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| Deinde considerandum est de dono correspondente iustitiae, scilicet de pietate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. | We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely, piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum sit donum spiritus sancti. | (1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost? |
| Secundo, quid in beatitudinibus et fructibus ei respondeat. | (2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pietas non sit donum. Dona enim a virtutibus differunt, ut supra habitum est. Sed pietas est quaedam virtus, ut supra habitum est. Ergo pietas non est donum. | Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ from the virtues, as stated above (FS, Question [68], Article [1]). But piety is a virtue, as stated above (Question [101], Article [3]). Therefore piety is not a gift. |
| Praeterea, dona sunt excellentiora virtutibus, maxime moralibus, ut supra habitum est. Sed inter partes iustitiae religio est potior pietate. Si ergo aliqua pars iustitiae debeat poni donum, videtur quod magis religio deberet esse donum quam pietas. | Objection 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, above all the moral virtues, as above (FS, Question [68], Article [8]). Now among the parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if any part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion should be a gift rather than piety. |
| Praeterea, dona manent in patria, et actus donorum, ut supra habitum est. Sed actus pietatis non potest manere in patria, dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., quod pietas cordis viscera misericordiae operibus replet; et sic non erit in patria, ubi nulla erit miseria. Ergo pietas non est donum. | Objection 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as stated above (FS, Question [68], Article [6]). But the act of piety cannot remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "piety fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy": and so there will be no piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Question [30], Article [1]]. Therefore piety is not a gift. |
| Sed contra est quod Isaiae XI ponitur inter dona. | On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh chapter of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: 'godliness'] [*"Pietas," whence our English word "pity," which is the same as mercy.] |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, dona spiritus sancti sunt quaedam habituales animae dispositiones quibus est prompte mobilis a spiritu sancto. Inter cetera autem, movet nos spiritus sanctus ad hoc quod affectum quendam filialem habeamus ad Deum, secundum illud Rom. VIII, accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum, in quo clamamus, abba, pater. Et quia ad pietatem proprie pertinet officium et cultum patri exhibere, consequens est quod pietas secundum quam cultum et officium exhibemus Deo ut patri per instinctum spiritus sancti sit spiritus sancti donum. | I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [68], Article [1]; FS, Question [69], Articles [1],3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial affection towards God, according to Rm. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)." And since it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father, it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we pay worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pietas quae exhibet patri carnali officium et cultum, est virtus, sed pietas quae est donum, hoc exhibet Deo ut patri. | Reply to Objection 1: The piety that pays duty and worship to a father in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God as Father. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod exhibere cultum Deo ut creatori, quod facit religio, est excellentius quam exhibere cultum patri carnali, quod facit pietas quae est virtus. Sed exhibere cultum Deo ut patri est adhuc excellentius quam exhibere cultum Deo ut creatori et domino. Unde religio est potior pietate virtute, sed pietas secundum quod est donum, est potior religione. | Reply to Objection 2: To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as Father is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and Lord. Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the gift of piety is greater than religion. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut per pietatem quae est virtus exhibet homo officium et cultum non solum patri carnali, sed etiam omnibus sanguine iunctis, secundum quod pertinent ad patrem; ita etiam pietas secundum quod est donum, non solum exhibet cultum et officium Deo, sed omnibus hominibus inquantum pertinent ad Deum. Et propter hoc ad ipsam pertinet honorare sanctos, non contradicere Scripturae, sive intellectae sive non intellectae, sicut Augustinus dicit, in II de Doct. Christ. Ipsa etiam ex consequenti subvenit in miseria constitutis. Et quamvis iste actus non habeat locum in patria, praecipue post diem iudicii, habebit tamen locum praecipuus actus eius, qui est revereri Deum affectu filiali, quod praecipue tunc erit, secundum illud Sap. V, ecce quomodo computati sunt inter filios Dei. Erit etiam mutua honoratio sanctorum ad invicem. Nunc autem, ante diem iudicii, miserentur sancti etiam eorum qui in statu huius miseriae vivunt. | Reply to Objection 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his kindred on account of their being related to his father so by the gift of piety he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii). Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness. And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the Day of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that this act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, "Behold how they are numbered among the children of God." The saints will also mutually honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day, the saints have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dono pietatis non respondeat secunda beatitudo, scilicet, beati mites. Pietas enim est donum respondens iustitiae. Ad quam magis pertinet quarta beatitudo, scilicet, beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam, vel etiam quinta, beati misericordes, quia, ut dictum est, opera misericordiae pertinent ad pietatem. Non ergo secunda beatitudo pertinet ad donum pietatis. | Objection 1: It seems that the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the gift corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," or the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," since as stated above (Article [1], Objection [3]), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore the second beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety. |
| Praeterea, donum pietatis dirigitur dono scientiae, quod adiungitur in connumeratione donorum Isaiae XI. Ad idem autem se extendunt dirigens et exequens. Cum igitur ad scientiam pertineat tertia beatitudo, scilicet, beati qui lugent, videtur quod non pertineat ad pietatem secunda beatitudo. | Objection 2: Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts (Is. 11). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter. Since, then, the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," corresponds to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second beatitude corresponds to piety. |
| Praeterea, fructus respondent beatitudinibus et donis, ut supra habitum est. Sed inter fructus, bonitas et benignitas magis videntur convenire cum pietate quam mansuetudo, quae pertinet ad mititatem. Ergo secunda beatitudo non respondet dono pietatis. | Objection 3: Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and gifts, as stated above (FS, Question [70], Article [2]). Now among the fruits, goodness and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness, which pertains to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not correspond to the gift of piety. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, pietas congruit mitibus. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Piety is becoming to the meek." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod in adaptatione beatitudinum ad dona duplex convenientia potest attendi. Una quidem secundum rationem ordinis, quam videtur Augustinus fuisse secutus. Unde primam beatitudinem attribuit infimo dono, scilicet timori; secundam autem scilicet, beati mites, attribuit pietati; et sic de aliis. Alia convenientia potest attendi secundum propriam rationem doni et beatitudinis. Et secundum hoc, oporteret adaptare beatitudines donis secundum obiecta et actus. Et ita pietati magis responderet quarta et quinta beatitudo quam secunda. Secunda tamen beatitudo habet aliquam convenientiam cum pietate, inquantum scilicet per mansuetudinem tolluntur impedimenta actuum pietatis. | I answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which they are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore he assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," to piety, and so on. Another congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes to the gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth and fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather than the second. Yet the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. | This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum proprietatem beatitudinum et donorum, oportet quod eadem beatitudo respondeat scientiae et pietati. Sed secundum rationem ordinis, diversae beatitudines eis adaptantur, observata tamen aliquali convenientia, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to their proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to knowledge and piety: but taking them according to their order, different beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity may be observed, as stated above. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod bonitas et benignitas in fructibus directe attribui possunt pietati, mansuetudo autem indirecte, inquantum tollit impedimenta actuum pietatis, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3: In the fruits goodness and benignity may be directly ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it removes obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above. |