Q. 12: Prophecy

ARTICLE II

In the second article we ask:

Does prophecy deal with conclusions which can be known scientifically?

[Parallel readings: C.G., III, 154; In Isaiam, I; S.T., II-II, 171, 3; In Psalm. 50; Ad Rom., c. 12, lect. 2.]

Difficulties

It seems that it does not, for

1. Prophecy is “the inspiration which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth.” But the outcomes of things are called future contingents, and the conclusions of the demonstrative sciences do not concern matters of this sort. Therefore, there cannot be prophecy about such things.

2. Jerome says that prophecy is “a sign of divine foreknowledge.” But foreknowledge refers to the future. Since, therefore, futures, especially future contingents, which prophecy seems mainly to deal with, cannot be the conclusions of any science, it seems that prophecy cannot deal with conclusions scientifically knowable.

3. Nature does not provide superfluities nor fail in necessary matters. Much less does 6od, whose activity is most wisely disposed. But to know the conclusions of the demonstrative sciences man has another way than prophecy, namely, through self-evident principles. Therefore, if things of this sort were known through prophecy, it would seem to be superfluous.

4. A different manner of generation is an indication of diversity of species. Thus, as the Commentator says, mice begotten from seed cannot be of the same species as mice begotten from decaying matter. But men naturally reach conclusions of the demonstrative sciences from self-evident principles. Therefore, if there are some men who receive knowledge of the demonstrative sciences in another way, as through prophecy, they will be of another species and will be called men equivocally, which seems absurd.

5. The demonstrative sciences deal with those things which relate indifferently to every time. But prophecy does not have a similar relation to every time, in fact, “sometimes the spirit of the prophets stirs the heart of a prophet for the present and not for the future, and sometimes just the opposite,” as Gregory says. Therefore, prophecy does not deal with those things about which there is scientific knowledge.

6. The mind of the prophet and the mind of anyone else do not relate in the same way to those things which are known through prophecy. But in things which are known through demonstration the judgment of the prophet and of anyone else who knows it is the same, and neither is preferred to the other, as Rabbi Moses says. Therefore, prophecy does not deal with those things which are known through demonstration.

To the Contrary

1. We believe the prophets only in so far as they are inspired by the spirit of prophecy. But we have to give belief to those things written in the books of the prophets even though they treat of conclusions of scientific knowledge, as in Psalms (135:6): “Who established the earth above the waters,” and whatever else there is of this sort. Therefore, the spirit of prophecy inspires the prophets even about conclusions of the sciences.

2. As the grace of miracles relates to the performance of deeds which are beyond the power of nature, so the gift of prophecy relates to the knowledge of things which surpass natural knowledge. But through the grace of miracles there take place not only things which nature cannot do, as to give sight to the blind and to raise the dead, but also things which nature can do, as to cure those with fevers. Therefore, through the gift of prophecy one can know not only those things to which natural knowledge does not extend, but also things to which natural knowledge does extend, and conclusions of the sciences are among these latter. Thus, it seems that prophecy can treat of them.

REPLY

In all things which exist for the sake of an end the matter is determined according to the exigency of the end, as is clear in the Physics. But the gift of prophecy is given for the use of the Church, as is clear in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:7): “And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit.” The letter adds many examples among which prophecy is numbered. Therefore, all those things the knowledge of which can be useful for salvation are the matter of prophecy, whether they are past, or future, or even eternal, or necessary, or contingent. But those things which cannot pertain to salvation are outside the matter of prophecy. Hence, Augustine says: “Although our authors knew what shape heaven is, [the spirit] wants to speak through them only that which is useful for salvation. And to the Gospel of St. John (16:13), “But when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will teach you all truth,” the Gloss adds: “necessary for salvation.”

Moreover, I say necessary for salvation, whether they are necessary for instruction in the faith or for the formation of morals. But many things which are proved in the sciences can be useful for this, as, for instance, that our understanding is incorruptible, and also those things which when considered in creatures lead to admiration of the divine wisdom and power. Hence, we find that mention of these is made in Holy Scripture.

However, we should bear in mind that, since prophecy is knowledge of things which are far away, it does not have the same relation to all the things we have mentioned. For some things are far from our knowledge because of the things themselves and some are such because of something in us.

Future contingents are beyond us because of the things themselves, for they are unknown because they lack existence, since they neither exist in themselves nor are determined in their causes. But the things beyond us because of something in us are those which we have difficulty knowing because of our own inadequacy and not because of the things themselveg, since they are the most knowable and the most perfect beings, such as things which are intelligible by nature, and especially things which are eternal.

Now, what belongs to a thing in itself belongs to it more truly than that which belongs to it by reason of something else. Hence, since future contingents are more truly beyond our knowledge than anything else, they seem, therefore, to belong especially to prophecy. And they pertain to it so much that, in the definition of prophecy, they are given as the special matter of prophecy. Thus: “Prophecy is a divine inspiration which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth.” And even the name of prophecy seems to be taken from this. Thus, Gregory says: “Prophecy is so called because it predicts the future. When it speaks of the present or the past, it loses the character of its name.”

Now, among those things which are beyond us because of something in us there is likewise a difference which we must consider some things are beyond us because they surpass all human knowledge, as that God is three and one, and other such things. These are not conclusions of the sciences.

Some things, however, are beyond us because they surpass the knowledge of some men, but not human knowledge simply. In this class there are those things which the educated know through demonstration, but which the uneducated do not grasp with natural knowledge, although they are sometimes elevated to them by divine revelation. These things do not belong to prophecy simply, but with reference to men of this type. Thus, conclusions which are demonstrated in the sciences can belong to prophecy.

Answers to Difficulties

1. The outcomes of things are put in the definition of prophecy as the most proper matter of prophecy, but not as the whole matter of prophecy.

2. Similarly, prophecy is called a sign of foreknowledge by reason of its principal matter.

3. Although conclusions of the sciences can be known in another way than through prophecy, it is not superfluous for them to be shown by prophetic light, for through faith we cling more firmly to what the prophets say than we do to the demonstrations of the sciences. And in this, too, the grace of God is praised and His perfect knowledge is shown forth.

4. Natural causes have determinate effects, since their powers are finite and limited to one type of effect. Therefore, it is necessary that those things which are brought into being by different natural causes according to different ways of generation be specifically different. But, since the divine power is infinite, it can without the work of nature produce effects specifically the same as those which nature produces. Hence, if those things which can be known naturally are divinely revealed, it does not follow that those who receive knowledge in a different way are specifically different.

5. Although prophecy sometimes concerns things which are separated as belonging to different divisions of time, it sometimes concerns those things which are true for all times.

6. Rabbi Moses does not mean that a revelation could not be made to a prophet of those things which are known through demonstration, but that, as soon as they are known by a demonstration, it makes no difference whether there is prophecy about them or not.

Q. 12: Prophecy

ARTICLE III

In the third article we ask:

Is prophecy natural?

[Parallel readings: S.T., III, 154; S.T., I, 86, 4; II-II, 172, 1.]

Difficulties

It seems that it is, for

1. The cognition of one who is awake is preferable to that of one who is sleeping. But it is natural for people who are asleep to foresee the future, as is clear in the divinations of dreams. Therefore, with much greater reason some can see the future naturally while awake. But this is the office of the prophet. Therefore, one can naturally be a prophet.

2. But it was said that the cognition of one who is awake is better for judgment, but the cognition of one who is asleep is better for reception.—On the contrary, the cognoscitive power can judge of something in so far as it receives its species. Therefore, judgment follows reception and, where the reception is better, the judgment is also more perfect. Thus, if one who is asleep is better in receiving, he ought also to be better in judging.

3. Our understanding is hampered in sleep only from without, namely in so far as it depends on sense. But the judgment of our understanding does not depend on sense, since the operation of our understanding depends on sense in so far as it receives from sense. But judgment follows reception. Therefore, the judgment of our understanding is not hampered in sleep. Hence, the distinction given seems to be of no importance.

4. What belongs to something because it is kept free from something else belongs to it by reason of its nature, just as brightness, which is natural to iron, comes to it because the iron is kept free from rust. But, as Augustine shows by many examples, it belongs to the soul to see the future in so far as it is cut off from the senses of the body. Therefore, it seems natural for the human soul to foresee the future. Thus, we conclude as before.

5. Gregory says: “Sometimes the very power of souls foresees something by its subtlety, for sometimes souls about to leave the body know through revelation things to come.” But the things which the soul can see because of its subtlety it sees naturally. Therefore, the soul can naturally know future things, and so naturally have prophecy, which consists especially in foreknowledge of the future.

6. It was said that the futures which the soul foresees by natural knowledge are those which have fixed causes in nature, but that prophecy deals with other futures.—On the contrary, those things which depend on free will do not have fixed causes in nature. But those things which the soul foresees from its subtlety depend altogether on free will, as is clear from the example of Gregory, who tells of a man who, when he was sick and his burial in a certain church had been arranged for, arose as he neared death, dressed, and predicted that he wanted to go by the Appian Way to the Church of St. Sixtus. When he died a short while later, as his funeral procession was going out along the Appian Way, they suddenly decided to bury him in the Church of St. Sixtus, since it was a long way to the church where they were supposed to bury him. And they did this without knowing what he had said. As Gregory adds, he would not have been able to predict this if the power and subtlety of his soul had not foreseen what would happen to his body. Therefore, man can naturally foresee those futures which arc independent of non-free causes. The same conclusion follows as before.

7. From natural causes we cannot perceive the meaning of those things which do not take place naturally. But astrologers perceive the meanings of prophecies from the movements of the heavenly bodies. Therefore, prophecy is natural.

8. In natural science the philosophers discuss only those things which can happen naturally. But Avicenna discusses prophecy. Therefore, prophecy is natural.

9. For prophecy, as Avicenna says, only three things are needed: clearness of intelligence, perfection of the imaginative power, and power of soul so that external matter obeys it. But these three things can be had naturally. Therefore, one can naturally be a prophet.

10. But it was said that our understanding and imagination can naturally be brought to the point where they have foreknowledge of natural future events, but that prophecy does not deal with these. On the contrary, those things which depend on lower causes are said to be natural. But Isaiah (38:1) foretold that Ezechias would die, and lie did this on the basis of [the expected outcome of ] the order of created causes, as the Gloss on that passage states. Therefore, prophecy is the foreknowledge of natural future events.

11. To the things which are brought into existence divine providence grants the possession of those things without which they could not be preserved in existence, as in the human body it put members with which food can be taken and digested, without which mortal life would not be maintained. But the human race cannot be maintained without society, for one man is not sufficient unto himself in the necessities of life. Hence, man is “naturally a political animal,” as is said in the Ethics. But society cannot be maintained without justice, and prophecy is the rule of justice. Therefore, human nature is endowed with the ability naturally to arrive at prophecy.

12. In any class there is that which is most perfect in that class. But among men the most perfect is the prophet, who transcends the others in that which is higher in man, his intellect. Therefore, man can naturally arrive at prophecy.

13. The properties of God are farther from the properties of creatures than the properties of future things are from present things. But man can reach the knowledge of God by natural knowledge through the properties of creatures, according to Romans (1:20): “For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world,...” Therefore, from the things which now exist man can arrive at the knowledge of future things. Thus, he can be a prophet naturally.

14. It was said that future things are more remote in knowledge although God is more remote in being.—On the contrary, the principles of being and of knowing are the same. Therefore, that which is more remote in being is more remote in knowledge.

15. Augustine distinguishes9 three kinds of goods: “insignificant, important, and ordinary.” But prophecy is not numbered among the insignificant goods, for the goods of this sort are bodily goods. Nor is it classed among the most important goods, for these are those by which we live rightly and which no one can abuse. And this does not seem to fit prophecy. Therefore, it remains that prophecy belongs to the ordinary goods, which are the natural goods of the soul. Thus, prophecy seems to be natural.

16. Boethius says that in one sense all that “can act or be acted upon” is called nature. But for someone to be a prophet he must undergo some spiritual change, which consists in the reception of the prophetic light, as was said above. Therefore, it seems that prophecy is natural.

17. If to act is natural for the agent and to receive is natural for that which is acted upon, the act of receiving must be natural. But it is natural for God to infuse the perfection of prophecy into men. For by His very nature He is good, and it is natural for the good to communicate itself. Likewise, it is natural for the human mind to receive things from God, since its nature is made up only of those things which it receives from God. Therefore, the reception of prophecy is natural.

18. There is a natural active potency corresponding to every natural passive potency. But in the human soul there is a natural potency for the reception of the light of prophecy. Therefore, there is also some natural active potency through which one is brought to the act of prophecy. Therefore, it seems that prophecy is natural.

19. Naturally, man has more perfect knowledge than other animals. But some animals are naturally prescient of those future things which especially concern them. This is clear of ants, who have foreknowledge of future rains, and of some fishes, which foretell future storms. Therefore, man, also, ought to be naturally prescient of those things which concern him. Thus, it seems that man naturally can be a prophet.

To the Contrary

1. In the second Epistle of St. Peter (1:21) is said: “For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time: but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit.”

2. That which depends on an external cause does not seem to be natural. But prophecy depends on an external cause, for the prophets read in the mirror of eternity. Therefore, it seems that prophecy is not natural.

3. Those things which are in us naturally are within our power. “But it was not in the power of a prophet to possess the spirit of predicting the future,” as is clear from the Gloss on the second Epistle of St. Peter (1:19): “We have the more firm prophetical word.” Therefore, prophecy is not natural.

4. Things which are natural happen as the more common occurrence. But prophecy exists in very few men. Therefore, it is not natural.

REPLY

A thing is called natural in two ways. In one it is so called because its active principle is natural, as it is natural for fire to be borne aloft. It is so called in another way when nature is the source not of any of its dispositions whatever, but of those which are a necessity for such a perfection. In this way, the infusion of the rational soul is called natural, inasmuch as through the activity of nature the body is given a disposition which is a necessity for the reception of the soul.

Some, then, were of the opinion that prophecy is natural in the first sense, for they said: “The soul had in itself a power of divination,” as Augustine relates. But in the same place he rejects that, for, if that were so, then the soul would be able to have foreknowledge of the future whenever it so wished. And this is clearly false.

Furthermore, the falsity of this is manifest because the nature of the human mind cannot naturally be the source of any knowledge to which it cannot arrive by means of self-evident principles, which are the prime instruments of the agent intellect. It cannot arrive at a knowledge of future contingents from these principles, except, perhaps, by studying some natural signs, as the doctor foresees that health or death will come, or a meteorologist foresees the storm or fair weather. But such knowledge of future things is not ascribed to divination or prophecy, but to technical knowledge.

Hence, some. have said that prophecy is natural in the second sense. For nature can bring man to such a state that he will have to receive foreknowledge of futures through the action of some higher cause. Indeed, this opinion is true of a certain type of prophecy, but not, however, of that type which the Apostle numbers among the gifts of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 12:10).

And so, to see the difference between these types we should keep in mind that, before they exist, future contingents pre-exist in two ways, that is, they are contained in the divine foreknowledge and in the created causes, by whose power they will be brought into existence. In these two the futures pre-exist in a doubly different manner.

The first difference is this, that all that pre-exists in created causes pre-exists in the divine foreknowledge, but not conversely. For God holds within Himself the principles which will determine some future things without infusing them into created things. An example of this is the principles which will determine those things which happen miraculously by the divine power alone, as Augustine says.

The second is this, that some things pre-exist in created causes changeably, since the power of the cause which is directed to bringing about such an effect can be hindered by some event. But all future things are in the divine foreknowledge unchangeably, for futures are objects of the divine foreknowledge not only as regards the order of their causes to those futures, but also as nards the outcome of that order or the event.

Accordingly, there are two ways in which foreknowledge of the future can be caused in the human mind. One is derived from the preexistence of futures in the divine mind. It is this prophecy that is called a gift of the Holy Spirit, and it is not natural. For those things which are executed by the divine power without natural intermediary causes are not said to be natural, but miraculous. Now the revelation of futures of this sort takes place without intermediary natural causes, for they are not revealed in so far as the principles which determine future things exist in created causes, but in so far as they exist in the divine mind, from which they flow into the mind of the prophet.

In the second way it is derived from the power of created causes, in so far as certain movements can be impressed on the human imaginative power, for instance, by the power of the heavenly bodies, in which there pre-exist some signs of certain future events. And, in so far as it is natural for the human understanding, as inferior, to receive instruction from the illumination of the separated intellects, and to be raised up to the knowledge of other things, prophecy can be called natural in the sense which was mentioned.

But this natural prophecy differs in three ways from that about which we are now speaking. It differs, first, in this, that the prophecy of which we speak gets its foreknowledge of future things immediately from God, although an angel can be an intermediary, inasmuch as he acts in virtue of the divine light. But natural prophecy is due to the proper activity of second causes. Second, it differs in this that natural prophecy extends only to those future things which have determinate causes in nature, but the prophecy of which we speak relates indifferently to all things. Third, they differ in this, that natural prophecy does not foresee infallibly, but predicts those things which are true for the most part, whereas the prophecy which is a gift of the Holy Spirit foresees the future infallibly. Hence, it is called a sign of the divine foreknowledge, since it foresees with that infallibility with which future things are foreseen by God.

This threefold difference can be noted in the definition of Cassiodorus. The first difference is in the word “divine”; the second is in the general phrase, “outcomes of things”; and the third in the words, “which announces with immutable truth.”

But two of the differences, the first and second, remain in prophecy in so far as it deals with things which are necessary, as those which can be known with scientific knowledge. For by natural prophecy man does not receive immediately from God the knowledge of the things which are known scientifically, but gets it through the mediation of second causes, and through the activity of second causes acting with their natural power. Nor, again, does such knowledge extend to things which are necessary, but only to those which can be known through first principles. For the power of the light of the agent intellect does not extend any farther and is not naturally elevated to other things as divine prophecy is raised to certain things which are beyond natural knowledge, such as that God is three and one and other things of this sort.

In this matter the third difference has no place, for both kinds of prophecy give the prophet knowledge of necessary conclusions of this kind as unchangeably and certainly as if they were known through the principles of demonstration. Furthermore, the mind of man is elevated by both prophecies so that it understands in a way similar to the separated substances, who understand the principles and the conclusions with the utmost certainty in a simple intuition without deducing one from the other.

Again, both prophecies differ from dreams and visions, in so far as we call a dream an apparition which comes to a man who is asleep and a vision one which comes to a man who is awake but carried out of his senses, because in both the dream and the simple vision the soul is fettered completely or partially by phantasms which are seen in such a way that the soul completely or partially clings to them as to things which are true. But, although in both prophecies some phantasms may be seen in sleep or in a vision, the soul of the prophet is not under the control of those phantasms, but knows through the prophetic light that the objects which it sees are not things, but likenesses of them with some meaning. And it knows their meaning for, as is said in Daniel (10:1): “There is need of understanding in a vision.”

Thus it is clear that natural prophecy is midway between dreams and divine prophecy. Hence it is that a dream is said to be a part of or an instance of natural prophecy, as also, that natural prophecy is an imperfect likeness of divine prophecy.

Answers to Difficulties

1. There are two things to be considered in knowledge: reception and judgment about that which is received. Accordingly, in the matter of judgment the cognition of one who is awake is preferable to that of one who is asleep, for the judgment of one who is awake is free, whereas the judgment of one who is asleep is fettered, as is said in Sleeping and Wakefulness. But the cognition of one who is asleep is preferable for reception, because internal impressions from external movements can be received better when the senses are at rest. This is so whether they come from the separated substances or from the heavenly bodies. Thus we can understand in this sense that which is said of Balaam in Numbers (24:16): “who falling,” that is, sleeping, “hath his eyes opened.”

2. Judgment does not depend only on the reception of the species, but also on the examination of the matter to be judged with reference to some principle of knowledge, just as we judge about conclusions by analyzing them back to principles.

Therefore, when the exterior senses are bound in sleep, the interior powers are, as it were, free from the bustle of the external senses and can better perceive the internal impressions made on the understanding or the imagination by a divine or angelic light, or by the power of the heavenly bodies, or by anything else, just as it seems to one who is asleep that he is eating something sweet when thin phlegm flows across his tongue. But, since the senses are the first source of our knowledge, we must in some way reduce to sense everything about which we judge. Hence, the Philosopher says” that the sensible visible thing is that at which the work of art and nature terminates, and from which we should judge of other things. Similarly, he says that the senses deal with that which is outermost as the understanding deals with principles. He calls outermost those things which are the term of the resolution of one who judges. Since, then, in sleep the senses are fettered, there cannot be perfect judgment so that a man is deceived in some respect, viewing the likenesses of things as though they were the things themselves. However, it sometimes does happen that one who is asleep knows that some of these are not things, but the likenesses of things.

3. The judgment of our understanding does not depend on sense in such a way that the act of understanding takes place by means of a sensible organ. However, it does need the senses as that which is last and outermost to terminate its analysis.

4. Some have held that the rational soul “has within itself some power of divination,” as Augustine says. But he himself rejects this in that same place, for, if this were so, the soul would be prepared to foresee futures when it so desired. And this is obviously false. For the soul at times sees the future when it is carried out of its senses, not because this belongs to it by reason of its natural power, but because it is thus rendered more fit to perceive the impressions of those causes which can give some foreknowledge of the future.

5. Subtlety of soul, which Gregory says is a cause of foreknowledge of futures, should be taken to mean that aptitude of the soul to receive something from the separated substances, not only in the order of grace, in so far as things are revealed to holy people by angels, but also in the order of nature, in so far as lower intellects in the order of nature are naturally fitted to receive perfection from the higher intellects, and in so far as human bodies are subject to the impressions of the heavenly bodies, in which there is a provision for some future events. The soul by its subtlety foresees these events through certain likenesses left in the imagination by the impression of the heavenly bodies.

6. Although free choice is not subject to natural causes, natural causes sometimes do facilitate or hinder the things which are done by free choice, as in the case mentioned rain or excessive heat could engender weariness in those who were carrying the bier, so that they would not carry it to the assigned place. And we could get foreknowledge of these happenings by means of the heavenly bodies.

7. Since human bodies are under the influence of the heavenly bodies, from the movements of the heavenly bodies we can perceive some indication of any disposition of the human body. Since, therefore, a certain constitution or disposition of the human body is a kind of prerequisite for natural prophecy, it is not inappropriate that an indication of natural prophecy be received from the heavenly bodies. But no indication of the prophecy which is a gift of the Holy Spirit is thus received.

8. Those philosophers who have treated of prophecy were not able to treat of the prophecy about which we are now speaking, but only of natural prophecy.

9. One of those three things cannot naturally belong to the soul, namely, that it have such power that external matter would be under its control, since, as Augustine says: “The matter in bodies is not subject to the arbitrary will even of the angels themselves.” Thus, on this point, what Avicenna or any other philosopher says cannot be held. The other two things which the objection deals with, in so far as they arise naturally in man, can cause natural prophecy, but not the prophecy of which we are talking.

10. Although only those things which fall under the influence of natural causes can be revealed through natural prophecy, nevertheless, not only other things but those, too, can be known through divine prophecy.

11. The society of men, in so far as it is ordained to eternal life as its end, can be preserved only through the justice of faith, of which prophecy is the source. Hence, Proverbs (29:18) says: “When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad.” But, since this end is supernatural, the justice, which is ordained to this end, and the prophecy, which is its source, will both be supernatural. But the justice through which human society is ruled in its ordination to the civil good can be had adequately through natural principles implanted in man. Hence, it is not necessary for prophecy to be natural.

12. By reason of the nobility of man there can be found in the human race a perfection so becoming that it could be produced only by a supernatural cause. But irrational creatures are not capable of such perfection. Therefore, it is not necessary that that which is most perfect in the human race should be obtained by the power of nature. This is necessary only for that which is most perfect according to the order of nature, not for that which is most perfect according to the order of grace.

13. A thing can be known in two ways: with reference to its existence, and to its quiddity. But, since the properties of creatures from which we get our knowledge are extremely remote from the properties of God, thence it is that we cannot have quidditative knowledge of God. However, since creatures depend on God, by looking at creatures we can know that God exists. But, since the things which now exist do not depend on future things, but do have similar properties, we cannot therefore know from present things whether certain future things will follow from them. However, we can know what their nature and properties will be if they should exist.

14. God is more remote from creatures than one creature is from another in His manner of existing, but not in the relation which exists between the principle of existing and that which has existence from such a principle. Therefore, by means of creatures we can know that God exists, but we cannot know His quiddity. It is just the opposite with the knowledge of future contingents by means of present or past things.

15. Prophecy is classified among the greatest goods, since it is a free gift. For, although it does not act as an immediate principle of meritorious action to make one live properly, the whole of prophecy is directed to the virtuous life. Nor, again, does one misuse prophecy in such a way that the misuse itself is an act of prophecy, as when someone misuses a natural power. For one who uses prophecy to seek gain or the favor of men has, indeed, a good act of prophecy, which is to know hidden things and to announce them, but the abuse of this good is an act of cupidity or some other vice. Nevertheless, although one does not misuse prophecy as a principle of action, he does misuse it as an object. In a similar way, those who are proud of their virtues misuse them, although the virtues are counted among the greatest goods.

16. We do not say that something is natural if it comes from nature taken in any sense, but taken in the third meaning which Boethius gives it there, namely, inasmuch as nature is “the principle of motion” and rest in the thing in which it is, and the essential, not the accidental, principle. Otherwise it would be necessary to say that all activities, receptions, and properties are natural.

17. To communicate His goodness is natural for God in the sense that it is in harmony with His nature and not in the sense that He communicates it because of some necessity of His nature. For such communication is made by the divine will in keeping with the order of wisdom which distributes Hi’s goods to all in an orderly way. It is also natural for a creature to receive from God not any goodness, but that which belongs to its nature, as to be rational belongs to man but not to a stone or an ass. Hence, if some perfection is received in man by reason of divine power, it is not necessary for it to be natural to man when it exceeds what is due to human nature.

18. In human nature there is a passive potency for the reception of prophetic light, which is not natural but only obediential, like the potency which is in physical nature for those things which happen miraculously. Hence, it is not necessary to have a natural active potency corresponding to such a passive potency.

19. Brute animals can be prescient only of those future events concerning them which depend on the movement of the heavens. And by the impressions of the heavens their imagination is stirred to do something which is an appropriate sign of the future. This kind of imprint has more place in brutes than in men because, as Damascene says, brutes “are more acted upon than acting.”Hence, they follow the impressions of the heavenly bodies completely. Man, however, who has free will, does not act in this way. Nor should a brute be called prescient of the future on this account, although a sign of some future event can be drawn from its activity. For it does not act to give any sign of the future, as though it knew the reason for its activity; rather, it is led on by a natural instinct.

Q. 12: Prophecy

ARTICLE IV

In the fourth article we ask: is some natural

Disposition needed for prophecy?

[Parallel readings: S.T., II-II, 172, 3.]

Difficulties

It seems that it is, for

1. Every perfection which in its reception must conform to the disposition of the receiver requires some definite disposition in the receiver. But prophecy is such a perfection, as is clear from Amos (1:2), “The Lord will roar from Sion,” on which the Gloss says: “It is natural, he says, for all who want to compare one thing to another to use comparisons taken from those things which they have experienced and among which they have been brought up. For example, sailors compare their enemies to storms, and loss to shipwreck. And shepherds liken their fear to the roaring of a lion, and call their enemies lions, bears, and wolves. Thus, the prophet, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to the roaring of a lion.” Therefore, prophecy requires some definite disposition in human nature.

2. Perfection of the imagination is needed for prophecy, since prophecy operates through the sight of imagination. But to have perfection of the power of imagination its organ must be in good condition and properly disposed. Therefore, a natural disposition is needed for prophecy.

3. A natural hindrance is stronger than one which comes from without. But some passions which are aroused from without interfere with prophecy. Thus, Jerome says: “At that time when the marital act is performed the presence of the Holy Spirit will not be given, even though the one who fulfills the duty of procreation seems to be a prophet.” Nor is this due to guilt, for there is no guilt in the marital act, but to the passion of the concupiscence connected with it. Therefore, an indisposition of the natural constitution is a much greater hindrance, tending to make it impossible for one to become a prophet.

4. Nature has an ordination to grace as grace has to glory. But the perfection of grace in one who would arrive at glory is a prerequisite for glory. Therefore, a natural disposition is prerequisite for prophecy and the other free gifts.

5. The contemplation in prophecy is higher than that in acquired scientific knowledge. But the contemplation in acquired scientific knowledge is hindered if the natural constitution lacks the proper disposition, for some are so unfit by reason of their natural constitution that they can hardly, if ever, progress far enough to acquire scientific knowledge. Therefore, if the natural constitution lacks the proper disposition, it is a much greater hindrance to the contemplation in prophecy.

6. As is said in Romans (13:1): “The things which are from God have order in them.” But the gift of prophecy is from God. Therefore, He dispenses it in an orderly manner. But there would be no orderly distribution if it were given to someone who had not the proper disposition to possess it. Therefore, prophecy requires a natural disposition.

To the Contrary

11. That which depends solely on the free choice of the giver does not require any disposition in the receiver. But prophecy is such a gift, as is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:11), which, after it has listed prophecy and other gifts of the Holy Spirit, adds: “But all these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone as he will.” And the Gospel of St. John (3:8) says: “The Spirit breatheth where he will.” Therefore, a natural disposition is not needed to have prophecy.

2. The Apostle says in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (1:27-28): “The weak things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the strong. And the base things of the world and things that are not, that he might bring to naught things that are.” Therefore, no disposition in the subject is a necessary prerequisite for the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

31. Gregory says: “The Holy Spirit fills the boy harpist and makes him a prophet; He fills the shepherd who is railing at the sycamore trees and makes him a prophet.”Therefore, the gift of prophecy does not require any disposition in him to whom it is given, but its bestowal depends on the divine will alone.

REPLY

There are two things to be considered in prophecy: the gift of prophecy itself, and the use of such a gift once received.

The gift itself of prophecy, which exists beyond the capacity of man, is given by God and not through the power of some created cause, although natural prophecy is produced in us by the power of some created cause, as has been said earlier.

But between the operation of a creature and that of God there is this difference, that, to bring about an effect, God’s activity does not need matter or any material disposition, for by His activity He produces not only the form but also the matter. However, He does not make the form without matter or without a disposition, but He can make matter and form together in one operation, or He can transform the matter, however unfit, to the proper disposition which is needed for the perfection which He gives. This is clear in resuscitation of a dead man, for the dead body is altogether unfit to receive the soul. Yet by the one divine action the body receives the soul and the disposition for the soul. But matter and the disposition of the matter are required for the activity of a creature, for a created power cannot make whatever it wishes from anything.

It is clear, then, that natural prophecy requires the proper disposition of the natural constitution, but the prophecy which is the gift of the Holy Spirit does not need this. However, it does require that the natural disposition which is suitable for prophecy be given with the gift of prophecy.

But the use of any prophecy is within the power of the prophet. It is in keeping with this that the first Epistle to the Corinthians (14:3 2) says: “And the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets.” Therefore, one can prevent himself from using prophecy. And the proper disposition is a necessary requirement for the proper use of prophecy, since the use of prophecy proceeds from the created power of the prophet. Hence, a definite disposition is also required.

Answers to Difficulties

1. Certain dispositions are unconnected with prophecy, and these are not changed in the prophet by the divine activity, but prophecy proceeds in harmony with these dispositions. For it is indifferent to prophecy, whether the thing prophesied be represented under one likeness rather than another. However, God takes away from the prophet the dispositions which oppose prophecy and gives, him the dispositions which are necessary.

2. Perfection of the imagination is needed for prophecy, but it is not necessarily needed beforehand. For God Himself, who infuses the gift of prophecy, can improve the constitution of the organ of the imaginative power, as He can make blear eyes see clearly.

3 Strong passions of this sort draw the attention of reason completely to themselves and, consequently, withdraw it from the study of spiritual things. Therefore, strong passions of anger or sorrow or pleasure hinder the use of prophecy in one who has received the gift of prophecy. Thus, the unfitness of the natural constitution would be a hindrance, unless it were somehow remedied by the divine power.

4. The application of the proposed likeness is limited to this, that as grace is added to nature, so glory is added to grace. But there is no likeness in all respects, for grace merits glory, but nature does not merit grace. Therefore, the merit of grace is prerequisite for glory, but the disposition of nature is not prerequisite for the reception of grace.

5. In some sense, acquired scientific knowledge is caused by us. But it is not in our power to improve the constitution of the organs of the soul, as it is within the divine power, which infuses the gift of prophecy. So, they are not alike.

6. The gift of prophecy is dispensed by God in a most orderly way. The orderly distribution of this gift also entails conferring it at times on those who seem least disposed for it, so that it will thus be attributed to the divine power and, as the first Epistle to the Corinthians (1:29) says: “That no flesh should glory in his sight.”

Q. 12: Prophecy

ARTICLE V

In the fifth article we ask:

Is moral goodness required for prophecy?

[Parallel readings: S.T., II-II, 17., 4; In Ioan., c. 11, lect. 7.]

Difficulties

It seems that it is, for

1. In Wisdom (7:27) we read: “Through prophecies [she] conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets.” But only those who have moral goodness are the friends of God. As the Gospel of St. John (14:2 3) says: “If anyone love me, he will keep my word.” Therefore, one who does not have moral goodness is not appointed a prophet.

2. Prophecy is a gift of the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit does not dwell in a sinner. As Wisdom (1:5) says: “For the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful.” Therefore, the gift of prophecy cannot exist in a sinner.

3. That which one cannot put to an evil use cannot exist in a sinner. But no one can put prophecy to an evil use for, since the act of Prophecy is from the Holy Spirit, if someone put it to an evil use, sin and the Holy Spirit would be causes of the same act. And this cannot be. Therefore, prophecy cannot exist in a sinner.

4. The Philosopher says: “If prophecy through dreams comes from God, it is unfitting for Him to give it to any but the best men.” But it is clear that the gift of prophecy is from God alone. Therefore, it is unfitting to say that it is given to any but the best men.

5. Plato says that it belongs to that which is best to produce what is best. But prophecy is more suitable in a good man than in a bad one. Therefore, since God is best, He will never give the gift of prophecy to evil men.

6. We find a likeness of the divine activity in the activity of nature. Hence, Dionysius compares3 the divine goodness to the light of the sun, because of the similarity of their effects. But natural activity gives more perfections to the things which are more disposed, as the more permeable bodies receive more light from the sun. Therefore, since the good man is more disposed to receive the gift of prophecy than the evil man, it seems that it should be given much more to good men than to evil men. But it is not given to all good men. Therefore, it should not be given to any evil man.

7. Grace is given to elevate nature. But nature should be elevated more in good men than in evil men. Therefore, the grace of prophecy should be given to good men rather than to evil men. We conclude as before.

To the Contrary

1. Balaam is said to have been a prophet, yet he was evil.

2. In the Gospel of St. Matthew (7:22), this statement is put in the mouth of the damned: “Lord, have not we prophesied in thy name...?” Therefore, prophecy can exist in evil men.

3. Whoever does not have charity is evil. But prophecy can exist in one who does not have charity, as is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:2)which says: “And if I should have knowledge and should know all mysteries... and have not charity... Therefore, prophecy can exist in a sinner.

REPLY

Man’s goodness consists in charity, through which he is united to God. Therefore, whatever can exist without charity, can be found indifferently in good men and in evil men. For the divine goodness is held in high esteem chiefly for this, that it uses both good and evil men to implement its designs. Therefore, it gives to both good and evil those gifts which do not have a necessary dependence on charity.

Now, prophecy does not have any necessary connection with charity for two reasons. First, because prophecy is in the understanding and charity is in the affections. But the understanding has priority over the affections, and, thus, prophecy and the other perfections of the understanding do not depend on charity. And for this reason faith, prophecy, knowledge, and everything else of this sort can exist in good men and in evil men.

The second reason is that prophecy is given to a person for the profit of the Church and not for himself. But it does happen that someone who is not good in himself and united to God by charity can be of profit to the Church in some fashion. Thus, prophecy, the working of miracles, ecclesiastical ministries, and all the other things of this sort, which contribute to the benefit of the Church, are sometimes found apart from charity, which alone makes men good.

However, we must bear in mind that some of the sins by which charity is lost hinder the use of prophecy, and some do not. For, since sins of the flesh draw the mind entirely away from things spiritual, by the very fact that one is given to sins of the flesh he is rendered unfit for prophecy. For the mind must have supreme competence in things spiritual to have the revelation of prophecy. But spiritual sins do not to the same extent interfere with the mind’s competence in spiritual things. Therefore, it happens that one who is a slave to spiritual sins, but not to those of the flesh, or even to the endless cares of this life, which withdraw the mind from its spiritual competence, can be a prophet.

And, therefore, Rabbi Moses says that entanglement in the pleasures and cares of this world is a sign that one is a false prophet. And this agrees with what we read in the Gospel of St. Matthew (7:15): “Beware of false prophets,” and a little later (7:16): “By their fruits you shall know them.” The Gloss on this passage reads that this must be understood of those sins “which are in plain sight,” and the foremost of these are the sins of the flesh, for spiritual sins lie hidden within.

Answers to Difficulties

1. Wisdom enters the soul in two ways. In one way, it so enters that the very wisdom of God dwells in the soul. This makes the man holy and a friend of God. In the other way, it enters only in its effects. In this way it does not have to make the man holy or a friend of God. It is in this second way that it enters the minds of the evil men whom it makes prophets.

2. Although prophecy is a gift of the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit is not given with the gift of prophecy, but only with the gift of charity. Hence, the reasoning does not follow.

3. There is never an evil use of prophecy in the sense that the act itself of prophecy, in so far as it comes from prophecy, is evil. For, when someone directs the act of prophecy toward some evil end, the act itself of prophecy is good and comes from the Holy Spirit, but the direction of that act toward an improper end does not come from the Holy Spirit, but from the perverse will of man.

4. The Philosopher intends to say that those things which are given by God depend on the will of the giver, and this will cannot be unreasonable. Hence, if the foreknowledge of the future which takes place in dreams were from God, some discrimination would appear in its infusion. But there is no discrimination there, since such divination takes place in anybody, and this shows that divination of dreams comes from nature. But we find discrimination in the gift of prophecy, for it is not given to everybody, even though they have this or that disposition, but only to those whom the divine will chooses. Nevertheless, these are not apt subjects or the best subjects simply in themselves. They are, however, apt subjects in so far as they perform the function of the prophet to the extent which the divine wisdom judges to be fitting.

5. That God is best appears in this, that He knows how to make good use not only of good men, but also of evil men. Hence, if he makes evil prophets perform the good functions of prophecy, this in no wise detracts from His supreme goodness.

6. Not every good man is more fit to become a prophet than every sinner. For some who lack charity have minds more fit to perceive spiritual things, since they are free from carnal affections and wordly cares and are gifted with a natural clarity of understanding. And, on the other hand, some who have charity are occupied with worldly business, are busy begetting children, and do not have a naturally acute understanding. Therefore, because of these and similar conditions, the gift of prophecy sometimes is given to some evil men and denied to some good men.

7. Through the grace of prophecy man’s nature receives an elevation ordained not directly to the participation of glory, but to the utility of others. However, in good men, nature rather receives an elevation ordained to the obtaining of glory from the grace which makes its recipient pleasing to God. Hence, the reasoning does not follow.

Q. 12: Prophecy

ARTICLE VI

In the sixth article we ask:

Do the prophets see in the mirror of eternity?

[Parallel readings: In Isaiam, cc. 1, 6; S.T., II-II, 173, 1.]

Difficulties

It seems that they do, for

1. The Gloss on Isaiah (38:1), “Take order with thy house,” says: “Prophets read in the book of the foreknowledge of God, in which all things are written.” But the book of the foreknowledge of God seems to be nothing else but the mirror of eternity, in which all the forms of things shine forth from eternity. Therefore, the prophets see in the mirror of eternity.

2. But it was said that the prophets are not said to read in the book of foreknowledge or see in the mirror of eternity in a material sense, as if they saw the mirror or the book itself, but in a causal sense, for their knowledge of prophecy is derived from that book or mirror. On the contrary, the prophets are said to see in the mirror of eternity or in the book of foreknowledge in this sense, that a kind of privileged knowledge is attributed to these prophets. But no privilege of knowledge is signified by saying that some knowledge is derived from the eternal mirror or from the book of divine foreknowledge, since all human knowledge is derived from that source, as Dionysius clearly shows. Therefore, the prophets are not said to see in the mirror of eternity in the sense that they derive knowledge from it, but in the sense that when they see the mirror itself, they see other things in it.

3. Nothing can be seen except where it is. But future contingent things, according to the unchangeable truth with which they are seen by the prophets, exist only in the divine foreknowledge. Therefore, the prophets see them only in the foreknowledge of God. Thus, we reach the same conclusions as before.

4 It was said that future contingent things are indeed in God as their source, but flow thence through certain species to the human mind, where they are seen by the prophet.—On the contrary, whatever is received in a thing exists there according to the manner of that which receives it and not according to its own manner. But the mind of the prophet is changeable. Therefore, future contingent things cannot be received in it in their unchanging truth.

5. That which is proper to the divine knowledge can be known only in God. But to know futures is proper to God, as is clear from Isaiah (41:23): “Shew the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall say that ye are gods.” Therefore, future contingent things can be seen by the prophets only in God.

6. Avicenna says that sometimes the mind of man is elevated so high that it is united to the world of foreknowledge.But the human mind has its highest elevation in the knowledge of prophecy. Therefore, it seems that it is so united to the world of foreknowledge that future things are seen in the very foreknowledge of God.

7. As the philosophers tell us, the end of human life is the union of man’s mind with a higher world, which is the world of the intelligible substances. But it would hardly fit in with what we know if man did not reach his end. Therefore, at some time man’s mind will be united with.the intelligible substances, the highest of which is the divine essence, in which everything shines forth. Therefore, the prophet, who among men has the mind which receives the loftiest elevation, will have his mind united with the divine essence, which seems to be the mirror of eternity. The same conclusions follow as before.

8. If there should be two mirrors, one higher and the other lower, and the likenesses come into the lower from the higher, one who sees the species in the lower mirror is not said to see them in the higher, although his sight is in a way derived from the higher mirror. But the species of future things come into the mind of the prophet from the divine mind, as into a lower mirror from a higher mirror. Therefore, the fact that the prophet sees in his own mind species received from the divine mind does not force us to say that he sees them in the divine mind, but rather in his own mind. But his own mind is not the mirror of eternity, but a mirror dependent on time. Therefore, if the prophets see only in their own minds, as has just been said, we should not say that they see in the mirror of eternity, but in a mirror which is dependent on time, although derived from the eternal mirror.

9. But it was said that someone is said to see not only in the thing illumined by the sun, but also in the sun itself, in so far as he sees by reason of the illumination of the sun.—On the contrary, the likenesses of visible things do not exist in the sun, yet this seems to pertain to the nature of a mirror. Therefore, it seems that to see something in the sun does not mean the same as to see it in a mirror.

10. The sight by which we see God as the object of beatitude is more lofty than that by which we see Him as an intentional likeness of things, for the former makes one blessed, and the latter does not. But a man living in this life can be raised up to see God as the object of beatitude by a loftier elevation, namely, that by which the mind is altogether transported out of the senses, as happens in rapture. Therefore, the mind of a prophet can be raised up to see the divine essence as the intentional likeness of things by a lesser elevation without rapture. Thus, the prophet can see things in the mirror of eternity.

11. The difference between the divine essence as considered in itself and as the likeness of something else, is greater than the difference between the divine essence as the likeness of one thing and as the likeness of another. For God is farther from any creature than one creature is from another. But one can see God in so far as He is the intentional likeness of one thing without seeing Him in so far as He is the likeness of something else. Otherwise, it would be necessary for all who saw God to know everything. Therefore, one can see God as the intentional likeness of some things without seeing His essence in itself. Therefore, those who do not see God through His essence can see in the mirror of eternity. And this seems especially to belong to the prophets.

12. Augustine says that the minds of some are elevated in such a manner that they look at the unchangeable intelligible natures in the highest citadel of all reality. But the minds of the prophets seem to have the most lofty elevation. Therefore, it seems that those things which they see prophetically they see in the very citadel of all reality, that is to say, in the divine essence. The same conclusion follows as before.

13. A thing can be judged only by that which is superior to it, as is clear from Augustine. But the prophets judge about the unchangeable truths of reality. Therefore, it is not possible for them to judge of these things through anything transitory and changeable, but through the unchangeable truth, which is God Himself. Thus, we reach the same conclusion as before.

To the Contrary

1. The Gloss on the Gospel of St. Luke (10:24), “Many kings and prophets...” says” that the prophets and just men saw the glory of God from afar, through a mirror darkly. But one who sees in the eternal foreknowledge of God does not see darkly. Therefore, prophets did not see in the divine foreknowledge, which they call the mirror of eternity.

2. Gregory says: “As long as we live in this mortal flesh, no one advances so far in the power of contemplation that he fixes the eyes of his mind on that incomprehensible beam of light. For we do not now see the omnipotent God in His brightness, but the soul does observe something beneath that brightness. Strengthened by this sight, it advances and later reaches the glory of His sight. It was thus that the prophet Isaiah (6:1), when he confessed that he had seen the Lord, said immediately: ‘I saw the Lord sitting...’ and added: ‘and the things beneath him filled the ternple,’ because, as has been said, when the mind advances in contemplation, it does not fix its gaze on what He is, but on that which is below Him.” From this it is clear that Isaiah and the other prophets did not see anything in the eternal mirror.

3. No evil man can see in the eternal mirror, for Isaiah (26:10) says, according to a variant reading: “Let the wicked man be carried away, lest he see the glory of God.” But some evil men are prophets. Therefore, prophetic vision does not take place in the eternal mirror.

4. The prophets have distinct knowledge of the things which they see prophetically. But, since the eternal mirror is entirely uniform, it does not seem to be the kind of thing in which one could perceive many things separately. Therefore, there is no prophetic sight in the eternal mirror.

5. We do not see something in a mirror which is in contact with the sense of sight, but in a mirror which is at a distance. But the mirror of eternity is in contact with ihe mind of the prophet, since God is in everything by His essence. Therefore, the mind of the prophet cannot see in the eternal mirror.

REPLY

Properly speaking, a mirror exists only in material things. But in spiritual things something is called a mirror in a transferred sense, because of the likeness taken from the material mirror. Thus, in spiritual things we call that a mirror in which other things are represented, just as the forms of visible things appear in a material mirror.

Therefore, some” say that the divine mind, in which all the intelligible characters of things shine forth, is a kind of mirror, and that it is called the mirror of eternity because it is eternal, inasmuch as it has eternity. Accordingly, they say that that mirror can be seen in two ways. It can be seen either through its essence, as the object of beatitude, and in this way it is seen only by those who have beatitude in its fullness or in some respect, as those in a rapture. Or it can be seen in so far as the likenesses of things are reflected in it, and in this way it is properly seen as a mirror. And they say that the mirror of eternity was seen in this way by the angels before they received beatitude, and by the prophets. But this opinion seems unreasonable on two scores.

First, these intentional likenesses of things reflected in the divine mind are not really anything different from the divine essence itself. But the likenesses and intelligible natures of this sort are distinguished in it in so far as it is related differently to different creatures. Therefore, to know the divine essence and the intentional likenesses reflected in it is nothing else than to know the divine essence in itself and in relation to other things. But one knows something in itself before knowing it as related to something else. Hence, the vision by which God is seen as the intentional likeness of things presupposes that vision by which He Himself is seen as an essence, in so far as He is the object of beatitude. Thus, it is impossible for someone to see God as the species of things and not to see Him as the object of beatitude.

Second, the intentional likeness of one thing is found in another in two ways. In the first way, it is there as pre-existing before the thing of which it is the likeness, and, in the second, as arising from the thing itself. Accordingly, that in which the likenesses of things appear as existing before the things cannot properly be called a mirror, but, rather, an exemplar. But that in which likenesses of things are caused by the things themselves can be called a mirror.

Accordingly, it has never been said by the saints that God is the mirror of things, because there are in God the intentional likenesses or intelligible natures of things, but that created things themselves are the mirror of God, according to the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:12): “We see now through a glass in a dark manner.” And it is thus, too, that the Son is called the mirror of the Father, inasmuch as the species of Divinity is received in Him from the Father, according to Wisdom (7:2 6): “For she is the brightness of eternal light and the unspotted mirror of God’s majesty.”

But when the Masters say that the prophets see in the mirror of eternity, we should not take this to mean that they see the eternal God Himself in so far as He is the mirror of things, but that they see something created, in which the eternity of God is portrayed. Thus, we understand that the mirror of eternity is not itself eternal, but represents eternity. For it belongs to God to have the same certain knowledge of the future as He has of the present, as Boethius says, because His sight is measured by eternity, in which everything is simultaneous. Hence, all times and all that take place in them are present to His sight at once.

Accordingly, in so far as the knowledge of the future is reflected in the mind of the prophet from that divine sight by means of the prophetic light and through the species in which the prophet sees, those species together with the prophetic light are called the mirror of eternity, since they represent the divine sight in so far as in eternity it sees all future events as present.

Therefore, we must concede that the prophets see in the mirror of eternity, but not that they see the eternal mirror as the first set of difficulties seemed to show. Therefore, we must answer them in order.

Answers to Difficulties

1. The metaphor which says that the prophets read in the book of foreknowledge means that the book of divine foreknowledge is a source of the knowledge of the future in the mind of the prophet, just as reading a book is the source of knowledge in the mind of the reader of the things which are written in the book. It does not mean that the prophet sees the very foreknowledge of God as one who reads a material book sees the material book.

Or we can say that the knowledge which is caused in the mind of the prophet is called the mirror of eternity, that is, something which represents eternity. Thus, it can be called the book of foreknowledge in a material sense, since the foreknowledge of God is to some extent copied in that knowledge.

2. Although all knowledge is derived from the divine foreknowledge, not all knowledge represents it in such a way that its eternity makes us see even future things as present. Hence, not any knowledge can be called a mirror of eternity. But in this we see the privileged nature of the knowledge of the prophets.

3. The intelligible natures of future contingent things exist according to unchangeable truth in the divine mind as in their source, but they flow thence to the mind of the prophet. Hence, in the revelation which he receives the prophet can have unchangeable knowledge of future things.

4. A form which is received follows the manner of the receiver in some respects, in so far as it has existence in the subject. For it is there materially or immaterially, uniformly or variably, according to the requirements of the subject receiving it. But the form which is received does in some respects draw the subject to its own mode of being, in so far as, for instance, the excellences which belong to the nature of the form are communicated to the receiving subject. For in this way the subject is perfected and ennobled through the form. And in this way the corruptible body is made immortal by reason of the glory of immortality, and similarly, by the light of unchangeable truth the mind of the prophet is raised up to see changeable things in their unchangeable truth.

5. Since knowledge of the future is proper to God, it therefore can be received only from God. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for everyone who learns the future from God to see God Himself.

6. According to that philosopher, the mind of the prophet is united to the world of the intelligences or foreknowledge, not in the sense that it sees these intelligences themselves, but in the sense that it shares in their foreknowledge from their illumination.

7. According to the faith, too, the end of human life is for man to be united with a higher world. But man reaches this end only in heaven, not in this life.

8. Although the mirror in which the prophet sees is dependent on time, it represents the eternal foreknowledge of God. And in this sense he sees in the mirror of eternity.

9. Although the sun cannot be called the mirror of visible things, visible things can in some way be called the mirror of the sun, in so far as the brightness of the sun shines in them. Thus, too, the knowledge caused in the mind of the prophet is called the mirror of eternity.

10. The sight by which God is seen as the intentional likeness of things is more peffect than that by which He is seen as the object of beatitude. For the latter presupposes the former and shows that it is more perfect. For one who can see the effects in the cause sees better than one who sees only the essence of the cause.

11. The relation by which God is referred to one creature does not presuppose the relation by which He is referred to another the way the relation by which He is referred to a creature presupposes the essence of God taken absolutely. Thus, the argument does not follow.

12. We should not apply Augustine’s words to the sight of the prophets, but to the vision of the saints in heaven, or of those who, in this life, see in the manner of heaven, as Paul did when enraptured (2 Cor. 12:1-13).

13 Prophets judge about the unchangeable truth of future events by means of uncreated truth, not because they see it, but because they are enlightened by it.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

We concede the reasons to the contrary in so far as they state that the prophets do not see the eternal God Himself, although they do see in the mirror of eternity, as we have said. But the last two arguments do not concludecorrectly, for, although there is complete uniformity in God, nevertheless, in Him things can be known distinctly inasmuch as He is the proper exemplar of each one. Similarly, although mirror is transferred from material to spiritual things, in this transfer we do not apply all the conditions of the material mirror, so that all of these conditions have to be found in the spiritual mirror. Rather, we take it only according to the act of representing.

Q. 12: Prophecy

ARTICLE VII

In the seventh article we ask:

Does God in the revelation made to a prophet imprint on the mind of the prophet new species of things or only intellectual light?

[Parallel readings: 1 Cor., c. 14, lect. i; In Isaiam, 1; S.T., II-II, 173, 2.]

Difficulties

It seems that He imprints only intellectual light without the species, for

1. The Gloss on the first Epistle to the Corinthians (14:2): says that one is called prophet because of intellectual sight alone. But intellectual sight does not refer to things through likenesses of the things, but through their very essences, as is said in the same Gloss. Therefore, in prophetic sight no species are imprinted on the mind of the prophet.

2. Our understanding abstracts from matter and material conditions. If, therefore, in the intellectual sight which constitutes prophecy some likenesses are produced, those likenesses will not be involved with matter or material conditions. Therefore, through them the prophet will not be able to know particular things, but only universals.

3 Prophets have in their minds some species of those things which are revealed to them. Thus, Jeremiah, who prophesied the burning of Jerusalem, had in his soul a species of that city received from sense, and, similarly, he had a species of fire burning, which he had frequently seen. If, then, other species of the same things are imprinted by God on the mind of the prophet, it follows that there would be in the same subject two forms with the same specific nature. But this is incorrect.

4. The sight by which one sees the divine essence is more powerful than the sight by which one sees the species of anything else whatever. But the sight by which one sees the divine essence is not enough to acquire knowledge of all things whatever. Otherwise, those who saw the divine essence would see everything. Therefore, no matter what species are imprinted on the mind of the prophet, they will not be able to cause the prophet to know reality.

5. It is not necessary for the divine action to produce in the prophet that which anyone can do of his own power. But through the power of imagination, which joins and divides the images received from things, anyone can form in his mind the species of anything whatever. Therefore, it is not necessary for the species of things to be impressed by God on the soul of the prophet.

6. Nature works through the shortest way possible; much more so does God, whose works have even better order. But the shorter way is to bring the prophet to some knowledge of things by means of the species which are in his soul, rather than by other newly imprinted species. Therefore, it does not seem that any species are imprinted anew.

7. The gloss of Jerome on Amos(1:2) reads: “Prophets use likenesses of things with which they are familiar.”But this would not be so if their visions took place through newly imprinted species. Therefore, no new species, but only the prophetic light, is imprinted on the soul of the prophet.

To the Contrary

1. It is not through light, but through a species of something visible, that sight receives the determination to know some definite visible object. Likewise, it is not through the light of the agent intellect, but through an intelligible species, that the possible intellect receives the determination to know intelligible objects. Therefore, since the knowledge of the prophet receives a determination to some things which he did not know before, it seems that the infusion of light without the impression of species is not sufficient.

2. Dionysius says: “It is impossible for the divine radiance to shine on us unless it is shrouded with a variety of sacred veils.”But for him figures are veils. Therefore, intelligible light is showered on the prophet only with figurative likenesses.

3. The infusion of light is uniform in all the prophets. But not all the prophets receive uniform knowledge, since some prophesy of the present, some of the past, and some of the future, as Gregory says. Therefore, there is not only the infusion of prophetic light but the impression of certain species by which the knowledge of the various prophets is distinguished.

4. The prophet receives the prophetic revelation through internal speech made to him by God or by an angel. This is clear to anyone who looks at the writings of all the prophets. But all speech takes place through some signs. Therefore, prophetic revelation takes place through some likenesses.

5. The sight of the imagination and of the understanding are higher than bodily sight. But when bodily sight takes place supernaturally, a new bodily species is shown to the eyes of the one who sees, as is evident in the case of the hand of one writing on the wall which appeared to Baltassar (Daniel 5:5). Therefore, it is much more necessary for new species to be imprinted on the sight of the imagination and the understanding when these take place supernaturally.

REPLY

Prophecy is a kind of supernatural knowledge. But two things are required for knowledge: reception of the things known, and judgment of what is received, as we have said previously. Accordingly, knowledge is supernatural sometimes only in reception, sometimes only in judgment, and sometimes in both.

However, one is not called a prophet if this knowledge is supernatural only in reception, just as Pharaoh, who supernaturally received a sign of abundance and famine under the figures of oxen and ears of corn (Genesis 41:25-36), was not called a prophet. But, if someone has supernatural judgment or judgment and reception together, he is called a prophet.

Now, supernatural reception can take place only through the three kinds of sight: through bodily sight, when certain things are shown to the bodily eyes by the divine power, as the hand of one writing was shown to Baltassar (Daniel 5:5); through the sight of imagination, when by the divine power some figures of things appear to the prophets, as the boiling cauldron appeared to Jeremiah (1:13) and horses and mountains to Zacharias (6:1-6); and through intellectual sight, when something is shown to the understanding in a way which surpasses its natural capacity.

But, since the human understanding is in natural potency to all the intelligible forms of sensible things, no matter what intelligible species arise in the understanding, there will be no supernatural reception; as there was supernatural reception in bodily vision when it saw things which were not formed naturally, but only by the divine power in order to reveal something. Similarly, there was supernatural reception in the sight of imagination when it saw some likenesses not received from the senses, but fashioned through some force of the soul. But our understanding receives supernaturally only when it sees through their essence the intelligible substances themselves, such as God and the angels. For it cannot reach this by virtue of its nature.

But the last of these three supernatural receptions surpasses the mode of prophecy. Hence, we read in Numbers (12:6-8): “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. But it is not so with my servant Moses... and plainly, and not in riddles and figures doth he see the Lord.” But to see God in His essence, as He is seen in rapture or by the blessed, or to see other intelligible substances through their essence, surpasses the mode of prophetic sight.

But the first supernatural reception , which takes place through bodily sight, is lower than prophetic reception. For in this reception the prophet is not given preference over anyone else, since all can equally see a species which God fashions for sight. Therefore, the supernatural reception which is proper to prophecy is the reception of the sight of imagination. Thus, every prophet has either only supernatural judgment of those things which are seen by another, as Joseph did about the things which Pharaoh saw (Genesis 41:25-36), or reception through the sight of imagination together with judgment.

Therefore, supernatural judgment is given to the prophet through the light infused in him which gives his understanding strength to judge. For this no species are required, but for reception there must be a new formation of species, whether to produce in the mind of the prophet species which were not there previously, as the species of colors might be imprinted on one born blind, or by the divine power to set in order and join the pre-existing species in a way which is capable of signifying the things which should be shown to the prophet. We must concede that revelation is made to the prophet in this way not only through the light, but also through species; but sometimes it is according to the light alone.

Answers to Difficulties

1. Although only he who has intellectual sight is called a prophet, yet, not only intellectual light pertains to prophecy, but also the sight of imagination, in which suitable species can be formed to represent singular things.

2. The solution to the second difficulty is clear from the first response.

3. The prophet does not need a new infusion of the species of those things which he has seen, but only an orderly grouping of the species retained in the storehouse of the imaginative power, which can suitably designate the thing to be prophesied.

4. The divine essence, in so far as it exists in itself, represents all things whatsoever more explicitly than any species or figure does. But, since the sight of the one who looks at it is overcome by the loftiness of that essence, the one who sees the essence does not see all that it represents. But the species imprinted on the imagination are proportioned to us; hence, from them we can come to knowledge of things.

5. just as one who receives knowledge from signs reaches the things themselves by way of the signs, so, conversely, one who uses signs to express something must know the thing represented before he can form the symbol. For one cannot use fitting signs for things which he does not know. Therefore, although any man can by his natural power form any images whatever, only one who knows the future events to be symbolized can form figures to represent them properly. This formation of images in the sight of imagination takes place supernaturally in the prophet.

6. The species pre-existing in the imaginative power of the prophet, in so far as they exist there, are not capable of signifying future things. Therefore, they must be reshaped into something else by the divine power.

7. The species pre-existing in the imagination of the prophet are, as it were, the elements of that sight of imagination which is revealed by the divine power, since it is somehow made up of them. Thus it is that the prophet uses the likenesses of things with which he is familiar.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

But, since prophetic revelation does not always take place through species, as has been said, we must answer the arguments given to the contrary.

1. Although the knowledge of the prophet receives no determination to some particular thing from the intellectual light when he receives supernatural judgment alone, his knowledge does receive its determination from species seen by someone else, as Joseph’s knowledge received its determination from the species seen by Pharaoh, or from any species seen by Joseph himself without supernatural aid.

2. When the rays of divine light shine on the prophet, they are always veiled in figures, not in the sense that species are always infused, but that these rays are always combined with the pre-existing species.

3. The revelation which the prophets receive is also differentiated by reason of the intellectual light, which some perceive more fully than others, and by reason of the species, which either exist beforehand or are received anew by the prophet himself or by another.

4. As Gregory says: “God speaks to the angels by the very act by which He shows His invisible secrets to their hearts,” and he adds that He speaks to holy souls by infusing certainty in them. Thus, in speech with which God is said to have spoken to the prophets in Holy Scripture, we consider not only the species of things which are imprinted, but also the light which is given, by which the mind of the prophet is made certain of something.

5. Since the sight of understanding and imagination are higher than bodily sight, through them we know not only things which are present, but even things which are absent, whereas with bodily sight we perceive only things which are present. Therefore, the species of things are stored in the imagination and the understanding, but not in the senses. Consequently, for bodily sight to be supernatural new bodily species must always be formed. But this is not needed for the sight of imagination or understanding to be supernatural.

Q. 12: Prophecy

ARTICLE VIII

In the eighth article we ask:

Does all prophetic revelation take place through the mediation of an angel?

[Parallel readings: In Matth., 2; C.G., III, 154; In Isaiam, 6; S.T., II-II, 172, 2.]

Difficulties

It seems that it does not, for

1. As Augustine says, the minds of some are so elevated that they do not see the unchangeable natures through an angel, but in the highest citadel of reality itself. But this seems especially to belong to the prophets. Therefore, their revelation does not take place through the mediation of an angel.

2. The gifts of the Holy Spirit and the infused habits come directly from God. But prophecy is a gift of the Holy Spirit, as is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:10). It is also a kind of infused light. Therefore, it is from God without the mediation of an angel.

3. The prophecy which proceeds from a created power is natural prophecy, as has been said. But an angel is a creature. Therefore, prophecy which is not natural but the gift of the Holy Spirit is not produced through the mediation of an angel.

4. Prophecy takes place through the infusion of light and the imprinting of species. But it seems that neither of these can take place through an angel. For the angel would have to be the creator either of the light or of the species, since these cannot be made from anything pre-existing. Therefore, prophetic sight does not take place through the mediation of an angel.

5. In the definition of prophecy we read that prophecy is a divine revelation or inspiration. But, if it took place through the mediation of an angel, it would be called angelic and not divine. Therefore, itdoes not take place through the mediation of angels.

6. Wisdom (7:27) says that the divine wisdom, “through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets.” Therefore, one is made a prophet directly by God Himself, and not through an angel.

To the Contrary

1. Moses seems to have been higher than the other prophets, as is clear in Numbers (11:16-17,25; 12:3,-8) and Deuteronomy (34:10). But God made the revelation to Moses through the mediation of angels. Hence, it is said in Galatians (3:19): “(the law) being ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator:” and in Acts (7:3 8) Stephen said of Moses: “This is he that was in the Church in the wilderness, with the angel who spoke to him on Mount Sinai, and with our fathers.” Therefore, the other prophets with much greater reason received their revelation through the mediation of an angel.

21. Dionysius says: “Our glorious fathers received divine visions through the mediation of the celestial powers.”

3. Augustine says that all appearances made to the fathers in the Old Testament took place through the ministration of the angels.

REPLY

Two things concur in effecting prophetic revelation: the illumination of the mind and the formation of the species in the imaginative power.

Therefore, the prophetic light itself, by which the mind of the prophet is enlightened, comes from God as its primary source. Nevertheless, the human mind is strengthened and to some extent prepared for its proper reception by the angelic light. For, since the power of the divine light is most simple and most universal, there is no proportion between it and reception of it by the human soul in this life, unless it is limited and specified through union with the angelic light, which is narrower, in scope and more commensurate with the human mind.

But the formation of the species in the imaginative power must be attributed properly to the angels, since the whole of bodily creation is under the direction of the spiritual creation, as Augustine proves. Now, the imaginative power uses a bodily organ; hence, the formation of species in the imaginative power is part of the work proper to the angels.

Answers to Difficulties

1. As has been said earlier, Augustine’s words are to be taken as referring to the vision of heaven or to the sight of rapture, but not to prophetic sight.

2. Prophecy is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit by reason of the prophetic light, which, it is true, is directly infused by God. Still, the ministration of the angels assists in its proper reception.

3. That which a creature performs by its own power is in some way natural, but that which a creature performs not of its own power, but in so far as it is moved by God or is an instrument of the divine activity, is supernatural. Hence, the prophecy which takes its origin from an angel according to the natural knowledge of the angel is natural prophecy. But that which takes its origin from an angel in so far as the angel receives revelation from God is supernatural prophecy.

4. An angel does not create light in the human understanding or species in the imaginative power. But God uses the activity of the angel to strengthen the natural light in the human understanding. In this way an angel is said to illuminate man. Also, since an angel has the power to move the organ of phantasy, it can fashion the sight of imagination in the way which befits prophecy.

5. Activity is not attributed to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as a bench is not called the effect of the saw, but of the carpenter. Similarly, since an angel is the cause of prophetic revelation only as a divine instrument using the revelation received from God, the prophecy should not be called angelic, but divine.

6. The divine wisdom, in transferring itself to the soul, brings about some effects without the mediation of the ministration of the angels, as the infusion of grace, through which one is made a friend of God. But nothing hinders it from bringing about some other effects through the mediation of the aforesaid ministration. And, transferring itself to holy souls in this way, it makes prophets through the mediation of an angel.

Q. 12: Prophecy

ARTICLE IX

In the ninth article we ask:

Does a prophet always lose sense-consciousness when he is under the influence of the spirit of prophecy?

[Parallel readings: S.T., II-II, 173, 3.]

Difficulties

It seems that he does, for

1. Numbers (12:6) says: “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear in a vision or I will speak to him in a dream.” But as the Gloss says, prophecy takes place “through dreams and visions” when it takes place “through those things which seem to be said or done.” But when there is an appearance of those things which seem to be said or done and they are not actually said or done, a man is transported out of his senses. Therefore, the sight of prophecy is always in a prophet who is transported out of his senses.

2. When one power is applied intensely to its activity, another power must be withdrawn from its activity. But in the sight of prophecy the interior powers, that is, the intellect and the imagination, are intensely applied to their activities, since prophetic sight is the most perfect thing which they can reach in this life. Therefore, in prophetic sight the prophet is always withdrawn from the activity of the exterior powers.

3. Intellectual sight is more noble than the sight of imagination, and this latter is more noble than bodily sight. But combination with that which is less noble detracts somewhat from the perfection of the more noble. Therefore, intellectual sight and the sight of imagination are more perfect when they are not combined with bodily sight. Therefore, since they reach their highest perfection in this life in prophetic sight, it seems that they are not at all combined with bodily sight in such a way that the prophet would make use of bodily sight together with them.

4. The senses are more remote from the understanding and the imagination than lower reason is from higher reason. But the consideration of higher reason, by which one devotes himself to the contemplation of eternal things, withdraws man from the consideration of lower reason, by which man employs himself in things temporal. With much more reason does the prophetic sight of the understanding and the imagination withdraw man from bodily sight.

5. One and the same power cannot apply itself to many things simultaneously. But, when one is using his bodily senses, his understanding and imagination are occupied with those things which are seen bodily. Therefore, one cannot at the same time occupy himself with this and with those things which appear in prophetic sight apart from the senses of the body.

To the Contrary

1. The first Epistle to the Corinthians (14:32) says: “The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets.” But this would not be so if the prophet lost sense-consciousness, for then he would not have control over himself. Therefore, prophecy does not take place in a man who has lost sense-consciousness.

2. Through the sight of prophecy one receives certain and inerrant knowledge of things. But in those who are transported out of their senses, either in a dream, or in some other way, the knowledge is mixed with error and is uncertain. For they hold fast to likenesses of things as if they were the things themselves, as Augustine says. Therefore, prophecy does not take place when one loses sense-consciousness.

3. If we posit this, we seem to fall into the error of Montanus, who said that the prophets spoke as insane people who did not know what they were saying.

4. As the Gloss says, prophecy sometimes takes place through words and deeds: “Through deeds, as the ark of Noe signified the Church, and through words, as those which the angels spoke to Abraham.” But it is clear that Noe, when building the ark, and Abraham, when conversing with angels and serving them, were not transported out of their senses. Therefore, prophecy does not always take place through transport out of the senses.

REPLY

Prophecy has two acts: one is principal, namely, sight, and the other is secondary, namely, announcing.

The prophet does the announcing either by words or even by deeds, as is clear in Jeremiah (13:5), inasmuch as he put his girdle near the river to rot. But in whichever of the two ways the prophetic announcing is made, it is always made by a man not transported out of his senses, for such an announcing takes place through certain sensible signs. Hence, the prophet doing the announcing has to use his senses for his announcement to be perfect. Otherwise, he would make the announcement like an insane person.

But in the sight of prophecy two things concur, as we have said earlier, namely, judgment and the proper reception of the prophecy. Now, when the prophet is divinely inspired, so that only his judgment is supernatural, and not his reception, such inspiration does not require transport out of the senses, for the judgment of the understanding is more perfect according to its nature in one who has the use of his senses than in one who does not have the use of them.

But the supernatural reception proper to prophecy is in the sight of imagination, and in order to see this vision human power is enraptured by some spirit and transported out of the senses, as Augustine says. The reason for this is that the power of imagination is mainly intent on the things which are received through the senses, as long as one uses his senses. Hence, its primary attention can be transferred to those things which are received from another source only when the man is transported out of his senses. Hence, whenever prophecy takes place according to the sight of imagination, the prophet must be transported out of his senses.

But this transport happens in two ways. In one it is from some cause in the soul, and in the other, from a physical cause. It comes from a physical cause when the external senses become dull either because of sickness or because of the vapors occurring in sleep, which ascend to the brain and deaden the organ of touch. It comes from a cause in the soul when a man, from too much attention to the objects of the understanding or the imagination, is altogether abstracted from the external senses.

However, transport from the bodily senses never takes place in a prophet through sickness, as happens in epileptics and those who are mad, but only through a properly disposed physical cause, as through sleep. Therefore, prophecy which takes place with the sight of imagination always comes either in a dream, when one is deprived of sense-consciousness through a properly disposed physical cause, or in a vision, when the transport comes from some cause in the soul.

Nevertheless, between the prophet in his transport out of the senses, whether it be through a dream or through a vision, and all others who are carried out of their senses, there is this difference, that the mind of the prophet is enlightened about those things which are seen in the sight of imagination. Consequently, he knows that they are not things, but in some way, the likenesses of things about which his judgment is certain because of the light of the mind. Therefore, it is clear from this that the inspiration of prophecy takes place sometimes with transport out of the senses and sometimes without it. Hence, we must answer both sets of difficulties.

Answers to Difficulties

1. In those words our Lord wanted to show the pre-eminence of Moses over the other prophets in supernatural reception. For Moses was raised to the sight of the very essence of God in itself. But everything which the prophets have received they have received only in the likenesses belonging to dreams or visions. Nevertheless, the judgment of the prophet is not by means of the likenesses belonging to dreams or visions. Hence judgment of prophecy takes place without transport out of the senses.

2.When an interior power applies itself to the sight of its object, if there is perfect attention, it is cut off from exterior sight. But no matter how perfect the judgment of the interior power is, it does not withdraw from exterior activity, for it is the duty of the internal power to judge of the external. Hence, the judgment of that which is higher is ordained to the same thing as the exterior activity. Therefore, they do not hinder each other.

3. This argument follows for the sight of the intellect and the imagination according to reception, but not according to judgment, as has been said.

4. The powers of the soul hinder each other in their operations because they are rooted in the one essence of the soul. Hence, the closer the powers are to each other, the more they naturally hinder each other if they are directed toward different objects. Hence, the argument does not follow.

5. This argument follows for supernatural reception of the imaginative or intellectual power, but not for judgment.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

1. The Apostle is speaking of the announcing of prophecy, for it is in the power of free choice to announce or not to announce those things about which he is inspired. However, as concerns the revelation, the prophet himself is subject to the spirit, for the revelation does not take place as the prophet wishes, but as the revealing spirit wishes.

2. It is from the light of prophecy that the mind of the prophet is so enlightened that even in the transport out of his senses he has a true judgment about those things which he sees in the dream or vision.

3. Montanus erred on two points. First, he took away from the prophets the light of mind by which they have true judgment about the things which they have seen. Second, he said that, when they were announcing, they were carried out of their senses, as happens with those who are mad, or with those who talk in their sleep. But this does not follow from the above position.

4. The fact that prophecy is said to take place through words or deeds is to be referred more to the announcing of prophecy than to prophetic sight.

Q. 12: Prophecy

ARTICLE X

In the tenth article we ask:

Is prophecy suitably divided into prophecy of predestination, foreknowledge, and threats?

[Parallel readings: In Matth., 1i; In Ierem., 18; S.T., II-II, 174, 1.]

Difficulties

It seems that it is not, for

1. When the Gloss divides prophecy, it says: “One type of prophecy

cy is according to foreknowledge, and this must be fulfilled in every way according to the meaning of the words. ‘Behold a virgin shall conceive’ (Isaiah 7:14) belongs to this type. The other kind of prophecy is a threat, as: ‘Yet forty days, and Ninive shall be destroyed’ (Jonas 3:4). This is not fulfilled in the superficial meaning of the words, but in the meaning of a tacit construction put on the words.” Therefore, it seems that the third division which Jerome made of prophecy of predestination is superfluous.

2. That which is a property of all prophecy should not be set down as a member dividing prophecy. But to be according to divine foreknowledge is a property of all prophecy, for, as the Gloss reads: “The prophets read in the book of foreknowledge.” Therefore, prophecy according to foreknowledge should not be set down as a division of prophecy.

3. Since foreknowledge is a more general term than predestination, inasmuch as it is part of its definition, foreknowledge can be divided from predestination only with reference to those things in which the extension of foreknowledge is greater than that of predestination. But it is with respect to evil things that the extension of foreknowledge is greater than that of predestination, for there is foreknowledge of these and not predestination. But there is both foreknowledge and predestination of good things. Therefore, when there is said to be one prophecy of predestination and another of foreknowledge, this means that one concerns good acts and the other evil. But as far as dependence on free will is concerned, there is no difference between good and evil. Therefore, there is no difference at all between these two kinds of prophecy which Jerome distinguishes when he says: “The prophecy of predestination is that which is fulfilled without our free choice, but the prophecy of foreknowledge is that in which our free choice is involved.”

4. As Augustine says, predestination concerns goods connected with salvation. But our merits, also, which depend on free choice, are numbered among these goods. Therefore, our free choice is involved in prophecy of predestination. Thus, Jerome made a poor division.

5. Only three things can be considered in prophecy: that from whom it is, that in which it is, and that about which it is. But there is no distinction in that from whom it is, for all prophecy is from one source, the Holy Spirit. Nor is there any difference in that in which it is, for the human spirit is the subject of prophecy. And those things which prophecy concerns are only good and evil things. Therefore, prophecy should be divided only into a division with two members.

6. Jerome says6 that the prophecy, “Behold a virgin shall conceive” (Isaiah 7:14; Matthew1:23), is a prophecy of predestination. But, for the fulfillment of that prophecy, free choice played a part in the assent of the Blessed Virgin. Therefore, the prophecy of predestination has free will involved in it, and, thus, it does not differ from the prophecy of foreknowledge.

7. Every declaration about something future which we do not know will exist, is either false or doubtful to the one making the declaration. But through the prophecy containing a threat one predicts that something will exist, as for example, the destruction of some city. Since this declaration is neither false nor doubtful because there is neither falsity nor doubt in the Holy Spirit, who is the author of the prophecy, this has to be foreknown at least by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the prophecy containing a threat is not distinct from the prophecy of foreknowledge.

8. When something is predicted according to the prophecy containing a threat, the prediction should be interpreted conditionally or unconditionally. If conditionally, it is not said to belong to prophecy, which consists in a kind of supernatural knowledge, for even natural reason can know that some things will happen if certain conditions are fulfilled. Therefore, it must be interpreted unconditionally. Accordingly, either the prophecy is false, or the outcome is as predicted. And this must be known beforehand by God. Therefore, prophecy containing a threat should not be distinguished from the prophecy of foreknowledge.

9. In Jeremiah (17:18, 24-27) there is a similar rule for the fulfillment of divine promises and threats, for the threats are recalled when the nation against whom the threat was made repents of its sins, and similarly the promise ceases when the nation to whom it was made leaves the path of justice. Therefore, just as one makes the prophecy containing a threat a division of prophecy, he ought to make the prophecy containing a promise a fourth division.

10. Isaiah (38:1) spoke prophetically to Ezechias: “Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die...” This is not a prophecy of predestination, for that kind must be fulfilled in every way even apart from our free choice. Again, it is not a prophecy of foreknowledge because God did not have foreknowledge of this future event, otherwise there would have been falsity in His foreknowledge. Similarly, it does not belong to prophecy containing a threat, since the event was predicted unconditionally. Therefore, there must be a fourth class of prophecy.

11. It was said that this was predicted to happen according to the lower causes, and thus was a prophecy containing a threat.—On the contrary, by the art of medicine man can know the lower causes of the death of a sick man. Therefore, if Isaiah predicted this only according to lower causes, either he did not predict it prophetically, or prophetic prediction does not differ from the prediction of a doctor.

12. Every prophecy deals with things either by viewing the higher causes or by viewing the lower causes. If we take the previously mentioned prophecy as conditional, since it is according to some causes, namely, lower causes, there is equal reason to say that all prophecy is conditional. Thus, all prophecy will have the same character as the prophecy containing a threat.

13. Although the prophecy of threatening is not fulfilled “in the superficial meaning of the words, nevertheless it is fulfilled in the meaning of the tacit construction put on the words,” as Cassiodorus says..Thus, Jonas’ words, “Niniveh shall be destroyed” (Jonas 3:4), were fulfilled according to Augustine, for, “although the walls of Niniveh remained standing, its evil ways were wiped out.” But the fulfillment of prophecy, not according to the exterior superficial meaning of the words, but according to their spiritual sense, takes place in the prophecy of predestination and of foreknowledge. We see this in Isaiah (54:11) “I will lay thy foundations with sapphires, Jerusalem,” and in Daniel (2:45): “the stone was cut out of the mountain without hands, and broke in pieces the statue,” and in many other similar passages. Therefore, prophecy containing a threat should not be distinguished from the prophecy of foreknowledge and predestination.

14. If likenesses of future things are shown to someone, he still is not called a prophet unless he understands the things signified through these likenesses. Thus, Pharaoh was not called a prophet when he saw the ears of corn and the cattle, “for there is need of understanding in a vision,” as Daniel (10:1) says. But those through whom the divine threats are made understand what they declare only according to the superficial meaning of the words, for they are not enlightened about the things which are signified through the words. This is clear in the case of Jonas, who understood that Ninive was to be overturned materially. Hence, he grieved as though his prophecy were not fulfilled when the city was not overturned but mended its ways. Therefore, one should not on this account be called a prophet, and, thus, threatening should not be made a species of prophecy. Hence, the distinction previously mentioned seems no distinction at all.

To the Contrary

The opposite appears from the Gloss on Matthew(1:23): “Behold a virgin shall conceive.” Here, the above division is given and explained.

REPLY

Prophecy is derived from the divine foreknowledge, as has been said above. But we must bear in mind that God knows futures differently from all others who have foreknowledge of them. For there are two things to consider in the knowledge of the future: the order of the causes to the future effects and the outcome or execution of this order in the actual procession of the effects from their causes.

Accordingly, no matter what created power has some knowledge of the future, its knowledge reaches only the order of the causes. Thus, a doctor is said to foreknow future death in so far as he knows that natural principles have an ordination to death. And a meteorologist is said to foresee future rains and winds in the same way. Hence, if these causes are such that their effects can be impeded, the event which is thus foreseen to happen does not always come to pass.

But God knows the future not only by reason of the order of the causes, but also in the very outcome or execution of that order. The reason for this is that His vision is measured by eternity, which comprehends all times in one indivisible present. Thus, in one simple glance He sees that to which the causes are ordered and how that order is fulfilled or obstructed. But this is impossible for a creature whose gaze is limited to a determined time. Hence, He knows those things which exist at that time. And at the time when futures are still future they exist only in the order of their causes, and hence, we can know them only in this way. Consequently, it is clear to all who consider it correctly that when we are said to foresee the future we have knowledge more of present things than of the future. And, so, it remains proper to God alone to have true foreknowledge of future events.

Therefore, prophecy is derived from divine foreknowledge sometimes by reason of the order of the causes and sometimes by reason of the execution or fulfillment of that order. Therefore, when prophetic revelation concerns only the order of the causes, it is called prophecy containing a threat. For, then, all that is revealed to the prophet is that according to the things which now exist such a person is ordained to this or that.

The fulfillment of the order, however, takes place in two ways. Sometimes it comes from the activity of the divine power alone, as the resuscitation of Lazarus, the conception of Christ, and things of this sort. And the prophecy of predestination follows this divine activity, for, as Damascene says: “Those things which God predestines are not in our power.” Hence, predestination is called a kind of preparatory action on the part of God. Now, preparatory action concerns that which one will do himself and not what someone else will do.

Some things, however, are brought to completion by the operation of other causes, whether natural or voluntary. These things, in so far as they are accomplished through other causes, are not predestined, but they are nevertheless foreknown. Hence, prophecy of these things is said to be according to foreknowledge. However, since prophecy takes place for the sake of men, the prophecy of foreknowledge especially concerns those things which men do by their free will. For this reason Jerome puts aside other created causes and makes mention only of free will when referring to the prophecy of foreknowledge.

Answers to Difficulties

1. The threefold division which Jerome makes is reduced to a twofold division, as has been said, because one division looks to the order of causes and the other to the outcome of that order. This is the division which Cassiodorus held. But Jerome subdivided the second member; thus, Cassiodorus gave two members of the division and Jerome three. Cassiodorus also took foreknowledge in its generality, for it refers to all existing things, whether they come about through created or uncreated power. But Jerome took foreknowledge with a certain restriction, inasmuch as it concerns only those things about which there is no predestination by reason of themselves, that is to say, those things which come to pass by created power.

2. Every prophecy has divine foreknowledge as its root. But, since there is knowledge of the order and the outcome in divine foreknowledge, one kind of prophecy is derived from the one of these and one from the other. However, the foreknowledge of God is properly called foreknowledge in so far as it looks to an outcome which is future. For the order to the outcome is in the present; hence, of it there is knowledge rather than foreknowledge. Thus, not that prophecy which looks to the order, but only that which deals with the outcome, is said to take place according to foreknowledge.

3. Foreknowledge is taken here in contrast with predestination in so far as foreknowledge has a broader extension than predestination. Now, foreknowledge has a broader extension than predestination not only in evil things, if predestination be taken strictly, but also in all good things which do not take place exclusively by the divine power. Hence, the argument does not follow.

4. Our merit is from grace and from free will. However, it belongs to predestination only in so far as it comes from grace, which is from God alone. Hence, that which is from our free will is said to belong to predestination for some extrinsic reason.

5. Here, prophecy is distinguished according to the things of which it treats. This is not according to good and evil, for differences of this sort are related by some extrinsic reason to the future thing which is known through prophecy, but rather according to that which concerns the order or the outcome of the order, as has been said.

6. The consent of the Blessed Virgin intervened in the conception of Christ as something which removed a hindrance and not as an operative cause. For it was not fitting that so great a benefit be given to one who was unwilling.

7. We can say that something will exist not only from the fact that it will exist in this way, but also from the fact that it is so ordained in its causes that it will thus exist. For it is in this way that a doctor says: “That man will be cured or will die.” And, if the event prove otherwise, he does not speak falsely. For at that time this was about to take place from the order of the causes, although it was possible for this to be impeded. Then, that which beforehand was going to take place in the event will not take place. For this reason the Philosopher says: “One who is about to enter will not enter.” And according to this the threat of the prophet is neither false nor doubtful, although what he has predicted does not come to pass.

8. If the prophecy containing a threat is referred to the ordination of causes to which it directly looks, it is consequently free from all condition. For it is absolutely true that it is so ordained in the causes that this happen. But, if it is referred to the event to which it looks indirectly, it must be understood under this condition: if the cause acts. Nevertheless, it is supernatural, because we cannot know by natural knowledge that precisely such or such a punishment is deserved according to divine justice, even if the cause does exist, namely, if the wickedness remain.

9. We take the prophecy containing a promise as belonging to the prophecy containing a threat because both have the same intelligible nature. However, this nature is better expressed in prophecy containing a threat, because threats are more frequently revoked than promises, for God is more inclined to be merciful than to punish.

10. That prophecy was a prophecy containing a threat, and although the condition was not stated explicitly, that threat should be interpreted under the implicit condition: if such an order of things continues.

11. Lower causes include not only natural causes, which doctors can know beforehand, but also meritorious causes, which are known from divine revelation alone. Likewise, the natural causes of health or death can be known much more perfectly by divine revelation than by human ingenuity.

12. Higher causes, which are the intelligible natures of things [represented] in the divine foreknowledge, never fail of fulfillment of their effects, as lower causes do. Therefore, the outcomes of things are known absolutely in the higher causes, but only conditionally in lower causes.

13. Although in the prophecy of predestination and of foreknowledge the truth to be fulfilled is presented under some likenesses, no literal sense is understood by reason of those likenesses, but the literal sense is grasped according to those things which are signified through the likenesses, as happens in all metaphorical expressions. Hence, in such prophecies we find no truth in the likenesses, but only in those things which are declared through the likenesses.

But, in the prophecy containing a threat, the literal sense of the words of the prophet is considered according to those likenesses of the things which will come to pass, because those likenesses are not given only as likenesses but as things. Hence, that which will come to pass and is represented through likenesses of this sort does not belong to the literal sense, but to the mystical sense. Thus, when it is said that Ninive will be destroyed, material destruction belongs to the literal sense, but destruction of evil ways belongs to the moral sense. By reason of the order of causes we see some truth in the literal sense itself, as has been said.

14. The ears of corn and the cattle were not shown in Pharaoh’s dream as things, but only as likenesses. Therefore, Pharaoh, who saw only those likenesses, had no understanding of any thing and for this reason was not a prophet. But Jonas, to whom it was said: “Ninive shall be destroyed,” had some understanding of a thing, namely, of the ordination of merits to destruction, even though, perhaps, he had no foreknowledge of the other thing, namely, the conversion. Thus, he was not a prophet in that which he did not understand. Nevertheless, Jonas and the prophets who threatened knew that the prophecy they foretold was not a prophecy according to foreknowledge, but according to threat. Hence, it is said in Jonas (4:2): “Therefore I went before to flee into Tharsis: for I know that thou art a gracious and merciful God.”

Q. 12: Prophecy

ARTICLE XI

In the eleventh article we ask:

Is there unchangeable truth in prophecy?

[Parallel readings: C.G., III, 154; S.T., II-II, 171,6; 172, 5, ad 3; 172, 6, ad 2.]

Difficulties

It seems that there is not, for

1. Since unchangeable truth is put in the definition of prophecy, if it belongs to prophecy at all, it must belong to it for some intrinsic reason. But future contingent things, about which we have prophecy, are not unchangeable for any intrinsic reason, but only in so far as they are referred to the divine foreknowledge, as Boethius says. Therefore, unchangeable truth should not be attributed to prophecy as part of its definition.

2. That which is fulfilled only if some changeable condition exists does not have unchangeable truth. But there is a prophecy, that containing a threat, which is fulfilled only if there exists a changeable condition, namely, persistence in justice or wickedness, as we see this in Jeremiah (18:8). Therefore, not all prophecy possesses unchangeable truth.

3. The Gloss on Isaiah (38:1) reads: “God reveals His sentence (sententia) but not His chosen plan (consilium) to the prophets.” But His sentence is changeable, as is said in the same place. Therefore, prophecy does not possess unchangeable truth.

4. If prophecy contains unchangeable truth, this happens because of the prophet who sees it, or because of the thing which is seen, or because of the eternal mirror by reason of which it is seen. But its source is none of these. Not the seer, for human knowledge is changeable. Not the thing which is seen, for that is contingent. Finally, not the divine foreknowledge or mirror, for this does not impose necessity on things. Therefore, prophecy in no way contains unchangeable truth.

5. It was said that divine foreknowledge does not impose a necessity which makes it impossible for the outcome to be different, but nevertheless the outcome which was foreknown will not be different, and that in this way prophecy contains unchangeable truth. For, according to the Philosopher, that is called unchangeable which cannot be changed, or is changed with difficulty, or simply does not change.—On the contrary, granted the occurrence of what is possible, nothing impossible follows. If, therefore, that which is foreknown and prophesied can vary, then, if we assume that it does vary, nothing impossible follows. But it does follow that prophecy possesses changeable truth. Therefore, prophecy does not necessarily contain unchangeable truth.

6. The truth of a proposition follows the condition of the thing, for: “A statement is true or false as the thing is or is not,” as the Philosopher says. But the things about which there is prophecy are contingent and changeable. Therefore, the prophetic statement contains changeable truth.

7. An effect is called necessary or contingent from the proximate cause, not from the first cause. But the proximate causes of the things of which we have prophecy are changeable causes, although the first cause is unchangeable. Therefore, prophecy does not possess unchangeable, but changeable, truth.

8. If prophecy possesses unchangeable truth, it is impossible for something to be prophesied and not happen. But it is impossible for what has been prophesied not to have been prophesied. Therefore, if prophecy has unchangeable truth, that which has been prophesied must necessarily happen. Thus, prophecy will not concern future contingent things.

To the Contrary

l. The Gloss says: “Prophecy is divine inspiration or revelation which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth.”

2. “Prophecy is a sign of divine foreknowledge,” as Jerome says. But things which arc foreknown are necessary in so far as they are subjects of foreknowledge. Therefore, the things prophesied are also necessary in so far as there is prophecy about them. Therefore, prophecy has unchangeable truth.

3. God’s knowledge about changeable things can be unchangeable, for He does not obtain it from things. But in the same way prophetic knowledge is not received from the things themselves. Therefore, Prophecy has unchangeable truth about changeable things.

REPLY

In prophecy there are two things to consider, the things prophesied and the knowledge which is had of those things. And the order of the causes in these two is different. For the things prophesied come immediately from changeable causes as from their proximate cause, but from the unchangeable causes as from their remote cause. Prophetic knowledge, on the other hand, comes from the divine foreknowledge as its proximate cause and depends on the things prophesied not as a proximate cause, but only as a sign of these things.

Moreover, the necessity and contingency of every effect depends on the proximate cause and not on the first cause. Hence, the things prophesied are changeable, but the prophetic knowledge is unchangeable, just as is the divine foreknowledge from which it is derived as a copy from the pattern. For, just as the necessity of the truth of the understanding causes necessary truth in the statement which is a sign of understanding, so also the immutable divine foreknowledge causes unchangeable truth in the prophecy which is its sign.

But the way in which God’s foreknowledge can be unchangeably true about changeable things is explained in another question, on God’s knowledge. Consequently, it is not necessary to repeat it here, since the whole immutability of prophecy depends on the immutability of the divine foreknowledge.

Answers to Difficulties

1. Nothing prevents something from being in another thing for an extrinsic reason, if that thing is taken in itself, and yet being in the thing for an intrinsic reason, if it is taken together with something else. Thus, to be moved belongs to man for an extrinsic reason, but, in so far as he is running, it belongs intrinsically to a man. So also, to be unchangeable does not belong intrinsically to the thing which is prophesied, but belongs to it only inasmuch as it is prophesied. Therefore, it is fittingly included in the definition of prophecy.

2. The prophecy containing a threat fully possesses unchangeable truth, for it does not deal with the outcomes of things, but with the order of the causes to the outcomes, as has been said. And this order, predicted by the prophet, must necessarily be, although sometimes the events do not follow.

3. That eternal disposition of God which never changes we call the chosen plan of God. For this reason Gregory says: “God never changes His chosen plan.” Sentence, however, is that to which some causes are ordained. Moreover, sentences are handed down in trials according to the merits of the cases (causae). However, sometimes that to which the causes (causae) are ordained is arranged by God from eternity. And, then, God’s chosen plan and sentence are the same. But, sometimes, causes are ordained to something which is not arranged by God from eternity. Then, God’s chosen plan and sentence are directed to different things. Therefore, there is mutability in the sentence which looks to lower causes, but there is always immutability in the chosen plan.

Sometimes, then, a sentence which is in conformity with the chosen plan is revealed to the prophet. In this case, the prophecy possesses unchangeable truth even with reference to the outcome. Sometimes, however, there is revealed a sentence which is not in conformity with the chosen plan. In this case, there is unchangeable truth with reference to the order, but not with reference to the outcome, as we have said.

4. The eternal mirror gives immutability to prophecy, not because it imposes necessity on the things prophesied, but because it makes the prophecy about contingent things necessary just as it itself is necessary.

5. Given that something has been prophesied according to foreknowledge, although in itself it is possible for it to fail to exist, still, granted that it is said to be foreknown, it is then impossible for it not to exist. For, from the fact that it is established as foreknown, it is established that it will be so, since foreknowledge looks to the outcome.

6. The truth of a proposition follows the condition of the thing when the knowledge of the one proposing the truth has its origin from things. However, this is not so in our case.

7. Although the proximate cause of the thing prophesied is changeable, the proximate cause of the prophecy itself is unchangeable, as has been said. Therefore, the argument does not follow.

8. We should pass like judgment on the failure of what is prophesied to come to pass and on the failure of what is foreknown to come to pass. To what extent this should be conceded and to what extent it should be denied is treated in the question on God’s knowledge.

Q. 12: Prophecy

ARTICLE XII

In the twelfth article we ask:

Is the prophecy which is according to the sight of understanding alone higher than that which has the sight of understanding together with imagination?

[Parallel readings: S.T., II-II, 174, 2-3; III, 30, 3, ad 1.]

Difficulties

It seems that it is not, for

1. Prophecy which has the sight of understanding along with imagination includes that which has the sight of understanding alone. Therefore, the prophetic sight which has both is better than that which has only one. For that which embraces something surpasses that which it embraces.

2. The more abundantly the light of understanding is in a prophecy, the more perfect it is. But, because of the fullness of the light of understanding in prophecy, there is an overflow from the understanding into the imagination, so that the sight of imagination is produced there.

Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of imagination added to it is more perfect than that which has the sight of understanding alone.

3 It is said of John the Baptist that he is a prophet and “more than a prophet” (Mat 11:9). But this is stated because he saw Christ not only through his understanding or imagination, as the other prophets did, but also physically pointed him out. Therefore, prophecy with which bodily sight is combined is the most noble, and for the same reason that to which the sight of imagination is added is more noble than that which has the sight of understanding alone.

4. The more fully a thing contains the differences which make up the intelligible nature of the species, the more perfect it is. But the differences which constitute prophecy are sight and declaration. Therefore, the prophecy which includes declaration seems to be more perfect than that which does not have it. But the declaration cannot take place without the sight of imagination, because the one who declares a prophecy must have in his imagination the words he is going to speak. Therefore, the prophecy which includes the sight of imagination and of understanding is more perfect.

5. The Gloss on “Yet by the Spirit he speaketh mysteries” (1 Cor. 14:2) says: “One who by spirit alone sees the likenesses of the things signified is less a prophet, and one who is granted only the understanding of them is more a prophet, but he is most a prophet who excels in both.” Thus, we conclude as before.

6. As Rabbi Moses says, prophecy begins in the understanding and is completed in the imagination. Therefore, prophecy which has the sight of imagination is more perfect than that which has only the sight of understanding.

7.Weakness of the light of understanding betrays an imperfection of the prophecy. But the fact that prophetic sight does not overflow into the imagination seems to come from weakness of the light of understanding. Therefore, prophecy which has the sight of imagination seems to be more perfect.

8. To know a thing as it is in itself and as the sign of something else is more perfect than to know it only in itself. Therefore, for the same reason it is more perfect to know a thing as it is represented in a sign than to know it only in itself. But, in the prophecy which has the sight of imagination and that of understanding, the thing prophesied is known not only in itself but also as it is represented by the images. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of imagination is more noble than that which contains only the sight of understanding, in which one understands the things prophesied only in themselves and not as represented in a sign.

9. Dionysius says: “It is impossible for the divine radiance to shine on us unless it is shrouded with a variety of sacred veils.”s But, for him veils are the imagery of the imagination, in which the purity of the light of understanding is, as it were, shrouded. Therefore, in every prophccy there must be imagery of the imagination either formed by man or introduced by God. Now, the imagery introduced by God seems to be more noble than that formed by man. Therefore, those prophecies seem to be most noble in which God at the same time infuses the light of understanding and the imagery of the imagination.

10. As Jerome says, the prophets are distinguished from the writers of sacred books. But, of those whom he calls the prophets, all, or almost all, received revelation under the imagery of imagination. But many of those whom he calls writers of sacred books received revelation without imagery. Therefore, those to whom revelation is given according to the sight of understanding and imagination are more properly called prophets than those to whom revelation is given according to the sight of understanding only.

11. According to the Philosopher, our understanding is related to the first causes of things, which naturally are most knowable, “just as the eye of the owl is related to the light of the sun.” But the eye of the owl can look at the light of the sun only when it is darkened to some extent. Therefore, our understanding, too, understands divine things when they are dimmed to some extent, and therefore seems to understand them in this way under certain likenesses. Consequently, the sight of understanding will not be more certain than that of imagination, since both take place under likenesses. Hence, it seems that the addition of the sight of imagination to that of understanding does not lessen the nobility of the latter. Thus, that prophecy which takes place under both sights is either of greater dignity or at least of equal dignity.

12. That which can be understood is related to the understanding as that which can be imagined is related to the imagination. But that which can be imagined is apprehended by the imagination only through the mediation of a likeness. Therefore, what can be understood is apprehended by the understanding only in the same way. Thus, we conclude as before.

To the Contrary

1. The Gloss says: “There is another kind of prophecy which is of greater dignity than the others, that in which one prophesies by means of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit alone and apart from every outside help of action or word or vision or dream.”But the prophecy which has the sight of imagination joined to it takes place with the help of a dream or a vision. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of understanding alone is more noble.

2. Everything which is received into a thing is received there according to the manner of the receiver. But the understanding, in which something is received by the sight of understanding, is more noble than the imagination, in which it is received by the sight of imagination. Therefore, prophecy which takes place according to the sight of understanding is more noble.

3. Where there is sight of understanding there can be no deception, for one who is mistaken does not understand, as Augustine says. However, the sight of imagination contains a great mixture of falsity. Hence, in the Metaphysics it is given as a kind of source of falsity. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of understanding is more noble.

4. When one power of the soul recedes from its activity, another is strengthened in its activity. Therefore, if the power of imagination is completely inactive in some prophecy, the sight of understanding will be stronger. Therefore, the prophecy will also be more noble.

5. The acts of the powers are related to each other just as the powers are. But understanding not joined to imagination, as in the angels, is more noble than understanding joined to imagination, as in men. Therefore, the prophecy which contains the sight of understanding without the sight of imagination is more noble than that which has both.

6. Assistance in an action shows imperfection in the agent. But the sight of imagination is given in the Gloss as a help to prophecy. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of imagination is more imperfect.

7. The more remote light is from darkness or clouds, the brighter it is. But the imagery of imagination is, as it were, clouds which darken the light of understanding. For this reason Isaac says that human reason, which abstracts from phantasms, has its origin in the shadow of intelligence. Therefore, prophecy which has the light of understanding without images is more perfect.

8. The whole nobility of prophetic knowledge consists in this, that it imitates God’s foreknowledge. But prophecy which has no sight of imagination imitates divine foreknowledge, in which there is no imagination, more than that which has the sight of imagination. Therefore, that which does not have the sight of imagination is more noble.

REPLY

Since the nature of a species is made up of the nature of the genus and the nature of the difference, the dignity of the species can be estimated from either of these. Likewise, according to these two considerations; certain things sometimes surpass each other in dignity. In so far as the nature of the species is concerned, that in which the difference formally constituting the species exists more nobly, always participates more perfectly in the nature of the species. But, absolutely speaking, sometimes that in which the nature of the genus is more perfect is more noble and sometimes that in which the nature of the difference exists more perfectly is more noble.

For, since the difference adds some perfection to the nature of the genus, the excellence which comes from the difference makes the thing more noble absolutely. Thus, just as in the species of man, who is a rational animal, he is more noble absolutely who is more gifted in rationality than one who is more gifted in the things which refer to the animal nature, as the senses, movement, and other things of this sort.

However, when the difference implies a certain imperfection, then that which has the nature of the genus more completely is more noble absolutely. This is clear in faith, which is an obscure knowledge, namely, of things which are not seen. For one who has a large share of the nature of the genus of faith and is deficient in the difference (as one of the faithful who has some understanding of matters of belief and in a way already sees them) has a faith simply more noble than one who has less knowledge. Nonetheless, as far as the nature of faith is concerned, he has it more properly who does not at all see the things which he believes.

The same is true in prophecy. For prophecy seems to be a knowledge which is shadowy and mixed with darkness, as the second Epistle of St. Peter (1:19) has: “We have the more firm prophetical word: whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place.” This, too, the very name prophecy shows, for prophecy is called a kind of sight from afar. And things which are seen clearly are seen, as it were, from nearby.

Therefore, if we compare the types of prophecy on the basis of the difference which completes the essence of prophecy, we find that the prophecy in which there is admixture of the sight of imagination possesses that nature of prophecy more perfectly and more properly. For in this the knowledge of prophetic truth is darkened.

But if we compare prophecies according to the attributes of the nature of the genus, namely, knowledge or sight, we see that we have to make a distinction. For all perfect knowledge has two elements, reception and judgment about that which is received. Now, in prophecy, judgment about that which is received is according to the understanding alone, but reception is according to the understanding and the imagination. Sometimes, therefore, there is no supernatural reception in prophecy, but only supernatural judgment. Thus, the understanding alone is enlightened without any sight of imagination. Perhaps Solomon’s inspiration was of this nature, since by a divine impulse he made more certain judgments than the rest of us about human actions and the natures of things, which we perceive naturally.

But, sometimes, there is also supernatural reception, and this takes place in two ways. For there is either reception by the imagination, as when images of things are formed by the divine power in the spirit of the prophet, or reception by the understanding, as happens when the understanding is so clearly flooded with knowledge of the truth that it does not grasp the truth from the likeness of any images, but in fact can form images for itself from the truth it has seen. And it uses these because of the nature of our understanding. But there can be no prophecy in which there is reception without judgment. Hence, no one can have sight of imagination without that of understanding.

Thus, it is clear that the pure sight of understanding, which has judgment alone without supernatural reception, is inferior to that which has judgment and the reception of imagination. But the sight of understanding which has judgment and supernatural reception is more noble than that which has judgment and the reception of imagination. In this respect we must concede that prophecy which contains the sight of understanding alone is more worthy than that which has sight of imagination joined to it.

Answers to Difficulties

1. Although the prophecy which consists of both sights does also have sight of understanding, it does not include the prophecy which consists of the sight of understanding alone, because the latter has the sight of understanding more nobly than the former, since in it the perception of the light of understanding is sufficient for reception and judgment, whereas in the other it is sufficient only for judgment.

2. In both types of prophecy the prophetic light descends from the understanding to the imagination, but in different ways. For in the type of prophecy which is said to contain the sight of understanding alone we perceive the whole fullness of the prophetic revelation in the understanding. Thereupon, because of the nature of our understanding, which cannot understand without phantasms, images are suitably formed in the imaginative power as the one who understands wishes. But in the other type of prophecy the whole fullness of prophetic revelation is not received in the understanding, but partly in the understanding, in so far as there is judgment, and partly in the imagination, in so far as there is reception.

Hence, the sight of understanding is more complete in the prophecy which contains only the sight of understanding. For the deficiency of the light received in the understanding causes it, in a sense, to fall to some extent from the intelligible purity into the imagery of imagination, as happens in dreams.

3. That John pointed out Christ physically does not belong to prophetic sight in the way we are now speaking about the comparison of prophecy. Rather, it belongs to the declaration of prophecy. Also, that he saw Christ bodily did not give him prophecy of a more perfect nature, but was a concession greater than prophecy given him by God. Hence, Luke (10:24) says: “Many prophets and kings have desired to see the things that you see...”

4. Declaration through words or deeds is common to both kinds of prophecy, for even the prophecy which has the sight of understanding alone can be declared according to images which [the prophet] freely forms.

5. That Gloss speaks of one who in his understanding has only judgment about those things which are received by another, as Joseph had only judgment about the things which Pharaoh had seen and he himself did not receive [knowledge of] what would happen. Thus, the argument does not reach any conclusion about the prophecy which has the sight of understanding alone. And it is of this that we are now speaking.

6. On this point we do not follow the opinion of Rabbi Moses, for he holds that the prophecy of David was below that of Isaiah and Jeremiah, which is the opposite of what holy men say. Still, there is some truth in what he says, because the judgment is not completed unless the things about which we are to judge are brought forward. Hence, in the prophecy in which the light of understanding is perceived only in order to make a judgment, there is only the light itself, which does not cause determinate knowledge of anything until some things about which we must judge are put before it, whether these are received either from the light itself or from another. Thus, the sight of understanding is perfected through the sight of imagination as what is common is determined through that which is particular.

7. It is not always weakness of the light of understanding which is the source of prophecy according to the sight of understanding alone. But sometimes it is caused by a very complete reception of the understanding, as we have noted.” Therefore, the argument does not follow. 8. A sign as such is a cause of knowledge. The thing which is represented is that which is known through something else. But, just as that which is known in itself and makes other things known is known in a more noble way than that which is known only in itself, so also, on the other hand, that which is known through itself and not through something else is known in a more noble way than that which is known through something else. Thus, principles are known in a more noble way than conclusions, and therefore, the case is just the opposite with the sign and the thing signified. Hence, the argument does not follow.

9. Although images imprinted by God are more noble than images formed by a man, the reception of knowledge which is in the mind from God is more noble than that which takes place through the forms of imagination.

10. Those who have prophecy according to visions of imagination are more especially called prophets in the above-mentioned distinction, for in them there is a fuller character of prophecy even by reason of the difference. They, however, are called sacred writers who had only intellectual visions supernaturally, whether in judgment alone or in judgment and reception together.

11. Although our intellect understands divine things through certain likenesses, still, because these are immaterial, they are more noble than the likenesses of imagination. Hence, the sight of understanding, also, is more noble.

12. A thing cannot be imaginable through its essence as it can be intelligible through its essence, for the imagination concerns only material things. Yet, it cannot receive anything except without matter. Consequently, it is always necessary for the imagination to attain an object not through its essence, but through its likeness. But understanding receives things immaterially, and so, knows not only material things, but also immaterial things. Hence, it knows some things through their essence and some through likenesses.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

The response to the difficulties to the contrary is easily seen, in so far as they conclude to something false.

Q. 12: Prophecy

ARTICLE XIII

In the thirteenth article we ask:

Are the grades of prophecy distinguished according to the sight of imagination?

[Parallel readings: IV Sent., 49, 2, 7, ad 2; 1 Cor., c. 13, lect. 4; S.T., II-II, 174, 3.]

Difficulties

And it seems that they are, for

1. Prophecy is more noble where the reception of the thing prophesied is more noble. But, sometimes, the reception of the thing prophesied takes place through the sight of imagination. Therefore, grades of prophecy can be distinguished according to the sight of imagination.

2. A more perfect medium of knowing produces more perfect knowledge. It is for this reason that scientific knowledge is more perfect than opinion. But the likenesses of imagination are a medium of knowing in prophecy. Therefore, where the sight of imagination is more noble, the grade of prophecy will be higher.

3. In all knowledge which takes place through a likeness the knowledge is more perfect where the likeness is more explicit. But in prophecy the imagery of imagination is made up of the likenesses of the things about which there is revelation of prophecy. Therefore, where the sight of imagination is more perfect, the grade of prophecy is higher.

4. Since the prophetic light descends from the understanding to the imagination, when the light in the understanding of the prophet is more perfect, the sight of imagination is the more perfect. Therefore, different grades of the sight of imagination show different grades of the sight of understanding. But where the sight of understanding is more perfect, the prophecy is more perfect. Therefore, grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the sight of imagination.

5. It was said that diversity of the sight of imagination does not distinguish species of prophecy and, therefore, grades of prophecy are not distinguished according to it.—On the contrary, every warm element is of the. same species, but doctors distinguish warmth into first, second, third, and fourth grades. Therefore, the distinction of grades does not require the distinction of species.

6. Greater and less do not constitute distinct species. But even the sight of understanding is distinguished in prophecy only according to the more or less perfect reception of the prophetic light. Therefore, difference in the sight of understanding does not constitute distinct species of prophecy and so it does not constitute distinct grades of prophecy according to the response just given. Thus, there would not be grades in prophecy if it were distinguished neither according to the sight of understanding nor the sight of imagination. Therefore, it remains that grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the sight of imagination.

To the Contrary

1. Only the sight of understanding, and not the sight of imagination, makes one a prophet. Therefore, neither are grades of prophecy distinguished according to the sight of imagination.

2. That which is distinguished by reason of something intrinsic is distinguished according to that which is formal to it. But in prophecy the sight of understanding is formal and the sight of imagination is, as it were, material. Therefore, grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the sight of understanding and not according to the sight of imagination.

3. The visions of imagination frequently vary in the same prophet, for sometimes he apprehends revelation in one way and sometimes in another. Therefore, it does not seem possible to distinguish grades of prophecy according to the sight of imagination.

4. Prophecy is related to the things prophesied just as scientific knowledge is related to the things known. But the sciences are distinguished according to the things known, as is said in The Soul. Therefore, prophecy is distinguished according to the things prophesied and not according to the sight of imagination.

5. According to the Gloss, prophecy consists in “words and deeds, dreams and visions.” Therefore, grades of prophecy should not be distinguished more according to the sight of imagination to which visions and dreams belong than according to words and deeds.

6. Miracles also are needed for prophecy. Hence, when Moses was sent by the Lord (Exodus 3:11-13), he sought a sign. And in Psalms (73:9) we read: “Our signs we have not seen, there is now no prophet...” Therefore, grades of prophecy should not be distinguished according to the sight of imagination rather than according to signs.

REPLY

When two things combine to make up something, and one of them is more important than the other in the composite which they constitute, we can consider grades of comparison according to that which is primary and according to that which is secondary. But a high degree of that which is primary shows an absolute pre-eminence, whereas a high degree of that which is secondary shows a pre-eminence in some respect and not absolutely, unless the high degree of that which is secondary is a sign of a high degree of that which is primary.

Thus, for human merit, charity, as that which is primary, unites with an external work, as that which is secondary. However, absolutely speaking, that is to say, with reference to the essential reward, we judge merit to be greater when it proceeds from greater charity. And the magnitude of the work makes for greater merit in so far as it refers to some accidental reward, but not absolutely, except in so far as it shows intensity of charity, according to what Gregory says: “Love of God, if it exists, does great things.” Therefore, since prophecy is achieved through the joint activity of both the sight of understanding and that of imagination, the former functioning as the principal factor, and the latter in a secondary capacity, it follows that pre-eminence of the sight of understanding should be the basis for judging one grade of prophecy as absolutely superior. However, pre-eminence of the sight of imagination shows a grade of prophecy to be higher in some respect, and not absolutely, unless to the extent that perfection of the sight of imagination exhibits perfection of the sight of understanding.

But we cannot perceive determinate grades of the sight of understanding, because the fullness of the light of understanding is displayed only through certain signs. Hence, we must distinguish grades of prophecy according to those signs. And in this way there are four bases on which we can distinguish grades of prophecy.

The first is according to the elements which are necessary for prophecy. Now, prophecy has two acts: sight and declaration. For sight, however, two things are needed: judgment, which is in the understanding, and reception, which is sometimes in the understanding and sometimes in the imagination. But for declaration something is needed in the one declaring, namely, a certain boldness so that he will not be afraid to speak the truth because of the opponents of the truth. In this sense the Lord said to Ezechiel (3:8-9): “Behold I have made thy face stronger than their faces: and thy forehead harder than their foreheads..., fear them not, neither be thou dismayed at their presence.” And something else is needed in the thing to be declared, namely, a sign through which the truth of the thing declared is made known. Thus, Moses received a sign from God in order that he might be believed.

But, since the place of declaration in prophecy is not primary but only secondary, the lowest grade of prophecy exists in one in whom there is a certain boldness or readiness to say or do something without having a revelation. This would be the case if we say that there was a grade of prophecy in Samson, taking prophecy in a broad sense in which every supernatural influx is reduced to prophecy. The second grade will be that in which the prophet has the sight of understanding only according to judgment, as in Solomon. The third grade is that in which one has the sight of understanding together with that of imagination, as in Isaiah and Jeremiah. The fourth is that in which the prophet has the very fullness of the sight of understanding in judgment and reception, as in David.

A second basis on which grades of prophecy can be distinguished is the disposition of the one prophesying. Thus, since prophecy takes place in a dream or in a vision when one is awake, as we read in Numbers (12:6), the grade of prophecy which takes place when one is awake is more perfect than that which takes place in a dream. This is so both because the understanding is better disposed for judging when one is awake and because the transport from sensible things does not take place naturally, but comes from the perfect concentration of the inner powers on the things which God is disclosing.

A third basis is the manner of perceiving these things, for the more distinctly the things prophesied are signified, the higher is the grade of prophecy. Rut no signs portray anything more distinctly than words. Therefore, when one perceives words expressly indicating the thing prophesied, as we read of Samuel in the first Book of Kings (3:11), the grade of prophecy is higher than when certain figures which are likenesses of the things are shown to us, as the boiling caldron which was shown to Jeremiah (1:13). From this it is clearly shown that the prophetic light is better grasped in its power when the things to be prophesied are exhibited according to more distinct likenesses.

The fourth basis is the one who makes the revelation. For the grade of prophecy is higher when he who speaks is seen than when one only hears the words, whether in a dream or in a vision. For this shows that the prophet approaches closer to the knowledge of him who reveals. And the grade of prophecy is higher when he who speaks is seen under the guise of an angel than when he is seen in the form of a man, and even higher if he should be seen in the image of God, as in Isaiah (6:1) “I saw the Lord sitting....” For, since revelation of prophecy descends from God to an angel and from the angel to man, the reception of prophecy is manifestly fuller, the more it approaches the first source of prophecy.

Answers to Difficulties

We must concede the arguments which show that grades of prophecy arc distinguished according to sight of imagination in the manner we have explained. And we must not say that diversity of grade requires distinction of species.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

1. The answer to the first difficulty is clear from what has been said.

2. When something is distinguished according to species, the distinction must be made according to that which is formal. But if there is distinction of grades within the same species, it can be according to that which is material, as animal is distinguished according to male and female, which are material differences, as is said in the Metaphysics.

3. Since prophetic light is not something abiding in the prophet, but a kind of transient impression, it is not necessary for the prophet always to possess the same grade of prophecy. In fact, revelation comes to him sometimes according to one grade and sometimes according to another.

4. Since some things which are more noble are at times known less perfectly, as when there is opinion about things divine and scientific knowledge about creatures, we cannot derive grades of prophecy from the things prophesied. This is especially true when the things which are to be declared are revealed to the prophet according to the demands of the disposition of those for whose sake the prophecy is given.

Still, it can be said that grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the things prophesied, but, because of their great diversity, we cannot thus assign definite grades of prophecy, except perhaps in a general way, as if we should say that the grade is higher when something about God is revealed than when something about creatures is revealed.

5. The words and deeds treated in this objection do not belong to the revelation of prophecy, but to the declaration which takes place according to the disposition of those to whom it is declared. Consequently, we cannot distinguish grades of prophecy according to this. The grace of working miracles differs from prophecy, yet it can be reduced to prophecy inasmuch as the truth of the prophet is shown forth through miracles. Hence, in this respect the grace of working miracles is better than prophecy, just as scientific knowledge which gives the reason is better than scientific knowledge which gives the fact. For this reason the grace of working miracles is put before the grace of prophecy in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:10).

Therefore, he is the most distinguished prophet who has prophetic revelation and also works miracles. However, if he works miracles without prophetic revelation, he is not more noble in what belongs to the nature of prophecy, although, perhaps, all things considered, he is more noble. But such a one is numbered among those in the lowest grade of prophecy, just as one who has only the boldness to do something.

Q. 12: Prophecy

ARTICLE XIV

In the fourteenth article we ask:

Was Moses more outstanding than other prophets?

[Parallel readings: De ver., 12, 9, ad 1; In Isaiam, 6; S.T., II-II, 174,4.]

Difficulties

It seems that he was not, for

1. Gregory says:. “As there has been a growth age by age, there has been an increase in the knowledge about God.” Therefore, the later prophets were more outstanding than Moses.

2. The Gloss reads: “David was the most outstanding of the prophets. Therefore, Moses was not the most outstanding.

3. Greater miracles were worked through Joshua, who made the sun and the moon stand still (Joshua 10:13), than through Moses. Greater miracles were also worked through Isaiah, who made the sun go backward (Isaiah 38:8). Therefore, Moses was not the greatest prophet.

4. In Sirach (48:4-5) there is this said of Elijah: “Who can glory like to thee who raisedst up a dead man from below... ? “ Thus, we conclude as before.

5. In Matthew (11:11), we read of John the Baptist: “There hath not risen among them that are born of women a greater than John the Baptist.” Therefore, Moses was not greater than he. Thus, we conclude as before.

To the Contrary

1. Deuteronomy (34: 10) says: “And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses.”

2. Numbers (12:6-7) says: “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. But it is not so with my servant Moses who is most faithful in all my house.” From this it is clear that he is given preference over the other prophets.

REPLY

Among the prophets, eminence can, according to various criteria, be attributed to some in a qualified way, but speaking without qualification, Moses was the greatest of them all. For in him the four things necessary for prophecy were present in a most outstanding manner.

First, the sight of understanding was most eminent in him, and through this he was lifted up to see the very essence of God, as is said in Numbers (12:8): “And plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord.” Moreover, this sight of his did not take place through the mediation of an angel, as it did in other prophetic visions. Hence, in the same place in Numbers (12:8) we read: “For I speak to him mouth to mouth.” And Augustine says this plainly.

Second, the sight of imagination existed in Moses most perfectly because he had it, as it were, at will. Hence, we read in Exodus (33:10: “And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend.” We can also note in this another excellence with reference to the sight of imagination, that he not only heard the words of the one revealing, but saw Him, and this not in the shape of a man or an angel, but as God Himself; not in a dream, but when awake. We read this of none of the other prophets.

Third, his declaration was most outstanding because all who were before him taught their families as one teaches a lesson, but Moses was the first who spoke for the Lord, saying: “The Lord says this.” And he spoke to the whole people and not to one family. Nor did he declare something for the Lord in such a way that his hearers should give heed to what another previous prophet said, as the prophets by their preaching led the people to observe the law of Moses. Hence, the preaching of previous prophets was a preparation for the law of Moses, and this law was the foundation of the preaching of subsequent prophets. Fourth, he was more outstanding in the matters which refer to the declaration of prophecy. For, as regards miracles, he worked signs for the conversion and teaching of a whole race, whereas other prophets worked particular miracles for special persons and special tasks. Hence, we read in Deuteronomy (34:10): “And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses whom the Lord knew face to face”. as for pre-eminence of revelation: “In all the signs and wonders, which he sent by him to do in the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to all his servants” (Deuteronomy 34:11); and “Great miracles, which Moses did before all Israel” (Deuteronomy 34:12). He also showed himself most outstanding in boldness, for with only a rod he went down into Egypt, not only to preach the words of the Lord, but also to scourge Egypt and to free his people.

Answers to Difficulties

1. We should take what Gregory says as referring to the things which pertain to the mystery of the Incarnation. Later prophets received more explicit revelations about these than Moses did. However, they did not receive more explicit revelations of the Divinity, about which Moses was most fully taught.

2. David is called the most outstanding of the prophets because he prophesied most clearly about Christ without any vision of imagination.

3. Although those miracles were greater than the miracles of Moses in the substance of what was done, the miracles of Moses. were greater in the manner in which they were performed because they were performed for the whole people and for the instruction of the people in a new law and for their liberation. These other miracles were for particular tasks.

4. The pre-eminence of Elijah is noted especially in this, that he was preserved from death and was more outstanding than many other prophets in boldness, by reason of which he did not fear the rulers of his times, and in greatness of miracles, as appears from the same place in Sirach (48:4).

5. When Moses is put before the other prophets, we should understand this as referring to prophets of the Old Testament, for, at that time especially, when the world awaited the coming of Christ, to whom all prophecy was ordained, prophecy was in its proper environment. John, however, belongs to the New Testament. Hence, Matthew (11:13) has: “For all the prophets and the law prophesied until John.” However, there is a clearer revelation in the New Testament; the second Epistle to the Corinthians (3:18) has: “But we all, beholding the glory of the Lord with open face...” Here, the Apostle distinctly puts himself and the other apostles ahead of Moses. Nevertheless, granted that no man was greater than John the Baptist, it does not follow from this that no prophet had a higher grade of prophecy than he, for one can be greater in prophecy and less in merit, since prophecy is not a gift of sanctifying grace.