Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 106 [<< | >>]
Deinde considerandum est quomodo una creatura moveat aliam. Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita, ut
|
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 106 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus non illuminet alium. Angeli enim eandem beatitudinem possident nunc, quam nos in futuro expectamus. Sed tunc unus homo non illuminabit alium; secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, non docebit ultra vir proximum suum, et vir fratrem suum. Ergo etiam neque nunc unus Angelus illuminat alium. | Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain. But one man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother." Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now. |
| Praeterea, triplex est lumen in Angelis, naturae, gratiae et gloriae. Sed Angelus illuminatur lumine naturae, a creante; lumine gratiae, a iustificante; lumine gloriae, a beatificante; quod totum Dei est. Ergo unus Angelus non illuminat alium. | Objection 2: Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes from God. Therefore one angel does not enlighten another. |
| Praeterea, lumen est forma quaedam mentis. Sed mens rationalis a solo Deo formatur, nulla interposita creatura, ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest. Ergo unus Angelus non illuminat mentem alterius. | Objection 3: Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational mind is "informed by God alone, without created intervention," as Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another. |
| Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod Angeli secundae hierarchiae purgantur et illuminantur et perficiuntur per Angelos primae hierarchiae. | On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the angels of the first hierarchy." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod unus Angelus illuminat alium. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod lumen, secundum quod ad intellectum pertinet, nihil est aliud quam quaedam manifestatio veritatis; secundum illud ad Ephes. V, omne quod manifestatur, lumen est. Unde illuminare nihil aliud est quam manifestationem cognitae veritatis alteri tradere; secundum quem modum apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. III, mihi, omnium sanctorum minimo, data est gratia haec, illuminare omnes quae sit dispensatio sacramenti absconditi a saeculis in Deo. Sic igitur unus Angelus dicitur illuminare alium, inquantum ei manifestat veritatem quam ipse cognoscit. Unde Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod theologi plane monstrant caelestium substantiarum ornatus a supremis mentibus doceri deificas scientias. | I answer that, One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation of truth, according to Eph. 5:13: "All that is made manifest is light." Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth; according to the Apostle (Eph. 3:8): "To me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God." Therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds." |
| Cum autem ad intelligendum duo concurrant, ut supra diximus, scilicet virtus intellectiva, et similitudo rei intellectae; secundum haec duo unus Angelus alteri veritatem notam notificare potest. Primo quidem, fortificando virtutem intellectivam eius. Sicut enim virtus imperfectioris corporis confortatur ex situali propinquitate perfectioris corporis, ut minus calidum crescit in calore ex praesentia magis calidi; ita virtus intellectiva inferioris Angeli confortatur ex conversione superioris Angeli ad ipsum. Hoc enim facit in spiritualibus ordo conversionis, quod facit in corporalibus ordo localis propinquitatis. Secundo autem unus Angelus alteri manifestat veritatem, ex parte similitudinis intellectae. Superior enim Angelus notitiam veritatis accipit in universali quadam conceptione, ad quam capiendam inferioris Angeli intellectus non esset sufficiens, sed est ei connaturale ut magis particulariter veritatem accipiat. Superior ergo Angelus veritatem quam universaliter concipit, quodammodo distinguit, ut ab inferiori capi possit; et sic eam cognoscendam illi proponit. Sicut etiam apud nos, doctores, quod in summa capiunt, multipliciter distinguunt, providentes capacitati aliorum. Et hoc est quod Dionysius dicit, XV cap. Cael. Hier., unaquaeque substantia intellectualis datam sibi a diviniore uniformem intelligentiam, provida virtute dividit et multiplicat, ad inferioris sursum ductricem analogiam. | Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have said (Question [105], Article [3]), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify the known truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened by the neighborhood of a more perfect body —for instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Secondly, one angel manifests the truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards by analogy." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes Angeli, tam superiores quam inferiores, immediate vident Dei essentiam; et quantum ad hoc, unus non docet alium. De hac enim doctrina propheta loquitur, unde dicit non docebit vir fratrem suum, dicens, cognosce dominum. Omnes enim cognoscent me, a minimo eorum usque ad maximum. Sed rationes divinorum operum, quae in Deo cognoscuntur sicut in causa, omnes quidem Deus in seipso cognoscit, quia seipsum comprehendit, aliorum vero Deum videntium tanto unusquisque in Deo plures rationes cognoscit, quanto eum perfectius videt. Unde superior Angelus plura in Deo de rationibus divinorum operum cognoscit quam inferior; et de his eum illuminat. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod Angeli existentium illuminantur rationibus. | Reply to Objection 1: All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another. It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: "They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know the Lord': for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the greatest." But all the types of the Divine works, which are known in God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He comprehends Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the latter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by the types of existing things." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod unus Angelus non illuminat alium tradendo ei lumen naturae vel gratiae vel gloriae; sed confortando lumen naturale ipsius, et manifestando ei veritatem de his quae pertinent ad statum naturae, gratiae et gloriae, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod rationalis mens formatur immediate a Deo, vel sicut imago ab exemplari, quia non est facta ad alterius imaginem quam Dei, vel sicut subiectum ab ultima forma completiva, quia semper mens creata reputatur informis, nisi ipsi primae veritati inhaereat. Aliae vero illuminationes, quae sunt ab homine vel Angelo, sunt quasi dispositiones ad ultimam formam | Reply to Objection 3: The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the created mind is always considered to be unformed, except it adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, dispositions to this ultimate form. |
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 106 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus possit movere voluntatem alterius. Quia secundum Dionysium, sicut unus Angelus illuminat alium, ita purgat et perficit; ut patet ex auctoritate supra inducta. Sed purgatio et perfectio videntur pertinere ad voluntatem, nam purgatio videtur esse a sordibus culpae, quae pertinet ad voluntatem; perfectio autem videtur esse per consecutionem finis, qui est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo unus Angelus potest movere voluntatem alterius. | Objection 1: It would seem that one angel can move another angel's will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above (Article [1]), as one angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel's will. |
| Praeterea, sicut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier., nomina Angelorum designant eorum proprietates. Seraphim autem incendentes dicuntur, aut calefacientes, quod est per amorem, qui ad voluntatem pertinet. Unus ergo Angelus movet voluntatem alterius. | Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "The names of the angels designate their properties." Now the Seraphim are so called because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another angel's will. |
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod appetitus superior movet appetitum inferiorem. Sed sicut intellectus Angeli superioris superior est, ita etiam appetitus. Ergo videtur quod superior Angelus possit immutare voluntatem alterius. | Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can change the will of another angel. |
| Sed contra, eius est immutare voluntatem, cuius est iustificare, cum iustitia sit rectitudo voluntatis. Sed solus Deus est qui iustificat. Ergo unus Angelus non potest mutare voluntatem alterius. | On the contrary, To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of the will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change another angel's will. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, voluntas immutatur dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte obiecti; alio modo ex parte ipsius potentiae. Ex parte quidem obiecti, movet voluntatem et ipsum bonum quod est voluntatis obiectum, sicut appetibile movet appetitum; et ille qui demonstrat obiectum, puta qui demonstrat aliquid esse bonum. Sed sicut supra dictum est, alia quidem bona aliqualiter inclinant voluntatem; sed nihil sufficienter movet voluntatem, nisi bonum universale, quod est Deus. Et hoc bonum solus ipse ostendit, ut per essentiam videatur a beatis, qui dicenti Moysi, ostende mihi gloriam tuam, respondit, ego ostendam tibi omne bonum, ut habetur Exod. XXXIII. Angelus ergo non sufficienter movet voluntatem, neque ut obiectum, neque ut ostendens obiectum. Sed inclinat eam, ut amabile quoddam, et ut manifestans aliqua bona creata ordinata in Dei bonitatem. Et per hoc inclinare potest ad amorem creaturae vel Dei, per modum suadentis. | I answer that, As was said above (Question [105], Article [4]), the will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both the good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points out the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good. But as we have said above (Question [105], Article [4]), other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God. And this good He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: "Show me Thy glory," answered: "I will show thee all good" (Ex. 33:18,19). Therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to God's goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion. |
| Ex parte vero ipsius potentiae, voluntas nullo modo potest moveri nisi a Deo. Operatio enim voluntatis est inclinatio quaedam volentis in volitum. Hanc autem inclinationem solus ille immutare potest, qui virtutem volendi creaturae contulit, sicut et naturalem inclinationem solum illud agens potest mutare, quod potest dare virtutem quam consequitur inclinatio naturalis. Solus autem Deus est qui potentiam volendi tribuit creaturae, quia ipse solus est auctor intellectualis naturae. Unde unus Angelus voluntatem alterius movere non potest. | But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will: just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's will. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum modum illuminationis, est accipienda et purgatio et perfectio. Et quia Deus illuminat immutando intellectum et voluntatem, purgat a defectibus intellectus et voluntatis, et perficit in finem intellectus et voluntatis. Angeli autem illuminatio refertur ad intellectum, ut dictum est. Et ideo etiam purgatio Angeli intelligitur a defectu intellectus, qui est nescientia; perfectio autem est consummatio in finem intellectus, qui est veritas cognita. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, VI cap. Eccl. Hier., quod in caelesti hierarchia purgatio est in subiectis essentiis tanquam ignotorum illuminatio in perfectiorem eas scientiam ducens. Sicut si dicamus visum corporalem purgari, inquantum removentur tenebrae; illuminari vero, inquantum perfunditur lumine; perfici vero, secundum quod perducitur ad cognitionem colorati. | Reply to Objection 1: Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. But the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as explained above (Article [1]); therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience in the intellect; and as perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that "in the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening of things unknown, that leads them to more perfect knowledge." For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the colored object. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod unus Angelus potest inducere alium ad amorem Dei per modum persuadentis, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion as explained above. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de appetitu inferiori sensitivo, qui potest moveri a superiori intellectivo, quia pertinet ad eandem naturam animae, et quia inferior appetitus est virtus in organo corporali. Quod in Angelis locum non habet. | Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does not apply to the angels. |
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 106 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus inferior superiorem illuminare possit. Ecclesiastica enim hierarchia derivata est a caelesti, et eam repraesentat, unde et superna Ierusalem dicitur mater nostra, Gal. IV. Sed in Ecclesia etiam superiores illuminantur ab inferioribus et docentur; secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. XIV, potestis omnes per singulos prophetare, ut omnes discant, et omnes exhortentur. Ergo et in caelesti hierarchia superiores ab inferioribus possunt illuminari. | Objection 1: It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called "our mother" (Gal. 4:26). But in the Church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:31): "You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted." Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened by inferiors. |
| Praeterea, sicut ordo corporalium substantiarum dependet ex Dei voluntate, ita et ordo substantiarum spiritualium. Sed sicut dictum est, Deus quandoque praeter ordinem substantiarum corporalium operatur. Ergo quandoque etiam operatur praeter ordinem spiritualium substantiarum, illuminando inferiores non per medios superiores. Sic ergo inferiores illuminati a Deo, possunt superiores illuminare. | Objection 2: Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. But, as was said above (Question [105], Article [6]), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the order of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors enlightened by God can enlighten superiors. |
| Praeterea, unus Angelus alium illuminat, ad quem se convertit, ut supra dictum est. Sed cum ista conversio sit voluntaria, potest supremus Angelus ad infimum se convertere, mediis praetermissis. Ergo potest eum immediate illuminare, et ita potest illuminare superiores. | Objection 3: Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as was above explained (Article [1]). But since this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others. Therefore he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can enlighten his superiors. |
| Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit hanc legem esse divinitatis immobiliter firmatam, ut inferiora reducantur in Deum per superiora. | On the contrary, Dionysius says that "this is the Divine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior" (Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod inferiores Angeli nunquam illuminant superiores, sed semper ab eis illuminantur. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut supra dictum est, ordo continetur sub ordine, sicut causa continetur sub causa. Unde sicut ordinatur causa ad causam, ita ordo ad ordinem. Et ideo non est inconveniens, si aliquando aliquid fiat praeter ordinem inferioris causae, ad ordinandum in superiorem causam, sicut in rebus humanis praetermittitur mandatum praesidis, ut obediatur principi. Et ita contingit ut praeter ordinem naturae corporalis, aliquid Deus miraculose operetur, ad ordinandum homines in eius cognitionem. Sed praetermissio ordinis qui debetur spiritualibus substantiis, in nullo pertinet ad ordinationem hominum in Deum, cum operationes Angelorum non sint nobis manifestae, sicut operationes visibilium corporum. Et ideo ordo qui convenit spiritualibus substantiis, nunquam a Deo praetermittitur, quin semper inferiora moveantur per superiora, et non e converso. | I answer that, The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above explained (Question [105], Article [6]), one order is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior cause, as in human affairs the command of the president is passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God works miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made known to us; as are the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so that the inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ecclesiastica hierarchia imitatur caelestem aliqualiter, sed non perfecte consequitur eius similitudinem. In caelesti enim hierarchia tota ratio ordinis est ex propinquitate ad Deum. Et ideo illi qui sunt Deo propinquiores, sunt et gradu sublimiores, et scientia clariores, et propter hoc superiores nunquam ab inferioribus illuminantur. Sed in ecclesiastica hierarchia, interdum qui sunt Deo per sanctitatem propinquiores, sunt gradu infimi, et scientia non eminentes, et quidam in uno etiam secundum scientiam eminent, et in alio deficiunt. Et propter hoc superiores ab inferioribus doceri possunt. | Reply to Objection 1: The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in some degree, but by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly hierarchy the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God in sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science, and fail in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod non est similis ratio de hoc quod Deus agat praeter ordinem naturae corporalis, et naturae spiritualis, ut dictum est. Unde ratio non sequitur. | Reply to Objection 2: As above explained, there is no similarity between what God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual nature. Hence the argument does not hold. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Angelus voluntate convertitur ad alium Angelum illuminandum; sed voluntas Angeli semper regulatur lege divina, quae ordinem in Angelis instituit. | Reply to Objection 3: An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel, but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made the order in the angels. |
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 106 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus superior non illuminet inferiorem de omnibus quae ipse novit. Dicit enim Dionysius, XII cap. Cael. Hier., quod Angeli superiores habent scientiam magis universalem, inferiores vero magis particularem et subiectam. Sed plura continentur sub scientia universali quam sub particulari. Ergo non omnia quae sciunt superiores Angeli, cognoscunt inferiores per superiorum illuminationem. | Objection 1: It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the superior angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being enlightened by the former. |
| Praeterea, Magister dicit, in XI distinctione II Sent., quod superiores Angeli cognoverunt a saeculis mysterium incarnationis, inferioribus vero ignotum fuit usquequo completum est. Quod videtur per hoc quod, quibusdam Angelis quaerentibus, quis est iste rex gloriae? Quasi ignorantibus, alii respondent, quasi scientes, dominus virtutum ipse est rex gloriae, ut Dionysius exponit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Hoc autem non esset, si superiores Angeli illuminarent inferiores de omnibus quae ipsi cognoscunt. Non ergo eos illuminant de omnibus sibi notis. | Objection 2: Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation, whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, as it were, in ignorance: "Who is this King of glory?" other angels, who knew, answered: "The Lord of Hosts, He is the King of glory," as Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the superior angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves. Therefore they do not do so. |
| Praeterea, si omnia superiores Angeli inferioribus annuntiant quae cognoscunt, nihil inferioribus ignotum remanet, quod superiores cognoscant. Non ergo de cetero superiores poterunt illuminare inferiores. Quod videtur inconveniens. Non ergo superiores de omnibus inferiores illuminant. | Objection 3: Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears open to objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, quod in illa caelesti patria, licet quaedam data sint excellenter, nihil tamen possidetur singulariter. Et Dionysius dicit, XV cap. Cael. Hier., quod unaquaeque caelestis essentia intelligentiam sibi a superiori datam, inferiori communicat; ut patet ex auctoritate supra inducta. | On the contrary, Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf. Gregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: "In that heavenly country, though there are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually." And Dionysius says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the inferior the gift derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above (Article [1]). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod omnes creaturae ex divina bonitate participant ut bonum quod habent, in alia diffundant, nam de ratione boni est quod se aliis communicet. Et inde est etiam quod agentia corporalia similitudinem suam aliis tradunt, quantum possibile est. Quanto igitur aliqua agentia magis in participatione divinae bonitatis constituuntur, tanto magis perfectiones suas nituntur in alios transfundere, quantum possibile est. Unde beatus Petrus monet eos qui divinam bonitatem per gratiam participant, dicens, I Petr. IV, unusquisque, sicut accepit gratiam, in alterutrum illam administrantes, sicut boni dispensatores multiformis gratiae Dei. Multo igitur magis sancti Angeli, qui sunt in plenissima participatione divinae bonitatis, quidquid a Deo percipiunt, subiectis impartiuntur. | I answer that, Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So the more an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfections to others as far as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace share in the Divine goodness; saying: "As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards of the manifold grace of God" (1 Pt. 4:10). Much more therefore do the holy angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine goodness, impart the same to those below them. |
| Non tamen recipitur ab inferioribus ita excellenter sicut est in superioribus. Et ideo superiores semper remanent in altiori ordine, et perfectiorem scientiam habentes. Sicut unam et eandem rem plenius intelligit magister, quam discipulus qui ab eo addiscit. | Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master understands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod superiorum Angelorum scientia dicitur esse universalior, quantum ad eminentiorem modum intelligendi. | Reply to Objection 1: The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Magistri non sic est intelligendum, quod inferiores Angeli penitus ignoraverint mysterium incarnationis; sed quia non ita plene cognoverunt sicut superiores, et in eius cognitione postmodum profecerunt, dum illud mysterium impleretur. | Reply to Objection 2: The Master's words are not to be understood as if the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards when the Mystery was accomplished. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, usque ad diem iudicii, semper nova aliqua supremis Angelis revelantur divinitus de his quae pertinent ad dispositionem mundi, et praecipue ad salutem electorum. Unde semper remanet unde superiores Angeli inferiores illuminent. | Reply to Objection 3: Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to the inferior. |