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| Deinde considerandum est de sobrietate, et vitio opposito, scilicet ebrietate. Et circa sobrietatem quaeruntur quatuor. | We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, quae sit materia sobrietatis. | (1) What is the matter of sobriety? |
| Secundo, utrum sit specialis virtus. | (2) Whether it is a special virtue? |
| Tertio, utrum usus vini sit licitus. | (3) Whether the use of wine is lawful? |
| Quarto, quibus praecipue competat sobrietas. | (4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia propria sobrietatis non sit potus. Dicitur enim Rom. XII. Non plus sapere quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem. Ergo sobrietas est etiam circa sapientiam, et non solum circa potum. | Objection 1: It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to sobriety. For it is written (Rm. 12:3): "Not to be more wise than it behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety." Therefore sobriety is also about wisdom, and not only about drink. |
| Praeterea, Sap. VIII dicitur de Dei sapientia quod sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, ubi sobrietatem ponit pro temperantia. Sed temperantia non solum est circa potus, sed etiam circa cibos et venerea. Ergo sobrietas non solum est circa potus. | Objection 2: Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (Wis. 8:7) that "she teacheth sobriety [Douay: 'temperance'], and prudence, and justice, and fortitude," where sobriety stands for temperance. Now temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and sexual matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink. |
| Praeterea, nomen sobrietatis a mensura sumptum esse videtur. Sed in omnibus quae ad nos pertinent debemus mensuram servare, unde dicitur Tit. II, sobrie et iuste et pie vivamus, ubi dicit Glossa, sobrie, in nobis, et I ad Tim. II dicitur, mulieres in habitu ornato, cum verecundia et sobrietate ornantes se, et sic videtur sobrietas esse non solum in interioribus, sed etiam in his quae pertinent ad exteriorem habitum. Non ergo propria materia sobrietatis est potus. | Objection 3: Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from "measure" [*'Bria,' a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini's Lexicon]. Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things appertaining to us: for it is written (Titus 2:12): "We should live soberly and justly and godly," where a gloss remarks: "Soberly, in ourselves"; and (1 Tim. 2:9): "Women . . . in decent apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety." Consequently it would seem that sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things appertaining to external apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter proper to sobriety. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XXXI, aequa vita hominis vinum in sobrietate potatum. | On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 31:32): "Wine taken with sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou shalt be sober." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod virtutes quae ab aliqua generali conditione virtutis nominantur, illam materiam specialiter sibi vindicant in qua difficillimum et optimum est conditionem huiusmodi observare, sicut fortitudo pericula mortis, et temperantia delectationes tactus. Nomen autem sobrietatis sumitur a mensura, dicitur enim aliquis sobrius quasi briam, idest mensuram, servans. Et ideo illam materiam specialiter sibi sobrietas adscribit in qua maxime laudabile est mensuram servare. Huiusmodi autem est potus inebriare valens, quia eius usus mensuratus multum confert, et modicus excessus multum laedit, quia impedit usum rationis, magis etiam quam excessus cibi. Unde dicitur Eccli. XXXI, sanitas est animae et corporis sobrius potus. Vinum multum potatum irritationem et iram et ruinas multas facit. Et ideo specialiter sobrietas attenditur circa potum, non quemcumque, sed eum qui sua fumositate natus est caput conturbare, sicut vinum et omne quod inebriare potest. Communiter autem sumendo nomen sobrietatis, potest in quacumque materia dici, sicut et supra dictum est de fortitudine et temperantia. | I answer that, When a virtue is denominated from some condition common to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that in which it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that condition of virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from "measure," for a man is said to be sober because he observes the "bria," i.e. the measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to that matter wherein /the observance of the measure is most deserving of praise. Such matter is the drinking of intoxicants, because the measured use thereof is most profitable, while immoderate excess therein is most harmful, since it hinders the use of reason even more than excessive eating. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 31:37,38): "Sober drinking is health to soul and body; wine drunken with excess raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many ruins." For this reason sobriety is especially concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but that which by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb the brain, such as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, sobriety may be employed in a general sense so as to apply to any matter, as stated above (Question [123], Article [2]; Question [141], Article [2]) with regard to fortitude and temperance. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut vinum materiale corporaliter inebriat, ita etiam metaphorice consideratio sapientiae dicitur potus inebrians, propter hoc quod sua delectatione animum allicit, secundum illud Psalmi, calix meus inebrians quam praeclarus est, et ideo circa contemplationem sapientiae per similitudinem quandam sobrietas dicitur. | Reply to Objection 1: Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to his body, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its delight, according to Ps. 22:5, "My chalice which inebriateth me, how goodly is it!" Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in speaking of the contemplation of wisdom. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia quae ad temperantiam proprie pertinent, necessaria sunt praesenti vitae, et eorum excessus nocet. Et ideo in omnibus necessarium est adhibere mensuram, quod pertinet ad officium sobrietatis. Propter quod nomine sobrietatis temperantia significatur. Sed modicus excessus in potu plus nocet quam in aliis. Et ideo sobrietas specialiter est circa potum. | Reply to Objection 2: All the things that belong properly to temperance are necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful. Wherefore it behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This is the business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with drink. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis mensura in omnibus requiratur, non tamen sobrietas proprie in omnibus dicitur, sed in quibus mensura est maxime necessaria. | Reply to Objection 3: Although a measure is needful in all things, sobriety is not properly employed in connection with all things, but only in those wherein there is most need for a measure. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sobrietas non sit per se quaedam specialis virtus. Abstinentia enim attenditur et circa cibos et potus. Sed circa cibos specialiter non est aliqua specialis virtus. Ergo nec sobrietas, quae est circa potus, est specialis virtus. | Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now there is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, which is about drink, a special virtue. |
| Praeterea, abstinentia et gula sunt circa delectationes tactus inquantum est sensus alimenti. Sed cibus et potus simul cedunt in alimentum, simul enim indiget animal nutriri humido et sicco. Ergo sobrietas, quae est circa potum, non est specialis virtus. | Objection 2: Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of touch as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment. Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue. |
| Praeterea, sicut in his quae ad nutritionem pertinent distinguitur potus a cibo, ita etiam distinguuntur diversa genera ciborum et diversa genera potuum. Si ergo sobrietas esset per se quaedam specialis virtus, videtur quod circa quamlibet differentiam potus vel cibi sit quaedam specialis virtus, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo videtur quod sobrietas sit specialis virtus. | Objection 3: Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment, drink is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats and of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue, seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue. |
| Sed contra est quod Macrobius ponit sobrietatem specialem partem temperantiae. | On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somno Scip. i, 8] reckons sobriety to be a special part of temperance. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad virtutem moralem pertinet conservare bonum rationis contra ea quibus potest impediri, et ideo, ubi invenitur speciale impedimentum rationis, ibi necesse est esse specialem virtutem ad illud removendum. Potus autem inebrians habet specialem rationem impediendi rationis usum, inquantum scilicet perturbat cerebrum sua fumositate. Et ideo, ad removendum hoc impedimentum rationis, requiritur specialis virtus, quae est sobrietas. | I answer that, As stated above (Question [146], Article [2]), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which may hinder it. Hence wherever we find a special hindrance to reason, there must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove this hindrance to reason a special virtue, which is sobriety, is requisite. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cibus et potus communiter impedire possunt bonum rationis absorbendo eam per immoderantiam delectationis. Et quantum ad hoc, communiter circa cibum et potum est abstinentia. Sed potus inebriare valens impedit speciali ratione, ut dictum est. Et ideo requirit specialem virtutem. | Reply to Objection 1: Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering the good of reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure: and in this respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike. But intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above, wherefore it requires a special virtue. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus abstinentiae non est circa cibos et potus inquantum sunt nutritiva, sed inquantum impediunt rationem. Et ideo non oportet quod specialitas virtutis attendatur secundum rationem nutritionis. | Reply to Objection 2: The virtue of abstinence is about meat and drink, considered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence it does not follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds of food. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod in omnibus potibus inebriare valentibus est una et eadem ratio impediendi usum rationis. Et sic illa potuum diversitas per accidens se habet ad virtutem. Et propter hoc, secundum huiusmodi diversitatem virtutes non diversificantur. Et eadem ratio est de diversitate ciborum. | Reply to Objection 3: In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind of hindrance to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks bears an accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does not call for a difference of virtue. The same applies to the difference of meats. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod usus vini totaliter sit illicitus. Sine sapientia enim non potest aliquis esse in statu salutis, dicitur enim Sap. VII, neminem diligit Deus nisi qui cum sapientia inhabitat; et infra, IX, per sapientiam sanati sunt quicumque placuerunt tibi a principio. Sed usus vini impedit sapientiam, dicitur enim Eccle. II, cogitavi abstrahere a vino carnem meam, ut transferrem animam meam ad sapientiam. Ergo potus vini est universaliter illicitus. | Objection 1: It would seem that the use of wine is altogether unlawful. For without wisdom, a man cannot be in the state of salvation: since it is written (Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom," and further on (Wis. 9:19): "By wisdom they were healed, whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the beginning." Now the use of wine is a hindrance to wisdom, for it is written (Eccles. 2:3): "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom." Therefore wine-drinking is altogether unlawful. |
| Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Rom. XIV, bonum est non manducare carnem et non bibere vinum, neque in quo frater tuus offenditur aut scandalizatur aut infirmatur. Sed cessare a bono virtutis est vitiosum, et similiter fratribus scandalum ponere. Ergo uti vino est illicitum. | Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 14:21): "It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is offended or scandalized, or made weak." Now it is sinful to forsake the good of virtue, as likewise to scandalize one's brethren. Therefore it is unlawful to make use of wine. |
| Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit quod vinum cum carnibus post diluvium est dedicatum, Christus autem venit in fine saeculorum, et extremitatem retraxit ad principium. Ergo, tempore Christianae legis, videtur esse illicitum vino uti. | Objection 3: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i] that "after the deluge wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in the last of the ages and brought back the end into line with the beginning." Therefore it seems unlawful to use wine under the Christian law. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. V, noli adhuc aquam bibere, sed modico vino utere, propter stomachum tuum et frequentes infirmitates. Et Eccli. XXXI dicitur, exultatio animae et cordis vinum moderate potatum. | On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:23): "Do not still drink water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake, and thy frequent infirmities"; and it is written (Ecclus. 31:36): "Wine drunken with moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod nullus cibus vel potus, secundum se consideratus, est illicitus, secundum sententiam domini dicentis, Matth. XV, nihil quod intrat in os, coinquinat hominem. Et ideo bibere vinum, secundum se loquendo, non est illicitum. Potest tamen illicitum reddi per accidens. Quandoque quidem ex conditione bibentis, qui a vino de facili laeditur, vel qui ex speciali voto obligatur ad vinum non bibendum. Quandoque autem ex modo bibendi, quia scilicet mensuram in bibendo excedit. Quandoque autem ex parte aliorum, qui ex hoc scandalizarentur. | I answer that, No meat or drink, considered in itself, is unlawful, according to Mt. 15:11, "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man." Wherefore it is not unlawful to drink wine as such. Yet it may become unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a circumstance on the part of the drinker, either because he is easily the worse for taking wine, or because he is bound by a vow not to drink wine: sometimes it results from the mode of drinking, because to wit he exceeds the measure in drinking: and sometimes it is on account of others who would be scandalized thereby. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sapientia potest haberi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum modum communem, prout sufficit ad salutem. Et sic non requiritur ad sapientiam habendam quod aliquis a vino omnino abstineat, sed quod abstineat ab immoderato usu vini. Alio modo, secundum quendam perfectionis gradum. Et sic requiritur in aliquibus, ad perfecte sapientiam percipiendam, quod omnino a vino abstineant, secundum conditiones quarundam personarum et locorum. | Reply to Objection 1: A man may have wisdom in two ways. First, in a general way, according as it is sufficient for salvation: and in this way it is required, in order to have wisdom, not that a man abstain altogether from wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate use. Secondly, a man may have wisdom in some degree of perfection: and in this way, in order to receive wisdom perfectly, it is requisite for certain persons that they abstain altogether from wine, and this depends on circumstances of certain persons and places. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod apostolus non simpliciter dicit bonum esse abstinere a vino, sed in casu in quo ex hoc aliqui scandalizantur. | Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle does not declare simply that it is good to abstain from wine, but that it is good in the case where this would give scandal to certain people. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus retrahit nos a quibusdam sicut omnino illicitis, a quibusdam vero sicut ab impedimentis perfectionis. Et hoc modo retrahit aliquos a vino studio perfectionis, sicut et a divitiis et aliis huiusmodi. | Reply to Objection 3: Christ withdraws us from some things as being altogether unlawful, and from others as being obstacles to perfection. It is in the latter way that he withdraws some from the use of wine, that they may aim at perfection, even as from riches and the like. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sobrietas magis requiratur in maioribus personis. Senectus enim excellentiam quandam homini praestat, unde et senibus reverentia et honor debetur, secundum illud Levit. XIX, coram cano capite consurge, et honora personam senis. Sed apostolus specialiter senes dicit esse ad sobrietatem exhortandos, secundum illud Tit. II, senes, ut sobrii sint. Ergo sobrietas maxime requiritur in excellentioribus personis. | Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing. For old age gives a man a certain standing; wherefore honor and reverence are due to the old, according to Lev. 19:32, "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man." Now the Apostle declares that old men especially should be exhorted to sobriety, according to Titus 2:2, "That the aged man be sober." Therefore sobriety is most requisite in persons of standing. |
| Praeterea, episcopus in Ecclesia excellentissimum gradum habet. Cui per apostolum indicitur sobrietas, secundum illud I ad Tim. III, oportet episcopum irreprehensibilem esse, unius uxoris virum, sobrium, prudentem, et cetera. Ergo sobrietas maxime requiritur in personis excellentibus. | Objection 2: Further, a bishop has the highest degree in the Church: and the Apostle commands him to be sober, according to 1 Tim. 3:2, "It behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless, the husband of one wife, sober, prudent," etc. Therefore sobriety is chiefly required in persons of high standing. |
| Praeterea, sobrietas importat abstinentiam a vino. Sed vinum interdicitur regibus, qui tenent summum locum in rebus humanis, conceditur autem his qui sunt in statu deiectionis, secundum illud Prov. XXXI, noli regibus dare vinum; et postea subdit, date siceram moerentibus, et vinum his qui amaro animo sunt. Ergo sobrietas magis requiritur in excellentioribus personis. | Objection 3: Further, sobriety denotes abstinence from wine. Now wine is forbidden to kings, who hold the highest place in human affairs: while it is allowed to those who are in a state of affliction, according to Prov. 31:4, "Give not wine to kings," and further on (Prov. 31:6), "Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to them that are grieved in mind." Therefore sobriety is more requisite in persons of standing. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus, I ad Tim. III, dicit, mulieres similiter pudicas, sobrias, et cetera. Et Tit. II dicitur, iuvenes similiter hortare ut sobrii sint. | On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:11): "The women in like manner, chaste . . . sober," etc., and (Titus 2:6) "Young men in like manner exhort that they be sober." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod virtus habet habitudinem ad duo, uno quidem modo, ad contraria vitia quae excludit, et concupiscentias quas refrenat; alio modo, ad finem in quem perducit. Sic igitur aliqua virtus magis requiritur in aliquibus duplici ratione. Uno modo, quia in eis est maior pronitas ad concupiscentias quas oportet per virtutem refrenari, et ad vitia quae per virtutem tolluntur. Et secundum hoc, sobrietas maxime requiritur in iuvenibus et mulieribus, quia in iuvenibus viget concupiscentia delectabilis, propter fervorem aetatis; in mulieribus autem non est sufficiens robur mentis ad hoc quod concupiscentiis resistant unde, secundum maximum Valerium, mulieres apud Romanos antiquitus non bibebant vinum. Alio vero modo sobrietas magis requiritur in aliquibus utpote magis necessaria ad propriam operationem ipsorum. Vinum autem immoderate sumptum praecipue impedit usum rationis. Et ideo senibus, in quibus ratio debet vigere ad aliorum eruditionem; et episcopis, seu quibuslibet Ecclesiae ministris, qui mente devota debent spiritualibus officiis insistere; et regibus, qui per sapientiam debent populum subditum gubernare, specialiter sobrietas indicitur. | I answer that, Virtue includes relationship to two things, to the contrary vices which it removes, and to the end to which it leads. Accordingly a particular virtue is more requisite in certain persons for two reasons. First, because they are more prone to the concupiscences which need to be restrained by virtue, and to the vices which are removed by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most requisite in the young and in women, because concupiscence of pleasure thrives in the young on account of the heat of youth, while in women there is not sufficient strength of mind to resist concupiscence. Hence, according to Valerius Maximus [*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1] among the ancient Romans women drank no wine. Secondly, sobriety is more requisite in certain persons, as being more necessary for the operations proper to them. Now immoderate use of wine is a notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety is specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should be vigorous in instructing others: to bishops and all ministers of the Church, who should fulfil their spiritual duties with a devout mind; and to kings, who should rule their subjects with wisdom. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. |