vita alterius, quia per hoc impeditur non solum a malis, sed etiam a bonis agendis. | Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from striking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing in general of the actions and of the life of another does it belong primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he hinders him from doing not only evil but also good deeds. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non aggravetur ex hoc quod praedictae iniuriae inferuntur in personas aliis coniunctas. Huiusmodi enim iniuriae habent rationem peccati prout nocumentum alicui infertur contra eius voluntatem. Sed magis est contra hominis voluntatem malum quod in personam propriam infertur quam quod infertur in personam coniunctam. Ergo iniuria illata in personam coniunctam est minor. | Objection 1: It would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected with others. Such like injuries take their sinful character from inflicting an injury on another against his will. Now the evil inflicted on a man's own person is more against his will than that which is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an injury inflicted on a person connected with another is less grievous. |
| Praeterea, in sacra Scriptura praecipue reprehenduntur qui pupillis et viduis iniurias inferunt, unde dicitur Eccli. XXXV, non despiciet preces pupilli, nec viduam, si effundat loquelam gemitus. Sed vidua et pupillus non sunt personae aliis coniunctae. Ergo ex hoc quod infertur iniuria personis coniunctis non aggravatur peccatum. | Objection 2: Further, Holy Writ reproves those especially who do injuries to orphans and widows: hence it is written (Ecclus. 35:17): "He will not despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when she poureth out her complaint." Now the widow and the orphan are not connected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated through an injury being inflicted on one who is connected with others. |
| Praeterea, persona coniuncta habet propriam voluntatem, sicut et principalis persona. Potest ergo aliquid ei esse voluntarium quod est contra voluntatem principalis personae, ut patet in adulterio, quod placet uxori et displicet viro. Sed huiusmodi iniuriae habent rationem peccati prout consistunt in involuntaria commutatione. Ergo huiusmodi iniuriae minus habent de ratione peccati. | Objection 3: Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own just as the principal person has, so that something may be voluntary for him and yet against the will of the principal person, as in the case of adultery which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now these injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involuntary commutation. Therefore such like injuries are of a less sinful nature. |
| Sed contra est quod Deut. XXVIII, ad quandam exaggerationem dicitur, filii tui et filiae tuae tradentur alteri populo videntibus oculis tuis. | On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 28:32) as though indicating an aggravating circumstance: "Thy sons and thy daughters shall be given to another people, thy eyes looking on [*Vulg.: 'May thy sons and thy daughters be given,' etc.]." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod quanto aliqua iniuria in plures redundat, ceteris paribus, tanto gravius est peccatum. Et inde est quod gravius est peccatum si aliquis percutiat principem quam personam privatam, quia redundat in iniuriam totius multitudinis, ut supra dictum est. Cum autem infertur iniuria in aliquam personam coniunctam alteri qualitercumque, iniuria illa pertinet ad duas personas. Et ideo, ceteris paribus, ex hoc ipso aggravatur peccatum. Potest tamen contingere quod secundum aliquas circumstantias sit gravius peccatum quod fit contra personam nulli coniunctam, vel propter dignitatem personae, vel propter magnitudinem nocumenti. | I answer that, Other things being equal, an injury is a more grievous sin according as it affects more persons; and hence it is that it is a more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in authority than a private individual, because it conduces to the injury of the whole community, as stated above (FS, Question [73], Article [9]). Now when an injury is inflicted on one who is connected in any way with another, that injury affects two persons, so that, other things being equal, the sin is aggravated by this very fact. It may happen, however, that in view of certain circumstances, a sin committed against one who is not connected with any other person, is more grievous, on account of either the dignity of the person, or the greatness of the injury. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iniuria illata in personam coniunctam minus est nociva personae cui coniungitur quam si in ipsam immediate inferretur, et ex hac parte est minus peccatum. Sed hoc totum quod pertinet ad iniuriam personae cui coniungitur, superadditur peccato quod quis incurrit ex eo quod aliam personam secundum se laedit. | Reply to Objection 1: An injury inflicted on a person connected with others is less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected, than if it were perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view it is a less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the person with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of which a man is guilty through injuring the other one in himself. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod iniuriae illatae in viduas et pupillos magis exaggerantur, tum quia magis opponuntur misericordiae. Tum quia idem nocumentum huiusmodi personis inflictum est eis gravius, quia non habent relevantem. | Reply to Objection 2: Injuries done to widows and orphans are more insisted upon both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the same injury done to such persons is more grievous to them since they have no one to turn to for relief. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod per hoc quod uxor voluntarie consentit in adulterium, minoratur quidem peccatum et iniuria ex parte ipsius mulieris, gravius enim esset si adulter violenter eam opprimeret. Non tamen per hoc tollitur iniuria ex parte viri, quia uxor non habet potestatem sui corporis, sed vir, ut dicitur I ad Cor. VII. Et eadem ratio est de similibus. De adulterio tamen, quod non solum iustitiae, sed etiam castitati opponitur, erit locus infra agendi in tractatu de temperantia. | Reply to Objection 3: The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to the adultery, lessens the sin and injury, so far as the woman is concerned, for it would be more grievous, if the adulterer oppressed her by violence. But this does not remove the injury as affecting her husband, since "the wife hath not power of her own body; but the husband" (1 Cor. 7:4). The same applies to similar cases. of adultery, however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also to chastity, we shall speak in the treatise on Temperance (Question [154], Article [8]). |