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| Deinde quaeritur de his materialibus quae ab Angelis cognoscuntur. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. | We next investigate the material objects which are known by the angels. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum Angeli cognoscant naturas rerum materialium. | (1) Whether the angels know the natures of material things? |
| Secundo, utrum cognoscant singularia. | (2) Whether they know single things? |
| Tertio, utrum cognoscant futura. | (3) Whether they know the future? |
| Quarto, utrum cognoscant cogitationes cordium. | (4) Whether they know secret thoughts? |
| Quinto, utrum cognoscant omnia mysteria gratiae. | (5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli non cognoscant res materiales. Intellectum enim est perfectio intelligentis. Res autem materiales non possunt esse perfectiones Angelorum, cum sint infra ipsos. Ergo Angeli non cognoscunt res materiales. | Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not know material things. For the object understood is the perfection of him who understands it. But material things cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are beneath them. Therefore the angels do not know material things. |
| Praeterea, visio intellectualis est eorum quae sunt in anima per sui essentiam, ut dicitur in Glossa, II ad Cor. XII. Sed res materiales non possunt esse in anima hominis, vel in mente Angeli, per suas essentias. Ergo non possunt intellectuali visione cognosci, sed solum imaginaria, qua apprehenduntur similitudines corporum; et sensibili, quae est de ipsis corporibus. In Angelis autem non est visio imaginaria et sensibilis, sed solum intellectualis. Ergo Angeli materialia cognoscere non possunt. | Objection 2: Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as exist within the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss [*On 2 Cor. 12:2, taken from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 28)]. But the material things cannot enter by their essence into man's soul, nor into the angel's mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision, but only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies are apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the angels, but only intellectual. Therefore the angels cannot know material things. |
| Praeterea, res materiales non sunt intelligibiles in actu, sed sunt cognoscibiles apprehensione sensus et imaginationis; quae non est in Angelis. Ergo Angeli materialia non cognoscunt. | Objection 3: Further, material things are not actually intelligible, but are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which does not exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things. |
| Sed contra, quidquid potest inferior virtus, potest virtus superior. Sed intellectus hominis, qui est ordine naturae infra intellectum Angeli, potest cognoscere res materiales. Ergo multo fortius intellectus Angeli. | On the contrary, Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do likewise. But man's intellect, which in the order of nature is inferior to the angel's, can know material things. Therefore much more can the mind of an angel. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod talis est ordo in rebus, quod superiora in entibus sunt perfectiora inferioribus, et quod in inferioribus continetur deficienter et partialiter et multipliciter, in superioribus continetur eminenter et per quandam totalitatem et simplicitatem. Et ideo in Deo, sicut in summo rerum vertice, omnia supersubstantialiter praeexistunt secundum ipsum suum simplex esse, ut Dionysius dicit, in libro de Div. Nom. Angeli autem inter ceteras creaturas sunt Deo propinquiores et similiores, unde et plura participant ex bonitate divina, et perfectius, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. Cael. Hier. Sic igitur omnia materialia in ipsis Angelis praeexistunt, simplicius quidem et immaterialius quam in ipsis rebus; multiplicius autem et imperfectius quam in Deo. | I answer that, The established order of things is for the higher beings to be more perfect than the lower; and for whatever is contained deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower beings, to be contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain degree of fulness and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest source of things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect of His simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1). But among other creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most; hence they share more fully and more perfectly in the Divine goodness, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially even than in themselves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in God. |
| Omne autem quod est in aliquo; est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Angeli autem secundum suam naturam sunt intellectuales. Et ideo, sicut Deus per suam essentiam materialia cognoscit, ita Angeli ea cognoscunt per hoc quod sunt in eis per suas intelligibiles species. | Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it after the manner of such subject. But the angels are intellectual beings of their own nature. Therefore, as God knows material things by His essence, so do the angels know them, forasmuch as they are in the angels by their intelligible species. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectum est perfectio intelligentis secundum speciem intelligibilem quam habet in intellectu. Et sic species intelligibiles quae sunt in intellectu Angeli, sunt perfectiones et actus intellectus angelici. | Reply to Objection 1: The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in his intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that intellect. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod sensus non apprehendit essentias rerum, sed exteriora accidentia tantum. Similiter neque imaginatio, sed apprehendit solas similitudines corporum. Intellectus autem solus apprehendit essentias rerum. Unde in III de anima dicitur quod obiectum intellectus est quod quid est, circa quod non errat, sicut neque sensus circa proprium sensibile. Sic ergo essentiae rerum materialium sunt in intellectu hominis vel Angeli, ut intellectum est in intelligente, et non secundum esse suum reale. Quaedam vero sunt quae sunt in intellectu vel in anima secundum utrumque esse. Et utrorumque est visio intellectualis. | Reply to Objection 2: Sense does not apprehend the essences of things, but only their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the imagination; for it apprehends only the images of bodies. The intellect alone apprehends the essences of things. Hence it is said (De Anima iii, text. 26) that the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," regarding which it does not err; as neither does sense regarding its proper sensible object. So therefore the essences of material things are in the intellect of man and angels, as the thing understood is in him who understands, and not according to their real natures. But some things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both natures; and in either case there is intellectual vision. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, si Angelus acciperet cognitionem rerum materialium ab ipsis rebus materialibus, oporteret quod faceret eas intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo eas. Non autem accipit cognitionem earum a rebus materialibus, sed per species actu intelligibiles rerum sibi connaturales, rerum materialium notitiam habet; sicut intellectus noster secundum species quas intelligibiles facit abstrahendo. | Reply to Objection 3: If an angel were to draw his knowledge of material things from the material things themselves, he would require to make them actually intelligible by a process of abstraction. But he does not derive his knowledge of them from the material things themselves; he has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species of things, which species are connatural to him; just as our intellect has, by species which it makes intelligible by abstraction. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus singularia non cognoscat. Dicit enim philosophus, in I Physic., quod sensus est singularium, ratio vero (vel intellectus) universalium. In Angelis autem non est vis cognoscitiva nisi intellectiva, ut ex superioribus patet. Ergo singularia non cognoscunt. | Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not know singulars. For the Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): "The sense has for its object singulars, but the intellect, universals." Now, in the angels there is no power of understanding save the intellectual power, as is evident from what was said above (Question [54], Article [5]). Consequently they do not know singulars. |
| Praeterea, omnis cognitio est per assimilationem aliquam cognoscentis ad cognitum. Sed non videtur quod possit esse aliqua assimilatio Angeli ad singulare inquantum est singulare, cum Angelus sit immaterialis, ut supra dictum est, singularitatis vero principium sit materia. Ergo Angelus non potest cognoscere singularia. | Objection 2: Further, all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of the knower to the object known. But it is not possible for any assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so far as it is singular; because, as was observed above (Question [50], Article [2]), an angel is immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity. Therefore the angel cannot know singulars. |
| Praeterea, si Angelus scit singularia, aut per species singulares, aut per species universales. Non per singulares, quia sic oporteret quod haberet species infinitas. Neque per universales, quia universale non est sufficiens principium cognoscendi singulare inquantum est singulare, cum in universali singularia non cognoscantur nisi in potentia. Ergo Angelus non cognoscit singularia. | Objection 3: Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by singular or by universal species. It is not by singular species; because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of species. Nor is it by universal species; since the universal is not the sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such, because singular things are not known in the universal except potentially. Therefore the angel does not know singulars. |
| Sed contra, nullus potest custodire quod non cognoscit. Sed Angeli custodiunt homines singulares, secundum illud Psalmi XC, Angelis suis mandavit de te, et cetera. Ergo Angeli cognoscunt singularia. | On the contrary, No one can guard what he does not know. But angels guard individual men, according to Ps. 90:11: "He hath given His angels charge over Thee." Consequently the angels know singulars. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod quidam totaliter subtraxerunt Angelis singularium cognitionem. Sed hoc primo quidem derogat Catholicae fidei, quae ponit haec inferiora administrari per Angelos, secundum illud Heb. I, omnes sunt administratorii spiritus. Si autem singularium notitiam non haberent, nullam providentiam habere possent de his quae in hoc mundo aguntur; cum actus singularium sint. Et hoc est contra illud quod dicitur Eccle. V, ne dicas coram Angelo, non est providentia. Secundo, etiam derogat philosophiae documentis, secundum quae ponuntur Angeli motores caelestium orbium, et quod eos moveant secundum intellectum et voluntatem. | I answer that, Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith, which asserts that these lower things are administered by angels, according to Heb. 1:14: "They are all ministering spirits." Now, if they had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision over what is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals: and this is against the text of Eccles. 5:5: "Say not before the angel: There is no providence." Secondly, it is also contrary to the teachings of philosophy, according to which the angels are stated to be the movers of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to their knowledge and will. |
| Et ideo alii dixerunt quod Angelus habet quidem cognitionem singularium, sed in causis universalibus, ad quas reducuntur particulares omnes effectus, sicut si astrologus iudicet de aliqua eclipsi futura, per dispositiones caelestium motuum. Sed haec positio praedicta inconvenientia non evadit, quia sic cognoscere singulare in causis universalibus, non est cognoscere ipsum ut est singulare, hoc est ut est hic et nunc. Astrologus enim cognoscens eclipsim futuram per computationem caelestium motuum, scit eam in universali; et non prout est hic et nunc, nisi per sensum accipiat. Administratio autem et providentia et motus sunt singularium, prout sunt hic et nunc. | Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all particular effects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming eclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens. This opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know a singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to know it as singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing from computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to happen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know it as taking place now, except by the senses. But administration, providence and movement are of singulars, as they are here and now existing. |
| Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod, sicut homo cognoscit diversis viribus cognitivis omnia rerum genera, intellectu quidem universalia et immaterialia, sensu autem singularia et corporalia; ita Angelus per unam intellectivam virtutem utraque cognoscit. Hoc enim rerum ordo habet, quod quanto aliquid est superius, tanto habeat virtutem magis unitam et ad plura se extendentem, sicut in ipso homine patet quod sensus communis, qui est superior quam sensus proprius, licet sit unica potentia, omnia cognoscit quae quinque sensibus exterioribus cognoscuntur, et quaedam alia quae nullus sensus exterior cognoscit, scilicet differentiam albi et dulcis. Et simile etiam est in aliis considerare. Unde cum Angelus naturae ordine sit supra hominem, inconveniens est dicere quod homo quacumque sua potentia cognoscat aliquid, quod Angelus per unam vim suam cognoscitivam, scilicet intellectum, non cognoscat. Unde Aristoteles pro inconvenienti habet ut litem, quam nos scimus, Deus ignoret; ut patet in I de anima, et in III Metaphys. | Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things singular and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both by his one mental power. For the order of things runs in this way, that the higher a thing is, so much the more is its power united and far-reaching: thus in man himself it is manifest that the common sense which is higher than the proper sense, although it is but one faculty, knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses, and some other things which no outer sense knows; for example, the difference between white and sweet. The same is to be observed in other cases. Accordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of nature, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one of his powers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge, namely, the intellect, does not know. Hence Aristotle pronounces it ridiculous to say that a discord, which is known to us, should be unknown to God (De Anima i, text. 80; Metaph. text. 15). |
| Modus autem quo intellectus Angeli singularia cognoscit, ex hoc considerari potest quod, sicut a Deo effluunt res ut subsistant in propriis naturis, ita etiam ut sint in cognitione angelica. Manifestum est autem quod a Deo effluit in rebus non solum illud quod ad naturam universalem pertinet, sed etiam ea quae sunt individuationis principia, est enim causa totius substantiae rei, et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam. Et secundum quod causat, sic et cognoscit, quia scientia eius est causa rei, ut supra ostensum est. Sicut igitur Deus per essentiam suam, per quam omnia causat, est similitudo omnium, et per eam omnia cognoscit non solum quantum ad naturas universales, sed etiam quantum ad singularitatem; ita Angeli per species a Deo inditas, res cognoscunt non solum quantum ad naturam universalem, sed etiam secundum earum singularitatem, inquantum sunt quaedam repraesentationes multiplicatae illius unicae et simplicis essentiae. | The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered from this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that they may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature, but likewise all that goes to make up their principles of individuation; since He is the cause of the entire substance of the thing, as to both its matter and its form. And for as much as He causes, does He know; for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as was shown above (Question [14], Article [8]). Therefore as by His essence, by which He causes all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows all things, not only as to their universal natures, but also as to their singularity; so through the species imparted to them do the angels know things, not only as to their universal nature, but likewise in their individual conditions, in so far as they are the manifold representations of that one simple essence. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de intellectu nostro, qui non intelligit res nisi abstrahendo; et per ipsam abstractionem a materialibus conditionibus, id quod abstrahitur, fit universale. Hic autem modus intelligendi non convenit Angelis, ut supra dictum est, et ideo non est eadem ratio. | Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect, which apprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by such abstraction from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal. Such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature of the angels, as was said above (Question [55], Article [2], Article [3] ad 1), and consequently there is no comparison. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum suam naturam Angeli non assimilantur rebus materialibus sicut assimilatur aliquid alicui secundum convenientiam in genere vel in specie, aut in accidente; sed sicut superius habet similitudinem cum inferiori, ut sol cum igne. Et per hunc etiam modum in Deo est similitudo omnium, et quantum ad formam et quantum ad materiam, inquantum in ipso praeexistit ut in causa quidquid in rebus invenitur. Et eadem ratione species intellectus Angeli, quae sunt quaedam derivatae similitudines a divina essentia, sunt similitudines rerum non solum quantum ad formam, sed etiam quantum ad materiam. | Reply to Objection 2: It is not according to their nature that the angels are likened to material things, as one thing resembles another by agreement in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears resemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way there is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and form, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause whatever is to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the angel's intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence, are the images of things not only as to their form, but also as to their matter. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Angeli cognoscunt singularia per formas universales, quae tamen sunt similitudines rerum et quantum ad principia universalia, et quantum ad individuationis principia. Quomodo autem per eandem speciem possint multa cognosci iam supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3: Angels know singulars by universal forms, which nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and as to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by the same species, has been already stated above (Question [55], Article [3], ad 3). |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli cognoscant futura. Angeli enim potentiores sunt in cognoscendo quam homines. Sed homines aliqui cognoscunt multa futura. Ergo multo fortius Angeli. | Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know future events. For angels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many future events. Therefore much more do the angels. |
| raeterea, praesens et futurum sunt differentiae temporis. Sed intellectus Angeli est supra tempus, parificatur enim intelligentia aeternitati, idest aevo, ut dicitur in libro de causis. Ergo quantum ad intellectum Angeli, non differunt praeteritum et futurum; sed indifferenter cognoscit utrumque. | Objection 2: Further, the present and the future are differences of time. But the angel's intellect is above time; because, as is said in De Causis, "an intelligence keeps pace with eternity," that is, aeviternity. Therefore, to the angel's mind, past and future are not different, but he knows each indifferently. |
| Praeterea, Angelus non cognoscit per species acceptas a rebus, sed per species innatas universales. Sed species universales aequaliter se habent ad praesens, praeteritum et futurum. Ergo videtur quod Angeli indifferenter cognoscant praeterita et praesentia et futura. | Objection 3: Further, the angel does not understand by species derived from things, but by innate universal species. But universal species refer equally to present, past, and future. Therefore it appears that the angels know indifferently things past, present, and future. |
| Praeterea, sicut aliquid dicitur distans secundum tempus, ita secundum locum. Sed Angeli cognoscunt distantia secundum locum. Ergo etiam cognoscunt distantia secundum tempus futurum. | Objection 4: Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant by reason of time, so is it by reason of place. But angels know things which are distant according to place. Therefore they likewise know things distant according to future time. |
| Sed contra, id quod est proprium signum divinitatis, non convenit Angelis. Sed cognoscere futura est proprium signum divinitatis; secundum illud Isaiae XLI, annuntiate quae ventura sunt in futurum, et sciemus quod dii estis vos. Ergo Angeli non cognoscunt futura. | On the contrary, Whatever is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, does not belong to the angels. But to know future events is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, according to Is. 41:23: "Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods." Therefore the angels do not know future events. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod futurum dupliciter potest cognosci. Uno modo, in causa sua. Et sic futura quae ex necessitate ex causis suis proveniunt, per certam scientiam cognoscuntur, ut solem oriri cras. Quae vero ex suis causis proveniunt ut in pluribus, cognoscuntur non per certitudinem, sed per coniecturam; sicut medicus praecognoscit sanitatem infirmi. Et iste modus cognoscendi futura adest Angelis; et tanto magis quam nobis, quanto magis rerum causas et universalius et perfectius cognoscunt; sicut medici qui acutius vident causas, melius de futuro statu aegritudinis prognosticantur. Quae vero proveniunt ex causis suis ut in paucioribus, penitus sunt ignota, sicut casualia et fortuita. | I answer that, The future can be known in two ways. First, it can be known in its cause. And thus, future events which proceed necessarily from their causes, are known with sure knowledge; as that the sun will rise tomorrow. But events which proceed from their causes in the majority of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally; thus the doctor knows beforehand the health of the patient. This manner of knowing future events exists in the angels, and by so much the more than it does in us, as they understand the causes of things both more universally and more perfectly; thus doctors who penetrate more deeply into the causes of an ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the future issue thereof. But events which proceed from their causes in the minority of cases are quite unknown; such as casual and chance events. |
| Alio modo cognoscuntur futura in seipsis. Et sic solius Dei est futura cognoscere, non solum quae ex necessitate proveniunt, vel ut in pluribus, sed etiam casualia et fortuita, quia Deus videt omnia in sua aeternitate, quae, cum sit simplex, toti tempori adest, et ipsum concludit. Et ideo unus Dei intuitus fertur in omnia quae aguntur per totum tempus sicut in praesentia, et videt omnia ut in seipsis sunt; sicut supra dictum est cum de Dei scientia ageretur. Angelicus autem intellectus, et quilibet intellectus creatus, deficit ab aeternitate divina. Unde non potest ab aliquo intellectu creato cognosci futurum, ut est in suo esse. | In another way future events are known in themselves. To know the future in this way belongs to God alone; and not merely to know those events which happen of necessity, or in the majority of cases, but even casual and chance events; for God sees all things in His eternity, which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time. And therefore God's one glance is cast over all things which happen in all time as present before Him; and He beholds all things as they are in themselves, as was said before when dealing with God's knowledge (Question [14], Article [13]). But the mind of an angel, and every created intellect, fall far short of God's eternity; hence the future as it is in itself cannot be known by any created intellect. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homines non cognoscunt futura nisi in causis suis, vel Deo revelante. Et sic Angeli multo subtilius futura cognoscunt. | Reply to Objection 1: Men cannot know future things except in their causes, or by God's revelation. The angels know the future in the same way, but much more distinctly. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet intellectus Angeli sit supra tempus quo mensurantur corporales motus, est tamen in intellectu Angeli tempus secundum successionem intelligibilium conceptionum; secundum quod dicit Augustinus, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod Deus movet spiritualem creaturam per tempus. Et ita, cum sit successio in intellectu Angeli, non omnia quae aguntur per totum tempus, sunt ei praesentia. | Reply to Objection 2: Although the angel's intellect is above that time according to which corporeal movements are reckoned, yet there is a time in his mind according to the succession of intelligible concepts; of which Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii) that "God moves the spiritual creature according to time." And thus, since there is succession in the angel's intellect, not all things that happen through all time, are present to the angelic mind. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet species quae sunt in intellectu Angeli, quantum est de se, aequaliter se habeant ad praesentia, praeterita et futura; tamen praesentia, praeterita et futura non aequaliter se habent ad rationes. Quia ea quae praesentia sunt, habent naturam per quam assimilantur speciebus quae sunt in mente Angeli, et sic per eas cognosci possunt. Sed quae futura sunt, nondum habent naturam per quam illis assimilentur, unde per eas cognosci non possunt. | Reply to Objection 3: Although the species in the intellect of an angel, in so far as they are species, refer equally to things present, past, and future; nevertheless the present, past, and future; nevertheless the present, past, and future do not bear the same relations to the species. Present things have a nature according to which they resemble the species in the mind of an angel: and so they can be known thereby. Things which are yet to come have not yet a nature whereby they are likened to such species; consequently, they cannot be known by those species. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod distantia secundum locum sunt iam in rerum natura, et participant aliquam speciem, cuius similitudo est in Angelo, quod non est verum de futuris, ut dictum est. Et ideo non est simile. | Reply to Objection 4: Things distant according to place are already existing in nature; and share in some species, whose image is in the angel; whereas this is not true of future things, as has been stated. Consequently there is no comparison. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli cognoscant cogitationes cordium. Dicit enim Gregorius, in moralibus, super illud Iob XXVIII, non aequabitur ei aurum vel vitrum, quod tunc, scilicet in beatitudine resurgentium, unus erit perspicabilis alteri sicut ipse sibi, et cum uniuscuiusque intellectus attenditur, simul conscientia penetratur. Sed resurgentes erunt similes Angelis, sicut habetur Matth. XXII. Ergo unus Angelus potest videre id quod est in conscientia alterius. | Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know secret thoughts. For Gregory (Moral. xviii), explaining Job 28:17: "Gold or crystal cannot equal it," says that "then," namely in the bliss of those rising from the dead, "one shall be as evident to another as he is to himself, and when once the mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the same time be penetrated." But those who rise shall be like the angels, as is stated (Mt. 22:30). Therefore an angel can see what is in another's conscience. |
| Praeterea, sicut se habent figurae ad corpora, ita se habent species intelligibiles ad intellectum. Sed viso corpore, videtur eius figura. Ergo visa substantia intellectuali, videtur species intelligibilis quae est in ipsa. Ergo, cum Angelus videat alium Angelum, et etiam animam, videtur quod possit videre cogitationem utriusque. | Objection 2: Further, intelligible species bear the same relation to the intellect as shapes do to bodies. But when the body is seen its shape is seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, the intelligible species within it is also seen. Consequently, when one angel beholds another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the thoughts of both. |
| Praeterea, ea quae sunt in intellectu nostro, sunt similiora Angelo quam ea quae sunt in phantasia, cum haec sint intellecta in actu, illa vero in potentia tantum. Sed ea quae sunt in phantasia, possunt cognosci ab Angelo sicut corporalia, cum phantasia sit virtus corporis. Ergo videtur quod Angelus possit cognoscere cogitationes intellectus. | Objection 3: Further, the ideas of our intellect resemble the angel more than do the images in our imagination; because the former are actually understood, while the latter are understood only potentially. But the images in our imagination can be known by an angel as corporeal things are known: because the imagination is a corporeal faculty. Therefore it seems that an angel can know the thoughts of the intellect. |
| Sed contra, quod est proprium Dei, non convenit Angelis. Sed cognoscere cogitationes cordium est proprium Dei, secundum illud Ierem. XVII, pravum est cor hominis et inscrutabile, quis cognoscet illud? Ego, dominus, scrutans corda. Ergo Angeli non cognoscunt secreta cordium. | On the contrary, What is proper to God does not belong to the angels. But it is proper to God to read the secrets of hearts, according to Jer. 17:9: "The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable; who can know it? I am the Lord, Who search the heart." Therefore angels do not know the secrets of hearts. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod cogitatio cordis dupliciter potest cognosci. Uno modo, in suo effectu. Et sic non solum ab Angelo, sed etiam ab homine cognosci potest; et tanto subtilius, quanto effectus huiusmodi fuerit magis occultus. Cognoscitur enim cogitatio interdum non solum per actum exteriorem, sed etiam per immutationem vultus, et etiam medici aliquas affectiones animi per pulsum cognoscere possunt. Et multo magis Angeli, vel etiam Daemones, quanto subtilius huiusmodi immutationes occultas corporales perpendunt. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de divinatione Daemonum, quod aliquando hominum dispositiones, non solum voce prolatas, verum etiam cogitatione conceptas, cum signa quaedam in corpore exprimuntur ex animo, tota facilitate perdiscunt, quamvis in libro Retract. hoc dicat non esse asserendum quomodo fiat. | I answer that, A secret thought can be known in two ways: first, in its effect. In this way it can be known not only by an angel, but also by man; and with so much the greater subtlety according as the effect is the more hidden. For thought is sometimes discovered not merely by outward act, but also by change of countenance; and doctors can tell some passions of the soul by the mere pulse. Much more then can angels, or even demons, the more deeply they penetrate those occult bodily modifications. Hence Augustine says (De divin. daemon.) that demons "sometimes with the greatest faculty learn man's dispositions, not only when expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought, when the soul expresses them by certain signs in the body"; although (Retract. ii, 30) he says "it cannot be asserted how this is done." |
| Alio modo possunt cognosci cogitationes, prout sunt in intellectu; et affectiones, prout sunt in voluntate. Et sic solus Deus cogitationes cordium et affectiones voluntatum cognoscere potest. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas rationalis creaturae soli Deo subiacet; et ipse solus in eam operari potest, qui est principale eius obiectum, ut ultimus finis; et hoc magis infra patebit. Et ideo ea quae in voluntate sunt, vel quae ex voluntate sola dependent, soli Deo sunt nota. Manifestum est autem quod ex sola voluntate dependet quod aliquis actu aliqua consideret, quia cum aliquis habet habitum scientiae, vel species intelligibiles in eo existentes, utitur eis cum vult. Et ideo dicit apostolus, I Cor. II, quod quae sunt hominis, nemo novit nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est. | In another way thoughts can be known as they are in the mind, and affections as they are in the will: and thus God alone can know the thoughts of hearts and affections of wills. The reason of this is, because the rational creature is subject to God only, and He alone can work in it Who is its principal object and last end: this will be developed later (Question [63], Article [1]; Question [105], Article [5]). Consequently all that is in the will, and all things that depend only on the will, are known to God alone. Now it is evident that it depends entirely on the will for anyone actually to consider anything; because a man who has a habit of knowledge, or any intelligible species, uses them at will. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11): "For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod modo cogitatio unius hominis non cognoscitur ab alio, propter duplex impedimentum, scilicet propter grossitiem corporis, et propter voluntatem claudentem sua secreta. Primum autem obstaculum tolletur in resurrectione, nec est in Angelis. Sed secundum impedimentum manebit post resurrectionem, et est modo in Angelis. Et tamen qualitatem mentis, quantum ad quantitatem gratiae et gloriae, repraesentabit claritas corporis. Et sic unus mentem alterius videre poterit. | Reply to Objection 1: In the present life one man's thought is not known by another owing to a twofold hindrance; namely, on account of the grossness of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets. The first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not exist at all in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in the angels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body will show forth the quality of the soul; as to its amount of grace and of glory. In this way one will be able to see the mind of another. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, etsi unus Angelus, species intelligibiles alterius videat, per hoc quod modus intelligibilium specierum, secundum maiorem et minorem universalitatem, proportionatur nobilitati substantiarum; non tamen sequitur quod unus cognoscat quomodo alius illis intelligibilibus speciebus utitur actualiter considerando. | Reply to Objection 2: Although one angel sees the intelligible species of another, by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank of these substances according to greater or lesser universality, yet it does not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by actual consideration. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod appetitus brutalis non est dominus sui actus, sed sequitur impressionem alterius causae corporalis vel spiritualis. Quia igitur Angeli cognoscunt res corporales et dispositiones earum, possunt per haec cognoscere quod est in appetitu et in apprehensione phantastica brutorum animalium; et etiam hominum, secundum quod in eis quandoque appetitus sensitivus procedit in actum, sequens aliquam impressionem corporalem, sicut in brutis semper est. Non tamen oportet quod Angeli cognoscant motum appetitus sensitivi et apprehensionem phantasticam hominis, secundum quod moventur a voluntate et ratione, quia etiam inferior pars animae participat aliqualiter rationem, sicut obediens imperanti, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Nec tamen sequitur quod, si Angelus cognoscit quod est in appetitu sensitivo vel phantasia hominis, quod cognoscat id quod est in cogitatione vel voluntate, quia intellectus vel voluntas non subiacet appetitui sensitivo et phantasiae, sed potest eis diversimode u. | Reply to Objection 3: The appetite of the brute does not control its act, but follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual cause. Since, therefore, the angels know corporeal things and their dispositions, they can thereby know what is passing in the appetite or in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of man, in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes, through following some bodily impression, influences his conduct, as always happens in brutes. Yet the angels do not necessarily know the movement of the sensitive appetite and the imaginative apprehension of man in so far as these are moved by the will and reason; because, even the lower part of the soul has some share of reason, as obeying its ruler, as is said in Ethics iii, 12. But it does not follow that, if the angel knows what is passing through man's sensitive appetite or imagination, he knows what is in the thought or will: because the intellect or will is not subject to the sensitive appetite or the imagination, but can make various uses of them. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli mysteria gratiae cognoscant. Quia inter omnia mysteria excellentius est mysterium incarnationis Christi. Sed hoc Angeli cognoverunt a principio, dicit enim Augustinus, V super Gen. ad Litt., quod sic fuit hoc mysterium absconditum a saeculis in Deo, ut tamen innotesceret principibus et potestatibus in caelestibus. Et dicit apostolus, I ad Tim. III, quod apparuit Angelis illud magnum sacramentum pietatis. Ergo Angeli mysteria gratiae cognoscunt. | Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace. For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all mysteries. But the angels knew of it from the beginning; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19): "This mystery was hidden in God through the ages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly places." And the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:16): "That great mystery of godliness appeared unto angels*." [*Vulg.: 'Great is the mystery of godliness, which . . . appeared unto angels.'] Therefore the angels know the mysteries of grace. |
| Praeterea, rationes omnium mysteriorum gratiae in divina sapientia continentur. Sed Angeli vident ipsam Dei sapientiam, quae est eius essentia. Ergo Angeli mysteria gratiae cognoscunt. | Objection 2: Further, the reasons of all mysteries of grace are contained in the Divine wisdom. But the angels behold God's wisdom, which is His essence. Therefore they know the mysteries of grace. |
| Praeterea, prophetae per Angelos instruuntur, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. Angel. Hier. Sed prophetae mysteria gratiae cognoverunt, dicitur enim Amos III, non faciet dominus verbum, nisi revelaverit secretum ad servos suos, prophetas. Ergo Angeli mysteria gratiae cognoscunt. | Objection 3: Further, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is clear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But the prophets knew mysteries of grace; for it is said (Amos 3:7): "For the Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets." Therefore angels know the mysteries of grace. |
| Sed contra est quod nullus discit illud quod cognoscit. Sed Angeli, etiam supremi, quaerunt de divinis mysteriis gratiae, et ea discunt, dicitur enim VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod sacra Scriptura inducit quasdam caelestes essentias ad ipsum Iesum quaestionem facientes, et addiscentes scientiam divinae eius operationis pro nobis, et Iesum eas sine medio docentem; ut patet Isaiae LXIII, ubi quaerentibus Angelis, quis est iste qui venit de Edom? Respondit Iesus, ego, qui loquor iustitiam. Ergo Angeli non cognoscunt mysteria gratiae. | On the contrary, No one learns what he knows already. Yet even the highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace. For it is stated (Coel. Hier. vii) that "Sacred Scripture describes some heavenly essences as questioning Jesus, and learning from Him the knowledge of His Divine work for us; and Jesus as teaching them directly": as is evident in Is. 63:1, where, on the angels asking, "Who is he who cometh up from Edom?" Jesus answered, "It is I, Who speak justice." Therefore the angels do not know mysteries of grace. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod in Angelis est cognitio duplex. Una quidem naturalis, secundum quam cognoscunt res tum per essentiam suam, tum etiam per species innatas. Et hac cognitione mysteria gratiae Angeli cognoscere non possunt. Haec enim mysteria ex pura Dei voluntate dependent, si autem unus Angelus non potest cognoscere cogitationes alterius ex voluntate eius dependentes, multo minus potest cognoscere ea quae ex sola Dei voluntate dependent. Et sic argumentatur apostolus, I Cor. II, quae sunt hominis, nemo novit nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est. Ita et quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei. | I answer that, There is a twofold knowledge in the angel. The first is his natural knowledge, according to which he knows things both by his essence, and by innate species. By such knowledge the angels cannot know mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the pure will of God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of another angel, which depend upon the will of such angel, much less can he ascertain what depends entirely upon God's will. The Apostle reasons in this fashion (1 Cor. 2:11): "No one knoweth the things of a man [*Vulg.: 'What man knoweth the things of a man, but . . . ?'], but the spirit of a man that is in him." So, "the things also that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God." |
| Est autem alia Angelorum cognitio, quae eos beatos facit, qua vident verbum et res in verbo. Et hac quidem visione cognoscunt mysteria gratiae, non quidem omnia, nec aequaliter omnes sed secundum quod Deus voluerit eis revelare; secundum illud apostoli, I Cor. II, nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum suum. Ita tamen quod superiores Angeli, perspicacius divinam sapientiam contemplantes, plura mysteria et altiora in ipsa Dei visione cognoscunt, quae inferioribus manifestant, eos illuminando. Et horum etiam mysteriorum quaedam a principio suae creationis cognoverunt; quaedam vero postmodum, secundum quod eorum officiis congruit, edocentur. | There is another knowledge of the angels, which renders them happy; it is the knowledge whereby they see the Word, and things in the Word. By such vision they know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor do they all know them equally; but just as God wills them to learn by revelation; as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10): "But to us God hath revealed them through His Spirit"; yet so that the higher angels beholding the Divine wisdom more clearly, learn more and deeper mysteries in the vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to the lower angels by enlightening them. Some of these mysteries they knew from the very beginning of their creation; others they are taught afterwards, as befits their ministrations. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de mysterio incarnationis Christi dupliciter contingit loqui. Uno modo, in generali, et sic omnibus revelatum est a principio suae beatitudinis. Cuius ratio est, quia hoc est quoddam generale principium, ad quod omnia eorum officia ordinantur, omnes enim sunt administratorii spiritus, ut dicitur Heb. I, in ministerium missi propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis; quod quidem fit per incarnationis mysterium. Unde oportuit de hoc mysterio omnes a principio communiter edoceri. | Reply to Objection 1: One can speak in two ways of the mystery of the Incarnation. First of all, in general; and in this way it was revealed to all from the commencement of their beatitude. The reason of this is, that this is a kind of general principle to which all their duties are ordered. For "all are [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all.'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation (Heb. 1:14)"; and this is brought by the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of them to be instructed in this mystery from the very beginning. |
| Alio modo possumus loqui de mysterio incarnationis quantum ad speciales conditiones. Et sic non omnes Angeli a principio de omnibus sunt edocti, immo quidam, etiam superiores Angeli, postmodum didicerunt, ut patet per auctoritatem Dionysii inductam. | We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in another way, as to its special conditions. Thus not all the angels were instructed on all points from the beginning; even the higher angels learned these afterwards, as appears from the passage of Dionysius already quoted. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet Angeli beati divinam sapientiam contemplentur, non tamen eam comprehendunt. Et ideo non oportet quod cognoscant quidquid in ea latet. | Reply to Objection 2: Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine wisdom, yet they do not comprehend it. So it is not necessary for them to know everything hidden in it. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod quidquid prophetae cognoverunt de mysteriis gratiae per revelationem divinam, multo excellentius est Angelis revelatum. Et licet prophetis ea quae Deus facturus erat circa salutem humani generis, in generali revelaverit; quaedam tamen specialia apostoli circa hoc cognoverunt, quae prophetae non cognoverant; secundum illud Ephes. III, potestis, legentes, intelligere prudentiam meam in mysterio Christi, quod aliis generationibus non est agnitum, sicut nunc revelatum est sanctis apostolis eius. Inter ipsos etiam prophetas, posteriores cognoverunt quod priores non cognoverant; secundum illud Psalmi CXVIII, super senes intellexi. Et Gregorius dicit quod per successiones temporum, crevit divinae cognitionis augmentum. | Reply to Objection 3: Whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the mysteries of grace, was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels. And although God revealed in general to the prophets what He was one day to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still the apostles knew some particulars of the same, which the prophets did not know. Thus we read (Eph. 3:4,5): "As you reading, may understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ, which in other generations was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles." Among the prophets also, the later ones knew what the former did not know; according to Ps. 118:100: "I have had understanding above ancients," and Gregory says: "The knowledge of Divine things increased as time went on" (Hom. xvi in Ezech.). |