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Deinde considerandum est de actibus quibus aliquae res exteriores Deo offeruntur. Circa quos occurrit duplex consideratio,
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod offerre sacrificium Deo non sit de lege naturae. Ea enim quae sunt iuris naturalis communia sunt apud omnes. Non autem hoc contingit circa sacrificia, nam quidam leguntur obtulisse in sacrificium panem et vinum, sicut de Melchisedech dicitur, Gen. XIV; et quidam haec, quidam illa animalia. Ergo oblatio sacrificiorum non est de iure naturali. | Objection 1: It would seem that offering a sacrifice to God is not of the natural law. Things that are of the natural law are common among all men. Yet this is not the case with sacrifices: for we read of some, e.g. Melchisedech (Gn. 14:18), offering bread and wine in sacrifice, and of certain animals being offered by some, and others by others. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is not of the natural law. |
| Praeterea, ea quae sunt iuris naturalis omnes iusti servaverunt. Sed non legitur de Isaac quod sacrificium obtulerit, neque etiam de Adam, de quo tamen dicitur, Sap. X, quod sapientia eduxit eum a delicto suo. Ergo oblatio sacrificii non est de iure naturali. | Objection 2: Further, things that are of the natural law were observed by all just men. Yet we do not read that Isaac offered sacrifice; nor that Adam did so, of whom nevertheless it is written (Wis. 10:2) that wisdom "brought him out of his sin." Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not of the natural law. |
| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei, quod sacrificia in quadam significantia offeruntur. Voces autem, quae sunt praecipua inter signa, sicut idem dicit, in libro de Doct. Christ., non significant naturaliter, sed ad placitum, secundum philosophum. Ergo sacrificia non sunt de lege naturali. | Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5,19) that sacrifices are offered in signification of something. Now words which are chief among signs, as he again says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), "signify, not by nature but by convention," according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i, 2). Therefore sacrifices are not of the natural law. |
| Sed contra est quod in qualibet aetate, et apud quaslibet hominum nationes, semper fuit aliqua sacrificiorum oblatio. Quod autem est apud omnes, videtur naturale esse. Ergo et oblatio sacrificii est de iure naturali. | On the contrary, At all times and among all nations there has always been the offering of sacrifices. Now that which is observed by all is seemingly natural. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is of the natural law. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod naturalis ratio dictat homini quod alicui superiori subdatur, propter defectus quos in seipso sentit, in quibus ab aliquo superiori eget adiuvari et dirigi. Et quidquid illud sit, hoc est quod apud omnes dicitur Deus. Sicut autem in rebus naturalibus naturaliter inferiora superioribus subduntur, ita etiam naturalis ratio dictat homini secundum naturalem inclinationem ut ei quod est supra hominem subiectionem et honorem exhibeat secundum suum modum. Est autem modus conveniens homini ut sensibilibus signis utatur ad aliqua exprimenda, quia ex sensibilibus cognitionem accipit. Et ideo ex naturali ratione procedit quod homo quibusdam sensibilibus rebus utatur offerens eas Deo, in signum debitae subiectionis et honoris, secundum similitudinem eorum qui dominis suis aliqua offerunt in recognitionem dominii. Hoc autem pertinet ad rationem sacrificii. Et ideo oblatio sacrificii pertinet ad ius naturale. | I answer that, Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a higher being, on account of the defects which he perceives in himself, and in which he needs help and direction from someone above him: and whatever this superior being may be, it is known to all under the name of God. Now just as in natural things the lower are naturally subject to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural reason in accordance with man's natural inclination that he should tender submission and honor, according to his mode, to that which is above man. Now the mode befitting to man is that he should employ sensible signs in order to signify anything, because he derives his knowledge from sensibles. Hence it is a dictate of natural reason that man should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in sign of the subjection and honor due to Him, like those who make certain offerings to their lord in recognition of his authority. Now this is what we mean by a sacrifice, and consequently the offering of sacrifice is of the natural law. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, aliqua in communi sunt de iure naturali quorum determinationes sunt de iure positivo, sicut quod malefactores puniantur habet lex naturalis, sed quod tali poena vel tali puniantur est ex institutione divina vel humana. Similiter etiam oblatio sacrificii in communi est de lege naturae, et ideo in hoc omnes conveniunt. Sed determinatio sacrificiorum est ex institutione humana vel divina, et ideo in hoc differunt. | Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (FS, Question [95], Article [2]), certain things belong generically to the natural law, while their determination belongs to the positive law; thus the natural law requires that evildoers should be punished; but that this or that punishment should be inflicted on them is a matter determined by God or by man. In like manner the offering of sacrifice belongs generically to the natural law, and consequently all are agreed on this point, but the determination of sacrifices is established by God or by man, and this is the reason for their difference. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Adam et Isaac, sicut et alii iusti, Deo sacrificium obtulerunt secundum sui temporis congruentiam, ut patet per Gregorium, qui dicit quod apud antiquos per sacrificiorum oblationes remittebatur pueris originale peccatum. Non tamen de omnibus iustorum sacrificiis fit mentio in Scriptura, sed solum de illis circa quae aliquid speciale accidit. Potest tamen esse ratio quare Adam non legitur sacrificium obtulisse, ne, quia in ipso notatur origo peccati, simul etiam in eo sanctificationis origo significaretur. Isaac vero significavit Christum inquantum ipse oblatus est in sacrificium. Unde non oportebat ut significaret quasi sacrificium offerens. | Reply to Objection 2: Adam, Isaac and other just men offered sacrifice to God in a manner befitting the times in which they lived, according to Gregory, who says (Moral. iv, 3) that in olden times original sin was remitted through the offering of sacrifices. Nor does Scripture mention all the sacrifices of the just, but only those that have something special connected with them. Perhaps the reason why we read of no sacrifice being offered by Adam may be that, as the origin of sin is ascribed to him, the origin of sanctification ought not to be represented as typified in him. Isaac was a type of Christ, being himself offered in sacrifice; and so there was no need that he should be represented as offering a sacrifice. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod significare conceptus suos est homini naturale, sed determinatio signorum est secundum humanum placitum. | Reply to Objection 3: It is natural to man to express his ideas by signs, but the determination of those signs depends on man's pleasure. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non soli summo Deo sit sacrificium offerendum. Cum enim sacrificium Deo offerri debeat, videtur quod omnibus illis sit sacrificium offerendum qui divinitatis consortes fiunt. Sed etiam sancti homines efficiuntur divinae naturae consortes, ut dicitur II Petri I, unde et de eis in Psalm. dicitur, ego dixi, dii estis. Angeli etiam filii Dei nominantur, ut patet Iob I. Ergo omnibus his debet sacrificium offerri. | Objection 1: It would seem that sacrifice should not be offered to the most high God alone. Since sacrifice ought to be offered to God, it would seem that it ought to be offered to all such as are partakers of the Godhead. Now holy men are made "partakers of the Divine nature," according to 2 Pt. 1:4; wherefore of them is it written (Ps. 81:6): "I have said, You are gods": and angels too are called "sons of God," according to Job 1:6. Thus sacrifice should be offered to all these. |
| Praeterea, quanto aliquis maior est, tanto ei maior honor debet exhiberi. Sed Angeli et sancti sunt multo maiores quibuscumque terrenis principibus, quibus tamen eorum subditi multo maiorem honorem impendunt, se coram eis prosternentes et munera offerentes, quam sit oblatio alicuius animalis vel rei alterius in sacrificium. Ergo multo magis Angelis et sanctis potest sacrificium offerri. | Objection 2: Further, the greater a person is the greater the honor due to him from man. Now the angels and saints are far greater than any earthly princes: and yet the subjects of the latter pay them much greater honor, by prostrating before them, and offering them gifts, than is implied by offering an animal or any other thing in sacrifice. Much more therefore may one offer sacrifice to the angels and saints. |
| Praeterea, templa et altaria instituuntur ad sacrificia offerenda. Sed templa et altaria instituuntur Angelis et sanctis. Ergo etiam sacrificia possunt eis offerri. | Objection 3: Further, temples and altars are raised for the offering of sacrifices. Yet temples and altars are raised to angels and saints. Therefore sacrifices also may be offered to them. |
| 42646] II-IIae q. 85 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod. XXII, qui immolat diis, occidetur, praeter domino soli. | On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:20): "He that sacrificeth to gods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, oblatio sacrificii fit ad aliquid significandum. Significat autem sacrificium quod offertur exterius, interius spirituale sacrificium, quo anima seipsam offert Deo, secundum illud Psalm., sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus, quia, sicut supra dictum est, exteriores actus religionis ad interiores ordinantur. Anima autem se offert Deo in sacrificium sicut principio suae creationis et sicut fini suae beatificationis. Secundum autem veram fidem solus Deus est creator animarum nostrarum, ut in primo habitum est. In solo etiam eo animae nostrae beatitudo consistit, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo sicut soli Deo summo debemus sacrificium spirituale offerre, ita etiam soli ei debemus offerre exteriora sacrificia, sicut etiam, orantes atque laudantes, ad eum dirigimus significantes voces cui res ipsas in corde quas significamus, offerimus, ut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei. Hoc etiam videmus in omni republica observari, quod summum rectorem aliquo signo singulari honorant, quod cuicumque alteri deferretur, esset crimen laesae maiestatis. Et ideo in lege divina statuitur poena mortis his qui divinum honorem aliis exhibent. | I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), a sacrifice is offered in order that something may be represented. Now the sacrifice that is offered outwardly represents the inward spiritual sacrifice, whereby the soul offers itself to God according to Ps. 50:19, "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit," since, as stated above (Question [81], Article [7]; Question [84], Article [2]), the outward acts of religion are directed to the inward acts. Again the soul offers itself in sacrifice to God as its beginning by creation, and its end by beatification: and according to the true faith God alone is the creator of our souls, as stated in the FP, Question [90], Article [3]; FS, Question [118], Article [2], while in Him alone the beatitude of our soul consists, as stated above (FS, Question [1], Article [8]; FS, Question [2], Article [8]; FS, Question [3], Articles [1],7,8). Wherefore just as to God alone ought we to offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought we to offer outward sacrifices to Him alone: even so "in our prayers and praises we proffer significant words to Him to Whom in our hearts we offer the things which we designate thereby," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 19). Moreover we find that in every country the people are wont to show the sovereign ruler some special sign of honor, and that if this be shown to anyone else, it is a crime of high-treason. Therefore, in the Divine law, the death punishment is assigned to those who offer Divine honor to another than God. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nomen divinitatis communicatur aliquibus non per aequalitatem, sed per participationem. Et ideo nec aequalis honor eis debetur. | Reply to Objection 1: The name of the Godhead is communicated to certain ones, not equally with God, but by participation; hence neither is equal honor due to them. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod in oblatione sacrificii non pensatur pretium occisi pecoris, sed significatio, qua hoc fit in honorem summi rectoris totius universi. Unde, sicut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei, Daemones non cadaverinis nidoribus, sed divinis honoribus gaudent. | Reply to Objection 2: The offering of a sacrifice is measured not by the value of the animal killed, but by its signification, for it is done in honor of the sovereign Ruler of the whole universe. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), "the demons rejoice, not in the stench of corpses, but in receiving divine honors." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, VIII de Civ. Dei, non constituimus martyribus templa, sacerdotia, quoniam non ipsi, sed Deus eorum nobis est Deus. Unde sacerdos non dicit, offero tibi sacrificium, Petre, vel Paule. Sed Deo de illorum victoriis gratias agimus, et nos ad imitationem eorum adhortamur. | Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii, 19), "we do not raise temples and priesthoods to the martyrs, because not they but their God is our God. Wherefore the priest says not: I offer sacrifice to thee, Peter or Paul. But we give thanks to God for their triumphs, and urge ourselves to imitate them." |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod oblatio sacrificii non sit specialis actus virtutis. Dicit enim Augustinus, X de Civ. Dei, verum sacrificium est omne opus quod agitur ut sancta societate inhaereamus Deo. Sed omne opus bonum non est specialis actus alicuius determinatae virtutis. Ergo oblatio sacrificii non est specialis actus determinatae virtutis. | Objection 1: It would seem that the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of virtue. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "A true sacrifice is any work done that we may cleave to God in holy fellowship." But not every good work is a special act of some definite virtue. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite virtue. |
| Praeterea, maceratio corporis quae fit per ieiunium, pertinet ad abstinentiam; quae autem fit per continentiam, pertinet ad castitatem; quae autem est in martyrio, pertinet ad fortitudinem. Quae omnia videntur comprehendi sub sacrificii oblatione, secundum illud Rom. XII, exhibeatis corpora vestra hostiam viventem. Dicit etiam apostolus, ad Heb. ult., beneficentiae et communionis nolite oblivisci, talibus enim hostiis promeretur Deus, beneficentia autem et communio pertinent ad caritatem, misericordiam et liberalitatem. Ergo sacrificii oblatio non est specialis actus determinatae virtutis. | Objection 2: Further, the mortification of the body by fasting belongs to abstinence, by continence belongs to chastity, by martyrdom belongs to fortitude. Now all these things seem to be comprised in the offering of sacrifice, according to Rm. 12:1, "Present your bodies a living sacrifice." Again the Apostle says (Heb. 13:16): "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained." Now it belongs to charity, mercy and liberality to do good and to impart. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite virtue. |
| Praeterea, sacrificium videtur quod Deo exhibetur. Sed multa sunt quae Deo exhibentur, sicut devotio, oratio, decimae, primitiae, oblationes et holocausta. Ergo sacrificium non videtur esse aliquis specialis actus determinatae virtutis. | Objection 3: Further, a sacrifice is apparently anything offered to God. Now many things are offered to God, such as devotion, prayer, tithes, first-fruits, oblations, and holocausts. Therefore sacrifice does not appear to be a special act of a definite virtue. |
| Sed contra est quod in lege specialia praecepta de sacrificiis dantur, ut patet in principio Levitici. | On the contrary, The law contains special precepts about sacrifices, as appears from the beginning of Leviticus. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, quando actus unius virtutis ordinatur ad finem alterius virtutis, participat quodammodo speciem eius, sicut cum quis furatur ut fornicetur, ipsum furtum accipit quodammodo fornicationis deformitatem, ita quod si etiam alias non esset peccatum, ex hoc iam peccatum esset quod ad fornicationem ordinatur. Sic igitur sacrificium est quidam specialis actus laudem habens ex hoc quod in divinam reverentiam fit. Propter quod ad determinatam virtutem pertinet, scilicet ad religionem. Contingit autem etiam ea quae secundum alias virtutes fiunt, in divinam reverentiam ordinari, puta cum aliquis eleemosynam facit de rebus propriis propter Deum, vel cum aliquis proprium corpus alicui afflictioni subiicit propter divinam reverentiam. Et secundum hoc etiam actus aliarum virtutum sacrificia dici possunt. Sunt tamen quidam actus qui non habent ex alio laudem nisi quia fiunt propter reverentiam divinam. Et isti actus proprie sacrificia dicuntur, et pertinent ad virtutem religionis. | I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [18], Articles [6],7), where an act of one virtue is directed to the end of another virtue it partakes somewhat of its species; thus when a man thieves in order to commit fornication, his theft assumes, in a sense, the deformity of fornication, so that even though it were not a sin otherwise, it would be a sin from the very fact that it was directed to fornication. Accordingly, sacrifice is a special act deserving of praise in that it is done out of reverence for God; and for this reason it belongs to a definite virtue, viz. religion. But it happens that the acts of the other virtues are directed to the reverence of God, as when a man gives alms of his own things for God's sake, or when a man subjects his own body to some affliction out of reverence for God; and in this way the acts also of other virtues may be called sacrifices. On the other hand there are acts that are not deserving of praise save through being done out of reverence for God: such acts are properly called sacrifices, and belong to the virtue of religion. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod Deo quadam spirituali societate volumus inhaerere, ad divinam reverentiam pertinet. Et ideo cuiuscumque virtutis actus rationem sacrificii accipit ex hoc quod agitur ut sancta societate Deo inhaereamus. | Reply to Objection 1: The very fact that we wish to cling to God in a spiritual fellowship pertains to reverence for God: and consequently the act of any virtue assumes the character of a sacrifice through being done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod triplex est hominis bonum. Primum quidem est bonum animae, quod Deo offertur interiori quodam sacrificio per devotionem et orationem et alios huiusmodi interiores actus. Et hoc est principale sacrificium. Secundum est bonum corporis, quod Deo quodammodo offertur per martyrium, et abstinentiam seu continentiam. Tertium est bonum exteriorum rerum, de quo sacrificium offertur Deo, directe quidem, quando immediate res nostras Deo offerimus; mediate autem, quando eas communicamus proximis propter Deum. | Reply to Objection 2: Man's good is threefold. There is first his soul's good which is offered to God in a certain inward sacrifice by devotion, prayer and other like interior acts: and this is the principal sacrifice. The second is his body's good, which is, so to speak, offered to God in martyrdom, and abstinence or continency. The third is the good which consists of external things: and of these we offer a sacrifice to God, directly when we offer our possession to God immediately, and indirectly when we share them with our neighbor for God's sake. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod sacrificia proprie dicuntur quando circa res Deo oblatas aliquid fit, sicut quod animalia occidebantur, quod panis frangitur et comeditur et benedicitur. Et hoc ipsum nomen sonat, nam sacrificium dicitur ex hoc quod homo facit aliquid sacrum. Oblatio autem directe dicitur cum Deo aliquid offertur, etiam si nihil circa ipsum fiat, sicut dicuntur offerri denarii vel panes in altari, circa quos nihil fit. Unde omne sacrificium est oblatio, sed non convertitur. Primitiae autem oblationes sunt, quia Deo offerebantur, ut legitur Deut. XXVI, non autem sunt sacrificia, quia nihil sacrum circa eas fiebat. Decimae autem, proprie loquendo, non sunt neque sacrificia neque oblationes, quia non immediate Deo, sed ministris divini cultus exhibentur. | Reply to Objection 3: A "sacrifice," properly speaking, requires that something be done to the thing which is offered to God, for instance animals were slain and burnt, the bread is broken, eaten, blessed. The very word signifies this, since "sacrifice" is so called because a man does something sacred [facit sacrum]. On the other hand an "oblation" is properly the offering of something to God even if nothing be done thereto, thus we speak of offering money or bread at the altar, and yet nothing is done to them. Hence every sacrifice is an oblation, but not conversely. "First-fruits" are oblations, because they were offered to God, according to Dt. 26, but they are not a sacrifice, because nothing sacred was done to them. "Tithes," however, are neither a sacrifice nor an oblation, properly speaking, because they are not offered immediately to God, but to the ministers of Divine worship. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes teneantur ad sacrificia offerenda. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. III, quaecumque lex loquitur, his qui sunt in lege loquitur. Sed lex de sacrificiis non fuit omnibus data, sed soli populo Hebraeorum. Ergo non omnes ad sacrificia tenebantur. | Objection 1: It would seem that all are not bound to offer sacrifices. The Apostle says (Rm. 3:19): "What things soever the Law speaketh, it speaketh to them that are in the Law." Now the law of sacrifices was not given to all, but only to the Hebrew people. Therefore all are not bound to offer sacrifices. |
| Praeterea, sacrificia Deo offeruntur ad aliquid significandum. Sed non est omnium huiusmodi significationes intelligere. Ergo non omnes tenentur ad sacrificia offerenda. | Objection 2: Further, sacrifices are offered to God in order to signify something. But not everyone is capable of understanding these significations. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices. |
| Praeterea, ex hoc sacerdotes dicuntur quod Deo sacrificium offerunt. Sed non omnes sunt sacerdotes. Ergo non omnes tenentur ad sacrificia offerenda. | Objection 3: Further, priests [*'Sacerdotes': Those who give or administer sacred things (sacra dantes): cf. 1 Cor. 4:1] are so called because they offer sacrifice to God. But all are not priests. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices. |
| Sed contra est quod sacrificium offerre est de lege naturae, ut supra habitum est. Ad ea autem quae sunt legis naturae omnes tenentur. Ergo omnes tenentur ad sacrificium Deo offerendum. | On the contrary, The offering of sacrifices of is of the natural law, as stated above (Article [1]). Now all are bound to do that which is of the natural law. Therefore all are bound to offer sacrifice to God. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est sacrificium, sicut dictum est. Quorum primum et principale est sacrificium interius, ad quod omnes tenentur, omnes enim tenentur Deo devotam mentem offerre. Aliud autem est sacrificium exterius. Quod in duo dividitur. Nam quoddam est quod ex hoc solum laudem habet quod Deo aliquid exterius offertur in protestationem divinae subiectionis. Et ad hoc aliter tenentur illi qui sunt sub lege nova vel veteri, aliter illi qui non sunt sub lege. Nam illi qui sunt sub lege, tenentur ad determinata sacrificia offerenda secundum legis praecepta. Illi vero qui non erant sub lege, tenebantur ad aliqua exterius facienda in honorem divinum, secundum condecentiam ad eos inter quos habitabant, non autem determinate ad haec vel ad illa. Aliud vero est exterius sacrificium quando actus exteriores aliarum virtutum in divinam reverentiam assumuntur. Quorum quidam cadunt sub praecepto, ad quos omnes tenentur, quidam vero sunt supererogationis, ad quos non omnes tenentur. | I answer that, Sacrifice is twofold, as stated above (Article [2]). The first and principal is the inward sacrifice, which all are bound to offer, since all are obliged to offer to God a devout mind. The other is the outward sacrifice, and this again is twofold. There is a sacrifice which is deserving of praise merely through being offered to God in protestation of our subjection to God: and the obligation of offering this sacrifice was not the same for those under the New or the Old Law, as for those who were not under the Law. For those who are under the Law are bound to offer certain definite sacrifices according to the precepts of the Law, whereas those who were not under the Law were bound to perform certain outward actions in God's honor, as became those among whom they dwelt, but not definitely to this or that action. The other outward sacrifice is when the outward actions of the other virtues are performed out of reverence for God; some of which are a matter of precept; and to these all are bound, while others are works of supererogation, and to these all are not bound. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad illa determinata sacrificia quae in lege erant praecepta, non omnes tenebantur, tenebantur tamen ad aliqua sacrificia interiora vel exteriora, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: All were not bound to offer those particular sacrifices which were prescribed in the Law: but they were bound to some sacrifices inward or outward, as stated above. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod quamvis non omnes sciant explicite virtutem sacrificiorum, sciunt tamen implicite, sicut et habent fidem implicitam, ut supra habitum est. | Reply to Objection 2: Though all do not know explicitly the power of the sacrifices, they know it implicitly, even as they have implicit faith, as stated above (Question [2], Articles 6,7). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod sacerdotes offerunt sacrificia quae sunt specialiter ordinata ad cultum divinum, non solum pro se, sed etiam pro aliis. Quaedam vero sunt alia sacrificia quae quilibet potest pro se Deo offerre, ut ex supradictis patet. | Reply to Objection 3: The priests offer those sacrifices which are specially directed to the Divine worship, not only for themselves but also for others. But there are other sacrifices, which anyone can offer to God for himself as explained above (Articles [2],3). |