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| Deinde considerandum est de opere distinctionis. Et primo considerandum est de ordine creationis ad distinctionem; secundo, de ipsa distinctione secundum se. | We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering of creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself. |
| Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. | Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum informitas materiae creatae praecesserit tempore distinctionem ipsius. | (1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation? |
| Secundo, utrum sit una materia omnium corporalium. | (2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same? |
| Tertio, utrum caelum Empyreum sit concreatum materiae informi. | (3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with formless matter? |
| Quarto, utrum tempus sit eidem concreatum. | (4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod informitas materiae tempore praecesserit formationem ipsius. Dicitur enim Gen. 1, terra erat inanis et vacua, sive invisibilis et incomposita, secundum aliam litteram; per quod designatur informitas materiae, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo materia fuit aliquando informis, antequam formaretur. | Objection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. For it is said (Gn. 1:2): "The earth was void and empty," or "invisible and shapeless," according to another version [*Septuagint]; by which is understood the formlessness of matter, as Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until it received its form. |
| Praeterea, natura in sua operatione Dei operationem imitatur; sicut causa secunda imitatur causam primam. Sed in operatione naturae informitas tempore praecedit formationem. Ergo et in operatione Dei. | Objection 2: Further, nature in its working imitates the working of God, as a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of nature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in the Divine working. |
| Praeterea, materia potior est accidente, quia materia est pars substantiae. Sed Deus potest facere quod accidens sit sine subiecto; ut patet in sacramento altaris. Ergo potuit facere quod materia esset sine forma. | Objection 3: Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is part of substance. But God can effect that accident exist without substance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore, cause matter to exist without form. |
| Sed contra, imperfectio effectus attestatur imperfectioni agentis. Sed Deus est agens perfectissimum, unde de eo dicitur, Deut. XXXII, Dei perfecta sunt opera. Ergo opus ab eo creatum nunquam fuit informe. | On the contrary, An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent. But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said of Him (Dt. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect." Therefore the work of His creation was at no time formless. |
| Praeterea, creaturae corporalis formatio facta fuit per opus distinctionis. Distinctioni autem opponitur confusio, sicut et formationi informitas. Si ergo informitas praecessit tempore formationem materiae, sequitur a principio fuisse confusionem corporalis creaturae, quam antiqui vocaverunt chaos. | Further, the formation of corporeal creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But confusion is opposed to distinction, as formlessness to form. It, therefore, formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter, it follows that at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in the corporeal creation. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc sunt diversae opiniones sanctorum. Augustinus enim vult quod informitas materiae corporalis non praecesserit tempore formationem ipsius, sed solum origine vel ordine naturae. Alii vero, ut Basilius, Ambrosius et Chrysostomus, volunt quod informitas materiae tempore praecesserit formationem. Et quamvis hae opiniones videantur esse contrariae, tamen parum ab invicem differunt, aliter enim accipit informitatem materiae Augustinus quam alii. Augustinus enim accipit informitatem materiae pro carentia omnis formae. Et sic impossibile est dicere quod informitas materiae tempore praecesserit vel formationem ipsius, vel distinctionem. Et de formatione quidem manifestum est. Si enim materia informis praecessit duratione, haec erat iam in actu, hoc enim duratio importat, creationis enim terminus est ens actu. Ipsum autem quod est actus, est forma. Dicere igitur materiam praecedere sine forma, est dicere ens actu sine actu, quod implicat contradictionem. Nec etiam potest dici quod habuit aliquam formam communem et postmodum supervenerunt ei formae diversae, quibus sit distincta. Quia hoc esset idem cum opinione antiquorum naturalium, qui posuerunt materiam primam esse aliquod corpus in actu, puta ignem, aerem aut aquam, aut aliquod medium. Ex quo sequebatur quod fieri non esset nisi alterari. Quia cum illa forma praecedens daret esse in actu in genere substantiae, et faceret esse hoc aliquid; sequebatur quod superveniens forma non faceret simpliciter ens actu, sed ens actu hoc, quod est proprium formae accidentalis; et sic sequentes formae essent accidentia, secundum quae non attenditur generatio, sed alteratio. Unde oportet dicere quod materia prima neque fuit creata omnino sine forma, neque sub forma una communi, sed sub formis distinctis. Et ita, si informitas materiae referatur ad conditionem primae materiae, quae secundum se non habet aliquam formam, informitas materiae non praecessit formationem seu distinctionem ipsius tempore, ut Augustinus dicit, sed origine seu natura tantum, eo modo quo potentia est prior actu, et pars toto. Alii vero sancti accipiunt informitatem, non secundum quod excludit omnem formam, sed secundum quod excludit istam formositatem et decorem qui nunc apparet in corporea creatura. Et secundum hoc dicunt quod informitas materiae corporalis duratione praecessit formationem eiusdem. Et sic secundum hoc, quantum ad aliquid cum eis Augustinus concordat, et quantum aliquid discordat, ut infra patebit. | I answer that, On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine for instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of matter was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or the order of nature, whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem.), Ambrose (In Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen.), hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. And although these opinions seem mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but little; for Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form, and if we thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of matter was prior in time either to its formation or to its distinction. As to formation, the argument is clear. For if formless matter preceded in duration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration, since the end of creation is being in act: and act itself is a form. To say, then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in terms. Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish it. For this would be to hold the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who maintained that primary matter was some corporeal thing in act, as fire, air, water, or some intermediate substance. Hence, it followed that to be made means merely to be changed; for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial being, and made some particular thing to be, it would result that the supervening form would not simply make an actual being, but 'this' actual being; which is the proper effect of an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely accidents, implying not generation, but alteration. Hence we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor under any one common form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of primary matter, which in itself is formless, this formlessness did not precede in time its formation or distinction, but only in origin and nature, as Augustine says; in the same way as potentiality is prior to act, and the part to the whole. But the other holy writers understand by formlessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence of that beauty and comeliness which are now apparent in the corporeal creation. Accordingly they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in duration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that Augustine agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees, as will be shown later (Question [69], Article [1]; Question [74], Article [2]). |
| Et quantum ex littera Genesis I, accipi potest, triplex formositas deerat, propter quod dicebatur creatura corporalis informis. Deerat enim a toto corpore diaphano, quod dicitur caelum, pulchritudo lucis, unde dicitur quod tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi. Deerat autem terrae duplex pulchritudo. Una, quam habet ex hoc quod est aquis discooperta, et quantum ad hoc dicitur quod terra erat inanis, sive invisibilis, quia corporali aspectui patere non poterat, propter aquas undique eam cooperientes. Alia vero, quam habet ex hoc quod est ornata herbis et plantis, et ideo dicitur quod erat vacua, vel incomposita, idest non ornata, secundum aliam litteram. Et sic, cum praemisisset duas naturas creatas, scilicet caelum et terram, informitatem caeli expressit per hoc quod dixit, tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi, secundum quod sub caelo etiam aer includitur, informitatem vero terrae, per hoc quod dixit, terra erat inanis et vacua. | As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a threefold beauty was wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason they are said to be without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that transparent body which we call the heavens, whence it is said that "darkness was upon the fact of the deep." And the earth lacked beauty in two ways: first, that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil was withdrawn, and so we read that "the earth was void," or "invisible," inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from view; secondly, that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and plants, for which reason it is called "empty," or, according to another reading [*Septuagint], "shapeless"—that is, unadorned. Thus after mention of two created natures, the heaven and the earth, the formlessness of the heaven is indicated by the words, "darkness was upon the face of the deep," since the air is included under heaven; and the formlessness of the earth, by the words, "the earth was void and empty." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod terra aliter accipitur in loco isto ab Augustino, et ab aliis sanctis. Augustinus enim vult quod nomine terrae et aquae significetur in hoc loco ipsa materia prima. Non enim poterat Moyses rudi populo primam materiam exprimere, nisi sub similitudine rerum eis notarum. Unde et sub multiplici similitudine eam exprimit, non vocans eam tantum aquam vel tantum terram, ne videatur secundum rei veritatem materia prima esse vel terra vel aqua. Habet tamen similitudinem cum terra, inquantum subsidet formis; et cum aqua, inquantum est apta formari diversis formis. Secundum hoc ergo, dicitur terra inanis et vacua, vel invisibilis et incomposita, quia materia per formam cognoscitur (unde in se considerata dicitur invisibilis vel inanis), et eius potentia per formam repletur (unde et Plato materiam dicit esse locum). Alii vero sancti per terram intelligunt ipsum elementum, quae qualiter, secundum eos, erat informis, dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: The word earth is taken differently in this passage by Augustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the words "earth" and "water," in this passage. primary matter itself is signified on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the idea of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under the similitude of well-known objects. Hence he uses a variety of figures in speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only, lest they should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the same time it has so far a likeness to earth, in that it is susceptible of form, and to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms. In this respect, then, the earth is said to be "void and empty," or "invisible and shapeless," that matter is known by means of form. Hence, considered in itself, it is called "invisible" or "void," and its potentiality is completed by form; thus Plato says that matter is "place" [*Timaeus, quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv, text. 15]. But other holy writers understand by earth the element of earth, and we have said (Article [1]) how, in this sense, the earth was, according to them, without form. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod natura producit effectum in actu de ente in potentia, et ideo oportet ut in eius operatione potentia tempore praecedat actum, et informitas formationem. Sed Deus producit ens actu ex nihilo, et ideo statim potest producere rem perfectam, secundum magnitudinem suae virtutis. | Reply to Objection 2: Nature produces effect in act from being in potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His power. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod accidens, cum sit forma, est actus quidam, materia autem secundum id quod est, est ens in potentia. Unde magis repugnat esse in actu materiae sine forma, quam accidenti sine subiecto. | Reply to Objection 3: Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of act; whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality. Hence it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form, than for accident to be without subject. |
| Ad primum vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, dicendum est quod si, secundum alios sanctos, informitas tempore praecessit formationem materiae, non fuit hoc ex impotentia Dei; sed ex eius sapientia, ut ordo servaretur in rerum conditione, dum ex imperfecto ad perfectum adducerentur. | In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if, according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God's part, but from His wisdom, and from the design of preserving due order in the disposition of creatures by developing perfection from imperfection. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam antiquorum naturalium posuerunt confusionem excludentem omnem distinctionem; praeter hoc quod Anaxagoras posuit solum intellectum distinctum et immixtum. Sed ante opus distinctionis Scriptura sacra ponit multiplicem distinctionem. Primo quidem, caeli et terrae (in quo ostenditur distinctio etiam secundum materiam, ut infra patebit), et hoc cum dicit, in principio Deus creavit caelum et terram. Secundo, distinctionem elementorum quantum ad formas suas, per hoc quod nominat terram et aquam. Aerem autem et ignem non nominat, quia non est ita manifestum rudibus, quibus Moyses loquebatur, huiusmodi esse corpora, sicut manifestum est de terra et aqua. Quamvis Plato aerem intellexerit significari per hoc quod dicitur spiritus domini (quia etiam aer spiritus dicitur), ignem vero intellexerit significari per caelum (quod igneae naturae esse dixit), ut Augustinus refert in VIII libro de Civ. Dei. Sed Rabbi Moyses, in aliis cum Platone concordans, dicit ignem significari per tenebras, quia, ut dicit, in propria sphaera ignis non lucet. Sed magis videtur esse conveniens quod prius dictum est, quia spiritus domini in Scriptura non nisi pro spiritu sancto consuevit poni. Qui aquis superferri dicitur, non corporaliter, sed sicut voluntas artificis superfertur materiae quam vult formare. Tertia distinctio significatur secundum situm. Quia terra erat sub aquis, quibus invisibilis reddebatur, aer vero, qui est subiectum tenebrarum, significatur fuisse super aquas, per hoc quod dicitur, tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi. Quid autem distinguendum remaneret, ex sequentibus apparebit. | In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction; except Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct and without admixture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy Scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first being that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a material distinction is expressed, as will be shown later (Article [3]; Question [68], Article [1]). This is signified by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." The second distinction mentioned is that of the elements according to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth and water, to the ignorant people to whom Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus xxvi), nevertheless, understood air to be signified by the words, "Spirit of God," since spirit is another name for air, and considered that by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to be composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii, 11). But Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire does not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to hold to what we stated above; because by the words "Spirit of God" Scripture usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the waters," not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman's will may be said to move over the material to which he intends to give a form. The third distinction is that of place; since the earth is said to be under the waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air, the subject of darkness, is described as being above the waters, in the words: "Darkness was upon the face of the deep." The remaining distinctions will appear from what follows (Question [71]). |
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Question: 66 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una sit materia informis omnium corporalium. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII Confess., duo reperio quae fecisti, unum quod erat formatum, alterum quod erat informe; et hoc dicit esse terram invisibilem et incompositam, per quam dicit significari materiam rerum corporalium. Ergo una est materia omnium corporalium. | Objection 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find two things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless," and he says that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore the matter of all corporeal things is the same. |
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod illa quae sunt unum in genere, sunt unum in materia. Sed omnia corporalia conveniunt in genere corporis. Ergo omnium corporalium est una materia. | Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10): "Things that are one in genus are one in matter." But all corporeal things are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all bodies is the same. |
| Praeterea, diversus actus fit in diversa potentia, et unus in una. Sed omnium corporum est una forma, scilicet corporeitas. Ergo omnium corporalium est materia una. | Objection 3: Further, different acts befit different potentialities, and the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter. |
| Praeterea, materia in se considerata, est solum in potentia. Sed distinctio est per formas. Ergo materia in se considerata, est una tantum omnium corporalium. | Objection 4: Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things. |
| Sed contra, quaecumque conveniunt in materia, sunt transmutabilia ad invicem, et agunt et patiuntur ab invicem, ut dicitur in I de Gen. Sed corpora caelestia et inferiora non sic se habent ad invicem. Ergo eorum materia non est una. | On the contrary, Things of which the matter is the same are mutually interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said (De Gener. i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act upon each other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc fuerunt diversae opiniones philosophorum. Plato enim, et omnes philosophi ante Aristotelem, posuerunt omnia corpora esse de natura quatuor elementorum. Unde cum quatuor elementa communicent in una materia, ut mutua generatio et corruptio in eis ostendit; per consequens sequebatur quod omnium corporum sit materia una. Quod autem quaedam corpora sint incorruptibilia, Plato adscribebat non conditioni materiae, sed voluntati artificis, scilicet Dei, quem introducit corporibus caelestibus dicentem, natura vestra estis dissolubilia, voluntate autem mea indissolubilia, quia voluntas mea maior est nexu vestro. Hanc autem positionem Aristoteles reprobat, per motus naturales corporum. Cum enim corpus caeleste habeat naturalem motum diversum a naturali motu elementorum, sequitur quod eius natura sit alia a natura quatuor elementorum. Et sicut motus circularis, qui est proprius corporis caelestis, caret contrarietate, motus autem elementorum sunt invicem contrarii, ut qui est sursum ei qui est deorsum, ita corpus caeleste est absque contrarietate, corpora vero elementaria sunt cum contrarietate. Et quia corruptio et generatio sunt ex contrariis, sequitur quod secundum suam naturam corpus caeleste sit incorruptibile, elementa vero sunt corruptibilia. Sed non obstante hac differentia corruptibilitatis et incorruptibilitatis naturalis, Avicebron posuit unam materiam omnium corporum, attendens ad unitatem formae corporalis. Sed si forma corporeitatis esset una forma per se, cui supervenirent aliae formae, quibus corpora distinguuntur, haberet necessitatem quod dicitur. Quia illa forma immutabiliter materiae inhaereret, et quantum ad illam esset omne corpus incorruptibile, sed corruptio accideret per remotionem sequentium formarum, quae non esset corruptio simpliciter, sed secundum quid, quia privationi substerneretur aliquod ens actu. Sicut etiam accidebat antiquis naturalibus, qui ponebant subiectum corporum aliquod ens actu, puta ignem aut aerem aut aliquid huiusmodi. Supposito autem quod nulla forma quae sit in corpore corruptibili remaneat ut substrata generationi et corruptioni, sequitur de necessitate quod non sit eadem materia corporum corruptibilium et incorruptibilium. Materia enim, secundum id quod est, est in potentia ad formam. | I answer that, On this question the opinions of philosophers have differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies are of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four elements have one common matter, as their mutual generation and corruption prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by Plato, not to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, God, Whom he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies: "By your own nature you are subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indissoluble, for My will is more powerful than the link that binds you together." But this theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5) disproves by the natural movements of bodies. For since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a natural movement, different from that of the elements, it follows that they have a different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the movements of the elements are mutually opposite, one tending upwards, another downwards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety in their nature. And as generation and corruption are from contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are corruptible, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible. But in spite of this difference of natural corruption and incorruption, Avicebron taught unity of matter in all bodies, arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if corporeity were one form in itself, on which the other forms that distinguish bodies from each other supervene, this argument would necessarily be true; for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter immutably and so far all bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption would then be merely accidental through the disappearance of successive forms—that is to say, it would be corruption, not pure and simple, but partial, since a being in act would subsist under the transient form. Thus the ancient natural philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself, is in potentiality to form. |
| Oportet ergo quod materia, secundum se considerata, sit in potentia ad formam omnium illorum quorum est materia communis. Per unam autem formam non fit in actu nisi quantum ad illam formam. Remanet ergo in potentia quantum ad omnes alias formas. Nec hoc excluditur, si una illarum formarum sit perfectior et continens in se virtute alias. Quia potentia, quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad perfectum et imperfectum, unde sicut quando est sub forma imperfecta, est in potentia ad formam perfectam, ita e converso. Sic ergo materia, secundum quod est sub forma incorruptibilis corporis, erit adhuc in potentia ad formam corruptibilis corporis. Et cum non habeat eam in actu, erit simul sub forma et privatione, quia carentia formae in eo quod est in potentia ad formam, est privatio. Haec autem dispositio est corruptibilis corporis. Impossibile ergo est quod corporis corruptibilis et incorruptibilis per naturam, sit una materia. | Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves. For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality to a perfect form, and "vice versa." Matter, therefore, whilst existing under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the latter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should possess the same matter. |
| Nec tamen dicendum est, ut Averroes fingit, quod ipsum corpus caeleste sit materia caeli, ens in potentia ad ubi et non ad esse; et forma eius est substantia separata quae unitur ei ut motor. Quia impossibile est ponere aliquod ens actu, quin vel ipsum totum sit actus et forma, vel habeat actum seu formam. Remota ergo per intellectum substantia separata quae ponitur motor, si corpus caeleste non est habens formam, quod est componi ex forma et subiecto formae, sequitur quod sit totum forma et actus. Omne autem tale est intellectum in actu; quod de corpore caelesti dici non potest, cum sit sensibile. Relinquitur ergo quod materia corporis caelestis, secundum se considerata, non est in potentia nisi ad formam quam habet. Nec refert ad propositum quaecumque sit illa, sive anima, sive aliquid aliud. Unde illa forma sic perficit illam materiam, quod nullo modo in ea remanet potentia ad esse, sed ad ubi tantum, ut Aristoteles dicit. Et sic non est eadem materia corporis caelestis et elementorum, nisi secundum analogiam, secundum quod conveniunt in ratione potentiae. | Neither can we say, as Averroes [*De Substantia Orbis ii.] imagines, that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven—beings in potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its form is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it be act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside, then, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form—that is, something composed of a form and the subject of that form—it follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing is something actually understood, which the heavenly bodies are not, being sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no potentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle [*De Coelo i, text. 20] says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so far as they agree in the character of potentiality. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus sequitur in hoc opinionem Platonis, non ponentis quintam essentiam. Vel dicendum quod materia informis est una unitate ordinis, sicut omnia corpora sunt unum in ordine creaturae corporeae. | Reply to Objection 1: Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato, who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter is one with the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of corporeal creatures. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod si genus consideretur physice, corruptibilia et incorruptibilia non sunt in eodem genere, propter diversum modum potentiae in eis, ut dicitur X Metaphys. Secundum autem logicam considerationem, est unum genus omnium corporum, propter unam rationem corporeitatis. | Reply to Objection 2: If genus is taken in a physical sense, corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on account of their different modes of potentiality, as is said in Metaph. x, text. 26. Logically considered, however, there is but one genus of all bodies, since they are all included in the one notion of corporeity. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod forma corporeitatis non est una in omnibus corporibus, cum non sit alia a formis quibus corpora distinguuntur, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3: The form of corporeity is not one and the same in all bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies are distinguished, as stated above. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum potentia dicatur ad actum, ens in potentia est diversum ex hoc ipso quod ordinatur ad diversum actum; sicut visus ad colorem, et auditus ad sonum. Unde ex hoc ipso materia caelestis corporis est alia a materia elementi, quia non est in potentia ad formam elementi. | Reply to Objection 4: As potentiality is directed towards act, potential beings are differentiated by their different acts, as sight is by color, hearing by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, because the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental form. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod caelum Empyreum non sit concreatum materiae informi. Caelum enim Empyreum, si est aliquid, oportet quod sit corpus sensibile. Omne autem corpus sensibile est mobile. Caelum autem Empyreum non est mobile, quia motus eius deprehenderetur per motum alicuius corporis apparentis; quod minime apparet. Non ergo caelum Empyreum est aliquid materiae informi concreatum. | Objection 1: It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created at the same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is anything at all, must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are movable, and the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so, its movement would be ascertained by the movement of some visible body, which is not the case. The empyrean heaven, then, was not created contemporaneously with formless matter. |
| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., quod inferiora corpora per superiora quodam ordine reguntur. Si ergo caelum Empyreum est quoddam supremum corpus, oportet quod habeat aliquam influentiam in haec inferiora corpora. Sed hoc non videtur, praesertim si ponatur immobile, cum nullum corpus moveat nisi motum. Non est ergo caelum Empyreum materiae informi concreatum. | Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the lower bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order." If, therefore, the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily exercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to be the case, especially as it is presumed to be without movement; for one body cannot move another unless itself also be moved. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter. |
| Si dicatur quod caelum Empyreum est locus contemplationis, non ordinatum ad naturales effectus, contra, Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., quod nos, secundum quod mente aliquid aeternum capimus, non in hoc mundo sumus; ex quo patet quod contemplatio mentem supra corporalia elevat. Non ergo contemplationi locus corporeus deputatur. | Objection 3: Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the place of contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "In so far as we mentally apprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this world"; from which it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of contemplation. |
| Praeterea, inter corpora caelestia invenitur aliquod corpus partim diaphanum et partim lucidum, scilicet caelum sidereum. Invenitur etiam aliquod caelum totum diaphanum, quod aliqui nominant caelum aqueum vel crystallinum. Si ergo est aliud superius caelum, oportet quod sit totum lucidum. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia sic continue aer illuminaretur, nec unquam nox esset. Non ergo caelum Empyreum materiae informi est concreatum. | Objection 4: Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven. There exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the aqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher heaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the air would be constantly illuminated, and there would be no night. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter. |
| Sed contra est quod Strabus dicit, quod cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, caelum dicit non visibile firmamentum, sed Empyreum, idest igneum. | On the contrary, Strabus says that in the passage, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," heaven denotes not the visible firmament, but the empyrean or fiery heaven. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod caelum Empyreum non invenitur positum nisi per auctoritates Strabi et Bedae, et iterum per auctoritatem Basilii. In cuius positione quantum ad aliquid conveniunt, scilicet quantum ad hoc quod sit locus beatorum. Dicit enim Strabus, et etiam Beda, quod statim factum Angelis est repletum. Basilius etiam dicit, in II Hexaem., sicut damnati in tenebras ultimas abiguntur ita remuneratio pro dignis operibus restauratur in ea luce quae est extra mundum, ubi beati quietis domicilium sortientur. Differunt tamen quantum ad rationem ponendi. Nam Strabus et Beda ponunt caelum Empyreum ea ratione, quia firmamentum, per quod caelum sidereum intelligunt, non in principio sed secunda die dicitur factum. Basilius vero ea ratione ponit, ne videatur simpliciter Deus opus suum a tenebris inchoasse; quod Manichaei calumniantur, Deum veteris testamenti Deum tenebrarum nominantes. Hae autem rationes non sunt multum cogentes. Nam quaestio de firmamento quod legitur factum in secunda die, aliter solvitur, ab Augustino et ab aliis sanctis. Quaestio autem de tenebris solvitur, secundum Augustinum, per hoc quod informitas (quae per tenebras significatur) non praecessit duratione formationem, sed origine. Secundum alios vero, cum tenebrae non sint creatura aliqua, sed privatio lucis, divinam sapientiam attestatur, ut ea quae produxit ex nihilo, primo in statu imperfectionis institueret, et postmodum ea perduceret ad perfectum. Potest autem convenientior ratio sumi ex ipsa conditione gloriae. Expectatur enim in futura remuneratione duplex gloria, scilicet spiritualis, et corporalis, non solum in corporibus humanis glorificandis, sed etiam in toto mundo innovando. Inchoata est autem spiritualis gloria ab ipso mundi principio in beatitudine Angelorum, quorum aequalitas sanctis promittitur. Unde conveniens fuit ut etiam a principio corporalis gloria inchoaretur in aliquo corpore, quod etiam a principio fuerit absque servitute corruptionis et mutabilitatis, et totaliter lucidum; sicut tota creatura corporalis expectatur post resurrectionem futura. Et ideo illud caelum dicitur Empyreum, idest igneum, non ab ardore, sed a splendore. Sciendum est autem quod Augustinus, X de Civ. Dei, dicit quod Porphyrius discernebat a Daemonibus Angelos, ut aerea loca esse Daemonum, aetherea vero vel Empyrea diceret Angelorum. Sed Porphyrius, tanquam Platonicus, caelum istud sidereum igneum esse existimabat, et ideo Empyreum nominabat; vel aethereum, secundum quod nomen aetheris sumitur ab inflammatione, et non secundum quod sumitur a velocitate motus, ut Aristoteles dicit. Quod pro tanto dictum sit, ne aliquis opinetur Augustinum caelum Empyreum posuisse sicut nunc ponitur a modernis. | I answer that, The empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in one respect, namely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede say that as soon as created it was filled with angels; and Basil [*Hom. ii. in Hexaem.] says: "Just as the lost are driven into the lowest darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the light beyond this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of rest." But they differ in the reasons on which they base their statement. Strabus and Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven, because the firmament, which they take to mean the sidereal heaven, is said to have been made, not in the beginning, but on the second day: whereas the reason given by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to have made darkness His first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert, when they call the God of the Old Testament the God of darkness. These reasons, however, are not very cogent. For the question of the firmament, said to have been made on the second day, is solved in one way by Augustine, and in another by other holy writers. But the question of the darkness is explained according to Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. i; vii.], by supposing that formlessness, signified by darkness, preceded form not by duration, but by origin. According to others, however, since darkness is no creature, but a privation of light, it is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the things it created from nothing it produced first of all in an imperfect state, and afterwards brought them to perfection. But a better reason can be drawn from the state of glory itself. For in the reward to come a two-fold glory is looked for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body to be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be made new. Now the spiritual glory began with the beginning of the world, in the blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning, there should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something corporeal, free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and change, and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after the Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called the empyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its heat, but from its brightness. It is to be noticed, however, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9,27) says that Porphyry sets the demons apart from the angels by supposing that the former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean. But Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal to denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it, swiftness of movement (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much has been said to prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained an empyrean heaven in the sense understood by modern writers. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpora sensibilia sunt mobilia secundum ipsum statum mundi, quia per motum creaturae corporalis procuratur electorum multiplicatio. Sed in ultima consummatione gloriae cessabit corporum motus. Et talem oportuit esse a principio dispositionem caeli Empyrei. | Reply to Objection 1: Sensible corporeal things are movable in the present state of the world, for by the movement of corporeal creatures is secured by the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is finally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod satis probabile est quod caelum Empyreum, secundum quosdam, cum sit ordinatum ad statum gloriae, non habet influentiam in inferiora corpora, quae sunt sub alio ordine, utpote ordinata ad naturalem rerum decursum. Probabilius tamen videtur dicendum quod, sicut supremi Angeli, qui assistunt, habent influentiam super medios et ultimos, qui mittuntur, quamvis ipsi non mittantur, secundum Dionysium; ita caelum Empyreum habet influentiam super corpora quae moventur, licet ipsum non moveatur. Et propter hoc potest dici quod influit in primum caelum quod movetur, non aliquid transiens et adveniens per motum, sed aliquid fixum et stabile; puta virtutem continendi et causandi, vel aliquid huiusmodi ad dignitatem pertinens. | Reply to Objection 2: It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that the empyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end, does not influence inferior bodies of another order—those, namely, that are directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more probable that it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself motionless, just as angels of the highest rank, who assist [*Infra, Question [112], Article [3]], influence those of lower degree who act as messengers, though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier. xii). For this reason it may be said that the influence of the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved, produces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of conservation or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to dignity. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod locus corporeus deputatur contemplationi non propter necessitatem, sed propter congruitatem, ut exterior claritas interiori conveniat. Unde Basilius dicit quod ministrator spiritus non poterat degere in tenebris; sed in luce et laetitia decentem sibi habitum possidebat. | Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not as necessary, but as congruous, that the splendor without may correspond to that which is within. Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) says: "The ministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made his habitual dwelling in light and joy." |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Basilius dicit in II Hexaem., constat factum esse caelum rotunditate conclusum, habens corpus spissum et adeo validum, ut possit ea quae extrinsecus habentur, ab interioribus separare. Ob hoc necessario post se regionem relictam carentem luce constituit, utpote fulgore qui superradiabat excluso. Sed quia corpus firmamenti, etsi sit solidum, est tamen diaphanum, quod lumen non impedit (ut patet per hoc, quod lumen stellarum videmus non obstantibus mediis caelis); potest aliter dici quod habet lucem caelum Empyreum non condensatam, ut radios emittat, sicut corpus solis, sed magis subtilem. Vel habet claritatem gloriae, quae non est conformis cum claritate naturali. | Reply to Objection 4: As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.): "It is certain that the heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body, and sufficiently strong to separate what is outside it from what it encloses. On this account it darkens the region external to it, the light by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region. "But since the body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for that it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that we can see the stars through the intervening heavens), we may also say that the empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun does, but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of glory which differs from mere natural brightness. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod tempus non sit concreatum materiae informi. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII Confess., ad Deum loquens, duo reperio quae fecisti carentia temporibus, scilicet materiam primam corporalem, et naturam angelicam. Non ergo tempus est concreatum materiae informi. | Objection 1: It would seem that time was not created simultaneously with formless matter. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find two things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary corporeal matter, and the angelic nature. "Therefore time was not created with formless matter. |
| Praeterea, tempus dividitur per diem et noctem. Sed a principio nec nox nec dies erat, sed postmodum, cum divisit Deus lucem a tenebris. Ergo a principio non erat tempus. | Objection 2: Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the beginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when "God divided the light from the darkness. "Therefore in the beginning time was not. |
| Praeterea, tempus est numerus motus firmamenti, quod legitur factum secundo die. Ergo non a principio erat tempus. | Objection 3: Further, time is the measure of the firmament's movement; and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day. Therefore in the beginning time was not. |
| Praeterea, motus est prior tempore. Magis igitur deberet numerari inter primo creata motus, quam tempus. | Objection 4: Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be reckoned among the first things created, rather than time. |
| Praeterea, sicut tempus est mensura extrinseca, ita et locus. Non ergo magis debet computari inter primo creata tempus, quam locus. | Objection 5: Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be reckoned among the things first created. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quod spiritualis et corporalis creatura est creata in principio temporis. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): "Both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod communiter dicitur quatuor esse primo creata, scilicet naturam angelicam, caelum Empyreum, materiam corporalem informem, et tempus. Sed attendendum est quod hoc dictum non procedit secundum Augustini opinionem. Augustinus enim ponit duo primo creata, scilicet naturam angelicam et materiam corporalem, nulla mentione facta de caelo Empyreo. Haec autem duo, scilicet natura angelica et materia informis, praecedunt formationem non duratione, sed natura. Et sicut natura praecedunt formationem, ita etiam et motum et tempus. Unde tempus non potest eis connumerari. Procedit autem praedicta connumeratio secundum opinionem aliorum sanctorum, ponentium quod informitas materiae duratione praecessit formationem, et tunc pro illa duratione necesse est ponere tempus aliquod; aliter enim mensura durationis accipi non posset. | I answer that, It is commonly said that the first things created were these four—the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless corporeal matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this is not the opinion of Augustine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies only two things as first created—the angelic nature and corporeal matter—making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two, namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, precede the formation, by nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as they precede formation, so do they precede movement and time. Time, therefore, cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above given is that of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the existence of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there would be no such measure. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus hoc dicit ea ratione qua natura angelica et materia informis praecedunt origine, seu natura, tempus. | Reply to Objection 1: The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut, secundum alios sanctos, materia erat quodammodo informis, et postea fuit formata; ita tempus quodammodo fuit informe, et postmodum formatum, et distinctum per diem et noctem. | Reply to Objection 2: As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was in some measure formless before it received its full form, so time was in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into day and night. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, si motus firmamenti non statim a principio incoepit, tunc tempus quod praecessit, non erat numerus motus firmamenti, sed cuiuscumque primi motus. Accidit enim tempori quod sit numerus motus firmamenti, inquantum hic motus est primus motuum, si autem esset alius motus primus, illius motus esset tempus mensura, quia omnia mensurantur primo sui generis. Oportet autem dicere statim a principio fuisse aliquem motum, ad minus secundum successionem conceptionum et affectionum in mente angelica. Motum autem non est intelligere sine tempore, cum nihil aliud sit tempus quam numerus prioris et posterioris in motu. | Reply to Objection 3: If the movement of the firmament did not begin immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the measure, not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement of whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of the firmament's movement, in so far as this is the first movement. But if the first movement was another than this, time would have been its measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. And it must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and affections in the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be conceived, since time is nothing else than "the measure of priority and succession in movement." |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod inter primo creata computantur ea quae habent generalem habitudinem ad res. Et ideo computari debuit tempus, quod habet rationem communis mensurae, non autem motus, qui comparatur solum ad subiectum mobile. | Reply to Objection 4: Among the first created things are to be reckoned those which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore, among these time must be included, as having the nature of a common measure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable subject. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod locus intelligitur in caelo Empyreo omnia continente. Et quia locus est de permanentibus, concreatus est totus simul. Tempus autem, quod non est permanens, concreatum est in suo principio, sicut etiam modo nihil est accipere in actu de tempore nisi nunc. | Reply to Objection 5: Place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven, this being the boundary of the universe. And since place has reference to things permanent, it was created at once in its totality. But time, as not being permanent, was created in its beginning: even as actually we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the "now." |