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| Deinde considerandum est de simonia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. | We must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of inquiry: |
| Primo, quid sit simonia. | (1) What is simony? |
| Secundo, utrum liceat pro sacramentis pecuniam accipere. | (2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments? |
| Tertio, utrum liceat accipere pecuniam pro spiritualibus actibus. | (3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions? |
| Quarto, utrum liceat vendere ea quae sunt spiritualibus annexa. | (4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals? |
| Quinto, utrum solum munus a manu faciat simoniacum, an etiam munus a lingua et ab obsequio. | (5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or also oral remuneration or remuneration by service? |
| Sexto, de poena simoniaci. | (6) Of the punishment of simony. |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod simonia non sit studiosa voluntas emendi et vendendi aliquid spirituale vel spirituali annexum. Simonia enim est haeresis quaedam, dicitur enim I, qu. I, tolerabilior est Macedonii, et eorum qui circa ipsum sunt sancti spiritus impugnatorum, impia haeresis quam simoniacorum. Illi enim creaturam, et servum Dei patris et filii, spiritum sanctum delirando fatentur, isti vero eundem spiritum sanctum efficiunt servum suum. Omnis enim dominus quod habet, si vult, vendit, sive servum, sive quid aliud eorum quae possidet. Sed infidelitas non consistit in voluntate, sed magis in intellectu, sicut et fides, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo simonia non debet per voluntatem definiri. | Objection 1: It would seem that simony is not "an express will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing." Simony is heresy, since it is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Eos qui per pecunias.]): "The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those who with him impugned the Holy Ghost, is more endurable than that of those who are guilty of simony: since the former in their ravings maintained that the Holy Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of God, whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own slave. For every master sells what he has just as he wills, whether it be his slave or any other of his possessions." But unbelief, like faith, is an act not of the will but of the intellect, as shown above (Question [10], Article [2]). Therefore simony should not be defined as an act of the will. |
| Praeterea, studiose peccare est ex malitia peccare, quod est peccare in spiritum sanctum. Si ergo simonia est studiosa voluntas peccandi, sequitur quod semper sit peccatum in spiritum sanctum. | Objection 2: Further, to sin intentionally is to sin through malice, and this is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, if simony is an intentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin against the Holy Ghost. |
| Praeterea, nihil magis est spirituale quam regnum caelorum. Sed licet emere regnum caelorum, dicit enim Gregorius, in quadam homilia, regnum caelorum tantum valet quantum habes. Ergo non est simonia velle emere aliquid spirituale. | Objection 3: Further, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of heaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory says in a homily (v, in Ev.): "The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you possess." Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy something spiritual. |
| Praeterea, nomen simoniae a Simone mago acceptum est, de quo legitur Act. VIII, quod obtulit apostolis pecuniam ad spiritualem potestatem emendam, ut, scilicet, quibuscumque manus imponeret, reciperent spiritum sanctum. Non autem legitur quod aliquid voluit vendere. Ergo simonia non est voluntas vendendi aliquid spirituale. | Objection 4: Further, simony takes its name from Simon the magician, of whom we read (Acts 8:18,19) that "he offered the apostles money" that he might buy a spiritual power, in order, to wit, "that on whomsoever he imposed his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost." But we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore simony is not the will to sell a spiritual thing. |
| Praeterea, multae aliae sunt voluntariae commutationes praeter emptionem et venditionem, sicut permutatio, transactio. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter definiatur simonia. | Objection 5: Further, there are many other voluntary commutations besides buying and selling, such as exchange and transaction [*A kind of legal compromise—Oxford Dictionary]. Therefore it would seem that simony is defined insufficiently. |
| Praeterea, omne quod est spirituali annexum est spirituale. Superflue igitur additur, vel spirituali annexum. | Objection 6: Further, anything connected with spiritual things is itself spiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to add "or connected with spiritual things." |
| Praeterea, Papa, secundum quosdam, non potest committere simoniam. Potest autem emere vel vendere aliquid spirituale. Ergo simonia non est voluntas emendi vel vendendi aliquid spirituale vel spirituali annexum. | Objection 7: Further, according to some, the Pope cannot commit simony: yet he can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore simony is not the will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in registro, altare et decimas et spiritum sanctum emere vel vendere simoniacam haeresim esse nullus fidelium ignorat. | On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Regist. [*Caus. I, qu. i, can. Presbyter, qu. iii, can. Altare]): "None of the faithful is ignorant that buying or selling altars, tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the heresy of simony." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus aliquis est malus ex genere ex eo quod cadit super materiam indebitam. Emptionis autem et venditionis est materia indebita res spiritualis, triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia res spiritualis non potest aliquo terreno pretio compensari, sicut de sapientia dicitur Prov. III, pretiosior est cunctis opibus, et omnia quae desiderantur huic non valent comparari. Et ideo Petrus, in ipsa sui radice Simonis pravitatem condemnans, dixit, pecunia tua tecum sit in perditionem, quoniam donum Dei existimasti pecunia possidere. | I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [18], Article [2]) an act is evil generically when it bears on undue matter. Now a spiritual thing is undue matter for buying and selling for three reasons. First, because a spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price, even as it is said concerning wisdom (Prov. 3:15), "she is more precious than all riches, and all things that are desired, are not to be compared with her": and for this reason Peter, in condemning the wickedness of Simon in its very source, said (Acts 8:20): "Keep thy money to thyself to perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money." |
| Secundo, quia illud potest esse debita venditionis materia cuius venditor est dominus, ut patet in auctoritate supra inducta. Praelatus autem Ecclesiae non est dominus spiritualium rerum, sed dispensator, secundum illud I ad Cor. IV. Sic nos existimet homo ut ministros Christi, et dispensatores ministeriorum Dei. | Secondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for sale if the vendor is not the owner thereof, as appears from the authority quoted (Objection [1]). Now ecclesiastical superiors are not owners, but dispensers of spiritual things, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers of God." |
| Tertio, quia venditio repugnat spiritualium origini, quae ex gratuita Dei voluntate proveniunt. Unde et dominus dicit, Matth. X, gratis accepistis, gratis date. | Thirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spiritual things, since they flow from the gratuitous will of God. Wherefore Our Lord said (Mt. 10:8): "Freely have you received, freely give." |
| Et ideo aliquis, vendendo vel emendo rem spiritualem, irreverentiam exhibet Deo et rebus divinis. Propter quod, peccat peccato irreligiositatis. | Therefore by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man treats God and divine things with irreverence, and consequently commits a sin of irreligion. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut religio consistit in quadam fidei protestatione, quam tamen interdum aliquis non habet in corde; ita etiam vitia opposita religioni habent quandam protestationem infidelitatis, licet quandoque non sit infidelitas in mente. Secundum hoc ergo, simonia haeresis dicitur secundum exteriorem protestationem, quia in hoc quod aliquis vendit donum spiritus sancti, quodammodo se protestatur esse dominum spiritualis doni; quod est haereticum. Sciendum tamen quod Simon magus, praeter hoc quod ab apostolis spiritus sancti gratiam pecunia emere voluit, dixit quod mundus non erat a Deo creatus, sed a quadam superna virtute, ut dicit Isidorus, in libro Etymol. Et secundum hoc, inter alios haereticos simoniaci computantur, ut patet in libro Augustini de haeresibus. | Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion consists in a kind of protestation of faith, without, sometimes, faith being in one's heart, so too the vices opposed to religion include a certain protestation of unbelief without, sometimes, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly simony is said to be a "heresy," as regards the outward protestation, since by selling a gift of the Holy Ghost a man declares, in a way, that he is the owner of a spiritual gift; and this is heretical. It must, however, be observed that Simon Magus, besides wishing the apostles to sell him a grace of the Holy Ghost for money, said that the world was not created by God, but by some heavenly power, as Isidore states (Etym. viii, 5): and so for this reason simoniacs are reckoned with other heretics, as appears from Augustine's book on heretics. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, iustitia et omnes partes eius, et per consequens omnia vitia opposita, sunt in voluntate sicut in subiecto. Et ideo convenienter simonia per voluntatem definitur. Additur autem studiosa, ad designandum electionem, quae principaliter pertinet ad virtutem et vitium. Non autem omnis qui peccat electione peccat peccato in spiritum sanctum, sed solum qui peccatum eligit per contemptum eorum quae homines solent retrahere a peccando, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Question [58], Article [4]), justice, with all its parts, and consequently all the opposite vices, is in the will as its subject. Hence simony is fittingly defined from its relation to the will. This act is furthermore described as "express," in order to signify that it proceeds from choice, which takes the principal part in virtue and vice. Nor does everyone sin against the Holy Ghost that sins from choice, but only he who chooses sin through contempt of those things whereby man is wont to be withdrawn from sin, as stated above (Question [14], Article [1]). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod regnum caelorum dicitur emi, dum quis dat quod habet propter Deum, large sumpto nomine emptionis, secundum quod accipitur pro merito. Quod tamen non pertingit ad perfectam rationem emptionis. Tum quia non sunt condignae passiones huius temporis, nec aliqua nostra dona vel opera, ad futuram gloriam quae revelabitur in nobis, ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Tum quia meritum non consistit principaliter in exteriori dono vel actu vel passione, sed in interiori affectu. | Reply to Objection 3: The kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when a man gives what he has for God's sake. But this is to employ the term "buying" in a wide sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it reach to the perfect signification of buying, both because neither "the sufferings of this time," nor any gift or deed of ours, "are worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us" (Rm. 8:18), and because merit consists chiefly, not in an outward gift, action or passion, but in an inward affection. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod Simon magus ad hoc emere voluit spiritualem potestatem ut eam postea venderet, dicitur enim I, qu. III, quod Simon magus donum spiritus sancti emere voluit ut ex venditione signorum quae per eum fierent, multiplicatam pecuniam lucraretur. Et sic illi qui spiritualia vendunt, conformantur Simoni mago in intentione, in actu vero, illi qui emere volunt. Illi autem qui vendunt, in actu imitantur Giezi, discipulum Elisaei, de quo legitur IV Reg. V, quod accepit pecuniam a leproso mundato. Unde venditores spiritualium possunt dici non solum simoniaci, sed etiam Giezitae. | Reply to Objection 4: Simon the magician wished to buy a spiritual power in order that afterwards he might sell it. For it is written (I, qu. iii [*Can. Salvator]), that "Simon the magician wished to buy the gift of the Holy Ghost, in order that he might make money by selling the signs to be wrought by him." Hence those who sell spiritual things are likened in intention to Simon the magician: while those who wish to buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell them imitate, in act, Giezi the disciple of Eliseus, of whom we read (4 Kgs. 5:20-24) that he received money from the leper who was healed: wherefore the sellers of spiritual things may be called not only "simoniacs" but also "giezites." |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod nomine emptionis et venditionis intelligitur omnis contractus non gratuitus. Unde nec permutatio praebendarum vel ecclesiasticorum beneficiorum fieri potest, auctoritate partium absque periculo simoniae, sicut nec transactio, ut iura determinant. Potest tamen praelatus, ex officio suo. Permutationes huiusmodi facere pro causa utili vel necessaria. | Reply to Objection 5: The terms "buying" and "selling" cover all kinds of non-gratuitous contracts. Wherefore it is impossible for the exchange or agency of prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made by authority of the parties concerned without danger of committing simony, as laid down by law [*Cap. Quaesitum, de rerum Permutat.; cap. Super, de Transact.]. Nevertheless the superior, in virtue of his office, can cause these exchanges to be made for useful or necessary reasons. |
| Ad sextum dicendum quod sicut anima vivit secundum seipsam, corpus vero vivit ex unione animae; ita etiam quaedam sunt spiritualia secundum seipsa, sicut sacramenta et alia huiusmodi; quaedam autem dicuntur spiritualia ex hoc quod talibus adhaerent. Unde I, qu. III, dicitur, cap. si quis obiecerit, quod spiritualia sine corporalibus rebus non proficiunt, sicut nec anima sine corpore corporaliter vivit. | Reply to Objection 6: Even as the soul lives by itself, while the body lives through being united to the soul; so, too, certain things are spiritual by themselves, such as the sacraments and the like, while others are called spiritual, through adhering to those others. Hence (I, qu. iii, cap. Siquis objecerit) it is stated that "spiritual things do not progress without corporal things, even as the soul has no bodily life without the body." |
| Ad septimum dicendum quod Papa potest incurrere vitium simoniae, sicut et quilibet alius homo, peccatum enim tanto in aliqua persona est gravius quanto maiorem obtinet locum. Quamvis enim res Ecclesiae sint eius ut principalis dispensatoris, non tamen sunt eius ut domini et possessoris. Et ideo si reciperet pro aliqua re spirituali pecuniam de redditibus alicuius Ecclesiae, non careret vitio simoniae. Et similiter etiam posset simoniam committere recipiendo pecuniam ab aliquo laico non de bonis Ecclesiae. | Reply to Objection 7: The Pope can be guilty of the vice of simony, like any other man, since the higher a man's position the more grievous is his sin. For although the possessions of the Church belong to him as dispenser in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore, were he to accept money from the income of any church in exchange for a spiritual thing, he would not escape being guilty of the vice of simony. In like manner he might commit simony by accepting from a layman moneys not belonging to the goods of the Church. |
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Article: 2 [<< | >>]
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non semper sit illicitum pro sacramentis pecuniam dare. Baptismus enim est ianua sacramentorum, ut in III parte dicetur. Sed licet, ut videtur, in aliquo casu dare pecuniam pro Baptismo, puta quando sacerdos puerum morientem sine pretio baptizare non vellet. Ergo non semper est illicitum emere vel vendere sacramenta. | Objection 1: It would seem that it is not always unlawful to give money for the sacraments. Baptism is the door of the sacraments, as we shall state in the TP, Question [68], Article [6]; TP, Question [73], Article [3]. But seemingly it is lawful in certain cases to give money for Baptism, for instance if a priest were unwilling to baptize a dying child without being paid. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell the sacraments. |
| Praeterea, maximum sacramentorum est Eucharistia, quae in Missa consecratur. Sed pro Missis cantandis aliqui sacerdotes praebendam vel pecuniam accipiunt. Ergo licet multo magis alia sacramenta emere vel vendere. | Objection 2: Further, the greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist, which is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests receive a prebend or money for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy or sell the other sacraments. |
| Praeterea, sacramentum poenitentiae est sacramentum necessitatis, quod praecipue in absolutione consistit. Sed quidam absolventes ab excommunicatione pecuniam exigunt. Ergo non semper est illicitum sacramenta emere vel vendere. | Objection 3: Further, the sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament consisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand money when absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell a sacrament. |
| Praeterea, consuetudo facit ut non sit peccatum illud quod alias peccatum esset, sicut Augustinus dicit quod habere plures uxores, quando mos erat, crimen non erat. Sed apud quosdam est consuetudo quod in consecrationibus episcoporum, benedictionibus abbatum, et ordinibus clericorum, pro chrismate vel oleo sancto et aliis huiusmodi aliquid detur. Ergo videtur quod hoc non sit illicitum. | Objection 4: Further, custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to be not sinful; thus Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that "it was no crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom." Now it is the custom in some places to give something in the consecration of bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore it would seem that it is not unlawful. |
| Praeterea, contingit quandoque quod aliquis malitiose impedit aliquem vel ab episcopatu obtinendo, vel ab aliqua alia dignitate. Sed licet unicuique redimere suam vexationem. Ergo licitum videtur in tali casu pecuniam dare pro episcopatu, vel aliqua alia ecclesiastica dignitate. | Objection 5: Further, it happens sometimes that someone maliciously hinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. But it is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is lawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a like ecclesiastical dignity. |
| Praeterea, matrimonium est quoddam sacramentum. Sed quandoque datur pecunia pro matrimonio. Ergo licitum est sacramenta pecunia vendere | Objection 6: Further, marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is given for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur I, qu. I, qui per pecuniam quemquam consecraverit, alienus sit a sacerdotio | On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Qui per pecunias]): "Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from the priesthood." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod sacramenta novae legis sunt maxime spiritualia, inquantum sunt spiritualis gratiae causa, quae pretio aestimari non potest, et eius rationi repugnat quod non gratuito detur. Dispensantur autem sacramenta per Ecclesiae ministros, quos oportet a populo sustentari, secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. IX, nescitis quoniam qui in sacrario operantur, quae de sacrario sunt edunt, et qui altari deserviunt, cum altario participantur? | I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are of all things most spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on which no price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with a non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the ministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:13), "Know you not, that they who work in the holy place, eat the things that are of the holy place; and they that serve the altar, partake with the altar?" |
| Sic igitur dicendum est quod accipere pecuniam pro spirituali sacramentorum gratia est crimen simoniae, quod nulla consuetudine potest excusari, quia consuetudo non praeiudicat iuri naturali vel divino. Per pecuniam autem intelligitur omne illud cuius pretium potest pecunia aestimari, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Accipere autem aliqua ad sustentationem eorum qui sacramenta ministrant, secundum ordinationem Ecclesiae et consuetudines approbatas, non est simonia, neque peccatum, non enim accipitur tanquam pretium mercedis, sed tanquam stipendium necessitatis. Unde super illud I ad Tim. V, qui bene praesunt presbyteri etc., dicit Glossa Augustini, accipiant sustentationem necessitatis a populo, mercedem dispensationis a domino. | Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot be excused by any custom whatever, since "custom does not prevail over natural or divine law" [*Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud.; cf. FS, Question [97], Article [3]]. Now by money we are to understand anything that has a pecuniary value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). On the other hand, to receive anything for the support of those who administer the sacraments, in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved customs, is not simony, nor is it a sin. For it is received not as a price of goods, but as a payment for their need. Hence a gloss of Augustine on 1 Tim. 5:17, "Let the priests that rule well," says: "They should look to the people for a supply to their need, but to the Lord for the reward of their ministry." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in casu necessitatis potest quilibet baptizare. Et quia nullo modo est peccandum, pro eodem est habendum si sacerdos absque pretio baptizare non velit, ac si non esset qui baptizaret. Unde ille qui gerit curam pueri in tali casu licite posset eum baptizare, vel a quocumque alio facere baptizari. Posset tamen licite aquam a sacerdote emere, quae est pure elementum corporale. Si autem esset adultus qui Baptismum desideraret, et immineret mortis periculum, nec sacerdos eum vellet sine pretio baptizare, deberet, si posset, per alium baptizari. Quod si non posset ad alium habere recursum, nullo modo deberet pretium pro Baptismo dare, sed potius absque Baptismo decedere, suppletur enim ei ex Baptismo flaminis quod ex sacramento deest. | Reply to Objection 1: In a case of necessity anyone may baptize. And since nowise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize without being paid, one must act as though there were no priest available for the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the child can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy the water from the priest, because it is merely a bodily element. But if it were an adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the priest were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, if possible, to be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for Baptism, and should rather die without being baptized, because for him the baptism of desire would supply the lack of the sacrament. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod sacerdos non accipit pecuniam quasi pretium consecrationis Eucharistiae aut Missae cantandae, hoc enim esset simoniacum, sed quasi stipendium suae sustentationis, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: The priest receives money, not as the price for consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would be simoniacal), but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod pecunia non exigitur ab eo qui absolvitur quasi pretium absolutionis, hoc enim esset simoniacum, sed quasi poena culpae praecedentis, pro qua fuit excommunicatus. | Reply to Objection 3: The money exacted of the person absolved is not the price of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a punishment of a past crime for which he was excommunicated. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, consuetudo non praeiudicat iuri naturali vel divino, quo simonia prohibetur. Et ideo si aliqua ex consuetudine exigantur quasi pretium rei spiritualis, cum intentione emendi vel vendendi, est manifeste simonia, et praecipue si ab invito exigantur. Si vero accipiantur quasi quaedam stipendia per consuetudinem approbatam, non est simonia, si tamen desit intentio emendi vel vendendi, sed intentio referatur ad solam consuetudinis observantiam; et praecipue quando aliquis voluntarie solvit. In his tamen omnibus sollicite cavendum est quod habet speciem simoniae vel cupiditatis, secundum illud apostoli, I ad Thess. ult., ab omni specie mala abstinete vos. | Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, "custom does not prevail over natural or divine law" whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the custom, if such there be, of demanding anything as the price of a spiritual thing, with the intention of buying or selling it, is manifestly simoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person unwilling to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a stipend recognized by custom it is not simoniacal, provided there be no intention of buying or selling, but only of doing what is customary, and especially if the demand be acceded to voluntarily. In all these cases, however, one must beware of anything having an appearance of simony or avarice, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Thess. 5:22), "From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves." |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod antequam alicui acquiratur ius in episcopatu, vel quacumque dignitate seu praebenda, per electionem vel provisionem seu collationem, simoniacum esset adversantium obstacula pecunia redimere, sic enim per pecuniam pararet sibi viam ad rem spiritualem obtinendam. Sed postquam iam ius alicui acquisitum est, licet per pecuniam iniusta impedimenta removere. | Reply to Objection 5: It would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition of one's rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric or any dignity or prebend, by election, appointment or presentation, since this would be to use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing. But it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust opposition, after one has already acquired that right. |
| Ad sextum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod pro matrimonio licet pecuniam dare, quia in eo non confertur gratia. Sed hoc non est usquequaque verum, ut in III parte huius operis dicetur. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod matrimonium non solum est Ecclesiae sacramentum, sed etiam naturae officium. Et ideo dare pecuniam pro matrimonio inquantum est naturae officium, licitum est, inquantum vero est Ecclesiae sacramentum, est illicitum. Et ideo secundum iura prohibetur ne pro benedictione nuptiarum aliquid exigatur. | Reply to Objection 6: Some [*Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia] say that it is lawful to give money for Matrimony because no grace is conferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we shall state in the Third Part of the work [*XP, Question [42], Article [3]]. Wherefore we must reply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church, but also an office of nature. Consequently it is lawful to give money for Matrimony considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if it be considered as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, according to the law [*Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia], it is forbidden to demand anything for the Nuptial Blessing. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod licitum sit dare et accipere pecuniam pro spiritualibus actibus. Usus enim prophetiae est spiritualis actus. Sed pro usu prophetiae olim aliquid dabatur, ut patet I Reg. IX, et III Reg. XIV. Ergo videtur quod liceat dare et accipere pecuniam pro actu spirituali. | Objection 1: It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears from 1 Kgs. 9:7,8, and 3 Kgs. 14:3. Therefore it would seem that it is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action. |
| Praeterea, oratio, praedicatio, laus divina sunt actus maxime spirituales. Sed ad impetrandum orationum suffragia pecunia datur sanctis viris, secundum illud Luc. XVI, facite vobis amicos de mammona iniquitatis. Praedicatoribus etiam spiritualia seminantibus temporalia debentur, secundum apostolum, I ad Cor. IX. Celebrantibus etiam divinas laudes in ecclesiastico officio, et processiones facientibus, aliquid datur, et quandoque annui redditus ad hoc assignantur. Ergo licitum est pro spiritualibus actibus accipere aliquid. | Objection 2: Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most spiritual actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to obtain the assistance of their prayers, according to Lk. 16:9, "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity." To preachers also, who sow spiritual things, temporal things are due according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:14). Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the divine praises in the ecclesiastical office, and make processions: and sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore it is lawful to receive something for spiritual actions. |
| Praeterea, scientia non est minus spiritualis quam potestas. Sed pro usu scientiae licet pecuniam accipere, sicut advocato licet vendere iustum patrocinium, et medico consilium sanitatis, et magistro officium doctrinae. Ergo, pari ratione, videtur quod liceat praelato accipere aliquid pro usu spiritualis suae potestatis, puta pro correctione, vel dispensatione, vel aliquo huiusmodi. | Objection 3: Further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it is lawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer may sell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a master the exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like manner it would seem lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of his spiritual power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and so forth. |
| Praeterea, religio est status spiritualis perfectionis. Sed in aliquibus monasteriis aliquid ab his qui recipiuntur exigitur. Ergo licet pro spiritualibus aliquid exigere. | Objection 4: Further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection. Now in certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are received there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for spiritual things. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur I, qu. I, quidquid invisibilis gratiae consolatione tribuitur, nunquam quaestibus, vel quibuslibet praemiis, venundari penitus debet. Sed omnia huiusmodi spiritualia per invisibilem gratiam tribuuntur. Ergo non licet ea quaestibus vel praemiis venundari. | On the contrary, It is stated (I, qu. i [*Can. Quidquid invisibilis]): "It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what is acquired by the consolation of invisible grace, whether by demanding a price or by seeking any kind of return whatever." Now all these spiritual things are acquired through an invisible grace. Therefore it is not lawful to charge a price or return for them. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod sicut sacramenta dicuntur spiritualia quia spiritualem conferunt gratiam, ita etiam quaedam alia dicuntur spiritualia quia ex spirituali procedunt gratia et ad eam disponunt. Quae tamen per hominum ministerium exhibentur, quos oportet a populo sustentari, cui spiritualia administrant, secundum illud I ad Cor. IX, quis militat suis stipendiis unquam? Quis pascit gregem, et de lacte gregis non manducat? Et ideo vendere quod spirituale est in huiusmodi actibus, aut emere, simoniacum est, sed accipere aut dare aliquid pro sustentatione ministrantium spiritualia, secundum ordinationem Ecclesiae et consuetudinem approbatam, licitum est; ita tamen quod desit intentio emptionis et venditionis; et quod ab invitis non exigatur per subtractionem spiritualium quae sunt exhibenda, haec enim haberent quandam venditionis speciem. Gratis tamen spiritualibus prius exhibitis, licite possunt statutae et consuetae oblationes, et quicumque alii proventus, exigi a nolentibus et valentibus solvere, auctoritate superioris interveniente. | I answer that, Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are called spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose thereto. And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of men, according to 1 Cor. 9:7, "Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?" Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is spiritual in such like actions; but to receive or give something for the support of those who minister spiritual things in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in such wise that there be no intention of buying or selling, and that no pressure be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by withholding spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then there would be an appearance of simony. But after the spiritual things have been freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary offerings and other dues may be exacted from those who are unwilling but able to pay, if the superior authorize this to be done. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, super Michaeam, munera quaedam sponte exhibebantur bonis prophetis ad sustentationem ipsorum, non quasi ad emendum prophetiae usum, quem tamen pseudoprophetae retorquebant ad quaestum. | Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says in his commentary on Micheas 3:9, certain gifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their livelihood, but not as a price for the exercise of their gift of prophecy. Wicked prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for it. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui dant eleemosynas pauperibus ut orationum ab ipsis suffragia impetrent, non eo tenore dant quasi intendentes orationes emere, sed per gratuitam beneficentiam pauperum animas provocant ad hoc quod pro eis gratis et ex caritate orent. Praedicantibus etiam temporalia debentur ad sustentationem praedicantium, non autem ad emendum praedicationis verbum. Unde super illud I ad Tim. V, qui bene praesunt presbyteri etc., dicit Glossa, necessitatis est accipere unde vivitur, caritatis est praebere, non tamen venale est Evangelium, ut pro his praedicetur. Si enim sic vendunt, magnam rem vili vendunt pretio. Similiter etiam aliqua temporalia dantur Deum laudantibus in celebratione ecclesiastici officii, sive pro vivis sive pro mortuis, non quasi pretium, sed quasi sustentationis stipendium. Et eo etiam tenore pro processionibus faciendis in aliquo funere aliquae eleemosynae recipiuntur. Si autem huiusmodi pacto interveniente fiant, aut etiam cum intentione emptionis vel venditionis, simoniacum esset. Unde illicita esset ordinatio si in aliqua Ecclesia statueretur quod non fieret processio in funere alicuius nisi solveret certam pecuniae quantitatem, quia per tale statutum praecluderetur via gratis officium pietatis aliquibus impendendi. Magis autem licita esset ordinatio si statueretur quod omnibus certam eleemosynam dantibus talis honor exhiberetur, quia per hoc non praecluderetur via aliis exhibendi. Et praeterea prima ordinatio habet speciem exactionis, secunda vero habet speciem gratuitae recompensationis. | Reply to Objection 2: Those who give alms to the poor in order to obtain from them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the intent of buying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of charity. Temporal things are due to the preacher as means for his support, not as a price of the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 5:11, "Let the priests that rule well," says: "Their need allows them to receive the wherewithal to live, charity demands that this should be given to them: yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a livelihood the object of preaching: for if they sell it for this purpose, they sell a great thing for a contemptible price." In like manner temporal things are given to those who praise God by celebrating the divine office whether for the living or for the dead, not as a price but as a means of livelihood; and the same purpose is fulfilled when alms are received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is simoniacal to do such things by contract, or with the intention of buying or selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were decreed in any church that no procession would take place at a funeral unless a certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance would preclude the free granting of pious offices to any person. The ordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed that this honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms, because this would not preclude its being granted to others. Moreover, the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction, whereas the latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ille cui committitur spiritualis potestas, ex officio obligatur ad usum potestatis sibi commissae in spiritualium dispensatione, et etiam pro sua sustentatione statuta stipendia habet ex redditibus ecclesiasticis. Et ideo si aliquid acciperet pro usu spiritualis potestatis, non intelligeretur locare operas suas, quas ex debito suscepti officii debet impendere, sed intelligeretur vendere ipsum spiritualis gratiae usum. Et propter hoc, non licet pro quacumque dispensatione aliquid accipere; neque etiam pro hoc quod suas vices committant; neque etiam pro hoc quod suos subditos corrigant, vel a corrigendo desistant. Licet tamen eis accipere procurationes quando subditos visitant, non quasi pretium correctionis, sed quasi debitum stipendium. Ille autem qui habet scientiam, non suscipit tamen hoc officium ex quo obligetur aliis usum scientiae impendere. Et ideo licite potest pretium suae doctrinae vel consilii accipere, non quasi veritatem aut scientiam vendens sed quasi operas suas locans. Si autem ex officio ad hoc teneretur, intelligeretur ipsam veritatem vendere, unde graviter peccaret. Sicut patet in illis qui instituuntur in aliquibus Ecclesiis ad docendum clericos Ecclesiae et alios pauperes, pro quo ab Ecclesia beneficium recipiunt, a quibus non licet eis aliquid recipere, nec ad hoc quod doceant, nec ad hoc quod aliqua festa faciant vel praetermittant. | Reply to Objection 3: A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted is bound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him in dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory payment from the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood. Therefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his labor (which he is bound to give, as a duty arising out of the office he has accepted), but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this reason it is unlawful for him to receive anything for any dispensing whatever, or for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for correcting his subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the other hand it is lawful for him to receive "procurations," when he visits his subjects, not as a price for correcting them, but as a means of livelihood. He that is possessed of science, without having taken upon himself the obligation of using it for the benefit of others can lawfully receive a price for his learning or advice, since this is not a sale of truth or science, but a hiring of labor. If, on the other hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would amount to a sale of the truth, and consequently he would sin grievously. For instance, those who in certain churches are appointed to instruct the clerics of that church and other poor persons, and are in receipt of an ecclesiastical benefice for so doing, are not allowed to receive anything in return, either for teaching, or for celebrating or omitting any feasts. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod pro ingressu monasterii non licet aliquid exigere vel accipere quasi pretium. Licet tamen, si monasterium sit tenue, quod non sufficiat ad tot personas nutriendas, gratis quidem ingressum monasterii exhibere, sed accipere aliquid pro victu personae quae in monasterio fuerit recipienda, si ad hoc monasterii non sufficiant opes. Similiter etiam licitum est si propter devotionem quam aliquis ad monasterium ostendit largas eleemosynas faciendo, facilius in monasterio recipiatur; sicut etiam licitum est e converso aliquem provocare ad devotionem monasterii per temporalia beneficia, ut ex hoc inclinetur ad monasterii ingressum; licet non sit licitum ex pacto aliquid dare vel recipere pro ingressu monasterii, ut habetur I, qu. II, cap. quam pio. | Reply to Objection 4: It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as price for entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries, that are unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance to the monastery is free, to accept something for the support of those who are about to be received into the monastery, if its revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to be easier in admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for that monastery by the generosity of his alms: just as, on the other hand, it is lawful to incite a person's regard for a monastery by means of temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced to enter the monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or receive something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio). |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod licitum sit pecuniam accipere pro his quae sunt spiritualibus annexa. Omnia enim temporalia videntur esse spiritualibus annexa, quia temporalia sunt propter spiritualia quaerenda. Si ergo non licet vendere ea quae sunt spiritualibus annexa, nihil temporale vendere licebit. Quod patet esse falsum. | Objection 1: It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to spiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the sake of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what is annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything temporal, and this is clearly false. |
| Praeterea, nihil videtur magis spiritualibus annexum quam vasa consecrata. Sed ea licet vendere pro redemptione captivorum, ut Ambrosius dicit. Ergo licitum est vendere ea quae sunt spiritualibus annexa. | Objection 2: Further, nothing would seem to be more annexed to spiritual things than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a chalice for the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (De Offic. ii, 28). Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things. |
| Praeterea, spiritualibus annexa videntur ius sepulturae, ius patronatus, et ius primogeniturae secundum antiquos (quia primogeniti, ante legem, sacerdotis officio fungebantur), et etiam ius accipiendi decimas. Sed Abraham emit ab Ephron speluncam duplicem in sepulturam. Ut habetur Gen. XXIII. Iacob autem emit ab Esau ius primogeniturae, ut habetur Gen. XXV. Ius etiam patronatus cum re vendita transit, in feudum conceditur. Decimae etiam concessae sunt quibusdam militibus, et redimi possunt. Praelati interdum retinent sibi ad tempus fructus praebendarum quas conferunt, cum tamen praebendae sint spiritualibus annexae. Ergo licet emere et vendere ea quae sunt spiritualibus annexa. | Objection 3: Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right of burial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, right of the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised the priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham bought from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gn. 23:8, sqq.), and Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-born (Gn. 25:31, sqq.). Again the right of patronage is transferred with the property sold, and is granted "in fee." Tithes are granted to certain soldiers, and can be redeemed. Prelates also at times retain for themselves the revenues of prebends of which they have the presentation, although a prebend is something annexed to a spiritual thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things. |
| Sed contra est quod dicit paschalis Papa, et habetur I, qu. III, cap. si quis obiecerit, quisquis eorum vendidit alterum sine quo nec alterum provenit, neutrum invenditum derelinquit. Nullus ergo emat Ecclesiam vel praebendam, vel aliquid ecclesiasticum. | On the contrary, Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says (cf. I, qu. iii, cap. Si quis objecerit): "Whoever sells one of two such things, that the one is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold. Wherefore let no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything ecclesiastical." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest esse spiritualibus annexum dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ex spiritualibus dependens, sicut habere beneficia ecclesiastica dicitur spiritualibus annexum quia non competit nisi habenti officium clericale. Unde huiusmodi nullo modo possunt esse sine spiritualibus. Et propter hoc, ea nullo modo vendere licet, quia, eis venditis, intelliguntur etiam spiritualia venditioni subiici. Quaedam autem sunt annexa spiritualibus inquantum ad spiritualia ordinantur, sicut ius patronatus, quod ordinatur ad praesentandum clericos ad ecclesiastica beneficia; et vasa sacra, quae ordinantur ad sacramentorum usum. Unde huiusmodi non praesupponunt spiritualia, sed magis ea ordine temporis praecedunt. Et ideo aliquo modo vendi possunt, non autem inquantum sunt spiritualibus annexa | I answer that, A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two ways. First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have to spiritual things, because it is not competent save to those who hold a clerical office. Hence such things can by no means exist apart from spiritual things. Consequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such things, because the sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual. Other things are annexed to spiritual things through being directed thereto, for instance the right of patronage, which is directed to the presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore such things as these do not presuppose spiritual things, but precede them in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not as annexed to spiritual things. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia temporalia annectuntur spiritualibus sicut fini. Et ideo ipsa quidem temporalia vendere licet, sed ordo eorum ad spiritualia sub venditione cadere non debet | Reply to Objection 1: All things temporal are annexed to spiritual things, as to their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal things, but their relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of a lawful sale. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam vasa sacra sunt spiritualibus annexa sicut fini. Et ideo eorum consecratio vendi non potest, tamen, pro necessitate Ecclesiae et pauperum, materia eorum vendi potest; dummodo, praemissa oratione, prius confringantur; quia post confractionem non intelliguntur esse vasa sacra, sed purum metallum. Unde si ex eadem materia similia vasa iterum reintegrarentur, indigerent iterum consecrari. | Reply to Objection 2: Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual things as to their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold. Yet their material can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the poor provided they first be broken, after prayer has been said over them, since when once broken, they are considered to be no longer sacred vessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels were to be made out of the same material they would have to be consecrated again. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod spelunca duplex quam Abraham emit in sepulturam, non habetur quod erat terra consecrata ad sepeliendum. Et ideo licebat Abrahae terram illam emere ad usum sepulturae, ut ibi institueret sepulcrum, sicut etiam nunc liceret emere aliquem agrum communem ad instituendum ibi coemeterium, vel etiam Ecclesiam. Quia tamen etiam apud gentiles loca sepulturae deputata religiosa reputabantur, si Ephron pro iure sepulturae pretium intendit accipere, peccavit vendens, licet Abraham non peccaverit emens, quia non intendebat emere nisi terram communem. Licet etiam nunc terram ubi quondam fuit Ecclesia, vendere aut emere in casu necessitatis, sicut et de materia vasorum sacrorum dictum est. Vel excusatur Abraham quia in hoc redemit suam vexationem. Quamvis enim Ephron gratis ei sepulturam offerret, perpendit tamen Abraham quod gratis recipere sine eius offensa non posset. | Reply to Objection 3: We have no authority for supposing that the double cave which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for that purpose: wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used for burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would be lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even a church. Nevertheless because even among the Gentiles burial places are looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price as payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham did not sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an ordinary plot of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell or buy land on which there has previously been a church, as we have also said with regard to sacred vessels (Reply Objection [2]). Or again, Abraham is to be excused because he thus freed himself of a grievance. For although Ephron offered him the burial place for nothing, Abraham deemed that he could not accept it gratis without prejudice to himself. |
| Ius autem primogeniturae debebatur Iacob ex divina electione, secundum illud Malach. I, Iacob dilexi, Esau odio habui. Et ideo Esau peccavit primogenita vendens, Iacob autem non peccavit emendo, quia intelligitur suam vexationem redemisse. | The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God's choice, according to Malach. 1:2,3, "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau." Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet Jacob sinned not in buying, because he is understood to have freed himself of his grievance. |
| Ius autem patronatus per se vendi non potest, nec in feudum dari, sed transit cum villa quae venditur vel conceditur. | The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can it be granted "in fee," but is transferred with the property sold or granted. |
| Ius autem spirituale accipiendi decimas non conceditur laicis, sed tantummodo res temporales quae nomine decimae dantur, ut supra dictum est. | The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk, but merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of tithe, as stated above (Question [87], Article [3]). |
| Circa collationem vero beneficiorum, sciendum est quod si episcopus, antequam alicui beneficium offerat, ob aliquam causam ordinaverit aliquid subtrahendum de fructibus beneficii conferendi et in pios usus expendendum, non est illicitum. Si vero ab eo cui beneficium offert requirat aliquid sibi exhiberi de fructibus illius beneficii, idem est ac si aliud munus ab eo exigeret, et non caret vitio simoniae. | With regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be observed, that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a person to a benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of the revenues of the benefice in question, and to spend it on some pious object. But, on the other hand, if he were to require part of the revenues of that benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary, it would be the same as though he demanded payment from him, and he would not escape the guilt of simony. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liceat spiritualia dare pro munere quod est ab obsequio vel a lingua. Dicit enim Gregorius, in registro, ecclesiasticis utilitatibus deservientes ecclesiastica dignum est remuneratione gaudere. Sed deservire ecclesiasticis utilitatibus pertinet ad munus ab obsequio. Ergo videtur quod licitum sit pro obsequio accepto ecclesiastica beneficia largiri. | Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral remuneration. Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): "It is right that those who serve the interests of the Church should be rewarded." Now an equivalent of service denotes serving the interests of the Church. Therefore it seems lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for services received. |
| Praeterea, sicut carnalis videtur esse intentio si quis alicui det beneficium ecclesiasticum pro suscepto servitio, ita etiam si quis det intuitu consanguinitatis. Sed hoc non videtur esse simoniacum, quia non est ibi emptio et venditio. Ergo nec primum. | Objection 2: Further, to confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so on account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal since it implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the former simoniacal. |
| Praeterea, illud quod solum ad preces alicuius fit, gratis fieri videtur, et ita non videtur habere locum simonia, quae in emptione et venditione consistit. Sed munus a lingua intelligitur si quis ad preces alicuius ecclesiasticum beneficium conferat. Ergo hoc non est simoniacum. | Objection 3: Further, that which is done only at another's request would seem to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve simony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration denotes the conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person's request. Therefore this is not simoniacal. |
| Praeterea, hypocritae spiritualia opera faciunt ut laudem humanam consequantur, quae videtur ad munus linguae pertinere. Nec tamen hypocritae dicuntur simoniaci. Non ergo per munus a lingua simonia contrahitur. | Objection 4: Further, hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that they may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral remuneration: and yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony. Therefore oral remuneration does not entail simony. |
| Sed contra est quod Urbanus Papa dicit, quisquis res ecclesiasticas, non ad quod institutae sunt, sed ad propria lucra, munere linguae vel obsequii vel pecuniae largitur vel adipiscitur, simoniacus est. | On the contrary, Pope Urban [*Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium] says: "Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the purpose for which they were instituted but for his own profit, in consideration of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service rendered or money received, is guilty of simony." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, nomine pecuniae intelligitur cuiuscumque pretium pecunia mensurari potest. Manifestum est autem quod obsequium hominis ad aliquam utilitatem ordinatur quae potest pretio pecuniae aestimari, unde et pecuniaria mercede ministri conducuntur. Et ideo idem est quod aliquis det rem spiritualem pro aliquo obsequio temporali exhibito vel exhibendo, ac si daret pro pecunia, data vel promissa, qua illud obsequium aestimari posset. Similiter etiam quod aliquis satisfaciat precibus alicuius ad temporalem gratiam quaerendam, ordinatur ad aliquam utilitatem quae potest pecuniae pretio aestimari. Et ideo sicut contrahitur simonia accipiendo pecuniam vel quamlibet rem exteriorem, quod pertinet ad munus a manu, ita etiam contrahitur per munus a lingua, vel ab obsequio. | I answer that, As stated above (Article [2]), the term "money" denotes "anything that can have a pecuniary value." Now it is evident that a man's service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage. Therefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or promised, at which that service could be valued. If likewise, to grant a person's request for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to some kind of usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just as a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any eternal thing which comes under the head of "real remuneration," so too does he contract it, by receiving "oral remuneration" or an "equivalent in service rendered." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod si aliquis clericus alicui praelato impendat obsequium honestum et ad spiritualia ordinatum, puta ad Ecclesiae utilitatem vel ministrorum eius auxilium, ex ipsa devotione obsequii redditur dignus ecclesiastico beneficio, sicut et propter alia bona opera. Unde non intelligitur esse munus ab obsequi. Et in hoc casu loquitur Gregorius. Si vero sit inhonestum obsequium, vel ad carnalia ordinatum, puta quia servivit praelato ad utilitatem consanguineorum suorum vel patrimonii sui, vel ad aliquid huiusmodi, esset munus ab obsequio, et simoniacum. | Reply to Objection 1: If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful service, directed to spiritual things (e.g. to the good of the Church, or benefit of her ministers), he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice by reason of the devotion that led him to render the service, as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is not a case of remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has in mind. But if the service be unlawful, or directed to carnal things (e.g. a service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his kindred, or the increase of his patrimony, or the like), it will be a case of remuneration for service rendered, and this will be simony. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod si aliquis aliquid spirituale alicui conferat gratis propter consanguinitatem, vel quamcumque carnalem affectionem, est quidem illicita et carnalis collatio, non tamen simoniaca, quia nihil ibi accipitur, unde hoc non pertinet ad contractum emptionis et venditionis, in quo fundatur simonia. Si tamen aliquis det beneficium ecclesiasticum alicui hoc pacto, vel intentione, ut exinde suis consanguineis provideat, est manifesta simonia. | Reply to Objection 2: The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a person by reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and carnal, but not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return, wherefore it does not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which simony is based. But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice with the understanding or intention that he provide for one's kindred from the revenue is manifest simony. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod munus a lingua dicitur vel ipsa laus pertinens ad favorem humanum, qui sub pretio cadit, vel etiam preces ex quibus acquiritur favor humanus, vel contrarium evitatur. Et ideo si aliquis principaliter ad hoc intendat, simoniam committit. Videtur autem ad hoc principaliter intendere qui preces pro indigno porrectas exaudit. Unde ipsum factum est simoniacum. Si autem preces pro digno porrigantur, ipsum factum non est simoniacum, quia subest debita causa ex qua illi pro quo preces porriguntur, spirituale aliquid conferatur. Potest tamen esse simonia in intentione, si non attendatur ad dignitatem personae, sed ad favorem humanum. Si vero aliquis pro se rogat ut obtineat curam animarum, ex ipsa praesumptione redditur indignus, et sic preces sunt pro indigno. Licite tamen potest aliquis, si sit indigens, pro se beneficium ecclesiasticum petere sine cura animarum. | Reply to Objection 3: Oral remuneration denotes either praise that pertains to human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby man's favor is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend this chiefly one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an unworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one's chief intention wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if the request be made for a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal, because it is based on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is granted to the person for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there may be simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness of the person, but to human favor. If, however, a person asks for himself, that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption renders him unworthy, and so his request is made for an unworthy person. But, if one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an ecclesiastical benefice without the cure of souls. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod hypocrita non dat aliquid spirituale propter laudem, sed solum demonstrat, et simulando magis furtive surripit laudem humanam quam emat. Unde non videtur pertinere ad vitium simoniae. | Reply to Objection 4: A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for the sake of praise, he only makes a show of it, and under false pretenses stealthily purloins rather than buys human praise: so that seemingly the hypocrite is not guilty of simony. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens simoniaci poena ut privetur eo quod per simoniam acquisivit. Simonia enim committitur ex eo quod alicuius muneris interventu spiritualia acquiruntur. Sed quaedam sunt spiritualia quae semel adepta, non possunt amitti, sicut omnes characteres, qui per aliquam consecrationem imprimuntur. Ergo non est conveniens poena ut quis privetur eo quod simoniace acquisivit. | Objection 1: It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are not fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in return for a remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be lost when once acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by a consecration. Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person to be deprived of what he has acquired simoniacally. |
| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens simoniaci poena ut privetur eo quod per simoniam acquisivit. Simonia enim committitur ex eo quod alicuius muneris interventu spiritualia acquiruntur. Sed quaedam sunt spiritualia quae semel adepta, non possunt amitti, sicut omnes characteres, qui per aliquam consecrationem imprimuntur. Ergo non est conveniens poena ut quis privetur eo quod simoniace acquisivit. | Objection 2: Further, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained the episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders from him: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power, if he has acquired it by simony. |
| Praeterea, nullus debet puniri pro eo quod non est factum eo sciente et volente, quia poena debetur peccato, quod est voluntarium, ut ex supra dictis patet. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis simoniace consequitur aliquid spirituale procurantibus aliis, eo nesciente et nolente. Ergo non debet puniri per privationem eius quod ei collatum est. | Objection 3: Further, no one should be punished for what was done without his knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin which is voluntary, as was shown above (FS, Question [74], Articles [1],2; FS, Question [77], Article [7]). Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires something spiritual, which others have procured for him without his knowledge and consent. Therefore he should not be punished by being deprived of what has been bestowed on him. |
| Praeterea, nullus debet portare commodum de suo peccato. Sed si ille qui consecutus est beneficium ecclesiasticum per simoniam, restitueret quod percepit, quandoque hoc redundaret in utilitatem eorum qui fuerunt simoniae participes, puta quando praelatus et totum collegium in simoniam consensit. Ergo non semper est restituendum quod per simoniam acquiritur. | Objection 4: Further, no one should profit by his own sin. Yet, if a person who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were to restore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit of those who had a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate and his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that which has been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored. |
| Praeterea, quandoque aliquis per simoniam in aliquo monasterio recipitur, et votum solemne ibi facit profitendo. Sed nullus debet absolvi ab obligatione voti propter culpam commissam. Ergo non debet monachatum amittere quem simoniace acquisivit. | Objection 5: Further, sometimes a person obtains admission to a monastery by simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But no one should be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he has committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the monastic state which he has acquired by simony. |
| Praeterea, exterior poena in hoc mundo non infligitur pro interiori motu cordis, de quo solius Dei est iudicare. Sed simonia committitur ex sola intentione vel voluntate, unde et per voluntatem definitur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non semper debet aliquis privari eo quod simoniace acquisivit. | Objection 6: Further, in this world external punishment is not inflicted for the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is the judge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will, wherefore it is defined in reference to the will, as stated above (Article [1], ad 2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what he has acquired by simony. |
| Praeterea, multo maius est promoveri ad maiora quam in susceptis permanere. Sed quandoque simoniaci, ex dispensatione, promoventur ad maiora. Ergo non semper debent susceptis privari. | Objection 7: Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less than to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they have received. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur I, qu. I, cap. si quis episcopus, qui ordinatus est, nihil ex ordinatione vel promotione quae est per negotiationem facta, proficiat, sed sit alienus a dignitate vel sollicitudine quam pecuniis acquisivit. | On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus): "He that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination or promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit the dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod nullus potest licite retinere illud quod contra voluntatem domini acquisivit, puta si aliquis dispensator de rebus domini sui daret alicui contra voluntatem et ordinationem domini sui, ille qui acciperet licite retinere non posset. Dominus autem, cuius Ecclesiarum praelati sunt dispensatores et ministri, ordinavit ut spiritualia gratis darentur, secundum illud Matth. X, gratis accepistis, gratis date. Et ideo qui muneris interventu spiritualia quaecumque assequuntur, ea licite retinere non possunt. Insuper autem simoniaci, tam vendentes quam ementes spiritualia, aut etiam mediatores, aliis poenis puniuntur, scilicet infamia et depositione, si sint clerici; et excommunicatione, si sint laici; ut habetur I, qu. I, cap. si quis episcopus. | I answer that, No one can lawfully retain that which he has acquired against the owner's will. For instance, if a steward were to give some of his lord's property to a person, against his lord's will and orders, the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received. Now Our Lord, Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of churches, ordered spiritual things to be given gratis, according to Mt. 10:8, "Freely have you received, freely give." Wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual things in return for a remuneration cannot lawfully retain them. Moreover, those who are guilty of simony, by either selling or buying spiritual things, as well as those who act as go-between, are sentenced to other punishments, namely, infamy and deposition, if they be clerics, and excommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus [*Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas]. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui simoniace accipit sacrum ordinem, recipit quidem characterem ordinis, propter efficaciam sacramenti, non tamen recipit gratiam, neque ordinis executionem, eo quod quasi furtive suscepit characterem, contra principalis domini voluntatem. Et ideo est ipso iure suspensus, et quoad se, ut scilicet de executione sui ordinis se non intromittat; et quoad alios, ut scilicet nullus ei communicet in ordinis executione; sive sit peccatum eius publicum, sive occultum. Nec potest repetere pecuniam quam turpiter dedit, licet alius iniuste detineat. | Reply to Objection 1: He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally, receives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the sacrament: but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the Order, because he has received the character by stealth as it were, and against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended, by virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that he should not busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards others, namely, that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his Order, whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the money which he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains it. |
| Si vero sit simoniacus quia contulit ordinem simoniace, vel quia dedit vel recepit beneficium simoniace, vel fuit mediator simoniae, si est publicum, est ipso iure suspensus et quoad se et quoad alios; si autem est occultum, est suspensus ipso iure quoad se tantum, non autem quoad alios. | Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in secret he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself alone, and not as regards others. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod nec propter praeceptum eius, nec etiam propter excommunicationem, debet aliquis recipere ordinem ab episcopo quem scit simoniace promotum. Et si ordinetur, non recipit ordinis executionem, etiam si ignoret eum esse simoniacum, sed indiget dispensatione. Quamvis quidam dicunt quod, si non potest probare eum esse simoniacum, debet obedire recipiendo ordinem, sed non debet exequi sine dispensatione. Sed hoc absque ratione dicitur. Quia nullus debet obedire alicui ad communicandum sibi in facto illicito. Ille autem qui est ipso iure suspensus et quoad se et quoad alios, illicite confert ordinem. Unde nullus debet sibi communicare recipiendo ab eo, quacumque ex causa. Si autem ei non constat, non debet credere peccatum alterius, et ita cum bona conscientia debet ab eo ordinem recipere. Si autem episcopus sit simoniacus aliquo alio modo quam per promotionem suam simoniace factam, potest recipere ab eo ordinem, si sit occultum, quia non est suspensus quoad alios, sed solum quoad seipsum, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one knows to have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his command or for fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders from him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they are ignorant of his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a dispensation. Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive Orders in obedience to his command unless one can prove him to be guilty of simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order without a dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement, because no one should obey a man to the extent of communicating with him in an unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue of the law, suspended as regards both himself and others, confers Orders unlawfully: wherefore no one should communicate with him, by receiving Orders from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be not certain on the point, one ought not to give credence to another's sin, and so one ought with a good conscience to receive Orders from him. And if the bishop has been guilty of simony otherwise than by a simoniacal promotion, and the fact be a secret, one can receive Orders from him because he is not suspended as regards others, but only as regards himself, as stated above (ad 1). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc quod aliquis privetur eo quod accepit, non solum est poena peccati, sed etiam quandoque est effectus acquisitionis iniustae, puta cum aliquis emit rem aliquam ab eo qui vendere non potest. Et ideo si aliquis scienter et propria sponte simoniace accipiat ordinem vel ecclesiasticum beneficium, non solum privatur eo quod accepit, ut scilicet careat executione ordinis et beneficium resignet cum fructibus inde perceptis; sed etiam ulterius punitur, quia notatur infamia; et tenetur ad restituendos fructus non solum perceptos, sed etiam eos qui percipi potuerunt a possessore diligenti (quod tamen intelligendum est de fructibus qui supersunt deductis expensis factis causa fructuum, exceptis fructibus illis qui alias expensi sunt in utilitatem Ecclesiae). | Reply to Objection 3: To be deprived of what one has received is not only the punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of acquiring unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it. Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives Orders or an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he deprived of what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his order, and resigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom, but also in addition to this he is punished by being marked with infamy. Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful possessor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits, allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits), excepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the Church. |
| Si vero, eo nec volente nec sciente, per alios alicuius promotio simoniace procuratur, caret quidem ordinis executione, et tenetur resignare beneficium quod est consecutus, cum fructibus extantibus (non autem tenetur restituere fructus consumptos, quia bona fide possedit), nisi forte inimicus eius fraudulenter pecuniam daret pro alicuius promotione, vel nisi ipse expresse contradixerit. Tunc enim non tenetur ad abrenuntiandum, nisi forte postmodum pacto consenserit, solvendo quod fuit promissum. | On the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured simoniacally by others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise of his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together with fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits which he has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Exception must be made in the case when his promotion has been deceitfully procured by an enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes the transaction, for then he is not bound to resign, unless subsequently he agree to the transaction, by paying what was promised. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod pecunia, vel possessio, vel fructus simoniace accepti, debent restitui Ecclesiae in cuius iniuriam data sunt, non obstante quod praelatus, vel aliquis de collegio illius Ecclesiae, fuit in culpa, quia eorum peccatum non debet aliis nocere. Ita tamen quod, quantum fieri potest, ipsi qui peccaverunt inde commodum non consequantur. Si vero praelatus et totum collegium sunt in culpa, debet cum auctoritate superioris vel pauperibus vel alteri Ecclesiae erogari. | Reply to Objection 4: Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received, must be restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their transfer, notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter of that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the losers by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of superior authority, either to the poor or to some other church. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod si aliqui sunt in monasterio simoniace recepti, debent abrenuntiare. Et si eis scientibus commissa est simonia post Concilium generale, sine spe restitutionis de suo monasterio repelluntur, et ad agendam perpetuam poenitentiam sunt in arctiori regula ponendi, vel in aliquo loco eiusdem ordinis, si arctior ordo non inveniretur. Si vero hoc fuit ante Concilium, debent in aliis locis eiusdem ordinis collocari. Et si hoc fieri non potest, dispensative debent in eisdem monasteriis recipi, ne in saeculo evagentur, mutatis tamen prioribus locis et inferioribus assignatis. | Reply to Objection 5: If there are any persons who have been simoniacally admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the simony was committed with their knowledge since the holding of the General Council [*Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, held by Innocent III], they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of return, and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some house of the same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however, this took place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses of the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into monasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they wander about the world, but they must not be admitted to their former rank, and must be assigned a lower place. |
| Si vero ipsis ignorantibus, sive ante Concilium sive post, sint simoniace recepti, postquam renuntiaverint, possunt de novo recipi, locis mutatis, ut dictum est. | On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting they may be received again, their rank being changed as stated. |
| Ad sextum dicendum quod quoad Deum sola voluntas facit simoniacum, sed quoad poenam ecclesiasticam exteriorem, non punitur ut simoniacus, ut abrenuntiare teneatur, sed debet de mala intentione poenitere. | Reply to Objection 6: In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty of simony; but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is not punished as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound to repent of his evil intention. |
| Ad septimum dicendum quod dispensare cum eo qui est scienter beneficiatus, solus Papa potest. In aliis autem casibus potest etiam episcopus dispensare, ita tamen quod prius abrenuntiet quod simoniace acquisivit. Et tunc dispensationem consequatur vel parvam, ut habeat laicam communionem; vel magnam, ut, post poenitentiam, in alia Ecclesia in suo ordine remaneat; vel maiorem, ut remaneat in eadem, sed in minoribus ordinibus; vel maximam, ut in eadem Ecclesia etiam maiores ordines exequatur, non tamen praelationem accipiat. | Reply to Objection 7: The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one who has knowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases the bishop also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all renounce what he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive either the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to retain his order in some other Church; or again a greater dispensation, allowing him to remain in the same Church, but in minor orders; or a full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the major orders in the same Church, but not to accept a prelacy. |