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| Deinde considerandum est de amicitia quae affabilitas dicitur; et de vitiis oppositis, quae sunt adulatio et litigium. Circa amicitiam autem seu affabilitatem quaeruntur duo. | We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum sit specialis virtus. | (1) Whether it is a special virtue? |
| Secundo, utrum sit pars iustitiae. | (2) Whether it is a part of justice? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amicitia non sit specialis virtus. Dicit enim philosophus, in VIII Ethic., quod amicitia perfecta est quae est propter virtutem. Quaelibet autem virtus est amicitiae causa, quia bonum omnibus est amabile, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo amicitia non est specialis virtus, sed consequens omnem virtutem. | Objection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that "the perfect friendship is that which is on account of virtue." Now any virtue is the cause of friendship: "since the good is lovable to all," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a consequence of every virtue. |
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., de tali amico, quod non in amando vel inimicando recipit singula ut oportet. Sed quod aliquis signa amicitiae ostendat ad eos quos non amat, videtur pertinere ad simulationem, quae repugnat virtuti. Ergo huiusmodi amicitia non est virtus. | Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind of friend that he "takes everything in a right manner both from those he loves and from those who are not his friends." Now it seems to pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship to those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue. Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue. |
| Praeterea, virtus in medietate constituitur prout sapiens determinabit, sicut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed Eccle. VII dicitur, cor sapientum ubi tristitia, et cor stultorum ubi laetitia, unde ad virtuosum pertinet maxime a delectatione sibi cavere, ut dicitur II Ethic. Haec autem amicitia per se quidem desiderat condelectare, contristare autem reveretur, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Ergo huiusmodi amicitia non est virtus. | Objection 3: Further, virtue "observes the mean according as a wise man decides" (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 7:5): "The heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth": wherefore "it belongs to a virtuous man to be most wary of pleasure" (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), "is essentially desirous of sharing pleasures, but fears to give pain." Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue. |
| Sed contra, praecepta legis dantur de actibus virtutum. Sed Eccli. IV dicitur, congregationi pauperum affabilem te facito. Ergo affabilitas, quae hic amicitia dicitur, est quaedam specialis virtus. | On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. Now it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): "Make thyself affable to the congregation of the poor." Therefore affability, which is what we mean by friendship, is a special virtue. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, cum virtus ordinetur ad bonum, ubi occurrit specialis ratio boni, ibi oportet esse specialem rationem virtutis. Bonum autem in ordine consistit, sicut supra dictum est. Oportet autem hominem convenienter ad alios homines ordinari in communi conversatione, tam in factis quam in dictis, ut scilicet ad unumquemque se habeat secundum quod decet. Et ideo oportet esse quandam specialem virtutem quae hanc convenientiam ordinis observet. Et haec vocatur amicitia sive affabilitas. | I answer that, As stated above (Question [109], Article [2]; FS, Question [55], Article [3]), since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists in order, as stated above (Question [109], Article [2]). And it behooves man to be maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order: and this virtue is called friendliness. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus in libro Ethicorum de duplici amicitia loquitur. Quarum una consistit principaliter in affectu quo unus alium diligit. Et haec potest consequi quamcumque virtutem. Quae autem ad hanc amicitiam pertinent, supra de caritate dicta sunt. Aliam vero amicitiam ponit quae consistit in solis exterioribus verbis vel factis. Quae quidem non habet perfectam rationem amicitiae, sed quandam eius similitudinem, inquantum scilicet quis decenter se habet ad illos cum quibus conversatur. | Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in his Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in treating of charity (Question [23], Article [1], Article [3], ad 1; Questions [25],26), what things belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this has not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those with whom he is in contact. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis homo naturaliter omni homini est amicus quodam generali amore, sicut etiam dicitur Eccli. XIII, quod omne animal diligit simile sibi. Et hunc amorem repraesentant signa amicitiae quae quis exterius ostendit in verbis vel factis etiam extraneis et ignotis. Unde non est ibi simulatio. Non enim ostendit eis signa perfectae amicitiae, quia non eodem modo se habet familiariter ad extraneos sicut ad eos qui sunt sibi speciali amicitia iuncti. | Reply to Objection 2: Every man is naturally every man's friend by a certain general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that "every beast loveth its like." This love is signified by signs of friendship, which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this: because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do not treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to us by special friendship. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod cor sapientum dicitur esse ubi tristitia non quidem ut ipse proximo tristitiam inferat, dicit enim apostolus, si propter cibum frater tuus contristatur, iam non secundum caritatem ambulas, sed ut contristantibus consolationem ferat, secundum illud Eccli. VII, non desis plorantibus in consolationem, et cum lugentibus ambula. Cor autem stultorum est ubi laetitia, non quidem ut ipsi alios laetificent, sed ut ipsi aliorum laetitia perfruantur. Pertinet ergo ad sapientem ut condelectationem afferat his cum quibus conversatur, non quidem lascivam, quam virtus cavet, sed honestam; secundum illud Psalm., ecce quam bonum et quam iucundum habitare fratres in unum. | Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that "the heart of the wise is where there is mourning" it is not that he may bring sorrow to his neighbor, for the Apostle says (Rm. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity": but that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful, according to Ecclus. 7:38, "Be not wanting in comforting them that weep, and walk with them that mourn." Again, "the heart of fools is where there is mirth," not that they may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others' gladness. Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures with those among whom he dwells, not lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures, according to Ps. 132:1, "Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity." |
| Quandoque tamen, propter aliquod bonum consequens vel propter aliquod malum excludendum, non refugiet virtuosus eos quibus convivit contristare, ut philosophus dicit, IV Ethic. Unde et apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. VII, si contristavi vos in epistola, non me poenitet, et postea, gaudeo, non quia contristati estis, sed quia contristati estis ad poenitentiam. Et ideo his qui sunt proni ad peccandum non debemus hilarem vultum ostendere ad eos delectandum, ne videamur eorum peccato consentire et quodammodo peccandi audaciam ministrare. Unde dicitur Eccli. VII, filiae tibi sunt, serva corpus illarum, et non ostendas hilarem faciem tuam ad illas. | Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): "Although I made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent," and further on (2 Cor. 7:9), "I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto repentance." For this reason we should not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that we may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin, and in a way encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 7:26): "Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and show not thy countenance gay towards them." |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod huiusmodi amicitia non sit pars iustitiae. Ad iustitiam enim pertinet reddere debitum alteri. Sed hoc non pertinet ad hanc virtutem, sed solum delectabiliter aliis convivere. Ergo huiusmodi virtus non est pars iustitiae. | Objection 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part of justice. |
| Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in IV Ethic., huiusmodi virtus consistit circa delectationem vel tristitiam quae est in convictu. Sed moderari maximas delectationes pertinet ad temperantiam, ut supra habitum est. Ergo haec virtus magis est pars temperantiae quam iustitiae. | Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest pleasures, as stated above (FS, Question [60], Article [5]; FS, Question [61], Article [3]). Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of justice. |
| Praeterea, aequalia inaequalibus exhibere contra iustitiam est, ut supra habitum est. Sed sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., haec virtus similiter ad ignotos et notos, et consuetos et inconsuetos operatur. Ergo haec virtus non est pars iustitiae, sed magis ei contrariatur. | Objection 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is contrary to justice, as stated above (Question [59], Articles [1],2). Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue "treats in like manner known and unknown, companions and strangers." Therefore this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto. |
| Sed contra est quod Macrobius ponit amicitiam partem iustitiae. | On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a part of justice. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod haec virtus est pars iustitiae, inquantum adiungitur ei sicut principali virtuti. Convenit enim cum iustitia in hoc quod ad alterum est, sicut et iustitia. Deficit autem a ratione iustitiae, quia non habet plenam debiti rationem, prout aliquis alteri obligatur vel debito legali, ad cuius solutionem lex cogit, vel etiam aliquo debito proveniente ex aliquo beneficio suscepto, sed solum attendit quoddam debitum honestatis, quod magis est ex parte ipsius virtuosi quam ex parte alterius, ut scilicet faciat alteri quod decet eum facere. | I answer that, This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to it as to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is directed to another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of the notion of justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is bound to another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him to pay, or by some debt arising out of a favor received. For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely, that we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, unless at times, for some reason, it be necessary to displease them for some good purpose. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, debet ex quadam honestate veritatis manifestationem aliis hominibus, sine qua societas hominum durare non posset. Sicut autem non posset vivere homo in societate sine veritate, ita nec sine delectatione, quia sicut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., nullus potest per diem morari cum tristi, neque cum non delectabili. Et ideo homo tenetur ex quodam debito naturali honestatis ut homo aliis delectabiliter convivat, nisi propter aliquam causam necesse sit aliquando alios utiliter contristare. | Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above (Question [109], Article [3], ad 1), because man is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the manifestation of truth without which human society could not last. Now as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not without joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a certain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for their good. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ad temperantiam pertinet refrenare delectationes sensibiles. Sed haec virtus consistit circa delectationes in convictu, quae ex ratione proveniunt, inquantum unus ad alterum decenter se habet. Et has delectationes non oportet refrenare tanquam noxias. | Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which have their origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves becomingly towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as though they were noisome. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi non est intelligendum quod aliquis eodem modo debeat colloqui et convivere notis et ignotis, quia, ut ipse ibidem subdit, non similiter convenit consuetos et extraneos curare aut contristare. Sed in hoc attenditur similitudo, quod ad omnes oportet facere quod decet. | Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that one ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and strangers, since, as he says (Ethic. iv, 6), "it is not fitting to please and displease intimate friends and strangers in the same way." This likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all in a fitting manner. |