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[*St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently 'fear' or 'timidity.'
The translation requires one to adhere to these terms on account of the connection with the passion of fear. Otherwise 'cowardice' would be a better rendering.]
Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis fortitudini.
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit peccatum. Timor enim est passio quaedam, ut supra habitum est. Sed passionibus nec laudamur nec vituperamur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Cum igitur omne peccatum sit vituperabile, videtur quod timor non sit peccatum. | Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion, as stated above (FS, Question [23], Article [4]; Question [42]). Now we are neither praised nor blamed for passions, as stated in Ethic. ii. Since then every sin is blameworthy, it seems that fear is not a sin. |
| Praeterea, nihil quod in lege divina mandatur est peccatum, quia lex domini est immaculata, ut dicitur in Psalmo. Sed timor mandatur in lege Dei, dicitur enim ad Ephes. VI, servi, obedite dominis carnalibus, cum timore et tremore. Timor ergo non est peccatum. | Objection 2: Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a sin: since the "law of the Lord is unspotted" (Ps. 18:8). Yet fear is commanded in God's law, for it is written (Eph. 6:5): "Servants, be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling." Therefore fear is not a sin. |
| Praeterea, nihil quod naturaliter inest homini est peccatum, quia peccatum est contra naturam, ut Damascenus dicit, II libro. Sed timere est homini naturale, unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod erit aliquis insanus, vel sine sensu doloris, si nihil timeat, neque terraemotum neque inundationes. Ergo timor non est peccatum. | Objection 3: Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for sin is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii). Now fear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "a man would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not even earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear." Therefore fear is not a sin. . |
| Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Matth. X, nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus. Et Ezech. II dicitur, ne timeas eos, neque sermones eorum metuas. | On the contrary, our Lord said (Mt. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that kill the body," and it is written (Ezech. 2:6): "Fear not, neither be thou afraid of their words." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse peccatum in actibus humanis propter inordinationem, nam bonum humani actus in ordine quodam existit, ut ex supra dictis patet. Est autem hic debitus ordo, ut appetitus regimini rationis subdatur. Ratio autem dictat aliqua esse fugienda, et aliqua esse prosequenda; et inter fugienda, quaedam dictat magis esse fugienda quam alia; et similiter inter prosequenda, quaedam dictat esse magis prosequenda quam alia; et quantum est bonum prosequendum, tantum est aliquod oppositum malum fugiendum. Inde est quod ratio dictat quaedam bona magis esse prosequenda quam quaedam mala fugienda. Quando ergo appetitus fugit ea quae ratio dictat esse sustinenda ne desistat ab aliis quae magis prosequi debet, timor inordinatus est, et habet rationem peccati. Quando vero appetitus timendo refugit id quod est secundum rationem fugiendum, tunc appetitus non est inordinatus, nec peccatum. | I answer that, A human act is said to be a sin on account of its being inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order, as stated above (Question [109], Article [2]; Question [114], Article [1]). Now this due order requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason. And reason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some sought after. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to be shunned more than others; and among things to be sought after, that some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a good is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be shunned. The result is that reason dictates that certain goods are to be sought after more than certain evils are to be avoided. Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we should endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather seek for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other hand, when the appetite fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the appetite is neither inordinate nor sinful. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod timor communiter dictus secundum suam rationem importat universaliter fugam, unde quantum ad hoc non importat rationem boni vel mali. Et similiter est de qualibet alia passione. Et ideo philosophus dicit quod passiones non sunt laudabiles neque vituperabiles, quia scilicet non laudantur neque vituperantur qui irascuntur vel timent, sed qui circa hoc aut ordinate aut inordinate se habent. | Reply to Objection 1: Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance in general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame, because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate manner. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod timor ille ad quem inducit apostolus, est conveniens rationi, ut scilicet servus timeat ne deficiat ab obsequiis quae domino debet impendere. | Reply to Objection 2: The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in accordance with reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be lacking in the service they owe their masters. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod mala quibus homo resistere non potest, et ex quorum sustinentia nihil boni provenit homini, ratio dictat esse fugienda. Et ideo timor talium non est peccatum. | Reply to Objection 3: Reason dictates that we should shun the evils that we cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us nothing. Hence there is no sin in fearing them. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum timoris non opponatur fortitudini. Fortitudo enim est circa pericula mortis, ut supra habitum est. Sed peccatum timoris non semper pertinet ad pericula mortis. Quia super illud Psalmi, beati omnes qui timent dominum, dicit Glossa quod humanus timor est quo timemus pati pericula carnis, vel perdere mundi bona. Et super illud Matth. XXVI, oravit tertio eundem sermonem etc., dicit Glossa quod triplex est malus timor, scilicet timor mortis, timor vilitatis, et timor doloris. Non ergo peccatum timoris opponitur fortitudini. | Objection 1: It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated above (Question [123], Articles [4],5). But the sin of fear is not always connected with dangers of death, for a gloss on Ps. 127:1, "Blessed are all they that fear the Lord," says that "it is human fear whereby we dread to suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods." Again a gloss on Mt. 27:44, "He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame word," says that "evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and fear of contempt." Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude. |
| Praeterea, praecipuum quod commendatur in fortitudine est quod exponit se periculis mortis. Sed quandoque aliquis ex timore servitutis vel ignominiae exponit se morti, sicut Augustinus, in I de Civ. Dei, narrat de Catone, qui, ut non incurreret Caesaris servitutem, morti se tradidit. Ergo peccatum timoris non opponitur fortitudini, sed magis habet similitudinem cum ipsa. | Objection 2: Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or shame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not to be Caesar's slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed thereto. |
| Praeterea, omnis desperatio ex aliquo timore procedit. Sed desperatio non opponitur fortitudini, sed magis spei, ut supra habitum est. Ergo neque timoris peccatum opponitur fortitudini. | Objection 3: Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Question [20], Article [1]; FS, Question [40], Article [4]). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et III Ethic., timiditatem ponit fortitudini oppositam. | On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that timidity is opposed to fortitude. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, omnis timor ex amore procedit, nullus enim timet nisi contrarium eius quod amat. Amor autem non determinatur ad aliquod genus virtutis vel vitii, sed amor ordinatus includitur in qualibet virtute, quilibet enim virtuosus amat proprium bonum virtutis; amor autem inordinatus includitur in quolibet peccato, ex amore enim inordinato procedit inordinata cupiditas. Unde similiter inordinatus timor includitur in quolibet peccato, sicut avarus timet amissionem pecuniae, intemperatus amissionem voluptatis, et sic de aliis. Sed timor praecipuus est periculorum mortis, ut probatur in III Ethic. et ideo talis timoris inordinatio opponitur fortitudini, quae est circa pericula mortis. Et propter hoc antonomastice dicitur timiditas fortitudini opponi. | I answer that, As stated above (Question [19], Article [3]; FS, Question [43], Article [1]), all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary to something he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular kind of virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every virtue, since every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue; while inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate love gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner inordinate fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is that which has the danger of death for its object, as we find proved in Ethic. iii, 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of death. For this reason timidity is said to be antonomastically* opposed to fortitude. [*Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of the danger of death.] |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritates illae loquuntur de timore inordinato communiter sumpto, qui diversis virtutibus opponi potest. | Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod actus humani praecipue diiudicantur ex fine, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ad fortem autem pertinet ut se exponat periculis mortis propter bonum, sed ille qui se periculis mortis exponit ut fugiat servitutem vel aliquid laboriosum, a timore vincitur, quod est fortitudini contrarium. Unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod mori fugientem inopiam vel cupidinem vel aliquid triste, non est fortis, sed magis timidi, mollities enim est fugere laboriosa. | Reply to Objection 2: Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the end, as stated above (FS, Question [1], Article [3]; FS, Question [18], Article [6]): and it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a good. But a man who exposes himself to danger of death in order to escape from slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is contrary to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), that "to die in order to escape poverty, lust, or something disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun hardships is a mark of effeminacy." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sicut spes est principium audaciae, ita timor est principium desperationis. Unde sicut ad fortem, qui utitur audacia moderate, praeexigitur spes, ita e converso desperatio ex aliquo timore procedit. Non autem oportet quod quaelibet desperatio procedat ex quolibet timore, sed ex eo qui est sui generis. Desperatio autem quae opponitur spei, ad aliud genus refertur, scilicet ad res divinas, quam timor qui opponitur fortitudini, qui pertinet ad pericula mortis. Unde ratio non sequitur. | Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (FS, Question [45], Article [2]), fear is the beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring. Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring in moderation presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some kind of fear. It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair results from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same kind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to fortitude regards dangers of death. Hence the argument does not prove. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit peccatum mortale. Timor enim, ut supra dictum est, est in irascibili, quae est pars sensualitatis. Sed in sensualitate est tantum peccatum veniale, ut supra habitum est. Ergo timor non est peccatum mortale. | Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated above (FS, Question [23], Article [1]), fear is in the irascible faculty which is a part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the sensuality, as stated above (FS, Question [74], Article [4]). Therefore fear is not a mortal sin. |
| Praeterea, omne peccatum mortale totaliter cor avertit a Deo. Hoc autem non facit timor, quia super illud Iudic. VII, qui formidolosus est etc., dicit Glossa quod timidus est qui primo aspectu congressum trepidat, non tamen corde terretur, sed reparari et animari potest. Ergo timor non est peccatum mortale. | Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God. But fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges 7:3, "Whosoever is fearful," etc., says that "a man is fearful when he trembles at the very thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart, but that he can rally and take courage." Therefore fear is not a mortal sin. |
| Praeterea, peccatum mortale non solum retrahit a perfectione, sed etiam a praecepto. Sed timor non retrahit a praecepto, sed solum a perfectione, quia super illud Deut. XX, quis est homo formidolosus et corde pavido, etc., dicit Glossa, docet non posse quemquam perfectionem contemplationis vel militiae spiritualis accipere qui adhuc nudari terrenis opibus pertimescit. Ergo timor non est peccatum mortale. | Objection 3: Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection but also from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a precept, but only from perfection; for a gloss on Dt. 20:8, "What man is there that is fearful and fainthearted?" says: "We learn from this that no man can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches." Therefore fear is not a mortal sin. |
| Sed contra, pro solo peccato mortali debetur poena Inferni. Quae tamen debetur timidis, secundum illud Apoc. XXI, timidis et incredulis et execratis, etc., pars erit in stagno ignis et sulphuris, quod est mors secunda. Ergo timiditas est peccatum mortale. | On the contrary, For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and yet this is due to the fearful, according to Apoc. 21:8, "But the fearful and unbelieving and the abominable," etc., "shall have their portion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the second death." Therefore fear is a mortal sin. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, timor peccatum est secundum quod est inordinatus, prout scilicet refugit quod non est secundum rationem refugiendum. Haec autem inordinatio timoris quandoque quidem consistit in solo appetitu sensitivo, non superveniente consensu rationalis appetitus, et sic non potest esse peccatum mortale, sed solum veniale. Quandoque vero huiusmodi inordinatio timoris pertingit usque ad appetitum rationalem, qui dicitur voluntas, quae ex libero arbitrio refugit aliquid non secundum rationem. Et talis inordinatio timoris quandoque est peccatum mortale, quandoque veniale. Si enim quis propter timorem quo refugit periculum mortis, vel quodcumque aliud temporale malum, sic dispositus est ut faciat aliquid prohibitum, vel praetermittat aliquid quod est praeceptum in lege divina, talis timor est peccatum mortale. Alioquin erit peccatum veniale. | I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), fear is a sin through being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be shunned according to reason. Now sometimes this inordinateness of fear is confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of the rational appetite's consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but only a venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches to the rational appetite which is called the will, which deliberately shuns something against the dictate of reason: and this inordinateness of fear is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin. For if a man through fear of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit what is commanded by the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin: otherwise it is a venial sin. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de timore secundum quod sistit infra sensualitatem. | Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers fear as confined to the sensuality. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam Glossa illa potest intelligi de timore in sensualitate existente. Vel potest melius dici quod ille toto corde terretur cuius animum timor vincit irreparabiliter. Potest autem contingere quod, etiam si timor sit peccatum mortale, non tamen aliquis ita obstinate terretur quin persuasionibus revocari possit, sicut quandoque aliquis mortaliter peccans concupiscentiae consentiendo, revocatur, ne opere impleat quod proposuit facere. | Reply to Objection 2: This gloss also can be understood as referring to the fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes his courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus sometimes a man sins mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside from accomplishing what he purposed doing. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur de timore revocante hominem a bono quod non est de necessitate praecepti, sed de perfectione consilii. Talis autem timor non est peccatum mortale, sed quandoque veniale; quandoque etiam non est peccatum, puta cum aliquis habet rationabilem causam timoris. | Reply to Objection 3: This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man aside from a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a precept, but for the perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for instance when one has a reasonable cause for fear. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non excuset a peccato. Timor enim est peccatum, ut dictum est. Sed peccatum non excusat a peccato, sed magis aggravat ipsum. Ergo timor non excusat a peccato. | Objection 1: It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is a sin, as stated above (Article [1]). But sin does not excuse from sin, rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin. |
| Praeterea, si aliquis timor excusat a peccato, maxime excusaret timor mortis, qui dicitur cadere in constantem virum. Sed hic timor non videtur excusare, quia cum mors ex necessitate immineat omnibus, non videtur esse timenda. Ergo timor non excusat a peccato. | Objection 2: Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would this be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse, because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin. |
| Praeterea, timor omnis aut est mali temporalis, aut spiritualis. Sed timor mali spiritualis non potest excusare peccatum, quia non inducit ad peccandum, sed magis retrahit a peccato. Timor etiam mali temporalis non excusat a peccato, quia sicut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., inopiam non oportet timere, neque aegritudinem, neque quaecumque non a propria malitia procedunt. Ergo videtur quod timor nullo modo excusat a peccato. | Objection 3: Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because instead of inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of temporal evil does not excuse from sin, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), "one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor anything that is not a result of one's own wickedness." Therefore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin. |
| Sed contra est quod in decretis, qu. I, dicitur, vim passus et invitus ab haereticis ordinatus colorem habet excusationis. | On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (I, Question [1], Cap. Constat.): "A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by heretics, has an ostensible excuse." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, timor intantum habet rationem peccati inquantum est contra ordinem rationis. Ratio autem iudicat quaedam mala esse magis aliis fugienda. Et ideo quicumque, ut fugiat mala quae sunt secundum rationem magis fugienda, non refugit mala quae sunt minus fugienda, non est peccatum. Sicut magis est fugienda mors corporalis quam amissio rerum, unde si quis, propter timorem mortis, latronibus aliquid promitteret aut daret, excusaretur a peccato quod incurreret si sine causa legitima, praetermissis bonis, quibus esset magis dandum, peccatoribus largiretur. Si autem aliquis per timorem fugiens mala quae secundum rationem sunt minus fugienda, incurrat mala quae secundum rationem sunt magis fugienda, non posset totaliter a peccato excusari, quia timor talis inordinatus esset. Sunt autem magis timenda mala animae quam mala corporis; et mala corporis quam mala exteriorum rerum. Et ideo si quis incurrat mala animae, idest peccata, fugiens mala corporis, puta flagella vel mortem, aut mala exteriorum rerum, puta damnum pecuniae; aut si sustineat mala corporis ut vitet damnum pecuniae; non excusatur totaliter a peccato. Diminuitur tamen aliquid eius peccatum, quia minus voluntarium est quod ex timore agitur; imponitur enim homini quaedam necessitas aliquid faciendi propter imminentem timorem. Unde philosophus huiusmodi quae ex timore fiunt, dicit esse non simpliciter voluntaria, sed mixta ex voluntario et involuntario. | I answer that, As stated above (Article [3]), fear is sinful in so far as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain evils to be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to be more avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin if through fear of death he were to promise or give something to a robber, and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners, rather than to the good to whom he should give in preference. On the other hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according to reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from sin, because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the soul are more to be feared than the evils of the body. and evils of the body more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to incur evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the body, such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as loss of money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet one's sin would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear is less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a certain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are done through fear are not simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod timor non excusat ex ea parte qua est peccatum, sed ex ea parte qua est involuntarium. | Reply to Objection 1: Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness, but in the point of its involuntariness. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet mors omnibus immineat ex necessitate, tamen ipsa diminutio temporis vitae est quoddam malum, et per consequens timendum. | Reply to Objection 2: Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet the shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object of fear. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod secundum Stoicos, qui ponebant bona temporalia non esse hominis bona, sequitur ex consequenti quod mala temporalia non sint hominis mala, et per consequens nullo modo timenda. Sed secundum Augustinum, in libro de Lib. Arbit., huiusmodi temporalia sunt minima bona. Quod etiam Peripatetici senserunt. Et ideo contraria eorum sunt quidem timenda, non tamen multum, ut pro eis recedatur ab eo quod est bonum secundum virtutem. | Reply to Objection 3: According to the opinion of Stoics, who held temporal goods not to be man's goods, it follows in consequence that temporal evils are not man's evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be feared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these temporal things are goods of the least account, and this was also the opinion of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to be feared; but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce that which is good according to virtue. |