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| Deinde considerandum est de partibus fortitudinis. Et primo considerandum est quae sint fortitudinis partes; secundo, de singulis partibus est agendum. | We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each part. |
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Question: 128 [<< | >>]
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter partes fortitudinis enumerentur. Tullius enim, in sua rhetorica, ponit fortitudinis quatuor partes, scilicet magnificentiam, fiduciam, patientiam et perseverantiam. Et videtur quod inconvenienter. Magnificentia enim videtur ad liberalitatem pertinere, quia utraque est circa pecunias, et necesse est magnificum liberalem esse, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Sed liberalitas est pars iustitiae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo magnificentia non debet poni pars fortitudinis. | Objection 1: It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to fortitude, namely "magnificence," "confidence," "patience," and "perseverance." Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; since both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent man must needs be liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (Question [117], Article [5]). Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude. |
| Praeterea, fiducia nihil aliud esse videtur quam spes. Sed spes non videtur ad fortitudinem pertinere, sed ponitur per se virtus. Ergo fiducia non debet poni pars fortitudinis. | Objection 2: Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude. |
| Praeterea, fortitudo facit hominem bene se habere circa pericula. Sed magnificentia et fiducia non important in sui ratione aliquam habitudinem ad pericula. Ergo non ponuntur convenienter partes fortitudinis. | Objection 3: Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude. |
| Praeterea, patientia, secundum Tullium, importat difficilium perpessionem, quod etiam ipse attribuit fortitudini. Ergo patientia est idem fortitudini, et non est pars eius | Objection 4: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part thereof. |
| Praeterea, illud quod requiritur in qualibet virtute, non debet poni pars alicuius specialis virtutis. Sed perseverantia requiritur in qualibet virtute, dicitur enim Matth. XXIV, qui perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit. Ergo perseverantia non debet poni pars fortitudinis. | Objection 5: Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required in every virtue: for it is written (Mt. 24:13): "He that shall persevere to the end he shall be saved." Therefore perseverance should not be accounted a part of fortitude. |
| Praeterea, Macrobius ponit septem partes fortitudinis, scilicet magnanimitatem, fiduciam, securitatem, magnificentiam, constantiam, tolerantiam, firmitatem. Andronicus etiam ponit septem virtutes annexas fortitudini, quae sunt eupsychia, lema, magnanimitas, virilitas, perseverantia, magnificentia, andragathia. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter Tullius partes fortitudinis enumeraverat. | Objection 6: Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of fortitude, namely "magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, forbearance, stability." Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, "courage, strength of will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence." Therefore it seems that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete. |
| Praeterea, Aristoteles, in III Ethic., ponit quinque modos fortitudinis. Quorum prima est politica, quae fortiter operatur propter timorem exhonorationis vel poenae; secunda militaris, quae fortiter operatur propter artem et experientiam rei bellicae; tertia est fortitudo quae fortiter operatur ex passione, praecipue irae; quarta est fortitudo quae fortiter operatur propter consuetudinem victoriae; quinta autem est quae fortiter operatur propter ignorantiam periculorum. Has autem fortitudines nulla praedictarum divisionum continet. Ergo praedictae enumerationes partium fortitudinis videntur esse inconvenientes. | Objection 7: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of fortitude. The first is "civic" fortitude, which produces brave deeds through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is "military" fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or experience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome; the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are not comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, alicuius virtutis possunt esse triplices partes, scilicet subiectivae, integrales et potentiales. Fortitudini autem, secundum quod est specialis virtus, non possunt assignari partes subiectivae, eo quod non dividitur in multas virtutes specie differentes, quia est circa materiam valde specialem. | I answer that, As stated above (Question [48]), a virtue can have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special matter. |
| Assignantur autem ei partes quasi integrales, et potentiales, integrales quidem secundum ea quae oportet concurrere ad actum fortitudinis; potentiales autem secundum quod ea quae fortitudo observat circa difficillima, scilicet circa pericula mortis, aliquae aliae virtutes observant circa quasdam alias materias minus difficiles; quae quidem virtutes adiunguntur fortitudini sicut secundariae principali. Est autem, sicut supra dictum est, duplex fortitudinis actus, scilicet aggredi, et sustinere. Ad actum autem aggrediendi duo requiruntur. Quorum primum pertinet ad animi praeparationem, ut scilicet aliquis promptum animum habeat ad aggrediendum. Et quantum ad hoc ponit Tullius fiduciam. Unde dicit quod fiducia est per quam magnis et honestis rebus multum ipse animus in se fiduciae cum spe collocavit. Secundum autem pertinet ad operis executionem, ne scilicet aliquis deficiat in executione illorum quae fiducialiter inchoavit. Et quantum ad hoc ponit Tullius magnificentiam. Unde dicit quod magnificentia est rerum magnarum et excelsarum cum animi ampla quadam et splendida propositione cogitatio atque administratio, idest executio, ut scilicet amplo proposito administratio non desit. Haec ergo duo, si coarctentur ad propriam materiam fortitudinis, scilicet ad pericula mortis, erunt quasi partes integrales ipsius, sine quibus fortitudo esse non potest. Si autem referantur ad aliquas alias materias in quibus est minus difficultatis, erunt virtutes distinctae a fortitudine secundum speciem, tamen adiungentur ei sicut secundarium principali, sicut magnificentia a philosopho, in IV Ethic., ponitur circa magnos sumptus; magnanimitas autem, quae videtur idem esse fiduciae, circa magnos honores. Ad alium autem actum fortitudinis, qui est sustinere, duo requiruntur. Quorum primum est ne difficultate imminentium malorum animus frangatur per tristitiam, et decidat a sua magnitudine. Et quantum ad hoc ponit patientiam. Unde dicit quod patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum ac difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio. Aliud autem est ut ex diuturna difficilium passione homo non fatigetur usque ad hoc quod desistat, secundum illud Heb. XII, non fatigemini, animis vestris deficientes. Et quantum ad hoc ponit perseverantiam. Unde dicit quod perseverantia est in ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio. Haec etiam duo, si coarctentur ad propriam materiam fortitudinis, erunt partes quasi integrales ipsius. Si autem ad quascumque materias difficiles referantur, erunt virtutes a fortitudine distinctae, et tamen ei adiungentur sicut secundariae principali. | However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because what fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain minor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (Question [123], Articles [3],6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance. Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions "confidence," of which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "with this the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings." The second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect Tully mentions "magnificence," which he describes as being "the discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind," so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to principal: thus "magnificence" is referred by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and "magnanimity," which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In this respect he mentions "patience," which he describes as "the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." The other is that by the prolonged suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage, according to Heb. 12:3, "That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds." In this respect he mentions "perseverance," which accordingly he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a well considered purpose." If these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnificentia circa materiam liberalitatis addit quandam magnitudinem, quae pertinet ad rationem ardui, quod est obiectum irascibilis, quam principaliter perficit fortitudo. Et ex hac parte pertinet ad fortitudinem. | Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod spes qua quis de Deo confidit, ponitur virtus theologica, ut supra habitum est. Sed per fiduciam quae nunc ponitur fortitudinis pars, homo habet spem in seipso, tamen sub Deo. | Reply to Objection 2: Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a theological virtue, as stated above (Question [17], Article [5]; FS, Question [62], Article [3]). But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in himself, yet under God withal. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod quascumque magnas res aggredi videtur esse periculosum, quia in his deficere est valde nocivum. Unde etiam si magnificentia et fiducia circa quaecumque alia magna operanda vel aggredienda ponantur, habent quandam affinitatem cum fortitudine, ratione periculi imminentis. | Reply to Objection 3: To venture on anything great seems to involve danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or venturing on any other great things, they have a certain connection with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod patientia non solum perpetitur pericula mortis, circa quae est fortitudo, absque superabundanti tristitia, sed etiam quaecumque alia difficilia seu periculosa. Et secundum hoc ponitur virtus adiuncta fortitudini. Inquantum autem est circa pericula mortis, est pars integralis ipsius. | Reply to Objection 4: Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral part thereof. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod perseverantia secundum quod dicit continuitatem boni operis usque in finem, circumstantia omnis virtutis esse potest. Ponitur autem pars fortitudinis secundum quod dictum est. | Reply to Objection 5: Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the Article. |
| Ad sextum dicendum quod Macrobius ponit quatuor praedicta a Tullio posita, scilicet fiduciam, magnificentiam, tolerantiam, quam ponit loco patientiae, et firmitatem, quam ponit loco perseverantiae. Superaddit autem tria. Quorum duo, scilicet magnanimitas et securitas, a Tullio sub fiducia comprehenduntur, sed Macrobius magis per specialia distinguit. Nam fiducia importat spem hominis ad magna. Spes autem cuiuslibet rei praesupponit appetitum in magna protensum per desiderium, quod pertinet ad magnanimitatem; dictum est enim supra quod spes praesupponit amorem et desiderium rei speratae. | Reply to Objection 6: Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by Tully, namely "confidence, magnificence, forbearance," which he puts in the place of patience, and "firmness," which he substitutes for perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely "magnanimity" and "security," are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence denotes a man's hope for great things: and hope for anything presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above (FS, Question [40], Article [2]) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped for. |
| Vel melius potest dici quod fiducia pertinet ad spei certitudinem; magnanimitas autem ad magnitudinem rei speratae. Spes autem firma esse non potest nisi amoveatur contrarium, quandoque enim aliquis, quantum ex seipso est, speraret aliquid, sed spes tollitur propter impedimentum timoris; timor enim quodammodo spei contrariatur, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo Macrobius addit securitatem, quae excludit timorem. Tertium autem addit, scilicet constantiam, quae sub magnificentia comprehendi potest, oportet enim in his quae magnifice aliquis facit, constantem animum habere. Et ideo Tullius ad magnificentiam pertinere dicit non solum administrationem rerum magnarum, sed etiam animi amplam excogitationem ipsarum. Potest etiam constantia ad perseverantiam pertinere, ut perseverans dicatur aliquis ex eo quod non desistit propter diuturnitatem; constans autem ex eo quod non desistit propter quaecumque alia repugnantia. | A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat contrary to hope, as stated above, (FS, Question [40], Article [4], ad 1). Hence Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind. For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in accomplishing great things, but also in discussing them generously in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may be called persevering through not desisting on account of delays, and constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles. |
| Illa etiam quae Andronicus ponit ad eadem pertinere videntur. Ponit enim perseverantiam et magnificentiam cum Tullio et Macrobio; magnanimitatem autem cum Macrobio. Lema autem est idem quod patientia vel tolerantia, dicit enim quod lema est habitus promptus tribuens ad conari qualia oportet, et sustinere quae ratio dicit. Eupsychia autem, idest bona animositas, idem videtur esse quod securitas, dicit enim quod est robur animae ad perficiendum opera ipsius. Virilitas autem idem esse videtur quod fiducia, dicit enim quod virilitas est habitus per se sufficiens tributus in his quae secundum virtutem. Magnificentiae autem addit andragathiam, quasi virilem bonitatem, quae apud nos strenuitas potest dici. Ad magnificentiam enim pertinet non solum quod homo consistat in executione magnorum operum, quod pertinet ad constantiam, sed etiam cum quadam virili prudentia et sollicitudine ea exequatur, quod pertinet ad andragathiam sive strenuitatem. Unde dicit quod andragathia est viri virtus adinventiva communicabilium operum. | Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions "perseverance" and "magnificence," and with Macrobius, "magnanimity." "Strength of will" is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that "strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be endured"—i.e. good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines it as "strength of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose." Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says that "manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue." Besides magnificence he mentions {andragathia}, i.e. manly goodness which we may render "strenuousness." For magnificence consists not only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to {andragathia}, strenuousness: wherefore he says that {andragathia} is the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works. |
| Et sic patet quod omnes huiusmodi partes ad quatuor principales reducuntur quas Tullius ponit. | Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by Tully. |
| Ad septimum dicendum quod illa quinque quae ponit Aristoteles, deficiunt a vera ratione virtutis, quia etsi conveniant in actu fortitudinis, differunt tamen in motivo, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo non ponuntur partes fortitudinis, sed quidam fortitudinis modi. | Reply to Objection 7: The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude, they differ as to motive, as stated above (Question [123], Article [1], ad 2); wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude. |