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Deinde considerandum est de effectibus consequentibus actum caritatis principalem, qui est dilectio.
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gaudium non sit effectus caritatis in nobis. Ex absentia enim rei amatae magis sequitur tristitia quam gaudium. Sed Deus, quem per caritatem diligimus, est nobis absens, quandiu in hac vita vivimus, quandiu enim sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a domino, ut dicitur II ad Cor. V. Ergo caritas in nobis magis causat tristitiam quam gaudium. | Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity. For the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But God, Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in this state of life, since "while we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us rather than joy. |
| Praeterea, per caritatem maxime meremur beatitudinem. Sed inter ea per quae beatitudinem meremur ponitur luctus, qui ad tristitiam pertinet, secundum illud Matth. V, beati qui lugent, quoniam consolabuntur. Ergo magis est effectus caritatis tristitia quam gaudium. | Objection 2: Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among those things whereby we merit happiness, according to Mt. 5:5: "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow, rather than joy, is an effect of charity. |
| Praeterea, caritas est virtus distincta a spe, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed gaudium causatur ex spe, secundum illud Rom. XII, spe gaudentes. Non ergo causatur ex caritate. | Objection 3: Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown above (Question [17], Article [6]). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to Rm. 12:12: "Rejoicing in hope." Therefore it is not the effect of charity. |
| Sed contra est quia, sicut dicitur Rom. V, caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Sed gaudium in nobis causatur ex spiritu sancto, secundum illud Rom. XIV, non est regnum Dei esca et potus, sed iustitia et pax et gaudium in spiritu sancto. Ergo caritas est causa gaudii. | On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 5:5): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." But joy is caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Rm. 14:17: "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost." Therefore charity is a cause of joy. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, ex amore procedit et gaudium et tristitia, sed contrario modo. Gaudium enim ex amore causatur vel propter praesentiam boni amati; vel etiam propter hoc quod ipsi bono amato proprium bonum inest et conservatur. Et hoc secundum maxime pertinet ad amorem benevolentiae, per quem aliquis gaudet de amico prospere se habente, etiam si sit absens. E contrario autem ex amore sequitur tristitia vel propter absentiam amati; vel propter hoc quod cui volumus bonum suo bono privatur, aut aliquo malo deprimitur. Caritas autem est amor Dei, cuius bonum immutabile est, quia ipse est sua bonitas. Et ex hoc ipso quod amatur est in amante per nobilissimum sui effectum, secundum illud I Ioan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet et Deus in eo. Et ideo spirituale gaudium, quod de Deo habetur, ex caritate causatur. | I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [25], Articles [1],2,3), when we were treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but in contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the presence of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing loved exists and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in the love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of his friend, though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from love, either through the absence of the thing loved, or because the loved object to which we wish well, is deprived of its good or afflicted with some evil. Now charity is love of God, Whose good is unchangeable, since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that He is loved, He is in those who love Him by His most excellent effect, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him." Therefore spiritual joy, which is about God, is caused by charity. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quandiu sumus in corpore dicimur peregrinari a domino, in comparatione ad illam praesentiam qua quibusdam est praesens per speciei visionem, unde et apostolus subdit ibidem, per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem. Est autem praesens etiam se amantibus etiam in hac vita per gratiae inhabitationem. | Reply to Objection 1: So long as we are in the body, we are said to be "absent from the Lord," in comparison with that presence whereby He is present to some by the vision of "sight"; wherefore the Apostle goes on to say (2 Cor. 5:6): "For we walk by faith and not by sight." Nevertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love Him, by the indwelling of His grace. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod luctus qui beatitudinem meretur est de his quae sunt beatitudini contraria. Unde eiusdem rationis est quod talis luctus ex caritate causetur, et gaudium spirituale de Deo, quia eiusdem rationis est gaudere de aliquo bono et tristari de his quae ei repugnant. | Reply to Objection 2: The mourning that merits happiness, is about those things that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to the same that charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy about God, since to rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to grieve for things that are contrary to it. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod de Deo potest esse spirituale gaudium dupliciter, uno modo, secundum quod gaudemus de bono divino in se considerato; alio modo, secundum quod gaudemus de bono divino prout a nobis participatur. Primum autem gaudium melius est, et hoc procedit principaliter ex caritate. Sed secundum gaudium procedit etiam ex spe, per quam expectamus divini boni fruitionem. Quamvis etiam ipsa fruitio, vel perfecta vel imperfecta, secundum mensuram caritatis obtineatur. | Reply to Objection 3: There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways. First, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself; secondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. The former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly: while the latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward to enjoy the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether perfect or imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one's charity. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gaudium spirituale quod ex caritate causatur recipiat admixtionem tristitiae. Congaudere enim bonis proximi ad caritatem pertinet, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, caritas non gaudet super iniquitate, congaudet autem veritati. Sed hoc gaudium recipit permixtionem tristitiae, secundum illud Rom. XII, gaudere cum gaudentibus, flere cum flentibus. Ergo gaudium spirituale caritatis admixtionem tristitiae patitur. | Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to charity to rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4,6: "Charity . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow, according to Rm. 12:15: "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep." Therefore the spiritual joy of charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. |
| Praeterea, poenitentia, sicut dicit Gregorius, est anteacta mala flere, et flenda iterum non committere. Sed vera poenitentia non est sine caritate. Ergo gaudium caritatis habet tristitiae admixtionem. | Objection 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv), "penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again those we have deplored." But there is no true penance without charity. Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow. |
| Praeterea, ex caritate contingit quod aliquis desiderat esse cum Christo, secundum illud Philipp. I, desiderium habens dissolvi et esse cum Christo. Sed ex isto desiderio sequitur in homine quaedam tristitia, secundum illud Psalm., heu mihi, quia incolatus meus prolongatus est. Ergo gaudium caritatis recipit admixtionem tristitiae. | Objection 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with Christ according to Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ." Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain sadness, according to Ps. 119:5: "Woe is me that my sojourning is prolonged!" Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of sorrow. |
| Sed contra est quod gaudium caritatis est gaudium de divina sapientia. Sed huiusmodi gaudium non habet permixtionem tristitiae, secundum illud Sap. VIII, non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius. Ergo gaudium caritatis non patitur permixtionem tristitiae. | On the contrary, The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom. Now such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16: "Her conversation hath no bitterness." Therefore the joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ex caritate causatur duplex gaudium de Deo, sicut supra dictum est. Unum quidem principale, quod est proprium caritatis, quo scilicet gaudemus de bono divino secundum se considerato. Et tale gaudium caritatis permixtionem tristitiae non patitur, sicut nec illud bonum de quo gaudetur potest aliquam mali admixtionem habere. Et ideo apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. IV, gaudete in domino semper. | I answer that, As stated above (Article [1], ad 3), a twofold joy in God arises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity; and with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself. This joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even as the good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of evil: hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always." |
| Aliud autem est gaudium caritatis quo gaudet quis de bono divino secundum quod participatur a nobis. Haec autem participatio potest impediri per aliquod contrarium. Et ideo ex hac parte gaudium caritatis potest habere permixtionem tristitiae, prout scilicet aliquis tristatur de eo quod repugnat participationi divini boni vel in nobis vel in proximis, quos tanquam nosipsos diligimus. | The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves for that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either in us or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fletus proximi non est nisi de aliquo malo. Omne autem malum importat defectum participationis summi boni. Et ideo intantum caritas facit condolere proximo inquantum participatio divini boni in eo impeditur. | Reply to Objection 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of some evil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the sovereign good: hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far as he is hindered from participating in the Divine good. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod peccata dividunt inter nos et Deum, ut dicitur Isaiae LIX. Et ideo haec est ratio dolendi de peccatis praeteritis nostris, vel etiam aliorum, inquantum per ea impedimur a participatione divini boni. | Reply to Objection 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to Is. 59:2; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins, or for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from participating in the Divine good. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis in incolatu huius miseriae aliquo modo participemus divinum bonum per cognitionem et amorem, tamen huius vitae miseria impedit a perfecta participatione divini boni, qualis erit in patria. Et ideo haec etiam tristitia qua quis luget de dilatione gloriae pertinet ad impedimentum participationis divini boni. | Reply to Objection 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate, after a fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the unhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for the delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a participation of the Divine good. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod spirituale gaudium quod ex caritate causatur non possit in nobis impleri. Quanto enim maius gaudium de Deo habemus, tanto gaudium eius in nobis magis impletur. Sed nunquam possumus tantum de Deo gaudere quantum dignum est ut de eo gaudeatur, quia semper bonitas eius, quae est infinita, excedit gaudium creaturae, quod est finitum. Ergo gaudium de Deo nunquam potest impleri. | Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is our joy in Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it is meet that we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is infinite, surpasses the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy in God can never be filled. |
| Praeterea, illud quod est impletum non potest esse maius. Sed gaudium etiam beatorum potest esse maius, quia unius gaudium est maius quam alterius. Ergo gaudium de Deo non potest in creatura impleri. | Objection 2: Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the joy, even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is greater than another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a creature. |
| Praeterea, nihil aliud videtur esse comprehensio quam cognitionis plenitudo. Sed sicut vis cognoscitiva creaturae est finita, ita et vis appetitiva eiusdem. Cum ergo Deus non possit ab aliqua creatura comprehendi, videtur quod non possit alicuius creaturae gaudium de Deo impleri. | Objection 3: Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the fulness of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature is finite, so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be comprehended by any creature, it seems that no creature's joy in God can be filled. |
| Sed contra est quod dominus discipulis dixit, Ioan. XV, gaudium meum in vobis sit, et gaudium vestrum impleatur. | On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 15:11): "That My joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod plenitudo gaudii potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte rei de qua gaudetur, ut scilicet tantum gaudeatur de ea quantum est dignum de ea gauderi. Et sic solum Dei gaudium est plenum de seipso, quia gaudium eius est infinitum, et hoc est condignum infinitae bonitati Dei; cuiuslibet autem creaturae gaudium oportet esse finitum. Alio modo potest intelligi plenitudo gaudii ex parte gaudentis. Gaudium autem comparatur ad desiderium sicut quies ad motum; ut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Est autem quies plena cum nihil restat de motu. Unde tunc est gaudium plenum quando iam nihil desiderandum restat. Quandiu autem in hoc mundo sumus, non quiescit in nobis desiderii motus, quia adhuc restat quod Deo magis appropinquemus per gratiam, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed quando iam ad beatitudinem perfectam perventum fuerit, nihil desiderandum restabit, quia ibi erit plena Dei fruitio, in qua homo obtinebit quidquid etiam circa alia bona desideravit, secundum illud Psalm., qui replet in bonis desiderium tuum. Et ideo quiescet desiderium non solum quo desideramus Deum, sed etiam erit omnium desideriorum quies. Unde gaudium beatorum est perfecte plenum, et etiam superplenum, quia plus obtinebunt quam desiderare suffecerint; non enim in cor hominis ascendit quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II. Et hinc est quod dicitur Luc. VI, mensuram bonam et supereffluentem dabunt in sinus vestros. Quia tamen nulla creatura est capax gaudii de Deo ei condigni, inde est quod illud gaudium omnino plenum non capitur in homine, sed potius homo intrat in ipsum, secundum illud Matth. XXV, intra in gaudium domini tui. | I answer that, Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first, on the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as much as it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy alone in Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is condignly due to the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any creature must needs be finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be understood on the part of the one who rejoices. Now joy is compared to desire, as rest to movement, as stated above (FS, Question [25], Articles [1],2), when we were treating of the passions: and rest is full when there is no more movement. Hence joy is full, when there remains nothing to be desired. But as long as we are in this world, the movement of desire does not cease in us, because it still remains possible for us to approach nearer to God by grace, as was shown above (Question [24], Articles [4],7). When once, however, perfect happiness has been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because then there will be full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain whatever he had desired, even with regard to other goods, according to Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Hence desire will be at rest, not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so that the joy of the blessed is full to perfection—indeed over-full, since they will obtain more than they were capable of desiring: for "neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him" (1 Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant by the words of Lk. 6:38: "Good measure and pressed down, and shaken together, and running over shall they give into your bosom." Yet, since no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it follows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on the contrary, man enters into it, according to Mt. 25:21: "Enter into the joy of thy Lord." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de plenitudine gaudii ex parte rei de qua gaudetur. | Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in reference to the thing in which we rejoice. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod cum perventum fuerit ad beatitudinem, unusquisque attinget terminum sibi praefixum ex praedestinatione divina, nec restabit ulterius aliquid quo tendatur, quamvis in illa terminatione unus perveniat ad maiorem propinquitatem Dei, alius ad minorem. Et ideo uniuscuiusque gaudium erit plenum ex parte gaudentis, quia uniuscuiusque desiderium plene quietabitur. Erit tamen gaudium unius maius quam alterius, propter pleniorem participationem divinae beatitudinis. | Reply to Objection 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach the term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term, some will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy will be full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully set at rest; yet one's joy will be greater than another's, on account of a fuller participation of the Divine happiness. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod comprehensio importat plenitudinem cognitionis ex parte rei cognitae, ut scilicet tantum cognoscatur res quantum cognosci potest. Habet tamen etiam cognitio aliquam plenitudinem ex parte cognoscentis, sicut et de gaudio dictum est. Unde et apostolus dicit, ad Coloss. I, impleamini agnitione voluntatis eius in omni sapientia et intellectu spirituali. | Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in respect of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be. There is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): "That you may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and spiritual understanding." |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gaudium sit virtus. Vitium enim contrariatur virtuti. Sed tristitia ponitur vitium, ut patet de acedia et de invidia. Ergo etiam gaudium debet poni virtus. | Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue. |
| Praeterea, sicut amor et spes sunt passiones quaedam quarum obiectum est bonum, ita et gaudium. Sed amor et spes ponuntur virtutes. Ergo et gaudium debet poni virtus. | Objection 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of which is "good," so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue. |
| Praeterea, praecepta legis dantur de actibus virtutum. Sed praecipitur nobis quod de Deo gaudeamus, secundum illud ad Philipp. IV, gaudete in domino semper. Ergo gaudium est virtus. | Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4: "Rejoice in the Lord always." Therefore joy is a virtue. |
| Sed contra est quod neque connumeratur inter virtutes theologicas, neque inter virtutes morales, neque inter virtutes intellectuales, ut ex supradictis patet. | On the contrary, It is not numbered among the theological virtues, nor among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is evident from what has been said above (FS, Questions [57],60,62). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod virtus, sicut supra habitum est, est habitus quidam operativus; et ideo secundum propriam rationem habet inclinationem ad aliquem actum. Est autem contingens ex uno habitu plures actus eiusdem rationis ordinatos provenire, quorum unus sequatur ex altero. Et quia posteriores actus non procedunt ab habitu virtutis nisi per actum priorem, inde est quod virtus non definitur nec denominatur nisi ab actu priori, quamvis etiam alii actus ab ea consequantur. Manifestum est autem ex his quae supra de passionibus dicta sunt, quod amor est prima affectio appetitivae potentiae, ex qua sequitur et desiderium et gaudium. Et ideo habitus virtutis idem est qui inclinat ad diligendum, et ad desiderandum bonum dilectum, et ad gaudendum de eo. Sed quia dilectio inter hos actus est prior, inde est quod virtus non denominatur a gaudio nec a desiderio, sed a dilectione, et dicitur caritas. Sic ergo gaudium non est aliqua virtus a caritate distincta, sed est quidam caritatis actus sive effectus. Et propter hoc connumeratur inter fructus, ut patet Gal. V. | I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [55], Articles [2],4), virtue is an operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an inclination to a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same habit there proceed several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of which follows from another. And since the subsequent acts do not proceed from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act, hence it is that the virtue is defined and named in reference to that preceding act, although those other acts also proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we have said about the passions (FS, Question [25], Articles [2],4) that love is the first affection of the appetitive power, and that desire and joy follow from it. Hence the same virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire, but from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tristitia quae est vitium causatur ex inordinato amore sui, quod non est aliquod speciale vitium, sed quaedam generalis radix vitiorum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo oportuit tristitias quasdam particulares ponere specialia vitia, quia non derivantur ab aliquo speciali vitio, sed a generali. Sed amor Dei ponitur specialis virtus, quae est caritas, ad quam reducitur gaudium, ut dictum est, sicut proprius actus eius. | Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of the vices, as stated above (FS, Question [77], Article [4]); so that it was necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special vices, because they do not arise from a special, but from a general vice. On the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as stated above (here and Article [2]). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod spes consequitur ex amore sicut et gaudium, sed spes addit ex parte obiecti quandam specialem rationem, scilicet arduum et possibile adipisci; et ideo ponitur specialis virtus. Sed gaudium ex parte obiecti nullam rationem specialem addit supra amorem quae possit causare specialem virtutem. | Reply to Objection 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz. "difficult," and "possible to obtain"; for which reason it is accounted a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love any special aspect, that might cause a special virtue. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod intantum datur praeceptum legis de gaudio inquantum est actus caritatis; licet non sit primus actus eius. | Reply to Objection 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of charity, albeit not its first act. |