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Deinde considerandum est de actibus religionis.
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod devotio non sit specialis actus. Illud enim quod pertinet ad modum aliorum actuum non videtur esse specialis actus. Sed devotio videtur pertinere ad modum aliorum actuum, dicitur enim II Paral. XXIX, obtulit universa multitudo hostias et laudes et holocausta mente devota. Ergo devotio non est specialis actus. | Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not a special act. That which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act. Now devotion seems to qualify other acts, for it is written (2 Paralip 29:31): "All the multitude offered victims, and praises, and holocausts with a devout mind." Therefore devotion is not a special act. |
| Praeterea, nullus specialis actus invenitur in diversis generibus actuum. Sed devotio invenitur in diversis generibus actuum, scilicet in actibus corporalibus et etiam in spiritualibus, dicitur enim aliquis et devote meditari et devote genu flectere. Ergo devotio non est specialis actus. | Objection 2: Further, no special kind of act is common to various genera of acts. But devotion is common to various genera of acts, namely, corporal and spiritual acts: for a person is said to meditate devoutly and to genuflect devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a special act. |
| Praeterea, omnis actus specialis aut est appetitivae aut cognoscitivae virtutis. Sed devotio neutri earum appropriatur, ut patet discurrenti per singulas species actuum utriusque partis, quae supra enumeratae sunt. Ergo devotio non est specialis actus. | Objection 3: Further, every special act belongs either to an appetitive or to a cognitive virtue or power. But devotion belongs to neither, as may be seen by going through the various species of acts of either faculty, as enumerated above (FP, Questions [78], seqq.; FS, Question [23], Article [4]). Therefore devotion is not a special act. |
| Sed contra est quod actibus meremur, ut supra habitum est. Sed devotio habet specialem rationem merendi. Ergo devotio est specialis actus. | On the contrary, Merits are acquired by acts as stated above (FS, Question [21], Articles [34]). But devotion has a special reason for merit. Therefore devotion is a special act. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod devotio dicitur a devovendo, unde devoti dicuntur qui seipsos quodammodo Deo devovent, ut ei se totaliter subdant. Propter quod et olim apud gentiles devoti dicebantur qui seipsos idolis devovebant in mortem pro sui salute exercitus, sicut de duobus Deciis Titus Livius narrat. Unde devotio nihil aliud esse videtur quam voluntas quaedam prompte tradendi se ad ea quae pertinent ad Dei famulatum. Unde Exod. XXXV dicitur quod multitudo filiorum Israel obtulit mente promptissima atque devota primitias domino. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas prompte faciendi quod ad Dei servitium pertinet est quidam specialis actus. Unde devotio est specialis actus voluntatis. | I answer that, Devotion is derived from "devote" [*The Latin 'devovere' means 'to vow']; wherefore those persons are said to be "devout" who, in a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject themselves wholly to Him. Hence in olden times among the heathens a devotee was one who vowed to his idols to suffer death for the safety of his army, as Livy relates of the two Decii (Decad. I, viii, 9; x, 28). Hence devotion is apparently nothing else but the will to give oneself readily to things concerning the service of God. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 35:20,21) that "the multitude of the children of Israel . . . offered first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout mind." Now it is evident that the will to do readily what concerns the service of God is a special kind of act. Therefore devotion is a special act of the will. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod movens imponit modum motui mobilis. Voluntas autem movet alias vires animae ad suos actus, et voluntas secundum quod est finis, movet seipsam ad ea quae sunt ad finem, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo, cum devotio sit actus voluntatis hominis offerentis seipsum Deo ad ei serviendum, qui est ultimus finis, consequens est quod devotio imponat modum humanis actibus, sive sint ipsius voluntatis circa ea quae sunt ad finem, sive etiam sint aliarum potentiarum quae a voluntate moventur. | Reply to Objection 1: The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of the thing moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, and the will, in so far as it regards the end, moves both itself and whatever is directed to the end, as stated above (FS, Question [9], Article [3]). Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby a man offers himself for the service of God Who is the last end, it follows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts, whether they be acts of the will itself about things directed to the end, or acts of the other powers that are moved by the will. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod devotio invenitur in diversis generibus actuum non sicut species illorum generum, sed sicut motio moventis invenitur virtute in motibus mobilium. | Reply to Objection 2: Devotion is to be found in various genera of acts, not as a species of those genera, but as the motion of the mover is found virtually in the movements of the things moved. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod devotio est actus appetitivae partis animae, et est quidam motus voluntatis, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3: Devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the soul, and is a movement of the will, as stated above. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod devotio non sit actus religionis. Devotio enim, ut dictum est, ad hoc pertinet quod aliquis Deo se tradat. Sed hoc maxime fit per caritatem, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., divinus amor extasim facit, non sinens amantes sui ipsorum esse, sed eorum quae amant. Ergo devotio magis est actus caritatis quam religionis. | Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not an act of religion. Devotion, as stated above (Article [1]), consists in giving oneself up to God. But this is done chiefly by charity, since according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "the Divine love produces ecstasy, for it takes the lover away from himself and gives him to the beloved." Therefore devotion is an act of charity rather than of religion. |
| Praeterea, caritas praecedit religionem. Devotio autem videtur praecedere caritatem, quia caritas in Scripturis significatur per ignem, devotio vero per pinguedinem, quae est ignis materia. Ergo devotio non est actus religionis. | Objection 2: Further, charity precedes religion; and devotion seems to precede charity; since, in the Scriptures, charity is represented by fire, while devotion is signified by fatness which is the material of fire [*Cant. 8:6; Ps. 52:6]. Therefore devotion is not an act of religion. |
| Praeterea, per religionem homo ordinatur solum ad Deum, ut dictum est. Sed devotio etiam habetur ad homines, dicuntur enim aliqui esse devoti aliquibus sanctis viris; et etiam subditi dicuntur esse devoti dominis suis, sicut Leo Papa dicit quod Iudaei, quasi devoti Romanis legibus, dixerunt, non habemus regem nisi Caesarem. Ergo devotio non est actus religionis. | Objection 3: Further, by religion man is directed to God alone, as stated above (Question [81], Article [1]). But devotion is directed also to men; for we speak of people being devout to certain holy men, and subjects are said to be devoted to their masters; thus Pope Leo says [*Serm. viii, De Pass. Dom.] that the Jews "out of devotion to the Roman laws," said: "We have no king but Caesar." Therefore devotion is not an act of religion. |
| Sed contra est quod devotio dicitur a devovendo, ut dictum est. Sed votum est actus religionis. Ergo et devotio. | On the contrary, Devotion is derived from "devovere," as stated (Article [1]). But a vow is an act of religion. Therefore devotion is also an act of religion. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ad eandem virtutem pertinet velle facere aliquid, et promptam voluntatem habere ad illud faciendum, quia utriusque actus est idem obiectum. Propter quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., iustitia est qua volunt homines et operantur iusta. Manifestum est autem quod operari ea quae pertinent ad divinum cultum seu famulatum pertinet proprie ad religionem, ut ex praedictis patet. Unde etiam ad eam pertinet habere promptam voluntatem ad huiusmodi exequenda, quod est esse devotum. Et sic patet quod devotio est actus religionis. | I answer that, It belongs to the same virtue, to will to do something, and to have the will ready to do it, because both acts have the same object. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1): "It is justice whereby men both will end do just actions." Now it is evident that to do what pertains to the worship or service of God, belongs properly to religion, as stated above (Question [81]). Wherefore it belongs to that virtue to have the will ready to do such things, and this is to be devout. Hence it is evident that devotion is an act of religion. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad caritatem pertinet immediate quod homo tradat seipsum Deo adhaerendo ei per quandam spiritus unionem. Sed quod homo tradat seipsum Deo ad aliqua opera divini cultus, hoc immediate pertinet ad religionem, mediate autem ad caritatem, quae est religionis principium. | Reply to Objection 1: It belongs immediately to charity that man should give himself to God, adhering to Him by a union of the spirit; but it belongs immediately to religion, and, through the medium of religion, to charity which is the principle of religion, that man should give himself to God for certain works of Divine worship. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod pinguedo corporalis et generatur per calorem naturalem digerentem; et ipsum naturalem calorem conservat quasi eius nutrimentum. Et similiter caritas et devotionem causat, inquantum ex amore aliquis redditur promptus ad serviendum amico; et etiam per devotionem caritas nutritur, sicut et quaelibet amicitia conservatur et augetur per amicabilium operum exercitium et meditationem. | Reply to Objection 2: Bodily fatness is produced by the natural heat in the process of digestion, and at the same time the natural heat thrives, as it were, on this fatness. In like manner charity both causes devotion (inasmuch as love makes one ready to serve one's friend) and feeds on devotion. Even so all friendship is safeguarded and increased by the practice and consideration of friendly deeds. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod devotio quae habetur ad sanctos Dei, mortuos vel vivos, non terminatur ad ipsos, sed transit in Deum, inquantum scilicet in ministris Dei Deum veneramur. Devotio autem quam subditi dicuntur habere ad dominos temporales alterius est rationis, sicut et temporalibus dominis famulari differt a famulatu divino. | Reply to Objection 3: Devotion to God's holy ones, dead or living, does not terminate in them, but passes on to God, in so far as we honor God in His servants. But the devotion of subjects to their temporal masters is of another kind, just as service of a temporal master differs from the service of God. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod contemplatio, seu meditatio, non sit devotionis causa. Nulla enim causa impedit suum effectum. Sed subtiles meditationes intelligibilium multoties devotionem impediunt. Ergo contemplatio, seu meditatio, non est devotionis causa. | Objection 1: It would seem that contemplation or meditation is not the cause of devotion. No cause hinders its effect. But subtle considerations about abstract matters are often a hindrance to devotion. Therefore contemplation or meditation is not the cause of devotion. |
| Praeterea, si contemplatio esset propria et per se devotionis causa, oporteret quod ea quae sunt altioris contemplationis magis devotionem excitarent. Huius autem contrarium apparet, frequenter enim maior devotio excitatur ex consideratione passionis Christi, et aliis mysteriis humanitatis ipsius, quam ex consideratione divinae magnitudinis. Ergo contemplatio non est propria devotionis causa. | Objection 2: Further, if contemplation were the proper and essential cause of devotion, the higher objects of contemplation would arouse greater devotion. But the contrary is the case: since frequently we are urged to greater devotion by considering Christ's Passion and other mysteries of His humanity than by considering the greatness of His Godhead. Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion. |
| Praeterea, si contemplatio esset propria causa devotionis, oporteret quod illi qui sunt magis apti ad contemplationem essent etiam magis apti ad devotionem. Huius autem contrarium videmus, quia devotio frequenter magis invenitur in quibusdam simplicibus viris et in femineo sexu, in quibus invenitur contemplationis defectus. Ergo contemplatio non est propria causa devotionis. | Objection 3: Further, if contemplation were the proper cause of devotion, it would follow that those who are most apt for contemplation, are also most apt for devotion. Yet the contrary is to be noticed, for devotion is frequently found in men of simplicity and members of the female sex, who are defective in contemplation. Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion. |
| Sed contra est quod in Psalm. dicitur, in meditatione mea exardescet ignis. Sed ignis spiritualis causat devotionem. Ergo meditatio est devotionis causa. | On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 38:4): "In my meditation a fire shall flame out." But spiritual fire causes devotion. Therefore meditation is the cause of devotion. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod causa devotionis extrinseca et principalis Deus est; de quo dicit Ambrosius, super Luc., quod Deus quos dignatur vocat, et quem vult religiosum facit, et si voluisset, Samaritanos ex indevotis devotos fecisset. Causa autem intrinseca ex parte nostra, oportet quod sit meditatio seu contemplatio. Dictum est enim quod devotio est quidam voluntatis actus ad hoc quod homo prompte se tradat ad divinum obsequium. Omnis autem actus voluntatis ex aliqua consideratione procedit, eo quod bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, unde et Augustinus dicit, in libro de Trin., quod voluntas oritur ex intelligentia. Et ideo necesse est quod meditatio sit devotionis causa, inquantum scilicet per meditationem homo concipit quod se tradat divino obsequio. Ad quod quidem inducit duplex consideratio. Una quidem quae est ex parte divinae bonitatis et beneficiorum ipsius, secundum illud Psalm., mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est, ponere in domino Deo spem meam. Et haec consideratio excitat dilectionem, quae est proxima devotionis causa. Alia vero est ex parte hominis considerantis suos defectus, ex quibus indiget ut Deo innitatur, secundum illud Psalm., levavi oculos meos in montes, unde veniet auxilium mihi. Auxilium meum a domino, qui fecit caelum et terram. Et haec consideratio excludit praesumptionem, per quam aliquis impeditur ne Deo se subiiciat, dum suae virtuti innititur. | I answer that, The extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God, of Whom Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 9:55, says that "God calls whom He deigns to call, and whom He wills He makes religious: the profane Samaritans, had He so willed, He would have made devout." But the intrinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or contemplation. For it was stated above (Article [1]) that devotion is an act of the will to the effect that man surrenders himself readily to the service of God. Now every act of the will proceeds from some consideration, since the object of the will is a good understood. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 12; xv, 23) that "the will arises from the intelligence." Consequently meditation must needs be the cause of devotion, in so far as through meditation man conceives the thought of surrendering himself to God's service. Indeed a twofold consideration leads him thereto. The one is the consideration of God's goodness and loving kindness, according to Ps. 72:28, "It is good for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God": and this consideration wakens love [*'Dilectio,' the interior act of charity; cf. Question [27]] which is the proximate cause of devotion. The other consideration is that of man's own shortcomings, on account of which he needs to lean on God, according to Ps. 120:1,2, "I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to me: my help is from the Lord, Who made heaven and earth"; and this consideration shuts out presumption whereby man is hindered from submitting to God, because he leans on His strength. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod consideratio eorum quae nata sunt dilectionem Dei excitare, devotionem causant. Consideratio vero quorumcumque ad hoc non pertinentium, sed ab his mentem distrahentium, impedit devotionem. | Reply to Objection 1: The consideration of such things as are of a nature to awaken our love [*'Dilectio,' the interior act of charity; cf. Question [27]] of God, causes devotion; whereas the consideration of foreign matters that distract the mind from such things is a hindrance to devotion. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ea quae sunt divinitatis sunt secundum se maxime excitantia dilectionem, et per consequens devotionem, quia Deus est super omnia diligendus. Sed ex debilitate mentis humanae est quod sicut indiget manuduci ad cognitionem divinorum, ita ad dilectionem, per aliqua sensibilia nobis nota. Inter quae praecipuum est humanitas Christi, secundum quod in praefatione dicitur, ut dum visibiliter Deum cognoscimus, per hunc in invisibilium amorem rapiamur. Et ideo ea quae pertinent ad Christi humanitatem, per modum cuiusdam manuductionis, maxime devotionem excitant, cum tamen devotio principaliter circa ea quae sunt divinitatis consistat. | Reply to Objection 2: Matters concerning the Godhead are, in themselves, the strongest incentive to love ['dilectio,' the interior act of charity; cf. Question [27]] and consequently to devotion, because God is supremely lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the human mind that it needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge, but also to the love of Divine things by means of certain sensible objects known to us. Chief among these is the humanity of Christ, according to the words of the Preface [*Preface for Christmastide], "that through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to the love of things invisible." Wherefore matters relating to Christ's humanity are the chief incentive to devotion, leading us thither as a guiding hand, although devotion itself has for its object matters concerning the Godhead. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia, et quidquid aliud ad magnitudinem pertinet, occasio est quod homo confidat de seipso, et ideo non totaliter se Deo tradat. Et inde est quod huiusmodi quandoque occasionaliter devotionem impediunt, et in simplicibus et mulieribus devotio abundat, elationem comprimendo. Si tamen scientiam, et quamcumque aliam perfectionem, homo perfecte Deo subdat, ex hoc ipso devotio augetur. | Reply to Objection 3: Science and anything else conducive to greatness, is to man an occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly surrender himself to God. The result is that such like things sometimes occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and women devotion abounds by repressing pride. If, however, a man perfectly submits to God his science or any other perfection, by this very fact his devotion is increased. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod laetitia non sit devotionis effectus. Quia, ut dictum est, passio Christi praecipue ad devotionem excitat. Sed ex eius consideratione consequitur in anima quaedam afflictio, secundum illud Thren. III, recordare paupertatis meae, absinthii et fellis, quod pertinet ad passionem; et subditur, memoria memor ero, et tabescet in me anima mea. Ergo delectatio, sive gaudium, non est devotionis effectus. | Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not an effect of devotion. As stated above (Article [3], ad 2), Christ's Passion is the chief incentive to devotion. But the consideration thereof causes an affliction of the soul, according to Lam. 3:19, "Remember my poverty . . . the wormwood and the gall," which refers to the Passion, and afterwards (Lam. 3:20) it is said: "I will be mindful and remember, and my soul shall languish within me." Therefore delight or joy is not the effect of devotion. |
| Praeterea, devotio praecipue consistit in interiori sacrificio spiritus. Sed in Psalm. dicitur, sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus. Ergo afflictio magis est devotionis effectus quam iucunditas sive gaudium. | Objection 2: Further, devotion consists chiefly in an interior sacrifice of the spirit. But it is written (Ps. 50:19): "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit." Therefore affliction is the effect of devotion rather than gladness or joy. |
| Praeterea, Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, in libro de homine, quod sicut risus procedit ex gaudio, ita lacrimae et gemitus sunt signa tristitiae. Sed ex devotione contingit quod aliqui prorumpant in lacrimas. Ergo laetitia, vel gaudium, non est devotionis effectus. | Objection 3: Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De Homine xii) [*Orat. funebr. de Placilla Imp.] that "just as laughter proceeds from joy, so tears and groans are signs of sorrow." But devotion makes some people shed tears. Therefore gladness or joy is not the effect of devotion. |
| Sed contra est quod in collecta dicitur, quos ieiunia votiva castigant, ipsa quoque devotio sancta laetificet. | On the contrary, We say in the Collect [*Thursday after fourth Sunday of Lent]: "That we who are punished by fasting may be comforted by a holy devotion." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod devotio per se quidem et principaliter spiritualem laetitiam mentis causat, ex consequenti autem et per accidens causat tristitiam. Dictum est enim quod devotio ex duplici consideratione procedit. Principaliter quidem ex consideratione divinae bonitatis, quia ista consideratio pertinet quasi ad terminum motus voluntatis tradentis se Deo. Et ex ista consideratione per se quidem sequitur delectatio, secundum illud Psalm., memor fui Dei, et delectatus sum, sed per accidens haec consideratio tristitiam quandam causat in his qui nondum plene Deo fruuntur, secundum illud Psalm., sitivit anima mea ad Deum vivum, et postea sequitur, fuerunt mihi lacrimae meae et cetera. Secundario vero causatur devotio, ut dictum est, ex consideratione propriorum defectuum, nam haec consideratio pertinet ad terminum a quo homo per motum voluntatis devotae recedit, ut scilicet non in se existat, sed Deo se subdat. Haec autem consideratio e converso se habet ad primam. Nam per se quidem nata est tristitiam causare, recogitando proprios defectus, per accidens autem laetitiam, scilicet propter spem divinae subventionis. Et sic patet quod ad devotionem primo et per se consequitur delectatio, secundario autem et per accidens tristitia quae est secundum Deum. | I answer that, The direct and principal effect of devotion is the spiritual joy of the mind, though sorrow is its secondary and indirect effect. For it has been stated (Article [3]) that devotion is caused by a twofold consideration: chiefly by the consideration of God's goodness, because this consideration belongs to the term, as it were, of the movement of the will in surrendering itself to God, and the direct result of this consideration is joy, according to Ps. 76:4, "I remembered God, and was delighted"; but accidentally this consideration causes a certain sorrow in those who do not yet enjoy God fully, according to Ps. 41:3, "My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God," and afterwards it is said (Ps. 41:4): "My tears have been my bread," etc. Secondarily devotion is caused as stated (Article [3]), by the consideration of one's own failings; for this consideration regards the term from which man withdraws by the movement of his devout will, in that he trusts not in himself, but subjects himself to God. This consideration has an opposite tendency to the first: for it is of a nature to cause sorrow directly (when one thinks over one's own failings), and joy accidentally, namely, through hope of the Divine assistance. It is accordingly evident that the first and direct effect of devotion is joy, while the secondary and accidental effect is that "sorrow which is according to God" [*2 Cor. 7:10]. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in consideratione passionis Christi est aliquid quod contristet, scilicet defectus humanus, propter quem tollendum Christum pati oportuit, et est aliquid quod laetificet, scilicet Dei erga nos benignitas, quae nobis de tali liberatione providit. | Reply to Objection 1: In the consideration of Christ's Passion there is something that causes sorrow, namely, the human defect, the removal of which made it necessary for Christ to suffer [*Lk. 24:25]; and there is something that causes joy, namely, God's loving-kindness to us in giving us such a deliverance. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod spiritus qui ex una parte contribulatur propter praesentis vitae defectus, ex alia parte condelectatur ex consideratione divinae bonitatis et ex spe divini auxilii. | Reply to Objection 2: The spirit which on the one hand is afflicted on account of the defects of the present life, on the other hand is rejoiced, by the consideration of God's goodness, and by the hope of the Divine help. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod lacrimae prorumpunt non solum ex tristitia, sed etiam ex quadam affectus teneritudine, praecipue cum consideratur aliquid delectabile cum permixtione alicuius tristabilis; sicut solent homines lacrimari ex pietatis affectu cum recuperant filios vel caros amicos quos aestimaverant se perdidisse. Et per hunc modum lacrimae ex devotione procedunt. | Reply to Objection 3: Tears are caused not only through sorrow, but also through a certain tenderness of the affections, especially when one considers something that gives joy mixed with pain. Thus men are wont to shed tears through a sentiment of piety, when they recover their children or dear friends, whom they thought to have lost. In this way tears arise from devotion. |