St. Thomas Aquinas
The Summa Theologica
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province
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Question: 9 [<< | >>]
OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether knowledge is a gift?
(2) Whether it is about Divine things?
(3) Whether it is speculative or practical?
(4) Which beatitude responds to it?
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Question: 9 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Whether knowledge is a gift?
Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the gifts of the
Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge implies an effect
of natural reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that a
"demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge." Therefore
knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all holy
persons, as stated above (Question [8], Article [4]; FS, Question [68], Article [5]). Now Augustine
says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful lack knowledge though
they have faith." Therefore knowledge is not a gift.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as stated
above (FS, Question [68], Article [8]). Therefore one gift suffices for the perfection
of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of
faith, as stated above (Question [8], Article [2]). Therefore the gift of knowledge does
not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear to which other virtue it
can respond. Since, then, the gifts are perfections of virtues, as stated
above (FS, Question [68], Articles [1],2), it seems that knowledge is not a gift.
On the contrary, Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (Is. 11:2).
I answer that, Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore, does
not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature. Now,
when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to some
truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth: first,
because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure judgment on it.
Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human intellect
may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of these is that he
should have a sound grasp of the things that are proposed to be believed,
and this pertains to the gift of understanding, as stated above (Question [8], Article [6]): while the other is that he should have a sure and right judgment
on them, so as to discern what is to be believed, from what is not to be
believed, and for this the gift of knowledge is required.
Reply to Objection 1: Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures, according
to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms a sure
judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his reason: and so
human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative reasoning. On the
other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of truth, without any
discursive process, by simple intuition, as was stated in the FP, Question [14],
Article [7]; wherefore God's knowledge is not discursive, or argumentative, but
absolute and simple, to which that knowledge is likened which is a gift
of the Holy Ghost, since it is a participated likeness thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of belief. One
is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning things to be
believed from things not to be believe: in this way knowledge is a gift
and is common to all holy persons. The other is a knowledge about matters
of belief, whereby one knows not only what one ought to believe, but also
how to make the faith known, how to induce others to believe, and confute
those who deny the faith. This knowledge is numbered among the gratuitous
graces, which are not given to all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after
the words quoted, adds: "It is one thing for a man merely to know what he
ought to believe, and another to know how to dispense what he believes to
the godly, and to defend it against the ungodly."
Reply to Objection 3: The gifts are more perfect than the moral and intellectual
virtues; but they are not more perfect than the theological virtues;
rather are all the gifts ordained to the perfection of the theological
virtues, as to their end. Hence it is not unreasonable if several gifts
are ordained to one theological virtue.
Index [<< | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 9 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Whether the gift of knowledge is about Divine things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine things.
For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "knowledge begets, nourishes
and strengthens faith." Now faith is about Divine things, because its
object is the First Truth, as stated above (Question [1], Article [1]). Therefore the
gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than acquired
knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine things, for
instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore is the gift of
knowledge about Divine things.
Objection 3: Further, according to Rm. 1:20, "the invisible things of God . .
. are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." If
therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems that there is
also knowledge of Divine things.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): "The knowledge of
Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of human
affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge."
I answer that, A sure judgment about a thing formed chiefly from its cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the order of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the second, so ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed through the first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first cause through any other cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed through the first cause, is the first and most perfect judgment.
Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common
name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short of
the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most perfect
thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of convertible terms,
that which signifies "what a thing is," is given the special name of
"definition," but the convertible terms which fall short of this, retain
the common name, and are called "proper" terms.
Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment as
stated above (Article [1]), if this certitude of the judgment is derived from
the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is wisdom: for
a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows the highest cause
of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of all matters by that
cause: and a wise man "absolutely," is one who knows the cause which is
absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the knowledge of Divine things is
called "wisdom," while the knowledge of human things is called
"knowledge," this being the common name denoting certitude of judgment,
and appropriated to the judgment which is formed through second causes.
Accordingly, if we take knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from
the gift of wisdom, so that the gift of knowledge is only about human or
created things.
Reply to Objection 1: Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet faith
itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence to know
what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge, but to know
in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of union with them,
belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of wisdom corresponds
more to charity which unites man's mind to God.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes knowledge in the generic acceptation of
the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special gift, but according
as it is restricted to judgments formed through created things.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Question [1], Article [1]), every cognitive habit regards
formally the mean through which things are known, and materially, the
things that are known through the mean. And since that which is formal,
is of most account, it follows that those sciences which draw conclusions
about physical matter from mathematical principles, are reckoned rather
among the mathematical sciences, though, as to their matter they have
more in common with physical sciences: and for this reason it is stated
in Phys. ii, 2 that they are more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man
knows God through His creatures, this seems to pertain to "knowledge," to
which it belongs formally, rather than to "wisdom," to which it belongs
materially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to
Divine things, this pertains to "wisdom" rather than to "knowledge."
Index [<< | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 9 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Whether the gift of knowledge is practical knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered among the
gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14) that
"knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we make use of external
things." But the knowledge which is concerned about actions is practical.
Therefore the gift of knowledge is practical.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge is nought if it
hath not its use for piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lacks
the discernment of knowledge." Now it follows from this authority that
knowledge directs piety. But this cannot apply to a speculative science.
Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but practical.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the righteous,
as stated above (Question [9], Article [5]). But speculative knowledge can be also in
the unrighteous, according to James 4:17: "To him . . . who knoweth to do
good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Therefore the gift of
knowledge is not speculative but practical.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge on her own day
prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in the
mind." Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds of
knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the gift of
knowledge is both speculative and practical.
I answer that, As stated above (Question [9], Article [8]), the gift of knowledge, like
the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of faith. Now
faith consists primarily and principally in speculation, in as much as it
is founded on the First Truth. But since the First Truth is also the last
end for the sake of which our works are done, hence it is that faith
extends to works, according to Gal. 5:6: "Faith . . . worketh by charity."
The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and
principally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man knows what he
ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works, since we
are directed in our actions by the knowledge of matters of faith, and of
conclusions drawn therefrom.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge, in so far
as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge, yet not
action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety.
Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 3: As we have already stated (Question [8], Article [5]) about the gift of
understanding, not everyone who understands, has the gift of
understanding, but only he that understands through a habit of grace: and
so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge, that they
alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about matters of
faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as never to
wander from the straight path of justice. This is the knowledge of holy
things, according to Wis. 10:10: "She conducted the just . . . through
the right ways . . . and gave him the knowledge of holy things."
Index [<< | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 9 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Whether the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," etc. corresponds to the gift of knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that
mourn," does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even as evil
is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy. Now
knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter is
known through evil: for "the straight line rules both itself and the
crooked line" (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not
suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge. Now there
is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there joy, since it
is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her
company any tediousness, but joy and gladness." Therefore the aforesaid
beatitude does not suitably correspond with the gift of knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation, before
operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation, sorrow does not
correspond to it, since "the speculative intellect is not concerned about
things to be sought or avoided" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore the
aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to correspond with the gift
of knowledge.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv): "Knowledge
befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been mastered by the
evil which he coveted as though it were good."
I answer that, Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to
knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God is
occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: "Creatures . . . are turned to an
abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise," of those,
namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they deem the
perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing their last end
in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a right judgment of
creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be the
occasion), which judgment he exercises through the gift of knowledge.
Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of
knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1: Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except in so far
as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper cause of
spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy correspond
directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of knowledge there
corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, and, in
consequence, consolation, since, by his right judgment, man directs
creatures to the Divine good. For this reason sorrow is set forth in this
beatitude, as the merit, and the resulting consolation, as the reward;
which is begun in this life, and is perfected in the life to come.
Reply to Objection 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he may
sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers: it is
thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.
Reply to Objection 3: No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it
consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in
considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude does
consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in well-ordered love
of them: and this I say with regard to the beatitude of a wayfarer. Hence
beatitude relating to contemplation is not ascribed to knowledge, but to
understanding and wisdom, which are about Divine things.
Latin — Corpus Thomisticum
Textum Leoninum Romae 1895 editumet automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticasdenuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit
Corpus Thomisticum: sth3001.html
[39143] IIª-IIae q. 9 pr. Deinde considerandum est de dono scientiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum scientia sit donum. Secundo, utrum sit circa divina. Tertio, utrum sit speculativa vel practica. Quarto, quae beatitudo ei respondeat.
[39144] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia non sit donum. Dona enim spiritus sancti naturalem facultatem excedunt. Sed scientia importat effectum quendam naturalis rationis, dicit enim philosophus, in I Poster., quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Ergo scientia non est donum spiritus sancti.
[39145] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, dona spiritus sancti sunt communia omnibus sanctis, ut supra dictum est. Sed Augustinus, XIV de Trin., dicit quod scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide. Ergo scientia non est donum.
[39146] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, donum est perfectius virtute, ut supra dictum est. Ergo unum donum sufficit ad perfectionem unius virtutis. Sed virtuti fidei respondet donum intellectus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non respondet ei donum scientiae. Nec apparet cui alii virtuti respondeat. Ergo, cum dona sint perfectiones virtutum, ut supra dictum est, videtur quod scientia non sit donum.
[39147] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Isaiae XI computatur inter septem dona.
[39148] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod gratia est perfectior quam natura, unde non deficit in his in quibus homo per naturam perfici potest. Cum autem homo per naturalem rationem assentit secundum intellectum alicui veritati, dupliciter perficitur circa veritatem illam, primo quidem, quia capit eam; secundo, quia de ea certum iudicium habet. Et ideo ad hoc quod intellectus humanus perfecte assentiat veritati fidei duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est quod sane capiat ea quae proponuntur, quod pertinet ad donum intellectus, ut supra dictum est. Aliud autem est ut habeat certum et rectum iudicium de eis, discernendo scilicet credenda non credendis. Et ad hoc necessarium est donum scientiae.
[39149] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod certitudo cognitionis in diversis naturis invenitur diversimode, secundum diversam conditionem uniuscuiusque naturae. Nam homo consequitur certum iudicium de veritate per discursum rationis, et ideo scientia humana ex ratione demonstrativa acquiritur. Sed in Deo est certum iudicium veritatis absque omni discursu per simplicem intuitum, ut in primo dictum est, et ideo divina scientia non est discursiva vel ratiocinativa, sed absoluta et simplex. Cui similis est scientia quae ponitur donum spiritus sancti, cum sit quaedam participativa similitudo ipsius.
[39150] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod circa credenda duplex scientia potest haberi. Una quidem per quam homo scit quid credere debeat, discernens credenda a non credendis, et secundum hoc scientia est donum, et convenit omnibus sanctis. Alia vero est scientia circa credenda per quam homo non solum scit quid credi debeat, sed etiam scit fidem manifestare et alios ad credendum inducere et contradictores revincere. Et ista scientia ponitur inter gratias gratis datas, quae non datur omnibus, sed quibusdam. Unde Augustinus, post verba inducta, subiungit, aliud est scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat, aliud scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur.
[39151] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod dona sunt perfectiora virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus. Non sunt autem perfectiora virtutibus theologicis, sed magis omnia dona ad perfectionem theologicarum virtutum ordinantur sicut ad finem. Et ideo non est inconveniens si diversa dona ad unam virtutem theologicam ordinantur.
[39152] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientiae donum sit circa res divinas. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIV de Trin., quod per scientiam, gignitur fides, nutritur et roboratur. Sed fides est de rebus divinis, quia obiectum fidei est veritas prima, ut supra habitum est. Ergo et donum scientiae est de rebus divinis.
[39153] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, donum scientiae est dignius quam scientia acquisita. Sed aliqua scientia acquisita est circa res divinas, sicut scientia metaphysicae. Ergo multo magis donum scientiae est circa res divinas.
[39154] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut dicitur Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. Si igitur est scientia circa res creatas, videtur quod etiam sit circa res divinas.
[39155] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, XIV de Trin., dicit, rerum divinarum scientia proprie sapientia nuncupetur, humanarum autem proprie scientiae nomen obtineat.
[39156] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod certum iudicium de re aliqua maxime datur ex sua causa. Et ideo secundum ordinem causarum oportet esse ordinem iudiciorum, sicut enim causa prima est causa secundae, ita per causam primam iudicatur de causa secunda. De causa autem prima non potest iudicari per aliam causam. Et ideo iudicium quod fit per causam primam est primum et perfectissimum. In his autem in quibus aliquid est perfectissimum, nomen commune generis appropriatur his quae deficiunt a perfectissimo, ipsi autem perfectissimo adaptatur aliud speciale nomen, ut patet in logicis. Nam in genere convertibilium illud quod significat quod quid est, speciali nomine definitio vocatur, quae autem ab hoc deficiunt convertibilia existentia nomen commune sibi retinent, scilicet quod propria dicuntur. Quia igitur nomen scientiae importat quandam certitudinem iudicii, ut dictum est; si quidem certitudo iudicii fit per altissimam causam, habet speciale nomen, quod est sapientia, dicitur enim sapiens in unoquoque genere qui novit altissimam causam illius generis, per quam potest de omnibus iudicare. Simpliciter autem sapiens dicitur qui novit altissimam causam simpliciter, scilicet Deum. Et ideo cognitio divinarum rerum vocatur sapientia. Cognitio vero rerum humanarum vocatur scientia, quasi communi nomine importante certitudinem iudicii appropriato ad iudicium quod fit per causas secundas. Et ideo, sic accipiendo scientiae nomen, ponitur donum distinctum a dono sapientiae. Unde donum scientiae est solum circa res humanas, vel circa res creatas.
[39157] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet ea de quibus est fides sint res divinae et aeternae, tamen ipsa fides est quoddam temporale in animo credentis. Et ideo scire quid credendum sit pertinet ad donum scientiae. Scire autem ipsas res creditas secundum seipsas per quandam unionem ad ipsas pertinet ad donum sapientiae. Unde donum sapientiae magis respondet caritati, quae unit mentem hominis Deo.
[39158] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum quod nomen scientiae communiter sumitur. Sic autem scientia non ponitur speciale donum, sed secundum quod restringitur ad iudicium quod fit per res creatas.
[39159] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quilibet cognoscitivus habitus formaliter quidem respicit medium per quod aliquid cognoscitur, materialiter autem id quod per medium cognoscitur. Et quia id quod est formale potius est, ideo illae scientiae quae ex principiis mathematicis concludunt circa materiam naturalem, magis cum mathematicis connumerantur, utpote eis similiores, licet quantum ad materiam magis conveniant cum naturali, et propter hoc dicitur in II Physic. quod sunt magis naturales. Et ideo, cum homo per res creatas Deum cognoscit, magis videtur hoc pertinere ad scientiam, ad quam pertinet formaliter, quam ad sapientiam, ad quam pertinet materialiter. Et e converso, cum secundum res divinas iudicamus de rebus creatis, magis hoc ad sapientiam quam ad scientiam pertinet.
[39160] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia quae ponitur donum sit scientia practica. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod actio qua exterioribus rebus utimur scientiae deputatur. Sed scientia cui deputatur actio est practica. Ergo scientia quae est donum est scientia practica.
[39161] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in I Moral., nulla est scientia si utilitatem pietatis non habet, et valde inutilis est pietas si scientiae discretione caret. Ex quo habetur quod scientia dirigit pietatem. Sed hoc non potest competere scientiae speculativae. Ergo scientia quae est donum non est speculativa, sed practica.
[39162] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, dona spiritus sancti non habentur nisi a iustis, ut supra habitum est. Sed scientia speculativa potest haberi etiam ab iniustis, secundum illud Iac. ult., scienti bonum et non facienti, peccatum est illi. Ergo scientia quae est donum non est speculativa, sed practica.
[39163] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in I Moral., scientia in die suo convivium parat, quia in ventre mentis ignorantiae ieiunium superat. Sed ignorantia non tollitur totaliter nisi per utramque scientiam, scilicet et speculativam et practicam. Ergo scientia quae est donum est et speculativa et practica.
[39164] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, donum scientiae ordinatur, sicut et donum intellectus, ad certitudinem fidei. Fides autem primo et principaliter in speculatione consistit, inquantum scilicet inhaeret primae veritati. Sed quia prima veritas est etiam ultimus finis, propter quem operamur, inde etiam est quod fides ad operationem se extendit, secundum illud Gal. V, fides per dilectionem operatur. Unde etiam oportet quod donum scientiae primo quidem et principaliter respiciat speculationem, inquantum scilicet homo scit quid fide tenere debeat. Secundario autem se extendit etiam ad operationem, secundum quod per scientiam credibilium, et eorum quae ad credibilia consequuntur, dirigimur in agendis.
[39165] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de dono scientiae secundum quod se extendit ad operationem, attribuitur enim ei actio, sed non sola nec primo. Et hoc etiam modo dirigit pietatem.
[39166] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 ad 2 Unde patet solutio ad secundum.
[39167] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est de dono intellectus quod non quicumque intelligit habet donum intellectus, sed qui intelligit quasi ex habitu gratiae; ita etiam de dono scientiae est intelligendum quod illi soli donum scientiae habeant qui ex infusione gratiae certum iudicium habent circa credenda et agenda, quod in nullo deviat a rectitudine iustitiae. Et haec est scientia sanctorum, de qua dicitur Sap. X, iustum deduxit dominus per vias rectas et dedit illi scientiam sanctorum.
[39168] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientiae non respondeat tertia beatitudo, scilicet, beati qui lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur. Sicut enim malum est causa tristitiae et luctus, ita etiam bonum est causa laetitiae. Sed per scientiam principalius manifestantur bona quam mala, quae per bona cognoscuntur, rectum enim est iudex sui ipsius et obliqui, ut dicitur in I de anima. Ergo praedicta beatitudo non convenienter respondet scientiae.
[39169] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, consideratio veritatis est actus scientiae. Sed in consideratione veritatis non est tristitia, sed magis gaudium, dicitur enim Sap. VIII, non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius, nec taedium convictus illius, sed laetitiam et gaudium. Ergo praedicta beatitudo non convenienter respondet dono scientiae.
[39170] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, donum scientiae prius consistit in speculatione quam in operatione. Sed secundum quod consistit in speculatione, non respondet sibi luctus, quia intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de imitabili et fugiendo, ut dicitur in III de anima; neque dicit aliquid laetum et triste. Ergo praedicta beatitudo non convenienter ponitur respondere dono scientiae.
[39171] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, scientia convenit lugentibus, qui didicerunt quibus malis vincti sunt, quae quasi bona petierunt.
[39172] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad scientiam proprie pertinet rectum iudicium creaturarum. Creaturae autem sunt ex quibus homo occasionaliter a Deo avertitur, secundum illud Sap. XIV, creaturae factae sunt in odium, et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium, qui scilicet rectum iudicium de his non habent, dum aestimant in eis esse perfectum bonum; unde in eis finem constituendo, peccant et verum bonum perdunt. Et hoc damnum homini innotescit per rectum iudicium de creaturis, quod habetur per donum scientiae. Et ideo beatitudo luctus ponitur respondere dono scientiae.
[39173] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bona creata non excitant spirituale gaudium nisi quatenus referuntur ad bonum divinum, ex quo proprie consurgit gaudium spirituale. Et ideo directe quidem spiritualis pax, et gaudium consequens, respondet dono sapientiae. Dono autem scientiae respondet quidem primo luctus de praeteritis erratis; et consequenter consolatio, dum homo per rectum iudicium scientiae creaturas ordinat in bonum divinum. Et ideo in hac beatitudine ponitur luctus pro merito, et consolatio consequens pro praemio. Quae quidem inchoatur in hac vita, perficitur autem in futura.
[39174] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod de ipsa consideratione veritatis homo gaudet, sed de re circa quam considerat veritatem potest tristari quandoque. Et secundum hoc luctus scientiae attribuitur.
[39175] IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod scientiae secundum quod in speculatione consistit, non respondet beatitudo aliqua, quia beatitudo hominis non consistit in consideratione creaturarum, sed in contemplatione Dei. Sed aliqualiter beatitudo hominis consistit in debito usu creaturarum et ordinata affectione circa ipsas, et hoc dico quantum ad beatitudinem viae. Et ideo scientiae non attribuitur aliqua beatitudo pertinens ad contemplationem; sed intellectui et sapientiae, quae sunt circa divina.
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