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| Deinde considerandum est an adoptio Christo conveniat. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | We must now come to consider whether adoption befits Christ: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum Deo conveniat filios adoptare. | (1) Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons? |
| Secundo, utrum hoc conveniat soli Deo patri. | (2) Whether this is fitting to God the Father alone? |
| Tertio, utrum sit proprium hominum adoptari in filios Dei. | (3) Whether it is proper to man to be adopted to the sonship of God? |
| Quarto, utrum Christus possit dici filius adoptivus. | (4) Whether Christ can be called the adopted Son? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deo non conveniat filios adoptare. Nullus enim adoptat nisi extraneam personam in filium, secundum quod iuristae dicunt. Sed nulla persona est extranea Deo, qui est omnium creator. Ergo videtur quod Deo non conveniat adoptare. | Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting that God should adopt sons. For, as jurists say, no one adopts anyone but a stranger as his son. But no one is a stranger in relation to God, Who is the Creator of all. Therefore it seems unfitting that God should adopt. |
| Praeterea, adoptatio videtur esse introducta in defectu filiationis naturalis. Sed in Deo invenitur naturalis filiatio, ut in prima parte habitum est. Ergo non convenit Deo filios adoptare. | Objection 2: Further, adoption seems to have been introduced in default of natural sonship. But in God there is natural sonship, as set down in the FP, Question [27], Article [2]. Therefore it is unfitting that God should adopt. |
| Praeterea, ad hoc aliquis adoptatur ut in hereditate adoptantis succedat. Sed in hereditate Dei non videtur aliquis posse succedere, quia ipse nunquam decedit. Ergo Deo non competit adoptare. | Objection 3: Further, the purpose of adopting anyone is that he may succeed, as heir, the person who adopts him. But it does not seem possible for anyone to succeed God as heir, for He can never die. Therefore it is unfitting that God should adopt. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. I, praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum Dei. Sed praedestinatio Dei non est irrita. Ergo Deus aliquos sibi adoptat in filios. | On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:5) that "He hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children of God." But the predestination of God is not ineffectual. Therefore God does adopt some as His sons. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod aliquis homo adoptat alium sibi in filium inquantum ex sua bonitate admittit eum ad participationem suae hereditatis. Deus autem est infinitae bonitatis, ex qua contingit quod ad participationem bonorum suas creaturas admittit et praecipue rationales creaturas, quae, inquantum sunt ad imaginem Dei factae, sunt capaces beatitudinis divinae. Quae quidem consistit in fruitione Dei, per quam etiam ipse Deus beatus est et per seipsum dives, inquantum scilicet seipso fruitur. Hoc autem dicitur hereditas alicuius ex quo ipse est dives. Et ideo, inquantum Deus ex sua bonitate admittit homines ad beatitudinis hereditatem, dicitur eos adoptare. Hoc autem plus habet adoptatio divina quam humana, quod Deus hominem quem adoptat idoneum facit, per gratiae munus, ad hereditatem caelestem percipiendam, homo autem non facit idoneum eum quem adoptat, sed potius eum iam idoneum eligit adoptando. | I answer that, A man adopts someone as his son forasmuch as out of goodness he admits him as heir to his estate. Now God is infinitely good: for which reason He admits His creatures to a participation of good things; especially rational creatures, who forasmuch as they are made to the image of God, are capable of Divine beatitude. And this consists in the enjoyment of God, by which also God Himself is happy and rich in Himself---that is, in the enjoyment of Himself. Now a man's inheritance is that which makes him rich. Wherefore, inasmuch as God, of His goodness, admits men to the inheritance of beatitude, He is said to adopt them. Moreover Divine exceeds human adoption, forasmuch as God, by bestowing His grace, makes man whom He adopts worthy to receive the heavenly inheritance; whereas man does not make him worthy whom he adopts; but rather in adopting him he chooses one who is already worthy. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo, in sua natura consideratus, non est extraneus a Deo quantum ad bona naturalia quae recipit, est tamen extraneus quantum ad bona gratiae et gloriae. Et secundum hoc adoptatur. | Reply to Objection 1: Considered in his nature man is not a stranger in respect to God, as to the natural gifts bestowed on him: but he is as to the gifts of grace and glory; in regard to which he is adopted. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod hominis est operari ad supplendam suam indigentiam, non autem Dei, cui convenit operari ad communicandam suae perfectionis abundantiam. Et ideo, sicut per actum creationis communicatur bonitas divina omnibus creaturis secundum quandam similitudinem, ita per actum adoptionis communicatur similitudo naturalis filiationis hominibus, secundum illud Rom. VIII, quos praescivit conformes fieri imaginis filii sui. | Reply to Objection 2: Man works in order to supply his wants: not so God, Who works in order to communicate to others the abundance of His perfection. Wherefore, as by the work of creation the Divine goodness is communicated to all creatures in a certain likeness, so by the work of adoption the likeness of natural sonship is communicated to men, according to Rm. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew . . . to be made conformable to the image of His Son." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod bona spiritualia possunt simul a pluribus possideri, non autem bona corporalia. Et ideo hereditatem corporalem nullus potest percipere nisi succedens decedenti, hereditatem autem spiritualem simul omnes ex integro percipiunt, sine detrimento patris semper viventis. | Reply to Objection 3: Spiritual goods can be possessed by many at the same time; not so material goods. Wherefore none can receive a material inheritance except the successor of a deceased person: whereas all receive the spiritual inheritance at the same time in its entirety without detriment to the ever-living Father. |
| Quamvis posset dici quod Deus decedit secundum quod est in nobis per fidem, ut incipiat in nobis esse per speciem, sicut Glossa dicit, Rom. VIII, super illud, si filii, et heredes. | Yet it might be said that God ceases to be, according as He is in us by faith, so as to begin to be in us by vision, as a gloss says on Rm. 8:17: "If sons, heirs also." |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod adoptare non conveniat toti Trinitati. Adoptatio enim dicitur in divinis ad similitudinem rerum humanarum. Sed in rebus humanis soli illi convenit adoptare qui potest filios generare, quod in divinis convenit soli patri. Ergo in divinis solus pater potest adoptare. | Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that the whole Trinity should adopt. For adoption is said of God in likeness to human custom. But among men those only adopt who can beget: and in God this can be applied only to the Father. Therefore in God the Father alone can adopt. |
| Praeterea, homines per adoptionem efficiuntur fratres Christi, secundum illud Rom. VIII, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Fratres autem dicuntur qui sunt filii unius patris, unde et dominus dicit, Ioan. XX, ascendo ad patrem meum et patrem vestrum. Ergo solus pater Christi habet filios adoptivos. | Objection 2: Further, by adoption men become the brethren of Christ, according to Rm. 8:29: "That He might be the first-born among many brethren." Now brethren are the sons of the same father; wherefore our Lord says (Jn. 20:17): "I ascend to My Father and to your Father." Therefore Christ's Father alone has adopted sons. |
| Praeterea, Galat. IV dicitur, misit Deus filium suum, ut adoptionem filiorum Dei reciperemus. Quoniam autem estis filii Dei, misit Deus spiritum filii sui in corda vestra, clamantem, abba, pater. Ergo eius est adoptare cuius est filium et spiritum sanctum habere. Sed hoc est solius personae patris. Ergo adoptare convenit soli personae patris. | Objection 3: Further, it is written (Gal. 4:4,5,6): "God sent His Son . . . that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because you are sons of God, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying: 'Abba' [Father]." Therefore it belongs to Him to adopt, Who has the Son and the Holy Ghost. But this belongs to the Father alone. Therefore it befits the Father alone to adopt. |
| Sed contra, eius est adoptare nos in filios quem nos patrem possumus nominare, unde dicitur Rom. VIII, accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum, in quo clamamus, abba, pater. Sed cum Deo dicimus, pater noster, hoc pertinet ad totam Trinitatem, sicut et cetera nomina quae dicuntur de Deo relative ad creaturam, ut in prima parte habitum est. Ergo adoptare convenit toti Trinitati. | On the contrary, It belongs to Him to adopt us as sons, Whom we can call Father; whence it is written (Rm. 8:15): "You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: 'Abba' [Father]." But when we say to God, "Our Father," we address the whole Trinity: as is the case with the other names which are said of God in respect of creatures, as stated in the FP, Question [33], Article [3], Objection [1]; cf. FP, Question [45], Article [6]. Therefore to adopt is befitting to the whole Trinity. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod haec est differentia inter filium Dei adoptivum et filium Dei naturalem, quod filius Dei naturalis est genitus non factus, filius autem adoptivus est factus, secundum illud Ioan. I, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri. Dicitur tamen quandoque filius adoptivus esse genitus, propter spiritualem regenerationem, quae est gratuita, non naturalis, unde dicitur Iac. I, voluntarie genuit nos verbo veritatis. Quamvis autem generare in divinis sit proprium personae patris, tamen facere quemcumque effectum in creaturis est commune toti Trinitati, propter unitatem naturae, quia, ubi est una natura, oportet quod ibi sit una virtus et una operatio; unde dominus dicit, Ioan. V, quaecumque facit pater, haec et filius similiter facit. Et ideo homines adoptare in filios Dei convenit toti Trinitati. | I answer that, There is this difference between an adopted son of God and the natural Son of God, that the latter is "begotten not made"; whereas the former is made, according to Jn. 1:12: "He gave them power to be made the sons of God." Yet sometimes the adopted son is said to be begotten, by reason of the spiritual regeneration which is by grace, not by nature; wherefore it is written (James 1:18): "Of His own will hath He begotten us by the word of truth." Now although, in God, to beget belongs to the Person of the Father, yet to produce any effect in creatures is common to the whole Trinity, by reason of the oneness of their Nature: since, where there is one nature, there must needs be one power and one operation: whence our Lord says (Jn. 5:19): "What things soever the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner." Therefore it belongs to the whole Trinity to adopt men as sons of God. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes personae humanae non sunt unius naturae secundum numerum, ut oporteat unam esse omnium operationem et unum effectum, sicut accidit in divinis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc non est possibile attendi similitudinem utrobique. | Reply to Objection 1: All human individuals are not of one individual nature, so that there need be one operation and one effect of them all, as is the case in God. Consequently in this respect no comparison is possible. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod nos per adoptionem efficimur fratres Christi quasi eundem patrem habentes cum ipso, qui tamen alio modo est pater Christi, et alio modo est pater noster. Unde signanter dominus, Ioan. XX, seorsum dixit, patrem meum, et seorsum dixit, patrem vestrum. Est enim pater Christi naturaliter generando, quod est proprium sibi, est autem noster voluntarie aliquid faciendo, quod est commune sibi et filio et spiritui sancto. Et ideo Christus non est filius totius Trinitatis, sicut nos. | Reply to Objection 2: By adoption we are made the brethren of Christ, as having with Him the same Father: Who, nevertheless, is His Father in one way, and ours in another. Whence pointedly our Lord says, separately, "My Father," and "Your Father" (Jn. 20:17). For He is Christ's Father by natural generation; and this is proper to Him: whereas He is our Father by a voluntary operation, which is common to Him and to the Son and Holy Ghost: so that Christ is not the Son of the whole Trinity, as we are. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, filiatio adoptiva est quaedam similitudo filiationis aeternae, sicut omnia quae in tempore facta sunt, similitudines quaedam sunt eorum quae ab aeterno fuerunt. Assimilatur autem homo splendori aeterni filii per gratiae claritatem, quae attribuitur spiritui sancto. Et ideo adoptatio, licet sit communis toti Trinitati, appropriatur tamen patri ut auctori, filio ut exemplari, spiritui sancto ut imprimenti in nobis huius similitudinem exemplaris. | Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Article [1], ad 2), adoptive sonship is a certain likeness of the eternal Sonship: just as all that takes place in time is a certain likeness of what has been from eternity. Now man is likened to the splendor of the Eternal Son by reason of the light of grace which is attributed to the Holy Ghost. Therefore adoption, though common to the whole Trinity, is appropriated to the Father as its author; to the Son, as its exemplar; to the Holy Ghost, as imprinting on us the likeness of this exemplar. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod adoptari non sit proprium rationalis creaturae. Non enim Deus pater creaturae rationalis dicitur nisi per adoptionem. Dicitur autem pater creaturae etiam irrationalis, secundum illud Iob XXXVIII, quis est pluviae pater? Aut quis genuit stillas roris? Ergo adoptari non est proprium rationalis naturae. | Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the rational nature to be adopted. For God is not said to be the Father of the rational creature, save by adoption. But God is called the Father even of the irrational creature, according to Job 38:28: "Who is father of the rain? Or who begot the drops of dew?" Therefore it is not proper to the rational creature to be adopted. |
| Praeterea, per adoptionem dicuntur aliqui filii Dei. Sed esse filios Dei in Scriptura proprie videtur attribui Angelis, secundum illud Iob I, quadam autem die, cum assisterent filii Dei coram domino. Ergo non est proprium rationalis creaturae adoptari. | Objection 2: Further, by reason of adoption some are called sons of God. But to be sons of God seems to be properly attributed by the Scriptures to the angels; according to Job 1:6: "On a certain day when the sons of God came to stand before the Lord." Therefore it is not proper to the rational creature to be adopted. |
| Praeterea, quod est proprium alicui naturae, convenit omnibus habentibus naturam illam, sicut risibile convenit omnibus hominibus. Sed adoptari non convenit omni rationali naturae. Ergo adoptari non est proprium rationalis naturae. | Objection 3: Further, whatever is proper to a nature, belongs to all that have that nature: just as risibility belongs to all men. But to be adopted does not belong to every rational nature. Therefore it is not proper to human nature. |
| Sed contra est quod filii adoptati sunt heredes Dei, ut patet Rom. VIII. Sed talis hereditas convenit soli creaturae rationali. Ergo proprium rationalis creaturae est adoptari. | On the contrary, Adopted sons are the "heirs of God," as is stated Rm. 8:17. But such an inheritance belongs to none but the rational nature. Therefore it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, filiatio adoptionis est quaedam similitudo filiationis naturalis. Filius autem Dei naturaliter procedit a patre ut verbum intellectuale, unum cum ipso patre existens. Huic ergo verbo tripliciter potest aliquid assimilari. Uno quidem modo, secundum rationem formae, non autem secundum intellectualitatem ipsius, sicut forma domus exterius constitutae assimilatur verbo mentali artificis secundum speciem formae, non autem secundum intelligibilitatem, quia forma domus in materia non est intelligibilis, sicut erat in mente artificis. Et hoc modo verbo aeterno assimilatur quaelibet creatura, cum sit facta per verbum. Secundo assimilatur creatura verbo, non solum quantum ad rationem formae, sed etiam quantum ad intellectualitatem ipsius, sicut scientia quae fit in mente discipuli, assimilatur verbo quod est in mente magistri. Et hoc modo creatura rationalis, etiam secundum suam naturam, assimilatur verbo Dei. Tertio modo, assimilatur creatura verbo aeterno secundum unitatem quam habet ad patrem, quod quidem fit per gratiam et caritatem, unde dominus orat, Ioan. XVII, sint unum in nobis, sicut et nos unum sumus. Et talis assimilatio perficit rationem adoptionis, quia sic assimilatis debetur hereditas aeterna. Unde manifestum est quod adoptari convenit soli creaturae rationali, non tamen omni, sed solum habenti caritatem. Quae est diffusa in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, ut dicitur Rom. V. Et ideo, Rom. VIII, spiritus sanctus dicitur spiritus adoptionis filiorum. | I answer that, As stated above (Article [2], ad 3), the sonship of adoption is a certain likeness of natural sonship. Now the Son of God proceeds naturally from the Father as the Intellectual Word, in oneness of nature with the Father. To this Word, therefore, something may be likened in three ways. First, on the part of the form but not on the part of its intelligibility: thus the form of a house already built is like the mental word of the builder in its specific form, but not in intelligibility, because the material form of a house is not intelligible, as it was in the mind of the builder. In this way every creature is like the Eternal Word; since it was made through the Word. Secondly, the creature is likened to the Word, not only as to its form, but also as to its intelligibility: thus the knowledge which is begotten in the disciple's mind is likened to the word in the mind of the master. In this way the rational creature, even in its nature, is likened to the Word of God. Thirdly, a creature is likened to the Eternal Word, as to the oneness of the Word with the Father, which is by reason of grace and charity: wherefore our Lord prays (Jn. 17:21,22): "That they may be one in Us . . . as We also are one." And this likeness perfects the adoption: for to those who are thus like Him the eternal inheritance is due. It is therefore clear that to be adopted belongs to the rational creature alone: not indeed to all, but only to those who have charity; which is "poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost" (Rm. 5:5); for which reason (Rm. 8:15) the Holy Ghost is called "the Spirit of adoption of sons." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus dicitur pater creaturae irrationalis, non proprie per adoptionem, sed per creationem, secundum primam participationem similitudinis. | Reply to Objection 1: God is called the Father of the irrational creature, not properly speaking, by reason of adoption, but by reason of creation; according to the first-mentioned participation of likeness. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Angeli dicuntur filii Dei filiatione adoptionis, non quia ipsis primo conveniat, sed quia ipsi primo adoptionem filiorum receperunt. | Reply to Objection 2: Angels are called sons of God by adoptive sonship, not that it belongs to them first; but because they were the first to receive the adoption of sons. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod adoptio non est proprium consequens naturam, sed consequens gratiam, cuius natura rationalis est capax. Et ideo non oportet quod omni rationali creaturae conveniat, sed quod omnis rationalis creatura sit capax adoptionis. | Reply to Objection 3: Adoption is a property resulting not from nature, but from grace, of which the rational nature is capable. Therefore it need not belong to every rational nature: but every rational creature must needs be capable of adoption. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus, secundum quod homo sit filius Dei adoptivus. Dicit enim Hilarius, de Christo loquens, potestatis dignitas non amittitur dum carnis humanitas adoptatur. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est filius adoptivus. | Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is the adopted Son of God. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii) speaking of Christ: "The dignity of power is not forfeited when carnal humanity [*Some editions read 'humilitas'---'the humility or lowliness of the flesh'] is adopted." Therefore Christ as man is the adopted Son of God. |
| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., quod eadem gratia ille homo est Christus, qua gratia ab initio fidei quicumque homo est Christianus. Sed alii homines sunt Christiani per gratiam adoptionis. Ergo et ille homo est Christus per adoptionem. Et ita videtur esse filius adoptivus. | Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) that "by the same grace that Man is Christ, as from the birth of faith every man is a Christian." But other men are Christians by the grace of adoption. Therefore this Man is Christ by adoption: and consequently He would seem to be an adopted son. |
| Praeterea, Christus, secundum quod homo, est servus. Sed dignius est esse filium adoptivum quam servum. Ergo multo magis Christus, secundum quod homo, est filius adoptivus. | Objection 3: Further, Christ, as man, is a servant. But it is of greater dignity to be an adopted son than to be a servant. Therefore much more is Christ, as man, an adopted Son. |
| Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de Incarnat., adoptivum filium non dicimus filium esse natura, sed eum dicimus natura esse filium qui verus est filius. Christus autem verus et naturalis est filius Dei, secundum illud I Ioan. ult., ut simus in vero filio eius, Iesu Christo. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, non est filius adoptivus. | On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarn. viii): "We do not call an adopted son a natural son: the natural son is a true son." But Christ is the true and natural Son of God, according to 1 Jn. 5:20: "That we may . . . be in His true Son, Jesus Christ." Therefore Christ, as Man, is not an adopted Son. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod filiatio proprie convenit hypostasi vel personae, non autem naturae, unde in prima parte dictum est quod filiatio est proprietas personalis. In Christo autem non est alia persona vel hypostasis quam increata, cui convenit esse filium per naturam. Dictum est autem supra quod filiatio adoptionis est participata similitudo filiationis naturalis. Non autem dicitur aliquid participative quod per se dicitur. Et ideo Christus, qui est filius Dei naturalis, nullo modo potest dici filius adoptivus. | I answer that, Sonship belongs properly to the hypostasis or person, not to the nature; whence in the FP, Question [32], Article [3] we have stated that Filiation is a personal property. Now in Christ there is no other than the uncreated person or hypostasis, to Whom it belongs by nature to be the Son. But it has been said above (Article [1], ad 2), that the sonship of adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship: nor can a thing be said to participate in what it has essentially. Therefore Christ, Who is the natural Son of God, can nowise be called an adopted Son. |
| Secundum autem illos qui ponunt in Christo duas personas, vel duas hypostases, seu duo supposita, nihil rationabiliter prohibet Christum hominem dici filium adoptivum. | But according to those who suppose two persons or two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, no reason prevents Christ being called the adopted Son of God. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut filiatio non proprie convenit naturae, ita nec adoptio. Et ideo, cum dicitur quod carnis humanitas adoptatur, impropria est locutio, et accipitur ibi adoptio pro unione humanae naturae ad personam filii. | Reply to Objection 1: As sonship does not properly belong to the nature, so neither does adoption. Consequently, when it is said that "carnal humanity is adopted," the expression is metaphorical: and adoption is used to signify the union of human nature to the Person of the Son. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo illa Augustini est intelligenda quantum ad principium, quia scilicet, sicut sine meritis habet quilibet homo ut sit Christianus, ita ille homo sine meritis habuit ut esset Christus. Est tamen differentia quantum ad terminum, quia scilicet Christus per gratiam unionis est filius naturalis; alius autem per gratiam habitualem est filius adoptivus. Gratia autem habitualis in Christo non facit de nonfilio filium adoptivum, sed est quidam effectus filiationis in anima Christi, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus gloriam eius quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. | Reply to Objection 2: This comparison of Augustine is to be referred to the principle because, to wit, just as it is granted to any man without meriting it to be a Christian, so did it happen that this man without meriting it was Christ. But there is a difference on the part of the term: because by the grace of union Christ is the natural Son; whereas another man by habitual grace is an adopted son. Yet habitual grace in Christ does not make one who was not a son to be an adopted son, but is a certain effect of Filiation in the soul of Christ, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father; full of grace and truth." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod esse creaturam, et etiam servitus vel subiectio ad Deum, non solum respicit personam, sed etiam naturam, quod non potest dici de filiatione. Et ideo non est similis ratio. | Reply to Objection 3: To be a creature, as also to be subservient or subject to God, regards not only the person, but also the nature: but this cannot be said of sonship. Wherefore the comparison does not hold. |