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Consequenter considerandum est de vitiis oppositis.
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod infidelitas non sit peccatum. Omne enim peccatum est contra naturam, ut patet per Damascenum, in II libro. Sed infidelitas non videtur esse contra naturam, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Praed. Sanct., quod posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere caritatem, naturae est hominum, habere autem fidem, quemadmodum habere caritatem, gratiae est fidelium. Ergo non habere fidem, quod est infidelem esse, non est peccatum. | Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "to be capable to having faith, just as to be capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have faith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful." Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a sin. |
| Praeterea, nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest, quia omne peccatum est voluntarium. Sed non est in potestate hominis quod infidelitatem vitet, quam vitare non potest nisi fidem habendo, dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. X, quomodo credent ei quem non audierunt? Quomodo autem audient sine praedicante? Ergo infidelitas non videtur esse peccatum. | Objection 2: Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since every sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man's power to avoid unbelief, for he cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the Apostle says (Rm. 10:14): "How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?" Therefore unbelief does not seem to be a sin. |
| Praeterea, sicut supra dictum est, sunt septem vitia capitalia, ad quae omnia peccata reducuntur. Sub nullo autem horum videtur contineri infidelitas. Ergo infidelitas non est peccatum. | Objection 3: Further, as stated above (FS, Question [84], Article [4]), there are seven capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not seem to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a sin. |
| Sed contra, virtuti contrariatur vitium. Sed fides est virtus, cui contrariatur infidelitas. Ergo infidelitas est peccatum. | On the contrary, Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue, and unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod infidelitas dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, secundum puram negationem, ut dicatur infidelis ex hoc solo quod non habet fidem. Alio modo potest intelligi infidelitas secundum contrarietatem ad fidem, quia scilicet aliquis repugnat auditui fidei, vel etiam contemnit ipsam, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, quis credidit auditui nostro? Et in hoc proprie perficitur ratio infidelitatis. Et secundum hoc infidelitas est peccatum. | I answer that, Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of pure negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because he has not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, or despises it, according to Is. 53:1: "Who hath believed our report?" It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in this sense that unbelief is a sin. |
| Si autem accipiatur infidelitas secundum negationem puram, sicut in illis qui nihil audierunt de fide, non habet rationem peccati, sed magis poenae, quia talis ignorantia divinorum ex peccato primi parentis est consecuta. Qui autem sic sunt infideles damnantur quidem propter alia peccata, quae sine fide remitti non possunt, non autem damnantur propter infidelitatis peccatum. Unde dominus dicit, Ioan. XV, si non venissem, et locutus eis non fuissem, peccatum non haberent, quod exponens Augustinus dicit quod loquitur de illo peccato quo non crediderunt in Christum. | If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in those who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character, not of sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine things is a result of the sin of our first parent. If such like unbelievers are damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot be taken away without faith, but not on account of their sin of unbelief. Hence Our Lord said (Jn. 15:22) "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin"; which Augustine expounds (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as "referring to the sin whereby they believed not in Christ." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod habere fidem non est in natura humana, sed in natura humana est ut mens hominis non repugnet interiori instinctui et exteriori veritatis praedicationi. Unde infidelitas secundum hoc est contra naturam. | Reply to Objection 1: To have the faith is not part of human nature, but it is part of human nature that man's mind should not thwart his inner instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way, unbelief is contrary to nature. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de infidelitate secundum quod importat simplicem negationem. | Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure negation. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod infidelitas secundum quod est peccatum, oritur ex superbia, ex qua contingit quod homo intellectum suum non vult subiicere regulis fidei et sano intellectui patrum. Unde Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral., quod ex inani gloria oriuntur novitatum praesumptiones. | Reply to Objection 3: Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride, through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumptuous innovations arise from vainglory." |
| Quamvis posset dici quod, sicut virtutes theologicae non reducuntur ad virtutes cardinales, sed sunt priores eis; ita etiam vitia opposita virtutibus theologicis non reducuntur ad vitia capitalia. | It might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital vices. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod infidelitas non sit in intellectu sicut in subiecto. Omne enim peccatum in voluntate est, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de duabus Anim. Sed infidelitas est quoddam peccatum, ut dictum est. Ergo infidelitas est in voluntate, non in intellectu. | Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as its subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine (De Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above (Article [1]). Therefore unbelief resides in the will and not in the intellect. |
| Praeterea, infidelitas habet rationem peccati ex eo quod praedicatio fidei contemnitur. Sed contemptus ad voluntatem pertinet. Ergo infidelitas est in voluntate. | Objection 2: Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the preaching of the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore unbelief is in the will. |
| Praeterea, II ad Cor. XI, super illud, ipse Satanas transfigurat se in Angelum lucis, dicit Glossa quod, si Angelus malus se bonum fingat, etiam si credatur bonus, non est error periculosus aut morbidus, si facit vel dicit quae bonis Angelis congruunt. Cuius ratio esse videtur propter rectitudinem voluntatis eius qui ei inhaeret intendens bono Angelo adhaerere. Ergo totum peccatum infidelitatis esse videtur in perversa voluntate. Non ergo est in intellectu sicut in subiecto. | Objection 3: Further, a gloss [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on 2 Cor. 11:14 "Satan . . . transformeth himself into an angel of light," says that if "a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be taken for a good angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does or says what is becoming to a good angel." This seems to be because of the rectitude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel, since his intention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin of unbelief seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and, consequently, it does not reside in the intellect. |
| Sed contra, contraria sunt in eodem subiecto. Sed fides, cui contrariatur infidelitas, est in intellectu sicut in subiecto. Ergo et infidelitas in intellectu est. | On the contrary, Things which are contrary to one another are in the same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in the intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum dicitur esse in illa potentia quae est principium actus peccati. Actus autem peccati potest habere duplex principium. Unum quidem primum et universale, quod imperat omnes actus peccatorum, et hoc principium est voluntas, quia omne peccatum est voluntarium. Aliud autem principium actus peccati est proprium et proximum, quod elicit peccati actum, sicut concupiscibilis est principium gulae et luxuriae, et secundum hoc gula et luxuria dicuntur esse in concupiscibili. Dissentire autem, qui est proprius actus infidelitatis, est actus intellectus, sed moti a voluntate, sicut et assentire. | I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [74], Articles [1],2), sin is said to be in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a sinful act may have two principles: one is its first and universal principle, which commands all acts of sin; and this is the will, because every sin is voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act is the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful act: thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and lust, wherefore these sins are said to be in the concupiscible. Now dissent, which is the act proper to unbelief, is an act of the intellect, moved, however, by the will, just as assent is. |
| Et ideo infidelitas, sicut et fides, est quidem in intellectu sicut in proximo subiecto, in voluntate autem sicut in primo motivo. Et hoc modo dicitur omne peccatum esse in voluntate. | Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate subject. But it is in the will as its first moving principle, in which way every sin is said to be in the will. |
| Unde patet responsio ad primum. | Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod contemptus voluntatis causat dissensum intellectus, in quo perficitur ratio infidelitatis. Unde causa infidelitatis est in voluntate, sed ipsa infidelitas est in intellectu. | Reply to Objection 2: The will's contempt causes the intellect's dissent, which completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of unbelief is in the will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui credit malum Angelum esse bonum non dissentit ab eo quod est fidei, quia sensus corporis fallitur, mens vero non removetur a vera rectaque sententia, ut ibidem dicit Glossa. Sed si aliquis Satanae adhaereret cum incipit ad sua ducere, idest ad mala et falsa, tunc non careret peccato, ut ibidem dicitur. | Reply to Objection 3: He that believes a wicked angel to be a good one, does not dissent from a matter of faith, because "his bodily senses are deceived, while his mind does not depart from a true and right judgment" as the gloss observes [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx]. But, according to the same authority, to adhere to Satan when he begins to invite one to his abode, i.e. wickedness and error, is not without sin. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod infidelitas non sit maximum peccatorum. Dicit enim Augustinus, et habetur V, qu. I, utrum Catholicum pessimis moribus alicui haeretico in cuius vita, praeter id quod haereticus est, non inveniunt homines quod reprehendant, praeponere debeamus, non audeo praecipitare sententiam. Sed haereticus est infidelis. Ergo non est simpliciter dicendum quod infidelitas sit maximum peccatorum. | Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins. For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): "I should hesitate to decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a heretic, in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the fact that he is a heretic." But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we ought not to say absolutely that unbelief is the greatest of sins. |
| Praeterea, illud quod diminuit vel excusat peccatum non videtur esse maximum peccatum. Sed infidelitas excusat vel diminuit peccatum, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Tim. I, prius fui blasphemus et persecutor et contumeliosus, sed misericordiam consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci in incredulitate. Ergo infidelitas non est maximum peccatum. | Objection 2: Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not, seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes sin: for the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13): "I . . . before was a blasphemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins. |
| Praeterea, maiori peccato debetur maior poena, secundum illud Deut. XXV, pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus. Sed maior poena debetur fidelibus peccantibus quam infidelibus, secundum illud ad Heb. X, quanto magis putatis deteriora mereri supplicia qui filium Dei conculcaverit, et sanguinem testamenti pollutum duxerit, in quo sanctificatus est? Ergo infidelitas non est maximum peccatum. | Objection 3: Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment, according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now a greater punishment is due to believers than to unbelievers, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?" Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, exponens illud Ioan. XV, si non venissem, et locutus eis non fuissem, peccatum non haberent, magnum, inquit, quoddam peccatum sub generali nomine vult intelligi. Hoc enim est peccatum, scilicet infidelitatis, quo tenentur cuncta peccata. Infidelitas ergo est maximum omnium peccatorum. | On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Jn. 15:22, "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin," says (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.): "Under the general name, He refers to a singularly great sin. For this," viz. infidelity, "is the sin to which all others may be traced." Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod omne peccatum formaliter consistit in aversione a Deo, ut supra dictum est. Unde tanto aliquod peccatum est gravius quanto per ipsum homo magis a Deo separatur. Per infidelitatem autem maxime homo a Deo elongatur, quia nec veram Dei cognitionem habet; per falsam autem cognitionem ipsius non appropinquat ei, sed magis ab eo elongatur. | I answer that, Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as stated above (FS, Question [71], Article [6]; FS, Question [73], Article [3]). Hence the more a sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach Him, but is severed from Him. |
| Nec potest esse quod quantum ad quid Deum cognoscat qui falsam opinionem de ipso habet, quia id quod ipse opinatur non est Deus. Unde manifestum est quod peccatum infidelitatis est maius omnibus peccatis quae contingunt in perversitate morum. Secus autem est de peccatis quae opponuntur aliis virtutibus theologicis, ut infra dicetur. | Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God. Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to the sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated further on (Question [20], Article [3]; Question [34], Article [2], ad 2; Question [39], Article [2], ad 3). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet peccatum quod est gravius secundum suum genus esse minus grave secundum aliquas circumstantias. Et propter hoc Augustinus noluit praecipitare sententiam de malo Catholico et haeretico alias non peccante, quia peccatum haeretici, etsi sit gravius ex genere, potest tamen ex aliqua circumstantia alleviari; et e converso peccatum Catholici ex aliqua circumstantia aggravari. | Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its genus from being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence Augustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic not sinning otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more grave generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and conversely the sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be aggravated. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod infidelitas habet et ignorantiam adiunctam, et habet renisum ad ea quae sunt fidei, et ex hac parte habet rationem peccati gravissimi. Ex parte autem ignorantiae habet aliquam rationem excusationis, et maxime quando aliquis ex malitia non peccat, sicut fuit in apostolo. | Reply to Objection 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter respect it is a most grave sin. In respect, however, of this ignorance, it has a certain reason for excuse, especially when a man sins not from malice, as was the case with the Apostle. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod infidelis pro peccato infidelitatis gravius punitur quam alius peccator pro quocumque alio peccato, considerato peccati genere. Sed pro alio peccato, puta pro adulterio, si committatur a fideli et ab infideli, ceteris paribus, gravius peccat fidelis quam infidelis, tum propter notitiam veritatis ex fide; tum etiam propter sacramenta fidei quibus est imbutus, quibus peccando contumeliam facit. | Reply to Objection 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for his sin of unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we consider the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g. adultery, committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer, other things being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and on account of the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and which he insults by committing sin. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod quaelibet actio infidelis sit peccatum. Quia super illud Rom. XIV, omne quod non est ex fide peccatum est, dicit Glossa, omnis infidelium vita est peccatum. Sed ad vitam infidelium pertinet omne quod agunt. Ergo omnis actio infidelis est peccatum. | Objection 1: It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin. Because a gloss on Rm. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin," says: "The whole life of unbelievers is a sin." Now the life of unbelievers consists of their actions. Therefore every action of an unbeliever is a sin. |
| Praeterea, fides intentionem dirigit. Sed nullum bonum potest esse quod non est ex intentione recta. Ergo in infidelibus nulla actio potest esse bona. | Objection 2: Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no good save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among unbelievers, no action can be good. |
| Praeterea, corrupto priori, corrumpuntur posteriora. Sed actus fidei praecedit actus omnium virtutum. Ergo, cum in infidelibus non sit actus fidei, nullum bonum opus facere possunt, sed in omni actu suo peccant. | Objection 3: Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of all the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in unbelievers, they can do no good work, but sin in every action of theirs. |
| Sed contra est quod Cornelio adhuc infideli existenti dictum est quod acceptae erant Deo eleemosynae eius. Ergo non omnis actio infidelis est peccatum, sed aliqua actio eius est bona. | On the contrary, It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever (Acts 10:4,31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not every action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are good. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum mortale tollit gratiam gratum facientem, non autem totaliter corrumpit bonum naturae. Unde, cum infidelitas sit quoddam mortale peccatum, infideles quidem gratia carent, remanet tamen in eis aliquod bonum naturae. Unde manifestum est quod infideles non possunt operari opera bona quae sunt ex gratia, scilicet opera meritoria, tamen opera bona ad quae sufficit bonum naturae aliqualiter operari possunt. | I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [85], Articles [2],4) mortal sin takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them. Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature suffices. |
| Unde non oportet quod in omni suo opere peccent, sed quandocumque aliquod opus operantur ex infidelitate, tunc peccant. Sicut enim habens fidem potest aliquod peccatum committere in actu quem non refert ad fidei finem, vel venialiter vel etiam mortaliter peccando; ita etiam infidelis potest aliquem actum bonum facere in eo quod non refert ad finem infidelitatis. | Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or even mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to the end of his unbelief. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud est intelligendum vel quia vita infidelium non potest esse sine peccato, cum peccata sine fide non tollantur. Vel quia quidquid agunt ex infidelitate peccatum est. Unde ibi subditur, quia omnis infideliter vivens vel agens vehementer peccat. | Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted must be taken to mean either that the life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no sin is taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence the same authority adds: "Because every one that lives or acts according to his unbelief, sins grievously." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod fides dirigit intentionem respectu finis ultimi supernaturalis. Sed lumen etiam naturalis rationis potest dirigere intentionem respectu alicuius boni connaturalis. | Reply to Objection 2: Faith directs the intention with regard to the supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can direct the intention in respect of a connatural good. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod per infidelitatem non corrumpitur totaliter in infidelibus ratio naturalis, quin remaneat in eis aliqua veri cognitio, per quam possunt facere aliquod opus de genere bonorum. De Cornelio tamen sciendum est quod infidelis non erat, alioquin eius operatio accepta non fuisset Deo, cui sine fide nullus potest placere. Habebat autem fidem implicitam, nondum manifestata Evangelii veritate. Unde ut eum in fide plene instrueret, mittitur ad eum Petrus. | Reply to Objection 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in them, whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not an unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God, whom none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the truth of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent to him to give him fuller instruction in the faith. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint plures infidelitatis species. Cum enim fides et infidelitas sint contraria, oportet quod sint circa idem. Sed formale obiectum fidei est veritas prima, a qua habet unitatem, licet multa materialiter credat. Ergo etiam obiectum infidelitatis est veritas prima, ea vero quae discredit infidelis materialiter se habent in infidelitate. Sed differentia secundum speciem non attenditur secundum principia materialia, sed secundum principia formalia. Ergo infidelitatis non sunt diversae species secundum diversitatem eorum in quibus infideles errant. | Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several species of unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another, they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends not on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not several species of unbelief, according to the various points which the unbeliever disbelieves. |
| Praeterea, infinitis modis potest aliquis a veritate fidei deviare. Si igitur secundum diversitates errorum diversae species infidelitatis assignentur, videtur sequi quod sint infinitae infidelitatis species. Et ita huiusmodi species non sunt considerandae. | Objection 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith in an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of our consideration. |
| Praeterea, idem non invenitur in diversis speciebus. Sed contingit aliquem esse infidelem ex eo quod errat circa diversa. Ergo diversitas errorum non facit diversas species infidelitatis. Sic igitur infidelitatis non sunt plures species. | Objection 3: Further, the same thing does not belong to different species. Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different points of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a diversity of species of unbelief: and so there are not several species of unbelief. |
| Sed contra est quod unicuique virtuti opponuntur plures species vitiorum, bonum enim contingit uno modo, malum vero multipliciter, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., et per philosophum, in II Ethic. Sed fides est una virtus. Ergo ei opponuntur plures infidelitatis species. | On the contrary, Several species of vice are opposed to each virtue, because "good happens in one way, but evil in many ways," according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now faith is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are opposed to it. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod quaelibet virtus consistit in hoc quod attingat regulam aliquam cognitionis vel operationis humanae, ut supra dictum est. Attingere autem regulam est uno modo circa unam materiam, sed a regula deviare contingit multipliciter. Et ideo uni virtuti multa vitia opponuntur. Diversitas autem vitiorum quae unicuique virtuti opponitur potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum diversam habitudinem ad virtutem. Et secundum hoc determinatae sunt quaedam species vitiorum quae opponuntur virtuti, sicut virtuti morali opponitur unum vitium secundum excessum ad virtutem, et aliud vitium secundum defectum a virtute. Alio modo potest considerari diversitas vitiorum oppositorum uni virtuti secundum corruptionem diversorum quae ad virtutem requiruntur. Et secundum hoc uni virtuti, puta temperantiae vel fortitudini, opponuntur infinita vitia, secundum quod infinitis modis contingit diversas circumstantias virtutis corrumpi, ut a rectitudine virtutis recedatur. Unde et Pythagorici malum posuerunt infinitum. | I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [55], Article [4]; FS, Question [64], Article [1]), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge or operation. Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter, whereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices are opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are opposed to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with regard to their different relations to the virtue: and in this way there are determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to a moral virtue one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and another, by falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of vices opposed to one virtue may be considered in respect of the corruption of the various conditions required for that virtue. In this way an infinite number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e.g. temperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number of ways in which the various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that the rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the Pythagoreans held evil to be infinite. |
| Sic ergo dicendum est quod, si infidelitas attendatur secundum comparationem ad fidem, diversae sunt infidelitatis species et numero determinatae. Cum enim peccatum infidelitatis consistat in renitendo fidei, hoc potest contingere dupliciter. Quia aut renititur fidei nondum susceptae, et talis est infidelitas Paganorum sive gentilium. Aut renititur fidei Christianae susceptae, vel in figura, et sic est infidelitas Iudaeorum; vel in ipsa manifestatione veritatis, et sic est infidelitas haereticorum. Unde in generali possunt assignari tres praedictae species infidelitatis. | Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison to faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in number. For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith, this may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted before it has been accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens; or the Christian faith is resisted after it has been accepted, and this either in the figure, and such is the unbelief of the Jews, or in the very manifestation of truth, and such is the unbelief of heretics. Hence we may, in a general way, reckon these three as species of unbelief. |
| Si vero distinguantur infidelitatis species secundum errorem in diversis quae ad fidem pertinent, sic non sunt determinatae infidelitatis species, possunt enim errores in infinitum multiplicari, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de haeresibus. | If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to the various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod formalis ratio alicuius peccati potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum intentionem peccantis, et sic id ad quod convertitur peccans est formale obiectum peccati; et ex hoc diversificantur eius species. Alio modo, secundum rationem mali, et sic illud bonum a quo receditur est formale obiectum peccati; sed ex hac parte peccatum non habet speciem, immo privatio est speciei. Sic igitur dicendum est quod infidelitatis obiectum est veritas prima sicut a qua recedit, sed formale eius obiectum sicut ad quod convertitur est sententia falsa quam sequitur; et ex hac parte eius species diversificantur. Unde sicut caritas est una, quae inhaeret summo bono, sunt autem diversa vitia caritati opposita, quae per conversionem ad diversa bona temporalia recedunt ab uno summo bono, et iterum secundum diversas habitudines inordinatas ad Deum; ita etiam fides est una virtus, ex hoc quod adhaeret uni primae veritati; sed infidelitatis species sunt multae, ex hoc quod infideles diversas falsas sententias sequuntur. | Reply to Objection 1: The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in two ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which case the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his sin, and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may be considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken is the formal object of the sin; which however does not derive its species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We must therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect, considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that it follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives its various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it adheres to the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of vice opposed to charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by turning to various temporal goods, and also in respect of various inordinate relations to God, so too, faith is one virtue through adhering to the one First Truth, yet there are many species of unbelief, because unbelievers follow many false opinions. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de distinctione specierum infidelitatis secundum diversa in quibus erratur. | Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the various species of unbelief according to various points in which errors occur. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut fides est una quia multa credit in ordine ad unum, ita infidelitas potest esse una, etiam si in multis erret, inquantum omnia habent ordinem ad unum. Nihil tamen prohibet hominem diversis infidelitatis speciebus errare, sicut etiam potest unus homo diversis vitiis subiacere et diversis corporalibus morbis. | Reply to Objection 3: Since faith is one because it believes in many things in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many things, be one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet nothing hinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief, even as one man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily diseases. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod infidelitas gentilium sive Paganorum sit gravior ceteris. Sicut enim corporalis morbus tanto est gravior quanto saluti principalioris membri contrariatur, ita peccatum tanto videtur esse gravius quanto contrariatur ei quod est principalius in virtute. Sed principalius in fide est fides unitatis divinae, a qua deficiunt gentiles, multitudinem deorum credentes. Ergo eorum infidelitas est gravissima. | Objection 1: It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is graver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver according as it endangers the health of a more important member of the body, so does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed to that which holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which is most important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which the heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest of all. |
| Praeterea, inter haereticos tanto haeresis aliquorum detestabilior est quanto in pluribus et principalioribus veritati fidei contradicunt, sicut haeresis Arii, qui separavit divinitatem, detestabilior fuit quam haeresis Nestorii, qui separavit humanitatem Christi a persona filii Dei. Sed gentiles in pluribus et principalioribus recedunt a fide quam Iudaei et haeretici, quia omnino nihil de fide recipiunt. Ergo eorum infidelitas est gravissima. | Objection 2: Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those which contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important points: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more detestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ from the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in more numerous and more important points than Jews and heretics; since they do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest. |
| Praeterea, omne bonum est diminutivum mali. Sed aliquod bonum est in Iudaeis, quia confitentur vetus testamentum esse a Deo. Bonum etiam est in haereticis, quia venerantur novum testamentum. Ergo minus peccant quam gentiles, qui utrumque testamentum detestantur. | Objection 3: Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some good in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who receive neither Testament. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur II Pet. II, melius erat illis non cognoscere viam iustitiae quam post cognitam retrorsum converti. Sed gentiles non cognoverunt viam iustitiae, haeretici autem et Iudaei aliqualiter cognoscentes deseruerunt. Ergo eorum peccatum est gravius. | On the contrary, It is written (2 Pt. 2:21): "It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back." Now the heathens have not known the way of justice, whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod in infidelitate, sicut dictum est, duo possunt considerari. Quorum unum est comparatio eius ad fidem. Et ex hac parte aliquis gravius contra fidem peccat qui fidei renititur quam suscepit quam qui renititur fidei nondum susceptae, sicut gravius peccat qui non implet quod promisit quam si non impleat quod nunquam promisit. Et secundum hoc infidelitas haereticorum, qui profitentur fidem Evangelii et ei renituntur corrumpentes ipsam, gravius peccant quam Iudaei, qui fidem Evangelii nunquam susceperunt. Sed quia susceperunt eius figuram in veteri lege, quam male interpretantes corrumpunt, ideo etiam ipsorum infidelitas est gravius peccatum quam infidelitas gentilium, qui nullo modo fidem Evangelii susceperunt. | I answer that, As stated above (Article [5]), two things may be considered in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from this point of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins more grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having accepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins more grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way the unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that of the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since, however, they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which they corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all. |
| Aliud quod in infidelitate consideratur est corruptio eorum quae ad fidem pertinent. Et secundum hoc, cum in pluribus errent gentiles quam Iudaei, et Iudaei quam haeretici, gravior est infidelitas gentilium quam Iudaeorum, et Iudaeorum quam haereticorum, nisi forte quorundam, puta Manichaeorum, qui etiam circa credibilia plus errant quam gentiles. | The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of heathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens do. |
| Harum tamen duarum gravitatum prima praeponderat secundae quantum ad rationem culpae. Quia infidelitas habet rationem culpae, ut supra dictum est, magis ex hoc quod renititur fidei quam ex hoc quod non habet ea quae fidei sunt, hoc enim videtur, ut dictum est, magis ad rationem poenae pertinere unde, simpliciter loquendo, infidelitas haereticorum est pessima. | Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point of view of guilt; since, as stated above (Article [1]) unbelief has the character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the mere absence of faith, for the latter as was stated (Article [1]) seems rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely, the unbelief of heretics is the worst. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. |
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| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit cum infidelibus publice disputandum. Dicit enim apostolus, II ad Tim. II, noli verbis contendere, ad nihilum enim utile est nisi ad subversionem audientium. Sed disputatio publica cum infidelibus fieri non potest sine contentione verborum. Ergo non est publice disputandum cum infidelibus. | Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to dispute with unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers." But it is impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly without contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute publicly with unbelievers. |
| Praeterea, lex Marciani Augusti, per canones confirmata, sic dicit, iniuriam facit iudicio religiosissimae synodi, si quis semel iudicata ac recte disposita revolvere et publice disputare contendit. Sed omnia quae ad fidem pertinent sunt per sacra Concilia determinata. Ergo graviter peccat, iniuriam synodo faciens, si quis de his quae sunt fidei publice disputare praesumat. | Objection 2: Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the canons [*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus: "It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if anyone ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which have once been judged and disposed of." Now all matters of faith have been decided by the holy councils. Therefore it is an insult to the councils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in public about matters of faith. |
| Praeterea, disputatio argumentis aliquibus agitur. Sed argumentum est ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem. Ea autem quae sunt fidei, cum sint certissima, non sunt in dubitationem adducenda. Ergo de his quae sunt fidei non est publice disputandum. | Objection 3: Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments. But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter: whereas things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about matters of faith. |
| Sed contra est quod Act. IX dicitur quod Saulus invalescebat et confundebat Iudaeos; et quod loquebatur gentibus et disputabat cum Graecis. | On the contrary, It is written (Acts 9:22,29) that "Saul increased much more in strength, and confounded the Jews," and that "he spoke . . . to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod in disputatione fidei duo sunt consideranda, unum quidem ex parte disputantis; aliud autem ex parte audientium. Ex parte quidem disputantis est consideranda intentio. Si enim disputet tanquam de fide dubitans, et veritatem fidei pro certo non supponens, sed argumentis experiri intendens, procul dubio peccat, tanquam dubius in fide et infidelis. Si autem disputet aliquis de fide ad confutandum errores, vel etiam ad exercitium, laudabile est. | I answer that, In disputing about the faith, two things must be observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of his hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about the faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would sin, as being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other hand, it is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to confute errors, or for practice. |
| Ex parte vero audientium considerandum est utrum illi qui disputationem audiunt sint instructi et firmi in fide, aut simplices et in fide titubantes. Et coram quidem sapientibus in fide firmis nullum periculum est disputare de fide. Sed circa simplices est distinguendum. Quia aut sunt sollicitati sive pulsati ab infidelibus, puta Iudaeis vel haereticis sive Paganis, nitentibus corrumpere in eis fidem, aut omnino non sunt sollicitati super hoc, sicut in terris in quibus non sunt infideles. In primo casu necessarium est publice disputare de fide, dummodo inveniantur aliqui ad hoc sufficientes et idonei, qui errores confutare possint. Per hoc enim simplices in fide firmabuntur; et tolletur infidelibus decipiendi facultas; et ipsa taciturnitas eorum qui resistere deberent pervertentibus fidei veritatem esset erroris confirmatio. Unde Gregorius, in II Pastoral., sicut incauta locutio in errorem pertrahit, ita indiscretum silentium eos qui erudiri poterant in errore derelinquit. In secundo vero casu periculosum est publice disputare de fide coram simplicibus; quorum fides ex hoc est firmior quod nihil diversum audierunt ab eo quod credunt. Et ideo non expedit eis ut verba infidelium audiant disceptantium contra fidem. | On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear the disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith, there can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their presence. But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; because either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for instance, Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith in them, or else they are not subject to provocation in this matter, as in those countries where there are not unbelievers. In the first case it is necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided there be those who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting errors; since in this way simple people are strengthened in the faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity to deceive, while if those who ought to withstand the perverters of the truth of faith were silent, this would tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 4): "Even as a thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does an indiscreet silence leave those in error who might have been instructed." On the other hand, in the second case it is dangerous to dispute in public about the faith, in the presence of simple people, whose faith for this very reason is more firm, that they have never heard anything differing from what they believe. Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what unbelievers have to say against the faith. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus non prohibet totaliter disputationem, sed inordinatam, quae magis fit contentione verborum quam firmitate sententiarum. | Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle does not entirely forbid disputations, but such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious words rather than of sound speeches. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod lex illa prohibet publicam disputationem de fide quae procedit ex dubitatione fidei, non autem illam quae est ad fidei conservationem. | Reply to Objection 2: That law forbade those public disputations about the faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are for the safeguarding thereof. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod non debet disputari de his quae sunt fidei quasi de eis dubitando, sed propter veritatem manifestandam et errores confutandos. Oportet enim ad fidei confirmationem aliquando cum infidelibus disputare, quandoque quidem defendendo fidem, secundum illud I Pet. III, parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti vos rationem de ea quae est in vobis spe et fide; quandoque autem ad convincendos errantes, secundum illud ad Tit. I, ut sit potens exhortari in doctrina sana, et eos qui contradicunt arguere. | Reply to Objection 3: One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not as though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known, and to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is necessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by defending the faith, according to 1 Pt. 3:15: "Being ready always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in you [*Vulg.: 'Of that hope which is in you' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken from Bede]." Sometimes again, it is necessary, in order to convince those who are in error, according to Titus 1:9: "That he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers." |
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| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod infideles nullo modo compellendi sint ad fidem. Dicitur enim Matth. XIII quod servi patrisfamilias in cuius agro erant zizania seminata quaesierunt ab eo, vis imus et colligimus ea? Et ipse respondit, non, ne forte, colligentes zizania, eradicetis simul cum eis triticum. Ubi dicit Chrysostomus, haec dixit dominus prohibens occisiones fieri. Nec enim oportet interficere haereticos, quia si eos occideritis, necesse est multos sanctorum simul subverti. Ergo videtur quod pari ratione nec aliqui infideles sint ad fidem cogendi. | Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be compelled to the faith. For it is written (Mt. 13:28) that the servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, asked him: "Wilt thou that we go and gather it up?" and that he answered: "No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also together with it": on which passage Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in Matth.): "Our Lord says this so as to forbid the slaying of men. For it is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will necessarily slay many innocent persons." Therefore it seems that for the same reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith. |
| Praeterea, in decretis, dist. XLV, sic dicitur, de Iudaeis praecepit sancta synodus nemini deinceps ad credendum vim inferre. Ergo pari ratione nec alii infideles sunt ad fidem cogendi. | Objection 2: Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De Judaeis): "The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that for the future, none are to be compelled to believe." Therefore, in like manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith. |
| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit quod cetera potest homo nolens, credere nonnisi volens. Sed voluntas cogi non potest. Ergo videtur quod infideles non sint ad fidem cogendi. | Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that "it is possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot believe unless he is willing." Therefore it seems that unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith. |
| Praeterea, Ezech. XVIII dicitur ex persona Dei, nolo mortem peccatoris. Sed nos debemus voluntatem nostram conformare divinae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam nos non debemus velle quod infideles occidantur. | Objection 4: It is said in God's person (Ezech. 18:32 [*Ezech. 33:11]): "I desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg.: 'of him that dieth']." Now we ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above (FS, Question [19], Articles [9],10). Therefore we should not even wish unbelievers to be put to death. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. XIV, exi in vias et saepes et compelle intrare, ut impleatur domus mea. Sed homines in domum Dei, idest in Ecclesiam, intrant per fidem. Ergo aliqui sunt compellendi ad fidem. | On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 14:23): "Go out into the highways and hedges; and compel them to come in." Now men enter into the house of God, i.e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some ought to be compelled to the faith. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod infidelium quidam sunt qui nunquam susceperunt fidem, sicut gentiles et Iudaei. Et tales nullo modo sunt ad fidem compellendi, ut ipsi credant, quia credere voluntatis est. Sunt tamen compellendi a fidelibus, si facultas adsit, ut fidem non impediant vel blasphemiis, vel malis persuasionibus, vel etiam apertis persecutionibus. Et propter hoc fideles Christi frequenter contra infideles bellum movent, non quidem ut eos ad credendum cogant (quia si etiam eos vicissent et captivos haberent, in eorum libertate relinquerent an credere vellent), sed propter hoc ut eos compellant ne fidem Christi impediant. | I answer that, Among unbelievers there are some who have never received the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are by no means to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may believe, because to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder the faith, by their blasphemies, or by their evil persuasions, or even by their open persecutions. It is for this reason that Christ's faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of forcing them to believe, because even if they were to conquer them, and take them prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe, if they will, but in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of Christ. |
| Alii vero sunt infideles qui quandoque fidem susceperunt et eam profitentur, sicut haeretici vel quicumque apostatae. Et tales sunt etiam corporaliter compellendi ut impleant quod promiserunt et teneant quod semel susceperunt. | On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates: such should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil what they have promised, and hold what they, at one time, received. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per illam auctoritatem quidam intellexerunt esse prohibitam non quidem excommunicationem haereticorum, sed eorum occisionem, ut patet per auctoritatem Chrysostomi inductam. Et Augustinus, ad Vincentium, de se dicit, haec primitus mea sententia erat, neminem ad unitatem Christi esse cogendum, verbo esse agendum, disputatione pugnandum. Sed haec opinio mea non contradicentium verbis, sed demonstrantium superatur exemplis. Legum enim terror ita profuit ut multi dicant, gratias domino, qui vincula nostra dirupit. Quod ergo dominus dicit, sinite utraque crescere usque ad messem, qualiter intelligendum sit apparet ex hoc quod subditur, ne forte, colligentes zizania, eradicetis simul cum eis et triticum. Ubi satis ostendit, sicut Augustinus dicit (contra Epist. Parmen.), cum metus iste non subest, idest quando ita cuiusque crimen notum est et omnibus execrabile apparet ut vel nullos prorsus, vel non tales habeat defensores per quos possit schisma contingere, non dormiat severitas disciplinae. | Reply to Objection 1: Some have understood the authority quoted to forbid, not the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears from the words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii) of himself: "It was once my opinion that none should be compelled to union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight with arguments. However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law was so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our chains asunder." Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord's words, "Suffer both to grow until the harvest," must be gathered from those which precede, "lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root the wheat also together with it." For, Augustine says (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) "these words show that when this is not to be feared, that is to say, when a man's crime is so publicly known, and so hateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none such as might cause a schism, the severity of discipline should not slacken." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Iudaei, si nullo modo susceperunt fidem, non sunt cogendi ad fidem. Si autem susceperunt fidem, oportet ut fidem necessitate cogantur retinere, sicut in eodem capitulo dicitur. | Reply to Objection 2: Those Jews who have in no way received the faith, ought not by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they have received it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in the same chapter. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut vovere est voluntatis, reddere autem est necessitatis, ita accipere fidem est voluntatis, sed tenere iam acceptam est necessitatis. Et ideo haeretici sunt compellendi ut fidem teneant. Dicit enim Augustinus, ad Bonifacium comitem, ubi est quod isti clamare consueverunt, liberum est credere vel non credere, cui vim Christus intulit? Agnoscant in Paulo prius cogentem Christum et postea docentem. | Reply to Objection 3: Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and keeping a vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a matter of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has received it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface (Ep. clxxxv): "What do these people mean by crying out continually: 'We may believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ compel?' They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards taught Him." |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut in eadem epistola Augustinus dicit, nullus nostrum vult aliquem haereticum perire. Sed aliter non meruit habere pacem domus David, nisi Absalom filius eius in bello quod contra patrem gerebat fuisset extinctus. Sic Ecclesia Catholica, si aliquorum perditione ceteros colligit, dolorem materni sanat cordis tantorum liberatione populorum. | Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says in the same letter, "none of us wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve to have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war which he had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church gathers together some of the perdition of others, she heals the sorrow of her maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations." |
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| Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod cum infidelibus possit communicari. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. X, si quis vocat vos infidelium ad coenam, et vultis ire, omne quod vobis apponitur manducate. Et Chrysostomus dicit, ad mensam Paganorum si volueris ire, sine ulla prohibitione permittimus. Sed ad coenam alicuius ire est ei communicare. Ergo licet infidelibus communicare. | Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:27): "If any of them that believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything that is set before you." And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad Heb.): "If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without any reservation." Now to sit at table with anyone is to communicate with him. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers. |
| Praeterea, apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. V, quid mihi est de his qui foris sunt iudicare? Foris autem sunt infideles. Cum igitur per iudicium Ecclesiae aliquorum communio fidelibus inhibeatur, videtur quod non sit inhibendum fidelibus cum infidelibus communicare. | Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do to judge them that are without?" Now unbelievers are without. When, therefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with certain people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers. |
| Praeterea, dominus non potest uti servo nisi ei communicando saltem verbo, quia dominus movet servum per imperium. Sed Christiani possunt habere servos infideles, vel Iudaeos vel etiam Paganos sive Saracenos. Ergo possunt licite cum eis communicare. | Objection 3: Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews, or pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully communicate with them. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VII, non inibis cum eis foedus, nec misereberis eorum, neque sociabis cum eis connubia. Et super illud Lev. XV, mulier quae redeunte mense etc., dicit Glossa, sic oportet ab idololatria abstinere ut nec idololatras nec eorum discipulos contingamus, nec cum eis communionem habeamus. | On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 7:2,3): "Thou shalt make no league with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make marriages with them": and a gloss on Lev. 15:19, "The woman who at the return of the month," etc. says: "It is so necessary to shun idolatry, that we should not come in touch with idolaters or their disciples, nor have any dealings with them." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod communio alicuius personae interdicitur fidelibus dupliciter, uno modo, in poenam illius cui communio fidelium subtrahitur; alio modo, ad cautelam eorum quibus interdicitur ne alii communicent. Et utraque causa ex verbis apostoli accipi potest, I ad Cor. V. Nam postquam sententiam excommunicationis protulit, subdit pro ratione, nescitis quia modicum fermentum totam massam corrumpit? Et postea rationem subdit ex parte poenae per iudicium Ecclesiae illatae, cum dicit, nonne de his qui intus sunt vos iudicatis? | I answer that, Communication with a particular person is forbidden to the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with whom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of those who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can be gathered from the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 5:6). For after he had pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: "Know you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump?" and afterwards he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the sentence of the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): "Do not you judge them that are within?" |
| Primo igitur modo non interdicit Ecclesia fidelibus communionem infidelium qui nullo modo fidem Christianam receperunt, scilicet Paganorum vel Iudaeorum, quia non habet de eis iudicare spirituali iudicio, sed temporali, in casu cum, inter Christianos commorantes, aliquam culpam committunt et per fideles temporaliter puniuntur. Sed isto modo, scilicet in poenam, interdicit Ecclesia fidelibus communionem illorum infidelium qui a fide suscepta deviant, vel corrumpendo fidem, sicut haeretici, vel etiam totaliter a fide recedendo, sicut apostatae. In utrosque enim horum excommunicationis sententiam profert Ecclesia. | Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the right to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i.e. as a punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the faith, as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of excommunication on both. |
| Sed quantum ad secundum modum, videtur esse distinguendum secundum diversas conditiones personarum et negotiorum et temporum. Si enim aliqui fuerint firmi in fide, ita quod ex communione eorum cum infidelibus conversio infidelium magis sperari possit quam fidelium a fide aversio; non sunt prohibendi infidelibus communicare qui fidem non susceperunt, scilicet Paganis vel Iudaeis, et maxime si necessitas urgeat. Si autem sint simplices et infirmi in fide, de quorum subversione probabiliter timeri possit, prohibendi sunt ab infidelium communione, et praecipue ne magnam familiaritatem cum eis habeant, vel absque necessitate eis communicent. | With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and time. For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith. These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or to communicate with them without necessity. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus illud praecipit de illis gentibus quarum terram ingressuri erant Iudaei, qui erant proni ad idololatriam, et ideo timendum erat ne per continuam conversationem cum eis alienarentur a fide. Et ideo ibidem subditur, quia seducet filium tuum ne sequatur me. | This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Ecclesia in infideles non habet iudicium quoad poenam spiritualem eis infligendam. Habet tamen iudicium super aliquos infideles quoad temporalem poenam infligendam, ad quod pertinet quod Ecclesia aliquando, propter aliquas speciales culpas, subtrahit aliquibus infidelibus communionem fidelium. | Reply to Objection 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them: but she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church, for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication with certain unbelievers. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod magis est probabile quod servus, qui regitur imperio domini, convertatur ad fidem domini fidelis, quam e converso. Et ideo non est prohibitum quin fideles habeant servos infideles. Si tamen domino periculum immineret ex communione talis servi, deberet eum a se abiicere, secundum illud mandatum domini, Matth. V et XVIII, si pes tuus scandalizaverit te, abscinde eum et proiice abs te. | Reply to Objection 3: There is more probability that a servant who is ruled by his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his master who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so the faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, however, the master were in danger, through communicating with such a servant, he should send him away, according to Our Lord's command (Mt. 18:8): "If . . . thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee." |
| [See answer to objection 1.] | With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition gives this solution before the Reply OBJ 2] sense the reply is that the Lord gave this command in reference to those nations into whose territory the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined to idolatry, so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those nations, they should be estranged from the faith: hence the text goes on (Dt. 7:4): "For she will turn away thy son from following Me." |
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| Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod infideles possint habere praelationem vel dominium supra fideles. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Tim. VI, quicumque sunt sub iugo servi dominos suos omni honore dignos arbitrentur, et quod loquatur de infidelibus patet per hoc quod subdit, qui autem fideles habent dominos non contemnant. Et I Pet. II dicitur, servi, subditi estote in omni timore dominis, non tantum bonis et modestis, sed etiam dyscolis. Non autem hoc praeciperetur per apostolicam doctrinam nisi infideles possent fidelibus praeesse. Ergo videtur quod infideles possint praeesse fidelibus. | Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1): "Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor": and it is clear that he is speaking of unbelievers, since he adds (1 Tim. 6:2): "But they that have believing masters, let them not despise them." Moreover it is written (1 Pt. 2:18): "Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward." Now this command would not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers can have authority over the faithful. |
| Praeterea, quicumque sunt de familia alicuius principis subsunt ei. Sed fideles aliqui erant de familiis infidelium principum, unde dicitur ad Philipp. IV, salutant vos omnes sancti, maxime autem qui de Caesaris domo sunt, scilicet Neronis, qui infidelis erat. Ergo infideles possunt fidelibus praeesse. | Objection 2: Further, all the members of a prince's household are his subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving princes' households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians (4:22): "All the saints salute you, especially they that are of Caesar's household," referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. Therefore unbelievers can have authority over the faithful. |
| Praeterea, sicut philosophus dicit, in I Polit., servus est instrumentum domini in his quae ad humanam vitam pertinent, sicut et minister artificis est instrumentum artificis in his quae pertinent ad operationem artis. Sed in talibus potest fidelis infideli subiici, possunt enim fideles infidelium coloni esse. Ergo infideles possunt fidelibus praefici etiam quantum ad dominium. | Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a slave is his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life, even as a craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning the working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion. |
| Sed contra est quod ad eum qui praeest pertinet habere iudicium super eos quibus praeest. Sed infideles non possunt iudicare de fidelibus, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. VI, audet aliquis vestrum, habens negotium adversus alterum, iudicari apud iniquos, idest infideles, et non apud sanctos? Ergo videtur quod infideles fidelibus praeesse non possint. | On the contrary, Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment on those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): "Dare any of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the unjust," i.e. unbelievers, "and not before the saints?" Therefore it seems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc dupliciter loqui possumus. Uno modo, de dominio vel praelatione infidelium super fideles de novo instituenda. Et hoc nullo modo permitti debet. Cedit enim hoc in scandalum et in periculum fidei, de facili enim illi qui subiiciuntur aliorum iurisdictioni immutari possunt ab eis quibus subsunt ut sequantur eorum imperium, nisi illi qui subsunt fuerint magnae virtutis. Et similiter infideles contemnunt fidem si fidelium defectus cognoscant. Et ideo apostolus prohibuit quod fideles non contendant iudicio coram iudice infideli. Et ideo nullo modo permittit Ecclesia quod infideles acquirant dominium super fideles, vel qualitercumque eis praeficiantur in aliquo officio. | I answer that, That this question may be considered in two ways. First, we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the faithful as of a thing to be established for the first time. This ought by no means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and endanger the faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply with their commands, unless the subjects are of great virtue: moreover unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they see the faithful fall away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to go to law before an unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether forbids unbelievers to acquire dominion over believers, or to have authority over them in any capacity whatever. |
| Alio modo possumus loqui de dominio vel praelatione iam praeexistenti. Ubi considerandum est quod dominium et praelatio introducta sunt ex iure humano, distinctio autem fidelium et infidelium est ex iure divino. Ius autem divinum, quod est ex gratia, non tollit ius humanum, quod est ex naturali ratione. Et ideo distinctio fidelium et infidelium, secundum se considerata, non tollit dominium et praelationem infidelium supra fideles. | Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force: and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers arises from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers, considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of unbelievers over the faithful. |
| Potest tamen iuste per sententiam vel ordinationem Ecclesiae, auctoritatem Dei habentis, tale ius dominii vel praelationis tolli, quia infideles merito suae infidelitatis merentur potestatem amittere super fideles, qui transferuntur in filios Dei. | Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief deserve to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted into children of God. |
| Sed hoc quidem Ecclesia quandoque facit, quandoque autem non facit. In illis enim infidelibus qui etiam temporali subiectione subiiciuntur Ecclesiae et membris eius, hoc ius Ecclesiae statuit, ut servus Iudaeorum, statim factus Christianus, a servitute liberetur, nullo pretio dato, si fuerit vernaculus, idest in servitute natus; et similiter si, infidelis existens, fuerit emptus ad servitium. Si autem fuerit emptus ad mercationem, tenetur eum infra tres menses exponere ad vendendum. Nec in hoc iniuriam facit Ecclesia, quia, cum ipsi Iudaei sint servi Ecclesiae, potest disponere de rebus eorum; sicut etiam principes saeculares multas leges ediderunt erga suos subditos in favorem libertatis. In illis vero infidelibus qui temporaliter Ecclesiae vel eius membris non subiacent, praedictum ius Ecclesia non statuit, licet posset instituere de iure. Et hoc facit ad scandalum vitandum. Sicut etiam dominus, Matth. XVII, ostendit quod poterat se a tributo excusare quia liberi sunt filii, sed tamen mandavit tributum solvi ad scandalum vitandum. Ita etiam et Paulus, cum dixisset quod servi dominos suos honorarent, subiungit, ne nomen domini et doctrina blasphemetur. | This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church and her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew became a Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without paying any price, if he should be a "vernaculus," i.e. born in slavery; and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought for his service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he should be offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church harm them in this, because since those Jews themselves are subject to the Church, she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular princes have enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, in favor of liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the above law to those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her members, in temporal matters, although she has the right to do so: and this, in order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Mt. 17:25,26) that He could be excused from paying the tribute, because "the children are free," yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in order to avoid giving scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that servants should honor their masters, adds, "lest the name of the Lord and His doctrine be blasphemed." |
| Unde patet responsio ad primum. | This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod illa praelatio Caesaris praeexistebat distinctioni fidelium ab infidelibus, unde non solvebatur per conversionem aliquorum ad fidem. Et utile erat quod aliqui fideles locum in familia imperatoris haberent, ad defendendum alios fideles, sicut beatus Sebastianus Christianorum animos, quos in tormentis videbat deficere, confortabat, et adhuc latebat sub militari chlamyde in domo Diocletiani. | Reply to Objection 2: The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction of faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the conversion of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that there should be a few of the faithful in the emperor's household, that they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed Sebastian encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, and, the while, remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace of Diocletian. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod servi subiiciuntur dominis suis ad totam vitam, et subditi praefectis ad omnia negotia, sed ministri artificum subduntur eis ad aliqua specialia opera. Unde periculosius est quod infideles accipiant dominium vel praelationem super fideles quam quod accipiant ab eis ministerium in aliquo artificio. Et ideo permittit Ecclesia quod Christiani possint colere terras Iudaeorum, quia per hoc non habent necesse conversari cum eis. Salomon etiam expetiit a rege Tyri magistros operum ad ligna caedenda, ut habetur III Reg. V. Et tamen si ex tali communicatione vel convictu subversio fidelium timeretur, esset penitus interdicendum. | Reply to Objection 3: Slaves are subject to their masters for their whole lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything: whereas the craftsman's laborer is subject to him for certain special works. Hence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have dominion or authority over the faithful, than that they should be allowed to employ them in some craft. Wherefore the Church permits Christians to work on the land of Jews, because this does not entail their living together with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre to send master workmen to hew the trees, as related in 3 Kgs. 5:6. Yet, if there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by such communications and dealings, they should be absolutely forbidden. |
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| Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ritus infidelium non sint tolerandi. Manifestum est enim quod infideles in suis ritibus peccant eos servando. Sed peccato consentire videtur qui non prohibet cum prohibere possit, ut habetur in Glossa Rom. I, super illud, non solum qui faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt facientibus. Ergo peccant qui eorum ritus tolerant. | Objection 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent therein, as a gloss observes on Rm. 1:32: "Not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them." Therefore it is a sin to tolerate their rites. |
| Praeterea, ritus Iudaeorum idololatriae comparantur, quia super illud Gal. V, nolite iterum iugo servitutis contineri, dicit Glossa, non est levior haec legis servitus quam idololatriae. Sed non sustineretur quod idololatriae ritum aliqui exercerent, quinimmo Christiani principes templa idolorum primo claudi, et postea dirui fecerunt, ut Augustinus narrat, XVIII de Civ. Dei. Ergo etiam ritus Iudaeorum tolerari non debent. | Objection 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry, because a gloss on Gal. 5:1, "Be not held again under the yoke of bondage," says: "The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of idolatry." But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated. |
| Praeterea, peccatum infidelitatis est gravissimum, ut supra dictum est. Sed alia peccata non tolerantur, sed lege puniuntur, sicut adulterium, furtum et alia huiusmodi. Ergo etiam ritus infidelium tolerandi non sunt. | Objection 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above (Article [3]). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the rites of unbelievers to be tolerated. |
| Sed contra est quod in decretis, dist. XLV, Can. qui sincera, dicit Gregorius de Iudaeis, omnes festivitates suas, sicut hactenus ipsi et patres eorum per longa colentes tempora tenuerunt, liberam habeant observandi celebrandique licentiam | On the contrary, Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret., dist. xlv, can., Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: "They should be allowed to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their fathers have for ages observed them." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod humanum regimen derivatur a divino regimine, et ipsum debet imitari. Deus autem, quamvis sit omnipotens et summe bonus, permittit tamen aliqua mala fieri in universo, quae prohibere posset, ne, eis sublatis, maiora bona tollerentur, vel etiam peiora mala sequerentur. Sic igitur et in regimine humano illi qui praesunt recte aliqua mala tolerant, ne aliqua bona impediantur, vel etiam ne aliqua mala peiora incurrantur, sicut Augustinus dicit, in II de ordine, aufer meretrices de rebus humanis, turbaveris omnia libidinibus. Sic igitur, quamvis infideles in suis ritibus peccent, tolerari possunt vel propter aliquod bonum quod ex eis provenit, vel propter aliquod malum quod vitatur. Ex hoc autem quod Iudaei ritus suos observant, in quibus olim praefigurabatur veritas fidei quam tenemus, hoc bonum provenit quod testimonium fidei nostrae habemus ab hostibus, et quasi in figura nobis repraesentatur quod credimus. Et ideo in suis ritibus tolerantur. | I answer that, Human government is derived from the Divine government, and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human government also, those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): "If you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust." Hence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we hold, there follows this good—that our very enemies bear witness to our faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak. For this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites. |
| Aliorum vero infidelium ritus, qui nihil veritatis aut utilitatis afferunt, non sunt aliqualiter tolerandi, nisi forte ad aliquod malum vitandum, scilicet ad vitandum scandalum vel dissidium quod ex hoc posset provenire, vel impedimentum salutis eorum, qui paulatim, sic tolerati, convertuntur ad fidem. Propter hoc enim etiam haereticorum et Paganorum ritus aliquando Ecclesia toleravit, quando erat magna infidelium multitudo. | On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. |
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| Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri Iudaeorum et aliorum infidelium sint baptizandi parentibus invitis. Maius enim est vinculum matrimoniale quam ius patriae potestatis, quia ius patriae potestatis potest per hominem solvi, cum filiusfamilias emancipatur; vinculum autem matrimoniale non potest solvi per hominem, secundum illud Matth. XIX, quod Deus coniunxit homo non separet. Sed propter infidelitatem solvitur vinculum matrimoniale, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, quod si infidelis discedit, discedat, non enim servituti subiectus est frater aut soror in huiusmodi; et canon dicit quod si coniux infidelis non vult sine contumelia sui creatoris cum altero stare, quod alter coniugum non debet ei cohabitare. Ergo multo magis propter infidelitatem tollitur ius patriae potestatis in suos filios. Possunt ergo eorum filii baptizari eis invitis. | Objection 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority over children, since the right of parental authority can be made to cease, when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be severed by man, according to Mt. 19:6: "What . . . God hath joined together let no man put asunder." And yet the marriage bond is broken on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:15): "If the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases": and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima, and Idololatria, qu. i] says that "if the unbelieving partner is unwilling to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator, then the other partner is not bound to cohabitation." Much more, therefore, does unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents' authority over their children: and consequently their children may be baptized against their parents' will. |
| Praeterea, magis debet homini subveniri circa periculum mortis aeternae quam circa periculum mortis temporalis. Sed si aliquis videret hominem in periculo mortis temporalis et ei non ferret auxilium, peccaret. Cum ergo filii Iudaeorum et aliorum infidelium sint in periculo mortis aeternae si parentibus relinquuntur, qui eos in sua infidelitate informant, videtur quod sint eis auferendi et baptizandi et in fidelitate instruendi. | Objection 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in danger of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal death. Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal death and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they be left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and instructed in the faith. |
| Praeterea, filii servorum sunt servi et in potestate dominorum. Sed Iudaei sunt servi regum et principum. Ergo et filii eorum. Reges igitur et principes habent potestatem de filiis Iudaeorum facere quod voluerint. Nulla ergo erit iniuria si eos baptizent invitis parentibus. | Objection 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves bondsmen, and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently kings and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish children. Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them against their parents' wishes. |
| Praeterea, quilibet homo magis est Dei, a quo habet animam, quam patris carnalis, a quo habet corpus. Non ergo est iniustum si pueri Iudaeorum carnalibus parentibus auferantur et Deo per Baptismum consecrentur. | Objection 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their parents, and consecrated to God in Baptism. |
| Praeterea, Baptismus efficacior est ad salutem quam praedicatio, quia per Baptismum statim tollitur peccati macula, reatus poenae, et aperitur ianua caeli. Sed si periculum sequitur ex defectu praedicationis, imputatur ei qui non praedicavit, ut habetur Ezech. III, et XXXIII de eo qui videt gladium venientem et non insonuerit tuba. Ergo multo magis, si pueri Iudaeorum damnentur propter defectum Baptismi, imputatur ad peccatum eis qui potuerunt baptizare et non baptizaverunt. | Objection 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt of punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, according to the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who "sees the sword coming and sounds not the trumpet." Much more therefore, if Jewish children are lost through not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who could have baptized them and did not. |
| Sed contra, nemini facienda est iniuria. Fieret autem Iudaeis iniuria si eorum filii baptizarentur eis invitis, quia amitterent ius patriae potestatis in filios iam fideles. Ergo eis invitis non sunt baptizandi. | On the contrary, Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these should not be baptized against their parents' will. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod maximam habet auctoritatem Ecclesiae consuetudo, quae semper est in omnibus aemulanda. Quia et ipsa doctrina Catholicorum doctorum ab Ecclesia auctoritatem habet, unde magis standum est auctoritati Ecclesiae quam auctoritati vel Augustini vel Hieronymi vel cuiuscumque doctoris. Hoc autem Ecclesiae usus nunquam habuit quod Iudaeorum filii invitis parentibus baptizarentur, quamvis fuerint retroactis temporibus multi Catholici principes potentissimi, ut Constantinus, Theodosius, quibus familiares fuerunt sanctissimi episcopi, ut Sylvester Constantino et Ambrosius Theodosio, qui nullo modo hoc praetermisissent ab eis impetrare, si hoc esset consonum rationi. Et ideo periculosum videtur hanc assertionem de novo inducere, ut praeter consuetudinem in Ecclesia hactenus observatam, Iudaeorum filii invitis parentibus baptizarentur. | I answer that, The custom of the Church has very great authority and ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of the Jews against the will of their parents, although at times past there have been many very powerful catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom most holy bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have failed to obtain this favor from them if it had been at all reasonable. It seems therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the children of Jews should be baptized against their parents' wishes, in contradiction to the Church's custom observed hitherto. |
| Et huius ratio est duplex. Una quidem propter periculum fidei. Si enim pueri nondum usum rationis habentes Baptismum susciperent, postmodum, cum ad perfectam aetatem pervenirent, de facili possent a parentibus induci ut relinquerent quod ignorantes susceperunt. Quod vergeret in fidei detrimentum. | There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of reason, afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith. |
| Alia vero ratio est quia repugnat iustitiae naturali. Filius enim naturaliter est aliquid patris. Et primo quidem a parentibus non distinguitur secundum corpus, quandiu in matris utero continetur. Postmodum vero, postquam ab utero egreditur, antequam usum liberi arbitrii habeat, continetur sub parentum cura sicut sub quodam spirituali utero. Quandiu enim usum rationis non habet puer, non differt ab animali irrationali. Unde sicut bos vel equus est alicuius ut utatur eo cum voluerit, secundum ius civile, sicut proprio instrumento; ita de iure naturali est quod filius, antequam habeat usum rationis, sit sub cura patris. Unde contra iustitiam naturalem esset si puer, antequam habeat usum rationis, a cura parentum subtrahatur, vel de eo aliquid ordinetur invitis parentibus. Postquam autem incipit habere usum liberi arbitrii, iam incipit esse suus, et potest, quantum ad ea quae sunt iuris divini vel naturalis, sibi ipsi providere. Et tunc est inducendus ad fidem non coactione, sed persuasione; et potest etiam invitis parentibus consentire fidei et baptizari, non autem antequam habeat usum rationis. Unde de pueris antiquorum patrum dicitur quod salvati sunt in fide parentum, per quod datur intelligi quod ad parentes pertinet providere filiis de sua salute, praecipue antequam habeant usum rationis. | The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother's womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, he differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father's care. Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents' custody, or anything done to it against its parents' wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then it should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace the faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even against its parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to understand that it is the parents' duty to look after the salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use of reason. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in vinculo matrimoniali uterque coniugum habet usum liberi arbitrii, et uterque potest invito altero fidei assentire. Sed hoc non habet locum in puero antequam habeat usum rationis. Sed postquam habet usum rationis, tunc tenet similitudo, si converti voluerit. | Reply to Objection 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the other's consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod a morte naturali non est aliquis eripiendus contra ordinem iuris civilis, puta, si aliquis a suo iudice condemnetur ad mortem temporalem, nullus debet eum violenter eripere. Unde nec aliquis debet irrumpere ordinem iuris naturalis, quo filius est sub cura patris, ut eum liberet a periculo mortis aeternae. | Reply to Objection 2: No one should be snatched from natural death against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence: hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the danger of everlasting death. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Iudaei sunt servi principum servitute civili, quae non excludit ordinem iuris naturalis vel divini. | Reply to Objection 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod homo ordinatur ad Deum per rationem, per quam eum cognoscere potest. Unde puer, antequam usum rationis habeat, naturali ordine ordinatur in Deum per rationem parentum, quorum curae naturaliter subiacet; et secundum eorum dispositionem sunt circa ipsum divina agenda. | Reply to Objection 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason, under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child in all matters relating to God. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod periculum quod sequitur de praedicatione omissa non imminet nisi eis quibus commissum est officium praedicandi, unde in Ezechiel praemittitur, speculatorem dedi te filiis Israel. Providere autem pueris infidelium de sacramentis salutis pertinet ad parentes eorum. Unde eis imminet periculum si, propter subtractionem sacramentorum, eorum parvuli detrimentum salutis patiantur. | Reply to Objection 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching, threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching. Hence it had already been said (Ezech. 3:17): "I have made thee a watchman to the children [Vulg.: 'house'] of Israel." On the other hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their children fail to obtain salvation. |