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| Deinde considerandum est de persona filii. Attribuuntur autem tria nomina filio, scilicet filius, verbum et imago. Sed ratio filii ex ratione patris consideratur. Unde restat considerandum de verbo et imagine. Circa verbum quaeruntur tria. | We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to the Son—namely, "Son," "Word," and "Image." The idea of Son is gathered from the idea of Father. Hence it remains for us to consider Word and Image. |
| Concerning Word there are three points of inquiry: | |
| Primo, utrum verbum dicatur essentialiter in divinis, vel personaliter. | (1) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a personal term? |
| Secundo, utrum sit proprium nomen filii. | (2) Whether it is the proper name of the Son? |
| Tertio, utrum in nomine verbi importetur respectus ad creaturas. | (3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed relation to creatures? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod verbum in divinis non sit nomen personale. Nomina enim personalia proprie dicuntur in divinis, ut pater et filius. Sed verbum metaphorice dicitur in divinis, ut Origenes dicit, super Ioannem. Ergo verbum non est personale in divinis. | Objection 1: It would seem that Word in God is not a personal name. For personal names are applied to God in a proper sense, as Father and Son. But Word is applied to God metaphorically, as Origen says on (Jn. 1:1), "In the beginning was the Word." Therefore Word is not a personal name in God. |
| Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, in libro de Trin., verbum est notitia cum amore. Et secundum Anselmum, in Monol., dicere summo spiritui nihil aliud est quam cogitando intueri. Sed notitia et cogitatio et intuitus in divinis essentialiter dicuntur. Ergo verbum non dicitur personaliter in divinis. | Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 10), "The Word is knowledge with love;" and according to Anselm (Monol. lx), "To speak is to the Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought." But knowledge and thought, and sight, are essential terms in God. Therefore Word is not a personal term in God. |
| Praeterea, de ratione verbi est quod dicatur. Sed, secundum Anselmum, sicut pater est intelligens, et filius est intelligens, et spiritus sanctus est intelligens; ita pater est dicens, filius est dicens, et spiritus sanctus est dicens. Et similiter quilibet eorum dicitur. Ergo nomen verbi essentialiter dicitur in divinis, et non personaliter. | Objection 3: Further, it is essential to word to be spoken. But, according to Anselm (Monol. lix), as the Father is intelligent, the Son is intelligent, and the Holy Ghost is intelligent, so the Father speaks, the Son speaks, and the Holy Ghost speaks; and likewise, each one of them is spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential term in God, and not in a personal sense. |
| Praeterea, nulla persona divina est facta. Sed verbum Dei est aliquid factum, dicitur enim in Psalmo CXLVIII, ignis, grando, nix, glacies, spiritus procellarum, quae faciunt verbum eius. Ergo verbum non est nomen personale in divinis. | Objection 4: Further, no divine person is made. But the Word of God is something made. For it is said, "Fire, hail, snow, ice, the storms which do His Word" (Ps. 148:8). Therefore the Word is not a personal name in God. |
| Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in VII de Trin., sicut filius refertur ad patrem, ita et verbum ad id cuius est verbum. Sed filius est nomen personale, quia relative dicitur. Ergo et verbum.. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "As the Son is related to the Father, so also is the Word to Him Whose Word He is." But the Son is a personal name, since it is said relatively. Therefore so also is Word. |
| I answer that, The name of Word in God, if taken in its proper sense, is a personal name, and in no way an essential name. | |
| Respondeo dicendum quod nomen verbi in divinis, si proprie sumatur, est nomen personale, et nullo modo essentiale. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod verbum tripliciter quidem in nobis proprie dicitur, quarto autem modo, dicitur improprie sive figurative. Manifestius autem et communius in nobis dicitur verbum quod voce profertur. Quod quidem ab interiori procedit quantum ad duo quae in verbo exteriori inveniuntur, scilicet vox ipsa, et significatio vocis. Vox enim significat intellectus conceptum, secundum philosophum, in libro I Periherm., et iterum vox ex imaginatione procedit, ut in libro de anima dicitur. Vox autem quae non est significativa, verbum dici non potest. Ex hoc ergo dicitur verbum vox exterior, quia significat interiorem mentis conceptum. Sic igitur primo et principaliter interior mentis conceptus verbum dicitur, secundario vero, ipsa vox interioris conceptus significativa, tertio vero, ipsa imaginatio vocis verbum dicitur. Et hos tres modos verbi ponit Damascenus, in I libro, cap. XIII, dicens quod verbum dicitur naturalis intellectus motus, secundum quem movetur et intelligit et cogitat, velut lux et splendor, quantum ad primum, rursus verbum est quod non verbo profertur, sed in corde pronuntiatur, quantum ad tertium, rursus etiam verbum est Angelus, idest nuntius, intelligentiae, quantum ad secundum. Dicitur autem figurative quarto modo verbum, id quod verbo significatur vel efficitur, sicut consuevimus dicere, hoc est verbum quod dixi tibi, vel quod mandavit rex, demonstrato aliquo facto quod verbo significatum est vel simpliciter enuntiantis, vel etiam imperantis. | To see how this is true, we must know that our own word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaning; while in a fourth sense it is taken improperly or figuratively. The clearest and most common sense is when it is said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds from an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior word—that is, the vocal sound itself, and the signification of the sound. For, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) vocal sound signifies the concept of the intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds from the signification or the imagination, as stated in De Anima ii, text 90. The vocal sound, which has no signification cannot be called a word: wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the fact the it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that, first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these three kinds of words (De Fide Orth. i, 17), saying that "word" is called "the natural movement of the intellect, whereby it is moved, and understands, and thinks, as light and splendor;" which is the first kind. "Again," he says, "the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word, but is uttered in the heart;" which is the third kind. "Again," also, "the word is the angel"—that is, the messenger "of intelligence;" which is the second kind. Word is also used in a fourth way figuratively for that which is signified or effected by a word; thus we are wont to say, "this is the word I have said," or "which the king has commanded," alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way of assertion or of command. |
| Dicitur autem proprie verbum in Deo, secundum quod verbum significat conceptum intellectus. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin., quisquis potest intelligere verbum, non solum antequam sonet, verum etiam antequam sonorum eius imagines cogitatione involvantur, iam potest videre aliquam verbi illius similitudinem, de quo dictum est, in principio erat verbum. Ipse autem conceptus cordis de ratione sua habet quod ab alio procedat, scilicet a notitia concipientis. Unde verbum, secundum quod proprie dicitur in divinis, significat aliquid ab alio procedens, quod pertinet ad rationem nominum personalium in divinis, eo quod personae divinae distinguuntur secundum originem, ut dictum est. Unde oportet quod nomen verbi, secundum quod proprie in divinis accipitur, non sumatur essentialiter, sed personaliter tantum. | Now word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the concept of the intellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 10): "Whoever can understand the word, not only before it is sounded, but also before thought has clothed it with imaginary sound, can already see some likeness of that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was the Word." The concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to proceed from something other than itself—namely, from the knowledge of the one conceiving. Hence "Word," according as we use the term strictly of God, signifies something proceeding from another; which belongs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine persons are distinguished by origin (Question [27], Articles [3],4,5). Hence the term "Word," according as we use the term strictly of God, is to be taken as said not essentially, but personally. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Ariani, quorum fons Origenes invenitur, posuerunt filium alium a patre esse in diversitate substantiae. Unde conati sunt, cum filius Dei verbum dicitur, astruere non esse proprie dictum; ne, sub ratione verbi procedentis, cogerentur fateri filium Dei non esse extra substantiam patris; nam verbum interius sic a dicente procedit, quod in ipso manet. Sed necesse est, si ponitur verbum Dei metaphorice dictum, quod ponatur verbum Dei proprie dictum. Non enim potest aliquid metaphorice verbum dici, nisi ratione manifestationis, quia vel manifestat sicut verbum, vel est verbo manifestatum. Si autem est manifestatum verbo, oportet ponere verbum quo manifestetur. Si autem dicitur verbum quia exterius manifestat, ea quae exterius manifestant, non dicuntur verba nisi inquantum significant interiorem mentis conceptum, quem aliquis etiam per exteriora signa manifestat. Etsi ergo verbum aliquando dicatur metaphorice in divinis, tamen oportet ponere verbum proprie dictum, quod personaliter dicatur. | Reply to Objection 1: The Arians, who sprang from Origen, declared that the Son differed in substance from the Father. Hence, they endeavored to maintain that when the Son of God is called the Word, this is not to be understood in a strict sense; lest the idea of the Word proceeding should compel them to confess that the Son of God is of the same substance as the Father. For the interior word proceeds in such a manner from the one who pronounces it, as to remain within him. But supposing Word to be said metaphorically of God, we must still admit Word in its strict sense. For if a thing be called a word metaphorically, this can only be by reason of some manifestation; either it makes something manifest as a word, or it is manifested by a word. If manifested by a word, there must exist a word whereby it is manifested. If it is called a word because it exteriorly manifests, what it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except in as far as it signifies the interior concept of the mind, which anyone may also manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word may be sometimes said of God metaphorically, nevertheless we must also admit Word in the proper sense, and which is said personally. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil eorum quae ad intellectum pertinent, personaliter dicitur in divinis, nisi solum verbum, solum enim verbum significat aliquid ab alio emanans. Id enim quod intellectus in concipiendo format, est verbum. Intellectus autem ipse, secundum quod est per speciem intelligibilem in actu, consideratur absolute. Et similiter intelligere, quod ita se habet ad intellectum in actu, sicut esse ad ens in actu, non enim intelligere significat actionem ab intelligente exeuntem, sed in intelligente manentem. Cum ergo dicitur quod verbum est notitia, non accipitur notitia pro actu intellectus cognoscentis, vel pro aliquo eius habitu, sed pro eo quod intellectus concipit cognoscendo. Unde et Augustinus dicit quod verbum est sapientia genita, quod nihil aliud est quam ipsa conceptio sapientis, quae etiam pari modo notitia genita dici potest. Et per eundem modum potest intelligi quod dicere Deo sit cogitando intueri, inquantum scilicet intuitu cogitationis divinae concipitur verbum Dei. Cogitationis tamen nomen Dei verbo proprie non convenit, dicit enim Augustinus, XV de Trin., ita dicitur illud verbum Dei, ut cogitatio non dicatur; ne aliquid esse quasi volubile credatur in Deo, quod nunc accipiat formam ut verbum sit, eamque dimittere possit, atque informiter quodammodo volutari. Cogitatio enim proprie in inquisitione veritatis consistit, quae in Deo locum non habet. Cum vero intellectus iam ad formam veritatis pertingit, non cogitat, sed perfecte veritatem contemplatur. Unde Anselmus improprie accipit cogitationem pro contemplatione. | Reply to Objection 2: Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to God personally, except word alone; for word alone signifies that which emanates from another. For what the intellect forms in its conception is the word. Now, the intellect itself, according as it is made actual by the intelligible species, is considered absolutely; likewise the act of understanding which is to the actual intellect what existence is to actual being; since the act of understanding does not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent, but an act remaining in the agent. Therefore when we say that word is knowledge, the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect, or any one of its habits, but stands for what the intellect conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1) that the Word is "begotten wisdom;" for it is nothing but the concept of the Wise One; and in the same way It can be called "begotten knowledge." Thus can also be explained how "to speak" is in God "to see by thought," forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the gaze of the divine thought. Still the term "thought" does not properly apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16): "Therefore do we speak of the Word of God, and not of the Thought of God, lest we believe that in God there is something unstable, now assuming the form of Word, now putting off that form and remaining latent and as it were formless." For thought consists properly in the search after the truth, and this has no place in God. But when the intellect attains to the form of truth, it does not think, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Hence Anselm (Monol. lx) takes "thought" in an improper sense for "contemplation." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut, proprie loquendo, verbum dicitur personaliter in divinis et non essentialiter, ita et dicere. Unde, sicut verbum non est commune patri et filio et spiritui sancto, ita non est verum quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sint unus dicens. Unde Augustinus dicit, VII de Trin., dicens illo coaeterno verbo non singulus intelligitur in divinis. Sed dici convenit cuilibet personae, dicitur enim non solum verbum sed res quae verbo intelligitur vel significatur. Sic ergo uni soli personae in divinis convenit dici eo modo quo dicitur verbum, eo vero modo quo dicitur res in verbo intellecta, cuilibet personae convenit dici. Pater enim, intelligendo se et filium et spiritum sanctum, et omnia alia quae eius scientia continentur, concipit verbum, ut sic tota Trinitas verbo dicatur, et etiam omnis creatura; sicut intellectus hominis verbo quod concipit intelligendo lapidem, lapidem dicit. Anselmus vero improprie accepit dicere pro intelligere. Quae tamen differunt. Nam intelligere importat solam habitudinem intelligentis ad rem intellectam; in qua nulla ratio originis importatur, sed solum informatio quaedam in intellectu nostro, prout intellectus noster fit in actu per formam rei intellectae. In Deo autem importat omnimodam identitatem, quia in Deo est omnino idem intellectus et intellectum, ut supra ostensum est. Sed dicere importat principaliter habitudinem ad verbum conceptum nihil enim est aliud dicere quam proferre verbum. Sed mediante verbo importat habitudinem ad rem intellectam, quae in verbo prolato manifestatur intelligenti. Et sic sola persona quae profert verbum, est dicens in divinis, cum tamen singula personarum sit intelligens et intellecta, et per consequens verbo dicta. | Reply to Objection 3: As, properly speaking, Word in God is said personally, and not essentially, so likewise is to "speak." Hence, as the Word is not common to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, so it is not true that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one speaker. So Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): "He who speaks in that co-eternal Word is understood as not alone in God, but as being with that very Word, without which, forsooth, He would not be speaking." On the other hand, "to be spoken" belongs to each Person, for not only is the word spoken, but also the thing understood or signified by the word. Therefore in this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to be spoken in the same way as a word is spoken; whereas in the way whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in the word, it belongs to each Person to be spoken. For the Father, by understanding Himself, the Son and the Holy Ghost, and all other things comprised in this knowledge, conceives the Word; so that thus the whole Trinity is "spoken" in the Word; and likewise also all creatures: as the intellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act of understanding a stone, speaks a stone. Anselm took the term "speak" improperly for the act of understanding; whereas they really differ from each other; for "to understand" means only the habitude of the intelligent agent to the thing understood, in which habitude no trace of origin is conveyed, but only a certain information of our intellect; forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form of the thing understood. In God, however, it means complete identity, because in God the intellect and the thing understood are altogether the same, as was proved above (Question [14], Articles [4],5). Whereas to "speak" means chiefly the habitude to the word conceived; for "to speak" is nothing but to utter a word. But by means of the word it imports a habitude to the thing understood which in the word uttered is manifested to the one who understands. Thus, only the Person who utters the Word is "speaker" in God, although each Person understands and is understood, and consequently is spoken by the Word. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod verbum sumitur ibi figurative, prout significatum vel effectus verbi dicitur verbum. Sic enim creaturae dicuntur facere verbum Dei, inquantum exequuntur effectum aliquem, ad quem ordinantur ex verbo concepto divinae sapientiae, sicut aliquis dicitur facere verbum regis, dum facit opus ad quod ex verbo regis instigatur. | Reply to Objection 4: The term "word" is there taken figuratively, as the thing signified or effected by word is called word. For thus creatures are said to do the word of God, as executing any effect, whereto they are ordained from the word conceived of the divine wisdom; as anyone is said to do the word of the king when he does the work to which he is appointed by the king's word. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod verbum non sit proprium nomen filii. Filius enim est persona subsistens in divinis. Sed verbum non significat rem subsistentem, ut in nobis patet. Ergo verbum non potest esse proprium nomen personae filii. | Objection 1: It would seem that "Word" is not the proper name of the Son. For the Son is a subsisting person in God. But word does not signify a subsisting thing, as appears in ourselves. Therefore word cannot be the proper name of the person of the Son. |
| Praeterea, verbum prolatione quadam procedit a dicente. Si ergo filius est proprie verbum, non procedit a patre nisi per modum prolationis. Quod est haeresis Valentini, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de haeresibus. | Objection 2: Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by being uttered. Therefore if the Son is properly the word, He proceeds from the Father, by way only of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine; as appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi). |
| Praeterea, omne nomen proprium alicuius personae significat proprietatem aliquam eius. Si igitur verbum sit proprium nomen filii, significabit aliquam proprietatem eius. Et sic erunt plures proprietates in divinis quam supra enumeratae sunt. | Objection 3: Further, every proper name of a person signifies some property of that person. Therefore, if the Word is the Son's proper name, it signifies some property of His; and thus there will be several more properties in God than those above mentioned. |
| Praeterea, quicumque intelligit, intelligendo concipit verbum. Sed filius intelligit. Ergo filii est aliquod verbum. Et sic non est proprium filii esse verbum. | Objection 4: Further, whoever understands conceives a word in the act of understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore some word belongs to the Son; and consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son. |
| Praeterea, Hebr. I dicitur de filio, portans omnia verbo virtutis suae, ex quo Basilius accipit quod spiritus sanctus sit verbum filii. Non est ergo proprium filii esse verbum. | Objection 5: Further, it is said of the Son (Heb. 1:3): "Bearing all things by the word of His power;" whence Basil infers (Cont. Eunom. v, 11) that the Holy Ghost is the Son's Word. Therefore to be Word is not proper to the Son. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., verbum solus filius accipitur. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 11): "By Word we understand the Son alone." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod verbum proprie dictum in divinis personaliter accipitur, et est proprium nomen personae filii. Significat enim quandam emanationem intellectus, persona autem quae procedit in divinis secundum emanationem intellectus, dicitur filius, et huiusmodi processio dicitur generatio, ut supra ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod solus filius proprie dicatur verbum in divinis. | I answer that, "Word," said of God in its proper sense, is used personally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son. For it signifies an emanation of the intellect: and the person Who proceeds in God, by way of emanation of the intellect, is called the Son; and this procession is called generation, as we have shown above (Question [27], Article [2]). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in God. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in nobis non est idem esse et intelligere, unde illud quod habet in nobis esse intelligibile, non pertinet ad naturam nostram. Sed esse Dei est ipsum eius intelligere, unde verbum Dei non est aliquod accidens in ipso, vel aliquis effectus eius; sed pertinet ad ipsam naturam eius. Et ideo oportet quod sit aliquid subsistens, quia quidquid est in natura Dei, subsistit. Et ideo Damascenus dicit quod verbum Dei est substantiale, et in hypostasi ens, reliqua vero verba, scilicet nostra, virtutes sunt animae. | Reply to Objection 1: "To be" and "to understand" are not the same in us. Hence that which in us has intellectual being, does not belong to our nature. But in God "to be" and "to understand" are one and the same: hence the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an effect of His; but belongs to His very nature. And therefore it must needs be something subsistent; for whatever is in the nature of God subsists; and so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that "the Word of God is substantial and has a hypostatic being; but other words [as our own] are activities if the soul." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod non propter hoc error Valentini est damnatus, quia filium dixit prolatione natum, ut Ariani calumniabantur, sicut Hilarius refert, VI de Trin., sed propter varium modum prolationis quem posuit, sicut patet per Augustinum in libro de haeresibus. | Reply to Objection 2: The error of Valentine was condemned, not as the Arians pretended, because he asserted that the Son was born by being uttered, as Hilary relates (De Trin. vi); but on account of the different mode of utterance proposed by its author, as appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod in nomine verbi eadem proprietas importatur quae in nomine filii, unde dicit Augustinus, eo dicitur verbum, quo filius. Ipsa enim nativitas filii, quae est proprietas personalis eius, diversis nominibus significatur, quae filio attribuuntur ad exprimendum diversimode perfectionem eius. Nam ut ostendatur connaturalis patri, dicitur filius; ut ostendatur coaeternus, dicitur splendor; ut ostendatur omnino similis, dicitur imago; ut ostendatur immaterialiter genitus, dicitur verbum. Non autem potuit unum nomen inveniri, per quod omnia ista designarentur. | Reply to Objection 3: In the term "Word" the same property is comprised as in the name Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "Word and Son express the same." For the Son's nativity, which is His personal property, is signified by different names, which are attributed to the Son to express His perfection in various ways. To show that He is of the same nature as the Father, He is called the Son; to show that He is co-eternal, He is called the Splendor; to show that He is altogether like, He is called the Image; to show that He is begotten immaterially, He is called the Word. All these truths cannot be expressed by only one name. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod eo modo convenit filio esse intelligentem, quo convenit ei esse Deum, cum intelligere essentialiter dicatur in divinis, ut dictum est. Est autem filius Deus genitus, non autem generans Deus. Unde est quidem intelligens, non ut producens verbum, sed ut verbum procedens; prout scilicet in Deo verbum procedens secundum rem non differt ab intellectu divino, sed relatione sola distinguitur a principio verbi. | Reply to Objection 4: To be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same way as it belongs to Him to be God, since to understand is said of God essentially, as stated above (Question [14], Articles [2],4). Now the Son is God begotten, and not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as producing a Word, but as the Word proceeding; forasmuch as in God the Word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect, but is distinguished from the principle of the Word only by relation. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum de filio dicitur, portans omnia verbo virtutis suae, verbum figurate accipitur pro effectu verbi. Unde Glossa ibi dicit quod verbum sumitur pro imperio; inquantum scilicet ex effectu virtutis verbi est quod res conserventur in esse, sicut ex effectu virtutis verbi est quod res producantur in esse. Quod vero Basilius interpretatur verbum pro spiritu sancto, improprie et figurate locutus est, prout verbum alicuius dici potest omne illud quod est manifestativum eius, ut sic ea ratione dicatur spiritus sanctus verbum filii, quia manifestat filium. | Reply to Objection 5: When it is said of the Son, "Bearing all things by the word of His power"; "word" is taken figuratively for the effect of the Word. Hence a gloss says that "word" is here taken to mean command; inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the Word, things are kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the Word things are brought into being. Basil speaks widely and figuratively in applying Word to the Holy Ghost; in the sense perhaps that everything that makes a person known may be called his word, and so in that way the Holy Ghost may be called the Son's Word, because He manifests the Son. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in nomine verbi non importetur respectus ad creaturam. Omne enim nomen connotans effectum in creatura, essentialiter in divinis dicitur. Sed verbum non dicitur essentialiter, sed personaliter, ut dictum est. Ergo verbum non importat respectum ad creaturam. | Objection 1: It would seem that the name 'Word' does not import relation to creatures. For every name that connotes some effect in creatures, is said of God essentially. But Word is not said essentially, but personally. Therefore Word does not import relation to creatures. |
| Praeterea, quae important respectum ad creaturas, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, ut dominus et creator. Sed verbum dicitur de Deo ab aeterno. Ergo non importat respectum ad creaturam. | Objection 2: Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is said of God in time; as "Lord" and "Creator." But Word is said of God from eternity. Therefore it does not import relation to the creature. |
| Praeterea, verbum importat respectum ad id a quo procedit. Si ergo importat respectum ad creaturam, sequitur quod procedat a creatura. | Objection 3: Further, Word imports relation to the source whence it proceeds. Therefore, if it imports relation to the creature, it follows that the Word proceeds from the creature. |
| Praeterea, ideae sunt plures secundum diversos respectus ad creaturas. Si igitur verbum importat respectum ad creaturas, sequitur quod in Deo non sit unum verbum tantum, sed plura. | Objection 4: Further, ideas (in God) are many according to their various relations to creatures. Therefore if Word imports relation to creatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but many. |
| Praeterea, si verbum importat respectum ad creaturam, hoc non est nisi inquantum creaturae cognoscuntur a Deo. Sed Deus non solum cognoscit entia, sed etiam non entia. Ergo in verbo importabitur respectus ad non entia, quod videtur falsum. | Objection 5: Further, if Word imports relation to the creature, this can only be because creatures are known by God. But God does not know beings only; He knows also non-beings. Therefore in the Word are implied relations to non-beings; which appears to be false. |
| Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod in nomine verbi significatur non solum respectus ad patrem, sed etiam ad illa quae per verbum facta sunt operativa potentia. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Questions. lxxxiii, qu. 63), that "the name Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod in verbo importatur respectus ad creaturam. Deus enim, cognoscendo se, cognoscit omnem creaturam. Verbum autem in mente conceptum, est repraesentativum omnis eius quod actu intelligitur. Unde in nobis sunt diversa verba, secundum diversa quae intelligimus. Sed quia Deus uno actu et se et omnia intelligit, unicum verbum eius est expressivum non solum patris, sed etiam creaturarum. | I answer that, Word implies relation to creatures. For God by knowing Himself, knows every creature. Now the word conceived in the mind is representative of everything that is actually understood. Hence there are in ourselves different words for the different things which we understand. But because God by one act understands Himself and all things, His one only Word is expressive not only of the Father, but of all creatures. |
| Et sicut Dei scientia Dei quidem est cognoscitiva tantum, creaturarum autem cognoscitiva et factiva; ita verbum Dei eius quod in Deo patre est, est expressivum tantum, creaturarum vero est expressivum et operativum. Et propter hoc dicitur in Psalmo XXXII, dixit, et facta sunt; quia in verbo importatur ratio factiva eorum quae Deus facit. | And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God, whereas as regards creatures, it is both cognitive and operative, so the Word of God is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both expressive and operative of creatures; and therefore it is said (Ps. 32:9): "He spake, and they were made;" because in the Word is implied the operative idea of what God makes. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in nomine personae includitur etiam natura oblique, nam persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. In nomine igitur personae divinae, quantum ad relationem personalem, non importatur respectus ad creaturam, sed importatur in eo quod pertinet ad naturam. Nihil tamen prohibet, inquantum includitur in significatione eius essentia, quod importetur respectus ad creaturam, sicut enim proprium est filio quod sit filius, ita proprium est ei quod sit genitus Deus, vel genitus creator. Et per hunc modum importatur relatio ad creaturam in nomine verbi. | Reply to Objection 1: The nature is also included indirectly in the name of the person; for person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Therefore the name of a divine person, as regards the personal relation, does not imply relation to the creature, but it is implied in what belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to prevent its implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence is included in its meaning: for as it properly belongs to the Son to be the Son, so it properly belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the Creator begotten; and in this way the name Word imports relation to creatures. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum relationes consequantur actiones, quaedam nomina important relationem Dei ad creaturam, quae consequitur actionem Dei in exteriorem effectum transeuntem, sicut creare et gubernare, et talia dicuntur de Deo ex tempore. Quaedam vero relationem quae consequitur actionem non transeuntem in exteriorem effectum, sed manentem in agente, ut scire et velle, et talia non dicuntur de Deo ex tempore. Et huiusmodi relatio ad creaturam importatur in nomine verbi. Nec est verum quod nomina importantia relationem Dei ad creaturas, omnia dicantur ex tempore, sed sola illa nomina quae important relationem consequentem actionem Dei in exteriorem effectum transeuntem, ex tempore dicuntur. | Reply to Objection 2: Since the relations result from actions, some names import the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows on the action of God which passes into some exterior effect, as to create and to govern; and the like are applied to God in time. But others import a relation which follows from an action which does not pass into an exterior effect, but abides in the agent—as to know and to will: such are not applied to God in time; and this kind of relation to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Nor is it true that all names which import the relation of God to creatures are applied to Him in time; but only those names are applied in time which import relation following on the action of God passing into exterior effect. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod creaturae non cognoscuntur a Deo per scientiam a creaturis acceptam, sed per essentiam suam. Unde non oportet quod a creaturis procedat verbum, licet verbum sit expressivum creaturarum. | Reply to Objection 3: Creatures are known to God not by a knowledge derived from the creatures themselves, but by His own essence. Hence it is not necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although the Word is expressive of creatures. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod nomen ideae principaliter est impositum ad significandum respectum ad creaturam, et ideo pluraliter dicitur in divinis, neque est personale. Sed nomen verbi principaliter impositum est ad significandam relationem ad dicentem, et ex consequenti ad creaturas, inquantum Deus, intelligendo se, intelligit omnem creaturam. Et propter hoc in divinis est unicum tantum verbum, et personaliter dictum. | Reply to Objection 4: The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation to creatures; and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to God; and it is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed chiefly to signify the speaker, and consequently, relation to creatures, inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands every creature; and so there is only one Word in God, and that is a personal one. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod eo modo quo scientia Dei est non entium, et verbum Dei est non entium, quia non est aliquid minus in verbo Dei quam in scientia Dei, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed tamen verbum est entium ut expressivum et factivum, non entium autem, ut expressivum et manifestativum. | Reply to Objection 5: God's knowledge of non-beings and God's Word about non-beings are the same; because the Word of God contains no less than does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14). Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings, but is expressive and manifestive of non-beings. |