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Question: 101 [<< | >>]
| Deinde considerandum est de conditione prolis generandae quantum ad scientiam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. | We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum pueri nascerentur in scientia perfecti. | (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge? |
| Secundo, utrum statim post nativitatem habuissent perfectum usum rationis | (2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth? |
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First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 101 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae pueri nati fuissent in scientia perfecti. Qualis enim fuit Adam, tales filios generasset. Sed Adam fuit in scientia perfectus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo filii nascerentur ab eo in scientia perfecti. | Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have begotten children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge (Question [94], Article [3]). Therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge. |
| Praeterea, ignorantia ex peccato causatur, ut Beda dicit. Sed ignorantia est privatio scientiae. Ergo ante peccatum pueri mox nati omnem scientiam habuissent. | Objection 2: Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf. FS, Question [85], Article [3]). But ignorance is privation of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born. |
| Praeterea, pueri mox nati iustitiam habuissent. Sed ad iustitiam requiritur scientia, quae dirigit in agendis. Ergo etiam scientiam habuissent. | Objection 3: Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge. |
| Sed contra est quod anima nostra per naturam est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed eadem animae natura est modo, quae tunc fuisset. Ergo animae puerorum in principio scientia caruissent. | On the contrary, The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have been without knowledge at birth. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, de his quae sunt supra naturam, soli auctoritati creditur, unde ubi auctoritas deficit, sequi debemus naturae conditionem. Est autem naturale homini ut scientiam per sensus acquirat, sicut supra dictum est, et ideo anima unitur corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem; quod non esset, si statim a principio scientiam haberet non acquisitam per sensitivas virtutes. Et ideo dicendum est quod pueri in statu innocentiae non nascerentur perfecti in scientia; sed eam in processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent, inveniendo vel addiscendo. | I answer that, As above stated (Question [99], Article [1]), as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as above explained (Question [55], Article [2]; Question [84], Article [6]); and for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. We must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse perfectum in scientia fuit individuale accidens primi parentis, inquantum scilicet ipse instituebatur ut pater et instructor totius humani generis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, non generabat filios similes sibi; sed solum quantum ad accidentia naturalia vel gratuita totius naturae. | Reply to Objection 1: The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ignorantia est privatio scientiae quae debet haberi pro tempore illo. Quod in pueris mox natis non fuisset, habuissent enim scientiam quae eis competebat secundum tempus illud. Unde ignorantia in eis non fuisset, sed nescientia respectu aliquorum. Quam etiam Dionysius ponit in Angelis sanctis, in VII Cael. Hier. | Reply to Objection 2: Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not have been in children from their birth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod pueri habuissent sufficientem scientiam ad dirigendum eos in operibus iustitiae in quibus homines diriguntur per universalia principia iuris; quam multo plenius tunc habuissent quam nunc naturaliter habemus, et similiter aliorum universalium principiorum. | Reply to Objection 3: Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles. |
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 101 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae mox nati habuissent perfectum usum rationis. Nunc enim pueri perfectum usum rationis non habent propter hoc, quod anima per corpus aggravatur. Hoc autem tunc non erat, quia, ut dicitur Sap. IX, corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam. Ergo ante peccatum et corruptionem a peccato subsecutam, pueri mox nati perfectum usum rationis habuissent. | Objection 1: It would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written, "The corruptible body is a load upon the soul" (Wis. 9:15). Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth. |
| Praeterea, quaedam alia animalia mox nata habent naturalis industriae usum, sicut agnus statim fugit lupum. Multo ergo magis homines in statu innocentiae mox nati habuissent usum perfectum rationis. | Objection 2: Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more, therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth. |
| Sed contra est quod natura procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum in omnibus generatis. Ergo pueri non statim a principio habuissent perfectum usum rationis. | On the contrary, In all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, usus rationis dependet quodammodo ex usu virium sensitivarum, unde ligato sensu, et impeditis interioribus viribus sensitivis, homo perfectum usum rationis non habet, ut patet in dormientibus et phreneticis. Vires autem sensitivae sunt virtutes quaedam corporalium organorum, et ideo, impeditis earum organis, necesse est quod earum actus impediantur, et per consequens rationis usus. In pueris autem est impedimentum harum virium, propter nimiam humiditatem cerebri. Et ideo in eis non est perfectus usus rationis, sicut nec aliorum membrorum. Et ideo pueri in statu innocentiae non habuissent perfectum usum rationis, sicut habituri erant in perfecta aetate. Habuissent tamen perfectiorem quam nunc, quantum ad ea quae ad eos pertinebant quantum ad statum illum; sicut et de usu membrorum superius est dictum. | I answer that, As above stated (Question [84], Article [7]), the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained above regarding the use of their limbs (Question [99], Article [1]). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aggravatio additur ex corruptione corporis in hoc, quod usus rationis impeditur quantum ad ea etiam quae pertinent ad hominem secundum quamcumque aetatem. | Reply to Objection 1: The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam alia animalia non habent ita perfectum usum industriae naturalis statim a principio, sicut postea. Quod ex hoc patet, quod aves docent volare pullos suos, et similia in aliis generibus animalium inveniuntur. Et tamen in homine est speciale impedimentum propter abundantiam humiditatis cerebri, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above (Question [99], Article [1]). |