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| Deinde considerandum est de comparatione personarum ad invicem. Et primo, quantum ad aequalitatem et similitudinem; secundo, quantum ad missionem. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. | We now have to consider the persons as compared to one another: firstly, with regard to equality and likeness; secondly, with regard to mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry. |
| Primo, utrum aequalitas locum habeat in divinis personis. | (1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons? |
| Secundo, utrum persona procedens sit aequalis ei a qua procedit, secundum aeternitatem. | (2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He proceeds in eternity? |
| Tertio, utrum sit aliquis ordo in divinis personis. | (3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons? |
| Quarto utrum personae divinae sint aequales secundum magnitudinem. | (4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness? |
| Quinto, utrum una earum sit in alia. | (5) Whether the one divine person is in another? |
| Sexto, utrum sint aequales secundum potentiam. | (6) Whether they are equal in power? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aequalitas non competat divinis personis. Aequalitas enim attenditur secundum unum in quantitate, ut patet per philosophum, V Metaphys. In divinis autem personis non invenitur neque quantitas continua intrinseca, quae dicitur magnitudo; neque quantitas continua extrinseca, quae dicitur locus et tempus; neque secundum quantitatem discretam invenitur in eis aequalitas, quia duae personae sunt plures quam una. Ergo divinis personis non convenit aequalitas. | Objection 1: It would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one in quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons. |
| Praeterea, divinae personae sunt unius essentiae, ut supra dictum est. Essentia autem significatur per modum formae. Convenientia autem in forma non facit aequalitatem, sed similitudinem. Ergo in divinis personis est dicenda similitudo, et non aequalitas. | Objection 2: Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have said (Question [39], Article [2]). Now essence is signified by way of form. But agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore, we may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equality. |
| Praeterea, in quibuscumque invenitur aequalitas, illa sunt sibi invicem aequalia, quia aequale dicitur aequali aequale. Sed divinae personae non possunt sibi invicem dici aequales. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., imago, si perfecte implet illud cuius est imago, ipsa coaequatur ei, non illud imagini suae. Imago autem patris est filius, et sic pater non est aequalis filio. Non ergo in divinis personis invenitur aequalitas. | Objection 3: Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "If an image answers perfectly to that whereof it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which it represents cannot be said to be equal to the image." But the Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the Son. Therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons. |
| Praeterea, aequalitas relatio quaedam est. Sed nulla relatio est communis omnibus personis, cum secundum relationes personae ab invicem distinguantur. Non ergo aequalitas divinis personis convenit. | Objection 4: Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common to the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of the relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons. |
| Sed contra est quod Athanasius dicit, quod tres personae coaeternae sibi sunt et coaequales. | On the contrary, Athanasius says that "the three persons are co-eternal and co-equal to one another." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere aequalitatem in divinis personis. Quia secundum philosophum, in X Metaphys., aequale dicitur quasi per negationem minoris et maioris. Non autem possumus in divinis personis ponere aliquid maius et minus, quia, ut Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., eos differentia, scilicet deitatis, comitatur, qui vel augent vel minuunt, ut Ariani, qui gradibus meritorum Trinitatem variantes distrahunt, atque in pluralitatem deducunt. Cuius ratio est, quia inaequalium non potest esse una quantitas numero. Quantitas autem in divinis non est aliud quam eius essentia. Unde relinquitur quod, si esset aliqua inaequalitas in divinis personis, quod non esset in eis una essentia, et sic non essent tres personae unus Deus, quod est impossibile. Oportet igitur aequalitatem ponere in divinis personis. | I answer that, We must needs admit equality among the divine persons. For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15,16, 17), equality signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius says (De Trin. i): "They must needs admit a difference [namely, of Godhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus involving a plurality." Now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else than His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the same essence; and thus the three persons would not be one God; which is impossible. We must therefore admit equality among the divine persons. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est quantitas. Una scilicet quae dicitur quantitas molis, vel quantitas dimensiva, quae in solis rebus corporalibus est, unde in divinis personis locum non habet. Sed alia est quantitas virtutis, quae attenditur secundum perfectionem alicuius naturae vel formae, quae quidem quantitas designatur secundum quod dicitur aliquid magis vel minus calidum, inquantum est perfectius vel minus perfectum in caliditate. Huiusmodi autem quantitas virtualis attenditur primo quidem in radice, idest in ipsa perfectione formae vel naturae, et sic dicitur magnitudo spiritualis, sicut dicitur magnus calor propter suam intensionem et perfectionem. Et ideo dicit Augustinus, VI de Trin., quod in his quae non mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse, quod est melius esse, nam melius dicitur quod perfectius est. Secundo autem attenditur quantitas virtualis in effectibus formae. Primus autem effectus formae est esse, nam omnis res habet esse secundum suam formam. Secundus autem effectus est operatio, nam omne agens agit per suam formam. Attenditur igitur quantitas virtualis et secundum esse, et secundum operationem, secundum esse quidem, inquantum ea quae sunt perfectioris naturae, sunt maioris durationis; secundum operationem vero, inquantum ea quae sunt perfectioris naturae, sunt magis potentia ad agendum. Sic igitur, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, aequalitas intelligitur in patre et filio et spiritu sancto, inquantum nullus horum aut praecedit aeternitate, aut excedit magnitudine, aut superat potestate. | Reply to Objection 1: Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of "bulk" or dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things, and has, therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of "virtue," which is measured according to the perfection of some nature or form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of something as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is more or less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly by its source—that is, by the perfection of that form or nature: such is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of great heat on account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 18) that "in things which are great, but not in bulk, to be greater is to be better," for the more perfect a thing is the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity is measured by the effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is being, for everything has being by reason of its form. The second effect is operation, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and in regard to action: in regard to being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are of longer duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so as Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says: "We understand equality to be in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one of them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or surpasses in power." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ubi attenditur aequalitas secundum quantitatem virtualem, aequalitas includit in se similitudinem, et aliquid plus, quia excludit excessum. Quaecumque enim communicant in una forma, possunt dici similia, etiamsi inaequaliter illam formam participant, sicut si dicatur aer esse similis igni in calore, sed non possunt dici aequalia, si unum altero perfectius formam illam participet. Et quia non solum una est natura patris et filii, sed etiam aeque perfecte est in utroque, ideo non solum dicimus filium esse similem patri, ut excludatur error Eunomii; sed etiam dicimus aequalem, ut excludatur error Arii. | Reply to Objection 2: Where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity, equality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to be alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said to be equal if one participates in the form more perfectly than another. And because not only is the same nature in both Father and Son, but also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not only that the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude the error of Arius. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod aequalitas vel similitudo dupliciter potest significari in divinis, scilicet per nomina et per verba. Secundum quidem quod significatur per nomina, mutua aequalitas dicitur in divinis personis et similitudo, filius enim est aequalis et similis patri, et e converso. Et hoc ideo, quia essentia divina non magis est patris quam filii, unde, sicut filius habet magnitudinem patris, quod est esse eum aequalem patri, ita pater habet magnitudinem filii, quod est esse eum aequalem filio. Sed quantum ad creaturas, ut Dionysius dicit, IX cap. de Div. Nom., non recipitur conversio aequalitatis et similitudinis. Dicuntur enim causata similia causis, inquantum habent formam causarum, sed non e converso, quia forma principaliter est in causa, et secundario in causato. Sed verba significant aequalitatem cum motu. Et licet motus non sit in divinis, est tamen ibi accipere. Quia igitur filius accipit a patre unde est aequalis ei, et non e converso, propter hoc dicimus quod filius coaequatur patri, et non e converso. | Reply to Objection 3: Equality and likeness in God may be designated in two ways—namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns, equality in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is because the divine essence is not more the Father's than the Son's. Wherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, and is therefore equal to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the Son, and is therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "Equality and likeness are not mutual." For effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they have the form of their causes; but not conversely, for the form is principally in the cause, and secondarily in the effect. |
| But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not in God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore, the Son receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the Father, and not conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is equalled to the Father, but not conversely. | |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod in divinis personis nihil est considerare nisi essentiam, in qua communicant, et relationes, in quibus distinguuntur. Aequalitas autem utrumque importat, scilicet distinctionem personarum, quia nihil sibi ipsi dicitur aequale; et unitatem essentiae, quia ex hoc personae sunt sibi invicem aequales, quod sunt unius magnitudinis et essentiae. Manifestum est autem quod idem ad seipsum non refertur aliqua relatione reali. Nec iterum una relatio refertur ad aliam per aliquam aliam relationem, cum enim dicimus quod paternitas opponitur filiationi, oppositio non est relatio media inter paternitatem et filiationem. Quia utroque modo relatio multiplicaretur in infinitum. Et ideo aequalitas et similitudo in divinis personis non est aliqua realis relatio distincta a relationibus personalibus, sed in suo intellectu includit et relationes distinguentes personas, et essentiae unitatem. Et propterea Magister dicit, in XXXI dist. I Sent., quod in his appellatio tantum est relativa. | Reply to Objection 4: In the divine persons there is nothing for us to consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations in which they are distinct. Now equality implies both —namely, distinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to itself; and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness and essence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another by a further relation: for when we say that paternity is opposed to filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity and filiation. For in both these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely. Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: but in its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the persons, and the unity of essence. For this reason the Master says (Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in these "it is only the terms that are relative." |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod persona procedens non sit coaeterna suo principio, ut filius patri. Arius enim duodecim modos generationis assignat. Primus modus est iuxta fluxum lineae a puncto, ubi deest aequalitas simplicitatis. Secundus modus est iuxta emissionem radiorum a sole, ubi deest aequalitas naturae. Tertius modus est iuxta characterem, seu impressionem a sigillo, ubi deest consubstantialitas et potentiae efficientia. Quartus modus est iuxta immissionem bonae voluntatis a Deo, ubi etiam deest consubstantialitas. Quintus modus est iuxta exitum accidentis a substantia, sed accidenti deest subsistentia. Sextus modus est iuxta abstractionem speciei a materia, sicut sensus accipit speciem a re sensibili, ubi deest aequalitas simplicitatis spiritualis. Septimus modus est iuxta excitationem voluntatis a cogitatione, quae quidem excitatio temporalis est. Octavus modus est iuxta transfigurationem, ut ex aere fit imago, quae materialis est. Nonus modus est motus a movente, et hic etiam ponitur effectus et causa. Decimus modus est iuxta eductionem specierum a genere, qui non competit in divinis, quia pater non praedicatur de filio sicut genus de specie. Undecimus modus est iuxta ideationem, ut arca exterior ab ea quae est in mente. Duodecimus modus est iuxta nascentiam, ut homo est a patre, ubi est prius et posterius secundum tempus. Patet ergo quod in omni modo quo aliquid est ex altero, aut deest aequalitas naturae, aut aequalitas durationis. Si igitur filius est a patre, oportet dicere vel eum esse minorem patre, aut posteriorem, aut utrumque. | Objection 1: It would seem that the person proceeding is not co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius gives twelve modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of a line from a point; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. The second is like the emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent equality of nature. The third is like the mark or impression made by a seal; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The fourth is the infusion of a good will from God; wherein also consubstantiality is wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an accident from its subject; but the accident has no subsistence. The sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter, as sense receives the species from the sensible object; wherein is wanting equality of spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the exciting of the will by knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The eighth is transformation, as an image is made of brass; which transformation is material. The ninth is motion from a mover; and here again we have effect and cause. The tenth is the taking of species from genera; but this mode has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated of the Son as the genus of a species. The eleventh is the realization of an idea [ideatio], as an external coffer arises from the one in the mind. The twelfth is birth, as a man is begotten of his father; which implies priority and posteriority of time. Thus it is clear that equality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one thing is from another. So if the Son is from the Father, we must say that He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both. |
| Praeterea, omne quod est ex altero, habet principium. Sed nullum aeternum habet principium. Ergo filius non est aeternus, neque spiritus sanctus. | Objection 2: Further, everything that comes from another has a principle. But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost. |
| Praeterea, omne quod corrumpitur, desinit esse. Ergo omne quod generatur, incipit esse, ad hoc enim generatur, ut sit. Sed filius est genitus a patre. Ergo incipit esse, et non est coaeternus patri. | Objection 3: Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence everything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He begins to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father. |
| Praeterea, si filius genitus est a patre, aut semper generatur, aut est dare aliquod instans suae generationis. Si semper generatur; dum autem aliquid est in generari, est imperfectum, sicut patet in successivis, quae sunt semper in fieri, ut tempus et motus, sequitur quod filius semper sit imperfectus; quod est inconveniens. Est ergo dare aliquod instans generationis filii. Ante illud ergo instans filius non erat. | Objection 4: Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He is always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is begotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process of generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in successive things, which are always in process of becoming, as time and motion, it follows that the Son must be always imperfect, which cannot be admitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of the Son, and before that moment the Son did not exist. |
| Sed contra est quod Athanasius dicit, quod totae tres personae coaeternae sibi sunt. | On the contrary, Athanasius declares that "all the three persons are co-eternal with each other." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere filium esse coaeternum patri. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod aliquid ex principio existens posterius esse suo principio, potest contingere ex duobus, uno modo, ex parte agentis; alio modo, ex parte actionis. Ex parte agentis quidem, aliter in agentibus voluntariis, aliter in agentibus naturalibus. In agentibus quidem voluntariis, propter electionem temporis, sicut enim in agentis voluntarii potestate est eligere formam quam effectui conferat, ut supra dictum est, ita in eius potestate est eligere tempus in quo effectum producat. In agentibus autem naturalibus hoc contingit, quia agens aliquod non a principio habet perfectionem virtutis naturaliter ad agendum, sed ei advenit post aliquod tempus; sicut homo non a principio generare potest. Ex parte autem actionis, impeditur ne id quod est a principio simul sit cum suo principio, propter hoc quod actio est successiva. Unde, dato quod aliquod agens tali actione agere inciperet statim cum est, non statim eodem instanti esset effectus, sed in instanti ad quod terminatur actio. Manifestum est autem secundum praemissa, quod pater non generat filium voluntate, sed natura. Et iterum, quod natura patris ab aeterno perfecta fuit. Et iterum, quod actio qua pater producit filium, non est successiva, quia sic filius Dei successive generaretur, et esset eius generatio materialis et cum motu, quod est impossibile. Relinquitur ergo quod filius fuit, quandocumque fuit pater. Et sic filius est coaeternus patri, et similiter spiritus sanctus utrique. | I answer that, We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons: one on the part of the agent, and the other on the part of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the form it gives to the effect, as stated above (Question [41], Article [2]), so it can choose the time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however, the same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural power from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for instance, a man is not able to generate from the very first. Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, but in the instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to what has been said (Question [41], Article [2]), that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was perfect from eternity; and again that the action whereby the Father produces the Son is not successive, because thus the Son would be successively generated, and this generation would be material, and accompanied with movement; which is quite impossible. Therefore we conclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis domini, nullus modus processionis alicuius creaturae perfecte repraesentat divinam generationem, unde oportet ex multis modis colligere similitudinem, ut quod deest ex uno, aliqualiter suppleatur ex altero. Et propter hoc dicitur in synodo Ephesina, coexistere semper coaeternum patri filium, splendor tibi denuntiet, impassibilitatem nativitatis ostendat verbum; consubstantialitatem filii nomen insinuet. Inter omnia tamen expressius repraesentat processio verbi ab intellectu, quod quidem non est posterius eo a quo procedit; nisi sit talis intellectus qui exeat de potentia in actum, quod in Deo dici non potest. | Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of these modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied from another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: "Let Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal Son existed always with the Father; let the Word announce the impassibility of His birth; let the name Son insinuate His consubstantiality." Yet, above them all the procession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly; the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an intellect passing from potentiality to act; and this cannot be said of God. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod aeternitas excludit principium durationis, sed non principium originis. | Reply to Objection 2: Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not the principle of origin. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis corruptio est mutatio quaedam, et ideo omne quod corrumpitur, incipit non esse, et desinit esse. Sed generatio divina non est transmutatio, ut dictum est supra. Unde filius semper generatur, et pater semper generat. | Reply to Objection 3: Every corruption is a change; and so all that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation, however, is not changed, as stated above (Question [27], Article [2]). Hence the Son is ever being begotten, and the Father is always begetting. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod in tempore aliud est quod est indivisibile, scilicet instans; et aliud est quod est durans, scilicet tempus. Sed in aeternitate ipsum nunc indivisibile est semper stans, ut supra dictum est. Generatio vero filii non est in nunc temporis, aut in tempore, sed in aeternitate. Et ideo, ad significandum praesentialitatem et permanentiam aeternitatis, potest dici quod semper nascitur, ut Origenes dixit. Sed, ut Gregorius et Augustinus dicunt, melius est quod dicatur semper natus, ut ly semper designet permanentiam aeternitatis, et ly natus perfectionem geniti. Sic ergo filius nec imperfectus est, neque erat quando non erat, ut Arius dixit. | Reply to Objection 4: In time there is something indivisible—namely, the instant; and there is something else which endures—namely, time. But in eternity the indivisible "now" stands ever still, as we have said above (Question [10], Article [2] ad 1, Article [4] ad 2). But the generation of the Son is not in the "now" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that "He is ever being born," as Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as Gregory [*Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [*Super Ps. 2:7] said, it is better to say "ever born," so that "ever" may denote the permanence of eternity, and "born" the perfection of the only Begotten. Thus, therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor "was there a time when He was not," as Arius said. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in divinis personis non sit ordo naturae. Quidquid enim in divinis est, vel est essentia vel persona vel notio. Sed ordo naturae non significat essentiam, neque est aliqua personarum aut notionum. Ergo ordo naturae non est in divinis. | Objection 1: It would seem that among the divine persons there does not exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the essence, or a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not signify the essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore there is no order of nature in God. |
| Praeterea, in quibuscumque est ordo naturae, unum est prius altero, saltem secundum naturam et intellectum. Sed in divinis personis nihil est prius et posterius, ut Athanasius dicit. Ergo in divinis personis non est ordo naturae. | Objection 2: Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in the divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no order of nature. |
| Praeterea, quidquid ordinatur, distinguitur. Sed natura in divinis non distinguitur. Ergo non ordinatur. Ergo non est ibi ordo naturae. | Objection 3: Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists. But there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is not subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it. |
| Praeterea, natura divina est eius essentia. Sed non dicitur in divinis ordo essentiae. Ergo neque ordo naturae. | Objection 4: Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there of nature. |
| Sed contra, ubicumque est pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est confusio. Sed in divinis personis non est confusio, ut Athanasius dicit. Ergo est ibi ordo. | On the contrary, Where plurality exists without order, confusion exists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius says. Therefore in God order exists. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ordo semper dicitur per comparationem ad aliquod principium. Unde sicut dicitur principium multipliciter, scilicet secundum situm, ut punctus, secundum intellectum, ut principium demonstrationis, et secundum causas singulas; ita etiam dicitur ordo. In divinis autem dicitur principium secundum originem, absque prioritate, ut supra dictum est. Unde oportet ibi esse ordinem secundum originem, absque prioritate. Et hic vocatur ordo naturae, secundum Augustinum, non quo alter sit prius altero, sed quo alter est ex altero. | I answer that, Order always has reference to some principle. Wherefore since there are many kinds of principle—namely, according to site, as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and according to each individual cause—so are there many kinds of order. Now principle, according to origin, without priority, exists in God as we have stated (Question [33], Article [1]): so there must likewise be order according to origin, without priority; and this is called 'the order of nature': in the words of Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv): "Not whereby one is prior to another, but whereby one is from another." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ordo naturae significat notionem originis in communi, non autem in speciali. | Reply to Objection 1: The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in general, not a special kind of origin. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod in rebus creatis, etiam cum id quod est a principio sit suo principio coaevum secundum durationem, tamen principium est prius secundum naturam et intellectum, si consideretur id quod est principium. Sed si considerentur ipsae relationes causae et causati, et principii et principiati, manifestum est quod relativa sunt simul natura et intellectu, inquantum unum est in definitione alterius. Sed in divinis ipsae relationes sunt subsistentes personae in una natura. Unde neque ex parte naturae, neque ex parte relationum, una persona potest esse prior alia, neque etiam secundum naturam et intellectum. | Reply to Objection 2: In things created, even when what is derived from a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle still comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations of cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the definition of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the part of the nature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to another, not even in the order of nature and reason. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ordo naturae dicitur, non quod ipsa natura ordinetur, sed quod ordo in divinis personis attenditur secundum naturalem originem. | Reply to Objection 3: The order of nature means not the ordering of nature itself, but the existence of order in the divine Persons according to natural origin. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod natura quodammodo importat rationem principii, non autem essentia. Et ideo ordo originis melius nominatur ordo naturae, quam ordo essentiae. | Reply to Objection 4: Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a principle, but essence does not; and so the order of origin is more correctly called the order of nature than the order of essence. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius non sit aequalis patri in magnitudine. Dicit enim ipse, Ioan. XIV, pater maior me est; et apostolus, I Cor. XV, ipse filius subiectus erit illi qui sibi subiecit omnia. | Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in greatness. For He Himself said (Jn. 14:28): "The Father is greater than I"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:28): "The Son Himself shall be subject to Him that put all things under Him." |
| Praeterea, paternitas pertinet ad dignitatem patris. Sed paternitas non convenit filio. Ergo non quidquid dignitatis habet pater, habet filius. Ergo non est aequalis patri in magnitudine. | Objection 2: Further, paternity is part of the Father's dignity. But paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore the Son does not possess all the Father's dignity; and so He is not equal in greatness to the Father. |
| Praeterea, ubicumque est totum et pars, plures partes sunt aliquid maius quam una tantum vel pauciores; sicut tres homines sunt aliquid maius quam duo vel unus. Sed in divinis videtur esse totum universale et pars, nam sub relatione vel notione plures notiones continentur. Cum igitur in patre sint tres notiones, in filio autem tantum duae, videtur quod filius non sit aequalis patri. | Objection 3: Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many parts are more than one only, or than fewer parts; as three men are more than two, or than one. But in God a universal whole exists, and a part; for under relation or notion, several notions are included. Therefore, since in the Father there are three notions, while in the Son there are only two, the Son is evidently not equal to the Father. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Philip. II, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo. | On the contrary, It is said (Phil. 2:6): "He thought it not robbery to be equal with God." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere filium esse aequalem patri in magnitudine. Magnitudo enim Dei non est aliud quam perfectio naturae ipsius. Hoc autem est de ratione paternitatis et filiationis, quod filius per generationem pertingat ad habendam perfectionem naturae quae est in patre, sicut et pater. Sed quia in hominibus generatio est transmutatio quaedam exeuntis de potentia in actum, non statim a principio homo filius est aequalis patri generanti; sed per debitum incrementum ad aequalitatem perducitur, nisi aliter eveniat propter defectum principii generationis. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod in divinis est proprie et vere paternitas et filiatio. Nec potest dici quod virtus Dei patris fuerit defectiva in generando; neque quod Dei filius successive et per transmutationem ad perfectionem pervenerit. Unde necesse est dicere quod ab aeterno fuerit patri aequalis in magnitudine. Unde et Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., tolle corporum infirmitates, tolle conceptus initium, tolle dolores et omnem humanam necessitatem, omnis filius secundum naturalem nativitatem aequalitas patris est, quia est et similitudo naturae. | I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His nature. Now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and filiation that the Son by generation should attain to the possession of the perfection of the nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is in the Father Himself. But since in men generation is a certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to act, it follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who begets him, but attains to equality by due growth, unless owing to a defect in the principle of generation it should happen otherwise. From what precedes (Question [27], Article [2]; Question [33], Articles [2],3), it is evident that in God there exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say that the power of generation in the Father was defective, nor that the Son of God arrived at perfection in a successive manner and by change. Therefore we must say that the Son was eternally equal to the Father in greatness. Hence, Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): "Remove bodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain and all human shortcomings, then every son, by reason of his natural nativity, is the father's equal, because he has a like nature." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verba illa intelliguntur dicta de Christo secundum humanam naturam, in qua minor est patre, et ei subiectus. Sed secundum naturam divinam, aequalis est patri. Et hoc est quod Athanasius dicit; aequalis patri secundum divinitatem, minor patre secundum humanitatem. Vel, secundum Hilarium, in IX libro de Trin., donantis auctoritate pater maior est, sed minor non est cui unum esse donatur. Et in libro de Synod. dicit quod subiectio filii naturae pietas est, idest recognitio auctoritatis paternae, subiectio autem ceterorum, creationis infirmitas. | Reply to Objection 1: These words are to be understood of Christ's human nature, wherein He is less than the Father, and subject to Him; but in His divine nature He is equal to the Father. This is expressed by Athanasius, "Equal to the Father in His Godhead; less than the Father in humanity": and by Hilary (De Trin. ix): "By the fact of giving, the Father is greater; but He is not less to Whom the same being is given"; and (De Synod.): "The Son subjects Himself by His inborn piety"—that is, by His recognition of paternal authority; whereas "creatures are subject by their created weakness." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod aequalitas attenditur secundum magnitudinem. Magnitudo autem in divinis significat perfectionem naturae, ut dictum est, et ad essentiam pertinet. Et ideo aequalitas in divinis, et similitudo, secundum essentialia attenditur, nec potest secundum distinctionem relationum inaequalitas vel dissimilitudo dici. Unde Augustinus dicit, contra Maximinum, originis quaestio est quid de quo sit; aequalitatis autem, qualis aut quantus sit. Paternitas igitur est dignitas patris, sicut et essentia patris, nam dignitas absolutum est, et ad essentiam pertinet. Sicut igitur eadem essentia quae in patre est paternitas, in filio est filiatio; ita eadem dignitas quae in patre est paternitas, in filio est filiatio. Vere ergo dicitur quod quidquid dignitatis habet pater, habet filius. Nec sequitur, paternitatem habet pater, ergo paternitatem habet filius. Mutatur enim quid in ad aliquid, eadem enim est essentia et dignitas patris et filii, sed in patre est secundum relationem dantis, in filio secundum relationem accipientis. | Reply to Objection 2: Equality is measured by greatness. In God greatness signifies the perfection of nature, as above explained (Article [1], ad 1), and belongs to the essence. Thus equality and likeness in God have reference to the essence; nor can there be inequality or dissimilitude arising from the distinction of the relations. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 13), "The question of origin is, Who is from whom? but the question of equality is, Of what kind, or how great, is he?" Therefore, paternity is the Father's dignity, as also the Father's essence: since dignity is something absolute, and pertains to the essence. As, therefore, the same essence, which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation, so the same dignity which, in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation. It is thus true to say that the Son possesses whatever dignity the Father has; but we cannot argue—"the Father has paternity, therefore the Son has paternity," for there is a transition from substance to relation. For the Father and the Son have the same essence and dignity, which exist in the Father by the relation of giver, and in the Son by relation of receiver. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod relatio in divinis non est totum universale, quamvis de pluribus relationibus praedicetur, quia omnes relationes sunt unum secundum essentiam et esse, quod repugnat rationi universalis, cuius partes secundum esse distinguuntur. Et similiter persona, ut supra dictum est, non est universale in divinis. Unde neque omnes relationes sunt maius aliquid quam una tantum; nec omnes personae maius aliquid quam una tantum; quia tota perfectio divinae naturae est in qualibet personarum. | Reply to Objection 3: In God relation is not a universal whole, although it is predicated of each of the relations; because all the relations are one in essence and being, which is irreconcilable with the idea of universal, the parts of which are distinguished in being. Persons likewise is not a universal term in God as we have seen above (Question [30], Article [4]). Wherefore all the relations together are not greater than only one; nor are all the persons something greater than only one; because the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each person. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius non sit in patre, et e converso. Philosophus enim, in IV Physic., ponit octo modos essendi aliquid in aliquo; et secundum nullum horum filius est in patre, aut e converso, ut patet discurrenti per singulos modos. Ergo filius non est in patre, nec e converso. | Objection 1: It would seem that the Son and the Father are not in each other. For the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 23) gives eight modes of one thing existing in another, according to none of which is the Son in the Father, or conversely; as is patent to anyone who examines each mode. Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each other. |
| Praeterea, nihil quod exivit ab aliquo, est in eo. Sed filius ab aeterno exivit a patre, secundum illud Micheae V, egressus eius ab initio, a diebus aeternitatis. Ergo filius non est in patre. | Objection 2: Further, nothing that has come out from another is within. But the Son from eternity came out from the Father, according to Micheas 5:2: "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity." Therefore the Son is not in the Father. |
| Praeterea, unum oppositorum non est in altero. Sed filius et pater opponuntur relative. Ergo unus non potest esse in alio. | Objection 3: Further, one of two opposites cannot be in the other. But the Son and the Father are relatively opposed. Therefore one cannot be in the other. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XIV, ego in patre, et pater in me est. | On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 14:10): "I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod in patre et filio tria est considerare, scilicet essentiam, relationem et originem; et secundum quodlibet istorum filius est in patre, et e converso. Secundum essentiam enim pater est in filio, quia pater est sua essentia, et communicat suam essentiam filio, non per aliquam suam transmutationem, unde sequitur quod, cum essentia patris sit in filio, quod in filio sit pater. Et similiter, cum filius sit sua essentia, sequitur quod sit in patre, in quo est eius essentia. Et hoc est quod Hilarius dicit, V de Trin., naturam suam, ut ita dicam, sequitur immutabilis Deus, immutabilem gignens Deum. Subsistentem ergo in eo Dei naturam intelligimus, cum in Deo Deus insit. Secundum etiam relationes, manifestum est quod unum oppositorum relative est in altero secundum intellectum. Secundum originem etiam manifestum est quod processio verbi intelligibilis non est ad extra, sed manet in dicente. Id etiam quod verbo dicitur, in verbo continetur. Et eadem ratio est de spiritu sancto. | I answer that, There are three points of consideration as regards the Father and the Son; the essence, the relation and the origin; and according to each the Son and the Father are in each other. The Father is in the Son by His essence, forasmuch as the Father is His own essence and communicates His essence to the Son not by any change on His part. Hence it follows that as the Father's essence is in the Son, the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise, since the Son is His own essence, it follows that He Himself is in the Father in Whom is His essence. This is expressed by Hilary (De Trin. v), "The unchangeable God, so to speak, follows His own nature in begetting an unchangeable subsisting God. So we understand the nature of God to subsist in Him, for He is God in God." It is also manifest that as regards the relations, each of two relative opposites is in the concept of the other. Regarding origin also, it is clear that the procession of the intelligible word is not outside the intellect, inasmuch as it remains in the utterer of the word. What also is uttered by the word is therein contained. And the same applies to the Holy Ghost. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae in creaturis sunt, non sufficienter repraesentant ea quae Dei sunt. Et ideo secundum nullum eorum modorum quos philosophus enumerat, filius est in patre, aut e converso. Accedit tamen magis ad hoc modus ille, secundum quem aliquid dicitur esse in principio originante, nisi quod deest unitas essentiae, in rebus creatis, inter principium et id quod est a principio. | Reply to Objection 1: What is contained in creatures does not sufficiently represent what exists in God; so according to none of the modes enumerated by the Philosopher, are the Son and the Father in each other. The mode the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be found in that whereby something exists in its originating principle, except that the unity of essence between the principle and that which proceeds therefrom is wanting in things created. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod exitus filii a patre est secundum modum processionis interioris, prout verbum exit a corde, et manet in eo. Unde exitus iste in divinis est secundum solam distinctionem relationum, non secundum essentialem aliquam distantiam. | Reply to Objection 2: The Son's going forth from the Father is by mode of the interior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and remains therein. Hence this going forth in God is only by the distinction of the relations, not by any kind of essential separation. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod pater et filius opponuntur secundum relationes, non autem secundum essentiam. Et tamen oppositorum relative unum est in altero, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3: The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not essentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite is in the other. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius non sit aequalis patri secundum potentiam. Dicitur enim Ioan. V, non potest filius a se facere quidquam, nisi quod viderit patrem facientem. Pater autem a se potest facere. Ergo pater maior est filio secundum potentiam. | Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in power. For it is said (Jn. 5:19): "The Son cannot do anything of Himself but what He seeth the Father doing." But the Father can act of Himself. Therefore the Father's power is greater than the Son's. |
| Praeterea, maior est potentia eius qui praecipit et docet, quam eius qui obedit et audit. Sed pater mandat filio, secundum illud Ioan. XIV, sicut mandatum dedit mihi pater, sic facio. Pater etiam docet filium, secundum illud Ioan. V, pater diligit filium, et omnia demonstrat ei quae ipse facit. Similiter et filius audit, secundum illud Ioan. V, sicut audio, iudico. Ergo pater est maioris potentiae quam filius. | Objection 2: Further, greater is the power of him who commands and teaches than of him who obeys and hears. But the Father commands the Son according to Jn. 14:31: "As the Father gave Me commandment so do I." The Father also teaches the Son: "The Father loveth the Son, and showeth Him all things that Himself doth" (Jn. 5:20). Also, the Son hears: "As I hear, so I judge" (Jn. 5:30). Therefore the Father has greater power than the Son. |
| Praeterea, ad omnipotentiam patris pertinet quod possit filium generare sibi aequalem, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro contra Maximin., si non potuit generare sibi aequalem, ubi est omnipotentia Dei patris? Sed filius non potest generare filium, ut supra ostensum est. Non ergo quidquid pertinet ad omnipotentiam patris, potest filius. Et ita non est ei in potestate aequalis. | Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the Father's omnipotence to be able to beget a Son equal to Himself. For Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 7), "Were He unable to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the omnipotence of God the Father?" But the Son cannot beget a Son, as proved above (Question [41], Article [6]). Therefore the Son cannot do all that belongs to the Father's omnipotence; and hence He is not equal to Him power. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. V, quaecumque pater facit, haec et filius similiter facit. | On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:19): "Whatsoever things the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere quod filius est aequalis patri in potestate. Potentia enim agendi consequitur perfectionem naturae, videmus enim in creaturis quod quanto aliquid habet perfectiorem naturam, tanto est maioris virtutis in agendo. Ostensum est autem supra quod ipsa ratio divinae paternitatis et filiationis exigit quod filius sit aequalis patri in magnitudine, idest in perfectione naturae. Unde relinquitur quod filius sit aequalis patri in potestate. Et eadem ratio est de spiritu sancto respectu utriusque. | I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power. Power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In creatures, for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the greater power is there for action. Now it was shown above (Article [4]) that the very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son should be the Father's equal in greatness—that is, in perfection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal to the Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation to both. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in hoc quod dicitur quod filius non potest a se facere quidquam, non subtrahitur filio aliqua potestas quam habeat pater; cum statim subdatur quod quaecumque pater facit, filius similiter facit. Sed ostenditur quod filius habet potestatem a patre, a quo habet naturam. Unde dicit Hilarius, IX de Trin., naturae divinae haec unitas est, ut ita per se agat filius, quod non a se agat. | Reply to Objection 1: The words, "the Son cannot of Himself do anything," do not withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the Father, since it is immediately added, "Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son doth in like manner"; but their meaning is to show that the Son derives His power from the Father, of Whom He receives His nature. Hence, Hilary says (De Trin. ix), "The unity of the divine nature implies that the Son so acts of Himself [per se], that He does not act by Himself [a se]." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod in demonstratione patris et auditione filii, non intelligitur nisi quod pater communicat scientiam filio, sicut et essentiam. Et ad idem potest referri mandatum patris, per hoc quod ab aeterno dedit ei scientiam et voluntatem agendorum, eum generando. Vel potius referendum est ad Christum secundum humanam naturam. | Reply to Objection 2: The Father's "showing" and the Son's "hearing" are to be taken in the sense that the Father communicates knowledge to the Son, as He communicates His essence. The command of the Father can be explained in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity knowledge and will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better still, this may be referred to Christ in His human nature. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut eadem essentia quae in patre est paternitas, in filio est filiatio; ita eadem est potentia qua pater generat, et qua filius generatur. Unde manifestum est quod quidquid potest pater, potest filius. Non tamen sequitur quod possit generare, sed mutatur quid in ad aliquid, nam generatio significat relationem in divinis. Habet ergo filius eandem omnipotentiam quam pater, sed cum alia relatione. Quia pater habet eam ut dans, et hoc significatur, cum dicitur quod potest generare. Filius autem habet eam ut accipiens, et hoc significatur, cum dicitur quod potest generari. | Reply to Objection 3: As the same essence is paternity in the Father, and filiation in the Son: so by the same power the Father begets, and the Son is begotten. Hence it is clear that the Son can do whatever the Father can do; yet it does not follow that the Son can beget; for to argue thus would imply transition from substance to relation, for generation signifies a divine relation. So the Son has the same omnipotence as the Father, but with another relation; the Father possessing power as "giving" signified when we say that He is able to beget; while the Son possesses the power of "receiving," signified by saying that He can be begotten. |