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Consequenter considerandum est de temperantia.
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod temperantia non sit virtus. Nulla enim virtus repugnat inclinationi naturae, eo quod in nobis est naturalis aptitudo ad virtutem, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed temperantia retrahit a delectationibus, ad quas natura inclinat, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo temperantia non est virtus. | Objection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue goes against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a natural aptitude for virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Now temperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines, according to Ethic. ii, 3,8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue. |
| Praeterea, virtutes sunt connexae ad invicem, ut supra habitum est. Sed aliqui habent temperantiam qui non habent alias virtutes, multi enim inveniuntur temperati qui tamen sunt avari vel timidi. Ergo temperantia non est virtus. | Objection 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above (FS, Question [65], Article [1]). But some people have temperance without having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue. |
| Praeterea, cuilibet virtuti respondet aliquod donum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed temperantiae non videtur aliquod donum respondere, quia iam in superioribus dona omnia sunt aliis virtutibus attributa. Ergo temperantia non est virtus. | Objection 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as appears from what we have said above (FS, Question [68], Article [4]). But seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have been already ascribed to the other virtues (Questions [8],9,19,45,52, 71,139). Therefore temperance is not a virtue. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in VI musicae, ea est virtus quae temperantia nominatur. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the name of a virtue." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, de ratione virtutis est ut inclinet hominem ad bonum. Bonum autem hominis est secundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Et ideo virtus humana est quae inclinat ad id quod est secundum rationem. Manifeste autem ad hoc inclinat temperantia, nam in ipso eius nomine importatur quaedam moderatio seu temperies, quam ratio facit. Et ideo temperantia est virtus. | I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [55], Article [3]), it is essential to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its very name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes. Therefore temperance is a virtue. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura inclinat in id quod est conveniens unicuique. Unde homo naturaliter appetit delectationem sibi convenientem. Quia vero homo, inquantum huiusmodi, est rationalis, consequens est quod delectationes sunt homini convenientes quae sunt secundum rationem. Et ab his non retrahit temperantia, sed potius ab his quae sunt contra rationem. Unde patet quod temperantia non contrariatur inclinationi naturae humanae, sed convenit cum ea. Contrariatur tamen inclinationi naturae bestialis non subiectae rationi. | Reply to Objection 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with reason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod temperantia, secundum quod perfecte habet rationem virtutis, non est sine prudentia, qua carent quicumque vitiosi. Et ideo illi qui carent aliis virtutibus, oppositis vitiis subditi, non habent temperantiam quae est virtus, sed operantur actus temperantiae ex quadam naturali dispositione, prout virtutes quaedam imperfectae sunt hominibus naturales, ut supra dictum est; vel per consuetudinem acquisita, quae sine prudentia non habet perfectionem rationis, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue, though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, in so far as certain imperfect virtues are either natural to man, as stated above (FS, Question [63], Article [1]), or acquired by habituation, which virtues, through lack of prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated above (FS, Question [65], Article [1]). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod temperantiae etiam respondet aliquod donum, scilicet timoris, quo aliquis refrenatur a delectationibus carnis, secundum illud Psalmi, confige timore tuo carnes meas. Donum autem timoris principaliter quidem respicit Deum, cuius offensam vitat, et secundum hoc correspondet virtuti spei, ut supra dictum est. Secundario autem potest respicere quaecumque aliquis refugit ad vitandam Dei offensam. Maxime autem homo indiget timore divino ad fugiendum ea quae maxime alliciunt, circa quae est temperantia. Et ideo temperantiae etiam respondet donum timoris. | Reply to Objection 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear, whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according to Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear." The gift of fear has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above (Question [19], Article [9], ad 1). But it may have for its secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God. Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance: wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod temperantia non sit specialis virtus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccle., quod ad temperantiam pertinet Deo sese integrum incorruptumque servare. Sed hoc convenit omni virtuti. Ergo temperantia est virtus generalis. | Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to temperance to preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption for God's sake." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue. |
| Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., quod in temperantia maxime tranquillitas animi spectatur et quaeritur. Sed hoc pertinet ad omnem virtutem. Ergo temperantia est generalis virtus. | Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we observe and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue. |
| Praeterea, Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., quod decorum ab honesto nequit separari, et quod iusta omnia decora sunt. Sed decorum proprie consideratur in temperantia, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo temperantia non est specialis virtus. | Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just is beautiful." Now the beautiful is considered as proper to temperance, according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27). Therefore temperance is not a special virtue. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et III Ethic., ponit eam specialem virtutem. | On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it a special virtue. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum consuetudinem humanae locutionis, aliqua nomina communia restringuntur ad ea quae sunt praecipua inter illa quae sub tali communitate continentur, sicut nomen urbis accipitur antonomastice pro Roma. Sic igitur nomen temperantiae dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, secundum communitatem suae significationis. Et sic temperantia non est virtus specialis, sed generalis, quia nomen temperantiae significat quandam temperiem, idest moderationem, quam ratio ponit in humanis operationibus et passionibus; quod est commune in omni virtute morali. Differt tamen ratione temperantia a fortitudine etiam secundum quod utraque sumitur ut virtus communis. Nam temperantia retrahit ab his quae contra rationem appetitum alliciunt, fortitudo autem impellit ad ea sustinenda vel aggredienda propter quae homo refugit bonum rationis. | I answer that, It is customary in human speech to employ a common term in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things to which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word "temperance" has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a general virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue. Yet there is a logical difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason. |
| Si vero consideretur antonomastice temperantia, secundum quod refrenat appetitum ab his quae maxime alliciunt hominem, sic est specialis virtus, utpote habens specialem materiam, sicut et fortitudo. | On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a special matter. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetitus hominis maxime corrumpitur per ea quibus allicitur homo ad recedendum a regula rationis et legis divinae. Et ideo, sicut ipsum temperantiae nomen dupliciter potest sumi, uno modo communiter, alio modo excellenter; ita et integritas, quam temperantiae Augustinus attribuit. | Reply to Objection 1: Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law. Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can, like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and secondly in a sense of excellence. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ea circa quae est temperantia maxime possunt animum inquietare, propter hoc quod sunt homini essentialia, ut infra dicetur. Et ideo tranquillitas animi per quandam excellentiam attribuitur temperantiae, quamvis communiter conveniat omnibus virtutibus. | Reply to Objection 2: The things about which temperance is concerned have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are natural to man, as we shall state further on (Articles [4],5). Hence tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although it is a common property of all the virtues. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod quamvis pulchritudo conveniat cuilibet virtuti, excellenter tamen attribuitur temperantiae, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, secundum communem rationem temperantiae, ad quam pertinet quaedam moderata et conveniens proportio, in qua consistit ratio pulchritudinis, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Alio modo, quia ea a quibus refrenat temperantia sunt infima in homine, convenientia sibi secundum naturam bestialem, ut infra dicetur, et ideo ex eis maxime natus est homo deturpari. Et per consequens pulchritudo maxime attribuitur temperantiae, quae praecipue turpitudinem hominis tollit. Et ex eadem etiam ratione honestum maxime attribuitur temperantiae. Dicit enim Isidorus, in libro Etymol., honestus dicitur quod nihil habeat turpitudinis, nam honestas dicitur quasi honoris status, qui maxime consideratur in temperantia, quae repellit vitia maxime opprobriosa, ut infra dicetur. | Reply to Objection 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First, in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his animal nature, as we shall state further on (Articles [4],5; Question [142], Article [4]), wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute of temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who has no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state." This is most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Question [142], Article [4]). |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod temperantia non sit solum circa concupiscentias et delectationes. Dicit enim Tullius, in sua rhetorica, quod temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio. Sed impetus animi dicuntur omnes animae passiones. Ergo videtur quod temperantia non sit solum circa concupiscentias et delectationes. | Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other wanton emotions of the mind." Now all the passions of the soul are called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures. |
| Praeterea, virtus est circa difficile et bonum. Sed difficilius videtur esse temperare timorem, maxime circa pericula mortis, quam moderari concupiscentias et delectationes, quae propter dolores et pericula mortis contemnuntur, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaest. Ergo videtur quod virtus temperantiae non sit praecipue circa concupiscentias et delectationes. | Objection 2: Further, "Virtue is about the difficult and the good" [*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear, especially with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires and pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and dangers, according to Augustine (Questions [83], qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and pleasures. |
| Praeterea, ad temperantiam pertinet moderationis gratia, ut Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic. Et Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., quod ad temperantiam pertinet omnis sedatio perturbationum animi, et rerum modus. Oportet autem modum ponere non solum in concupiscentiis et delectationibus, sed etiam in exterioribus actibus et quibuslibet exterioribus. Ergo temperantia non est solum circa concupiscentias et delectationes. | Objection 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) "the grace of moderation belongs to temperance": and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27) that "it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the mind and to enforce moderation." Now moderation is needed, not only in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever pertains to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about desires and pleasures. |
| Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod temperantia est qua libido concupiscentiaque refrenatur. | On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym.) [*The words quoted do not occur in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii, and De Different. ii, 39]: that "it is temperance whereby lust and desire are kept under control." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad virtutem moralem pertinet conservatio boni rationis contra passiones rationi repugnantes. Motus autem passionum animae est duplex, ut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Unus quidem secundum quod appetitus sensitivus prosequitur sensibilia et corporalia bona; alius autem secundum quod refugit sensibilia et corporalia mala. | I answer that, As stated above (Question [123], Article [12]; Question [136], Article [1]), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the passions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's passions is twofold, as stated above (FS, Question [23], Article [2]), when we were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive appetite pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it flies from sensible and bodily evils. |
| Primus autem motus appetitus sensitivi praecipue repugnat rationi per immoderantiam. Nam bona sensibilia et corporalia, secundum suam speciem considerata, non repugnant rationi, sed magis serviunt ei, sicut instrumenta quibus ratio utitur ad consecutionem proprii finis. Repugnant autem ei praecipue secundum quod appetitus sensitivus in ea tendit non secundum modum rationis. Et ideo ad virtutem moralem proprie pertinet moderari huiusmodi passiones quae important prosecutionem boni. | The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason, but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing to the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good. |
| Motus autem appetitus sensitivi refugientis mala sensibilia, praecipue contrariatur rationi non quidem secundum suam immoderantiam, sed maxime secundum suum effectum, prout scilicet aliquis, refugiendo mala sensibilia et corporalia, quae interdum concomitantur bonum rationis, per consequens discedit ab ipso bono rationis. Et ideo ad virtutem moralem pertinet in huiusmodi firmitatem praestare in bono rationis. | On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when a man flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying from evil to remain firm in the good of reason. |
| Sicut ergo virtus fortitudinis, de cuius ratione est firmitatem praestare, praecipue consistit circa passionem pertinentem ad fugam corporalium malorum, scilicet circa timorem; ex consequenti autem circa audaciam, quae aggreditur terribilia sub spe alicuius boni, ita etiam temperantia, quae importat moderationem quandam, praecipue consistit circa passiones tendentes in bona sensibilia, scilicet circa concupiscentiam et delectationem; consequenter autem circa tristitias quae contingunt ex absentia talium delectationum. Nam sicut audacia praesupponit terribilia, ita etiam tristitia talis provenit ex absentia praedictarum delectationum. | Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz. fear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring, which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good, so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise from the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the absence of the aforesaid pleasures. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, passiones quae pertinent ad fugam mali praesupponunt passiones quae pertinent ad prosecutionem boni, et passiones irascibilis praesupponunt passiones concupiscibilis. Et sic, dum temperantia directe modificat passiones concupiscibilis tendentes in bonum, per quandam consequentiam modificat omnes alias passiones, inquantum ad moderantiam priorum sequitur moderantia posteriorum. Qui enim non immoderate concupiscit, consequens est ut moderate speret, et moderate de absentia concupiscibilium tristetur. | Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (FS, Question [23], Articles [1],2; FS, Question [25], Article [1]), when we were treating of the passions, those passions which pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions pertaining to the pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible presuppose the passions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance directly moderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards good, as a consequence, it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch as moderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the passions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the things he desires. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod concupiscentia importat impetum quendam appetitus in delectabile, qui indiget refrenatione, quod pertinet ad temperantiam. Sed timor importat retractionem quandam animi ab aliquibus malis, contra quod indiget homo animi firmitate, quam praestat fortitudo. Et ideo temperantia proprie est circa concupiscentias, fortitudo circa timores. | Reply to Objection 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards the object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to temperance. on the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and fortitude about fears. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod exteriores actus procedunt ab interioribus animae passionibus. Et ideo moderatio eorum dependet a moderatione interiorum passionum. | Reply to Objection 3: External acts proceed from the internal passions of the soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of the internal passions. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod temperantia non solum sit circa concupiscentias et delectationes tactus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccle., quod munus temperantiae est in coercendis sedandisque cupiditatibus, quibus inhiamus in ea quae nos avertunt a legibus Dei et a fructu bonitatis eius. Et post pauca subdit quod officium temperantiae est contemnere omnes corporeas illecebras, laudemque popularem. Sed non solum cupiditates delectationum tactus avertunt nos a legibus Dei, sed etiam concupiscentiae delectationum aliorum sensuum, quae etiam pertinent ad illecebras corporales, et similiter cupiditates divitiarum, vel etiam mundanae gloriae, unde dicitur, I ad Tim. ult., quod radix omnium malorum est cupiditas. Ergo temperantia non est solum circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus. | Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that "the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and from the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular praise." Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by the desire for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is written (1 Tim. 6:10). "Desire [*'Cupiditas,' which is the Douay version following the Greek {philargyria} renders 'desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Therefore temperance is not only about desires of pleasures of touch. |
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod ille qui est parvis dignus et his dignificat seipsum, est temperatus, non autem magnanimus. Sed honores parvi vel magni, de quibus ibi loquitur, non sunt delectabiles secundum tactum, sed secundum apprehensionem animalem. Ergo temperantia non est solum circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus. | Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate, but he is not magnificent." Now honors, whether small or great, of which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch, but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only about desires for pleasures of touch. |
| Praeterea, ea quae sunt unius generis, videntur eadem ratione pertinere ad materiam alicuius virtutis. Sed omnes delectationes sensuum videntur esse unius generis. Ergo pari ratione pertinent ad materiam temperantiae. | Objection 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect. Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus. Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance. |
| Praeterea, delectationes spirituales sunt maiores quam corporales, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Sed quandoque propter concupiscentias delectationum spiritualium aliqui discedunt a legibus Dei et a statu virtutis, sicut propter curiositatem scientiae. Unde et primo homini Diabolus scientiam promisit, Gen. III, dicens, eritis sicut dii, scientes bonum et malum. Ergo non solum est temperantia circa delectationes tactus. | Objection 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures of the body, as stated above (FS, Question [31], Article [5]) in the treatise on the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the state of virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man knowledge, saying (Gn. 3:5): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil." Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch. |
| Praeterea, si delectationes tactus essent propria materia temperantiae, oporteret quod circa omnes delectationes tactus temperantia esset. Non autem est circa omnes, puta circa eas quae sunt in ludis. Ergo delectationes tactus non sunt propria materia temperantiae. | Objection 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of temperance. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod temperantia proprie est circa concupiscentias et delectationes tactus. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ita est temperantia circa concupiscentias et delectationes sicut fortitudo circa timores et audacias. Fortitudo autem est circa timores et audacias respectu maximorum malorum, quibus ipsa natura extinguitur, quae sunt pericula mortis. Unde similiter temperantia oportet quod sit circa concupiscentias maximarum delectationum. Et quia delectatio consequitur operationem connaturalem, tanto aliquae delectationes sunt vehementiores quanto consequuntur operationes magis naturales. Maxime autem naturales animalibus sunt operationes quibus conservatur natura individui per cibum et potum, et natura speciei per coniunctionem maris et feminae. Et ideo circa delectationes ciborum et potuum, et circa delectationes venereorum, est proprie temperantia. Huiusmodi autem delectationes consequuntur sensum tactus. Unde relinquitur quod temperantia sit circa delectationes tactus. | I answer that, As stated above (Article [3]), temperance is about desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring. Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the sense of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about pleasures of touch. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibi videtur accipere temperantiam non secundum quod est specialis virtus habens determinatam materiam, sed secundum quod ad eam pertinet moderatio rationis in quacumque materia, quod pertinet ad generalem conditionem virtutis. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod ille qui potest refrenare maximas delectationes, multo etiam magis potest refrenare minores delectationes. Et ideo ad temperantiam principaliter quidem et proprie pertinet moderari concupiscentias delectationum tactus, secundario autem, alias concupiscentias. | Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but as concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and secondarily other pleasures. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod philosophus ibi refert nomen temperantiae ad moderationem exteriorum rerum, dum scilicet aliquis tendit in aliqua sibi commensurata, non autem prout refertur ad moderationem affectionum animae, quae pertinet ad virtutem temperantiae. | Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod delectationes aliorum sensuum aliter se habent in hominibus, et aliter in aliis animalibus. In aliis enim animalibus ex aliis sensibus non causantur delectationes nisi in ordine ad sensibilia tactus, sicut leo delectatur videns cervum vel audiens vocem eius, propter cibum. Homo autem delectatur secundum alios sensus non solum propter hoc, sed etiam propter convenientiam sensibilium. Et sic circa delectationes aliorum sensuum, inquantum referuntur ad delectationes tactus, est temperantia, non principaliter, sed ex consequenti. Inquantum autem sensibilia aliorum sensuum sunt delectabilia propter sui convenientiam, sicut cum delectatur homo in sono bene harmonizato, ista delectatio non pertinet ad conservationem naturae. Unde non habent huiusmodi passiones illam principalitatem ut circa eas antonomastice temperantia dicatur. | Reply to Objection 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a different part in man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in relation to his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the other senses, not only for this reason, but also on account of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to pleasures of touch, not principally but consequently: while in so far as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature. Hence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can be referred to them antonomastically. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod delectationes spirituales, etsi secundum suam naturam sint maiores delectationibus corporalibus, tamen non ita percipiuntur sensu. Et per consequens non ita vehementer afficiunt appetitum sensitivum, contra cuius impetum bonum rationis conservatur per moralem virtutem. Vel dicendum quod delectationes spirituales, per se loquendo, sunt secundum rationem. Unde non sunt refrenandae, nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet una delectatio spiritualis retrahit ab alia potiori et magis debita. | Reply to Objection 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a hindrance to another greater and more binding. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod non omnes delectationes tactus pertinent ad naturae conservationem. Et ideo non oportet quod circa omnes delectationes tactus sit temperantia. | Reply to Objection 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of nature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod circa proprias delectationes gustus sit temperantia. Delectationes enim gustus sunt in cibis et potibus, qui sunt magis necessarii ad vitam hominis quam delectationes venereorum, quae pertinent ad tactum. Sed secundum praedicta, temperantia est circa delectationes eorum quae sunt necessaria ad vitam hominis. Ergo temperantia est magis circa proprias delectationes gustus quam circa proprias delectationes tactus. | Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink, which are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which regard the touch. But according to what has been said (Article [4]), temperance is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste rather than about those proper to the touch. |
| Praeterea, temperantia est circa passiones magis quam circa res ipsas. Sed sicut dicitur in II de anima, tactus videtur esse sensus alimenti, quantum ad ipsam substantiam alimenti, sapor autem, qui est proprie obiectum gustus, est sicut delectamentum alimentorum. Ergo temperantia magis est circa gustum quam circa tactum. | Objection 2: Further, temperance is about the passions rather than about things themselves. Now, according to De Anima ii, 3, "the touch is the sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food, whereas "savor" which is the proper object of the taste, is "the pleasing quality of the food." Therefore temperance is about the taste rather than about the touch. |
| Praeterea, sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., circa eadem sunt temperantia et intemperantia, continentia et incontinentia, perseverantia et mollities, ad quam pertinent deliciae. Sed ad delicias videtur pertinere delectatio quae est in saporibus, qui pertinent ad gustum. Ergo temperantia est circa delectationes proprias gustus. | Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. vii, 4,7: "temperance and intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit quod temperantia et intemperantia videntur gustu parum vel nihil uti. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the taste." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, temperantia consistit circa praecipuas delectationes, quae maxime pertinent ad conservationem humanae vitae, vel in specie vel in individuo. In quibus aliquid consideratur principaliter, aliquid autem secundario. Principaliter quidem ipse usus rei necessariae, puta vel feminae, quae est necessaria ad conservationem speciei; vel cibi vel potus, quae sunt necessaria ad conservationem individui. Et ipse usus horum necessariorum habet quandam essentialem delectationem adiunctam. | I answer that, As stated above (Article [4]), temperance is about the greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life either in the species or in the individual. In these matters certain things are to be considered as principal and others as secondary. The principal thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the species, or of food and drink which are necessary for the preservation of the individual: while the very use of these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto. |
| Secundario autem consideratur circa utrumque usum aliquid quod facit ad hoc quod usus sit magis delectabilis, sicut pulchritudo et ornatus feminae, et sapor delectabilis in cibo, et etiam odor. Et ideo principaliter temperantia est circa delectationem tactus, quae per se consequitur ipsum usum rerum necessariarum, quarum omnis usus est in tangendo. Circa delectationes autem vel gustus vel olfactus vel visus, est temperantia et intemperantia secundario, inquantum sensibilia horum sensuum conferunt ad delectabilem usum rerum necessariarum, qui pertinet ad tactum. Quia tamen gustus propinquior est tactui quam alii sensus, ideo temperantia magis est circa gustum quam circa alios sensus. | In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a pleasing savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of these necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the touch. Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things that have relation to the touch. But since the taste is more akin to the touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance is more about the taste than about the other senses. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam ipse usus ciborum, et delectatio essentialiter ipsum consequens, ad tactum pertinet, unde philosophus dicit, in II de anima, quod tactus est sensus alimenti, nutrimur enim calido et frigido, humido et sicco. Sed ad gustum pertinet discretio saporum, qui conferunt ad delectationem alimenti, inquantum sunt signa convenientis nutrimenti. | Reply to Objection 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3) that "touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold, wet or dry." To the taste belongs the discernment of savors, which make the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its being suitable for nourishment. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod delectatio saporis est quasi superveniens, sed delectatio tactus per se consequitur usum cibi et potus. | Reply to Objection 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional, so to speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the use of food and drink. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod deliciae principaliter quidem consistunt in ipsa substantia alimenti, sed secundario in exquisito sapore et praeparatione ciborum. | Reply to Objection 3: Delicacy regards principally the substance of the food, but secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in which it is served. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod regula temperantiae non sit sumenda secundum necessitatem praesentis vitae. Superius enim non regulatur ab inferiori. Sed temperantia, cum sit virtus animae, est superior quam necessitas corporalis. Ergo regula temperantiae non debet sumi secundum necessitatem corporalem. | Objection 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not regulated according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the body. |
| Praeterea, quicumque excedit regulam, peccat. Si ergo necessitas corporalis esset regula temperantiae, quicumque aliqua delectatione uteretur supra necessitatem naturae, quae valde modicis contenta est, peccaret contra temperantiam. Quod videtur esse inconveniens. | Objection 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the needs of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin against temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required by nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem unreasonable. |
| Praeterea, nullus attingens regulam peccat. Si ergo necessitas corporalis esset regula temperantiae, quicumque uteretur aliqua delectatione propter necessitatem corporalem, puta propter sanitatem, esset immunis a peccato. Hoc autem videtur esse falsum. Ergo necessitas corporalis non est regula temperantiae. | Objection 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin in using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for the sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need of the body is not the rule of temperance. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccle., habet vir temperans in rebus huius vitae regulam utroque testamento firmatam, ut eorum nihil diligat, nihil per se appetendum putet; sed ad vitae huius atque officiorum necessitatem quantum sat est usurpet, utentis modestia, non amantis affectu. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): "In both Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule forbidding him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them desirable for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself of those things with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a lover, in so far as they are requisite for the needs of this life and of his station." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, bonum virtutis moralis praecipue consistit in ordine rationis, nam bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Praecipuus autem ordo rationis consistit ex hoc quod aliqua in finem ordinat, et in hoc ordine maxime consistit bonum rationis nam bonum habet rationem finis, et ipse finis est regula eorum quae sunt ad finem. Omnia autem delectabilia quae in usum hominis veniunt, ordinantur ad aliquam vitae huius necessitatem sicut ad finem. Et ideo temperantia accipit necessitatem huius vitae sicut regulam delectabilium quibus utitur, ut scilicet tantum eis utatur quantum necessitas huius vitae requirit. | I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]; Question [109], Article [2]; Question [123], Article [12]), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason: because "man's good is to be in accord with reason," as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is that by which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good of reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed to some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance takes the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects of which it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of this life requires. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, necessitas huius vitae habet rationem regulae inquantum est finis. Considerandum est autem quod quandoque aliud est finis operantis, et aliud finis operis, sicut patet quod aedificationis finis est domus, sed aedificatoris finis quandoque est lucrum. Sic igitur temperantiae ipsius finis et regula est beatitudo, sed eius rei qua utitur, finis et regula est necessitas humanae vitae, infra quam est id quod in usum vitae venit. | Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the need of this life is regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed that sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work, thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is useful for life is subordinate. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod necessitas humanae vitae potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, secundum quod dicitur necessarium id sine quo res nullo modo potest esse, sicut cibus est necessarius animali; alio modo, secundum quod necessarium dicitur id sine quo res non potest convenienter esse. Temperantia autem non solum attendit primam necessitatem, sed etiam secundam, unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod temperatus appetit delectabilia propter sanitatem, vel propter bonam habitudinem. Alia vero quae ad hoc non sunt necessaria, possunt dupliciter se habere. Quaedam enim sunt impedimenta sanitatis vel bonae habitudinis. Et his nullo modo temperatus utitur, hoc enim esset peccatum contra temperantiam. Quaedam vero sunt quae non sunt his impedimenta. Et his moderate utitur, pro loco et tempore et congruentia eorum quibus convivit. Et ideo ibidem philosophus dicit quod et temperatus appetit alia delectabilia, quae scilicet non sunt necessaria ad sanitatem vel ad bonam habitudinem, non impedimenta his existentia. | Reply to Objection 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term "necessary" to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man desires pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound condition of body." Other things that are not necessary for this purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But others are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in keeping with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) says that the "temperate man also desires other pleasant things," those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to these things." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, temperantia respicit necessitatem quantum ad convenientiam vitae. Quae quidem attenditur non solum secundum convenientiam corporis, sed etiam secundum convenientiam exteriorum rerum, puta divitiarum et officiorum; et multo magis secundum convenientiam honestatis. Et ideo philosophus ibidem subdit quod in delectabilibus quibus temperatus utitur, non solum considerat ut non sint impeditiva sanitatis et bonae habitudinis corporalis, sed etiam ut non sint praeter bonum, idest contra honestatem; et quod non sint supra substantiam, idest supra facultatem divitiarum. Et Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccle., quod temperatus respicit non solum necessitatem huius vitae, sed etiam officiorum. | Reply to Objection 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need according to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external things, such as riches and station, and more still on the requirements of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily condition, but also that they be not inconsistent with good," i.e. good conduct, nor "beyond his substance," i.e. his means. And Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi) that the "temperate man considers the need" not only "of this life" but also "of his station." |
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| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod temperantia non sit virtus cardinalis. Bonum enim virtutis moralis a ratione dependet. Sed temperantia est circa ea quae magis distant a ratione, scilicet circa delectationes quae sunt nobis et brutis communes, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo temperantia non videtur esse principalis virtus. | Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue. For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is about those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal virtue. |
| Praeterea, quanto aliquid est magis impetuosum, tanto difficilius videtur esse ad refrenandum. Sed ira, quam refrenat mansuetudo, videtur esse impetuosior quam concupiscentia, quam refrenat temperantia, dicitur enim Prov. XXVII, ira non habet misericordiam, nec erumpens furor, et impetum concitati spiritus ferre quis poterit? Ergo mansuetudo est principalior virtus quam temperantia. | Objection 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it to control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be more impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it is written (Prov. 27:4): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth; and who can bear the violence [impetum] of one provoked?" Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than temperance. |
| Praeterea, spes est principalior motus animae quam desiderium seu concupiscentia, ut supra habitum est. Sed humilitas refrenat praesumptionem immoderatae spei. Ergo humilitas videtur esse principalior virtus quam temperantia, quae refrenat concupiscentiam. | Objection 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of desire and concupiscence, as stated above (FS, Question [25], Article [4]). But humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore, seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance which controls concupiscence. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius, in II Moral., ponit temperantiam inter virtutes principales. | On the contrary, Gregory reckons temperance among the principal virtues (Moral. ii, 49). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus principalis seu cardinalis dicitur quae principalius laudatur ex aliquo eorum quae communiter requiruntur ad rationem virtutis. Moderatio autem, quae in omni virtute requiritur, praecipue laudabilis est in delectationibus tactus, circa quae est temperantia, tum quia tales delectationes sunt magis nobis naturales, et ideo difficilius est ab eis abstinere et concupiscentias earum refrenare; tum etiam quia earum obiecta magis sunt necessaria praesenti vitae, ut ex dictis patet. Et ideo temperantia ponitur virtus principalis seu cardinalis. | I answer that, As stated above (Question [123], Article [11]; Question [61], Article [3]), a principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is requisite in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, both because these pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain from them, and to control the desire for them, and because their objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above (Article [4]). For this reason temperance is reckoned a principal or cardinal virtue. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tanto maior ostenditur agentis virtus, quanto in ea quae sunt magis distantia potest suam operationem extendere. Et ideo ex hoc ipso ostenditur maior virtus rationis quod potest etiam concupiscentias et delectationes maxime distantes moderari. Unde hoc pertinet ad principalitatem temperantiae. | Reply to Objection 1: The longer the range of its operation, the greater is the agent's power [virtus] shown to be: wherefore the very fact that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power. This is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod impetus irae causatur ex quodam accidente, puta ex aliqua laesione contristante, et ideo cito transit, quamvis magnum impetum habeat. Sed impetus concupiscentiae delectabilium tactus procedit ex causa naturali, unde est diuturnior et communior. Et ideo ad principaliorem virtutem pertinet ipsum refrenare. | Reply to Objection 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident, for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is more lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a more principal virtue. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quorum est spes, sunt altiora his quorum est concupiscentia, et propter hoc spes ponitur passio principalis in irascibili. Sed ea quorum est concupiscentia et delectatio tactus, vehementius movent appetitum, quia sunt magis naturalia. Et ideo temperantia, quae in his modum statuit, est virtus principalis. | Reply to Objection 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of desire, wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the irascible. But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal virtue. |
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| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod temperantia sit maxima virtutum. Dicit enim Ambrosius, in I de Offic., quod in temperantia maxime honesti cura, decoris consideratio spectatur et quaeritur. Sed virtus laudabilis est inquantum est honesta et decora. Ergo temperantia est maxima virtutum. | Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and the regard for what is beautiful." Now virtue deserves praise for being honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest of the virtues. |
| Praeterea, maioris virtutis est operari id quod est difficilius. Sed difficilius est refrenare concupiscentias et delectationes tactus quam rectificare actiones exteriores, quorum primum pertinet ad temperantiam, secundum ad iustitiam. Ergo temperantia est maior virtus quam iustitia. | Objection 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the virtue. Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of touch than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a greater virtue than justice. |
| Praeterea, quanto aliquid est communius, tanto magis necessarium videtur esse et melius. Sed fortitudo est circa pericula mortis, quae rarius occurrunt quam delectabilia tactus, quae quotidie occurrunt, et sic usus temperantiae est communior quam fortitudinis. Ergo temperantia est nobilior virtus quam fortitudo. | Objection 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of death which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these occur every day; so that temperance is in more general use than fortitude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in I Rhet., quod maximae virtutes sunt quae aliis maxime sunt utiles, et propter hoc, fortes et iustos maxime honoramus. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the "greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for which reason we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., bonum multitudinis divinius est quam bonum unius. Et ideo quanto aliqua virtus magis pertinet ad bonum multitudinis tanto melior est. Iustitia autem et fortitudo magis pertinent ad bonum multitudinis quam temperantia, quia iustitia consistit in communicationibus, quae sunt ad alterum; fortitudo autem in periculis bellorum, quae sustinentur pro salute communi; temperantia autem moderatur solum concupiscentias et delectationes eorum quae pertinent ad ipsum hominem. Unde manifestum est quod iustitia et fortitudo sunt excellentiores virtutes quam temperantia, quibus prudentia et virtutes theologicae sunt potiores. | I answer that, As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good of the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual," wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod honestas et decor maxime attribuuntur temperantiae, non propter principalitatem proprii boni, sed propter turpitudinem contrarii mali, a quo retrahit, inquantum scilicet moderatur delectationes quae sunt nobis et brutis communes. | Reply to Objection 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance, not on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance, but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the lower animals. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum virtus sit circa difficile et bonum, dignitas virtutis magis attenditur circa rationem boni, in quo excedit iustitia, quam secundum rationem difficilis, in quo excedit temperantia. | Reply to Objection 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good, wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein temperance excels. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod illa communitas qua aliquid pertinet ad multitudinem hominum, magis facit ad excellentiam bonitatis quam illa quae consideratur secundum quod aliquid frequenter occurrit, in quarum prima excedit fortitudo, in secunda temperantia. Unde simpliciter fortitudo est potior, licet quoad aliquid possit dici temperantia potior non solum fortitudine, sed etiam iustitia. | Reply to Objection 3: That which is general because it regards the many conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is general because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former way, temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply, although in some respects temperance may be described as greater not only than fortitude but also than justice. |