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| Deinde considerandum est de ordinatione Angelorum secundum hierarchias et ordines, dictum est enim quod superiores inferiores illuminant, et non e converso. | We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders; for it was said above (Question [106], Article [3]), that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely. |
| Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. | Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum omnes Angeli sint unius hierarchiae. | (1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy? |
| Secundo, utrum in una hierarchia sit unus tantum ordo. | (2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order? |
| Tertio, utrum in uno ordine sint plures Angeli. | (3) Whether in one order there are many angels? |
| Quarto, utrum distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum sit a natura. | (4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural? |
| Quinto, de nominibus et proprietatibus singulorum ordinum. | (5) Of the names and properties of each order. |
| Sexto, de comparatione ordinum ad invicem. | (6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another. |
| Septimo, utrum ordines durent post diem iudicii. | (7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment? |
| Octavo, utrum homines assumantur ad ordines Angelorum | (8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders? |
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Question: 108 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes Angeli sint unius hierarchiae. Cum enim Angeli sint supremi inter creaturas, oportet dicere quod sint optime dispositi. Sed optima dispositio est multitudinis secundum quod continetur sub uno principatu; ut patet per philosophum, XII Metaphys., et in III Politic. Cum ergo hierarchia nihil sit aliud quam sacer principatus, videtur quod omnes Angeli sint unius hierarchiae. | Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality, it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. |
| Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, in III cap. Cael. Hier., quod hierarchia est ordo, scientia et actio. Sed omnes Angeli conveniunt in uno ordine ad Deum, quem cognoscunt, et a quo in suis actionibus regulantur. Ergo omnes Angeli sunt unius hierarchiae. | Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that "hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action." But all the angels agree in one order towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy. |
| Praeterea, sacer principatus, qui dicitur hierarchia, invenitur in hominibus et Angelis. Sed omnes homines sunt unius hierarchiae. Ergo etiam omnes Angeli sunt unius hierarchiae. | Objection 3: Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy. Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy. |
| Sed contra est quod Dionysius, VI cap. Cael. Hier., distinguit tres hierarchias Angelorum. | On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three hierarchies of angels. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod hierarchia est sacer principatus, ut dictum est. In nomine autem principatus duo intelliguntur, scilicet ipse princeps, et multitudo ordinata sub principe. Quia igitur unus est Deus princeps non solum omnium Angelorum, sed etiam hominum, et totius creaturae; ideo non solum omnium Angelorum, sed etiam totius rationalis creaturae, quae sacrorum particeps esse potest, una est hierarchia, secundum quod Augustinus dicit, in XII de Civ. Dei duas esse civitates, hoc est societates, unam in bonis Angelis et hominibus, alteram in malis. Sed si consideretur principatus ex parte multitudinis ordinatae sub principe, sic unus principatus dicitur secundum quod multitudo uno et eodem modo potest gubernationem principis recipere. Quae vero non possunt secundum eundem modum gubernari a principe, ad diversos principatus pertinent, sicut sub uno rege sunt diversae civitates, quae diversis reguntur legibus et ministris. Manifestum est autem quod homines alio modo divinas illuminationes percipiunt quam Angeli, nam Angeli percipiunt eas in intelligibili puritate, homines vero percipiunt eas sub sensibilium similitudinibus, ut Dionysius dicit I cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo oportuit distingui humanam hierarchiam ab angelica. Et per eundem modum in Angelis tres hierarchiae distinguuntur. Dictum est enim supra, dum de cognitione Angelorum ageretur, quod superiores Angeli habent universaliorem cognitionem veritatis quam inferiores. Huiusmodi autem universalis acceptio cognitionis secundum tres gradus in Angelis distingui potest. Possunt enim rationes rerum de quibus Angeli illuminantur, considerari tripliciter. Primo quidem, secundum quod procedunt a primo principio universali, quod est Deus, et iste modus convenit primae hierarchiae, quae immediate ad Deum extenditur, et quasi in vestibulis Dei collocatur, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Secundo vero, prout huiusmodi rationes dependent ab universalibus causis creatis, quae iam aliquo modo multiplicantur, et hic modus convenit secundae hierarchiae. Tertio autem modo, secundum quod huiusmodi rationes applicantur singulis rebus, et prout dependent a propriis causis, et hic modus convenit infimae hierarchiae. Quod plenius patebit, cum de singulis ordinibus agetur. Sic igitur distinguuntur hierarchiae ex parte multitudinis subiectae. | I answer that, Hierarchy means a "sacred" principality, as above explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself and the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also of men and all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but also of all rational creatures, who can be participators of sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): "There are two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked." But if we consider the principality on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality is said to be "one" accordingly as the multitude can be subject in "one" way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince belong to different principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities, which are governed by different laws and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels; for the angels receive them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same manner we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown above (Question [55], Article [3]), in treating of the angelic knowledge, that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels. This universal knowledge has three grades among the angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner. First as preceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, "as it were, placed in the vestibule of God," as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created causes which in some way are already multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things as depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat of each of the orders (Article [6]). In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the multitude of subjects. |
| Unde manifestum est eos errare, et contra intentionem Dionysii loqui, qui ponunt in divinis personis hierarchiam quam vocant supercaelestem. In divinis enim personis est quidam ordo naturae, sed non hierarchiae. Nam, ut Dionysius dicit III cap. Cael. Hier., ordo hierarchiae est alios quidem purgari et illuminari et perfici, alios autem purgare et illuminare et perficere. Quod absit ut in divinis personis ponamus. | Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, and call it the "supercelestial" hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is no hierarchical order, for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): "The hierarchical order is so directed that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected; and that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect"; which far be it from us to apply to the Divine Persons. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de principatu ex parte principis, quia optimum est quod multitudo regatur ab uno principe, ut philosophus in praedictis locis intendit. | Reply to Objection 1: This objection considers principality on the part of the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as the Philosopher asserts in those passages. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, quantum ad cognitionem ipsius Dei, quem omnes uno modo, scilicet per essentiam, vident, non distinguuntur in Angelis hierarchiae, sed quantum ad rationes rerum creatarum, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one way—that is, in His essence—there is no hierarchical distinction among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the types of created things, as above explained. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes homines sunt unius speciei, et unus modus intelligendi est eis connaturalis, non sic autem est in Angelis. Unde non est similis ratio. | Reply to Objection 3: All men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and hence the same argument does not apply to both. |
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Question: 108 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in una hierarchia non sint plures ordines. Multiplicata enim definitione, multiplicatur et definitum. Sed hierarchia, ut Dionysius dicit, est ordo. Si ergo sunt multi ordines, non erit una hierarchia, sed multae. | Objection 1: It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there is not one hierarchy only, but many. |
| Praeterea, diversi ordines sunt diversi gradus. Sed gradus in spiritualibus constituuntur secundum diversa dona spiritualia. Sed in Angelis omnia dona spiritualia sunt communia, quia nihil ibi singulariter possidetur. Ergo non sunt diversi ordines Angelorum. | Objection 2: Further, different orders are different grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is possessed individually" (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore there are not different orders of angels. |
| Praeterea, in ecclesiastica hierarchia distinguuntur ordines secundum purgare, illuminare et perficere, nam ordo diaconorum est purgativus, sacerdotum illuminativus, episcoporum perfectivus, ut Dionysius dicit V cap. Eccles. Hier. Sed quilibet Angelus purgat, illuminat et perficit. Non ergo est distinctio ordinum in Angelis. | Objection 3: Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are distinguished according to the actions of "cleansing," "enlightening," and "perfecting." For the order of deacons is "cleansing," the order of priests, is "enlightening," and of bishops "perfecting," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no distinction of orders among the angels. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit ad Ephes. I, quod Deus constituit Christum hominem supra omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem; qui sunt diversi ordines Angelorum, et quidam eorum ad unam hierarchiam pertinent, ut infra patebit. | On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) that "God has set the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion": which are the various orders of the angels, and some of them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained (Article [6]). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, una hierarchia est unus principatus, idest una multitudo ordinata uno modo sub principis gubernatione. Non autem esset multitudo ordinata, sed confusa, si in multitudine diversi ordines non essent. Ipsa ergo ratio hierarchiae requirit ordinum diversitatem. | I answer that, As explained above, one hierarchy is one principality—that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince. Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy requires diversity of orders. |
| Quae quidem diversitas ordinum secundum diversa officia et actus consideratur. Sicut patet quod in una civitate sunt diversi ordines secundum diversos actus, nam alius est ordo iudicantium, alius pugnantium, alius laborantium in agris, et sic de aliis. | This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and actions, as appears in one city where there are different orders according to the different actions; for there is one order of those who judge, and another of those who fight, and another of those who labor in the fields, and so forth. |
| Sed quamvis multi sint unius civitatis ordines, omnes tamen ad tres possunt reduci, secundum quod quaelibet multitudo perfecta habet principium, medium et finem. Unde et in civitatibus triplex ordo hominum invenitur, quidam enim sunt supremi, ut optimates; quidam autem sunt infimi, ut vilis populus; quidam autem sunt medii, ut populus honorabilis. Sic igitur et in qualibet hierarchia angelica ordines distinguuntur secundum diversos actus et officia; et omnis ista diversitas ad tria reducitur, scilicet ad summum, medium et infimum. Et propter hoc in qualibet hierarchia Dionysius ponit tres ordines. | But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has a beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as the nobles; others are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between these, as the middle-class [populus honorabilis]. In the same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three—namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so in every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ordo dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, ipsa ordinatio comprehendens sub se diversos gradus, et hoc modo hierarchia dicitur ordo. Alio modo dicitur ordo gradus unus, et sic dicuntur plures ordines unius hierarchiae, | Reply to Objection 1: Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy is called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are so called. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod in societate Angelorum omnia possidentur communiter; sed tamen quaedam excellentius habentur a quibusdam quam ab aliis. Unumquodque autem perfectius habetur ab eo qui potest illud communicare, quam ab eo qui non potest, sicut perfectius est calidum quod potest calefacere, quam quod non potest; et perfectius scit qui potest docere, quam qui non potest. Et quanto perfectius donum aliquis communicare potest, tanto in perfectiori gradu est, sicut in perfectiori gradu magisterii est qui potest docere altiorem scientiam. Et secundum hanc similitudinem consideranda est diversitas graduum vel ordinum in Angelis, secundum diversa officia et actus. | Reply to Objection 2: All things are possessed in common by the angelic society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some than by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate it; as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone can communicate a gift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among the angels, according to their different offices and actions. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod inferior Angelus est superior supremo homine nostrae hierarchiae; secundum illud Matth. XI, qui minor est in regno caelorum, maior est illo, scilicet Ioanne Baptista, quo nullus maior inter natos mulierum surrexit. Unde minor Angelus caelestis hierarchiae potest non solum purgare sed illuminare et perficere, et altiori modo quam ordines nostrae hierarchiae. Et sic secundum distinctionem harum actionum non distinguuntur caelestes ordines; sed secundum alias differentias actionum. | Reply to Objection 3: The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our hierarchy, according to the words, "He that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven, is greater than he"—namely, John the Baptist, than whom "there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of women" (Mt. 11:11). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts. |
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Article: 3 [<< | >>]
| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in uno ordine non sint plures Angeli. Dictum est enim supra omnes Angelos inaequales esse ad invicem. Sed unius ordinis esse dicuntur quae sunt aequalia. Ergo plures Angeli non sunt unius ordinis. | Objection 1: It seems that there are not many angels in one order. For it was shown above (Question [50], Article [4]), that all the angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many angels in one order. |
| Praeterea, quod potest sufficienter fieri per unum, superfluum est quod fiat per multa. Sed illud quod pertinet ad unum officium angelicum, sufficienter potest fieri per unum Angelum; multo magis quam per unum solem sufficienter fit quod pertinet ad officium solis, quanto perfectior est Angelus caelesti corpore. Si ergo ordines distinguuntur secundum officia, ut dictum est, superfluum est quod sint plures Angeli unius ordinis. | Objection 2: Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs to the office of the sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, therefore, the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated above (Article [2]), several angels in one order would be superfluous. |
| Praeterea, supra dictum est quod omnes Angeli sunt inaequales. Si ergo plures Angeli sint unius ordinis, puta tres vel quatuor, infimus superioris ordinis magis conveniet cum supremo inferioris quam cum supremo sui ordinis. Et sic non videtur quod magis sit unius ordinis cum hoc, quam cum illo. Non igitur sunt plures Angeli unius ordinis. | Objection 3: Further, it was said above (OBJ 1) that all the angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or four), are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than with the highest of his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than with the former. Therefore there are not many angels of one order. |
| Sed contra est quod Isaiae VI dicitur, quod Seraphim clamabant alter ad alterum. Sunt ergo plures Angeli in uno ordine Seraphim. | On the contrary, It is written: "The Seraphim cried to one another" (Is. 6:3). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the Seraphim. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ille qui perfecte cognoscit res aliquas, potest usque ad minima et actus et virtutes et naturas earum distinguere. Qui autem cognoscit eas imperfecte, non potest distinguere nisi in universali, quae quidem distinctio fit per pauciora. Sicut qui imperfecte cognoscit res naturales, distinguit earum ordines in universali, ponens in uno ordine caelestia corpora, in alio corpora inferiora inanimata, in alio plantas, in alio animalia, qui autem perfectius cognosceret res naturales, posset distinguere et in ipsis corporibus caelestibus diversos ordines, et in singulis aliorum. | I answer that, Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points. Thus, one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another; whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and in each of the other orders. |
| Nos autem imperfecte Angelos cognoscimus, et eorum officia, ut Dionysius dicit VI cap. Cael. Hier. Unde non possumus distinguere officia et ordines Angelorum, nisi in communi; secundum quem modum, multi Angeli sub uno ordine continentur. Si autem perfecte cognosceremus officia Angelorum, et eorum distinctiones, perfecte sciremus quod quilibet Angelus habet suum proprium officium et suum proprium ordinem in rebus, multo magis quam quaelibet stella, etsi nos lateat. | Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much more so than any star, though this be hidden from us. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes Angeli unius ordinis sunt aliquo modo aequales, quantum ad communem similitudinem secundum quam constituuntur in uno ordine, sed simpliciter non sunt aequales. Unde Dionysius dicit, X cap. Cael. Hier., quod in uno et eodem ordine Angelorum, est accipere primos, medios et ultimos. | Reply to Objection 1: All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who are first, middle, and last. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod illa specialis distinctio ordinum et officiorum secundum quam quilibet Angelus habet proprium officium et ordinem, est nobis ignota. | Reply to Objection 2: That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in superficie quae partim est alba et partim nigra, duae partes quae sunt in confinio albi et nigri, magis conveniunt secundum situm quam aliquae duae partes albae, minus tamen secundum qualitatem; ita duo Angeli qui sunt in terminis duorum ordinum, magis secum conveniunt secundum propinquitatem naturae, quam unus eorum cum aliquibus aliis sui ordinis; minus autem secundum idoneitatem ad similia officia, quae quidem idoneitas usque ad aliquem certum terminum protenditur. | Reply to Objection 3: As in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin in their fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit. |
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Question: 108 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum non sit a natura in Angelis. Hierarchia enim dicitur sacer principatus, et in definitione eius Dionysius ponit quod deiforme, quantum possibile est, similat. Sed sanctitas et deiformitas est in Angelis per gratiam, non per naturam. Ergo distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum in Angelis est per gratiam, non per naturam. | Objection 1: It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is "a sacred principality," and Dionysius places in its definition that it "approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be" (Coel. Hier. iii). But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not by nature. Therefore the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature. |
| Praeterea, Seraphim dicuntur ardentes, vel incendentes, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Hoc autem videtur ad caritatem pertinere, quae non est a natura, sed a gratia, diffunditur enim in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis, ut dicitur ad Rom. V. Quod non solum ad sanctos homines pertinet, sed etiam de sanctis Angelis dici potest, ut Augustinus dicit XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo ordines in Angelis non sunt a natura, sed a gratia. | Objection 2: Further, the Seraphim are called "burning" or "kindling," as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which comes not from nature but from grace; for "it is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" (Rm. 5:5): "which is said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic orders are not from nature, but from grace. |
| Praeterea, hierarchia ecclesiastica exemplatur a caelesti. Sed ordines in hominibus non sunt per naturam, sed per donum gratiae, non enim est a natura quod unus est episcopus, et alius est sacerdos, et alius diaconus. Ergo neque in Angelis sunt ordines a natura, sed a gratia tantum. | Objection 3: Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore neither in the angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only. |
| Sed contra est quod Magister dicit, IX dist. II Sent., quod ordo Angelorum dicitur multitudo caelestium spirituum, qui inter se aliquo munere gratiae similantur, sicut et naturalium datorum participatione conveniunt. Distinctio ergo ordinum in Angelis est non solum secundum dona gratuita, sed etiam secundum dona naturalia. | On the contrary, The Master says (ii, D. 9) that "an angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts." Therefore the distinction of orders among the angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ordo gubernationis, qui est ordo multitudinis sub principatu existentis, attenditur per respectum ad finem. Finis autem Angelorum potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum facultatem suae naturae, ut scilicet cognoscant et ament Deum naturali cognitione et amore. Et secundum respectum ad hunc finem, distinguuntur ordines Angelorum secundum naturalia dona. Alio modo potest accipi finis angelicae multitudinis supra naturalem facultatem eorum, qui consistit in visione divinae essentiae, et in immobili fruitione bonitatis ipsius; ad quem finem pertingere non possunt nisi per gratiam. Unde secundum respectum ad hunc finem, ordines distinguuntur in Angelis completive quidem secundum dona gratuita, dispositive autem secundum dona naturalia, quia Angelis data sunt dona gratuita secundum capacitatem naturalium, quod non est in hominibus, ut supra dictum est. Unde in hominibus distinguuntur ordines secundum dona gratuita tantum, et non secundum naturam. | I answer that, The order of government, which is the order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the angels may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly, the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (Question [62], Article [6]). Hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | From the above the replies to the objections are evident. |
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Question: 108 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ordines Angelorum non convenienter nominentur. Omnes enim caelestes spiritus dicuntur et Angeli et virtutes caelestes. Sed nomina communia inconvenienter aliquibus appropriantur. Ergo inconvenienter nominatur unus ordo Angelorum, et alius virtutum. | Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly named. |
| Praeterea, esse dominum est proprium Dei; secundum illud Psal. XCIX scitote quoniam dominus ipse est Deus. Ergo inconvenienter unus ordo caelestium spirituum dominationes vocatur. | Objection 2: Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the words, "Know ye that the Lord He is God" (Ps. 99:3). Therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called "Dominations." |
| Praeterea, nomen dominationis ad gubernationem pertinere videtur. Similiter autem et nomen principatuum, et potestatum. Inconvenienter ergo tribus ordinibus haec tria nomina imponuntur. | Objection 3: Further, the name "Domination" seems to imply government and likewise the names "Principalities" and "Powers." Therefore these three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders. |
| Praeterea, Archangeli dicuntur quasi principes Angeli. Non ergo hoc nomen debet imponi alii ordini quam ordini principatuum. | Objection 4: Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the "Principalities." |
| Praeterea, nomen Seraphim imponitur ab ardore qui ad caritatem pertinet, nomen autem Cherubim imponitur a scientia. Caritas autem et scientia sunt dona communia omnibus Angelis. Non ergo debent esse nomina specialium ordinum. | Objection 5: Further, the name "Seraphim" is derived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name "Cherubim" from knowledge. But charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders. |
| Praeterea, throni dicuntur sedes. Sed ex hoc ipso Deus in creatura rationali sedere dicitur, quod ipsum cognoscit et amat. Non ergo debet esse alius ordo thronorum ab ordine Cherubim et Seraphim. Sic igitur videtur quod inconvenienter ordines Angelorum nominentur. | Objection 6: Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it. Therefore there ought not to be any order of "Thrones" besides the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim." Therefore it appears that the orders of angels are not properly styled. |
| Sed contra est auctoritas sacrae Scripturae, quae sic eos nominat. Nomen enim Seraphim ponitur Isaiae VI; nomen Cherubim Ezech. I; nomen thronorum, Coloss. I; dominationes autem et virtutes et potestates et principatus ponuntur Ephes. I; nomen autem Archangeli ponitur in canonica Iudae, nomina autem Angelorum in pluribus Scripturae locis. | On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so named. For the name "Seraphim" is found in Is. 6:2; the name "Cherubim" in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); "Thrones" in Col. 1:16; "Dominations," "Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are mentioned in Eph. 1:21; the name "Archangels" in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name "Angels" is found in many places of Scripture. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod in nominatione angelicorum ordinum, considerare oportet quod propria nomina singulorum ordinum proprietates eorum designant, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ad videndum autem quae sit proprietas cuiuslibet ordinis, considerare oportet quod in rebus ordinatis tripliciter aliquid esse contingit, scilicet per proprietatem, per excessum, et per participationem. Per proprietatem autem dicitur esse aliquid in re aliqua, quod adaequatur et proportionatur naturae ipsius. Per excessum autem, quando illud quod attribuitur alicui, est minus quam res cui attribuitur, sed tamen convenit illi rei per quendam excessum; sicut dictum est de omnibus nominibus quae attribuuntur Deo. Per participationem autem, quando illud quod attribuitur alicui, non plenarie invenitur in eo, sed deficienter; sicut sancti homines participative dicuntur dii. Si ergo aliquid nominari debeat nomine designante proprietatem ipsius, non debet nominari ab eo quod imperfecte participat, neque ab eo quod excedenter habet; sed ab eo quod est sibi quasi coaequatum. Sicut si quis velit proprie nominare hominem, dicet eum substantiam rationalem, non autem substantiam intellectualem, quod est proprium nomen Angeli, quia simplex intelligentia convenit Angelo per proprietatem, homini vero per participationem; neque substantiam sensibilem, quod est nomen bruti proprium, quia sensus est minus quam id quod est proprium homini, et convenit homini excedenter prae aliis animalibus. | I answer that, As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each order, we must consider that in coordinated things, something may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and by way of participation. A thing is said to be in another by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have stated (Question [13], Article [2]) concerning all the names which are attributed to God: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something not fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating its property, it ought not to be named from what it participates imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we wish properly to name a man, we should call him a "rational substance," but not an "intellectual substance," which latter is the proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by participation; nor do we call him a "sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals. |
| Sic igitur considerandum est in ordinibus Angelorum, quod omnes spirituales perfectiones sunt omnibus Angelis communes et quod omnes abundantius existunt in superioribus quam in inferioribus. Sed cum in ipsis etiam perfectionibus sit quidam gradus, superior perfectio attribuitur superiori ordini per proprietatem, inferiori vero per participationem, e converso autem inferior attribuitur inferiori per proprietatem, superiori autem per excessum. Et ita superior ordo a superiori perfectione nominatur. | So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation; and conversely the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection. |
| Sic igitur Dionysius exponit ordinum nomina secundum convenientiam ad spirituales perfectiones eorum. Gregorius vero, in expositione horum nominum, magis attendere videtur exteriora ministeria. Dicit enim, quod Angeli dicuntur qui minima nuntiant; Archangeli, qui summa; virtutes per quas miracula fiunt; potestates quibus adversae potestates repelluntur; principatus, qui ipsis bonis spiritibus praesunt. | So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior ministrations; for he says that "angels are so called as announcing the least things; and the archangels in the greatest; by the virtues miracles are wrought; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities preside over the good spirits themselves." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Angelus nuntius dicitur. Omnes ergo caelestes spiritus, inquantum sunt manifestatores divinorum, Angeli vocantur. Sed superiores Angeli habent quandam excellentiam in hac manifestatione, a qua superiores ordines nominantur. Infimus autem Angelorum ordo nullam excellentiam supra communem manifestationem addit, et ideo a simplici manifestatione nominatur. Et sic nomen commune remanet infimo ordini quasi proprium, ut dicit Dionysius V cap. Cael. Hier. Vel potest dici quod infimus ordo specialiter dicitur ordo Angelorum, quia immediate nobis annuntiant. | Reply to Objection 1: Angel means "messenger." So all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known Divine things, are called "angels." But the superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. The lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that the lowest order can be specially called the order of "angels," forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately. |
| Virtus autem dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, communiter, secundum quod est media inter essentiam et operationem, et sic omnes caelestes spiritus nominantur caelestes virtutes, sicut et caelestes essentiae. Alio modo, secundum quod importat quendam excessum fortitudinis, et sic est proprium nomen ordinis. Unde Dionysius dicit, VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen virtutum significat quandam virilem et inconcussam fortitudinem, primo quidem ad omnes operationes divinas eis convenientes; secundo, ad suscipiendum divina. Et ita significat quod sine aliquo timore aggrediuntur divina quae ad eos pertinent, quod videtur ad fortitudinem animi pertinere. | "Virtue" can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the medium between the essence and the operation, and in that sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also "heavenly essences." Secondly, as meaning a certain excellence of strength; and thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the "name 'virtues' signifies a certain virile and immovable strength"; first, in regard of those Divine operations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly the Divine behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius XII cap. de Div. Nom., dominatio laudatur in Deo singulariter per quendam excessum, sed per participationem, divina eloquia vocant dominos principaliores ornatus, per quos inferiores ex donis eius accipiunt. Unde et Dionysius dicit in VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen dominationum primo quidem significat quandam libertatem, quae est a servili conditione et pedestri subiectione, sicut plebs subiicitur, et a tyrannica oppressione, quam interdum etiam maiores patiuntur. Secundo significat quandam rigidam et inflexibilem gubernationem, quae ad nullum servilem actum inclinatur, neque ad aliquem actum subiectorum vel oppressorum a tyrannis. Tertio significat appetitum et participationem veri dominii, quod est in Deo. Et similiter nomen cuiuslibet ordinis significat participationem eius quod est in Deo; sicut nomen virtutum significat participationem divinae virtutis; et sic de aliis. | Reply to Objection 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "Dominion is attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the Divine word gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the Divine gifts." Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Domination" means first "a certain liberty, free from servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians, and from tyrannical oppression," endured sometimes even by the great. Secondly, it signifies "a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act, of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants." Thirdly, it signifies "the desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God." Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation of what belongs to God; as the name "Virtues" signifies the participation of the Divine virtue; and the same principle applies to the rest. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod nomen dominationis, et potestatis, et principatus, diversimode ad gubernationem pertinet. Nam domini est solummodo praecipere de agendis. Et ideo Gregorius dicit quod quaedam Angelorum agmina, pro eo quod eis cetera ad obediendum subiecta sunt, dominationes vocantur. Nomen vero potestatis ordinationem quandam designat; secundum illud apostoli ad Rom. XIII, qui potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi resistit. Et ideo Dionysius dicit quod nomen potestatis significat quandam ordinationem et circa susceptionem divinorum, et circa actiones divinas quas superiores in inferiores agunt, eas sursum ducendo. Ad ordinem ergo potestatum pertinet ordinare quae a subditis sint agenda. Principari vero, ut Gregorius dicit, est inter reliquos priorem existere, quasi primi sint in executione eorum quae imperantur. Et ideo Dionysius dicit, IX cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen principatuum significat ductivum cum ordine sacro. Illi enim qui alios ducunt, primi inter eos existentes, principes proprie vocantur secundum illud Psalmi LXVII, praevenerunt principes coniuncti psallentibus. | Reply to Objection 3: The names "Domination," "Power," and "Principality" belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only to prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Evang.), that "some companies of the angels, because others are subject to obedience to them, are called dominations." The name "Power" points out a kind of order, according to what the Apostle says, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God" (Rm. 13:2). And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Power" signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above. Therefore, to the order of "Powers" it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those who are subject to them. To preside [principari] as Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is "to be first among others," as being first in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that the name of "Principalities" signifies "one who leads in a sacred order." For those who lead others, being first among them, are properly called "princes," according to the words, "Princes went before joined with singers" (Ps. 67:26). |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod Archangeli, secundum Dionysium, medii sunt inter principatus et Angelos. Medium autem comparatum uni extremo, videtur alterum, inquantum participat naturam utriusque, sicut tepidum respectu calidi est frigidum, respectu vero frigidi est calidum. Sic et Archangeli dicuntur quasi principes Angeli, quia respectu Angelorum sunt principes, respectu vero principatuum sunt Angeli. Secundum Gregorium autem, dicuntur Archangeli ex eo quod principantur soli ordini Angelorum, quasi magna nuntiantes. Principatus autem dicuntur ex eo quod principantur omnibus caelestibus virtutibus divinas iussiones explentibus. | Reply to Objection 4: The "Archangels," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ix), are between the "Principalities" and the "Angels." A medium compared to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, and hot compared to cold. So the "Archangels" are called the "angel princes"; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the "Angels," and angels as regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) they are called "Archangels," because they preside over the one order of the "Angels"; as it were, announcing greater things: and the "Principalities" are so called as presiding over all the heavenly "Virtues" who fulfil the Divine commands. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod nomen Seraphim non imponitur tantum a caritate, sed a caritatis excessu, quem importat nomen ardoris vel incendii. Unde Dionysius, VII cap. Cael. Hier., exponit nomen Seraphim secundum proprietates ignis, in quo est excessus caliditatis. In igne autem tria possumus considerare. Primo quidem, motum, qui est sursum, et qui est continuus. Per quod significatur quod indeclinabiliter moventur in Deum. Secundo vero, virtutem activam eius, quae est calidum. Quod quidem non simpliciter invenitur in igne, sed cum quadam acuitate, quia maxime est penetrativus in agendo, et pertingit usque ad minima; et iterum cum quodam superexcedenti fervore. Et per hoc significatur actio huiusmodi Angelorum, quam in subditos potenter exercent, eos in similem fervorem excitantes, et totaliter eos per incendium purgantes. Tertio consideratur in igne claritas eius. Et hoc significat quod huiusmodi Angeli in seipsis habent inextinguibilem lucem, et quod alios perfecte illuminant. | Reply to Objection 5: The name "Seraphim" does not come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire. Hence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name "Seraphim" according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of heat. Now in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they are borne inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is "heat," which is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervor; whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised powerfully upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor, and cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly we consider in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these angels have in themselves an inextinguishable light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others. |
| Similiter etiam nomen Cherubim imponitur a quodam excessu scientiae, unde interpretatur plenitudo scientiae. Quod Dionysius exponit quantum ad quatuor, primo quidem, quantum ad perfectam Dei visionem; secundo, quantum ad plenam susceptionem divini luminis; tertio, quantum ad hoc, quod in ipso Deo contemplantur pulchritudinem ordinis rerum a Deo derivatam; quarto, quantum ad hoc, quod ipsi pleni existentes huiusmodi cognitione, eam copiose in alios effundunt. | In the same way the name "Cherubim" comes from a certain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," which Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the perfect vision of God; the full reception of the Divine Light; their contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to the fact that possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it forth copiously upon others. |
| Ad sextum dicendum quod ordo thronorum habet excellentiam prae inferioribus ordinibus in hoc, quod immediate in Deo rationes divinorum operum cognoscere possunt. Sed Cherubim habent excellentiam scientiae; Seraphim vero excellentiam ardoris. Et licet in his duabus excellentiis includatur tertia, non tamen in illa quae est thronorum, includuntur aliae duae. Et ideo ordo thronorum distinguitur ab ordine Cherubim et Seraphim. Hoc enim est commune in omnibus, quod excellentia inferioris continetur in excellentia superioris, et non e converso. Exponit autem Dionysius nomen thronorum, per convenientiam ad materiales sedes. In quibus est quatuor considerare. Primo quidem, situm, quia sedes supra terram elevantur. Et sic ipsi Angeli qui throni dicuntur, elevantur usque ad hoc, quod in Deo immediate rationes rerum cognoscant. Secundo in materialibus sedibus consideratur firmitas, quia in ipsis aliquis firmiter sedet. Hic autem est e converso, nam ipsi Angeli firmantur per Deum. Tertio, quia sedes suscipit sedentem, et in ea deferri potest. Sic et isti Angeli suscipiunt Deum in seipsis, et eum quodammodo ad inferiores ferunt. Quarto, ex figura, quia sedes ex una parte est aperta ad suscipiendum sedentem. Ita et isti Angeli sunt per promptitudinem aperti ad suscipiendum Deum, et famulandum ipsi. | Reply to Objection 6: The order of the "Thrones" excels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works; whereas the "Cherubim" have the excellence of knowledge and the "Seraphim" the excellence of ardor. And although these two excellent attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the "Thrones" does not include the other two; and so the order of the "Thrones" is distinguished from the orders of the "Cherubim" and the "Seraphim." For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained in the superior, but not conversely. But Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the name "Thrones" by its relation to material seats, in which we may consider four things. First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and to the angels who are called "Thrones" are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in material seats is displayed strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. But here the reverse is the case; for the angels themselves are made firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the angels receive God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is open on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to serve Him. |
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First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 108 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter gradus ordinum assignentur. Ordo enim praelatorum videtur esse supremus. Sed dominationes, principatus et potestates ex ipsis nominibus praelationem quandam habent. Ergo isti ordines debent esse inter omnes supremi. | Objection 1: It would seem that the grades of the orders are not properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the names of "Dominations," "Principalities," and "Powers" of themselves imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be supreme. |
| Praeterea, quanto aliquis ordo est Deo propinquior, tanto est superior. Sed ordo thronorum videtur esse Deo propinquissimus, nihil enim coniungitur propinquius sedenti, quam sua sedes. Ergo ordo thronorum est altissimus. | Objection 2: Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to God; for nothing is nearer to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is the highest. |
| Praeterea, scientia est prior quam amor; et intellectus videtur esse altior quam voluntas. Ergo et ordo Cherubim videtur esse altior quam ordo Seraphim. | Objection 3: Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher than will. Therefore the order of "Cherubim" seems to be higher than the "Seraphim." |
| Praeterea, Gregorius ponit principatus supra potestates. Non ergo collocantur immediate supra Archangelos, ut Dionysius dicit. | Objection 4: Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the "Principalities" above the "Powers." These therefore are not placed immediately above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix). |
| Sed contra est quod Dionysius ponit, in prima quidem hierarchia. Seraphim ut primos, Cherubim ut medios, thronos ut ultimos; in media vero, dominationes ut primos, virtutes ut medios, potestates ut ultimos; in ultima, principatus ut primos, Archangelos ut medios, Angelos ut ultimos. | On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest hierarchy the "Seraphim" as the first, the "Cherubim" as the middle, the "Thrones" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the "Dominations," as the first, the "Virtues" in the middle, the "Powers" last; in the lowest hierarchy the "Principalities" first, then the "Archangels," and lastly the "Angels." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod gradus angelicorum ordinum assignant et Gregorius et Dionysius, quantum ad alia quidem convenienter, sed quantum ad principatus et virtutes differenter. Nam Dionysius collocat virtutes sub dominationibus et supra potestates, principatus autem sub potestatibus et supra Archangelos, Gregorius autem ponit principatus in medio dominationum et potestatum, virtutes vero in medio potestatum et Archangelorum. Et utraque assignatio fulcimentum habere potest ex auctoritate apostoli. Qui, medios ordines ascendendo enumerans, dicit, Ephes. I, quod Deus constituit illum, scilicet Christum, ad dexteram suam in caelestibus, supra omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem, ubi virtutem ponit inter potestatem et dominationem, secundum assignationem Dionysii. Sed ad Coloss. I, enumerans eosdem ordines descendendo, dicit, sive throni, sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt, ubi principatus ponit medios inter dominationes et potestates, secundum assignationem Gregorii. | I answer that, The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree as regards all except the "Principalities" and "Virtues." For Dionysius places the "Virtues" beneath the "Dominations," and above the "Powers"; the "Principalities" beneath the "Powers" and above the "Archangels." Gregory, however, places the "Principalities" between the "Dominations" and the "Powers"; and the "Virtues" between the "Powers" and the "Archangels." Each of these placings may claim authority from the words of the Apostle, who (Eph. 1:20,21) enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that "God set Him," i.e. Christ, "on His right hand in the heavenly places above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion." Here he places "Virtues" between "Powers" and "Dominations," according to the placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (1:16), numbering the same orders from the highest, he says: "Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things were created by Him and in Him." Here he places the "Principalities" between "Dominations" and "Powers," as does also Gregory. |
| Primo igitur videamus rationem assignationis Dionysii. In qua considerandum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, prima hierarchia accipit rationes rerum in ipso Deo; secunda vero in causis universalibus; tertia vero secundum determinationem ad speciales effectus. Et quia Deus est finis non solum angelicorum ministeriorum, sed etiam totius creaturae, ad primam hierarchiam pertinet consideratio finis; ad mediam vero dispositio universalis de agendis; ad ultimam autem applicatio dispositionis ad effectum, quae est operis executio; haec enim tria manifestum est in qualibet operatione inveniri. Et ideo Dionysius, ex nominibus ordinum proprietates illorum considerans, illos ordines in prima hierarchia posuit, quorum nomina imponuntur per respectum ad Deum, scilicet Seraphim et Cherubim et thronos. Illos vero ordines posuit in media hierarchia, quorum nomina designant communem quandam gubernationem sive dispositionem, scilicet dominationes, virtutes et potestates. Illos vero ordines posuit in tertia hierarchia, quorum nomina designant operis executionem, scilicet principatus, Angelos et Archangelos. | Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above (Article [1]), the highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the universal causes; and third in their application to particular effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also of the whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect, which is the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering the properties of the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are taken from their relation to God, the "Seraphim," "Cherubim," and "Thrones"; and he places in the middle hierarchy those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition—the "Dominations," "Virtues," and "Powers"; and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work, the "Principalities," "Angels," and "Archangels." |
| In respectu autem ad finem, tria considerari possunt, nam primo, aliquis considerat finem; secundo vero, perfectam finis cognitionem accipit; tertio vero, intentionem suam in ipso defigit; quorum secundum ex additione se habet ad primum, et tertium ad utrumque. Et quia Deus est finis creaturarum sicut dux est finis exercitus, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys., potest aliquid simile huius ordinis considerari in rebus humanis, nam quidam sunt qui hoc habent dignitatis, ut per seipsos familiariter accedere possunt ad regem vel ducem; quidam vero super hoc habent, ut etiam secreta eius cognoscant; alii vero insuper circa ipsum semper inhaerent, quasi ei coniuncti. Et secundum hanc similitudinem accipere possumus dispositionem ordinum primae hierarchiae. Nam throni elevantur ad hoc, quod Deum familiariter in seipsis recipiant, secundum quod rationes rerum in ipso immediate cognoscere possunt, quod est proprium totius primae hierarchiae. Cherubim vero supereminenter divina secreta cognoscunt. Seraphim vero excellunt in hoc quod est omnium supremum, scilicet Deo ipsi uniri. Ut sic ab eo quod est commune toti hierarchiae, denominetur ordo thronorum; sicut ab eo quod est commune omnibus caelestibus spiritibus, denominatur ordo Angelorum. | As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of the end; thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an addition to the first, and the third an addition to both. And because God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition are privileged to know his secrets; and others above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this similitude, we can understand the disposition in the orders of the first hierarchy; for the "Thrones" are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves, in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the whole of the first hierarchy. The "Cherubim" know the Divine secrets supereminently; and the "Seraphim" excel in what is the supreme excellence of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the "Thrones"; as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together, they are all called "Angels." |
| Ad gubernationis autem rationem tria pertinent. Quorum primum est definitio eorum quae agenda sunt, quod est proprium dominationum. Secundum autem est praebere facultatem ad implendum, quod pertinet ad virtutes. Tertium autem est ordinare qualiter ea quae praecepta vel definita sunt, impleri possint, ut aliqui exequantur, et hoc pertinet ad potestates. | As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which are to be done, and this belongs to the "Dominations"; the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be done, which belongs to the "Virtues"; the third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried out by others, which belongs to the "Powers." |
| Executio autem angelicorum ministeriorum consistit in annuntiando divina. In executione autem cuiuslibet actus, sunt quidam quasi incipientes actionem et alios ducentes, sicut in cantu praecentores, et in bello illi qui alios ducunt et dirigunt, et hoc pertinet ad principatus. Alii vero sunt qui simpliciter exequuntur, et hoc pertinet ad Angelos. Alii vero medio modo se habent, quod ad Archangelos pertinet, ut supra dictum est. | The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs to the "Principalities." There are others who simply execute what is to be done; and these are the "Angels." Others hold a middle place; and these are the "Archangels," as above explained. |
| Invenitur autem congrua haec ordinum assignatio. Nam semper summum inferioris ordinis affinitatem habet cum ultimo superioris; sicut infima animalia parum distant a plantis. Primus autem ordo est divinarum personarum, qui terminatur ad spiritum sanctum, qui est amor procedens, cum quo affinitatem habet supremus ordo primae hierarchiae, ab incendio amoris denominatus. Infimus autem ordo primae hierarchiae est thronorum, qui ex suo nomine habent quandam affinitatem cum dominationibus, nam throni dicuntur, secundum Gregorium, per quos Deus sua iudicia exercet; accipiunt enim divinas illuminationes per convenientiam ad immediate illuminandum secundam hierarchiam, ad quam pertinet dispositio divinorum ministeriorum. Ordo vero potestatum affinitatem habet cum ordine principatuum, nam cum potestatum sit ordinationem subiectis imponere, haec ordinatio statim in nomine principatuum designatur, qui sunt primi in executione divinorum ministeriorum, utpote praesidentes gubernationi gentium et regnorum, quod est primum et praecipuum in divinis ministeriis; nam bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis. Unde dicitur Dan. X, princeps regni Persarum restitit mihi. | This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the first order is that of the Divine Persons, which terminates in the Holy Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the "Thrones," who in their own order are akin to the "Dominations"; for the "Thrones," according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called "because through them God accomplishes His judgments," since they are enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the Divine ministrations. The order of the "Powers" is akin to the order of the "Principalities"; for as it belongs to the "Powers" to impose order on those subject to them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of "Principalities," who, as presiding over the government of peoples and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof; "for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man" (Ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me" (Dan. 10:13). |
| Dispositio etiam ordinum quam Gregorius ponit, congruitatem habet. Nam cum dominationes sint definientes et praecipientes ea quae ad divina ministeria pertinent, ordines eis subiecti disponuntur secundum dispositionem eorum in quos divina ministeria exercentur ut autem Augustinus dicit in III de Trin., corpora quodam ordine reguntur, inferiora per superiora, et omnia per spiritualem creaturam; et spiritus malus per spiritum bonum. Primus ergo ordo post dominationes dicitur principatuum, qui etiam bonis spiritibus principantur. Deinde potestates, per quas arcentur mali spiritus, sicut per potestates terrenas arcentur malefactores, ut habetur Rom. XIII. Post quas sunt virtutes, quae habent potestatem super corporalem naturam in operatione miraculorum. Post quas sunt Archangeli et Angeli, qui nuntiant hominibus vel magna, quae sunt supra rationem; vel parva, ad quae ratio se extendere potest. | The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also reasonable. For since the "Dominations" appoint and order what belongs to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things in which the Divine ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), "bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good spirit." So the first order after the "Dominations" is called that of "Principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then the "Powers," who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers, as it is written (Rm. 13:3,4). After these come the "Virtues," which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after these are the "Angels" and the "Archangels," who announce to men either great things above reason, or small things within the purview of reason. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in Angelis potius est quod subiiciuntur Deo, quam quod inferioribus praesident, et hoc derivatur ex illo. Et ideo ordines nominati a praelatione non sunt supremi, sed magis ordines nominati a conversione ad Deum. | Reply to Objection 1: The angel's subjection to God is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the former. Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name from their nearness and relation to God. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod illa propinquitas ad Deum quae designatur nomine thronorum, convenit etiam Cherubim et Seraphim, et excellentius, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: The nearness to God designated by the name of the "Thrones," belongs also to the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim," and in a more excellent way, as above explained. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cognitio est secundum quod cognita sunt in cognoscente; amor autem secundum quod amans unitur rei amatae. Superiora autem nobiliori modo sunt in seipsis quam in inferioribus, inferiora vero nobiliori modo in superioribus quam in seipsis. Et ideo inferiorum quidem cognitio praeeminet dilectioni, superiorum autem dilectio, et praecipue Dei, praeeminet cognitioni. | Reply to Objection 3: As above explained (Question [27], Article [3]), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united to the object loved. Now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler way than they are in themselves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things, God above all, is better than to know them. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod, si quis diligenter consideret dispositiones ordinum secundum Dionysium et Gregorium, parum vel nihil differunt, si ad rem referantur. Exponit enim Gregorius principatuum nomen ex hoc, quod bonis spiritibus praesunt, et hoc convenit virtutibus, secundum quod in nomine virtutum intelligitur quaedam fortitudo dans efficaciam inferioribus spiritibus ad exequenda divina ministeria. Rursus virtutes, secundum Gregorium, videntur esse idem quod principatus secundum Dionysium. Nam hoc est primum in divinis ministeriis, miracula facere, per hoc enim paratur via Annuntiationi Archangelorum et Angelorum. | Reply to Objection 4: A careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name "Principalities" from their "presiding over good spirits," which also agrees with the "Virtues" accordingly as this name expressed a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in the execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the "Virtues" seem to be the same as "Principalities" of Dionysius. For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine ministrations; since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the "Archangels" and the "Angels." |
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| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ordines non remanebunt post diem iudicii. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XV, quod Christus evacuabit omnem principatum et potestatem, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et patri, quod erit in ultima consummatione. Pari ergo ratione, in illo statu omnes alii ordines evacuabuntur. | Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:24), that Christ will "bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father," and this will be in the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will be abolished in that state. |
| Praeterea, ad officium angelicorum ordinum pertinet purgare, illuminare et perficere. Sed post diem iudicii unus Angelus non purgabit aut illuminabit aut perficiet alium, quia non proficient amplius in scientia. Ergo frustra ordines angelici remanerent. | Objection 2: Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore the angelic orders would remain for no purpose. |
| Praeterea, apostolus dicit, ad Heb. I, de Angelis, quod omnes sunt administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis, ex quo patet quod officia Angelorum ordinantur ad hoc, quod homines ad salutem adducantur. Sed omnes electi usque ad diem iudicii salutem consequuntur. Non ergo post diem iudicii remanebunt officia et ordines Angelorum. | Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says of the angels (Heb. 1:14), that "they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation"; whence it appears that the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the Day of Judgment. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Iudic. V, stellae manentes in ordine et cursu suo, quod exponitur de Angelis. Ergo Angeli semper in suis ordinibus remanebunt. | On the contrary, It is written (Judges 5:20): "Stars remaining in their order and courses," which is applied to the angels. Therefore the angels will ever remain in their orders. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod in ordinibus angelicis duo possunt considerari, scilicet distinctio graduum, et executio officiorum. Distinctio autem graduum est in Angelis secundum differentiam gratiae et naturae, ut supra dictum est. Et utraque differentia semper in Angelis remanebit. Non enim posset naturarum differentia ab eis auferri, nisi eis corruptis, differentia etiam gloriae erit in eis semper, secundum differentiam meriti praecedentis. Executio autem officiorum angelicorum aliquo modo remanebit post diem iudicii, et aliquo modo cessabit. Cessabit quidem, secundum quod eorum officia ordinantur ad perducendum aliquos ad finem, remanebit autem, secundum quod convenit in ultima finis consecutione. Sicut etiam alia sunt officia militarium ordinum in pugna, et in triumpho. | I answer that, In the angelic orders we may consider two things; the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The distinction of grades among the angels takes place according to the difference of grace and nature, as above explained (Article [4]); and these differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of natures cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever remain in them according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod principatus et potestates evacuabuntur in illa finali consummatione quantum ad hoc, quod alios ad finem perducant, quia consecuto iam fine, non est necessarium tendere in finem. Et haec ratio intelligitur ex verbis apostoli, dicentis, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et patri, idest, cum perduxerit fideles ad fruendum ipso Deo. | Reply to Objection 1: The principalities and powers will come to an end in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words of the Apostle, "When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father," i.e. when He shall have led the faithful to the enjoyment of God Himself. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod actiones Angelorum super alios Angelos considerandae sunt secundum similitudinem actionum intelligibilium quae sunt in nobis. Inveniuntur autem in nobis multae intelligibiles actiones quae sunt ordinatae secundum ordinem causae et causati; sicut cum per multa media gradatim in unam conclusionem devenimus. Manifestum est autem quod cognitio conclusionis dependet ex omnibus mediis praecedentibus, non solum quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae, sed etiam quantum ad scientiae conservationem. Cuius signum est quod, si quis oblivisceretur aliquod praecedentium mediorum, opinionem quidem vel fidem de conclusione posset habere, sed non scientiam, ordine causarum ignorato. Sic igitur, cum inferiores Angeli rationes divinorum operum cognoscant per lumen superiorum Angelorum, dependet eorum cognitio ex lumine superiorum, non solum quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae, sed etiam quantum ad cognitionis conservationem. Licet ergo post iudicium non proficiant inferiores Angeli in cognitione aliquarum rerum, non tamen propter hoc excluditur quin a superioribus illuminentur. | Reply to Objection 2: The actions of angels over the other angels are to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions. In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things, still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, etsi post diem iudicii homines non sint ulterius ad salutem adducendi per ministerium Angelorum; tamen illi qui iam salutem erunt consecuti, aliquam illustrationem habebunt per Angelorum officia. | Reply to Objection 3: Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry. |
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| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines non assumantur ad ordines Angelorum. Hierarchia enim humana continetur sub infima hierarchiarum caelestium, sicut infima sub media, et media sub prima. Sed Angeli infimae hierarchiae nunquam transferentur in mediam aut in primam. Ergo neque homines transferentur ad ordines Angelorum. | Objection 1: It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders. |
| Praeterea, ordinibus Angelorum aliqua officia competunt, utpote custodire, miracula facere, Daemones arcere, et huiusmodi, quae non videntur convenire animabus sanctorum. Ergo non transferentur ad ordines Angelorum. | Objection 2: Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders. |
| Praeterea, sicut boni Angeli inducunt ad bonum, ita Daemones inducunt ad malum. Sed erroneum est dicere quod animae hominum malorum convertantur in Daemones, hoc enim Chrysostomus reprobat, super Matth. Ergo non videtur quod animae sanctorum transferantur ad ordines Angelorum. | Objection 3: Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls of bad men are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in Matt.). Therefore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will be transferred to the orders of angels. |
| Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Matth. XXII, de sanctis, quod erunt sicut Angeli Dei in caelo. | On the contrary, The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as the angels of God" (Mt. 22:30). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ordines Angelorum distinguuntur et secundum conditionem naturae, et secundum dona gratiae. Si ergo considerentur Angelorum ordines solum quantum ad gradum naturae, sic homines nullo modo assumi possunt ad ordines Angelorum, quia semper remanebit naturarum distinctio. Quam quidam considerantes, posuerunt quod nullo modo homines transferri possunt ad aequalitatem Angelorum. Quod est erroneum, repugnat enim promissioni Christi, dicentis, Lucae XX, quod filii resurrectionis erunt aequales Angelis in caelis. Illud enim quod est ex parte naturae, se habet ut materiale in ratione ordinis, completivum vero est quod est ex dono gratiae, quae dependet ex liberalitate Dei, non ex ordine naturae. Et ideo per donum gratiae homines mereri possunt tantam gloriam, ut Angelis aequentur secundum singulos Angelorum gradus. Quod est homines ad ordines Angelorum assumi. Quidam tamen dicunt quod ad ordines Angelorum non assumuntur omnes qui salvantur, sed soli virgines vel perfecti; alii vero suum ordinem constituent, quasi condivisum toti societati Angelorum. Sed hoc est contra Augustinum, qui dicit XII de Civ. Dei, quod non erunt duae societates hominum et Angelorum, sed una, quia omnium beatitudo est adhaerere uni Deo. | I answer that, As above explained (Articles [4],7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace. Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction will always remain. In view of this distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven (Lk. 20:36). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders, but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not be two societies of men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gratia Angelis datur secundum proportionem naturalium; non autem sic est de hominibus, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo sicut inferiores Angeli non possunt transferri ad naturalem gradum superiorum, ita nec ad gratuitum. Homines vero possunt ad gratuitum conscendere, sed non ad naturalem. | Reply to Objection 1: Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above explained (Article [4]; Question [62], Article [6]). So, as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Angeli, secundum naturae ordinem, medii sunt inter nos et Deum. Et ideo, secundum legem communem, per eos administrantur non solum res humanae, sed etiam omnia corporalia. Homines autem sancti, etiam post hanc vitam, sunt eiusdem naturae nobiscum. Unde secundum legem communem, non administrant humana, nec rebus vivorum intersunt, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de cura pro mortuis agenda. Ex quadam tamen speciali dispensatione interdum aliquibus sanctis conceditur, vel vivis vel mortuis, huiusmodi officia exercere, vel miracula faciendo, vel Daemones arcendo, vel aliquid huiusmodi; sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit. | Reply to Objection 2: The angels according to the order of nature are between us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But holy men even after this life are of the same nature with ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer human affairs, "nor do they interfere in the things of the living," as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the demons, or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xvi). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod homines ad poenam Daemonum transferri, non est erroneum, sed quidam erronee posuerunt Daemones nihil aliud esse quam animas defunctorum. Et hoc Chrysostomus reprobat. | Reply to Objection 3: It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects. |