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Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis.
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod irasci non possit esse licitum. Hieronymus enim, exponens illud Matth. V, qui irascitur fratri suo etc., dicit, in quibusdam codicibus additur, sine causa, ceterum in veris definita sententia est, et ira penitus tollitur. Ergo irasci nullo modo est licitum. | Objection 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For Jerome in his exposition on Mt. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his brother," etc. says: "Some codices add 'without cause.' However, in the genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbidden altogether." Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry. |
| Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., malum animae est sine ratione esse. Sed ira semper est sine ratione. Dicit enim philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod ira non perfecte audit rationem. Et Gregorius dicit, V Moral., quod cum tranquillitatem mentis ira diverberat, dilaniatam quodammodo scissamque perturbat. Et Cassianus dicit, in libro de institutis coenobiorum, qualibet ex causa iracundiae motus effervens, excaecat oculum cordis. Ergo irasci semper est malum. | Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "The soul's evil is to be without reason." Now anger is always without reason: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger does not listen perfectly to reason"; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "when anger sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends it by its riot"; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): "From whatever cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the eye of the mind." Therefore it is always evil to be angry. |
| Praeterea, ira est appetitus vindictae, ut dicit Glossa super Levit. XIX, non oderis fratrem tuum in corde tuo. Sed appetere ultionem non videtur esse licitum, sed hoc Deo est reservandum, secundum illud Deut. XXXII, mea est ultio. Ergo videtur quod irasci semper sit malum. | Objection 3: Further, anger is "desire for vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2] according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart." Now it would seem unlawful to desire vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Dt. 32:35, "Revenge is Mine." Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always an evil. |
| Praeterea, omne illud quod abducit nos a divina similitudine, est malum. Sed irasci semper abducit nos a divina similitudine, quia Deus cum tranquillitate iudicat, ut habetur Sap. XII. Ergo irasci semper est malum. | Objection 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since God judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be angry is always an evil. |
| Sed contra est quod Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., qui sine causa irascitur, reus erit, qui vero cum causa, non erit reus. Nam si ira non fuerit, nec doctrina proficit, nec iudicia stant, nec crimina compescuntur. Ergo irasci non semper est malum. | On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He that is angry without cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless, judgments unstable, crimes unchecked." Therefore to be angry is not always an evil. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ira, proprie loquendo, est passio quaedam appetitus sensitivi, a qua vis irascibilis denominatur, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Est autem hoc considerandum circa passiones animae, quod dupliciter in eis potest malum inveniri. Uno modo, ex ipsa specie passionis. Quae quidem consideratur secundum obiectum passionis. Sicut invidia secundum suam speciem importat quoddam malum, est enim tristitia de bono aliorum, quod secundum se rationi repugnat. Et ideo invidia, mox nominata, sonat aliquid mali, ut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Hoc autem non convenit irae, quae est appetitus vindictae, potest enim vindicta et bene et male appeti. Alio modo invenitur malum in aliqua passione secundum quantitatem ipsius, idest secundum superabundantiam vel defectum ipsius. Et sic potest malum in ira inveniri, quando scilicet aliquis irascitur plus vel minus, praeter rationem rectam. Si autem aliquis irascatur secundum rationem rectam, tunc irasci est laudabile. | I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above (FS, Question [46], Article [1]) when we were treating of the passions. Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may be found in them in two ways. First by reason of the passion's very species, which is derived from the passion's object. Thus envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since it is displeasure at another's good, and such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention of envy denotes something evil." Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a passion in respect of the passion's quantity, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's anger is deserving of praise. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Stoici iram et omnes alias passiones nominabant affectus quosdam praeter ordinem rationis existentes, et secundum hoc, ponebant iram et omnes alias passiones esse malas, ut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Et secundum hoc accipit iram Hieronymus, loquitur enim de ira qua quis irascitur contra proximum quasi malum eius intendens. Sed secundum Peripateticos, quorum sententiam magis approbat Augustinus, in IX de Civ. Dei, ira et aliae passiones animae dicuntur motus appetitus sensitivi, sive sint moderatae secundum rationem sive non. Et secundum hoc, ira non semper est mala. | Reply to Objection 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above (FS, Question [24], Article [2]) when we were treating of the passions. It is in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger whereby one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing him a wrong.—But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not always evil. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ira dupliciter se potest habere ad rationem. Uno quidem modo, antecedenter. Et sic trahit rationem a sua rectitudine, unde habet rationem mali. Alio modo, consequenter prout scilicet appetitus sensitivus movetur contra vitia secundum ordinem rationis. Et haec ira est bona, quae dicitur ira per zelum. Unde Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., curandum summopere est ne ira, quae ut instrumentum virtutis assumitur, menti dominetur, ne quasi domina praeeat, sed velut ancilla ad obsequium parata, a rationis tergo nunquam recedat. Haec autem ira, etsi in ipsa executione actus iudicium rationis aliqualiter impediat, non tamen rectitudinem rationis tollit. Unde Gregorius, ibidem, dicit quod ira per zelum turbat rationis oculum, sed ira per vitium excaecat. Non autem est contra rationem virtutis ut intermittatur deliberatio rationis in executione eius quod est a ratione deliberatum. Quia etiam ars impediretur in suo actu si, dum debet agere, deliberaret de agendis. | Reply to Objection 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called "zealous anger." Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "We must beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey." This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "zealous anger troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it." Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution of what reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, while having to act. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod appetere vindictam propter malum eius qui puniendus est, illicitum est. Sed appetere vindictam propter vitiorum correctionem et bonum iustitiae conservandum, laudabile est. Et in hoc potest tendere appetitus sensitivus inquantum movetur a ratione. Et dum vindicta secundum ordinem iudicii fit, a Deo fit, cuius minister est potestas puniens, ut dicitur Rom. XIII. | Reply to Objection 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved thereto by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order of judgment, it is God's work, since he who has power to punish "is God's minister," as stated in Rm. 13:4. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod Deo assimilari possumus et debemus in appetitu boni, sed in modo appetendi ei omnino assimilari non possumus; quia in Deo non est appetitus sensitivus, sicut in nobis, cuius motus debet rationi deservire. Unde Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod tunc robustius ratio contra vitia erigitur, cum ira subdita rationi famulatur. | Reply to Objection 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows to the command of reason." |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit peccatum. Peccando enim demeremur. Sed passionibus non demeremur, sicut neque vituperamur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo nulla passio est peccatum. Ira autem est passio, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Ergo ira non est peccatum. | Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by sinning. But "we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do we incur blame thereby," as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above (FS, Question [46], Article [1]) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a sin. |
| Praeterea, in omni peccato est conversio ad aliquod commutabile bonum. Sed per iram non convertitur aliquis ad aliquod bonum commutabile, sed in malum alicuius. Ergo ira non est peccatum. | Objection 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to a person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin. |
| Praeterea, nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed iram homo vitare non potest, quia super illud Psalmi, irascimini et nolite peccare, dicit Glossa quod motus irae non est in potestate nostra. Philosophus etiam dicit, in VII Ethic., quod iratus cum tristitia operatur, tristitia autem est contraria voluntati. Ergo ira non est peccatum. | Objection 3: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine asserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger, for a gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says: "The movement of anger is not in our power." Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. vii, 6) that "the angry man acts with displeasure." Now displeasure is contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin. |
| Praeterea, peccatum est contra naturam, ut Damascenus dicit, in II libro. Sed irasci non est contra naturam hominis, cum sit actus naturalis potentiae quae est irascibilis. Unde et Hieronymus dicit, in quadam epistola, quod irasci est hominis. Ergo ira non est peccatum. | Objection 4: Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene [*De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30]. But it is not contrary to man's nature to be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible; wherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach.] that "to be angry is the property of man." Therefore it is not a sin to be angry. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. IV, omnis indignatio et ira tollatur a vobis. | On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): "Let all indignation and anger [*Vulg.: 'Anger and indignation'] . . . be put away from you." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ira, sicut dictum est, proprie nominat quandam passionem. Passio autem appetitus sensitivi intantum est bona inquantum ratione regulatur, si autem ordinem rationis excludat, est mala. Ordo autem rationis in ira potest attendi quantum ad duo. Primo quidem, quantum ad appetibile in quod tendit, quod est vindicta. Unde si aliquis appetat quod secundum ordinem rationis fiat vindicta, est laudabilis irae appetitus, et vocatur ira per zelum. Si autem aliquis appetat quod fiat vindicta qualitercumque contra ordinem rationis; puta si appetat puniri eum qui non meruit, vel ultra quam meruit, vel etiam non secundum legitimum ordinem, vel non propter debitum finem, qui est conservatio iustitiae et correctio culpae, erit appetitus irae vitiosus. Et nominatur ira per vitium. | I answer that, Anger, as stated above (Article [1]), is properly the name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so far as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the order of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called "zealous anger" [*Cf. Greg., Moral. v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire the taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will be sinful, and this is called sinful anger. |
| Alio modo attenditur ordo rationis circa iram quantum ad modum irascendi, ut scilicet motus irae non immoderate fervescat, nec interius nec exterius. Quod quidem si praetermittatur, non erit ira absque peccato, etiam si aliquis appetat iustam vindictam. | Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of anger should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor externally; and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack sin, even though just vengeance be desired. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia passio potest esse regulata ratione vel non regulata, ideo secundum passionem absolute consideratam non importatur ratio meriti vel demeriti, seu laudis vel vituperii. Secundum tamen quod est regulata ratione, potest habere rationem meritorii et laudabilis, et e contrario, secundum quod non est regulata ratione, potest habere rationem demeriti et vituperabilis. Unde et philosophus ibidem dicit quod laudatur vel vituperatur qui aliqualiter irascitur. | Reply to Objection 1: Since passion may be either regulated or not regulated by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely does not include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "it is he who is angry in a certain way, that is praised or blamed." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod iratus non appetit malum alterius propter se, sed propter vindictam, in quam convertitur appetitus eius sicut in quoddam commutabile bonum. | Reply to Objection 2: The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite turns as to a mutable good. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod homo est dominus suorum actuum per arbitrium rationis. Et ideo motus qui praeveniunt iudicium rationis, non sunt in potestate hominis in generali, ut scilicet nullus eorum insurgat, quamvis ratio possit quemlibet singulariter impedire ne insurgat. Et secundum hoc dicitur quod motus irae non est in potestate hominis, ita scilicet quod nullus insurgat. Quia tamen aliqualiter est in hominis potestate, non totaliter perdit rationem peccati, si sit inordinatus. Quod autem philosophus dicit, iratum cum tristitia operari, non est sic intelligendum quasi tristetur de eo quod irascitur, sed quia tristatur de iniuria quam aestimat sibi illatam, et ex hac tristitia movetur ad appetendum vindictam. | Reply to Objection 3: Man is master of his actions through the judgment of his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that judgment, it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i.e. so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each one, if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger is not in man's power, to the extent namely that no such movement arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not entirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the Philosopher that "the angry man acts with displeasure," means that he is displeased, not with his being angry, but with the injury which he deems done to himself: and through this displeasure he is moved to seek vengeance. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod irascibilis in homine naturaliter subiicitur rationi. Et ideo actus eius intantum est homini naturalis inquantum est secundum rationem, inquantum vero est praeter ordinem rationis, est contra hominis naturam. | Reply to Objection 4: The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is in accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is contrary to man's nature. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis ira sit peccatum mortale. Dicitur enim Iob V, virum stultum interficit iracundia, et loquitur de interfectione spirituali, a qua peccatum mortale denominatur. Ergo ira est peccatum mortale. | Objection 1: It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin. For it is written (Job 5:2): "Anger killeth the foolish man [*Vulg.: 'Anger indeed killeth the foolish']," and he speaks of the spiritual killing, whence mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin. |
| Praeterea, nihil meretur damnationem aeternam nisi peccatum mortale. Sed ira meretur damnationem aeternam, dicit enim dominus, Matth. V, omnis qui irascitur fratri suo, reus erit iudicio; ubi dicit Glossa quod per illa tria, quae ibi tanguntur, scilicet, iudicium, Concilium et Gehennam, diversae mansiones in aeterna damnatione, pro modo peccati, singulariter exprimuntur. Ergo ira est peccatum mortale. | Objection 2: Further, nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal condemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord said (Mt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment": and a gloss on this passage says that "the three things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and hell-fire, signify in a pointed manner different abodes in the state of eternal damnation corresponding to various sins." Therefore anger is a mortal sin. |
| Praeterea, quidquid contrariatur caritati est peccatum mortale. Sed ira de se contrariatur caritati, ut patet per Hieronymum, super illud Matth. V, qui irascitur fratri suo etc., ubi dicit quod hoc est contra proximi dilectionem. Ergo ira est peccatum mortale. | Objection 3: Further, whatsoever is contrary to charity is a mortal sin. Now anger is of itself contrary to charity, as Jerome declares in his commentary on Mt. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his brother," etc. where he says that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor. Therefore anger is a mortal sin. |
| Sed contra est quod super illud Psalmi, irascimini et nolite peccare, dicit Glossa, venialis est ira quae non perducitur ad effectum. | On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says: "Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod motus irae potest esse inordinatus et peccatum dupliciter, sicut dictum est. Uno modo, ex parte appetibilis, utpote cum aliquis appetit iniustam vindictam. Et sic ex genere suo ira est peccatum mortale, quia contrariatur caritati et iustitiae. Potest tamen contingere quod talis appetitus sit peccatum veniale propter imperfectionem actus. Quae quidem imperfectio attenditur vel ex parte appetentis, puta cum motus irae praevenit iudicium rationis, vel etiam ex parte appetibilis, puta cum aliquis appetit in aliquo modico se vindicare, quod quasi nihil est reputandum, ita quod etiam si actu inferatur, non esset peccatum mortale; puta si aliquis parum trahat aliquem puerum per capillos, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Alio modo potest esse motus irae inordinatus quantum ad modum irascendi, utpote si nimis ardenter irascatur interius, vel si nimis exterius manifestet signa irae. Et sic ira secundum se non habet ex suo genere rationem peccati mortalis. Potest tamen contingere quod sit peccatum mortale, puta si ex vehementia irae aliquis excidat a dilectione Dei et proximi. | I answer that, The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful in two ways, as stated above (Article [2]). First, on the part of the appetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger is a mortal sin in the point of its genus, because it is contrary to charity and justice. Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a venial sin by reason of the imperfection of the act. This imperfection is considered either in relation to the subject desirous of vengeance, as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment of his reason; or in relation to the desired object, as when one desires to be avenged in a trifling matter, which should be deemed of no account, so that even if one proceeded to action, it would not be a mortal sin, for instance by pulling a child slightly by the hair, or by some other like action. Secondly, the movement of anger may be inordinate in the mode of being angry, for instance, if one be too fiercely angry inwardly, or if one exceed in the outward signs of anger. In this way anger is not a mortal sin in the point of its genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin, for instance if through the fierceness of his anger a man fall away from the love of God and his neighbor. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate non habetur quod omnis ira sit peccatum mortale, sed quod stulti per iracundiam spiritualiter occiduntur, inquantum scilicet, non refrenando per rationem motum irae, dilabuntur in aliqua peccata mortalia, puta in blasphemiam Dei vel in iniuriam proximi. | Reply to Objection 1: It does not follow from the passage quoted that all anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually by anger, because, through not checking the movement of anger by their reason, they fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God or by doing injury to their neighbor. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod dominus verbum illud dixit de ira, quasi superaddens ad illud verbum legis, qui occiderit, reus erit iudicio. Unde loquitur ibi dominus de motu irae quo quis appetit proximi occisionem, aut quamcumque gravem laesionem, cui appetitui si consensus rationis superveniat, absque dubio erit peccatum mortale. | Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition to the words of the Law: "Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment" (Mt. 5:21). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of the movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave injury of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod in illo casu in quo ira contrariatur caritati, est peccatum mortale, sed hoc non semper accidit, ut ex dictis patet. | Reply to Objection 3: In the case where anger is contrary to charity, it is a mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we have said. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira sit gravissimum peccatum. Dicit enim Chrysostomus quod nihil est turpius visu furentis, et nihil deformius severo visu, et multo magis, anima. Ergo ira est gravissimum peccatum. | Objection 1: It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan.] that "nothing is more repulsive than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a ruthless* face, and most of all than a cruel soul." [*'Severo'. The correct text is 'Si vero.' The translation would then run thus . . . 'and nothing uglier.' And if his 'face is ugly, how much uglier is his soul!']. Therefore anger is the most grievous sin. |
| Praeterea, quanto aliquod peccatum est magis nocivum, tanto videtur esse peius, quia sicut Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., malum dicitur aliquid quod nocet. Ira autem maxime nocet, quia aufert homini rationem, per quam est dominus sui ipsius; dicit enim Chrysostomus quod irae et insaniae nihil est medium, sed ira temporaneus est quidam Daemon, magis autem et Daemonium habente difficilius. Ergo ira est gravissimum peccatum. | Objection 2: Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would seem to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is said to be evil because it hurts." Now anger is most hurtful, because it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself; for Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that "anger differs in no way from madness; it is a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome than one harassed by a demon." Therefore anger is the most grievous sin. |
| Praeterea, interiores motus diiudicantur secundum exteriores effectus. Sed effectus irae est homicidium, quod est gravissimum peccatum. Ergo ira est gravissimum peccatum. | Objection 3: Further, inward movements are judged according to their outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin. |
| Sed contra est quod ira comparatur ad odium sicut festuca ad trabem, dicit enim Augustinus, in regula, ne ira crescat in odium, et trabem faciat de festuca. Non ergo ira est gravissimum peccatum. | On the contrary, Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the beam; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest anger grow into hatred and a mote become a beam." Therefore anger is not the most grievous sin. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, inordinatio irae secundum duo attenditur, scilicet secundum indebitum appetibile, et secundum indebitum modum irascendi. Quantum igitur ad appetibile quod iratus appetit, videtur esse ira minimum peccatorum. Appetit enim ira malum poenae alicuius sub ratione boni quod est vindicta. Et ideo ex parte mali quod appetit, convenit peccatum irae cum illis peccatis quae appetunt malum proximi, puta cum invidia et odio, sed odium appetit absolute malum alicuius, inquantum huiusmodi; invidus autem appetit malum alterius propter appetitum propriae gloriae; sed iratus appetit malum alterius sub ratione iustae vindictae. Ex quo patet quod odium est gravius quam invidia, et invidia quam ira, quia peius est appetere malum sub ratione mali quam sub ratione boni; et peius est appetere malum sub ratione boni exterioris, quod est honor vel gloria, quam sub ratione rectitudinis iustitiae. Sed ex parte boni sub cuius ratione appetit iratus malum, convenit ira cum peccato concupiscentiae, quod tendit in aliquod bonum. Et quantum ad hoc etiam, absolute loquendo, peccatum irae videtur esse minus quam concupiscentiae, quanto melius est bonum iustitiae, quod appetit iratus, quam bonum delectabile vel utile, quod appetit concupiscens. Unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod incontinens concupiscentiae est turpior quam incontinens irae. | I answer that, As stated above (Articles [1],2), the inordinateness of anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the least of sins, for anger desires the evil of punishment for some person, under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the part of the evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those sins which desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred; but while hatred desires absolutely another's evil as such, and the envious man desires another's evil through desire of his own glory, the angry man desires another's evil under the aspect of just revenge. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy, and envy than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an evil, than as a good; and to desire evil as an external good such as honor or glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude of justice. On the part of the good, under the aspect of which the angry man desires an evil, anger concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends to a good. In this respect again, absolutely speaking. the sin of anger is apparently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according as the good of justice, which the angry man desires, is better than the pleasurable or useful good which is desired by the subject of concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "the incontinent in desire is more disgraceful than the incontinent in anger." |
| Sed quantum ad inordinationem quae est secundum modum irascendi, ira habet quandam excellentiam, propter vehementiam et velocitatem sui motus, secundum illud Proverb. XXVII, ira non habet misericordiam, nec erumpens furor, et impetum concitati spiritus ferre quis poterit? Unde Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., irae suae stimulis accensum cor palpitat, corpus tremit, lingua se praepedit, facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi, et nequaquam recognoscuntur noti, ore quidem clamorem format, sed sensus quid loquitur, ignorat. | On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on account of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to Prov. 27:4, "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth: and who can bear the violence of one provoked?" Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "The heart goaded by the pricks of anger is convulsed, the body trembles, the tongue entangles itself, the face is inflamed, the eyes are enraged and fail utterly to recognize those whom we know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but there is no sense in its utterance." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Chrysostomus loquitur de turpitudine quantum ad gestus exteriores, qui proveniunt ex impetu irae. | Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of the outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum inordinatum motum irae, qui provenit ex eius impetu, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the inordinate movement of anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod homicidium non minus provenit ex odio vel invidia quam ex ira. Ira tamen levior est, inquantum attendit rationem iustitiae, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3: Murder results from hatred and envy no less than from anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the aspect of justice, as stated above. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter determinentur species iracundiae a philosopho, in IV Ethic., ubi dicit quod iracundorum quidam sunt acuti, quidam amari, quidam difficiles sive graves. Quia secundum ipsum, amari dicuntur quorum ira difficile solvitur et multo tempore manet. Sed hoc videtur pertinere ad circumstantiam temporis. Ergo videtur quod etiam secundum alias circumstantias possunt accipi aliae species irae. | Objection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some angry persons are "choleric," some "sullen," and some "ill-tempered" or "stern." According to him, a person is said to be "sullen" whose anger "is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time." But this apparently pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the other circumstances. |
| Praeterea, difficiles, sive graves, dicit esse quorum ira non commutatur sine cruciatu vel punitione. Sed hoc etiam pertinet ad insolubilitatem irae. Ergo videtur quod idem sint difficiles et amari. | Objection 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "ill-tempered" or "stern" persons "are those whose anger is not appeased without revenge, or punishment." Now this also pertains to the unquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is the same as bitterness. |
| Praeterea, dominus, Matth. V, ponit tres gradus irae, cum dicit, qui irascitur fratri suo; et, qui dixerit fratri suo, raca; et, qui dixerit fratri suo, fatue qui quidem gradus ad praedictas species non referuntur. Ergo videtur quod praedicta divisio irae non sit conveniens. | Objection 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He says (Mt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say" to his brother, "Thou fool." But these degrees are not referable to the aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of anger is not fitting. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod tres sunt irascibilitatis species, scilicet ira quae vocatur fellea; et mania, quae dicitur insania; et furor. Quae tria videntur esse eadem tribus praemissis, nam iram felleam dicit esse quae principium et motum habet, quod philosophus attribuit acutis; maniam vero dicit esse iram quae permanet et in vetustatem devenit, quod philosophus attribuit amaris; furorem autem dicit esse iram quae observat tempus in supplicium, quod philosophus attribuit difficilibus. Et eandem etiam divisionem ponit Damascenus, in II libro. Ergo praedicta philosophi distinctio est conveniens. | On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi] says "there are three species of irascibility," namely, "the anger which is called wrath [*'Fellea,' i.e. like gall. But in FS, Question [46], Article [8], St. Thomas quoting the same authority has {Cholos} which we render 'wrath']," and "ill-will" which is a disease of the mind, and "rancour." Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid. For "wrath" he describes as "having beginning and movement," and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to "choleric" persons: "ill-will" he describes as "an anger that endures and grows old," and this the Philosopher ascribes to "sullenness"; while he describes "rancour" as "reckoning the time for vengeance," which tallies with the Philosopher's description of the "ill-tempered." The same division is given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod praedicta distinctio potest referri vel ad passionem irae, vel etiam ad ipsum peccatum irae. Quomodo autem referatur ad passionem irae, supra habitum est, cum de passione irae ageretur. Et sic praecipue videtur poni a Gregorio Nysseno et Damasceno. Nunc autem oportet accipere distinctionem harum specierum secundum quod pertinent ad peccatum irae, prout ponitur a philosopho. | I answer that, The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated when treating of the passions (FS, Question [46], Article [8]) how it is to be applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, however, we have to take the distinction of these species in its application to the sin of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher. |
| Potest enim inordinatio irae ex duobus attendi. Primo quidem, ex ipsa irae origine. Et hoc pertinet ad acutos, qui nimis cito irascuntur, et ex qualibet levi causa. Alio modo, ex ipsa irae duratione, eo scilicet quod ira nimis perseverat. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, quia causa irae, scilicet iniuria illata, nimis manet in memoria hominis, unde ex hoc homo diutinam tristitiam concipit; et ideo sunt sibi ipsis graves et amari. Alio modo contingit ex parte ipsius vindictae, quam aliquis obstinato appetitu quaerit et hoc pertinet ad difficiles sive graves, qui non dimittunt iram quousque puniant. | For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards "choleric" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause. Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger endures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too long in a man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a lasting displeasure, wherefore he is "grievous" and "sullen" to himself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a man seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to "ill-tempered" or "stern" people, who do not put aside their anger until they have inflicted punishment. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in speciebus praedictis non principaliter consideratur tempus, sed facilitas hominis ad iram, vel firmitas in ira. | Reply to Objection 1: It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger, or his pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in the aforesaid species. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod utrique, scilicet amari et difficiles, habent iram diuturnam, sed propter aliam causam. Nam amari habent iram permanentem propter permanentiam tristitiae, quam interius tenent clausam, et quia non prorumpunt ad exteriora iracundiae signa, non possunt persuaderi ab aliis; nec ex seipsis recedunt ab ira, nisi prout diuturnitate temporis tristitia aboletur, et sic deficit ira. Sed in difficilibus est ira diuturna propter vehemens desiderium vindictae. Et ideo tempore non digeritur, sed per solam punitionem quiescit. | Reply to Objection 2: Both "sullen" and "ill-tempered" people have a long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a "sullen" person has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear away with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger of "ill-tempered" persons is long-lasting on account of their intense desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can be quelled only by revenge. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod gradus irae quos dominus ponit, non pertinent ad diversas irae species, sed accipiuntur secundum processum humani actus. In quibus primo aliquid in corde concipitur. Et quantum ad hoc dicit, qui irascitur fratri suo. Secundum autem est cum per aliqua signa exteriora manifestatur exterius, etiam antequam prorumpat in effectum. Et quantum ad hoc dicit, qui dixerit fratri suo, raca, quod est interiectio irascentis. Tertius gradus est quando peccatum interius conceptum ad effectum perducitur. Est autem effectus irae nocumentum alterius sub ratione vindictae. Minimum autem nocumentorum est quod fit solo verbo. Et ideo quantum ad hoc dicit, qui dixerit fratri suo, fatue. Et sic patet quod secundum addit supra primum, et tertium supra utrumque. Unde si primum est peccatum mortale, in casu in quo dominus loquitur, sicut dictum est, multo magis alia. Et ideo singulis eorum ponuntur correspondentia aliqua pertinentia ad condemnationem. Sed in primo ponitur iudicium, quod minus est, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in iudicio adhuc defensionis locus datur. In secundo vero ponit Concilium, in quo iudices inter se conferunt quo supplicio damnari oporteat. In tertio ponit Gehennam ignis, quae est certa damnatio. | Reply to Objection 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course of the human act [*Cf. FS, Question [46], Article [8], Objection [3]]. For the first degree is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever is angry with his brother." The second degree is when the anger is manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into effect; and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca!" which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is when the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the effect of anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou fool!" Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first, and the third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (Article [3], ad 2), much more so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation is assigned as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case "judgment" is assigned, and this is the least severe, for as Augustine says [*Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9], "where judgment is to be delivered, there is an opportunity for defense": in the second case "council" is assigned, "whereby the judges deliberate together on the punishment to be inflicted": to the third case is assigned "hell-fire," i.e. "decisive condemnation." |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non debeat poni inter vitia capitalia. Ira enim ex tristitia nascitur. Sed tristitia est vitium capitale, quod dicitur acedia. Ergo ira non debet poni vitium capitale. | Objection 1: It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among the capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice known by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital vice. |
| Praeterea, odium est gravius peccatum quam ira. Ergo magis debet poni vitium capitale quam ira. | Objection 2: Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger. |
| Praeterea, super illud Proverb. XXIX, vir iracundus provocat rixas, dicit Glossa, ianua est omnium vitiorum iracundia, qua clausa, virtutibus intrinsecus dabitur quies; aperta, ad omne facinus armabitur animus. Nullum autem vitium capitale est principium omnium peccatorum, sed quorundam determinate. Ergo ira non debet poni inter vitia capitalia. | Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, "An angry [Douay: 'passionate'] man provoketh quarrels," says: "Anger is the door to all vices: if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the virtues; if it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime." Now no capital vice is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., ponit iram inter vitia capitalia. | On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the capital vices. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praemissis patet, vitium capitale dicitur ex quo multa vitia oriuntur. Habet autem hoc ira, quod ex ea multa vitia oriri possint, duplici ratione. Primo, ex parte sui obiecti, quod multum habet de ratione appetibilitatis, inquantum scilicet vindicta appetitur sub ratione iusti et honesti, quod sua dignitate allicit, ut supra habitum est. Alio modo, ex suo impetu, quo mentem praecipitat ad inordinata quaecumque agenda. Unde manifestum est quod ira est vitium capitale. | I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [84], Article [3],4), a capital vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two reasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on the part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so far as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest*, which is attractive by its excellence, as stated above (Article [4]). [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Question [145], Article [1]]. The second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident that anger is a capital vice. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa tristitia ex qua oritur ira, ut plurimum, non est acediae vitium, sed passio tristitiae, quae consequitur ex iniuria illata. | Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the most part, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results from an injury inflicted. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, ad rationem vitii capitalis pertinet quod habeat finem multum appetibilem, ut sic propter appetitum eius multa peccata committantur. Ira autem, quae appetit malum sub ratione boni, habet finem magis appetibilem quam odium, quod appetit malum sub ratione mali. Et ideo magis est vitium capitale ira quam odium. | Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Question [118], Article [7]; Question [148], Article [5]; Question [153], Article [4]; FS, Question [84], Article [4]), it belongs to the notion of a capital vice to have a most desirable end, so that many sins are committed through the desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of good, has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is more a capital vice than hatred is. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ira dicitur esse ianua vitiorum per accidens, scilicet removendo prohibens, idest impediendo iudicium rationis, per quod homo retrahitur a malis. Directe autem et per se est causa aliquorum specialium peccatorum, quae dicuntur filiae eius. | Reply to Objection 3: Anger is stated to be the door to the vices accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the judgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is, however, directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called its daughters. |
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| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur sex filiae irae, quae sunt rixa, tumor mentis, contumelia, clamor, indignatio, blasphemia. Blasphemia enim ponitur ab Isidoro filia superbiae. Non ergo debet poni filia irae. | Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to anger, namely "quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamor, indignation and blasphemy." For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore [*Questions. in Deut., qu. xvi] to be a daughter of pride. Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of anger. |
| Praeterea, odium nascitur ex ira, ut Augustinus dicit, in regula. Ergo deberet numerari inter filias irae. | Objection 2: Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of anger. |
| Praeterea, tumor mentis videtur idem esse quod superbia. Superbia autem non est filia alicuius vitii, sed mater omnium vitiorum, ut Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral. Ergo tumor mentis non debet numerari inter filias irae. | Objection 3: Further, "a swollen mind" would seem to be the same as pride. Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but "the mother of all vices," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of the mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., assignat has filias irae. | On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to anger. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ira potest tripliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod est in corde. Et sic ex ira nascuntur duo vitia. Unum quidem ex parte eius contra quem homo irascitur, quem reputat indignum ut sibi tale quid fecerit. Et sic ponitur indignatio. Aliud autem vitium est ex parte sui ipsius, inquantum scilicet excogitat diversas vias vindictae, et talibus cogitationibus animum suum replet, secundum illud Iob XV, nunquid sapiens implebit ardore stomachum suum. Et sic ponitur tumor mentis. | I answer that, Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. one is on the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems unworthy [indignum] of acting thus towards him, and this is called "indignation." The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in so far as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like thoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2, "Will a wise man . . . fill his stomach with burning heat?" And thus we have "swelling of the mind." |
| Alio modo consideratur ira secundum quod est in ore. Et sic ex ira duplex inordinatio procedit. Una quidem secundum hoc quod homo in modo loquendi iram suam demonstrat, sicut dictum est de eo qui dicit fratri suo, raca. Et sic ponitur clamor, per quem intelligitur inordinata et confusa locutio. Alia autem est inordinatio secundum quod aliquis prorumpit in verba iniuriosa. Quae quidem si sint contra Deum, erit blasphemia; si autem contra proximum, contumelia. | Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (Article [5], ad 3) of the man who says to his brother, "Raca": and this refers to "clamor," which denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is when a man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against God, it is "blasphemy," if against one's neighbor, it is "contumely." |
| Tertio modo consideratur ira secundum quod procedit usque ad factum. Et sic ex ira oriuntur rixae, per quas intelliguntur omnia nocumenta quae facto proximis inferuntur ex ira. | Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus anger gives rise to "quarrels," by which we are to understand all manner of injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod blasphemia in quam aliquis prorumpit deliberata mente, procedit ex superbia hominis contra Deum se erigentis, quia, ut dicitur Eccli. X, initium superbiae hominis apostatare a Deo; idest, recedere a veneratione eius est prima superbiae pars, et ex hoc oritur blasphemia. Sed blasphemia in quam aliquis prorumpit ex commotione animi, procedit ex ira. | Reply to Objection 1: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against God: since, according to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God," i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him is the first part of pride [*Cf. Question [162], Article [7], ad 2]; and this gives rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod odium, etsi aliquando nascatur ex ira, tamen habet aliquam priorem causam ex qua directius oritur, scilicet tristitiam, sicut e contrario amor nascitur ex delectatione. Ex tristitia autem illata quandoque in iram, quandoque in odium aliquis movetur. Unde convenientius fuit quod odium poneretur oriri ex acedia quam ex ira. | Reply to Objection 2: Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from sloth rather than from anger. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod tumor mentis non accipitur hic pro superbia, sed pro quodam conatu sive audacia hominis intentantis vindictam. Audacia autem est vitium fortitudini oppositum. | Reply to Objection 3: Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude. |
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| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliquod vitium oppositum iracundiae, proveniens ex defectu irae. Nihil enim est vitiosum per quod homo Deo similatur. Sed per hoc quod homo omnino est sine ira, similatur Deo, qui cum tranquillitate iudicat. Ergo non videtur quod sit vitiosum omnino ira carere. | Objection 1: It would seem that there. is not a vice opposed to anger, resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God. Now by being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who judges "with tranquillity" (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is not a vice to be altogether without anger. |
| Praeterea, defectus eius quod ad nihil est utile, non est vitiosus. Sed motus irae ad nihil est utilis, ut probat Seneca in libro quem fecit de ira. Ergo videtur quod defectus irae non sit vitiosus. | Objection 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether useless. But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca proves in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it seems that lack of anger is not a vice. |
| Praeterea, malum hominis, secundum Dionysium, est praeter rationem esse. Sed, subtracto omni motu irae, adhuc remanet integrum iudicium rationis. Ergo nullus defectus irae vitium causat. | Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "man's evil is to be without reason." Now the judgment of reason remains unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of anger amounts to a vice. |
| Sed contra est quod Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., qui cum causa non irascitur, peccat. Patientia enim irrationabilis vitia seminat, negligentiam nutrit, et non solum malos, sed etiam bonos invitat ad malum. | On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He who is not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ira dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, simplex motus voluntatis quo aliquis non ex passione, sed ex iudicio rationis poenam infligit. Et sic defectus irae absque dubio est peccatum. Et hoc modo ira accipitur in verbis Chrysostomi, qui dicit ibidem, iracundia quae cum causa est, non est iracundia, sed iudicium. Iracundia enim proprie intelligitur commotio passionis, qui autem cum causa irascitur, ira illius non est ex passione. Ideo iudicare dicitur, non irasci. Alio modo accipitur ira pro motu appetitus sensitivi, qui est cum passione et transmutatione corporali. Et hic quidem motus ex necessitate consequitur in homine ad simplicem motum voluntatis, quia naturaliter appetitus inferior sequitur motum appetitus superioris, nisi aliquid repugnet. Et ideo non potest totaliter deficere motus irae in appetitu sensitivo, nisi per subtractionem vel debilitatem voluntarii motus. Et ideo ex consequenti etiam defectus passionis irae vitiosus est, sicut et defectus voluntarii motus ad puniendum secundum iudicium rationis. | I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom): "Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion": and when a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion: wherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with passion resulting from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in man, to the movement of his will, since the lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the passion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment by the judgment of reason. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui totaliter non irascitur cum debet irasci, imitatur quidem Deum quantum ad carentiam passionis, non autem quantum ad hoc quod Deus ex iudicio punit. | Reply to Objection 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought to be angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's punishing by judgment. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod passio irae utilis est, sicut et omnes alii motus appetitus sensitivi, ad hoc quod homo promptius exequatur id quod ratio dictat. Alioquin, frustra esset in homine appetitus sensitivus, cum tamen natura nihil faciat frustra. | Reply to Objection 2: The passion of anger, like all other movements of the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt execution [*Cf. FS, Question [24], Article [3]] of reason's dictate: else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas "nature does nothing without purpose" [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4]. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod in eo qui ordinate agit, iudicium rationis non solum est causa simplicis motus voluntatis, sed etiam passionis appetitus sensitivi, ut dictum est, et ideo, sicut remotio effectus est signum remotionis causae, ita etiam remotio irae est signum remotionis iudicii rationis. | Reply to Objection 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking. |