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| Deinde considerandum est de comparatione vitae activae ad contemplativam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | We must now consider the active life in comparison with the contemplative life, under which head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, quae sit potior sive dignior. | (1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence? |
| Secundo, quae sit maioris meriti. | (2) Which of them has the greater merit? |
| Tertio, utrum vita contemplativa impediatur per activam. | (3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life? |
| Quarto, de ordine utriusque. | (4) Of their order. |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita activa sit potior quam contemplativa. Quod enim est meliorum, videtur esse melius, ut philosophus dicit, in III Topic. Sed vita activa pertinet ad maiores, scilicet ad praelatos, qui sunt in honore et potestate constituti, unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod in actione non amandus est honor in hac vita, sive potentia. Ergo videtur quod vita activa sit potior quam contemplativa. | Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative. For "that which belongs to better men would seem to be worthier and better," as the Philosopher says (Top. iii, 1). Now the active life belongs to persons of higher rank, namely prelates, who are placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "in our actions we must not love honor or power in this life." Therefore it would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative. |
| Praeterea, in omnibus habitibus et actibus praecipere pertinet ad potiorem, sicut militaris, tanquam potior, praecipit frenorum factrici. Sed ad vitam activam pertinet disponere et praecipere de contemplativa, ut patet per id quod dicitur Moysi, Exod. XIX, descende, et contestare populum, ne forte velit transcendere propositos terminos ad videndum Deum. Ergo vita activa est potior quam contemplativa. | Objection 2: Further, in all habits and acts, direction belongs to the more important; thus the military art, being the more important, directs the art of the bridle-maker [*Ethic. i, 1]. Now it belongs to the active life to direct and command the contemplative, as appears from the words addressed to Moses (Ex. 19:21), "Go down and charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the" fixed "limits to see the Lord." Therefore the active life is more excellent than the contemplative. |
| Praeterea, nullus debet abstrahi a maiori ut applicetur minoribus, apostolus enim dicit, I ad Cor. XII, aemulamini charismata meliora. Sed aliqui abstrahuntur a statu vitae contemplativae et occupantur circa vitam activam, ut patet de illis qui transferuntur ad statum praelationis. Ergo videtur quod vita activa sit potior quam contemplativa. | Objection 3: Further, no man should be taken away from a greater thing in order to be occupied with lesser things: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:31): "Be zealous for the better gifts." Now some are taken away from the state of the contemplative life to the occupations of the active life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the state of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative. |
| Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Luc. X, Maria optimam partem elegit, quae non auferetur ab ea. Per Mariam autem significatur vita contemplativa. Ergo contemplativa vita potior est quam activa. | On the contrary, Our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her." Now Mary figures the contemplative life. Therefore the contemplative life is more excellent than the active. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid secundum se esse excellentius quod tamen secundum aliquid ab alio superatur. Dicendum est ergo quod vita contemplativa simpliciter melior est quam activa. Quod philosophus, in X Ethic., probat octo rationibus. | I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent in themselves, whereas they are surpassed by another in some respect. Accordingly we must reply that the contemplative life is simply more excellent than the active: and the Philosopher proves this by eight reasons (Ethic. x, 7,8). |
| Quarum prima est, quia vita contemplativa convenit homini secundum illud quod est optimum in ipso, scilicet secundum intellectum, et respectu propriorum obiectorum, scilicet intelligibilium, vita autem activa occupatur circa exteriora. Unde Rachel, per quam significatur vita contemplativa, interpretatur visum principium, vita autem activa significatur per Liam, quae erat lippis oculis, ut Gregorius dicit, VI Moral. | The first is, because the contemplative life becomes man according to that which is best in him, namely the intellect, and according to its proper objects, namely things intelligible; whereas the active life is occupied with externals. Hence Rachael, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is interpreted "the vision of the principle," [*Or rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from {rah} and {irzn}; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.] whereas as Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) the active life is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. |
| Secundo, quia vita contemplativa potest esse magis continua, licet non quantum ad summum contemplationis gradum, sicut supra dictum est. Unde et Maria, per quam significatur vita contemplativa, describitur secus pedes domini assidue sedens. | The second reason is because the contemplative life can be more continuous, although not as regards the highest degree of contemplation, as stated above (Question [180], Article [8], ad 2; Question [181], Article [4], ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is described as "sitting" all the time "at the Lord's feet." |
| Tertio, quia maior est delectatio vitae contemplativae quam activae. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis Dom., quod Martha turbabatur, Maria epulabatur. | Thirdly, because the contemplative life is more delightful than the active; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) that "Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted." |
| Quarto, quia in vita contemplativa est homo magis sibi sufficiens, quia paucioribus ad eam indiget. Unde dicitur Luc. X, Martha, Martha, sollicita es et turbaris erga plurima. | Fourthly, because in the contemplative life man is more self-sufficient, since he needs fewer things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (Lk. 10:41): "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things." |
| Quinto, quia vita contemplativa magis propter se diligitur, vita autem activa ad aliud ordinatur. Unde in Psalmo dicitur, unam petii a domino, hanc requiram, ut inhabitem in domo domini omnibus diebus vitae meae, ut videam voluntatem domini. | Fifthly, because the contemplative life is loved more for its own sake, while the active life is directed to something else. Hence it is written (Ps. 36:4): "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, that I may see the delight of the Lord." |
| Sexto, quia vita contemplativa consistit in quadam vacatione et quiete, secundum illud Psalmi, vacate, et videte quoniam ego sum Deus. | Sixthly, because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest, according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still and see that I am God." |
| Septimo, quia vita contemplativa est secundum divina, vita autem activa secundum humana. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis Dom., in principio erat verbum, ecce quod Maria audiebat. Verbum caro factum est, ecce cui Martha ministrabat. | Seventhly, because the contemplative life is according to Divine things, whereas active life is according to human things; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ): "'In the beginning was the Word': to Him was Mary hearkening: 'The Word was made flesh': Him was Martha serving." |
| Octavo, quia vita contemplativa est secundum id quod est magis proprium homini, idest secundum intellectum, in operationibus autem vitae activae communicant etiam inferiores vires, quae sunt nobis et brutis communes. Unde in Psalmo, postquam dictum est, homines et iumenta salvabis, domine, subditur id quod est hominibus speciale, in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. | Eighthly, because the contemplative life is according to that which is most proper to man, namely his intellect; whereas in the works of the active life the lower powers also, which are common to us and brutes, have their part; wherefore (Ps. 35:7) after the words, "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord," that which is special to man is added (Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light we shall see light." |
| Nonam rationem addit dominus, Luc. X, cum dicit, optimam partem elegit Maria, quae non auferetur ab ea. Quod exponens Augustinus, in libro de verbis Dom., dicit, non tu malam, sed illa meliorem. Audi unde meliorem, quia non auferetur ab ea. A te auferetur aliquando onus necessitatis, aeterna est dulcedo veritatis. | Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Lk. 10:42) when He says: "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her," which words Augustine (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: "Not—Thou hast chosen badly but—She has chosen better. Why better? Listen—because it shall not be taken away from her. But the burden of necessity shall at length be taken from thee: whereas the sweetness of truth is eternal." |
| Secundum quid tamen, et in casu, magis est eligenda vita activa, propter necessitatem praesentis vitae. Sicut etiam philosophus dicit, in III Topic., quod philosophari est melius quam ditari, sed ditari melius est necessitatem patienti. | Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer the active life on account of the needs of the present life. Thus too the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2): "It is better to be wise than to be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich . . ." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad praelatos non solum pertinet vita activa, sed etiam debent esse excellentes in vita contemplativa. Unde Gregorius dicit, in pastorali, sit rector actione praecipuus, prae cunctis in contemplatione suspensus | Reply to Objection 1: Not only the active life concerns prelates, they should also excel in the contemplative life; hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1): "A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifted than others in contemplation." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod vita contemplativa in quadam animi libertate consistit. Dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod vita contemplativa ad quandam mentis libertatem transit, temporalia non cogitans, sed aeterna. Et Boetius dicit, in V de Consolat., humanas animas liberiores esse necesse est cum se in mentis divinae speculatione conservant, minus vero, cum dilabuntur ad corpora. Unde patet quod vita activa non directe praecipit vitae contemplativae, sed, disponendo ad vitam contemplativam, praecipit quaedam opera vitae activae; in quo magis servit contemplativae vitae quam dominetur. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod activa vita servitus, contemplativa autem libertas vocatur. | Reply to Objection 2: The contemplative life consists in a certain liberty of mind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal but of eternal things." And Boethius says (De Consol. v, 2): "The soul of man must needs be more free while it continues to gaze on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things." Wherefore it is evident that the active life does not directly command the contemplative life, but prescribes certain works of the active life as dispositions to the contemplative life; which it accordingly serves rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the active life is bondage, whereas the contemplative life is freedom." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ad opera vitae activae interdum aliquis a contemplatione avocatur propter aliquam necessitatem praesentis vitae, non tamen hoc modo quod cogatur aliquis totaliter contemplationem deserere. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, otium sanctum quaerit caritas veritatis, negotium iustum, scilicet vitae activae, suscipit necessitas caritatis. Quam sarcinam si nullus imponit, percipiendae atque intuendae vacandum est veritati. Si autem imponitur, suscipienda est, propter caritatis necessitatem. Sed nec sic omnino veritatis delectatio deserenda est, ne subtrahatur illa suavitas, et opprimat ista necessitas. Et sic patet quod, cum aliquis a contemplativa vita ad activam vocatur, non hoc fit per modum subtractionis, sed per modum additionis. | Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes a man is called away from the contemplative life to the works of the active life, on account of some necessity of the present life, yet not so as to be compelled to forsake contemplation altogether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest toil," the work namely of the active life. "If no one imposes this burden upon us we must devote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even then we must not altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive ourselves of its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm us." Hence it is clear that when a person is called from the contemplative life to the active life, this is done by way not of subtraction but of addition. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita activa sit maioris meriti quam contemplativa. Meritum enim dicitur respectu mercedis. Merces autem debetur labori, secundum illud I ad Cor. III, unusquisque propriam mercedem accipiet secundum suum laborem. Sed vitae activae attribuitur labor, contemplativae vero quies, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., omnis qui ad Deum convertitur, prius necesse est ut desudet in labore, idest Liam accipiat, ut post ad videndum principium in Rachel amplexibus requiescat. Ergo vita activa est maioris meriti quam contemplativa. | Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed is due to labor, according to 1 Cor. 3:8, "Every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor." Now labor is ascribed to the active life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "Whosoever is converted to God must first of all sweat from labor, i.e. he must take Lia, that afterwards he may rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle." Therefore the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative. |
| Praeterea, vita contemplativa est quaedam inchoatio futurae felicitatis. Unde super illud Ioan. ult., sic eum volo manere donec veniam, dicit Augustinus, hoc apertius dici potest, perfecta me sequatur actio, informata meae passionis exemplo, inchoata vero contemplatio maneat donec venio, perficienda cum venero. Et Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod contemplativa vita hic incipitur, ut in caelesti patria perficiatur. Sed in illa futura vita non erit status merendi, sed recipiendi pro meritis. Ergo vita contemplativa minus videtur habere de ratione meriti quam vita activa, sed plus habet de ratione praemii. | Objection 2: Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on Jn. 21:22, "So I will have him to remain till I come," says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.): "This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works follow Me conformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun here remain until I come, that it may be perfected when I shall come." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "contemplation begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home." Now the life to come will be a state not of meriting but of receiving the reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life would seem to have less of the character of merit than the active, but more of the character of reward. |
| Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod nullum sacrificium est Deo magis acceptum quam zelus animarum. Sed per zelum animarum aliquis se convertit ad studia activae vitae. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa non sit maioris meriti quam activa. | Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.) that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls." Now by the zeal for souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is not of greater merit than the active. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., magna sunt activae vitae merita, sed contemplativae potiora. | On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Great are the merits of the active life, but greater still those of the contemplative." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod radix merendi est caritas, sicut supra habitum est. Cum autem caritas consistat in dilectione Dei et proximi, sicut supra habitum est, diligere Deum secundum se est magis meritorium quam diligere proximum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo illud quod directius pertinet ad dilectionem Dei, magis est meritorium ex suo genere quam id quod directe pertinet ad dilectionem proximi propter Deum. Vita autem contemplativa directe et immediate pertinet ad dilectionem Dei, dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod otium sanctum, scilicet contemplativae vitae, quaerit caritas veritatis, scilicet divinae; cui potissime vita contemplativa insistit, sicut dictum est. Vita autem activa ordinatur directius ad dilectionem proximi, quia satagit circa frequens ministerium, ut dicitur Luc. X. Et ideo ex suo genere contemplativa vita est maioris meriti quam activa. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, in III Homil. Ezech., contemplativa est maior merito quam activa, quia haec in usu praesentis operis laborat, in quo scilicet necesse est proximis subvenire; illa vero sapore intimo venturam iam requiem degustat, scilicet in contemplatione Dei. | I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [114], Article [4]), the root of merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Question [25], Article [1]), charity consists in the love of God and our neighbor, the love of God is by itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated above (Question [27], Article [8]). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to the love of God is generically more meritorious than that which pertains directly to the love of our neighbor for God's sake. Now the contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of God; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the love of" the Divine "truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contemplative life, for it is that truth above all which the contemplative life seeks, as stated above (Question [181], Article [4], ad 2). On the other hand, the active life is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor, because it is "busy about much serving" (Lk. 10:40). Wherefore the contemplative life is generically of greater merit than the active life. This is moreover asserted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "The contemplative life surpasses in merit the active life, because the latter labors under the stress of present work," by reason of the necessity of assisting our neighbor, "while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of the coming rest," i.e. the contemplation of God. |
| Potest tamen contingere quod aliquis in operibus vitae activae plus meretur quam alius in operibus vitae contemplativae, puta si propter abundantiam divini amoris, ut eius voluntas impleatur propter ipsius gloriam, interdum sustinet a dulcedine divinae contemplationis ad tempus separari. Sicut apostolus dicebat, Rom. IX, optabam ego ipse anathema esse a Christo pro fratribus meis, quod exponens Chrysostomus, in libro de Compunct., dicit, ita totam mentem eius demerserat amor Christi, ut etiam hoc quod ei prae ceteris omnibus amabilius erat, esse cum Christo, rursus idipsum, quia ita placeret Christo, contemneret. | Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the active life than another by the works of the contemplative life. For instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then suffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the time being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake. Thus the Apostle says (Rm. 9:3): "I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ, for my brethren"; which words Chrysostom expounds as follows (De Compunct. i, 7 [*Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis.]): "His mind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired above all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he pleased Christ." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod labor exterior operatur ad augmentum praemii accidentalis, sed augmentum meriti respectu praemii essentialis consistit principaliter in caritate. Cuius quoddam signum est labor exterior toleratus propter Christum, sed multo expressius eius signum est quod aliquis, praetermissis omnibus quae ad hanc vitam pertinent, soli divinae contemplationi vacare delectetur. | Reply to Objection 1: External labor conduces to the increase of the accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod in statu felicitatis futurae homo pervenit ad perfectum, et ideo non relinquitur locus proficiendi per meritum. Si tamen relinqueretur, esset efficacius meritum, propter caritatem maiorem. Sed contemplatio praesentis vitae cum quadam imperfectione est, et adhuc habet quo proficiat. Et ideo non tollit rationem merendi, sed augmentum meriti facit, propter maius exercitium caritatis divinae. | Reply to Objection 2: In the state of future happiness man has arrived at perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the greater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on account of the practice of greater Divine charity. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod sacrificium spiritualiter Deo offertur cum aliquid ei exhibetur. Inter omnia autem bona hominis Deus maxime acceptat bonum humanae animae, ut hoc sibi in sacrificium offeratur. Offerre autem debet aliquis Deo, primo quidem, animam suam, secundum illud Eccli. XXX, miserere animae tuae placens Deo, secundo autem, animas aliorum, secundum illud Apoc. ult., qui audit, dicat, veni. Quanto autem homo animam suam vel alterius propinquius Deo coniungit, tanto sacrificium est Deo magis acceptum. Unde magis acceptum est Deo quod aliquis animam suam et aliorum applicet contemplationi, quam actioni. Per hoc ergo quod dicitur quod nullum sacrificium est Deo magis acceptum quam zelus animarum, non praefertur meritum vitae activae merito vitae contemplativae, sed ostenditur magis esse meritorium si quis offerat Deo animam suam et aliorum, quam quaecumque alia exteriora dona. | Reply to Objection 3: A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God specially accepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in sacrifice. Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his soul, according to Ecclus. 30:24, "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God"; in the second place, the souls of others, according to Apoc. 22:17, "He that heareth, let him say: Come." And the more closely a man unites his own or another's soul to God, the more acceptable is his sacrifice to God; wherefore it is more acceptable to God that one apply one's own soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to action. Consequently the statement that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls," does not mean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to God one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other external gifts. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita contemplativa impediatur per activam. Ad vitam enim contemplativam necessaria est quaedam vacatio mentis, secundum illud Psalmi, vacate, et videte quoniam ego sum Deus. Sed vita activa habet inquietudinem, secundum illud Luc. X, Martha, Martha, sollicita es et turbaris erga plurima. Ergo vita activa contemplativam impedit. | Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active life. For the contemplative life requires a certain stillness of mind, according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still, and see that I am God"; whereas the active life involves restlessness, according to Lk. 10:41, "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative. |
| Praeterea, ad vitam contemplativam requiritur claritas visionis. Sed vita activa impedit visionis claritatem, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod lippa est et fecunda, quia, dum occupatur in opere, minus videt. Ergo vita activa impedit contemplativam. | Objection 2: Further, clearness of vision is a requisite for the contemplative life. Now active life is a hindrance to clear vision; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it "is blear-eyed and fruitful, because the active life, being occupied with work, sees less." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative. |
| Praeterea, unum contrariorum impeditur per aliud. Sed vita activa et contemplativa videntur contrarietatem habere ad invicem, quia vita activa occupatur circa plurima, vita autem contemplativa insistit ad contemplandum unum, unde et ex opposito dividuntur. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa impediatur per activam. | Objection 3: Further, one contrary hinders the other. Now the active and the contemplative life are apparently contrary to one another, since the active life is busy about many things, while the contemplative life attends to the contemplation of one; wherefore they differ in opposition to one another. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., qui contemplationis arcem tenere desiderant, prius se in campo per exercitium operis probent. | On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation, must first of all train in the camp of action." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod vita activa potest considerari quantum ad duo. Uno modo, quantum ad ipsum studium et exercitium exteriorum actionum. Et sic manifestum est quod vita activa impedit contemplativam, inquantum impossibile est quod aliquis simul occupetur circa exteriores actiones, et divinae contemplationi vacet. Alio modo potest considerari vita activa quantum ad hoc quod interiores animae passiones componit et ordinat. Et quantum ad hoc, vita activa adiuvat ad contemplationem, quae impeditur per inordinationem interiorum passionum. Unde Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., cum contemplationis arcem aliqui tenere desiderant, prius se in campo per exercitium operis probent, ut sollicite sciant si nulla iam mala proximis irrogant, si irrogata a proximis aequanimiter portant, si obiectis bonis temporalibus nequaquam mens laetitia solvitur, si subtractis non nimio maerore sauciantur. Ac deinde perpendant si, cum ad semetipsos introrsus redeunt, in eo quod spiritualia rimantur, nequaquam secum rerum corporalium umbras trahunt, vel fortasse tractas manu discretionis abigunt. Ex hoc ergo exercitium vitae activae confert ad contemplativam, quod quietat interiores passiones, ex quibus phantasmata proveniunt, per quae contemplatio impeditur. | I answer that, The active life may be considered from two points of view. First, as regards the attention to and practice of external works: and thus it is evident that the active life hinders the contemplative, in so far as it is impossible for one to be busy with external action, and at the same time give oneself to Divine contemplation. Secondly, active life may be considered as quieting and directing the internal passions of the soul; and from this point of view the active life is a help to the contemplative, since the latter is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal passions. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation must first of all train in the camp of action. Thus after careful study they will learn whether they no longer wrong their neighbor, whether they bear with equanimity the wrongs their neighbors do to them, whether their soul is neither overcome with joy in the presence of temporal goods, nor cast down with too great a sorrow when those goods are withdrawn. In this way they will known when they withdraw within themselves, in order to explore spiritual things, whether they no longer carry with them the shadows of the things corporeal, or, if these follow them, whether they prudently drive them away." Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contemplative, by quelling the interior passions which give rise to the phantasms whereby contemplation is hindered. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam rationes illae procedunt quantum ad ipsam occupationem exteriorum actuum, non autem quantum ad effectum, qui est moderatio passionum. | This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for these arguments consider the occupation itself of external actions, and not the effect which is the quelling of the passions. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita activa non sit prior quam contemplativa. Vita enim contemplativa directe pertinet ad dilectionem Dei, vita autem activa ad dilectionem proximi. Sed dilectio Dei praecedit dilectionem proximi, inquantum proximus propter Deum diligitur. Ergo videtur quod etiam vita contemplativa sit prior quam activa. | Objection 1: It would seem that the active life does not precede the contemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the love of God; while the active life pertains to the love of our neighbor. Now the love of God precedes the love of our neighbor, since we love our neighbor for God's sake. Seemingly therefore the contemplative life also precedes the active life. |
| Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., sciendum est quod, sicut bonus ordo vivendi est ut ab activa in contemplativam tendatur, ita plerumque utiliter a contemplativa animus ad activam reflectitur. Non ergo simpliciter vita activa est prior quam contemplativa. | Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "It should be observed that while a well-ordered life proceeds from action to contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the contemplative to the active life." Therefore the active is not simply prior to the contemplative. |
| Praeterea, ea quae diversis competunt, non videntur ex necessitate ordinem habere. Sed vita activa et contemplativa diversis competunt, dicit enim Gregorius, in VI Moral., saepe qui contemplari Deum quieti poterant, occupationibus pressi ceciderunt, et saepe qui occupati bene humanis usibus viverent, gladio suae quietis extincti sunt. Non ergo vita activa prior est quam contemplativa. | Objection 3: Further, it would seem that there is not necessarily any order between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now the active and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects; for Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Often those who were able to contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when pressed with occupation; and frequently they who might live advantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures are killed by the sword of their inaction." |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in III Homil. Ezech., activa vita prior est tempore quam contemplativa, quia ex bono opere tenditur ad contemplationem. | On the contrary, some are in the state of perfection, who are wholly lacking in charity and grace, for instance wicked bishops or religious. Therefore, seemingly, whoever has perfection, for this very reason has the state of perfection. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse prius dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum suam naturam. Et hoc modo vita contemplativa est prior quam activa, inquantum prioribus et melioribus insistit. Unde et activam vitam movet et dirigit, ratio enim superior, quae contemplationi deputatur, comparatur ad inferiorem, quae deputatur actioni, sicut vir ad mulierem, quae est per virum regenda, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. | I answer that, A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with regard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes the active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and are better than others, wherefore it moves and directs the active life. For the higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is compared to the lower reason which is assigned to action, and the husband is compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3,7,12). |
| Alio modo est aliquid prius quoad nos, quod scilicet est prius in via generationis. Et hoc modo vita activa est prior quam contemplativa, quia disponit ad contemplativam, ut ex supra dictis patet. Dispositio enim in via generationis praecedit formam, quae simpliciter et secundum naturam est prior. | Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first in the order of generation. In this way the active precedes the contemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above (Article [1]; Question [181], Article [1], ad 3); and, in the order of generation, disposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and according to its nature. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vita contemplativa non ordinatur ad qualemcumque Dei dilectionem, sed ad perfectam. Sed vita activa necessaria est ad dilectionem proximi qualemcumque. Unde Gregorius dicit, in III Homil. Ezech., sine contemplativa vita intrare possunt ad caelestem patriam qui bona quae possunt, operari non negligunt, sine activa autem intrare non possunt, si negligunt bona operari quae possunt. | Reply to Objection 1: The contemplative life is directed to the love of God, not of any degree, but to that which is perfect; whereas the active life is necessary for any degree of the love of our neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "Without the contemplative life it is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided one omit not the good actions we are able to do; but we cannot enter therein without the active life, if we neglect to do the good we can do." |
| Ex quo etiam patet quod vita activa praecedit contemplativam, sicut id quod est commune omnium, praecedit in via generationis id quod est proprium perfectorum. | From this it is also evident that the active precedes the contemplative life, as that which is common to all precedes, in the order of generation, that which is proper to the perfect. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod a vita activa proceditur ad vitam contemplativam secundum ordinem generationis, a vita autem contemplativa reditur ad vitam activam per viam directionis, ut scilicet vita activa per contemplationem dirigatur. Sicut etiam per operationes acquiritur habitus, et per habitum acquisitum perfectius aliquis operatur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. | Reply to Objection 2: Progress from the active to the contemplative life is according to the order of generation; whereas the return from the contemplative life to the active is according to the order of direction, in so far as the active life is directed by the contemplative. Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the acquired habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in Ethic. ii, 7. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod illi qui sunt proni ad passiones propter eorum impetum ad agendum, sunt similiter magis apti ad vitam activam propter spiritus inquietudinem. Unde dicit Gregorius, in VI Moral., quod nonnulli ita inquieti sunt ut, si vacationem laboris habuerint, gravius laborent, quia tanto deteriores cordis tumultus tolerant, quanto eis licentius ad cogitationes vacat. Quidam vero habent naturaliter animi puritatem et quietem, per quam ad contemplationem sunt apti, qui si totaliter actionibus deputentur, detrimentum sustinebunt. Unde Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod quorundam hominum ita otiosae mentes sunt ut, si eos labor occupationis excipiat, in ipsa operationis inchoatione succumbant. Sed, sicut ipse postea subdit, saepe et pigras mentes amor ad opus excitat; et inquietas in contemplatione timor refrenat. Unde et illi qui sunt magis apti ad activam vitam, possunt per exercitium activae ad contemplativam praeparari, et illi nihilominus qui sunt magis ad contemplativam apti, possunt exercitia vitae activae subire, ut per hoc ad contemplationem paratiores reddantur | Reply to Objection 3: He that is prone to yield to his passions on account of his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life by reason of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "there be some so restless that when they are free from labor they labor all the more, because the more leisure they have for thought, the worse interior turmoil they have to bear." Others, on the contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they are apt for contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves wholly to action, this would be detrimental to them. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "some are so slothful of mind that if they chance to have any hard work to do they give way at the very outset." Yet, as he adds further on, "often . . . love stimulates slothful souls to work, and fear restrains souls that are disturbed in contemplation." Consequently those who are more adapted to the active life can prepare themselves for the contemplative by the practice of the active life; while none the less, those who are more adapted to the contemplative life can take upon themselves the works of the active life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation. |